

UNAMIDR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - OPERATIONS-GENERAL 31 AUG 1994 - 21 JUNE 1995

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ORIGINAL ORDER

[6 CONFIDENTIAL]

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BOX 130

FILE 5

ACC. 1998/0283



UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.1 (PLANS)

To: MALICOY
SENBATT
TUNBATT

From: G3 PLANS

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be a stylized 'A' or 'M' followed by a flourish.

Date: 21 June 95

Subject: TRANSLATION OF FRAGO 16

Reference: A. FRAGO 16 Dated 14 June 1995

Please find enclosed a translation of the referenced document.

Enclosures: 1

14 Juin 1995

3000.1 (Plans)

SOUS ORDRE NO 16

REFERENCES;

A. OPORD 20 du 06 Octobre 1994

Situation

1. Le mandat de La MINUAR autorisé par Le Conseil de Sécurité dans sa résolution 965(94) du 30 Novembre 1994 a pris fin en date du 09 juin 1995. Le Conseil de Sécurité a décidé de prolonger le mandat de la MINUAR jusqu'au 08 12 1995 et a autorisé que le nombre de ses effectifs soit réduit à 2300 dans trois mois à partir de l'adoption de la résolution et à 1800 troupes dans quatre mois. Au cours de ce nouveau mandat le nombre des effectifs des MILOBS et CIVPOL resteront inchangés. Les tâches assignées au nouveau mandat sont tout à fait différentes à celles du précédent; c'est ainsi que les tâches des MILOBS et celles des troupes constituées doivent être redéfinies. Dès la réception de ce sous ordre, les tâches assignées seront limitées et remplacées par celles mentionnées dans "OPORD 20". Dans ce sens, les tâches relatives au maintien de la sécurité des Rwandais, contrôle des entrées et sorties aux frontières, empêcher les activités insurrectionnelles, assurer la sécurité de grandes villes, protection des champs aériens et pistes d'atterrissage et assistance aux autorités locales au niveau de maintien de la loi et de l'ordre dans le cas où cela s'avère nécessaire. Référence A sera bientôt amendée et pourra indiquer la nouvelle méthodologie sur l'administration et la logistique. Une fois que UNHQ aura approuvé le nouveau concept des opérations de la MINUAR et déterminé les pays qui pourront fournir les troupes, un plan détaillé de la réduction des Effectifs sera publié en indiquant les rotations des troupes et équipement.

Mission

2. L'assistance de la MINUAR se fera au niveau de la normalisation et de la stabilisation du Rwanda.

Exécution

3. **Plan Général.** Le nouveau mandat de la MINUAR a changé sa forme. Alors que sa mission était de maintenir la paix, maintenant son rôle consiste à la normalisation et stabilisation du Rwanda. Dans ce cadre, la MINUAR entreprendra, d'une part, des activités nécessaires pour soutenir la présence du maintien de la paix par les NU au Rwanda et, d'autre part, elle aidera le

Gouvernement Rwandais à promouvoir la réconciliation des réfugiés et à créer un climat qui favorise la stabilité et le retour des réfugiés. Les activités mentionnées ci-dessous servent à contribuer à la sécurité. Cependant, il est à noter qu'à ce niveau la responsabilité de la prise en charge des ces activités revient là, APR, la MINUAR quant à elle interviendra comme élément de coordination, de liaison, et en disponibilisant tout autre moyen possible et nécessaire pour la réalisation de ces activités.

Le Groupe MILOB

4. **Effectifs.** Pas de changement.

5. **Tâches**

- a. Seront déployés dans tous les secteurs.
- b. Assurer le service d'escorte comme prévu.
- c. Assister dans la coordination des agences humanitaires dans toutes leurs opérations.
- d. Assister au niveau de coordination des ONGs dans leurs opérations.
- e. S'apprêter à coordonner et éventuellement à fournir les moyens de transports pour le rapatriement des réfugiés.
- f. Assister en encourageant les personnes de rentrer chez eux.
- g. Contrôler le mouvement des réfugiés.
- i. Contrôler les conditions en commun.

NIBATT

6. **Effectif** Pas de changement.

7. **Tâches**

- a. Continuer l'occupation du secteur actuel.
- b. Etre prêt à fournir les moyens de transport pour le déplacement des réfugiés comme recommandé.
- c. Assister, si nécessaire, les agences humanitaires dans leurs opérations.
- d. Orienter dans le même sens la coordination et l'approvisionnement des aides humanitaires.

- e. Assurer la sécurité du personnel de la MINUAR et leurs biens.
- f. Contribuer à la sécurité du personnel et bâtiments des agences de l'ONU.
- g. Contribuer à la sécurité du Tribunal international, si nécessaire.
- h. Contribuer à la sécurité des bureaux des droits de l'homme là où c'est possible.
- i. Contribuer à la sécurité des agences humanitaires, en cas de besoin.

GHANBATT

8. **Effectif** Pas de changement.

9. **Tâches**

- a. Continuer l'occupation du secteur actuel.
- b. Etre prêt à fournir les moyens de transport pour le déplacement des réfugiés comme recommandé.
- c. Assister, si nécessaire, les agences humanitaires dans leurs opérations.
- d. Orienter dans le même sens la coordination et l'approvisionnement des aides humanitaires.
- e. Assurer la sécurité du personnel de la MINUAR et leurs biens.
- f. Contribuer à la sécurité du personnel et bâtiments des agences de l'ONU.
- g. Contribuer à la sécurité du Tribunal international si nécessaire et assurer en permanence la protection du bureau du Procureur de la République.
- h. Contribuer à la sécurité des bureaux des droits de l'homme là où c'est possible.
- i. Contribuer à la sécurité des agences humanitaires, en cas de besoin.

MALAWICOY

10. **Effectifs.** Pas de changement.

11. **Tâches**

- a. Continuer l'occupation du secteur actuel.
- b. Etre prêt à fournir les moyens de transport pour le déplacement des réfugiés comme recommandé.
- c. Assister, si nécessaire, les agences humanitaires dans leurs opérations.
- d. Orienter dans le même sens la coordination et l'approvisionnement des aides humanitaires.
- e. Assurer la sécurité du personnel de la MINUAR et leurs biens.
- f. Contribuer à la sécurité du personnel et bâtiments des agences de l'ONU.
- g. Contribuer à la sécurité du Tribunal international si nécessaire.
- h. Contribuer à la sécurité des bureaux des droits de l'homme là où c'est possible.
- i. Contribuer à la sécurité des agences humanitaires, en cas de besoin.

MALICOY

12. **Effectifs.** Pas de changement.

13. **Tâches**

- a. Continuer l'occupation du secteur actuel.
- b. Etre prêt à fournir les moyens de transport pour le déplacement des réfugiés comme recommandé.
- c. Assister, si nécessaire, les agences humanitaires dans leurs opérations.
- d. Orienter dans le même sens la coordination et l'approvisionnement des aides humanitaires.
- e. Assurer la sécurité du personnel de la MINUAR et leurs biens.
- f. Contribuer à la sécurité du personnel et bâtiments des agences de l'ONU.
- g. Contribuer à la sécurité du Tribunal international si nécessaire.

- h. Contribuer à la sécurité des bureaux des droits de l'homme là où c'est possible.
- i. Contribuer à la sécurité des agences humanitaires, en cas de besoin

SENBATT

14. **Effectif.** Pas de changement.

15. **Tâches**

- a. Continuer l'occupation du secteur actuel.
- b. Etre prêt à fournir les moyens de transport pour le déplacement des réfugiés comme recommandé.
- c. Assister, si nécessaire, les agences humanitaires dans leurs opérations.
- d. Orienter dans le même sens la coordination et l'approvisionnement des aides humanitaires.
- e. Assurer la sécurité du personnel de la MINUAR et leurs biens.
- f. Contribuer à la sécurité du personnel et bâtiments des agences de l'ONU.
- g. Contribuer à la sécurité du Tribunal international si nécessaire.
- h. Contribuer à la sécurité des bureaux des droits de l'homme là où c'est possible.
- i. Contribuer à la sécurité des agences humanitaires, en cas de besoin.

ZAMBATT

16. **Effectif.** Pas de changement.

17. **Tâches**

- a. Continuer l'occupation du secteur actuel.
- b. Etre prêt à fournir les moyens de transport pour le déplacement des réfugiés comme recommandé.
- c. Assister, si nécessaire, les agences humanitaires dans leurs opérations.
- d. Orienter dans le même sens la coordination et l'approvisionnement des aides humanitaires.

- e. Assurer la sécurité du personnel de la MINUAR et leurs biens.
- f. Contribuer à la sécurité du personnel et bâtiments des agences de l'ONU.
- g. Contribuer à la sécurité du Tribunal international si nécessaire.
- h. Contribuer à la sécurité des bureaux des droits de l'homme là où c'est possible.
- i. Contribuer à la sécurité des agences humanitaires, en cas de besoin.

ETHIOBATT

18. **Effectif.** Pas de changement.

Tâches

- a. Continuer l'occupation du secteur actuel.
- b. Etre prêt à fournir les moyens de transport pour le déplacement des réfugiés comme recommandé.
- c. Assister, si nécessaire, les agences humanitaires dans leurs opérations.
- d. Orienter dans le même sens la coordination et l'approvisionnement des aides humanitaires.
- e. Assurer la sécurité du personnel de la MINUAR et leurs biens.
- f. Contribuer à la sécurité du personnel et bâtiments des agences de l'ONU.
- g. Contribuer à la sécurité du Tribunal international si nécessaire.
- h. Contribuer à la sécurité des bureaux des droits de l'homme là où c'est possible.
- i. Contribuer à la sécurité des agences humanitaires, en cas de besoin.

TUNBATT

20. **Effectif.** Pas de changement.

21. **Tâches**

- a. Continuer l'occupation du secteur actuel.
- b. Etre prêt à fournir les moyens de transport pour le déplacement des réfugiés comme recommandé.
- c. Assister, si nécessaire, les agences humanitaires dans leurs opérations.
- d. Orienter dans le même sens la coordination et l'approvisionnement des aides humanitaires.
- e. Assurer la sécurité du personnel de la MINUAR et leurs biens.
- f. Contribuer à la sécurité du personnel et bâtiments des agences de l'ONU.
- g. Contribuer à la sécurité du Tribunal international si nécessaire.
- h. Contribuer à la sécurité des bureaux des droits de l'homme là où c'est possible.
- i. Contribuer à la sécurité des agences humanitaires, en cas de besoin.

INDBATT

22. **Effectif.** Pas de changement.

23. **Tâches**

- a. Continuer l'occupation du secteur actuel.
- b. Etre prêt à fournir les moyens de transport pour le déplacement des réfugiés comme recommandé.
- c. Assister, si nécessaire, les agences humanitaires dans leurs opérations.
- d. Orienter dans le même sens la coordination et l'approvisionnement des aides humanitaires.
- e. Assurer la sécurité du personnel de la MINUAR et leurs biens.
- f. Contribuer à la sécurité du personnel et bâtiments des agences de l'ONU.
- g. Contribuer à la sécurité du Tribunal international si nécessaire et assurer la sécurité totale du bureau du Procureur de la République.

- h. Contribuer à la sécurité des bureaux des droits de l'homme là où c'est possible.
- i. Contribuer à la sécurité des agences humanitaires, en cas de besoin.

FORCE ENGR COY

24. **Effectif.** Pas de changement.

25. **Tâches**

- a. Procurer une assistance d'Ingénieurs à la MINUAR à travers la maintenance des routes, approvisionnement en eau ainsi que de petits travaux de construction.
- b. Etre prêt à effectuer des travaux de déminage comme prévu.
- c. Assistance au niveau de la réhabilitation/retablissement des services essentiels comme il en est recommandé par la MINUAR.
- d. Etre prêt à entraîner les éléments du Gouvernement dans le domaine des Ingénieurs.

FORCE SIG COY

26. **Effectif.** Pas de changement.

27. **Tâches.**

- a. Assurer la communication avec les secteurs.
- b. Assister le QG MINUAR en moyens de communication.
- c. Assister le QG du groupe MILOBS en moyens des communications.
- d. Assister les agences de l'ONU en moyens de communication comme il en est recommandé.

AUSMED

28. **Effectifs.** Pas de changement.

29. **Tâches.**

- a. Assistance médicale à la Force de la MINUAR comme prévu dans le plan médical.
- b. Pouvoir gérer un bâtiment abritant trois services principaux:

- i. Service de Chirurgie.
- ii. Eléments spécialistes pour assistance.
- iii. 35 lits au moins.
- c. Etre prêt à déployer un poste d'accueil pour les accidentés comme il se doit.
- d. Etre prêt à déployer une section dentaire avec une autre pour la médecine préventive comme prévu.
- e. Se préparer à disponibiliser deux équipes AME.
- f. Assurer un service d' évacuation médicale par route.
- g. Il faut qu' il y ait /prévoir un conseiller médical pour FMO.
- h. Prévoir une assistance médicale au CHK et ailleurs dans la mesure du possible.

FORCE MP COY

- 30. **Effectifs** Pas de changement.
- 31. **Tâches.** Pas de changement.

FLSG

- 32. **Effectifs.** Pas de changement.
- 33. **Tâches.** Pas de changement.

HAC

- 34. **Tâches**
 - a. Conseiller Le Commandant en Chef sur les opérations d'assistance humanitaire
 - b. Conseiller l'Ops branch de la MINUAR sur les opérations humanitaires
 - c. Concourir pour la sécurité des organisations d'assistance oeuvrant au Rwanda en liaison directe avec la "Ops branch" de la MINUAR.
 - d. Aider dans la coordination des activités des agences de l'ONU et celles des ONGs.
 - e. Faire une reconnaissance humanitaire comme recommandé.

- f. Rassembler les données issues des représentants des sector humanitaires et en préparer les rapports comme prévu.
 - g. Etre toujours informés sur les réfugiés et les personnes déplacées.
 - h. Effectuer des liaisons directes avec les agences de l'ONU et des ONGs
 - i. Informer les officiels des agences de droits de l'homme de l'ONU de toute violaton de droit de l'homme remarquées ou apprises.
- J. Collaboration avec les représentants des ligues pour le droit de l'homme du Gouvernement Rwandais.

