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SRPSKI DEMOKRATSKI FORUM
SERBIAN DEMOCRATIC FORUM

Dist: GW
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Zagreb, August 24, 1995

Dear Mr. Stoltenberg,

I would like to thank you again for your **kind coming** to Serbian Democratic Forum and to send, according to our agreement, **information about our efforts** concerning the inclusion of our projects to Phare program.

I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely yours.

Dr. Milorad Pupovac

41000 Zagreb, Berislavićeva 10, Croatia

Zagreb, August 24, 1995

Serbian Democratic Forum, Serbian Cultural Society "Prosvjeta" and several communities of Serbs from the Republic of Croatia made respectively a sketch for three projects:

- A) Reconciliation, Confidence and Reconstruction of Civil Society;
- B) Cultural Autonomy of Serbs in Croatia;
- C) Reconstruction and Renewal Programs.

Each of these projects gripe an important part of life of Serbs in Croatia, trying to contribute to protect and preserve Serb national identity. First of them includes ideas that should be realized in the frame of Central Bureau for Refugees, Human Rights and Rights of National Communities, establishing Center for Interethnic Studies and running "Bridge", a magazine for culture of dialogue. Second project deals with cultural, primarily educational autonomy of Serbs in Croatia, including different activities from scientific researches to equipping library and making information system, publishing activities etc. Third from the group of our projects will be dedicated to reconstruction and renewal of infrastructure: schools, churches, monasteries, grave-yards etc.

These three programs were presented for the first time in March 1995 in Brussels when our

representative, Dr. Milorad Pupovac, visited European Commission and Council of Europe and made some very important contacts. He met Mr. Pablo de Benavides, Dr. Hansjörg Kretschmer, Mr. Peter Dun, who promised their support. On similar topics, but from a little bit different point of view, our representative discussed with Mr. R. Devries, Mr. J. Durieux, Professor Senell, as well with Croatian ambassador, Mr. J. Dobrinović-Vranyczany, and Mr. P. Champenois.

After these first contacts, Mr. Louis Day, as a representative of European Human Rights Foundation, visited Serbian Democratic Forum and gave us concrete instructions on the application procedure. Following all of the instructions, we sent as soon as we could our application for Phare program.

On behalf of SDF, SCS "Prosvjeta" and
communities of Serbs from RH

Dimitrije Todorović

CZN-1477
CZG-1201
SSN-2262

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MOST IMMEDIATE

95 AUG 23 14:06

Page 1 of 1

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM : JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
DATE : 23 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER : UNPF HQ Z- 1489
SUBJECT : CROATIAN LETTER OF PROTEST
REFERENCE : UNNY MSC-2800 Dated 22 August 1995

*Bogen Volchek
COS*

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95 AUG 23 15:08

UNOG Telecom Unit
Palais des Nations

1. The letter at reference from the Permanent Representative of Croatia has been reviewed. The Croatian allegations of ARSK shelling into Osijek on 19 August have been confirmed by UN sources. Although the HV retaliated, the exchange of fire was initiated by the ARSK and was far more severe than the HV response. Details are as follows:

- a. Between 1655 and 1820 hours, 28 mortar rounds were fired from ARSK positions (CR 1157) into Osijek;
- b. Between 1834 and 1919 hours, the HV retaliated with ten mortar rounds into ARSK positions (CR 2050, 2051, 2052);
- c. Between 1835 and 2047 hours, the ARSK fired an additional 26 mortar rounds into Osijek;
- d. At 1854 hours, the HV fired two artillery rounds into ARSK positions (CR 1838); and
- e. Between 1907 and 2112 hours, the HV fired ten mortar rounds into ARSK positions.

2. The Croatian allegation of 55 impacts in the Dubrovnik area on 19 August is not accurate by UN sources. Only two incoming explosions were confirmed by UNMOs. These impacted in the general area west of Gruda (BN 8410) and have been assessed as mortar/artillery fire. 18 additional explosions were confirmed by UNMOs, however, they assessed it as outgoing HV artillery fire from the general area BN 8410 between 1330 and 1530 hours.


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95 AUG 24 4:19CNZ 813 / **CYZ 811** P1/2**95 OUTGOING CODE CABLE**UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS**IMMEDIATE**

1995 AUG 23 P 8:13

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB Attn. SRSG/TEC

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA ✓

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 

DATE: 23 AUGUST 1995

NUMBER: MSC- 2814

SUBJECT: **Letter from chargé d'affaires of the FRY concerning
alleged attack by HV artillery**

Please find attached for your attention and comments a self-explanatory letter from the chargé d'affaires of the FRY to the President of the Security Council on the above subject.

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GENERALS/1995/727
22 August 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 22 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions of my Government, I am writing to inform you
of the following.

On 19 August 1995, the Croatian armed forces opened fire from
the region of Butkovina (position 611) on two occasions on the
units of the Army of Yugoslavia deployed along the border and thus
again violated the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia.

At 11.45 a.m. one shell landed 7 meters away from the position
of the Army of Yugoslavia. Shortly after, at 11.46 a.m. the
watchtower of the Army of Yugoslavia was exposed to Croatian
gunfire. There were not casualties. The Army of Yugoslavia did not
return fire.

In the wake of the above, I avail myself of this opportunity
to lodge a strong protest to you, in your capacity as President of
the Security Council and warn the Council of the seriousness of
this situation and the possible consequences caused by the repeated
incidents and provocations of Croatia against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter
circulated as a ~~document~~ document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest
considerations.

(Signed)

Dragomir Djokic
Ambassador

Charge d'affaires a.i.

His Excellency
Mr. Kugroho Wisnumura
President of the Security Council
New York

CZN-1476
CZG-1200
SSN-2260

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Page 1 of 6

FOR
CAG
95 AUG 23 11:30

95 AUG 23 12:01

UNOG Precomm Unit
Palais des Nations

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICF, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: Z- 1488

DATE: 23 AUGUST 1995

SUBJECT: Report of Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 1009 (1995)

1. With reference to your Code Cable 2793 of 22 August 1995, amendments to your version of the Secretary-General's report dated 22 August 1995 1:00pm, which I consider to be absolutely necessary, follow.

2. Delete present paragraph 7 and in its place, insert the following:

"7. Heavy fighting took place in the Dvor area where Danish battalion elements reported that some of their members witnessed the killing of disabled civilians by a military unit, the identity of which is unknown, in the town of Dvor. Subsequently, it was established that 11 persons had died at this site. This incident is presently subject to an investigation by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia."

3. Delete present paragraph 8 and in its place, insert the following:

"8. During the fighting between Croatian and Krajina Serb troops, there were several incidents in which the safety and welfare of United Nations troops were not sufficiently considered by the parties. For instance, a total of 98 United Nations observation posts were overrun and destroyed by the Croatian Army during its offensive in Sectors North and South. Reports indicate that Croat soldiers directly and indirectly fired upon observation posts, arrested and temporarily disarmed United Nations soldiers, and took United Nations equipment. In one particularly egregious incident on 5 August 1995, several members of an United Nations battalion and a group of Krajina Serb prisoners were forced by an unit of the Croatian Army to walk ahead of their forward lines, using them as human shields. In all, three United Nations peace-keepers died as a result of actions by Croatian troops during the offensive and one died as a result of action

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by Krajina Serbs. In addition, 16 peace-keepers were injured during the conflict. These incidents have been vigorously protested by UNPF. The Foreign Minister of Croatia, Mr. Mate Granic, has indicated that Croatia would investigate incidents in which United Nations personnel were attacked. To date, no reports on these incidents have been received from the Croatian Government, although UNCRO has been requested to assist in investigating the incident of 5 August 1995. In response to the deteriorating military situation that was threatening the security of United Nations troops in Sector South, a request was made on 4 August 1995 for NATO air presence over the sector. This was granted by the Theatre Force Commander in order to deter any hostile action against United Nations personnel."

4. In paragraph 9, delete the last sentence which reads:

"Despite the establishment of Croatian civil authority, difficulties persist in relation to the humanitarian situation, the return of refugees, and the monitoring of human rights."

5. Delete present paragraph 10 and in its place, insert the following:

"10. UNCRO's ability to move throughout Sector North and Sector South was greatly reduced during the Croatian offensive. It is thus difficult to determine if many incidents are attributable to advancing Croatian forces, or to the actions of departing Serbs. It is also difficult to determine the extent to which the mass exodus of the Krajina Serb population was brought on by fear of Croatian forces, as opposed to a desire not to live under Croatian government authority or encouragements by local leaders to depart. Consequently, little is known about what happened in some parts of the sectors during the offensive. The mass exodus of the Krajina Serb population has created a humanitarian crisis of significant proportions. About 3,500 Krajina Serbs remain in the former Sector North and about 2,000 remain in the former Sector South; these estimates represent a small percentage of the former Krajina Serb population. Most of those leaving have fled to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro): UNHCR estimates this number to be above 150,000. Other refugees from the area are still in transit; the number who remain in the Banja Luka area at this point is estimated by UNHCR to be between 10,000 and 15,000. Another group of refugees of approximately 21,000 people, consisting largely of Bosnian Muslims from the former "Autonomous Province of Western Bosna", made its way north from Velika Kladusa into Croatia. Negotiations have taken place between the Government of Croatia and the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with representatives of the former "Autonomous Province of Western Bosna", to determine the future of the refugees. Although an agreement was reached that they would return to the area of Velika Kladusa, there are indications that many of the refugees are unwilling to return at the present time without additional guarantees for their safety."

6. With respect to present paragraph 11:

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a) In the second sentence, delete:

"with more than 8,000 having crossed the Sava River as of 18 August 1995".

and insert the following:

"with more than 11,000 having crossed the Sava River as of 20 August 1995".

b) In the third sentence, without an additional insertion, delete the words:

"as well as in Vojvodina in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)".

c) After the end of the fourth sentence, without an additional insertion, delete the remainder of the paragraph, commencing with the words:

"Their humanitarian situation is ...".

7. With respect to paragraph 13:

a) In the first sentence, delete the following words:

"were sometimes blocked by Croatian authorities, who cited security concerns".

and insert the following:

"were sometimes blocked as a result of security concerns".

b) At the end of the paragraph, insert the following:

"The Agreement between the United Nations and Croatia dated 6 August 1995 provided for full access by UNCRO and humanitarian organizations to the civilian population in Croatia. There have been many instances where local Croatian authorities have not respected the United Nations' freedom of movement. The need for interventions with Croatian authorities to obtain freedom of movement has resulted in considerable delays to deliveries of humanitarian aid. For example, access to a large group of refugees from the Velika Kladusa area has been intermittent and has delayed needed humanitarian assistance."

8. Delete present paragraph 14 and in its place, insert the following:

"14. In response to the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation during and after the Croatian offensive, my Special Representative established a Humanitarian Crisis Cell to collate information and coordinate responses. The Cell, comprised of UNPF staff, communicates with all international agencies involved in humanitarian affairs and coordinates four recently created Human

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Rights Action Teams. On 7 August, the first of the Human Rights Action Teams, led by a staff member of the UN Centre for Human Rights, was deployed to Knin. Pursuant to the Agreement between the United Nations and Croatia dated 6 August 1995, the role of these teams is to report upon the observance of human rights. Although the teams have reported that their freedom of movement has improved substantially within the last several days, they have previously been denied access to areas and persons in circumstances where no reasonable justification was being given by the Croatian authorities. For example, on 11 August 1995, members of a Human Rights Action Team were denied access to a cemetery outside Gracac in Sector South when bodies were seen to be being buried."

9. Delete present paragraph 15 and in its place, insert the following paragraphs:

"15. Since the beginning of the Croatian offensive, there have been numerous reports of houses and other property being set on fire, and property being looted. Although there were no sightings of houses actually being set alight, many of the reports indicated that Croatian troops were either very nearby or in the vicinity of the burning houses. At the same time, many of the areas in question were devoid of other inhabitants. As to instances of these reports, on 8 August 1995, United Nations civilian police reported houses in Zazvici, Djevske and Kistanje, situated in Sector South, were on fire. A Human Rights Action Team reported on 10 August 1995 that between 35 to 40 houses along a 15 kilometre stretch of road south of Knin towards Dmisi, were burning; crops had been also set ablaze. Members of an United Nations battalion reported that on both 10 and 11 August 1995, houses recently set on fire were observed in nine different villages in Sector South. In addition, they reported evidence of looting. As to another instance, on 13 August 1995, a report by an United Nations Military Observer observed a burning house in Topusko in Sector North; Croatian soldiers were standing by. As late as 15 August 1995, a Human Rights Action Team reported houses as having been freshly set ablaze in Mircete in Sector South. Throughout the period that monitoring has taken place, there have been many reports of houses and shops being looted.

"16. In addition, there are a few reports of physical violence by Croatian authorities against members of the Krajina Serb population. For example, several United Nations personnel have given testimony that on 9 August 1995 they saw an elderly Serb civilian in the custody of Croatian police. About half an hour later, the civilian was found dead with numerous bullet wounds. A Human Rights Action Team reported a case involving a 62 year old Serb male civilian who left the compound at UNCRO HQ-Knin and returned to his flat. During the afternoon of his return, he was physically assaulted and threatened by one of four Croatian soldiers who entered the flat. The man then returned to the UNCRO compound where he sought medical attention."

10. Delete present paragraph 16 without additional insertion.
11. Delete present paragraph 17 and in its place insert the following:

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"17. Representatives of the International Committee for the Red Cross have given favourable reports concerning the access they have been given to all persons detained in connection with the recent conflict by Croatian authorities. The ICRC has been notified of persons detained by Croatian authorities, and has registered more than 600 detainees at this point. The majority of those originally detained have been released and many of those who remain in detention have been transferred from collective centres to district prisons."

12. In paragraph 19, third line, change "Seventeen" to "Sixteen." Change "three," at the fourth line, to "two."

13. At the end of paragraph 20, add: "In recent days, the tension appears to be relaxing due to increasing restraint and cooperation by both parties."

14. With respect to present paragraph 21:

- a) In the second sentence, delete "179" and insert in its place "184".
- b) In the second sentence, delete "ten" and insert in its place "eleven".
- c) In the second sentence, insert the word "inclusive" immediately after "17 August".
- d) In the second sentence, delete "122" and insert in its place "114".
- e) In the fourth sentence, delete "7 August" and insert in its place "6 August".
- f) In the fourth sentence, without an additional insertion, delete the words "against soldiers and civilians".

15. At paragraph 26, fourth line, change "Operations" to "operations" and add "within" after "to."

16. Change the last sentence of paragraph 29 to read: "Local Serb leaders did not exclude any of the proposals made on behalf of my Special Representative in discussions on 20 August 1995, including more effective border monitoring, provided that the military situation is, at a minimum, restored to the circumstances prior to 1 May 1995."

17. At paragraph 30, tenth line, add "within" after "to."

18. At the end of present paragraph 34, after "theatre.", delete the full-stop and insert the following:

", noting that their presence and functioning in the Republic of Croatia is regulated by, *inter alia*, the Agreement on the Status of Forces concluded on 15 May 1995 by the Republic of Croatia and the United Nations (SOFA)."

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19. With respect to present paragraph 35:

a) Delete the following at the beginning of the paragraph:

"There is one related matter that requires urgent attention. An agreement was concluded on 15 May 1995 between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the United Nations on the Status of United Nations Forces and Operations (SOFA). This was welcomed as a positive step. Regrettably,".

b) Insert the following in its place:

"Although the conclusion of the SOFA was welcomed as a positive step, regrettably, ... ".

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UNHCR

Palais des Nations

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'95 AUG 22 19:20

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TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 22 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER: 2793

UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS

AUG 22 2:31

MOST IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: Secretary-General's report on Croatia

1. The attached draft report was approved last night by the Secretary-General and has been sent for advance translation. You will note that the passages describing your current consultations with the Croatian Government and the Sector East Serbs have been considerably shortened. This is because the Secretary-General decided not to reveal more than absolutely necessary until it was clear what outcome you have been able to achieve. You should be aware that the Secretary-General is at present unenthusiastic about the idea of patrolling by boat and helicopter and would not wish you to promote this in your discussions with the two sides.

2. Thank you for the revised text which was received this morning. Unfortunately it arrived too late to be taken into account in our discussions of the draft with the Secretary-General, who has now left New York. I should be grateful, however, if you would urgently review the attached draft and check that it contains no statements which are factually incorrect or would create difficulties for you in your relations with the parties.

3. As already mentioned, the draft has gone to advance translation. Please let us have any amendments which you think absolutely necessary by 0830 hours New York time tomorrow, Wednesday 23 August.

Best regards.

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1:00 pm 22 August 1995

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1009 (1995)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 10 of its resolution 1009 (1995) of 10 August 1995, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report within three weeks of the adoption of that resolution on its implementation and on the implications of the situation for the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia, which is known as UNCRO. The present report, in conjunction with my report pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 981 (1995) of 3 August 1995 (S/1995/650) and my letter of 7 August 1995 (S/1995/666), is intended to assist the Council in its consideration of the implications for the mandate of UNCRO of the situation following the military offensive launched by the Government of the Republic of Croatia on 4 August.

