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**ASSESSMENT OF THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ELEMENTS**  
**FROM DP CAMPS AT KIBEHO AND NDAGO**

For: MGEN G.C. Tousignant

By: LTCOL A.D. Brimelow

Date: 26 November 1994

Ref: Z 723, Sheet 40 Butare, Ed 1, 1:50 000

**AIM**

1. To clear criminal elements from Kibeho and Ndago Displaced Persons Camps with the following limitations:
  - a. The operation must be completed as soon as possible;
  - b. Surprise must be maintained;
  - c. RPA participation is required;
  - d. Tasks which require RPA contact with DPs must be minimised;
  - e. The risk of casualties is to be minimised; and
  - f. NGO cooperation is required.

**FACTORS**

**Relative Strengths**

2. Opposition. The estimated populations of Kibeho and Ndago are 40 000 and 20 000 respectively. The number of dwellings approximates 10 - 15 000. The strength of the criminal element is unknown:
  - a. Criminals and extremists in both camps are suspected of being armed;
  - b. Armed resistance is likely;
  - c. Suspects are likely to attempt to escape;
  - d. A number of the criminal element is known to the RPA;
  - e. The general mood of the camp inhabitants is one of apprehension and insecurity.
3. Own Troops.
  - a. UNAMIR presently consists of six battalions and three independent companies;

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- b. Two battalions are not yet fully deployed;
- c. One of the remaining four battalions is conducting rotation which will not be completed until 30 Nov;
- d. The sector in which the objective camps are located is occupied by GHANBATT (the rotating unit) and ZAMBATT (deployment not complete);
- e. ZAMBATT is the most self sufficient unit in terms of transport;
- e. The RPA have indicated the availability of a battalion sized force to cooperate in the conduct of the operation;
- ① f. The use of UNAMIR troops from other sectors will degrade security in the sectors from which they are drawn;
- i. The use of a significant portion of a single unit, other than GHANBATT or ZAMBATT, would degrade security to an unacceptable level;
- j. Three of the contingents are French speakers.

#### 4. Deductions

- a. The nature of the task requires a cordon and search type of operation;
- b. RPA contact with the bulk of the population should be avoided, therefore participation in the cordon element would be prudent;
- c. RPA liaison will be required to identify suspects;
- d. A holding/screening facility will be required for detainees;
- e. The requirement to achieve surprise will require deployment, from a relatively remote assembly area, under cover of darkness and will probably prevent full scale rehearsals;
- f. The use of obscurants by day, illumination by night and APCs early in the operation would probably cause panic among the DPs, therefore, a dawn H Hr and subsequent introduction of APCs (if necessary) would probably be necessary;
- g. The likelihood of casualties might require the forward deployment of medical support.
- h. Establishment of a composite force will be necessary if the operation is to be mounted before the GHANBATT rotation/ZAMBATT deployment is complete;
- ② x i. The establishment of a composite force may result in the requirement for disparate national clearances, which could delay the operation and compromise security.
- ② j. Contributions to a composite force should be limited to company level to reduce the complexity of command and control. Likely contributors are:

- (1) FRAFBATT - one company ;
- (2) TUNBATT - two companies;

- (3) ZAMBATT -one company (until fully deployed);
- (4) GHANBATT - two companies (after rotation completion -30 Nov); and
- (5) ETHIOBATT - two companies.

(4) k. <sup>(6)</sup> ~~MBATT~~ Maximum force available on a composite basis is seven companies;

l. The maximum force available on a single unit basis is one battalion (four companies);

m. Since GHANBATT and ZAMBATT both occupy positions in relatively close proximity to the objective, either of these units presents the practical alternative if the most cohesive force possible is to be utilised;

n. Both alternatives, given RPA participation, present the requirement for the superimposition of a separate command and control element

#### (5) Ground

5. General The Kibeho/Ndago DP Camp complex covers an area of approximately 15 x 4 Km. The complex is situated between the 00 and 11 Northings and the 82 and 88 Eastings on a dominating ridgeline which generally runs NW/SE with heavily populated radial ridges which slope steeply to the east and west. Each ridgeline represents a separate objective. The area between the 04 and 06 Northings is the least populated and generally defines the relatively indistinct boundary between the two camps. The feature is devoid of vegetation. Observation to the East and West is generally good along the whole feature. A well defined, unsealed road provides easy access for mounted and dismounted operations along the ridgeline throughout the complex. Lateral access to the ridgeline is difficult and steep for dismounted troops and is limited four routes for vehicular traffic from the East and two from the West.

6. Approaches There are four principal approach routes as shown on the attached trace:

##### a. Approach A

##### (1) Advantages

- (a) Relatively narrow frontage (approx 800 metres);
- (b) Dominates high ground throughout the operation;
- (c) Relatively secure flanks;
- (d) Good going for mounted and dismounted operations;
- (e) High speed approach;
- (f) Well defined axis facilitates ease of control; and
- (g) Clears the largest camp first.

