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EXCLUSIVE: Secret Diplomatic Messages on Nixon's Bombing of the Dikes

“Why I did it” A Pre-Prison Interview with Clifford Irving
by Abbie Hoffman
HOW TO VOTE FOR THE VIETNAMESE

by Tom Hayden
In election year 1972, forces are converging in Indochina and America which bear a strong resemblance to those that, in 1954, brought the French phase of the war to an end. It is premature to know if history will repeat itself, but one point is clear: the Indochina crisis each day becomes more intense, and will continue to do so despite all Pentagon propaganda, media distortion and campaign rhetoric.

In early 1954, as the French Expeditionary Force faced disaster on the battlefield, and as popular discontent in France manifested itself in the rise of "peace candidate" Pierre Mendes-France, the French government of Prime Minister Laniel sought to extricate itself by diplomatic maneuvering aimed at isolating the Vietminh from their major allies—China and the Soviet Union. This attempt failed, and the French Parliament replaced Laniel with Mendes-France.

Now George McGovern is making a bid for power under similar circumstances. Yet optimism seems naive at this point, and properly so to many anti-war organizers who through years of frustration have accepted the war as a permanent agony rather than a conflict which must, like all wars, come to an end.

Even so, this is a unique period—if not for ending the war, at least for reaching a new plateau of anti-war opposition. On the other hand, if the opportunity is missed, the anti-war movement could well find itself in the most difficult bind it has ever faced.

The main arena, as always, is the battlefield, where the offensive against Vietnamization is continuing to threaten Thieu with early and total collapse. Typically, officials in Washington, in a fit of suicidal overconfidence, have concluded that "Saigon's forces with U.S. air support not only stemmed the largest communist offensive in the history of the war but . . . regained the initiative." (Christian Science Monitor, 7/18/72) In fact, however, the Vietnamese military campaign has proven to be the longest and most effective ever. One fact alone disproves the claims about "stemming" the offensive.

On June 19, Thieu was raving about the "liberation" of An Loc, one of the three fixed—though not necessarily permanent—battlefronts into which his conventional troops were drawn by the offensive. But at this writing (August 6), his troops there have been under siege for 120 days. "As for the state of the defenders," almost every man was a casualty" in the ARVN 5th Division (New York Times, 6/29/72). The ARVN 21st Division, pulled from the Mekong Delta to be a relief column on Highway 13, took 3000
casualties "without fulfilling its task." One month after
Thieu's announcement of success, the American brigadier
general commanding the Saigon area was killed in his heli-
copter over An Loc.

On the Central Highlands front, the Saigon forces near
Kontum have been tied down on Highway 14 for a sim-
ilar length of time, as the guerrillas have sought to encircle
the ARVN in indefensible positions on roads. Meanwhile,
the PRG completely controls nearly all of heavily-popu-
lated Binh Dinh province, which stretches inland from the
sea three-quarters of the distance to Laos. Thus Thieu's
country is all but cut in two. But the Saigon regime has not
been alone in sustaining heavy losses in the fighting. In
early June, the U.S. lost its most important and experienced
official in all Indochina, John Paul Vann, killed in his heli-
copter over Kontum.

On the Quang Tri-Hue front, a fatal error may have been
committed by Nixon and Thieu in trying to retake Quang
Tri before the November election. For the PRG guerrillas
there, territory is not as decisive as it is for Thieu, who
must claim to rule in at least the formal sense. Thieu faced
the classic choice of dictators under attack: he could con-
centrate his remaining forces at the symbolic Hue and thus
lose Quang Tri, or he could overextend himself by a
"counter-offensive" into the lost province. He chose the
latter.

Ironically, the general whom Thieu dispatched to Quang
Tri was a man who had fought with the French at Dien-
bienphu, Ngo Quang Trung. With him went the entire stra-
tegic reserve of the Saigon Army, the marines and para-
troopers, who are the only experienced and mobile units left.

As in the case of An Loc, Thieu claimed victory pre-
maturely. In early July he said that Quang Tri City was re-
taken, and on July 26 that its inner Citadel was in his
hands. In reality his troops were only beginning a long and
bloody fight. They had marched up the "Street Without
Joy" (so named by the weary French) into the most heav-
ily fortified front they had encountered since they invaded
Laos in February 1971.

Quickly the "Street Without Joy" became a dead end.
The guerrilla army began "initiating its classic technique of
forcing enemy troops into a long, narrow corridor and then
attacking from the sides." (New York Times, 7/22/72)
In Quang Tri City, the ARVN paratroopers took so many
casualties that they were relieved by the marines at the
end of July. The marines then were thrown to their stom-
achs by pinpoint shelling which reached the level of 2000
rounds per day despite the most concentrated U.S. air and
naval bombing, shelling and gassing ever attempted. Meanwhile, the PRG began shelling and probing the western outskirts of Hue, which now was left more exposed by the Quang Tri fighting.

Concurrently, in the Mekong Delta, another classic guerrilla pattern has appeared which may become the politically decisive confrontation of the war. The Delta contains one-third of the people of the South, and supplies most of the rice to Saigon. The occupying ARVN had departed there for the three main fronts in early April, and in the vacuum the guerrillas began appearing everywhere, "quietly reasserting control this spring over many of their once powerful bases around Saigon." (New York Times, 6/16/72) Not only are central Delta provinces like Chuong Thien fully liberated but, according to sources as conservative as the Los Angeles Times, so are those ringing the outer defense perimeter of Saigon itself: Phuoc Thuy to the Southeast, Go Cong directly South, Tayninh and the Plain of Reeds to the north and west, and Dinh Tuong, which lies on strategic Route 4 to the southwest. Despite the fact that these provinces were the chief U.S. pacification efforts in 1965-68, the guerrillas have returned to dominant positions there.

The Delta is politically the most important confrontation point of the offensive, even though less publicized than the siege warfare to the north. During this summer's rains, the guerrillas are destroying any remaining ARVN companies, in apparent preparation for the October-November dry season when they can either ring Saigon with an offensive or isolate the city by cutting all road and communication lines. It is, of course, dangerous to predict the course of an offensive, but this possibility seems so clear that it is already contributing to the crisis of Thieu's tenure (New York Times, 8/6/72).

Thieu's army, the very base of Nixon's Vietnamization doctrine, is approaching its last stand. If two divisions are destroyed at Quang Tri, the remaining troops would face general collapse.

Already, various signs point to the disintegration of the army, including its high command. Saigon Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy has been arrested and charged with graft. Gen. Vu Van Goai, who retreated from Quang Tri in May, is under house arrest. Gen. Hoang Xuan Lam, commander in the northernmost provinces (I Corps), and Gen. Ngo Dzu, of the Central Highlands (II Corps), were relieved during the offensive. According to the Los Angeles Times, 8/3/72, only General Trung at Quang Tri is above suspicion and "respectable." That is one general out of fifty who make up the ARVN high command.

Meanwhile, the cities suffer under what the New York Times, 7/24/72, describes as "draconian police measures." Thieu managed to obtain emergency powers by calling a special midnight meeting of the Senate, from which the opposition was excluded by means of police and barbed wire. He has closed all but the most favorable Saigon newspapers, and he has arrested tens of thousands—essentially, his entire non-communist opposition. All things considered, it thus appears likely that Thieu will soon be "presiding" over a "country" minus one northern province, cut through its middle, and physically cut off from the majority of its population. He will nominally "govern" Saigon, and perhaps Pleiku, Danang and Hue, but these cities will be politically restive and economically disintegrating. They will not be enough of a base for Thieu to justify continued rule, and ultimately they will not be defensible. All this leaves Nixon in an ever-more-precarious situation. Unlike Johnson, who had 500,000 American troops to protect Saigon, he has only Thieu and his sinking army. Therefore he has turned to terror bombing—the worst in history—to punish the Vietnamese and threaten them with genocide as the price of victory.