2. The present report reflects events up to 20 August 1995.

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 1009 (1995)

A. Military Activities

3. Since my report of 3 August and my letter of 7 August 1995, neither party has ceased military actions, nor have they complied fully with relevant Council resolutions. Tensions have remained

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high and the Croatian Army has not always prosecuted its campaigns with sufficient regard for the safety of United Nations personnel or Krajina Serb civilians.

4. As mentioned in my letter to the President of the Security Council of 7 August 1995 (S/1995/66), efforts to avoid the conflicts in July and early August through negotiations were met with delays and intransigence. Over the period of 29 July to 3 August 1995, my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and the Co-Chairman of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg, made a series of attempts to avert the war. Their endeavours, however, did not succeed as both sides adopted irreconcilable positions. The Theatre Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Bernard Janvier, attempted to arrange a meeting between the military commanders of the Croatian Army and the Krajina Serb forces on 31 July, but the Croatian Army Commander did not attend.

5. On 4 August 1995, the Croatian Army launched the attack in Sectors North and South, and Knin fell on 5 August following concentrated shelling. After Krajina Serb defences collapsed, 700 civilians took shelter in Sector South headquarters, and large numbers of displaced persons fled from Sector South to Bosnian Serb-held territory. Resistance was stronger in Sector North, particularly around Turanj and Petrinja. The Bosnian Army's 5th Corps launched a cross-border offensive against the

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Krajina Serbs in the Licko Petrovo Selo area, linking up with the Croatian Army in the area of Rakovica. The situation in Sector East became tense and some civilians departed the area as the local population feared that a Croatian offensive was imminent.

6. In Sector North, vigorous attempts on 7 August to conclude an agreement on the surrender of Krajina Serb elements collapsed when the Serbs tried to take heavy weapons systems with them on the departure route. This led to continued fighting, with civilians and Krajina Serb troops intermixed on the withdrawal route, and avoidable casualties resulted. A cease-fire was however successfully concluded for the Topusko and Glina areas on 8 August, to come into effect the following day. It provided for the surrender of Serb heavy weapons, the withdrawal of Krajina Serb soldiers with side arms only, and the safe passage of civilians from the area. Deplorably, a convoy of displaced people from Sector North, whose movement had been sanctioned by the cease-fire agreement, was attacked by a mob of Croatian civilians in Sisak on 9 August. Large numbers of vehicles were damaged and many people injured. One woman died subsequently of her wounds. Croatian police, who were present at the scene, intervened only after pressure from United Nations civilian police monitors (UNCIVPOL).

7. Heavy fighting continued in the Dvor area where Danish battalion elements reported an atrocity against handicapped

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civilians in the town. An unknown unit, bearing insignia which appeared to be of the 505 Brigade of the Bosnian Army 5th Corps, took a group of mentally handicapped people, tied their hands behind their necks and executed them. Later, eleven bodies were found in this location. In addition, during intensive fighting in the town, a number of displaced people were caught in the crossfire.

8. A total of 98 United Nations observation posts were overrun and destroyed by the Croatian Army during its offensive in Sectors North and South. Some observation posts came under direct and indirect fire; UNCRO soldiers were forcibly disarmed and their equipment and supplies taken. NATO air presence was requested on 4 August in response to this threat. On one occasion, UNCRO troops and Krajina Serb prisoners were used as human shields by Croatian Army units during their attacks. Four United Nations peace-keepers were killed in the course of the offensive, including one by Krajina Serbs, and an additional 16 injured. In at least one incident, the Croatian Air Force attacked troops and civilians in the town of Dvor. These incidents have been vigorously protested. The Foreign Minister of Croatia, Dr. Mate Granic, has informed UNCRO that Croatia would investigate the incidents in which United Nations personnel had been attacked and used as human shields. Reportedly, the Croatian officer responsible for the "human shields" incident has been arrested for interrogation. To date, however, no reports on

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such investigations have been received from the Croatian Government.

B. Humanitarian Situation and Human Rights Violations

9. On 6 August, my Special Representative concluded a nine-point agreement with Mr. Hrvoje Sarinic, the Head of the Croatian Commission for Relations with UNCRO, to allow the United Nations, together with other international organizations, to cope with the humanitarian difficulties caused by the Croatian offensive, to monitor the human rights situation, and to permit the safe return of displaced persons (S/1995/666 Annex III). The following day, my Special Representative visited Knin where he received assurances from the Croatian Army commander in the area, General Cermak, that that agreement between the United Nations and Croatia would be respected. As the situation in Sector South began to stabilize, Croatian civilian authorities began to assert their control over the area and Croatian displaced people started returning to identify their homes. On 12 August, the Knin-Split railway began operating. Despite the establishment of Croatian civil authority, difficulties persist in relation to the humanitarian situation, the return of refugees, and the monitoring of human rights.

10. UNCRO's ability to move and observe was greatly reduced during the Croatian offensive, limiting the information available

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on events in Serb-controlled areas. It is thus impossible to determine whether specific transgressions by the advancing Croatian forces or a general fear led the majority of the Serb residents of Sectors North and South to leave the country so quickly. It is also difficult to establish how much of the destruction observed was caused by Krajina Serbs before their departure or by advancing Croatian forces. The mass exodus of the Krajina Serb population has created a humanitarian crisis of enormous proportions. Only a small percentage (estimated to be less than 10%) of the Krajina Serb population of former Sectors North and South remains in the area. Most of those leaving have fled to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); the estimated 140,000 refugees who travelled through Northern Bosnia were joined by approximately 15,000 who left former Sector North in a Croatian-organized convoy through the Lipovac crossing. Other refugees from the area are still in transit though the number who remain in the Banja Luka area at this point is believed to be less than 10,000. Another group of refugees, consisting largely of more than 20,000 Bosnian Muslims from the self-proclaimed "Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia" led by Mr. Fikret Abdic, made its way north from Velika Kladusa into Croatia. The Croatian authorities have been insisting that these refugees must return to Bosnia but the indications are that many of them are unwilling to do so, for fear of ill-treatment by the BiH V Corps.

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11. These large movements of people have had several troubling consequences. Members of the minority (Croat and Muslim) communities in Banja Luka have begun to leave the area in large numbers, with more than 8,000 having crossed the Sava River as of 18 August 1995. Furthermore, there are credible reports of expulsions of non-Serb persons from their homes in the Banja Luka area as well as in Vojvodina in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). As Croats from Bosnia begin to move into Croatia, questions grow concerning the fate of the few Krajina Serbs who chose to remain and the right to return of those Serbs who fled. Their humanitarian situation is precarious. Many of them would like to emigrate to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), but lack transportation. Some have indicated an interest in remaining, but after examining the destruction of property in Krajina Serb areas have said that it is impossible for them to stay. One local Croat mayor in former Sector South has actively encouraged the return of nine Krajina Serbs to their homes, but despite his support, concerns for their safety continue.

12. Also of concern are reports that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) authorities intend to resettle a substantial number of the refugees from Krajina in Kosovo and Vojvodina. Officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have all expressed concern that a significant resettlement of Krajina Serbs in these

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areas could have a destabilizing effect on the region as a whole.

13. Initial efforts to provide humanitarian relief to the nearly 200,000 persons displaced as a result of the Croatian offensive were sometimes blocked by Croatian authorities, who cited security concerns. Humanitarian assistance has reached the large population of refugees in Northern Bosnia largely by the circuitous route through Belgrade to Banja Luka. Since 12 August, air craft have been successfully used to expedite transport of aid to Banja Luka; the non-governmental organization Medecins Sans Frontières has delivered aid to Banja Luka by fixed-wing aircraft, while UNHCR has used transport helicopters from Zagreb to the area. In the wake of the conflict, it has also become possible to open humanitarian aid routes to Bihac, thus alleviating long-standing shortages of aid in that area.

14. In response to the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation during and after the Croatian offensive, my Special Representative established a Humanitarian Crisis Cell within UNPF to collate information and coordinate responses. The Cell communicates with all international agencies involved in humanitarian affairs. On 7 August, the first Human Rights Action Team, led by a staff member of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, was deployed to Knin. The role of this and future teams is to report upon the observance of human rights by the Croatian forces.

15. Compliance by Croatian authorities with the agreement of 6 August 1995 remains unsatisfactory. Despite Croatia's stated desire to respect fully the rights of the local Krajina Serb population, including their right to remain, Croatian authorities have failed to prevent violence, looting and destruction of their property. Croatian police have stood by while the houses of Krajina Serbs were burned and Croatian soldiers have been seen in circumstances which leave little doubt that they have set fire to Krajina Serb houses. The personal property of Krajina Serbs who left their houses has been stolen or destroyed on a large scale. These abuses, perhaps difficult to curb during active hostilities, have continued now for nearly two weeks since the end of the fighting. Given these violations, it is clear that Croatia has not fulfilled its commitment to "create conditions conducive to the return of those persons who have left their homes." In addition, there are a number of reports under investigation of physical violence against Krajina Serbs, including killings of civilians and apparent executions. For example, a dead Serb was found with numerous bullet wounds only an hour after he was observed in the custody of Croatian police. UNCRO, UNHCR, UNHCHR and other international humanitarian institutions continue to investigate alleged incidents which may be violations of international humanitarian law. Elements from the forces of all warring factions are believed to have engaged in widespread looting and destruction of personal property.

16. The 6 August agreement provided for full access by UNCRO and humanitarian organizations to the civilian population. This was not initially complied with by the Government of Croatia, though access is now improving. In general, local commanders and officials have not accorded United Nations personnel the freedom of movement called for, inter alia, in paragraph 6 of Security Council Resolution 1009 (1995). The need to intervene with higher authorities to obtain freedom of movement resulted in considerable delays to aid deliveries and investigations. Croatian authorities have belatedly begun to comply with their obligation to permit access by international humanitarian organizations to the local Krajina Serb population, although problems have sometimes arisen in visiting Krajina Serbs assembled in collection centres established by the Croatian authorities. Access to the large group of refugees from the Velika Kladusa area has been intermittent, delaying both urgently needed humanitarian assistance and interviews by UNHCR protection officers. United Nations human rights monitoring teams and CIVPOL monitors have been denied access to a collection centre and cemetery in Knin, the refugee camp south of Vojnic, and to a PTT building in Vrginmost where displaced persons were being held and reportedly physically abused. While access to each of these locations was eventually granted after intervention at the highest levels, human rights monitoring is a task that must be fulfilled from the earliest stages. Monitoring delayed is monitoring denied.

17. Representatives of the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), however, have provided favourable reports on the access they have been given to Krajina Serb detainees by Croatian authorities. The ICRC has been notified of persons detained by Croatian authorities, and has so far registered approximately 600 detainees, almost all of whom have been transferred from collective centres to district prisons. ICRC is unaware of any detainees to whom access has not been given.

C. Situation in and around Sector East

18. Following the launching of the Croatian offensive, the situation in Sector East deteriorated rapidly. The local Serb forces and the Croatian Army exchanged artillery, mortar and small arms fire, and elements from both sides deployed into the zone of separation. The Serb leadership in the Sector became increasingly tense and uncertain as events in Sectors North and South unfolded. The level of uncertainty was reflected in a breakdown of law and order which saw the hijacking of United Nations vehicles, acts of harassment directed against United Nations personnel, and the temporary detention of five Sector Headquarters staff by Serb elements.

19. Both the Croatian Army and the local Serb forces have adopted an aggressive stance against UNCRO forces in Sector East. Seventeen UN observation posts have now been taken over: fourteen

by the Croatian Army and three by the Serb forces. In addition, both sides have fired upon UNCRO positions, with one Russian soldier being wounded by direct fire from local Serb forces. The local Serb forces consider that a Croatian offensive remains imminent and are seeking to occupy tactically advantageous positions within the zone of separation. The Croatian forces appear to be positioning themselves to apply pressure upon the Sector by forcing UNCRO to evacuate its observation posts. A number of civilians have now left the Sector and the presence of "volunteers" from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) has been reported. Between 9 and 12 August, some 600 to 700 Serb police personnel were observed entering Baranja in Sector East over the Batina bridge, but there is no information to identify where these elements came from. Adding to the tension is the reported presence of Yugoslav Army units on the Yugoslav side of the Danube. However, there is no evidence of the presence in the Sector of formed units from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

20. Severe restrictions on all United Nations movements are imposed by both sides. Local lawlessness further limits movements. These factors severely hamper not only UNCRO's ability to implement its mandate, but also its ability to conduct such simple tasks as resupplying observation posts. Restrictions on movement have also prevented UNCRO from investigating allegations of troop build-ups. As a result, each side is

reacting increasingly to rumours and there is the real risk of an incident igniting conflict that could spiral out of control. Considerable efforts are being made to restore stability, but without the willingness of both parties to cooperate, these efforts can achieve little.

D. "No Fly Zone"

21. The monitoring of the "No-Fly Zone" over Bosnia and Herzegovina in accordance with resolutions 781 and 816 continued during and after the Croatian offensive. 179 violations were recorded for the ten days from 7 to 17 August compared to 122 for the whole of August 1994. The increase is attributed to the Croatian offensive, with accompanying air operations in Bosnian airspace by all parties. The Bosnian Serbs launched an air attack on the Kutina chemical plant in Croatia on 7 August, and United Nations Military Observers deployed at Croatian airfields were able to confirm a Croatian air strike on 8 August against soldiers and civilians in the area of Dvor.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNCRO

A. Immediate Impact on Mandate

22. Events in Sectors North and South have had a major impact on

UNCRO. With the collapse and departure of the political leadership and the armed forces of the Krajina Serbs, there is no longer a requirement, except in Sector East, to monitor or control the confrontation line, zones of separation, weapons storage sites, and areas of limitation established by the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994. Nor is there any longer a requirement for UNCRO to assist with economic projects across former confrontation lines, as set out in the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994. Finally, again with the exception of Sector East, the Croatian government has now established full sovereignty over its territory as well as access to its international borders. The remaining aspects of the UNCRO mandate, including confidence-building, assisting in humanitarian activities, and the protection of refugees and displaced persons are now primarily the responsibility of the Croatian government, and can in any case be performed without the presence of UNCRO infantry battalions.

23. In Sector East, on the other hand, UNCRO's existing mandate remains essentially unchanged. Its implementation has, however, been seriously hampered by high levels of tension, lack of cooperation by both sides, and a volatile military situation which has persisted since the Croatian advance into Sector West on 1 May 1995. As in the other sectors, the confidence which had been built since the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994 has been seriously undermined. Both sides have taken over UNCRO

observation posts and restricted freedom of movement. Serious problems of law and order have led to repeated waves of vehicle hijacking in Sector East. A climate of mutual hostility and suspicion has blocked progress in restoring compliance with the zone of separation, and no progress has been made on local confidence-building measures or establishing the additional UNCRO posts along the international border as called for in Security Council resolutions 981 (1995) and 990 (1995).

24. If UNCRO's presence in Sector East is to be made effective, it is essential that both sides reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and cooperate with UNCRO in stabilizing the military situation and reducing tension. Unless there is a significant change in the attitude of the parties, and much improved cooperation with UNCRO in enabling it to fulfil its existing mandate, including border monitoring and patrolling on both sides of the confrontation line, the continuation of UNCRO's current deployment in Sector East would be difficult to justify. In the present circumstances, with the parties unwilling to respect the provisions of Security Council Resolutions 981 (1995) and 990 (1995), UNCRO's tasks cannot be implemented.

25. While the situation has deteriorated significantly in Sector East, and changed completely in the former sectors, UNCRO performs useful tasks in other parts of Croatia. The presence of UNMOs in the strategically sensitive Prevlaka area, as called for

by Security Council resolution 779 (1992), is of major importance. With the consent of the Croatian government, the UNMOs also investigate incidents of shelling around Dubrovnik, although the city is outside the demilitarized area defined by the Prevlaka agreement. UNMOs also investigate incidents of shelling or air attacks along the north bank of the Sava River. This role, although not included in current mandates, is economical in manpower. It could, with the agreement and cooperation of the governments and parties concerned, be extended to cover all border areas, thereby keeping the international community informed as the situation evolves in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

B. Reduction of UNCRO Troop Strength

26. In view of the situation described in paragraph 22 above, the former Sectors North, South and West no longer require infantry battalions, and UNCRO is therefore taking immediate action to reduce the Operations strength to the currently authorized ceiling of 8750 troops. It will be recalled from my report S/1995/467 of 9 June 1995 that, following the offensive against Sector West, it had been impossible to implement the reduction of troop levels required by Security Council Resolution 990 (1994). The repatriation of four battalions will reduce troop strength to approximately 8,000. In paragraph below, I recommend an immediate start to repatriating all

remaining battalions, except for the time being the two in Sector East. This would further reduce troop strength to below 2,500 by mid-November. Further reductions might thereafter be appropriate depending on the evolution of UNCRO's mandate and the results of current peace initiatives.