## (2) Disadvantages

- (a) Depth of objective will reduce the element of surprise;
- (b) No concealment and cover is sparse;

b. Approach B

## (1) Advantages:

- (a) Multiple objectives can be approached simultaneously;
- (b) Well defined, multiple axes to the Northern end of the objective.

## (2) Disadvantages:

- (a) Large frontage (15 Km) cannot be covered in a single phase;
- (b) Linear configuration of objective would necessitate flank security;
- (c) Difficult to control;
- (d) High ground not dominated early in the operation;
- (e) Difficult approach; and
- (f) No concealment and cover is sparse.

c. Approach C

## (1) Advantages:

- (a) Relatively narrow frontage (approx 800 metres);
- (b) Dominates high ground throughout the operation;
- (c) Relatively secure flanks;
- (d) Good going for mounted and dismounted operations;
- (e) High speed approach;
- (f) Well defined axis facilitates ease of control; and
- (g) Blocks most likely escape route to the south early.

## (2) Disadvantages:

- (a) Depth of objective will reduce the element of surprise;
- (b) No concealment and cover is sparse;
- (c) Long approach march; and
- (d) Fails to clear the most heavily populated camp early in the operation.

d. Approach D

## (1) Advantages:

- (a) Multiple objectives can be approached simultaneously; and
- (b) Two well defined axes to the northern end of the objective.

## (2) Disadvantages:

- (a) Longest approach;
- (b) Two single routes only to the northern end of the objective; poor access for vehicles elsewhere;
- (c) Insecure flanks;
- (d) Approach is dominated by high ground; and
- (e) Difficult to control.

8. Deductions All approaches offer a range of useable assembly areas and FUPs and would require the use of multiple phases. Approaches A and C provide for the most manageable frontages and ease of control however leapfrog of sub units would be necessary to access assigned objectives. Approaches B and D present the capacity to access multiple objectives simultaneously, however the going is generally poor, coordination would be difficult for an unrehearsed force and the size of the objective would require the force to reorient for subsequent phases.

- a. Approaches A and B are the most direct;
- b. Approaches A and C facilitate the most positive control;
- c. Approach B facilitates the opportunity to present the most impact early in the operation.
- d. Approach D is discounted due to poor access, going, control requirements and the need to maintain security.

Time and Space

9. The operation is to be mounted as soon as possible to deter the RPA from taking unilateral action, however, the desired effect (to provide incentive to DPs to return to their homes) should complement Op TAHA. Considerations are as follows:



- a. Outline planning - 5 days (D-11);
- b. Consultation with RPA - 1 day (D-6);
- c. Battle procedure - 5 days (D-5);
- d. Conduct (approach A):
  - (1) Preliminary move - 1 day (D-1);
  - (2) Move to FUP/cutoff positions - H-6;

- (3) Time in FUP - 2 hrs;
- (4) Advance from LD to objective - H+20;
- (5) Clearance of objective (restricted to daylight hours) - 5 days.

(11)

e. Approach C would require more time to conduct a move to the FUP with the attendant risk to the element of surprise. Clearance of the objective would be marginally faster in the first phase; subsequent phases would take the same amount of time. Approaches A and B are the most direct.

(12)

10. Deductions The earliest practical D Day is 8 Dec 94. The earliest completion date is 13 Dec 94. Any significant delay to this timeframe might prompt the RPA to take unilateral action to forcibly clear the camps.

#### Assessment of Tasks

11. The Camp complex presents approximately 15 search objectives and up to 10 escape routes. The task / troop requirement is assessed as follows:

- a. Secure FUP (approaches A and C) - one company; 3 x pls 3
- b. Secure FUP (approach B) - four platoons; 4 x pls 4
- (13) c. Clear each objective - one company; 15 x 3 pls = 45
- d. Reserve - one platoon; 1 x pl 1
- (14) e. Flank security (approaches A and C) - two sections;
- (14) f. Flank security (approach B) - four sections;
- g. Cordon/cutoff - minimum of 10 platoons; 10 x pls 10
- h. Holding/screening facility security - one platoon; 1 x pl 1
- i. Command and control element; 4 pls
- (1) A Tac HQ;
- (2) Helicopter support;
- (3) Signals detachment.
- j. Transport - battalion lift plus second line element;
- l. Medical support element;
- j. Liaison - MILOB detachment;
- k. CIVPOL detachment;
- l. Interpreter element;
- m. BBGNU law enforcement representation;
- n. UN representatives;

less 10 pls RPA  
= 54 pls  
= 18 coys  
= 4 1/2 bns.

- (1) UNREO;
- (2) Human rights;
- (3) ICRC.

o. NGO representatives.

(15)

12. Deductions The assembly of a seven company force (plus a RPA battalion) would create the need for a command and control capability which is beyond the resources of UNAMIR. The maximum practical UNAMIR force is four rifle companies plus organic and second line support. Regardless, multiple phases will be required to successfully complete the task.

