

UNAWDR

OPERATIONS AND PLANS

27 AUG - 25 NOV 1944

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

[3 (CONFIDENTIAL)]
R#1WG JULY 1909

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>51002</u>
BOX	<u>183</u>
FILE	<u>3</u>
ACC.	<u>1992/0223</u>



MILOB GP HQ

TO : See Distribution


Date: 14 Nov 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : Plans 47/94

SUBJECT : FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR
NEWLY ARRIVED MILOBs/CIVPOL

1. Attached is a programme for orientation of newly arrived MILOBs/CIVPOL to UNAMIR. Instructors can introduce subjects they consider vital to the Observers while performing duties. This HQ would appreciate being informed to enable adjustments on next programme.
2. Venue for programme shall be KIGALI MILOB Sector 6 HQ. Sector 6 to assist throughout.
3. Programme is to start on 25 Nov 94. Those involved shall be informed in advance if there are any changes.
4. Participants are required to adhere to the programme.


M MASANGANISE
Lt Col
for CMO

Distribution:
External:
Action:
CMPO (FHQ)

*OK keep
me in check
1 - JZ
25/11
DFC/cos/CMO*

*G9
SB
28/11/94*

Force Medical Officer (FHQ)

Chief Plans Officer (FHQ)

Chief Transport Officer (FHQ)

Commissioner CIVPOL

Comd MILOB Sector 6

Internal:

Action:

CMO

DCMO

HAC

SOO

SMPO

S LOGO

S PLANS/TRG O

MILOB SIG O

FAMILIARIZATION TRAINING PROGRAM
AS FROM 26 NOVEMBER 1994

SLNO	DATE	FROM	TO	SUBJECT	PRESENTED BY
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1	26 NOV FRIDAY SAT	0830 HRS	0855 HRS	WELCOME ADDRESS	CMO
		0900 HRS	0950 HRS	POLITICAL & HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF RWANDA	SPLANS/TRG
		1000 HRS	1050 HRS	ARUSHA AGREEMENT	SQN LDR NAIM
		1100 HRS	1150 HRS	UNAMIR FORMATION & MANDATE	CMPO (FHQ)
		1200 HRS	1400 HRS	LUNCH	
		1400 HRS	1450 HRS	ORGANIZATION OF UNAMIR	C PLANS (FHQ)
		1500 HRS	1550 HRS	ORGANIZATION OF FHQ	CMPO (FHQ)
		1600 HRS	1650 HRS	ORG OF MILOB GP HQ & SECTS	S PLANS/TRG
		1650 HRS	1730 HRS	ADMINISTRATION	COMD SECTOR 6
2.	28 NOV SAT MON	0800 HRS	0850 HRS	ADMIN, PERSONAL CONDUCT, DISCIPLINE, LEAVE/CTO AND ENTITLEMENT	SMPO
		0900 HRS	0950 HRS	BOARDS OF INQUIRIES	MAJ RIZVI
		1000 HRS	1050 HRS	MEDICAL BRIEF	FORCE MED OFFR
		1100 HRS	1150 HRS	INTRODUCTION, CARE & MAINT OF COMM EQUIPMENT	MILOB SIGNAL OFFICER
		1200 HRS	1400 HRS	LUNCH	
		1400 HRS	1450 HRS	VOICE PROCEDURE & COMM SEC	MILOB SIGNAL OFFICER
		1500 HRS	1550 HRS	UNAMIR LOGISTIC SYSTEM AND PROCEDURE	SLOGO
		1600 HRS	1645 HRS	PATROLLING, ESCORTS, CHECK POINTS, OBSERVATION POSTS AND MONITORING.	SQN LDR NAIM

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
3	20 NOV 94, MONDAY TUESDAY	0800 HRS	0850 HRS	COMPLAINS AND INVESTIGATIONS	LT COL ANOCHKINE
		0900 HRS	0950 HRS	OPS REPORTS/RETURNS	sqn LDR NAIM
		1000 HRS	1050 HRS	BRIEF ON MILOB SECTOR OPERATIONS	LT COL ANOCHKINE
		1100 HRS	1150 HRS	RULES OF ENGAGEMENT	CPLANS (FHQ)
		1200 HRS	1400 HRS	LUNCH	
		1400 HRS	1450 HRS	HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS	HAC
		1500 HRS	1550 HRS	CARE & MAINT OF VEHICLES	CTO
		1600 HRS	1650 HRS	ACCIDENT PROCEDURE	CIVPOL
4	30 NOV 94, WED WED.	0800 HRS	0850 HRS	CIVPOL OPERATIONS	CIVPOL
		0900 HRS	1155 HRS	DRIVING TEST	CTO
		1200 HRS	1400 HRS	LUNCH	
		1400 HRS	1430 HRS	POSTING INSTRUCTION	SMPO
		1500 HRS	1530 HRS	CLOSING ADDRESS	DCMO

LEGEND :

CMO	:	CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER
DCMO	:	DEPUTY CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER
CMPO	:	CHIEF MILITARY PERSONNEL OFFICER
SMPO	:	SENIOR MILITARY PERSONNEL OFFICER
SLOGO	:	SENIOR LOGISTICS OFFICER
FHQ	:	FORCE HEADQUARTERS
CTO	:	CHIEF TRANSPORT OFFICER
CIVPOL	:	CIVILIAN POLICE
HAC	:	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CELL



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Minute

From: DCOS Ops

To: FC

Info: DFC/COS
G3 PLANS

Date: 16 Nov 94

Subject: FRAFBATT OPTIONS

Reference: 5000.46 (PLANS) 15 NOV 94

1. Please find enclosed the appreciation on options to redeploy FRAFBATT.

2. DFC provided additional comment on the option in general:

I also think that another advantage of keeping the FRAFBATT in loc is to avoid the introduction of new political elements into the theatre. FRAFBATT seems to be the only Francophone contingent even though Tunisia is also. We shall stand to be accused if we suddenly remove them. Perhaps what we need is very frequent visits and close liaison with that contingent and the local RPA.

3. Perhaps we should discuss at your convenience with DFC, myself and G3 Plans.

Done
+ Jhi
21/11
DFC/cos

G9
22/11/94
SB

OPTIONS TO REDEPLOY FRAFBATT

GENERAL

1. Over recent weeks considerable friction between the RPA and FRAFBATT has developed in Sector 4B. As a result, the degree of protection, security and supervision exerted by the battalion is reduced.
2. In the event that existing conditions deteriorate, action to redeploy FRAFBATT may be necessary.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to examine options for the redeployment of FRAFBATT.

OPTIONS

4. In spite of the current situation in Sector 4B, premature redeployment of FRAFBATT could be interpreted as a sign of weakness and lack of resolve. Accordingly, the decision to redeploy the battalion must be based on specific indicators:
 - a. Overt aggression by the RPA towards FRAFBATT personnel.
 - b. Serious threat of violence which would warrant a decision to reinforce Sector 4B.
 - c. Political pressure from UNNY or contributing nations to improve the working environment and logistic support to FRAFBATT.
5. Under the first two circumstances described above, removal of FRAFBATT from RWANDA may be a more prudent option than redeployment within.
6. In the event that a decision is made to redeploy FRAFBATT, the following options are presented:
 - a. Option 1. Redeploy to Sector 2.
 - (1) Advantages
 - (a) A volatile situation may be diffused;

- (b) The likelihood of casualties may be averted;
and
- (c) Reestablishment of stability in Sector 4B might result.

(2) Disadvantages

- (a) Sector 4B could not be left vacant and deployment of replacement troops would be necessary;
- (b) Replacement troops would be occupying an unfamiliar Sector in relatively hostile circumstances;
- (c) National pride/esteem may be affected;
- (d) A similar situation in Sector 2 may emerge;
and
- (e) A rapid redeployment (which would probably be necessary under the conditions presented at para 4) would impose a heavy logistic burden.

- b. Option 2. Reconfigure Sector 4B to enable FRAFBATT to concentrate.

(1) Advantages

- (a) The battalion might be in a better position to present as a more resolute force;
- (b) National pride/esteem would not necessarily be affected;
- (c) Major redeployment is averted;
- (d) Logistic support requirement is minimized; and
- (e) The integrity of Sector 4B is enhanced;

(2) Disadvantages

- (a) The likelihood of casualties might not be reduced to an acceptable level;
- (b) A change to the boundary of Sector 4B, which presently coincides with the KIBUYE Prefecture boundary would dilute the affect of liaison at the political level;

(c) FRAFBATT is not effectively removed from Sector 4B; and

(d) Complaint lodged by Chad regarding underutilization is reinforced.

c. Option 3. Redeploy to Sector 1.

(1) Advantages:

(a) Sector 4B is smaller than Sector 1 and might be more manageable for the smaller NICOY.

(b) NICOY engineer capability (although limited) would enhance road maintenance in Sector 4B.

(c) Remainder as per option 1.

(2) Disadvantages.

(a) Sector 1 is somewhat of a RPA 'stronghold' and FRAFBATT redeployment to that Sector might simply relocate the problem we seek to resolve;

(b) NICOY EOD capability would be lost to Sector 1;

(c) Remainder as per Option 1.

DISCUSSION


7. The requirement to replace FRAFBATT in Sector 4B is clear if that Sector is not absorbed by adjacent Sectors. Absorption would require a major boundary restructure and would probably overstretch the occupying troops. Moreover, the nature of the terrain would probably present the C2 and logistic support difficulties similar to those that FRAFBATT experienced with the Chadian Company.

The replacement options to accord with the redeployment options above include GHANBATT, ZAMBATT, or NICOY. The use of either GHANBATT or ZAMBATT would dilute the capacity to reinforce anyone of the western Sectors in the event of deteriorating security conditions. This would reduce flexibility considerably and would denude the east of the country of troops to its currently unacceptable level.

RECOMMENDATION

8. The following recommendations are made:

- a. That the decision to redeploy FRAFBATT be delayed until clear evidence that continued occupation of Sector 4B by that battalion will lead to violence or that RPA obstruction/ interference prevents execution of the FRAFBATT mission.
- b. That Option 3 be adopted if it becomes necessary to redeploy FRAFBATT and that NICOY occupy Sector 4B.



A.D. BRIMELOW
Lt Col
G3 Plans

15 Nov 94

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

①

File No 5000. (G3 PLANS)

→ To: DCOS Ops

From: G3 Plans 3

Info: G3 Air Ops

Date: 15 Nov 94

Subject: OP RONDAVAL TASK FORCE MANNING

SO - G3 Plans 3

1. On the basis of our discussion yesterday, I would like to form a team from the following:

a. Sqn Ldr Jan Janiurek. If you could provide a replacement for two weeks during the period 21 Nov-9 Dec, Janiurek would be available to me from now until 28 Dec. He has now rationalised the Air Ops job so that it runs very efficiently - his other talents are needed on the Task Force.

SO - G3 Air

b. Maj Andy Moore. Log matters and project management. G4 Maint

c. Maj Don Macneil. HAC Liaison Officer. UNMO -

d. Capt Adam Adamu. Information coordination. LO - DO

e. Capt Glen Leduc. Plans. UNMO - Tac SO

2. Further Options. A number of potential candidates to augment the TF have been suggested:

a. Maj Justin Chanbo (Zambia) - Ops.

b. Capt Charles Moloko (Malawi) - MALAWICOY.

c. Capt Hamaimbo Muzyamba (Zambia) - G4.

d. Capt Edgar Kaunda (Zambia) ZAMBATT (MP).

② DFC/COS/CMO

I would like to discuss this with you at your earliest convenience to get your direction.

DCOS ops
15.11

G-9
8h
17/11/94


DCOS OPS
Let us discuss
17/11
DJF/10

e. Clerical Staff. As there is to be no "temporary" Cell in the hotel, the option of sharing clerical staff is foreclosed. We will need a dedicated slice of clerical support which will need to include stationery, computer and photocopying facilities.

3. Co-Opted Members. I believe we will have to co-opt other members onto the TF Cell as required. Options are:

- a. Maj Paul Rutherford - Comms.
- b. Maj Bruce Oswald - Legal.
- c. Capt Stefan Grenier - PI/information strategy (until PI "expert" arrives).
- d. Lt Danny Gagnon/WO Dupuis - Real Estate/office management for Amahoro Stadium.

4. Timeframe. I will let you know of the timeframe for the formation of the full team. In principle, those in para 1 should be made available soonest, with the entire team ready to go by 28 Nov 94.



T A P MULLARKEY
Maj
G3 Plans 3

01 04 121000Z NOV 94 PP RR UUUU

PLANS 025

HQ UNAMIR

AUSMED

BRITCON

TUNBATT

FRAFBATT

ETHIOBATT

SECTOR 5 MILOBS//CO//

INFO DFC/COS

DCOS SP

MA TO FC

G3 OPS

G3 PLANS

G4

G6/FSO

UNCLAS PLANS 025

SUBJ: SMALL CRAFT HANDLER TRAINING.

GENERAL

1. UNAMIR IS TO COMMENCE WATERBORNE PATROLLING OF LAKE KIVU BY 20 NOV 94.

G9
SB
14/11/94

MA

I think we should ask
CO Ghanbalt to take
advantage of this and get
a few of our men trained in this
field especially if there are for Eng
around. This can be done through
liaison with G3 plans.

UNCLASSIFIED

JG

13/11
DFC/CO

Dr. Diggel
we need for
the next course
of instruction
Cass/over 2 rotation
MA

2. BRITCON, SUPPORTED BY AUSMED, IS TO CONDUCT THE SUBJECT TRAINING FOR ELEMENTS OF TUNBATT, FRAFBATT AND ETHIOBATT DURING PERIOD 14 - 18 NOV 94.

AIM

3. THE AIM OF THIS INSTRUCTION IS TO DETAIL THE COORDINATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE TRAINING PERIOD.

DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

4. DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES ARE DETAILED BELOW:

A. BRITCON

- (1) PROVIDE OIC/SAFETY OFFICER AND THREE INSTRUCTORS.
- (2) PRODUCE TRAINING SYLLABUS.
- (3) COORDINATE INSTRUCTIONAL ACTIVITIES.

B. AUSMED

- (1) PROVIDE TWO INSTRUCTORS.

C. G4 HQ UNAMIR

- (1) ARRANGE TRANSPORTATION OF BOATS TO CONTINGENTS DESIGNATED AT PARAGRAPHS E, F AND G.
- (2) ARRANGE REGULAR MAINTENANCE OF MOTORS AND ENSURE THAT USER MAINTENANCE SCHEDULES ARE AVAILABLE.