INSTRUCTIONS DE COORDINATIONS

35. Pas de changement

ADMINISTRATION ET LOGISTIQUE

36. Pas de changement

COMMANDEMENT ET SIGNAUX

37. Pas de changement

38. Accusé réception

G.C. Toussignant
Major-General
Force Commander

Liste de Distribution

Action

List A, B & D

Pour Information

Bureau du SRSG
CAO
UNDPKO
OL RPA

Spare

HQ UNAMIR
Ops Branch
Kigali

3000.1(Plans)

14 June 1995

FRAGMENTARY ORDER NO 16

References:

A. OPOD 20 dated 06 Oct 1994

Situation

1. The UNAMIR mandate authorized by the Security Council vide resolution 965(94) of 30 November 1994 ended on 09 June 1995. The Security Council has decided to extend the UNAMIR mandate until 08 Dec 95 and authorized a reduction of force level to 2,330 within three months of the adoption of the resolution and to 1,800 troops within four months. Milobs and Civpol authorized strength remain unchanged throughout at their current levels. The tasks of the revised mandate are significantly different from those of the previous mandate and therefore the tasks for the Milobs and formed troops require to be redefined. On receipt of this FRAGO, the tasks given will be limited to and supersede those laid down in OPOD 20. Accordingly, tasks related to the provision of security to Rwandans, monitoring of border crossings, denying insurgent activities, provision of security in large towns, protection of airfields/strips and assisting the local authorities to maintain law and order in camps are deleted forthwith. Reference A will be amended shortly and will indicate the drawdown methodology and provide details on administration and logistics in addition to reflecting the new tasks. Once UNHQ approves the UNAMIR Concept of Operations and determines the troop contributing nations, a detailed Force Reduction Plan will be issued to indicate troop and equipment rotations

Mission

2. UNAMIR is to assist in the normalization and stabilization of Rwanda.

Execution

3. **General Outline.** The revised mandate has shifted the focus from peace-keeping to a role of assisting in the normalization and stabilization of Rwanda. On that basis, UNAMIR will only undertake tasks specifically required to sustain a UN peace-keeping presence in Rwanda mainly in Kigali and tasks aimed at assisting the Govt of Rwanda in promoting reconciliation and reconstruction and in the promotion of a climate conducive to the stability and to the return of refugees. Taskings below which state "contribute to the security" mean that the primary responsibility for these tasks rests with the RPA. Therefore, UNAMIR will only assist in these

tasks with coordination, liaison and any augmentation (within capability) required to meet the requests.

Milob Group

4. **Grouping.** No change

5. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue deployment in all the sectors.
- b. Provide escorts as required.
- c. Assist in the coordination of humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Assist in the coordination of NGOs in their operations.
- e. Be prepared to coordinate and possibly provide transport for the repatriation of refugees.
- g. Assist in motivating the persons to return to their homes.
- h. Monitor refugee movement.
- i. Monitor conditions in communes.

NIBATT

6. **Grouping.** No change

7. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.

- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

GHANBATT

8. **Grouping.** No change.

9. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal and be prepared to provide full time protection to the office of the Prosecutor
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

MALAWICOY

10. **Grouping.** No change

11. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required

- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

MALICOY

12. **Grouping.** No change.

13. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

SENBATT

14. **Grouping.** No change

15. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

ZAMBATT

16. **Grouping.** No change.

17. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.

- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need

ETHIOBATT

18. **Grouping.** No change.

19. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

TUNBATT

20. **Grouping.** No change.

21. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies

- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

INDBATT

20. **Grouping.** No change.

21. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal and be prepared to provide full time protection to the office of the Prosecutor.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

Force Engr Coy

24. **Grouping.** No change

25. **Tasks.**

- a. Provide engr support to UNAMIR principally through maintenance of routes, provision of water points and minor construction works
- b. Be prepared to carry out EOD tasks as required
- c. Assist in the restoration of essential services as directed by the UNAMIR HQ

- d. Be prepared to provide expertise to the Govt of Rwanda on engr matters.

Force Sig Coy

26. **Grouping.** No change.

27. **Tasks.**

- a. Provide Force communication to the sectors.
- b. Provide sig communication support to HQ UNAMIR.
- c. Provide sig communication to the Milob Group HQ.
- d. Assist UN agencies in sig matters as required.

AUSMED

28. **Grouping.** No change.

29. **Tasks.**

- a. Provide medical support to UNAMIR Force as per the Force medical plan.
- b. Maintain a level three facility with:
 - i. Initial surgical wound capability.
 - ii. Specialist support elements.
 - iii. At least 35 beds.
- c. Be prepared to deploy a casualty collection post (CCP) as required
- d. Be prepared to deploy a dental section and preventive medicine section as required.
- e. Be prepared to provide up to two AME teams
- f. Provide road evacuation service as required
- g. Provide health advice to the FMO

- h. Provide humanitarian support at CHK and other locations with in spare capacity.

Force MP Coy

30. **Grouping.** No change.

31. **Tasks.** No change.

FLSG

32. **Grouping.** No change.

33. **Tasks.** No change.

HAC

34. **Tasks.**

- a. Advise the Force Commander on humanitarian assistance operations.
- b. Advise the UNAMIR Ops branch on humanitarian operations.
- c. Arrange for the security aspects of the humanitarian organizations conducting relief operations in Rwanda in close liaison with the Ops branch of HQ UNAMIR.
- d. Assist in the coordination of the activities of UN agencies and NGOs.
- e. Conduct humanitarian recce as directed.
- f. Collect data from sector humanitarian representatives and produce humanitarian reports as required.
- g. Maintain current data on refugees and displaced persons
- h. Effect close liaison with UN agencies and NGOs
- i. Inform UN Human Rights officers of any human right abuse reported
- j. Effect close liaison with the Govt of Rwanda humanitarian representatives

Coordinating Instructions

35. No change.


Administration and Logistics

36. No change.

Command and Signals

37. No change.

38. Acknowledge.



G.C. Tousignant
Major General
Force Commander

Distribution List:

Action:

List A, B & D

For Information:

Office of SRSG
CAO
UNDPKO (MPS)
RPA LO

HQ UNAMIR
Ops Branch
Kigali

3000,1(Plans)

14 June 1995

FRAGMENTARY ORDER NO 16

References:

A OPOD 20 dated 06 Oct 1994.

Situation

1 The UNAMIR mandate authorized by the Security Council vide resolution 965(94) of 30 November 1994 ended on 09 June 1995. The Security Council has decided to extend the UNAMIR mandate until 08 Dec 95 and authorized a reduction of force level to 2,330 within three months of the adoption of the resolution and to 1,800 troops within four months. Milobs and Civpol authorized strength remain unchanged throughout at their current levels. The tasks of the revised mandate are significantly different from those of the previous mandate and therefore the tasks for the Milobs and formed troops require to be redefined. On receipt of this FRAGO, the tasks given will be limited to and supersede those laid down in OPOD 20. Accordingly, tasks related to the provision of security to Rwandans, monitoring of border crossings, denying insurgent activities, provision of security in large towns, protection of airfields/strips and assisting the local authorities to maintain law and order in camps are deleted forthwith. Reference A will be amended shortly and will indicate the drawdown methodology and provide details on administration and logistics in addition to reflecting the new tasks. Once UNHQ approves the UNAMIR Concept of Operations and determines the troop contributing nations, a detailed Force Reduction Plan will be issued to indicate troop and equipment rotations.

Mission

2 UNAMIR is to assist in the normalization and stabilization of Rwanda

Execution

3 **General Outline.** The revised mandate has shifted the focus from peace-keeping to a role of assisting in the normalization and stabilization of Rwanda. On that basis, UNAMIR will only undertake tasks specifically required to sustain a UN peace-keeping presence in Rwanda mainly in Kigali and tasks aimed at assisting the Govt of Rwanda in promoting reconciliation and reconstruction and in the promotion of a climate conducive to the stability and to the return of refugees. Taskings below which state "contribute to the security" mean that the primary responsibility for these tasks rests with the RPA. Therefore, UNAMIR will only assist in these

tasks with coordination, liaison and any augmentation (within capability) required to meet the requests.

Milob Group

4. **Grouping.** No change.

5. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue deployment in all the sectors
- b. Provide escorts as required.
- c. Assist in the coordination of humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Assist in the coordination of NGOs in their operations.
- e. Be prepared to coordinate and possibly provide transport for the repatriation of refugees.
- g. Assist in motivating the persons to return to their homes.
- h. Monitor refugee movement.
- i. Monitor conditions in communes.

NIBATT

6. **Grouping.** No change.

Tasks.

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid
- e. Provide security for UN AMIR personnel and property
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies

- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

GHANBATT

8. **Grouping.** No change.

Tasks.

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal and be prepared to provide full time protection to the office of the Prosecutor.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

MALAWICOY

10. **Grouping.** No change

Tasks.

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required

- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

IALICOY

12. **Grouping.** No change.

13. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

SENBATT

14. **Grouping.** No change

15. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

ZAMBATT

16. **Grouping.** No change.

17. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.

- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need

ETHIOBATT

18. **Grouping.** No change.

19. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector.
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property.
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

TUNBATT

20. **Grouping.** No change.

21. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies

- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal, if required.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

INDBATT

20. **Grouping.** No change.

21. **Tasks.**

- a. Continue occupying the existing sector
- b. Be prepared to provide transport for the movement of refugees as required.
- c. Assist, where possible, the humanitarian agencies in their operations.
- d. Provide a focal point for the coordination and provision of humanitarian aid.
- e. Provide security for UNAMIR personnel and property
- f. Contribute to the security of personnel and premises of UN agencies.
- g. Contribute to the security of International Tribunal and be prepared to provide full time protection to the office of the Prosecutor.
- h. Contribute to the security of Human Rights offices, where possible.
- i. Contribute to the security of the humanitarian agencies, in case of need.

Force Engr Coy

24. **Grouping.** No change.

25. **Tasks.**

- a. Provide engr support to UNAMIR principally through maintenance of routes provision of water points and minor construction works.
- b. Be prepared to carry out EOD tasks as required
- c. Assist in the restoration of essential services as directed by the UNAMIR HQ

- d. Be prepared to provide expertise to the Govt of Rwanda on engr matters.

Force Sig Coy

26. **Grouping.** No change.

27. **Tasks.**

- a. Provide Force communication to the sectors.
- b. Provide sig communication support to HQ UNAMIR.
- c. Provide sig communication to the Milob Group HQ.
- d. Assist UN agencies in sig matters as required.

AUSMED

28. **Grouping.** No change.

29. **Tasks.**

- a. Provide medical support to UNAMIR Force as per the Force medical plan.
- b. Maintain a level three facility with:
 - i. Initial surgical wound capability.
 - ii. Specialist support elements.
 - iii. At least 35 beds.
- c. Be prepared to deploy a casualty collection post (CCP) as required
- d. Be prepared to deploy a dental section and preventive medicine section as required.
- e. Be prepared to provide up to two AME teams.
- f. Provide road evacuation service as required
- g. Provide health advice to the FMO

- h. Provide humanitarian support at CHK and other locations with in spare capacity.

Force MP Coy

30. **Grouping.** No change.

31. **Tasks.** No change.

FLSG

32. **Grouping.** No change.

33. **Tasks.** No change.

HAC

34. **Tasks.**

- a. Advise the Force Commander on humanitarian assistance operations.
- b. Advise the UNAMIR Ops branch on humanitarian operations.
- c. Arrange for the security aspects of the humanitarian organizations conducting relief operations in Rwanda in close liaison with the Ops branch of HQ UNAMIR
- d. Assist in the coordination of the activities of UN agencies and NGOs.
- e. Conduct humanitarian recce as directed.
- f. Collect data from sector humanitarian representatives and produce humanitarian reports as required.
- g. Maintain current data on refugees and displaced persons
- h. Effect close liaison with UN agencies and NGOs
- i. Inform UN Human Rights officers of any human right abuse reported
- j. Effect close liaison with the Govt of Rwanda humanitarian representatives

Coordinating Instructions

35. No change


Administration and Logistics

36 No change.

Command and Signals

37 No change.

38 Acknowledge.



G C Tousignant
Major General
Force Commander

Distribution List:

Action.

List A, B & D

For Information.

Office of SRSG
CAO
UNDPKO (MPS)
RPA LO



UNAMIR - MINUAR

From: A/DFC

To: Camp Commandant

Info: Lists A & B
CSO
RPA LO

Date: 16 June 95

Subject: ENTRY INTO UNAMIR HQ BUILDING
BY SOLDIERS BEARING WEAPONS

1. To ensure the safety of all UNAMIR personnel, all soldiers wishing to enter the UNAMIR HQ building with their weapons are required to unload their personal weapons at the unloading bay outside the building near the main entrance. After this unloading procedure, magazines are not to be placed back on the weapon as long it remains inside the building.
2. Although this directive has been in place for some time, in view of recent reports of violation of this procedure, you are requested to put in place a mechanism of ensuring that the instruction above is adhered to by all military personnel of all nations, including Rwanda, intending to enter UNAMIR HQ. Those soldiers who are not prepared to abide by this weapon regulation will be allowed to remain outside UNAMIR HQ.
3. For your necessary action.



File: 5000.I(Plans)

To: DCOS OPS

From: G3 PLANS

Date: 15 Jun 95

Subject: UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL/EVACUATION PLAN

References:

A. Draft UNAMIR Withdrawal/Evacuation plan

1. The following decisions require to be made before the withdrawal/evacuation plan can be finalised:

a. **Alternate destinations.** After carrying out an appreciation on the current situation and evacuation process, the following likely evacuation destinations have been included in the draft plan (refer to paras 20, 21 & 22 of the reference):

- (1) **Kabale, Kampala and Nairobi.** These destinations were used during the evacuation of UNAMIR 1 and thus may be once again suitable.
- (2) **Nyamahale and Kanazi in Tanzania.** These areas are proposed as alternative destinations should the evacuation of Kabale be disrupted. It has been selected because of its close proximity and good communications system. Although it may only be used by a small element of force it allows some flexibility.
- (3) **Goma, Bakvu in Zaire and Cibitoke/Bujumbura in Burundi.** These have been selected to cater for worst case contingencies peculiar to sectors 4C & 5.

You should be aware that the plan prepared by the OIC Administration only included Nairobi, Kabale, Kampala and Goma as evacuation destinations.

b. **Reconnaissance and Talks with Governments.** There is an urgent requirement for the mission to hold talks with the governments of Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire to obtain their agreement to the use of these centres as part of the UNAMIR Withdrawal/evacuation plan. Once their agreement has been given a representative from Plans and Logistics should conduct a reconnaissance of these areas.

c. **Command and Control of Troops in Evacuation Destinations.** It is recommended that either the DFC or the COS move with a TAC HQ early in the evacuation process to command those troops in the evacuation destination.

- d. **Contract of TRAFIPRO.** There is some doubt as to the number of troops allowed by the contract to reside in TRAFIPRO. This aspect needs to be addressed because of the importance of TRAFIPRO as a safe area for personnel, BRSC and store.
- e. **Rations.** Logistics branch has indicated a shortfall in the number of combat rations required for withdrawal/evacuation plan. The force must have ten days of combat rations as a reserve for this contingency.
- f. **Rations for Civilian Personnel.** When civilians are withdrawn to sector concentration areas and safe areas in Kigali they must be fed using combat rations. A policy on the provision and accounting of combat rations to civilians must be addressed by the CAO.

①

TO:DCOS/OPs

INFO:FC
DFC
COS

FROM:CO ETHIOBATT-II

UNCLASSIFIED

FILE NO. 040/2..

DATE:12/06/95

SUBJECT:RELOCATION REQUEST BY RPA

② G3 Plans

1. Coord assessment with DCOS Sp and CBMS to determine if this can be achieved within sector with a minimum of disruption, expenditure of money/resources and within a reasonable timeframe.
2. FC will auth only if this can be achieved with minimum fuss.
3. Pls staff soonest.