(16)

#### Summary of Deductions

13. Principal deductions are as follows:

- a. A cordon and search operation is required;
- b. Cooperation by the RPA to provide the cordon, liaison with protection parties, advice and linguists will minimise the likelihood of casualties to and apprehension among DPs;
- c. An operation mounted at dawn is most likely to achieve the desired element of surprise;
- d. The establishment of a composite force would minimise security degradation in each sector;
- e. The utilisation of GHANBATT or ZAMBATT will provide a measure of unity of command, minimise the logistic burden and facilitate the maintenance of security;
- f. The utilisation of GHANBATT or ZAMBATT is not feasible before 5 Dec or on deployment of the remainder of ZAMBATT, whichever is the earlier;
- g. The composition of the force and the potential complexity of the command and control arrangements imply the establishment of a Tac HQ;
- h. Approach A is the most practical in terms of control, coordination and supportability;
- i. The requirement for a multi phased operation and the associated battle procedure presents 8 Dec as an indicative D Day.

(17)

#### COURSES OF ACTION

(18)

#### Opposition

14. Course A Armed resistance.

- a. Likely reaction by some individuals but coordinated resistance is unlikely.
- b. The effect of this would be to create panic amongst the DPs and increase the possibility of collateral damage.



15. Course B Escape.
- Most likely reaction.
  - This course of action would have little effect on the aim of the operation.
16. Deductions:
- The most probable course is Course B, however, suspects might choose to fight once escape routes are blocked.
  - UNAMIR troops should prevent escape if the likelihood of violence is low, otherwise escapees should be left to the cordon.
  - UNAMIR should respond to engagement strictly in the terms of the ROE.

19

Own Courses

17. Course I Assign a formed unit to advance on a single axis (Approach A) to conduct a search of Kibeho and Ndaga DP Camps with an RPA battalion providing the cordon element.
- Advantages:
    - Unity of command is inherent;
    - The logistic overhead is minimised;
    - The maintenance of physical and operational security is enhanced; and
    - Control and coordination is simplified.
  - Disadvantages:
    - The earliest time that a unit will be available to conduct the operation is 5 Dec. Time for preparation is, therefore reduced.
    - Advance on a single axis will reduce momentum; and
    - An element of surprise will be lost on depth objectives.
18. Course II Assign a composite force to advance on a single axis (Approach A) to conduct a search of Kibeho and Ndaga DP Camps with an RPA battalion providing the cordon element.
- Advantages:
    - Participation by a variety of countries is consistent with the spirit of the UN ethos;
    - Participation by a French speaking nation would enhance community relations;
    - Maximum presence would be maintained in all sectors.

## b. Disadvantages:

- (1) Unity of command is not easily achieved;
- (2) Administrative overhead is increased;
- (3) Disparate communication equipment could frustrate command and control.

19. Course III Assign the RPA to conduct the search with UNAMIR providing the cordon.

## a. Advantages:

- (1) Casualties to UNAMIR will be minimised;
- (2) Does not compromise UN impartiality;
- (3) Adheres to the current peacekeeping (vice peacemaking) concept of operations.

## b. Disadvantages:

- (1) The presence of the RPA in force may cause panic amongst the DPs unless an intense information campaign precedes the operation;
- (2) Influence over RPA activities will be marginalised;
- (3) Potential adverse effect on Op TAHA.

## COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE

20. Guidance on the following issues is requested:

(20) a. Confirmation of your requirement to mount the operation in view of the potential adverse effect on Op TAHA, the UNAMIR mandate/concept of operations and the risk to UNAMIR troops;

(21) b. Troops to task:

- (1) Size; and
- (2) Composition.

c. Command and control arrangements;

d. Timing;

(22) e. Delineate specific tasks and roles:

- (1) RPA;
- (2) CIVPOL; and
- (3) NGO

(4) ROE limitations

SECRET

COPY NO 24 OF 28

UNAMIR HQ  
OPERATIONS BRANCH

12 DEC 94

3000.15 (OPS)

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G3OPS2

SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: AMENDMENTS/ADDITIONS TO OP ORDER 21

Reference: OP Order NO 21 dated 08 Dec 94.

1. You are please requested to make the following amendments/additions to the above reference:

a. Amendments: Paragraph (6) (b) to read as follows:

(1) NICOY

(a) Tasks.

- (i) Secure Force Release Point on red route.
- (ii) Provide security element under Command HQ.
- (iii) Construct and provide security for detainee cage at area of church building Objective 2.
- (iv) Be prepared on order to:
  - (aa) Clear objectives of unauthorised wpns, eqpt and stores.
  - (ab) Arrest Criminals.
  - (ac) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objectives into each cleared obj with Inf Sect each.

b. Additions: Paragraph (16) to read as follows:

(1) INDBATT

(a) Grouping.

1/3

SECRET

SECRET

- (i) Two PLs.
- (ii) In Sp one RPA Liaison team per PL.
- (b) Tasks.
  - (i) Force reserve.
  - (ii) Act as Force RRF.
  - (iii) Provide protection for Helipad at GR 493105 throughout duration of Operation.
  - (iv) Be prepared on order to:
    - (aa) Clear objectives of unauthorised wpns, eqpt and stores.
    - (ab) Arrest Criminals.
    - (ac) Prevent infiltration of DPs from other objectives into each cleared objectives with Inf Sect each.

