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
DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS

ADDRESS - ADDRESSEE: Room S-3600, UNITED NATIONS N.Y. 10017
FAX: (212) 963-1312

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

TO: Mr. Marrack I. Goulding
Under-Secretary-General
Department of Political Affairs

Mr. Kofi Annan
Under-Secretary-General
Department of Peace-keeping Operations



Mr. Shaharyar Khan
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
Kigali

FROM: Peter Hansen
Under-Secretary-General
Department of Humanitarian Affairs

This is a good
study. JNK & David should
look through it - esp for
last chapter. I have read it
Jen

DATE: October 20, 1995

SUBJECT: MULTI-DONOR EVALUATION OF EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE
TO RWANDA, DRAFT REPORT OF STUDY III,
EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO RWANDA

Further to earlier correspondence transmitting draft reports of other components of this multi-donor evaluation, please find attached a copy of Study III.

As you will see, this Report is primarily concerned with the provision of humanitarian assistance. However, it also touches on a number of political and security issues including the role of UNAMIR and other military contingents.

As a member of the Steering Committee, DHA is anxious to ensure that the authors benefit from your comments which we would appreciate receiving by 6 November.

Your collaboration in this matter is appreciated.



Overseas Development Institute

MASKING A POLICY VACUUM:

HUMANITARIAN AID AND THE 1994 CRISIS IN RWANDA

Report by the Study III Team
of Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda

**This draft is solely for use by members of the Steering Committee
of the Joint Evaluation and named agencies
in preparing their comments.
IT MUST NOT BE QUOTED.**

**All comments should be submitted in writing to
Johnny Morris, Evaluation Department, Overseas Development
Administration, London
by 10 November 1995.**

Date of Final Draft version: 17 October 1995

Study III Team

Core Team (ODI, London, UK)

John Borton	Team Leader, Research Fellow
Emery Brusset	UN and Coordination Specialist, Research Associate
Alistair Hallam	Economist, Research Associate

Administrative/Secretarial Support

Laura Jackson
Nathalie Shellard
Amanda Welch

Technical Specialists

Steve Collins	Health Specialist; Freelance/Centre for International Child Health, London, UK
Johan Pottier	Anthropologist; School of Oriental and African Studies, London, UK
Danielle de Lame	Anthropologist; Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale, Tervuren, Belgium
Andrew Chalinder	Water and Sanitation Specialist; Freelance, Botswana
Jeremy Shoham	Nutritionist; London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK
Lisa Lee	Epidemiologist; Centre for Disease Control, Atlanta, USA
Richard Connaughton	Military/protection Specialist; Freelance/University of Lancaster
Torben Ishøy	Health/military Specialist; Danish Armed Forces
John Telford	Field/Airlift Logistics Specialist; EMMA Ltd, Eire
Franz Goetz	Transport Economist; STEP International, Rome, Italy
Gill Shepherd	Environment/Fuelwood Specialist; Overseas Development Institute, London, UK
Lindsey Hilsum	Journalist Freelance/BBC, London, UK
Bruce Jones	Research Assistant/Media; London School of Economics, London, UK
David Turton	Advisory/Editorial Assistance; Department of Anthropology, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
Mark Duffield	Advisory/Editorial Assistance; School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK

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The opportunity of participating in such a professionally stimulating and challenging study has been greatly appreciated by the Team members.

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Executive Summary

This study examines the international community's provision of humanitarian aid and physical protection in response to the Rwanda crisis. It combines a detailed technical assessment of the principal sectors and phases of the response with the principal conclusions and policy lessons that may be derived from the experience. The period covered is broadly that from April 1994 until the end of the year for operations inside Rwanda, but for refugee operations in Tanzania and Eastern Zaire the period covered extends into 1995. Humanitarian operations prior to April 1994 are described but not evaluated. Insecurity in Burundi and also the limited time available resulted in the refugee operations in Burundi not being included in the study. Time pressures obliged the study to focus on the main refugee concentration in Ngara, Goma and Bukavu and consequently, the refugee movements into Karagwe in Tanzania and Uvira in Zaire were not considered.

The study was undertaken by a Team of 21 people, representing eight nationalities and wide range of backgrounds and experiences. Initial consultations with key UN agencies and NGOs began in January 1995. A reconnaissance mission by five Team members to the Great Lakes region was undertaken in April and the principal block of fieldwork by more Team members was undertaken during June and July. Within the Great Lakes region a total of 235 donor, UN, NGO and government personnel were interviewed together with approximately 140 beneficiaries of assistance. These were complemented by interviews with 245 personnel of donor organisations, UN agencies and departments and NGOs in Europe and North America and a document collection which eventually exceeded 2,000 items. A database to enable analysis of financial flows during 1994 was created, and two sub-studies on the 1994 dysentery epidemic and UK TV coverage were commissioned.

The protection and humanitarian crisis of 1994 did not begin with the shooting down of the Presidential plane on 6 April, but was preceded by at least three and a half years of developing operations inside Rwanda and in neighbouring countries within the Great Lakes region. By mid-1992 for instance, attacks by the RPF in the north of the country and ethnic violence and insecurity elsewhere had created 200-300,000 IDPs. Following the February 1993 advance by the RPF, this number increased sharply to perhaps 900,000, though, by the end of the year, 60% of these had returned to their homes. Large scale relief operations were mounted, including a massive WFP airlift of food which transported twice the tonnage carried by the 1994 airlift operations. In October 1993, the attempted coup and subsequent wave of ethnic violence in Burundi resulted in the death of 50,000 to 100,000 and an influx of almost 700,00 refugees to neighbouring countries, principally southern Rwanda and eastern Tanzania. The international community's response to the plight of these refugees was poor and probably several thousand died as a result of the combined effects of inadequate water and sanitation, food supplies and health care.

The events which followed 6 April were an extraordinary human tragedy consisting of a genocide and civil war which caused the violent death of between 0.5 to 1 million people, the movement of over 2 million Rwandans into neighbouring countries and the temporary displacement of well over a million people inside Rwanda. This study estimates that approximately 80,000 people died in the refugee and IDP camps in Zaire, Tanzania and inside Rwanda during 1994, principally from cholera and dysentery. This figure would probably exceed 100,000 if mortality among Rwandan refugees in Burundi and Rwandans outside the IDP camps if data were available for these populations.

It is highly significant that the numbers who died as a result of causes which could be considered 'avoidable' (had the humanitarian response been more effective), was several times lower than those who died as a result of the genocide and conflict. The critical failings in the international community's overall response therefore lay within the political, diplomatic and military domains rather than the humanitarian domain. Had the international community responded more effectively in the months prior to, or in the days immediately following, the shooting down of the Presidential plane on 6 April, many, perhaps most, of those who died would probably have survived and much of the massive expenditures on the provision of humanitarian assistance been unnecessary.

Over the period April to December 1994, approximately US\$1.4 billion was allocated by the international

community to the response. Of this amount approximately 85% was from official sources with the remainder being provided from private sources. By a substantial margin, the EU Commission and the US Government were the largest official sources of funds accounting for 50% of total allocations. Approximately 50% of the total allocations were expended by, or channelled through, UN agencies with just two agencies UNHCR and WFP accounting for over 85% of these. A substantial proportion of the resources channelled through these two agencies were allocated onwards to NGO implementing partners. The Red Cross Movement accounted for 17% of all flows. In all, at least 200 NGOs were involved in the response.

The response contained many highly commendable efforts, notably: the initial response in Ngara; the impressive performance of UNHCR Emergency Response Teams in Ngara and Goma; the work of the ICRC inside Rwanda between April and July 1994; and the courage and commitment shown by UN and NGO personnel in extremely difficult and often dangerous situations. Widespread starvation did not occur. In Rwanda, the combination of a good crop and the dramatic reduction in population meant that locally available foods were comparatively plentiful. However, for the refugees and many of the IDPs the food aid supply system, dominated by WFP and to a lesser extent the ICRC, performed well. Given the magnitude and scale of the population movements and the distance of the beneficiary populations from coastal ports, this was a substantial achievement.

Humanitarian operations in Kigali and in FAR controlled areas after 6 April were severely constrained by the high levels of violence. Only the ICRC (with MSF support) and the UN Advance Humanitarian Team were able to operate in Kigali and, though valuable, the volume of humanitarian assistance they were able to provide was limited. The critical need was for security and physical protection which the much reduced and ill-equipped UNAMIR force was unable to provide, though it did succeed in protecting perhaps 25,000 threatened civilians. Between April and the end of June, only the ICRC, CRS/Caritas and to a lesser extent WFP were able to provide humanitarian assistance in the south and west of the country, though, again, the volume was severely limited. In the RPF controlled areas in the north and east the ICRC, UN agencies and NGOs had greater access and were able to deliver quite substantial volumes of assistance, though their freedom of operation was closely controlled by the RPF and many agencies were not allowed to remain inside Rwanda overnight.

The French-led Opération Turquoise which pushed into western Rwanda on 22 June and then concentrated on the creation of a 'Safe Zone' in the south-west remained in the country for two months. Despite uncertainties over the initial motivations of the operation, it saved approximately 14,000 threatened civilians and the improvement in security enabled a dramatic increase in the humanitarian assistance activities from the three agencies which operated during the April-June period to at least 15 agencies by August. Such efforts served to spread out over a longer time period the number of displaced Rwandans crossing into Bukavu and to limit their eventual number. Had this not been done, it is highly likely that the mortality rates experienced in Bukavu would have been much higher.

Despite this, Opération Turquoise is judged as a partial rather than a complete success as it did not address the situation in the north-west where, just three weeks after the start of the operation, approximately 850,000 IDPs suddenly crossed into Goma resulting in the death of approximately 50,000 and necessitating a massive humanitarian assistance effort. By providing a temporary Safe Zone, several hundred thousand Hutus, encouraged by the humanitarian assistance efforts, remained in IDP camps in the Gikongoro area and presented the new Government and the UN with an extremely difficult problem. Though the majority were eventually returned to their home communes, several thousand IDPs were killed at Kibeho camp in April 1995. The south-west has arguably remained the most insecure area of the country.

The response of humanitarian agencies to the needs of those concentrated in the IDP camps in the Gikongoro area was initially slow as a result of: the reluctance by some NGOs to be closely identified with the French military; the time needed to establish operational capacity in the area; the focus of international attention during July and August upon the situation in Goma; and a lack of technical coordination capacity within UNREO and UNICEF. The initial lack of food and water and inadequate sanitation resulted in very high rates of dysentery in many of the camps and the death of perhaps 20,000 IDPs.

Because of the insecurity inside Rwanda and the access problems, facing not only humanitarian agencies, but also the international media, the large scale movement of Rwandans into neighbouring countries enabled readier access, at the same time as creating substantial humanitarian needs. The international response to the first major influx, that of almost 200,000 into Ngara District at the end of April, which was led, and closely coordinated by, UNHCR was highly impressive. Substantial loss of life was avoided. However, despite the initial successes and the continued impressive performance of most agencies working in Ngara, the programme has remained fragile as a result of a number of factors, including:

- Refugees have continued crossing into Ngara (in contrast to the pattern following the initial influx in Goma and Bukavu), so that the refugee population in May 1995 was 500,000 - double that of May 1994. Consequently, the situation has never quite stabilised and agencies have been continually having to increase the scale of their programmes.
- In July, the focus of international attention moved to Goma and resources and personnel were transferred away from the camps in Tanzania.
- The amounts of water available to individual refugees has deteriorated considerably and in June 1995 was less than half that of July 1994, as a result of the expanding population, the poor performance of the emergency boreholes drilled by UNICEF and a lack of investment in more sustainable supply systems.
- The response by the international community to compensate the local population for the detrimental effects on their assets, livelihoods and environment has been quite inadequate and may have contributed to the closure of Tanzania's borders with Burundi and Rwanda in 1995.

The numbers moving into Bukavu during July and August were approximately 300,000. The influx was not as intense as the initial influxes into Ngara and Goma and, because of the lack of camp sites for them to immediately move to, the town effectively served as a huge temporary transit camp, until UNHCR, NGOs and the local authorities were able to identify and open new sites. A combination of the continued operation of the municipal water system, substantial levels of initial assistance from the people and local agencies in Bukavu and the fact that many refugees arrived with disposable assets (much of it looted on leaving Rwanda), meant that disease outbreaks were limited and substantial loss of life did not occur. This result is somewhat paradoxical, as coordination was poor and Bukavu received substantially less financial and human resources than were being deployed to Goma.

The influx into Goma resulted in approximately 50,000 deaths, principally as a result of cholera and dysentery, but also from dehydration and violence. Given the massive scale of the influx, many deaths were likely. However, the lack of preparedness for the influx was remarkable and UNHCR should bear the principal responsibility for this situation. Whilst the ICRC, Oxfam and MSF-Holland had prepositioned supplies in the town, UNHCR had not. The agency was aware of the likelihood of a massive population movement out of Rwanda, having participated in an UNREO-coordinated contingency planning exercise, and of the possibility that Goma could be one of the possible 3-4 outflow points. It had prepared a contingency plan for a camp of 50,000 in the face of poor cooperation by the Zairean authorities, but had not operationalised this plan prior to the influx, largely, it seems, as a result of poor judgement and rules relating to the deployment and replacement of Emergency Response Team personnel. Despite the airport having been identified as being critical to the response in the event of a large influx, no attempt was made ahead of the influx to ensure the airport had the capacity to cope with a large airlift operation. Not only did this poor performance result in the avoidable loss of life, but it also resulted in a response that was considerably more costly than it need have been.

The scale of the response to the crisis in Goma was extraordinary. Assisted by the intense media coverage of the influx and the subsequent cholera outbreak, the international community poured assistance into the area in an often uncoordinated manner. It involved not just the usual UN agencies and NGOs, but also civil defence and disaster response agencies from within donor countries, several military contingents providing support to the humanitarian activities and a large number of comparatively inexperienced NGOs. Almost

all the assistance arrived by air and the management of the airlift and the limited capacity of the airport became a critical constraint. Though many aspects of the response and the performance of individual agencies were poor or highly questionable, the overall results were impressive. The speed with which water was supplied to the camps, health care facilities established and general ration distributions initiated were commendable. Less impressive was the performance of the Zairean authorities and the international community in addressing the very substantial levels of violence in the camps; it was not until March 1995 that a satisfactory solution was implemented involving a contingent of the Zairean Presidential Guard, paid and equipped by UNHCR, and supervised by an international monitoring team.

The main policy conclusions and recommendations emerging from the study are indicated below.

The close relationship between the level of security and the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance highlights the need for coherence in the strategies adopted by the political/military and humanitarian domains. However, the Rwanda crisis has been characterised by the lack of a coordinated political strategy within the international community for 'managing' the crisis. Differences between key members of the UN Security Council and governments of neighbouring countries in terms of their attitude towards the RPF and the former Government and an apparent inability to confront and overcome these differences appear to have been responsible for the lack of a coordinated political approach. Despite this lack of an agreed framework, donor countries have been prepared to allocate substantial resources, particularly in the second half of 1994, to humanitarian assistance programmes. This readiness, with which the international community appears prepared to fund humanitarian assistance programmes, contrasts with the lack of concerted efforts to devise coordinated political solutions to the crisis. It is for this reason that the Study III Team chose 'Masking a Policy Vacuum' as the title for this report.

In the absence of a coherent political approach, it seems that humanitarian agencies, encouraged by the new Government and some western political figures, developed and pursued strategies that attempted (but failed) to substitute for political solutions to the crisis. In a society which had just experienced a genocide, apparently carried out by a substantial proportion of the society, a strategy of reintegrating Hutu refugees and IDPs into Rwanda was unrealistic and broadly unsuccessful. Reports or events which threatened to undermine these strategies by questioning the new Government's commitment to respecting human rights were suppressed or downplayed. Despite the massive loss of life and the expenditure of enormous sums of money 1.8 million Rwandans remain in camps outside their country and many observers expect the civil war to be resumed at some point. A solution remains distant.

The Rwanda case demonstrates the need for the development of coordinated political strategies prior to, or at the outset of, a crisis and the need for coherence between the humanitarian and political strategies. The development of coordinated political strategies cannot be forced, but there may be room for encouraging coordinated political strategies through the mechanism of Task Forces or Contact Groups composed of key interested parties. To achieve the latter, closer linkage between the foreign and humanitarian assistance policies in the principal donor countries and the UN system will be required.

The response was resourced through a variety of mechanisms but ultimately donor organisations and donor governments accounted for the bulk of the resources provided. The extent to which funding was reactive to events was striking. There was a marked contrast in resource availability between the 'tap-on' period from mid-July to September when funding appeared limitless and other periods when it was less readily available. The factors contributing to this reactive characteristic are many and their relationship complex. Media coverage and the concern of almost all organisations (donor organisations and the military as well as NGOs and UN agencies) involved in the response for profile and visibility were clearly significant. What was clear from the study is that the way the system was resourced is sub-optimal, limiting the effectiveness of the response and substantially increasing the eventual costs. Preparedness and contingency planning were not encouraged and investments that would have yielded substantial savings, such as opening road routes and increasing the capacity of low-cost railway routes were not made. Whilst donor organisations did provide some 'upfront' funding this was quite inadequate in the face of such a large and highly dynamic emergency and in some cases did not even reach the levels previously agreed to by donor organisations.

The response involved an unprecedented number of agencies and organisations and this must have increased the overall costs of the response and the difficulties of ensuring a coordinated response. The unprecedented number of NGOs involved reflects not only a genuine and widespread desire to provide assistance but also the reality that participation in large-scale, high profile relief operations has become an important factor in the formation and development of NGOs. The performance of many NGOs was impressive and many cooperated closely with each other. However, there were numerous examples where this was not the case. Some NGOs sent inadequately trained and equipped personnel, some undertook to cover a particular sector or need and failed and others were unwilling to be coordinated. The conclusion drawn by the study is that the time has come to establish more formal and effective mechanisms for ensuring that NGOs adhere to certain professional standards. An accreditation system is required to ensure that beneficiaries receive an acceptable standard of service and care complemented by the development of operating principles setting down the obligations of agencies wishing to work in humanitarian aid operations.

Within a system involving so many agencies and organisations, there is a critical need for a strong capacity at the centre to provide leadership and overall coordination. UNHCR came close to fulfilling such a role in relation to refugee operations by virtue of its clear mandate, support from host governments, control over at least a proportion of the funding being allocated and highly competent technical coordination personnel. Approximately 50% of total resources allocated during 1994 were expended by or channelled through the UN system with WFP and UNHCR accounting for 85% of these. However, the overall humanitarian response system was characterised by what we term a 'hollow core' with DHA, UNREO, UNDP the SRSG and UNICEF all undertaking some form of coordinating role inside Rwanda but none enjoying clear role definition, control over the allocation of the humanitarian aid resources or a cadre of competent, readily available, technical personnel. The evacuation of UN agency personnel and their relocation to Nairobi in April disrupted the existing structures and resulted in a high turnover of key personnel. In this hiatus UNREO was formed as a joint DHA/UNDP ad hoc coordinating body. Paradoxically UNDP played the major role in UNREO during the critical emergency period and DHA's involvement did not become substantial until the August-September period when UNDP re-established its office in Kigali and focussed on rehabilitation activities leaving UNREO to focus largely on information sharing and coordinating the response to the IDPs in the south-west.

As the two largest agencies within the UN humanitarian system, WFP and UNHCR's performance was of critical importance to the overall response. Though the team were impressed by many aspects of the performance of the two agencies, the relationship between them was subject to unproductive tensions stemming from the division between them of the general ration supply/distribution chain. Despite the development of a detailed Memorandum of Understanding between them, these tensions persist and are likely to, given their different perspectives on the same problems and the inherent difficulty of splitting such a critical function between the two largest agencies. One aspect of this split is that accountability is diluted as each invariably attempts to shift the burden of responsibility for problems encountered onto the other. Such tensions resulted in unnecessary expenditures and reduced, though to an uncertain amount, the effectiveness of their combined actions. In the light of these problems and the conclusion that the system has a 'hollow core' rather than leadership by a strong, well-resourced, central agency, this Study has drawn the conclusion that the humanitarian aid functions within the UN system should be consolidated within one organisation.

