

[5 CONFIDENTIAL]

UNARCHIVES

SERIES S-1120
BOX 23
FILE 3
ACC. 1998/0278

PUBLIC INFO

T-10: Military Sec
2) Security

UN RESTRICTED

Ops Branch
HQ UNAMIR

5000.15(PLANS)

22 Oct 94

FRAGMENTARY ORDER NO 02 TO OPORD 20.

Reference:

A: HQ UNAMIR 5000.1 dated 6 Oct 94.

SITUATION

1. General. No change.
2. Specific. Increasing incidents of violence, intimidation and general lawlessness in refugee camps within RWANDA indicate a clear trend of tension and uncertainty.

MISSION

3. To increase UN presence in refugee camps within RWANDA.

EXECUTION

4. General Outline. All Sector Commanders are to intensify UN presence and activity in and around refugee camps within boundaries.

- a. Tasks Sector Commanders are to:
 - (1) Increase the frequency of patrols to refugee camps within capacity.
 - (2) Identify disruptive individuals/elements and report accordingly.
 - (3) Intensify efforts to encourage refugees to return to their homes.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

5. No change.

COMMAND AND SIGNALS

6. No change.

7. ACK.



G.C. TOUSIGNANT
MAJGEN
FC

Distribution:

List C Serials 31-39

Information:

List A

List B less Serials 12 and 20

File, Military

Ops Branch
HQ UNAMIR

19 Oct 94

5000.15(G3 Plans)

FRAGMENTARY ORDER NO 01 TO OPERATION ORDER NO 20

Reference:

A. HQ UNAMIR 5000.1 dated 6 Oct 94.

SITUATION

1. General. As given in Reference A.
2. Specific. The population movement figures across Rwanda's borders are notoriously inaccurate and inconclusive. The number of routes, the patchy coverage of crossing points and the variety of reporting sources contribute to an overall statistical base which is, at best, imprecise, and more likely, erroneous. UN and UNAMIR planning is constrained by the poor quality of this information. This Fragmentary Order directs commanders to adopt more precise and independent methods, as a basis for statistical comparison.

MISSION

3. To monitor population movement across the Rwandan borders with Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire.

EXECUTION

4. General Outline. Sector Commanders of Sectors 1,2,3,4 and 5 are to establish border monitoring posts at all identifiable crossing points with Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire.

Tasks. Sector Commanders are to:

a. Identify all crossing points within their Sectors which fulfil any one of the following criteria:

- (1). Are capable of wheeled traffic.
- (2). Are well used by people moving on foot.
- (3). If situated on water, are suitable landing sites for boats carrying over 20 people.

b. Man these crossing points from 0600 to 1900 hrs daily, utilising MILOBs or infantry as appropriate.

c. Keep an accurate record of people crossing in both directions, to include the following:

- (1). No of adults.
- (2). No of children.
- (3). Vehicles by type.

d. Report these figures to HQ UNAMIR, as part of the Daily SITREP.

e. Maintain local statistical records of population movement.

6. Statistical Analysis. On receipt of the Daily SITREP figures from each Sector, SO2 G2 MilInfo is to incorporate them into the UNAMIR Daily SITREP and report them at the daily FC's Briefing as follows:

- a. Total inflow from each country.
- b. Total outflow from each country.
- c. Net gain/loss.
- d. Comparison with previous day's figures.
- e. On a weekly basis, comparison with previous week's figures.
- f. Any items of special interest.

7. Database. SO2 G2 MilInfo is to maintain a database of all figures collated from Sector sources, and provide access to those UNAMIR personnel who require to use it for planning purposes.

8. MILOBs. Sector Commanders may utilise MILOBs or infantry under command, as required, to fulfil the mission.


9. Coordinating Instructions.

a. Timings. Sector Commanders are to meet the following timings:

- (1). Identification of crossing points - by 21 Oct 94.
- (2). First date of monitoring - 23 Oct 94.
- (3). First report to HQ UNAMIR - by 2359 hrs 23 Oct 94.