2. For your necessary action.

DISTRIBUTION LIST

External

COPY NO:

GHANBATT  
ETHIOBATT  
FRAFBATT  
ZAMBATT  
TUNBATT  
NICOY  
MILOB GP HQ  
AUSMED  
CANSIGS  
CIV POL  
CLO  
HRL  
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G3 AIR OPS

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UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
KIGALI

ADMINO 01

11 Dec 94

RELATED OPO NO 21

Reference

A Map Series Z723 BUTARE Sheet 40 Edition 1, 1 50,000

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order BRAVO

I SITUATION

- a Enemy Forces As per OpO
- b Friendly Forces
  - (1) As per OpO
  - (2) In addition 3 CSG, GHA Sup Pl and BRSC pers will provide sp for the op
- c Att and Det
  - Under comd for daily maint.
    - TUNBATT - Inf Bn less 2 Coys
    - ETHIOBATT - Inf Bn less 2 Coys
    - GHANBATT - Inf Bn less 2 Coys
    - FRAFBATT - One Indep Inf Coy
    - ZAMBATT - One Indep Inf Coy
    - NICOY - One Indep Coy
    - less 2 pls
    - 20 MILOBS
    - 30 RPA LO Interpreter

2 MISSION To maint UNAMIR Force during OP OVERTURE.

3 GENERAL

a General Outline

- (1) Estb of Log Base at Butare
- (2) Selected log elms to deploy fwd to Op area

4 MATERIAL AND SERVICES

a Supply

(1) Class 1 - Rat

- (a) 3 days CRP per soldier to be provided by the contingents.
- (b) 3 CSG to deliver qty 5600 CRP to GHA Sup Pl loc at Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1
- (c) 3 CSG to deliver bottled water qty 11200 bottles to GHA Sup Pl loc at Bkutare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1
- (d) Units to collect 2 days CRP and water from GHA Sup Pl at Butare GR 7011 D + 1 and D + 3
- (e) Brown and Root to provide 1 x Water Tanker Report GHA Sup Pl and mov fwd to KIBEHO GR 5007 and NDAGO GR 5201 when ordered by GHA Sup Pl Comd.

(2) Class 2 - Gen Stores Not required

(3) Class 3 - POL

- (a) 3 CSG to deliver 10,000 lts (in drums) of diesel to GHA Sup Pl loc in Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1
- (b) 3 CSG to deliver 1000 lts (in drums) of gasoline (petrol) to GHA Sup Pl loc Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1
- (c) Units to go for resupply at GHA Sup Pl loc at Butare Gr 7011 Resup pt will open 140600B Dec 94

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- (4) Class 4 - Def Stores. 3 CSG to deliver the following def stores to GHA  
Sup Pl loc in Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1
- (a) Barbed Wire - 1000 rolls
  - (b) Concertina - 1000 rolls
  - (c) Tie Wire - 200 kg
  - (d) Sand Bags - 2000 bags
  - (e) 6" Post Picket - 1000
- (5) Class 5 - Ammunition Contingents to use part of their reserves
- (6) Class 6 - Welfare and Personal Demand Items Not required
- (7) Class 7 Major Items. Not required.
- (8) Class 8 - Medical Stores. To be covered under medical
- (9) Class 9 - Repair Parts
- (a) First line repair parts to be catered for by all units
  - (b) Second line to be provided by BRSC
- b Transportation. Nec tpt alloc to fol.
- c Services
- (1) BRSC to deliver qty 2000 garbage bags to Sup Pl at Butare at the rate of 100 bags per coy
  - (2) BRSC to dispose all the garbage at the end of the operation
- d Maintenance
- (1) All units to provide first line repairs
  - (2) Second line repairs to be provided by BRSC at Butare
  - (3) BRSC to provide MRT at Butare
  - (4) BRSC to provide first and second line recovery

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5 MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

a. Medical Support. Companies are to deploy with organic level one health including CoyAid Posts (CAP). AS MSF is to provide a Casualty Collecting Post (CCP) capable of limited level one and a level two capability of two resuscitation teams and a 10 bed holding facility. The CCP is also to provide three ambulances and crews and AME teams as required. The AS MSF will continue to provide level three support in Kigali. One MO to be deployed to sp detainee holding area

b. Casualty Evacuation

(1) Casevac is to be conducted using road and AME assets. Units are responsible for evacuation with their unit area of responsibility. The normal means from CAP to CCP is to be by road. AME is to be normal means of evacuation from KIBEHO to level three facility

(2) Road. Three ambulances and crews are to be available for road evacuation and are to be positioned at the CCP. Sub-units requesting evacuation to the CCP are to initiate the request using the Casevac Request format transmitted on the OP OVERTURE command net. Road evac rearward of the CCP will be directed by Med Br, HQ UNAMIR.

