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BOX 32

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ACC. 2011/0195

UNMO HQ SECTOR SOUTH - KNIN

Routine Priority Immediate Most Immediate
Unclas UN Restricted UN Confidential UN Secret Only

DTG: 050957A Dec 94	File Ref:	Stn. Srl No :		
Fm: UNMO HQ SECTOR SOUTH DSMO Capt Jens Paul Madsen	Fax Tel No: 99 41 22 917 00 79	Route:	No:	TOT
To: MR STOLTENBERG				
Info:				
Subject: Special report		Total Pages: (17) including cover letter		
Int Distr:				
Drafter: Captain J. P. Madsen	Dept/Tel:	Signature: 		
Releasing Officer: Captain J. P. Madsen	Dept/Tel:	Signature: 		
Acc Clk:	Router:	FTx Op:	Dist Op:	Check Op:

If Mr Stoltenberg already has gone to Belgrade please transmit it to his destination.

Regards,

Jens Paul Madsen

DISTRIBUTION:	
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FROM: DSMO SECTOR SOUTH CAPT. JENS POUL MADSEN
TO: CO-CHAIRMAN ICFY MR. THORVALD STOLTENBERG
CO-CHAIRMAN ICFY MR. DAVID OWEN
INFO: CMO UNMO HQ/CAC SECTOR SOUTH/SMO SECTOR SOUTH
DTG: 041700A DEC 1994
SUBJECT: SPECIAL REPORT

**GENERAL ASSESSMENT ABOUT THE SITUATION IN GENERAL AREA EAST
OF PERUCA LAKE**

GENERAL SITUATION:

1. The general area NE of Peruca Lake (Perucko Jezero) XJ Easting 20-40 and XJ Northing 46-72 are getting tense due to the increase of military activities on ARSK and HV side. The tension on both sides started from 28 Nov 94 where both sides initiated mortar/ artillery shelling and machine gun fires. The incidents are reported by UNMO teams assigned in that area (see annex # 1) as well as the sector report (see annex # 2).
2. In the last Sector Joint Commission Meeting (SJC) on 23rd Nov 94 at Medak Crossing, both parties agreed to solve all violations in the area. In this agreement Karaula OP (XJ 285574) was a final and special issue. It should be handed over to UNPROFOR to manage an OP by KENBAT on the 28th Nov 94.

EVENTS:

3. In the morning 28 Nov 94 KENBAT troops was denied by HV to use the territory to access the OP, however HV stated that UNMOs would be allowed to manage the OP. Consequently since 282330A Nov UNMO Team SINJ deployed a permanent patrol at the top of the hill and negotiations continued during 29 NOV to allow KENBAT a "normal" access to the OP.
4. On 30 NOV morning HV sent different protest regarding troop movements in the area of OPSENIAK (XJ 252578), OBODINA (XJ 082547) and TAVNIZA (XJ 2475545). At 1100 Hrs UNMO OP at KARAULA observed arty fire deep in BH territory. The KENBAT report from this time indicates that CA side fired a mortar RD to Gird XJ 304624 and five minutes later ARSK answered with several burst of HMG from BUDIM (XJ 304624).
5. On 30 Nov 94 at 1125 Hrs UNMOs at KARAULA OP reported they could very well observe 4 unarmed ARSK soldiers at KENBAT OP at VRANOVACA (XJ 278614).

6. The following is an exchange of fire throughout 30 NOV afternoon between both parties that include the shelling in the area of KENBAT OP positions at LIMAR. According to KENBAT the fire was incoming from around KARAULA (NOT UNMO CONFIRMED). UNMOs at KARAULA confirmed 6 x impacts in the area of KENBAT OP at Vranovaca (XJ 278612).

7. UNMOs at KARAULA reported at 1625 Hrs an HV convoy at the junction KARAULA / MAGLAJ (XJ 290558) consisting in 2 x trucks, about 40 sldr full equipped with 2 x mortars manpacked and one civilian truck with MP escort heading direction MAGLAJ.

8. Since then and during the next day K4 and K5 were tasked to attend the events in the general area of PERUCA and MALIKOVO CP. As a result of these patrols K5 reported tracks of probably tanks (minimum 2) and troops (infantry size) in the area close of MALIKOVO CP at XJ 253505, however the tanks or whatever they were could not been directly observed.

9. The exact description of the fire from both sides during this and the next two days may be confused, but the general assesment is that HV initiated the fire towards positions in BH, and ARSK answered this fire. Then and during the 30 Nov ARSK and HV exchanged some fire from their respective positions that was shifting gradually towards east into BH. The fire continued on DEC 1st and 2nd but now most probably between HVO and BSA, but involvement of HV on BH side of border cannot be compleately ruled out.

10. It can be assessed then that the first firing activity was a sort of support from HV and ARSK to the actions of their respective allies in BiH. Whether this support will continue or escalate is a matter of consideration but it seems to be that the situation will continue into BH rather than escalate in our AOR for the time being.

11. The general area for all these events is also the division of four different factions: ARSK, HV, BSA and BiH (or Muslim Serbs - Croatian Federation). In the AOR of Sector South the official boundary between Croatia and BH is a barrier that prevents any investigation or action. Consideration should also be given as to whether the boarder as described on maps is exact or not, since both CROATIA and RSK accept that the real border is Eastern of the marked one. Of course ROM are established normally at the marked border - in order to make it difficult for UNMO's to verify.

12. After contacts with UNMO BH SW and UNMO Team TOMISLAVGRAD it was noted that ROM are imposed to UNPROFOR members on this side to access to the area.

13. UNMO HQ has been informed by ECMM Knin, that according to the Mayor of Bosanska Grahovo (WJ 1093), who is the representative of the Serb Democratic Party of "RS" - HV and HVO forces attacked yesterday 3rd Dec 94 from the direction of LIVANJSKO POLJE near LIVNO towards the GRAHOVO MUNICIPALITY. The joint forces should have captured the village of PROVO (XI 3466) - Not UNMO confirmed.

14. Accordingly to UNMO observation on the HV side (see annex # 3) a considerably movement of troops and heavy weapons has gone across the border into BH territory from Croatia, and is still continuing.

ASSESSMENTS:

15. After a general discussion at this HQ different objectives were assessed to the action:

(a) A manoeuvre to attract BSA attention in the area and release pressure around BIHAC, although it seems to arrive late, after almost 20 days from the offensive against BIHAC was launched and the situation in the pocket is now almost defined.

(b) Connected with the above the manoeuvre can be considered as a different way for the HV or HVO (or joint federation) forces to approach and reach KNIN through LIVANJSKO POLJE valley in direction to BOSANSKA GRAHOVO and by this means cut of the so called KNIN capital from the rest of RSK.

(c) It is also important to note that HV artileri has put intense shelling into ARSK side just across the border of BH. This event can be considered as a diversion from infiltration that may happening in this part of the area. But strategically the main infiltration may come deeper inside Bosnia with the support of HVO inside BiH. If this situation comes true, that indicates the HV intension is to gain ground to get KNIN by using the approach as stated in para (b) above.

(d) Considering the bordering characteristic of the area and the lack of precession on the boundaries, the warring parties involved in the incident tried to chase each other and "play the game in the no-mans land" - where UN has no access.

CONCLUSION:

16. It is recommended that UN should immediately start negotiations with all parties, in order for UN - (Military Observers) to monitor the border into BH - from all four sides ARSK, BSA, BiH and HV - with total freedom of movement, and by this to prevent the situation from escalating further.

17. If we continue as it is today the only result we are achieving is that we are producing reports about alleged activities and due to lack of any proof - no action is being taken.

Best regards



Captain Jens Poul Madsen
DSMO Sector South

ANNEX #1

#	TIME	EVENT	REPORTED BY		CONFIRMED /HEARD	COMMENT
			UNMO	UNPRO FOR		
1	290600A NOV	HV OP AT KARAUULA(XJ 284573) WAS ABANDONED / UNMOS ARE OCCUPYING THE OP	SINJ-K5	-	CONFIRMED	
2	301100A NOV	SEVERAL ROUNDS OF ARTY WERE FIRED FROM DIRECTION OF NE OF MAGLAJ (XJ 338539)	SINJ-K5	-	HEARD	
3	301125A NOV	4 x UNARMED ARSK SLDS INSIDE KENBAT OP (XJ 278614)	SINJ-K5	-	OBSERVED	
4	301520A NOV	HV PROTESTED ABOUT 120MM MORTAR IMPACT AT MAGLAJ AREA (XJ 331605). ACCORDING PROTEST FIRE STARTED AT 1520HRS(LOCAL TIME) AND ORIGINATED FROM BRAVCE DOLAC (XJ 251618)/ARSK SIDE. NUMBER OF IMPACTS ARE UNKNOWN	SINJ-K5	-	UNCONFIRMED	

5	301605A NOV	6 x MORTAR ROUNDS NEAR KENYAN OP (XJ 278614). INITIATOR OR CALIBRE OF WEAPON ARE UNKNOWN. THE FIRE STARTED WITH 2 x SINGLE ROUNDS TO MARK THE DISTANCE AND AFTER TWO MINUTES 4 x ROUNDS IMPACTED WITHIN TWO SECONDS. THE IMPACTS LANDED IN THE AREA OF KENYAN OP.	SINJ-K5	-	OBSERVED	
6	301625A NOV	1 x CONVOY OF HV UNITS CONSISTS OF 2 x TRUCKS CARRYING APPROX 40 SLDS IN COMBAT UNIFORMS, ARMED WITH GRENADES AND 2 x MORTARS COVERED(CALI BRE UNKNOWN DUE DARKNESS) AND 1 x CIV TRUCK BEING ESCORTED BY A MP VEHICLE AT JUNCTION KARULA/MAG LAJ (XJ 290558) - NEW ROAD AND NOT IN MAPS - HEADING TO THE DIRECTION OF MAGLAJ (XJ 338599)	SINJ-K5	-	OBSERVED	

7	01(1100-1400)A DEC	30 x EXPLOSIONS(BE LIEVED TO BE IMPACTS) IN THE AREA NORTH-EAST OF BUZIM (XJ 291619) - INSIDE THE ZOS OR JUST OUTSIDE OF THE ZOS ON THE ARSK SIDE.	DRNIS K7A	-	HEARD	IT IS THEREFORE SUSPECTED THAT HV OR HVO MAY HAVE BEEN SHELLING THE ARSK. TIME IS DIFFICULT TO BE CONFIR- MED.
8	011415A DEC	5 x NEW IMPACT CRATERS WERE FOUND AND ANALYZED. 3 x 120MM MORTAR GRENADES WERE FIRED INTO XJ 273609 FROM A DIRECTION OF 1800 MILS AND 2 x ARTILLERY SHELLS(CALIBR E UNKNOWN) INTO XJ 271603 FROM A DIRECTION OF 1600 MILS.	DRNIS K7A	-	CONFIRMED	THE FIRING WAS DONE BY HV OR HVO FROM THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF MAGLAJ (XJ 337598).

9	011045A DEC	TRACKS OF TANKS(AT LEAST TWO, UNKNOWN TYPE) WERE FOUND. INVESTIGATION INDICATE THAT THE TANKS WERE MOVED FROM ONE HIDDEN PLACE AT XJ 253502 TO A NEW ONE AT XJ 241499. TRACK OF TANK ALSO WERE FOUND AT XJ 245509. THE LENGTH OF TRACKS ARE 200M AND 24HRS OLD.	SINJ-K5	-	CONFIRMED	AT XJ 241499 THE TEAM NORMALLY REPORTED AN INFANTARY UNIT(COY SIZE).
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10	010900A DEC	SEVERAL ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY GUN FIRED DEEP INTO BH FROM THE NE OF MAGLAJ (XJ 338578). THE FIRED SHIFTED GRADUALLY TOWARDS EAST OF MAGLAJ AND STOPPED AT ABOUT 011500A DEC. FROM 011700A DEC CONTINUING FIRE STARTED AGAIN.	SINJ-K5	-	REPORTED	THE ACTIVITY REPORTED IS A CLEAR EXCHANGE OF ARTY/MORT AR FIRE BETWEEN ARSK AND HV. THE REASONS FOR THAT ACTIVITY AND WHETHER IT CAN ESCALATE OR NOT IS UNCERTAIN BUT ACCORDIN GLY TO THE MAPS PROVIDED BY UNPROFOR THE ACTIVITY TAKE PLACE FROM INSIDE BH, THAT IS BEYOND THE CROATIAN BORDER, TOWARDS ARSK POSITIONS OR VICE- VERSA.
11	02 (1200- 1315A) DEC	100-150 x IMPACTS INTO AREA XJ 2866 AND 5 x SALVOS MRL INTO THE SAME AREA.	BENKOVAC K7	-	HEARD	ASSESS THAT THE SHELLING WAS CONDUCTED FROM MAGLAJ (XJ 337598) AREA.

12	021205A DEC	2 x IMPACTS, PROBABLY ARTILLERY, IN AREA XJ 2766.	SINJ-K5	-	HEARD	INITIATOR IS PROBABLY IN BH SIDE.
13	02 (1206A- 1212A) DEC	16 x MORTAR IMPACTS IN AREA XJ 2866.	SINJ-K5	-	HEARD	INITIATOR IS UNKNOWN.
14	02 (1210- 1215A) DEC	5 x IMPACTS INTO AREA XJ 2866.	BENKOVAC K7	-	HEARD	AS ABOVE
15	02 1220A DEC	CRATER ANALYSIS ON THE IMPACTS AT XJ 273609 AND CONFIRMED FIRING TO HAVE BEEN DONE FROM GENERAL DIRECTION OF MAGLAJ XJ 3759	BENKOVAC K7	-	CONFIRMED	
16	03 (1035A- 1055A) DEC	8 x HV TRUCKS AT GRID XJ 3240 MOVING UP ON THE ROAD TO MAGLAJ (XJ 3359)	SINJ-K5	-	CONFIRMED	
17	03 1100A DEC	10 x UNKNOWN ARMED SLDS WALKING ON THE TOP OF MALI SOKOLAC XJ 327 631	SINJ-K5	-	CONFIRMED	MOST PROBABLY THEY ARE NOT SERBIAN SLDS DUE HV OR HVO AT MAGLAJ XJ 34 60 COULD HAVE ENGAGED THIS TARGET.

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18	03 1315A DEC	UNMOS WENT TO STRMICA XJ 00 91 AND WAS REFUSED ENTRY ACROSS BH BORDER WITHOUT CLEARANCE OF RSK INTERIOR MINISTRY	BENKOVAC K7	-	CONFIRMED	UNMOS CONFIR- MED THAT THE BH BORDER AREA FROM STRMICA TO THE ZOS WAS CALM. NO REPORTS OF ANY RECENT SHELLING.
19	03 1700A DEC	FLAMING AT AREAS XJ 32 63 AND XJ 30 63(WOOD BURNING)	SINJ-K5	-	OBSERVED	

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ANNEX 2

SERIAL	DATE	EVENT	COMMENT
1	28 NOV 94	KENBAT OCCUPIED AN OP AT VRANOVACA GR XJ 279614 AND ESTABLISHED, WITH UNMO'S, A PRESENCE ON KARLAULA XJ 285575. DSC MET WITH COMD OG SINJ WHO AGREED TO MOVEMENT OF KENBAT ENGR AND LOG CONVOY TO KARLAULA.	THIS WAS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT REACHED WITH COMD ND CORPS AND COMD OZ SPLIT ON 18 NOV 94.
2	29 NOV 94	UNMO'S CONTINUED TO OCCUPY KARLAULA. A RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENT WAS IMPOSED ON KENBAT BY HV. HV ADVISED THAT THE PROBLEM CAN ONLY BE ADDRESSED BY COMD OZ SPLIT.	RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENT ON KENBAT IS CONSIDERED NOT TO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT REACHED WITH COMD OG SINJ ON 18 NOV 94.
3	30 NOV 94	AT APPROXIMATELY 0930 HRS 3 PROTESTS WERE RECEIVED FROM CA, REGARDING SA ACTIVITIES IN OBODINA XJ 082547, OBSENJAK XJ 252578, AND TAVNICA XJ 247554.	PROTESTS REGARDING OBODINA AND OPSENJAK WERE NOT SUBSTANTIATED. THE TAVNICA PROTEST WAS INVESTIGATED AND REPORTED AS ONE VEHICLE OUTSIDE THE ZOS.
4		1100 HRS KENBAT REPORTED THAT CA FIRED A MORTAR RD TO BUDIM XJ 302 623.	THE UNMO REPORTED NO IMPACT.
5		1105 HRS KENBAT REPORTED HMG FIRING FROM BUDIM XJ 309624 TO MAGLAJ XJ 331605	SERIALS 4 AND 5 ARE ASSESSED AS A CROSS BORDER EXCHANGE BETWEEN SA FORCES AND UNIDENTIFIED FORCES IN BOSNIA.
		1125 HRS. UNMO REPORTED 4 UNARMED SA SOLDIERS AT THE KENBAT OP AT VRANOVACA.	THIS WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE AGREEMENT OF 18 NOV 94.
7		1300 HRS. KENBAT REPORTS EXCHANGE OF FIRE; SA FIRING HMG FROM BUDIM/VRANOVACA AND RETURN FIRE COMING FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED SOURCE FROM MAGLAJ AREA, AND KARLAULA. UNMO'S ON KARLAULA REPORTED NO FIRING FROM THIS LOCATION.	IT IS ASSESSED THAT NO FIRING TOOK PLACE FROM KARLAULA. THE FIRING BETWEEN BUDIM/VRANOVACA AND MAGLAJ IS A FURTHER CROSS BORDER EXCHANGE.

8		1330 HRS. SA REINFORCED BUDIM AND VRANOVACA, AND HARASSED A KENBAT APC.	HARASSMENT OF UNPROFOR TROOPS IS AGAINST THE SPIRIT OF THE CFA. THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE OPS IS A CHANGE IN THE TACTICAL SITUATION, AND THEREFORE A VCFA.
9		1400 HRS. DSC, CO KENBAT AND UNMO SINJ MET WITH CALO IN OG SINJ HQ. MEETING WAS SUPPOSED TO BE WITH COMD OG SINJ.	NO REASON FOR THE COMD ABSENCE WAS GIVEN, NOR WAS ANY CONCERN ABOUT SA ACTIVITIES MENTIONED.
10		1520 HRS. CA PROTESTED MORTAR IMPACTS AT MAGLAJ. SHELLING REPORTED AS ORIGINATING FROM THE AREA OF BRAVCEV DOLAC XJ 251618.	NO OBSERVATION BY EITHER UNMO OR KENBAT. FOLLOW UP INVESTIGATION ALSO PROVED NEGATIVE.
11		1530 HRS. KENBAT REPORTED 14 MORTAR RDS FIRED FROM AROUND KARLAULA LANDED AT LIMAR OF XJ 284601 AND VRANOVICA ON SA SIDE.	NO REPORT FROM UNMO'S AT KARLAULA. INVESTIGATION TEAM CONFIRMED AT LEAST FIVE IMPACTS NEAR VRANOVICA. NEW 120MM MORTAR BASE PLATE WAS DISCOVERED.
12		1605 HRS. UNMO'S REPORTED SIX RDS LANDED IN THE AREA OF OF VRANOVICA. DIRECTION OF FIRE AND CAL OF WPN IS UNKNOWN.	IT IS BELIEVED THAT SERIAL 10 AND 11 ARE PART OF THE SAME ATTACK. INVESTIGATION TEAM CONFIRMED THAT THE DIRECTION OF THE SHELLING ORIGINATED FROM THE AREA OF MAGLAJ. THIS ATTACK WAS A DIRECT THREAT TO UNPROFOR AND WAS FIRED ACROSS THE BOSNIA BORDER.
13		1615 HRS. KENBAT REPORTED CA FIRED ANOTHER 18 RDS OF MORTAR FROM AREA GR XJ 3057 TO THE GENERAL AREA OF BRAVCEV DOLAC XJ 275622.	UNMOS AND KENBAT HAVE INVESTIGATED. NO IMPACTS DISCOVERED.
14		1625 HRS. A CONVOY OF HV UNITS (40 SOLDIERS, 2 TRUCKS, 2 MORTARS) WAS REPORTED AT THE KARLAULA/MAGLAJ ROAD JUNCTION XJ 290558, HEADING TOWARDS MAGLAJ.	ALTHOUGH THE DIRECTION OF MOVEMENT WAS TOWARDS MAGLAJ, IT CANNOT BE ABSOLUTELY CONFIRMED THAT THE CA IS MANNING A POSTION IN MAGLAJ.

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15		WEAPON STORAGE SITES ARE INSPECTED ON A REGULAR BASIS. ON THE CROAT SIDE THE UNMO INSPECT EVERY TWO TO THREE DAYS. ON THE SERB SIDE KENBAT CARRIES OUT DAILY INSPECTION.	NEITHER THE UNMO'S NOR KENBAT REPORT ANY SPECIAL ACTIVITIES REGARDING THE WEAPONS STORAGE SITES OVER THE LAST WEEK.
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ANNEX #3

#	DTG	MOVEMENT	DESTINATION
1	11 1630A NOV 94	1 X T-72 TANK (ON TRAILER)	TROGIR-KAMENSKO
2	11 2348A NOV 94	1 X T-72 TANK (ON TRAILER)	SPLIT-CISTAPROVO
3	14 0145A NOV 94	1 X T-55 TANK (ON TRAILER)	SOLIN-KLIS-KONJSKO
4	14 1045A NOV 94	1 X M-48 MOUNTAIN GUN(TOWED)	KAMENSKO-SPLIT
5	15 1920A NOV 94	11 X BUSES WITH 500 HV SLDS	SOLIN-KLIS-KAMENSKO
6	16 0148A NOV 94	3 X D-20 ARTILLERY GUNS(TOWED) 3 X BRDM-2 3 X TRUCKS 2 X JEEPS	TROGIR-KAMENSKO
7	16 0408A NOV 94	24 X HV TRUCKS COVERED 2 X HV JEEPS 3 X HV 1.5 TONNE TRUCK	TROGIR-SPLIT
8	17 0405A NOV 94	6 X CIVILIAN TRUCKS 2 X POLICE CARS 1 X NISSAN PATROL	SPLIT-KAMENSKO
9	18 1135A NOV 94	1 X M-55 AAG(TOWED)	SIBENIK-SPLIT
10	18 1850A NOV 94	1 X D-30 HOWITZER(TOWED)	SOLIN ONLY
11	22 2000A NOV 94	2 X 2S1 SP HOWITZER	SIBENIK-KAMENSKO
12	26 1116A NOV 94	1 X PT/6 LIGHT TANK(ON TRAILER)	KAMENSKO-KLIS
13	30 1625A NOV 94	2 X HV TRUCKS 40 X HV SLDS 2 X 60MM MORTARS(COVERED) 1 X CIVILIAN TRUCK(COVERED) 1 CA MILITARY POLICE CAR	SINJ-MAGLAJ
14	03 1035A DEC 94	4 X HV MILITARY TRUCKS	SINJ-MAGLAJ
15	03 1055A DEC 94	4 X HV MILITARY TRUCKS	SINJ-MAGLAJ

LEGEND

TOWN

CISTAPROVO
KAMENSKO
KONJSKO
TROGIR
SINJ
MAGLAJ
SOLIN
KLIS

GRID

XJ 576 186
XJ 610 310
XJ 200 279
XJ 03 20
XJ 32 40
XJ 34 60
XJ 19 22
XJ 23 24

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05/12 '94 10:16


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FROM: UNPF PONIKUE

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

Page 1 of 3

21 November 1994

To : BERTIE RAMCHARAN

From : *for* KAI EIDE, ICFY ZAGREB 

Subject : STATEMENT

1. STATEMENT, 2 PAGES, TO FOLLOW.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR KAI EIDE, ICFY, 21 NOVEMBER 1994

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT AND
THE SERB AUTHORITIES IN THE UNPAS

During the negotiations at Pleso on 15 November 1994 it was possible - due to a constructive and helpful approach from the delegations - to remove a number of obstacles, which have prevented the conclusion of an economic agreement. On this basis, the ICFY Co-chairmen presented a final agreement to the delegations the following day. This agreement is the result of long and intense efforts. It represents a balanced and carefully drafted compromise of differing positions. Furthermore, it is concrete and will allow all involved to proceed quickly to the implementation of its various provisions.

Consequently, in presenting the agreement it was emphasized that the only steps which now remain are the signing and implementation of the agreement by both delegations.

The head of the Croatian delegation, Mr. Šarinić, has now declared that his government is ready to sign the agreement. The ICFY Co-Chairmen welcome this decision, which they see as an important expression of readiness to seek a peaceful solution to the conflict.

However, they regret that the Assembly of the Serb authorities in the UNPAs, at its meeting in Vukovar on 19 November 1994, decided not to approve the agreement at this stage. Following this meeting, the Serb authorities have raised a number of

specific issues included in the agreement and have asked for a continuation of the negotiations.