According to Agence France Press, from March 30 to June 20 Nixon dropped 218,700 tons of bombs on Vietnam, including 146,700 from B-52s during saturation bombing runs. This represents the quickest, most massive escalation in the history of this war. While those who name him as the greatest war criminal of the whole Vietnam aggre-
"McGovern’s campaign is the first which holds out the real possibility of peace, not because McGovern is ‘different’ but because the American government faces a truly desperate situation."

His proposal can never be acceptable to the winning PRG forces since it merely rehashes the 1954 Geneva promise which has yet to be fulfilled. They have already experienced American neo-colonialism under Diem’s police state, when there were no U.S. troops and no U.S. bombs, yet no independence existed for the Vietnamese people. They cannot accept now what they originally took up arms against; instead, they propose a coalition government of anti-communists, neutralists and the PRG with only one condition—that it not be controlled by the U.S. They seem even willing to accept a “transitional coalition” to replace Thieu and then negotiate with the PRG and other parties (New York Times, 8/3/72). This is the most generous offer they can make and still retain their right to self-determination. If the U.S. chooses not to negotiate on this basis in Paris, the Vietnamese will simply continue implementing the three-segment coalition as they have in Paris with many exile groups, in Quang Tri with the former ARVN, and in Saigon clandestinely.

Though touted as a sign of “suffering” on the part of the liberation forces, the reopening of talks in Paris represents a change of policy not by the PRG and the DRV, but by the Nixon Administration which cancelled them in the first place. Kissinger was forced back to the conference room by the collapse of Vietnamization and a desire to undercut the domestic impact of the war issue in the Presidential campaign (Los Angeles Times, 7/20/72). Such a move became necessary with the failures of the Grand Design to have Russia and China pressure Vietnam into a Nixonesque “settlement.”

Not that the diplomatic maneuvering bore no fruit for the administration. The story of this effort requires further examination, but it seems clear now that both Russia and China have placed national interests, as indicated by Kissinger, above their solidarity with Vietnam. It was hardly “internationalism” when China announced its acceptance of the U.S. ping pong team one week after the PRG proposed its Seven Point Program last July. More callous by far was the Russian decision to welcome Nixon in Moscow and sign a “peaceful coexistence” agreement after Haiphong harbor was mined. Reliable sources go further to state that Podgorny followed the summit with a trip to Hanoi in which he urged acceptance of the Nixon ceasefire proposal. All these actions at the very least diverted attention from the Paris talks by opening the illusory prospect of a Great Power settlement once again. They also permitted the U.S. to escalate the killing of the Indochinese people without danger of a direct Soviet or Chinese response, thus bolstering the arguments made by hawks in the United States for the past five years.

Granted that the American anti-war movement has not given sufficient support to Vietnam (we have, after all, not sent tanks or rice), it still is not a “petit bourgeois hangup,” as some maintain, to question the degree of proletarian internationalism being displayed by the socialist camp towards Vietnam. If Fidel Castro and Le Due Tho can indirectly criticize their major benefactors, as they both have recently done in Eastern Europe, those who need no aid or supplies should go farther and make the criticism explicit. Otherwise, Kissinger can gloat in the complete silence of the
international left towards the isolation of Vietnam.

But it is unjustified as well to go as far as others in implying that both Russia and China have betrayed Vietnam. Some, indeed, adopt the mechanical view that all socialist revolutions, when they attain state power, place national interests above international ones, and that their international interests always coincide with those of imperialism rather than revolution. This cannot account for the steady flow of oil and foodstuffs into Vietnam from its allies. The Chinese in particular have been refusing to make certain agreements with the U.S. until the Indochina war is settled. They have taken the lead, and more recently the Soviets have joined them, in organizing world opinion against the U.S. through the United Nations and other forums.

In fact the international tempo, which seemed to favor Nixon in the immediate wake of the summits, now is swinging the other direction as a result of the genocidal bombing of the dikes and cities, and the U.S. refusal to talk sense in Paris.

Still, Nixon can be expected to develop a number of surprise maneuvers between now and November to offset this “worldwide propaganda campaign,” as he calls it. Chief among these would be a domestic peace offering of the sort already predicted by Flora Lewis (New York Times, 8/11/72) in reporting the speculation in Paris about impending developments: “Since these are crucial months on the American political calendar, it is considered that a bombing halt may be feasible and even desirable from the American point of view, if Washington can get something in exchange.” Obviously, “something in exchange” would not include independence for the Vietnamese people. Rather, the Administration has in mind a gesture designed to cool off the war as a campaign issue, possibly the release of some American POWs.

With the same purpose, the U.S. government has recently begun to inspire news stories in the national media about “bloodbaths” in Quang Tri and Binh Dinh. Through such devices, the administration hopes to justify its negotiating posture—i.e., that a complete U.S. withdrawal would prepare the way for the massacre of, and tyranny over, millions of South Vietnamese.

In making these charges, the Nixon Administration is, of course, playing to the American people, and here the role of the anti-war movement becomes crucial. The propaganda about “winding down the war,” the summits which promised peace, and now the Electoral Spectacle, have served to sidetrack many people seriously worried about Vietnam. Frustrated by apparent failure, they have given up on their own sense of power, and are viewing McGovern as the “last hope” (as many viewed McCarthy and Kennedy in 1968). At another extreme are those so alienated from electoral politics that they are in danger of missing a unique opportunity to seize the time in organizing against U.S. aggression.

To those who feel useless: read the Pentagon Papers; it will be seen that protest and war-weariness were among the major “costs” of the war which worried the Pentagon and led to the adoption of the Nixon Doctrine. Beyond that, they prepared the base for anti-war politicians to emerge in 1968 and for the demonstrations in Chicago that year which “reformed” the Democratic Party, leading ultimately to McGovern’s nomination in 1972. Why should we then underestimate our own power now by either indulging in frustration or abandoning anti-war work to join the McGovern campaign?

McGovern has risen to prominence through the same factors that brought Mendes-France to power in 1954. His campaign is the first since the beginning of the Vietnam war which holds out a real possibility of peace—not because McGovern is “different” but because the American government faces a truly desperate situation.

The anti-war movement can determine the election, and the election period can determine the future of the anti-war movement. This election, like others before, is marked by military escalation wrapped in promises of peace. Nixon aims to force McGovern to down-play Vietnam. In this he is aided by the Establishment Democrats whom McGovern is trying to woo. Already the candidate has backtracked on amnesty for war resisters and on the question of “residual forces” in Thailand.

The anti-war movement alone can expose the Administration’s lies about Vietnam, and thereby force McGovern to keep the issue a top priority. If we succeed in that, we will force upon Nixon the only two choices we are capable of imposing: that he negotiate sincerely in Paris or face defeat in November. A steady rise in McGovern’s popularity will not only threaten Nixon’s ability to hold on, but will intensify the hysteria within the Thieu regime. As one is weakened, the other suffers too; the rhythm, once begun, could be fatal.

If the anti-war movement creates an anti-Nixon mood, if most of the traditional Democratic coalition holds, if youth registration and voting is very high, McGovern can be elected and the war brought to its final phase in November.