C. Ongoing Consultations on the Future of UNCRO

27. My Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and the Theatre Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Bernard Janvier, in an effort to lessen the tension in and around Sector East, met with President Milosevic of Serbia on 12 August. Mr. Akashi also met with the Krajina Serb leadership, represented by Mr. Babic and Mr. Pajic. During this meeting, Krajina Serb leaders expressed their gratitude for the United Nations' efforts to prevent the conflict and aid the Krajina Serb civilian population during and after it.

28. My Special Representative has also conducted initial exploratory talks on the future of UNCRO with the Croatian government, President Milosevic, and local Serb representatives. However, further consultations and contact will have to take place with a view to obtaining support of all concerned for a revised mandate and convincing assurances of their readiness to co-operate in its implementation.

29. Neither of the parties has objected in principle to the continued application in Sector East of the Cease-fire Agreement of 29 March 1994. The Croatian Government has made effective monitoring by UNCRO of the international border in Sector East a precondition for UNCRO's continued performance of tasks set out in existing mandates there or elsewhere in Croatia, particularly in relation to human rights monitoring. It is the strong wish of the Croatian Government that UNCRO strengthen its presence along the border. President Milosevic, while not taking a position on UNCRO's presence along the international border, has suggested that the first step should be a de-escalation of tension in Sector East, accompanied by a disengagement of forces. Local Serb leaders have requested time for internal consultations before taking a position on military matters, including the enhancement of UNCRO's presence on the border.

IV OBSERVATIONS

30. Croatia's reintegration by force of the former Sectors West, South and North has eliminated the need for infantry battalions in these areas. The inability of the troops deployed to affect the course of events there creates some doubt about the continued usefulness of battalions in Sector East, unless there is a concerted effort by both sides to support the implementation of the UNCRO mandate, abide by the 29 March cease-fire agreement, and negotiate a lasting settlement. The Theatre Force Commander

has therefore initiated the immediate reduction of UNCRO's troop strength to the level authorized by the Security Council in its resolution 990 (1995). I recommend that the Security Council approve the repatriation, during the remainder of the present mandate, of all remaining battalions, except the two in Sector East.

31. UNCRO's immediate task in Sector East is to try to re-establish the regime created by the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994. If that can be achieved, I am inclined to think that there will be a continuing role for United Nations forces (infantry, logistics units and military observers) in Sector East. But I would so recommend only if a new spirit of cooperation is demonstrated by the parties. This will require them inter alia to give UNCRO unrestricted freedom of movement, to return all seized OPs and put a complete stop to the hijacking of United Nations vehicles. I have instructed my Special Representative to pursue consultations urgently with the Croatian Government and the local Serb leadership in order to define in detail a possible mandate for UNCRO which I could recommend to the Security Council.

32. I have also instructed my Special Representative to discuss with the Croatian Government what tasks, if any, it would be useful for UNCRO to continue to perform elsewhere in Croatia.

Such tasks could include:

- (a) monitoring and good offices in relation to the Prevlaka Peninsula and Dubrovnik;
- (b) monitoring of Croatia's international border with Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- (c) monitoring of the Croatian police and other aspects of human rights in those parts of Croatia in which a minority Serb community remains.

Pending the conclusion of my Special Representative's consultations, I have instructed him and the Theatre Force Commander to use UNCRO's existing assets in the former Sectors North, South and West, and elsewhere in Croatia, to continue to perform such of the above tasks as seem to them useful and feasible and are accepted by the Croatian Government.

33. I shall report with my recommendations to the Security Council as soon as my Special Representative's consultations reach a conclusion.

34. I do not at present recommend any changes in the other elements of the United Nations presence in the Republic of Croatia, namely the Headquarters of the United Nations Peace

Forces in Zagreb and the logistics bases there and elsewhere which provide support and transit facilities for United Nations operations throughout the theatre.

35. There is one related matter that requires urgent attention. An agreement was concluded on 15 May 1995 between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the United Nations on the Status of United Nations Forces and Operations (SOFA). This was welcomed as a positive step. Regrettably, at the time of writing, the Government of the Republic of Croatia has yet to implement fully various provisions of the SOFA such as making available the necessary premises free of rent and making arrangements for the exemption of the United Nations forces and operations from various taxes and tolls. As indicated in paragraph 55 of my report S/1995/222 of 22 March 1995, the amounts are substantial, running at the rate of about two million dollars a month for taxes and fuel alone. Despite repeated requests at various levels, the Government of Croatia so far has not honoured its commitments in this regard.

36. I should like to pay tribute to my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, the Theatre Force Commander, Lt. Gen. Bernard Janvier, and the brave men and women of UNCRO who have served the mission with courage and distinction during the recent difficult period. I also pay tribute to the efforts of the United Nations Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Former

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Yugoslavia, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg.

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TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: *for* AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE: 22 AUGUST 1995

NUMBER: Z - 1485

SUBJECT: Report Pursuant to Resolution 1009 (1995)

Attached is a revised version of the draft submitted on 20 August 1995. We have gone through the portions relating to international humanitarian law to ensure that all statements and assessments made can be verified. Portions where changes are suggested are sidelined.

Our senior legal advisor has included a suggested paragraph concerning the SOFA.

The last sentence of paragraph 31 should be changed to read: "Local Serb leaders have not excluded any of our proposals, including more effective monitoring of the international border, provided that the military situation is, at a minimum, restored to the circumstances prior 1 May 1995."

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 1009 (1995)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The Security Council instructed me to report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1009 (1995) within three weeks of its adoption. The present report, in conjunction with my report dated 3 August 1995 (S/1995/650) pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 981 (1995) and my letter of 7 August 1995 (S/1995/666), is intended to assist the Council in its consideration of the continuing mandate of UNCRO.
2. The present report reflects events up to 20 August 1995.

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 1009

Military Activities

3. To date, neither the Croatian Army nor the Krajina Serbs have ceased military action or fully complied with relevant Security Council resolutions. Tensions have remained high and the Croatian Army has prosecuted campaigns that have placed UN personnel and Krajina Serb civilians at risk.
4. Negotiations in July and early August to avoid the conflict were not successful. Between 29 July 1995 and 3 August 1995, my Special Representative, Mr Yasushi Akashi, and Co-Chairman of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, Mr Thorvald Stoltenberg made a series of attempts, without success, to avert the hostilities. In addition, the Theatre Force Commander attempted to arrange a meeting between the military commanders of the Croatian Army and the Krajina Serb forces on 31 July but the Croatian Army Commander did not attend.

5. On 4 August 1995, the Croatian Army launched an attack in Sectors North and South, and Knin fell on 5 August following concentrated shelling. After Krajina Serb defences collapsed, about 700 civilians took shelter in UNCRO's Sector South headquarters, and large numbers of displaced persons fled from Sector South to Bosnian Serb-held territory. Resistance to the Croatian offensive was stronger in Sector North, particularly around Turanj and Petrinja. The Bosnian Army 5 Corps launched an offensive against the Krajina Serbs in the Licko Petrovo Selo area, linking up with the Croatian Army in the area of Rakovica. At the same time, the situation in Sector East intensified. It was reported that the Serbs feared an offensive was inevitable and that they considered it could take place within days.

6. In Sector North, attempts to broker an agreement regarding the surrender of Krajina Serb elements collapsed on 7 August 1995 when the Serbs tried to leave the region with heavy weapons. Consequently Krajina Serb civilians and troops were intermixed on the withdrawal route and it was difficult to find a Krajina Serb figure with the authority to bring the troops under control. A cease-fire was successfully concluded for the Topusko and Glina areas on 8 August, to come into effect the following day. It provided for the placement of Serb heavy weapons in UN weapons collection points, for the withdrawal from Croatia of Krajina Serb soldiers with side arms, and for the safe passage of civilians from the area. Unfortunately, on 9 August, a convoy of displaced people from Sector North, whose movement had been sanctioned by the cease-fire agreement, was attacked by Croatian civilians in Sisak. Large numbers of vehicles were damaged and many people were injured. One woman died subsequently from her wounds. Croatian police, who were present at the scene, intervened only after pressure from United Nations civilian police.

7. Heavy fighting took place in the Dvor area where Danish battalion elements reported that some of their members witnessed the killing of disabled civilians by a military unit, the identity of which is unknown, in the town of Dvor. Subsequently, it was established that 11 persons had died at this site. This incident is presently subject to an investigation by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

8. During the fighting between Croatian and Krajina Serb troops, there were several incidents in which the safety and welfare of United Nations troops was not duly considered by the parties. For instance, a total of 98 United Nations observation posts were overrun and destroyed by the Croatian Army during its offensive in Sectors North and South. Reports indicate that Croat soldiers directly and indirectly fired upon observation posts, arrested and temporarily disarmed United Nations soldiers and took United Nations equipment. In one particularly egregious incident on 5 August 1995, several members of an United Nations battalion and a group of Krajina Serb prisoners were forced by an unit of the Croatian Army to walk ahead of their forward lines, using them as human shields. In all, three United Nations peace-keepers died as a result of actions by Croatian troops during the offensive. These incidents have been vigorously protested by UNPF. The Foreign Minister of Croatia, Mr. Mate Granic, has indicated that Croatia would investigate incidents in which United Nations personnel were attacked. To date, no reports on these incidents have been received from the Croatian Government.

9. In response to the deteriorating military situation that was threatening the security of United Nations troops in Sector South, a request was made on 4 August 1995 for NATO air presence over the sector. This was granted by the Theatre Force Commander in order to deter any hostile action against United Nations personnel.

Humanitarian Situation and Human Rights Violations

10. On 6 August 1995, my Special Representative and a representative of the Croatian Government concluded an Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the United Nations Peace Forces - UNCRO on Temporary Measures in the Areas Formerly Known as "Sector North" and "Sector South" (S/1995/666, annex III), which stipulated that the the United Nations, together with other international organisations, would be given full access in order to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Civilian population and to monitor the human rights situation. On the following day, my Special Representative visited Knin where he received assurances from the Croatian Army commander in the area, General Cermak, that the Agreement dated 6 August 1995 would be respected. As the situation in Sector South began to stabilize, Croatian civilian

authorities began to assert their control over the area and Croatian displaced persons who previously left their homes in 1991, started to return to the area in order to identify their homes. On 12 August, the Knin-Split railway began operating.

11. UNCRO's ability to move throughout Sector North and Sector South was greatly reduced during the Croatian offensive. Consequently, little is known about what happened in some parts of the sectors during the offensive. The mass exodus of the Krajina Serb population has created a humanitarian crisis of significant proportions. About 3,500 Krajina Serbs remain in the former Sector North and about 2,000 remain in the former Sector South; these estimates represent a small percentage of the former Krajina Serb population. Most of those leaving have fled to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro): UNHCR estimates this number to be above 150,000. Other refugees from the area are still in transit; the number who remain in the Banja Luka area at this point is estimated by UNHCR to be between 10,000 and 15,000. Another group of refugees of approximately 21,000 people, consisting largely of Bosnian Muslims from the former "Autonomous Province of Western Bosna", made its way north from Velika Kladusa into Croatia. Negotiations have taken place between the Government of Croatia and the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with representatives of the former "Autonomous Province of Western Bosna", to determine the future of the refugees. Although an agreement was reached that they would return to the area of Velika Kladusa, there are indications that many of the refugees are unwilling to return at the present time without additional guarantees for their safety.

12. These large movements of people have had several troubling consequences. Members of the Croatian and Muslim minorities in Banja Luka in Bosnia and Herzegovina, have begun to flee the area in large numbers. Croatian authorities report that, as of 20 August 1995, more than 11,000 refugees have crossed the Sava River. Despite this movement being organized, with Bosnian Serb authorities registering and then transporting the minorities to awaiting Croatian authorities, the exodus is taking place in an atmosphere of intimidation. This is substantiated by UNHCR reports of incidents of forced expulsion from the Banja Luka area. In addition, there is concern over reports that the authorities in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) intend to

resettle some of the refugees from Sector North and Sector South in Kosovo and Vojvodina. Officials from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have all expressed concern that a significant resettlement of Krajina Serbs in these areas could have a destabilizing effect on the region as a whole.

13. Initial efforts to provide humanitarian relief to persons displaced in this conflict were sometimes blocked as a result of security concerns. Humanitarian assistance has reached the large population of refugees in Northern Bosnia largely by the circuitous route through Belgrade to Banja Luka. Since 12 August, an air bridge has been successfully opened to Banja Luka; *Médecins Sans Frontières* delivery of aid to Banja Luka in a Boeing 707 has been joined by UNHCR's use of British Chinook helicopters to the area. In the wake of the conflict, humanitarian aid routes to Bihac have also been opened, alleviating long-standing shortages of aid in that region.

14. The Agreement dated 6 August 1995 provided for full access by UNCRO and humanitarian organizations to the civilian population. There have been many instances where local Croatian authorities have not respected the United Nations' freedom of movement. The need for interventions with higher authorities to obtain freedom of movement has resulted in considerable delays to deliveries of humanitarian aid. For example, access to a large group of refugees from the Velika Kladusa area has been intermittent and has delayed needed humanitarian assistance.

15. In response to the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation during and after the Croatian offensive, my Special Representative established a Humanitarian Crisis Cell to collate information and coordinate responses. The Cell, comprised of UNPF staff, communicates with all international agencies involved in humanitarian affairs and coordinates four recently created Human Rights Action Teams. On 7 August, the first of the Human Rights Action Teams, led by a staff member of the UN Centre for Human Rights, was deployed to Knin. Pursuant to the Agreement of 6 August 1995, the role of these teams is to report upon the observance of human rights. Although the teams have reported that their freedom of movement has improved substantially within the last several days, they have previously been denied access to areas and persons in circumstances

where no reasonable justification was being given by the Croatian authorities. For example, on 11 August 1995, members of a Human Rights Action Team were denied access to a cemetery outside Gracac in Sector South when bodies were seen to be being buried.

16. During the period that United Nations personnel have been present in Sector North and Sector South since the beginning of the Croatian offensive, there have been numerous reports of houses and other property being set on fire, and property being looted. Although there were no sightings of houses actually being set alight, many of the reports indicated that Croatian troops were either very nearby or in the vicinity of the burning houses. At the same time, many of the areas in question were devoid of other inhabitants. For instance, on 8 August 1995, United Nations civilian police reported houses in Zazvici, Djevrške and Kistanjc, situated in Sector South, were on fire. A Human Rights Action Team reported on 10 August 1995 that between 35 to 40 houses along a 15 kilometre stretch of road south of Knin towards Drnis, were burning; crops had been also set ablaze. Members of an United Nations battalion reported that on both 10 and 11 August 1995, houses recently set on fire were observed in nine different villages in Sector South. In addition, they reported evidence of looting. As to another instance, on 13 August 1995, a report by an United Nations Military Observer observed a burning house in Topusko in Sector North; Croatian soldiers were standing by. As late as 15 August 1995, a Human Rights Action Team reported houses as having been freshly set ablaze in Mircete in Sector South. Throughout the period that monitoring has taken place, there have been many reports of houses and shops being looted.

17. In addition, there are a few reports of physical violence by Croatian authorities against members of the Krajina Serb population. For example, several United Nations personnel have given testimony that on 9 August 1995 they saw an elderly Serb civilian in the custody of Croatian police. About half an hour later, the civilian was found dead with numerous bullet wounds. A Human Rights Action Team reported a case involving a 62 year old Serb male civilian who left the compound at UNCRO HQ-Knin and returned to his flat. During the afternoon of his return, he was physically assaulted and threatened by

one of four Croatian soldiers who entered the flat. The man then returned to the UNCRO compound where he sought medical attention.

18. Representatives of the International Committee for the Red Cross have given favourable reports concerning the access they have been given to all persons detained in connection with the recent conflict by Croatian authorities. The ICRC has been notified of persons detained by Croatian authorities, and has registered more than 600 detainees at this point. The majority of those originally detained have been released and many of those who remain in detention have been transferred from collective centres to district prisons.

Sector East

19. Following the launch of the Croatian offensive, the situation in Sector East deteriorated rapidly. The Serb forces and the Croatian Army exchanged artillery, mortar and small arms fire and elements from both sides deployed into the zone of separation. The Serb leadership in the Sector became increasingly distracted and uncertain as events in Sectors North and South unfolded. The level of uncertainty was reflected in a breakdown of law and order which saw UN vehicles being hijacked, UN personnel being harassed and the temporary detention of five Sector Headquarters staff.