Having considered the Serb response, the ICFY Co-Chairmen believe that further negotiations will not improve the agreement, which represents a carefully balanced compromise. Therefore, they do not intend to conduct such negotiations in Knin or elsewhere at this juncture. They urge the Serb authorities to reconsider their position and to sign the agreement without delay. They are firmly convinced that an early signing is in the interest of all involved. In particular, in the present and difficult situation, the signing of the agreement by both delegations would represent a much needed contribution to reducing tension and to improving the political climate. Furthermore, it is now of crucial importance to abstain from any action which could further jeopardize the search for peaceful solutions.

FAX TRANSMISSION

OUTGOING FAX NO.:

DATE: 6 October 1994

TO: Mr. B. Ramcharan ICFY Geneva	FROM: Laura Vaccari Political Affairs Off. Europe Division/DPA UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK
FAX NO.: 41 22 917 0079	FAX NO.: (212) 963-1440
ATTN:	REF: Croatian letters
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 4	

Enclosed please find letters from the Permanent Mission of Croatia.

Also please note our new fax number: 963 1440

Best regards,




**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

201 East 42nd street; Suite 3108
New York, NY 10017 USA

Tel: (212) 986-1585
Fax: (212) 986-2011

New York, 4 October 1994



H.E. Boutros Boutros Ghali
Secretary General
UNITED NATIONS
New York

DPK 0100
Rec'd S.10 914
AC 100
DB LV
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Your Excellency,

I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the letter that I have today forwarded to the President of the Security Council, H.E Sir David Hannay.

I would kindly request your assistance in distributing this letter and its Annex as a document of General Assembly, under the Agenda item 148, and of the Security Council

Accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Mario Nobilo

Ambassador Dr. Mario Nobilo
Permanent Representative



cc SG
ong. G/A
cc Bali
Goulding
Annan
Nordenfjeld
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New York, 4 October 1994.

COPY

H.E. Sir David Hannay
President of the Security Council
UNITED NATIONS
New York

OCT 10 1994

Your Excellency,

In accordance with instructions from my Government, I must express deep indignation of the Republic of Croatia with regard to the Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia on their Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), distributed by the Secretary General in his letter to your Excellency on 3 October 1994 [S/1994/1124].

Without entering into a debate whether there is *de facto* sufficient ground to declare that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is meeting its commitment to close its border with the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serb forces based on a report of only 93 members of the "Mission", the Republic of Croatia is shocked by the para. 3 of the said Report. The Co-Chairmen submit that *".../ as far as transit traffic to the Republic of Croatia is concerned, agreements have been made covering customs documentation and the sealing of load-carrying vehicles to reduce the obvious risk of a diversion of supplies to the Bosnian Serbs"*.

There is no doubt that the quoted part of the Report does not relate to humanitarian supplies distributed by international humanitarian organizations or agencies. Had that been the case, those shipments would not have been subject of interest of the Mission, since the Belgrade authorities never indicated their willingness to deprive their Bosnian and Croatian proxies of food and medical supplies. More important, the Mission is to monitor other supplies than humanitarian supplies going to the Bosnian Serbs, and in particular strategic goods.

- 2 -

In the view of my Government, this action represents a clear and blatant violation of the Security Council resolution 820 (1993) that, *inter alia*, decided that *".../ import to, export from, and transshipment through the United Nations Protected Areas in the Republic of Croatia and those areas in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of Bosnian Serb forces, with exception of essential humanitarian supplies including medical supplies and foodstuffs distributed by international humanitarian agencies, shall be permitted only with proper authorization from the Government of the Republic of Croatia or the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina respectively"*.

The shipments that the Mission is monitoring, and that are - according to the Report - destined *"as transit traffic to the Republic of Croatia"* do not have required authorization of Croatian Government to be imported into the territory of the Republic of Croatia. Further, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has informed us that it has not issued proper authorization for their transshipment through their territory *"controlled by Bosnian Serb forces"*.


The Government of the Republic of Croatia is outraged by the fact that the ICFY Mission, acting under the mandate given by the Security Council, is not only tacitly allowing for the constant flow of supplies going to Belgrade proxies in the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia, but is *"making agreements"* to facilitate violation of Council resolutions. Such action is seriously jeopardizing the sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia over its own territory, and my Government can not tolerate it.

This biased and illegal action of the ICFY does not contribute to the overall peace process and the stability in the region. Further, this action will not be helpful to the Croatian Parliament when it shall debate the future of the UN presence on Croatian territory within 100 days. Our deliberations shall be influenced by the actions of the international community, and in particular the Contact Group, with regard to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, and the restoration of the legitimate authority over its entire territory.

Croatia demands that the Security Council act immediately in respect of the obvious violation of resolution 820 (1993) by the ICFY Monitor Mission, consistent with its previous decisions.

I have sent a copy of this letter to the Secretary General, requesting its distribution as a document of the Security Council and of the General Assembly under the Agenda item 148.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Ambassador Dr. Mario Nobilo
Permanent Representative

010/12

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

URGENT

Page 1 of 9

16 September 1994

To : STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA
Info : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
From : EIDE, ICFY/ZAGREB
Subject : ARTICLE AND INTERVIEW WITH ŠARINIĆ IN THE
CROATIAN WEEKLY DANAS

.... Attached you will find an article concerning the establishment of a so-called "mini contact group" for Croatia and an interview with Šarinić concerning the negotiations with the Krajina Serbs. You will see that he comments in some detail on the highway negotiations as well as the question of a political settlement.

Please forward this article to Ambassador Ahrens immediately. sent

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Danas, 13 Sept 1994

EXCLUSIVE

FROM DIPLOMATIC SOURCES

In UNPROFOR HQ a nucleus of a future "mini contact group" is in formation. At their first meetings on the 8th and 9th this month, present were representatives from the United States and Russia, ambassadors Peter W. Galbraith and Victor Kerestedjants.

A SECRET PLAN FOR CROATIA

Behind closed doors of one of conference halls in UNPROFOR HQ in Zagreb foundations for the first global plan for the Croatian crisis are being laid! Judging by the information from reliable sources, at UNPROFOR's HQ a nucleus of a future "mini contact group" is in formation. Following the example of the current peace plan for BH, it will put together a scenario for the solution of the present "status quo" in Croatia.

With the exception of the UN and EU representatives, UN ambassadors at the International conference on former Yugoslavia, Kai Eide and Gherd Ahrens, at the first meetings on the 8th and the 9th of this month, present were the representatives of the US and Russia, ambassadors Peter W. Galbraith and Victor Kerestedjants. A kind of confirmation that something is cooking at the UNPROFOR HQ in Zagreb, was given by Paul Resley, Yasushi Akashi's spokesperson at the regular press conference on Thursday, when he refused to comment anything in regard with the unexpected long talks.

But, regardless of the closed doors, occasionally some information leaked through. Judging by the anonymous, but proverbially well informed western sources, consultations regarding an integral articulation of the global plan for the Croatian crisis are underway. The leading role should be played by the US and Russian representatives, in cooperation with the diplomatic apparatus of the UN and the European Union. The representatives of the present Contact Group are to be included in this group, and their global plan is to be presented to the public on the 15th of October. According to announcements, a "take it or leave it" option would be offered to both sides, a system already seen in BH. This would be all the available information in regard to the first plan of the international community, which is to solve the Croatian situation of "neither war nor peace".

After the Vance plan, accepted at the beginning of January of 1991, which stopped the fighting in Croatia, but subsequently cemented the existing situation and results of the war occupation, the international community did not take any steps towards securing Croatia's control of its entire territory. A non-existence of an efficient mechanism of force in the international community is a factor which very clearly illustrates the incapacity and disorientation of the world community, but also the paradox of the Croatian problem. Failure to implement the existing UN resolutions in Croatia and the lack of determination of the world organization make it very logical for us to ask the question about the interests of the

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world power centers which ruthlessly conflict in the project of the new world order - right here, in this region. Thus the question - what's cooking?

Since there are no accurate guidelines to the plan for a global solution to the Croatian crisis (its creators, most likely, don't have them either), indications of a solution must be looked for in the analysis of the stands the representatives of large powers have adopted in the past, and in the mechanisms and fate of former plans of the international community for BH. The international recognition of the Croatian state should, in the basic postulates of the future plan, stipulate precisely the integrity and independence of the Croatian state. This is, according to the stands of the representatives of the two world powers, the only thing that is indisputable. Disputable is, however, how to use the carrot to make the Croatian Serbs return under the Croatian national umbrella. At the same time, this is also a great test for Croatia, because some of the statements, especially those by Vitali Churkin and Peter W. Galbraith, can be the route to a mutual arrangement in the Croatian-Serbian relations. A state within a state, confederation or federation of Croatia as a type of guarantee for the Serb ethnic minority? Or rather remaining within the framework of the Croatian Constitutional law, with full international control, a solution which Serbs have not consented to as yet? These are two strategic questions which will determine the future of the recently conceived plan.

On the other hand, a notorious fact is that the solution to the BH crisis is connected by an umbilical cord to the solution of the Croatian crisis. All past BH plan failures and the Serb "no" to the last plan, devalue the so-called threat issued by the international community. How much credibility is there in its "take it or leave it"? What will happen if one of the sides refuses the offered plan? And, if it is the Serb side, will the military action whose goal would be to reintegrate the UNPAs (which is the strategic objective of the Croatian state), have the blessing of the international community?

Questions grow in number, the dilemmas remain unsolved. Of course, the initiative to achieve a global solution for the Croatian crisis is welcome. But, the negative experiences in BH warn about the complexity of the situation here. After all, many of the so-called peace plans turned out to be stillborn, even before they were made public. Maybe Croatia will be the exception.

By Milan Jelovac

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Danas, 13 Sept 1994

INTERVIEW: HRVOJE ŠARINIĆ

REINTEGRATION OF UNPA IS OUR MINIMUM

Hrvoje Šarinić, former Chief of Staff in President's office, subsequently Prime-minister for a short while, has been for a longer period of time Head of National Security Office. He is also a Head of the Croatian delegation at negotiations with rebelled Serbs and also number one for relations with UNPROFOR. The fact that UNPROFOR'S mandate is soon expiring and that the new round of negotiations with Kinin has been announced were sufficient reasons for an interview with Mr. Šarinić.

First of all, of course, an inevitable question, the continuation of talks with rebelled Serbs and the unexpected "cooperativeness" .

- It is not the first time that they say that they are interested in negotiations, talks, agreement but when they really sit at the negotiating table they put forward conditions which are absolutely unacceptable for Croatia. Except for the Zagreb Agreement of 29 March, we have indeed not achieved progress in the negotiating process. If the Serb side is today insisting on the continuation of negotiations, as you say, in particular regarding the opening of the high-way, then this initiative should be put in perspective. We should take a look little bit further to the East in order to discover the causes for the change of their tactics. You probably know that there were numerous speculations about the conflict between Belgrade and Pale. The issue of its credibility was raised. Some people reproached to me that I had naively stated that this was a real conflict. By isolating Karadžić, Milošević is probably attempting to shift the blame thus granting amnesty to himself and assigning himself the role of peace-maker. However, it is the fact that the Belgrade change of heart resulted in the isolation of Pale. Therefore, I am not surprised that Karadžić is now looking for allies among, as they occasionally call it "Serbhood". Knin is the first at his hand.

Do you see any difference, after the last steps taken by Milošević? Have Martić and Mikelić changed or their so far very firm negotiating platform? How big is the influence of Belgrade on them?

- The influence of Belgrade is absolutely the most significant. At least it has been so up till now. Because, it is a public secret that Milošević appointed Martić and that Mikelić is Milošević's pawn. After all he is their close friend, he is very close to Mirjana Marković. It is also known that Babić is more radical and Serbian Orthodox Church is behind him. However, it is obvious that things change and that at this moment Belgrade is loosing some of its influence on Knin in favor of Karadžić. The fact that Martić voted in Drvar at the so called referendum of Bosnian Serbs thus taking a clear stand towards the recent steps of

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Belgrade. The fact is that Karadžić and his Serbs are now in isolation and therefore they try to show little more cooperation with the West in certain issues. They are aware of the vulnerability of their Posavina corridor and they are therefore initiating the opening of Zagreb Belgrade high-way although still recently, they did not want to hear about it.

You were in Knin on 5 August. Did you discuss the opening of the high-way?

- At first they did not want even to hear about it but however they accepted it in the end but from a completely different standpoint. They talked about pensions, water supply, bank accounts and they accepted the opening of the high-way only after I had insisted on it. If they had not accepted the talks on the opening of the high-way I would have not accepted talks with them any more.

And you see, after that Babić sent a letter to Akashi informing him of the establishment of expert groups which examine this whole issue and announcing that he would inform UNPROFOR of security and technical aspect of the high-way opening. It is therefore obvious that Knin's change of heart should be viewed in the context of the latest events which took place between Belgrade and Pale. Right now we can only guess and speculate but it is important that Croatia has been for the opening of the communications since the beginning. But under certain conditions, and unless they are met, we will, and must not accept negotiations, I assure you.

What is then Croatian negotiating platform, what is the minimum below which the delegation headed by you, will not accept talks?

- It is the reintegration of Croatian occupied territories, reintegration of the so-called Krajina into the legal system of Croatia. Representatives of international community, peace mediators who visit both sides and do everything in order to approach the positions in order to achieve an acceptable agreement, are mediators in this process. It is a usual instrument used by word diplomacy.

Have the frequent visits of international negotiators to Knin bore any fruit, plan for the process of normalization, opening of the high-way?

- They suggested to us the starting plan for the opening of the high-way which was to be agreed on by both sides subsequently. But modalities of these starting solutions, I must say this, are completely unacceptable to us. The plan defines four types of traffic along the Zagreb-Lipovljani high-way. The international plan for the opening of the high-way included provisions allowing traffic between the East and West UNPA Sectors. This would involve traffic of convoys from Nova Gradiška to Lipovac along the 110 km long section. According to the initial proposal Croatian police would not be allowed to stop and inspect such convoys. According to this for us unacceptable proposal, UNPROFOR would escort such convoys. This would de facto mean further reduction of Croatian sovereignty. We will never accept this. In addition, the initial plan of international community stipulated that members of UNPROFOR and Serb police would control traffic on the high-way in UNPA Sectors West and East. Thus they attempted to emphasize a kind of sovereignty of some kind of state, which is out of question. This is of course, completely unacceptable because it does not lead to our main objective - beginning of the reintegration process of UNPAs into a legal system of the Republic of Croatia.

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Have you put forward a counter proposal?

- Of course, we simplified the whole game by saying "Gentlemen, we agree to UNPROFOR's opening of the high-way in two sectors but if it is under its exclusive control. So these twenty seven km between Novska and Gradiška and additional 7 between Lipovac and Serbian international border under the condition that on the remaining, complete length of the road Republic of Croatia guarantees traffic security by its apparatus of legal system. So we give guarantees to everyone, everybody can travel and this will in fact be the actual beginning of the implementation of the resolution 871 instead of further philosophic discussions which do not suit the international community and not to mention Croatia. Such proposal was taken to Knin by Co-Chairmen Stoltenberg and Owen and there has not been any answer yet. It seems that the other side is not yet completely aware of the fact that the self-declared state will not succeed. When I was in Knin in August, I openly told them at the very beginning that it was out of the question that we discuss and negotiate as representatives of two states which organize their relations.

What was their reaction?

- There was no reaction, they remained silent, they were looking at their papers and remained silent...

I told you that what our stand is, our norms and standards, below which we are not prepared to go. We want to make the whole highway issue more simple, because the manner in which it has been presented by the international community is quite complicated and unacceptable to us. Among other things, they have proposed a corridor linking Sectors West and North. Can you imagine that! They actually want to establish communications!

On Thursday Mikelic said (and it was reported in our media) that the priorities were the opening of the highway and the restoration of the water supply to Zadar and Biograd on the one, and Novi Licki Osik and Drnis on the other side. Will Croatia allow that, as the Croatian population, which was in majority in Drnis, was driven away from Drnis a long time ago?

- Yes, but within the context of the overall normalization, not separately. Their tactics are rather obvious. They want to solve practical problems, such as the water supply, in the way in which the neighboring countries, such as Italy and Austria, do it. The masks are down, there can be no more cheating. We know perfectly well what their current goal is. It is not acceptable to us, and we refuse to negotiate and reach agreements on that basis. But, we are convinced that they will see the dangers of total isolation, especially after the recent developments and the new attitude of Belgrade towards Pale. We should not forget that there is another factor, which is getting closer - the probable lifting of the arms embargo and the continuation of the war in BH. This will undoubtedly affect the situation here. This is a very serious jigsaw puzzle and I hope that the analysts in Knin and their advisers will closely analyze the possible developments of the situation, because what we are offering to them on the basis of the Constitutional Law should be acceptable to them. As the situation develops, they may end up with even less.

Mikelic's condition for the opening of the highway is the return of the Serbian refugees to some places in western Slavonia, and international guarantees for their

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safety. Can Croatia agree to that condition, since Serbs do not allow the Croatian refugees to return, despite the fact that the Vance Plan and UN resolutions compel them to do so?

- We are working on and demanding the return of the refugees and displaced persons to their homes. Both Croatian and Serbian. This has been the constant feature of our policies from the very beginning. It is out of the question to allow only Serbian refugees to return, for the sake of opening the highway. When Croats start to go back to their homes, then the Serbs will return too.

Under which conditions will Croatia agree to extend the UN mandate? Those who consider that Croatia is under international pressure when it comes to the extension of the mandate are getting more vociferous. Some even think that the recent visit of Mr. Klaus Kinkel to Zagreb is to be seen in that light.

- Pressure is too strong a word, but it is absolutely true that the international community is interested in extending the mandate and in remaining physically present in this region until a solution is found. The mandate of the protection force expires in less than three weeks, and the President will surely discuss that when he goes to the USA to attend the session of the UN General Assembly. You know that certain countries have announced that they will withdraw their troops from UNPROFOR, if the arms embargo is lifted. In that case, the situation both in BH and in Croatia would become very precarious. This would mean that in effect only the representatives of Muslim countries would remain, which would make the situation in BH even more complicated, but solutions for Croatia are also closely related; the two situations directly affect each other. To cut a long story short, Croatia cannot accept the existing mandate, I assure you of that. We are prepared to accept any mandate which will clearly define the beginning of the process of solving the problem of the integration of the occupied territories. Everything else would mean that there is no going forward, in other words, a Cyprization. And we will not allow that.

According to verified information, at the UN Headquarters the outlines of the new plan of the international community for Croatia are busily being prepared; this plan would in its form and its meaning be a duplicate of the Contact Group plan for BH. It should be made public, according to the information, on 15 October, on the take-it-or-leave-it basis. Apart from the peace mediators, representatives of the USA and Russia have also been involved in its creation.

- Your information is correct. I have also heard that something is going on at the UN HQ, that something is being prepared and discussed, because these partial proposals which we have discussed so far, the problem of the water supply and the opening of the highway, have proven to be too hard to implement. And the international community is not taking any steps forward, and it is to be expected that it will tackle the problem of Croatia more radically. After all, we are glad because of it, because that has been our negotiating position from the very start.

There simply cannot be such a wide gap between the theory, when the resolutions are adopted, and the reality in the field, as there is in Croatia. I think that the international community will be putting forth more global solutions. We are here and we are waiting. After all, this is all happening at the end of the current mandate of UNPROFOR. This is certainly yet another factor in this problem, because I am sure that the international community also

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craves some results.

You see, several days ago I spoke with Mr. Akashi about the pilot project of the return of the refugees to some locations. I told him "Excellency, for God's sake, you must do something too!" He agreed, because he is also aware of the whole situation.

This is the first time that the international community is trying to achieve a global solution for Croatia.

- Croatia is willing to accept everything that is leading towards the commencement of the process of reintegration. The international community and its mediators are aware of the problems Croatia faces. We have discussed them many times, and it would be very odd if they were to come out with a proposal which would be in contradiction with the existing UN SC resolutions. If they are preparing a global political solution, they cannot sidestep the reality and the stand taken formally by the international community, expressed in Resolutions 871 and 769 of the UN SC.

You have been leading the Croatian negotiating team in talks with the rebel Serb representatives, for a long time. You have been to Belgrade on secret diplomatic missions, you have met with the Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic. What are your impressions, since many opposition politicians take a dim view of the negotiations with Belgrade?

- There have been public and secret missions, but these are all part of the negotiating process. This is no precedent. We must negotiate, we must take every resource at our disposal which might lead to a peaceful solution. Of course, these resources are not endless, if there is no common sense these resources will eventually run out, more radical solutions and the war option will not go away. I have negotiated and I will negotiate, for as long as I am in this office. You have asked me about president Milosevic. I have met with him quite a few times, with president Tudman during the talks in Karadordevo, Tikves and on some other missions. Mr. Milosevic is a very cunning politician, I would say he is a clever tactician, but he is not such a good strategist in the long run; he is more of a good short-term tactician.

The UN Security Council will, according to the media, ease the sanctions against FR Yugoslavia, regardless of the Croatian issue, the Serbian secessions and their aggression against Croatia. Is it not the beginning of what you have recently termed "little Greater Serbia"?

- Sanctions will merely be eased. The world will subject Serbia to a kind of a test, to see how serious Belgrade is about imposing sanctions on Pale. Any further easing of sanctions should depend on the implementation of the Resolution 769. But, if the world realizes that this is just a game the Serbs are playing, the whole apparatus of the sanctions will be put back into place. This is the carrot and stick approach. This is not necessarily detrimental for the further development of the situation, especially if the international community is just testing the Serbs. It is true, however, that Croatia has always insisted, and will insist that the complete lifting of the sanctions be linked to the issue of the occupied areas of Croatia. In this respect, the international factors are in agreement, although there have been some rather strange statements recently by Mr. Kozirjev. But Russians alone cannot sway the partners in the Contact Group to accept their view as correct.

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Do you think that "small greater Serbia" is being created?

- I have already elaborated that in an interview to *Vecernji list*. I have come under severe criticism because of that statement. Everybody keeps saying that Serbia should not be any larger, that it must be smaller than it is. This is what we all want, we all want Serbs not to cross the Drina River. But they have crossed it. It is hard not to see what the situation on the ground is, and on the other hand there is no place for sentiments, or for justice, in the international politics. There are only interests, the balance of powers. After all, you can see that nowadays territories are haggled over as if we were at a green market. The proof is the 49:51 percent. What is the criterion for allotting 49% of the territory to Serbs, when it does not belong to the,, neither according to the cadastral principle nor according to the ethnic principle? But the international community agrees that 49% belongs to Serbs. I have been criticized when I said that, but no one was opposed to the 51:49% partition. Even the Muslims agreed to that, and Silajdzic once said that Serbs could secede from BH if they wanted to: not with 49% of the territories, but only with the territories in which they had absolute majority. So, there is no firm principle, it is pure haggling. This is what I had in mind when I spoke about "small Greater Serbia".

Of course, we must do everything to stop the Serbian invasion, and when we reach a solution which would be as just as possible, then we must make sure that there can be no further onslaughts of this kind, with all guarantees of the international community. Because, these onslaughts, as President Tudman has noted on several occasions, may lead to the war between civilizations. Because, as soon as the political agreement is reached, the international community will use military and political means to fortify this border. So that as little of the East as possible crosses over to the West.

It is rumored that you will soon be leaving your post of the Head of the National Security Bureau. This is discussed quite openly, and Mr. Slaven Letica, former adviser to President Tudman, now widely considered as Tudman's fierce critic, quotes you on that.

- Change is the only permanent feature of some people. Yes, Mr. Letica constantly takes trips into the future. A lot has been written about it, and my answer to you is - there is no smoke without fire.

By Milan Jelovac

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INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



Office of the Co-Chairmen

FAX

URGENT

PAGE 1 OF 10

To: Ambassador Geert Ahrens

Fax No: 49-228-17 44 84

From: Ann-Marie Cox

Fax No: 41-22 917 0079

Date: 16 September 1994

If transmission incomplete please telephone (41-22) 917 1200

Attached, for your immediate attention, is a fax just received from Kai Eide.

Regards.

Dr. Vladimir Pavićević
Ambassador, Permanent Representative of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
Geneva

To: Kadi Eide - 2 By
To: Geert A. Burin - 1 By

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010/12

No 738/1

Geneva, September 12, 1994

Excellencies,

I have the honour to forward, enclosed herewith, a letter of Mr. Zeljko Simic, Vice Prime Minister of the Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of September 11, 1994.

Please accept, Excellencies, the assurances of my highest consideration.


Dr. Vladimir Pavićević
Ambassador

Their Excellencies
Lord D. OWEN
T. STOLTENBERG
Co-Chairmen
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
United Nations Office
Geneva

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

September 11, 1994

Esteemed Gentlemen,

I am compelled to address you with this letter due to the very difficult position of the Serbs in Gorski Kotar, in the Republic of Croatia.

The Republic of Croatia has in August 1994 began a forced recruitment of Serbs from this region. The recruited Serbs from Gorski Kotar are being sent by the Croatian authorities to the front towards the Republic of Srpska Krajina. According to the information we possess, the recruitment has been carried out, besides other places, in Gornja Srpska Moravica, Partizanski Drezenci, Jasenak, Gomirje and Ponikva.