03

UUUU

PLANS 025

(3) PROVIDE 650 LTRS OF 2 STROKE FUEL FOR TRG ACTIVITY.

(4) PROVIDE 2 STROKE FUEL RESUPPLY TO USERS AS REQUIRED.

D. FSO. COORD OF COMMUNICATION SAFETY NET WITH BRITCON.

E. TUNBATT

(1) PROVIDE 10 STUDENTS FOR TRAINING.

(2) HOST THE TRAINING ACTIVITY.

F. FRAFBATT. PROVIDE 10 STUDENTS FOR TRAINING.

G. ETHIOBATT

(1) PROVIDE 10 STUDENTS FOR TRAINING.

(2) PROVIDE INTERPRETER IF NECESSARY (ALL INSTRUCTION WILL BE PRESENTED IN ENGLISH).

H. SECTOR 5 MILOB COMMANDER. PROVIDE ACCOMMODATION FOR 6 INSTRUCTORS.
REPORTING

5. STUDENTS ARE TO REPORT TO THE FORMER NAVAL FACILITY AT GISENYI BY
1600 HRS 13 NOV 94. TRAINING IS TO COMMENCE AT 1200 HRS, 14 NOV.
ADMINISTRATION.

6. CONTINGENTS ARE TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT, RATIONS, WATER BEDDING AND
TENTED ACCOMODATION FOR STUDENTS FROM THEIR OWN RESOURCES. ALL
PARTICIPANTS ARE TO BE FULLY SELF SUFFICIENT

04

UUUU

PLANS 025

LIAISON.

7. CAPT I. DENNY, G3 PLANS 4, IS APPOINTED AS COURSE
COORDINION/LIAISON OFFICER.

EQUIPMENT ALLOCATION

8. EACH OF THE CONTINGENTS DESIGNATED IS TO BE ALLOCATED THREE BOATS
AND FOUR OUTBOARD MOTORS. THE CRAFT ALLOCATED TO TUNBATT ARE TO BE
UTILIZED FOR TRAINING.

CONCLUSION

9. THIS TRAINING PERIOD WILL PROVIDE A VALUABLE OPPORTUNITY TO
STANDARDIZE OPERATOR TECHNIQUES AND TO OPTIMIZE OPERATOR SAFETY.
YOUR POSITIVE RESPONSE WILL ADD SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE ENHANCEMENT OF
UNAMIR S SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITY.

LCOLA. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS, 11148

COL J. ARP, DCOS OPS, 11186

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

File No 5000.1 (Plans)

To: Distribution List

From: G3 Plans *JB* *h/c*

Date: 26 Oct 94

Subject: WARNING ORDER

Reference: HQ UNAMIR Msg PLANS 020 of 240800Z OCT 94
(enclosed)

Enclosed, for your information, is the referenced Warning Order.

Enclosure: 1

Distribution List

Internal

Information

List A
List B
CAO
CLO
AUSMED
BRITCON
CANCON
SRSG'S OFFICE
FILE

External

Information

MALAWICOY
MALICOY
ETHIOBATT
TUNBATT

G9
SB
12/11/94

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.1 (PLANS)

01 06 240800Z OCT 94 RR RR UUUU

PLANS 020

HQ UNAMIR

GHANBATT

FRAFBATT

ZAMBATT

INDBATT

NICOY

INFO TACHQ BUTARE

MILOB GP HQ

UNCLAS PLANS 020

SUBJ: WNGO

REF: OPORD 20 DATED 6 OCT 94

1. SIT.

A. AS A RESULT OF RPA ACTIVITIES OBSERVED IN CAMP NDABA, SECT 4B, AND FC S DISCUSSIONS WITH RPA LOS AND PREFECT OF GIKONGORO, FC STRONGLY BELIEVES THAT RPA WILL INTENSIFY EFFORTS DURING NEXT MONTH IN SECTS 4A AND 4B TO ENCOURAGE DPS TO LEAVE THE CAMPS AND RETURN HOME

B. RPA HAVE EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION THAT THESE DPS ARE NOT CONTRIBUTING TO THE OVERALL EFFORT OF REBUILDING RWANDA HOWEVER THEY CONTINUE TO CONSUME VALUABLE RESOURCES REQUIRED ELSEWHERE AND CREATE

UNCLASSIFIED

HEALTH PROBLEMS. RPA EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE DPS TO MOVE FROM CAMPS WILL LIKELY RESULT IN VIOLENCE BETWEEN DPS AND RPA. DANGER TO NGOS AND UNAMIR TROOPS IS ALSO LIKELY. THIS ACTIVITY COULD COINCIDE WITH GHANBATT ROTATION (9-30 NOV 94) WHILE ZAMBATT AND INDBATT HAVE STILL NOT YET DEPLOYED

C. IN CONCERT WITH SRSG, FC WILL PURSUE PREVENTATIVE NEGOTIATIONS WITH BBGNU AND RPA. FC HAS ISSUED ORDERS TO DEPLOYED TROOPS TO INCREASE PRESENCE IN CAMPS WITHIN CAPABILITY AND INSTRUCTED STAFF TO EXPLORE OPTIONS TO REINFORCE AFFECTED SECTORS. LATTER OPTION REQUIRES RAPID DEPLOYMENT OF ZAMBATT AND EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOVE OF INDBATT. PRESENCE OF TROOPS URGENTLY REQUIRED IN PREVENTATIVE DEPLOYMENT IN ORDER TO AVOID POTENTIALLY VIOLENT SITUATION

D. UNAMIR FORCES. GHANBATT DEPLOYMENT IN SECTOR 4A IS RESTRICTED TO 3 X COY DUE TO ADDITIONAL TASKS IN SECTORS 6 AND 2A. ACCORDINGLY, REINFORCEMENT OF SECTOR 4A BY A FURTHER BATTALION IS UNDER CONSIDERATION

2. MSN. TO REINFORCE SECTOR 4A IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN DP CAMPS

3. EXECUTION

A. GENERAL OUTLINE. OP TO BE CONDUCTED IN 2 PHASES:

(1) PHASE 1

- (A) REINFORCEMENT OF SECTOR 4A BY ZAMBATT
- (B) ROTATION OF GHANBATT
- (C) OCCUPATION OF SECTORS 2 AND 6 BY INDBATT

(2) PHASE 2

- (A) OCCUPATION OF SECTOR 2 BY GHANBATT OR ZAMBATT
- (B) COY GP(INDBATT) REDEPLOYS TO SECTOR 6
- (C) ZAMBATT OR GHANBATT OCCUPIES SECTOR 4A IN TOTAL.

B. GP AND TASKS

(1) ZAMBATT

- (A) GP. NO CHANGE
- (B) TASKS. (PHASE 1)
 - (I) OCUPPY SECTOR 4A (NORTH)
 - (II) RELIEVE CHADCOY (FRAFBATT)
 - (III) CONDUCT SECURITY OPERATIONS, CONCENTRATING ON DP CAMPS
 - (IV) REMAINING TASKS PER REF A, PARA 16 B (1)
- (C) PHASE 2

- (I) BE PREPARED TO RELIEVE GHANBATT IN SECTOR 4A (SOUTH)
- (II) MAINTAIN OCCUPATION OF SECTOR 4A (NORTH)
- (III) BE PREPARED TO OCCUPY SECTOR 2
- (IV) REMAINING TASKS NO CHANGE

(2) GHANBATT

(A) GP. NO CHANGE

(B) TASKS. (PHASE 1)

- (I) REDEPLOY TO OCCUPY SECTOR 4A (SOUTH)
- (II) CONDUCT SECURITY OPS CONCENTRATING ON DP CAMPS
- (III) REMAINING TASKS PER REF A PARA 13 B(1)(E) TO (Z)

(C) PHASE 2

- (I) CONDUCT ROTATION BY COMPANY THROUGH SECTOR 6
- (II) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT RELIEF IN PLACE WITH INDBATT IN SECTOR 6
- (III) BE PREPARED TO RELIEVE ZAMBATT IN SECTOR 4A (NORTH)
- (IV) BE PREPARED TO REDEPLOY TO SECTOR 2

(3) FRAFBATT

(A) GP. NO CHANGE

(B) TASKS. (PHASES 1 AND 2) NO CHANGE

(4) INDBATT

(A) GP. NO CHANGE

(B) TASKS (PHASE 1)

(I) NO CHANGE TO SECTOR 6 TASKS AT REF A

(II) BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT COY LEVEL OPERATIONS IN
SECTOR 2

(C) PHASE 2

(I) CONDUCT RIP IN SECTOR 2 WITH ZAMBATT OR GHANBATT

(II) RESUME FULL STRENGTH OPS IN SECTOR 6

(5) COORD INSTR

(A) BOUNDARIES

(I) BOUNDARY SECTOR 4A (NORTH/SOUTH) TO BE COORD WITH
CO/OPS OFFR GHANBATT AND G3 PLANS, HQ BY 26 OCT 94

(II) ZAMBATT/GHANBATT BDRY CHANGE TO BE EFFECTED ON ORDER

(III) SECTOR 4B BDRY CHANGE AS PER ANNEX B REF A ON ORDER
AFTER RELIEF IN PLACE COMPLETE CHADCOY/ZAMBATT(B) TIMINGS. POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS AND TIMELY DEPLOYMENT OF
ZAMBATT AND INDBATT ALONG WITH THE ROTATION OF GHANBATT ARE
KEY FACTORS. ACCORDINGLY ADDRESSEES ARE TO BE PREPARED TO

REACT TO CONTINGENCIES LISTED BELOW

(I) ZAMBATT TO OCCUPY SECTOR 2/ GHANBATT REMAIN IN PLACE

(II) GHANBATT TO ROTATE AS PLANNED - INCOMING BATTALION
TO OCCUPY SECTOR 2/ ZAMBATT CONDUCTS RELIEF IN PLACE WITH
OUTGOING BATTALION IN SECTOR 4A

4. ADMIN AND LOG. NO CHANGE

5. COMMAND AND SIGNALS

A. LOC OF HQ

(1) SECTOR 4A (NORTH) - GIKONGORO

(2) SECTOR 4A (SOUTH) - TBA

B. CONFIRMATORY ORDERS TO FOLLOW

LCOL A. BRIMELOW G3 PLANS, 11148

COL J. ARP, DCOS OPS, 11186

UNCLASSIFIED



OUTGOING FAX NO. 2919

PAGE 1 OF 2

DATE: November 4, 1994

File No. 5000.26 (PLANS)

UNAMIR
194 NOV -5 08 28

Seen by 07/11 DFC/COS

[Signature]

TO: BARIL, UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK FAX # (212) 963-9070 PHONE # (212) 963-2400	FROM: MGEN GC TOUSIGNANT FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI
ATTN:	PHONE: 1 212 963 3092
INFO:	FAX NO: 1 212 963 3090
INTERNAL DISTR: CAO, DFC/COS, DCOS OPS, DCOS SP, G3 OPS	DRAFTED BY: G3 PLANS
SUBJECT: REDUCTION OF UNAMIR TO AUTHORIZED LEVEL	
REFERENCE: YOUR UPD 044 DATED 28 OCT 94	

1. THE DETAIL BELOW IS PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO THE REFERENCE.

2. BASED ON CURRENT TROOP CONTRIBUTION COMMITMENT THE MATURE STRENGTH OF UNAMIR WILL BE 6573 INCLUDING HQ, SPT ELMS, ETC. NATURAL ATTRITION WILL REDUCE THE FORCE TO 5647 WITH THE DEPARTURE OF CANCON ON 25 JAN 94.

3. IT WILL BE NOTED THAT AT THE ENCLOSURE, WHICH DETAILS UNAMIR REDUCTION CALCULATIONS THAT, IN ORDER TO MEET THE AUTHORIZED CEILING OF 5500, IT MAY BE NECESSARY TO REDUCE THE FORCE BY ONE BATTALION. CLEARLY, THIS IS AN UNDESIRABLE OUTCOME IF SECURITY, UNDER INDICATED CIRCUMSTANCES, IS TO BE MAINTAINED. ACCORDINGLY ROTATION OF A COMMENSURATELY SIZED UNIT, GIVEN THE ASSUMED ADDITIONS AT THE ENCLOSURE, WOULD REALIZE A STRENGTH OF 6000,

4. FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

G9
SR 7/11/94

UNAMIR
194 NOV -5 08 47

UNAMIR TROOP STRENGTH

1.	UNAMIR troop strength (4 Nov 94)	5182
	ZAMBATT Main Body (yet to deploy)	366
	INDBATT (yet to deploy)	800
	SUBTOTAL	<hr/> 6348
	HQ, C2, MP, Log Elm	225 (Ref)
	Mature Strength	<hr/> 6573
	Less BRITCON (17 Nov 94)	551
	SUBTOTAL	<hr/> 6022
	Less CANCON (25 Jan 94)	375
	SUBTOTAL	<hr/> 5647
	Less FRAFBATT (Feb 94)	487
	TOTAL	<hr/> 5160

2. The figures below incorporate assumed additions (logistics, C2 and aviation):

UNAMIR troop strength (Feb 94)	5160
Command and Control	125
Logistics	100
Aviation	120
SUBTOTAL	<hr/> 5505
Replacement unit for FRAFBATT	500
TOTAL	<hr/> 6000

5000.8 (PLANS)

HQ UNAMIR
OPS BRANCH

3/ Oct 1994

Distribution List

SUBJECT: PROTECTION OF DISPLACED PERSONS CAMPS - ROE

Ref: A. FRAGO No. 02 to OPORD 20 dated 22 oct 94
B. UN Security Council Resolution 925 dated 8 June 94
C. OPDIR No. 2 - ROE dated 6 Oct 94

1. Reference A directs all commanders to increase UN presence in refugee camps within RWANDA. Contingency plans have been developed to reinforce certain sectors in the event that displaced persons (DPs) are forcibly removed from their camps.

2. Clearly, if this situation arises, the potential for confrontation will emerge. Under these circumstances, a sound understanding of the applicable Rules of Engagement is fundamental.

3. Reference B mandates UNAMIR to "contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in RWANDA" and "Recognizes that UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief".

4. Reference C provides clear guidance for the application of Resolution 925. The following provisions should be specifically noted:


- a. Authority to use force. The use of force is authorized to protect the above designated individuals against forcible removal from the camps which they occupy (Ref C, para 8).
- b. The principles for the use of force must be adhered to (Ref C, para 7).
- c. Challenge and escalation procedures are to be followed (Ref C, paras 14 and 15).