20. The Croatian Army and the Serb forces have adopted an aggressive stance against UN forces in the area. Seventeen UN observation posts have now been taken over: fourteen by the Croatian Army and three by the Serb forces. In addition, both sides have fired upon UN positions, leaving one Russian soldier wounded. The Serb forces consider that a Croatian offensive is imminent and are seeking to occupy tactically advantageous positions within the zone of separation. The Croatians appear to be positioning themselves to apply pressure upon the Sector by forcing UNCRO to evacuate its observation posts. Many civilians have now left the Sector and "volunteers" from Serbia are swelling the ranks of the Serb forces. Between 9 and 12 August, some 600 to 700 Serbian police personnel were observed entering Baranja in Sector East over the Batina bridge although there is no information to identify their origins. Adding to the tension is

the reported presence of Yugoslav Army units on the Yugoslav side of the Danube. However, there is no evidence of the presence of Yugoslav units within the Sector.

21. Severe restrictions on all UN movement have been imposed by both sides. Local lawlessness further limits movement. These restrictions severely hamper the ability of UNCRO to implement its mandate. Restrictions of movement have also prevented UNCRO from investigating allegations of troop build-ups. Hence, each side is reacting increasingly to rumours. Consequently, there is a real risk of an accidental conflict spiralling out of control. Strong efforts are being made to stabilise the situation, but without the willingness of both parties to cooperate, these efforts have achieved little.

No Fly Zone

22. The monitoring of the No Fly Zone in accordance with resolutions 781 and 816 continued during and after the Croatian offensive. 184 violations were recorded for the period from 7 August 1995 to 17 August 1995 inclusive compared to 114 for the whole month of August, 1994. The increase is attributed to the Croatian offensive, with violations being carried out by both parties. The Bosnian Serbs launched an air attack on the Kutina chemical plant in Croatia on 6 August 1995, and UN Military Observers deployed at Croatian airfields were able to confirm a Croatian air strike on 8 August in the area of Dvor.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNCRO

23. Events in Sectors North and South have had a major impact on UNCRO. With the collapse or departure of the governing structure and armed forces of the Krajina Serbs, there is no longer a requirement to monitor or control the confrontation line, zone of separation, weapon storage sites, and areas of limitation established by the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994 outside of Sector East. The requirement for UNCRO to assist with economic projects across former confrontation lines, as set out in the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994, also no longer exists. Finally, with the exception of Sector East, the Croatian government now has full sovereignty over its territory and

access to its international borders. The remaining aspects of the UNCRO mandate, including confidence-building, assisting in humanitarian activities, and the protection of refugees and displaced persons are now primarily the responsibility of the Croatian government, and can in any case be performed without the presence of UNCRO infantry battalions.

24. UNCRO's existing mandate in Sector East remains essentially unchanged. Its implementation has, however, been seriously hampered by high levels of tension, lack of co-operation, and a volatile military situation dating from the Croatian advance into Sector West on 1 May 1995. As in the other sectors, the confidence which had been built up since the cease-fire agreement of 29 March 1994 has been seriously and repeatedly undermined. Both sides have taken over United Nations observation posts and restricted freedom of movement. Serious problems of law and order have led to repeated waves of vehicle hijacking in Sector East. A climate of mutual hostility and suspicion has blocked progress in restoring compliance with the zone of separation, and no progress has been made on local confidence-building measures or establishing the additional UNCRO posts along the international border as called for under Security Council resolutions 981 (1995) and 990 (1995).

25. If UNCRO's presence in Sector East is to be made effective, it is vital that both sides reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements and co-operate with UNCRO in stabilizing the military situation and reducing tension. Unless there is a significant change in the attitude of the parties, and much improved cooperation with the existing mandate including border monitoring and patrolling on both sides of the confrontation line, the continuation of UNCRO's current deployment in Sector East is of dubious value. For the present, unless the parties accept some responsibility for the implementation of Resolution 981, UNCRO's tasks are impossible.

26. While the situation has deteriorated significantly in Sector East, and changed completely in the former sectors, UNCRO performs useful tasks in other parts of Croatia. The presence of UNMOs in the strategically sensitive Prevlaka area, as called for by Security Council resolution 779 (1992), is of major importance. UNMOs, with the

consent of the Croatian government, frequently investigate incidents of shelling around Dubrovnik although the region itself is outside the demilitarized area defined by the Prevlaka agreement. UNMOs also investigate incidents of shelling or air attack along the north bank of the Sava River. This role, although not included in current mandates, is economical in manpower. It can, with the agreement and cooperation of the governments and parties concerned, be extended to cover all border areas, thereby informing the international community and enhancing regional peace and stability as the situation evolves in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Immediate Reduction of UNCRO Troop Strength

27. The former sectors no longer require infantry battalions, and we have therefore begun to reduce towards the authorized ceiling of 8750 troops. The repatriation of four battalions will reduce troop strength to approximately 8,000 once completed. We are prepared to begin immediately the repatriation of all remaining battalions, except the two in Sector East, which would further reduce troop strength to below 2,500 by mid-November. Further reductions might be appropriate depending on the evolution of UNCRO's mandate and the results of regional peace initiatives.

28. Despite the change in the military situation, the requirement remains to monitor and report on military border crossings, police activities, and the human rights situation. These tasks can be accomplished most effectively and economically by Military Observers, UN Civilian Police, and Civil Affairs officers. These components of a mission can only be effective, however, with the full cooperation of the parties to the conflict. Recent efforts in the theatre have concentrated on re-establishing the conditions for an effective execution of the existing mandate.

Ongoing Negotiations on the Future of UNCRO

29. My Special Representative and the Force Commander, in an effort to lessen the tension around Sector East, met with President Milosevic of Serbia on 12 August. He also met with the Krajina Serb leadership, Mr. Babic and Mr. Pajic. During this meeting,

Krajina Serb leaders expressed their thanks for the UN's efforts to prevent the conflict, and to aid the Krajina Serb civilian population during and after it.

30. My Special Representative has conducted initial talks on the future of UNCRO with the Croatian government, President Milosevic, and local Serb representatives. Further consultation will take place with a view to seeking a revised mandate which can be implemented with the full support of the parties.

31. The Croatian government has made an effective UNCRO presence along the international border in Sector East a precondition for the continuation of tasks set out in existing mandates, or as proposed by my Special Representative. It is the strong wish of the Croatian government that UNCRO's presence along the border include river and helicopter patrols. President Milosevic, while not taking a position on UNCRO's presence along the international border, has suggested that the first step should be a de-escalation of tension in Sector East, accompanied by a disengagement of forces. Local Serb leaders have requested time for internal consultations before taking a position on military matters, including the enhancement of UNCRO's presence on the border.

32. None of the parties has objected to the continuation of the cease-fire Agreement of 29 March 1994 as applied to Sector East, or of UNCRO's mandate in the Prevlaka area. The Croatian government would also welcome patrolling by UNMOs along those portions of the border with the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that are not under the control of Federation forces. It is the view of my Special Representative that UNMO patrols, while concentrating on areas where difficulties are most likely to arise at any particular time, can best contribute to long term stability and credible reporting if they are free to patrol the entire border. If this is not agreed, there is little to be gained through border monitoring, except in Sector East.

33. As monitoring human rights and the protection of minorities are tasks which could be assigned to or shared by other United Nations agencies or international organizations, the Croatian government has taken the position that UNCRO involvement in these

functions is contingent on an effective presence in Sector East along the border with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

34. Detailed negotiations have not yet been held with the Serb authorities in Sector East. However, indications are that they may react in a positive way to our proposals. I therefore recommend that UNCRO retain a full capacity to perform its present mandate in Sector East, including intensified border patrolling and a stronger presence by UNMOs. Attention will be devoted primarily to stabilizing the situation with the aim of facilitating negotiations between the Croatian government and local Serb authorities. In view of the down-sizing of the remainder of UNCRO, some adjustments to the composition of UNCRO forces in Sector East may be required.

35. In the remainder of Croatia, UNCRO will focus on monitoring human and minority rights, including facilitating with UNHCR the return of displaced persons and refugees.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

36. Croatia's successful reintegration of the former Sectors West, South and North has eliminated the need for infantry battalions in these areas. The inability of the troops deployed to affect the course of events leaves some doubt about the continued usefulness of battalions in Sector East, unless there is a concerted effort by both sides to support the implementation of the mandate, abide by the 29 March cease-fire agreement, and negotiate a lasting settlement. The Force Commander has therefore initiated the immediate reduction of UNCRO's troop strength to the level authorized by the Security Council. I recommend that the Security Council approve further gradual reductions during the remainder of the present mandate, to include the repatriation of all remaining battalions, except the two in Sector East. A new spirit of cooperation by the parties should be a prerequisite to continuing the deployment of battalions in Sector East.

37. Reduction of infantry battalions does not represent abandonment of the mission in the new circumstances. The mandate to monitor borders should be met by redeploying the 300 Military Observers currently in the mission. Depending on decisions about the extent of border monitoring, both boats and helicopters may be required to increase the effectiveness of Military observers.

38. The need to monitor and report on the treatment of minorities, to assist the return of displaced persons, and to build confidence between communities recently at war will continue. The extensive population movement caused by recent fighting means that this task now extends to the whole territory of Croatia and beyond. Rather than being limited to the former Sectors, monitoring activities should concentrate on areas where minorities settle. In this way, the international community can support Croatia's sovereignty through monitoring its borders, as well as its legitimacy by monitoring human rights within those borders. Civilian Police and Civil Affairs will cooperate closely to monitor institutions and the human rights of minorities. There is also scope for close collaboration with other UN and international agencies to achieve a balanced and economical fulfilment of the mandate. As the mandate and tasks are defined in the course of upcoming negotiations, the structure of the mission and its headquarters will be adjusted. Planning and consultation between military and civilian components of the mission is proceeding well.

39. In conclusion, the recent events in Croatia do not represent the way in which we might have wished events to unfold, but the efforts of UNCRO and the UNPF have made an enormous difference. They have reduced human suffering, helped Croatia live up to its responsibilities and hold individuals accountable for their acts, and helped to contain the conflict. The changed situation now presents an opportunity to redouble our efforts to build an enduring peace in Croatia using all the means at our disposal.

15/15

CZV-1473

19 August 1995

D R A F T

An agreement was concluded on 15 May 1995 between the Government of the Republic of Croatia and the United Nations on the Status of United Nations Forces and Operations (SOFA). This was welcomed as a positive step. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, the Government of the Republic of Croatia has yet to implement fully various provisions of the SOFA such as making available the necessary premises free of rent and making arrangements for the exemption of the United Nations forces and operations from various taxes and tolls. As indicated in paragraph 55 of my report S/1995/222 of 22 March 1995, the amounts are substantial, running at the rate of about two million dollars a month for taxes on fuel alone. Despite repeated requests at various levels, the Government of Croatia so far has not honoured its commitments in this regard.

UNOG
Palais des Nations

CODED CABLE

CNZ 807 **CYZ 807** P 1/2

'95 AUG 23 -3 :57

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS

IMMEDIATE

1995 AUG 22 P 8:42

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB

Attn. SRSC/TEC

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 22 AUGUST 1995

NUMBER: MSC- 2300

SUBJECT: Letter from PR of Croatia concerning alleged attack on Osijek

Please find attached for your attention and comments a self-explanatory letter from the Permanent Representative of Croatia to the President of the Security Council on the above subject.

Dist: GN
BW/BS
DM.
END
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CODED CABLE

CNZ 807 CYZ 800 ST P 2

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/717
21 August 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 20 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

It is with utmost concern that I inform you about severe artillery attack on the city of Osijek, that has inflicted heavy casualties and material damage. On 19 August 1995, at 18.25 hrs. local time, Croatian Serb paramilitaries, with the assistance of the Novi Sad Corps of the Army of Yugoslavia, launched terrorist attack on Osijek, from their positions in occupied Vukovar region (formerly known as Sector East) of the Republic of Croatia. Casualties include three killed and ten wounded.

At the same time shelling of the Croatian territory from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina continues, in spite of the reiterated warnings from my Government that the Republic of Croatia shall not tolerate such aggressive actions of the Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces. On 19 August 55 impacts were recorded in Dubrovnik region.

Should the Serbian side continue with such indiscriminate attacks primarily aimed at civilians and non-military targets, my Government will be compelled to respond appropriately in order to disengage the attacking positions of the Serbian paramilitary forces on the occupied territory of the Republic of Croatia and on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in the latter case, acting in accordance with the Split Declaration of 22 July 1995 (S/1995/609).

May I ask for your kind assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Ambassador Dr. Marko Nobile
Permanent Representative



CB/GN/CETX.P/BR/GATSU/ED/PC

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CZV-1462
CZG-1186
SSN-2241

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

95 AUG 22 11:39

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -11442

INFO : GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE : 22 AUGUST 1995

NUMBER : Z - 1474

SUBJECT : Meeting with Mr Sarinic

95 AUG 22 11:53

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

Le 21 Août 1995, en fin de matinée, Mr Sarinic a reçu pendant une heure et demie, à la Présidence, le FC accompagné du général Ashton, de Mr Almstrom et du DCMNAT.

L'entretien s'est déroulé, comme à l'accoutumé, dans une ambiance sereine, confiante et amicale. Le FC est intervenu, à plusieurs reprises, sur les sujets énumérés ci-dessous d'où il ressort les réponses et commentaires de Mr Sarinic :

1) Situation en Secteur Est.

Après que le FC ait fait un point précis de situation et insisté, face à la tension actuelle, sur l'impérieuse nécessité de rétablir le dialogue entre les chefs militaires des deux parties pour que la ZOS redevienne une zone démilitarisée, et qu'ainsi la tension décroisse, et après que le DFC ait informé Mr Sarinic des entretiens qu'il a eu hier, 20 Août, en Secteur Est, avec les représentants serbes (ceux-ci sont disposés à entamer des négociations globales, dès lors que les Croates excluent le recours à la guerre pour résoudre les problèmes qui se posent), les réponses suivantes ont été apportées :

a- la décision politique croate est que HV ne doit ni attaquer ni mener des actions de rétorsion contre les Serbes,

b- la Croatie n'a pas l'intention de régler le problème de la « Baranya » par une action militaire, et se tient prête à négocier pendant les trois ou quatre mois à venir,

c- le général Decac sera reçu officiellement demain matin à la Présidence, recevra des instructions très strictes en la matière ; dès l'après-midi, il informera le Cdt de Secteur de l'acceptation d'une rencontre avec le général Loncar (ce dernier y est déjà favorable) en vue d'un retrait réciproque des forces de la ZOS, sous le contrôle de UNCRO,

d- Mr Sarinic est tout à fait disposé à reprendre les discussions avec Mr Stoltenberg dès après la rencontre Decac/Loncar pour faire d'abord retomber la tension militaire. Sans aucune précondition de la part des Croates, l'agenda des discussions pourra être aussi large et ouvert que possible.

A une question de Mr Sarinic sur le soutien apporté par la RFY aux Serbes du Secteur Est, il lui a été répondu qu'aucune preuve formelle n'était acquise, mais qu'avec une situation stabilisée, les restrictions de mouvement apportées à l'UNCRO par les Serbes seraient certainement diminuées, et l'information de meilleure qualité. Par ailleurs, si des « volontaires » de RFY servent dans les rangs serbes de Baranya, ce qui n'est pas non plus prouvé

CZ N1462 2/3

formellement, il en est peut-être de même pour le HVO qui recrute aussi des « volontaires ». Le principe de l'appel au volontariat est bien commode pour les deux camps.

2) Situation dans la région de Dubrovnik.

Mr Sarinic estime que la situation y est très explosive depuis l'attaque d'infanterie serbe, précédée d'une préparation d'artillerie, le 12 Août à 0525H heures, dans la région de Plat, et qui visait à couper le territoire croate au sud de Dubrovnik. Les Serbes auraient même bombardé leur propre territoire au sud de Trebinje pour faire croire à une action croate et détenir le prétexte à leur intervention. Mr Karadzic, s'il répugne à faire bombarder Dubrovnik, aurait encouragé ce type d'action qui a néanmoins été repoussée.

Les Croates estiment pouvoir s'emparer aisément de Trebinje, mais ne le souhaitent pas.

Dans le but de ramener le calme dans la région, ordre a été donné au général Cervenko de laisser toute liberté de mouvement aux UNMOs afin qu'ils puissent patrouiller le long de la frontière. Cette décision a été portée à la connaissance de Mr Akashi.

3) Situation en Bosnie occidentale.

A une question du FC sur les intentions croates dans la région de Mostar et Drvar où la situation est grave, là encore, Mr Sarinic a précisé qu'il n'était pas dans les intentions des Croates d'occuper la zone de Livno à Bihać, en passant par Bos Grahovo et Drvar. Le seul souci de la Croatie est de protéger sa frontière dans cette région.

Bien qu'en mesure de se diriger vers Banja Luka, les Croates veulent faire la paix avec les Serbes, et trouver un accord avec eux pour le long terme. Mr Sarinic s'en est entretenu avec Mr Izetbegovic qui est d'un avis contraire, et l'a encouragé dans le voie du dialogue avec les Serbes (« compromis n'est pas capitulation »).