Even if McGovern does not win, even if he loses by a small margin, the war—having played a major role in the campaign—will have given Nixon warning that he cannot prolong the war without severe domestic “costs” of the kind the Nixon Doctrine was designed to prevent. Upon taking office, he will once again be faced with a collapsing Thieu regime and a rising opposition in America. The stage will be set for a major confrontation between Nixon and public opinion, perhaps including Congress itself, if he attempts further escalation.

Thanks to the Vietnamese offensive, and the American election, the anti-war movement thus has an opportunity which may not come again for a long time.

At this point, we certainly ought not forget that the war has shown us what is wrong and what must be changed in America. If the Vietnamese secure their independence, the American people will be the victors as well. We will have resisted the encroachment of the draft, the repression of anti-war forces, the racism and elitism of the U.S. Army, the economic squeeze required to continue the war. Perhaps, most of all, we will have ended through our own efforts a generation of official lies meant to control our minds. Vietnam’s independence will open the possibility of our own.
Waldheim und Nixon


In seiner überraschenden Stellungnahme hätte Präsident Nixon dem UNO-Generalsekretär auch vorgeworfen, bisher kein Wort gegen die Invasion kommunistischer Truppen in Südostasien gesagt zu haben. fremden Besuchern Nordvietnams werden Beschädigungen an kleinen Deichanlagen als Beweis für eine systematische amerikanische Bombardierung vorgeführt. Auch der UN-Generalsekretär sei dieser Propaganda zum Opfer gefallen", fuhr Nixon fort.

Lückenloser Ausstand britischer Docker

Versorgungskrise bei Obst, Eiern und Butter


Die Regierung, die noch immer hofft, daß die Differenzen zwischen den Dockern und der Regierung bald durch Verhandlungen beilegen zu können, bereitet sich jedoch auf einen längeren Konflikt vor. Arbeitsminister MacMillan erklärte, die Regierung arbeite bereits vorbereitend an Maßnahmen „zum Schutz des allgemeinen Interesses der Wirtschaft und der Verbraucher“. Im Klarblick Deutschlands die Ausarbeitung eines Votenplanes für den Fall einer Versorgungskrise durch den Dockersstreik.


Die Schärfe des Konflikts zeigt die Erklärung eines Sprechers der Hafenarbeiter-Gewerkschaft von gestern: „Dieser Kampf ist das Wasserland des Industriellen. Worauf jemand genannt worden, wird das Arbeitspapier sein.“
Waldheim und Nixon / Von Hugo Plattisch


Waldheim forderte die USA auf, die Bombardierung von Dämmen und Deichen in Nordvietnam einzustellen. Er setzte hinzu, dass er über private Kanäle von solchen Bombardierungen erfahren habe; und auf Befragen meinte er, er könne nicht sagen, ob diese Bombenangriffe beachtlich oder unbedeutend erfolgten.


Weshalb ist die Frage der Bombardierung der Dämme und Deiche in Nordvietnam so wichtig?

Eine Zerstörung dieser Dämme und Deiche wäre gleichbedeutend mit der nahezu totalen Vernichtung Nordviets. Als 1944 die Hochwässer in Nordvietnam über diese Dämme traten, starben mindestens eine Million Menschen in den Fluten, wurden Straßen und Eisenbahnlinien auf Jahre hinüber vernichtet, gingen Städte und Dörfer dutzende in der Flut unter.

Es ist eigentlich erstaunlich, dass ein Land, das solche Vernichtung durch Luftangriffe jederzeit preisgegeben werden kann, es gewagt hat, selbst einen Aggressionskrieg zu führen. Dennoch glaubte man in Hanoi, kein zu großes Risiko einzugehen; die totale Vernichtung und die Besetzung des kommunistischen Regimes war nach dem Verhalten der USA nicht zu erwarten. Denn schon zu Beginn des Vietnamkrieges, zeigten die Amerikaner deutlich, dass sie nicht, wie einst in Korea, eine Invasion Nordvietnams planen und es auch nicht darauf abgesehen hatten, das dortige Regime zu enthronen.

Ihr Motiv war weder besondere Friedfertigkeit noch Angst vor den Nordvietnamesen, die USA wollten vielmehr eine Intervention Chinas oder gar eine bewaffnete Konfrontation mit der Sowjetunion vermeiden. Ein „Auslösen“ Nordvietnams aber hätte derartige Konflikte wahrscheinlich herabgeschreckt. Deshalb blieben die Bombardements gegen Nordvietnam auf einen streng überwachten Katalog von Zielen beschränkt, deshalb unterblieb auch die Erinnerung an die große nationale Überschwemmung der Donauinsel für Wien und seine Bewohner.

Und sie werden dort mit Erschrecken feststellen, dass die Bagger wieder ein Stück Landschaft vernichtet haben, dass die zweite Donauinsel bereits im Entstehen sind. In einer Großernte der Donauinsel für Wien und seine Bewohner hat 7 bringt deshalb heute der KURIER mehrere Beiträge zur Diskussion, welche Vor- und Nachteile der Bau der Donauinsel für Wien und seine Bewohner hat.

Jede Woche, Bargeld, Lacht

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Samstag, 19. Juli 1972

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Der KURIER bezahlt Ihren Urlaub

FORTSETZUNG AUF SEITE 2

ro-dixan jetzt zum Sonderpreis pro-dixan
zu einer regelrechten Invasion Südvietnams an, noch dazu in einem Zeitpunkt, da sich die Amerikaner bereits in vollem Rückzug aus Süd Vietnam befanden. Hätten sich die USA weiterhin so verhalten wie bisher, so wäre den Nordviets namen ein leichter Sieg sicher gewesen. Präsident Nixon aber antwortete mit der Verletzung bisheriger Tabus. Die Häfen Nordvietnams wurden erstmals vermint, die Luftbombardements wieder aufgenommen und mit noch nie dagewesener Intensität geführt.

Weder die Sowjetunion noch China griffen zu Repressalien. Im Gegenteil - Nixon wurde gleich danach mit allen Ehren in Moskau empfangen, Henry Kissinger konnte einen weiteren Besuch in Peking absolvieren. Auch die öffentliche Meinung in der Welt reagierte ähnlich: Hatte bis dahin jede Eskalation im Vietnamkrieg ungeheure Protestwellen ausgelöst, so blieb es jetzt bei kleinen Einzelprotesten gegen die USA.

Hanoi mußte wohl erkennen, daß es durch seine eigene Offensive viele Sympathien und sogar einen wesentlichen Teil der Unterstützung seiner Bundesgenossen Sowjetunion und China verloren hatte.

Man kann sich denken, daß sich die Nordviets namen nun auch die Frage stellen mußten, ob die USA bei der selbst aufgerufenen Beschränkung der Kriegsaktionen bleiben würden. Wie haltbar war der Mechanismus noch - keine Vernichtung Nordvietnams, weil Amerika sich vor sowjetischen und chinesischen Interventionen fürchtete?

Die US-Regierung erklärte zwar weiterhin, daß sie keine civilen Ziele absichtlich bombardieren werde, aber der Bombenhagel ist schon so dicht und die Isolation Hanois in der Welt schon so groß, daß man die Sorge der Nordviets namen verstehen kann. Nichts aber hätten sie mehr zu fürchten, als die Zerstörung der Dämme und Deiche - selbst Atombomben hätten kaum eine verheerendere Wirkung.