DCOS
13-6

1. WE ARE REQUESTED BY RPA TO REDEPLOY OUR TROOPS FROM TWO OF OUR PRESENT COY POSITIONS WHICH ARE:

- a) KABAYEGO (GR7818)-1ST COY LOCATION
- b) MURURU (GR7723)-4TH COY LOCATION

THE REASON FOR THIS REDEPLOYMENT REQUEST AS THEY EXPLAINED IT TO US IS DUE TO THE TACTICAL IMPORTANCE OF THESE TERRAINS.

2. WE HAVE INFORMED THEM TO WAIT TILL WE GET FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE REDUCTION OF FORCES RELATIVE TO THE NEW UNAMIR MANDATE.

Thut
13/06

3. FROM THE CURRENT EXPECTED THREAT, ON ONE HAND THEY WISH TO DEPLOY THEIR FORCES ON THESE PLACES, ON THE OTHER THEY DO NOT WANT TO FORCE US TO LEAVE THE PLACES BUT THEY NEED IT TO BE DONE FROM OUR OWN CONVICTION. THEREFORE, WE REQUEST:

- a) TO REMOVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THE HIGH CAPACITY TENTS THAT BROWN AND ROOT HAD PITCHED AT KABAYEGO.
- b) PERMISSION TO PULL BACK OUR COYS TO BN HQ AREA FOR THE TIME BEING, THOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET ENOUGH CONCENTRATION AREA FOR THE WHOLE BN.

4. IN GENERAL, THE SITUATION THAT DEMANDS THE CONCENTRATION OF OUR TROOPS AT A PLACE AND THE PRESENT CLOSE DISPOSITION WITH RPA, WOULD KEEP US IN A MORE COMPLICATED SITUATION IN CASE UNFORESEEN SECURITY PROBLEM ARISES. THEREFORE, WE WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION IF WE ASSEMBLE OUR TROOPS IN A CONCENTRATION AREA. FOR THIS PURPOSE WE HAVE TWO ALTERNATIVES:

- a) THE SHAGASHA TEA FACTORY COMPOUND WHICH WAS EARLIER SELECTED AS THE BN HQ AND THE CONSTRUCTION WORK STOPPED DUE TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNAMIR AND MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY. TO RESOLVE THE DIFFERENCE AND THE MAINTENANCE WORK SEEM TO TAKE MORE THAN TWO MONTHS.
- b) THE OTHER ALTERNATIVE IS TO SELECT SUITABLE PLACE OUTSIDE OUR SECTOR. WE DON'T HAVE ENOUGH INFO TO SELECT POSSIBLE SITE FOR A CONCENTRATION AREA. SO WE LOOK FOR YOUR SUGGESTION.

5. BEST REGARDS.



MINUTE PAPER

REF: SO LOG 272/95

TO: DCOS OPS

INFO: ~~A/~~DCOS SP
G3 PLANS 19 7/6
CISS
CILM
CCMC
BRSC

FROM: A/DCOS SP

SUBJECT: PROVISION OF SECURITY FOR BRSC WATER DELIVERY TEAM

Reference:

A. 95 FLSG Minute 9750-1 (Ops O) dated 5 Jun 95

B. Meeting 95 FLSG/BRSC Water Reps/SO LOG of 6 Jun 95


1. As a result of the change in contract conditions that BRSC are now working under, to maintain the current water delivery requirements throughout UNAMIR, there is a need to alter the hours of operation at the Kigali Water Point.

2. BRSC will need to operate a night shift of two drivers from 1800-0200 hrs daily to ensure that all water tankers are refilled prior to the following days deliveries.

3. To enable the night shift to operate a security escort of two persons is required during the period 1800-0200hr daily. The escort would be required to ride in the vehicles with the drivers.

4. The escort would be required to report to the BRSC reps (Mr Gerald Dennis or Mr Bernie Marshall) at IVECO at 1800 hr daily. The BRSC drivers would be operating from the IVECO site to the Water Point and back during this shift.
5. It is requested that this security detail is provided from 1800 hrs 7 Jun 95.

A. CHABIR
LTCOL
A/DCOS SP



6 JUN 95



G3 PLAN

2
3
4

INFORMATION CIRCULAR No. 032/95

TO: All UNAMIR Civilian and Military Personnel,
CIVPOL, HRFOR, ICTR, UNDP WHO

DATE: 1 June 1995

FROM: Chaim Ouziel
CAO

SUBJECT: Increased security measures at Amahoro HQ.

I regret to inform you that over the last weekend, one of the offices inside the Amahoro building was broken into and several office items and personal property were stolen from it.

We view this occurrence with much seriousness, and increased security measures have to be taken. They include the following, with immediate effect:

(a) The side entrance of the building will be closed; access into the building will be through the main entrance only;

(b) The number and work hours of non-essential staff working in the building will be reduced. Office cleaners will enter the building not before 8 a.m., and will complete the cleaning work not later than 12 noon. For the afternoon hours cleaning service will be available for special needs only. There will be no cleaning service on Sundays;

(c) All cars may be searched at the discretion of the soldiers at the main gate;

(d) All staff entering the building before 7:00 a.m. or after 7:00 p.m., and all staff leaving the office after 7:00 p.m., will register at the reception desk. The same will apply all day Sunday. On Saturdays registration will be for entry before 7:00 a.m. and after 1:00 p.m., and exit after 1:00 p.m.;

(e) Staff are reminded to avoid keeping valuable personal items in the office and to lock the doors when leaving.

(f) Control of spare keys at reception will be increased. Spare office keys will only be issued to those persons registered as authorized for entry into a certain office.

As is the case with security measures, some may inconvenience us. I trust in your understanding of their need in the circumstances in which we live and work. Any ideas for other means to increase our security are most welcome; please convey them to our Chief Security Officer or to me.

5000.1

C

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: See Distribution List

DATE: 20 May 1995
REF.: UNAMIR/SO/094

FROM: Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan
SRSG

Shaharyar M. Khan

SUBJECT: Security/Crises Management Meeting

The Security/Crises Management team will meet on Monday, 29 May 1995 at 10 am at the Conference Hall of Amahoro Hotel - UNAMIR HQ.

All members of the team are kindly requested to attend.

Agenda:

- (i) The introduction of the new Chief of Administration, UNAMIR, Mr. Chaïm Ouziel;
- (ii) To review the General Security in Rwanda and to adopt measures to contain the situation;
- (iii) To review the draft evacuation plan for Rwanda in terms of Safe Havens outside the country.

cc: FC
DFC
COS
CIVPOL
CAO
UNDP Res. Rep.
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNDP FSO
CSO/ASC

DCOS (ops)

1. Ref att.

2. pl provide a copy of the revised 'Evac Plan', if ready

[Signature]
26/5



UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.1 (PLANS)

To: G3 PLANS

From: G3 PLANS

Date: 27 May 95

Subject: COMMUNE POPULATION FIGURES

Reference: A. Commune populations table dated 26 May 95


1. The following observations have been made upon review of population figures of Reference A:

- a. Sector 1. Communes in general are very well populated. The northern communes of KIYOMBE, MUVUMBA, NGARAMA and MUKARANGE exceed the pre-war population when the figures in Tanzania are added. The Commune of NGARAMA in particular is overpopulated.
- b. Sector 2. The commune of RUSUMO, which borders Tanzania, contains slightly less than half of its pre-war population. If the RUSUMO refugees from Tanzania were to return it would contain approx 40% more people than pre-war.
- c. Sector 4A. The communes of NSHILI, along the border with BURUNDI, and MUDASOMWA, next to the forest on the main road to Cyangugu, contain more people than pre-war.
- d. Sector 4B. The population of the SHYANDA commune, which contains BUTARE approaches its pre-war population and yet 18,815 remain in Tanzania camps.
- e. Sector 5. The northern communes of KIDAHU, BUTARO and NKUMBA, bordering with UGANDA, exceed their pre-war populations.
- f. Sector 6. The Kigali area of KICUKIRO contains approximately 17,000 more people than pre-war.

2. Forwarded for your information.

G3 OPS

For your info p/s


27/5

2. Srr,

Copy sent to G3 ops
27/5

G3 PLANS 2

3 E
4 W

NL BURUM LES 493139099=FOPF X 24-MAY-1995 11:29:28 413846

P 241300 B MAY 95

FROM : SENBATT, BUTARE

TO : DFC X DCOS/OPS

INFO : G - 3 OPS AND PLAN. *25/5*

BT

UNCLAS OPS 158

NO 75 /SENBATT/CONT.COMDR.

SUBJ : SECURITY PATROLS IN BUTARE TOWN .

1/. SINCE THE 20 TH OF MAY 1995, SENBATT'S UNIT IS CONDUCTING PATROLS IN BUTARE TOWN AT NIGHT TIME DUE TO INCREASEMENT OF IN SECURITY AROUND THIS LOCATION . THOSE PATROLS ARE DONE SO THAT TO PROVIDE SECURITY TO UN AGENCIES, NGOS AND OTHER UNAMIR PERSONALS ACTING IN THIS AREA AS IT IS ASSIGNED TO US BY THIS CURRENT MANDATE.

2/. THIS DAY, RPA BRIGADE COMMANDER DENIED US CONDUCTING PATROLS IN THE TOWN X IN THIS FACT , I DECIDED TO POSTPONE THOSE SECURITY DUTIES UNTILL WE ARRANGE COORDINATION WITH RPA RESPONSIBLES IN THIS SECTOR . BUT THEIR POSITION ABOUT THIS MATTER IS WELL KNOWN,AN IT IS NEGATIVE .

3/. RIGHT NOW, I AM ASKING THAT YOU INTERFERE ON A HIGH LEVEL SO THAT
THEY LET US DO OUR SECURITY TASK.

4./ BEST REGARDS.

BT

#

IN.790

FROM: G3 OPS

TO: MILOB GP HQ
SECTOR 1
SECTOR 5
SECTOR 6
G3 AIR

INFO: DCOS OPS
G3 PLANS
G3 ENGRS
MAJ MACZA

File No. 3000.5 (ops)

DATE: 23 Jan 95

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR SECURITY/UNAMIR SUPPORT FOR US DEMINING ASSESSMENT TEAM

GENERAL

1. The above mentioned team is to visit Rwanda from 23 Jan 95 to 02 Feb 95. The purpose of the visit is to identify the extent of the demining requirement in the country and to assess the training need. UNAMIR is to provide support to the following activities:

- a. 25 Jan(0900-1200hrs) - Consultations with UNAMIR EOD personnel.
- b. 27 Jan(0800-1600hrs) - Visit to Sector 5.
- c. 28 Jan(0800-1600hrs) - Visit to Sector 1.
- d. 29 Jan(0900-1200hrs) - Tour Kigali.

TASKS

2. TUNBATT

- a. Provide a protection party of not less than half a section and two vehs with dvrs to convey the team from Ruhengeri to designated mine sites in Sector 5.
- b. Protection party and Sector MILOB will RV with heli at landing site at RUHENGARI at 0830hrs on 27 Jan 95.

3. NICOY

- a. Provide a protection party of not less than half a section and two vehs with dvrs to convey the team from BYUMBA to designated mine sites in Sector 1.
- b. Protection party and MILOB will RV with the heli at landing site at BYUMBA at 0830hrs on 28 Jan 95.

4. INDBATT.

a. Provide a protection party and two vehs with drivers to convey the team from UNAMIR HQ to designated mine sites in sector 6.

b. Protection party and MILOB will RV with team at HQ UNAMIR at 0900hrs on 29 Jan 95.

5 MILOB GP HQ.

a. Sector MILOBs to detail a team each to escort and advise the demining team on mine locations in respective Sectors (1, 5 and 6).

b. Detail Major J Macza, the former G3 Engr to accompany team throughout the exercise.

6. Acknowledge.



File No 5000.1 (PLANS)

To: MILOB GP HQ

From: A/DCOS OPS

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "A. Am" or similar, written over the "From:" line.

Date: 19 May 95

Subject: COMMUNE POPULATIONS


-
1. The Plans sections is attempting to obtain commune populations for planning purposes.
 2. It is requested that you forward your most current commune population figures with the dates they were compiled, if possible, to G3 Plans.
 3. Your assistance is most appreciated.

From : G 3 Plans 
To : DCOS SP
: FCU
Info : DCOS OPS
Subject : COMMENTS : DISCUSSION PAPER ON OPERATION CHAMELEON

REFERENCE : A Discussion Paper on Operation Chameleon.
B Letter no 4000.1/Log-11 Dated 16 May 95.

1. It is agreed that some empty containers may be utilized for the stores of repatriating contingents. However the exact No can only be laid down after the new mandate is announced. The priority of stores can also be worked out after receipt of the guidelines on the new mandate.
2. The priority for the movement of containers can only be worked out after knowing their contents. The list of contents should be procured at the earliest so as to work out the priorities of stores required for this mission. It will save time required for execution of the Operation.
3. The 50% figure for reduction of troops is only an assumption. Exact figure can only be known after the new mandate is known and therefore requirement of stores for the remaining force level.
4. The movement of only empty containers can be organized before the new mandate is intimated. The movement of others should only be decided after wards. However all the preliminary actions like liaison, recce and other related formalities can be proceeded with immediately. Some accommodation containers can also be considered for movement to Kigali. These can be located in Kigali as reserve to supplement the transit facility and to cater for the shortfall of accommodation in Kigali in some eventuality.
5. A doctor may also be required as part of the Team, in case some containers have rations, to certify the condition.
6. A rep of the Plans Section should also be included in the team to represent the military.

*Sir, Mr Malik would be the plans
representative*


11/5

5000-1 (Plans)
UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR


NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

G3PLANS2
3h
407
16/5

INFORMATION CIRCULAR 029/95

13 May 1995

To: All Personnel, Military, CIVPOL, Civilian of UNAMIR

FROM: Ally H. Golo, 
OIC, Administration

SUBJECT: Statements regarding security situation

Under the instruction of the Assistant Secretary-General/UN Security Coordinator, all UNAMIR personnel (military, Civilian Police, civilian) are strongly reminded that under no circumstances should statements regarding any security situation to be made to the Press unless the text has been cleared by his Office. This is particularly critical in cases involving the kidnapping/detention of staff members where premature and irresponsible statements to the media can, and have jeopardized, delicate negotiations and placed the lives of staff at risk.

Please be advised accordingly.



UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



5000-1 (Plans)

G3 PLANS 2-

From : CO INDBATT

To : DCOB (Ops)

G 3 Ops

G 3 Plans

Info : COS

Subject : SECURITY DUTIES BY INDBATT

1. As per Fragmentation order number 14 dt 27 Apr 95 additional duties have been taken over by INDBATT tps wef 04 May 95.

2. After the redeployment the distribution of various sections of INDBATT on ground is as under :-

(a) BCC	- 2 Secs	
(b) Force HQ	- 2 "	
(c) Chez Lando	- 2 "	(KK Security pers not yet arr)
(d) UNICEF building	- 1 Sec	
(e) UNDP building	- 1 "	
(f) UNHCR building	- 1 "	
(g) IVECO	- 1 "	
(h) IVECO annexe	- 1 "	
(j) UN Workshop	- 1 "	
(k) Brown & Root HQ	- 1 "	
(l) Transit Camp	- 1 1/2 Sec	
(m) Ndera Camp	- 2 Secs	
(n) RRF	- 3 Secs	(for one sec at 10 min NTM round the clock, 3 secs are required on 8 hrs shift basis. These secs must be maintained for Sector as well as own requirements).