Another principal conclusion drawn from the Study is that accountability mechanisms within the humanitarian aid system are quite inadequate and need radically strengthening. The Team found remarkable variation in the amount and quality of information on the situation in a given area depending on the agencies involved. Thus for some areas, especially the refugee camps, detailed information on morbidity and mortality was readily available whereas inside Rwanda such information was extremely patchy. In part this reflected UNHCR's clear coordination role in relation to refugees and the presence of highly competent technical coordinators which was in contrast to the unclear responsibilities inside Rwanda and the lack of technical personnel within UNREO. Thus large parts of the response could not be properly assessed either because information on process and impact indicators was not available or it had been collected differently by different agencies. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. A potentially more disturbing problem is that in a context of increased concern for profile by, and competition between, humanitarian agencies that the objectivity of their reporting may be suffering as a result of their emphasis on the positive aspects of their

programmes and a downplaying of the negative. Finally, the Team was struck by the very limited attempts to obtain the views of beneficiaries on the assistance they were being provided with. To overcome these shortcomings an organisation, independent of UN agencies and donor organisations will need to be created which can undertake on-the-spot monitoring of system performance, rapidly generating reports for use in the field and by donor organisations and subsequent ex post evaluations. This would involve analysis of outcome indicators and surveys of beneficiary views of the assistance. This would require a strong epidemiological capacity complemented by anthropological and other technical skills. A potential model for this organisation is provided for the health sector by the US Centers for Disease Control.

Principal recommendations

1. Linkages between the humanitarian and political/diplomatic domains should be strengthened, so that the political/diplomatic framework for managing complex political emergencies includes humanitarian considerations from the outset and that the humanitarian system does not operate autonomously.
2. Much greater emphasis needs to be given to preparedness measures by donor organisations and implementing agencies. Substantially increased levels of advance funding are necessary for such measures to be effectively undertaken.
3. The emergency response functions of the principal UN humanitarian agencies (WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF) and DHA should be consolidated within one organisation.
4. A system of accreditation of NGOs, actively supported by donors, should be established to provide the basis for ensuring beneficiaries receive an acceptable professional standard of service and care. This should be complemented by the development of operating principles which outline the obligations of NGOs providing emergency assistance.
5. An organisation, independent of UN agencies and donor organisations should be created which can undertake on-the-spot monitoring of system performance, rapidly generating reports for use in the field, by donor organisations and in ex post evaluations. To ensure full account is taken of such reports, they should immediately be placed in the public domain.

Chapter 1 Methods Employed by the Study

1.1 Design of the Study and Composition of Team

1. The unprecedented scale and scope of this study meant that there was no readily available model from the field of emergency aid evaluation as to how it should be carried out. The principal approach and methods used were developed during the initial phase, a process which drew on experience gained during previous emergency aid evaluations and through a process of discussions with members of the Management Group, personnel in the Evaluation Department of the UK Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and personnel in key agencies involved in the response.
2. Essentially the method adopted by Study III may be seen as a hybrid - attempting to incorporate but extend the usual evaluative criteria with a mechanism for elucidating the principal policy questions for the international community from the experience of the response to the Rwandan Emergency. Thus, standard evaluative criteria were extended and tailored to the specific requirements of a humanitarian aid evaluation¹. The evaluative criteria used by Study III were:
 - Appropriateness
 - Cost effectiveness
 - Coverage
 - Coherence
 - Connectedness
 - Impact
3. As well as the 'new' criteria of coverage, coherence and connectedness the method of assessment attempts to take formal account of the security mandates and resource constraints under which agencies were obliged to operate by using the concept of 'humanitarian space'.
4. The Terms of Reference for Study III proposed three scenarios, namely:
 - i) mass killings, mass movement and social collapse;
 - ii) stabilisation of mass displacement situations, authority vacuum, military offensive and new mass movements; and
 - iii) consolidation, attempts at re-establishment of authority.
5. On consideration this categorisation was felt to be too restrictive. So as to take account of the unusual dynamism and complexity of the events and the humanitarian programmes during 1994, the overall response was instead sub-divided into 11 episodes²:
 1. Rwanda: from RPF invasion in 1990 to April 1994
 2. Burundi: from October 1993 to late 1994
 3. Uganda-Based Operations: April to August 1994
 4. Burundi-Based Operations: April to September 1994
 5. Protection and Relief Operations in Kigali: April to July 1994
 6. Operations within the Humanitarian Protection Zone: end-June to mid-August 1994
 7. Refugee Influx into Ngara and Karagwe Districts, Tanzania: end-April 1994 onwards
 8. Refugee Influx into Goma area, Zaire: July 1994 onwards
 9. Refugee Influx into Bukavu/Uvira area, Zaire: July 1994 onwards
 10. Relief Operations inside Rwanda: mid-July 1994 onwards
 11. Regional Aspects of the response³
6. Of these 11, the first two were **described**, but were not **evaluated**. It was recognised that both cases are of direct relevance to Study III: setting the context for subsequent relief operations and even perhaps having some influence upon events inside Rwanda. However, it was felt that for these two to be included within

the evaluation proper would result in the capacity of the Study III Team being overextended - a view shared by the Management Group⁴. The evaluation proper therefore covered the response in episodes 3-11.

7. Preliminary discussions with selected agencies revealed a remarkably high turnover of field staff. Personnel who had played a key role during the April-December period were no longer based in the region, many having transferred to emergency programmes elsewhere, taken recuperative leave, or dropping out of relief work altogether. It was clear that any fieldwork would need to be extensively complemented by interviews with key personnel involved in the response who had since left the region.
8. The Team assembled to undertake Study III represented a broad range of skills and perspectives, as well as a mix of nationalities. It was structured around a London-based Core Team of three researchers and administrative support staff and 15 'Technical Specialists' with an unusually broad range of skills including anthropologists and economists, a military specialist, journalist and fuelwood specialist, as well as the medical, nutritional, logistical and water and sanitation skills usually found within an emergency aid evaluation team. The time input of the Team members also varied considerably, ranging from the Emergency Health Management specialist at 50 days to two members in an editorial/advisory role with 6 days input each. The total personnel input, including administrative support staff, was equivalent to just over 4 person-years.

1.2 Methods Employed

9. Fieldwork in the Great Lakes Region was undertaken in two blocks. A 20 day 'Reconnaissance Mission' to the sub-region was undertaken between during April and May by five members of the Team (Team leader, Team economist, coordination specialist, anthropologist, military/medical specialist). The purpose of this first visit was to: interview those personnel involved in the emergency phase; collect documentation not readily available in Europe and North America; and initiate arrangements for subsequent visits by Team members. As well as Rwanda, they visited Kenya, Uganda, Zaire, Tanzania. They were joined for one week in Kigali by a sixth member examining security and protection issues. Visits were made to Nairobi, Kampala, Kigali, Goma, Bukavu, Ngara and Dar es Salaam. Selected refugee camps were visited in Goma, Bukavu and Ngara. The planned visit to Bujumbura was cancelled largely for security reasons. The Team's arrival in Kigali coincided with events at the Kibeho IDP camp which made it difficult to meet with key agency and Government personnel and resulted in revisions to the travel schedule. During the second block of fieldwork, seven members of the Team visited the Great Lakes region during the June-July period (Team leader, transport economist, both anthropologists, water and sanitation specialist, health management specialist). Their travel schedules were tailored to their own needs and, for the most part, they travelled separately.
10. Apart from the two anthropologists, all other members of the Team used secondary data. For the most part this involved data collected by the agencies involved in the response, but data drawn from surveys and studies undertaken by other researchers was also used. During March and April, the anthropologists drew up a questionnaire of all the questions that could usefully be asked of beneficiaries, local officials and agency personnel during their fieldwork. Because of the tendency for interviews with beneficiaries in the refugee camps and in Rwanda to draw a wider audience and involve more than the selected interviewee and the associated problems of confidentiality and thus accuracy of responses, the questionnaire was used more as a checklist of points to be covered in the discussion rather than an formal survey. For the most part, interviews with beneficiaries were conducted without agency personnel or government officials being present, but this was not possible in all cases.
11. Fieldwork in the region was complemented by extensive visits by different members of the Team to collect documentation and undertake interviews with key personnel involved in the response in France, Belgium, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland, the UK, the USA and Canada. In some cases, the same individual was interviewed by different members of the Team on different occasions with the content of the discussion reflecting the different interests of the Team member undertaking the interview. Team members were encouraged to write-up their interview notes in order to share the information. In June, a

pack of 130 pages of interview notes was disseminated amongst Team members. During the course of the visits to head offices and offices in the region, documents were copied and in all the documentation collection assembled numbered over 2,000 items which were catalogued on a specially modified database programme.

Numbers of Individuals Interviewed during the Study (January to September 1995)

In the Great Lakes region	235
In donor countries	245
No of beneficiaries (individuals and groups)	140

12. As well as the interviews and assembling of documentation special investigations were undertaken. One which absorbed a substantial proportion of the time of the Team Economist was the compilation of a database of resource allocations during 1994. This involved modifying and complementing the DHA Financial Tracking System (FTS) dataset for 1994⁵ through⁶:
 - i) corresponding with the principal official donors on their allocations and expenditures;
 - ii) attempting to reconcile any substantial discrepancies between the information provided to the Team by donor organisations, UN agencies and NGOs and that contained within the DHA FTS;
 - iii) adding information on onward allocations by the main 'intermediary' agencies such as UNHCR and Caritas;
 - iv) wherever possible, linking resources to the geographical area of final use;
 - v) attempting to capture as much of the private flows as possible through correspondence with the larger NGOs and organisations involved in administering public appeals for funding and also through the questionnaire sent to most of the NGOs which operated, or appear to have operated, inside Rwanda during 1994.
13. The resultant database enabled analysis that would not have been possible using the DHA FTS alone and gave the Team a greater level of confidence in the quality of the data and an understanding of those areas where coverage and accuracy was poor. Principally, these areas concerned private donations through NGOs⁷, the costs of the various military contingents and support activities and the costs to the neighbouring countries⁸. The combined scale of undercounted private flows and the costs of the military contingents and support operations can only be guessed at, but could well be in the region of \$400-500 million.
14. As a separate exercise, an attempt was made to contact all of the NGOs which appeared to have been involved in the response inside Rwanda itself and obtain information on their activities. Using the various lists prepared between July 1994 and April 1995 by UNREO and the Ministry of Rehabilitation, together with one prepared by the US military in August 1994, it appeared that over 200 organisations¹⁰ had programmes in Rwanda during this period. Contact details for the head offices of these organisations could only be obtained for 177 of these organisations. A short questionnaire was faxed to this group. Responses were received from 61 by 15 September 1995.
15. Two research papers were commissioned. One, undertaken in support of the work of the media specialist, examined in detail the content of British TV News coverage over a 6 day period in July 1994, which included the influx into Goma and the installation of the new Government in Kigali. The other commissioned from the French epidemiological research group Epicentre involved the analysis of their datasets to establish the incidence and characteristics of dysentery epidemics in Rwanda and the refugee camps.
16. Following the second period of fieldwork and the completion of their reports by members of the Team, a Workshop was held in the UK in August at which a draft outline of main report was reviewed and discussions held to agree on the principle findings and recommendations of the Team. The final report was written by the Team Leader with the support of the members of the Core Team and comments on those

sections corresponding to their area of input by the Technical Specialists. Whilst the report relies heavily upon the material and opinions of all members of the Team, not all members necessarily agree with each conclusion and recommendation.

1.3 Difficulties Encountered

17. Despite the very substantial personnel and financial resources deployed during the Study, these were still limited in relation to the scale and complexity of the response. Time did not prove sufficient to pursue certain lines of enquiry and it was not possible to interview all the key personnel that Team members would have liked.
18. Quantitative information on process and outcome indicators was markedly more available for the refugee operations than it was for operations inside Rwanda during the critical relief period. Whilst detailed information was readily available on, for instance, mortality rates or the volume of water distributed in Goma, Bukavu and Ngara, such information was rarely available for IDP camps inside Rwanda, particularly for those that existed for a few weeks only in the May to August period in the north and east but also many of those in the south-west. Factors contributing to this situation include: the disruption caused by the war and the genocide; the extremely difficult and often dangerous working conditions of the humanitarian agencies working inside Rwanda between April and July 1994; and the lack of clear agency responsibility for the coordination of humanitarian activities inside the country which was in contrast to the clear role of UNHCR in relation to refugees. The fact that all IDP camps had been closed by the start of the fieldwork period further increased the 'inside-outside' contrast in the availability of information. Site visits, often a valuable source of information, were no longer a valid option. Interviews with former IDPs who had been returned to their home communes did not prove possible for a combination of reasons, including the difficulty of arranging such interviews with officials and the probability that the former IDPs would feel reluctant to talk openly about their experiences, given their new situation. Some interviews were carried out with former IDPs who had subsequently taken refuge in Tanzania and Zaire, but these did not fully compensate for the difficulties experienced in Rwanda.
19. Of the evaluative criteria employed, cost-effectiveness was the most problematic, due to difficulties in obtaining cost information on particular activities. Until now, cost-effectiveness has not been a principal concern of many humanitarian agencies, and agency accounting practices rarely allow for calculations to be made on, for example, the average cost of producing and delivering treated water. The substantial involvement of military contingents and the considerable uncertainties involved in estimating the costs and charging basis of their contribution further increased these difficulties. As a result, the assessment of cost-effectiveness issues is largely confined to the logistics sector, where information on overland and airlift transport costs was more readily available.
20. A frustrating aspect of the study was that, in order to establish a full and reliable perspective on a particular event or process, it was invariably necessary to obtain information, often involving different and sometimes contradictory perspectives, from personnel spread between several different agencies, some of whom had since moved to other countries. This difficulty reflected the large number of agencies involved in the response and the high turnover of their staff, though the sometimes contradictory nature of their perspectives might also be attributed to agency rivalry and competition. The Team were frequently struck by the readiness with which personnel from one agency, donor agencies included, criticised the activities of other agencies whilst being unwilling to turn a critical eye to the activities of their own agency.
21. Most agencies responded readily to enquiries by the Team and some devoted considerable staff time to preparing information in response to enquiries by the Team. Nevertheless, it should be said that some agencies were less helpful and were reluctant to provide complete access to internal documentation.

Notes on Chapter 1

1. These additional criteria are borrowed Minear, Larry, 1994 'The International Relief System: A Critical Review'. Paper presented to the Parallel National Intelligence Estimate on Global Humanitarian Emergencies, Meridian International Centre, Washington DC September 22 (mimeo).
2. Initially, these were referred to as 'case studies', but as a result of the enormous variation in the availability of information for different case studies and time pressures which prevented Team members spending much time in particular locations, the term 'case study' was replaced by 'episode' in the latter stages of the study.
3. This case study was added to facilitate the evaluation of the regional aspects of the response such as coordination and the regional logistics operations involving Kampala/Entebbe, Mombasa, Dar es Salaam and Nairobi.
4. The difficulty of evaluating relief efforts inside Burundi has subsequently increased with the deterioration of the security situation there. Principally due to the insecurity, the April-May Reconnaissance Mission did not visit Bujumbura as had originally been planned.
5. The DHA Financial Tracking System records emergency aid resource allocations by bilateral donors, multilateral agencies and some of the largest NGOs to those operations where the UN has launched a Consolidated Appeal. Though the DHA requests donors and agencies to provide information on allocations by geographical area and sector, this information is often not available. Though information on the final implementing agency is also requested, this is often not apparent to donors providing block grants to intermediary agencies, such as UNHCR which allocate substantial funds to other agencies. Due to lack of personnel resources, the DHA Financial Tracking Unit is not able to fill many of the gaps in the information provided.
6. These activities were extremely time consuming, accounting for at least 50 days of the Team Economist's input.
7. Funding appeals to private donors were mounted in many countries by NGOs or NGO consortia, particularly during the period immediately following the Goma influx. However, the combination of a lack of formal mechanisms for collating private flows and the minimal reporting by NGOs on the use of such funds makes information on private flows patchy and incomplete. Of the two largest NGO consortia capable of capturing official and private flows through NGOS (VOICE for the EU countries and InterAction for the USA), the former ran out of funds to continue a financial tracking/coordination system established in mid-1994 and the latter did not attempt to monitor such flows.
8. Considerable variation exists in the way that governments estimate and deal with the costs of military contingents and military support activities in humanitarian aid operations. In part, this reflects the range of roles in which the various military contingents operated (see Chapter 3), but it also reflects differences in attribution practices. For instance, in estimating the costs of an operation, some governments appear to have used gross costs as their basis, whilst others appear to have used additional costs as their basis. Some covered all the costs from within their Defence budgets, but did not report the costs to DHA; some covered the additional costs from within their Defence budgets, but reported an estimated cost to DHA, in order that it be counted as part of their national contribution to the overall relief effort; others appear to have charged a portion of the costs to their Aid budgets.
9. The DHA database does not record financial or in-kind contributions by countries hosting Rwandan refugees. As discussed in Chapter 7, these flows may be very substantial, though they are extremely difficult to quantify and, at an aggregate level, may be offset by beneficial flows resulting from the activities of the relief agencies in those countries.
10. Some of the organisations were only listed by their acronyms and it is possible that some were not NGOs.

Chapter 2 An Overview of the Emergency and the Response


2.1 Introduction

22. The purpose of the chapter is to provide a descriptive account of the emergency and the response to it by the international community, before the report moves on to assess performance in subsequent chapters. This chapter begins by indicating the principal elements of the crisis and the response using resource flows to convey a picture of how the humanitarian system operated during 1994. It is important to understand that the humanitarian operations in April 1994 were preceded by what became very substantial relief operations inside Rwanda and in neighbouring countries. The development of these programmes from 1990 to early 1994 are described in Section 2.3. The main part of the chapter (Sections 2.4 to 2.10) summarises the humanitarian operations which began in April 1994. The organisation of these summaries follows closely, though not entirely, the 'episodes' indicated as part of the methodology in Chapter 1.

2.2 Principal Elements of the Crisis and the Response

23. The crisis in Rwanda during 1994 and the response to it by the international community was unique in many respects, involving as it did the following elements.
- a genocide by substantial elements within the majority ethnic group (Hutu) against the minority (Tutsi), but with moderates within the majority group also being targeted, which resulted in the death of between 0.5 to 1 million people and on-going problems of retribution and justice;
 - a conventional conflict between the Force Armée Rwandaise (FAR) and RPF, in which the front-line traversed the whole country between April and July 1994 resulting in an RPF victory and a new RPF-led government;
 - the rapid movement of at least 1.5 million refugees into four neighbouring countries and the mounting of substantial and high profile relief efforts by the host governments, the UN, the Red Cross and NGOs;
 - the presence of remnants of the defeated army and militia within the refugee camps;
 - the substantial involvement of third party military contingents, either as part of UNAMIR I or UNAMIR II, the unique French-led Opération Turquoise, or in a logistical support or humanitarian role in Eastern Zaire and Kigali;
 - humanitarian activities undertaken by an unprecedented number of agencies including over 200 NGOs.
24. No other recent large scale humanitarian operation has been so complex or dynamic.
25. In terms of the scale of the resources deployed, the available data indicates that, over the period April-December 1994, approximately \$1.29 billion was allocated by the international community to humanitarian agencies. It was not possible to accurately determine amounts actually expended, though it is assumed that, over the year analysed, expenditures closely matched allocations. If full account is taken of the costs of the various military contingents and private flows not captured by the available data sets (see Section 1.2), then it is likely that the total response during this nine month period alone was in the order of \$1.4 billion.
26. Of the \$1.29 billion of recorded allocations, approximately 86% was from official sources, with the remainder from private donors, the bulk of which was channelled through NGOs¹, the Red Cross Societies and the UNICEF National Committees. By a substantial margin, the EU Commission and the US Government were the largest official sources of funds accounting for 50% of total allocations. Figure 1 shows the principal official donors.