Nur ein Teil dieser Kampagne ist also Propaganda - die Behauptung, solche Bombardierungen würden bereits in großem Stil und mit voller Absicht durchgeführt; der andere Teil entspringt echter Furcht und dem Wunsch nach Vorbeugung.

Nun zu Waldheim: Er ist der Propaganda bestimmt nicht naiv und leichtgläubig aufgesessen; er hat sich höchsten
liche Teil des Bundesgenossen-Sovjets und China verloren hatte.
Man kann sich denken, daß sich die Nordvietnamesen nun auch die Frage stellen müssen, ob die USA bei der sich selbst auferlegten Beschränkung der Kriegsaktionen bleiben würden. Wenn sich "halber" war der Mechanismus noch - keine Vernichtung Nordviets, weil Amerika sich vor sowjetischen und chin.
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Mit diesem Ordnungsruf aber hat sich Waldheim - wir sagten es schon einmal - die Möglichkeit verschafft, künftig auch die andere Seite zu kritisieren.
Man kann nur für Waldheim hoffen, daß er es auch tun wird. Sein Vor gänger U Thant ist all die Jahre den Weg des geringsten Widerstandes gegangen - und der ergibt sich aus der UNO:\nArithmetik: Ostblock plus afro-asiatischer Block ist gleich Zweidrittelmehrheit. Der Westen kam stets zu kurz.
Nachsatz: Immerhin hat Waldheims Appell zu einer besonderen Versicherung Nixons geführt, die Dämme und Deiche auch künftig nicht zu bombardieren und damit eine menschliche Katastrophe größten Ausmaßes zu vermeiden.

Exklusiv-Kindergarten an der Alten Donau
Neueröffnung am 1. September
Nixon Blast
On Vietnam
Chills
Waldheim

By MICHAEL J. BERLIN

Kurt Waldheim drove back to the UN as the sun was setting. He climbed grimly out of his limousine, uttering an unsmiling string of "no comments" to questions about the verbal attack launched against him by President Nixon, and went up to his office on the 38th floor.

It should have been a smiling day for the tall, thin Austrian diplomat who took over the UN's reins from U Thant in January. Early in the afternoon there had been a ceremony for the signing over of the million-dollar Sutton Pl. townhouse donated for his use by Arthur Houghton Jr. Then the Secretary General had driven out to the country to inspect a house picked out by his wife for use as a weekend retreat.

But on the way, the news from Washington reached the UN.

President Nixon, at an impromptu White House press conference, had been asked about the bombing of North Vietnamese dikes and had lashed out Waldheim, saying:

"I think it is time to strip away the double standard.

Unwelcome at White House

"I noted with interest that the Secretary General of the UN, just like his predecessor, seized upon this enemy-inspired propaganda, which has taken in many well-intentioned and naive people, to attack the American bombing of civilian installations and risking of civilian lives and yet not raising one word against the deliberate bombing of civilian installations in South Vietnam."

With those words came the final realization that the new Secretary General, just seven months into his five-year term, would be persona non grata at the White House.

Kurt Waldheim has never been a favorite in Washington, but it was a bitter irony that, of all persons, should arouse such hostility from the Chief Executive of a superpower.

When the Austrian ran for office, he was described as a diplomat who, as chairman of the UN Space Committee, never ventured an opinion until he was sure it was shared by both the U.S. and Soviet Union.

In his first weeks as Secretary General, he made a pilgrimage to Washington and emerged from the White House saying that the President had expressed support for both him and the UN. The White House issued no comment on the visit.

Nixon was known as a man who had little use for the UN as a political mechanism, and tensions grew between his Administration and the world institution over UN finances, the American defeat suffered with the ouster of Nationalist China, and Congressional action to import Rhodesian chrome in the face of a UN economic embargo.

Reports Unverified

On Monday, Waldheim returned from a long European trip during which he had visited Geneva, Vienna, Poland and the Soviet Union, and told a press conference that he had received reports from "private channels" in Hanol of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam's dikes.

He said he had no way of verifying the reports, and no indication of whether the dikes had been hit intentionally. But, he said, "if those allegations were correct, and a number of reports came forth in this respect, I deeply deplore such bombings and appeal for a stop to them because if the dikes were destroyed it would mean enormous disaster for the population of that area, and I think we all wish that to be avoided."

Washington reacted quickly and bluntly to the state's obligation to pay this amount. The bill, which hit a sensitive nerve in Nixon's election strategy, is thus the U.S. should default on its fiscal obligation.

Despite these difficulties, one UN official shrugged and suggested it still might all be for the best.

"There was never much to be gained in Washington," he said. "There was no prospect of good will in the White House."

Perhaps, he suggested, Waldheim and the UN will now be able to digest that reality.

Clarification Needed

Another aide maintained that "it is a misunderstanding which has to be clarified. Nixon talks of things that are quite different from what Waldheim said. If the President hadn't named Waldheim, you wouldn't know it was the Secretary General to whom he was referring."

Both Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers, for example, spoke of an accusation of "intentional" bombing of the dikes — while Waldheim pointedly withheld making any charge of intent.

But while UN officials hope for a "clarification" that will repair relations between Washington and the UN, they realize that events are heading in the opposite direction.

Today, the UN Security Council meets to consider Rhodesia. And one of the prime objectives of the exercise will be to hit the U.S. over the head for violating UN sanctions against imports of Rhodesian chrome.

And in Washington, a House-Senate conference committee is considering a bill that would limit U.S. payments of annual UN dues to 25 per cent of the UN budget. The UN currently assesses the U.S. at a 315 per cent rate, based on American ability to pay, and
Hanoi’s Choice...

What is probably the last round of the Paris peace talks prior to the American Presidential election is now under way with the resumption of private meetings between Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho.

The issues are clearly drawn. President Nixon has offered a military settlement—a cease-fire, followed by release of American prisoners of war and withdrawal of all American troops in four months—leaving the political issue of South Vietnam’s future government to be settled among Vietnamese. Alternatively, he is prepared to discuss a political settlement, ruling out in advance only the “imposition” of a pro-Communist coalition government by the United States.

Hanoi heretofore has insisted on a political settlement first, while refusing to negotiate it with Saigon unless President Thieu resigns and a new government that it dislikes less is installed there. But at least two hints of possible flexibility have now been lofted.

A possible willingness to separate the military from the political settlement was hinted in the Hanoi statement that political issues could be divided into “two aspects.” One, a halt in American support of the Thieu Government, was Washington’s “responsibility.” But the next stage of arranging a replacement government could be worked out among Vietnamese alone.

The demand for a halt in American support of the Thieu Government presumably raises the question of military and economic aid. An aid halt has long been part of Hanoi’s demand for “total” American withdrawal and Mr. Kissinger has indicated that this is negotiable.

The other hint of possible Communist flexibility came in a statement last week by Madame Binh, the Vietcong negotiator, that suggested less rigidity on a political settlement. Some observers see a possible effort to explore a middle ground between the Communist demand for immediate removal of President Thieu and the formation of a coalition government, and President Nixon’s January announcement that General Thieu had offered to resign one month before general elections conducted by mixed Saigon-Communist-neutralist electoral commissions.

What is not known yet is whether these hints, made publicly, are open for examination in the private talks or have just been advanced for propaganda, something that has happened in the past. Once Hanoi takes a decision to negotiate a settlement, it should be possible to devise formulas to reconcile the differences.

...Washington’s Evasion

In its response to Secretary General Waldheim’s appeal not to bomb the dikes of North Vietnam, the United States Government has distorted and evaded the main issue.