4) Réduction du format de l'UNCRO.

Le FC l'a informé que conformément aux prescriptions de la résolution 981, les effectifs de l'UNCRO allait rapidement être ramenés au seuil autorisé de 8 750 hommes, prêt à poursuivre la mise en oeuvre d'un nouveau format suivant les directives qui seront données par le Conseil de Sécurité, en temps utile.

Mr Sarinic est revenu à la charge concernant sa demande du maintien d'une partie du bataillon argentin (250 hommes), sollicitant qu'une cinquantaine d'Argentins soient affectés aux UNMOs.

5) Action du FC auprès de Mr Muratovic.

Le FC l'a informé du processus d'échange de lettres qu'il a réalisé avec Mr Muratovic afin d'estomper les difficultés rencontrées dans la mise en place de la RRF. Il l'a aussi informé des besoins de terrain de manoeuvre au profit de la 24ème brigade aéromobile (demande en cours d'élaboration).

Mr Sarinic en a profité pour rappeler que l'ONU devra participer au coût de réalisation des travaux de renforcement du réseau électrique et d'assainissement qui pourraient être réalisés à Ploce.

6) Exactions commises par les forces croates en Krajina.

Le FC l'a informé de l'envoi imminent d'une lettre de protestation de sa part concernant les exactions commises par les troupes croates dans les ex-Secteurs Sud et Nord, particulièrement, la mise à feu de nombreuses maisons.

Mr Sarinic s'est immédiatement passionné, insistant sur le fait que des ordres très rigoureux avaient été donnés aux troupes pour interdire de tels excès qui ne pouvaient donc être que de l'ordre de l'incident, ce qui est inévitable dans toute action de guerre, mais qui ne

Entretien réalisé à la demande du FC, très instructif et positif.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

Office of the Co-Chairmen



Page 1 of 4

NOTE TO DEREK BOOTHBY

FAX NO: 1 212 963 1440

RE: THE DRAFT REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL CONTAINED IN
UNPF HQ Z 1458 OF 10 AUGUST 1995

Please find attached a copy of the cable Mr Stoltenberg sent to the Secretary-General on 3 August 1995 on the meeting between representatives of the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs. Mr Stoltenberg is of the view that the gist of this note, particularly the seven point proposal, should be included in the report of the Secretary-General somewhere after existing paragraph four of the draft.

Best regards.


BGR

21 AUGUST 1995



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



21
114

CRYPTOFAX TRANSMITTAL

MOST IMMEDIATE

PAGE 1 OF 3

TO: The Secretary-General

COPY: Goulding/Annan/Gharekhan, New York
Akashi, Zagreb

FROM: Thorvald Stoltenberg

DATE: 3 August 1995

SUBJECT: Meeting between Croatian Government representatives
and representatives of the Croatian Serb leadership
Geneva, 3 August 1995

Please find attached a report on the abovementioned meeting.

13.5
3/1

**Note on Meeting between Representatives of
the Croatian Government and the Croatian Serbs
Geneva, 3 August 1995**

The abovementioned meeting took place under the chairmanship of Mr Stoltenberg from 10.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m. The Croatian Government delegation, throughout the day, basically took the position that the Croatian Serb leadership must agree to the reintegration of "the occupied areas" within the Republic of Croatia and under its Constitution and Laws. The Croatian Government would not wait any longer and unless it received a positive answer during the day, it would have to act as it saw best for the reintegration of "the occupied areas".

The Croatian Serb delegation proceeded from the starting point that the most important thing was to arrange for a cessation of hostilities, following which other issues could be discussed. It felt that it would be difficult to negotiate under an ultimatum or a dictat.

In this situation, after a series of bilateral meetings between the two delegations, Mr Stoltenberg and his team drew up and presented to the two delegations the attached list of seven points, which are crafted basically from the letter presented by President Tudjman to SRSK Akashi and a document that Ambassador Galbraith worked out together with Mr Babic last night. The Croatian Serb delegation took the position that apart from one or two specific comments, notably that it would have to consult its political leadership before it could accept a reference to the Z-4 document, it could accept the paper, which it saw as a useful basis on which to proceed henceforth.

The Croatian Government delegation took the view that the paper did not address its fundamental concern which was that the Serbs should state immediately that they accept reintegration under the Croatian Constitution and Laws. The Croatian Government delegation gave the impression of having no room to manoeuvre at the talks and of fully expecting a negative answer to its ultimatum to the Serbs to accept reintegration into Croatia immediately or to face the consequences. One could draw the conclusion that, expecting a negative answer, which it could use as a pretext towards the international community, the next move may well be to exercise the military option which we felt Zagreb had already thoroughly planned.

In the situation that thus prevails, and having regard to reported developments in Zagreb, it would seem extremely important that every effort be made, including by Governments with influence on Zagreb, Knin and Belgrade, to promote acceptance of the attached paper as a basis for continuing the talks and for averting resort to military force.

It is worth noting that the Serbs have accepted the full implementation of the UNCRO mandate (which also means a presence on the border) and the immediate start of negotiations for a political settlement. Furthermore, the Serbs did not reject the Z-4 plan as the basis for these negotiations. On the contrary, Mr Stoltenberg believes that the Z-4 document will now be accepted by the Serbs as the basis for discussion.

On the basis of the agreement specified below, the delegations of the Croatian Government and of the Serb authorities in Knin have decided to halt all military actions directed against each other from 12 noon on Friday, 4 August 1995. They have agreed to the following undertakings:

1. The segment of the oil pipeline referred to in the Economic Agreement of 2 December 1994 will be reopened under the supervision of the United Nations by Monday, 7 August 1995 provided that there are no technical obstacles to this caused by the recent closure of the pipeline. A meeting will be held at Pleso on Tuesday, 8 August, to determine the quantities as well as other modalities for supply of oil and oil products from Sisak to Petrinja.
2. A meeting will take place on Wednesday, 9 August, in Knin to determine the modalities and timetable for opening the railway between Zagreb and Split via Knin.
3. Negotiations concerning a final political settlement concerning the status of the Krajina will commence on the basis of the Z-4 plan. The first meeting will take place in Pleso on Thursday, 10 August 1995, and the second in Knin on Thursday, 17 August 1995.
4. The access for delivery of humanitarian aid to the Bihac pocket will be permitted without hindrance.
5. There will be no cross border interference in Bihac by presence, fire power or air activity in violation of international law.
6. Immediate steps will be taken to implement fully the mandate established in United Nations Security Council Resolution 981.
7. In the light of the above agreement, and the decision on that basis to halt all military actions directed against each other, the signatories agree that a meeting of the senior military commanders will take place in Turanj on Saturday, 5 August 1995, under the auspices of General Janvier in order to consolidate the cessation of hostilities and further stabilise the military situation.

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CNZ - 799 / CYZ 796 P1/1

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IMMEDIATE

UNITED NATIONS
MOBILE OPERATIONS
1995 AUG 20 P 7:05

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB

Attn. SRSG/TFC

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: *P. Annan* ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *P. I. L.*

DATE: 21 AUGUST 1995

NUMBER: MSC- 2780

SUBJECT: **Draft Report pursuant to SCR 1009 (1995)**

1. Thank you very much for making the extra effort to provide the draft earlier than originally planned.
2. With regard to para. 10 of your draft, it would be helpful if you could provide an estimate of the remaining Serb population in Sector North and South in absolute figures rather than as a percentage.
3. We would also need an indication as to whether the Croatian Government is complying with operative para. 9 of SCR 1009, i.e. is showing any intention to resume talks under the auspices of the ICFY Co-Chairmen.

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations
95 AUG 21 -4 :13

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95 AUG 21 16:46

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PAGE 1 OF 1

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: *[Signature]* ARASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB
DATE: 21 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER: Z - 1467

C2N-1455
~~C2G-1179~~
1181

SUBJECT: Draft Report Pursuant to Resolution 1009 (1995)

Further to your MSC-2780 of 21 August 1995, our assessment from various sources indicates that the population of Sectors North and South may have reduced from a pre-war estimate of about 220,000 to about 180,000 by July 1995. UNHCR now estimates that about 2500 Krajina Serbs remain in Sector North, with a further 1000 in collective centres. In Sector South, about 700 Krajina Serbs remain in the compound of our sector headquarters, with as few as 800 to 1000 in the rest of the sector. These figures must be treated with caution as our movement continues to be restricted in many areas and populations are still moving. There are discrepancies in the estimates provided by different agencies, and no agency is prepared to state a definitive view on numbers in any region.

With respect to operative paragraph 9 of resolution 1009 (1995), Mr. Sarinic stated in discussions today with the Force Commander that he has been attempting to contact Mr. Stoltenberg. Croatia, he said, is willing to enter into negotiations, on a "wide agenda, at any time, without preconditions." Sarinic stated that he will contact Stoltenberg, and suggested that ICFY arrange a meeting after the meeting of HV and Serb military commanders which Commander Sector East will be instructed to convene as soon as possible. Both parties have indicated a willingness to send their military commanders to this meeting.

UNEC Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

95 AUG 21 17:11

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95 AUG 21 16:48

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PAGE 1 OF 3
SSN-2231

'95 AUG 21 15:51

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MOST IMMEDIATE

C2N-1452

C2G-1180

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: *fr* AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE: 21 AUGUST 1995

NUMBER: Z - 1464

SUBJECT: Developments in the Situation and Report Pursuant
to Security Council Resolution 1009 (1995)

UNPROCESSED
COMMUNICATIONS

'95 AUG 21 15:54

This message provides initial information on developments since the submission of the draft report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 1009 (1995) at our Z-1458 of yesterday. More detailed records of discussions will follow.

Yesterday, the DFC carried out negotiations on UNCRO's mandate with local Serb authorities in Sector East. The Serb delegation was led by Mr. Milanovic, who was assisted by General Loncar, the minister responsible for police, and the mayors of Vukovar and Beli Manastir. Significantly, the delegation included no representatives from the former Knin leadership.

While expressing their conviction that a Croatian invasion would lead to outside assistance and develop into a major war, the Serbs appeared to understand fully the seriousness of the situation, and the need not to lose time. The Serbs repeatedly emphasized their desire to reduce tension and to restore the military situation to that which existed on 1 May 1995, following which they are prepared to enter into immediate political negotiations. They suggested an immediate meeting of military commanders in order to re-institute the zone of separation and UNMO patrols on both sides, with the aim of making sure "that local commanders cannot decide between war and peace."

The DFC pressed them hard on border monitoring, to include establishing all nine points called for under UNCRO's plan for implementing resolution 981 (1995), as well as adding riverine and helicopter patrols. While not making a commitment on border monitoring, the Serbs stated that "everything mentioned was possible provided that [Croatian] rounds do not fall," and that "nothing mentioned will be a problem and progress can be made on border monitoring if the Croats renounce the war option."

Today, the Force Commander and DFC met Sarinic to relay the results of the meeting in Sector East. Sarinic demonstrated a strong resolve to reduce tension in the area,

'95 AUG 21 16:08

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Palais des Nations

asking pointed questions of detail such as the number of UN observation posts taken over by both sides. He stated, in "carefully weighed words," that Croatia has no intention of seeking a military solution to the problem of Sector East for "three, four, or five months," but that an escalatory spiral could easily be set off. Croatian forces in the area have therefore received strict instructions not to attack, and not even to respond to Serb fire unless absolutely necessary. Sarinic stated that he will be briefing the local Croatian commander tomorrow, and that he will instruct him to attend a meeting with General Loncar, which Commander Sector East should propose as soon as possible. Finally, Sarinic gave some suggestions as to how river patrols might be made more palatable to the Serbs.

With respect to the negotiations called for under operative paragraph 9 of resolution 1009 (1995), Sarinic stated that he has been attempting to contact Mr. Stoltenberg as Croatia is willing to enter negotiations without preconditions. Sarinic suggested that ICFY propose a date after the meeting of local military commanders to be convened by Sector East; and that Croatia is "inclined to accept what ICFY might propose provided that Mr. Bildt is not involved."

Sarinic then stated that Croatian forces had defeated a Bosnian Serb infantry attack near Cavtat, to the south of Dubrovnik. We have not verified this allegation. Describing the situation as "explosive," Sarinic asked that we deploy more UNMOs immediately in order to stabilize the border in the Dubrovnik area. He stated that, although Croatia could easily take Trebinje, this concession demonstrates Croatia's desire to calm the situation and to avoid conflict. We are taking action now on Sarinic's request.

With respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarinic went on to say that assisting in the capture of Prijedor, Sanski Most, or Banja Luka is not part of Croatia's strategic or political approach. He stated that Croatia is not interested in territory, but only in securing its borders. He added that he has personally criticized President Izetbegovic for insisting that the Bosnian Serbs be either isolated or militarily defeated, as "this is not a long term solution, and that compromise is not capitulation but rather the way in which all conflicts must end." Sarinic concluded that the international community may be close to its objective of bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the negotiating table, as they will now be hard-pressed to retain 50% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He emphasized, however, that the US initiative must go forward at best possible speed before the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina deteriorates. Even the eight days required by the US to regroup their negotiating team could be, under the present circumstances, "a long time."

Sarinic reacted somewhat angrily to our mention of the continued burning of houses in Sectors North and South. He asked that we not use isolated incidents to create a distorted picture of the policies of the Croatian government. The Force Commander stated that we would provide a letter, simply

outlining specific incidents. In that regard, you are requested to bear in mind that the draft report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolution 1009 (1995) was written under considerable time pressure, and that great care must be taken to ensure that any statements concerning compliance by the parties with international humanitarian law avoid conjecture and not go beyond the strict limit of available evidence. We are carrying out another thorough review of our draft, and would ask that our suggested amendments be fully considered before the final version of the report is released.

1995-08-19 02:38

5603

CB/GN/CE/DLP/BR/GA/LS/ED

UNOG

Parsons

CNZ 793 CYZ 791 P 1/4

'95 AUG 19 -4 08
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB Attn. SRSGITEC
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *[Signature]*
DATE: 18 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER: MSC- 2774
SUBJECT: Letter from chargé d'affaires of FRY to the President of the Security Council

Further to our 2722, please find attached for your attention a letter from the chargé d'affaires of the FRY commenting on the letter dated 14 August of the Croatian Foreign Minister, Dr. Granic.


UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS
1995 AUG 18 P 10:09



СТАЛНА МИСИЈА САВЕЗНЕ РЕПУБЛИКЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ ПРИ УЈЕДИЊЕНИМ НАЦИЈАМА

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

854 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10021 TEL: (212) 879-8700 FAX: (212) 879-8703



No. 776/95

18 August 1995

Your Excellency,

Upon instructions of my Government, I am writing to you regarding the letter of Mr. Mate Granic of 14 August 1995 (A/50/354-S/1995/696).

The said letter represents the height of cynicism of the policy pursued by Croatia. At a time when the Croatian authorities have resorted to the cruelest means - massive armed aggression - with a view to realizing the basic premise of its policy i.e. the creation of the ethnically pure state, Mr. Granic is attempting to divert the attention of the international public from humanitarian catastrophe and tragedy of the Krajina Serbs who were forced to flee their ancestral homes.

Even before Croatia's latest aggression, around 350,000 Serbs have been expelled from Croatia. Those that remained have been subjected to extreme harassment, forcible conversion into Catholic faith, lay-offs, eviction - just for being Serbs.

His Excellency
Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General of the
United Nations
New York

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H.L.
CC/K/USA
CP

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So far, 220,000 Serbs, almost entire population of the parts of Krajina, fled the area since Croatia's latest aggression.

According to the data of the Commissariat for Refugees of the Republic of Serbia, ever since the onset of the Croatian attacks on Krajina on 4 August 1995 until 17 August 1995, 151,934 Serb refugees were registered in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is estimated that this number will reach 200,000, at least 25 per cent of which are children. A great number of Serb refugees also found shelter in the Republic of Srpska - in the area of Banja Luka alone, 30,000 refugees remained and it is anticipated that 10,000 - 15,000 more refugees are still to come.

Despite Croatia's attempts to obscure all traces of the horrendous and massive crimes committed against the Krajina Serbs, the truth is nevertheless starting to prevail.

Following the massive crimes in the Western Slavonia in May 1995, committed by the Croatian forces, which resulted in territory cleansed of the Serbs, Croatia is resorting to the same method in Krajina. Namely, the media and international humanitarian organizations and the UN representative are denied access to the area, before all incriminating traces are removed. However, even according to sparse reports of the relevant organizations, including the UN, it is vastly evident that atrocities of the Croatian army were abundant - indiscriminate shelling of columns of refugees, total destruction of entire Serb villages, looting and gross human rights violations. The UN representative today said that certain evidence indicate the possibility of mass graves in Knin, Vrlika and other places.

