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UNAMIR

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194 MAR 24 11 57

7186/DMZ/OPS

24 March 1994

To : See Distribution:

From: DMZ Sector Comd

Subject: PLANNED POLITICAL DEMONSTRATION  
IN THE DMZ BY RPF ON 26 MAR 94

1. A letter received by the DMZ Sector HQ from Mr Jean Munyemana, President of RPF in Cyungu Commune indicates that members of the RPF in the DMZ near the Prefecture of Kinshira intend to organise a demonstration on 26 Mar 94 in protest against the delay in the installation of the transitional institutions. A copy of the letter is attached for your perusal please.
2. Other letters of complaint have been received from the Bourgmestre of Tumba Commune on the same subject and other issues of security in DMZ. Copies of these letters are also attached for your study.
3. I am to draw your attention to the security implications of this planned activity and convey to you the Force Commander's strongest protest against the plan.
4. I am further to request you to take steps to prevent the demonstration from taking place.
5. Kindly submitted for your immediate attention.

  
CB YAACHE  
Col  
Sector Commander

Distribution:

Action:

Information:

External:  
THE RPF CHAIRMAN  
MULINDI

Dist: FC  
DTC/COS  
RPF LO (DMZ SECTOR HQ)  
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P. R. INKOTANYI

Cyungu, le 18 mars 1994

Préfecture KINIHIAA

Monsieur le sous-préfet de la  
Sous-préfecture KINIHIAA.

Objet: Manifestations pacifiques

Monsieur,

J'ai l'honneur de vous  
informer que les partisans du Front Patriotique Rwandais  
des communes de la zone démilitarisée proche de la  
Sous-préfecture de Kinihira comptent faire des  
manifestations pacifiques à la date sous-préfecture  
à date du 26 mars 1994.

Cette marche aura pour but  
le dire "NON" au blocage de la mise en place des  
institutions de transition.

Je vous en souhaite bonne  
réception et vous remercie.

~~Monsieur~~  
C. 18/3/94

P. I

Commandant en chef  
la MINUHA dans la  
Préfecture KINIHIAA

Jean KUNYEMANA  
Président du FPA Commune Cyungu  
et Représentant du FPA dans la  
région.

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE

Tumba, le **23 Mars 1994**Préfecture de Byumba  
Commune de Tumba

N° .....

Objet:

**NOTE A MONSIEUR LE COMMANDANT DE LA MINUAR A TUMBA**

Monsieur le Commandant,

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que des informations qui nous parviennent disent que les Militaires du FPR sont en train de creuser des positions le long de la Colline KINYIHIRA, dans la Commune OYUNGO.

- La KAKABOWA, près de la maison des parents du Frère Aloys NDIMUKYIHE
- Chez KARYABWIRE à KINYIHIRA
  - Chez NURIRIKARI, au CERAI de KINYIHIRA


Ils préparent la population de OYUNGO pour les manifestations prévues Samedi, le 26/03/1994 au Bureau de la Sous-Préfecture de KINYIHIRA.

Fraternelle collaboration.

Le Bourgmestre de la Commune Tumba  
GACAMBA

Cordialement, pour information à:

- Monsieur le Commandant de la MINUAR  
**KINYIHIRA.**



REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE

Préfecture de Byumba  
Commune de Tumba

Tumba, le ..... 21 Mars 1994.....

N° ..... 085 / 04.17.02.....

Monsieur le Commandant de la MINUAR  
TUMBA.

Objet: Rapport de circonstance

Monsieur le Commandant,

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer qu'en Commune Tumba, il y a une panique généralisée due à la circulation des éléments armés qui viennent déranger la population dans cette zone, surtout au voisinage de la plantation théière CYOHONA-RUKERI.

De source de la population, ces éléments proviennent de la Commune CYUHITO où ils sont abrités par Messieurs MAKETE Prodournd et ATUMUASHI ? ce dernier étant le Directeur du CERAI dans la Commune susdite.

Cette population signale qu'après l'attaque de Monsieur MATENOU Flicier, certains paysans ne passent plus la nuit dans leurs ménages de peur d'être tués. Des raisons qu'ils avancent sont notamment l'attaque dudit MATENOU, les tueries qui ont eu lieu à Gungu, la décision prise par la Direction de l'Uganda à Tse CYOHONA-RUKERI de suspendre ses activités ainsi que des manifestations qui sont en cours de préparation dans la zone tampon. L'on affirme que ces <sup>manifestations</sup> seront dirigées par les membres du FPR, visant à la destruction des ponts reliant la Commune Tumba aux Communes Gungu et Nyungali et le barrage de la route Kigali-Rubengera à Base.

Pour calmer les esprits de la population, votre intervention s'avère nécessaire ~~sur~~ menant une enquête minutieuse sur le cas.

Copie pour information à :

- Monsieur le Commandant de la MINUAR  
KIMIRIRA.Le Chef de la Commune Tumba  
G. KIMIRIRA Directeur

DR KABIA *257*

*For Comments*  
*25.01.94*  
N. KANE

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U N A M I R  
INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

→ SRJ.6

RECEIVED OFFICE OF SRSG	
Date	25 Jan 94
No.	386 By <i>ET</i>

File No. 1000

To: *Distribution List*  
From: Force Commander  
Date: 25 January 1994

1. The following are notes of a four-hour supper engagement between the FC and the Minister of Transport, Mr André Ntagerura, at the Restaurant Péché Mignon on 24 January 1994.