Dismissing as mere propaganda widespread reports that the dikes are being bombed, Secretary of State Rogers announced that he had “instructed Ambassador Bush to point out to Mr. Waldheim that “the information that he has received concerning alleged deliberate bombing to damage the dikes in North Vietnam is false.”

The Secretary General in fact had taken pains to make clear to a news conference Monday that he was not accusing the United States of deliberately bombing Hanoi’s vital and highly vulnerable flood control network. “I cannot tell you whether the bombing was intentional or not,” Mr. Waldheim said in response to a question. But he added that he had received “private and unofficial” information from Hanoi “that the dikes were bombed and also the nearby areas causing cracks in the dams and producing the same results as if the dikes were bombed directly.”

President Nixon himself said last month that bombing the dikes could cause “extraordinary” civilian casualties. He said then: “We have orders out not to hit dikes.” But American officials have since said only that the dikes are not being “deliberately” targeted. Some officials have conceded that some dikes might have been hit “inadvertently” during the continuing heavy American bombing of the north, as a number of Western reporters and diplomats posted in Hanoi have reported.

Echoing the recent plea of Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, secretary general of the World Council of Churches, Secretary General Waldheim said: “I am deeply concerned about this development and I appeal to stop this kind of bombing which could lead to enormous human suffering, enormous disaster.”

This humane appeal from the official spokesman of the international community deserves a more forthright response from the United States Government.
Damn Those Dikes

The response to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim's plea on the bombing of North Vietnamese dikes— "which could lead to enormous human suffering, enormous disaster"—has been both hot-headed and heavy-handed. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who has been losing more and more of his mild manners lately, fired back with the words "false" and "falsehood" and an unstatesmanlike: "We cannot consider helpful any public statements giving further currency to these reports." White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler whipped out the theme of North Vietnamese "propaganda," despite mounting eyewitness confirmation of the bombings by columnist Joseph Kraft—no particular friend of the North Vietnamese—and other journalists and diplomats of several nations. And George Bush, Mr. Nixon's man at the UN, rushed up from Washington to try to sell the propaganda theory to Waldheim. He didn't succeed.

Mr. Waldheim's own statements have been contrastingly measured and qualified, with admission that he cannot yet personally verify the bombings he has heard of through "private contacts" and that some of the destruction may be unplanned though "the nearby bombing causes cracking of the earth of the dams and . . . in this way the result is the same."

It says much for the insensitivity of those who think they are "winding down" this war through the massive bombing of a tiny land of yellow peasants that they react with such frenzy to the mere fact of the Secretary General's speaking out, speaking his mind, his conscience. May the time come when the conscience of America will force an end to the slaughter of Asians.
On bombing

The differences between the American Government and the Secretariat of the United Nations over the bombing of North Vietnam are symptomatic of a basic difference between Americans and most other people in the world over bombing. Americans have never been bombed in their homes. Most other people in the world know what it is like to have sudden destruction descend from the skies. Kurt Waldheim is a European. The memory is still vivid in all Europe of the bombs which wrecked many of the great cities of Europe during World War II.

Mr. Waldheim speaks as Secretary-General of the United Nations and as a European when he protests against American bombs which sometimes, admittedly, do hit the dikes in North Vietnam which contain the rice paddies and thus sustain the food supply of the plain people of that country.

Washington promptly retorts that he has been duped by the North Vietnamese into taking up a public position which could hamper the military operations which President Nixon is conducting in retaliation for the major offensive which North Vietnam has launched into South Vietnam.

There is no common ground between these two positions and these two points of view. Americans are more willing to use the bombing weapon than are Europeans because Americans have never yet been on the receiving end of this weapon. Europeans are highly suspicious of the motives of anyone who uses bombs, and also skeptical of the military effectiveness of bombs. They have seen bombs increase the will to resistance of a people. They know the anger which wells up among survivors.

We cannot know that every American pilot sent on a bombing mission over North Vietnam is scrupulously careful to avoid hitting anything but lines of supply and weapons aimed at him. There is the unfortunate case of General Lavelle who admits he deliberately engaged in bombing against orders. We do know that President Nixon has authorized only the bombing of supply lines and weapons. As for any bombing of North Vietnam, there is still a substantial part of the main Army of North Vietnam in the south. The great offensive seems to be receding now, but there was a major offensive and it probably very nearly achieved a decisive military success. Mr. Nixon felt entitled to answer that offensive by trying to isolate the battlefield from its accustomed sources of supply.

He mined the harbor of Haiphong, which seems to have stopped almost all movement of supplies into North Vietnam by sea. He authorized the bombing of the rail and road lines coming down from China in an effort to cut down the supplies coming overland. It has been partially successful. In view of the size and weight and near success of the offensive the response was as justified as anything is in war. It was an available, partial answer to a major act of war.

But the outside world will inevitably be skeptical. Some civilians are bound to be hurt by any bombing. Some dikes have admittedly been hit. The argument is that the bomb was aimed at the road or anti-aircraft battery sitting on the dike.

For all such reasons any bombing by Americans becomes bad publicity for the United States everywhere else in the world. And there is a good deal of evidence that bombing increases the will to fight among the North Vietnamese people.

There is always a question whether the military results of the bombing equal the damage done to the one who bombs. Strategic bombing in World War II was found, after the war, to have been the most expensive and least productive way of waging war. The same blood and treasure put into other weapons would have had more military effect.

Hence we urge on the White House the utmost restraint in the bombing. Mr. Nixon is entitled to try to stop train loads of guns and ammunition, but he should be as sparing as possible in the methods used to that end because his motives are going to be misunderstood among friends abroad as well as by unfriends. And bombing is at best a marginal advantage to the user. He should, of course, end all bombing just as soon as he thinks he safely can.
U.S. rips Waldheim on bombing

By the Associated Press

United Nations, N.Y.

The United States has sharply warned UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim against spreading reports of U.S. bombings of dikes in North Vietnam.

Mr. Waldheim, while saying he could not verify the reports, replied that he thought "it was his duty to speak out on the devastating consequences which might result" from either intentional or unintentional bombing of the flood-control system along the Red River in North Vietnam.

A storm between the United States and Mr. Waldheim developed July 24 after the Secretary-General told a news conference he had "private unofficial" reports via Hanoi of the bombing of the dikes. He appealed to the United States to stop.

Secretary of State William P. Rogers protested in Washington and sent Ambassador George Bush to put the U.S. position personally to Mr. Waldheim.

After his one-hour meeting with Waldheim, Ambassador Bush told reporters he was convinced the Secretary-General did not want to give credibility to what Mr. Bush called a massive North Vietnamese propaganda campaign.

Mr. Waldheim told the news conference: "Through private unofficial channels... we were informed that the dikes are being bombed..."

The Secretary-General said he did not know whether the bombing was intentional, and he admitted: "This is Hanoi information."

Mr. Rogers said in a statement that Mr. Waldheim's information "concerning alleged deliberate bombing to damage the dikes in North Vietnam is false — as the President stated in his June 29 press conference."

After his conference with Mr. Waldheim, Ambassador Bush told newsmen the Secretary-General meant to say that if the dikes were being bombed, "it ought to stop."
Admit Hanoi Is Making Its Point

WASHINGTON (WP) — The White House has acknowledged with exasperation that North Vietnam is achieving "some success" in its world campaign of charges that the U.S. is deliberately bombing its dikes.