The accounts of the surviving Serb refugees are appalling. They bear witness to a large number of mass murders particularly in the area of Topusko and Dvor. Especially telling are the pictures of the fleeing Serbs being brutally humiliated and attacked by the Croats in Sisak despite the presence of Croatian authorities and in full view of the representatives of the UN, ICRC and UNHCR. The fate of the column of 10,000 refugees from Topusko, which was allowed by the Croatian authorities to leave for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, is still unknown since 10 August 1995.

The terror of the Croatian authorities against the Serb people in Krajina is an obvious proof that the declared readiness of the Croatian officials to ensure "normal life" to all Serbs who decide to stay in Croatia, was a sham designed to offset the criticism of the international community.

Mr. Granic's allegations to the effect that "... the Croatian ethnic community is being subjected to 'ethnic cleansing' ..." in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, are absolutely untrue and utterly malicious. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, as a multi-ethnic state where over 30 per cent constitute the members of the

CNZ 793 CYZ 791 P 4/4

3

national minorities, under its Constitution provides full equality of its citizens regardless of their nationality, religion or political affiliation, in full accordance with the relevant international conventions acceded to by Yugoslavia.

In the final analysis, what is the moral integrity of the regime which obviously continues the policy of genocide against the Serb people that fifty years ago executed 700,000 in concentration camps and in the past four years killed and expelled over half a million of them?

I should be grateful if you would circulated the present letter as an official document of the General Assembly under agenda item 114 (c) of the provisional agenda, and of the Security Council.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Dragomir Djokic
Ambassador
Charge d'affaires a.i.

1995-08-18 22:09 5603

CB/GN/DLP/CE/BR

018

UNOG - Palais des Nations

Palais des Nations

CNZ 789 CYZ 786 P1/3

'95 AUG 18 22:17

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 18 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER: MSC 2763
SUBJECT: Letter of chargé d'affaires of FRY

Attn. SRSGATEC

UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS
1995 AUG 18 P 6:02

Please find attached for your attention and views a self-explanatory letter from the chargé d'affaires of the FRY to the President of the Security-Council.

CNNZ 789 CYZ 786 P2/3

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/704
16 August 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

~~Your Excellency~~

Upon instructions of my Government, I am writing to you regarding the letter of the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Croatia, of 11 August addressed to you (S/1995/684), in which it is said that Croatia supports the peace process in the territory of the previous Yugoslavia.

Such a statement, following Croatia's aggression against Krajina, is downright hypocritical and sanctimonious, since the unscrupulous aggression of the Croatian army against the United Nations Protected Areas still continues. Military involvement of the regular units of the Croatian army in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in cooperation with the Bosnian Muslims along the entire front against the Serbs, portray an accurate picture of Croatia's true intentions.

Croatia not only demonstrated by its acts that it had chosen a war option and rejection of peace negotiations but at the same time even launches attacks against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. On 12 August 1995, Croatia launched artillery attacks on the facilities of the Army of Yugoslavia. It has also continued with its armed activities around Osijek and in the area of Trebinje.

His Excellency
Mr. Nugroho Wisnumurti
President of the Security Council
of the United Nations
New York

CNZ 789 CYZ 786 P 3/3

2

By such military activities, Croatia continues to demonstrate the policy of force and its orientation towards war and aggression. It all indicates that Croatia continues its military and aggressive policy, supported by a number of countries, which threatens not only the negotiating process regarding the crisis in the territory of the previous Yugoslavia but represents a serious threat to peace and international security in the region as a whole.

The aggressive conduct of Croatia has to be stopped and sanctioned under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations thus setting an example of an impartial attitude in the similar situations with which the United Nations may be faced in the future.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as an ~~official~~ document of the Security Council.

~~Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest considerations.~~

Dragomir Djokic
Dragomir Djokic
Ambassador
Charge d'affaires a.i.

1995-08-19 02:35

5603

BR/file

003

UNOG - UNOG, UNOG
Palais des Nations


CNZ 791 CYZ 789 P 1/1

'95 AUG 19 -4 :08
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 18 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER: MSC- 2772
SUBJECT: **Report pursuant to SCR 1009 (1995)**

Attn. SRSG/TFC



UNITED NATIONS
CABLE OPERATIONS
18 AUG 18 P 10:08

1. The Secretary-General has given Instructions that the above report be finalized and be ready for his approval by Monday morning, 21 August.
2. As already discussed on the telephone between Schmitz and Almstrom, I would appreciate your dispatching your draft containing the elements requested in the operative paragraphs of the resolution by close of business your time on Saturday, 19 August.

CZN-1420
CZG-1155
SSN-2181

CODE
RESTRICTED
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

all

Page 1 of 2

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: Z - 1432

DATE: 16 AUGUST 1995

SUBJECT: LETTERS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL BY FRY AND CROATIA

1. Reference your cable 2722 of 15 August 1995, we offer the following comments.

Letter from Croatian Ambassador Nobilo

2. We can confirm the Croatian statement that a new series of artillery attacks began on 12 August against the Dubrovnik region. UNMOs in the region note that a general alert was sounded in Dubrovnik on 12 August and they recorded 104 explosions in the region, including four shells fired from Dubravka (BN 8914). UNMOs also heard 13 incoming shells and assessed their impact to be in Ilina Kita (BN 8409). Additionally, the Croatsians have claimed that five mortar shells were fired from the Montenegrin side of the border- this has not been confirmed by UNMOs.

3. The Mayor of Trebinje (Bosnian Serb held territory) claimed that the Croatsians had launched an offensive into the Trebinje area on 12 August. The Croatian Army Liaison Officer in Dubrovnik rejected the allegation. Further, UNMOs have not confirmed the Mayor of Trebinje's statement.

4. On 13 August, the Dubrovnik airport was closed. UNMOs recorded 55 explosions in the region. In addition, they heard seven shells impact in the area of Dubravka and they heard six probable mortar rounds fired from Dubravka. The Croatsians have claimed that an air attack was made on the area of Stravca (BN 8020) and that Dubrovnik airport was shelled- neither of these claims have been confirmed by UNMOs.

5. On 14 August, UNMOs recorded 13 explosions and heard one shell fall to the north of the Dubrovnik airport. They also investigated six craters in the airport area- all were made by shells fired from the northwest to east-northeast. This is consistent with the general direction to Bosnian Serb held territory.

6. There was no war-like activity reported on 15 August.

Internal Distribution: FC, DFC, DI, ICFY

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UNITED NATIONS
Palais des Nations

CZN-1420
CZG-1155

- 2 -

2/2

Letter from Yugoslav Ambassador Djokic

7. On 7 August at 1600B, unconfirmed reporting indicated that an unidentified aircraft bombed possible military targets that were in close proximity to a refugee column southwest of Sanski Most.

8. The Yugoslav letter refers to a town called Drvar being attacked on 8 August- however, we assume that the town in question is actually Dvor. On 8 August at 1735B, UN elements observed two Mig 21 aircraft taking off from Pleso, Zagreb. The aircraft were armed and departed in a southeasterly direction. At 1743B, two aircraft were seen overhead of Dvor, flying at high speed, from north to south, dropping bombs south of Dvor. At 1745B, the aircraft were observed landing at Pleso without weapons. This 19 minute sortie fits exactly with the profile required for an air attack on Dvor.

9. On 9 August, between 1806B and 1823B, NATO reported radar contact with two aircraft 21km south of Zagreb. The aircraft flew to a position near Dvor, infringing the edge of the No Fly Zone and returned to Zagreb. Danbat reported that one Mig 21 was observed flying from north to south over Dvor at approximately 1805B. Danbat did not report a bombing run. Although there is a small discrepancy in timings in these two report, it is assessed that they refer to the same aircraft.

CODE -
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CZEN-1436

CZG-1167

SSN-2204

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

C03

15 AUG 17 18:09

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, IZPP, GENEVA
FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB
DATE: 17 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER: Z - 1448

SUBJECT: General Assembly Resolution 49/43

1. Reference your cable 2426 of 21 July 1995, we offer the following comments for inclusion in the report on General Assembly resolution 49/43 on "The Situation in the Occupied Territories of Croatia." Much of the resolution has been eclipsed by events. This is particularly the case for the Ceasefire Agreement of March 1994. Thus, except where appropriate, our comments relate to the present situation.

Ref Para 2

2. Gaining definitive confirmation that Yugoslavia has integrated the occupied territories of Croatia into its military structure is difficult. We have reports from Radio Vukovar in Sector East (9 August 1995) that a joint military command has been formed between the "ARSK" elements in Sector East and Yugoslavia. This declaration has not been reported by the Yugoslav media. There is no tangible evidence of this new structure and we assess that the statement was made primarily to bolster morale in the Sector.

3. Much of Sector East's infra-structure is sourced from Yugoslavia. For example, electricity, telephone lines, railway links and postal services all come from Yugoslavia. Only limited tertiary education (an agricultural school) is available in the Sector. The most important source of raw material for use in Sector East industrial facilities, and the prime market for the products of the Sector, is Yugoslavia. Other markets for the produce of Sector East are Serb-controlled areas in Bosnia and, previously, other parts of the "RSK". The only routes to these markets transit through Yugoslavia. Thus, circumstances have forced significant economic cooperation with Yugoslavia.

4. There is little evidence of substantive economic links between Yugoslavia and the former Sectors North, South and West. The distance from these Sectors to Yugoslavia made their direct access to the Yugoslav infra-structure impossible.

95 AUG 17 18:30

UNOG Telecom Unit
Palais des Nations

Ref Para 3

2/3

5. It is extremely difficult to gain accurate information on the level of logistic support provided to the "ARSK" by Yugoslavia--severe restrictions on freedom of movement impede the collection of information.

6. Sector East, due to its position on the border of Yugoslavia, is the most likely area to receive support from Yugoslavia. We have confirmed reports of fuel entering the Baranja across the Batina Bridge--we presume that this situation is mirrored in other parts of the Sector. It is also possible for material to enter the Sector via ferry across the Danube, but we have no direct observation or confirmation of this.

7. The recent transfer of military materiel (40 armoured vehicles and 12 artillery pieces) from the Rusbat area to the Belbat area of Sector East has caused some to surmise that new equipments have entered the Rusbat area, thus making the old equipment redundant at its original location in the Rusbat area. We have been unable to confirm this hypothesis. (Note. As there is no geographic link between the Rusbat and Belbat area, all transits between these areas take place through Yugoslav territory, and are monitored by UNCRO detachments at official crossings)

Ref Paras 4 to 7

8. Since the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 49/43, the situation in the Serb-controlled areas of Croatia has changed dramatically. Following the Croatian recapture of Sector West, a number of Croats living in the other parts of the "RSK" chose to leave, or were driven out as a result of intimidation and harassment by Serbs. For example, in Sector East at least 80 elderly Croats left the area for temporary accommodation in Yugoslavia before entering Croatia. Generally, though, the departure of Croats from the Serb-held areas tended to be a gradual process with family groups leaving. The remaining minority groups in Sector East are still subject to human rights violations.

9. According to the Croatian Government, there are 192,660 registered DPs from the UN Sectors in Croatia. This figure is based upon the April to July 1994 nation-wide registration of DPs and refugees in Croatian controlled territory. Of this figure, 76,392 DPs originate from Sector East. There are other unregistered DPs abroad or within Croatia. Of the registered DPs from the Sectors who are in Croatian controlled territory, 94% are Croats, 2% are Serbs, 2% are Hungarians, and 2% are "others".

10. There are no reliable figures pertaining to the number of Serb DPs from Croatian controlled territory who are now residing in Sector East. However, in addition to the Serbs who moved into the Sector after the 1991-92 conflict, UNHCR is aware of at least 7,500 Serb DPs from West Slavonia who resettled in Sector East following the Croatian recapture of

West Slavonia in May 1995.

3/3

11. The Croatian recapture of Sectors North and South has given a new dimension to mass population movement. Since 4 August 1995, an estimated 90% to 95% of the Serb population has fled to Bosnia or Yugoslavia. More than 112,000 Serbs from the "RSK" are reported by UNHCR to have entered Yugoslavia and an estimated 30,000 to 70,000 have sought refuge in northern Bosnia or are en route to Yugoslavia. In an agreement dated 6 August 1995 with the UN, Croatia "encourage[d] all those previous inhabitants of the Republic of Croatia who so wish to remain peacefully in the areas over which Croatian authority is exercised". In contravention of the agreement, however, Croatian authorities appear to have permitted a campaign of looting and burning of personal property throughout Sector South and, to a lesser extent, Sector North. This campaign leaves little doubt that amongst lower-ranking army and police officials there is a desire to ensure that Serbs do not return to their homes. The reports of the burning of Serb houses are widespread. The burnings have continued for more than one week after the cessation of hostilities.

12. Croatian DP's are beginning to return to Sectors North and South and West Slavonia. Only very limited numbers of Serbs have returned to West Slavonia since the mass exodus that followed the Croatian recapture in May 1995. Our information is that three Serbs have returned to West Slavonia through official channels (UNHCR) and at least ten have returned "unofficially". In addition, we understand that around 100 Serbs have expressed interest in returning to West Slavonia.

Ref Para 10

13. Recent events have demonstrated that the Ceasefire Agreement of March 1994 is effectively finished, although neither party has formally abrogated it. Prior to the Croatian offensive, "Operation Storm", the integrity of the Ceasefire Agreement was being progressively undermined by the actions of both the HV and the "ARSK". These breaches of the Agreement included entry into the Zone of the Separation by military units, the presence of heavy weapons within the 10km and 20km zones, and exchanges of fire. Whilst both sides professed to support the Ceasefire Agreement, their actions belied their words.

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75 AUG 17 18:16
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MISSION PERMANENTE
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FÉDÉRALE DE
YUGOSLAVIE
AUPRES DES NATIONS UNIES
A GENEVE

5, chemin Thury - 1206 Genève
Tél. 839 33 44 - Fax 839 33 59
Telex 42 77 64

No 543/1


→ GN, for action

Geneva, 14 August 1995

Excellency,

I have the honour to forward, enclosed herewith, the letter of H.E. Mr. Vladislav Jovanović, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of 13 August 1995.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurance of my highest consideration.


Dr Vladimir Pavićević

Ambassador

H.E. Mr Thorvald Stoltenberg
Co-chairman
International Conference on the
Former Yugoslavia
G E N E V A



**FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA
FEDERAL MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

Belgrade, 13 August 1995

Excellency,

Despite the efforts of the Co-Chairmen, members of the Contact Group, Security Council and a number of prominent international public figures, the unscrupulous aggression of Croatia against the United Nations protected areas and the military presence of the regular units of the Croatian military in the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina continue unabated. In joint operations with the Muslims the regular units of the Croatian armed forces are fighting the Serbs along the entire line of the front in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the same time, Croatia carries out the attacks against the territory of the FR of Yugoslavia. The FR of Yugoslavia considers these attacks as an aggression on its territory.

- On 12 August 1995, the Croatian armed forces continued their aggressive activities along the entire line of separation in UNPA Sector East, particularly near Osijek, opening incessant small-arms and mortar fire.

- On 12 August 1995, the regular units of the Croatian armed forces shelled the positions of the armed forces of the Republic of Srpska in the area of Trebinje.

- On 12 August 1995, the units of the armed forces of Croatia from the area of Dunave Krajinje (Pelinovo brdo) engaged with mortar fire the objects of the Army of Yugoslavia, the observation post in the area of Debela Ljut and the area of Kožen Do.

- At the same time, the regular units of the Croatian armed forces continue their joint operations with Muslim units along the entire line of the front.

**H.E.MR. THORVALD STOLTENBERG
CO-CHAIRMAN
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
GENEVA**

It is obvious that, by its aggressive acts, Croatia is trying to provoke large-scale armed conflicts in the entire region. It is firm in its attempts to achieve by aggression and violence what it will not be able to achieve in peace.

On its part, the FR of Yugoslavia which is lastingly and genuinely committed to peace and a peaceful solution to the crisis, with full respect for the interests and equality of all concerned, will invest its best efforts to avoid being provoked and will continue to render a concrete contribution to peace and stability in the region in which we live.

I therefore call on your Excellency to take urgent and concrete measures within your competence, particularly in cooperation with the member-States of the Contact Group, to compel Croatia to cease fire and establish peace in the entire region and to stop and prevent Croatian aggressive acts. In the interest of peace, each and every future behaviour of Croatia of this type must result in a negative consequence for it.

Yours sincerely,

Vladislav Jovanović
(signed)

UNHCR Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CEN-1394
CZG-1133

SSN-2142⁹⁵ AUG 12 17:55

CB/GN/CE/DLP/BR/GA/ED/LS

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

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95 AUG 12 17:37

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 Of 2

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: UNPF Z- 1407

DATE: 12 AUGUST 1995

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Milosevic; Meeting with Babic.