(3) Air. Dedicated AME is to be allocated under opcon HQ UNAMIR. This ac is to be pre-positioned at KIBEHO during daylight hours and will be re-positioned at KIGALI during hours of darkness. AS MSF in consultation with Air Ops are to ensure this ac is kitted for AME prior to H hour. Requests for AME are to be transmitted on the UNAMIR Command net to HQ UNAMIR using the Casevac Request format. Casualty regulation rearward of KIBEHO is to remain the responsibility of Medical Branch, HQ UNAMIR.

c. Holding Policy. Holding policy for casualties is as follows

- |     |             |   |         |
|-----|-------------|---|---------|
| (1) | CAP         | - | nil     |
| (2) | CCP         | - | 24 hrs. |
| (3) | Level Three | - | 28 days |

d. Health

(1) All units are to be responsible for organic field sanitation and hygiene throughout the Op. Units are to deploy with sufficient health stores for this purpose. Given the high concentration of personnel during the op, unit commanders are to ensure that the highest standards of field hygiene are maintained

(2) Queries on appropriate health measure are to be directed to Med BR and HQ UNAMIR

e Dental Dental support will be provided at Level ONE and Level Two facilities. Casualties requiring dental treatment will be evacuated to AS MSF Kigali

f Medical Resupply CAP and CCP are to deploy with 9 days Class 7 (medical) supplies. Requests for resupply are to be staffed to G4 Med at HQ UNAMIR, through Tac HQ using normal message demand procedures

g Health Report CAP are to provide reports to their unit HQ as required. CCP is to provide a daily medical SITREP for the duration of the Operation to Med Branch as per UNAMIR Medical Branch SOP. They are also to provide the AS MSG with medical statistics for weekly reports as required. All personnel elements are to be aware of Casualty Evacuation request formats prior to deployment

6 PERSONNEL

a Units are to fwd nominal roll of all personnel taking part in the operation to Tac HQ (G1), copy to Force HQ (CMPO) by 1800 hrs D-1

b Personnel are to wear ID tags (if aval) and UN ID cards for immediate identification.

c NOTICAS as per UNAMIR SOP

d Detainees The correct handling of detainees is a critical component of Op OVERTURE and is, therefore, covered in the OpO. The following stores are required:

(1) Polaroid cameras A minimum of 12 cameras (with film) for the authentication of evidence, to document finds and to ensure that any damage caused in the searching of dwellings and vehicles is accurately and fully recorded. One camera is to be issued to each infantry company; the remainder (including a reserve for issue to infantry companies) are to be held by the MP Company

(2) "Plasticuffs" It is estimated that up to 2,000 plasticuffs will be required - including a significant reserve for the release and re-cuffing of individuals

(3) Bags for the collection and handling of evidence Any evidence and personal property collected will need to be safeguarded and transferred to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC). It is to be placed in bags and taken by the soldier who collects it to the DPC where it will be documented and labelled by MP personnel. There is a requirement, therefore, for 2,000 heavy duty

plastic bags (or sandbags if none better are available) and luggage labels

- (a) Bags Bags are to be issued to
  - (i) Infantry coys: 200 to each
  - (ii) The MP Coy: the remainder, both for the processing of evidence and to act as a reserve for redistribution to infantry coys

- (4) Labels Labels are to be issued to the Force MP Coy

e Paper proformae Locally produced proformae - examples of which are included with the OpO - will be needed for the documentation of searches and detainees; the requirement is:

- (1) Search Proformae: 200 to each infantry coy
- (2) Detainee Proformae: 1,000 to the Force MP Coy

If one is available, a photocopier (with, say, 4 reams of paper) should be issued to the Force MP Coy for the local production of additional forms should the need arise.

f. Tentage and accommodation

- (1) For detainees It is anticipated that up to 400 detainees will be processed during the 48 hrs of Op OVERTURE. It is not anticipated, therefore, that accommodation will be needed for more than 50 detainees at any one time. Four 20-man tents have been allocated - providing room for sufficient separation and segregation of detainees.
- (2) For MP personnel
  - (a) Up to 24 MPs will deploy on the Op and will require sleeping accommodation; six 4-man tents are required.
  - (b) Additionally, sleeping bags (say, 8) will be required for the MPs of some nations
  - (c) Lanterns are required, 1 per 4-man tent

(3) Furniture. The following stores are required:

Folding tables.	16
Folding chairs.	50
Camp beds/cots.	40

These stores are primarily for use by detainees and their processing rather than for UNAMIR personnel.

(4) Portaloos. Apart from any requirement at Tac HQ and other UNAMIR Op OVERTURE sites, the provision of portaloos (together with the necessary servicing) will be essential for the dignified processing of detainees at the MP DPC. They should cater for an equivalent permanent population of up to 60.

(5) Hessian Screen. Hessian or equivalent screening (to a length of up to 20 metres) will be required to seclude search and interview areas.

(6) Loud Hailer. A loud hailer (with batteries if necessary) is needed by the Force MP Coy.

(7) Eating and drinking utensils. Eating and drinking utensils are required for the provision of meals and drinks to detainees; 50 sets are required.

g. Concertina wire, gloves and pickets. Up to 1,000 metres of concertina wire will be needed together with sufficient pickets (say, 100), wire ties, cutters and sledge hammers and gloves as necessary.