"Without question there is a propaganda effort that they are working very hard on and with some success," Presidential press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said yesterday. He again denied that the U.S. is "purposely undertaking a policy of bombing dikes," as North Vietnam charges.

"Our bombing policy has been spelled out," Ziegler said. "We have never had a policy of bombing dams and dikes. We have a policy of not hitting dams and dikes."

Ziegler was responding to reporters' questions about the unusually sharp language used the day before in a statement by Secretary of State Rogers criticizing comments made by UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.

The Waldheim Statement

The UN chief said he had received information through private channels that American planes were bombing North Vietnamese dikes.

Rogers replied that all claims that the U.S. is engaged in "deliberate bombing" of dikes are "false."

At the Defense Dept. yesterday, spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim also assailed what he called "Hanoi's propaganda campaign." He repeated that U.S. bombing is directed only against "military targets."

Defense Secretary Laird said on July 17: "There are occasions . . . when a dam or dike could possibly be hit when an anti-aircraft installation is placed on a dam or dike or when there is a roadway or a bridgework that is also tied in with a dam or dike formation."

But Laird also said at the time that there was "no targeting of dikes or dams" in North Vietnam.
**Hanoi Voice
Is Heard, U.S. Admits**

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"Our bombing policy has been spelled out," said Ziegler: "We have never had a policy of bombing dams and dikes. We have a policy or not hitting dams and dikes."

Ziegler was responding to newsmen's questions about the unusually sharp language used the day before in a statement by Secretary of State William P. Rogers criticizing comments made by United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim. The U.N. chief had said he received information through private channels, that American air attacks on North Vietnam are hitting dikes. Rogers replied that all claims that the United States is engaged in "deliberate bombing" of dikes are "false."

At the Defense Department yesterday, spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim also assailed what he called "Hanoi's propaganda campaign." He repeated that U.S. bombing is directed only against "military targets." When reporters asked if American planes fire at targets on dikes, Friedheim replied, "If a U.S. plane is attacked it will respond to protect itself."

On July 17, Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird said, "There are occasions... when a dam or dike could possibly be hit when an anti-aircraft installation is placed on a dam or dike or when there is a roadway or a bridgework that is also tied in with a dam or dike formation." But Laird said there is "no targeting of dikes or dams in North Vietnam."
Schluß ziehen, daß es keine systematische Bombardierung von Taipachen durch Waldheims Nachfolger gegeben hat", berichtete Joseph Krafft, der alles andere als Ni
torf-freundliche Kolumnist, der auf Ein
diedung Hanoi's gegenüber Nordviet
jungern, Berichten und Bemerkungen von ameri-
kanischen Blättern. Nach seiner Beob-
achtung sind lediglich einzelne Treffer
gegen Brücken, Bahnhöfen und Straßen
festzustellen, die in der Nähe von Ta-
men oder Dämmen liegen. „Es ist
nicht überraschend", sagt Krafft hinzu,
„daß die Nordvietnamer ein Protest
gebeutet haben. Sie hoffen offensicht-
lich, damit das Weltgut, besonders
aber das Großamerika, aufruf
niederzulegen. Wenn das ein amerikanischer
Journalist aus Hanoi meldet darf, ohne
dafß ihn das kommunistische Regime
hindert, wäre es die Pflicht des
UNO-Generalsekretärs gewesen, sich
zunächst zu informieren, bevor er den
Vereinten Staaten die schädliche Zuwendung der Dämme anmerkt.
Es fehlt an Beweisen, daß von
Nativität dazu, nicht erkennt man zu wollen,
dafß Waldholm sich zu einem Instrument
des Herrschaftskampfes gemacht hat, mit dem
Nordvietnam die öffentliche Meinung
inlandisch und außeralter Amerikas auf
seine Seite zu bringen such. Es
sollte nicht die Aufgabe eines interna-
tionalen Beamt von Einge Wald-
heims sein, sich zum stößigen Werk-
zug dieser Strategie zu erniedrigen.

Der Generalsekretär nannte sich zu einer
„schleudernden“ Stellungnahme geneigt, in
welcher er zugab, daß seine Behauptungen
durch beweisendes Material
nicht beweisen kann. Seine Haltung
wird nicht gerade zur Verbesserung des
eurosenen Verhältnisses der
Vereinten Staaten zur UNO beitragen.
Man würde sich nicht wundern, wenn
der Kongreß nach den jüngsten Erdfüh-
run gen mit Waldheims Drohung
wahr machen sollte, die für den Bestand
der Welorganis ungen lebenswichtigen
amerikanischen Zuschübe (33,33 Pro-
zent des UNO-Budgets), drastisch zu kür-
zau.
U.N. Chief Says U.S. Hits Dikes

Special to The Washington Post

UNITED NATIONS, July 24—U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim said today that he had "private and unofficial" information from Hanoi that the U.S. was bombing the dikes of North Vietnam—and appealed to Washington to stop it.

Without directly challenging the Nixon administration position that the U.S. is avoiding deliberate targeting intended to damage the dikes, Waldheim cited reports of damage, intentional or not.

He appealed to the U.S. to "avoid this kind of action, which could lead to enormous disaster and enormous human suffering. Thousands and thousands of persons would die. This has to be avoided."

The secretary general's statement, made at a press conference here on the day of his return to work after a three-week trip to Geneva, Vienna, Poland and the Soviet Union, touched a nerve of extreme sensitivity in Washington.

Secretary of State Rogers reacted with a statement that "we cannot consider helpful any public statements giving further currency to these reports."

U.N. Ambassador George Bush, who was in Washington today, flew back on instructions from Rogers to meet Waldheim this evening. Rogers said Bush would point out "again" that "the information Waldheim has received regarding alleged deliberate bombing to damage dikes in North Vietnam is false, as the President said in his June 29 press conference."

The allegations, said Rogers, "are part of a carefully planned campaign by North Vietnam and its supporters to give worldwide circulation to this falsehood."

State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray told reporters that Ambassador Bush had seen Waldheim before his departure for Moscow and told him it was not U.S. policy to damage the dikes system deliberately.

"What we're being subjected to," said Bray, "is a classic and neatly executed propaganda campaign which, interestingly enough, is greatly muted within North Vietnam itself."

Bray said that in North Vietnam "the major thrust of information given to the public concerns the need to repair damage done to the dikes during last year's heavy flooding.

"Waldheim, in his press conference, was careful to disclaim any information that bomb damage to the dikes was "intentional." Intentional or not, he said, his formation from "private channels to Hanoi—and this is Hanoi information—is that dikes were bombed, and also explosions nearby caused cracks in the dams and produced the same results as if the dikes were bombed directly."

Waldheim's statement, even if it is not regarded by Washington as a challenge to Nixon administration credibility, is still viewed as an attack on those actions the United States admits that it is taking—sorties against military targets on or near the North Vietnamese complex of dikes.

As such, it is regarded by diplomats here, including Americans, as sure to damage the already tense relationship between Washington and the United Nations. Referring to the congressional threat to cut U.S. contributions to the U.N. budget to 25 per cent, one Western diplomat suggested that "now the U.N. will be lucky if Washington gives 12.5 per cent."

Waldheim said he had been told of the attacks on the dikes at the end of June, before his trip. The information, he said, came from "private contacts through unofficial channels to Hanoi."

At that time, he said, he privately informed Washington of the charges, and was told, presumably in his meeting with Bush, "that this is not correct, and that the U.S. did give instructions to avoid bombing of dikes." This was the same position taken by President Nixon at his June 29 press conference.