Figure 1 Contributions from the Main Bilateral and Multilateral Donors (\$m)



27. Approximately 50% of total resources were expended by, or channelled through, UN agencies with just two agencies, UNHCR and WFP, accounting for over 85% of all the resources expended by, or channelled through, the UN system. A substantial proportion of this amount was allocated onwards by these two agencies, either in cash or in-kind, to NGO implementing partners. The Red Cross Movement (ie. ICRC, IFRC and National Societies) accounted for 17% of all flows with the ICRC playing a major role within Rwanda and the IFRC concentrating its efforts on the refugees in neighbouring countries.
28. The balance of allocations between Rwanda and the neighbouring countries for the whole of 1994 is shown in Figure 2.
29. In terms of the 'balance' of resource flows between the refugees and Rwanda itself, these results are of particular interest, as the new Government in Kigali has been claiming that international assistance has been biased towards the refugees. However, great care is needed in pursuing this analysis, as the figure of \$372 million allocated for use in Rwanda includes funds allocated between January and 6 April (roughly \$50m) and does not separate out the amounts spent in the (Hutu) IDP camps in the south-west between July and December, which the Government regards in the same vein as international assistance to the refugees.

Figure 2 Allocation of Aid by Country during 1994





Figure 3 Breakdown of Allocations by Agency/Type of Agency during 1994




2.3 Humanitarian Activities Before April 1994

Rwanda

30. The October 1990 RPF invasion entered Rwanda at Kagitumba, in the extreme north-east of Rwanda, and advanced as far south as Gabiro before it was repulsed (see Figure 4). It resulted in the displacement of approximately 30,000 people. The Rwandan and Belgian Red Cross Societies and Caritas were involved in responding to their needs with support from the EU. The RPF attack on Ruhengeri in January 1991 displaced a further 10,000 and resulted in a spate of killings in the north-west which claimed the lives of several hundred people of Tutsi origin. Further killings took place in the Bugesera area in March 1991 causing displacements in the south-west. By April, there were more than 90,000 IDPs in the country, at which point the ICRC became directly involved in relief efforts.

Figure 4 Location of Demilitarised Zone as of September 1993



31. During the first half of 1992, the RPF mounted a series of attacks which left them in control of approximately a 10 km-wide strip of northern Rwanda from Lake Bulera around to the town of Lubirizi and within just a few kilometres of the town of Byumba. This resulted in the displacement of approximately 50,000 people. The general lack of security elsewhere in the northern area prevented many farmers from cultivating their land. By July 1992, when another cease-fire was agreed between the RPF and the Government, the numbers judged to be dependent upon external food assistance had increased to 350,000. The instability and violence was not confined to the north. As the number of political parties and the competition between them increased, there were terrorist bombings in Kigali and the north of the country.

public buildings and churches, though many were accommodated by Zairean families.

37. UNHCR mobilised its Emergency Response Team (ERT) mechanism and a total of 25 staff were deployed to the region. Charter flights and overland transport were organised from Nairobi to move non-food items and equipment to the affected areas. In Rwanda, with their ongoing IDP programmes, agencies were able to divert supplies and personnel to the south of the country comparatively quickly. However, the spontaneous sites were cramped, densely populated and difficult to reach. Supplies of clean water and sanitation arrangements were poor and water sources became polluted. High rates of dysentery and malaria were experienced. Though quick to respond, WFP was unable to provide a full ration, in part it seems because of lack of funds to carry out local purchases, and high rates of malnutrition occurred from November through to January when the situation was brought under control. Some camps experienced mortality rates 20 times the normal rate.
38. In Tanzania, the situation was even worse. The refugees were stretched over a distance of 500 kms initially in 50 sites many of which had less than 2,000 refugees and were difficult to access as it was the wet season. Once again, water and sanitation were particular problems. High rates of dysentery and malaria were experienced and a measles outbreak occurred at the end of the year. Few NGOs were working in the area - the principal ones involved were MSF-France, MSF-Belgium, Concern, the Tanzanian Red Cross (IFRC supported), IRC, Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service and Caritas. Because of this limited number, both HCR and WFP had little choice over their implementing partners and some apparently performed very poorly. Whilst WFP had ready access to the Tanzanian Strategic Grain Reserve, its ability to procure and ensure regular supplies of vegetable oil, beans and Corn-Soya-Blend (CSB) was limited and the nutritional value of the general ration was quite inadequate. The local population provided supplies initially, but these were soon exhausted. Malnutrition, morbidity and mortality rates increased substantially to very high levels in several camps. Surveys in some camps revealed mortality rates 40 times the normal rate. A survey of camps in Kibondo District estimated that 43% of the deaths were due to malnutrition⁶. A refugee population, which had arrived in reasonable health, experienced a famine. Accurate estimates of the numbers who died are not available, but it was certainly in the thousands.
39. The relative significance of the logistical difficulties, inadequate resources and management factors in contributing to the increased mortality are difficult to gauge. Certainly, resourcing was a particular problem for WFP: its specially created Immediate Response Account had only received \$12.4 million of the \$30 million target set for 1993 by WFP's governing body⁷ and the response by donors to its \$17 million Appeal for a regional emergency operation sent to donors in mid-November was slow and inadequate. This considerably hampered its ability to make local purchases and fund the additional logistical and personnel capacity required, particularly in Tanzania. Consequently, WFP was obliged to draw \$5 million from DHA's Central Emergency Revolving Fund at the end of December. Whilst the response to UNHCR's appeals were also inadequate and slow, it appeared to have more readily available resources being able to release \$8 million from its own Emergency Fund in late October.
40. By early 1994, the situation in Burundi had improved and with the poor conditions in the camps many refugees began returning. By the first week of April, approximately 60,000 were still present in Tanzania, 50,000 in Rwanda and 40,000 in Zaire.

2.4 Operations in and around Kigali

41. Almost immediately after the Presidential plane was shot down on the evening of 6 April, roadblocks were set up around Kigali and killings began. The RPF contingent based at the Parliament building fought its way around the city to avoid being pinned down and also to rescue some Tutsis. This action and fighting between some FAR units resulted in heavy fighting and contributed to the initial confusion over the systematic nature of the killings of civilians which were being undertaken by the Interahamwe, often with the support of some elements of the FAR and the Gendarmerie.
42. In the first few days, the international community's efforts were focused on the evacuation of foreign

In May 1992, a demonstration in Kigali led to rioting which left 20 people dead. Inter-ethnic violence also occurred again in the Bugesera area.

32. Disturbances intensified in January 1993, following the signing of the protocol on power sharing of the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) Agreement by the negotiators in Arusha. The MRND and CDR parties organised violent demonstrations and these sparked anti-Tutsi violence which involved elements of the FAR. In 6 days, 300 people were killed in Gisenyi; contacts between the negotiators in Arusha were suspended, and on 8 February 1993, the RPF launched its all out attack along the entire cease-fire line. Within a matter of days, they had advanced to within 25 kms of Kigali, but with military support being provided directly by Zairean troops and indirectly by French military advisers the advance was halted. A cease-fire was agreed in the first week of March, on condition that the RPF withdraw to its former positions.
33. The February 1993 advance pushed ahead of it the 2-300,000 previously displaced, as well as displacing a similar number for the first time. By early March, the total number of displaced was put at 860,000 (though this figure was not accepted by all agencies) spread between scores of camps and population concentrations around public buildings in the northern half of the country. The scale of the relief operations was dramatically increased. Unable to supply Kigali and the IDP camps by overland routes from Uganda, WFP undertook a substantial airlift of 26,000 tonnes of food (mainly maize grain, but also some beans) from Entebbe to Kigali between February 1993 and mid-July. Thereafter, an overland route was agreed with the RPF. WFP supplied the food to the ICRC and NGOs who were responsible for supervising distributions within the camps. The Belgian Red Cross undertook non-food distributions. CRS, Caritas, MSF-Belgium, MSF-Holland, Oxfam, CARE and several other NGOs were substantially involved in the response.
34. Conditions in the IDP camps were difficult. Accurate lists of beneficiaries were rarely available and the absence of the local authorities at the distribution sites contributed to a lack of security for relief agency personnel². Government estimates of the number of IDPs became inflated and, by the middle of the year, it was being claimed that there were 1.2 million. However, it began to emerge that a substantial proportion of the food aid was being diverted (apparently with the involvement of senior government officials) and in addition, many beneficiaries were selling the maize grain because of its low acceptability³. WFP took steps to halt the diversions, including writing to the Prime Minister threatening to terminate food aid supplies, working more closely with the ICRC to improve methods for assessing the number of beneficiaries and improving monitoring⁴. In June 1993, the Government and the RPF reached agreement for the safe return of most of the displaced to their homes in the north and about 600,000 had returned to their homes by September, but some 350,000, whose homes were in the RPF-held zone, remained in IDP camps until the events of April 1994.
35. A drought in late 1993 affected southern parts of the country. An FAO/WFP Assessment Mission, which visited the country in February 1994, estimated a 21% reduction on the previous years harvest as a result of the drought and the massive population displacements in the north of the country. WFP began preparing to provide food assistance to approximately 250,000 people judged to be most affected by the drought. Distributions, apart from some EU food donated to Caritas, had not commenced by the first week of April and so, were never implemented.

Burundi

36. The attempted coup of 21 October during which President Melchior Ndadaye⁵ was assassinated produced a wave of ethnic violence in which approximately 50,000 to 100,000 were killed, and the displacement of approximately 1 million Burundians, 70% as refugees to neighbouring countries. Approximately 375,000 crossed into southern Rwanda and settled in 21 camps along the border, mostly in Butare Prefecture, but camps were also established in Cyangugu, Gikongoro, Kigali and Kibungo Prefectures. An estimated 245,000 crossed into Tanzania the majority to Kigoma Region (Kasulu, Kibondoa and Kigoma Districts) and the remainder into Ngara District in Kagera Region. Approximately 40,000 Burundians crossed into Uvira Province in Zaire just across the border from Bujumbura, the majority settling at 17 sites - mostly

nationals. US nationals were evacuated by vehicle convoy to the Burundi border whilst other nationalities were mostly evacuated by Operation Amarylis, a combined French, Belgian and Italian operation, which operated in the Kigali area between the 9 and 13 April and involved 1,100 troops. Many of those evacuated witnessed killings and were aware that their Tutsi colleagues and neighbours were being left to their fate.


43. Within 10 days of the shooting down of the Presidential plane, the only international agencies with an effective presence in Kigali were UNAMIR (later joined by the UN Advance Humanitarian Team) and the ICRC. Both UNAMIR and the ICRC provided protection to a substantial number of threatened civilians in and around Kigali⁸. Some 10,000 people had congregated at the Amohoro Stadium where UNAMIR was able to guard the entrances. Other concentrations were the Saint Famille Catholic Church and the King Faysal Hospital. Most had made their own way to these locations, but many were effectively 'rescued' and transported there by UNAMIR and ICRC. Until mid-July when the RPF finally took control of the city, movement was extremely hazardous. On one occasion, Red Cross ambulances were stopped and the patients inside killed, and the Stadium and the Central Hospital shelled with the loss of several lives, including ICRC local personnel.
44. Apart from its protection activities the ICRC's efforts focused upon the provision of surgical and medical care to civilians and combatants at the Kigali Central Hospital and an emergency surgical hospital set up next to the ICRC compound in Kyovu. Nine MSF-France personnel remained in Kigali attached to the ICRC. The agency was faced with such high levels of violence and lack of respect for its neutrality that its ability to operate effectively was severely limited.
45. UNAMIR concentrated its rapidly declining force in Kigali at their base near the Amohoro Stadium not far from the International Airport. Apart from periodic interruptions caused by fighting between the RPF and the FAR, the airport was kept open until 7 June when heavy fighting forced its closure for one month. Between April and June, twice-daily flights were operated by the Canadian Air Force Hercules' bringing in supplies for UNAMIR, limited relief items and media teams and taking out withdrawing UNAMIR contingents. On 20 April, UNAMIR's Humanitarian Assistance Cell was reinforced by a UN Advance Humanitarian Team including WFP, UNICEF and DHA personnel and, on occasions, UNHCR and WHO. With UNAMIR support, the UNAHT jointly assessed needs in those besieged population groups that were accessible and where possible, attempted to provide them with relief supplies. Apart from security, the priority needs were water (as the municipal system had stopped functioning) and ready-made food, in that order. However, these operations were severely hampered by the lack of security and the quantities of relief provided were limited to just a few tonnes. The realisation that the opportunities for providing relief in Kigali contained high levels of risk led other relief agencies to concentrate their attention on cross-border operations from Uganda and Burundi.
46. Substantial food and relief stocks were located in warehouses around Kigali⁹, but could not be reached or it was felt that attempts to undertake distributions would attract violence. In June, WFP personnel in UNAHT decided to abandon efforts to utilise existing stocks in Kigali and to bring in supplies from Nairobi, as UNICEF had begun doing a few days earlier, but the closure of the airport as the battle for Kigali intensified prevented this taking place. At the beginning of July, the RPF advance enabled overland convoys to reach Kigali from Uganda. As the RPF took control of the city, severe looting took place, and even when the RPF were in control of the city, WFP was not allowed access to all its warehouses.

2.5 The Ngara/Karagwe Influx

47. The start of the genocide resulted in the almost immediate arrival of Rwandans (predominantly Tutsi) in Uganda, in Eastern Zaire and in Ngara District in Tanzania, though, compared to later flows, the numbers involved were limited¹⁰. During the second and third weeks of April, UNHCR deployed Emergency Response Teams to Tanzania, Zaire (Goma and Bukavu) and Burundi with the objective of assisting with the response to the Tutsi refugees and to prepare for subsequent outflows from Rwanda. In Ngara District, HCR already had a sub-office, opened in late 1993, as part of the response to the Burundian refugee influx¹¹, and had established working relationships with several NGOs.


48. The Emergency Response Team began working in the area on 20 April and, by the morning of 29 April, had identified, together with District officials, a site for a 'transit' camp next to the tarred road from Rusumo Falls to Isaka (see Figure 5). The site covered a low hill named Benaco after an Italian road construction company which had previously worked in the area and next to it was a small artificial lake.

Figure 5 Location of Refugee Camps in Ngara District



49. On the evening of 29 April, an influx began of Hutus from the eastern Prefectures of Rwanda fearing a southward advance by the RPF. The population were largely farming households and the militia were not greatly evident. Unlike the later influxes into Goma and Bukavu, FAR troops were not present. 25 hours after the start of the influx, an RPF platoon arrived at the border post and halted the flow. The initial estimate of the numbers that had crossed during this brief period was 300,000, but this was subsequently revised down to 170,000. The flow was directed to the Benaco site. Media coverage during the first few days was substantial, partly because of the scale and rapidity of the influx and partly because many journalists were returning to Europe on their way back from covering the first multi-racial general elections in South Africa.
50. Within a few days of the establishment of the Benaco camp, influxes occurred in Karagwe District further north and more refugees continued to arrive in Ngara where new camps were opened, partly in order to accommodate the new arrivals, and partly to reduce the congestion in Benaco (see Figure 6). By October, there were an estimated 400,000 refugees in Ngara and 155,000 in Karagwe. In Ngara, additional sites were established in July (Lumasi Camp), August (Musuhuru Camp) and in February 1995 (Kitale Camp).

Figure 6 Graph showing growth in refugee populations in Ngara and Karagwe Districts



51. The response to the influx at Benaco was highly impressive. ERT members from Zaire and Burundi were redeployed to assist those already in Ngara. The Tanzanian authorities formally requested UNHCR to coordinate the operations, giving the ERT considerable clout in allocating responsibilities to the NGOs which were present. Mwanza (200 kms away) was identified as the nearest suitable Air Head. The first food distributions were carried out within 2 days of the influx by the IFRC using supplies which the ICRC had been building up in anticipation of cross-border operations into Rwanda. A subsidiary of COGEFAR, the Italian company constructing a road from Burundi to Rwanda¹², was hired to cut a protective ditch around the lake, to establish roads into the Benaco site and to improve the route between Ngara town, where many agencies established offices, and the Benaco site. Oxfam quickly established a system to pump, store and distribute water from the lake and MSF, AICF and Concern established health services in Benaco. CARE took responsibility for food and non-food stores management and for part of the general ration distributions.
52. The donor response was prompt and compared to the Burundian influx six months earlier comparatively generous. The UK ODA provided a logistics team and airfreighted a steel bridge to improve access between

Ngara town and Benaco¹³. Under a pre-existing support arrangement with UNHCR, EMERCOM¹⁴ provided large transport aircraft and six-wheel drive vehicles, which proved ideal for operations in the area when the rains started soon after the influx. ECHO, which had substantial unused funds remaining from the Burundian refugee operation, was able to provide immediate funding to the European NGOs already present and, by requiring that those NGOs it funded be coordinated by UNHCR, considerably strengthened UNHCR's coordinating role. Anxious to prevent an influx of NGOs and a dissipation of effort, the UNHCR Coordinator limited the numbers who could work in the camps to those which were already present and those, such as CARE, whose specialist skills were clearly required¹⁵. Roles were clearly allocated between the various agencies and a highly collaborative approach engendered.

53. Initially, most agencies appear to have paid little attention to the genocide and the presence of the militia and the implications for the power structures in the camps. On 15 June, what came to be known as the Gatete incident¹⁶ resulted in the temporary withdrawal of agencies from Benaco for 2-3 days (15 days in the case of MSF-France) and forced an awareness of the presence within the camps of those suspected of involvement in the genocide and the potential for violence against the agencies.
54. Despite the excellent response in the initial phase, the status of the operation has remained fragile. The food supply pipeline was not able to build up a satisfactory operating stock until 1995 and, to this day, remains effectively a 'ship-to-mouth' operation (see Chapter 5). The lake next to Benaco has been unable to provide satisfactory supplies of water and attempts to complement it from other sources have not been very successful (see Chapter 4). In mid-July, Goma and to a lesser extent Bukavu became the focus of attention and resources and personnel were transferred to the massive operations in Eastern Zaire¹⁷. The assumption that the refugees would soon repatriate deterred the scale of investments that would have guaranteed satisfactory and reliable water supplies. Instead, the number of refugees has increased steadily and made planning difficult. The total refugee population in Ngara District in May 1995 was double that of May 1994.

2.6 Cross-Border Operations from Uganda


55. Several thousand Rwandans (predominantly Tutsi) fled to Uganda during the second week of April and were accommodated in camps in Mbarara District. On 12 April, the RPF forces moved across the demilitarised zone (DMZ) and began advancing southwards towards Kigali and down the eastern side of Rwanda reaching Rusomo Falls by the end of the month, and then, establishing a line running approximately south from the outskirts of Kigali by early May. Many, perhaps the majority of people in the Prefectures of Byumba, Kibungo and Kigali fled their homes ahead of this advance. In late April, tens of thousands began crossing to Karagwe and Ngara Districts in Tanzania. Others moved westwards becoming IDPs in the FAR controlled areas of the country.
56. Within the RPF-controlled areas, a substantial proportion of the population was temporarily displaced and gathered in and around public buildings and pre-April IDP camps. This displacement was not just the result of the fighting but also the RPF's actions in screening the population, so as to identify the militia and those who participated in the genocide¹⁸. There was considerable flux in these populations though it appears that the number of locations with significant concentrations (ie. above 500 people) numbered around 30. WFP and the ICRC which had both been providing assistance to IDPs in northern Rwanda from Uganda prior to 6 April gained agreement from the RPF to provide relief assistance in RPF area. WFP undertook an assessment at the end of April and began transporting food across the border to IDP camps on 2 May¹⁹. Discussions involving WFP, the ICRC, UNREO UNICEF and UNAMIR, and subsequently the RPF and the FAR, resulted in agreement on six Operating Principles for agencies working inside Rwanda. In addition, a geographical 'Division of Labour' was agreed between WFP and the ICRC: WFP took responsibility for the north-eastern areas down to Kayonza and the area around Byumba (an estimated 95,000 people); and the ICRC took responsibility principally for the North West area around Ruhengeri, but also for the former ICRC caseload of IDPs in the north and also for people who had escaped to Byumba from Kigali, involving an estimated population of 100,000. During the May-July period, WFP distributed between 2-3,000 tonnes in its area of responsibility and ICRC distributed 10,000 tonnes.