By this recruitment the Croatian authorities have violated the agreement between the Serbs and Croatian authorities reached on July 6, 1992 in Vrbovsko, by which Croatia has been formally obliged not to recruit Serbs from Gorski Kotar for its forces.

These acts of the authorities of the Republic of Croatia are in contradiction with the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights from 1966 (articles 18 and 20).

The recruitment of Serbs in Gorski Kotor represents only the most recent example of the drastic pressure exerted on them by the Croatian authorities. You are probably aware of the fact that for already a long period of time a part of Gorski Kotor inhabited by Serbs is surrounded with a strong military force composed of 20000 soldiers with 36 tanks and 20 personnel carriers. With this policy Croatia has drastically aggravated the overall situation of the Serbs in this part of Croatia, because it is obvious that Croatian authorities intend to force them into fleeing or assimilation.

Without any doubt that you will understand the graveness of this problem, I address myself to you with a request to, according to your abilities, influence the Government of the Republic of Croatia to act according to the reached agreements, end all recruitment of Serbs and provide fulfillment of the basic human rights of Serbs in Gorski Kotor.

Respectfully yours,

Zeljko Simic
Vice Prime Minister

Their Excellencies
Lord D. OWEN
T. STOLTENBERG
Co-Chairmen
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
United Nations Office
G e n e v a

PCSz/GA/KAE, 31 August 1994

AGREEMENT ON THE OPENING OF THE ZAGREB-BELGRADE HIGHWAY

Heads of Agreement

1. Subject of the Agreement:

- 1.1 (a) Traffic passing on the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway through UNPA Sectors West and/or East without stopping inside either Sector;
- (b) Traffic passing on the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway between UNPA Sectors West and East without stopping outside of these Sectors;
- (c) Traffic passing on the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway between UNPA Sector East and the FRY;
- (d) Traffic passing between UNPA Sectors West and North without stopping outside of these Sectors?
- 1.2 The Agreement does not relate to any traffic on the Zagreb-Belgrade Highway between territory inside any UNPA Sector and territory outside the Sector. (Such traffic to be regulated as under the 29 March 1994 ceasefire Agreement or other existing or future agreements.)

2. Permissible Traffic under the Agreement:

- 2.1 All persons, except persons who are armed and/or in uniform and who are not members of UNPROFOR or other international monitoring units;
- 2.2 All goods, except:
- (a) military vehicles, equipment or other items, as defined in: ?
- (b) goods contrary to Security Council sanctions, on the Highway segments specified in 1.1(b)-(d)

3. Methods of Control:

3.1 All traffic under the Agreement to move in convoys:

- (a) Convoys shall be accompanied by UNPROFOR vehicles, but their security within any UNPA Sector shall be ensured by Serb police in the UNPA, and outside of such Sectors by Croatian police;
- (b) Convoys may not stop (except for emergencies, as permitted by UNPROFOR) where forbidden by 1.1(a)-(d);
- (c) Individual vehicles may not leave convoys.

3.2 At checkpoints controls will be carried out to monitor compliance with applicable SC sanctions resolutions and with terms of the Agreement:

- (a) At the FRY border, convoys will be controlled solely by UNPROFOR;
- (b) At the entries and exits from the Sectors, convoys will be controlled by UNPROFOR, whose activities may be monitored by Croatian and by Serb police in the UNPAs;
- (c) Convoys shall not be subject to any other controls by Croatian or Serb authorities.



010/12

UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA
CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

TO: Mr. David Owen Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia Geneva		FROM: J. L. GOMEZ DEL PRADO OFFICER IN CHARGE SPECIAL PROCEDURES BRANCH <i>[Signature]</i>	
FAX #: 91 70079		FAX #: 41/22/917.00.92 PHONE #: 917.33.57	
SUBJECT:			
DATE: 25 August 1994	.. PAGES ATTACHED 2	DRAFTER:	

MESSAGE:

Please see attached.

Regards, UNATIONS, GENEVA

OFFICE DES NATIONS UNIES A GENÈVE



UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA

CENTRE POUR LES DROITS DE L'HOMME

CENTRE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

Télégrammes: UNATIONS, GENÈVE

Télex : 41 29 62

Téléphone : 917 1234 -907 1234

Téléfax : (22) 917 0123

Palais des Nations
CH-1211 Genève 10Réf. N° : (G/SO/214(77-2)
(à rappeler dans la réponse)

23 August 1994

Dear Sir,

"Feral Tribune", No.464, published an interview with Mr. Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission for Human Rights.

The Zagreb Field Office of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights has learned of misunderstandings provoked by Mr. Mazowiecki's statement about the Pakracka Poljana case.

In light of these regrettable misunderstandings and in order to avoid their repetition in the future, we think it is necessary to present some further details about this matter.

As Mr. Mazowiecki stressed in his response, the investigation of war crimes for purposes of prosecution is not within his mandate, nor is it within the mandate of the Field Office of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights. It was within the competence of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Resolution 780 of the Security Council, and currently is within the competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Those are the institutions competent to investigate war crimes for prosecution purposes, and thus it is they who have at their disposal the information gathered and the professionally prepared documentation about all crimes committed.

Mr. Mazowiecki is aware of the allegations about the crime committed in the area of Pakracka Poljana. In fact, in December 1992, he requested that the Special Rapporteur for extrajudicial, arbitrary and summary executions carry out a mission in Croatia, in order to investigate allegations of the existence of mass graves. During this mission the case of Pakracka Poljana was investigated specifically.

Mr. Viktor Ivancic
Editor-in-Chief
FERAL TRIBUNE
FAX: 058 589 288

- 2 -

After the establishment of the Commission of Experts, Mr. Mazowiecki once again expressed the need to deal with the case of Pakracka Poljana. An official investigation duly followed in October 1993.

We regret that an impression has been given that the Special Rapporteur could be ignorant of the case of Pakracka Poljana, and we trust that the entire body of work of the Special Rapporteur bears witness that this as well as other similar cases, have been and will be given the most serious consideration.

Best regards.

Yours sincerely,



Tatiana Termacic
Human Rights Officer
Special Procedures
Centre for Human Rights

cc:

Mr. Yuriy Vorontsov
President of the Security Council
New York

Mr. Y. Akashi
Special Representative of the Secretary General
Zagreb

Messrs David Owen & Thorvald Stoltenberg
Co-Chairmen of the International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia
Geneva

Mr. Cornelio Sommaruga
President of the International Commission of the Red Cross
Geneva

Mr. Ibrahima Fall
Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights
Geneva

UNHCR. Information Unit
Palais des Nations

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

SSN 1301

UNPROFOR

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

94 JUN 28 19:35

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Page 1 of 2

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 28 June 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-981

SUBJECT: PROPOSED VISIT OF US AMBASSADOR GALBRAITH
TO SECTOR EAST

In anticipation that this matter may be raised with you by the US mission, following is an account of where matters now stand with regard to a proposed visit to Sector East by US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, on 30 June 1994.

Ambassador Galbraith contacted the SRSG and Civil Affairs on 22 June requesting facilitation of a visit to Sector East. Through our Civil Affairs Coordinator in Sector East we proceeded to make the necessary local arrangements which were progressing well until today. We also alerted him to the possibility that his wish to travel in his own vehicle which bears the Croatian flag on the licence plate may be problematic and we offered to provide UNPROFOR vehicles for his travel in the Sector.

This morning we were informed by the senior-most Serb civilian official in Sector East that the authorities in Knin will not approve Ambassador Galbraith's visit. Our CAC was told that Knin leaders will not accept the visit in an official capacity of any Ambassador accredited to Croatia, because such acceptance would mean acknowledgement that the UNPAs are a part of Croatia. If diplomatic representatives in Croatia wish to visit the UNPAs they would need to apply to Knin as private citizens for permission to enter the "RSK".

We communicated this to the US Embassy together with our willingness to seek alternative ways for the Ambassador to visit Sector East. We offered our full assistance to arranging a visit to UNPROFOR units and facilities in Sector East. We also noted the assessment of the CAC in Sector East that having had Galbraith's request to travel through the Sector in his own car refused, any attempt to do so on the

SRSG, FC, HCA, DFC, COS, DI - INTERNAL DISTR

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same day and according to the same timetable in an UNPROFOR vehicle could pose unacceptable security risks. It would be seen by the Serbs as an attempt to circumvent their decision. For this reason we offered to carry Ambassador Galbraith and his party by UNPROFOR helicopter to Erdut and Beli Manastir.

Early this afternoon we were informed by the US Embassy that Ambassador Galbraith considered the Serb decision as an insult to his Government and to him personally. He wished us to convey his deep disappointment and anger to the Serb leaders and to communicate to them that this threatens all contact with the US Government and would only further their isolation. We were also informed of his concern that "UNPROFOR functions in the UNPAs only according to the wishes of the Serbs" and his view that UNPROFOR should be "responsible for its own margin of activity in the Sectors" with the clear implication that we should proceed to organise his visit and provide security for it.

Ambassador Galbraith's criticisms of UNPROFOR's modus operandi in the Sectors misses the point. Our mandate, our resources, and the process of reconciliation and peace we are pursuing would be badly served by attempting to facilitate his original visit plans against the clear disapproval of the Serb authorities.

This evening our CAC in Knin raised Galbraith's views with "Prime Minister" Mikelic. Mikelic gave a host of excuses why it was not possible to change the decision (other officials were unavailable, it was a national holiday etc.) but he also said that Galbraith had made anti-Serb statements recently and therefore his security could not be guaranteed if he visited Sector East. The bottom line is that the decision stands, but we are seeking to raise it with Martić tomorrow morning. We have expressed our full support for Galbraith's visit as an important part of the ongoing peace efforts, but at this stage we are not hopeful the decision will be reversed.

Galbraith was in telephone contact with Vieira de Mello twice this evening and was briefed on our demarches in Knin, for which he was grateful.

ENDALL.

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IMMEDIATE '94 JUN 28 -6 :41

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK - 0625Z
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z - 973

DATE: 27 June 1994

SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY PLANNING - WITHDRAWAL FROM CROATIA

J. Akashi

Please see attached for your information an informal note on "Contingency Planning - Withdrawal from Croatia".

Regards.

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UNPROFOR
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

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To: CAO, HAAU, COS, COS(LOG&ADM), SPO
Info: [SRS] FC, HCA
From: DFC *RR Crabbe*
File: 3300-9(DFC)
Date: 24 June 1994
Subject: CONTINGENCY PLANNING - WITHDRAWAL FROM CROATIA

Refs: A. Discussions FC/DFC - 21 Jun 94
B. Meeting SRS - 22 Jun 94
C. UNPROFOR Operation Plan 8/94 - 11 Feb 94 (OP PROTECT)

1. As discussed at the references, the changing political and military climate may call into question the continued presence of UNPROFOR in all or part of the mission area. It is therefore necessary to develop and refine withdrawal contingency plans for UNPROFOR with the emphasis in the short term in Croatia. The purpose of this memo is to detail the division of responsibilities and the coordination required in order to establish outline planning guidance for this possible operation.

2. There are many possibilities and scenarios that could lead to a withdrawal, in whole or in part, of UNPROFOR. This could be the result of a non-renewal of existing mandates, breakdown of CFAs, a lack of economic/political solutions or a lack of commitment (including financial) by nations. The above could also lead to a reduction of troop levels before, during or after a possible conflict, with existing troops being required to re-enter the area following a conflict. Finally, the above scenarios could lead to a situation wherein UNPROFOR adopts a monitoring posture rather than its current disposition.

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3. In essence, the above is based on three potential scenarios: the status quo being maintained; an improved situation in which fewer troops would be required; or a deterioration in the current status. Each of these three scenarios could therefore lead to a benign withdrawal (eg. the mandate not renewed and time to withdraw is given) or withdrawal under threat. Obviously, there are significant political implications in any withdrawal scenarios, which must be dealt with.

4. UNPROFOR contingency planning for a withdrawal under duress has been completed and can be found at Reference C. Therefore initial planning will be based on a benign withdrawal of all UNPROFOR troops and equipment from Croatia including logistic installations and headquarters. Follow on planning may examine BH Comd and FYROM, should that be required.

5. The first step in the planning process will be the identification of the assumptions, guidelines/principles and outline concepts of operation applicable to such a withdrawal. This will lead to the issue of the necessary planning guidance for the operation, and, if required, the formulation of detailed plans. For discussion purposes, I would propose the following assumptions:

- a. the withdrawal of UNPROFOR will be conducted administratively and without significant interference from either of the warring factions;
- b. UNPROFOR can expect to have up to sixty(60) days to withdraw the troops from the UNPAs and an additional thirty(30) days to complete the removal of equipment;
- c. although a significant portion of the Force currently in the UNPAs may be available for redeployment into BH and FYROM, this will be the exception; and

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- d. Croatian approval of the retention of logistic sites to support BH Comd can not be assured.

6. In accordance with reference B, it is requested that the following appointments examine, as a minimum, the following aspects of a withdrawal:

- a. HAAU. The political implications including examination of indicators that could lead to option analysis including, inter alia;
- (1) the "RSK" reaction to an UNPROFOR withdrawal or reduction; including the potential effect on RSK stability and its relationship with the "RS" and FRY,
 - (2) any possible linkage between and UNPROFOR withdrawal from the UNPAs and the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
 - (3) the reaction of Croatian political and military authorities and the degree to which UN withdrawal, could be viewed as encouragement to those seeking a military solution.
- b. CAO. The assumptions and principles dealing with the administrative aspects of a withdrawal, including the initial identification of any priorities of effort and the general division of responsibilities. Also, examine the time lines for such a withdrawal and be prepared to comment on paragraph 5b; and
- c. COS and COS (Log and Adm). The identification of assumptions and principles dealing with the military aspects of a withdrawal, including the identification of any priorities of effort, and outline division of responsibilities.

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7. To meet the timing established in the references and in view of the upcoming mandate renewal for Croatia, the following milestones will be followed:

- a. initial meeting chaired by DFC to discuss assumptions, guidelines and possible options for concept of operations (by 8 Jul 94);
- b. briefing to FC and FC's additional direction/guidance (before 20 Jul 94);
- c. briefing to SRSG for concurrence/additional direction (before 20 Jul 94);
- d. briefing to SRSG and FC for concurrence (by 30 Jul 94);
- e. issue of planning guidance to Sectors (by 7 Aug 94); and
- f. coordination and discussion with commanders and staffs shall occur throughout the planning process. Details will be advised.

8. The initial meeting with action addressees will be held in the DFC's office at 1400hrs, 8 Jul 94. The submission of written notes to the DFC prior to the initial meeting would be appreciated.

9. Notwithstanding the need to conduct well coordinated planning, the subject of a possible UNPROFOR withdrawal is, at the moment, highly sensitive. Addressees are asked to bear this in mind.

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TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

SSN 1229

010/12

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 18 June 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 937

CODED CABLE

SUBJECT : KAKMA WATER STATION

1. As you requested in your 1974, attached please find a draft response to the 14 June 1994 letter of the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Croatia concerning the Kakma water pumping station. Background information on this issue can be found in UNPROFOR Z-885 of 11 Jun 1994.

2. The Kakma project has, in the period leading up to the planned ICFY-led economic talks on 16/17 Jun 94, become publicized and as such it will be difficult to make substantive progress without some political consensus. Nevertheless, UNPROFOR will, pending a breakthrough on the economic negotiations, attempt to return this project to the local level where economic imperatives may outweigh political ones. At least in the immediate term, it is our assessment that our only hope for success lies in the form of a local agreement. Meanwhile, it is our understanding that the project remains on the ICFY agenda.

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3. UNPROFOR has increased its presence in the area of the pumping station and is undertaking repairs to the 03 Jun 94 damage. In addition and in the regrettable absence of experts of the two parties, UNPROFOR will conduct a detailed engineering assessment of pumping apparatus. As a minimum, this assessment will provide a more refined repair timeline and resource requirement.

18 June 1994

Excellency

I am writing in reply to your letter of 10 June 1994 in which you expressed concern over a recent incident which occurred in the Kakma area.

UNPROFOR fully shares your concern about the incident in question and has deployed additional resources to the area in order to improve the security situation on the ground. In accordance with information given to your Government by UNPROFOR, UNPROFOR has already initiated the process of repairing that section of the pipe damaged by the explosion, a process which should be completed in the near future.

Furthermore, UNPROFOR has been endeavoring to bring together representatives of both parties, at the local level, to examine the pumping station and to develop jointly a plan of action for its repair. Unfortunately, to date, the parties have not been able to agree to pursue this approach. In view of the cancellation of the 16-17 June 1994 economic negotiations scheduled for Plitvice, UNPROFOR will renew its efforts to find a solution to the Kakma problem and in this respect would appreciate the full support of the Government of the Republic of Croatia in this matter.

Finally, I wish to assure you that UNPROFOR reports that Serbian paramilitary forces have withdrawn from the zone of separation in the vicinity of the pumping station. The increased UNPROFOR presence in the area should assist in maintaining this situation. It is and has been UNPROFOR's goal to achieve full implementation and no effort will be spared in this regard.

HE Dr Mario Nobilio
Permanent Representative
Republic of Croatia

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JAN 17 - 8:43

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

To : STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

Info : AKASHI, SRSG, ZAGREB

From : EIDE, ICFY, ZAGREB

Subject : NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE SERB AUTHORITIES IN KNIN.
THE MEETING IN PLITVICE CANCELLED

In the letters of Wednesday evening from the Co-Chairmen of ICFY to the Croatian government and the Serb authorities in Knin, outlining the proposed modalities for the Plitvice-meeting on economic issues, it was made clear that if the acceptance of both parties had not been given by noon on Thursday the meeting would be cancelled. At noon we had the replies, which were positive from the Croatian side and negative from the Serb side. Consequently, the two parties were informed that the meeting had been cancelled.

Attached you will find a written Croatian reply and a note from Mr. Aguilar's meeting in Knin where he was given the Serb reply.

As you will see, the Croatian government accepted the modalities, with the unilateral understanding that "the negotiations will be conducted within the framework of overall normalisation of relations with the Serbs in the provisionally occupied areas..."

The Serb leaders in Knin accepted all the modalities, except those relating to the presence of journalists of Croatian nationality. The reports from Knin suggest that the leadership debated the issue at great length Wednesday evening and Thursday morning. It is our impression that while some of the participants - and possibly Martić and Mikelic included - may have wanted to seek a way out of the deadlock Thursday morning, others have insisted that no compromise should be made. The strongest opposition seems to have come from Mr. Babic, who controls the majority in the "RSK Parliament". This

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confirms a pattern, which has become more and more apparent over the last month. It is my impression, however, from the discussion I have had in Knin that the issue of the journalists was an excuse rather than the reason for causing the impasse. In my meetings with the Serb leaders a number of other preconditions and objections were repeatedly presented and subsequently withdrawn. When the reply came to the letter of the Co-Chairmen only the issue of the journalists remained. However, on this issue no flexibility was shown and the minimum requirements of the Croatian government could not be met.

Following the negative reply from Knin, we informed the media of the cancellation at 2 p.m. In addition to the ICFY Ambassadors Ahrens and myself, the Russian and US Ambassadors also participated. My opening statement has already been sent to ICFY, Geneva. It does not specifically mention the issue of the journalists. However, the issue was raised and explained in the following questions and answers.

After the press conference, Ahrens and myself had a brief discussion with the US and Russian Ambassadors concerning the way ahead. You will receive a separate note on this discussion.

ENDALL.

TRANSLATION

REPUBLIC OF CROATIA
COMMISSION FOR RELATIONS WITH UNPROFOR

Zagreb, June 16, 1994

International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia
Att. ICFY representative, UNPROFOR Headquarters,
Zagreb

Dear Sirs,

Further to your letter of June 15, 1994, let me inform you as follows:

1. The Croatian delegation hereby confirms its agreement with reference to the negotiations at Plitvice as suggested in your letter.
2. It is our understanding that the negotiations will be conducted within the framework of overall normalization of relations with the Serbs in the provisionally occupied areas under the protection of the peace-keeping forces, in accordance with all relevant UN Security Council resolutions.

Sincerely,

Head of the Commission


Hrvoje Šarinić

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Page 1 of 5 page

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ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
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Outgoing fax no:	Date/time: 16 JUNE 1994
To: ICFY CO-CHAIRMEN MR. THORVALD STOLTENBERG LORD OWEN MR. Y. AKASHI, SRSG	From: ENRIQUE AGUILAR, CAC SECTOR SOUTH HQ/ KNIN
Fax no.: (041) 170 099	Fax no.:
Attn.: AMB. KAI EIDE ICFY	Ref. no.: Drafter: Title: Releasing off.: Signature:
Info: MR. YASUSHI AKASHI, SRSG MR. DE MELLO, HCA Fax no.:	
Subject: PLITVICE MEETING ON ECONOMIC TALKS	

MESSAGE

AS REQUESTED I DELIVERED THE URGENT MESSAGE OF ICFY CO-CHAIRMEN, MR. STOLTENBERG AND LORD OWEN TO THE "RSK" AUTHORITIES, (MR. MIKELIC), LAST NIGHT (30 MINUTES AFTER MIDNIGHT). THE OFFICIAL ANSWER RECEIVED AT 12 NOON, TODAY IS NEGATIVE, REPEAT. NEGATIVE.

FOLLOWING THIS ANNOUNCEMENT I WAS CALLED TO MR. MARTIC'S OFFICE WHERE I WAS INFORMED THAT REGRETTABLY AND AFTER LENGTHY CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE "GOVERNMENT", HE WAS NOT ABLE TO ACCEPT THE CONDITIONS SET BY ICFY, PARTICULARLY PARA d) OF SUCH A PROPOSAL.

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MARTIC ALSO STATED THAT AS AN EXPRESSION OF GOOD WILL AND SUPPORT TO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS HE COMMITTED HIMSELF IN GENEVA WITH THE CO-CHAIRMEN AND THE SRSG ON THE VENUE (PLITVICE) AND ON THE DATES FOR THE FIRST TWO ROUNDS OF NEGOTIATIONS (16-17 JUNE AND 30 JUNE), AT CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL RISK.

THE "RSK" DELEGATION, ACCORDING TO MARTIC, IS ALREADY IN PLITVICE AND WOULD BE READY TO CONDUCT NEGOTIATIONS AS ORIGINALLY SCHEDULED.

MARTIC FURTHERMORE STATED THAT THE ONLY POSSIBLE WAY OUT OF THIS IMPASS IS TO CONVENE THE MEETING WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF JOURNALISTS FROM EITHER SIDE.

AS A RESULT OF MY MEETING WITH MR. MARTIC I FEEL THERE IS STILL ROOM TO SALVAGE THE SITUATION BY TAKING A NEW INITIATIVE TO BREAK THE IMPASS. AT THIS CRUCIAL MOMENT WE RECOMMEND THAT UNPROFOR AND ICFY, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, URGENTLY INTERVENE.

JUDGING FROM THE SENSITIVE POLITICAL SITUATION WE STRONGLY FEEL THAT THE CANCELLATION OF THE PLITVICE MEETING COULD HAVE SERIOUS NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS, NOT ONLY FOR ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS, BUT ON THE OVERALL CEASE-FIRE AND PEACE PROCESS.

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Page 1 of 4

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY UN, GENEVA
OGATA, UNHCR GENEVA

FROM : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 15 June 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-909

SUBJECT: President Tudjman's visit to Bosnia-Herzegovina -
HCA's meeting with President Izetbegović

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1. President of Croatia Franjo Tudjman, accompanied by Minister of Defence Šušak, Minister of Foreign Affairs Granić, Head of National Security Šarinić and other senior officials, visited Sarajevo on 14 June. Tudjman had invited me to accompany him on this visit, which took place with UNPROFOR's extensive logistical support, but I declined. He, in turn, invited Vieira de Mello, who travelled with the Croatian delegation from Zagreb to Sarajevo and attended the official lunch offered by President Izetbegović. He did not, however, attend the bilateral meetings, despite Croatian invitations for him to do so.

2. From Sarajevo Tudjman's delegation flew by UNPROFOR helicopters to Vitez, then by road to Nova Bila and Busovača, again by helicopter to Herzegovina where it spent the night. On 15 June, Tudjman will visit Mostar and fly to Split using HV/HVO helicopters ("no-fly zone" clearances obtained by UNPROFOR).

3. For the record, at 12h00 of 14 June while at the BH Hq, Vieira de Mello received the attached urgent letter from B-H Minister of Interior Bakir Alispahić clearly alluding to threats to the security of President Tudjman in the Croat-controlled areas of Kiseljak, Busovača, Vitez, Prozor and Mostar. At 12h20, Vieira de Mello personally brought the contents of Alispahić's

-2-

letter to the knowledge of Croatian National Security Head Šarinić whom he met at the Presidency and recommended that General Ante Roso (HVO Commander and presently Chief of Staff of the new "Federal" Army), who has made all field security arrangements for the presidential visit, be also consulted. Tudjman, Šarinić and Roso later decided to proceed with the original programme. BH Commander Rose did not object and Vieira de Mello's Military Assistants de Battista and Smith accompanied the delegation for the rest of their visit to Central Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4. We interpret the above as an indication of the Bosnian Government's displeasure with Tudjman's visit to Croat strongholds in Central Bosnia and in Herzegovina and the ambiguity it is likely to entertain on the status of "Herceg-Bosna" within the new federal/confederal partnership.