Total = 19 1/2 Sections

3. In addition INDBATT has to cater for security of its own locations as under :-

(a) Alexandra	Bn HQ loc	- 2 secs.
(b) Soaltee	Coy loc	- 2 secs.
(c) Birpur	Coy loc	- 1 sec.
(d) Bn Wksp (Bahadur)		- 1 sec.

Total = 6 secs

04 May 95



1ST BATTALION

UNAMIR

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



4. Vide the Fragmentation order certain locs deployment is given as half a section which is not found to be militarily/tactically feasible. After necessary recce has been carried out of these locations ie, Brown & Root HQ, IVECO annexe, UNDP compound and UNHCR bldg the minimum strength for security duties works out to a section each.

5. Thus INDBATT has presently deployed approx 26 to 27 sections which leaves the Bn with absolutely no reserves. 8 vehicles had to be provided for evacuation of IDPs with escort with effect from 04 May 95 resulting in tps working without any break. This escort had to be hurriedly put together on an ad hoc basis.

6. Considering that the troops have completed 5-6 months in the mission area, they will now require to proceed on leave as well as R&R. If one takes this into consideration, the strength of two coys, the present deployment is not sustainable and INDBATT resources are totally overstretched on ground.

7. In view of the above, you are requested to reconsider the above tasking, or take action to have some offices/facilities merged with others so as to reduce the number of guards.

(NK Singh)
Colonel
Commanding Officer
INDBATT

Cover Sheet Classification UNCLASSIFIED	Enclosure Classification UNCLASSIFIED
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Department of Defence


FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

Page 1 of 2

File Number: 611-1-1	Senders Name: MAJ M.R. RICKETTS
Precedence: ROUTINE	DTG Sent: 02 0453MAY95 Z
Facsimile Destination	Facsimile Originator
DCOS OPS UNAMIR HQ	AUSMED
Unclas Fax No: 11 278	Unclas Fax No: 75 216
Discon Fax No:	Discon Fax No:
Telephone No: 11 186	Telephone No: 76 519
Subject Title: OUTLINE OF EVENTS IN KIBEHO IDP CAMP 21 - 25 APR 95	

Instructions/Comments

- Please find attached an outline of events which occurred in Kibeho IDP Camp over the period 21 - 25 Apr 95. This summary is drawn on the first hand observations of troops who observed the events over the period in question.
- Further information is available if required.

Releasing Officer's Name	Signature	Rank / Appointment	Date
RICKETTS		MAJ/OPSO	02/05/1995

THIS FAX COVER SHEET AND CLOSURE ARE TO BE TRANSMITTED IAW THE REQUIREMENTS OF

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN KIBEHO
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS CAMP 21 - 25 APR 95

1. **Background.** At about 18 0530B Apr 95, approximately three battalions of RPA surrounded Kibeho Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Camp and began to close in on the population. The camp population fled in a mass panic to the two ZAMBATT positions within the camp. Amongst the chaos, a woman was shot in the hip and ten people were trampled to death. The RPA announced that the camp was being closed and that transport would be provided for persons wishing to return to their home communes. As at 20 Apr 95, approximately 5 000 people had been transported out of Kibeho and numerous reports of deaths and injuries to the IDP population had been reported.
2. **21 Apr 95.** The IDP population became agitated on the night of 21 Apr 95 due to a combination of overcrowding, lack of food, water and sanitation, widespread fear of RPA intentions and agitation from within the ranks of the IDPs. It was reported that IDPs were attacking other IDPs with machettes.
3. **22 Apr 95.** The IDP population made two attempts to break through the RPA cordon:
 - a. The first attempt occurred between 1100 and 1500 hr and resulted in 130 IDPs dead and a further 100 IDPs breaking the cordon. It is believed that the attempt coincided with a thunderstorm.
 - b. A second attempt commenced at 1710 hr. Initially up to 5 000 IDPs attempted to break-out of the cordon. Firing was reported from both RPA and IDP sides. RPA used heavy machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and small arms in their attempts to reconstitute the cordon. Initial reports of mortar fire directed against IDPs have not been confirmed.
4. **23 Apr 95.** At first light, it was apparent that the RPA cordon had been broken en masse. The IDP population remaining in the camp was estimated to be as low as 1 000. AS MSF elements arrived in the camp at 0630 hr and were tasked to satisfy a HQ UNAMIR priority task of estimating the dead and wounded. Their report as at 0745 hr was a count of 4050 dead and 650 wounded. This count was restricted to the immediate area around the old cordon area with AS MSF elements being denied access to the camp's wider areas. Each death was confirmed by a Medical Assistant. Accompanying Infantry used pace counters to record each confirmed fatality. An intensive medical effort was performed by the two AS MSF CCPs believed to be the only medical assets within the Kibeho vicinity.
5. **24 Apr 95.** Upon arrival at Kibeho, AS MSF elements reported that a stand-off had developed between the 500 remaining IDPs and the RPA who had adopted an aggressive stance surrounding the compound. ZAMBATT and AS MSF elements negotiated with RPA and gained a stay-of-action from the RPA. This enabled over 200 IDPs to leave the compound under UN escort. At last light, over 200 IDPs remained in the compound surrounded by an RPA cordon. Over this period the count figures of the dead were revised by UNAMIR HQ to approx 2000.
6. **25 Apr 95.** AS MSF elements arriving at 0800 hr reported the situation in the camp was unchanged from the previous night.

To - A **DFC (thru COS)**
 Date **2.5.95**
 Time - Heure

From - De **DCOS Ops**

Language spoken - Langue utilisée
☐ English / Anglais
 ☐ French / Français

Telephone No. - N° de téléphone


Extension / Poste

☐ Please call / Prière d'appeler
 ☐ Returned your call / Vous a rappelé
 ☐ Will call again / Vous rappellera
 ☐ Wants to see you / Désire vous voir

☐ Action / Donner suite
 ☐ Approval / Approbation
 ☐ Note and return / Noter et retourner
☐ Comments / Commentaires
 ☐ Draft reply / Projet de réponse
 ☐ Note and forward / Noter et faire suivre
☐ As requested / Comme demandé
 ☒ Signature
 ☐ Note and file / Noter et classer

File No. - N° de dossier

Message taken by - Message reçu par

Instr for A/FC's
 signature. 



From: DCOS Ops

To: FC

Through: COS
DFC

Info: DCOS Sp

Date: 15 April 95

Subject: TAC HQ

Reference: Brief prepared by G3 Plans dated 14 Apr 95 (Attached)

1. I would suggest that the reassignment of Staff Officers be considered separately once FC has given direction; however, I believe that placing Col Osae Aday in the IOC as the UNAMIR representative to Op Retour would be the best option to derive maximum benefit from his recent experience. The remainder of the staff could be integrated into Force HQ in the HAC and throughout to relieve Milob who are currently "misemployed". SO Accn will have to find housing in Kigali/BBC accordingly.
2. Additionally, the facility that houses Tac HQ could be reallocated to Milob Sect HQ and Senbatt to improve their accommodation situation.
3. FC's direction requested.

② COS

- This is an excellent brief and I want action taken A.S.P. as per recommendations.
- I also want the staff to know that TAC HQ did an excellent job - The concept is simply outdated.

④ G3 Plans

1. Pls draft an FC's Instr for the disbandment of Tac HQ.
2. Suggest a coord mtg with key players to iron out details.

21.4

FC
20 Apr 95



③ DCOS (Ops)

1. Ref Note 2 ante.
2. Issue Snikable lists to deestablish Tac HQ
3. Process to commence in first wk May and completed by 08 May 95

21.4

BRIEF ON THE REVIEW OF TAC HQ BUTARE

FOR

FORCE COMMANDER

General

- DCOS OPS directed me to conduct a review of the functions and structure of TAC HQ located in Butare. I visited TAC HQ on 4 Apr 95 and was briefed by the COO COL Osae Adaye

Background

- Tac HQ was established in August 1994 as a forward command unit responsible for command and administration of units in sector 4 during the handover of responsibility for the humanitarian zone at the end of Operation Turquoise. This role enabled the HQ to conduct staff visits to examine operational performance and evaluate their administrative requirements.
- The command of sector 4 units was later reverted to UNAMIR HQ and Tac HQ was assigned a monitoring, non tactical role. It continued to monitor the events in sector 3 and 4 and became the main co-ordinating centre for Operation Homeward and subsequently Operation Retour.
- Tac HQ is located in Butare and is accommodated in the Laureate Centre, a French cooperative and has a staff of 13 personnel (including 8 officers, a clerk and a civilian administrative staff). The sector 4B MILOB HQ, of 25 officers, is collocated with Tac HQ in this building.

Current Tasks Performed by Tac HQ

- The following tasks are performed by Tac HQ:
 - Report on incidents that happen in sector 4.
 - Point of coordination for all NGOs in sector 4.
 - Coordinating centre for Operation Retour.
 - Coordinate the provision of support to the local communities (requests for assistance come to Tac HQ not to the individual battalions).
- **Comment.** The reporting of incidents is a function that is also carried out by sector 4B MILOB HQ.

Increased responsibility for Tac HQ

- The COO maintains that if Tac HQ is allocated the required logistics, including transport, it could fulfil the following tasks (Flag A):
 - Supervise and administer units in sector 4.
 - Serve as a contact point for all NGOs operating in sector 4.
 - Centre for reporting all information regarding human rights abuses.
 - Serve as a transit point for UNAMIR convoys travelling to/from Kigali.
 - Staff could visit IDP camps to investigate and report on events.
 - **Comment.** For these functions to be undertaken by Tac HQ would require UNAMIR HQ to delegate command of the units in sector 4. Furthermore, it is duplicating some of the functions which are/should be carried out by sector 4B MILOB HQ.

Flag A

Advantages/Disadvantages of Retaining Tac HQ

- **Advantages.** The following are the perceived advantages of retaining Tac HQ:
 - Provides a coordinating and monitoring centre for Operation Retour and future operations.
 - Keeps the representational status (ie. representing the FC) at the right level.
 - Retains corporate knowledge on past and present operations.
 - Maintains a close working relationship with the NGOs.
- **Comment.** The coordination and monitoring function could be undertaken by either SENBATT or MILOB HQ with augmentation from UNAMIR HQ when required. Furthermore, other areas have established good working relationships with NGO without the benefit of an intermediate HQ. Finally, the perceived representational status of Tac HQ (ie. representing the FC) should be retained at the appropriate level by appointing SENBATT contingent commander as his representative.
- **Disadvantages.** The following are the perceived disadvantages of retaining Tac HQ:
 - Duplicating a functions already carried out by other groups, therefore, it is a poor use of personnel and equipment.
 - It will not allow the redeployment of Tac HQ staff officers to release MILOBS from staff positions on UNAMIR HQ.

Alternate Uses for Tac HQ Personnel

- The following are the possible future employment of Tac HQ staff:
 - Its personnel could be used to release MILOBS being mis-employed as staff officers on UNAMIR HQ.
 - Elements could be used to increase UNAMIR presence in the Intergraded Operations Centre (IOC) and staff positions in HAC.

Conclusion

- The options are clear, either Tac HQ is given realistic tactical role and responsibilities, together with the resources to accomplish that role, or disestablished .
- The reporting and investigation of incidents in sector 4 is a function of the sector MILOB HQ, not the Tac HQ.
- The coordination and monitoring of Operation Retour and future operations should be undertaken by either SENBATT or sector MILOB HQ. Augmentation from UNAMIR HQ could be provided for surge periods.
- The perceived representational nature of Tac HQ (ie. representing the FC) should be retained at the appropriate level by appointing SENBATT contingent commander as his representative.
- The loss of the working relationships with the NGOs in sector 4, if Tac HQ is disestablished, is a valid concern. However, other areas have been able to establish good relationships with their NGOs without the benefit of an intermediate HQ.


Recommendations

- It is recommended that Tac HQ be disestablished and its staff redeployed to UNAMIR HQ, the IOC and HAC.

Brief prepared by: LTCOL S.J. Dunn, G3 PLANS
 Cleared by: COL J. Arp, DCOS OPS
 14 Apr 95

UN RESTRICTED

TO : G3 PLANS, UNAMIR HQ,
KIGALI

FROM : COO, TAC HQ, BUTARE 

DATE : 4 APRIL, 1995

SUBJECT : FUTURE ROLE OF TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS

1. Tac Headquarters Butare was established in mid-August 1994 as a forward sub-command unit responsible for command and administration of units within sector 4. This role enabled the staff officers to visit units within this sector and examine their operational performances and to evaluate their administrative requirements. The command aspect of this Sub-HQ was later on reverted to UNAMIR HQ at Kigali. It was later assigned the responsibility of monitoring role and became the main co-ordinating centre for OP HOMEWARD. Presently, Tac HQ has a staff of eight (8) officers a clerk and a civilian administrative staff. Attached is the organisation of Tac HQ.

2. With the advent of OP RETOUR in December 1994, this HQ remained the main co-ordinating centre and continued to monitor events in Sector 3 and 4. All occurrence were immediately passed on to UNAMIR HQ.

3. Despite the limited operational resources available to the staff, there exists a good working relationship between the numerous NGOs within Butare and Gikongoro Prefectures as well as the top heiracy of the local RPA.

4. Through the efforts of this Sub-HQ, UNAMIR HQ at Kigali was constantly informed about events such as:

- a. The withdrawal of the French Forces from Sector 4 and the subsequent deployment of UNAMIR Forces in this area.
- b. The movement and deployment of RPA troops in this sector which was followed immediately by the appointments of Prefects for Gikongoro, Kibuye and Cyangugu.
- c. The murder of a Canadian Roman Catholic Priest in November 1994 at Kibiriti in Ntyazo commune within the Butare Prefecture was thoroughly investigated by this HQ and a report on it was accordingly submitted to UNAMIR HQ.

1

UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

- d. The murder of Dr Rwangabo Pierre Claver, Prefect of Butare was the latest incident which was accurately reported to UNAMIR HQ.

5. This HQ could serve the following useful purposes if other logistics including transport are provided:

- a. As a sub-command unit to supervise and administer units within sector 4. If part of command could be decentralised to this Sub-HQ and the necessary logistics provided, the staff officers can pay regular visits to formed troops in Gikongoro and Cyangugu and report accurately to main UNAMIR HQ at Kigali. This will bring command nearer to the formed troops
- b. The presence of this Sub-HQ will facilitate constant consultation between the RPA and Tac HQ regarding the former's operations and movement in this sector. This established machinery is presently working faultlessly in the overall interest of UNAMIR.
- c. Tac HQ/Bde HQ/Liaison Office could serve as contact point for all NGOs operating in this area from Butare through Gikongoro to Cyangugu. This HQ as at now is opened to the public for 24 hours each day of the week to receive complaints and offer assistance where necessary.
- d. This Sub-HQ could act as a centre where all information concerning Human Rights abuses and other vital information on any major events taking or yet to take place could be reported to UNAMIR HQ.
- e. Tactical HQ could serve as a Transit Point for the numerous UNAMIR convoys travelling south to and from Kigali.
- f. The presence of a Senior Civilian Administrative Officer at this HQ also facilitates the job of the Field Officers serving in the units within sector 4.