57. As awareness of the developing genocide increased, the RPF tended to be seen as the aggrieved party by many relief organisations. Following the reduction in the UNAMIR force, some saw the RPF as the group best placed to stop the killings by advancing and taking territory. Agencies whose staff had been evacuated from Rwanda, together with other agencies which had no previous experience in Rwanda assembled in southern Uganda, mostly in the town of Kabale, during April and May. Because of the insecurity and lack of access to the rest of the country, these agencies were anxious to establish (and be seen to establish) relief programmes inside Rwanda. By June, approximately 40 NGOs were involved in relief and rehabilitation activities in RPF areas. The RPF closely controlled the activities of all agencies. For instance, all UN and NGO vehicles had to be accompanied by a 'guide' and only a select group of NGOs, including MdM, MSF, CARE, SCF, World Vision and Samaritans Purse, was allowed to remain inside Rwanda overnight²⁰. The majority of NGOs therefore had to cross the border every morning and return to Uganda every evening. Soldiers were present in the camps and surveys of any sort were discouraged, particularly the monitoring of mortality and those involving close questioning of the IDPs.
58. Coordination amongst the agencies appears to have been poor, probably as a result of the intense competition between them and the RPF's close control of their activities. For instance, the ICRC was critical of WFP for not supervising (or ensuring supervision by an NGO partner) the distributions of its assistance which were effectively handed over to the RPF refugee affairs personnel or local leaders to distribute. Two NGOs involved in drug distributions (Memisa and PSF) would not cooperate with each other²¹. In addition local personnel of some agencies appear to have developed an uncritical, sympathetic relationship with the RPF. One NGO supplied the RPF with 4,000 litres of diesel fuel, supposedly for running water pumps, though the UNAMIR Force Commander believed it was used by RPF vehicles²². Six WFP trucks were hijacked by the RPF and verbal assurance was given that they would be returned at some point in the future. To ensure that they were properly maintained, local WFP staff sent a mechanic to where the vehicles were being used²³. Because of personal links between UNICEF personnel and the RPF, some NGOs appear to have used the UNICEF office in Kabale as their liaison point with the RPF refugee affairs branch who were based at RPF headquarters in Mulindi, 10 kms inside Rwanda for much of the period.
59. As the RPF pushed westwards in June and July, its screening programme in the north-east was ended and people returned to their communes. Rwandan refugees who had been living in Uganda for up to 30 years also began returning. Several agencies began seeds and tool distributions in northern and eastern areas in July.

2.7 The Goma Influx

60. In April-May 1994, several thousand Rwandans (predominantly Tutsi) sought refugee in Goma. The UNHCR Emergency Response Team and those NGOs present rapidly established a camp at Kituku near to the Lake Kivu shore on the road to Sake (see Figure 7). During June, UNHCR, together with the North Kivu authorities, identified a contingency site for 50,000 refugees at Rutshuru and Katale 55 kms north of Goma, the plan being finalised on 20 June, just after French forces began arriving in Goma to launch Opération Turquoise. Between the finalisation of the plan and the influx on 14 July, there was little or no follow-up to translate it to the level of operational preparedness. The contingency plan at Katale was prepared at the same time as UNHCR personnel in Nairobi were participating in an UNREO coordinated regional contingency plan, which included a scenario that up to 1.5 million Rwandans would move westwards ahead of the RPF front line and cross into Zaire to the north and/or south of Lake Kivu. (The lack of linkage between these two processes is analysed further in Section 6.3). However, three agencies (ICRC, MSF-Holland and Oxfam) did preposition supplies in Goma and, though inadequate due to the scale of the influx, these were to prove useful (for 200,000 refugees for the first two).

Figure 7 Camps in the Goma Area



61. During the days immediately prior to the 14 July, agency personnel in Goma were aware of the build-up of people just across the border in Gisenyi and the increasing likelihood that they would flow over into Goma as the FAR were forced to retreat. Because of French Government requests for more agencies to establish programmes inside Zone Turquoise, once the security situation had been stabilised in the Zone by the first week of July, officials from the head offices of the UK ODA, ECHO and UNHCR were in Goma in the days immediately prior to the influx, and participated in assessment missions beyond Gisenyi two days before the influx. On their return, they began efforts to mobilise resources in the hours immediately before the influx.
62. The mass influx began during the night of 14 July and continued until 18 July, when the RPF forces arrived at the border and sealed it. Initial estimates were that up to 1.2 million refugees had crossed the border, but in the light of subsequent revisions, the number appears to have been around 800,000. The majority crossed from Gisenyi to Goma, either along the shore road, or at points further north, bringing them directly into the town with many walking across the unfenced airport. However, many thousands also crossed the border well to the north of the town, notably at Kibumba where the road to Rutshuru passes close to the Rwandan

border. Those entering Goma were encouraged to keep moving and were directed on the north axis towards Katale by UNHCR and NGO personnel. Between Goma and Katale, much of the terrain is waterless lava fields, and the distance to the planned (but still unequipped) site at Katale was too great for many of the refugees: hundreds died of dehydration during the long walk up over the lava fields towards Katale, whilst tens of thousands decided to settle at Kibumba, a wholly inappropriate location, 27 kms from the nearest water source.

63. Elements of the FAR were mixed in with the initial influx, but with the fall of Gisenyi on the 17 July, the rump of the FAR crossed the border and, apparently, as a result of a prior agreement with the provincial authorities, were allowed along the westward road where they established military camps near the shore of Lake Kivu beyond Mugunga. The FAR was immediately followed by refugees, who established a camp alongside the road at Mugunga.
64. The first case of cholera was diagnosed on 20 July and spread rapidly throughout the whole population²⁴. In the clinics that had been set up, the number of cases peaked on 26 July with the body collections peaking two days later. An estimated 30,000 people died as a result of the cholera epidemic, which by the end of the first week in August, had effectively run its course. Thousands of deaths also resulted from other causes, principally: a dysentery epidemic which began after the start of the cholera epidemic but continued longer; straightforward dehydration (lack of fluid intake) in exhausted, but otherwise healthy refugees; and by violent deaths resulting from the lack of security. In all, an estimated 50,000 refugees died in the first month following the start of the influx.
65. Despite some preparedness for the influx by the ICRC (principally food stocks), Oxfam (principally water pumping, storage and distribution equipment), MSF-Holland (medical supplies) and UNHCR (the Katale contingency plan), the capacity of the agencies present, and that of the local authorities, were overwhelmed by the scale of the influx. For instance, at the start of the influx, only two water tankers were in operation (those hired and managed by MSF-Belgium) and it was over a week before two more were added to the fleet. Attention focused on the need to airlift in trained personnel and supplies of equipment and food and non-food items for distribution. The first planes arrived with supplies and personnel on 16 July and airlift operations grew rapidly.
66. An unusual feature of the operation was the nature of the terrain in the area, which was predominantly recent volcanic lava flows, which made it almost impossible for tired vehicles to leave the road and enter the concentrations of population. One consequence of this was that the roads were heavily congested by people moving between Goma and the camps, vehicles (some of them FAR military vehicles) were left where they had broken down or run out of fuel, the bodies of those who had died were left on the road for collection, and market stalls set up along the roadside. Relief traffic could only move slowly along the main axes. In addition, it made site planning and the location of services, such as clinics and food and water distribution centres extremely difficult. Even the sinking of fence posts into the ground to ensure security of agency facilities and assist crowd control were severely hampered. The provision of heavy equipment therefore became a critical need and, though the French and US military did have a handful of bulldozers between them, requests by UNHCR and other agencies for many more bulldozers and diggers and minebars to be provided were not responded to and eventually the US Government paid for a British logistics NGO (Assist/ActionAid) to airlift such equipment to Goma and operate it.
67. The influx and the subsequent cholera epidemic received extraordinary media attention. By the end of July, an estimated 500²⁵ journalists and media technicians were in the Goma area, and scores of satellite transmission dishes established at the airport. The substantial coverage and the visual impact of the scale of the suffering contributed to a massive response by governments and the public around the world. Approximately \$200 million was spent on the relief efforts in Goma over the 5 and a half month period from mid-July to the end of December²⁶.
68. On 20 July, the same day as the first cholera case was diagnosed, UNHCR issued an urgent request to donor governments to 'commit themselves to providing services as defined in eight packages'²⁷. This request

coincided with, and contributed to, the mobilisation of several large-scale military/civil responses which encompassed many of the areas identified by UNHCR²⁸.


69. Thus the US Operation Support Hope, which began fielding military units in Goma on 24 July included: making available a substantial airlift capacity based in Germany and Entebbe, the operation of water purification equipment and the delivery and operation of water tankers; the securing of the airport perimeter and management of aircraft and cargo; and the provision and operation of road and site preparation equipment. On the day the US forces arrived in Goma, an airdrop of food commodities and clothing near Katale was organised amid considerable media coverage using three C-130s transport aircrafts from Entebbe²⁹. It is unclear how many US military personnel were based in Goma at any time, but it is thought to have been around 300. In addition to the water purification and distribution role of the US military, the US government also commissioned a private company (PWSS) to deliver and operate a large capacity pump to pump water from Lake Kivu into water tankers where chlorine was added and the water taken to the camps, principally Kibumba.
70. The German Government provided water purification and pumping equipment and a sizeable team of engineer and logistics specialists from THW, together with three military cargo aircraft based at Nairobi. The Israeli military provided and operated a military field hospital in Goma for a five week period until the end of August. The Dutch military fielded a mixed logistics/water transport and medical contingent of 108 personnel from the end of July until the first week of September. Through the International Peace Cooperation Corps, the Japanese Self-Defence Forces fielded a 420 person contingent in Goma and Nairobi from the second week of October until the third week of December. Their principal activities were a medical team attached to Goma City Hospital and a water team, which took over the role of the Swedish Relief Team when they left in October. In addition, other governments, such as the Swedish and British ones, provided teams working in different sectors. Whether all these activities adhered to the original concept of self-contained packages envisaged by UNHCR is questionable.
71. The presence of the airport in Goma and the scale of the airlift operation was critical to the response. Between the end of July and the first two weeks of August, the airport received an average of 40 flight arrivals each day³⁰, peaking at 75. Initially the local airport management and cargo handling capacity was supported by the French military but was subsequently complemented by personnel provided by ODA and other donors, and with the arrival of the American military on 24 July, the management of the airport was largely taken over by the US. Many of the aircraft involved in the airlift flew direct to Goma from North America, Europe and elsewhere, but many also operated a shuttle service from Entebbe, (where the US military established their main support base and UNHCR operated an Airhead) and Nairobi. The airlift was coordinated from 20 July by an AirCell located in UNHCR offices in Geneva³¹ to which several governments seconded civilian and military personnel to assist.
72. From the 4 or 5 international NGOs present in Goma at the start of the influx, the number leapt to an estimated 100 by September. The scale of the needs but also the intense media coverage contributed to the unprecedented number of NGOs and resulted in prominent displays in what one journalist called 'the battle of logos and T-shirts'³². This unprecedented number included many which were new to humanitarian operations in Africa. Many focused their activities on the provision of health care (particularly the cholera treatment) and the care of Unaccompanied Minors. In contrast, few were prepared to work in the sanitation sector or undertake body burial³³. Many NGOs made a substantial and in some cases a critical contribution to the overall effort. Nevertheless, many had problems in fielding appropriately skilled personnel who could speak French, and it is questionable whether the standard of assistance provided by some agencies was acceptable (see Section 4.4). The large number of NGOs arriving in the space of 2-3 weeks placed enormous demands on UNHCR's ability to coordinate the operations. UNHCR was able to field a highly competent team³⁴ which was well resourced, largely as a result of an unprecedented donation by ECHO.
73. By September, the situation had been stabilised and the morbidity and mortality rates dramatically reduced. The US military had withdrawn by 25 August and the UNHCR coordinated airlift ended on 30 September. Work on improving the delivery of health and other services continued. Aggregate food supplies for the

general ration distributions were more or less adequate though considerable problems were being experienced with the distribution mechanisms used within most camps and the resultant inequity in the rations received. The level of insecurity remained high much of it the result of actions by the militia and local Zairean troops. A group of 15 NGOs joined together to lobby for more effective action to address the security situation and in November called upon the Security Council to provide UN troops to police the camps. Protesting at the lack of security and the questionable morality of assisting those involved in the genocide who were now regrouping to continue their struggle MSF-France withdrew its personnel simultaneously from Goma, Bukavu and Ngara/Karagwe.

2.8 The Bukavu Influx

74. The majority of the Burundian refugees who crossed into South Kivu in October 1993 were concentrated in the Uvira area and only a limited number settled in Bukavu. Following the start of the genocide inside Rwanda approximately 10,000 Rwandans (principally of Tutsi origin) crossed into the Bukavu area settling in temporary camps on Ijwi Island, on the Birava shore and in the town itself. Subsequently, these were moved to planned camps at Nyakavogo, Nyangezi and Nyatende. In July, when refugees of Hutu origin began arriving in Bukavu in massive numbers, the Tutsis discretely returned to Rwanda and within a few days the population of the three camps changed completely.
75. As with Ngara and Goma, some preparations were made by relief agencies to cope with a large influx of refugees. The ICRC opened an office in the town and at the end of April UNHCR dispatched ERT members and consultants to Bukavu to assist the sub-office with the Tutsi caseload and to plan for a larger influx should the need arise. However, by July when the large influx began it appears that these personnel had left the area and UNHCR's level of preparedness was limited. From 19 June until the end of August Bukavu was used as a rear base by the French-led force involved in Opération Turquoise.
76. The major influx occurred in two waves. The first wave occurred around mid-July and, as with the simultaneous influx into Goma, contained a substantial proportion of military personnel from the FAR, though the Bukavu influx also included a large number of civil servants and wealthy merchants. The second wave took place during the week from 14-20 August in anticipation of the departure of the French forces from Zone Turquoise. A feature of both waves was the amount of removable assets (much of it looted) which was carried over the border including zinc sheeting, furniture, doors and even toilets. Some refugees made several return trips to collect more assets.
77. The total number which crossed during this period was approximately 250,000. Both waves crossed the Ruzizi River at two bridges. Though some were moved out to the existing camps, the majority were forced to settle on available open ground in the town which quickly became choked. To prevent more entering the town, the Zairean authorities officially closed the border on 19 August, though refugees were still permitted to enter at the Ruzizi II, crossing south of the town, on condition that they were transported directly to camps.
78. Within the town, by far the largest concentration was at the Alfajiri Seminary/College in the centre which, by 23 August had an estimated 20,000 people in the grounds. Other locations, where large numbers were temporarily camped included Panzi (5,000), Mukukwe (9,600), Nguba (5,000), Anglican Cathedral (3,500), Athenee de Bagira (6,000). Thousands more were settled on any available open sites such as roundabouts school grounds and roadsides. The local authorities, local NGOs/churches and other agencies present responded as best they could. For instance, the seminarists at Alfajiri organised food and water distributions to those settled in the college grounds with the assistance of Caritas, while CEPZa/CELZa (Communauté d'Eglise Pentecôte du Zaïre/Communauté d'Eglise Libre du Zaïre, a local NGO supported by Norwegian Church Aid), organised food distributions and medical care for over 20,000 refugees located at 5 sites around the town. Other local NGOs involved were AUCUN/AntiBwaki and Parosiss.

Figure 8 Location of the Camps in the Bukavu Area



79. Apart from the relief provided by these agencies, three factors appear to have been crucial in assisting the refugees to cope during this period, namely:

- townspeople provided considerable assistance hosting some families and providing food and water to others;
- the refugees were by no means helpless or all destitute. Some were wealthy and had brought considerable amounts of cash; others had assets (either their own or looted) which they were able to sell or barter for food and water. Some groups organised themselves effectively constructing their own temporary pit latrines;

- the municipal water system was able to sustain supplies of chlorinated water across the town.

80. Blanket general ration distributions were deliberately not undertaken in the town, partly to discourage permanent settlement and instead, efforts by WFP and the other agencies were concentrated on the existing and newly opened camps. However, fearing a deterioration of nutritional status of groups within the refugees in the town, the local authorities and agencies working in the town decided to undertake large scale wet-feeding (ie. cooked) distributions at the main sites and these commenced in the third week of August.
81. From late July onwards, the number of international agencies working in the Bukavu area increased and began to complement the efforts of the local NGOs, churches and municipal authorities. An MSF-France medical team and a WFP 'Rapid Response Team' designed to reinforce the WFP-Bukavu sub-office arrived on 18 July. Coordination meetings were held every morning attended by WFP, HCR, ICRC and NGOs. Subsequently, other agencies arrived and worked in either the town and/or the camps. These included CARE-Canada, Oxfam, the Swedish Rescue Board, World Vision, UNICEF, the IFRC, GTZ, THW, Order of Malta, CARE-Deutschland, AICF and AMDA. Because of problems experienced by UNHCR in fielding, additional senior personnel the WFP RRT leader chaired these meetings.
82. Assisted by NGOs such as CARE, Oxfam and MSF, UNHCR attempted to rapidly identify potential sites for new camps and to make arrangements for them to be opened and for refugees to be moved out of the town to them. However, this process took considerable time as a result of inadequate preparedness, limited personnel capacity, lack of suitable sites and problems encountered with the owners and local authorities over permission to use the land.
83. The sequence of the opening of the new camps was as follows:

April, May, June	Karama (Ijwi Island) Birava, Nyakavogo, Nyangezi I and Nyatende
Second half of July	Kalehe, Katana, Mudaka-Murhla, Muku and Mushweshwe
August	Kashusha, Adi-Kivu, Inera, Hongo I and Hongo II, Bideka, Iziranngablo, Nyamirangwe
September	Kabira and Shabarabe
October	Nyangezi-Mulwa
84. On 15 December, the town was declared to be 'free' of refugees and the transfer process halted³⁵. Refugees were taken to the new sites by bus and lorry, with the Anglican Cathedral and Alfajiri being the collecting points. Some refugees organised their own transport. Once in the camps, the provision of services and registration was the responsibility of the lead NGOs or those NGOs involved in the provision of particular services. CARE, IFRC, Order of Malta, Caritas and CEPZa/CELZa were the lead agencies in setting up and managing the camps. In most cases, the lead agency also took responsibility for organising food and non-food distributions. A larger number of NGOs were involved in providing health care within the camps.
85. Formal enumeration of the refugee population took place between 28 February and 7 March. This resulted in a reduction of the total population estimate from 350,000 to just under 300,000. By March 1995, the estimated population was 307,951 which were spread between 25 camps and four Unaccompanied Children's Centres (UCCs). The camps range from the largest Inera (52,294) to the smallest Bideka (939). The approximate distance between Chimanga camp in the far southwest and Kabira camp in the far north of the Bukavu group of camps is 120 kilometres. Kashusha camp is referred to variously as the 'Government in Exile' camp or the 'Intellectuals' camp. Two 'military camps' fell outside HCR obligations: one at Panzi (near Ruzizi I bridge) and the other at Bulongwi (west of Bukavu). Lack of food in these camps resulted in thefts and violence in neighbouring camps. In early 1995, Caritas began supplying food to them to reduce the level of insecurity.