5. After Tudjman's departure from Sarajevo, Rose and Vieira de Mello met with Izetbegović. They reviewed:

- (a) on-going negotiations on exchange of information on missing persons, including, at Izetbegović's suggestion, a "no-publicity" arrangement on information that the Serbs might provide on the Hadzići missing and a guaranteed transfer "to another safer location" of the Tarčin equivalent number of Serb hostages, to be followed by an "exchange" of prisoners;
- (b) implementation so far of the military aspects of the Geneva Agreement of 8 June. Rose highlighted BiH/HVO's violations (rockets from Orašje pocket on Brčko and offensive across internal line in Bihać) and insisted on the need to place liaison officers at BH Command in Sarajevo and at every Sector Command, including Tuzla (where the Sector Command, as you know, is located at the airport). Izetbegović agreed, after some discussion, to consult with Ganić, who is, as you know, in charge of military negotiations, while Silajdžić is responsible for political (Contact Group) matters.

-3-

(c) the fate of displaced persons within the 3-km. TEZ around Gorazde. Vieira de Mello told Izetbegović that it was somewhat unfair and premature to expect UNPROFOR to successfully pass the "test" (as the B-H Government keeps calling it) of the return of DPs to the shaded area of the 3-km zone - that is, to an extremely difficult and potentially explosive environment, only a few hundred metres away from a strong BSA presence, whereas the solution to the wider DPs and refugee problem was still under debate, even in areas which now fall under the authority and control of the Bosniac-Croat federation. Therefore, he repeated the need for cooperation on the part of local BH military and civilian authorities in preventing a recurrence of the 13 June incident (i.e. large numbers of DPs attempting to return to their homes with an instant hostile reaction by armed Serbs) and in supporting UNPROFOR in its attempts at achieving gradual, orderly and negotiated returns. Izetbegović was informed that Civil Affairs was strengthening its presence in Gorazde and requesting the Serb side to delegate a senior civilian official to the area, with authority to negotiate and decide on such matters. Izetbegović listened, acknowledged our efforts, criticized the Serbs for taking advantage of "concessions and compromises" made after resolution 913, but agreed on the need for a negotiated solution, including the setting up of a joint commission on this question "but only with UNPROFOR". He did state, however, that he "feared conflict" as a result of the DPs' impatience.

ENDALL

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REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS
MINISTER'S OFFICE
SARAJEVO



Number: 11-1903
Date: 14.06.1994

UNPROFOR - CIVIL AFFAIRS

Mr. Sergio de Mello

Sir,

Ministry of Internal Affairs has reliable information that in the region of the Kiseljak, Busovaca, Vitez, Prozor and Mostar municipalities, an illegal organization was formed, primarily made up of renegade members of the ATG "Apostoli" and "Maturice" from Kiseljak, and ATG "Mrniak" and "Garavi" from Prozor (former activities in the Bugojno region).

The establishing of such an organization is aimed at making impossible, at all costs, the implementation of the Bosniac - Croat Federation agreement in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

One of the former members of the ATG "Mrniak", who is currently residing, illegally, in the Kiseljak municipality, on the 12th of June, 1994, stated to some of his sympathizers that the man to blame for the establishing of the BiH Federation was the President of the Republic of Croatia, Mr. Franjo Tudjman "who is coming to visit Bosnia in order to justify himself, and to drive out the fighters for the Croatian cause out of the country" and that "he must be dealt with on this territory".

We believe that this is a direct threat to the security of Mr. Tudjman and, therefore, during the Presidents possible visit to these territories we cannot guarantee his safety.

Once again, we would like to stress that the source of the above mentioned information is completely reliable and verified.



MINISTER

Bakir Alispahic

B. Alispahic

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

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UNPROFOR

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UNPROFOR
Palais des Nations
Unit

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK - 1730Z
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 13 JUNE 1994

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 898

SUBJECT : MEETING WITH CROATIAN DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER. DR KOSTOVIC

Y. Arakawa

DISTRIBUTION:	
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<i>DI/LO</i>	
<i>WS</i>	
<i>SC/GA</i>	
<i>ED/DK</i>	

1. This afternoon the Deputy Force Commander, myself and other UNPROFOR officials held a meeting with Dr Kostovic, the Deputy Prime Minister of Croatia. Dr Kostovic had requested the meeting in order to convey, on behalf of the Croatian Cabinet, the position of his government on the Kakma water pipe blown up by the Krajina Serbs on 3 June 1994.

2. Dr Kostovic began by stating that Croatia would be firm in demanding the restoration of the water pipe in the forthcoming Plitvice economic talks with the "RSK". He said that the blowing up of the pipeline had put the lives of some 30,000 refugees, displaced persons and local civilians in Beograd in danger and that this would be the fourth year that the population had suffered from water shortages. While his government had explored alternative water supply options, including the building of an aqueduct, these had proved either insufficient, too expensive or not possible to implement on time. As a result, Croatia had no option but to make this topic the "main issue" at Plitvice.

3. Continuing, Dr Kostovic also focused on the public pressure from displaced persons and refugees to resolve the Krajina situation. He said that if the government and UNPROFOR were unable to show their ability to solve simple things like water, then people would lose faith in their ability to solve larger issues, leading to public support for the war option as the only way out of the current impasse. He further noted the growing public dissatisfaction with the constant concessions made by Croatia to the "RSK" with, at best, nothing in return and, at worse, the deterioration of the situation as the "RSK" further consolidated its links with Serbia through the establishment of monetary and military unions. Public opinion and pressure were, he said, the essence of the problem and Croatia could "only control the situation up to a certain point." If the displaced persons could be given some hope of the implementation of various resolutions and agreements, they could wait for 5 to 10 years to return to their homes but, as the situation stood, the Minister could not even guarantee the signing of the oil pipeline agreement this Christmas if it would encourage or support the permanent occupation of Croatia by the "RSK".

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4. I assured Dr Kostovic that UNPROFOR was fully committed to the full implementation of the CFA and that significant progress had been made towards this end since 20 May 1994. I informed him of UNPROFOR's offer to restore the Kakma pipeline to its previous condition (Ref our code cable 855 of 11 June for our letter to Sarinic on the same) and of our awareness of the importance of the water problem to the costal populations. However, I cautioned the Deputy Prime Minister that economic and political issues were the responsibility of ICFY and not UNPROFOR. We were, therefore, pleased to note that this issue would be the first agenda item on the ICFY sponsored economic talks in Plitvice on 16 June 1994.

5. On the issue of displaced persons and refugees, I informed Mr Kostovic that UNPROFOR was working closely with UNHCR to solve this issue. Dr Kostovic then referred to the heavy economic burden being placed on Croatia by the influx of refugees from Banja Luka and by the recent policy of western countries to send back refugees to Croatia. He said that officially Croatia receives some 500 refugees per week and he hoped that something could be done to stop this influx. I informed him that I continually raised the issue of Serb ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka in my talks with President Milosovic and Dr Karadzic and that I had been considering visiting the area in the near future. Dr Kostovic thought a visit by myself, and one by Dr Karadzic in particular, would be a good idea and could go some way in alleviating the current situation in Banja Luka. He further expressed his appreciation for the work being done by UNPROFOR in the UNPAs, particularly in the protection of Croatian minorities, and offered to supply medicines and other humanitarian supplies for the UNPA population, including Serbs.

6. Regards.

'94 JUN 10 15:42

'94 JUN 10 15:01

Page 1 of 3

010/12

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK - 1507Z
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
DATE: 10 JUNE 1994
NUMBER: Z-879
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM DPM OF CROATIA

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	WS
	SC/GA

1. Please refer to your cable 1828 of 6 June on the above subject. We have consulted with UNHCR on this matter since it falls essentially within its purview.

2. UNHCR has provided the following background information:

- (a) UNHCR and ICRC have in recent months had considerable difficulty in persuading the Croatian authorities to keep the border open to the victims of ethnic cleansing in the Banja Luka region;
- (b) the re-registration of refugees currently underway with UNHCR support is expected to reveal significantly less than 300,000 refugees (the Bosnian Government claims the figure is well under half that number);
- (c) while there are indeed some problems in cooperation between the humanitarian agencies and the competent Croatian authorities, these are very largely the result of significant problems of internal coordination on the Croatian side. As a result, even the resources that are already available through UNHCR are not fully committed.

3. It is perhaps also worth noting that, while Dr. Granic and his Ministry are well aware of the respective roles of UNPROFOR and UNHCR, the letter only mentions UNPROFOR. In this connection, the reference in the letter to the transportation of the refugees "through the intercession of UNPROFOR" is puzzling. As you are aware, UNPROFOR is not deployed in these Serb-held areas in BH. It has, therefore, not been in a position either to endeavour to prevent "ethnic cleansing" or to assist those affected in

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leaving the area. When the refugees from these areas transit through Sector West, UNPROFOR's Nepalese and Jordanian battalions have assisted UNHCR, when required, by providing lodging for a few days for the refugees pending their admission by the Croatian authorities into the territory of Croatia under their control.

.... 4. Attached for your consideration is a draft reply to Dr. Granic which broadly addresses his concerns.

ENDALL.

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DRAFT LETTER

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 3 June 1994 about the dramatic situation of the non-Serbian population in the regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of the Bosnian Serbs. Your letter will be circulated as requested.

I fully share your concern, and deplore the fact that the efforts of the international community have failed to prevent the continuing abuse of the most basic rights of these persons, and that UNPROFOR has not been able to deploy to these areas. My Special Representative for the former Yugoslavia and his senior colleagues have repeatedly raised this matter with the Bosnian Serb leadership and called for effective action at the local level to bring such practices to an end. As soon as circumstances permit, my Special Representative intends to visit Banja Luka and Prijedor. The United Nations will intensify its efforts to stop ethnic cleansing and to mobilize the necessary political will to this end.

The positive response of your Government and people to the plight of those who manage to escape to Croatia is admirable. I know that your Government will continue to respect the right to asylum and its obligations under the international instruments to which it is party.

For its part, the United Nations will continue to do all that it can to mobilize resources to help alleviate the burden on Croatia and strengthen the already very significant support of the international community to your efforts. I know how important your own personal contribution has been to our common humanitarian endeavour. I am confident that every effort will be made by the competent Croatian authorities to further facilitate the work of the humanitarian organizations and ensure that this support is used to maximum effect.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has repeatedly called on other countries to share the refugee burden that has fallen disproportionately on Croatia. Many have responded generously, so that despite the new arrivals, the overall number of refugees in Croatia is declining, albeit not yet significantly. The United Nations is sparing no effort to help the parties reach the political solution that would create the conditions whereby the burden could be lifted. Meanwhile, the High Commissioner will of course continue her efforts.

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1 OF 13

MOST IMMEDIATE

010/12

TO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB

Sam W

~~CUMINFO~~ ~~SSSC HICA~~ ~~DEMINAT~~ *can*

DATE: 6 JUNE 1994

NUMBER:

UNPROFOR Z - 859

SUBJECT: REPORTS ON NEGOTIATIONS

Attached are copies of our most recent reports and a draft report on the current state of negotiations.

ENDALL

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BR, SC/GA

WS

BP

CODE RESTRICTED

94 JUN -6 16:39

UNDE Telecom Unit
Palais des Nations

DRAFT

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN
FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD
DATE: JUNE 1994
SUBJECT: THE CURRENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS

1. There have been no direct negotiations between the Croatian government and the Serb authorities in Knin since the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the parties in the Russian embassy in Zagreb on 29 March 1994. Following the agreement on the ceasefire there was a certain air of optimism and a belief that the parties might be prepared to move rapidly on to negotiations on economic subjects. Indeed, the parties agreed in principle to return to the same venue on 12 April 1994 to start the new round of talks. In practice, this did not happen. New disagreements over the question of the venue erupted, a disagreement which has blocked any possibility for progress since then.

2. The Serbs first objected to returning to the Russian embassy, saying that the facilities were inadequate for the negotiations. Most probably, this was a reaction to statements by the Russian Ambassador that he was the Ambassador to Croatia, within its internationally recognised borders, which included the Serb held territories. Thus for the Serbs this venue was no longer considered to be a "neutral venue". At the same time, the first use of Close Air Support in Gorazde caused a hardening of the Serb position. However, when alternative venues in Zagreb, such as UNPROFOR HQ, were proposed to "President of the RSK" Martić on 10 April 1994, it became clear that no location in Croatia was acceptable and that the Croatian delegation would not be welcome on Serb held territory for fear that they would state that they were on Croatian territory. He said that Geneva would be the best place for negotiations, adding that the Krajina Serbs wanted to be included in the ICFY process in Geneva, a reference to the Succession Issues Working Group which was meeting at that time and an indication that the "RSK" should be treated as an "equal partner".

3. The Serb negotiators who came to Zagreb and the "caretaker government" that sent them were heavily criticised by the opposition for accepting the Russian embassy in Zagreb as a venue, despite the result they achieved. The Serb negotiators had been businesslike and wanted the ceasefire. Their strategy seemed clear: they saw the ceasefire agreement as another step in the process of creating their state, and a border, guarded by UNPROFOR. The criticism was rather due to the political power struggle in Knin between Martić who won the "presidential" election on 25 January 1994, and Babić, who won the first round of the "presidential" election in December 1993; a struggle which continues to be a problem despite the formation of a "government of national reconciliation" on 21 April 1994. As such, this criticism in no way diminishes the common aim of consolidating their "state" and integrating with the other Serbs.

4. The Croatian position on the venue for negotiations has remained unchanged since the negotiations in Geneva on 11 to 13 August 1993, when the parties did not actually meet, and was reiterated to the ICFY negotiators Ambassadors Eide and Ahrens by President Tudjman on 13 April 1994: the Croatian government will only negotiate within the territory of the Republic of Croatia, which includes the Serb held territories. They consider these negotiations to be an internal problem and there is no need to leave the country, which, they

believe, in itself would give undue and "equal" status to the Serbs. Nevertheless, during November and December 1993, five separate meetings between the parties did in fact take place under ICFY auspices in Norway and Serbia, on the understanding that they should be secret. In practice, the meetings became common knowledge and the publicity did not seem to hurt the Croatian position. The Croatian chief negotiator, Sarinic, said on 24 May 1994 that he would be prepared to cede the question of meeting within Croatia, as long as he was sure that there would be significant progress. He then immediately qualified his statement, saying that of course he knew there would be none.

5. Following the 19 January 1994 declaration of normalisation of relations between Zagreb and Belgrade, significant progress was made to identify modalities for the start of economic projects such as the opening of routes and trade. Following the ceasefire, a "Programme on Economic Affairs" was produced by ICFY in anticipation of negotiations on this subject. This paper was accepted by the Croatian government as a good starting point. Martić and the new "RSK Prime Minister" Mikelic, however, suggested that the paper was not balanced enough and did not adequately reflect their position. It is worth noting that his predecessor Bjegovic, on 10 April 1994, said that he did think the ICFY paper was a good basis for negotiation. Recently, the Serbs have expressed interest in a very narrow spectrum of economic matters, prefacing all statements with a demand that paragraph 12 of resolution 820 be abandoned, "so that the parties are on an equal footing", and the Serbs can trade independently of the Croatian government, in line with their desired sovereignty. They have rejected the possibility of opening routes and trading with the Croatian side, strengthening their trading and other economic links with Banja Luka and Belgrade instead.

6. Babic, now "RSK Foreign Minister", has suggested that negotiations should first of all deal with a limited number of "humanitarian issues" such as the Croatian payment of pensions to Serbs in the UNPAs. Following that, the opening of broader economic negotiations could be considered. This confirms the very narrow perspective the Serbs are now taking for economic talks. The Croatian side has indicated that although they are ready to discuss the payment of pensions, in spite of severe criticism from domestic lobbies such as the displaced, this cannot be done in isolation and must be seen in the context of wider economic negotiations. The Serbs are only prepared to indicate a willingness to negotiate on those items that will not involve any contact between the people of the two parties and which will help them to build up their economy and gain some kind of breathing space. They fear that any negotiations will be the thin edge of the wedge designed to separate them from Mother Serbia and draw them into Croatia. Babic has said that he finds himself having to negotiate in an established three phase strategy, while his inclination would be to start with the political questions and then see the other problems fall into place as a result of a political settlement. Behind the Serb position is the fact that any meaningful economic negotiations will have an underlying political element which may lead to political results unacceptable to them.

7. The Croatian position on the venue has been equally firm, with the same result in practice: that there are no negotiations. On the Croatian side, there are also elements for whom this is a preferred state of affairs. There was considerable reluctance on the part of the Croatian negotiators to actually finalise the ceasefire agreement on 29 March 1994, because of their fear that this would give the Serbs a border. The prospect of a rapid continuation with the negotiating process on economic issues to break down the "border" was a major factor in convincing the Croatian side to sign. Since then they have been criticised in Croatia for allowing the Serbs a political victory. This criticism has been strengthened by the lack of progress on economic issues of vital interest to Croatia. There is political upheaval in Croatia, with the establishment of the breakaway opposition party HND causing problems for Tudjman's HDZ. Although the opposition does not criticise the government over the handling of Krajina, a lack of progress may be a major political point in the elections which are now predicted by some for the end of this year. There are,

increasingly, comments from members of the Croatian government that the political problem over the UNPAs must be solved in parallel with the problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Added to this there is a combination of growing confidence in terms of military strength and international support for Croatia, and considerable internal criticism from some quarters, over the results of the Washington and Vienna agreements. All of these factors have led Tudiman to state publicly that if there is not progress by the end of the present UNPROFOR mandate in September 1994, he will not renew the mandate and will resort to military action to resolve his problem with the Serbs in the Krajina.

8. Against this background the ICFY negotiators have made great efforts to help the parties find common ground on the question of the venue for negotiations. In the absence of flexibility from the parties, they have suggested combinations or packages designed to allow face saving and movement. Following a long series of meetings, between 10 April and 20 May 1994, they told the parties that they would now abstain from producing new proposals on the venue, and that they would wait for the parties to show some flexibility. If this takes some time, however, there is concern that the ceasefire agreement will start to fall apart, since it was built on the expectation that economic progress would be rapidly forthcoming to consolidate it. However, even if economic negotiations had started on 12 April, it is unlikely that progress would have been rapid and the ceasefire agreement would in any case have to stand on its own merit. At this stage, the ceasefire agreement has been implemented effectively, and seems to be solid. However, the underlying political climate is unstable and the ceasefire agreement could easily be eroded.

9. It has been the position of the ICFY negotiators that negotiations on economic matters should not prejudice the final political arrangements to be made between the parties. Judging from recent statements there are indications that the parties would rather like to address the political issues first and then let the economic questions fall into place as a result of a political settlement. In the past there have been indications from Belgrade that the Krajina leadership would negotiate a political deal with the Croatian government built on the greatest possible degree of autonomy. However, the present activities of the Krajina leadership have not given any similar indications. There seems to be a hardening of their position and determination to integrate with the Bosnian Serbs and with Belgrade. The Croatian government points to an exemplary constitution and says that everything short of sovereignty is on the table for the Serbs. But at the same time they talk openly of war if a solution is not found which allows for their integration into Croatia. At face value, the positions of the parties are diametrically opposed.

10. The negotiators and the big powers who will actually provide the political leverage to complete any deal have to decide which path to follow, and then convince the parties that the risk of a new and unacceptable conflict is too high to allow "technical questions" such as the venue for negotiations to block progress. In making this decision, the degree to which the process is inevitably linked to events in Bosnia-Herzegovina may be decisive, since a political solution there will have a significant impact on the possible outcomes of the political negotiations in Croatia. Certainly, raising the profile of the negotiations could help to get them going. But if the direct route to a political solution is taken, it is unlikely that it will be possible to return to any halfway house of economic matters, or to another ceasefire agreement should that be necessary, before an overall political solution is reached. The position of the international community is quite clear on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia, but the Serbs control their territory, and it may take great political will on the part of the international community to make them give it up.

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1 OF 3
IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB

INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT

DATE: 20 MAY 1994

NUMBER: _____

SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH BABIC AND KUZET IN KNIN - 20 MAY 1994

1. On 20 May 1994 Ambassador Eide, accompanied by CAC Knin Mr Aguilar and Mr McLeod had meetings with "RSK foreign minister" Babic and chef de cabinet of "president" Martic, Kuzet. These meetings were the follow up to the meeting in Belgrade with Martic and "prime minister" Mikelic on 13 May, at which Eide had proposed a "package" as an attempt on the part of ICFY to find a way for the Knin leadership over the question of the venue for economic negotiations. This "package" included a visit by the Serb leadership to Geneva for a bilateral meeting with the Co-Chairmen of ICFY, and the opportunity for the Serbs to choose the venue for the first meeting on economic negotiations, with the proviso that the venue must be within Croatia, including the UNPAs. In addition to this the ICFY-negotiators had reaffirmed Mr Stoltenberg's interest in visiting Knin at an appropriate date. At the meeting of 13 May, Martic had seemed positive about the proposal and had made specific references to the possibility of holding economic negotiations at Plitvice. He had said that he would have to consult the "parliament" about the proposal. The meetings on 20 May were to hear the results and we had been informed from Knin that the leadership had interesting news to communicate to us and that a visit to Knin should therefore take place as soon as possible.

2. In the meeting with Babic, Eide started by reviewing the detail of the proposal and emphasising that it none of the elements could be taken alone. Babic said that the fair attitude of the negotiators was demonstrated by their attitude to the economic package that had been proposed by ICFY, which opened up the possibility for negotiations on subjects of concern to the Serbs. Regarding the issue of the venue for economic negotiations, he said that although they had signed a ceasefire with Croatia, which in itself was an important step, until they had achieved a final peace there was no question of a Croatian delegation coming to the territory controlled by the Serbs for negotiations, particularly if those negotiations had political overtones, as was the case with the economic questions. This was why they proposed a neutral neighbouring country; equally they did not rule out a meeting on the confrontation line. He said that he thought that an opportunity to go to Geneva would be very useful, however no Serb official could accept anything other than the options he had outlined.

3. Babic then said that he thought there might be a way to get around the problem of the venue. He said that he believed there was value in starting negotiations on some humanitarian issues to build confidence. Being more specific, he said that in particular they had pensions in mind but that the Croats might also find things of interest. Water could be included under this issue. When asked about venues, he said that they should be not too deep inside Serb held territory, but not on the border, and suggested Drnis, Vrhovine (opposite Otocac) and Tusilovic (opposite Karlovac).

4. Eide said that the Croatian side were unlikely to go for negotiations on humanitarian issues and particularly pensions in isolation, but that if there were a clear link between negotiations on this subject and a follow up to other economic matters, then it would possibly be acceptable. Babic said that he could not find such a link acceptable, as they could not negotiate on the basis of economic integration into Croatia. He said that in his opinion, the Croatian position was better represented by the ICFY negotiators, who showed a degree of bias. The way ahead for the negotiations was either to negotiate on economic issues with no preconditions at a neutral venue, or to negotiate on some selected humanitarian issues while continuing to find a way around the deadlock caused by the Croatian insistence on a venue inside Croatia, with all its political implications. Eide said that he chose to ignore Babic's comment about bias, and that his answer could only be interpreted as a "no" to the proposal the ICFY negotiators had presented.

5. In the second meeting, with Kuzet, Eide again reviewed the proposal made the Martić and Mikelic and asked if there was a definite response from Martić. Kuzet thanked Eide, and said that if he cleaned the diplomatic cosmetics from the package he saw that we were attempting to blackmail the Serbs into negotiating in Croatia by linking the visit to Geneva to such a venue. Eide reacted to this suggestion, pointing out that the visit to Geneva was offered as a mechanism to help the Serbs adjust their position given the earlier public positions they had taken. Words like blackmail were therefore totally inappropriate and unacceptable. Kuzet then said that the answer was yes to ICFY's proposal. The Serbs would come to Geneva for a meeting with the Co-Chairmen, they would negotiate on economic matters with equal status, and any agreement would not prejudice the final political solution. We should find a venue that fitted in with their principles. In other words, outside Croatia.

6. Eide said that he interpreted this answer as a "no". Kuzet then said that if they came to Geneva, they would offer three concrete projects to the Co-Chairmen that they knew would be acceptable to the Croats. Thus the meeting would take place and there would be results. When asked to specify the dates, venues for discussions and projects to be discussed, Kuzet said that we should go in phases. First the meeting with the Co-Chairmen at which they would present the projects. Then the Co-Chairmen should specify the dates and venues for negotiations on these projects. The venues, however, should be outside Croatia. Eide said that this was clearly at variance with the package

C28-449

that he had offered, and that if Kuzet could not be specific about projects now and take a more flexible position on the venue, then there was little prospect of progress.