2. Several subjects were touched upon but by far the most pertinent was the insistence on the Minister's part - he has been in party politics and ministries for the last 13 years - concerning the fact that the President, Head of State, is no longer the seat of power in the political framework of this country. According to the Minister, the President has given up all his power and people have not realized that he is no more in charge. The MRND party is operating on its own and is answering only to its own decisions. Those who insist in pursuing the President for a solution to the current political impasse are essentially knocking at the wrong door. To a question regarding whether the Directeur de Cabinet of the President filters any of the information going to his boss, the answer was that he has never had any experience of such actions that he can recollect. The essence of the problem is, according to the Minister, with the Prime Minister Designate and with the political parties.

3. On several occasions, the Minister emphasized the need to speak to the PM(D) to change his hard-line stance regarding his own party nominations and show a modicum of flexibility. The governmental posts must reflect more the party itself and not the single mindedness of it's president, particularly one that is on the way out of the said party.

4. Regarding the PL and its internal problems, he argues that we should be concentrating on the priority of reconciliation versus the democratic process. He explains this by stating that the deputies are not really elected by the population but nominated for a transitional period. This transitional period must reflect the nature of the country's

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make up and not the sudden resurgence of a minority ethnic entity that will dominate the majority. Thus the current proposed make up of the national assembly, and in particular the overt efforts by the RPF to dominate 2/3 of the assembly, are poor reflections of the appropriate transitional structures. This ethnic point was expressed often enough to be fundamental in the basic arguments of the problem. He stated that it is unacceptable to the MRND that the RPF so overtly attempts to dominate the transitional government institutions. It smells too much like a return to the pre-1959 feudal system. He stated also that the option provided by the Bishops is a reasonable starting point.

5. A number of remarks were directed to UNAMIR regarding its true impartiality. Examples presented were the November killings of Hutus, for which no results or accusations have been made by us. Yet we were very rapid in condemning the MRND militia for the alleged killings in Kigali on 5 and 8 Jan 94. The RPF is getting away with too much freedom at the CND where they are convinced that the number of people in the complex is at least 1,000 and that RPF agents are influencing the local population. The Belgique contingent has been too aggressive, too humiliating of the locals in their arms recuperation actions, too much into the running after women and in the discos and bars, too easy on the RPF, too aggressive against the Bangladesh who want to tighten the controls at the CND. They feel that UNAMIR protection is going only to the opposition or RPF/Tutsi supporters. He feels that UNAMIR is getting bad press around the country and that we don't seem to react against it. I made it clear to him that so far all the victims that we have seen were Tutsis and that the witnesses were unanimous in accusing the Interamwe. I also reminded him that although he keeps insisting that the Head of State is out of the action, senior officers of his presidential guard were directly involved in preventing the Lando group of deputies from attending the swearing-in ceremonies.

6. The Minister stated that they believe that there is too little information coming out of UNAMIR to explain its position in all what is going on. In particular, he firmly believes that UNAMIR is not putting straight some of the falsehoods that are stated in the media. Our responses so far are seen as evasive and not enough to the point, particularly to direct questions in press conferences.

6. The Minister believes there is room to manoeuvre if we go to those involved, particularly the PM(D) and the PL and get them to sit down and work out the details of a compromise. Going to the President's door is not going to lead us anywhere as he does not control the party, and Arusha puts all the

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authority in this process in the hands of the parties. He was quite clear that any option to exclude the President, through the use of the President of the Constitutional Court, will result in some very serious repercussions. Just as those who are using the card of lack of funds in the government (directing this comment to the Minister of Finance), where the possibility of strikes, or even revolt by the army by the end of the month is a very dangerous process that could backfire. He feels that Madame Agathe is not doing enough to get the current government together to sort out some of the problems. He feels she is hiding from the fact that she must permit difficult debate and responses on current problems.

7. There is doubt about UNAMIR wanting to get into the thick of things and bring about or at least assist in some compromise solutions. It was quite evident that UNAMIR will not be permitted to sit on the fence as he feels incidents will continue to occur, and unless we can pro-actively refute them or take the initiative, we will continue to be the brunt of disinformation and as such will create a gulf between us and the majority of the population. The possibility of a potential smear campaign against us seems to be in the offing.

8. The Minister demonstrated genuine concern about the Interhamwe and the fact that they have not contacted us yet. He did mention with pride up front that the rally of two weekends ago was a fine demonstration of restraint, control and mature party politics. He does not agree with their militia's tactics and said he will speak about it to the party. He realises that they will react to any type of provocation as the impression among them is that the President or the government gave away the farm to the RPF at Arusha and the latter are trying to take even more than the peace accord stipulates. I reminded him that any action on the part of their militia will have devastating effects of their credibility as a serious political party.

9. These notes are a reasonable recapitulation of the discussions. They essentially reflect a deep-seated malaise about how the situation seems to have turned against them, the old party and the Hutus, and that the RPF/Tutsis are rubbing their noses in it. The deployment of the battalion in Kigali is seen as a victory on the part of the RPF and they are consolidating their position.

10. There are a number of deductions that can be gleamed from all the points touched upon in this session with the Dean of the MRND Ministers. I believe it essential that we review these points in order to align our strategy and tactics over



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the next while. I am getting the impression that both sides have us spinning around. I believe we must gain the initiative once again as we did at Kinihira on 10 Dec 93.

11. These notes are for your consideration.

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	DFC