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- d. Units involved in the protection of DP camps are to remain on State GREEN (Annex A to Ref C) until ordered otherwise.



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MGen
FC

Distribution List:

Action:

List C

Info:

List A

List B

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should have a copy
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DFC/CO5

3000.12 (PLANS)

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH

22nd October 1994

Distribution List

SUBJECT: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SECURITY OF
UNAMIR AND NGO INSTALLATIONS IN KIGALI CITY

- Ref: A. Op Dir No. 2 Rules of Engagement dated 6 Oct 94
B. HQ UNAMIR FC Directive On the Handling of Detainees
(to be revised)
C. HQ UNAMIR Op Instruction 3000.12 (Ops) dated 30 Aug 94

GENERAL

1. UNAMIR and NGO installations in KIGALI are vulnerable to trespass by armed or unarmed unauthorised personnel; there have been attempted encroachments in the past. The Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) has been constituted to provide a direct response to this threat. On order, INDBATT will assume RRF responsibilities from GHANBATT, AUSMED and CANCON.

MISSION

2. To protect UNAMIR and NGO installations in Kigali against unauthorised encroachments.

EXECUTION

3. General Outline. The RRF is a motorised platoon. It is capable of responding to an immediate threat at section level, and to augment that force as required, up to platoon level. INDBATT will assume full Sector 6 RRF responsibilities on order.

4. Groupings and Tasks.

a. INDBATT.

(1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Tasks

(a) Assume responsibility for RRF.

(b) Detail one infantry section as RRF.

(c) Undertake the following on order:

(i) Guard threatened UNAMIR/NGO installations,

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(ii) Provide sentries for unmanned UN property,

(iii) Protect NGO facilities,

(iv) Escort unauthorized persons out of UN property or installations, and

(v) Arrest and handover trespassers to local authorities with the assistance of UNAMIR Military Police, in accordance with Ref B.

(vi) Escort HQ UNAMIR civilian staff to respective homes during the hours of darkness.

(d) Be prep to reinforce RRF section with up to two Inf Sections.

(e) Be prepared to reinforce or provide guards at the installations indicated at Annex A.

(f) Be prepared to protect VIPs.

b. AUSMED.

(1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Task

(a) Discontinue RRF responsibilities.

(b) Handover designated responsibilities to INDBATT.

c. CANCON.

(1) Grouping. No change.

(2) Task

(a) Discontinue RRF responsibilities.

(b) Handover designated responsibilities to INDBATT.

d. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Section at 30 mins NTM daily.

(2) First reinforcement section at 60 min NTM.

(3) Reinforcement section 2 at 90 min NTM.

(4) Assy area - sect location.

(5) Rules of Engagement as per Ref A.

SERVICE SUPPORT

5. Wpn/Ammo. Tps are to carry personal wpns and first line ammo.

6. Med.

a. First line - Coy Aid Post.

b. Second/Third line - Central Hospital Kigali

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

7. Control. Authority to deploy RRF to be exercised by Ops Duty Officer (UNAMIR HQ).

8. Radio. RRF Comd to be on Force Coord Net channel 7.

a. Callsigns

(1) INDBATT RRF Section - RR1;

(2) INDBATT Reinforcement Section 1 - RR2; and


(3) INDBATT Reinforcement Section 2 - RR3.

9. Codewords.

<u>Codewords</u>	<u>Meaning</u>	<u>Issued By</u>
RANGER	Require RRF	HQUNAMIR Duty Officer
COOLER	Withdraw RRF	HQUNAMIR Duty Officer
ZOOM	Move to Force HQ	HQUNAMIR Duty Officer

10. NICKNAMES. Annex A.

11. Ref C is cancelled.


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Brig Gen
DFC/COS

Annex:

Annex A - List of Installations and Nicknames

Distribution:

External:

Action:

AUSMED
CANCON
GHANBATT
INDBATT

Info:

BRITCON
HAC
MILOB GP HQ

Internal:

LIST A
LIST B

ANNEX A TO
3000.12 (PLANS)
DATED 22 OCT 94

LIST OF INSTALLATIONS AND NICKNAMES

<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>NICKNAME</u>
1. UNAMIR HQ (Amahoro Hotel)	HOME RUN
2. Kigali Airport/Warehouse	POT BELLY
3. Amahoro Stadium (CANCON/BRITCON)	PALM WINE
4. 500 man transit camp	BIG HOUSE
5. Log Base (Rwandex)	GOOD HOPE
6. Communications compound	CAPE FEAR
7. MAN Diesel compound	SNAKE CHARM
8. Kigali Central Hospital	RED RAIN
9. Belgian Village (UNAMIR staff)	SINGLE FILE
10. MT compound (Workshop)	WILD WEST
11. UNICEF Bldg (UNAMIR)	IVORY TOWER
12. UNDP Bldg (UNHCR)	COW LEG
13. Hotel Meridien (MILOBs)	HIP BONE
14. Military Academy	LOW BROW
15. MILOB GP HQ/CIVPOL HQ	COLD SHOWER
16. IVECO compound (Brown & Root)	BIG HAMMER
17. Chez Lando (UN civilians)	LONG JUMP
18. TRAFIPRO COMPOUND	APPLE PIE
19. Spare	TOM THUMB
20. Spare	LIGHT HOUSE
21. Spare	CRAZY HORSE

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Mr Harman

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.14(G3 PLANS)

To: Nick Harman
Information Consultant
SRSG's Office

From: G3 Plans 3

Date: 18 Oct 94

Subject: FACTSHEETS FOR RWANDA

Reference: Your minute dated 14 October.

1. Thank you for a chance to comment on the Factsheet.

2. I have two specific points:

a. Patronizing. I think we have to be very careful to avoid sounding patronizing. The sentences highlighted have, I suggest, the capacity to sound a little OTT. While there is every merit in being compassionate, these examples may be a little too empathic.

b. Jargon. I believe there may be a little too much "jargon" for the consumption of even the literati. While many of your target audience will be educated, the too prolific use of terms which are common in the UN, may prove to be an obstacle to comprehension and dissemination in the country. The term "NGO" is used, as is "non governmental organisations". I think this could be confusing. Similarly, references to the numerous bodies and agencies, within and without the UN, might serve to impede, rather than speed, the progress of our message.

3. In short, I feel the thrust of the Factsheet is very positive and can only help to prepare the ground for further information work. Were it simpler, and a little more direct, I feel it would have greater impact.

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T. A. P. Mullarkey

T A P MULLARKEY
Maj
G3 Plans 3

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19/10

FROM: SQN LDR AA GAJERE
AIR OPS CELL, KIA

TO : DFC
FHQ

DATE: 18 Oct 94

SUBJECT: CLOSURE OF AIR OPS CELL - KIA

Sir,

1. Last week a letter was sent to the air ops cell notifying the cessation of the air ops cell duties at the airport. It was instructed that all duties of the air ops cell should be handed over to the civilian authority not later than 31 Oct 94. As a member of the air ops cell, I have a few observations to make on the hurried closure of the air ops cell.
2. The air ops cell was established to achieve the following:
 - a. To mainly provide assistance and clearances to especially relief flights destined to Rwanda.
 - b. To ensure that humanitarian flights operating into Rwanda are screened and monitored for security reasons.
 - c. To establish and continue to show a firm UNAMIR presence at the airport.
 - d. To provide a means of joint control with the civilian authority until a large part of the force has been repatriated or UNAMIR interest is no longer necessary nor required.
 - e. To clear all flights after the government approval.

With the above responsibilities, the air ops cell was established by UNAMIR and, and the Rwandese on the other hand established a liaison office at the Airport.

3. The decision to close the air ops cell came as a surprise as even the LO and the Airport Manager were not consulted before a final decision was taken to close the office. I will like to make the following observation on the planned closure:

①
FC (WITH RANK)
I returned from Louisa to see the instructions on the closure of the cell at the airport. The views advanced here by the officer, who is one of the original members with whom we established the cell, appear constructive to me. My suggestion is that it is too early to close the cell. May I have your views Sir. *[Signature]*
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a. The primary focus of UNAMIR at the moment is humanitarian assistance. Our interest can be sustained by having UNAMIR presence at the airport.


b. The relief operation has not ended as many fresh requests are being recieved daily by the air ops cell for processing. Some of these requests come from organitions and agencies that know little about Rwanda and as such require every assistance from UNAMIR. On the average there are 20 flights daily with about 15 flights relating to humanitarian requirements.

c. Clearances given jointly by UNAMIR and the Rwandese government representative gives credibility and security of operation to the agencies bringing in relief materials. Some organisations and agencies would be reluctant to accept clearances or assurances given by the government alone. Infact, this point was reiterated by the LO at the airport.

d. Although the situation appears calm, we cannot now relagate our authority to mere monitoring at the airport. We should not forget our experience when the war broke-out in April. There is need for some control and close monitoring of the vital entry entry and exit point especially at the strategic level.

4. From the above observations, I suggest that the planned closure of the air ops cell should be approached with caution and the withdrawal plan be gradual and properly coordinated with the government at the appropriate level. The Rwandese government from my discussion with the LO at the airport, is well aware of the responsibilities entrusted to UNAMIR by allowing the establishment of the air ops cell. The closure of the air ops cell at this time without enough transitional period will send the wrong signal about UNAMIR activities in Rwanda. The closure should marry with the withdrawal of the contingent. Even if it becomes necessary to hand-over, I suggest a simple hand-over ceremony be held as a PR for UNAMIR activities in Rwanda.

5. Sir, the above is meant to appraise you with situation at the Airport.


AA GAJERE
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MILOB



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OUTGOING FAX NO. 2125

PAGE 1 OF 18

DATE: October 3, 1994

File No. 5000.26 (PLANS)

MIR 1969

Toussignant

TO: BARIL, UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK FAX # (212) 963-1356 PHONE # (212) 963-3310	FROM: MGEN GC TOUSIGNANT FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI
ATTN:	PHONE: 1 212 963 3092
INFO:	FAX NO: 1 212 963 3090
INTERNAL DISTR: SRSG, FC, DFC, CAO, DCOS OPS, DCOS SP	DRAFTED BY: G3 PLANS
SUBJECT: FC APPRECIATION ON UNAMIR FORCE STRUCTURE	
REFERENCE: UNNY UPD 016	

1. PLEASE FIND ENCLOSED THE SUBJECT DOCUMENT AS REQ AT REF.
2. THE FOLLOWING MATTERS SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY NOTED:
 - A. THE FORCE STRUCTURE PROPOSED AT THE ENCLOSURE EXCEEDS THE AUTHORISED STRENGTH BY APPROX 500 PERSONNEL AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF BRITCON, CANCON AND THE COMMENCEMENT OF NATURAL ATTRITION. AUTHORIZATION IS SOUGHT ACCORDINGLY.
 - B. ENGINEER SUPPORT IS EXPECTED TO BE ADEQUATELY MET BY INDBATT RESOURCES (COMPLETE ENGINEER COY). CANADIAN COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT WILL BE WITHDRAWN BY CANCON. THE UNAMIR COMMUNICATIONS PROPOSAL WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF A SEPARATE PAPER FOR SUBMISSION BY 10 OCT 94.
 - C. THE FORMATION OF A LOGISTIC SUPPORT GROUP BASED ON THE CANADIAN 3 CSG CAPABILITY IS CRITICAL TO THE MAINTENANCE OF EFFECTIVE LOGISTIC SUPPORT ONCE BRITCON DEPARTS RWANDA. THIS CONCEPT MUST BE CONSIDERED AS AN URGENT MATTER. STAFFING OF UNHQ APPROVAL AND NATIONAL CONCURRENCE MUST BE SOUGHT ASAP. THIS LSG MUST BE IN PLACE BY 1 NOV AND OPERATIONAL NO LATER THAN 15 NOV.
 - D. THE TROOP REQUIREMENT PRESENTED UNDER AN EXPANDED MANDATE SCENARIO IS EXPECTED TO BE APPLICABLE SHOULD A SEPARATE MANDATE BE ESTABLISHED.

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AN APPRECIATION ON UNAMIR FORCE STRUCTURE

AIM

1. To identify an appropriate UNAMIR force structure with the following limitations:
 - a. The authorised strength of the force is 5500;
 - b. The troop strength currently committed by UNHQ is approximately 1500 personnel in excess of the UN authorised strength;
 - c. The UNAMIR mandate might be expanded in the future to include an unknown regional scope.

FACTORS

Threat

2. There are reports of approximately 20,000 former RGF troops in camps in ZAIRE. The troops are based around the towns of GOMA and BUKAVU. It is estimated that a further 10,000 - 15,000 troops are located in BURUNDI and TANZANIA. Approximately 10,000 RGF troops are located in the MUNGAGA refugee camp. A recent mission to ZAIRE has reported that the RGF command structure is relatively intact, however, troops are reportedly killing each other and refugees for food.
3. It is assessed that the former RGF has the capability to mount small scale insurgency operations at the moment. Little evidence of such a campaign has been seen apart from isolated incidents described as "banditry" and Interhamwe activity in the south and south east. There does not appear to be a coordinated campaign, which is probably due to the requirement for training and consolidation. It is assessed that the reorganisation process is in progress at the moment and that the capability to mount small scale insurgency operations could be developed within six months. The risk of such operations increases as time progresses. The fundamental indication of a deteriorating security situation could be overt and concentrated subversive activities in cross border camps followed by growing popular support. The size and effectiveness of future RGF operations will depend on the level of external support (training, funds, popular support). The capability to conduct conventional operations is unlikely to be developed in the foreseeable future.
4. It is unlikely that the bulk of the Hutu refugees in ZAIRE and TANZANIA will return to RWANDA within a year unless the ZAIRIAN authorities decide on a policy of forcible repatriation (which is assessed to be unlikely). This population in exile potentially provides a political support base for a large scale and sustained insurgency campaign unless steps are taken to repatriate refugees and demobilise the former RGF. Recent discussions in ZAIRE with the Deputy Force Commander,

UNAMIR indicate that the RGF leadership holds UNAMIR responsible for the overthrow of the former government and that separation of the RGF from civilians was not desired by those who present themselves as spokespersons of the refugees. Accordingly, UNAMIR is regarded as being RPA biased and agitation for the repatriation of RGF troops and civilians is taking place.

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RPA

5. The RPA consists of approximately five brigades. Many soldiers are newly recruited. Transport resources are limited and the communications capability is not well developed.
6. The RPA capability will clearly improve with time, however this does not accord with the potential growth in threat presented by the RGF.