2.9 Humanitarian Activities in the South and West of Rwanda April to December

April to the start of Opération Turquoise

86. The genocide was extended to the south of the country in the third week of April following the arrival of elements of the Presidential Guard in Butare. The sudden worsening of the security situation forced the withdrawal of the MSF team which had remained in the area. Between then and the start of Opération Turquoise in the third week of June the insecurity was so great that relief efforts were very limited and effectively only three agencies were able to deliver assistance - the ICRC, CRS/Caritas and WFP (with a small Trocaire medical team setting up in Gikongoro just prior to the start of Opération Turquoise).
87. Of these agencies, the ICRC had the greatest freedom of movement, and personnel operating out of Bujumbura and Bukavu undertook regular, albeit slow and often extremely hazardous missions in the area. Beginning in April, the ICRC office in Bukavu began providing medical and food supplies to some 8,000 displaced Tutsis at Nyarushishi near Cyangugu and some 2,500 at other locations near the town. In May, at the request of the transitional Government which was then located in Gitarama, the ICRC opened a sub-Delegation office at Kabgayi to provide food supplies (much of it supplied by WFP) and medical care to displaced in the area. A five person surgical team worked in the mission hospital in Kabgayi until June, when the RPF offensive forced a move initially to Nyanza and then to Rilima in the Bugesera area in July. Throughout May, June and July a water and sanitation specialist based in Bukavu toured the FAR areas extensively enabling the ICRC to make a significant contribution to the restoration and maintenance of water supplies in several of the large towns, and a number of orphanages, hospitals, IDP camps and ICRC medical facilities. In the towns, the officials of Electrogaz³⁶, who remained were contacted and supported with supplies of equipment and water purification chemicals³⁷ purchased in neighbouring countries and delivered by ICRC. In all, the ICRC distributed approximately 800 tonnes of food, relief supplies and water purification chemicals in the FAR area during May and June.
88. In May, discussions between WFP and ICRC about how to rationalise their activities resulted in the agreement that, in the south of the country, WFP would take responsibility for supplying Burundian refugees, who were located in camps along the border and for Rwandan IDPs and conflict affected persons between the border up to and including Butare. ICRC took responsibility for supplying Rwandan IDPs and conflict affected persons to the north of the line, including the area from Rusumo to Rwamagana and to the north of Butare up to and including Gitarama. Initially, distributions were undertaken using supplies from WFP stocks in Butare by MSF (for the first two weeks after the Presidential plane was shot down until deteriorating security forced the withdrawal) and the Rwandan Red Cross which continued to operate in the Butare area until the end of May. Thereafter, the insecurity and WFP's lack of implementing partners severely limited its ability to distribute relief food in the agreed area. Support was given to the Father Vjeko/CRS cross-border effort (see below) and food was supplied to ICRC's efforts further north. However, the amounts of food aid involved during the period were very limited. Approximately 400 tonnes of food were distributed in the Butare, Gitarama and Nyamata areas during April, May and the beginning of June. Approximately 80% of this amount was drawn from the Butare stores and the remainder provided from Burundi.
89. Because of the insecurity, WFP was only able to carry out three assessment missions into Rwanda during this period. As a result, information provided by distributing partners could not be properly checked. The requirement that UN personnel receive permission before crossing into Rwanda and communication problems between WFP-Bujumbura and UNREO in Nairobi delayed one assessment mission for several days.
90. At the end of April, CRS-Rwanda personnel who had earlier evacuated to Bujumbura made contact with a Catholic Priest, Father Vjeko from the mission in Kabgayi who had crossed into Burundi to procure supplies for IDPs who had gathered at the Kabgayi Mission.
91. CRS supported his efforts to provide food to concentrations of threatened Tutsis and Hutus at various

locations in the south and west of the country. The first two truck convoys carrying food at the beginning of May quickly developed into regular convoys operating two or three times a week delivering anywhere between 100 tonnes to 400 tonnes of food commodities, blankets and medicines each week. Other agencies contributing to the CRS/Caritas-Rwanda cross-border operation included Caritas-Neerlandica, Caritas-Germany, Caritas-Spain, OFDA, WFP, UNICEF and World Vision. Towards the end of June, the number of NGOs based in Burundi and supporting the operation had grown and this enabled the rationalisation of the trucks available and the provision of complementary assistance. Solidarité Française provided trucks and drivers to the CRS-led operation and this enabled the redeployment of smaller trucks to the Dioceses in Butare and Gikongoro. Trocaire, in conjunction with Medical Missionaries of Mary, placed a four person medical team at the developing IDP camp at Cyanika. AICF, Merlin and CARE joined the overall efforts around this time.

Opération Turquoise and its Aftermath

92. The mandate for Opération Turquoise provided by Security Council resolution 929 on 22 June invoked Chapter VII (enforcement) rather than Chapter VI (peacekeeping) wording and set the objectives as ending the massacres in Rwanda, protecting the surviving groups, facilitating humanitarian operations and handing over to UNAMIR after the two month period judged necessary to bring UNAMIR up to the force level agreed under SC918 of 17 May.
93. The force was composed of 2,555 French troops and 350 other troops principally from Senegal but also including contributions from six other Francophone countries. It contained a substantial 'punch' including 12 Jaguar and F-1 jet aircraft, artillery, light armour and helicopters. Though the force structure may have contributed to the initial international questioning of the mission's precise motives, it carried a clear but unspoken message that neither the RPF nor FAR forces should interfere with the mission. In the transmission of this message, it was highly successful. Contact established in Brussels with the RPF was maintained indirectly through the RPF Liaison office within UNAMIR and directly through a specially established satellite telephone link. By these means the RPF was briefed on the mission so as to reduce the chances of confrontation between the Operation Turquoise forces and the RPF. Apart from two incidents, one near Kibuye and the other in Butare³⁸, there were no violent confrontations with the RPF. Within the Zone there were apparently a number of unrecorded confrontations with elements of the FAR and the civilian militia as the Turquoise troops sought to disarm the militia.
94. Movement of the troops to the rear bases of Goma and Bukavu began on 19 June but the first reconnaissance mission into Rwanda was delayed until after authorisation had been obtained from the UN Security Council three days later. On the first day, accompanied by film crews, troops began protecting the large, predominantly Tutsi, camp at Nyarushishi near Cyangugu which the ICRC had been providing with food and medical assistance for several weeks previously. From Goma and Bukavu infantry and armoured columns pushed eastwards to a north-south line running just west of Gitarama. By the end of the month the force was concentrated on a Safe Zone covering the south-west quadrant of the country and its presence in the north-west withdrawn. The decision process which led to the concentration on the south-west is unclear. A civilian adviser to the French military has claimed that it was influenced by the absence of Tutsis requiring protection in the north-west of the country³⁹, implying, in case of deployment, a negation of the operation's protective intent.
95. With 7 weeks remaining before the withdrawal date stipulated in the Security Council Resolution, French efforts were concentrated on policing the Safe Zone and encouraging relief organisations to establish programmes for the IDPs in the area. First estimates by the Turquoise forces of the number of IDPs in the Gikongoro area were 250,000 at the beginning of July with another 100,000 in the Cyangugu and Kibuye areas. With the rapid advances being made by the RPF in the north and central areas, the collapse and withdrawal of the FAR forces in the north west, the numbers of IDPs in the Safe Zone grew rapidly particularly from the beginning of July. By 12 August these estimates had increased dramatically to 600,000 in Gikongoro and with a further 800,000 in Cyangugu and 300,000 in Kibuye⁴⁰. Several assessments of the situation were carried out during June and July by inter-agency teams with personnel

from the French Humanitarian Cell, UNREO, and the OFDA/DART Team playing a central role. The policy that evolved was to commence relief distributions to the IDPs as quickly as possible so as to discourage their westward movement and thereby prevent a repeat of the Goma exodus. In early July WFP and the ICRC reviewed their earlier 'division of labour' agreement and it was agreed that they would jointly share responsibility for supplying food to the IDPs concentrated around Gikongoro with WFP taking responsibility for providing food to the IDP camps to the north of the Butare-Cyangugu road and the ICRC the area to the south.

96. Many NGOs were initially reluctant to commence operations in the area being suspicious of the motives underlying Opération Turquoise and reluctant to work with Hutu officials and IDPs who had been involved in the genocide. The initial lack of implementing partners made it difficult for WFP and other UN agencies to rapidly establish programmes to meet the needs of the IDPs. WFP's own logistics was limited pending the arrival in Bujumbura of additional trucks from the WTOE fleet in Ethiopia and both UNAMIR and Opération Turquoise maintained that they could not spare logistics capacity for WFP use in the south. French officials became frustrated at the slow response seeing the situation in the south-west as a 'forgotten humanitarian catastrophe' at the time when attention was focused on Goma and to a lesser extent Kigali and the north-west. WFP in particular was criticised for its delay in commencing distributions to the IDPs north of Gikongoro - distributions which included French donated food aid⁴¹. In July, ECHO practically obliged NGOs it was funding in Burundi to establish operations in the Safe Zone using funds which remained from its allocations to the Burundian refugee and IDP emergency of late 1993.

97. The main camps north of Gikongoro for which WFP had taken responsibility were:

Camp	Approximate Population
Cyanika	85,000
Rukondo	48,000
Kaduha	25,000
Musenge	5,000

98. Agreements were reached with AICF to manage food distributions in Cyanika and with CARE for the other three camps. WFP supplied food to stores in Gikongoro⁴² and AICF and CARE, with assistance from the French logistics NGO Equilibre⁴³, moved the food to the camps for distribution. WFP began deliveries to Gikongoro in July, but was unable to build up sufficient stocks to enable full general ration distributions in the camps until August. However, CARE was able to borrow over 400 tonnes of food from CRS-Burundi and commence distributions in the Rukondo, Kaduha and Musenge camps in July.

99. There were eight IDP camps south of Gikongoro for which ICRC took responsibility for supplying food:

Camp	Approximate Population
Kibeho	100,000 (of which 60,000 actually in the camp)
Ndago	60,000
Nuyamigina	25,000
Kamana	20,000
Munini	12,000
Buhoro	<5,000
Ruramba	<5,000
Rwamik	<5,000

100. The ICRC transported the food from Uganda initially across RPF/Opération Turquoise lines. Approximately 600 tonnes were distributed to the IDPs in July, increasing dramatically to over 4,000 tonnes during August and slightly 3,700 tonnes in September. However, the agency experienced considerable difficulties in estimating the camp populations, as it had not been able to conduct a census and its chosen

method of distribution within the camps was inequitable (see Section 5.5).

101. Despite the initial reluctance of NGOs to work in the south-west, there was a rapid increase in the number of agencies in August. Some worked in both ICRC and WFP supplied camps, whilst others established programmes for the host population. The earlier CRS-Caritas operations were expanded and in July, MSF, CARE, AICF and Equilibre opened offices in or near Gikongoro. Trocaire, Merlin, Feed the Children, SCF-UK and several other agencies set up programmes involving non-food distributions, health care and supplementary feeding, during August. On 20 August, the British Army field medical team which had initially been based in Ruhengeri in the north-west was redeployed to the south-west and ran treatment facilities in Kitabi and Kibeho camps and provided mobile services to several other IDP camps. Oxfam and PWSS⁴⁴ began water supply and distribution operations for IDPs during September.
102. In accordance with Security Council Resolution 929, Opération Turquoise forces withdrew from Rwanda on 22 August. The withdrawal created considerable fears amongst the IDPs for their security and thousands moved across the border to Bukavu, though efforts were made to encourage them to remain by UNREO. By agreement with UNAMIR and the SRSG, the RPF did not immediately assume control of the area. Prefects were placed in Cyangugu, Kibuye and Gikongoro on 12 September, each accompanied by a platoon of RPF troops, and civilian customs officers were stationed in Cyangugu.
103. Conditions in the camps were poor. Congestion, lack of water, inadequate sanitation arrangements and problems with either the supply of food and/or its inequitable distribution within the camps resulted in high rates of malnutrition in those camps where surveys were carried out in August and also of morbidity and mortality rates. A dysentery outbreak appears to have begun in early August and affected many camps reaching its peak in at the end of August. These problems appear to have been worst in Kibeho camp, where mortality rates reached 20 times normal in September. Lack of experienced ICRC medical personnel and delays in the provision of clean water appear to have been critical factors there. A lack of technical coordination amongst agencies working in the south-west also appears to have been a contributory factor (see Section 6.3), at least until late September.

2.10 Humanitarian Activities In the Rest of Rwanda After July 1994

104. With the exodus to Goma in mid-July and the installation of the new Government in Kigali, the July-September period saw substantial efforts being focused on the immediate repair and rehabilitation of infrastructure under the UN Special Representative's Rwanda Emergency Normalisation Plan (RENP) and efforts to encourage and facilitate the early return of the refugees in Goma.
105. These efforts were truly multi-agency involving not only UN agencies, the ICRC and NGOs, but also several military contingents operating within the UNAMIR framework and subsequently commercial contractors. The ending of the conflict and the May 17 agreement by the Security Council to build up UNAMIR to a force of 5,500 troops resulted in the arrival of several new military contingents in August including Britain, Canada and Australia. Many of these contingents deliberately included medical, logistics, mechanical repair and communications units to assist in the relief and immediate rehabilitation efforts.
106. Thus, the British contingent (Operation Gabriel) of 550 personnel included a field ambulance, and engineering and vehicle repair units. The field ambulance unit rehabilitated the hospital in Ruhengeri and on 20 August was redeployed to Gikongoro where it operated treatment facilities in IDP camps. The vehicle repair unit established vehicle repair workshops which serviced UNAMIR and other agencies vehicles. The engineering unit's principal activity was the repair of the main road from the Ugandan border to Kigali. The Canadian contingent included a field ambulance which took over the operation of Ruhengeri hospital after the redeployment of the British field ambulance⁴⁵. A Canadian signals unit played a key role in the restoration of Kigali's telephone system and reopening its international links. The Australian army medical contingent operated the Central Hospital in Kigali, together with NGOs, including Samaritans Purse and Italian Emergency, and medical teams worked in conjunction with CARE-Australia in the Butare area. The US Operation Support Hope operated outside the UNAMIR framework (see Chapter 3), but a US military

contingent was based at Kigali Airport where it helped increase its security and handling capacity and enabled the resumption of limited scheduled civilian flights in September.

107. Other immediate rehabilitation activities in Kigali included the restoration of power supplies through a collaborative effort involving UNAMIR engineers, the commercial contractor Brown and Root⁴⁶ and GTZ, which involved the repair and/or replacement of damaged equipment and rebuilding the capacity of Electrogaz. The ICRC and UNAMIR assisted the resumption of water supplies across the city by providing generators to district pumping stations. MSF-France operated the King Faysal Hospital and WHO supported the resumption of the Central Pharmaceutical Office.
108. The cholera in Goma and the ending of the conflict led to a spontaneous repatriation of approximately 100,000 refugees at the end of July. To respond to the needs of those making their way back towards Kigali and to encourage others to follow them, several agencies, including UNHCR, CARE, AICF, Concern, German Emergency Doctors and the Canadian Field Ambulance, MSF and SCF set up waystations and medical posts along the Gisenyi-Ruhengeri-Kigali route. The waystations provided space for overnight halts, cooked food and gave 'start-up kits' comprising dry rations and household items. The IOM organised trucks (many of them WFP trucks returning from food deliveries to Goma) for those unable to walk. A crisis committee was set up in Ruhengeri to assist coordination of these efforts. The number of returnees was much less than originally hoped and gradually the 1994 refugees were replaced by returning Tutsis who had left the country up to 30 years earlier. Agencies operating the waystations had considerable difficulty differentiating returnees from the local population who tried to benefit from the assistance. The leaking of sections of UNHCR's suppressed 'Gersony Report' in the third week of September effectively thwarted any hopes of an early major repatriation⁴⁷.

Notes on Chapter 2

1. As noted in Section 1.2, private resource flows are probably substantially undercounted by the available datasets. However, this undercounting is probably more than balanced out by the undercounted costs of the military contingents and support activities. The results of the analysis by Study III are therefore taken at face value.
2. For instance, in August road blocks forced the temporary suspension of the ICRC programme. In another incident, 26 Rwandan Red Cross volunteers were taken hostage and in November, a Belgian Red Cross truck was blown up in the demilitarised zone killing an employee of the Rwandan Red Cross.
3. A WFP assessment in September concluded that as much as 30-50% of the maize and vegetable oil were being sold.
4. This episode led to tensions between the two agencies. WFP was critical of the ICRC for not having alerted it to the extent of the diversions and sales and the ICRC resisted closer monitoring by WFP whose initial monitoring had not been expanded in line with the scale of operations, apparently because of inadequate funding by donors.
5. Burundi's first Hutu President who had only been elected in June.
6. UNHCR/London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine cited in RNIS January 1994.
7. The Committee on Food Aid Policies and Procedures which is composed of donor and recipient nations.
8. The RPF contingent in Kigali also rescued and provided protection to threatened civilians.
9. For instance, when the Presidents plane was shot down, WFP had 9,000 tonnes of food and ICRC 6,000 tonnes. Eventually, both these warehouses were looted.
10. In Ngara, some 2,000 were accommodated in Burigi camp.
11. 17,000 Burundian refugees were still in Lukole camp in Ngara District by April 1994.
12. The route passes through Ngara Town, where the company had its base camp, to link with the existing Isaka-Rusomo Falls road just near to the Benaco site.
13. A small pontoon ferry operated across the Ruhuhu River and quickly became a bottleneck for agency vehicles. The Ruhuhu is a tributary of the Kagera River which in Ngara District forms the border between Tanzania and Rwanda.
14. The Russian emergency response organisation.
15. Though the approach was highly effective, several agencies were frustrated at not being allowed to work in Benaco. Some found other activities for involvement.
16. An attempt was made by Tanzanian police with UNHCR collaboration to arrest the former Bourgmestre of Murambi, who was strongly suspected of having been involved in the organisation and carrying out of the genocide in his area. An angry mob formed and attacked UNHCR and NGO personnel forcing them to barricade themselves into the HCR compound in Benaco. It was several hours before additional police arrived and the situation defused.
17. Many of those interviewed in Ngara commented on the effective downgrading of the Tanzanian operations and the difficulty of obtaining adequate resources after mid-July.
18. The limited size of the RPF force apparently meant that there were insufficient soldiers to ensure security in the areas coming under their control and that such screening had to be carried out before the troops could advance.
19. This began ahead of permission being given by either UNREO or the UNAMIR Force Commander who despite being restricted to parts of Kigali city felt his permission should have been sought in order that a 'balance' be maintained between humanitarian aid delivered to RPF and FAR-controlled areas.