[Handwritten signature: Akashi]

1. At my request and accompanied by the Force Commander and by my representative in Belgrade, Ambassador Miakotnykh, I met today with President Milosevic at one of his hunting lodges, 50 minutes by helicopter from Belgrade. Upon my return to Belgrade, I met with a nine-member delegation from the Krajina Serb leadership, including "Prime Minister" Babic, and "Interior Minister" Pajic. In my meeting with President Milosevic, I explained the efforts of Mr. Stoltenberg, U.S. Ambassador Galbraith, and myself during the closing days of July and the beginning of August to avert an outbreak of war in Croatia. I also explained the United Nations' efforts since the fighting began to address the substantial humanitarian needs of the population displaced from the Krajina, the priority we placed on the safe departure of all those who wanted to leave the Krajina, and the implementation of my 6 August agreement with the Croatian government. I then described the concept for a future United Nations mission in Croatia along the understood lines. President Milosevic was deeply appreciative of our humanitarian efforts and those of our partners, but was less enthusiastic about the proposal to have monitors stationed on the Croatian border with the FRY. Rather, Milosevic cautioned that the current Croatian army dispositions along the ZOS in Sector East were highly destabilizing, and served to create an atmosphere conducive to talks or compromise. He strongly urged me to get the Croatian forces to disengage themselves from that area, asserting that, only after such a move was made, was it conceivable to discuss U.N. monitoring of the FRY border with Sector East. He then qualified his position by saying that this was simply his personal opinion, and that any decision on the matter would be up to the "RSK" leadership. Milosevic, not surprisingly, had no objections to monitoring the confrontation line in Sector East, or the other activities that I proposed for a future UNCRO elsewhere in Croatia. The Force Commander and I then raised Mladic's commitments to General Smith on humanitarian

Int Distr: SRSG; FC; CoM UNCRO; DFC; HAAU; DI; DOA; PLA; PC;

aid deliveries to Sarajevo, ICRC access to those detained in Srebrenica, the shelling of the Bihac safe area, and violations of the no-fly zone by aircraft operating out of the Banja Luka airport. President Milosevic generally pledged his assistance on each of these matters, asserting that "General Mladic must stick to his promises." During a brief discussion on the prospects for wider peace in the region, Milosevic said that he believed there was hope because it was no longer in the interests of the U.S. to oppose the Bildt package. Milosevic also suggested that it was good the Americans were sending National Security Advisor Lake because Lake was one of the Clinton Administration's toughest opponents to sanctions lifting, and the current trip would give him an opportunity to learn first hand from leaders in the region about the conflict's complexities.

2. In my meeting with Babic and the other Krajina Serb leaders, their mood was sombre and their attitude generally conciliatory. While they of course blamed the Croatian government for the war, they thanked the United Nations profusely for our efforts at helping the Serb victims. "Interior Minister" Pajic, after a long intervention, ended by saying: "Thank you again. This is probably the first time the people of the Krajina have understood the role of the United Nations. Thank you." On the subject of the future role of UNCRO, the Krajina leadership simply was not in a position to make a decision, or even respond to my proposals. Babic claimed that they were overwhelmed by the refugee crisis, and would need three to five days to attend to its needs and to develop a position with regard to my mandate proposals. I impressed upon my interlocutors the urgency of the matter, and the great interest with which it was looked upon by the Secretariat and by the Security Council. I then suggested that we meet again on Monday 14 August to further elaborate my proposals. Babic took the point on the urgency, but said the leadership just would not be ready by then; he twice assured me that he would get back to me as soon as possible.

3. I will be in phone contact with Babic and perhaps others in the coming few days to maintain the pressure on them to meet, with the hope that by Tuesday or Wednesday I may be able to travel to Sector East for further talks. However, the Krajina leadership at this point has little interest to discuss the drastic reduction in UNCRO forces in Sector East that a new mandate probably would entail, much less express the open consent for such a mandate. Consequently, based on what President Milosevic conveyed to me, and on the current interests of the Krajina Serb leadership, I anticipate delays and obfuscation in my talks with them. It is evident that, despite President Milosevic's suggestions to the contrary, his views will have a significant impact on the position taken by the Krajina Serb leadership, particularly on any decision concerning Sector East. I will also endeavor to convince the Croats to reduce their deployment in the area of Sector East, and to render the remaining deployments more benign, in order to calm the overall tensions. In this matter, however, I should note that on my way in from the Belgrade airport to the city, I observed a large column of various military vehicles (over 100) with towed artillery pieces, covered trucks, etc., heading in the general direction of the border with Croatia. It is quite possible that the deployment is as much for public consumption as out of military necessity. Nonetheless, I may as a result have a difficult time in the next few days to convince the Croats to reduce their deployments in the area of Sector East. I will keep you fully informed.

4. A full report on my two meetings will be sent shortly. Regards.

CRN-1395

CRG-1134

SSN-2143

Please see instructions

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'95 AUG 12 17:55 IMMEDIATE

UNPROCESSED
COMMUNICATIONS

'95 AUG 12 17:39 Page 1 of 2

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: Z-1408

DATE: 12 AUGUST 1995

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN CROATIA



1. Reference your cable 2642 of 9 August, our comments on the statement from the Foreign Minister of Croatia are as follows.
2. We can confirm that the towns in the area bordering Sector East, including Osijek (particularly its environs) and Vinkovci, have been subject to frequent mortar and artillery attacks from the "ARSK" elements based in Sector East. Towns within the Sector have also been subject to artillery attack from HV forces. The vicinity of Osijek was last subjected to attack on 10 August.
3. Zupanja and Dubrovnik have been shelled, although less frequently. The last UNMO confirmed attack on Dubrovnik occurred on 5 August when 14 detonations were recorded. Croatian authorities note three dead as a result of the attack, but we cannot confirm this. We presume that the origin of fire in this case was the Bosnian Serb military. On 6 August, UNMOs recorded 10 detonations in the vicinity of Zupanja, although they were unable to confirm whether these were in-coming or out-going shells.
4. The air attack on Kutina occurred on 6 August- not 7 August as noted by the Croatian Foreign Minister. The UNMOs have confirmed that an air-launched weapon landed inside the chemical plant compound at Kutina and damaged a small container. Our "No Fly Zone" reports show that two aircraft departed from Banja Luka, flew in the direction of Kutina, turned just short of Kutina and returned to Banja Luka. It is probable that these aircraft were involved in the attack on Kutina.
5. The UNMOs report that the Croatian authorities alleged that Kutina was bombed on 7 August- to substantiate this, they handed over to the UNMOs what they described as rocket fragments from an air attack on that day. We have no information on any aircraft approaching the Kutina area on 7 August.

Internal distribution: FC/DFC/COM(UNCRO) / DI

- 2 -

CEN-1395 2/2

6. We can confirm that on 9 August, 600-700 milicija with personal weapons entered the Baranja (Sector East), via the Batina bridge. The presence of these milicija has been confirmed by both Belbat and Civpol. We do not have any information that substantiates where these personnel came from. We do not have evidence of the entry of units of the Yugoslav Army into the Sector.

7. Regards.



THE LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION

LUTHERISCHER WELTBUND - FEDERACIÓN LUTERANA MUNDIAL - FÉDÉRATION LUTHÉRIENNE MONDIALE
GENERAL SECRETARIAT

Mr Carl Bildt
Mr Thorvald Stoltenberg

Co-Chairmen
International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia

11 August 1995

Fax: 917 0079
(Total of 2 pages)

Gentlemen,

Please find attached for information a copy of Dr Noko's letter of today's date to President Tudjman.

Yours faithfully,

Shelagh Friedli
Office for International
Affairs and Human Rights

Enc.



THE LUTHERAN WORLD FEDERATION

LUTHERISCHER WELTBUND - FEDERACIÓN LUTERANA MUNDIAL - FÉDÉRATION LUTHÉRIENNE MONDIALE
GENERAL SECRETARIAT

Mr. Franjo Tudjman
President of the
Republic of Croatia

11 August 1995

Your Excellency,

I am writing to you on behalf of the Lutheran World Federation to register my grave concern about the recent military operations in Croatia. We deeply deplore the impact of the fighting on innocent civilians and United Nations personnel.

It is our conviction that violence does not lead to a just and lasting peace. On the contrary, the use of force often leads to still greater loss of lives and provokes further violence rather than bringing a swift and lasting solution.

I therefore urge the parties to stop any military action and to exercise the utmost restraint. I particularly call on the responsible leaders to scrupulously observe the rights of defenceless civilians and prisoners, and to resume efforts towards a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

The LWF remains committed to providing humanitarian assistance to the people of the region, irrespective of nationality, ethnicity or religious belief.

Respectfully,

Ishmael Noko
General Secretary

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'95 AUG 10 19:10

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

95 AUG 10 18:26 OF 4

CZNL-1381
CZG-1123
SSN-21K

6927

TO: ANNAN, UNATION, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: Z - 1394

DATE: 10 August 1995

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH ICFY CO-CHAIRMAN IN ZAGREB
ON 9 AUGUST 1995

Y. Akashi

Please find attached a copy of the Note for the File on the Meeting between the SRSG UNPF-HQ and ICFY Co-Chairman held in Zagreb, 9 August 1995.

NOTE FOR THE FILE

2/4

Meeting between the SRSG, Mr Akashi and the ICFY Co-Chairmen, Zageb, 9 August 1995.

Mr Akashi met with the ICFY Co-chairmen this morning to brief them on the activities of UNPF since the outbreak of fighting in Croatia. He informed them of our efforts to secure the 6 August agreement with the Croatian government and noted that it was our intention to ensure that the Croats abided by the human rights and other commitments given to us. He also briefed them on his visit to Knin on 7 August, during which General Cermak had given his assurance to honour the provisions of the agreement. Increased cooperation from the Croatian authorities, particularly as regards our freedom of movement, was expected from today.

On the issue of refugees, he noted that some 779 remained in our HQ in Sector South. Most of these were anxious to leave the area. However, the Croats had indicated that prior to their departure, all military age men would be screened for war crimes. It was our hope that this screening exercise would take place in the compound in order that we could monitor that it was conducted in a fair and impartial matter.

With regard to Sector North, he informed the Co-chairmen that fighting continued in some areas. UNPF/UNCRO was negotiating for the safe passage of civilians from the area and for the withdrawal of ARSK soldiers with only their side arms. Heavy weapons were to be put in two UN weapon collection points. Due to the presence of 5 Corps in the area, particularly along the routes that the displaced persons would withdraw on, he had raised with Sarinic the possibility of allowing the refugees and soldiers to be evacuated to the FRY via the highway to Sector East. Sarinic had repeated his government's stated desire for the Serb population in both sectors to remain in Croatia, although many appeared determined to leave.

Our Humanitarian Crisis Cell then provided the Co-chairmen with an update on the refugee situation. At present, it appeared that almost all of the population in Sector South had fled the area: latest figures on refugees were as follows: 30,000 refugees were already in Banja Luka; 37,000 were in and around the Topusko area; 15,000 were in Dvor; 10,000 near Petrinja; 2,500 Muslim refugees from Velika Kladusa were joining others on the way to Bosnian Serb territory; 39,500 had reportedly crossed into the FRY and an unknown number were in transit between these points and BH. These figures were, we underlined to the Co-chairmen, mere estimates: it was possible that they included double counting by one or another source. On humanitarian assistance convoys for the refugees, the situation was bleak. Some supplies had been delivered to Knin but due to the absence of most of the population, this was not a priority need area. It was hoped that a convoy would gain access to Glina today, but access to Dvor and Topusko remained difficult due to the security situation. An UNHCR convoy to Bihac had been turned back yesterday by the Croats but would hopefully enter the pocket today. UNHCR was getting

convoys into Banja Luka via the Belgrade route but was still keen to have access via the shorter route from Zagreb. In this regard, UNPF/UNCRO was in a position to rebuild the blown up bridge on the route in 48 hours.

With regard to human rights monitoring, UNPF already had a team deployed and working in Sector South. If the security situation permitted, a team would be deployed to Sector North either later this afternoon or tomorrow morning. Currently, the human rights team in Sector South was interviewing displaced persons who had taken refuge in the sector HQ. While many of those had been in the HQ since the start of hostilities and therefore had little information on outside events, a few persons continued to trickle in. Of these, some reported being well treated by HV forces while others reported being harassed and threatened.

The Co-chairmen were keen for detailed information on the humanitarian situation in the sectors and for information on the current situation in Western Slavonia - they believe that the situation in Western Slavonia, which we have reported on in our recent draft of the Secretary-General's report, will provide a good indication of the Croatian's cooperation, or lack thereof, under the current circumstances. They wished to also know what we would do with the information we were currently receiving on human rights abuses and asked whether such information would be conveyed to the Hague. We informed them that it was our intention to compile an UNPF report with the information we collected and it was our impression that other organisations such as the Center for Human Rights would be compiling their own reports too. We concurred that the situation in Western Slavonia could provide a preview of developments in the Krajina but also noted that as a result of our experience in that case, we had insisted on concluding a humanitarian/human rights agreement with the Croats as soon as possible - this was no mean achievement, although their full cooperation and compliance remained to be seen.

On more general topics, Mr Bildt noted that in a meeting with Dr Granic over the weekend, the latter had said that he believed 99% of the population in the Krajina would leave Croatia (our figure was slightly lower). Granic had also indicated that the Croatian military plan had been designed to facilitate their departure - "a form of ethnic cleansing by other means" in Mr Bildt's opinion. With regard to the swift routing of the ARSK, it was felt that this had been a result of the Croats taking the ARSK by surprise with new military tactics. The HV targeting of command and control elements, the taking of high ground and the intensive use of heavy artillery on towns had been unanticipated. In effect, the Croats had used the past few years to prepare for a professional military assault while the ARSK had continued to focus on past tactics. However, despite reports to the contrary, it was ICFY's understanding that the ARSK had mounted a fierce defence of Knin and had had no intention of abandoning the town (they also pointed out that the HV strategy had been to immobilize UNCRO's ability to observe the ARSK defence). The HV main thrust from the north, rather than from the south and the west, had been unexpected, as had the shelling of Knin - ARSK soldiers had indicated that while they were prepared to die on the front-line, they had abandoned their posts to save their

4/4
families in the town.

Mr Bildt also noted that they were aware of the Croatian intention to go for Sector East as a result of their successes in Sectors North and South. The Americans had also got wind of the impending attack and had applied a great deal of pressure on Croatia to stop it - in this regard, Mr Bildt said that there was an increasing nervousness in Washington over the whole situation. He also expressed his conviction that if Croatia went for Sector East there would be no option for Milosevic but to intervene or to provide substantial support in the form of volunteers and armaments.

The Co-chairmen and Mr Akashi continued discussions on these and other issues over lunch.

E.S.
9 August 1995

CZK - 263

CZN - 1379

CZG - 1121

SSN - 2113

File: Croatia (also filed under "Bosnia")

6925

UNPF - HQ

UNPROFOR
COMM. NO. 1 Page 1 of 3
'95 AUG 10 17:25
IMMEDIATE

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB

DATE: 10 AUGUST 1995

NUMBER: UNPF Z- 1392

SUBJECT: Meeting with Field Marshall Inge

J. Akashi
'95 AUG 10 17:58

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. This morning the Force Commander and I met with Field Marshall Sir Peter Inge, Chief of the Defence Staff of the UK. He was accompanied by the British Ambassador to Croatia, Mr Gavin Hewitt.

2. We discussed the recent Croatian offensive in the Krajinas, its implications for the future of UNCRO and the mission area as a whole. It was our joint belief that the Croatian action had provided us with a very brief window of opportunity for negotiations which, if not seized quickly, would disintegrate rapidly into a path to a much wider war. President Milosevic would be hard pressed to intervene in Sector East, the Bosnian Government would be less likely to compromise in BH, the Bosnian Serbs put under increasing military pressure, and United Nations personnel placed under greater danger. While President Milosevic still remained the key player in the region, the Bosnian unwillingness to accept any compromise would most likely be a trigger for a wider conflict. In view of the potential seriousness of the situation and the great possibility of our being dragged into the war, Field Marshall Inge felt that efforts should be made to reduce the presence of the UN not only in Croatia but in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. In this regard, the British appear keen to remove their battalion in Central BH at the end of its current tour and to reconsider the retention of the 24 air mobile brigade in the RRF beyond November, particularly if the situation has deteriorated on the ground and the NATO withdrawal plan is not revised to take into account current realities on the ground. They further feel that UNPROFOR is over deployed in Sarajevo and should reduce its presence in the city.

3. On the implications of the Croatian offensive, I informed the Field Marshall that we believed Croatia would try to consolidate its position before mounting an offensive on Sector East. President Milosevic would be under increasing domestic pressure to provide some form of support or intervention if

Internal distribution: SRSG, FC, CoM UNCRO, CoM UNPROFOR, DFC

that occurred. His position was being weakened by the influx of refugees who would put increasing pressure on an already weak economy. While he could settle these DPs in Kosevo or the Sandjak, this action could destabilize both those areas and FYROM as well. With regard to Bosnia, it was likely that the Croatian success would result in the improvement of the Croat position, to the detriment of the Bosnians, in the Federation. The recent departure of Prime Minister Silajdzic from the Government would further complicate matters by strengthening the hands of the fundamentalists in the Government and making it less likely that they would be prepared to compromise on any new peace proposals. In answer to the query from the Field Marshall on the split between the military and civilian authorities within the Bosnian Serb side, I told him that the general consensus was that General Mladic would come out on top in any show down on the issue.