Current UNAMIR Force

7. The force currently deployed in RWANDA consists of :
 - a. three infantry battalions (11 companies);
 - b. one independent infantry company;
 - c. MILOBS and CIVPOL;
 - d. Headquarters staff;
 - e. medical support force;
 - f. support battalion comprised of engineer, logistics and maintenance elements;
 - g. signals unit; and
 - h. a 3rd line logistics support group.

Total personnel - 4200

8. Given the current security situation, the currently deployed force capacity is limited essentially to the conduct of operations in the south west of the country with a small security element in KIGALI CITY. There is no substantial UN presence in the remainder of the country.
9. If all committed troops are deployed by mid November, the force will total approximately 7000 (six battalions and 3 independent companies - 24 companies).
10. If the increase is not authorised by the Security Council, force reduction will be necessary to accord with the resolution strength of 5500.
11. The committed force of six battalions and three independent rifle companies provides the capacity to provide a strong UN presence throughout RWANDA.

Deductions from Threat and Own Forces

12. The present, relatively benign security situation in RWANDA is probably due to the former RGF's lack of capacity to mount and sustain effective insurgent operations.

13. A strong UN presence in RWANDA is necessary to ensure interim security until the BBGNU has the clear capacity to assume full responsibility for security and the establishment and maintenance of stability.

14. Removal of subversive elements in cross border camps will present the RPA with the time required to develop to the point where assumption of full responsibility for security will be feasible.

15. The threat assessment suggests three possible security scenarios in RWANDA as follows:

- a. Status quo. Maintenance of the current security situation is largely dependant on the deployment of UN troops throughout the country. In order to achieve this, deployment of the committed force is required. As the situation develops, revised estimates will be necessary in order to more accurately define the force structure required.
- b. Deteriorating Situation. The RGF does not have the capacity to conduct coordinated operations, therefore operations would probably be sporadic and localised. The security situation is unlikely to deteriorate in multiple sectors. Should a credible threat emerge, reinforcement of the affected sector(s) by the force in being would be required to contain the situation.
- c. Improved Security Situation. As the situation improves, reduction of the force could be anticipated, however, maintenance of a UN presence throughout the country would be necessary.

16. The likelihood of each of these scenarios is largely dependant on resolution of the situation in the refugee camps located in neighbouring countries. The tenuous security situation in cross border refugee camps has a potential long term effect on the maintenance of security in RWANDA. Separation of the former RGF from its political base and demobilisation will contribute significantly to the establishment of stability. An expanded mandate would demonstrate UN resolve to address the situation.

17. RGF attribution of the overthrow of the former government and the RPA victory to UNAMIR may require the establishment of a separate Mission(s) to effectively address the situation outside RWANDA.

18. If UN sponsored operations are to be conducted in neighbouring countries, the simultaneous conduct of security operations in RWANDA will be necessary if a secure base (from which such operations are to be mounted and supported) is to be maintained. This requirement will necessitate commitment of a larger force (with additional C3, air and armoured mobility, engineers, logistics and equipment) than that currently contemplated.

Assessment of Troop Requirement

19. The current outline of tasks required of UNAMIR are as follows:

- a. Provide security in order to facilitate the humanitarian effort; and
- b. Commitment of UNAMIR resources in direct support of the humanitarian effort.

20. The troop requirement to carry out these tasks under the three scenarios is as follows:

- a. Scenario 1 - Status Quo.

- (1) Sector 1 - one independent (reinforced) company;
- (2) Sector 2 - three companies (one battalion (-));
- (3) Sector 3 - two companies;
- (4) Sector 4A - four companies (one battalion);
- (5) Sector 4B - three companies (one battalion (-));
- (6) Sector 4C - four companies (one battalion);
- (7) Sector 5 - four companies (one battalion);
- (8) Sector 6 - two companies (one battalion (-)); and
- (9) Reserve - drawn from the force in being.

TOTAL - 23 companies (six battalions and three independent companies)

- (10) Force support - one engineer company, one transport company (or civilian equivalent), one maintenance platoon (or civilian equivalent), one medical support force and a signals unit.
- (11) All available residual effort is committed to humanitarian assistance.

b. Scenario 2 - Deteriorated Situation.

- (1) Sector 1 - three companies (battalion (-));
- (2) Sector 2 - three companies (battalion (-));
- (3) Sector 3 - two companies;
- (4) Sector 4A - four companies (battalion);
- (5) Sector 4B - three companies (battalion (-));
- (6) Sector 4C - four companies (battalion);
- (7) Sector 5 - four companies (battalion);
- (8) Sector 6 - three companies (battalion (-)); and
- (9) Reserve - drawn from force in being

TOTAL - 26 companies (seven battalions and two independent companies)

- (10) Force support - no change.

c. Scenario 3 - Improved Situation.

- (1) Sector 1 - one company;
- (2) Sector 2/6 - four companies (battalion);
- (3) Sector 3A - one company;

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- (4) Sector 4A/B/C - four companies (battalion);
- (5) Sector 5/3B - four companies (battalion).
- TOTAL - 14 companies (three battalions and two independent companies)
- (6) Force Support - one engineer company, maintenance element (military or civil), transport element (military or civil), reduced medical element.
- (7) The force reserve and all other resources would be committed to humanitarian assistance.

d. **Expanded Mandate**

- (1) This scenario is overarching and could conceivably occur concurrently with scenarios 1 and 2 (status quo and deteriorated); however, it is unlikely that this would occur in Scenario 3 unless in the distant future.
- (2) The lack of specific guidance precludes development of a precise force structure. A detailed assessment of the threat (organisation, strength, dispositions, capabilities etc), the terrain (going, numbers, size and shape of refugee camps etc) and the level of involvement by neighbouring states would be necessary to determine the feasibility of a larger scale operation conducted simultaneously into all affected neighbouring states or a phased operation with limited objectives. The requirement to conduct the former could conceivably involve a division (+) sized force with attendant training, command and control and support implications. The following force levels are indicative of the minimum requirement for the latter option:

ZAIRE - eight companies (two battalions)
 TANZANIA - four companies (one battalion)
 BURUNDI - four companies (one battalion)
 RWANDA - 23 companies (status quo)
 Reserve - drawn from RWANDA

TOTAL - 39 companies (10 battalions and three independent companies)

Force Support - additional transport, maintenance and enhanced communications capability.

- (3) It is assessed that the minimum requirement to conduct a phased operation with limited objectives would be eight companies (two battalions) dedicated to the expanded mandate task.
- (4) Unity of command and interoperability will be a fundamental requirement of the force.

Deductions from Assessment of Troop Requirement

21. The currently committed force is in excess of the UN authorised strength. Once the force is deployed, reduction could be prudently effected by natural attrition as follows:

- a. Mid November - BRITCON departs (600) (Note)

Bal 6400

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- b. Mid November - GHANBATT rotates with three company battalion (600) Bal 6200
- c. February - CANCON departs (400) (Note) Bal 5800
- d. Balance consists of three battalions (-), three full strength battalions and three independent companies in addition to engineer, signals and service support.
- e. Reduction by natural attrition will require Security Council approval to exceed the authorised strength. Consultation and approval will have to be sought from the Government of GHANA.

Note: Provided civilian component/Brown and Root is ready to assume responsibility for logistics and communications support (see full assessment at Enclosure 1).

22. Maintenance of the **status quo** will require a force of approximately 300 personnel in excess of the authorised strength until the security situation improves.

23. **Deteriorating security** would require four additional companies, however, widespread disruption is unlikely, therefore, reinforcement by units in relatively unaffected sectors is a reasonable basis for planning purposes. The permanent allocation of additional forces is not required.

24. An **improved security** situation provides for force reduction of nine companies (two battalions and one independent company). This could also be achieved by natural attrition.

25. An **expanded mandate** could require up to 16 additional companies (four battalions) with commensurate service support, however, with limited objectives and a phased operation, this could be reduced to two battalions. The net infantry requirement under an expanded mandate is assessed as follows:

- a. Status Quo. 31 companies - 23+8 (eight battalions and three independent companies);
- b. Deteriorating Situation. 31 companies - 23+8 (eight battalions and three independent companies);
- c. Improved Situation. 22 companies - 14+8 (five battalions and two independent companies)

26. Depending on the political framework and the military concept, this taskforce should come from a single contributing nation or one treaty organisation (such as NATO) to reduce the pre deployment training commitment and to maximise unity of command, interoperability and logistics supportability. The task force should be organised as an independent force with organic C3, armoured mobility, engineer and logistics support. The force should be allocated to OPCON Force Commander UNAMIR under an expanded mandate, however, it should be noted that the establishment of a separate Mission(s) may be more appropriate.

27. The following additional support capabilities would be required:

- a. One or more headquarters;
- b. Airmobility for up to a company sized force;
- c. Armoured mobility;
- d. Field engineers;

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- e. Enhanced communications for HQ UNAMIR; and
- f. Increased logistic capability.

Logistic Support

- 28. The remaining logistics capability will be unable to meet UNAMIR's support requirements once the departure of BRITCON is effected.
- 29. The logistic support appreciation at Enclosure 1 identifies three courses of action to support UNAMIR as follows:
 - a. Fully contracted support;
 - b. Full military support; and
 - c. Integrated support.
- 30. The preferred course of action is integrated support.
- 31. The establishment of integrated support would require an additional 100 military to augment the Canadian 3 CSG.
- 32. Under an expanded mandate the following factors apply:
- 33. The residual capacity of the logistic support capability proposed at Enclosure 1 would be limited.
- 34. The current Medical Support Force has the capability to support a force of up to 7000.
- 35. The AME capability available to UNAMIR is limited to the force in being.

Deductions from Logistic Support

- 36. The present logistics capability has the capacity to support UNAMIR until 17 Nov 94. Augmentation will be required before that date.
- 37. Augmentation of and extended commitment of 3 CSG will require UN and National approval to achieve integrated logistic support.
- 38. Under an expanded mandate, additional troops must be deployed with an appropriate allocation of 2nd line logistics support and a commensurate level 2, surgical, air/road evacuation capability.

Summary of Deductions

- 39. The RPA lacks the capability, in the short term, to maintain security in RWANDA in the face of the potential threat
- 40. The UNAMIR force requirement depends largely on the pervading security situation. The minimum requirement is as follows:
 - a. Status quo. 23 companies (six battalions and three independent companies);

- 7/18
- b. Deteriorating Situation. No change from status quo, given that reinforcement would be provided by unaffected sectors (para 20);
 - c. Improved Situation. 14 companies (three battalions and two independent companies); and
 - d. Expanded Mandate:
 - (1) Eight additional companies (two battalions);
 - (2) Organic C3 capability;
 - (3) Air and armoured mobility;
 - (4) Engineer support;
 - (5) 2nd line logistics support;
 - (6) AME and ambulance support; and
 - (7) Enhanced communications for HQ UNAMIR

41. Unless a significant increase in refugee movement from cross border camps emerges in the near future, an expanded mandate should be considered as a high priority option.

42. Under an expanded mandate, the identification of limited objectives and a phased operation will be necessary.

43. The maintenance of security in RWANDA is critical to the success of an expanded mandate option.

44. The establishment of a separate Mission may be a more practical alternative to expansion of UNAMIR's mandate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

45. The following recommendations are made:
- a. Maintain the currently committed force until a clear trend of improved security emerges;
 - b. Seek Security Council authorisation to exceed the resolution strength by up to 500 personnel;
 - c. Seek national approval to extend the commitment of the Canadian 3CSG;
 - d. Seek Security Council planning guidance on the perceived military and political objectives of an expanded mandate and the proposed scope thereof;
 - e. Subject to the provision of clear planning guidance for the conduct of operations under an expanded mandate, confirm the availability of the following capabilities:
 - (1) 2 - 11 infantry battalions under unified command with organic communications;
 - (2) 2nd line logistics and level 2 medical self sufficiency;
 - (3) Engineer, helicopter and APC support; and

- (4) Commensurate enhancement of HQ UNAMIR's communications.

10/18

Enclosure:

1. Appreciation on UNAMIR logistics support.

11/18

ADMINISTRATIVE APPRECIATION
TO SUPPORT UNAMIR FORCES
AND EXPANDED UNAMIR OPTIONS

AIM

1. To support UNAMIR operations in theatre and expanded options with the following limitations:

- a. second line logistic support arrangements are as yet undefined,
- b. some second line support elements do not currently have a mandate that allows their deployment into neighbouring countries,
- c. civilian contractors are not immediately available on 24 hour call, and
- d. BRITCON will commence redeployment from 17 November.

FACTORS

2. Maximum planned strength is 7000 personnel, 800 prime movers and associated equipment which should, under current planning fall to approximately 5500. The military vehicles alone, cover almost 50 different types of manufacturer/models.

3. The following factors require consideration:

- a. Maintenance and transport support provided by BRITCON will become non-operational by mid November 1994, prior to BRITCON leaving theatre.
- b. UNAMIR has no dedicated second line supply support agency. However, limited supply support has been provided by 3 CSG and this subunit is due to leave the theatre in January 1995. Limited supply support has also been provided by Brown and Root although the support has been rudimentary. UNAMIR currently has no visibility of the stocks or progress of demands.
- c. Although Brown and Root are keen, enthusiastic and competent they are limited by the serviceability of their equipment, and scarcity of tools, both of which are a UN responsibility. It is acknowledged that, given time and resources, Brown and Root could provide a satisfactory level of second and third line support.

12/18

- d. With the split of UNAMIR into six main sectors and the ~~possibility of expansion~~ into neighbouring countries there exists a requirement to deploy forward logistic groups that cater for the second line logistic needs of those elements of the force remote from Kigali, the logistic base.
- e. Force transport has no vehicles fitted with cranes or trailer pulling capability. This severely limits vehicle fleet flexibility in that many loads cannot be moved in bulk and there is no self load and discharge capability in the fleet.
- f. The diverse nature of the deployed fleet places a huge strain on the supply of repair parts and fuel to the contingents.
- g. Problems with the supply of rations, water and POL will increase as the force increases and the roads deteriorate due to the onset of the wet season, although this is to be alleviated to a degree by the acquisition of Log Cap equipment.
- h. The Bedford fleet have no winches and therefore no self recovery facility.
- i. The force has no integral very heavy lift (semi-trailer) capability. Heavy lift is provided by contractors from Uganda.
- j. The manning of logistic functions within neighbouring countries by civilians poses a problem particularly under an expanded mandate. Whilst Brown and Root may be willing to perform all functions under an expanded mandate, in practice, the employment of civilian contractors has its limitations whereas support by military units would be a distinct advantage in this environment.
- k. There is no dedicated distribution organization and system.
- l. The contractual system employed by UNAMIR for the provision of services by Brown and Root was hampered by constant referral to UNOSOM. The Brown and Root contract was an adjunct to the UNOSOM contract and when this situation is amended, will give UNAMIR more flexibility in the management of the contract. The performance of Brown and Root has been restricted because UNAMIR has been competing for resources with UNOSOM.
- m. The Bedford fleet, although suitable for First Line tasks in the UNAMIR environment, is unsuitable to provide Second Line support. In addition, it is nearing the end of its useful life and availability will continue to decline over the coming weeks. ISUZU, UNIMOG and MAN trucks can be used to supplement the Brown and root fleet in the short term but they will deteriorate due to a current shortage of repair parts.