20. This group was frequently referred to as the 'sleepover agencies'.
21. Les Roberts CDC Atlanta Interview 4 May 1995.
22. Major General Dallaire. Interview 22 March 1995.
23. Information on this emerged during interviews with WFP personnel in Kampala. WFP Rome was apparently unaware of this episode.
24. Between 20 July and the end of the first week of August the whole population was *exposed* to the cholera vibrio. Of these 10-15% developed clinical cholera symptoms, the epidemic being characterised by unusually high *attack* rates. Of those that developed the symptoms, the *case fatality rate* was also very high, probably ranging between 25-50%, as a result of lack of access to effective rehydration therapy.
25. Estimate by Ray Wilkinson, UNHCR Public Information Officer, Goma.
26. Because of the way the value of the assistance provided and the transport costs of delivering it were not recorded specifically with regard to Goma, it is not possible to ascertain the precise amount. This figure is therefore no more than a guesstimate.
27. The packages were: airport services; logistics base services; road servicing and road security; site preparation; provision of domestic fuel; sanitation facilities; water management and; management of airhead.
28. The precise role of the UNHCR request is unclear, as the intense media coverage of events was exerting considerable pressure on many governments to be taking exceptional measures in responding to the situation.
29. This was criticised at the time as being a 'PR stunt' by relief workers and media reporters, as it tied up part of the scarce logistics capacity in recovering the crates and made only a very limited contribution to the overall efforts.
30. Between 16 July and 30 September, when the airlift officially ended, approximately 11,500 tonnes of commodities were airlifted to Goma (see Section 5.7).
31. The Air Cell was essentially an expansion and extension of the Sarajevo Air Operations Cell which had been operational for 2 years in Geneva.
32. Richard Dowden, The Independent on Sunday 4 September 1994, London.
33. The burial of the tens of thousands of bodies was initially undertaken by the French military, but this support was withdrawn without warning and the Irish NGO GOAL took over this role in collaboration with teams of Zairean Boy Scouts.
34. Though it should be said that some critical members did not arrive until several days after the influx. In the case of the Water and Sanitation Coordinator, this was ten days.
35. Several hundred remained in the town, but were relatively well integrated.
36. The Rwandan power and water supply parastatal.
37. Principally, aluminium sulphate, calcium hydroxide and calcium hypochloride.
38. The incident near Butare occurred on 3 July, when a French reconnaissance mission 'rescuing' orphans, western journalists, nuns from the city exchanged fire with the RPF. Following this incident, the 'hawks' within the French force who were spoiling for a fight with the RPF and whose views were felt not to be compatible with the 'safe zone' policy, were removed from the force and moved to other duties.
39. Prunier Gérard, 1995.

40. It is possible that the start of relief distributions in the camps may have attracted IDPs to the camps and thus, contributed unintentionally to the rapid growth in numbers during the July to early August period. The study was not able to clarify whether this was the case.
41. Prior to April 1994, France had approved a donation of 2,200 tonnes of maize-flour for use in the earlier IDP programmes in the north of the country. It was then agreed that WFP could allocate the shipment to wherever it was most needed, but with the commencement of Opération Turquoise, WFP was specifically requested to distribute it within the Safe Zone before the withdrawal of the Turquoise forces. The shipment arrived at Dar es Salaam in the second week of July and was transported to Gikongoro by rail, barge and road via Kigoma and Bujumbura. Approximately half the shipment was distributed by AICF and CARE before withdrawal of the Turquoise forces.
42. During July and August the supplies were trucked from Burundi. From September they were trucked from Uganda via Kigali.
43. The agency previously had worked only in Bosnia, but was encouraged to work in Rwanda by the French Government which provided it with trucks. Because of its links with the French Government and its use of expatriate drivers, the agency had difficult relations with the RPF and, in December, its trucks were impounded and its operations halted by the new Government in Kigali.
44. The private US company involved in pumping operations in Goma.
45. When the Canadian platoon left in September, MSF-Holland, which had been providing health services in Ruhengeri alongside the military contingents, took over responsibility for supporting the hospital.
46. A US contractor company which provided civilian support to UNAMIR and a US follow-up to Operation Support Hope.
47. The report alleged 'an unmistakable pattern of killings and persecution' by the RPF.

Chapter 3 Assessment of Performance: Security, Physical Protection and Military Support

3.1 The Critical Failure: Not Preventing the Genocide

109. At the outset it needs to be clearly stated that the failure of the international community to either prevent the genocide or do more to limit its spread was by far the most significant failing of the whole response. Whilst the genocide and subsequent violence resulted in the loss of between 0.5 to 1 million lives¹, this Study indicates that the numbers who died from non-violent causes was of a much lower order of magnitude in the region of 100,000 deaths may be attributed to disease outbreaks which may be considered to have been either preventable or at least more controllable (see Section 4.1). Moreover, had the genocide and the FAR/RPF conflict been prevented or at least mitigated much of the subsequent population displacements and relief efforts, which cost at least \$1.2 billion during 1994, would not have been required.
110. Study II has examined the lead-up to the start of the genocide in considerable detail. At risk of oversimplifying the conclusions from Study II, it appears that the genocide could have been prevented or at least mitigated had key members of the UN (above all the Permanent 5) and the Secretariat, engaged themselves more effectively in preventing the start and spread of the genocide. The actions that could have been taken were:
- to have reinforced UNAMIR before April to bring it up to a military capacity commensurate with the level of threat and interpreted UNAMIR's mandate in a proactive manner in response to escalating violence and intelligence information indicating plans to exterminate large numbers of Tutsi in the Kigali area;
 - to have ensured that UNAMIR's force level was not reduced following the shooting down of the plane and that where contingents were withdrawn that they were rapidly replaced.

3.2 Insecurity and its Effect Upon the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance

111. The start of the genocide and the renewal of the FAR/RPF conflict saw the withdrawal of most humanitarian agencies from Kigali and the FAR-controlled areas where the genocide gained momentum. The ability of those agencies that remained to distribute humanitarian assistance was severely constrained. The overriding need of the threatened populations who had gathered together in churches and other public buildings or were in hiding alone or in isolated groups was for protection, though there were undoubtedly also needs for food and water and, for those who had been wounded, medical treatment.
112. The ability of the much reduced and ill-equipped force of 472 UNAMIR troops who remained in Kigali to provide such protection was extremely limited. Their role after 6 April was defined as:
- acting as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure a ceasefire;
 - assisting in the resumption of humanitarian relief operations to the extent feasible;
 - monitoring and reporting on developments in Rwanda, including the safety of civilians under UNAMIR protection in a few sites.
113. The reduction of the UNAMIR force and the interpretation of the mandate and rules of engagement enabled the genocide to continue almost unhindered. Through extraordinary efforts the small UNAMIR force was able to protect and rescue perhaps 25,000 civilians in Kigali, an effort that was bolstered by the stronger mandate adopted by the Security Council in mid-May. Principally this was achieved through guarding those who had gathered in the Amohoro Stadium and preventing access to the Stadium by the Interahamwe. However, other techniques employed were:
- interposing UNAMIR soldiers (with light arms only) between the Interahamwe and buildings where Tutsi's were known to be sheltering (as occurred on one occasion at the Hôtel des Mille Collines);

- UNAMIR soldiers (armed only with automatic rifles) touring the streets in vehicles and rescuing threatened civilians;
 - UNAMIR organising operations to force their way into areas where threatened civilians were gathered and transport them to the better security of the Stadium².
114. Had UNAMIR been able to mount more such operations outside Kigali tens of thousands of additional lives could have been saved. This would have required more troops. Whether it would also have required an armour-equipped force as the Security Council appeared to believe is not so clear. The ability of the UNAMIR troops armed only with automatic rifles to save threatened people in Kigali suggests that much could have been achieved even without armoured vehicles. In considering the options facing UNAMIR the Security Council appear to have been preoccupied with the FAR/RPF confrontation and given inadequate attention to the potential contribution UNAMIR could make to limiting the genocide.
 115. Following the Somalia experience, where key UN agencies were heavily criticised for not being present in Mogadishu during the fighting and the initial stages of the ensuing food crisis, the UNAHT represented a determined effort by the UN humanitarian agencies and a courageous effort on the part of the personnel involved to ensure that they were present and active in the midst of such a protection crisis. The reality of the situation however was that their ability to distribute relief assistance was extremely limited. WFP food stocks in Kigali could not be accessed and, even if that had been possible, large scale distributions could have provoked additional violence. Threatened populations that were visited and provided with modest assistance were subsequently targeted by the militia. The UNAHT personnel worked very closely with the UNAMIR troops. At one stage in an attempt to extend UNAHT activities into FAR areas outside Kigali but also to enable UNAMIR units to be stationed in FAR areas with the permission of the Interim Government UNAHT personnel devised a plan to establish relief stores in locations in FAR areas. However, the plan failed due to lack of agreement from the Interim Government and the limited capacity of UNAMIR at that time³.
 116. Operating from bases in Kigali, Goma, Bukavu and Bujumbura the ICRC undertook not only relief and surgical activities in FAR areas but also protection activities. Such activities were undertaken at considerable risk to ICRC personnel and those of the Rwandan Red Cross that continued to work with them. There were several instances of local personnel being killed in the course of their humanitarian work and expatriate personnel being injured. The ICRC surgical facility in Kigali was attacked by mortar and there were cases of patients in transit being pulled from ICRC vehicles and being killed.
 117. The protection activities consisted of regularly visiting, or in some cases actually stationing personnel for extended periods at, known concentrations of threatened civilians and attempting to prevent or mitigate their killing at the hands of the Hutu militia. Such efforts did not prevent the militia attacking the civilians particularly during the hours of darkness when the ability of ICRC personnel to witness the militia's activities was very limited. However it did appear to have the effect of limiting the focus of the militia upon those groups that were being monitored. The clearest evidence of success was at the Nyarushishi camp near Cyangugu where some 10,000 civilians survived with material and protection assistance from the ICRC from late May until the arrival of the Opération Turquoise forces in the third week of June (see also Study II of the evaluation). Despite such admirable achievements the ICRC's experience during the April-July period was shocking for the agency as it had regarded Rwanda as the country in Africa where the Red Cross Principles had been most thoroughly disseminated⁴.
 118. Other agencies, such as WFP and CRS/Caritas, did succeed in providing relief assistance in FAR areas during the April-July period. However the amounts of relief assistance were limited.
 119. The extent to which the level of insecurity in the FAR areas limited humanitarian assistance activities can be seen by the much higher levels of assistance provided in RPF areas, when Rwandans crossed into the relative security of Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire and when security was provided by Opération Turquoise in the southwest of the country after the third week of June.

120. Significant levels of insecurity were also experienced in the refugee camps during the initial weeks after the influx. Goma appears to have been the worst affected by such violence. The scale of the influx made it extremely difficult to improve levels of security in the absence of a substantial presence of a disciplined security force. The influx also contained substantial numbers of FAR forces and militia members. Though there was some disarmament by Zairean and French soldiers these were not comprehensive and there were many instances of refugees and relief workers being threatened with violence, in some cases by individuals or groups armed with hand grenades as well as guns and machetes. Many observers felt that much of the violence was attributable to efforts by the Hutu militia to establish their authority and control over the refugee population. The level of discipline amongst the local Zairean troops appears to have been very poor prior to the deployment of the Zairean Contingent in March 1995, and there was considerable evidence to link a substantial part of the insecurity to actions by the Zairean troops. The number of rapes appears on the basis of anecdotal evidence to have been very high and probably resulted in a substantial number of deaths.
121. Estimates of the numbers who died as a result of the violence are inevitably very approximate as those bodies collected and buried during the cholera outbreak were invariably shrouded and were not examined. However a retrospective survey conducted in one camp (Mugunga) in September found that 8% of the deaths which occurred during the first month of the influx was attributable to 'traumatic injury'⁵. If it were assumed that 8% of all deaths could be attributed in this way this suggests that 4,200 refugees died as a result of traumatic injury during the month immediately following the influx.
122. Such levels of violence and insecurity had important ramifications for the provision of relief assistance in Goma, the principal one being that most expatriate relief workers did not remain in the camps during the hours of darkness. Only in those treatment centres or Unaccompanied Children's Centres that had electricity and lighting⁶ did expatriates remain after nightfall to supervise the continuation of treatments. Where the experience of local personnel remaining in the centres overnight was not considered sufficient, many agencies disconnected intravenous rehydration drips. Anecdotal evidence indicates that a disproportionate number of deaths occurred during night. Though the levels of violence appear to have been reduced after the first month they remained unacceptably high and stimulated collaborative action by 18 agencies which in November jointly requested the UN Secretary General to deploy a UN security force in the camps and led to the withdrawal of at least two important international agencies from the camps in the same month. It was not until the Zairean Contingent was deployed in March 1995 that the level of insecurity became more acceptable (see Section 3.4).
123. In Tanzania, the levels of insecurity appears to have been much more limited as a result of the lower numbers of militia among the refugees, the absence of FAR units and the discipline of Tanzania soldiers and in particular the police units stationed in the Ngara and Karagwe Districts. Nevertheless, the Rwandese political authorities did exercise substantial control over the refugee population as, for instance, shown in the 'Gatete incident'.


3.3 The Role of Foreign Military Contingents: An Overview

124. Foreign military forces were heavily involved in the international community's response during 1994. Whilst some contingents concentrated solely on the provision of security, others concentrated solely on the provision of relief assistance or providing support to relief agencies. In between these two extremes were several contingents which mixed the two roles providing both security and support to the relief efforts. Additional complexity stems from differences in the legal basis and command frameworks in which the various contingents operated. Thus, within Rwanda most contingents were part of UNAMIR operating under a Chapter VI mandate. However, the French-led Opération Turquoise was a UN-sanctioned operation with a Chapter VII mandate⁷ and the US forces which were based at Kigali Airport as part of Operation Support Hope operated outside the UN structure altogether. UNAMIR's mandate and force deployment did not extend beyond Rwanda's border consequently all military contingents which operated in Goma were outside UNAMIR's command and operated on the basis of permission from the Zairean authorities which was sought and gained bilaterally. As a result of its rear bases being located in Goma and Bukavu, the

Opération Turquoise forces were able to provide some security and support to the humanitarian relief activities, though in terms of its activities such as disarming militia members among the refugees in Zaire this appears to have been beyond the terms of any agreement with the Zairean authorities.

125. Figure 9 attempts to show the on-the-ground deployment of the various contingents and, using the judgement of Team members, to indicate whether a contingent's role fell into the security, humanitarian or mixed security/humanitarian categories. The diagram does not show the timing of the air transport support provided to the relief efforts by more than ten foreign Air Forces (see Section 3.5 and 5.7).
126. The fact that UNAMIR I and Opération Turquoise were the only foreign contingents deployed in advance of mid-July is highly significant. Mid-July saw the simultaneous occurrence of two events which put pressure on foreign governments to be seen to be responding whilst at the same time as reducing the risks of foreign military contingents being drawn into the conflict and foreign soldiers lives being unduly threatened. The two events were: a) the refugee influx into Goma and the ensuing cholera outbreak and intense international media coverage; and b) the end of open conflict between the RPF and FAR and the swearing-in of the new Government in Kigali. After mid-July, it became significantly easier and less risky for foreign governments to deploy their military to Rwanda and Goma and this was reflected in the sudden increase in the number of contingents deployed from the end of July onwards.

Figure 9 On-the-ground presence of Third Party Military Contingents in Rwanda and Goma 1994



Note: Thickness of the band is proportional to the number of troops on the ground.

127. Both Study II and Study III have examined the role of foreign military contingents, though from different perspectives. Study II approached the issues from a conflict management perspective and focused upon: the deployment and subsequent reduction of UNAMIR I; the establishment of UNAMIR II; the deployment and role of Opération Turquoise; and the search for a means of improving security in the refugee camps in

133. It could be argued that the decision to create the Safe Zone in the south-west and to leave the north-west uncovered was mistaken as it led to the collapse of the FAR forces and the disaster in Goma. The factors leading to the decision to concentrate Turquoise forces in the south-west are not fully known. The knowledge that the remaining concentrations of Tutsi were in the south-west has been cited as a factor¹¹ but it is unlikely to have been the only factor. For the French to have been seen to be effectively protecting the bulk of the FAR in the north west, a traditional stronghold of Hutu extremism, would have raised further doubts about the motives underlying the operation and would have increased the risks of military confrontation with the RPF. Analysis of the factors explaining the remarkable lack of preparedness in Goma prior to the influx concludes that Opération Turquoise had the effect of diverting the attention of agencies, key analysts and the media away from the developing crisis in the north-west and reduced the intelligence information on the build-up of IDPs in the north-west (see Section 6.2).
134. Whilst the effect of delaying and mitigating the influx into Bukavu can be considered as a positive achievement in the short term, from a longer term perspective it was less positive. The concentration of Hutu IDPs into numerous camps in the Gikongoro area and the initially inadequate response by relief agencies resulted in high mortality rates in the camps during the July-September period and an extremely difficult problem for the Government and the UN as to how the IDPs should be dealt with. Eventually the situation resulted in the death of thousands of IDPs, many as a result of actions by RPF soldiers, at Kibeho camp in April 1995. In retrospect it might have been preferable from a humanitarian perspective not to have discouraged IDPs from moving into Bukavu once the capacity to receive additional refugees had been increased.
135. Though the French Government strove to encourage humanitarian agencies to establish programmes in the south-west, it would appear that more could have been done to facilitate their work. Many NGOs were suspicious of, or felt uncomfortable about, the French military involvement. Indeed several of the main French NGOs had publicly criticised the Operation when it was originally announced and refused to work with the French military. Despite the attachment of a civilian Diplomatic and Humanitarian Cell to the Operation it does not appear to have functioned as effectively as the Civil-Military Operations Centres established by the US forces, and NGOs looked to the UN (UNREO) to coordinate the humanitarian efforts in the Safe Zone. Unlike other contingents operating in Goma or within Rwanda the logistical resources of Opération Turquoise were not made available to humanitarian agencies¹².
136. Whilst Turquoise substantially improved security in the Safe Zone during the period of the intervention, since then the south-west has remained what is arguably the most insecure area of Rwanda. The presence of the IDP camps, the introduction of RPF administration into the area in September, the use of armoured personnel carriers for patrolling by UNAMIR troops rather than the more relaxed methods of the Turquoise forces and the incidents of rape apparently attributable to UNAMIR troops have all contributed to the insecurity in the south-west since August 1994. Nevertheless, with the benefit of hindsight the rejection of requests from UN agencies for Turquoise to be extended for several months and the strict adherence to the two month time limit set in Resolution 929, appears questionable from a strictly humanitarian perspective.
137. Though a partial rather than a complete success, the Opération Turquoise experience contains several important lessons for future interventions designed to increase security and protect civilians, especially in an African context where the likely opposing forces are not well armed.
138. Most significantly, the mandate and force composition of Opération Turquoise contrasted sharply with that of UNAMIR. Whereas UNAMIR I's mandate was that of a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation SC 929 employed Chapter VII wording enabling the force to use force as it deemed necessary. Moreover, the force contained a substantial military 'punch' including 12 Jaguar and F-1 jet aircraft, artillery, light armour and helicopters which together carried a clear but unspoken message that neither the RPF nor FAR forces should interfere with the mission. In a telling phrase, General Dallaire stated 'Turquoise was everything I wanted to be'¹³.
139. Whilst many observers initially thought that France's partisan role would compromise the operation, the

Goma and Bukavu which eventually led to the innovative deployment of the Zairean Contingent. Study III focused upon:

1. the extent to which all military contingents in Rwanda and eastern Zaire were able to increase the security of threatened populations and create 'humanitarian space' for effective relief assistance to be provided;
 2. the performance of selected military contingents in the provision of relief assistance and the support provided to relief agencies;
 3. the lessons from the various experiences in terms of the future involvement of the military in humanitarian operations
128. Inevitably, there was some overlap between the studies, particularly in relation to UNAMIR I and Opération Turquoise, however this proved beneficial in terms of additional information and the sharing of insights.

3.4 The Provision of Security and Physical Protection by Military Contingents

129. As indicated above, the ability of the (reduced) UNAMIR force to provide security during the April-July period, even within the geographically confined context of Kigali, was severely restricted. Prior to the deployment of several UNAMIR II contingents in August with the explicit objective of maintaining or improving security in different sectors within Rwanda, the principal contingents with an important security and physical protection role apart from UNAMIR I were Opération Turquoise and the Zairean Contingent in the camps in Eastern Zaire⁸.