UN RESTRICTED

10. Command and Signal. Normal methods of reporting are to be carried out by Sector Commanders. Should an inflow/outflow of special significance occur, Sector Commanders are to report the matter to HQ UNAMIR immediately.



C G TOUSIGNANT
Maj Gen
FC

Distribution:

External:

Action:

List C Serials 31-39

Information:

List A less Serial 7

List B serials 13-15 and 18

UN RESTRICTED

CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS

11. MILOBS. Under Article VI of the UN Convention, defined in Reference B, MILOBS are described as "experts". They do not carry weapons and further policy, described below, on the Carriage of Weapons, does not apply to them.

12. Principle. As UNAMIR military personnel are on duty at all times, and as they have been issued with weapons for their own protection, or the protection of those whom they have a duty to protect, the principle to be applied is that UNAMIR military personnel will carry weapons at all times. Current ROE and Security Alert Measures (to be issued) will further dictate the readiness of UNAMIR personnel. This policy does not apply to medical and religious personnel. The protection of those personnel will be as directed by the Contingent Commander/Commanding Officer.

13. Exceptions. The occasions on which military UNAMIR personnel do not carry weapons are as follows:

- a. When consuming alcohol.
- b. When in civilian clothes.
- c. When leaving Rwanda - see Other Countries (below).

14. Consumption of Alcohol & Carriage of Weapons. UNAMIR personnel are not to consume alcohol when carrying weapons. Alcohol may only be consumed in the following circumstances:

- a. In a unit location or Mess which is guarded by armed guard(s).
- b. In a private residence.
- c. In a public place, (such as a bar, hotel or restaurant) at which personal protection must be provided - see Personal Protection (below).

15. Personal Protection. UNAMIR military personnel must receive Personal Protection whenever they attend a social function, at which they consume alcohol. On other occasions, they will be armed and in uniform, and able to protect themselves. Personal Protection, which must include the provision of communications (eg Motorola), during the period of the social function will be exercised as follows:

- a. In a unit location or Mess, where it will be provided by armed guard(s). This
- b. En route to/from a private residence. While personnel are visiting a private residence, their security is considered to be at a higher level than in a public place.
- c. En route to/from **and in** a public place.
- d. When carrying out organised sports or PT outside an area which is under guard

16. Level of Personal Protection. Commanding Officers/Contingent Commanders are to determine the level of Personal Protection afforded. Communications must be provided throughout these activities. Some examples of the minimum level of protection required

UN RESTRICTED

File: Military

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: REPORT ON CASUALTIES AND DEATH ON
22 AND 23 FEB 94

1. Inquiries were made at Remera Gendarmerie Brigade, Kigali Hospital and from Maj Nzabonimpa (LO to Sector Kigali). Following information was obtained.
2. During night 22/23 Feb, 6 people sustained injuries in Remera in Kigali City. One of the injured is a Gendarme, a member of Gendarmerie Patrol which was fired at. The others are members of PSD Party (Party of the murdered Minister Gatabazi).
3. Twenty-five (25) people were admitted at Kigali Hospital between 221700 and 230500 Feb. These include seven (7) dead, seven (7) injured by grenade explosions and two (2) injured with matchets.
4. Between 230500 and 231700 Feb a total of 35 people were admitted at Kigali Hospital. These include 5 dead, 11 injured by matchets, 1 injured by bullet and 4 injured by grenade explosions.
5. The NGOs, MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (MSF) and Red Cross are erecting tents in the gardens of Kigali Hospital and sending medical equipment and stores.
6. It is to be noted that the capacity of the mortuary is limited (6 bodies only). As a result many bodies are scattered all over the mortuary on stretchers.
7. The medical personnel are of the view that the killings are indiscriminate with some political inclinations but have no close links with ethnic cleansing.

Capt Cooper from URUGUAY

CONFIDENTIAL