7. Eide emphasised that this was seen by ICFY as the last attempt to break the current deadlock over a venue for continued negotiations. He was convinced that this position was shared by others who had engaged themselves in these negotiations. Until the parties showed more flexibility on the question of the venue there would be no point in continuing the discussion. When asked several times to consider the situation carefully, Kuzet talked in circles and attempted to interpret his comments as not being a rejection of the ICFY proposal, while trying to isolate the Geneva visit from the question of the venue for economic talks. Eide emphasised that he did not want to involve the Co-Chairmen in a sterile debate on the venue and had made an offer to help the Serbs. Eide left by saying that since he had originally made the proposal to Martić, Kuzet should attempt to speak Martić before Eide left Knin and convey the results of their meeting to him, and confirm that Martić did intend to send the "no" that seemed to be given now.

Kuzet said that he would try, but that this was the official position. On leaving Knin two hours later, Eide was informed that Kuzet had not been able to contact Martić.

8. The conclusion at this stage is that the parties are not prepared to make any compromise on the venue for continued negotiations, or on the substance of negotiations, and they value the insistence on certain principles more highly than the possible benefits of negotiation. The parties have been informed that if at any stage they feel able to offer a new position, the negotiators remain ready to resume their efforts.

9. A more comprehensive assessment will follow on Monday.

ENDALL

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1 OF 2
MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB

DATE: 14 MAY 1994

NUMBER: _____

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MARTIC AND MIKELIC IN BELGRADE - 13 MAY 1993

1. On 11 May Ambassadors Ahrens and Eide tried twice to reach Knin by helicopter for discussions with "foreign minister" Babic concerning the question of the venue for the economic negotiations between the Croatian government and the Serb authorities in Knin. Due to the weather conditions it was not possible to reach Knin. The Civil Affairs Coordinator in Knin, Mr. Enrique Aguilar, however, met Babic in order to receive whatever message the Krajina-Serbs had to give after their "government" meeting the preceding day. Babic informed Aguilar that the "government" had confirmed that the first meeting on economic negotiations had to take place in Geneva.

2. On that basis Eide asked Aguilar to communicate to the Knin authorities that we had obviously reached a deadlock and that we as negotiators had no intentions of continuing to shuttle between the two parties as long as no flexibility was indicated by them. On Thursday afternoon the message came from Knin that Martic and Mikelic would like to see us the following day in Belgrade. Eide therefore travelled to Belgrade on Friday morning, accompanied by Aguilar and McLeod. Martic and Mikelic said that they were prepared to commence economic negotiations in any location outside Croatia, with the exception of Germany. They also said that they accepted the Croatian proposal that negotiations should take place on 20 May. They asked Eide to bring the Croatian side to accept their proposal with regard to the venue.

3. Eide tried to analyse the situation as seen from Knin and underlined that it should be in the Serb interest to open economic negotiations, thereby also consolidating the ceasefire agreement, which was certainly in their interests. He said that despite the best efforts of the negotiators, the positions of the parties appeared to be deadlocked over the venue, and that unless there was some new movement from either side, this situation seemed unlikely to change. He and Ahrens had told the Croatian side to contact them when they were ready to offer some more room for manoeuvre, and the same message had been given to the Serbs. However, at this stage he would make a final proposal to the Serbs in an attempt to offer them a way out of their position.

4. Eide said that he had discussed the issues of the venue with the Co-Chairman of ICFY and referred to the Serb interest in negotiating in Geneva. We could not offer Geneva as the venue for negotiations. However, the Co-Chairmen were ready to receive a Knin delegation in Geneva, for example at the end of next week. He hoped that such a visit might make it easier for the Serbs to accept that the economic negotiations themselves would take place inside Croatia, including the Serb held territories. Eide also referred to the fact that Stoltenberg had already expressed his interest in visiting Knin. This clearly demonstrated the seriousness of ICFY in trying to find a way out. On this basis Eide asked the Serbs to select any venue within the area for the start of economic negotiations.

5. The Serbs rejected this proposal twice. Martić then left for another important meeting. When Martić came back, Eide underlined that this was a final attempt and that the mediators would have to report that no solution could be found if ICFY's proposals were rejected. Martić then said that the decision would have to be taken by "parliament", as accepting the proposal would mean changing a decision already taken by them. However, he went on, if the decision were taken for a meeting in Plitvice, for example, who would meet the financial costs of such a meeting, how big would the delegations be and so on? Eide replied that he was encouraged by this turn in the discussion and that the practical questions could be easily solved once the venue was decided.

6. Martić promised to raise the question in a closed session of "parliament" and said that the result should be available on 17 or 18 May. He would suggest Plitvice on the basis of the proposal made by Eide for a visit to Geneva etc. If there were to be such a meeting with the Co-Chairmen, the date for a first meeting on economic matters might be 23 May. However, the dates would have to be set in light of the need for preparation of a visit to Geneva. Regarding the substance of such a meeting, again the emphasis was on reciprocal deals of benefit to both sides, such as Obrovac/Zadar, with the "humanitarian issues", pensions and bank accounts, being handled separately.

ENDALL

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1 OF 1

IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB
INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT
DATE: 10 MAY 1994
NUMBER: _____
SUBJECT: AKASHI'S MEETING IN KNIN - 9 MAY 1994

1. On 9 May 1994 Ambassador Eide accompanied Mr Akashi and the Force Commander to Knin for a meeting between Akashi and the Serb authorities, followed by lunch. The Serbs delegation was lead by Martić and included Mikelic ("prime minister"), Babic ("deputy prime minister and foreign minister"), Tanjga ("minister of defence"), Prijic ("minister of interior"), Celeketić ("chief of staff of the army"), Novakovic (military negotiator), Lubovac (advisor on the economy), Kuzet (chief of Martić's cabinet) and Strbac ("secretary to the government"). The discussion centred on the implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the start of economic negotiations and the relationship between UNPROFOR and the Serbs.

2. Regarding implementation of the ceasefire agreement, the Serbs agreed that there were problems and that the agreement should be fully implemented over the following ten days. Meetings between UNPROFOR and UNCIVPOL and their Serb counterparts should see to this. Regarding the economic negotiations, the Serbs said that they wanted to start negotiations as soon as possible, and suggested 18 May. They said that they would meet either in Geneva, or in Vojvodina. The Croats have already made it clear that both alternatives are unacceptable to them. Turanj was rejected as not having the facilities. They said that they preferred not to produce written proposals before the negotiating meeting, but rather to attempt to find common ground at the first meeting. The Serbs appealed to Akashi to use his influence in order to modify paragraph 12 of resolution 820 as soon as possible.

3. However, Mikelic suggested a number of areas of common ground which might be in the first package: the Obrovac poles for Zadar water supply; the 400KW power line; provision of water from Petrinje to Sisak, in return for fuel and oil; the opening of the oil pipeline, and trade across the border, in convoys rather than individual vehicles (it was not clear whether this was transit or local commerce). He also said that pensions and other humanitarian matters should not be part of the economic negotiations, but should be handled separately. Eide commented that the venue remained a serious problem, but that there did seem to be significant common ground to start with. There was agreement for a meeting on 11 May in Knin with Babic to discuss the results of the Serbs' meeting on 10 May, at which their platform was to be finalised.

ENDALL

211
C2G-449

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1 OF 1
IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB

INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT

DATE: 5 MAY 1994

NUMBER: _____

SUBJECT: MEETINGS WITH SIMIC, BABIC AND JOVANOVIC IN BELGRADE -
4 MAY 1994

1. On 4 May 1994 Ambassadors Eide and Ahrens had meetings in Belgrade with Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Simic, "RSK Foreign Minister" Babic and Serbian Foreign Minister Jovanovic. The same message was given at each meeting, with Simic and Jovanovic asked to reinforce the message on our behalf with the Krajina Serbs, and we left with a reasonably positive impression.

2. Ambassador Eide outlined our proposal for a Programme on Economic Affairs and raised the questions of venue, date, preconditions and substance for the first meeting between the parties on this subject. Babic maintained a position of wanting either to meet at a crossing point or in a different country, but saw merit in our proposal that it would be more practical to meet in towns adjacent to crossing points, such as Petrinje and Sisak. He indicated that he was interested in starting negotiations as soon as possible after the Serb platform had been agreed, in theory at a meeting on 10 May. Babic understood that there could be no preconditions, that trade was an integral part of our proposal and that the payment of pensions would probably be included in the first tranche of deals. His position seemed far less opposed to economic links with Croatia than that of Mikelic.

3. Both Eide and Ahrens stressed our concern that problems with implementing the ceasefire agreement and with starting negotiations on economic matters could lead to an unravelling of the ceasefire agreement. Ahrens reported the concerns expressed to him by Ambassador Kerestedzhlyants of the Russian Federation that most of the failure to implement the ceasefire agreement was on the Serb side and that elements within the Croatian army were talking about going back to their original positions and then never withdrawing again. Each of the Serbs commented that they hoped the problems with the ceasefire were small and could be resolved quickly. They did not dispute the fact that they might be at greater fault in this respect. Jovanovic commented several times that it was essential that the ceasefire should be respected and that economic negotiations should take place, as these constituted the first and second requirements for the establishment of the modus vivendi described by the European Union.

4. The next steps in this process will be the meeting in Knin on 9 May between Akashi and Martić, with participation by Eide; the meeting of the Knin authorities on 10 May at which it is hoped they will reach positive consensus on economic negotiations, and a meeting in Knin on 11 May between Eide and Ahrens and the Serbs to review the outcome of the Knin authorities session.

ENDALL

CZG-449

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1 OF 1

IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB
INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT
DATE: 28 APRIL 1994
NUMBER: _____
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR SARINIC - 27 APRIL 1994

1. On 27 April Ambassador Eide had a short meeting with Mr Sarinic, with the intention of discussing the present state of progress towards economic negotiations. However, just before the meeting Eide received a copy of the letter dated 26 April from Sarinic to Akashi on the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. In light of this, and a request from Col Duburg for a meeting with Sarinic as Eide started the meeting, he was joined by Duburg and BGen Peeters.

2. Sarinic was rather taken aback that Eide did not immediately approve of his letter. He said that the only way he could see to resolve the impasse with Knin was to implement resolution 769, since the connection between Belgrade and Knin was now more apparent than ever, and had to be physically cut. He cited Milosovic's influence over Martić, the milicija and army as key, as well as Mikelic's statements about financial, communications and political unification of the Serb "states". He also said that the international community, and specifically UNPROFOR, was not firm enough with the Serbs. His intention with this letter was to give a kick to the process.

3. Eide, Peeters and Duburg each cautioned Sarinic against the course he was taking. Eide emphasised the potential cost to Croatia of starting a process which could lead the ceasefire agreement to unravel. Peeters and Duburg concentrated on the military aspects, raising a question over the accuracy of information being supplied to Sarinic by his own military, and also stressing the risk of taking the path to confrontation that Sarinic seemed to be favouring.

4. Sarinic had to leave to a subsequent engagement, so there was no satisfactory conclusion to the meeting. However, this meeting and other indicators suggest that we may be in for a difficult period, particularly if the Serbs take much longer to start economic negotiations.

ENDALL

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1 OF 1
IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: EIDE/MCLEOD, ICFY, ZAGREB
INFO: SRSG, HCA, DFC, MNAT
DATE: 2 MAY 1994
NUMBER: _____
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR MIKELIC - 30 APRIL 1994

On 30 April Ambassador Eide accompanied the Force Commander to Petrinje for a meeting arranged at short notice with Mr Mikelic, who was accompanied by Gen Mile Novakovic and "Minister of Interior" Ilija Prijic. The first part of the meeting was led by the Force Commander and resulted in a successful conclusion to the block on the move of Jorbat from Sector West to Sector North. Eide raised three issues with Mikelic and responded to a fourth raised by him during a hard but reasonably positive meeting.

Eide briefly outlined the background to the ceasefire and economic negotiations and asked Mikelic to indicate his position on the likely date, venue and substance of future economic negotiations. Mikelic seemed unable to produce concrete answers, saying that he expected Martic to be able to convey this information at his meeting with Akashi scheduled now for 9 May. When pushed, he said that he could envisage negotiations starting by 20 May. Mikelic said that the Serbs would not return to Zagreb to negotiate, and that he did not expect the Croats would come to Knin, so he suggested Suranj as a venue. Eide replied that the Croats probably would come to Knin, which led to backtracking by Mikelic. While he would not commit himself, he understood the proposal to meet in a number of locations, such as Plitvice, Split, Knin and Zagreb. After some time, Mikelic acknowledged the need to enter negotiations with no preconditions.

Eide presented Mikelic with copies of the current Programme on Economic Affairs, which he looked at briefly. He said this was clearly a Croatian document as we would not know the detail of places and so on, but also accepted a copy of the Serb programme of economic steps dated 23 November 1993, which we explained had been used in the production of our text. Mikelic read out elements of the economic platform that he said was being considered at the moment, but refused to give us a copy at this stage. There were no surprises, and with the exception of the references to resolution 820, little that was not covered by our paper. Eide pointed out the proposals to allow international and local trade, despite resolution 820, which was beyond our mandate to remove.

4. Mikelic raised the supply of 1,000 tonnes of fuel by 15 May to allow the completion of spring planting. Eide said that he had indications from UNPROFOR and the Croatian government that such a deal might be possible, but pointed out that it would be helpful if Mikelic could be more specific about the date and venue for renewed negotiations. Mikelic replied that if this was to be a precondition for negotiations, his request was withdrawn. As we were packing up, he reverted to the matter, suggesting that the fuel should be provided as part payment for the outstanding debts owed by UNPROFOR. Eide replied that this would be reported to Akashi.

ENDALL

CZN 788

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IMMEDIATE

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SSN 1070

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW-YORK
FROM : DE LAPRESLE, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
INFO : AKASHI, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
DATE : 31 MAY 1994
NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z - 841
SUBJECT : FORCE COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE.

2 la Rusle

CODED CABLE

1. The Force commander's conference for Croatia has been held in Zagreb on the 29 and 30 may 1994.
2. Attached is the summary of the main presentations and discussions.
3. The next Force commander's conference is scheduled on the 20 and 21 june 1994 in Zagreb, and will concern Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM.
4. Best regards.

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SUMMARY OF THE FORCE COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

Force Commander (TXT attached)

1. New concept of the Force Commander's bi-monthly meeting

The concept of the Force Commander's conference has changed. There will henceforth be two, one for Croatia and FYROM, and one for Bosnia. The aim of the organisation is to promote fruitful exchanges between Force Commander's co-ordinators and the sector commanders.

2. General framework of action

Our mandate has, in my view, 3 aspects : assistance to the delivery of aid ; creation of conditions for peace negotiations ; monitoring of the cease fires.

There is close relationship between Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and the commands.

Concerning the general situation, from the military stand point, the mission is considered a success, but this success is fragile and can break down if progress is not made on political and economic matters.

After the Gorazde crisis, there is a significant easing of military tension in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In FYROM, the situation is calm, due to the preventative deployment of UNPROFOR. This should be considered as one of the great successes of the mission.

3. UNPAs

We have achieved a fairly good success in the implementation of the CF. The excellent work done by sector commanders, but the most difficult part is yet to come. In regard, it is essential to foster cooperation, with other UN actors as well as neighbouring sectors.

4. General directives

The existing directives are being revised, but I ask you to abide as much as possible by the following watchword : "constructive impartiality". You should apply the following principles : impartiality, use of minimum forces, negotiation, mediation, restraint, transparency.

Concerning the use of force, you must continue to apply the following principles : impartiality, minimum necessary force, compliance with legal limits, firmness, offering an escape route and need to be protected.

Finally, I would like to touch upon 4 particular issues of importance. Minimise the permanent danger. Road traffic accidents : everything should be done to avoid them. Market/trafficking : it requires resolute action from you all. Public information : you must comply strictly with the directives you received from Mr AKASHI and from me.

SRSG

I fully agree with the principles outlined by the Force Commander. I congratulate the sector commanders for the outstanding achievement of the implementation of the cease fire agreement.

The situation in Croatia today is quiet, and that is related to your good work. I encourage you to continue along the same track. In Croatia, we are clearly under chapter 6 of the UN charter, which means that you must make the minimum use of force in your mission. You have to be not only soldiers, but also ambassadors and negotiators.

I also want to show my appreciation for the very good cooperation between the various components of UNPROFOR. This mission must be a joint operation involving all components, and for this I want to pay tribute to General de LAPRESLE for the excellent work he has done during the last months to increase this cooperation.

Last, I want once again to ask the sector commanders to adhere strictly to the directives issued on relations with the media. You all know how inappropriate and unauthorised declarations to the media can embarrass UNPROFOR and make our task more difficult.

Head of Civil Affairs (TXT attached)

Although the cease fire is generally holding, the negotiations have not moved forward to the stage of building confidence through economic measures, seemingly because of the inability to find a venue for the next stage of talks. Such "technical" difficulties reflect broader political differences - each side reads the signals that have emerged from the CFA as a clear legitimization of their own specific political goals. We may best find the key to a solution to these issues by a.) addressing the difficult political issues that separate the parties at the same time as we move to build confidence through economic measures ; b.) remaining sensitive to the dynamics of domestic politics in Croatia and in the "RSK" ; and c.) linking the negotiations in Croatia to those in Bosnia.

ICFY : Ambassador K. EIDE (Briefing notes attached)

We are in a deadlock concerning the economic situation. This deadlock is due to the Serbian fear of integration that directly opposes the Croatian desire of integration. Both parties seem to want to go directly to political issues, but this will inevitably lead to increased tension.

So we are in a situation where, on the one hand, the cease fire may deteriorate if it is not followed by economic negotiations, and, on the other hand, the raising of political issues may lead to the same deterioration by making public the conflicting views of the parties.

Undoubtedly, both parties look at the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and know that either increased hostilities, or a successful peace progress there will affect the situation in Croatia.

The best way to overcome this deadlock is to try to obtain a greater involvement by the international community on the Croatian issue.

COCC : General TAYYEB (TXT attached)

In his briefing, General TAYYEB, COCC touched upon the most important questions relating to the implementation of the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994.

The success achieved so far ranging from demarcation and delimitation of the zones of separation, the withdrawal of troops, direct and indirect weapons, to the establishment of new check-points and observation post was the highlight of his briefing. The briefing also drew attention to the fact that creative arrangements are necessary to be taken by the two parties due to the fact that the separation lines extend to 712 km in the four sectors of UNPAS.

The briefing showed that UNPROFOR is the eyes and ears of the international community and is hoped to build a solid peace, block by block.

SECTORS COMMANDERS' ADDRESSES

The sector commanders each reported on the implementation of the CFA in their respective areas of responsibility (see attached document to CMNAT presentation). They then made an assessment on the possible evolution of the situation in their sectors.

Sector East : Col PERELYAKIN

The cease fire agreement in Sector East has been implemented quite successfully by both warring factions. The withdrawal of troops out of the separation zone is practically complete and it is assessed that the situation will remain stable in the near future. SHQ East assesses the violations occurring in the area of Ivanovac and Mirkovci as the only essential ones of concern.

Sector West : Brig Gen SHARMA

Sector West has two main concerns on the implementation of the CFA. The first one is the problem of the presence of Special Police Forces in the sector. These forces should have been withdrawn, following the agreement given by UNPROFOR for their presence, but we have difficulties assessing the effectiveness of this withdrawal. The second one lies in the partial absence of zone of separation on the Croatian Side.

The lack of forces experienced by the sector should be resolved by the arrival of battalions with more companies during the next rotation of forces.

Sector North : Brig Gen CHMIEL

The situation in Sector North can be considered calm as there are no shootings or serious tension. The biggest concern in the future will be civilian matters. Serb side wants to start production in some factories or to take over schools rented by UN, Croat side wants their population to come back to their homes within the zone of separation.

Sector South : Maj Gen KOTIL

The implementation of the CFA can be assessed as successful despite some minor violations. I consider this to be a good precondition for continuation of negotiations. For continued progress to take place, our determination to stay in the separation zone must be indicated. We will do it by strengthening our presence and by placing UNCIVPOL stations in this zone. We are receiving more and more requests for the return of the population to their original dwellings within the separation zone and thus need a policy for the return of these displaced persons.

CMNAT : B. Gen PEETERS

Considering the last report on the application of the CFA (attached), I can say that this agreement is in effect everywhere throughout the UNPAs. Our daily challenge is to make it hold. So, I urge you to do all your best to react as soon as possible to every new violation in order to avoid degradation of the situation. The key problems we face now are as follow. Sector East : three temporary storage sites that have to be removed and the zone of separation around Vinkowski where there are still soldiers. Sector North : absence of the line of separation on the Croatian side. Sector North : no real problem. Sector South : incursion by both parties in the Velebit area.

A good way to avoid the emergence of new problems is to anticipate them. For this a good way is to develop relationships with the Civil Affairs Coordinator. As a matter of fact they have the political background on the situation in your sector, and they can help you to be not only reactive, but also proactive.

Finally, I would say that even if the negotiations at the highest level are in a stalemate, you should take every opportunity to encourage small actions at the sector, battalion, company or even platoon level. These actions such as family visits, opening of a church... cannot solve the whole problem, but certainly can ease the tension in your sector, and so reduce the number of violations.

COS/G3

I would like to address two specific issues dealing with Croatia.

1. Mine clearance update.

Mine clearance is one of the elements of the CFA. The parties agreed first to hand over mine field maps and records ; second, to clear routes and areas affecting UNPROFOR operations ; third, in the long term, to lift all mine fields.

The success in meeting the terms of this agreement is better than expected. Minefield information is still lacking in some areas ; nevertheless roads and areas are being cleared under the supervision of UNPROFOR.

We have four main concerns : lack of mine clearing units and assets ; insufficient recording and marking of cleared areas ; coordination and control of mine clearance within the sectors ; momentum obtained by urging parties to begin the lifting of minefields in the zone of separation.

In summary, good progress has been made in mine clearance operations in the UNPAs : routes and areas are gradually being opened to allow better supervision of the cease fire, and mine casualties are on the decline.

2. Close Air Support (CAS) for Croatia.

UNSCR 908 allows for the extension of CAS into Croatia in defence of UNPROFOR personnel, who are carrying out the UN mandate.

The UN release authority request procedure for CAS in Croatia is the same as for the one in Bosnia. The co-location of the SRSG, the Force Commander and the Commander Croatia Command will allow a faster time of response.

In addition to the assets already in place, UNPROFOR will require the following :

- Air Operations Coordination Center (AOCC) located in Zagreb, which will coordinate all CAS training and requests in Croatia.

- 6 TACPs, with supporting equipment will be required : 1 for Sec East, 1 for Sec West, and 2 each for Sectors North and South, located at Sector HQ's.

Each TACP would consist of 1 or 2 FAC's (to guide aircraft), using an armoured personnel carrier (APC) equipped with the appropriate communications. The FAC's would have to be provided from NATO nations due to the classification of crypto material.

PIQ (TXT attached)

Public relations being one of the most important element for the success of UNPROFOR mission, a number of press and information problems were identified. Adequate solutions have started to be, and continue to be put in place. As such, there is need to draft an adequate public information plan for UNPROFOR, a plan which would be distributed and adapted to all levels of the mission for implementation. UNPROFOR has to pursue a more active approach in all its communications activities within the mission area, mainly when dealing with the media, and adapt its communications techniques to better explain UNPROFOR'S mandate. There is a need to appoint press and information officers at all levels, especially at the battalion level, to promote the activities of the force. A review of the SRSG's and FC's directives on public information was done to ensure that everybody was fully aware of and implementing them in a most effective manner.

CAO.

Although there has been a distinct improvement in most areas of support, in some areas we are still not providing the timely and effective support which is our aim. I want to address your four topics.

1. Introduction of the REALITY system to the PLESO warehouse.

This computer software system will improve ordering and receipts of supplies as well as accountability. We intend to expand it to each battalion.

2. Rations.

We work closely with COS Logistics and Administration to improve the rations system. The current UN rations scale is approximately US\$ 6.50 per day, per person. During deployment of troops, a 3 week notification period is necessary in order to avoid disruption in the food supply.

3. Engineering.

The priority is currently being given to the redeployment of JORBAT 2 and UKRBAT in Sector North ; CANBAT 1 and JORBAT 3 in Sector South ; and to the pending reinforcement of ARGBAT and JORBAT 1 in Sector West.

4. General administrative matters

- there is a lack of Sector Administrative Officers, although this is being addressed ;
- an increased authority to settle claims up to US \$ 3.000 has been received from the controller in New-York ; this should ease your action in the sectors.

DISCUSSION

As wished by the Force Commander, a very fruitful discussion among the participants in this conference took place. Various issues, some of them having been raised during the sectors' addresses, were discussed ; among the most prominent are the following :

- possibility to move the lines of separation defined by the CFA. B. Gen PEETERS called for caution in this matter, because any slight modification could be like the opening of a Pandora box

- problems of displaced persons : B. Gen PEETERS emphasised the fact that it is absolutely necessary to have the same rules and regulations for all the sectors. Mr Nicholas MORRIS (UNHCR) recalled that the problem of displaced persons and refugees falls under his responsibility, and that sector commanders should not hesitate to turn their problems to UNHCR.

- presence of UNCIVPOL within the zone of separation : Commissioner FREDERICKSEN (UNCIVPOL) stated that it was his intent to deploy all over the zone of separation, but that was not possible currently due to the dramatic lack of resources.