Opération Turquoise

130. Opération Turquoise represented the first additional foreign military intervention which explicitly included the protection of threatened civilians among its objectives and provides an interesting contrast to the UNAMIR experience during the genocide. The principle elements of Opération Turquoise were summarised in Section 2.9. Study II of the evaluation examines the origins of the intervention and the questions surrounding the initial motivations of the operation, so these will not be repeated here. Despite the uncertainties over the initial motivations of the operation, from the perspective of providing security and physical protection and enabling humanitarian agencies fuller access to the south-west of Rwanda, the operation can be considered to have been a partial success.
131. On the plus side, Opération Turquoise significantly improved security in the Safe Zone, removing the numerous militia checkpoints on the roads and enabling freer movement. However, it is difficult to be precise about the extent of the improvement and the degree of physical protection provided to threatened civilians. There is evidence that the killing of Tutsi continued in the Safe Zone during the intervention in areas away from the Turquoise forces. There are also wide differences in the estimates of the numbers of Tutsi judged to have been saved. Whilst the French military claim that the intervention saved 80-100,000⁹ A well informed source puts the figure between 13-14,000¹⁰. The improvement in security enabled a dramatic increase in the humanitarian assistance activities in the south-west. Whereas only the ICRC, CRS/Caritas and WFP had been able to provide any form of relief assistance prior to the intervention, by August the number of UN agencies and NGOs running programmes or in the process of establishing programmes had risen to at least 15. Such efforts served to spread out over a longer time period the number of Rwandans crossing into Bukavu and to limit their eventual number. Though difficult to predict what would have happened if an equivalent number to those entering Goma had crossed into Bukavu at the same time it is highly likely that the mortality rates experienced in Bukavu would have been much higher.
132. However, against this substantial achievement the following factors need to be considered. The operation was much too late. The majority of Tutsi in Rwanda at the start of the genocide had been killed by the time Opération Turquoise was mounted. Had the international community, including France, mounted a similar intervention, through or in support of UNAMIR, in April hundreds of thousands of threatened civilians could have been saved.

fact that France was seen as an ally by the Hutus was an important factor contributing to its success. Throughout the operation, but particularly initially, the Hutu population warmly welcomed the intervention, though this might have stemmed from a misguided belief that the objective of the mission was to protect them from the RPF. Whatever the reason the fact that the force was able to operate in a population that was not hostile made the Operation much easier. Whilst the use of perceived allies as intervention forces carries with it a number of potential problems the Turquoise experience suggests that in some circumstances it can be beneficial. The deterrent effect and the acceptance of the force by the majority of the local population enabled it to present itself on the ground more as a police force with the soldiers deliberately trying to relax the situation by dispensing with their body armour and helmets and carrying out foot patrols. The ability of the soldiers to communicate directly in French with local officials many of whom could speak French was of benefit. Such lessons are illustrated by the handover to the Ghanaian contingent of UNAMIR II which replaced the Turquoise troops in the Gikongoro sector. When the French discovered that the Ghanaians would be using Armoured Personnel Carriers¹⁴ and intended to concentrate their soldiers and equipment in guarded compounds they tried to persuade them to adopt the more relaxed tactics which the French had found to be so effective, but without success¹⁵.

The Zairean Contingent

140. After a prolonged search for acceptable ways of increasing security and physical protection in the camps in Eastern Zaire, especially in Goma, the UN devised an arrangement composed of the following principal elements:
- units of the Zairean Presidential Guard would be responsible for providing security in the camps;
 - that they would be equipped and paid by UNHCR;
 - that they would be supervised and monitored by an International Liaison Group composed of a mix of seconded foreign police officers, lawyers and human rights monitors.
141. The Contingent was deployed in March 1995 with small units stationed at agency compounds and storage and distribution points within the camps. It is generally believed that there was an immediate improvement in security which appears to have been sustained. Interestingly, the factors contributing to the initial success of the Zairean Contingent are similar to those listed above for Opération Turquoise, namely *enforcement capacity* (in this case the status of the Zairean Presidential Guard and thus the President of Zaire), *familiarity* with the area, and *physical presence* on the ground among the population.

3.5 The Provision of Relief Assistance and Support to Relief Agencies by Military Contingents

142. Probably all military contingents, whether deployed in Rwanda or Eastern Zaire, have provided some relief assistance or a measure of support to relief agencies. For instance Opération Turquoise troops based in Goma became drawn into relief operations there following the influx - playing a valuable role in managing the airport for the first few days and undertaking the vital body collection and burial in the initial stages. The military-medical group BioForce attached to Turquoise provided medical assistance to large numbers of civilians within the Safe Zone as well as in Goma and their laboratory facility proved crucial in the early identification of the cholera and dysentery strains responsible for the outbreaks. Among the UNAMIR II contingents, the Canadian, British and Australian contingents stood out in terms of their direct involvement in the provision of relief assistance and support to relief agencies by virtue of their substantial logistical, medical units and engineering units. Nevertheless, other UNAMIR II contingents such as the Ghanaian and Ethiopian whilst concentrating on security provision activities, such as mounting patrols, setting up checkpoints and carrying out arms searches, also supported relief activities. For instance, trucks belonging to various UNAMIR contingents were widely used to transport IDPs during Operation Retour and vital relief equipment.
143. Of those contingents which emphasised the delivery of relief assistance or support to relief agencies, Study III focused upon:

- the US Operation Support Hope which involved up to 3,000 personnel in Entebbe, Goma, Kigali, though with the bulk deployed at the rear base at Stuttgart/Mannheim in Germany, and operated between the third week of July and the last week of August;
 - the British Operation Gabriel which involved 600 personnel and operated in Rwanda under UNAMIR command between the first week of August and the end of November
 - the Dutch contingent of 108 personnel which worked in Goma from the end of July until first week of September
144. In addition, limited information was obtained on the Japanese Self Defence Force contingent (called the International Peace Cooperation Corps) which operated in Goma and Nairobi between early October and late December and involved a total of 420 personnel. Unsuccessful attempts were made to visit the Israeli military to obtain information on the Field Hospital which operated in Goma from late July until early September¹⁶.
145. The activities of all these contingents were briefly summarised in Sections 2.7, 2.9 and 2.10. In view of its scale and its significance the performance of Operation Support Hope is assessed separately.

Operation Support Hope

146. Operation Support Hope stemmed from an assessment visit to Goma shortly after the influx by the USAID Administrator during which water supply, sanitation, logistical support, the expansion of the capacity of Goma airport, medicines, food, plastic sheeting and communications systems were identified as the major needs. On returning to Washington the Administrator briefed President Clinton on 21 July who immediately ordered the Commander-in-Chief US European Command (EUCOM) to assist with humanitarian relief operations in Rwanda and Eastern Zaire. A Joint Task Force (JTF) was established with the designation 'Operation Support Hope'.
147. Support Hope represented an abrupt about turn from the earlier US position in the early stages of the genocide and RPF/FAR conflict that there was insufficient US national interest in Rwanda to justify a US military intervention. That policy had been guided by the lessons drawn from the wounding US experience in Somalia and Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) of May 1994 which set out the US policy on reforming 'multilateral peace operations'. The scale of the influx into Goma, the subsequent cholera epidemic and the intense TV coverage combined with the ending of the open conflict between the RPF/FAR resulted in a policy flip such that it now became in the US national interest to deploy its military. However, to overcome reluctance to the foreign deployment of US forces among the US public and politicians Operation Support Hope was presented as a strictly humanitarian operation with no peacekeeping role and, in line with the new PDD 25, maintaining a clear separation of its command structure from third parties including UNAMIR¹⁷. In giving its approval to the operation the US Senate introduced a time limitation - requiring all US forces to leave the area by 1 October 1994 unless this was overruled by Congress.
148. The objectives set for the JTF were to assist efforts to establish water purification and distribution systems in Goma; establish an airhead and cargo distribution capability at Entebbe; provide round-the-clock airfield services at Goma, Kigali and Bukavu; provide logistics management support to UN and other agencies; protect the force. JTF Headquarters were established at Entebbe with JTF-A in Goma and JTF-B in Kigali, each with its own Civil-Military Operations Centre to ensure liaison with UN agencies and NGOs. It continued until after mid-August when it began winding down and withdrew from Goma and Kigali in the last week of August - one month ahead of the Senate-imposed time limit.
149. The scale of the logistical support provided by Operation Support Hope was highly impressive. The US AirForce flew a total of 380 long-distance sorties (mostly USA to the Great Lakes region) and 996 regional sorties (within the East Africa and Great Lakes region) and delivered 15,331 tons of supplies. Within these figures are contained the substantial logistical support given to the UK, Ethiopian and Australian military contingents provided to UNAMIR¹⁸, intra-theatre (ie intra-regional) movements for UN and NGO agencies (principally Entebbe to Goma but also Entebbe to Kigali and Dar es Salaam to Kigali), as well as the

equipment required by the US military themselves. The logistical support provided by such an intensive and well organised capacity facilitated the work of implementing agencies in numerous ways other than just transporting equipment and personnel. For instance, an epidemiological reporting form for daily reporting by agencies operating clinics, cholera treatment and Unaccompanied Children's Centres designed in Goma by CDC and UNHCR medical personnel was flown back to the rear base and 48 hours later several thousand copies had been printed and delivered to Goma. Similarly, the early identification of the particular strains of dysentery in Goma was facilitated by the capacity to rapidly deliver samples to specialist laboratories in Germany and the USA.

150. Within Goma, the principal activities of the US forces were: the operation of the water purification equipment; the operation of water tankers supplying water to distribution points in the camps; roadworks and camp construction work particularly around Kibumba; and the management of cargo handling at the airport. On the first day of deployment in a highly questionable operation three C-130's airdropped supplies near Katale amid considerable media coverage. The operation tied up scarce logistics resources that could have better used in other activities and was criticised as a 'PR stunt' by relief agency personnel and journalists. The water purification equipment used (Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units - ROWPUs) was not appropriate to the scale of the needs, being tailored to the needs of providing limited quantities of high quality water to army units rather than large quantities of pathogen-free water to a refugee population equivalent to a small city. Fortunately, the ROWPUs were quickly complemented by a civilian operated large-scale pump (see Section 4.3). The tankering operation made an important contribution to the efforts to supply water from Lake Kivu to Kibumba and some useful construction work was undertaken but, apparently as a result of poor communication and priority setting within the military, the much needed heavy equipment for use in site layout and access work was not provided by the US military and in desperation UNHCR had to use a British NGO to supply and operate the equipment (see Section 4.3). Despite the creation of Civil-Military Operations Centres (CMOC) the ability of the US forces to dovetail their activities with those of UN agencies and NGOs working in the same sector or geographical area was limited¹⁹.
151. In Kigali, the contribution of Operation Support Hope appears to have been less impressive, principally as a result of the limitations on its operations stemming from its separation from the UNAMIR command structure and the strict interpretation of the guidance on the security of US personnel. At the airport, there appears to have been significant overlap between the activities of the Support Hope contingent and those of the Canadian UNAMIR contingent which had been operating daily Canadian AirForce C-130 flights into Kigali for most of the period since April. The US forces 'secured' the airport and increased its capacity to handle incoming supplies. Water tankers were flown to Kigali to assist in efforts to improve the water supply but were not used outside the airport, even though water supply was a critical need during August, apparently because of a strict interpretation of the guidance on the security of US personnel²⁰. A commitment was apparently made by the US to repair the water system in the city and to provide a radio station but neither of these commitments was followed through.
152. Concern for the security of US personnel appears to have been of considerable importance to the commanders of the Operation. In Goma, US soldiers moved about in convoys of vehicles with the capacity to defend themselves with heavy machine guns should the need arise and wore their helmets and flak jackets at all times. This practice contrasted sharply with the deliberately relaxed policy of the Opération Turquoise forces operating in the Goma area which saw pairs of French soldiers walking around Goma wearing berets and no body armour and occasionally disarming militia members who overtly carried weapons. In addition all US military personnel were required to return to the secure US military compound by nightfall with the result that US soldiers attending the late afternoon coordination meetings with NGOs and UN agencies had to leave those meetings that went on beyond dusk. Whilst the protection of civilians was admittedly not an objective of the US mission, many of the relief agency personnel interviewed found it remarkable that well-armed soldiers should be so cautious about their own security in a context where hundreds of refugees were being killed each week, rapes were common and most expatriate aid workers were being withdrawn from the camps during the hours of darkness as a result of the high level of insecurity in the camps.
153. The operation was wound down earlier than many outside the US military thought appropriate. The extent

to which this reflected a lack of awareness among UN agencies and NGO as to the limitations and constraints that the US commander was operating under or whether the departure was indeed premature is unclear. UNHCR had formally requested the US military to retain a presence for a further 6 months and many NGO personnel had assumed that, given the high profile and bold claims made at the start of the operation, that it would remain in Rwanda and Goma longer than the five weeks that it did.

Military Airlift Operations

154. Several airforces transported relief supplies on their aircraft. According to information provided by the UNHCR Air Operations Cell the US AirForce accounted for 411 flights²¹, the German AirForce (Luftwaffe) for 162 flights, the Royal New Zealand AirForce for 145 flights and the Canadian AirForce for 60 flights. The UK Royal AirForce, the Royal Netherlands AirForce, the Spanish AirForce, the Israeli AirForce and the Tunisian AirForce also carried relief supplies though the number of flights involved were very limited. Of the total number of flights recorded by the Air Operations Cell 48% were military aircraft carrying relief supplies and personnel, 20% were military aircraft carrying military supplies and personnel (principally UNAMIR related flights into Kigali) and 32% were commercial or private flights carrying relief supplies (see Figure 10).

Figure 10 Airlift Flights to Goma, Bukavu and Kigali: By Category of Carrier and Cargo²²

Location	Total Cargo Flights	Military/ Humanitarian	Military	Commercial/ Private
Goma	467	157	43	267
Bukavu	243	159	0	84
Kigali	917	469	283	165
Total	1627	785 (48%)	326 (20%)	516 (32%)

Period covered by data: Goma 19 July to 25 September
 Bukavu 5 August to 2 October
 Kigali 3 August to 2 October

Source: UNHCR Air Operations Cell, Geneva.

155. Precise information on the cost of carrying cargo on military aircraft is hard to come by due to the difficulty of obtaining precise costings from the military and the uncertainty over whether the use of military assets should be made on a total cost or a marginal cost basis, or something between the two. On a total cost basis it would appear that military aircraft are between 4-8 times more expensive than commercial aircraft for comparable routes²³.
- 3.6 General Points on the Role of the Military in the Provision of Relief Assistance and Support to Relief Operations**
156. Generalisations about the performance of the various contingents providing humanitarian assistance or providing support to humanitarian activities are difficult. The contingents were extremely varied in their capacity, objectives and the command and coordination frameworks they operated within. However, it does seem possible to make some general points based on the experience of those contingents examined.
157. Apart from Opération Turquoise, which has been considered separately, none of the contingents was familiar with Rwanda and Zaire prior to their deployment and this will have increased the difficulties faced

by those involved in planning the operations so as to tailor the objectives and composition of the contingents to the particular context. Apart from the Japanese Self Defence Force contingent (International Peace Cooperation Corps) which was only deployed after a careful reconnaissance in Goma by a 23 person team during the last week of September and the first week of October the US, British and Dutch contingents were deployed on the basis of rushed and inadequate reconnaissance assessments which served to limit the effectiveness of the subsequent deployments.

158. For instance, the decision to send a contingent of British troops to Rwanda appears to have been taken on 25 July and not to have involved the Department responsible for administering UK humanitarian aid to Rwanda²⁴. The reconnaissance team was briefed in London on the 26 July and flew to Kigali the next day where they spent only 36 hours on the ground before returning to London on 30 July. The first flight carrying the main contingent left the UK on 1 August. The pressure to get the first units to Kigali as quickly as possible led to them arriving with inadequate vehicle support. Lack of clarity over the role of the substantial medical team within the contingent resulted in them not taking medicines suitable for treating the local population and they consequently had to use supplies provided by a French NGO²⁵. Similarly, the Dutch contingent was preceded by a 6 person reconnaissance team which was sent to the area on 24 July but it had not completed its assessment by the time, four days later, when the main contingent was despatched. Operation Support Hope experienced similar problems with the US military survey team arriving in Goma on the same day that announcements in Washington were being made as to the objectives and size of the operation. Had the survey team been despatched earlier or allowed more time, it is likely that the initial actions in the water sector would have been more effective and that greater use would have been made of overland rather than air transport from Entebbe (see Section 5.7).
159. That the military forces involved were not more prepared for an involvement in Rwanda/Zaire and had to plan and assemble their contributions so rapidly would seem to reflect a general lack of coherence in humanitarian and security policies within the international community and more specifically within the administrations of the respective countries. For the three months prior to these deployments, the same governments had been having to justify why they were not offering any military contingents to bolster UNAMIR during the genocide. When the security risks had been considerably reduced (ie. the FAR/RPF conflict had ended) and there was intense media coverage of the humanitarian disaster in Goma, senior political figures quickly turned to the military.
160. The use of military capacity as an emergency standby to occasionally complement capacity within the humanitarian system is nothing new - the use of military aircraft to carry relief supplies has taken place almost since airforces began forming 80 years ago. However, the use of soldiers to undertake activities such as meningitis vaccinations, the treatment of dysentery cases, water purification and the rehabilitation of urban electricity supply systems is a rarer occurrence and appears to have increased since the end of the Cold War period as the military look for alternative ways in which to utilise their capacity. This raises a number of policy issues, with four in particular standing out from the Rwanda experience, namely: cost considerations; stand-by capacity; and civil-military cooperation.

Cost Considerations

161. If estimated on the basis of total costs there is no doubt that the same activities cost considerably more if undertaken by a the military than by civilian contractors or NGOs. Several attempts were made during the study to explore this issue but were thwarted by the difficulty of identifying activities that were directly comparable and then obtaining precise cost figures on those activities. In the instance of airlifting relief supplies, it would appear that the use of military aircraft costs between 4-8 times that of commercial alternatives.
162. However, the picture is considerably complicated by the fact that military capacity used in support of humanitarian operations would either have remained idle or been engaged in training exercises and also by the way in which governments attribute the costs. For instance some government Defence Departments absorb all the costs of such support within their departmental budgets whilst others charge the client

department (eg, foreign ministry humanitarian aid section) part of the additional costs arising from the operation. Study III was not able to explore the way in which the additional costs arising from the Rwanda operations were charged by the relevant Defence Departments. In a post Cold War context in which defence spending and force levels have been considerably reduced, assumptions underlying the traditional costing basis are becoming increasingly questionable. Essentially what is being provided by the military is a stand-by capacity with highly developed systems and expertise in the field of logistics. If a humanitarian aid stand-by capacity were to be developed in the commercial or non-governmental sector it is likely that such a capacity would be considerably cheaper to a central finance ministry than funding the maintenance of such capacity within the military.

Stand-by Capacity

163. During the July-August period, there is ample evidence that the capacity of the humanitarian aid system was overstretched. Senior officials in UNHCR felt so overwhelmed that the concept of Service Packages was hurriedly developed. Many relief agencies had problems in locating and sending suitably qualified and experienced personnel to work in Goma and indeed in the south-west of Rwanda (see Chapters 4 and 8). The military therefore provided additional capacity that was not readily available within the relief system or from commercial service providers. The airlift sector may be somewhat different as there is no clear evidence to suggest that the full capacity of the commercial charter sector was approached in late July. If this is so then it is possible that part of the additional airlift capacity provided by the military could have been undertaken much more cost-effectively by commercial carriers which in at least one instance appear to have been more flexible than some of the airforces²⁶. Despite these questions about potential capacity within the air transport sector, it remains the case that much useful work was undertaken by the military during the July-August period undertaking certain tasks such as water tankering, compound construction, road repair, infrastructure rehabilitation and logistics support.
164. This study has not been able to explore the costs of developing civilian stand-by capacity, perhaps based on those large international NGOs with a proven track record in rapid response. Building up and retaining such capacity for sudden deployment would involve substantial costs. How these costs would compare with (occasional) use of high cost military contingents is not clear. It is probably the case that civilian stand-by capacity would be cheaper than reliance upon the military as a form of stand-by capacity for humanitarian operations. In the absence of any substantial investment in civilian stand-by capacity it is likely that there will be occasions, such as the July-August period in 1994 when the only additional capacity that can be quickly deployed is that of the military. If this is to be the case, then it will be necessary to ensure that such support is predictable and not subjected to the sudden changes in attitude to military deployment displayed by several governments during late July.