But in Geneva early this month, Waldheim said, he received additional information from his Hanoi contacts, and from Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, head of the World Council of Churches, "confirming" the bombing of the dikes.

"If the allegations are correct, and a number of informations have come forth in this respect, I deeply deplore such bombings and I appeal to stop it," Waldheim said.
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Bray said that in North Vietnam the major thrust of information given to the public concerns the need to repair damage done to the dikes during last year's heavy flooding. Waldheim, in his press conference, was careful to disclaim any information that bomb damage to the dikes was "intentional." Intentional or not, he said, his formation from "private channels to Hanoi—and this is Hanoi information—is that dikes were bombed, and also explosions nearby caused cracks in the dams and produced the same results as if the dikes were bombed directly."

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Dikes Hit, Waldheim Says; Rogers Quickly Denies It

By ROBERT ALDEN
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., July 24—Secretary General Waldheim and Secretary of State William P. Rogers clashed today over charges that the United States bombing had intentionally damaged dikes in North Vietnam.

Earlier in the day Mr. Waldheim said he had received word through private unofficial channels that the dikes had been bombed and that "even in cases where the dikes are not directly bombed, the nearby bombing causes cracking of the earth of the dams and that in this way the result is the same."

"I am deeply concerned about this development," Mr. Waldheim said, and I appeal to stop this kind of bombing, which could lead to enormous human suffering, enormous disaster."

Mr. Rogers, in Washington, responded:

"I have asked Ambassador Bush to seek an early ap- pointment with the Secretary General, and today to point out that the information that he has received concerning alleged deliberate bombing to damage the dikes in North Vietnam is false — as the President stated in his June 29 press conference.

"Furthermore, I have asked Ambassador Bush to inform the Secretary General that these allegations are part of a carefully planned campaign by the North Vietnamese and their supporters to give worldwide circulation to this falsehood.

"The Secretary General in his press conference today said that 'it is always my interest in using quiet diplomacy to be helpful.' We cannot consider helpful any public statements giving further currency to these reports."

George Bush, the United States delegate, met with Mr. Waldheim this evening for an hour and said that he had put forth strongly the view that the bombing charge was part of a "massive propaganda campaign."

A spokesman for the United Nations said that the Secretary General was "deeply preoccu- pled especially from a humanitarian point of view with putting an end to the hostilities in all of Vietnam."

"The Secretary General is naturally concerned," the spokesman said, "by the continued heavy bombing of North Vietnam and, in particular, by numerous reports from different sources concerning its effects on the dikes.

"The Secretary General, while taking note of these reports, stated in his press briefing today that he could not verify them. He felt, however, that it was his duty to speak out on the devastating consequences which might result."

During his news conference, Mr. Waldheim would not specifically identify the "private unofficial channels" through which he had heard about the bombing of the dikes.

"You understand that I do not want to comment further on these contacts or there were private contacts," he said.

He said that the communication concerning the bombing of the dikes had been in addition to a conversation with Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, secretary general of the World Council of Churches in Geneva and reports of diplomatic representatives based in Hanoi.

Cracks in the Dams

"I cannot tell you whether the bombing was intentional or not," Mr. Waldheim said, "but the private channels to Hanoi—and this is Hanoi in- formation—is that the dikes were bombed and also the nearby by areas causing cracks in the dams and producing the same results as if the dikes were bombed directly. But I could not verify this."

Dr. Blake, who wrote to President Nixon last week that he believed the dikes were being bombed and asked that it be halted, said at the time that he had no other evidence that there had been any bombing except for the report by a French newsman and Swedish television film.

During his home leave in June, Sweden's Ambassador to North Vietnam, Jean-Christophe Oberg, was widely quoted in Swedish newspapers as saying that United States attacks on the dikes were intentional."

"I appeal to stop this bombing," the Secretary General said, "because if the dikes are destroyed it would mean an enormous disaster for the population of that area. The whole plain will be flooded and thousands and thousands of people would die."

On another matter, Mr. Waldheim, who has just returned from a 26-day visit to Europe, said that as a result of his intercession with member governments, the immediate financial problems of the United Nations were solved for this year.

"We should have no real difficulty — that is in meeting our payroll this year," Mr. Waldheim said. "However, the long-range problem of paying off the United Nations debts remains and I hope we can solve that during the next General Assembly."

The Secretary General said that he had received an invitation to visit China, but that no date had yet been agreed upon.

Swede Tells of Bombing

STOCKHOLM, July 24 (UPI) — A Swedish journalist said today that he saw United States planes bomb civilian targets in North Vietnam Saturday.

Aven Oeste, foreign editor of the liberal Stockholm newspaper Dagens Nyheter, in a letter to an American pilot published today, said that he had seen the planes attack Namhong village.

The letter said in part: "Yes, to the pilot who dropped two bombs — one with thousands of steel bullets — over the village with three churches near the river in Namhong Province yesterday morning at 9:30, you will surely be satisfied when I tell you that they were not wasted in vain. You killed two women in a rice paddy, wounded another six. All women, all Catholics. So the church bells rang for mourning services when we got to the village an hour later."
Despite American attempts to turn him around UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim stood firm today against the "devastating consequences which might result" from U.S. bombing of the dikes in North Vietnam—whether intentional or not.

Waldheim stirred up a furor yesterday with his statement that he had private reports from Hanoi of damage to the dikes, and with his appeal to the Nixon Administration to have the bombing stopped.

Secretary of State Rogers responded bluntly: "We cannot consider helpful any public statements giving further currency to these reports."

A Second Statement

UN Ambassador George Bush, rushed here from Washington, met with Waldheim for an hour last night and presented the official U.S. view that the dike-bombing reports are just a North Vietnamese propaganda campaign.

But even before Bush was ushered into Waldheim's office, the UN put out a second statement saying Waldheim "could not verify the reports. But it said the Secretary General still felt "that it was his duty to speak out on the devastating consequences which might result."

In his earlier press conference, Waldheim had made clear that he had no indication that the U.S. was hitting the dikes intentionally. However, the implication was that he believed but could not verify that intentionally or not, the dikes were being damaged — and that this damage must stop.

What Bush Says

When Bush emerged from his meeting, he said that Waldheim had "made clear that he didn't intend to accept these charges or give credence to these charges that the U.S. was bombing these dikes."

Did Bush deny that the U.S. was hitting the dikes inadvertently?

"I stand by the official statements," Bush said. "I deny that they've been targeted."

Waldheim's intention, on the bombing said Bush, was that "if it was going on it ought to stop. The U.S. government accepts this explanation . . . . I respect the Secretary General as a man who's got this restless quest for peace motivating him."

Would the incident hurt the relations between the U.S. and the UN?

"Not if I have anything to do with it," said Bush, "and I expect I will."

Despite the American ambassador's demurrer, most diplomats believed that Waldheim's statements will further embitter the already tense dealings between the UN and both the Administration and Congress.

Budget Cut?

Congress is about to start considering proposals that would unilaterally cut the U.S. share of the UN budget to 25 per cent from the current 31.5 per cent, and the UN Security Council is getting ready to denounce the U.S. for importing chrome and other raw materials from Rhodesia, in violation of a UN trade embargo.

Some diplomats have therefore reacted with puzzlement to what they see as Waldheim's gratuitous slap at an aspect of the Vietnam war that is already becoming an issue in the American election campaign. Some of Waldheim's aides suggest that the answer lies simply in the Secretary-General, moral outrage over the war.