13/18

Deductions

4. An alternate second line logistic system (supply, transport and maintenance) must be formed and in place by 1 November 1994.
5. Planning for the new logistic system needs to be complete by 7 October 1994 to allow for the development and deployment of the required personnel by 31 October 1994.
6. The command, supervisory and logistic operations function of the second line logistic system must be military. This situation is required until the logistic system is effective and Brown and Root can recruit, train and progressively deploy civilian staff to replace military staff (approximately six to twelve months). Thereafter, a military logistics capability must be maintained in order to provide flexibility and a surge capability.
7. If the force second line vehicle fleet is not updated then the fleet may become unsupportable.
8. The second line vehicle fleet must be able to carry ISO containers and APCs, and to reach troops deployed in the field via secondary roads. Therefore, vehicles must have a limited off road capability (including all wheel drive), a carrying capacity of 10 tonnes, and be accompanied by 20 tonne trailers. In addition, one in five vehicles require a crane for self load and discharge, and one in five vehicles (not necessarily those with a crane) require a winch for self recovery. These requirements can only be satisfied by the acquisition of a new fleet of vehicles.
9. There is a requirement to quantify Class 9, repair parts, support as the contingents arrive in theatre or preferably before. Once this is complete, appropriate procurement action needs to be initiated which could most conveniently and effectively be achieved by LOAs. Repair parts need to be ordered in sufficient quantities to sustain contingents for at least 60 days with an additional 60 days in reserve.
10. Engineer support will be required to maintain supply routes in the wet season.

Assessment of Tasks

11. Until the departure of BRITCON both second line maintenance and transport support to the force will be sufficient to maintain current operations.
12. As no dedicated second line military supply organization exists supply support will continue to be provided by 3 CSG, even though this is outside their agreed charter of support. Until such time as 3 CSG depart, their command status should be amended to under operational control of UNAMIR. 3 CSG is due to leave in late January 1995. This situation will require additional supply support to be acquired for the conduct of UNAMIR operations in the mission for both the current and expanded mandate. If a military element is deployed then the option

17/8

rests with UNAMIR to hire additional contractor support to supplement specific operations or shortfalls in the military capabilities.

13. The employment of a logistic element based on the courses offered will suffice for the both the current and a deteriorating situation in Rwanda. The force will also need to be capable of supporting a deployment to neighbouring countries to cater for any expanded mandate. In the event of an improved situation in Rwanda the force deployed would have inherent flexibility and redundancy; under certain circumstances it could be scaled down to suit the requirement.

COURSES OPEN

14. After the departure of BRITCON in early November there are three logistic courses open.

15. Course 1 - Fully Contracted Support. Develop the Brown and Root facility within Rwanda to provide logistic support to the force with a capacity to deploy a Forward Logistic Group (FLG) both within and outside Rwanda.

a. Advantages.

- (1) On going support is not controlled by government decisions on the deployment of military forces.
- (2) Brown and Root are experienced in operating in a UN environment.
- (3) Brown and Root already provide a basic level of support to UNAMIR which is expandable.
- (4) Brown and Root have established a good knowledge of operating conditions and resources available within Rwanda.

b. Disadvantages

- (1) There is the potential for an inflexible arrangement with a big company, although the contractual arrangements, if sufficiently tight, should negate this.
- (2) There is a high financial commitment for the use of civilian contractors over a military unit.
- (3) The provision of necessary tool kits for Brown and Root may delay their deployment.
- (4) The Brown and Root contract expires on 31 December 1994. An international competitive tender will be accepted and if required a handover from Brown and Root will need to be conducted in December.

- 157/18
- (5) Brown and Root cannot provide all the logistic support requirements of UNAMIR within the time- frame of the departure of BRITCON.
 - (6) Brown and Root cannot provide an effective command and control organization required of a second line logistic organization in the short term. Brown and Root currently cannot act independently and therefore they can not be responsive to the logistic needs that arise at short notice.

16. Course 2 - Full Military Support. UNAMIR to request formal support from the Canadian government to increase the role, establishment and command status of 3 CSG. This course assumes that 3 CSG would initially be given the task of logistic support but plans would need to be developed to replace them with another military force in the future. The expanded unit would be structured to provide second line maintenance, supply and transport support to the force using UN resources. The contingent is to provide a military deployable force to support operations in the event of an expanded mandate. There is no contractor support to be provided through Brown and Root or any other contractor.

a. Advantages.

- (1) A military force with established and proven procedures would require little or no set up assistance from UN.
- (2) UN would retain absolute control over logistic operations within UNAMIR.
- (3) The command and control of the 3 CSG element is already in place and would only require a change to command procedures within UNAMIR. The current organization is also cognizant of UN and contractual procedures.
- (4) This course would provide for an easy transfer to another military unit.

b. Disadvantages.

- (1) This course requires Canadian and UN approval before deployment, which may delay the insertion of the logistic troops.
- (2) If third line support was not available from Brown and Root then the 3 CSG organization would need to become very large in order to cope with the additional responsibilities and continue to provide flexibility which should be inherent in a military organisation.
- (3) This course does not make the best use of the limited military numbers deployed to UNAMIR.

16/18

17. Course 3 - Integrated Logistic Support. UN requests formal support from Canadian government for a command and control element, approximately 80-100 personnel, and invoke Brown and Root and other contractors to augment the logistic functions and the change of command status of 3 CSG to under command UNAMIR. The contingent is to provide a military deployable force to support operations in the event of an expanded mandate.

a. Advantages.

- (1) Adoption of this course would minimize set up time because fewer Canadian logistic staff would be required and the expansion of Brown and Root can be usefully employed in the tasks for which they are best suited.
- (2) Both the 3 CSG command and control cell and Brown and Root are experienced in operating in an UN environment as well as a detailed knowledge of the contractual arrangements currently in place.
- (3) UNAMIR would retain absolute control of logistic operations in Rwanda and surrounding countries if required.
- (4) The logistic force would be capable of supporting 24 hour operations in any environment.

b. Disadvantages.

- (1) This course still requires both Canadian and UN approval for the deployment of additional Canadian logistic staff.
- (2) This arrangement would require a clear chain of command between 3 CSG and Brown and Root.

SELECTION OF BEST COURSE

18. Course 3 offers the most practicable solution. It is envisaged that Canadian support, whilst forthcoming, may be limited in its nature. The use of Brown and Root is viable at least until 31 December 1994 and can be used to augment military resources.

19. This course provides the flexibility to deploy a forward logistic group to support a limited expansion into a neighbouring country. Any large expansion would require logistic augmentation by the deployed force.

20. Attached is a proposed organisation for course 3. Brown and Root would augment this force and would require only minor increases in establishment. Most of Brown and Root tasks involve the use of local labour which is hired as required.

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
Attachment:

1. Proposed organisation chart for course 3

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Attachment 1 to
Admin Apprec

PROPOSED STRUCTURE
FOR A MILITARY ORGANIZATION
ACT AS A LOG SPT GP FOR THE FORCE



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PLANS 017

HQ UNAMIR

LIST A

LIST B

LIST C

DFC/ccs

UNCLAS PLANS 017

SUBJ: ACTION TO BE TAKEN ON UNAMIR PERSONNEL OPENING FIRE

REFS: A. HQ UNAMIR OP DIRECTIVE 02 - ROE - 22 JUL 94.

B. AMENDMENT 1 TO REF A DATED 10 SEP 94.

1. THE PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED IN THE EVENT OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL
OPENING FIRE IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. HQ UNAMIR DUTY OFFICER IS TO BE INFORMED THAT THE EVENT HAS
OCCURRED BY THE FASTEST POSSIBLE MEANS. THE SECTOR COMMANDER OR
COMMANDING OFFICER CONCERNED IS TO FOLLOW THIS UP:

- (1) WITH A DETAILED REPORT WITHIN ONE HOUR OF THE EVENT.
- (2) WITH A WRITTEN REPORT WITHIN 3 HOURS OF THE EVENT.

B. DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS, THE DUTY OFFICER IS TO INFORM:

- (1) DCOS OPS OR HIS SUBORDINATE.
- (2) MA/FC OR MA/DFC.
- (3) CONTINGENT COMMANDER CONCERNED, IF HE IS NOT ALREADY

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AWARE OF THE INCIDENT.

C. IN SILENT HOURS, THE DUTY OFFICER IS TO INFORM:

- (1) FC OR DFC.
- (2) DCOS OPS OR HIS SUBORDINATE.
- (3) CONTINGENT COMMANDER CONCERNED IF HE IS NOT ALREADY
AWARE OF THE INCIDENT.

2. THE DUTY OFFICER IS TO LOG AND DISTRIBUTE SUBSEQUENT REPORTS FROM THE SECTOR COMMANDER/COMMANDING OFFICER TO THOSE LISTED ABOVE, AS THEY ARE RECEIVED.

3. SECTOR COMMANDERS/COMMANDING OFFICERS ARE TO BE PREPARED FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION IF ORDERED BY HQ UNAMIR. THEY SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY AWARE OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR:

- A. PRESERVING/RECORDING EVIDENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE INCIDENT.
WITNESS LISTS.
- C. WITNESS STATEMENTS.
- D. STATEMENTS BY THE INDIVIDUAL(S) WHO OPENED FIRE.
- E. MP INVESTIGATION UNDER NATIONAL AND/OR UNAMIR AUSPICES, AS ORDERED BY HQ UNAMIR.

4. ADDRESSEES ARE REMINDED OF THE NEED FOR ALL PERSONNEL TO BE FULLY

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PLANS 017

BRIEFED ON THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER CURRENT ROE, REFS A AND B.

MAJ T.A.P. MULLARKEY, G3 PLANS 3

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS *for Jettys'.*

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PLANS 015 -

UNAMIR HQ

CANCON

BRITCON (LESS ANNEX)

GHANBATT

MILOB GP HQ

AUSMED (LESS ANNEX)

INFO NICOY (LESS ANNEX)

MALAWICOY (LESS ANNEX)

COMD SECTOR 3 (LESS ANNEX)

B COY GHANBATT

UNCLAS PLANS 015 - FRAGO 05/94

SUBJ: TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO SECTOR 2

REFS:

A. HQUNAMIR OPORD 18 DATED 31 AUG 94

B. HQUNAMIR 3000.12 (OPS) DATED 30 AUG 94

C. HQUNAMIR OPS 001 (WNGO) OF 231253Z SEP 94

1. SIT. RECENT UNHCR ALLEGATIONS AND INCREASING (UNCONFIRMED) REPORT OF ATROCITIES FROM A VARIETY OF OTHER SOURCES INDICATE THE REQUIRMENT FOR INCREASED UN PRESENCE IN SECTOR 2. UNHQ HAS DIRECTED INCREASED UN

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PRESENCE IN SECTOR 2 ASAP.

2. RPA. RPA PTLS ACTIVE THROUGHOUT SECTOR 2.

3. RGF. SPORADIC REPORTS (UNCONFIRMED) OF INTERHAMWE ACTIVITY HAVE BEEN RECEIVED.

4. UNAMIR FORCES. THE CURRENT TROOP COMMITMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE THE FLEXIBILITY TO REDEPLOY WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE FRAGILE SECURITY SITUATION IN SECTORS 3 AND 4. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS NECESSARY TO UTILIZE THE RESIDUAL TROOP CAPABILITY PRESENTLY GARRISONED IN KIGALI TO AUGMENT MILOBS UNTIL THE DEPLOYMENT OF REINFORCEMENTS. THE FORCE COMMITMENT WILL BE AS FOLLOWS:

A. CANCON: 1 X PL GP, 1 X LOG SPT SECT, MED SPT ELM

B. GHANBATT: 1 X PL GP, 1 X SPT ELM

C. BRITCON: 1 X SECURITY SPT ELM

D. AUSMED: 1 X PL GP

5. MSN. TO CONDUCT SECURITY OPS IN SECTOR 2 AND KIGALI CITY

6. EXEC.

A. GENERAL OUTLINE. CANCON AND GHANBATT WILL PROVIDE PL GPS TO CONDUCT OPS IN SECTOR 2 PER TRACE AT ANNEX A. AUSMED AND BRITCON WILL RELIEVE GHANBATT AND CANCON FROM KIGALI SECURITY TASKS FOR

WHICH THE GHAN AND CAN PL GPS ARE CURRENTLY RESPONSIBLE

B. GP AND TASKS

(1) GHANBATT

(A) GP. INF PL, APC IN SPT COMD MILOB SECTOR 2

(B) TASKS

(I) OCCUPY AND CONDUCT OPS IN SECTOR 2A

(II) PROVIDE SECURITY BY: PTL, CHECK PT, OP, AND
RANDOM ROAD BLOCK

(III) MONITOR BORDER CROSSING WITHIN BDRY

(IV) MONITOR INSURGENT ACTIVITY

(V) CONTROL MAIN AXIS WITHIN BDRY

(2) CAN PL GP

(A) GP. PL GP, APC SECT, LOG SPT SECT IN SPT COMD MILOB
SECTOR 2

(B) TASKS

(I) OCCUPY AND CONDUCT OPS IN SECTOR 2A

(II) PROVIDE SECURITY BY: PTL, CHECK PT, OP, AND
RANDOM ROAD BLOCK

(III) MONITOR BORDER CROSSING WITHIN BDRY

(IV) MONITOR INSURGENT ACTIVITY

(V) CONTROL MAIN AXIS WITHIN BDRY

(3) BRITCON

(A) GP. SECURITY AUGMENTATION ELEMENT

(B) TASKS. AUGMENT CANCON KIGALI SECURITY COMMITMENT
WITHIN CAPACITY

(4) AUSMED

(A) GP. PL GP

(B) TASKS.