UNAMIR TAC HQ
BUTARE

FC/DFC (ALTERNATING)

FC/DFC PERS STAFF (3)

TAC HQ TP
(38)

G1/G4
(1)

AIR
(1)

MED
(1)

G2
(1)

G3
(5)
-CDO+2
-SDO
-DO(3)

SAO

LO
(4)

BRITCON
LO (1)

CIV STAFF



ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION NO. 017/95

DATE: 10 April 1995

To: All UNAMIR Civilian and Military Staff

From: Ally H. Golo, OIC
Administration

Subject: Security of information

This Administrative Instruction is issued with a view to remind all UNAMIR civilian and military staff of Staff Regulation 1.5, in connection with "discretion in regard to all matters of official business.... particularly in peace-keeping and peacemaking...."

A copy of Secretary General's Bulletin No. ST/SGB/272 dated 9 August 1994 is attached herewith for the full information of everyone, bearing in mind the Secretary General's instructions on this subject.

Please be guided accordingly.



Secretariat

ST/SGB/272
9 August 1994

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S BULLETIN

To: Members of the staff

Subject: SECURITY OF INFORMATION*

1. Most United Nations information is available to the Member States, managers and staff of the Organization and the general public. This is consistent with the Organization's commitment to transparency in the way that its business is undertaken. However, the United Nations functions in a number of areas, most particularly in peace-keeping and peacemaking, political affairs and in all matters related to the security of personnel and installations, in which absolute confidentiality and discretion are essential.

2. All staff members are required, under staff regulation 1.5, to "exercise the utmost discretion in regard to all matters of official business. They shall not communicate to any person any information known to them by reason of their official position that has not been made public, except in the course of their duties or by authorization of the Secretary-General. Nor shall they at any time use such information to private advantage. These obligations do not cease upon separation from the Secretariat."

3. I appreciate that the great majority of staff members are both aware of these provisions and respect them. However, I want to remind all staff of their obligations in regard to security of information under the staff regulations, and their personal responsibility for the proper protection of information which they may be called upon to handle in the course of their duties. Heads of department or mission are responsible for ensuring the safe custody of sensitive information communicated to them, and for ensuring that appropriate security measures are in place to protect vulnerable communications links, such as telephone or facsimile equipment and computer systems.

* Personnel Manual index No. 1060.

4. Guidelines and standards for transmitting and protecting sensitive information entrusted to or originating from the United Nations will shortly be issued. In the meantime, all responsible officials should review existing arrangements within their department or office to ensure that all staff understand the need for the utmost discretion and that appropriate security measures are in place.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI
Secretary-General

✓ 3000.12 (Plans)

G. B. Plan

Plan 2
3
4

FROM : DCOS OPS

3000.12 (OPS)

TO : LISTS A, B AND E
MILOB GP HQ
FSO
FORCE ENGR COY
AUSMED
95 FLSC

INFO : CSO
UNCIVPOL
STO
B & R
UNDP

DATE : 27 APRIL 95

SUBJECT : ACCESS SECURITY

1. Lately, there have been a number of instances of UN vehicles being stolen or hijacked at gun point. It has been noted that the robbers have now started using the UN vehicles to gain access to UN facilities and residences in order to carry out armed robberies.

2. In view of the above, it is directed that instructions be passed to all the guards who are guarding UN installations to ensure that all UN vehicles are properly screened and identified before they are allowed access inside the premises. Further, the sentries on duty must establish the identity of the driver and the occupants of the vehicles by checking their identity cards.

3. It is further requested that similar instructions be passed to civilian security agencies like KK Security who are providing security to UN installations and private residences, for implementation.

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.1 (PLANS)

01 02 290700Z APR 95 RR RR UUUU

PLANS 054

HQ UNAMIR

ZAMBATT

SENBATT

INFO TAC HQ

MILOB GP HQ

UNCLAS PLANS 054

SUBJ: WNGO

1. THE CLOSURE OF IDP CAMPS IN SECTOR 4A HAS RELEASED MANY OF THE ZAMBATT COYS TO REDEPLOY THROUGHOUT THEIR SECTOR. HOWEVER, THE CURRENT SECTOR IS TOO SMALL TO ALLOW THE BATTALION TO FULLY DEPLOY. SENBATT, ON THE OTHER HAND, DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH RESOURCES TO ADEQUATELY DEPLOY IN ALL THE COMMUNES THROUGHOUT SECTOR 4B

2. THE FC IS CONSIDERING CHANGING THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN SECTOR 4A AND 4B. SECTOR 4A WOULD BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING COMMUNES FROM THE NORTHERN PART OF SECTOR 4B:

- A. MARABA
- B. RUHASHYA
- C. RUSATIRA
- D. NTYAZO

UNCLASSIFIED

02

UUUU

PLANS 054

E. NYABISINDU

F. MUYIRA

3. ZAMBATT AND SENBATT ARE TO CONDUCT RECON AND LIAISON BEFORE 3 MAY 95 AND PLAN THEIR REDEPLOYMENT IN THE REVISED SECTORS.

4. CO ZAMBATT AND CO SENBATT ARE TO BRIEF DCOS OPS OF THEIR PLANNED DEPLOYMENTS AND IMPLICATIONS ON 4 MAY 95 AT 1100 HRS. VENUE IS DCOS OPS OFFICE UNAMIR HQ.

5. BOUNDARY WOULD NOT CHANGE BEFORE 15 MAY 95


6. ACK

DFC
COS
DCOS SP
FMO
FSO


LT COL S. DUNN G3 PLANS, 11148

COL J. ARP, DCOS OPS, 11186

UNCLASSIFIED



File with Frago
p/s
TANZANIE 29/4





UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.1 (PLANS)

To: Distribution List

From: COS

Date: 18 Apr 95

Subject: SPECIAL SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS

References: A. 3000.12 (Ops) dated 2 Apr 95

1. The preventive and cautionary measures introduced at Reference A for the anniversary week of the genocide are cancelled.
2. Notwithstanding that Reference A is cancelled, all personnel are reminded that appropriate security measures are to be taken at all times.

Distribution List:

LISTS A, B & E
UNCIVPOL
MILOB GP HQ
G6/FSO
FORCE ENGR COY
AUSMED
95 FLSG

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH

3 September 1994

3000.15(Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: FC DIRECTIVE FOR HANDOVER OF EX-RGF SOLDIERS TO
RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FOR INTEGRATION INTO RPA

GENERAL

1. Ex-RGF soldiers continue to respond positively to the Rwandese Governments integration policy. Hundreds have already voluntarily requested to be integrated into the RPA and many more are expected to follow.

AIM

2. The aim of this directive is to streamline the procedure for the handover of ex-RGF soldiers by UNAMIR to the Rwandese Government.

PROCEDURE

3. All ex-RGF soldiers who voluntarily surrender to UNAMIR Troops/units will be disarmed and evacuated to the appropriate sector/sub-sector HQ as applicable for documentation under the supervision of the sector/sub-sector UNMO and ICRC or UNHCR representative.

4. After documentation a consolidated list will be forwarded to UNAMIR Force HQ for the necessary clearance to be sought from the appropriate government agency through the RPA Liaison Officer to transport the ex-RGF soldiers to Kigali.

5. On receipt of clearance, the clearance certificate is to be forwarded to the sector HQ concerned for the necessary transportation of the soldiers to be effected under MILOB escort to Force HQ.


6. The convoy commander must carry the clearance certificate to be shown at each RPA check point en route if necessary.

7. Units requiring transport assistance will request Force HQ to make the necessary arrangements to move the soldiers to Kigali.

HANDOVER

8. The convoy commander will report to G3 Ops on arrival for the necessary transfer of the soldiers to be made to the

appropriate Rwandese authority under the supervision of ICRC or UNHCR representative and the press.



GC TOUSIGNANT
Major-General
Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Sector 1
Sector 2
Sector 3
Sector 4A
Sector 4B
Sector 4C
Sector 5
MILOB GP HQ
HAC
CANSIGS
BRITCON
AUSMED

Internal:

Info:

DFC
CAO
DCOS OPS
Tac HQ
G3 Plans
G4 Log
CMPO
G3 Engr

HQ UNAMIR
KIGALI

15 October 1994

Distribution List

FORCE COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE ON MASS GRAVES AND
ALLEGED MASSACRE SITE REGISTRATION, INVESTIGATION AND HANDLING.

GENERAL

1. Instances of widespread killing during the recent civil war in RWANDA are well known. The development of a strategy to investigate these occurrences is in progress. However, a comprehensive database on mass graves is required to focus the Human Rights Committee investigation and to provide the BBGNU with limited assistance from NGOs and UNAMIR to deal with the situation in a dignified manner.
2. Additionally, it has been revealed in recent reports that a number of mass graves discovered to date present a health hazard to the neighbouring population.

AIM

3. The aim of this directive is to outline the UNAMIR policy on registration and handling of mass graves.

PROCEDURE

4. Reports of mass graves and alleged massacre sites are random and do not identify a trend. The recording of relevant data has been equally sporadic. Accordingly, a database is to be established at HQ UNAMIR by the MILINFO cell in Operations Branch.
5. Reporting. Action addressees are to report the discovery of mass graves to HQ UNAMIR. Reports are to include the following details:
 - a. Location.
 - (1) map coordinates (8 figures).
 - (2) nearest town, village, commune or camp.
 - b. General description.
 - (1) dimensions.
 - (2) condition.

- (a) sealed.
- (b) unsealed.
- (3) proximity to water source.
- (4) proximity to population concentration.
- (5) approximate age.
- (6) estimated number of persons buried therein.
- (7) cause of death where discernable.

c. Remarks.


6. Recording. MILINFO cell, HQ UNAMIR is to record mass grave reports in a format which will be useful to military, government departments, UN agencies and NGOs. Cooperation amongst all parties will ensure that maximum information is collectively made available. Accordingly, the MILINFO cell is to gather from and share information with all available sources.

7. Investigation. Investigation of all the circumstances surrounding mass graves and alleged massacres is the responsibility of Human Rights and the BBGNU of RWANDA. The involvement of UNAMIR personnel will be specifically ordered when necessary.

8. Handling. FMO staff is to inspect reported mass graves to ascertain the health risk if any. If a clear health risk to the civilian population and/or UNAMIR personnel is identified, the FMO inspection report, including recommendations to the Government on the appropriate procedure to effectively address the matter, is to be submitted to Operations Branch. Due to the limited resources currently at the government's disposal, UNAMIR is to be prepared to provide the resources and expertise required. Requests to provide such resources are to be approved by DCOS OPS in consultation with the FMO and DCOS SP.

CONCLUSION

9. The handling of mass graves has legal, moral and memorial implications which are properly the responsibility of the BBGNU of RWANDA to address. UNAMIR personnel are to treat mass grave issues with appropriate sensitivity and are to limit their involvement to the essential requirements of reporting unless specifically ordered otherwise.



G.C. Tousignant
MGen
Force Commander

Distribution List: (page 3)

Distribution List:

External:

Action:

CANCON
AUSMED
BRIT CON
NICOY
MALICOY
GHANBATT
MALAWI COY
ZAMBATT
FRAFBATT
ETHIOBATT
TUNBATT
INDBATT

Information:

Human Rights Coordinator (UNDP)

Internal:

Action:

List A
List B

Information:

SRSG's Office
CC LOG O
File

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH

3/ August 1994

3000.15 (OPs)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: FC'S DIRECTIVE ON TRANSPORTATION ON REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS
IN UNAMIR AOR

GENERAL

1. UNAMIR and NGO convoys operating within and outside UNAMIR AOR are encouraged to assist in the relocation of refugees/displaced persons to their towns and villages.
2. To prevent RPA arresting, for interrogation, ex RGF and Militia/Gendarmes travelling with UNAMIR/NGO convoys, the guidelines below will be adhered to.

AIM

3. The aim of this directive is to outline the procedures for the movement of refugees/displaced persons in UNAMIR AOR.

TASKS

4. UNAMIR HQ. UNAMIR HQ will ensure the following:
 - a. A contingent/NGO provides transport to move refugees /displaced persons.
 - b. MILOB GP HQ will provide UNMOs at Pick up Point, and in all Sectors.
 - c. Humanitarian Assistance Cell will undertake reception arrangements.

SCREENING

5. All refugees/displaced persons will be thoroughly searched for weapons, documented and categorised as follows:
 - a. Category A. Ordinary Rwandese citizens.
 - b. Category B. Politicians and EX government officials.
 - c. Category C. Ex-RGF/Interahmwe/Gendarmerie Members.
6. Documentation is to be undertaken be MILOBs.

7. Conveyance of categories B and C refugees/displaced persons will be undertaken separately after clearance has been sought from the RPA through UNAMIR HQ.


ESCORT/CHECK POINT PROCEDURE

8. The loading of refugees/displaced persons will be supervised by MILOBs and convoy commanders. In addition MILOB will ensure the following:

a. MILOB at the Pick up Point will accompany convoy to edge of its sector and handover to MILOB in next sector.

b. . On reaching Sector 4 boundary, each convoy is to stop short of any RPA check point to allow refugees to dismount and approach the check point under MILOB control. The convoy vehicles will then proceed through the check point and halt a short distance on the other side. Once refugees are through the check point, MILOB will accompany the convoy to the Drop off Point and hand over to HAC.

9. For categories B and C refugees/displaced persons, ICRC or UNHCR will be provided details of personnel transported for follow up action.



GC TOUSIGNANT
Major-General
Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Info:

Sector 1
Sector 2
Sector 3
Sector 4A
Sector 4B
Sector 4C
Sector 5
MILOB GP HQ
Canadian Centre
BRITCON
Ausmed

DFC
CAO
DCOS Ops
SO2 G1
SO2 G3 Plans
SO2 G4 Log

V5000-1 (Plans)

AB (Plans) - 2-7
3-12
4-15

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA




NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR-MINUAR

From: DCOS OPS

File: 3000.12(Ops)

To: 
LISTS A, B & E
UNCIVPOL
MILOB GP HQ
FSO
FORCE ENGR COY
AUSMED
95 FLSG

Info: CSO
STO
OSRSG
B & R
UNDP

Date: 25 Mar 95

Subject: SECURITY AWARENESS

1. The aim of this instruction is to appraise all military personnel of the prevailing security situation in Rwanda, with a view of creating a sense of security awareness in the hearts and minds of all concerned.

General

2. The overall security situation, although it remains relatively calm, is of serious concern. Incidents of armed robberies directed against UN personnel, accidents involving UN vehicles, hijacking of UN vehicles and altercations between the RPA and formed troops is generally on the increase. Therefore, there is a need to make all uniformed personnel of UNAMIR aware of the procedure to call for help in any adverse situation. Some of the emergency situations which may occur are as under:

- a. Detention by the local authorities.
- b. The victim of a robbery of any kind, at home or elsewhere.
- c. The victim of an assault.
- d. Involvement in a vehicle accident and in need of assistance, an ambulance or a tow truck.
- e. Witness to a situation which would include any of the preceding.