CO Force MP Coy is to appoint a suitable supervisor to receive and account for the stores issued to the MP DPC for Op OVERTURE. All such stores are to be returned on the closure of the facility.

7 Route Signing. The traffic control plan will be determined in detail after the recce process. It is anticipated that the following will be required for the signing of 2 x main routes, 7 x company-sized concentration areas and routes to the DPC:

- a 500 x signs with pickets - to be locally produced
- b 200 x signs with holes and wire ties - to be locally produced/procured.
- c 5 x stencil kits and paint for the marking of signs by MP route signing teams. The paint is to be of a colour that contrasts with the material used to make the signs.

8. Engrs

a. Erection of wire and tentage. Engr sp is required for the establishment of the MP DPC - specifically, the erection of tentage and concertina wire. Engrs and the CO of the Force MP Coy are to liaise as necessary to ensure that it is positioned as required.

b. Route Maintenance. Bad weather may give rise to problems with the 2 x main routes, in particular. The ability to place fascines may be required, should any minor bridges be washed away

c. Generator and lighting. The DPC will need to be lit at night

9 Rats and water for detainees. It is essential for the success of Op OVERTURE that detainees (of which up to 400 are expected to pass through the DPC, each staying for between 2 and 4 hours) are treated with civility; they are to be provided with dry rations and drinking water on demand.

10 COMMAND AND SIGNAL


a. Location of HQ.

- (1) Tac HQ KIBEHO, to incl GI/G4 rep
- (2) Alternate HQ - Tac HQ Butare
- (3) Milob HQ Det co-loc with Tac HQ.

b. Electronic Silence. As per OPO.

c. Code Words. As per OPO

8 Ack Instrs: Ack.

  
HK ANYIDHO  
Brig Gen  
FC

Authentication

K P O'KELLY  
Col  
DCOS SP

Distribution

External

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GHANBATT	1
ETHIOBATT	2
FRAFBATT	3
ZAMBATT	4
TUNBATT	5
NICOY	6
MILOB GP HQ	7
AUSMED	8
CANSIG	9
3CSG	10
FMO	11
MP COY	12
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GHA SUP PL	14
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Copy No 2 of 2

UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
KIGALI

ADMINO 01

10 Dec 94

RELATED OPO NO 21

Reference:

A. Map Series Z723 BUTARE Sheet 40 Edition 1, 1:50,000.

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order: BRAVO

I. SITUATION

- a. Enemy Forces. As per OpO.
- b. Friendly Forces
  - (1) As per OpO.
  - (2) In addition 3 CSG, GHA Sup Pl and BRSC pers will provide sp for the op.
- c. Att and Det

Under comd for daily maint:

- TUNBATT - Inf Bn less 2 Coys
- ETHIOBATT - Inf Bn less 2 Coys
- GHANBATT - Inf Bn less 2 Coys
- FRAFBATT - One Indep Inf Coy
- ZAMBATT - One Indep Inf Coy
- NICOY - One Indep Coy
- less 2 pls
- INDIBATT - TBA
- 20 MILOBS
- 30 RPA LO/Interpreter

2. MISSION. To maint UNAMIR Force during OP OVERTURE.

3. GENERAL

a. General Outline

- (1) Estb of Log Base at Butare.
- (2) Selected log elms to deploy fwd to Op area.

4. MATERIAL AND SERVICES

a. Supply

(1) Class 1 - Rat

- (a) 3 days CRP and water per soldier to be provided by the contingents.
- (b) 3 CSG to deliver qty 5600 CRP to GHA Sup Pl loc at Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1. Note CRP to include menu that do not contain pork.
- (c) 3 CSG is to deliver 500 german rations and 500lt bottled water to GHA Sup Pl GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1. These rations are for sustenance of detainees only.
- (d) 3 CSG to deliver bottled water qty 11200 bottles to GHA Sup Pl loc at Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1.
- (e) Units to collect 2 days CRP and water from GHA Sup Pl at Butare GR 7011 D + 1 and D + 3.
- (f) Brown and Root to provide 1 x Water Tanker with 20,000lt ROWPU water. Report GHA Sup Pl and move fwd to KIBEHO GR 5007 and NDAGO GR 5201 when ordered by GHA Sup Pl Comd.

(2) Class 2 - Gen Stores. Contingents to provide and deploy with their immediate requirements. Specific requirements as indicated on contingent returns will be provided as far as possible and delivered to GHA Sup Pl.