(I) AUGMENT GHANBATT KIGALI SECURITY COMMITMENT

(II) PROVIDE RRF IAW REF B

(III) PROVIDE SECURITY IN FOL LOC:

(AA) BELGIAN VILLAGE

(BB) KING FAISAL HOSPITAL

(CC) MILITARY ACADEMY

(5) MILOB SECTOR 2

(I) GP. IN SPT GHAN PL GP AND CAN PL GP

(II) TASKS. NO CHANGE

7. COORD INSTR

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PLANS 015 -

A. TIMINGS

- (1) SECTOR 2A OCCUPIED BY 241600B SEP 94
- (2) SECTOR 2B OCCUPIED BY 231600B SEP 94
- (3) RELIEF IN KIGALI TO BE EFFECTED BY 231800B SEP 94

B. ASSY AREA - CURRENT LOCATION

C. ROUTES - PER RECCE/REF A

D. BOUNDARY - ANNEX A

8. ADMIN AND LOG

A. CBT SUP.

- (1) 1ST LINE SPT PROV FROM CONTINGENT RESOURCES
- (2) 2ND LINE PROV DIR FROM KIGALI STOCK
- (3) STOCK STATE REQR DAILY FROM 240800B SEP 94
- (4) OTHER SUP ITEMS. ON DEMAND

B. MEDICAL

- (1) 1ST LINE FROM CONTINGENT RESOURCES
- (2) MED EVAC PER REF A

C. REPAIR AND RECOVERY

- (1) FIRST LINE THEN BY EQUIP CAS REQUEST TO UNAMIR HQ


9. COMMAND AND SIG.

- A. INDEPENDENT OPS IN RESPECTIVE SECTORS
- B. PARENT CONTINGENT TO EXERCISE COMD OVER RESPECTIVE NATIONAL ELMS
- C. SITREP REQUIRED 241400B SEP 94, THENCE 4 HOURLY AND AS REQD
- D. FREQUENCIES
 - (1) FORCE COMD VHF 50.25, HF 5.210
 - (2) PL 42.60 (CAN PL GP) 45.00 (GHAN PL GP)
 - (3) SPARE 49.70 AVAL ON REQ
 - (4) BRITCON AND AUSMED ELMS - INTERNAL ALLOCATION
- E. GHAN PL GP CALLSIGN 2A, CAN PL GP CALLSIGN 2B
- F. KIGALI SECURITY ELMS REPT PARENT CONTINGENT HQ
- G. CONFIRMS REF C

ACK INSTR. ACK.

LIST A (LESS ANNEX)
LIST B (LESS ANNEX)

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS, 11148


COL J. ARP, DCOS OPS, 11185

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014

HQ UNAMIR

TAC HQ

BRITCON

CANCON

ETHIOBATT

FRAFBATT

GHANBATT

MALAWICOY

ZAMBATT

TO AUSMED

U 11 014

SUBJ: VEH ALLOCATION FOR OP HOMEWARD.

REF: 3000.15 (PLANS) DATED 18 SEP 84.

1. AVAILABILITY OF TPT TO SUPPORT OP HOMEWARD NOW REQUIRES DETAILED PLANNING. LESS TPT MAY NOW BE AVAILABLE THAN WAS ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED. TAC HQ IS TO CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING ACTION:

ESTABLISH VEH TO TASK REQUIREMENT IN CONCERT WITH UN AGENCIES

NO S

B REPAIR SUP, MAINT AND RECOVERY PLANS, REQUESTING ADDITIONAL

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SP FROM HQ UNAMIR G4 AS REQUIRED.

C. COORDINATE THOSE ASSETS AVAILABLE.

2. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE FOLLOWING TPT WILL BE AVAILABLE:

A. BRITCON - 13 VEHS.

B. BROWN AND ROOT - 8 VEHS.

C. CANCON - 5 VEHS FROM FIRST LINE.


3. FURTHER FIRST LINE ASSETS MAY BE AVAILABLE FOR LIMITED PERIODS.

ZAMBATT, ETHIOBATT, GHANBATT, TUNBATT AND FRAFBATT ARE ASKED TO PASS
DETAILS OF FIRST LINE AVAILABILITY TO SUPPORT OP HOMEWARD DURING WEEK
26 29 SEP 94 TO TAC HQ FOR COORDINATION.

DFC/COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
G4 TPT
HAC
G3 PLANS

MAJ T A P MULLEN
G3 PLANS 3

LT COL AD BRIMELOW
G3 PLANS



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UNAMIR

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OUTGOING FAX NO. 1898

PAGE 1 OF 1

m.r. 4856

DATE: September 21, 1994

File No. 5000.48 (PLANS)

Tousignant

TO: DPKO, UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK FAX # (212) 963-9070	FROM: MGEN GC TOUSIGNANT FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI
ATTN:	PHONE: 1 212 963 3092
INFO:	FAX NO: 1 212 963 3090
INTERNAL DISTR: DFC/COS, DCOS OPS, DCOS SP, G4, G3 Ops, G3 Plans, CCLOGO	DRAFTED BY: G3 PLANS
SUBJECT: TROOP DEPLOYMENT TO RWANDA	
REFERENCE:	

*MA Put on file psc
22/9 DFC/LOS*

URGENT

1. RECENT UNHCR ALLEGATIONS AND INCREASING (UNCONFIRMED) REPORTS OF ATROCITIES FROM A VARIETY OF OTHER SOURCES INDICATE THE REQUIREMENT FOR INCREASED UN PRESENCE IN SECTOR 2. ACCORDINGLY MR ANNAN, PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM KIGALI, GAVE ME DIRECTION TO DEPLOY TROOPS TO SECTOR 2 ASAP.
2. THE CURRENT TROOP COMMITMENT DOES NOT PROVIDE THE FLEXIBILITY TO REDEPLOY WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE FRAGILE SECURITY SITUATION IN SECTORS 3 AND 4.
3. I AM CURRENTLY EXAMINING REDEPLOYMENT OPTIONS HOWEVER I MUST IMPRESS UPON YOU THE URGENCY OF MY REQUIREMENT FOR CONTINGENTS AWAITING DEPLOYMENT IF I AM TO ESTABLISH A BALANCED FORCE.
4. THE REQUIREMENT TO PROVIDE SOME ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT TO TUNISIA AND MALI CONTINGENTS IS ACKNOWLEDGED, HOWEVER IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT AIR TRANSPORT IS THE ONLY IMPEDIMENT TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ZAMBIAN AND NIGERIAN CONTINGENTS. A HIGH PRIORITY MUST BE ALLOCATED TO THESE CONTINGENTS (ZAMBIA IN PARTICULAR) IF UNAMIR IS TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM AND CAPITALIZE ON PROGRESS MADE TO DATE.
5. YOUR PROMPT ADVICE IS REQUESTED.

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5000.39 (G3 PLANS)

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PLANS 012

UNAMIR HQ

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G3 ENGR

INFO MA TO FC

DFC/COS

HAC

OIC ADMINISTRATION

BEMS

UNCLAS PLANS 012

SUBJ: OCCUPATION OF SCHOOL BUILDINGS BY UNAMIR

1. ADDRESSEES ARE TO SUBMIT DETAILS OF SCHOOLS WITHIN RESPECTIVE SECTORS WHICH ARE OCCUPIED BY UNAMIR FORCES AS FOLLOWS:

A. NAME OF SCHOOL

B. PREFECTURE IN WHICH SCHOOL IS LOCATED

C. NUMBER OF TROOPS IN OCCUPATION

D. TYPE OF UNIT IN OCCUPATION EG. PLATOON, COY HQ, MILOB TM ETC

E. GENERAL CONDITION OF BUILDING(S)

2. ADDRESSEES WHICH CURRENTLY OCCUPY SCHOOL BUILDING(S) ARE TO

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5000.39 (G3 PLANS)

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PLANS 012

IMMEDIATELY IDENTIFY ALTERNATE ACCOMMODATION AND SUBMIT DETAILS TO
ENABLE NEGOTIATIONS FOR PERMISSIVE OCCUPANCY OR LEASE

3. RESPONSE TO PARA 1 REQUIRED TO G3 PLANS BY 23 SEP 94

G3 PLANS

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS, 11148

UNCLASSIFIED



UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: Mr. GOLO
OIC ADMINISTRATION

FROM: G3 PLANS *[Signature]*

INFO: DFC/COS

DATE: 19 SEPTEMBER 1994

SUBJECT: USE OF BUILDINGS BY UNAMIR FORCES IN SECTOR 5

1. AS PART OF UNAMIR II, TUNISIA IS PROVIDING A BATTALION OF 800 PERSONS TO BE DEPLOYED IN THE NORTH WEST OF RWANDA.
2. TO ASSIST IN THE DEPLOYMENT IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF BUILDINGS IN THE FOLLOWING TOWNS WERE MADE AVAILABLE:
 - a. SHYORONG 22 KM NORTH WEST OF KIGALI (95-96) 1/50000 FOR TWO WEEKS.
 - b. NEMBA HIGH SCHOOL , 1.5 KM NORTH NYRUTOV (76-19) FOR ONE COY.
 - c. BARRACKS 2.5 KM NORTH EAST NUKUMBA (64-41) 1/50000 FOR ONE COY.
 - d. MUHIRA (GATEBE) 7 KM EAST GESIGNYI (24-12) 1/50000 AGRICULTURE CENTER FOR ONE COY.
 - e. GISENYI:
 - (1) NAVY TRAINING CENTER;
 - (2) JEAN BAPTIST HOSPITAL AND SCOUT CENTRE; AND
 - (3) AIRPORT.
3. INFORMAL LIAISON WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES INDICATES THAT THIS PROPOSAL MAY BE ACCEPTABLE, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE CONCERNED AUTHORITIES IN THE GOVERNMENT.
4. YOUR ACTION TO SECURE THE USE OF THE ABOVE PREMISES IS REQUIRED.

DCOS SP
Let us follow-up
to see if the required
action is being taken.
[Signature]
21/9
DFC/COS

24/9
[Signature]



UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: Mr. GOLO
OIC ADMINISTRATION

FROM: G3 PLANS *[Signature]*

INFO: DFC/COS, Mr. MITNICK, CBES

DATE: 19 SEPTEMBER 1994

SUBJECT: USE OF BUILDINGS BY UNAMIR FORCES IN SECTOR 5

1. AS PART OF UNAMIR II, TUNISIA IS PROVIDING A BATTALION OF 800 PERSONS TO BE DEPLOYED IN THE NORTH WEST OF RWANDA.
2. TO ASSIST IN THE DEPLOYMENT IT WOULD BE MOST HELPFUL IF BUILDINGS IN THE FOLLOWING TOWNS WERE MADE AVAILABLE:
 - a. SHYORONG 22 KM NORTH WEST OF KIGALI (95-96) 1/50000 FOR TWO WEEKS.
 - b. NEMBA HIGH SCHOOL , 1.5 KM NORTH NYRUTOV (76-19) FOR ONE COY.
 - c. BARRACKS 2.5 KM NORTH EAST NUKUMBA (64-41) 1/50000 FOR ONE COY.
 - d. BUSOGO EDUCATION CENTER 13 KM WEST OF RUHENGARI (49-26) FOR HQ COY.
 - e. MUHIRA (GATEBE) 7 KM EAST GESIGNYI (24-12) 1/50000 AGRICULTURE CENTER FOR ONE COY.
 - f. GISENYI:
 - (1) NAVY TRAINING CENTER;
 - (2) JEAN BAPTIST HOSPITAL AND SCOUT CENTRE; AND
 - (3) AIRPORT.
3. INFORMAL LIAISON WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES INDICATES THAT THIS PROPOSAL MAY BE ACCEPTABLE, SUBJECT TO THE APPROVAL OF THE CONCERNED AUTHORITIES IN THE GOVERNMENT.
4. YOUR ACTION TO SECURE THE USE OF THE ABOVE PREMISES IS REQUIRED.

G3 Plans
How Ghenset submitted
to you the list of places
(they) in town occupying in sector 2
or the RPA is still not allowing
the force to be conducted.
[Signature]
2/19
DFC/COS

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5000.1 (G3PLANS)

01 02 Z SEP 94 RR RR UUUU

013

HQ UNAMIR

TAC HQ

INFO SECTOR COMDS 3, 4A AND 4B

UNCLAS 013

SUBJ:PTS ARISING FOR OP HOMEWARD MEETING 201000B SEP 94.

REFS: A. 3000.15 (PLANS) DATED 18 SEP.

B. 3000.15 (OPS) DATED 31 AUG - FC DIRECTIVE ON MOVEMENT OF DPS.

1. ANSWERS TO YOUR VARIOUS QUESTIONS FOLLOWING THE MEETING TODAY, AS
FOLLOWS:

A. OPCON OF SECTOR COMDS. REF A GIVES COMD OF OP HOMEWARD TO
COO. THIS IS SUFFICIENT FOR YOUR NEEDS.

B. U-KRTTZ. REALLOCATION HAS BEEN JUSTIFIED ON A PRIORITY
BASIS. WILL CARRY OUT FURTHER RESEARCH TOMORROW.

C. MILOB VEHS. DFC HAS INSTRUCTED MILOB HQ TO REALLOCATE MILOB
VEHS TO MEET THE MISSION. YOU SHOULD CONSIDER ALTERNATIVE PLANS BY
DRAWING RESOURCES FROM SECTOR COMDS AS REQUIRED.

D. MILOB ESCORTING OF CONVOYS. UNDER THE SPECIFIC CIRCUMSTANCES
OF OP HOMEWARD, AUTHORITY IS GRANTED TO WAIVE THE RULES REGARDING
MILOB ESCORTING OF DP CONVOYS. CONVOYS WITH COMMUNICATIONS MAY MOVE

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DFC

Levy
H
23/9
DFC/COS

23/9
OK

02

UUUU

013

WITHOUT MILOB ESCORT BETWEEN CAMPS AND CHECKPOINTS, PROVIDED THERE IS A MILOB PRESENCE AT BOTH LOCATIONS.


E. PSE SUBMIT HELQUESTS FOR OP HOMEWARD ASAP.

F. BRITCON IS DEALING WITH THE DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY TO MOVE BRITCON CONVOYS OFF ROAD BY NIGHT TO OC 63 SQN.