- coordination within the sector : the Force Commander took the opportunity to clearly recall to all the participants that the sector commanders are the coordinators of all UN actions within their sectors.

- lack of resources in specific items : night vision and optical equipment, communication assets, spare parts, accommodation : CAO emphasised the fact that it is important to differentiate between items under national responsibilities (spare parts) and those under UN responsibilities.

FC'S CONFERENCE - Croatia

30 MAY 1994

I am pleased to be able to bring you together here today for my first Force Commander's Conference which was initially scheduled for 14 April, then postponed to 21 April, and finally had to be cancelled in the light of events in Gorazde.

INTRODUCTION

I would like, first of all, to thank Mr AKASHI for his participation in this conference. His attendance demonstrates his interest in your work on the ground. I equally welcome Mr DE MELLO, Head of Civil Affairs, and Mr BALDIE, Chief Administrative Officer who will address you shortly.

The entire UNPROFOR Command team is thus here this morning at your disposal.

Having reminded you about my concept for this conference and what I expect from it, I will give you my assessment of where UNPROFOR stands, as I see it today, followed by future actions to be undertaken in the UNPAS, and end by reminding you of my general directives requiring your attention.

The general idea behind my remarks is that the prevailing situation within the UNPROFOR theatre of operations, especially in Croatia, calls for further resolve, balanced judgement, and firmness on our part. This is necessary in order not to disappoint those for whom the recent UNPROFOR achievements, especially the implementation of the 29 March cease-fire, have raised hope, even if this is at times paradoxical. Therein lies the difficulty of your mission and I will come back to this later.

WHICH THE RECENT UNPROFOR ACHIEVEMENTS, ESPECIALLY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 29 MARCH cease-fire, have raised hope, even if this is at times paradoxical. Therein lies the difficulty of your mission and I will come back to this later.

1 - THE NEW CONCEPT OF THE FORCE COMMANDERS' BIMONTHLY MEETINGS.

First, let me say a few words on the concept of my Conferences. Following a preparatory meeting for this conference, involving the Deputy Force Commander and the Chief of Staff, I considered two key elements :

- On the one hand, the concerns of the sector commanders in the UNPAS and those of sector commanders in Bosnia-Herzegovina are largely different in view of the special nature of their respective areas of operations,
- On the other hand, the number of participants at these conferences as they have been organised hitherto, was too high.

Taking these factors into account, I concluded that these conferences should be organised in a way which would allow a more meaningful exchange of views between sector commanders and the UNPROFOR command team

I decided that my aim would be better achieved by holding two separate conferences, one for Croatia and FYROM (this conference is an exception due to the absence of Brig Gen Telefsen), the other for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

My aim, through the medium of this new style of conference, is to promote an exchange of views amongst commanders whose tasks and concerns are similar.

Furthermore, I expressed the wish that the issues addressed should be reduced, and restricted to those directly concerning the sector commanders, me and my general subordinates.

Other issues, obviously important, but which are not within the scope of this conference, may be addressed in other meetings, such as the bi-monthly COS conference, like the one recently held which, from information reaching me, was a great success.

2 - GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF ACTION.

I would now like to give you a general framework for UNPROFOR in former Yugoslavia.

2.1- The mission.

Our mission, in my view, consists of three aspects:

- First of all, there is the continued assistance to the delivery of humanitarian aid delivery, distributed by UNHCR to about 4 million people throughout former Yugoslavia. This constitutes the initial reason for our presence, especially in Bosnia.

-Then there is our contribution to the creation of conditions which facilitate the resumption of peace negotiations between the various parties, and these conditions are basically the general and lasting cessation of hostilities.

Finally there is the monitoring of the various cease-fire agreements, particularly the one signed on 29 March 1994 by the Croats and the Krajina Serbs, which should pave the way for a normalisation of economic and then political relations between the two parties : this normalisation is indispensable for the emergence of a lasting peace.

The emphasis on these three aspects may vary with time, in the light of the situation on the ground and of diplomatic achievements, and there is no doubt that attention is currently being focused more on the second and the third than on the first.

2.2- Interrelationship between the various parties on the theatre.

I would also like to underscore the close relationship which you probably do not perceive clearly, but which undoubtedly exists between Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM Command. Any action undertaken on one of these three territories may affect the entire UNPROFOR action in one way or the other. The repercussions from the use of air power in Bosnia-Herzegovina speak for themselves. And we are all aware of the influence which Belgrade's instructions have on the authorities in Knin or Pale, and their consequences in Skopje.

Our theatre of operations has truly strategic unity, even if our task as peace-keepers and role as "non-combatants" make it difficult to distinguish eventually between the strategic, operational and tactical level. They are in fact inextricably linked.

2.3- General situation.

Concerning the general situation throughout our mission area, I strongly feel that the military component of UNPROFOR has generally reached a level of efficiency vis-à-vis its mandates and its numerical strength, which may only slightly be increased with reinforcements, not due to arrive until the next few weeks if not months. It is therefore my impression that this mission has been a real success to date, although such a statement may surprise the media.

But I also feel that this success is very fragile and will only be consolidated if appropriate economic and political measures are taken as soon as possible, both in Croatia as well as in Bosnia-Herzegovina and even in FYROM. This must supplement military action, which should not be slackened, but it cannot on its own, bring about a lasting peace. We all know that there is no military solution to the problems of this country. Economic and political consequences of this often repeated statement, should be quickly taken into account.

2.4- Specific situation in BH and FYROM.

Before addressing the issue of your theatre which is Croatia, let me give you in a few words of my own analysis of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and FYROM.

In **Bosnia-Herzegovina**, following the Serb offensive of 10 April on Gorazde, which led to the passing of a new resolution by the Security Council and a new ultimatum by NATO, there has been a significant easing of military tension.

- In **Gorazde**, General Rose is trying to obtain the withdrawal of all military forces, militia and police from the 3 km zone. After a Bosnian agreement on a first proposal, followed by a Serb agreement on a second slightly different proposal, we have a great deal of hope that each and every party will abide by their respective commitments.
- In **Sarajevo**, the situation is generally calm with a return to a semblance of normal life, while the team led by Mr Eagleton is laying the groundwork for the reconstruction of the city.

- In **Tuzla**, and **Brcko** area, the deployment of UNMOS and a battery of a Jordanian mortar and artillery locating unit will enable us to better assess the situation in these extremely sensitive areas. This would prevent us from falling into provocation.
- In **Sector South-East**, the Croat-Muslim federation seems to be consolidating, and while we are generally witnessing the emergence of various common bodies, i.e. the presidency of the federation and a common Force Headquarters, there is a generally stable military situation on the ground.

Finally, today the 30 May, an important Bosnian parliamentary meeting is being held and we hope that the outcome will favour renewed negotiations.

We therefore strongly hope to obtain, and maybe not later than Thursday or Friday, a general cease-fire in Bosnia-Herzegovina, similar to the one you have been implementing for the past two months in Croatia.

In **FYROM**, the situation is relatively calm in spite of the pressure felt by this country from the South, West and North. This situation is perhaps attributable to the fact that the UN for the first time, made a preventative rather than a reactive deployment in a potential zone of conflict. But even there, it is obvious that the situation is fragile and that several grounds for dissatisfaction are emerging, as much in Kosovo, as in Serbia, or in Albania.

As you can see therefore, in Bosnia as well as in FYROM, the general tendency is towards a relatively low level of military activity, even if several areas of tension exist, and the transition to a climate of peace is not yet truly assured.

3 - UNPAS

I would now like to address the operations which you are undertaking in the UNPAS.

First of all, let me congratulate you once again for the excellent work that you have been doing with regard to the implementation of the CFA. It is only thanks to your recent efforts that such results have been achieved.

However I should sound this note of warning : without being unduly pessimistic, I would say that the most difficult part is yet to come. As a matter of fact, the implementation of this agreement has raised some hope. Hope for the refugees to be able to return home soon and live and work there in safety. Hope for the Croat government for a normalisation of the situation in the UNPAS which they wish to reintegrate into their economic and political system. The concern of the Serbs for a *de facto* situation which establishes a border between the "RSK" and Croatia. Obviously, these hopes are clearly divergent in the short term. The feeling that these hopes will be dashed could bring about very negative reactions from all sides, and these could lead to a gradual resumption of hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, and even extend to the rest of the Balkans.

That is why it is incumbent upon you to continue to give substance to this hope by directing your action :

- as a first priority, to the military achievement of the cease-fire by pursuing and stepping up those actions that you have been undertaking hitherto,
- as a second priority to the support of the Civil Affairs' actions in your sector.

May I point out once again that the Cease-fire Agreement is not an end in itself, and that all your actions in collaboration with UNCIVPOL, UNMOS, ECMM, UNHCR etc. should pave the way for economic negotiations in the first place, to be followed later by political negotiations, although this distinction between the economic and the political is obviously quite artificial...

Finally in all that you do, I would like to emphasise two factors which should play a major role.

First of all I wish to mention the co-ordination of the various activities in your sector. You know that the UN has limited resources to accomplish all its tasks : it is therefore imperative to avoid duplication of effort between the various actors (Civil Affairs, UNHCR, UNMOs, CIVPOL), and to clearly define your priorities.

In the same vein, I ask you to develop relationships across your boundaries, with the neighbouring sectors. In view of what I just mentioned about the UN resources, I want to reiterate clearly that no new reinforcement should be expected in the short term. It is therefore important to foster relationships which, at your level, and subject to the approval of the Headquarters in Zagreb, could lead to reciprocal support actions from sector to sector.

4 - GENERAL DIRECTIVES.

I would now like to talk about my general directives.

The existing Force Commander's directives, dating back to 7 March, are currently being revised in the light of recent developments in the situation and in the missions, and also in the light of what you are going to tell me during the course of this morning's conference.

4.1- Principles

While awaiting receipt of these directives I ask you to continue to abide as much as possible by the following watchword which I think sums up the entire philosophy of our mission :

"Constructive impartiality"

I ask you to use this watchword in the application of the following principles :

- **Impartiality** : it is essential because it is the foundation for the entire credibility, not only of UNPROFOR, but also in a more general sense, of all operations of this kind. That is why I ask you to strictly abide by it. But it is necessary for this impartiality to be both dynamic and constructive. I mean that this impartiality should not be a pretext for a passive neutrality or inaction to avoid criticism. On the contrary, this impartiality should entail unflinching and determined action.
- **Use of minimum force** : as a peace-keeping force, we have neither the mission, nor the means to impose peace. We are, by definition and structure, "non-combatants", and we definitively have neither the mandate nor the means to become, even for a single operation, "combatants". We should therefore know how to strike a balance between firmness and flexibility. I emphasise this point so that we will never hesitate, in self defence, to use force as a riposte commensurate with the threat, in order to save life and to preserve the dignity of our officers and other ranks within the legal framework of the ROE. The use of force, when it is impartial and measured, contributes to our credibility. I will return to this in a minute.
- **Negotiation / Mediation** : it is thanks to your constant actions with the various parties that you have been able to create the climate of confidence necessary for the restoration of peace. With this in mind, I ask you to intensify your daily contacts at all levels on an equitable basis between the parties, as well as between civilian and military authorities. Every day dedicated to strengthening the bonds between your local partners is a day well spent in the service of peace.
- **Patience and Restraint** : this only can serve to bring closer together the radically opposing positions of the various parties. These qualities will enable you to avoid breaking the bridge that you, as peacekeepers, should be between the parties.
- **Transparency** : as a UN mission called upon to carry out mandates given to us by the international community, we do not have enemies, but partners and above all a large number of external observers. We must therefore do all we can to present as clear a picture of our action as possible, so that we leave no room for criticism, but rather seduce them into supporting our actions.

4.2- Use of force.

Returning to the use of force, I would ask you to continue to apply the following 7 principles whenever required :

1. **Impartiality** : I have just touched upon that and I will not repeat myself.

2. **Minimum necessary force** which can be defined as follows : the measured application of force or coercion, sufficient only to achieve a specific end, demonstrably reasonable, proportionate and appropriate : and confined in effect to the specific and legitimate target intended. In this context, I stress that the limit, which I do not want to see passed between "non-combatants" which we are and "combatants" which we cannot become is not a question of the use of force or otherwise. Nor is it a question of the level of force used. It is rather in the measured, proportional and impartial nature of the response used in self defence of our personnel in their physical and moral integrity.
3. Compliance with **legal limits**, as laid down in the ROE.
4. **Firmness** in the general attitude of the commanders and soldiers.
5. Unequivocal **warning** of the intention to use force.
6. Offering an acceptable **escape route** to the party against whom you want to use force to enable it "give up", while "saving face."
7. Finally being in a **protected position** in order to minimise risks. Our constant concern should be the protection of our soldiers.

I ask you to apply these principles firmly for it is difficult to imagine a faster way of crossing the crucial impartiality line dividing peace-keeping and non-combatant from peace-keeping and combatant than by a crass, unthinking, unfocused use of force.

But on the other hand, we must never hesitate to be firm and use force when it is necessary. A weak approach will never help the implementation of our peace keeping tasks, and this is why such a mission can only be fulfilled by soldiers. You remember the well-known sentence of former Secretary-general Dag Hamarskjöld : it is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it.

4.3- Special issues.

Before concluding, I would like to briefly touch upon 4 special issues.

-Mines:

One of the most important issues is that of the danger of mines spread all over the theatre. I ask you to do all in your power to minimise the risks that these mines represent for your soldiers as well as for the civilian population.

-Road traffic accidents:

I also ask you to do all within your power to reduce the number of accidents, as there is nothing more stupid than ruining health or losing lives because of such avoidable accidents. With this in mind, we should all focus on our responsibilities: traffic regulations, vehicle roadworthiness and so on.

Black Market / trafficking:

By controlling these plagues, UNPROFOR will preserve its credibility within the international community and amongst the various parties. I therefore ask you to be vigilant and resolute in dealing very severely with any related offence committed in your sector.

Public Information Policy:

Mr Williams being absent, in his place and on his behalf, Major Desjardins, my PIO, will address this issue in greater detail shortly, but I would like to draw your attention to the considerable harm that could be done to UNPROFOR by issuing unauthorised statements to journalists. I realise that, with the media having focused its attention on Bosnia-Herzegovina, you do not have too strong a pressure on you. I ask you however to be very careful and strictly apply those directives I have given you and which I have recently reiterated.

TRANSITION

I have now come to the end of my address. Before handing over to Mr AKASHI, I would like to mention quickly the agenda for this morning's proceedings.

After Mr AKASHI, Mr DE MELLO will address the main Civil Affairs issues.

He will be followed by General TAYYEB, then by each of the Sector Commanders.

Before the coffee break, General PEETERS will brief you about the application of the CFA that you are making hold.

After the coffee break, the COS and G3 air will address the issue of the extension of close air support to Croatia. They will be followed by Ambassador EIDE who will raise the problems faced by ICFY, with special reference to the economic negotiations in Croatia.

Finally to end this series of presentations, Major Desjardins will deal with the issue of Public Information and Mr Baldie those concerning Administration.

I urge speakers to keep strictly to the their allotted time so that the discussion period, which in my opinion, is the highlight of the day, will be given the time allotted. It is moreover my wish that this free exchange of ideas continues during lunch which will bring this conference to a close

Remarks by Mr. Sergio Vieira de Mello
UNPROFOR Head of Civil Affairs, at the
Force Commander's Conference
30 May 1994

1. The reporting that comes in from the sectors, from our colleagues in ICFY, from ECMM and from the local press all suggest that we find ourselves at a critical juncture in the implementation of the Cease Fire Agreement. Although the ceasefire itself is generally holding, the negotiations have not moved forward to the stage of building confidence via economic measures. In my remarks this morning, I will make three broader points: the problems in implementing the CFA may force us to attend, straight away, to difficult political issues that separate the parties. Second, to address these problems successfully, we should be well-informed about the evolution of domestic politics in Croatia and in the "RSK." Third, we should also appreciate how and how closely the problems in Croatia are linked to those in Bosnia, so that we can coordinate our activities in Zagreb and in the sectors more closely with our and ICFY's work in all theaters of the conflict.

2. The difficulties in implementing the first phase of the CFA -- especially in regulating the Zone of Separation /ZOS/ - - reflect deeper problems in moving negotiations forward. For example, we have not yet satisfactorily resolved the problem of policing the ZOS. As a result, there have been a number of arrests of individuals from one side by the police from the other side. It is now clear that Paragraphs 9-10 of the CFA were too vague, perhaps deliberately and unavoidably so. As a result, the Commissioner and the sector commanders are forced to develop an ad hoc implementation strategy that is essentially faced with the fundamental political and legal issue of jurisdiction over the ZOS. I wish to pay tribute to the professionalism and resourcefulness of our Civilian Police monitors in adapting, as they have done, to these major challenges.

3. The problems with police reflect the two sides' deep conceptual differences: the Serbs maintain that the former CL is an inviolable border, while the Croats do not recognize any borders between Croatia and UNPAs whatsoever and view the creation of the ZOS as a temporary and very preliminary stage.

4. Nor should we ignore the difficulties faced by displaced persons/DP's/. The establishment of the ZOS together with the cessation of hostilities have raised expectations of DP's to return home. This genuinely humanitarian issue leaves a deep emotional imprint on those affected, but it is also a crucial political issue used by both sides to exert pressure on UNPROFOR and each other. In the Vance plan and general international practice, the division of responsibility on this issue is clear: UNHCR is the lead organization which

facilitates the return of DP's and UNPROFOR plays an ancillary and supportive role. In close consultation with UNPROFOR over the past several weeks, UNHCR has stated that now is not the time to encourage DP's to return and the decision of individuals to return must be made with full knowledge of the safety and security aspects. In other words, we should not discourage an informed choice either.

5. As you can see, these problems are neither trivial nor transitory. In fact, they reflect the broader political differences that remain between the two sides. The seemingly "technical" issues facing ICFY's negotiators -- such as finding a venue for the stage of talks in which we help the two sides "build confidence" via economic cooperation -- hang up on fundamental political differences. The negotiators on the two sides each read the signals that have emerged from the CFA as a clear legitimization of their own specific political projects. So, as the newly elected RSK authorities move forward with their project of political and economic integration with "all Serbian lands," the Croatian government impatiently seeks to re-integrate the UNPA's into the Croatian economy and political system. Mr. Mikelic, during a recent visit to Sector East was quoted as having said that "the economic future of "RSK" lies with the other Serb States; Sector East with Serbia and the rest with Republica Srpska". These are unfortunate statements. In Croatia the reintroduction of Kuna as a currency replacing the Dinar is equally regrettable. In short, we find almost no common ground between the two sides. What is certain, as far as UNPROFOR is concerned, is that the CFA is not, must not be allowed to become an end in itself. To forget that would be an unforgivable and probably deliberate display of amnesia.

6. If we were fatalists, we might explain these difficulties merely by reference to the "typical mid-mandate lag," in which a hopeful first two months of a mandate is followed by a period in which negotiations bog down by both sides intransigence and disappointment that UNPROFOR is not fully on their side. It is true that we see the typical signs of "mid-mandate lag." The talks have stalled; the situation is tense throughout the sectors. The highest Croatian authorities have suggested that they may seek not to renew UNPROFOR's mandate again. Similarly, Mr. Martić has stalled his negotiations with ICFY. The only encouraging development in this rather somber environment was the visit on 18 May of the Archbishop of Sibenik, Rev. Badurina, to Knin where he met the Serbian Episcopate, Jovic, and visited several damaged and destroyed catholic churches. Badurina was reported as having described his trip as "a step forward towards the normalization of the situation in Croatia". How can we re-gain the momentum and move the negotiations forward towards a settlement?

7. We might find some clues if we look at the economic and political prospects faced by the two governments. The newly elected authorities from the "RSK" face some difficult choices, for example. If they seek complete independence, they would seem to have few prospects for economic development. Their desire for integration with Serbia and the

FRY puts them directly in conflict with a long list of SCR's and with the Croats sitting across the table. Nor will it be easy to reconcile these imperatives with the "RSK's" domestic politics: reporting from a variety of sources suggests that serious frictions and contentions within RSK political system.

8. Nor should Croatian politics prove to have a moderating influence in the near term. It is still too early to read the ultimate effect of the split within the ruling HDZ in which two of the party's leaders Josip Manolić (President of the upper House of Counties) and Stipe Mesic (President of the lower House of Representatives) -- have founded a new political party and have called on moderates in the party to join them. Their move represents the first serious crisis within the ruling HDZ. It may seriously erode its parliamentary majority as more defections may follow. Early elections may be called.

9. Unfortunately, we should not expect the renewal of open political competition in Croatian politics to precede a more conciliatory approach to negotiations. The comments of some individuals who have left the ruling party confirm that the mainstream Croatian opposition remains quite hawkish in its positions towards the UNPAs and not terribly supportive of UNPROFOR. And, quite frankly, in the search for votes, who better is there to attack out of frustration than the presence of an international peacekeeping force that is castigated for its alleged passivity.

10. In short, we should not expect our jobs to become easier in the near term. Recent events suggest that work on the ground will become even more difficult. Just as neither side seems ready to make concessions, both sides should be willing to push UNPROFOR in line with its own political program.

11. Therefore, we may not be able to find the key to crossing this impasse in the negotiations in Croatia without reference to those in Bosnia. We are told that the Serbs in the "RSK" are looking intently at the situation in Bosnia in order to see how far they can go. The Croatian government has invested a great deal in the negotiations for a federation with the BiH predominantly Muslim Government. So we know that solutions to the wars in Bosnia and Croatia depend on each other. This is why it is terribly disappointing that, at the conclusion of the meeting about Bosnia on 13 May, the Foreign Ministers said nothing about Croatia, established no clear link between the two.

12. A solution to the Bosnian conflict may not necessarily help solve the problems in Croatia if we continue to address the two separately and to privilege one over the other. Time has come to again adopt an integrated approach. A unity of purpose and resolve of the UN, the EU, Russia, the United States and other major players - including regional ones - is required on both fronts. Active and cohesive international diplomatic support is called for, to prevent UNPROFOR from becoming, in Croatia, another UNFICYP or UNIFIL (and I know

what I am talking about, having served in Cyprus and Lebanon): by that I mean that UNPROFOR is likely to become a convenient tool or screen for the Serbs and an object of increasingly systematic criticism on the part of a broad spectrum of anxious and frustrated Croatian public opinion. We keep repeating, as I did on Osijek on Saturday morning, that UNPROFOR is an instrument not of the parties to the conflict but of their efforts and those of the international community to resolve their conflict.

13. The coming summer may well be the last for the present status quo. Offensive action or other irrational types of behaviour are almost unavoidable by next September unless the present deadlock is broken. In his opening remarks, Mr. Akashi referred to 1956 as the birth date of UN peace-keeping. It reminded me of UNEF I and its pull-out from Sinai, at the request of one of the parties to the conflict. We all know the tragic end to that episode. This is why UNPROFOR should not be used merely as the manager of the 29 March CFA. In the absence of a political strategy, the CFA is bound to suffer erosion and to ultimately collapse. UNPROFOR's positive role could be the next casualty.

Thank you.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

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AMBASSADOR KAI EIDE

SPEAKING NOTES FOR THE FORCE COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE ON CROATIA

30 MAY 1994

- Where do we stand on the venue for the economic negotiations?
 - There was tentative agreement by the parties on 29/30 March 1994 to meet again on 12 April in the Russian embassy.
 - The Serbs withdrew the option of the Russian embassy and then of coming to any venue in Zagreb.
 - Now the Croatian side insist on meeting inside Croatia, including the UNPAs, and the Serbs insist on meeting outside Croatia, including the territory they control.
 - We have made a number of imaginative proposals, none of which has been acceptable to both parties. Therefore we are in deadlock.
- Why is there deadlock?
 - Serb fear of integration.
 - Croatian desire for integration.
 - The Serbs see the CFA as an end in itself while the Croats see it as the first step in a process.
 - Public statements on both sides lead to a hardening of positions.
- How to overcome the deadlock?
 - This is not a question of coming out with new fancy proposals. We must avoid the tendency for someone to always arrive with new proposals, letting the parties off the hook.
 - The issue is how can pressure be put on the parties.

- If we manage to break the deadlock on venue, what then? The Serbs have a minimalist approach and the Croats want everything as soon as possible, so there could be a new deadlock.
- Should we go directly to the political issues?
 - Both sides seem to want this.
 - But, if we open the political questions, this will almost inevitably also lead to increased tension.
- I agree the lack of economic negotiations may lead to the erosion of the CFA. But the initiation of new negotiations could do exactly the same, with the conflicting views of the parties openly out on the table. Negotiations could, of course, be a mechanism for moderating the behavior of the parties. But past experience suggests that the public positions will harden which could lead to more dangerous policies.
- Both parties look at the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and know that increased hostilities there, or a successful peace process, will affect the situation in Croatia.
- The crucial element will be our ability to mobilise a far greater involvement by the international community if we are to make significant progress. At present the focus is almost entirely on BH, and we will make efforts to change that. Greater international attention is not only of decisive importance to the final political solution, but also to make the parties abstain from renewed conflict.
- We have to face the fact that the easy part has been done. With or without the economic negotiations, the CFA will be under pressure. The widespread belief that lack of economic/political negotiations will lead to the erosion of the CFA is a somewhat simplistic view. If the CFA is to survive, the decisive element will be the ability of the international community to focus on the Croatian issue, and even then success is far from guaranteed.
- This is a gloomy picture, perhaps. I seek comfort in the words of Mark Twain: "Fortunately, most of my worries never came true".