3. It should also be noted that within Kigali, there is a Ready Reaction Force (RRF) available 24 hrs a day to react to any adverse situation in which the extrication of UN personnel warrants the use of armed troops. The RRF can be contacted through the UNAMIR duty officer on channel 4 or telephone # UNAMIR extn 11150 or Rwandatel 84265. The duty officer is responsible for monitoring the channels for emergencies and have access to all the military and civilian information/assets that may be needed in case of emergency, including the RRF, civilian police, military police, tow trucks, ambulances as well as medivac and casevac procedures.

Vehicle/Travel

4. All travel must be authorised prior to your departure from your unit and you must carry your UN ID and license permit at all times. When travelling by car, keep the doors locked and avoid travelling alone at night. Generally, hijackers are less likely to inflict serious injuries when two or more persons are in a vehicle. You must not pick up non - UNAMIR personnel and do not stop for broken down vehicles which are not UNAMIR. Finally, keep your vehicle parked in a safe, guarded, well lit area at night and do not leave valuable items in a parked vehicle.

5. Action at Road Blocks. When approaching a road block/check point drive slowly and put your car lights in the 'park' position. Turn on the interior light and act in a calm and polite manner in your conversation. Milk crates, branches, metal parts of a chair, witches hats and string may be used as road blocks in Rwanda. Please ensure that you observe them and drive very carefully as they are manned by armed soldiers.

Road Accidents

6. The UNAMIR Military Police (MP) Company Headquarters is located 500 meters East of the old UNICEF Building on the main Airport road (GR 125836). The Kigali Detachment operates on channel 7, call sign "ESCORT ZERO". You can contact the MP Desk Officer, day or night, on telephone # UNAMIR extn 11249. All road accident must be reported to the UNAMIR MP Coy HQ.

Personal Security

7. You must keep abreast of the current situation and developments in Rwanda. Particularly in the areas in which you live, work and frequent. Familiarise yourself with your work and residential locations. To enhance your personal security you should:

- a. get to know who your nearest UN neighbour and where the nearest UN vehicle is parked at night;
- b. know the phone number and/or the radio call sign to us in case of emergency (these are included at Annex A);
- c. inform your superior of all your travel plans in and out of the country;
- d. eat and drink in secure locations. There is safety in numbers! Never let the spirit of the moment cloud your judgement with regards to your personal safety;
- e. not travel at night outside your duty station;
- f. lie flat on the floor if you hear explosives or shooting near your residence. Do not look outside and stay away from windows. Try to crawl to a corridor which has no windows;

- g. maintain a week's supply of food and water in your residence;
- h. avoid setting a routine, ie. alternate your route and/or timing to and from home or office; and
- i. try to minimise unnecessary movements and where possible avoid travelling alone and after dark.

How to React to Attack

8. If you are attacked try to remain calm and do not panic (this may be very hard). In general, it is best to comply with the demand of the attackers or captors you are less likely to be harmed. Do not become aggressive and try to establish some type of compromise with your captors. Contact your Security Officer or superior as soon as possible.

Security of Personal Effects

9. You should update your inventory of personal effects, furniture, household effects, automobiles and valuables whenever necessary and submit the revised copy to the Security Officer.

Residential Security

10. Inform the designated Official/Unit Security Officer of any change of address/telephone during your stay in Rwanda. Contact your neighbours to ensure cooperation between the guards in your neighbourhood.

11. You should install curtains on your windows, especially in your bedroom and don't leave keys in a hidden place outside your house (under mats, flower pots, door ledges, etc.). Prior to retiring for the night you should ensure your home is secure by checking all doors and windows. Finally, don't give duplicate keys for your house to domestic help and keep your house keys separate from your vehicle keys.

Hotels

12. When staying in a hotel, familiarise yourself with fire safety instructions and know where the nearest emergency exit is located. Always lock your door after you enter or leave your room. Ensure that no money, jewellery, cameras, or other valuables are visible when leaving your room and, if possible, use a safe deposit box to store your valuables. Always ensure that you lock all suitcases left in the room.

Domestic Help

13. You should request references/recommendations from any locals that you hire as domestic help. Furthermore, ensure that you ascertain their exact residential address in Kigali. Once hired you must ensure that they are issued the proper security pass when hired through Brown and Root. Create a bonus/incentive on top of their salary in case of privately hired help. However, be strict with them and allow no visitors in your residence without your permission.

Guards

14. If you employ a guard, ensure he is issued with a whistle and a flash light. Establish a signal with him so that he will open your gate immediately (For example you might sound the car horn three times at 100 meters from your residence). Avoid waiting in front of your gate. Give your guard clear instructions such as:

- a. Your gate must always be locked (chain with padlock).
- b. Never authorise visitors to enter without your permission.
- c. Patrol every morning and evening to inspect the fence or wall.
- d. Report all incidents (window left open, exterior light not working, etc).

Security Guidelines Summary

15. There are certain important security guidelines which need to be followed by all personnel in uniform. These are as follows:

- a. Carry your ID card with you all times. If you are issued with a Motorola Radio, you are advised to carry it with you as well.
- b. Avoid going out on your own and staying out too late at night. It is advisable that you go out in groups of two or more, and where possible go in convoys of two or more vehicles.
- c. Avoid driving at night at remote and isolated areas in the city. Know safe streets and routes.
- d. Avoid using local taxis and privately owned cars particularly at night time, except if you know the private car owner. Should you be forced to use a local taxi, you must always be in the company of somebody you know and trust. Relying on Registration number plates of taxis is not enough.
- e. Should you be attacked, you should always try to be calm and firm, and courteous. Never show signs of stress and intimidation, even though you may feel intimidated.
- f. Avoid all forms of arguments with your attackers even where you have your right.
- g. It is always in your best interest to yield to the demands of your attackers and where possible establish some kind of rapport with them.
- h. Stop only at established road blocks/check points, and avoid giving lifts to non - UN personnel. Do not stop at hand signals of any kind at night, especially in suspicious circumstances and areas.
- i. Should you be trailed at night, avoid heading for your residence especially if it is a distance away from you. You should always try to head for public houses specially HQ where there is a crowd and call for help on your radio describing your exact location.
- j. Above all, do not discard "Common Sense" as it will assist you to appreciate the situation on the ground, make sensible deductions and take decisions in your best interest. Remember your life comes first, and thereafter, all other things shall be added unto it.

16. Your attention is drawn to the Force Commander's Directive No 01/94 on UNAMIR Conduct, Dress and Weapon Carriage Policy forwarded vide this HQ letter no 5000.45(Plans) dated 7 Nov 94.

ANNEX A TO
SECURITY AWARENESS
DATED 25 MAR 95

EMERGENCY CONTACT NUMBERS/CHANNELS

1. For incidents occurring after 1800 or on the weekend: switch your radio to channel 8 or channel 4 and call callsign "Zero". Callsign Zero is the Military Duty Officer in the UNAMIR HQ Ops Room. You may also can call for help on following Callsigns and channels:

- a. **Channel 11 - " Sierra Oscar 9 " HQ Civilian Security Officer - between 0830 and 1800 hrs. Monday -Saturday.**
- b. **Channel 8 - Callsign " Zero " - Military Duty Officer - 24 hrs.**
- c. **Channel 7 - Callsign " Escort Zero " - Force Provost Marshal.**
- d. **Civilian Security Officer - Telephone # 84268 Ext. 11073/11135.**
- e. **Military Duty Officer - Channel 4 - call sign "Zero" or telephone # 84268 Ext. 11150 or # 84265.**

2. Standard procedures and discipline must be observed if radio communication is to be used successfully for security purpose. Messages should be planned in advance. Long difficult messages should be avoided as they can be misunderstood. In case of a shooting, do not panic, use your radio to call for assistance. Speak in a calm even voice and give the following information:

- a. Clearly state your callsign.
- b. Give your location and describe the incident that has taken place. This is the most important piece of information and could save vital minutes in time it takes for assistance to reach you.
 - (1) All personnel should know the grid reference of their place of residence as well as that of homes or other places that are frequently visited.
 - (2) You should also know their location at all times in relation to prominent reference location (the Meridian, Chez Lando, Mille Collins, The Parliament Building are examples of such locations).
 - (3) Which way is north, south, east and west in Kigali.
 - (4) If the situation permits, the person calling for assistance should go to an easily identifiable rendez-vous point to meet the person(s) sent to provide assistance.
 - (5) End the message with " I need emergency assistance right away . "



UNAMIR - MINUAR

To: All UNAMIR Civilian & Military personnel
B&R
UNDP, UNHCR, UNHRFO, UNREO (With a request to inform
all NGOs and UN Agencies)
From: SRSG
Date: 11 Apr 95

Subject: SEARCHING OF UNAMIR VEHICLES BY RPA

1. Under SOMA, all UNAMIR vehicles are exempted from being searched by RPA, or any security agencies of the Rwandese government. In practice, this is manifested in another manner through varying interpretations by the parties involved. Rwandan officials interpret the SOMA to read that they have the right to search the personal luggage of members of UNAMIR. UNAMIR's interpretation is that personal property of the members of UNAMIR "...required by them by reason of their presence in Rwanda with UNAMIR" is immune to search.

2. In a joint UNAMIR/RPA meeting, it was agreed that searches of vehicles could only be conducted under very exceptional circumstances, which may involve the following:

- a. Transportation of unauthorised (non-UN) personnel.
- b. Transportation of unauthorised equipment or stores.
- c. Personnel in the vehicle have been observed committing a crime.

3. As a result of the modified interpretation by the RPA, these searches have nearly become a routine exercise in many areas of Rwanda. Therefore, it is clear that the original understanding of para 2 has been misused. We are actively discussing a more reasonable approach. For the interim all personnel are cautioned to use restraint and diplomacy in these demands for searches. Requesting Milob or formed troop assistance for negotiation and not proceeding through the check point are possible alternative options to allowing the search to take place. All should be reminded that these searches are not worthy of escalation in the use of force resulting in increased tension or injury.

4. When assisting other personnel or agencies such as UNHCR and UNHRFO, Milobs and formed troops should remember it is the responsibility of the various agencies to determine whether or not to subject themselves to searches and under which parameters those searches can or can not be conducted.

5. UNREO's security plan directs its personnel to indicate that their vehicle is owned by the United Nations, is on official business and that they are protected from searches by formal agreement with the government. They are further directed, if the request for search persists, to permit the search but indicate that a report will be filed and forwarded to the host government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

6. UNHCR's and UNHRFOR's personnel have been directed by similar guidelines but are more concerned with the search of pouches. Their personnel have been directed to allow the search of pouches if demands persist but to indicate that documentation in pouches is not to be read.

7. Until an agreed policy is reached with the RPA please ensure these guidelines are followed.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Date: 8 April 1995

To: ED
FC
COS

From: Shaharyar M. Khan
SRSG

Shaharyar M. Khan

Subject: Searching of UNAMIR Vehicles by RPA

I feel para 2 (b) and (c) may have opened the way for RPA to flout our basic immunity. Our direction should be that clearly the understanding at para 2 has been misused. We are actively discussing a more reasonable approach.

Meanwhile, all concerned are requested to exercise restraint.

This order should not give the air of permanence to existing practice. I agree otherwise with the contents.

DCos(Cops) *Done*

1. Ref att
2. Is the att encl our Draft? Are we required to issue any detailed Instrs. Please check

A
0014



To: All UNAMIR Civilian & Military personnel
B&R
UNDP, UNHCR, UNHRFO, UNREO (With a request to inform
all NGOs and UN Agencies)
From: SRSG
Date: 6 Apr 95

Subject: SEARCHING OF UNAMIR VEHICLES BY RPA

1. Under SOMA, all UNAMIR vehicles are exempted from being searched by RPA, or any security agencies of the Rwandese government. In practice, this is manifested in another manner through varying interpretations by the parties involved. Rwandan officials interpret the SOMA to read that they have the right to search the personal luggage of members of UNAMIR. UNAMIR's interpretation is that personal property of the members of UNAMIR "...required by them by reason of their presence in Rwanda with UNAMIR" is immune to search.

2. In a joint UNAMIR/RPA meeting, it was agreed that searches of vehicles could only be conducted under very exceptional circumstances, which may involve the following:

a. Transportation of unauthorised (non-UN) personnel.

b. Transportation of unauthorised equipment or stores.

c. Personnel in the vehicle have been observed committing a crime.

*original
Therefore, it is clear that the understanding
of para 2 has been misused. We are...*

3. As a result of the modified interpretation by the RPA, these searches have nearly become a routine exercise in many areas of Rwanda. *as in the interim* All personnel are cautioned to use restraint and diplomacy in these demands for searches. Requesting Milob or formed troop assistance for negotiation and not proceeding through the check point are possible alternative options to allowing the search to take place. All should be reminded that these searches are not worthy of escalation in the use of force resulting in increased tension or injury.

4. When assisting other personnel or agencies such as UNHCR and UNHRFO, Milobs and formed troops should remember it is the responsibility of the various agencies to determine whether or not to subject themselves to searches and under which parameters those searches can or can not be conducted.

SRSG sect

20/05/95

A draft for your
consideration pls

1/2

D

3) Pls fm

UNHRFO's pol
and incl in new
para 7.

6/p

UNHRFO's
policy
confirmed
11/4/95

5. UNREO's security plan directs its personnel to indicate that their vehicle is owned by the United Nations, is on official business and that they are protected from searches. They are further directed, if the request for search persists, to permit the search but indicate that a report will be filed and forwarded to the host government's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

6. UNHCR's personnel have been directed by similar guidelines but are more concerned with the search of pouches. Their personnel have been directed to allow the search of pouches if demands persist but to indicate that the documentation is not to be read.

7. For your action please.

*Please ensure these guidelines are followed, until
an agreed policy is agreed*

*until an agreed policy is reached with the RPA
please*

To: All team leaders

20 March 1995

Through: William Clarance
Chief,
Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda

From: Maj JLA Racine
Human Rights Liaison Officer

SUBJECT: PROCEDURE TO FOLLOW AT ROADBLOCK

1. Based on a recent deterioration of the freedom of movement at roadblock the following procedure will have to be followed in order to let authorities know what is the Human Rights personnel status in Rwanda and on the other hand get as less interference in the daily activities of the Human Rights personnel.

2. When being stopped at a roadblock and asked for the vehicle and personal effects to be search the personnel involved must adhere to the following steps:

- a. identify yourself properly as a Human Rights Field Officer, showing your identity card;
- b. explain that you benefit of United nations immunity and have the roadblock personnel read the back of your identification card;
- c. explain that you also benefit of an immunity as per the agreement signed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda, show them the document with an emphasis on paragraph 7 and 8 and on the signature block at the end, a copy of that document in english, french and kinyrwanada should prove helpful;
- d. tell them that this search is illegal unless they can provide evidence that they have reason to do it;
- e. if you are still not allowed to proceed without being searched, mention that you do not have anything to hide, that you will agree to the search, and that you will lodge a official complain for the non respect of your immunity;
- f. try to obtain the name of the person in charge of the roadblock;
- g. insist to be present while your vehicle is being searched;

- h. ask to have your belongings put back in the car the way they were;
- i. if they start looking at your official papers remind them that it is completely against the immunity and the agreement of your presence in Rwanda, and that an official complain will be lodged, then let them search;
- j. take note of all the details taking place while the search is being done like timings, duration of search, the way the search is conducted, the attitude of the personnel etc, and report in writing as soon as possible;

3. At any time in that procedure if you feel that the situation is getting much more tense call the Human Rights Field Operation or the Military Observers to report your location and briefly explain the reason.