HAC
G3 AIR

MAJ T A P MULLARKEY
G3 PLANS 3

LT COL AD BRIMLOW
G3 PLANS



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5000.4 (G3 PLANS)

01 01 160600Z SEP 94 RR

UUUU

PLANS 008

UNAMIR HQ

GHANBATT SECTOR 4A

TUNBATT

3 CSG

UNCLAS PLANS 008

SUBJ: RATIONALIZATION OF UNAMIR M113 FLEET

1. LIMITATIONS ON TRACKED VEHICLE OPERATIONS IN RWANDA REQUIRE RATIONALIZATION OF THE CURRENT M113 FLEET.
2. IN ORDER TO ENSURE ADEQUATE ARMoured MOBILITY FOR TUNBATT TEN OF THE M113 CURRENTLY HELD BY GHANBATT AND ONE M578 HELD BY BRITCON ARE TO BE RETURNED TO 3 CSG LOG BASE NLT 20 SEP 94.
3. G4 MAINTENANCE IS REQUESTED TO INITIATE INSPECTION/REPAIR PROGRAM TO FACILITATE REISSUE OF 21 (20 M113 AND ONE M578) FULLY SERVICEABLE VEHICLES TO TUNBATT BY 25 SEP 94.
4. GHANBATT IS REQUESTED TO BID FOR NECESSARY TRANSPORT TO EFFECT RETURN OF VEHICLES.

MA TO FC
DFC
CC LOG O
G4
G3 PLANS

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS, 11148

COL J. ARP, DCOS OPS, 11185

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MA
Learn. Explain to Ghanbatt
that it is a new concept
being evolved. I need to
speak to the A/CO

JG
16/9
DFC/CO1



OUTGOING FAX NO. _____

PAGE 1 OF 1

DATE: September 14, 1994

File No. 5000.1 (PLANS)

TO: DPKO UNITED NATIONS NEW YORK FAX # (212) 963-9070	FROM: MGEN G.C. TOUSIGNANT FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI
ATTN:	PHONE: 1 212 963 3091
INFO:	FAX NO: 1 212 963 3090
INTERNAL DISTR: G3 PLANS	DRAFTED BY: G3 PLANS
SUBJECT: UNAMIR FORCE COMMANDERS GUIDANCE	
REFERENCE: UNAMIR PLANS 007 OF 131430Z SEP 94 (ENCLOSED)	

ENCLOSED, FOR YOUR INFORMATION IS A COPY OF THE THE FORCE COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE FOR THE REINTEGRATION OF THE BBGNU TO SECTOR 4 (FORMERLY THE HPZ).

MA

I shall have to discuss these points with FC. Place in a folder for my attn.

15/9
DFC/los

23/9

24/9

01 03 131430Z SEP 94 PP RR UUUU

PLANS 007

UNAMIR HQ

GHANBATT SECTOR 4A

FRAFBATT SECTOR 4B

ETHIOBATT SECTOR 4C

INFO ZAMBATT

TUNBATT

NICOY

MALAWICOY

AUSMED

CANCON

BRITCON

MILOB GP HQ

UNCIVPOL

UNCLAS PLANS 007

SUBJ: REINTEGRATION OF SECTOR 4 - FORCE COMMANDERS GUIDANCE

REF: A. OPORD 19 DATED 4 SEP 94

B. OPORD 18 DATED 31 AUG 94

1. IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A THE INTRODUCTION OF BBGNU ADMINISTRATION
AND RPA FORCES TO SECTOR 4 IS NOW WELL UNDER WAY. ALTHOUGH THE

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02

UUUU

PLANS 007

TRANSITION HAS NOT PROGRESSED AS SMOOTHLY AS ANTICIPATED FROM A UNAMIR VIEWPOINT, IT MUST BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT UNAMIR IS COMMITTED IN ALL RESPECTS TO THIS REINTEGRATION

2. THE DEPLOYMENT OF RPA FORCES TO SECTOR 4 MEETS THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS:

- A. PROTECTION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
- B. PROVISION OF NATIONAL SECURITY
- C. PROTECTION OF NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
- D. REESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIAL ORDER

3. IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY ACCOMMODATE THE RPA DEPLOYMENT, SOME MODIFICATION TO THE CONDUCT OF UNAMIR OPERATIONS WILL BE NECESSARY.

? IN ESSENCE, UNAMIR MUST COMPLIMENT RPA OPERATIONS. TASKS LISTED AT REF B APPLY, HOWEVER, UNAMIR FORCES MUST BE PREPARED TO ALLOW THE RPA TO TAKE THE LEAD TO THE EXTENT OF RELOCATING UNAMIR TROOPS IF *who will re-locate* NECESSARY. NO TYPE OF JOINT OPERATION WILL BE UNDERTAKEN. IF IT IS NECESSARY FOR UNAMIR TPS TO WITHDRAW, OBSN/LIAISON SHOULD BE MAINTAINED TO MONITOR AND ENSURE SECURITY AND PROTECTION OF REFUGEES/DISPLACED PERSONS/CIVILIANS *who will ensure those*

4. FURTHER GUIDANCE WILL BE PROVIDED AS RPA INTENTIONS ARE MADE

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03

UUUU

PLANS 007

KNOWN. IN THE MEANTIME, CONTINUED TACT, DIPLOMACY, COOPERATION AND
INITIATIVE IS EXPECTED OF COMMANDERS AT ALL LEVELS

DISTRIBUTION-DIFFUSION

SRSG
MA TO FC
DFC/COS
DCOS SP
DCOS OPS
G1
G2
G3 OPS
G3 PLANS
G4
G6/FSO
FMO

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS, 11148


MGEN G.C. TOUSIGNANT, FC

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5000.1 (G3 PLANS)

01 03 111000Z SEP 94 PP RR UUUU

PLANS 005

UNAMIR HQ

TAC HQ BUTARE

MILOBGP HQ

CIVPOL

GHANBATT SECTOR 4A

FRAFATT SECTOR 4B

ETHIOBATT SECTOR 4C

INFO AUSMED

BRITCON

CANCON

UNCLAS PLANS 005

SUBJ: FRAGO 02/94

REF: A. UNAMIR HQ OPORD 19 DATED 4 SEP 94

B. PLANS 003 FRAG O 01/94 OF 091200Z SEP 94

SITUATION

1. INTRODUCTION OF GOVT OFFICIALS AND RPA TO SECTOR 4 IS CONTINUING
IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A. INSERTION OF COMPANY GROUPS WAS COMPLETED
ON 10 SEP 94

MISSION

*Scanned
H/L
17/9
DFC*

UNCLASSIFIED

02

UUUU

PLANS 005

2. NO CHANGE

EXECUTION

3. GEN OUTLINE. A RPA BATTALION WILL BE DEPLOYED TO SECTOR 4C VIA 4A COMMENCING ON NIGHT 11/12 SEP. ANTICIPATED COMPLETION BY 14 SEP 94. UNAMIR OPS TO CONTINUE PER REF A.

GROUPING AND TASKS

4. GROUPING. NO CHANGE

5. TASKS

A. MILOB

(1) PROVIDE ESCORT TEAMS FOR RPA INSERTION

(2) REMAINING TASKS PER REF A

B. TAC HQ

(1) ESTB LIAISON WITH RPA BRIGADE COMD IN BUTARE AREA

(2) ASCERTAIN TIMINGS, DEPARTURE LOC AND CONVOY COMPOSITION AND ADVISE THIS HQ AND MILOBGP HQ ACCORDINGLY

(3) ADVISE RPA COMD OF UNAMIR INTENTION

(4) CONDUCT LOCAL COORD AS REQUIRED

6. COORD INSTR

A. TIMINGS

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.1 (G3 PLANS)

03

UUUU

PLANS 005

(2) DETAILED CONVOY/PACKET TIMINGS TO BE CONFIRMED BY TACHQ ASAP

B. ROUTE. PINK ROUTE

C. RV PTS. SECTORS 4A AND 4C PER REF A.

ADMIN AND LOG

7. NO CHANGE

SRSG, MA TO FC, DFC/COS, DCOS OPS, DCOS SP, FMO,
G1, G2, G3 OPS, G3 PLANS, G4, G6/FSO, MIL SPOKESMAN

LCOL A. BRIMLOW, G3 PLANS, 11148

COL J. ARP, DCOS OPS, 11185

UNCLASSIFIED

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5000.1 (G3 PLANS)

01 03 091200Z SEP 94 RR RR UUUU

PLANS 003

UNAMIR HQ

TAC HQ BUTARE

MILOB GP HQ

CIVPOL

GHANBATT SECTOR 4A

FRAFBATT SECTOR 4B

ETHIOBATT SECTOR 4C

INFO AUSMED

BRITCON

CANCON

UNCLAS PLANS 003

SUBJ: FRAGO 01/94

REF: OPORD 19 DATED 4 SEP 94

1. GEN

A. INTRODUCTION OF PREFECTS WITH RPA SECURITY TO SECTOR 4 IS COMPLETE. AS PREDICTED AT REF A, FURTHER ELEMENTS OF RPA ARE TO BE INTRODUCED NOT BEFORE 10 SEP 94

MISSION

2. NO CHANGE

*Seen
Hgi
10/9
Dfe/cos*

UNCLASSIFIED

02

UUUU

PLANS 003

EXECUTION

3. GEN OUTLINE. TWO ADDITIONAL RPA PLATOONS PER SUBSECTOR WILL BE DEPLOYED TO SECTOR 4. TOTAL FORCE PER SUBSECTOR TO APPROXIMATE ONE COY. UNAMIR OPS TO CONTINUE PER REF A

4. GROUPINGS AND TASKS

A. GROUPING. NO CHANGE

B. TASKS

(1) MILOB

(A) PROVIDE ESCORT TEAMS FOR RPA TROOP INSERTION

(B) REMAINING TASKS PER REF A

(2) NO CHANGE TO TASKS ALLOC TO ADDRESSEES AT REF A

5. COORD INSTR

A. TIMINGS

(1) MILOBS TO MAN RV BY 100700B SEP 94

(2) 30 MINS NTM FROM 100730B SEP 94

B. ROUTES. NO CHANGE

C. RV PTS. NO CHANGE

ADMIN AND LOG

6. NO CHANGE

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5000.1 (G3 PLANS)

03

UUUU

PLANS 003

COMD AND SIGS

7. NICKNAMES

A. EAGLE ROCK, ESCORT COMMENCED, ISS BY MILOBS

B. QUIET DAY, ESCORT COMPLETE, ISS BY MILOB

8. REMAINDER. NO CHANGE

ACK INSTR

ACK

SRSG, MA TO FC, DEC/COS, DCOS OPS, DCOS SP, FMO/G6
G1, G2, G3, G3 PLANS, G4, MIL SPOKESMAN

LCOL A. BRIMEDOW, G3 PLANS, 11148


COL J. ARP, DCOS OPS, 11185

UNCLASSIFIED

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5000.1 (PLANS)

01 02 061430Z^{1200Z} SEP 94 PP UUUU

PLANS 001

UNAMIR HQ

TAC HQ BUTARE

GHANNBATT GIKONGORO

FRAFBATT KIBUYE

ETHIOBATT CYANGUGU

ZAMBATT UNICEF BLDG KIGALI

MILOB GP HQ

UNCIVPOL

NICOY BUYUMBA

UNCLAS PLANS 001

SUBJ: SUSPECTED CACHEING ACTIVITIES

1. MILITARY INFORMATION COLLECTED TO DATE INDICATES THAT CACHEING ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY IN SECTOR 4, ARE BEING CARRIED OUT BY SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS. THE MOST RECENT INCIDENT INVOLVED THE THEFT OF A LARGE QUANTITY OF FOOD FROM MBOGO REFUGEE CAMP. IT IS ASSESSED THAT INCIDENTS SUCH AS THIS ARE NOT SIMPLE ACTS OF BANDITRY AND THEREFORE CONSTITUTE A DELIBERATE CAMPAIGN TO AMASS SUPPLIES TO SUSTAIN PRESENT/FUTURE INSURGENT OPERATIONS.

2. ADDRESSEES ARE TO THOROUGHLY SCREEN AND CLEARLY ESTABLISH THE

G3 PLANS
Been and thank you
A. J. H.
07/9
DFC/COS

UNCLASSIFIED

PLANS .

✓

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5000.1 (PLANS)

02

UUUU

PLANS 001

LEGITIMACY OF ALL VEHICLES CARRYING FOOD AND SUPPLIES WHICH ARE NOT
CLEARLY UN OR HUMANITARIAN NGO SPONSORED. PATROLS ARE TO REMAIN ALERT
TO THE CONDUCT OF CACHEING ACTIVITIES AND ARE TO INVESTIGATE ALL
ASSOCIATED CIRCUMSTANCES.

UNREO, MA TO FC, DFC, DCOS OPS, G2, G3, G4

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS, 11148
CACHE.MSG

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS, 11148

UNCLASSIFIED

6 Sep 94



File No 5000.52 (Plans)

To: Distribution List

From: G3 Plans

Date: 30 Aug 94

Subject: INDIAN RECCE TEAM

References: A. MEMO 5000.52 (PLANS) 29 AUG 94

B. CONVERSATION G3 PLANS 4/CSS 30 AUG 94

1. REF A INDICATED THAT AN INDIAN RECCE TEAM OF 4 PERS WOULD ARRIVE KAMPALA 30 AUG 94, DRIVE TO UNAMIR FOR RECCE/BRIEFING AND DEPART KIGALI 4 SEP 94. NO ETA IN KIGALI WAS INDICATED.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS A SCHEDULE FOR THEIR BRIEFING, TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED TO BE HELD 31 AUG 94 AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE TO 1 SEP 94:

- A. 0915 - 0930, FC;
- B. 0930 - 0935, DCOS OPS;
- C. 0935 - 0945, G2;
- D. 0945 - 1010, G3 OPS;
- E. 1010 - 1025, G1/CMPO;
- F. 1025 - 1040, G4;
- G. 1040 - 1045, G6/FSO; AND
- H. 1045 - 1110, G3 PLANS.

3. CONFIRMATION OF FINAL DATE WILL BE FORWARDED BY G3 PLANS DFC/CSS ASAP.

4. TO CSS, YOU OR A REPRESENTATIVE ARE REQUESTED TO ATTEND THE BRIEFING TO ANSWER ANY ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS WHICH MAY ARISE.

G3 PLANS
This is OK but I would like to be present, at least at some of these initial briefings to welcome the team also.

A/S
A. BRIMELOW
LCOL
G3 PLANS
11148

Distribution List: (next page)

Distribution List:

ACTION:

G1/CMPO
G2
G3
G4
G6/FSO

INFO:

MA TO FC
DFC/COS
CAO
CSS
UNAMIR HQ (TAC)



File No 5000.4 (PLANS)

To: DFC/COS

From: G3 PLANS *[Signature]* *hr Col*

Date: 28 AUG 94

Subject: UNISOM ENGINEERING FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT

Reference: CONVERSATION DFC/G3 PLANS 27 AUG 94

1. FURTHER TO REF, IT IS PROPOSED TO DISPATCH A UNAMIR STAFF TEAM TO MOGADISHU TO SOURCE, INSPECT AND COORDINATE THE MOVEMENT OF ACCOMMODATION STORES AND OTHER EQUIPMENT TO UNAMIR.