- (3) Class 3 - POL
  - (a) 3 CSG to deliver 10,000 lts (in drums) of diesel to GHA Sup Pl loc in Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1
  - (b) 3 CSG to deliver 1000 lts (in drums) of gasoline (petrol) to GHA Sup Pl loc Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1.
  - (c) 3 CSG is to deliver 2000LT JET-A1 fuel to BUTARE airstrip for helo op by H-HR + 2.
  - (d) GHA Sup Pl to confirm any additional requirement for hand fuel pumps to G4.
  - (e) POL resup is by unit collection from GHA Sup Pl loc at Butare GR 7011. Resup pt will open 140600B Dec 94.
- (4) Class 4 - Def Stores. 3 CSG to deliver the following def stores to GHA Sup Pl loc in Butare GR 7011 by 1200 hrs D - 1
  - (a) Barbed Wire - 5 rolls.
  - (b) Concertina - 50 rolls.
  - (c) Tie Wire - 2 rolls.
  - (d) Sand Bags - 500 bags.
  - (e) 6" Post Picket - 300.
- (5) Class 5 - Ammunition. Contingents to deploy with contingent first line holding.
- (6) Class 6 - Welfare and Personal Demand Items. Not required.
- (7) Class 7 Major Items. Not required.
- (8) Class 8 - Medical Stores. To be covered under medical.
- (9) Class 9 - Repair Parts
  - (a) First line repair parts to be catered for by all units.
  - (b) Second line to be provided by BRSC.

b. Transportation.

- (1) G4 TPT. G4 TPT is to;
  - (a) Provide one potable water tanker to be located at the GHA Sup PI Butare for the duration of op.
  - (b) Arrange provision of four minibuses to the Provost Marshal for movement of detainees.
- (2) 3 CSG. 3 CSG is to;
  - (a) deliver the stores and equipment detailed at para 4a. and as otherwise instructed to GHA Sup PI Butare.
  - (b) return all unused stores and equipment from GHA Sup PI Butare at end of op.
- (3) ZAMBATT. ZAMBATT is to;
  - (a) Provide the G4 TPT cell for the operation of TAC HQ.
  - (b) Ensure the nominated offr to be G4 TPT contact HQ UNAMIR G4 TPT for briefing prior to op.
  - (c) Provide and operate 15 MDM veh for tpt tasking in support to op.
  - (d) Tpt TUNBATT elm and their stores and equipment from Busogo to the assembly area at Butare.
  - (e) Redeploy TUNBATT elm and stores and equipment to Busogo at end of operation.
  - (f) Tpt GHANBATT and their stores and equipment from Gikongoro to the assembly area at Butare.
  - (g) Redeploy GHANBATT elm and their stores and equipment to Gikongoro at the end of op.
  - (h) Coordinate tpt for deployment of units from the assembly area to the FUP.
  - (i) Coordinate the tpt of stores, equipment, water and rations forward of GHA Sup PI Butare as required.

- (4) All Units Less TUNBATT AND GHANBATT. Deploy and redeploy unit personnel stores and equipment to and from the assembly area at Butare. Unit tpt used for deployment are to come under op con ZAMBATT for deployment of units from the assembly are to the FUP.

c. Services

- (1) BRSC to deliver qty 2000 garbage bags to GHA Sup Pl at Butare at the rate of 100 bags per coy.
- (2) All contingents are to back load their garbage to GHA Sup Pl at Butare.
- (3) BRSC to collect for disposal, all garbage from GHA Sup Pl on a daily basis and at the end of the operation.

d. Maintenance

- (1) All units to provide first line repairs.
- (2) Second line repairs to be provided by BRSC at Butare.
- (3) BRSC to provide MRT at Butare.
- (4) BRSC to provide first and second line recovery.
- (5) Requests for recovery and second line repairs are to be directed to the G4 staff at op TAC HQ.

5. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION

- a. Medical Support. Companies are to deploy with organic level one health including Coy Aid Posts (CAP). AS MSF is to provide a Casualty Collecting Post (CCP) capable of limited level one and a level two capability of two resuscitation teams and a 10 bed holding facility. The CCP is also to provide three ambulances and crews and AME teams as required. The AS MSF will continue to provide level three support in Kigali. One MO to be deployed to sp detainee holding area.

b. Casualty Evacuation

- (1) Casevac is to be conducted using road and AME assets. Units are responsible for evacuation with their unit area of responsibility. The normal means from CAP to CCP is to be by road. AME is to be normal means of evacuation from KIBEHO to level three facility.
- (2) Road. Three ambulances and crews are to be available for road evacuation and are to be positioned at the CCP. Sub-units requesting evacuation to the CCP are to initiate the request using the Casevac Request format transmitted on the OP OVERTURE command net. Road evac rearward of the CCP will be directed by Med Br, HQ UNAMIR.
- (3) Air. Dedicated AME is to be allocated under op con HQ UNAMIR. This ac is to be pre-positioned at KIBEHO during daylight hours and will be re-positioned at KIGALI during hours of darkness. AS MSF in consultation with Air Ops are to ensure this ac is equipped for AME prior to H hour. Requests for AME are to be transmitted on the UNAMIR Command net to HQ UNAMIR using the Casevac Request format. Casualty regulation rearward of KIBEHO is to remain the responsibility of Medical Branch, HQ UNAMIR.

c. Holding Policy. Holding policy for casualties is as follows:

- (1) CAP - nil.
- (2) CCP - 24 hrs.
- (3) Level Three - 28 days.

d. Health

- (1) All units are to be responsible for organic field sanitation and hygiene throughout the Op. Units are to deploy with sufficient health stores for this purpose. Given the high concentration of personnel during the op, unit commanders are to ensure that the highest standards of field hygiene are maintained.
- (2) Queries on appropriate health measure are to be directed to Med BR and HQ UNAMIR.

e. Dental. Dental support will not be provided at Level ONE and Level Two facilities. Casualties requiring dental treatment will be evacuated to AS MSF Kigali.