4. The more sensitive issue being the documentation you may have with you, it is therefore suggested for you to minimize the quantity of CONFIDENTIAL report that you carry and if you do so try to have it on your person discretely, no body search has been done or reported till now.

5. It is hoped that this issue will be solved at higher level but in the mean time you are requested to follow these instructions.



INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Ambassador Shaharyar M. Khan
SRSG

FROM: Ladan M. Rafii *LM*
Political/Legal Officer

SUBJECT: Searches of U.N. personnel at Kigali Airport

DATE

①
G3 Plans

Pls provide DCOS Sp
the opportunity to review
our final draft of
SRSG instr re searches
prior to "transmitting".

[Signature]
DCOS Sp
8.4

I would like to take this opportunity to clarify certain matters regarding personal property belonging to U.N. personnel conducted by C
Airport, particularly with regard to customs clearance.

First and foremost, it should be noted that personal belongings, unlike official U.N. documents and property, are not granted immunity from search unless they constitute the personal property of certain categories of individuals. The following are immune from search with regard to their personal belongings:

- the Special Representative, the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner of CIVPOL
- MILOBS and CIVPOL personnel (in their capacity as U.N. experts on mission)
- other high-ranking members of the SRSG's staff as may be agreed upon with the Government

Other U.N. officials and members of UNAMIR (excluding locally-recruited staff) have the right to duty-free importation of personal effects at the time of their initial arrival in the country. However, under the provisions of UNAMIR's Status of Mission Agreement:

Members of UNAMIR...shall be subject to the laws and regulations of Rwanda governing customs and foreign exchange with respect to personal property not required by them by reason of their presence in Rwanda with UNAMIR.

Clearly, this implies that airport officials are at liberty to apply domestic Rwandese law with regard to searches of personal luggage belonging to most U.N. staff arriving or leaving the airport. However, what is noticeable from my personal observations and experience, as well as that of other colleagues, is that airport officials are applying their regulations with a vengeance when it involves U.N., and especially UNAMIR, personnel, regardless of the category of people with whom they are dealing.

Despite the fact that our own U.N. personnel may be harbouring certain misconceptions with regard to their own immunity from search and seizure, Government officials should be reminded that official U.N. property, assets and documents, as well as the personal property of the above-listed categories of individuals, should not be subjected to searches at Kigali Airport.

cc: FC
ED
CSO
LA

BRIEF

DCOS-OPS

For your info/advice
p/s
4/4

TO: G3 PLANS

FROM: SO2 LEGAL

DATE: 4 APR 95

SEARCHES OF UNAMIR MEMBERS AT KIGALI AIRPORT BY RWANDAN OFFICIALS / LEGAL POSITION OF MILITARY MEMBERS NOT IN UNIFORM

Searches of UNAMIR personal at Kigali airport

1. I have been asked to provide my advice on the status of the military members of UNAMIR in respect of their personal property in light of searches being conducted at Kigali airport by Rwandan officials. The members of UNAMIR have been granted certain privileges and immunities under part VI of the Status of Mission agreement. In respect of personal property the SOMA states:-

"30. Members of UNAMIR shallbe subject to the laws and regulations of Rwanda governing customs and foreign exchange with respect to personal property not required by them by reason of their presence in Rwanda with UNAMIR."

2. There are two possible interpretations of the above provision. The first being that Rwandan officials have the right to search the personal luggage of members of UNAMIR. This view would be supported by the use of the words '*...shall be subject to the laws and regulations of Rwanda governing customs...*', within clause 30. This interpretation fails however to take into account the balance of the sentence.

3. The second and in my opinion the better view is that the personal property of the members of UNAMIR are immune from the application of Rwandan domestic law if that property is '*...required by them by reason of their presence in Rwanda with UNAMIR.*' These words qualify what would otherwise be the case i.e., that the law relating to customs will apply. Accordingly if the personal property of a member of UNAMIR falls into this category then there is no lawful basis for Rwandan officials searching the members personal luggage.

4. The real issue is what class of personal property is immune from the application of Rwandan domestic law? The answer to this question lies in the meaning to be afforded to the word '*presence*' as it appears in the sentence. I am of the view that a wide interpretation of that word is appropriate. I take this view because given its usual every day meaning it covers a wider situation than would be the case if the term '*official duty/ies*' had been used. The term '*official duty/ies*' is used elsewhere in the SOMA and consequently there is a clear intention on the part of the signatories to the agreement that this provision was intended to cover a different situation.

5. That being the case it relates to the actual day to day living of a military member of UNAMIR within Rwanda in order that he may carry out his official duties. In other words it is that personal property which is required for a member to maintain his presence in Rwanda. As a result whatever personal property is reasonably necessary for a member to maintain his presence in Rwanda for the duration of his assignment is immune from the application of Rwandan domestic law. Such property could include, but not be limited to, civilian clothing, family photographs, family memorabilia, books, music, and other items which are necessary for an extended deployment.

② G3 Plans

1. Pls incorporate paras 1-7 in our search directive and paras 8-12 in the new FC's dir on conduct etc.
2. Pls bear in mind that "civilians" and wpps do not mix and that uniform should be the norm when on duty, esp when away from residence. DCOS OPS 5.4

6. There are obvious difficulties with the application of this interpretation. These difficulties arise as a result of the poor drafting of the provision. Nevertheless the interpretation is I believe correct and consequently if the issue is going to be raised with the Rwandan government then regard has to be had to the following.

7. Who is going to determine what personal property is immune? How is it going to be determined what personal property is immune? What action is going to be taken to separate that property from property not subject to the immunity?

Legal position of military members of UNAMIR when not in uniform

8. I have also been asked to consider the legal position of the military members of UNAMIR when not in uniform. Clause 37 of the SOMA requires that military members '*...shall wear, while performing official duties...*', their uniform.

9. In respect of criminal offences clause 47 (b) grants exclusive jurisdiction over the military members of the military component of UNAMIR to their respective participating states. Nowhere is that exclusive jurisdiction either, related to the wearing of uniform or the performance of '*official duties*'. Accordingly whether or not a military member is in uniform he is not subject to the criminal law of Rwanda.

10. In respect of civil action this area is covered by clause 48. Briefly if a military member breaches Rwandan civil law whilst carrying out official duties then Rwandan civil courts can be relieved of their jurisdiction. If a breach is not related to his official duties the domestic courts have, and are able to exercise jurisdiction against the member.

11. The term '*official duties*' is not defined within the SOMA, but for the purposes of this brief the meaning of that term is not essential. What is important is that the term is not linked to any loss of legal protection for a member who is not in uniform at the time of performing an official duty. In other words the failure of a military member to wear his uniform whilst performing his official duty does not have any effect on the level of legal protection he would otherwise be afforded.

12. The failure to wear his uniform may result in disciplinary action being taken by his participating state, or an official complaint by the Rwandan government, but such action would only relate to the failure to wear the uniform, nothing else. In so far as a criminal breach is concerned the participating state always retains its jurisdiction. As regards civil jurisdiction as long as the member is performing an official duty at the time of the civil breach he is protected from civil action regardless of whether he is in uniform or not.

FROM : COS

3000.12(Ops)

TO : LISTS A, B, & E
UNCIVPOL
MILOB GP HQ
FSO
FORCE ENGR COY
AUSMED
95 FLSG

DATE :02 APR 95

SUBJECT : SPECIAL SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS

1. The Govt of Rwanda is planning to celebrate the first anniversary of the genocide from 07 to 14 April 95, which as you know has caused apprehensions in the minds of the majority of the population and the international community. This occasion is likely to evoke strong sentiments in the local population and may result in outbreak of violence and general degeneration of law and order in the country.

2. Although there are no confirmed indications that violence may break out in the above mentioned period, it is felt that certain additional personal security measures must be observed by UNAMIR personnel from 04 April 95 till further orders to the contrary, so as a preventive and cautionary measure. These measures are as follows:

- a. Do not travel alone in a vehicle whether by day or by night. Restrict your movement to essential travel such as from your place of residence to the place of work and back only. Keep your movement to the minimum.
- b. Always inform someone as to where you are going and when you are likely to return.
- c. Never leave your place of residence or work without your radio.
- d. Do not travel at night unless absolutely necessary, and if you have to, travel in pairs.
- e. Avoid travel to the city and the market as far as possible. Stock upon your foodstuff and other essential household goods for a fortnight before 04 April 95.
- f. Avoid travel on dirt roads that are not frequently travelled on by others. Do not drive in potholes or on fresh

moved/dug ground..

g. Do not move out of your respective AORs till further orders, without permission.

h. Avoid entering large crowds, demonstrations or gatherings unless prearranged security elements are in place.

i. Be aware of the procedure to call for help in case of an emergency.

3. The above measures are by no means comprehensive and complete. Your attention is drawn to our letter on Security Awareness forwarded vide our letter no 3000.12 (Ops) dated 25 Mar 95.

✓ 5000.1 (Plans)

G3 plans 2-3-4-17

UNAMIR HQ
Force Headquarters
Ops Cell
KIGALI

12 April 95

3000.12 (Ops)


See Distribution:

SECURITY OF UN PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES

1. The period of 7 - 14 Apr 95 has been earmarked by the Rwandan government for the commemoration of the anniversary of the 1994 genocide. It is anticipated that many anti - UNAMIR/UN demonstrations and rhetorics will occur throughout Rwanda. Demonstrations have already been conducted in Kigali and Gisenyi. The latter has resulted in the theft/loss of 2 motorolas and damage of a UNAMIR vehicle.

2. UNAMIR and UN personnel operating within the UNAMIR AOR are therefore instructed to adopt a very low profile during the period, and are advised to avoid large gatherings and road blocks by the civilian population.

3. For your appropriate and immediate attention.


J ARP
Col
for Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

List B, C & D

Information:

List A



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Ref: LOG/255

Date: 21 March, 1995

To: G3 Plans

Info: CISS (w/o enclosure)

From: G J Wordley
CILM

Subject: PATROL BOATS FOR LAKE KIVU

*No action as yet.
Hold on file
p/s [signature]
21/3*

1. You asked me to provide comments on the attached paper stating the requirements for patrol boats for Lake Kivu.
2. Radar It seems that one of the over-riding requirements is for the boats to be capable of patrolling at night and the need for radar is therefore paramount. However, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve a range of 30-40 km with a radar mounted in a 25-35ft boat. Firstly the mast height which can be achieved in such a boat will be insufficient to provide a greater range than 5 - 10 kms; secondly it is doubtful that the power output required to achieve that range will be possible from an outboard motor. If an inboard motor is fitted, this will increase the draught by perhaps as much as a foot. In addition, a boat of the proposed length will not be capable of carrying 2 inboard motors.
3. Initially it had been suggested that a high definition surface warning radar would be required. The cost of such a set would be prohibitive (perhaps \$10 - 15k) nor could such a set be easily procured, maintained or used. Additionally, I doubt that the power required could be provided in a boat of this size. And yet the alternative, a yacht or small boat radar, would not provide sufficient definition to pick out the low, wooden construction boats on Lake Kivu which have a poor radar signature.
4. On the issue of required range, a surface radar of 30 - 40 km range will give coverage of almost the whole of Lake Kivu. Given the probable technical problems as explained above a range of 5 - 10 kms is probably all that is required.
5. Speed A boat capable of 30 - 40 kts for which the primary purpose is patrolling at night is asking for a disaster, particularly when it cannot be fitted with a high definition radar. The amount of flotsam in Kivu leads me to the conclusion that any boat travelling at that speed at night will be holed very soon. Additionally, the control of a shallow draught boat at that speed requires experienced and well trained coxswains which are, in all likelihood, not available within the Mission. Also, given that the majority of the security problem is between Ijwi and the coast of Rwanda which is a distance of some 20 kms I might suggest that a speed requirement of 40 kts goes beyond the real requirement.

6. In sum I would suggest that far better radar coverage could be provided by installing a radar on the top of a hill on the coast and the patrol boats vectored to intercept contacts from that location. Fitting radar in the boats themselves will not achieve the objective within the budget and cannot provide the range requested. I also question the speed requirement for the boats given the conditions on the Lake and the experience of UNAMIR troops as coxswains in this type of boat.

7. I am attempting to provide you with some of the technical data on radar ranges v mast heights v power requirements and power v speed ratios to substantiate some of my comments above.

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File: 5000.1 (Plans)

To: CISS

From: G3 PLANS *[Signature]*

Date: 18 Mar 95

Subject: ESSENTIAL AND DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
WATERCRAFT FOR OPERATIONS ON LAKE KIVU

Attached is the amended characteristics for the watercraft for operations on Lake Kivu. Would you please take action to carry out a market survey only at this stage.

Regards

ESSENTIAL AND DESIRABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WATERCRAFT
FOR OPERATIONS ON LAKE KIVU

Essential Characteristics

1. The following characteristics are considered essential to meet the requirement for Watercraft Operations on Lake Kivu:

- a. Riverine/coastal style patrol craft (25-35ft);
- b. Speed 30 - 40 knots;
- c. Shallow draught;
- d. Navigational equipment (Surface search radar (range 30 - 40 km), compass & depth sounder));
- e. Search light (range 500 m);
- f. Carry 8 - 10 personnel;
- g. Fresh water tank (200 litre capacity)
- h. Low training liability;
- i. Low maintenance liability;
- j. Logistic supportability;
- k. GPS navigation aid; and
- l. Safety equipment.
- m. Sleeping accommodation for three personnel (to include airconditioning)
- n. Toilet (compact)

Desirable Characteristics

2. The following characteristics are desirable:

- a. Twin engine propulsion; and
- b. Beaching capability.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

FROM: Mr G J Wordley
CCLOGO

To: CISS

DATE:

Ref: LOG/

Subject: BOATS.

for approval/signature of enclosed covering
letter and the attached requisition. MT.

CCM.
Add this till
3 Plans revamps
the characteristics
required. CISS
28/2

✓

File



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Ref: LOG/255

Date: 28 February, 1995

To: M Vanttaja
OIC Procurement

Info: DCOS(Sp) (w/o enclosure)
G3 Plans (w/o enclosure)
SCU

Thru: P J A Hornsby
CISS

From: G J Wordley
CILM

Subject: SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY PATROL BOATS

(1)

1. UNAMIR military staff has identified a requirement for patrol boats for surveillance and security operations on Lake Kivu. UNHQ had been in negotiation with the US to loan the necessary craft but this avenue to obtain the boats has been unsuccessful.

2. UNHQ has now indicated that it may be prepared to make available up to \$100,000 to procure the boats. CPO is therefore requested to carry out a market survey only, to determine availability and price of these boats if procured within the UNAMIR procurement area. A description of the requirement is attached to the Requisition enclosed. Should any further advice be required to clarify the specifications, G3 Plans should be consulted.

(2)

CPO

when going to the market, do not
include the entire capability statement,
only the essential and desirable
characteristics. No need to mention
weapons either.