FORCE COMMANDER'S CONFERENCE

FOR CROATIA COMMAND
30 MAY 1994

CROATIA COMMAND PRESENTATION

A. INTRODUCTION

The signing of the cease-fire agreement on 29 March 94 forms the threshold of success toward having a peaceful settlement to the conflict in the UNPAS which caused people to suffer over the last two years. The UNPROFOR mission is in the midst of a transformation to a more defined peace -keeping role, with a concrete agreement to implement. The logic of the peace process, evident and encouraging at present, is that the military phase is the initial step, to be followed by arrangements in the economic and political spheres. Therefore, the implementation of the cease-fire agreement should not be viewed as an end in itself, but as a true test to the commitment of both sides, Serbs and Croats, to peace.

B. MILITARY

Most parts of the cease-fire agreement ranging from the demarcation and delimitation of zones of separation, policing, withdrawal of troops, the withdrawal of direct and indirect weapons, appear to have been tested on the ground with a fair degree of success. In the implementation of these measures, there were some delays, logistical constraints and tactical maneuvers on the part of all parties concerned. However, the fact of the matter is that we now have separation zones in areas where they never existed before. The separation lines extend to a 712-kilometer length in the four sectors. This

-2-

length requires a huge number of troops to deal with, in addition to a good number of UNMOS and CIVPOL officers. In this connection, and due to the lack of troops, it is worth noting here that creative arrangements may be attempted by both parties to have confidence-building measures to materialize and help solve major problems related to the full implementation of the CFA. In the implementation of the CFA, observation posts and check-points have been tactically positioned within peace-keeping parameters, UNMOS have had relatively unimpeded access to carry out their verifications, and joint patrols between UNPROFOR and the appropriate unit of each of the two sides is functioning.

An aspect relating to the military dimensions of the negotiating process which requires attention and is applicable to all the UNPAS is the indication that may be concluded to the effect that the Serb side probably takes the CFA as the end-point, while the Croatian side looks at the CFA as a point of departure towards enforcing some of the provisions of the Vance plan, particularly in relation to the question of demilitarization. At this stage, it is important to consider ways and means of filling the gaps sensed in the agreement and strengthening its foundations. Two sets of issues need to be addressed: structural and instrumental and these may be done simultaneously. Firstly, those issues which have now persisted need to be placed under scrutiny of an extraordinary sessions of the Joint Commissions. Preferably, prior to this, these outstanding issues could be a subject for a problem-solving study to be carried out by

a tripartite group appointed by the Central Joint Commission and entrusted primarily with the task of examining their special features and making recommendations. Secondly, UNPROFOR may need to gear itself to anticipatory thinking. In this connection some thoughts come to mind. These include the following:

- Are the next set of problems going to come from the military sphere?
- Is there a need for a contingency planning?
- Are there problem areas which are critical, and on which we need to urgently focus?
- How do we time and prepare for movement of troops, within sectors and between sectors, to avoid inappropriate political signals?
- What should be the structure of deployment in each sector, particularly in the zones of separation, taking into account different experiences and diverse capabilities of units?
- How does one maintain continuity and consistency of presence from one rotation to another?
- What kind of organizational arrangements and institutional procedures ought to be developed in concert with UNCIVPOL, Civil Affairs, UNHCR and other agencies so as to exercise credible authority in the zone of separation ?

C. ECONOMIC

Because resources are limited, we have to identify, S by Sector, which are the priority programs and projects will require assistance from the military component of UNPROFOR. To prepare for the next step of the peace process it would be useful to develop, in coordination with Civil Affairs, an inventory of projects in agriculture, manufacturing, services, infrastructure water, sewage, energy, transport, communication, electricity, housing, ecology and humanitarian field. The types and locations of such projects should also be identified. A list of this type can be used as a planning base for procurement of relevant resources, and also as a guide to demining operations. The emphasis should be here on those areas which could come up in the course of impending economic negotiations. Rehabilitation and reconstruction proposals in the UNPA are not the responsibility of UNPROFOR alone. It should be a kind of coordinated proposals with different UN and humanitarian bodies and agencies. Within this context, the return of the displaced people to their homes and property can be considered through stages and priorities by both UN and UNPROFOR in accordance to the availability of resources and assistance.

D. CONCLUSION

The dangers of the CFA getting politicized are real. Therefore, it is an imperative that we continue to push the Dayton Agreement as much as possible, so long as the window of opportunity remains open.

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A sustainable peace unfolds on account of work at all levels. The role of UNPROFOR is from the ground up, and to be the eyes and ears of the international community. While we await a comprehensive solution to the problems of war, UNPROFOR must continue to build for peace, brick by solid brick.

Maj Gen Al Tayyeb
COCC

**STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT**

AS OF 282400 MAY 1994

1. Breaches of the cease-fire since 04 April 94 (Par 1-CFA)a. By Croatian side b. By Serbian side

EAST	4
SOUTH	1

Total	5

EAST	6
WEST	2
SOUTH	1
Total	9

A cease-fire violation is a confirmed engagement of one or more rounds of fire directed against an opposing force.

2. Retaliation after breaches of the cease-fire since 04 April 94 (Par 7-CFA)a. Croatian side b. Serbian side

EAST	3
WEST	0
SOUTH	0
NORTH	0
Total	3

EAST	2
WEST	0
SOUTH	0
NORTH	0
Total	2

3. Violations of the freeze of the tactical situation in the 0-10 km zone and unauthorized moves since 04 April 94 (Par 2-CFA)a. Croatian side b. Serbian side

EAST	0
WEST	0
SOUTH	0
NORTH	0
Total	0

EAST	0
WEST	0
SOUTH	0
NORTH	0
Total	0

4. Withdrawal of heavy weapons (Par 3-CFA)a. Croatian side(1) Violations with regard to the 10 km line

The following weapons are still deployed between 0-10 km.

EAST	0
WEST	0
SOUTH	0
NORTH	0

(2) Violations with regard to the 20 km line

The following weapons are still deployed between 0-20 km.

EAST	0
WEST	0
SOUTH	0
NORTH	0

(3) Storage sites, other than the three mentioned in CFA and not respecting the 10 or 20 km constraint.

EAST:	0		
WEST:	0		
SOUTH:	0		
NORTH:	BOSILJEVO	SxZIS-3/76	13km
	TURKOVICI	Tks	17km
	KASUNI	Tks	17km
	PRIBIC	Arty	19km

(4) Which weapons with range exceeding 20 km are not redeployed out of range (Par 3 of Annex B-CFA):

None

b. Serbian side(1) Violations with regard to the 10 km line

The following weapons are still deployed between 0-10 km.

EAST: 0

WEST: 0

SOUTH: 0

NORTH: 0

(2) Violations with regard to the 20km line

The following weapons are still deployed between 0-20km.

EAST: 1 (4 M60 RCL)

WEST: 0

SOUTH: 0

NORTH: 0

- (3) Storage sites, other than the five mentioned in CFA and not respecting the 10 or 20km constraint.

EAST: SIRINE, MARINOVCI, KARANAC:
accepted by UNPROFOR as a temporary solution.
SECERANA: accepted by UNPROFOR: colocated with the authorized site of BELI-MANASTIR.

WEST: 7 sites under double lock:
BRUSNIK, SEOVICA, RAJIC, MLAKA, JASENOVAC, CAGE, STARA GRADISKA.
Those sites are accepted by UNPROFOR (implementation of VANCE PLAN).

SOUTH: 0

NORTH: RAKOVICA 1 Tks 16km
JELOV KLANAC 15km

- (4) Which weapons with range exceeding 20km are not redeployed out of range? (Par 3 of Annex B-CFA)

NORTH	RAKOVICA	3x130	16km
	POLOSKI VARUS	8x130	24km
	KATINOVAC 3	8x130	24km (will be consolidated at POLOSKI)
	KOMANDA	1x130	21,5km

5. Separation of forces - withdrawal behind the SL of all military, paramilitary, militia and police personnel (Par 4-CFA)

a. Croatian side violations

EAST:	11	
WEST:	2	Still 50/60 special policemen are within SL after VUKOVJE issue
SOUTH:	1	
NORTH:	3	

b. Serbian side violations

EAST:	3
WEST:	0
SOUTH:	10
NORTH:	3

- c. Still some problems exist in the VELEBIT mountains, where both sides occasionally patrol and where UNPROFOR has difficulties to control due to the extensiveness of the area and the existing mine danger.

6. Freedom of movement violations since 04 Apr 94 (Par 5-CFA)a. Croatian side(1) Restrictions on UNMO's movement between 0-20 km

EAST: 9

WEST: 0

SOUTH: 16

NORTH: 7

Restrictions on UNPROFOR's movement:

North: 6

East : 2

(2) Restrictions on the UNMO's visit to storage sites or military facilities after 4hrs notice

EAST: 2

WEST: 0

SOUTH: 4

NORTH: 1

(3) VUKOVJE incident of 11 May. Several restrictions on the movement of UNPROFOR personnel.(4) Restrictions on UNPROFOR's use of helicopters over the 0-10-20 km zone.

No violation reported.

b. Serbian side(1) Restrictions on UNPROFOR's movement throughout the UNPA

EAST:	2
WEST:	0
SOUTH:	5
NORTH:	8

(2) Restrictions on UNPROFOR's visits to storage sites or military facilities after 4 hrs notice.

EAST:	0
WEST:	0
SOUTH:	4
NORTH:	1

(3) Restrictions on UNPROFOR's use of helicopters over Sector.

none

7. Do SJC and LJC exist? (Par 6-CFA)

- a. Do the Croats attend the meetings after having been called by UNPROFOR/ Violations since 04 April 94.

EAST:	NTR
WEST:	NTR
SOUTH:	5
NORTH:	NTR

- b. Do the Serbs attend the meetings after having been called by UNPROFOR? Violations since 04 April 1994.

EAST:	NTR
WEST:	NTR
SOUTH:	NTR
NORTH:	1

8. Mineclearing-minefield records violations since 04 April 94a. Croatian side

Which minefield records haven't been given?

(1) Records

EAST: No record received
WEST: NTR
SOUTH: No records from Gospic OZ
NORTH: NTR

(2) Demining NOT occurring on request and under control of UNPROFOR

EAST: 1
WEST: 1
SOUTH: 3
NORTH: NTR

b. Serbian side

(1) Which minefield records haven't been given?

EAST: No records received
WEST: NTR
SOUTH: No records from Lika Corps
NORTH: No records from Lika Corps & Banija Corps

(2) Demining NOT occurring on request and under control of UNPROFOR.

EAST: 1
WEST: 0
SOUTH: 5
NORTH: 0

9. Are all foreseen X-ings operating (Par 8-CFA)Not operating crossings

EAST: NTR
WEST: NTR
SOUTH: NTR
NORTH: 1 (BREST): not accepted by Serbian side

10. Further reduction talks (Par 9-CFA)

Those talks have not yet started. During the Central Joint Commission meeting of 18 May 1994, both sides claimed to have taken already steps on their respective sides. The FC asked both parties to inform him in writing of these steps.

The Serbian side accepted to start these talks immediately on the basis of the framework proposed by UNPROFOR. The Croatian side want these talks to begin after full implementation of the CFA.

11. Police-milicia (Par 10 of Ann B-CFA)a. Croatian sideNumber of distributed ID-cards to police:

EAST:	45
WEST:	20
SOUTH:	75
NORTH:	60
	<hr/> 200

b. Serbian sideNumber of distributed ID-cards to militia:

EAST:	45
WEST:	44
SOUTH:	60
NORTH:	50
	<hr/> 199

FORCE COMMANDERS CONFERENCE - CROATIA COMMAND
PUBLIC INFORMATION WITHIN UNPROFOR

30 MAY 1994

INTRODUCTION

1. GOOD MORNING, I AM MAJOR YVON DESJARDINS, THE PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICER TO THE FORCE COMMANDER AND THE SENIOR MILITARY SPOKESMAN. M. MICHAEL WILLIAMS, THE UN DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION, ASKED ME TO REPRESENT HIM TODAY. HE IS UNFORTUNATELY UNABLE TO BE HERE TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF PRESS AND INFORMATION WITHIN UNPROFOR.
2. AS YOU CERTAINLY KNOW, PUBLIC RELATIONS IS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENTS FOR THE SUCCESS OF THE UNPROFOR MISSION.
3. UNFORTUNATELY, FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, IT APPEARS THAT UNPROFOR HAS EXPERIENCED SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH ITS PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST FEW MONTHS. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED HOWEVER THAT UNPROFOR IS THE LARGEST PEACEKEEPING MISSION EVER PUT TOGETHER BY THE UNITED NATIONS. AND AS SUCH, WE ARE STILL LEARNING FROM ITS EVOLUTION.
4. MY PRESENTATION WILL THEREFORE ADDRESS THE FOLLOWING:
 - (1) ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE UNPROFOR DIVISION OF INFORMATION.
 - (2) MAJOR PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED WITHIN THE MISSION, AND SOLUTIONS.
 - (3) UNPROFOR PUBLIC INFORMATION DIRECTIVES.
 - (4) BASIC PUBLIC RELATIONS ADVICE.
 - (5) QUESTION PERIOD.

I - STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

5. THE UNPROFOR DIVISION OF INFORMATION IS MANAGED BY THE DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION, WHO IS ALSO THE CHIEF SPOKESMAN. LOCATED IN ZAGREB, HE IS DIRECTLY ACCOUNTABLE TO THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL.

6. THE DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION'S RESPONSIBILITIES ARE:

- (1) TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE PUBLIC ABOUT UNPROFOR'S MISSION, MANDATE AND ACTIVITIES.
- (2) TO PROMOTE UNDERSTANDING OF UNPROFOR'S ROLES.
- (3) TO REDRESS INACCURACIES AND MISPERCEPTIONS.
- (4) TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITIES.
- (5) TO PREPARE UNPROFOR PUBLIC INFORMATION PLANS.
- (6) TO COORDINATE ALL COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE MISSION AREA, AND CLARIFY FC'S AND SRSG'S DIRECTIVES ON MEDIA RELATIONS.

7. THE UNPROFOR DIVISION OF INFORMATION IS THEREFORE STRUCTURED IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

- (1) OFFICE OF THE UNPROFOR DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION AND CHIEF SPOKESMAN:
 - SERVE AS THE DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION OF INFORMATION AND CHIEF SPOKESMAN TO THE SRSG.
 - 1 DEPUTY DIRECTOR; 1 ASSISTANT TO THE DIRECTOR; 3 SECRETARIES AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF.
- (2) OFFICE OF THE UNPROFOR SPOKESMAN:
 - RESPONSIBLE FOR OFFICIAL DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION TO THE MEDIA AND TO THE PUBLIC (THE MEDIA IS OUR MAIN TOOL TO REACH INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCES).
 - 1 SPOKESMAN; 2 DEPUTY SPOKESMEN.
 - 1 HEAD OF MEDIA RELATIONS UNIT; 3 INFORMATION OFFICERS; 2 INFORMATION ASSISTANTS.
- (3) LOCAL MEDIA ANALYSIS:
 - RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING AND PROVIDING WRITTEN TRANSLATION AND ANALYSIS OF LOCAL NEWS REPORTS.
 - 4 LOCAL INFORMATION OFFICERS.

- (4) PRESS AND ACCREDITATION UNIT:
- RESPONSIBLE FOR MEDIA ACCREDITATION WITHIN UNPROFOR.
 - 1 INFORMATION OFFICER; 1 ASSISTANT; 1 ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT ASSISTANT.
- (5) BROADCAST RADIO UNIT (NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED YET):
- RESPONSIBLE FOR PRODUCTION OF RADIO MATERIAL AND BROADCASTING IN ENGLISH AND LOCAL LANGUAGES IN THE MISSION AREA.
 - 1 SECTION HEAD; 1 RADIO COORDINATOR - EDITORIAL; 1 RADIO PRODUCTION MANAGER; 7 RADIO PRODUCERS; 1 RADIO PRODUCTION ASSISTANT; 1 ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT; 50 LOCAL RADIO STAFFS.
- (6) BROADCAST TELEVISION UNIT (NOT FULLY IMPLEMENTED YET):
- RESPONSIBLE FOR PRODUCTION OF TELEVISION MATERIAL AND BROADCASTING IN ENGLISH AND LOCAL LANGUAGES IN THE MISSION AREA.
 - 1 SECTION HEAD; 10 TELEVISION PRODUCERS AND DIRECTORS; 10 ASSISTANT PRODUCERS; 7 RADIO PRODUCERS; 1 RADIO PRODUCTION MANAGER; 3 CAMERAPERSONS; 3 SOUND RECORDERS; 27 LOCAL TELEVISION PRODUCTION STAFFS.
- (7) PUBLICATION AND PHOTOGRAPHY UNIT:
- RESPONSIBLE FOR PRODUCTION OF UNPROFOR NEWSLETTER AND PHOTOGRAPHIC MATERIAL FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL USES.
 - 1 SECTION HEAD AND EDITOR; 1 PHOTO COORDINATOR AND EDITOR; 3 INFORMATION OFFICERS AND WRITERS; 2 PHOTOGRAPHERS; 1 ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT; 4 LOCAL INFORMATION AND EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS.
- (8) PRINT PRODUCTION AND PROMOTION UNIT:
- RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PRODUCTION, TRANSLATION, PRINTING AND DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMATION AND PROMOTIONAL PRODUCTS.
 - 1 SECTION HEAD; 2 INFORMATION OFFICERS, 1 ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECRETARIAL ASSISTANT; 1 INFORMATION ASSISTANT; 6 LOCAL INFORMATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANTS.

- (9) BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA COMMAND (SARAJEVO) INFORMATION OFFICE:
- RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING AND MANAGING ALL PRESS AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES WITHIN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA COMMAND.
 - REPORTS DIRECTLY TO THE DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION (IN COORDINATION WITH BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA CHAIN OF COMMAND).
 - IN SARAJEVO: 1 SENIOR INFORMATION OFFICER; 4 INFORMATION OFFICERS; 1 LOCAL ADMINISTRATION ASSISTANT; 1 SECRETARY.
 - EACH SECTOR ALSO HAS A MILITARY PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICER REPORTING TO THEIR RESPECTIVE SECTOR COMMANDER, AND RECEIVING PUBLIC RELATIONS GUIDANCE FROM THE SARAJEVO OFFICE.
- (10) BELGRADE INFORMATION OFFICE:
- RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING AND MANAGING ALL PRESS AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES IN BELGRADE.
 - REPORTS DIRECTLY TO THE DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION (IN COORDINATION WITH BELGRADE UNPROFOR AUTHORITIES).
 - 1 HEAD OF INFORMATION OFFICER; 3 LOCAL INFORMATION ASSISTANTS, MEDIA ANALYSTS AND INTERPRETERS; 1 ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT AND SECRETARIAL SUPPORT.
- (11) FYROM COMMAND INFORMATION OFFICE .
- RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING AND MANAGING ALL PRESS AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES WITHIN FYROM COMMAND. IT IS LOCATED IN SKOPJE.
 - REPORTS DIRECTLY TO THE DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION (IN COORDINATION WITH FYROM COMMANDER.
 - 1 INFORMATION OFFICER; 1 INFORMATION ASSISTANT AND INTERPRETER.

(12) CROATIA COMMAND INFORMATION OFFICES:

- SECTOR EAST (ERDUT).
- SECTOR WEST (DARUVAR) (SHOULD BE FILLED WITHIN 2 WEEKS).
- SECTOR NORTH (TOPUSKO).
- SECTOR SOUTH (KNIN).
- RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATING AND MANAGING ALL PRESS AND INFORMATION ACTIVITIES WITHIN THEIR SECTOR.
- THEY REPORT DIRECTLY TO THE DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION (IN COORDINATION WITH THEIR SECTOR COMMANDER).
- ALL HAVE: 1 INFORMATION OFFICER; 1 INFORMATION ASSISTANT AND INTERPRETER.

(13) MILITARY INTERNAL INFORMATION NEWSPAPER:

- RESPONSIBLE FOR PROVIDING INFORMATION ABOUT UNPROFOR TO MILITARY PERSONAL SERVING WITHIN UNPROFOR.
- REPORT TO THE DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION THROUGH THE PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICER TO THE FORCE COMMANDER (FOR COUNSELLING AND MILITARY INFORMATION ADVICE).
- 1 LIEUTENANT-COLONEL (EDITOR); 2 MAJORS AND 1 CAPTAIN (WRITERS); 1 STAFF SERGEANT (PHOTOGRAPHER).

(14) BATTALION (MILITARY) PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICERS:

- EVERY BATTALION HAS (OR SHOULD HAVE) A PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL PUBLIC RELATIONS PERTAINING TO THEIR UNIT'S ACTIVITIES.
- THEY REPORT TO THEIR BATTALION COMMANDING OFFICER AND NATIONAL CONTINGENT COMMANDER, AND RECEIVE PUBLIC RELATIONS GUIDANCE FROM THEIR COMMAND OR SECTOR PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICERS.
- THEIR ROLES ARE MAINLY TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE MEDIA INTERESTED IN THEIR UNIT'S ACTIVITIES AND TO THEIR NATIONAL MEDIA, TO INFORM THE LOCAL POPULATION ON THEIR UNIT'S ACTIVITIES WITHIN THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY AND TO PROVIDE PHOTOS AND ARTICLES ON THEIR UNIT TO THE MILITARY INTERNAL INFORMATION NEWSPAPER.

II - MAJOR PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS/SOLUTIONS

8. A NUMBER OF SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC INFORMATION OR PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEMS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN IDENTIFIED WITHIN UNPROFOR. THESE PROBLEMS HAVE IN SOME INSTANCES NEGATIVELY INFLUENCED THE IMAGE OF UNPROFOR AROUND THE WORLD. HOWEVER, APPROPRIATE MEASURES CAN AND HAVE STARTED TO BE TAKEN TO ALLEVIATE THOSE PROBLEMS AND TO INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY OF ALL PUBLIC INFORMATION ACTIVITIES WITHIN UNPROFOR, THEREFORE IMPROVING THE GLOBAL IMAGE OF THE FORCE.

9. THE MAIN PROBLEMS (AND THEIR SOLUTIONS) ARE:

(1) —THE UNPROFOR PUBLIC RELATIONS APPROACH HAS MAINLY BEEN REACTIVE, ESPECIALLY WHEN DEALING WITH THE MEDIA (REACTING TO INCIDENTS).

=> AS WE SIMPLY CANNOT IMPROVISE GOOD PUBLIC RELATIONS, THE DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION WILL PREPARE A COMPREHENSIVE PUBLIC INFORMATION PLAN FOR UNPROFOR. SUCH PLAN WILL THEN BE DISTRIBUTED TO ALL LEVELS OF PRESS AND INFORMATION WITHIN UNPROFOR, WHO WILL THEN ADAPT THE GLOBAL PLAN TO THEIR COMMAND/SECTOR/BATTALION'S ACTIVITIES.

=> WE ARE ALSO CHANGING THE GLOBAL APPROACH TO A MORE ACTIVE ONE, ESPECIALLY AS FAR AS COMMUNICATIONS WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES:

- TELEVISION PROGRAMS:

THE FIRST TELEVISION PROGRAM PRODUCED BY UNPROFOR IN LOCAL LANGUAGES WAS BROADCASTED ON 24 MAY 1994 ON BOSNIAN TELEVISION. UNPROFOR WILL SOON BROADCAST TWICE PER WEEK ON CROATIAN AND BOSNIAN TELEVISION. WE ARE ALSO COLLABORATING WITH SOME BATTALION PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICERS WHO, WITH CONSIDERABLE INITIATIVE AND INGENUITY, ARE DOING SIMILAR PROJECTS LOCALLY IN THEIR RESPECTIVE AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY (SUCH INITIATIVE IS COMMENDED AS IT GREATLY CONTRIBUTES TO IMPROVING THE IMAGE OF THE MILITARY COMPONENT OF UNPROFOR WITH THE LOCAL POPULATIONS THROUGHOUT THE MISSION AREA).

- RADIO PROGRAMS:

UNPROFOR IS BROADCASTING UNPROFOR PRODUCED RADIO PROGRAMS, 5 DAYS PER WEEK FOR 20 MINUTES, IN SARAJEVO BOSNIAN RADIO AND IN KNIN IN SECTOR SOUTH. WE ARE DEVELOPING A NETWORK, TO BE ESTABLISHED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS, OF RADIO STATION WHICH WILL BROADCAST IN ENGLISH, CROATIAN AND SERBIAN.