"There are certain things," suggested one UN official, "on which you just cannot remain silent. You have to speak out when asked."
Waldheim stirs US ire by hinting dikes bombed

From Wire Services

UNITED NATIONS — A storm blew up yesterday between the United States and US Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim over Waldheim’s mention of reports that US warplanes have bombed and damaged dikes in North Vietnam.

Waldheim, fresh from a visit to Europe, told a news conference he had such reports from unidentified channels. He said that although he could not verify the reports, he felt it was his duty “to speak out on the devastating consequences which might result.”

In Washington, Secretary of State William P. Rogers promptly issued a statement labeling as “false” all allegations that the United States has deliberately bombed the dikes.

He said he asked UN Ambassador George Bush to seek an early appointment with Waldheim to inform him that “these allegations are part of a carefully planned campaign by the North Vietnamese and their supporters to give worldwide circulation to this falsehood.”

Noting that the secretary general in his press conference had said that “it is always my interest in using quiet diplomacy to be helpful,” Rogers added: “We cannot consider helpful any statement giving further currency to these reports.”

Bush immediately flew up from Washington and said he “strongly” told Waldheim the reports were part of a massive North Vietnamese propaganda campaign.

At the end of his meeting with Waldheim, Bush told reporters he was convinced that the secretary general “did not want to give credibility” to the reports.

Bush claimed that what Waldheim had intended to say at his morning news conference about dike bombing was that “if it was going on it ought to stop.”

In the seven months since he assumed office, Waldheim has tried to remain neutral in the Vietnam conflict, although he has pleaded with both sides to stop fighting and negotiate their differences. He conceded that he had accomplished nothing in this regard in Moscow. He said his conversations on Vietnam did not touch on “details,” such as whether the Soviet Union could pressure North Vietnam to bargain for peace in Paris by cutting off war supplies.

The secretary general also reported no progress in the Middle East, although he endorsed the idea of an embargo on arms to the area. He declined comment on the Egyptian ejection of Soviet advisers except to say that it had nothing to do with the United Nations peacemaking efforts. He said Gunnar Jarring, his personal representative in the Middle East, will go to New York next week for the submission of a report to the Security Council on his work.
By FRANK VAN RIPER

Washington, July 24 (NEWS Bureau) —Secretary of State William P. Rogers today accused United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim of strengthening the Hanoi line that the United States deliberately is bombing dikes in North Vietnam.

In a statement read to reporters by State Department spokesman Charles W. Bray, Rogers declared that remarks made by Waldheim only hours before at the UN can only aid "the carefully planned campaign by the North Vietnamese and their supporters to give worldwide circulation to this falsehood."

Hanoi's Information

Waldheim, at a news conference following his return from Moscow, acknowledged that "this is Hanoi's information that the dikes have been bombed. I cannot tell you whether the bombing was intentional or not. If indeed dikes were being bombed, I appeal to stop this type of bombing which can lead to such enormous suffering."

The dikes in question are for irrigation, essential for controlling the Red River, which runs through North Vietnam. The secretary at the time had received information through "private channels" that U.S. bombs have cracked the dikes.

The Red River flows along a 300-mile route from its source in the mountains in Yunnan Province in southern China to spill onto the vast and fertile plains of the Red River delta, where more than 15 million Vietnamese work and farm.

The U.S. has repeatedly denied that it has targeted the dikes for attack. Originally, U.S. spokesmen even denied that dikes had been hit. Now the official word is that if dikes were destroyed, it was accidental or because military installations were located on or near them.

Rogers said that American Ambassador George Bush had been instructed to relay the U.S. view to Waldheim personally. Bush was said to have spoken to Waldheim prior to his news conference and told him that Hanoi's claims of deliberate U.S. attack on the dikes were false.

Nevertheless, Waldheim told reporters: "I can only say that if it is true (that the attacks were intentional), that it leads to disaster. Thousands of persons will have died. This must be avoided."

Waldheim discusses reports that U.S. has bombed dikes.

Bray read two articles from a North Vietnamese newspaper which acknowledged that dikes had been badly damaged by floods last year and had not yet been repaired.

"We are being subjected to a classic and neatly executed propaganda campaign which, interesting enough, is greatly muted within North Vietnam itself, where the thrust, instead is on the need to repair damage inflicted by last year's flood," Bray declared.

Rogers' statement took note of Waldheim's press conference remark that "it is always my interest in using quiet diplomacy to be helpful."

The secretary added that in light of Waldheim's remarks on the possibility of air strike bombing: "We cannot consider helpful any public statements giving further currency to these reports."

Rogers recalled that President Nixon said on June 29 that he had given orders that the dikes were not to be bombed. Nixon said at the time that he did not intend to permit any air strikes that would involve breaking the dikes or inflicting civilian casualties "if it can be avoided."
HANOI'S DIKES WERE CRACKED by U.S. bombing, Waldheim said; Rogers denied it.

The UN Secretary General told reporters he had been assured by Washington that the dikes weren't a target. But, he said, he was deeply concerned by information received from sources he refused to identify that explosions near the dikes had caused cracks that could make the barriers give way, flooding vast areas and causing heavy loss of life. In Washington, Secretary of State Rogers said Waldheim's "allegations are part of the carefully planned campaign by the North Vietnamese and their supporters to give world-wide circulation to this falsehood."

A State Department spokesman read newsmen articles from a North Vietnamese newspaper acknowledging the dikes had been badly damaged by floods last year and repairs hadn't been completed.

Saigon troops stormed Quang Tri's Citadel, but they ran into withering fire and the outcome of the battle was in doubt. Two airborne battalions sought to enter the Citadel through two holes in the fort's 40-foot walls. One U.S. officer said: "The North Vietnamese are funneling their firepower into the gaps in the walls, and it's murder in there." The walls were breached two weeks ago by U.S. jets dropping laser-guided bombs.
GENEVA, July 20 (NYT).—The Rev. Dr. Eugene Carson Blake, secretary-general of the World Council of Churches, has informed President Nixon that he believes U.S. planes are deliberately bombing the dikes in North Vietnam.

In a letter sent Monday, the chief executive of the agency representing 250 Protestant, Anglican and Orthodox churches, addressed an "urgent appeal" to the President. He asked him to "use your authority as commander in chief of the military forces of the U.S.A. immediately to cease this bombing."

He also asked Mr. Nixon to "stop the bombing in the region of the dikes in order that the people of North Vietnam can make the urgent, necessary repairs to avoid a catastrophe of unthinkable proportions."

Dr. Blake, former head of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States, made public the letter today because, he wrote the President, "I feel conscience-bound to publish [the letter] at the time you receive it since publicity is the only channel left to me."

Dr. Blake wrote that he was raising an "issue of supreme urgency and moral import" because of the council's alarm over the allegations that the U.S. military was seeking to destroy the dikes "both by bombing and artificially induced rainfall."

He said that "in-depth inquiries with Western Europeans who have personally witnessed the situation since late June" had led to the conclusions that:

1. The American explanation that the present weakness of the dikes is due to neglect by the population is untrue.

2. "The American protests that no intentional bombing has occurred, and that only 'accidental' bombs have fallen on or near the dikes must also be untrue."

Commenting on the letter in an interview Dr. Blake said he had "no other evidence" of the alleged bombings than reports by a French newsman based in Hanoi and Swedish television films.

But he added that council officials were alarmed by the growing number of rumors about the bombings they were hearing from contacts in Western Europe.

"The nature of the widespread rumors reminds me of other occasions when reports first denied by the Defense Department were later admitted as true," Dr. Blake said.