- f. Medical Resupply. CAP and CCP are to deploy with 9 days Class 7 (medical) supplies. Requests for resupply are to be staffed to G4 Med at HQ UNAMIR, through TAC HQ using normal message demand procedures.
  - g. Health Report CAP are to provide reports to their unit HQ as required. CCP is to provide a daily medical SITREP for the duration of the Operation to Med Branch as per UNAMIR Medical Branch SOP. They are also to provide the AS MSF with medical statistics for weekly reports as required. All personnel elements are to be aware of Casualty Evacuation request formats prior to deployment.
6. PERSONNEL
- a. Units are to fwd nominal roll of all personnel taking part in the operation to Tac HQ (G1), copy to Force HQ (CMPO) by 1800 hrs D-1
  - b. Personnel are to wear ID tags (if avail) and UN ID cards for immediate identification.
  - c. NOTICAS. Any occurrence of death or serious injury is to be reported to the KIBEHO HQ immediately. As soon as possible thereafter, as much of the following information as possible in respect of the casualty is to be passed to the HQ:
    - (1) UN ID CARD number.
    - (2) Service number.
    - (3) Rank.
    - (4) Name.
    - (5) Sex.
    - (6) Contingent.
    - (7) Status (MILOB or contingent).
    - (8) Nature of casualty (death or serious injury).
    - (9) Cause of casualty.
  - d. Detainees. The correct handling of detainees is a critical component of Op OVERTURE and is, therefore, covered in the OpO. The following stores are required:

- (1) Polaroid cameras. 4 cameras (with film) have been issued for the authentication of evidence, to document finds and to ensure that any damage caused in the searching of dwellings and vehicles is accurately and fully recorded.
  - (2) Bags for the Collection and Handling of Evidence. Any evidence and personal property collected will need to be safeguarded and transferred to the MP Detainee Processing Centre (DPC). It is to be placed in bags and taken by the soldier who collects it to the DPC where it will be documented and labelled by MP personnel. There is a requirement, therefore, for 2,000 heavy duty plastic bags (or sandbags if none better are available) and luggage labels:
    - (a) Bags. Bags are to be issued to:
      - (i) Infantry coys: 200 to each.
      - (ii) The MP Coy: the remainder, both for the processing of evidence and to act as a reserve for redistribution to infantry coys.
  - (4) Labels. Labels are to be issued to the Force MP Coy.
- e. Paper proforma. Locally produced proforma - examples of which are included with the OPO - will be needed for the documentation of searches and detainees; the requirement is:
- (1) Search Proforma: 200 to each infantry coy.
  - (2) Detainee Proforma: 1,000 to the Force MP Coy.
  - (3) CCO is requested to provide, a photocopier and 4 reams of paper to the Force MP Coy for the local production of additional forms should the need arise.
- f. (1) Loud Hailer. A loud hailer (with batteries if necessary) is needed by the Force MP Coy.
- (2) Eating and drinking utensils. Eating and drinking utensils are required for the provision of meals and drinks to detainees; 50 sets are required.

8. Engrs

- a. Erection of wire and tentage. Engr sp is to be provided from NICOY is to establish the MP DPC - specifically, the erection of tentage and concertina wire. NICOY and the CO of the Force MP Coy are to liaise as necessary to ensure that it is positioned as required.
- b. Route Maintenance. Bad weather may give rise to problems with the 2 x main routes, in particular. The ability to place fascines may be required, should any minor bridges be washed away.
- c. Generator and Lighting. CCO is requested to provide a generator and lighting for the DPC as it will need to be lit at night. CCO and CO of the Force MP Coy are to liaise as necessary.

9. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Location of HQ.
  - (1) TAC HQ KIBEHO, to incl GI/G4 rep.
  - (2) Alternate HQ - TAC HQ Butare.
  - (3) MILOB HQ Det co-loc with TAC HQ.
- b. ZAMBATT is to provide personnel for operation of TAC HQ G4 cell.
- c. TAC HQ Butare is to provide G4 personnel for SUP and MAINT for operation of TAC HQ G4 for the duration of op.
- d. 15 X ZAMBATT mdm veh under op con of operation TAC HQ.
- e. Unit first line veh used to deploy unit elements to assembly area Butare to come under op con of operation TAC HQ for deployment of troops from assembly area to FUP.
- f. Electronic Silence. As per OPO..
- g. Code Words. As per OPO.

10. Ack Instrs: Ack.

HK ANYIDOHO  
Brig Gen  
FC



K P O'KELLY  
Col  
DCOS SP

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