4. The Field Marshall concurred with my view and said that it was clear that there was only a short period in which to seize the opportunities presented by the new balance of power in the Balkans. With regard to BH, he felt that as Mladic would continue to be the power to be reckoned with, the international community should continue to focus on Milosevic for a resolution to the BH conflict. The difficulty would be, however, how to get the Bosnians "on board". It was Inge's view that the Bosnians were currently focusing on short term benefits rather than the long term implications of the Croatian victory.

5. The Force Commander gave his views on the possible military developments by the autumn. He noted that he did not believe that the situation in Sector East would deteriorate in the near future but also emphasized the need to be cautious in this regard - the HV could engage a brigade in the sector in a single night and if the FRY were to provide artillery support for the ARSK in the sector, it would be difficult for UNCRO to positively determine which side of the Danube it came from. In BH, the Bosnian Serbs continued to be on the defensive and faced the real threat of a concerted 5 Corps attack out of the Bihac pocket to link up with Bosnian troops in the Dornji Vakuf area. Although the BSA was now rearmed and strengthened by the ARSK, this would not compensate for the tiredness of the troops or the logistical problems they would encounter in moving their troops from the east and the Tuzla area to face this threat. In addition, the presence of refugees streaming through the Posavina corridor further neutralized the BSA ability to quickly move its forces. If there was no political agreement by autumn, the Force Commander saw the Bosnians attempting to break out of Sarajevo while the BSA would be pinned down by HV/HVO and BiH actions in Central BH. At the same time, it could be expected that Croatia would take action to neutralize the BSA artillery positions firing on the Dubrovnik area. The recent deployment of HV troops to Ploce could only be for this purpose. The end result of all this action would be the collapse of the BSA.

6. The Force Commander clarified that the collapse of the BSA would not be for the same structural reasons that the ARSK had collapsed but as a result of being too stretched on the ground to mount a good defence. Mladic had, however, made a tactical mistake in delegating the defence of Grahovo and

Glamoc, and the attack on Bihac, to the ARSK - he would now be constrained by the actions of the 5 Corps in the north. In this regard, the FC believes the 5 Corps will attempt to push towards the Prijedor area rather than towards Ripa. He also believes that the HV will resupply the 5 Corps with the weapons they have impounded from the ARSK. If negotiations are not forthcoming or fail, and the Serbs are under such an acute threat, then Milosevic will have to get involved, not in central BH but in Sector East. Alternatively, Milosevic could provide support for a link up of BSA and RSK territory in Sector East.

7. Field Marshall Inge noted that overall situation in the Balkans was a lot more serious than many people realized and that there was a move towards a wider war which we would be dragged into. Everyone spoke of this short window of opportunity to avoid the war but no-one seemed able to define what should be done. In addition, there remained the question of whether or not the US would be willing to give Milosevic enough to gain his support. Ambassador Hewitt, on this point, said that he believed the US would be prepared to reward Milosevic with a lifting of sanctions in a package deal which included the recognition of Croatia, proper ICIFY control of the Danube and a modification of the map. The US would not accept Bildt's proposals. However, again, progress would rely on the position taken by the Bosnian Government. It was most likely that the latter, particularly after the NATO decision on air strikes to defend the safe areas, would harden their position.

8. In view of the possible deterioration in the situation, Field Marshall Inge and his colleagues expressed concern at the present levels of troops within BH. They believed that UNPROFOR should thin out its forces in Sarajevo and certainly in central BH where battalions were now doing work better suited to military observers. They hoped that a decision on the thinning out of UNPROFOR would be made before the winter in order that their battalion in central BH be withdrawn before winter conditions set in. It was also the British intention to withdraw its force from Gorazde later this month. With regard to the RRF, the British were supportive of it being used to facilitate convoy and other movements but believed that placing it in Sarajevo would be a waste. The force was meant to be mobile not static. They were also looking to see whether they would continue to supply the 24 air mobile brigade after November - this decision would very much depend on the situation on the ground. Field Marshall Inge pointed out that the 24 air mobile brigade had the capability to both reinforce UNPROFOR and assist in a withdrawal according to the current withdrawal plans of NATO. However, as the circumstances on the ground had changed, the plans would need to be revised to take into account current realities and to allow for the proper use of the brigade under such circumstances. On a more general issue, the Field Marshall noted that the impediments placed in the way by the Federation on the deployment of the RRF had two objectives: one was to ensure that the RRF would not get in the way of Federation offensives and the other was to ensure that it did what they wanted. This policy had made the RRF "dangerously ineffective" and consideration should be given to withdrawing the force if continued "logistic jams" made performance of its mission impossible.

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UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit

Palais des Nations

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CNZ 733 CYZ 740 P1/5

'95 AUG 10 -4 :46

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG/FC/CAO
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 9 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER: 2642
SUBJECT: Situation in Croatia



TO: UNATIONS
FROM: UNATIONS
DATE: 9 AUG 1995
TIME: 09:40

Please find enclosed for your information a copy of a self-explanatory communication from the FM of Croatia. We would appreciate your comments and advice.

CNZ 733 CYZ 740 P2/5

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1995/670
8 August 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH


LETTER DATED 8 AUGUST 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to enclose herewith a letter dated 8 August 1995 by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia Dr. Mate Granić, addressed to you.

I would kindly request your assistance in circulating this letter and its Annex as a document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) 
Dr. Mario Nobile
Permanent Representative

→ CAPS



CN2 733 CYZ 740 P3/5

- 2 -

Annex

Letter dated 8 August 1995 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Croatia addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you that the military and police operation aimed at establishing constitutional order, the rule of law and public safety in the formerly designated sectors North and South, and aimed at breaking the three-year long siege and joint offensive of the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs against the UN Safe Area was successfully completed after 84 hours, at 6:00 p.m. CET, on August 6, 1995.

The operation has achieved all its strategic and tactical aims, as elaborated in my letter of August 4, 1995, with minimal loss of civilian life.

Only police and security activities in restricted areas on a minor scale are still under way in the recently liberated areas of the Republic of Croatia.

The military and police operation aimed at establishing sovereignty over occupied parts of Croatia's territory has been conducted strictly in accordance with international law, the UN Charter and under specific and explicit orders to limit to the absolute minimum civilian casualties and damage to property, as well as to protect the lives and to the maximum possible extent ensure the safety of the UNCRO personnel in the given circumstance.

The Croatian Government deeply regrets the unfortunate incidents involving the UNCRO personnel, including the loss of life of three UN peace-keepers. All such incidents are being thoroughly investigated. The UNCRO officials and troop contributing countries have been informed of both the initial findings and the subsequent measures taken against those who allegedly violated these standing orders and the Army's Military Code of Conduct.

Following 1,201 days of being under siege, the humanitarian situation in the Bihać area is being improved by the hour. Due to the successfully completed joint military operation of the two neighbouring countries, President Alija Izetbegović was today able to visit the Bihać area, after having met with President Tudman in Zagreb.

A special convoy consisting of twenty trucks containing essential foodstuffs and other humanitarian items, named the Federation Convoy, has left Zagreb.

A UNHCR humanitarian convoy will also be directed to Bihać, and to Banja Luka. The ICRC has also been granted permission by the Croatian Government to use its facilities

- 3 -

to send relief and humanitarian assistance to Banja Luka by plane.

Life in the newly liberated areas is slowly but increasingly getting back to normal: local civilian authority is being reestablished, communications are being restored, and people have begun to return to their homes after four years of displacement.

To facilitate the overall normalisation of life and reconciliation in the liberated territories, an agreement was signed by the Head of the Cabinet of the President of the Republic, Mr. Hrvoje Šarinić, and the UN Secretary General's Special Envoy, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, on August 6, 1995. The Agreement provides and guarantees the UNCRO and international humanitarian organizations complete access to the area, including monitoring of the human rights situation. A similar arrangement has been reached with the EU Monitoring Mission.

The Government of Croatia sincerely hopes that the Government of the FRY (Serbia/Montenegro) and the Bosnian Serb authorities will pose no obstacles for the safe return of those Croatian citizens of Serb ethnic origin willing to do so.

Under the arrangement with Mr. Akashi, the Croatian Government has agreed to permit the unimpeded departure of civilians from the previously occupied areas, with the assistance of international humanitarian organizations and in accordance with their rules and procedures. However, it is the hope of my Government that many of the Croatian Serbs will decide to remain in or return to their homes.

The Government of the Republic of Croatia will ensure the full realization of all human and minority rights for those who will choose to stay in Croatia as their homeland. These rights are guaranteed by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, the Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, and the existing laws of the democratic Republic of Croatia, which are in complete accord with the highest European standards of human and minority rights.

Despite the repeated appeals by the President of the Republic Dr. Franjo Tuđman and the Croatian Government to the local Serbian population to lay down their arms and stay in their homes, as well as promises and guarantees of amnesty and abolition to all those who have not committed war crimes, and renewed guarantees for the safety and constitutional rights of the Serb ethnic community in Croatia, a large number of Serb civilians in the liberated areas have left their homes. This departure has been instigated and organized well in advance of the commencement of the operation and carried out by the local Serb authorities. That this was a highly organised evacuation can be testified by the number of totally deserted towns and villages which Croatian military and police forces entered.

It should be stressed that the cooperation of the UNCRO, UNPROFOR and Serb authorities is needed considering the number of people on the move: maybe as many as 90,000 civilians and 30,000 armed men.

Your Excellency,

Unfortunately, I must also report that several Croatian towns, especially Osijek, Vinkovci, Županja and Dubrovnik have recently been subjected to further indiscriminate attacks and bombardment from Serb positions in the occupied Croatian territories of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem, as well as from areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina under Serb control. Particularly dangerous was the attack by Bosnian Serb planes against the chemical plant in Kutina of August 7, 1995, which could have had extremely severe consequences or even caused an ecological disaster.

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NEW YORK
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The Government of Croatia appeals to the UN Security Council and the international community in general to exert increased pressure on the Belgrade regime and the Bosnian Serbs to stop these acts of terrorism, violence, aggression and occupation.

Additional concerns arise from the fact that the majority of the troops in the Croatian occupied territories in the Vukovar region consist of regular units of the Army of the FRY (Serbia/Montenegro), who are constantly being rotated and strengthened directly by the Belgrade regime. The scale of those violations is confirmed in the Secretary's General Report S/1995/650 of August 3, 1995.

The Government of Croatia reiterates its firm commitment to the search for a peaceful, negotiated solution for the reintegration of the occupied territories and a lasting and viable settlement to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In line with this, the Government of Croatia will continue to fully cooperate with the United Nations Security Council, the UN Secretary General, the UN Special Envoy for Croatia, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, the Contact Group, and all friendly countries interested in a just and lasting peace in Southeastern Europe. The Government of Croatia in this connection expects that efforts will be made for the full implementation of the existing UNCRO mandate in the areas of Croatia still under Serbian occupation, especially in regard to establishing full and effective control of the Croatian international border line with the FRY (Serbia/Montenegro).

The Government of the Republic of Croatia sincerely hopes that completing the reintegration of Croatia's occupied territories will be achieved through political means and attaches special importance to constructive negotiations with the Serbs and their legitimate representatives. The Croatian Government further hopes that in completing this task it will enjoy the full assistance and support of all relevant international factors.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Zagreb, August 18, 1995

(Signature)

Dr. Mate Granic

CAPS

H. Granic

1995-08-10 01:46 5604
UNOG Telecomm. Unit

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

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Palais des Nations

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'95 AUG 10 -4 :47

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TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG/FC/CAO
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 9 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER: 2643
SUBJECT: Situation in Croatia: Russian Views

S. J. Hage

RECEIVED
UNOG
10 AUG 1995
P 9 40

Please find enclosed for your Information a copy of a self-explanatory Note from Under Secretary-General Gharekhan enclosing a communication from the FM of the Russian Federation.

CNZ 734 CYZ 741 P2/4

Note to the Secretary-General

Mr. Sidorov, the Charge d'affaires of the Russian Federation came to see me today. He handed over the enclosed message from Foreign Minister Kozyrev addressed to you.

Regarding the last paragraph on page one of Mr. Kozyrev's letter -- relating to air support -- the Russian Representative had asked the same question to me yesterday in the Security Council consultations. I had replied to him that the authority to request air support had been delegated by you to your Force Commander and that you did not question the judgement or decisions of the Force Commander in this respect.

Mr. Sidorov informed me that President Tudjman and President Milosevic have accepted President Yeltsin's invitation to go to Moscow for a meeting. This meeting will take place in Moscow on Thursday, 10 August. I requested Mr. Sidorov to inform us of the results of the meeting as soon as it was concluded.

I am sending copies of this note to Mr. Annan and Mr. Goulding.

DPKO
1995 AUG -9 AD-04

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cc. Mr. Annan
Mr. Goulding

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C.R. Gharekhan
C.R. Gharekhan
8 August 1995

CNZ 734 CYZ 741 P3/4

Enclosure
Unofficial translation

August 8, 1995

Mr. Secretary - General,

I am addressing you in connection with the dramatic developments of the last few days in and around Croatia. The massive offensive of the Croatian armed forces against the Serb-populated areas renders null and void your appeals, as well as the efforts by international mediators Thorvald Stoltenberg and Carl Bildt to continue the search for ways of a political settlement.

Deplorably, the line has prevailed in Zagreb to forcibly integrate the Serb-populated areas -- a line which has been indirectly encouraged from the capitals of a number of major States of the world.

What we have on hands here is a case when the principles of a just and fair settlement are being sacrificed to the philosophy of *fait accompli*. We believe that such an approach will have damaging consequences for both the settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia and -- in a broader sense -- for the role the United Nations is called upon to perform in the maintenance and restoration of international peace and security.

Having launched an offensive against Krajina the Croatian side not only violated a whole number of Security Council resolutions but also carried out a series of deliberate attacks on "blue helmets". We strongly believe that those who undertook such actions or gave orders to carry them out are personally responsible for the casualties sustained by peace-keepers.

The lack of due reaction to such developments may well serve as additional grounds to accuse the United Nations of double standards. Deserving a most serious consideration, in this connection, is the fact that the UNCRO Command did not request (or did not obtain?) air support from NATO, in order to protect its personnel -- this at the very time when NATO aircraft requested by General Bernard Janvier were pounding Krajina Serb positions under Croatian attack.

H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros - Ghali
Secretary - General
United Nations
New York

CNZ 734 CYZ 741 P4/4

Today, we are eye witnesses to a humanitarian tragedy unprecedented since the beginning of the Yugoslav conflict. An exodus of over 150,000 people from the Serb Krajina has started, which implies enormous human suffering.

We hope that you will apply your authority and capacities for the United Nations to take all possible measures so as to protect civilian population, which would include, besides an efficient humanitarian assistance to the refugees, political pressure on Croatia to ensure full respect on its part as a United Nations Member—State of human rights.

In practical terms, what is of key importance at the present stage is also the continuation of the UN peacekeeping operation in Croatia for preventing a complete humanitarian catastrophe and for ensuring objective international monitoring of actions by Croatian authorities in respect to the Serb population now under their control.

Andrey V. Kozyrev

CEN-1365
CZG-1109
SSN-2085

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95 AUG -9 17:17

Page 1 of 1

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM : AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB *M. Fish*
DATE : 09 AUGUST 1995
NUMBER : UNPF-Z-1578
SUBJECT: Views of Bosnia on movement from Croatia

95 AUG -9 18:35

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

1. Reference your 2625 of 8 August 1995 concerning the Bosnian Government's concerns over population movement from Croatia, we offer the following comments.

2. The agreement concluded between the SRSG and Mr. Šarinić on 6 August 1995 makes no specific mention of the movement of Serbs through the territory of Bosnia. The agreement only notes that "Croatia will allow, with full guarantees of security, the departure from those areas of all those who express their desire to do so...." Thus, whilst the agreement does not preclude that Serbs may leave Croatia through Bosnian territory, it does not specify that they must follow this route. Further, the departure of Serbs from Croatia into Bosnia is a matter involving the Croatian Government as it is now in control of its international border with Bosnia. By way of note, we are presently planning, with full Croatian Government involvement, the movement of Serbs from Sector North to Sector East via the territory of Croatia.

3. The UNPF has not provided transport to any groups of Serbs leaving Croatia via Bosnia.

4. Lastly, we do not have any information which shows that the Government of Yugoslavia has closed its border to all men of fighting age who have left the former Serb occupied parts of Croatia.

5. Regards.

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