2. THE RECOMMENDED COMPOSITION OF THE TEAM IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. G4;

B. BMS REPRESENTATIVE; AND

C. CC LOG O.

3. FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION AND APPROVAL.

②
Approved.
[Signature]
28/8

③

CAO

could you pse facilitate
the journey for the three
officers to go to Mogadishu.
[Signature]
28/8
DFC/COS



TO: Force Engineer
Major Jerzy Maczka
HQ UNAMIR, Kigali, Rwanda

27 August 1994

THRU: Philip Metnick, C/BMS

FROM: Stephen Etsell/BMS Officer

INFO: OIC-ADMIN, DFC, C/PLANS/C/SS,CLOGO

RE: Engineer Construction Requirements for UNAMIR

The construction schedule for the 500 man Transit Camp is attached for your information and action. Please note that we have included several construction tasks for the military engineers in order to save money and to speed the completion date.

Please contact us for detailed information regarding start dates and construction specifics.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

②
MA

Is major Maczka in Kigali at all?
Let him see me.

29/8

DFC/COS

In. Off presently engaged
in an engr recce on water pipeline
system & electrical installation
in Cyangugu.

Off 21/8
MA or DFC/COS

UNAMIR project for 500 man transit and training camp at Kigali Stadium

ID	Name	Duration	Scheduled Start	Scheduled Finish	Predecessors	Resource Names	28 August							4 S
							S	M	T	W	T	F	S	
1	Project 500 man camp Start	0d	1/9/94 8:00	1/9/94 8:00										
2	Install guard and patrol on site	0d	1/9/94 8:00	1/9/94 8:00	1	UN-soldiers								
3	Do fencing and barbwiring around the site	2.5d	1/9/94 8:00	3/9/94 12:00	1	UN-soldiers								
5	Level site	1d	1/9/94 8:00	1/9/94 17:00	1									
6	Excavation for drainage + plus piping	5d	1/9/94 8:00	5/9/94 17:00										
7	Excavation	2d	1/9/94 8:00	2/9/94 17:00	1	BRIT.ENG HP								
8	lay down drainage + plus piping	3d	3/9/94 8:00	5/9/94 17:00	7	B&R-Int,B&R-loc T3[3]								
20	Production of block for foundation (300x300x200 mm)	7.5d	1/9/94 8:00	8/9/94 12:00	1	Concrete BPA								
21	Order cement + gravel and finde place for production	0d	1/9/94 8:00	1/9/94 8:00		Concrete contractor								
22	Production of 1850 blocks	5d	1/9/94 8:00	5/9/94 17:00	1	Concrete contractor								
23	Transport to site (74 ton)	5d	3/9/94 13:00	8/9/94 12:00	22SS+50%	Concrete contractor								
44	Order crane for the frame work on the kitchen	0d	1/9/94 8:00	1/9/94 8:00	1									
9	Excavation for Septic tank, and do lines for soak and sewage	3d	3/9/94 8:00	5/9/94 17:00										
10	Excavation	2d	3/9/94 8:00	4/9/94 17:00	7	BRIT.ENG HP								
11	lay lines for soak and sewage to and from septic	1d	5/9/94 8:00	5/9/94 17:00	10	setic contrator								
4	Install temp generator and security lights on the site	5h	3/9/94 13:00	4/9/94 9:00	3	B&R-Int								
24	Transport all materials and containers to site	2d	3/9/94 13:00	5/9/94 12:00	3	BRIT.ENG HP								
12	Do Form work and reinforcement for septic tank	16d	5/9/94 8:00	20/9/94 17:00										
13	Make form for septic tank	4d	5/9/94 8:00	8/9/94 17:00	10	setic contrator								
14	Cast concrete for septic tank	4d	9/9/94 8:00	12/9/94 17:00	13	setic contrator								
15	Cast concrete hardening	7d	13/9/94 8:00	19/9/94 17:00	14	setic contrator								
16	Remove form from septic tank	1d	20/9/94 8:00	20/9/94 17:00	15	setic contrator								
17	Excavation for electric wiring and lay down cables	2d	5/9/94 8:00	6/9/94 17:00										
18	Excavation	1d	5/9/94 8:00	5/9/94 17:00	10	BRIT.ENG HP								
19	lay down cables	1d	6/9/94 8:00	6/9/94 17:00	18	ELECU								
25	Level new gravel on roads and walkways	10h	7/9/94 8:00	8/9/94 10:00	19	B&R-loc T1								

UNAMIR project for 500 man transit and training camp at Kigali Stadium

ID	Name	Duration	Scheduled Start	Scheduled Finish	Predecessors	Resource Names	28 August							4 S
							S	M	T	W	T	F	S	
26	Level blocks for aocom rubhalls	10d	8/9/94 13:00	18/9/94 12:00										
27	Aocom rubhall no 1-3	2d	8/9/94 13:00	10/9/94 12:00	23	B&R-loc T3[10]								
28	Aocom rubhall no 4-6	2d	10/9/94 13:00	12/9/94 12:00	27	B&R-loc T3[10]								
29	Aocom rubhall no 7-9	2d	12/9/94 13:00	14/9/94 12:00	28	B&R-loc T3[10]								
30	Aocom rubhall no 10-12	2d	14/9/94 13:00	16/9/94 12:00	29	B&R-loc T3[10]								
31	Aocom rubhall no 13-15	2d	16/9/94 13:00	18/9/94 12:00	30	B&R-loc T3[10]								
32	Level blocks for abi containers	2d	8/9/94 13:00	10/9/94 12:00	23	B&R-loc T2[4]								
38	Make frame work and ground anchor for aocom rubhalls	10d	10/9/94 13:00	20/9/94 12:00	27	Const. mat.								
39	Aocom rubhall no 1-3	2d	10/9/94 13:00	12/9/94 12:00	27	B&R-loc T1[10]								
40	Aocom rubhall no 4-6	2d	12/9/94 13:00	14/9/94 12:00	28	B&R-loc T1[10]								
41	Aocom rubhall no 7-9	2d	14/9/94 13:00	16/9/94 12:00	29	B&R-loc T1[10]								
42	Aocom rubhall no 10-12	2d	16/9/94 13:00	18/9/94 12:00	30	B&R-loc T1[10]								
43	Aocom rubhall no 13-15	2d	18/9/94 13:00	20/9/94 12:00	31	B&R-loc T1[10]								
57	Place beams and plywood floor in aocom rubhalls	22.5d	18/9/94 13:00	10/10/94 17:00	31									
58	Aocom rubhall no 1-3	4.5d	18/9/94 13:00	22/9/94 17:00	39	Const. mat.,B&R-loc T3[10]								
59	Aocom rubhall no 4-6	4.5d	23/9/94 8:00	27/9/94 12:00	58	Const. mat.,B&R-loc T3[10]								
60	Aocom rubhall no 7-9	4.5d	27/9/94 13:00	1/10/94 17:00	59	Const. mat.,B&R-loc T3[10]								
61	Aocom rubhall no 10-12	4.5d	2/10/94 8:00	6/10/94 12:00	60	Const. mat.,B&R-loc T3[10]								
62	Aocom rubhall no 13-15	4.5d	6/10/94 13:00	10/10/94 17:00	61	Const. mat.,B&R-loc T3[10]								
33	Level blocks for kitchen unit, freeze cont. and rubhall	2d	20/9/94 13:00	22/9/94 12:00	43	B&R-loc T2[3]								
45	Make framework for kitchen rubhall (require a crane)	4d	20/9/94 13:00	24/9/94 12:00	43	Crane contractor,Const. mat.[3],B&R-loc T1[10]								
55	Place freeze containers on blocks	0.5d	22/9/94 13:00	22/9/94 17:00	33	Crane contractor,B&R-loc T2[2]								
56	Do necessary repairs to freeze cont.	1.5d	23/9/94 8:00	24/9/94 12:00	55	B&R-Int								
52	Cover framework of rubhall for dining area	2d	24/9/94 13:00	26/9/94 12:00	45	B&R-loc T1[10]								
63	Place beams and plywood floor in kitchen rubhall	3d	24/9/94 13:00	27/9/94 12:00	48	B&R-loc T2[10]								
36	Make staircase for kitchen and dining	1.5d	27/9/94 13:00	28/9/94 17:00	52,63	B&R-loc T1[3]								


UNAMIR project for 500 man transit and training camp at Kigali Stadium

ID	Name	Duration	Scheduled Start	Scheduled Finish	Predecessors	Resource Names	28 August							4 S
							S	M	T	W	T	F	S	
46	Cover framework of rubhall for accom.	5d	29/9/94 15:00	4/10/94 15:00	39									
47	Accom rubhall no 1-3	1d	29/9/94 15:00	30/9/94 15:00	57SS+50%	B&R-loc T2[10]								
48	Accom rubhall no 4-6	1d	30/9/94 15:00	1/10/94 15:00	47	B&R-loc T2[10]								
49	Accom rubhall no 7-9	1d	1/10/94 15:00	2/10/94 15:00	48	B&R-loc T2[10]								
50	Accom rubhall no 10-12	1d	2/10/94 15:00	3/10/94 15:00	49	B&R-loc T2[10]								
51	Accom rubhall no 13-15	1d	3/10/94 15:00	4/10/94 15:00	50	B&R-loc T2[7]								
56	Connect and do electric installation in accom rubhalls	7d	29/9/94 15:00	6/10/94 15:00	57SS+50%	B&R-int								
57	Make staircase for accom rubhalls	8d	2/10/94 8:00	9/10/94 17:00	60	B&R-loc T1[3]								
64	Place kitchen unit, freeze cont.	1d	11/10/94 8:00	11/10/94 17:00	62	Crane contractor, B&R-loc T3[3]								
63	Place abl. cont. on concrete blocks	1.5d	12/10/94 8:00	13/10/94 12:00	34	B&R-loc T1[3], Crane contractor								
65	Connect and do electric installation in kitchen unit	4d	12/10/94 8:00	15/10/94 17:00	34	B&R-int								
67	Connect and do water installation in kitchen unit	2d	12/10/94 8:00	13/10/94 17:00	34	B&R-int								
69	Connect and do sewage installation in kitchen unit	2d	12/10/94 8:00	13/10/94 17:00	34	B&R-int								
65	Make staircase of blocks for abl cont.	2.5d	13/10/94 13:00	15/10/94 17:00	53	B&R-loc T2[3]								
54	Do necessary repairs to sanitary and hygiene fittings in abl cont.	4d	13/10/94 13:00	17/10/94 12:00	53	B&R-loc T1[2], B&R-int								
64	Connect and do electric installation in abl cont.	3d	13/10/94 13:00	16/10/94 12:00	53	B&R-int								
68	Connect and do water installation in ablution units	1d	13/10/94 13:00	14/10/94 12:00	53	B&R-int								
70	Connect and do sewage installation in ablution units	1d	13/10/94 13:00	14/10/94 12:00	53	B&R-int								
71	Soldiers can move in to camp.	0d	14/10/94 12:00	14/10/94 12:00	70									
72	Install fire protection system in the camp	1d	14/10/94 13:00	15/10/94 12:00	71	B&R-int								
73	Install communication to UNAMIR HQ	2d	14/10/94 13:00	16/10/94 12:00	71	Field Service								
74	Do permanent security light system	3d	14/10/94 13:00	17/10/94 12:00	71	B&R-int								
75	Make necessary display and circulation fittings on site	3d	14/10/94 13:00	17/10/94 12:00	71	B&R-loc T1								


UNAMIR project for 500 man transit and training camp at Kigali Stadium

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UNAMIR project for 500 man transit and training camp at Kigali Stadium



UNAMIR project for 500 man transit and training camp at Kigali Stadium



UNAMIR project for 500 man transit and training camp at Kigali Stadium

Project:
Date: 25/8/94

Critical
Noncritical



Progress
Milestone



Summary
Rolled Up





UNAMIR - KIGALI

5000.33 (PLANS)

27 August, 1994

To : UNDP SECURITY OFFICER/JEAN FRANCOIS-FEVRE

Info: DFC, DCOS OPS, BRITCON, CANSIGS

From: G3 PLANS

Subject: UNAMIR MILITARY EOD CAPABILITY

Reference: Conversation Security Officer UNICEF - David McBride/G3 Plans 26 Aug 94

1. As a result of the referenced conversation, it was requested that we provide to you a list of the UNAMIR Military Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) capability.

2. While some EOD capability currently exists within each contingent, this capability is usually limited; by the contingent's government. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) has four EOD personnel but they are limited to the gathering and collation of EOD data and disposal of only that ordinance which may endanger the lives of UK personnel.

3. Canada also has four EOD personnel but the government of Canada has allowed them to act on behalf of the safety of UNAMIR personnel as well. The Canadian contingent plans to eliminate its EOD capability in the coming weeks.

4. It has been decided that, with the limited military capability, the best course of action would be to contract a civilian agency to train the Rwandan Patriotic Army to conduct EOD activities. Clearly, the pursuit of this course of action will take some time.

② GB Plans
When is the Canadian EOD team leaving?

A. Brimelow
LCol
G3 Plans

④ G3 PLANS
Can aware of the presence of EOD team with GHANBATT for its own operations. Can we find out if all the battalions have their own? I want to hold a S1. it meeting over the

③ DFC
The Canadian EOD team is scheduled to leave Rwanda on 1 Sep 94. The capability effectively ceased today
G3 PLANS
30/8

MEMORANDUM

9300-1 (Force Engr)


27 Aug 94

Distribution List

ENGINEERING TASK FOR FORCE ENGR COY

Ref: 1000.7 (DFC) G1

1. Regarding DFC/COS's report on the visit to tactical headquarters in Butare 21 - 23 Aug 94. It was emphasized that the battalion commander in sector 4C - Cyangugu has been requested by the local administrators to provide them with water and electricity recently provided by the French.
2. In the same report it was mentioned that the oval bypass around the runway at Cyangugu must be regravelled.
3. Timely action and liaison between the CAO Staff and the Force Engr Coy to rectify this situation will be appreciated.


J. Arp
Col
D COS Ops

Distribution List

Action

Force Engr Coy
CAO

Info

DFC/COS

(2)
DCOS OPS
Thank you for
reminding them
JG
28/8
DFC