ACISS
28/2

**UNITED NATION ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
REQUISITION FOR SUPPLIES**

Requisition #: UNAMIR - LOG/HQ- 20292

Date: 28 FEBRUARY 1995

TO: **Procurement Section**
ATT: **QUOC-SUNG DUCAM**

FROM : **LOGISTICS SECTION** Tel. Ext 11139

(Requesting Officer)

DELIVER TO : **ALLY H. GOLO, OIC ADM.UNAMIR**

Name _____

Boom No.

APPROVED BY: **PETER HORNSBY**

Name _____

CSS

Title

THIS BLOCK FOR USE OF CONTRACT,
PURCHASE OR LOGISTICS UNITS

Case No.:

Acc. No.: RNA-30310-599

Date Charged:[illegible]

ORIGINATOR REF. : CILM

SPECIAL

INSTRUCTIONS :

DELIVERED TO UNAMIR/HQ, KIGALI, OIC ADMIN. SHIPMENT TO BE
VISIBLY LABELED WITH PO NUMBER ATTN: LOGISTICS SECTION
UNAMIR/HQ

RECEIPT OF GOODS ACKNOWLEDGED:

NAME: _____

TITLE:

DATE: _____

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

SC

To:

CISS

File: 5000.1(Plans)

From:

G3 PLANS

[Signature]

Date:

17 Feb 95

Subject:

WATERCRAFT OPERATIONS IN RWANDA

Reference:

A. Capability Requirement Watercraft in Rwanda

1. DCO has indicated that approval has been given for the expenditure of up to \$100,000 for the purchase of three boats for surveillance and security operations on Lake Kivu. Therefore, would you please take action to acquire suitable boats in accordance with the Reference (enclosed).

2. Regards.

⑩ By Ciss

SC

Per min requisition to UNHCR for:

3 surveillance ^{+ security} / patrol boat

Total cost > \$100,000.

In accordance with specifications attached.

[Signature]
21/2

CAPABILITY REQUIREMENT

WATERCRAFT OPERATIONS IN RWANDA

Introduction

1. Recent incidents of banditry in the Western sectors indicate that undetected penetration of the Rwanda's western border is being effected via Lake Kivu. Indications to date suggest the emergence of insurgent operations, however, confirmation is frustrated by UNAMIR's lack of capability to monitor activity on Lake Kivu. Moreover, UNAMIR is unable to provide in transit protection to refugees who seek repatriation via the lake. Although UNAMIR is presently developing a helicopter borne night surveillance capability, the shortage of aircraft and higher priority operational requirements effectively preclude protracted operations. The boats which are currently issued to UNAMIR are unsuitable for offshore patrol operations.

Aim

2. The aim of this paper is to propose the acquisition of suitable water craft for the conduct of surveillance and security operations on Lake Kivu.

Discussion

3. Current Capability UNAMIR's current watercraft capability consists of nine inflatable Zodiac boats for shoreline patrolling. These craft are ex-UNOSOM equipment which were delivered incomplete and unserviceable. To date, only three of the boats are certified for operational use. Moreover, the lack of navigation aids and safety equipment on the serviceable boats prevent extensive patrolling and the underpowered motors preclude timely interception to establish the identity of the occupants of transiting boats.

4. The Requirement Lake Kivu covers an area of approximately 10,000 sq km within Rwanda's border. The 200(+) km coastline is extremely vulnerable to infiltration and is beyond UNAMIR's current resources to monitor. UNAMIR does not have the manpower to effectively monitor all likely landing places and lacks the resources to detect and react to border penetration. Approximately 50,000 refugees are known to be on the Isle of Ijwe (Zaire). It is believed that insurgents are operating from this location using powered and unpowered boats to reach their targets. It is considered, therefore, that the introduction of suitable watercraft would enable UNAMIR to conduct effective surveillance of Lake Kivu in order to identify the extent of infiltration and to provide protection to refugees who seek to return to Rwanda by boat. Accordingly, it is proposed that the UN acquire suitable watercraft to facilitate regular patrolling of the lake by day and by night in order to detect and monitor infiltration activity which may present a security risk to UNAMIR and those under UN protection.

5. Concept of Operations In order to establish the required level of credibility and deterrence, regular patrolling of the lake by day and by night and maintenance of a ready reaction craft is considered necessary. Adequate coverage of the area in a 24 hr period would require the availability of three to five patrol craft. It is envisaged that when the FLIR capable helicopter is

available for surveillance operations, the watercraft patrol program would be tailored to compliment the airborne operation while retaining the capability to react to target detection.

6. Training and Maintenance The training and maintenance liability should be within the current capacity of UNAMIR, noting that some specialist operator and maintenance training would be necessary to establish the capability. Accordingly, it is proposed that manufacturer/source nation sponsored training be conducted in theatre and that UNAMIR undertakes to carry out operator continuation training. It is further proposed that Brown and Root carry out maintenance on the craft and undertakes the associated maintenance continuation training.

7. Manpower It is proposed that the patrol craft crews be drawn from existing contingents. Establishment of the capability will, therefore be manpower neutral.

8. Essential Characteristics The following characteristics are considered essential to meet the requirement:

- a. riverine/coastal style patrol craft (30-35ft);
- b. shallow draught;
- c. beaching capability;
- d. VHF communications;
- e. low training liability;
- f. low maintenance liability;
- g. logistic supportability;
- h. high resolution surface search radar;
- i. GPS navigation aid;
- j. searchlight;
- k. self protection (medium and light machine gun); and
- l. safety equipment.

9. Desirable Characteristics The following characteristics are desirable:

- a. depth sounder; and
- b. twin engine propulsion.

Conclusion

10. In light of the emerging indications of an insurgency threat and increasing incidents of banditry which are mounted from offshore locations along Lake Kivu, it is considered essential for UNAMIR to develop the capability to conduct waterborne surveillance and patrol operations. A capability which facilitates intensive day/night patrolling and speed of reaction will enhance security and will serve as a deterrent to border incursions.

Recommendation

11. It is recommended that action be taken to acquire suitable patrol craft for the conduct of surveillance and security operations on Lake Kivu.

Prepared by G3 Plans

Cleared by DCOS OPS



File No 3000.3/OPS/1

To: DCOS Spt
G3 Ops
Force Engineer
Force Signals Officer

File 5000.1

Info: MA to FC
COS
G3 Plans ← *[Handwritten mark]*
CO Sector 4B
Manager Canadian Helicopters

Plans 2
3
4

From: DCOS Ops

Date: 21 Jan 95

Reference: 3000.3/OPS/1 dated 14 Jan 95 (NOTAL).

Subject: PREPARATION OF HELICOPTER NIGHT LS AT KIBUYE

1. Background. The helicopter night surveillance task outlined at Reference has been approved by the Force Commander. A trial period of night surveillance operations will be undertaken in the Lake Kivu area during the period 30 Jan - 05 Feb 95 inclusive. Central to the task, codenamed Operation Eyeball, will be the preparation of a suitable night landing site at Kibuye at GR 248 729.

2. LS Recce Report. An HQ UNAMIR staff recce carried out on 19 Jan determined that the chosen LS was suitable for the Op. However, to ensure that operations can be carried out efficiently and safely, the following preparatory tasks were identified:

a. EOD Sweep. Although FRAFBATT and the RPA report the Kibuye area mine free, it would be prudent to carry out a limited EOD sweep of the vehicle track leading from Kibuye town onto the peninsular which ends at the helicopter landing site at GR 248 729, and of the general area of the LS itself. The FRAFBATT RPA Liaison Officer (Lt Joseph) should be asked to indicate the route to the LS. The EOD sweep is to be completed preparatory to the engineer task at subpara b.

Action - Force Engineer

b. LS Preparation. The area of the chosen helicopter LS is a relatively flat area at the summit of a small hill at GR 248 729. The site is presently littered with the remnants of an old shack, including several sheets of corrugated metal cladding. There is also a partially demolished trench in the centre of the area. To permit safe helicopter operations, the site must be cleared, the trench filled in, and all loose debris, rocks etc

of the hilltop should be cleared down to ground level. The latter task will include a requirement to cut down the few tall trees in the area of the LS.

All site preparation is to be complete by 291200Jan95.

Action - Force Engineer

c. Installation of Non-Directional Radio Beacon (NDB). International commercial aviation regulations require all helicopter night flying to be aided by appropriate external radio navigation aids. Accordingly, Canadian Helicopters have requested the installation of a portable NDB beacon in the vicinity of the night LS at Kibuye. The company has such a beacon in store at the Presidential Hangar at KIA which is available for the task. The equipment, which is powered by a portable generator, must be installed correctly with an adequate ground plane to ensure a uniform omni-directional signal strength. Further, the NDB must be mounted on a small mast or pole to ensure adequate signal propagation above ground clutter (given the relatively unobstructed area of the LS, a vertical extension above ground level of between 2 - 3 metres should be sufficient). Lastly, the NDB mast should be firmly fixed to the ground with guy wires or ropes to avoid disturbance of the equipment by helicopter rotor downdraft. The precise location for the NDB installation should be clear of the LS itself, but within 150 metres. The site for the NDB must be selected to ensure no signal masking in the quadrant SE clockwise to NE. Signals staffs are to liaise with Canadian Helicopters to review the technical requirements for the installation. The NDB is to be installed, powered up, and ready for flight checking by 291200Jan95. Sample installation diagrams for the Canadian Helicopters NDB are attached at Annex A.

Action - Force Signals Officer

d. Domestic Arrangements. It will be necessary to accommodate 3 x Canadian Helicopter personnel (2 aircrew and 1 technician) at the LS location. A tented site will be constructed in the area of the LS, sufficient to provide living accommodation for the Canadian Helicopters personnel (x 3) and a rest area for a section of UN guards. The site should be located 200m clear of the LS itself, but ideally in sight of the parked helicopter. To accord with the terms of the UN/Canadian Helicopters contract, and to ensure that aircrews receive adequate rest during the day, the tented site is to comprise the following:

- i. Adjoining tents, equipped with bunk beds, mosquito nets, and a communal rest area with seating.

ii. Tented area to be lit and provided with electric fans for air conditioning. Electricity to be provided by a portable generator with sufficient fuel for 7 days.

iii. An adequate supply of fresh water (this could be driven in daily from HQ Sector 4B).

iv. Rations sufficient to feed all on-site personnel for 7 days (UN guards could eat at HQ Sector 4B).

v. A means to cook ration food (with fuel sufficient for 7 days).

vi. Motorola radio communications with HQ Sector 4B, together with provision for battery recharging.

vii. Ablution facilities (could be chemical and emptied daily by arrangement with HQ Sector 4B).


viii. Helicopter fuel sufficient for 7 days flying. Plan on maintaining a ready-use stock of 4 x 45 drums Jet A1 at the LS, provided from a main contingency reserve of 100 drums stored at HQ Sector 4B. Canadian Helicopters will provide transfer pumping gear.

The tented site is to be complete by 301200Jan95.

Action - G4.

e. LS Security. The area of the LS is regularly patrolled by the RPA, and is militarily secure. However, to ensure adequate protection of UN and Canadian Helicopters property, it will be necessary to provide a 24 hour UN guard for the site. A section of troops rotated regularly by vehicle from HQ Sector 4B should be sufficient for the task. The guard is to be in place in time to protect the NDB installation and preparation of the tented site.

Action - G3 Ops.


J ARP
Col
DCOS Ops

Annex:

A. Sample NDB Installation Diagrams.

TYPICAL INSTALLATIONS OF 8TA-240 ANTENN.




Fig. 2.2.12

GROUND
TOWER




Fig. 2.2.13




Fig. 2.2.14

GROUND SUBSTITUTE
INSULATED RADIAL COUNTERPOISE





Fig. 2.2.15

BURIED RADIAL GROUND SYSTEM

NOTE. There are 30 ground radial wires
equally spaced at 12° and 45 meters
in length. They radiate from a ground
stake mounted as close as possible to
the base of the antenna shaft.



INSTALLATION DIAGRAM
RADIAL COUNTERPOISE

(30 RADIALS)

VE UCTOI-2

Fig. 2.2.16




Fig. 2.2.18








Fig. 2.2.17

STA-240
MISCELLANEOUS
APPLICATIONS



2.4.4
TYPICAL INSTALLATION
SELF-SUPPORTING
TOWER



- For 2 installations
- ① 200' 1/8" braided copper wire for umbrella
 - ② 750' 1/8" guy wire with 20 ft. clamps
 - ③ 6 stakes to be cemented in (large) for guy wires
 - ④ 6 small stakes nylon rope attachment
 - ⑤ 500' nylon rope
 - ⑥ 12 meters for guy wires
 - ⑦ 20 insulators
 - ⑧ 2.3.2 Solid Copper antenna wire (insulated) (3/8") 100'
- TYPICAL INSTALLATION**
- ⑨ 100' RG 8/U COAX cable
 - ⑩ 40-50' of tubing for mast 3" diameter



File: 5000.1 (Plans)

To: DCOS OPS

From: G3 PLANS

Date: 5 Apr 95

Subject: BOAT OPERATIONS ON LAKE KIVU

References: A. G3 PLANS 5000.1 dated 18 Mar 95
B. CLIM LOG/225 dated 21 Mar 95

1. Reference A requested CISS to carry out a market survey against the identified essential/desirable characteristics of the proposed patrol boats for operations on Lake Kivu. However, CLIM at Reference B has advised that two of the essential characteristics, radar and speed, were not appropriate for the proposed operations on Lake Kivu.
2. He has indicated that with a 25-35 ft boat it would be impossible to get the mast height to achieve a radar coverage of 30-40 km. In fact, the power output required to run the radar would not be achievable using an outboard motor or a single inboard motor. Furthermore, the cost of a high definition search radar would be prohibitive (\$10 - 15k). He also maintains that a boat capable of achieving 30 - 40 knots, with the primary purpose of patrolling at night, is courting disaster, particularly when it cannot be fitted with a high definition radar. Finally, he recommends that a ground based radar, situated on the top of one of the hills overlooking Lake Kivu, would give a far better radar coverage and that the patrol boats could be vectored to intercept contacts from that location.
3. After careful consideration of these points I tend to agree with the CLIM. Therefore, I propose that we now separate the issues of the radar and the patrol boats and in future treat them individually. This would allow UNAMIR to put patrol boats onto Lake Kivu in a very short time as a deterrent measure. We could then look in detail at the concept of a ground based radar to interface with patrol boat operations on Lake Kivu.
4. It is therefore recommended that:
 - a. a market survey be carried out using the revised essential characteristics (attached), and
 - b. following this, a team from CLIM and PLANS go to Mombasa to further evaluate the ability to supply the required boats.

REVISED ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WATERCRAFT
FOR OPERATIONS ON LAKE KIVU

Essential Characteristics

1. The following characteristics are considered essential to meet the requirement for Watercraft Operations on Lake Kivu:

- c. Riverine/coastal style patrol craft (20-30 ft);
- d. Outboard engine propulsion (possibly twin engine)
- e. Speed 20 - 30 knots;
- f. Shallow draught;
- g. Navigational equipment (compass & GPS);
- h. Search light (range 200 m);
- i. Carry 6 - 10 personnel;
- j. Low training liability;
- k. Low maintenance liability;
- l. Logistic supportability;
- m. Safety equipment, and
- n. Beaching capability.