- PRINT:
UNPROFOR NEWS MAGAZINE WILL BE PUBLISHED TWICE PER MONTH IN ENGLISH AND ONCE PER MONTH IN LOCAL LANGUAGES. WE ARE ALSO EXPANDING THE OUTPUT OF POSTERS, PAMPHLETS IN LOCAL LANGUAGES. A MONTHLY MILITARY INTERNAL INFORMATION NEWSPAPER HAS BEEN RE-ESTABLISHED. THE FIRST ISSUE IS PRESENTLY AT THE PRINTER.
- => UNPROFOR MUST PURSUE THAT TREND AND ADOPT A MORE ACTIVE APPROACH WITH THE MEDIA. AS SUCH, PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICERS, AND SPOKESMAN, MUST ADAPT THEIR COMMUNICATIONS TECHNIQUES AND BETTER EXPLAIN UNPROFOR'S MANDATE (AS IT IS NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY).
- => WE MUST ALSO PROMOTE THE ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF UNPROFOR PERSONNEL, BOTH ON THE POLITICAL SCENE AND IN THE MISSION AREA. JOURNALIST ARE HERE TO SELL NEWS STORIES. WE MUST GIVE THEM SOMETHING INTERESTING. WE MUST THUS PROMOTE OUR GOOD WORK AND MAKE IT APPEALING TO THE MEDIA.
- => WE SHOULD ALSO, IN OUR DAILY PUBLIC INFORMATION SUMMARIES DISTRIBUTED TO THE MEDIA, STOP TALKING ABOUT YESTERDAY'S EVENTS AND ADDRESS INSTEAD FUTURE ACTIVITIES. HOWEVER, WE NEED THAT YOU PROVIDE US WITH THAT INFORMATION. IN YOUR DAILY SITUATION REPORTS FOR EXAMPLE, YOU COULD HAVE A SECTION ON WHAT THE UNITS ARE GOING TO DO. IF WE DON'T TELL THE MEDIA ALL THE GOOD THING WE DO, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THEY WILL NOT KNOW AND WON'T REPORT IT TO THE WORLD. WE MUST TALK ABOUT THE BRIDGES WE BUILD, THE HUMANITARIAN AID WE DELIVERED, ETC. IF WE DON'T, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO TALK ABOUT THE NUMBER OF SHELLS BEING FIRED BETWEEN THE FACTIONS.
- (2) APPARENT DIFFICULTY IN COORDINATING THE INFORMATION BETWEEN SPOKESPERSONS, WHICH SOMETIMES LEADS TO THE MISINFORMATION OF MEDIA (A SPOKESPERSON IN ONE LOCATION MAY SAY SOMETHING DIFFERENT THAN ANOTHER ONE ELSEWHERE).
- => COORDINATION BETWEEN THE SPOKESPERSONS IS IMPROVING AS WE TRY TO INSURE THAT ONLY THE CORRECT INFORMATION IS BEING RELEASED TO THE MEDIA. THIS CAN BE FURTHER IMPROVED BY ESTABLISHING A "SINGLE SOURCE OF INFORMATION" PROCEDURE, WHERE ONLY THE SPOKESPERSON IN ONE AREA WILL ADDRESS ISSUES PERTAINING TO THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. THIS SCENARIO WILL BE EASIER TO ESTABLISH WHEN THE TELEPHONE SYSTEM IS IMPROVED. AS IT IS, SOME MEDIA ARE NOT ABLE TO COMMUNICATE WITH SOME PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICERS WITHIN THE MISSION AREA.

- => WE HAVE ALSO ESTABLISHED A JOINT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN INFORMATION OFFICE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA COMMAND (SARAJEVO), AS I MENTIONED EARLIER FOR THE JOURNALISTS TO HAVE BETTER ACCESS TO INFORMATION OFFICERS.
- (3) MEDIA COMPLAINING ABOUT THE DIFFICULTY OF OBTAINING CLEAR AND PRECISE INFORMATION (THEY MAINTAIN THAT THEY GET TOO LITTLE INFORMATION, TOO LATE). THEY ARE SOMETIMES TREATED AS "THE ENEMY".
- => UNPROFOR MUST ADAPT ITS COMMUNICATIONS TO BETTER SUIT THE NEEDS OF THE MEDIA. WE MUST PROVIDE THEM WITH ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION. HOWEVER, WE DON'T HAVE TO TELL ALL THE TRUTH. WE MUST NOT FORGET THAT THE MEDIA ARE UNPROFOR'S PRIMARY TOOL OF COMMUNICATION WITH THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLICS.
- (4) UNAUTHORIZED SPOKESPERSONS (UNRELIABLE SOURCES) MAKING UNAUTHORIZED STATEMENTS.
- => THIS MAY BE CAUSED BY FRUSTRATED PERSONNEL. BOTH THE UNPROFOR NEWS AND MILITARY NEWSPAPER MAY HELP IN BETTER INFORMING AND EXPLAINING THE SITUATION IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, THUS REDUCING THE LEVEL OF FRUSTRATION. MILITARY COMMANDERS AND SENIOR CIVILIAN SUPERVISORS HAVE TO GIVE BRIEFINGS TO THEIR PERSONNEL TO BETTER INFORM THEM ON THE DECISION BEING TAKEN WITHIN UNPROFOR. THEY MUST ALSO EXPLAIN THAT UNAUTHORIZED STATEMENTS OR COMMENTS ARE EXTREMELY HARMFUL TO THE MISSION, THAT CARELESS REMARKS CAN HAVE VERY SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS FOR UNPROFOR.
- => THERE ARE CLEAR DIRECTIVES WHICH MUST BE ADHERED TO AND ENFORCED BY THE CHAIN OF COMMAND.
- (5) SPECULATION (ON THE OUTCOME OF AN EVENT, ON THE MOTIVES OF THE WARRING FACTIONS FOR SHELLING, ETC). THIS RESULTS IN CONFUSION AND FURTHER SPECULATION ON THE PART OF JOURNALISTS AND IS DEFINITELY DETRIMENTAL TO THE GLOBAL IMAGE OF UNPROFOR, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE SPECULATION PROVES TO BE WRONG IN THE AFTERMATH.
- => SPOKESPERSONS, OR ANY UNPROFOR PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO TALK TO THE MEDIA, SHOULD STRICTLY ADHERE TO THE FACTS AND REFRAIN FROM ANSWERING A QUESTION WITH AN ASSESSMENT, AN IMPRESSION, OR AN EVALUATION OF A PARTICULAR SITUATION.

- > MEDIA SHOULD BE REFERRED TO THE FACTION CONDUCTING MILITARY OPERATIONS FOR EXPLANATIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS. THE MEDIA WILL BE DISAPPOINTED WITH SUCH ANSWERS, BUT THEY WILL HAVE TO GET USED TO THEM, AS THEY ARE THOSE USUALLY PROVIDED BY PROFESSIONAL PUBLIC RELATIONS SPECIALISTS.

III - UNPROFOR PUBLIC INFORMATION DIRECTIVES

10. MR. AKASHI, THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL, ISSUED, ON 2 FEBRUARY 1994, THE PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR MEDIA RELATIONS.
11. THESE DIRECTIVE ARE (AN ORIGINAL COPY IS ENCLOSED TO THIS TEXT):
 - (1) UNPROFOR HAS TO SPEAK WITH ONE VOICE:
 - BE FULLY AWARE OF THE MANDATE GIVEN TO UNPROFOR BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.
 - KEEP FAMILIAR WITH KEY DEVELOPMENTS, DECISIONS TAKEN BY SECURITY COUNCIL AND STATEMENTS MADE BY SECRETARY-GENERAL AND SRSG.
 - (2) STAFF MEMBERS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF UNPROFOR UNLESS SPECIFICALLY AUTHORIZED TO DO SO BY THE SRSG OR HEAD OF THEIR COMPONENT (CIVIL AFFAIRS, MILITARY, CIVILIAN POLICE), IN CONSULTATION AND COORDINATION WITH THE SPOKESMAN'S OFFICE.
 - (3) IN ADDITION TO AUTHORIZATION, OFFICIAL HAVE TO OBTAIN GUIDANCE FROM THE SRSG, THE HEAD OF THEIR COMPONENT AND/OR THE SPOKESMAN, AS APPROPRIATE.
 - (4) ONLY THE SRSG IS AUTHORIZED TO SPEAK TO THE MEDIA ON GENERAL POLICY MATTERS.
 - (5) THE FOLLOWING PERSONS ARE AUTHORIZED TO ADDRESS THE MEDIA IN THE AREAS OF THEIR RESPECTIVE COMPETENCE ONLY:
 - THE FORCE COMMANDER.
 - THE HEAD OF CIVIL AFFAIRS.
 - THE DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER.
 - THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER.
 - THE DIRECTOR OF INFORMATION.

- (6) ON MATTERS SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO BOSNIA, THE COMMANDER BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA COMMAND AND HEAD OF CIVIL AFFAIRS IN BOSNIA ARE AUTHORIZED TO SPEAK TO THE MEDIA (UNPROFOR GENERAL POLICY MATTERS MUST BE REFERRED TO SRSG).
 - (7) SOME REQUESTS FOR INTERVIEW WITH SRSG MAY BE DELEGATED BY HIM TO SENIOR OFFICIALS.
 - (8) THE SPOKESMAN, AND HIS STAFF, SHOULD HANDLE AS MANY MEDIA INQUIRIES AS POSSIBLE.
12. IN ADDITION, THE FORCE COMMANDER ISSUED A MEMORANDUM ON 11 MAY 1994 (ENCLOSED TO THIS TEXT) REITERATING THE ABOVE DIRECTIVES AND ADDING THAT MILITARY COMMANDERS AND THEIR PERSONNEL ARE AUTHORIZED TO SPEAK TO THE MEDIA, AS LONG AS THEY LIMIT THEIR COMMENTS TO THEIR CONTINGENT'S, UNIT'S OR WORK'S AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY. THEY SHALL NOT DISCUSS ANY POLICY MATTERS. THEY SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON THE FACTS AND REFRAIN FROM GIVING OPINIONS, ANALYSIS OR PERCEPTIONS OF GIVEN SITUATIONS.

IV - BASIC PUBLIC RELATIONS ADVICE

13. 'THE FOLLOWING WILL HELP YOU CONDUCT', AT YOUR LEVELS, BETTER PUBLIC RELATIONS:
- (1) REMEMBER THAT THE MEDIA ARE ALL OVER THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA. THEREFORE ALL OUR ACTIONS ARE BEING MONITORED AND SOMETIMES FILMED. IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO HIDE SOMETHING.
 - (2) INVITE THE LOCAL MEDIA, INTERNATIONAL MEDIA, AND YOUR HOME COUNTRY'S MEDIA, TO SEE YOUR OPERATIONS. EXPLAIN TO THEM ALL THE GOOD THING YOU DO IN YOUR SECTOR. STAY AWAY FROM THE POLITICAL ASPECT OF YOUR WORK.
 - (3) THE CONVERSATIONS WE HAVE AMONG OURSELVES (ON OUTCOME OF OPERATIONS OR CONFRONTATIONS BETWEEN THE PARTIES) ARE ABSOLUTELY NOT FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION AND SHOULD NOT BE TRANSMITTED TO THE MEDIA.
 - (4) APPOINT A PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICER FOR EACH OF THE BATTALIONS YOU HAVE UNDER YOUR COMMAND (IF IT HAS NOT ALREADY BEEN DONE). THE SECTOR PRESS AND INFORMATION OFFICER WILL CERTAINLY BE HAPPY TO PROVIDE THEM WITH THE BASIC GUIDELINES FOR DEALING WITH THE MEDIA, IF THEY ARE NOT EXPERIENCED.

(5) WHEN GIVING A MEDIA INTERVIEW:

- DON'T SPECULATE.
- DON'T GIVE YOUR OPINION.
- BE HONEST (YOU DON'T HAVE TO TELL ALL THE TRUTH).
- IF YOU DON'T WANT TO ANSWER A QUESTION, SAY SO.
- IF A QUESTION RELATES TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, INFORM THE JOURNALIST THAT YOU CAN'T ANSWER "BECAUSE THE INFORMATION IS CLASSIFIED".
- CONCENTRATE ON YOUR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.
- BE CAREFUL ABOUT WHAT YOU SAY; DON'T SAY ANYTHING YOU WOULD NOT WANT TO SEE YOUR NAME ASSOCIATED WITH.
- DON'T TRY TO FOOL JOURNALISTS: THEY ARE MUCH MORE EXPERIENCED THAN YOU ARE AT CONDUCTING INTERVIEWS. THEY CAN HARDLY BE TRICKED.
- IN TODAY'S WORLD, THE CONCEPT OF "OFF THE RECORD" NO LONGER EXISTS. EVERYTHING YOU SAY IS "ON THE RECORD" AND MAY BE PUBLISHED AS SUCH.


V - QUESTION PERIOD

14. I HAVE PRESENTED YOU THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF OUR PUBLIC INFORMATION STRATEGY. OBVIOUSLY, AS I HAVE SAID IN THE BEGINNING OF MY PRESENTATION, UNPROFOR IS THE LARGEST PEACEKEEPING MISSION EVER PUT TOGETHER BY THE UNITED NATIONS AND WE ARE STILL LEARNING FROM ITS EVOLUTION.
15. GREAT PROGRESS IS BEING MADE, ESPECIALLY AS FAR AS INFORMING THE LOCAL POPULATIONS OF OUR MANDATE AND ACTIVITIES. DEALING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL MEDIA IS A LITTLE MORE COMPLEX AS THEY ARE GREATLY INFLUENCED BY THEIR OWN GOVERNMENT'S PERCEPTION OF OUR REALITY. WE MUST ALSO REMEMBER THAT THE MEDIA ARE IN BUSINESS TO MAKE MONEY, AND THAT IN TODAY'S WORLD, UNFORTUNATELY, VIOLENT ACTIONS ARE MORE NEWSWORTHY THAN PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES. NEVERTHELESS, OUR TASK TO TRY TO CORRECT THIS SITUATION AND INFLUENCE THE MEDIA IN COVERING OUR PEACEKEEPING AND HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES, BY PRESENTING THESE ACTIVITIES IN A NEWSWORTHY FASHION. I BELIEVE WE ARE ON THE RIGHT TRACK, AND THAT WE WILL SUCCEED IN CONVINCING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY THAT UNPROFOR IS FULFILLING ITS MANDATE.

16. THIS CONCLUDES MY PRESENTATION. I WOULD BE VERY HAPPY TO ANSWER YOUR QUESTIONS.

PREPARED AND PRESENTED BY:

MAJOR YVON DESJARDINS
PIO TO FC AND UNPROFOR SENIOR MILITARY SPOKESMAN
HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB
TELEPHONE: 385 41 180 011 EXT 2632
FAX: 385 41 176 707



51/51

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

MEMORANDUM.

94 MAY 27 17:53

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GOULDING, UNATIONS (NEW YORK)
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPROFOR (ZAGREB)

DATE: 27 May 1994

NUMBER: UNPROFOR - Z 824

SUBJECT: Incident, Sector West

CC# 4209
REG# 010112
7
SSN 1046

UNIT Telecomm Unit

Palais des Nations

94 MAY 27 18:58

J. Akashi

Ref. your subject message (1645) of 18 May attaching a letter (S/1994/578) from the Charge d'Affaires of Croatia, addressed to the President of the Security Council.

Attached for your information is a detailed review of the incident in Sector West involving the murder of five persons. It may be useful to see the details contained in the attached document in the context of the following messages separately forwarded to you:

- Our message (Z-789) dated 20 May in reply to yours (1491) of 6 May attaching a letter (S/1994/535) from the Croatian Permanent representative to the UN dated 4 May addressed to the President of the Security Council.
- Our message () dated 24 May in reply to yours (1670) of 19 May attaching a letter (S/1994/595) from the Croatian Permanent representative to the UN dated 19 May addressed to the President of the Security Council.

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Letter dated 16 May 1994 from the Charge d'Affaires a.i.
Of the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the United Nations
Addressed to the President of the Security Council

1. In the first paragraph of his reference letter, the Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Croatia to the UN informs the Council about:

"...a tragic development in *Vukovje* (Daruvar county) in the United Nations protected area (UNPA) sector West in the occupied territories of the Republic of Croatia where Serbian extremists ambushed and summarily executed five civilians and wounded two on 11 May 1994."

2. The murders are reported to have occurred at approximately 2230 hrs, 11 May 94 at VUKOVJE (XL 7854) village inside UNPA Sector West. It is alleged that a total of eight persons were forcefully apprehended by four assailants armed with silenced rifles. The assailants are said to have been wearing facial masks and dark clothing. Five of the victims were executed, each with a single bullet to the head, while the other three managed to escape with injuries. Of the five executed, only one is reportedly from Croatia. The other four victims were, also reportedly, Bosnian Croats who had taken refuge in the Sector. The location where the murders allegedly took place is about 18 km from the confrontation line.

3. The murders provoked a strong reaction, well publicized in the media, from Croatian authorities, including the personal presence of the Minister of Interior, Mr. Ivan Jarnjak, at the location. A force of reportedly up to 300 Croatian police "Special forces" were ready to go into action. Sector West's command was urgently requested, and pressured, by Croatian authorities to facilitate action by the "special forces." About mid-day of the 12 May, Sector West was instructed:

(a) To cooperate and offer whatever assistance possible to the Croatian authorities in the process of the investigation. This was to include patrols by UNPROFOR troops or CIVPOL monitors as well as the use of UNPROFOR surveillance helicopters.

(b) To make it clear to the Croatian Authorities that there was a definitive limit to the investigation involving the presence of the "special forces" in the Sector. This was to be five days starting from 12 May.

(c) Inform the Serb side about the presence of the 300 "Special forces" in the sector, the terms of their presence in the Sector, and the extent of UNPROFOR's cooperation and acquiescence. The intention was to avert possible counter measures the Serb side may contemplate as a reaction to the presence of such armed forces close to the confrontation line.

4. Our reaction to the presence of 300, well armed, Croatian "special forces" in the Sector was a source of serious concern warranting, initially, a negative response on our part, i.e denial of entry into the Sector. The positive decision at THQ was taken, however, bearing in mind the high tension created in the first place by the murders, and the escalation that would certainly have followed had UNPROFOR denied the Croatians either entry by their special forces or our cooperation and assistance in the process of the investigation. UNPROFOR would undoubtedly not only have been portrayed as "obstructive" in a matter of grave security concern but would also have faced a hostile and well armed Croatian contingent of "special forces". Thus UNPROFOR only agreed not to impede the participation of the "special forces" in the investigation process for a period of not more than five days. The arrangement seems to have satisfied the Croatian authorities well enough for their Minister of Interior, Jarnjak, to make a press statement appreciating the prompt and effective assistance received from UNPROFOR. In a letter to me dated 19 May, Jarnjak acknowledged his government's satisfaction and added:

"I wish to point out to you that I gave my statement while firmly believing that it was in the wide interest of UNPROFOR, not only in Sector West, that terrorists who committed the hideous murders of five and wounded three Croatian citizens will be brought to justice as soon as possible."

5. I fully share the view expressed by Jarnjak that it is in the interest of all parties that such heinous crimes as the five murders should be brought to justice as soon as

possible. We expected our cooperation to be reciprocated in the investigation process, particularly between UNCIVPOL and the Croatian police. Regrettably UNCIVPOL was not provided, at any time during the course of the investigation to-date, with an opportunity to monitor the Croatian police as they carried out the investigation. Conclusions about the murders and the alleged perpetrators were reached by the Croatian police alone notwithstanding the fact that the alleged crime took place in the UNPA.

6. The lack of cooperation by the Croatian police during the investigation is particularly significant. It was coupled with some hostility towards UNPROFOR personnel in the Sector despite the official acknowledgement of our prompt and effective assistance by the Minister in charge of Croatian police. The residence of one Civil Affairs officer in Daruvar was forcefully searched by three armed members of the "special forces" in his presence. Another staff member was stopped in Novska and had the vehicle similarly searched. In a letter dated 17 May, I addressed these concerns to Jarnjak and requested the withdrawal of the "special forces" from the Sector by the end of the day as previously agreed. In his reply dated 19 May, Jarnjak stated the following in this regard:

" In order to really find out all details of the crime committed against Croatian citizens murdered in Vukovje (in compliance with the mutually expressed endeavors of cooperation between Croatian Police, UNPROFOR and UNCIVPOL) I consider it necessary that our special forces, though reduced, remain in the Sector in the agreed area for a while. *I find it necessary that 100 of our policemen continue their operative tasks in the field.* While fully cooperating with UNPROFOR, because there are sufficient indices that the terrorists have remained in the area where the area was committed [emphasis added]."

7. Notwithstanding the notification to the SECCO, in advance of the findings of the investigation, that the perpetrators of the crime were "Serbian extremists", UNCIVPOL Chief of Police in Sector West was informed by his Croatian police counterpart (Mato Sicaja), in a letter dated 18 May, of the identity of three perpetrators. Two of them are reportedly from the Municipality of Durovac, a few kilometers from Daruvar, and the other from Pakrac, both in Sector West. One has a Moslem name. In his letter, Sicaja's states the belief by Croatian authorities that:

"the identified perpetrators are on the *occupied area of Sector West*, and in the interest of arresting them we would like to ask you to do everything possible so that those persons would be taken to the judicial bodies of the Republic of Croatia [emphasis added]."

The term "*the occupied area of Sector West*" would be interpreted to mean the Serb controlled part of Sector West. This is significant seen in the context of the request by Jarnjak for the continued presence of the "special forces" in the Sector. According to their own police statement, the suspects are reportedly across the CFL *on the Serb side*. It raises the troubling question of the intent and purpose for the "special forces."

8. There is ample evidence that the Croatian authorities have seized the opportunity created by the tragedy of the five murders to advance a sensitive political agenda in their quest for the reintegration of the UNPAs into Croatia proper. The presence of the "special forces" is claimed to have reinforced the security of the residents of the Sector. Croatian authorities have made well publicized statements to the effect that now the security of the Sector is better since the presence of the special forces. At the same time the often repeated "inability" of UNPROFOR to "guarantee" security for the residents of the Sector has lately begun to be publicly highlighted. The same theme was picked up in the reference letter of the Croatian Charge d'Affaires, Drobnjak, wherein he draws the following conclusion to the attention of the Council:

"...this act of terror [the 5 murders] would not have happened had Sector West been reintegrated to the security system of the Republic of Croatia."

This conclusion was presented to the Council even before the investigation was fully under way.

9. In a speech broadcast on HRTV on 22 May, President Tudjman called for UNPROFOR to leave Croatia at the end of the current mandate. His message has been echoed by local authorities around the UNPAs. The 29 March CFA has become a source of emotional and divisive debate among Croatian politicians within the government as well as in the opposition. There are visible signs that the balance of the Croatian body politic

regards the CFA as not in their national interests. There are strong voices advocating the scuttling of the Agreement before key parts become institutionalized in the Cyprus model, through what is increasingly seen as Serb intransigence. The economic phase of the negotiation process expected after the CFA is stalled because the two sides are far apart on the question of the negotiating venue. They are also far apart on the question of the basic orientation of economic linkages to the UNPAs. I have addressed this subject in a greater detail in the context of my reply to your message (1670) of 19 May.

10. Any unilateral action on the Croatian side that amounts to the elimination of UNPROFOR's presence in the Croatian controlled part of Sector West, or reduces significantly the role and influence of UNPROFOR in that Sector will, in all likelihood, be viewed on the Serb side as a fundamental reversal of a key provision of the original Vance Plan (SCR 721). That is, the exercise of the right of all displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes in all four UNPAs regardless of their ethnicity will essentially be pre-empted. Sector West exists under the Vance Plan because a great number of Serbs were displaced from that area.

11. In the past both sides have flouted key provisions of the Vance Plan whenever it has been convenient. It is noteworthy, however, that this is the one document both sides have publicly taken pains to proclaim allegiance to, albeit begrudgingly. Thus any action that fully or significantly restores Croatian authority in the Sector before the next phases of the face-to-face negotiations bear fruit will be seen by the Serbs, rightly, as prejudging their vital interests not only in this Sector but beyond.

12. We take seriously the Croatian notice that their consent to the renewal of the next mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia may not be forthcoming. In our view, however, the renewal of UNPROFOR's mandate is not an end in itself. The choice the Croats appear to be preparing to place before the Council, if the recent stream of letters is any guide, is to seek the understanding, acquiescence or support of present or future Croatian actions that progressively return parts of the UNPAs into Croatian control. In the case of the events in Sector West, the ruling party (HDZ) may be viewing the opportunity there also as a chance to advance a domestic political agenda. Part of that agenda, it seems, is

to force the gradual, if not full, reintegration of the UNPAs into Croatian economic and legal system.

13. I have addressed a letter to Mr. Šarinić declining UNPROFOR's concurrence for the continued presence of Croatian "special forces" in the Sector in any numbers. I have requested that they be withdrawn without further delay. In view of the difficulties I have outlined above with regard to cooperation with Croatian police in the Sector, we regrettably are not in a position to confirm the numbers of the "special forces" present or withdrawing from the Sector.