Civil-Military Cooperation

165. Increases in the number of peace-keeping operations around the world mean that humanitarian agencies and military contingents are increasingly having to work together, either alongside each other or collaboratively. Though the use of military assets in the provision of relief assistance and in support of relief agencies may be questionable in terms of effectiveness and cost-effectiveness criteria, it is likely that governments will continue to order the deployment of such assets in situations of extreme, highly visible suffering which provokes public and political pressure for the government to respond in a high profile manner. It is important, therefore, that the two communities - the humanitarian and the military - should seek to improve their mechanisms for coordination and collaboration.
166. During the course of the study, Team members heard evidence of the awkwardness that exists between some personnel of the humanitarian agencies and the military. For instance, some agencies in Goma refused to admit foreign military personnel into their compounds or into their vehicles. In some cases the same agencies were among those calling, in November 1994, for the Security Council to urgently address the high levels of insecurity in the camps. Such suspicion and lack of trust displayed by some NGO personnel towards the military appears to have been greater in Goma than inside Rwanda, possibly due to the lack of

a single command structure for the various military contingents operating their and the role of the Zairean soldiers in exacerbating the insecurity. Inside Rwanda, all military contingents apart from Opération Turquoise and Operation Support Hope operated with the UNAMIR command structure and the mechanisms for liaison between the humanitarian agencies and UNAMIR were well developed in the form of UNREO in Kigali which for a time contained the UNAMIR Humanitarian Cell and the US Civil-Military Operation Centre.

Notes on Chapter 3

1. The numbers killed during the April-July genocide cannot be known with any accuracy and estimates range widely. On the basis of calculations and assumptions which appear realistic Prunier (1995) estimates that 800,000 were killed during the genocide. In conjunction with the other studies in the Joint Evaluation, the range of 0.5 to 1 million is used in this report. The numbers were clearly so large that arguments over whether it was nearer the lower estimates or the higher estimates are of questionable utility and perhaps also morality.
2. Significantly, the last two methods of saving lives were undertaken without the authorisation of New York; as strictly speaking, they were beyond even the mandate eventually agreed upon by the Security Council.
3. Lance Clark DHA and former member of UNAHT. Personal communication September 1995.
4. Geoff Loane, Deputy Head of Delegation, ICRC, Nairobi. Interview April 1995.
5. CDC: Population, Nutrition and Mortality Survey, Mugunga 31/8/94. Such a classification could include crush injuries sustained during the shelling incident at the airport during the influx and at badly managed relief distributions. Nevertheless, on the basis of anecdotal evidence, it would appear that the principal cause of traumatic injury was violent attacks.
6. Ndoshor orphanage was connected to the Goma town electrical supply though this unreliable. Some agencies possessed generators which were used either in the treatment centres or in the compounds near the camps or in Goma town. One positive aspect of the Dutch military contingent, which worked closely with MSF-Holland in Katale, were the generators they brought with them.
7. The operation of a Chapter VII intervention in the same country as an ongoing Chapter VI operation appears to have been unique to Rwanda.
8. During the course of the study, several interviewees expressed the view that the presence of a group of military personnel had a positive impact on security in areas experiencing high levels of violence and instability even if they were medical personnel or logistical units rather than armed infantry. However, there was little evidence to either support or contradict this view. This section of the report therefore considers only Opération Turquoise and the Zairean Contingent.
9. Interview Connaughton/Lafoucade, Toulouse 28 March 1995.
10. Prunier, Gérard 1995. Background paper prepared for Study II.
11. Prunier, Gérard 1995
12. Unlike media representatives, NGO personnel were not given access to Turquoise helicopter flights, and WFP's request for Turquoise trucks in August was turned down, even though this was to assist in the transport of a French food aid consignment from Bujumbura.
13. Interview with General Dallaire, The Hague, Netherlands 22 March 1995.
14. The US M113 APCs which it was proposed to lease to UNAMIR in April, but which did not become operational for several months.
15. In his discussions with his Ghanaian counterpart, General Lafoucade 'impressed upon him the necessity of scattering units so as to cover the ground, and to conduct night patrols, but I believe that as soon as we left, they crept back inside their shells'. Interview Connaughton/Lafoucade, Toulouse.
16. By the time the visit by a team member was approved by the relevant authorities, there was insufficient time left to carry out the visit and integrate the material into the draft report.

17. Indeed, the After Action Review for Operation Support Hope states 'the JTF on a humanitarian assistance mission could not appear to be taking sides, or cooperating with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), a UN military command with a peacekeeping mission'.
18. Totalling 56 C5 Galaxy (or Galaxy equivalent) sorties and 15 C-141 Starlifter sorties.
19. For instance, Oxfam played a key role in the water sector yet experienced difficulty in working collaboratively with the US military. At one point the officer in charge of the water activities stated: 'I take my orders from Mannheim'. Nick Stockton, Head of Emergency Unit, Oxfam, personal communication.
20. Interview with Major-General Dallaire, The Hague, 22 March 1995.
21. Because of the USAF use of the larger capacity C-141 and C5A in addition to the ubiquitous C-130 used by the USAF and other Airforces, the average tonnage carried on USAF flights will have been greater than that carried by other Airforces.
22. Unfortunately, information is not readily available for flights to Mwanza in support of the refugee relief operations in Ngara and Karagwe. These operations were not coordinated by the UNHCR Air Operations Cell which was only requested to become involved in the Rwanda operations four days after the start of the Goma influx.
23. A real case comparison during the Goma airlift of military versus commercial quotations for a specific cargo to a specific location showed a ratio of six to one. For flying, the same cargo from the UK to Kigali, SCF UK were quoted £7.00/kilogram by the UK RAF and £1.6/kilogram by Sabena. Steven Rifkind SCF-UK Country Representative, Kigali, Interviewed April 1994.
24. On 25 July, the Head of the Emergency Aid Department in the ODA informed his counterpart at the OFDA in Washington that the UK was not planning to send a military contingent to Rwanda.
25. Originally, the 150 personnel from the 23 Parachute Field Ambulance were intended to provide medical support only to UNAMIR soldiers, using drugs and supplies that were available in UNAMIR, but on arrival in Rwanda it was decided to deploy the personnel to Ruhengeri Hospital, and then, after 12 days, they were redeployed to Gikongoro to operate clinics and treatment centres in IDP camps and surrounding areas. The medicines were supplied by Pharmaciens Sans Frontières (PSF).
26. For instance, WFP were using commercial C-130 charters to transport food to the airstrip in Bukavu for several weeks before the USAF investigated the use of the airstrip and decided that it was not possible for their C-130s to use the airstrip. Subsequently, both the German and Royal New Zealand Airforces operated C-130 into Bukavu. Trevor Page WFP Rapid Response Team, Bukavu - personal communication.

Chapter 4 Assessment of Performance: Health, Water and Sanitation

4.1 Morbidity and Mortality

167. After the genocide, the principal causes of mortality during the emergency were cholera and dysentery. As both these diseases are spread as a result of inadequate water and sanitation arrangements, performance in the health and water/sanitation sectors is therefore considered together.
168. Morbidity and mortality statistics relating to the emergency are extremely patchy in terms of their geographical coverage and are of very variable quality. For instance, the amount and quality of public health information available for Goma contrasts sharply with that for IDPs in Rwanda. Though this reflects the different coordination regimes for refugees and IDPs (see Section 6.3), the principal reason for this variation stems from the presence and work of teams of epidemiologists from CDC and Epicentre in Goma with support from WHO, whereas for the IDP camps inside Rwanda the CDC involvement was very limited and Epicentre's data relates only to those camps where MSF agencies were present. Epidemiological information is a crucial tool in efforts to assess the impact and effectiveness of emergency aid and the Team's ability to comment authoritatively on impact and effectiveness was severely constrained by the lack of comprehensive datasets. In view of the substantial resources expended on the response, the patchiness of the epidemiological information is highly unsatisfactory and steps are recommended to ensure that the performance of future large-scale relief operations can be more effectively assessed (see *Problématique and Recommendations*).
169. Bearing in mind the difficulties with the available datasets, Figure 11 shows the estimated numbers of people who died and the cause of death. The figure for Cholera is that determined by CDC. The figure for dysentery was determined using available information on global attack rates and case fatality rates which had been collated and analysed by Epicentre¹ and making realistic assumptions where data was not available for all camps². Had information been available for dysentery death in camps in Burundi and for the non-camp populations inside Rwanda, this result would probably have been significantly higher.

Figure 11 Principal Causes of Death

Violent death (war and genocide)	0.5 - 1 million
Cholera (Goma)	30,000
Dysentery (Rwanda, Tanzania, Zaire)	46,000 - 63,000

4.2 Cholera Outbreaks During the Emergency


170. Cholera is endemic in the Kivu region of Zaire. Though the outbreak that occurred in Goma in July-August 1994 is the focus of this section, it should not be forgotten that cholera cases also occurred elsewhere. For instance, Ngara experienced an outbreak in December 1994 with a second smaller peak in February 1995. The source was new arrivals from Rwanda and transmission was person to person rather than use of an infected water source as was the case in Goma. The outbreak was confined to Benaco and Mushura Hill camps which at that stage had a combined population of around 290,000. In all 1,800 people were infected of which 90 died. Crucial to the successful response to the outbreak was the protection of the water sources from contamination, though other factors included:
- good contingency plans for dealing with an outbreak with each camp having its own purpose built cholera centre;
 - well developed programmes to mobilise the community with many Community Health Workers

- and community awareness groups which promoted early case finding and referral to the centres;
 - a well motivated population conscious of what had happened 5 months earlier in Goma
 - good co-ordination between curative and public health services which enabled the rapid spraying of infected areas.
171. These measures prevented the explosive epidemic profile that occurred in Goma and enabled the well developed curative and community services to operate without becoming overrun. Whereas in Goma 100% of the refugee were exposed to cholera within 2-3 weeks, in Benaco and Mushura Hill camps approximately 6% of the population were exposed to cholera in the space of 4 months.
172. There were also sporadic cases of cholera in Bukavu town during the influx and when large numbers of refugees were temporarily settled in the town. Transmission was from person to person as a result of inadequate hygiene practices due to the very limited amounts of water available to the refugees. Crucially however, the municipal supply remained uncontaminated and the numbers infected were very limited.
173. Though much studied, the available data on the Goma outbreak cannot be regarded as accurate. Mortality statistics rely on tallies from the body collecting trucks and given the considerable confusion in the burial sites and camps during the first weeks after the influx and that many deaths occurred outside the camps, these estimates can only be regarded as approximate. In addition estimates of the refugee population at the time of the outbreak varied substantially and so, there is wide variation in the calculation of attack rates, etc. Despite the limitations of the available data, it is clear that the cholera outbreak was extremely severe and explosive. Almost 50,000 people (between 6%-10% of the total refugee population) died during the first month after the influx principally as a result of the cholera outbreak and the dysentery outbreak which began a few days later. Differentiating cause of death between cholera and dysentery can be difficult but it would seem that approximately 25,000-30,000 deaths resulted from the cholera³.
174. The outbreak began within 6 days of the start of the influx and peaked very rapidly, apparently within a week of the first case being diagnosed. Attack rates were extremely high, most probably in the region of 10-15% and it is likely that the entire refugee population was exposed to cholera in the space of 2-3 weeks. Given that immunity is acquired after exposure to cholera, the extent of the epidemic was almost certainly limited by population immunity. Case fatality rates in the various cholera centres were initially extremely high (50% plus in some centres) but fell rapidly and within two weeks after the start of the epidemic were below 10%. There is no data available as to case fatality rates outside the treatment centres and consequently estimates of the numbers of lives saved by the international intervention are not possible.

4.3 Provision of Water and Sanitation in Goma

175. Prior to the influx, only one agency had a substantial contingency stock of water equipment in Goma⁴. Using its own funds Oxfam had prepositioned sufficient materials for a population of 50,000 refugees at a cost of approximately £400,000⁵. Though quite inadequate in the face of such a massive influx the equipment bought time and allowed the agency to start operations as soon as an Emergency Team arrived from the UK on 19 July.
176. Though 15-20 litres/day/person is the internationally recognised standard, 5 litres/day/person (6 litres/day/person inside Rwanda for UNHCR) was taken as the immediate target by UNHCR technical personnel⁶. Assuming a total population of 800,000 the initial distribution target was therefore 4 million litres/day. Figure 12 shows the growth in water delivered in the camps from the influx until the 12 August. The 4 million litres target was achieved on 10 August 27 days after the start of the influx and 15 days after the peak of the cholera epidemic. Though late in terms of mitigating the cholera epidemic, the provision of potable water to such a large population in such a short space of time nevertheless represents a very substantial achievement.

Figure 12 Total Treated Water Delivered to Refugees in North Kivu (14 July- 12 August 1994)



177. Water was produced using sources such as streams near to Katale camp, though in the initial stages this was complemented to a limited extent by tankers drawing water which had been either purified or chlorinated from Lake Kivu. Kibumba camp containing approximately 40% of the refugees had been spontaneously settled and was located 27 kms from the Lake which was its nearest source. Kibumba was wholly dependent upon tankered water and indeed this situation has continued up to mid-1995. In addition to the water produced by agencies either from local sources or from the Lake, a substantial but unknown volume of water was extracted directly from the Lake by refugees using buckets and jerrycans. Whilst media attention focused on the efforts to pump and purify water from the Lake it appears that in the days immediately following the influx it was bucket-drawn water that was the principal source for refugees in the town and those in Mugunga camp and perhaps even for some of those at Kibumba. Whilst this source will have served to limit the numbers who died from dehydration it is almost certain that it was also responsible for the rapid spread of cholera through the camps.
178. By 26 July, the apparent peak of the cholera epidemic, Oxfam was producing and distributing a total of 600,000 litres of water in Mugunga and Katale camps and the 5 litre target immediate target was reached in these camps during the first week of August when queuing at the tapstands ended⁷. Initially, Oxfam refused to work in Kibumba regarding it as an inappropriate location given its location 27 kms from the nearest water source. However, as it became apparent that the camp was going to remain the agency changed its position and constructed storage tanks and distribution systems within the camp which were supplied by water tankers with water drawn from Lake Kivu.
179. Amid considerable media coverage, the first units of US Operation Support Hope began to arrive in Goma on 24 July. The following day two Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Units (ROWPUs) arrived and began production of high quality water on the morning of 26 July. Their capacity was 14,400 US gallons/day or approximately 57,600 litres/day⁸. In what proved to be a critical intervention, particularly for supplies to Kibumba camp, PWSS⁹ arrived on the 26 with a large capacity hydro sub-pump capable of pumping approximately 3.5 million litres/day. The equipment was located next to the US Army ROWPUs and initially used to increase the supply to the ROWPUs. After three days however, at the recommendation of UNHCR's Water and Sanitation Coordinator, the pump was used to directly fill water tankers which were injected with chlorine before setting off to delivery points in the camps - principally in Kibumba¹⁰. In addition the pumps and purification units were used to supply temporary distribution

points in Goma town. THW, the German Government's Service Package arrived in Goma at the beginning of August and began producing treated water on 5 August using mobile filtration units. Production was approximately 750,000 litres/day throughout the first month¹¹.

180. With the arrival of PWSS, the critical bottleneck shifted from being one of production to one of transporting the water from the wharf at Goma to those camps where production was insufficient or where, as in the case of Kibumba, the camp was entirely dependent upon tankered water. Tankering operations were begun initially by MSF-Belgium using three locally hired petrol tankers whose tanks had been cleaned. There was intense competition between agencies the limited locally available capacity and the hiring rate became inflated as a result¹². It was estimated that Kibumba required a fleet capacity of about 600m³ (equivalent to 60 tankers of the common 10m³ capacity operating throughout daylight hours). By 25 July, total fleet capacity was only 50m³¹³. Unfortunately, information showing the growth in tankering capacity was not readily available so it was not possible to analyse either the arrival of tankers on the airlift or the effectiveness of the tankering operation itself. Considerable effort was exerted by donor organisations and UN agencies on locating tanker capacity. Fifteen tankers were supplied by the US military, though it is not clear when they arrived; 9 milk tankers were located in Finland and flown to Goma by the US AirForce; and several were also flown from ex-Yugoslavia by the UK ODA. However, the build up of capacity was slow and the management of the operation was problematic - the volumes transported were apparently less than the optimum possible as a result of lack of communication and coordination. At the end of July, MSF-Holland and Belgium took over the co-ordination and management of the operation and efficiency increased. The immediate target of 5 litres/person/day was reached in Kibumba on 9 August¹⁴. The experience highlights the fact that having tankers available is of itself not sufficient - they need to have effective arrangements for their management. A result of the rapid procurement process undertaken by a number of donor organisations was a non-standardised tanker fleet, which has led to maintenance problems and subsequent difficulties in keeping the fleet operational, and thus Kibumba adequately supplied¹⁵.
181. As well as the (probable) contamination of the principal water source, a significant factor contributing to the rapidity of the dissemination of the cholera throughout the population was the lack of adequate sanitation arrangements. Sanitation programmes were slow to get underway. By 12 August, there was only one latrine for each 1,029 inhabitants in Mugunga, one per 500 in Kibumba, and one per 184 in Katale¹⁶. Whilst the extremely difficult terrain and the scale of the influx were important factors in explaining the slow improvement in sanitation provision, critical factors appear to have been:
- a) the lack of heavy equipment to dig communal latrines and open up roads into the camps to aid decongestion and improve camp layouts;
 - b) the lack of expertise and experience in dealing with large scale excreta disposal in emergencies; and
 - c) the apparent reluctance of agencies to work in, and donors to fund, this unattractive but nevertheless vital sector.
182. The volcanic rock, on which the camps were established, dictated that normal responses such as digging communal pit latrines were not possible in the absence of heavy earth moving machinery and planned camp layouts. Despite being identified as a priority as early as 26 July, adequate quantities of heavy machinery did not arrive in Goma for two months¹⁷. Early promises from the US military in Goma to supply heavy equipment did not materialise, apparently as a result of the priority ranking of the equipment not being correctly relayed to the US military in Europe, who, it appears, were quite able to supply the equipment required¹⁸. After unsuccessful attempts by UNHCR to procure the services of construction companies in the region¹⁹, UNHCR and OFDA then proposed that ActionAid/Assist (a UK NGO and its partner organisation already providing logistical support in Goma) be asked to provide and operate the heavy equipment with the US AirForce providing the transport to the region. This process was delayed and eventually reconditioned equipment (bulldozers and graders) was airlifted from Scotland by a Ukrainian commercial charter company arriving in the third week of September. The total cost of the grant was over US\$ 2 million. The delay in providing this equipment was a significant shortcoming in the response to the Goma influx, delaying not only the digging of pit latrines, but also vehicle access

to service points within the camps (clinics, food distribution centres, water points, etc.) and efforts to reduce the very high population densities in the camps through decongestion and improved layout.

183. Given the terrain and the scale of the influx, latrine construction was never going to be a realistic sole option for excreta control in the short term. Alternative solutions were required in the form of efforts to manage and control the defecation habits of the refugees. Serious attempts to do this did not gain momentum until MSF-France introduced an effective managed defecation scheme in Kibumba camp in mid-August, one month after the initial influx. Whilst this was limited in its application, the scheme did serve as a model for other agencies to emulate. However, efforts by UNHCR technical personnel to encourage more agencies to undertake managed defecation schemes did not meet with an adequate response. Only a limited number of agencies were prepared to work in the sanitation sector (MSF-France, IRC, Oxfam, Concern, Swedish Rescue Board and GTZ), a situation which contrasted starkly with the number of agencies working in the higher profile activities, such as establishing cholera treatment centres and centres for unaccompanied children.
184. This pattern was remarked upon not just by UNHCR coordinators, but also by agency personnel looking back at the lessons of Goma, and appears to reflect an overemphasis upon high profile, curative services within the international relief system, and a distinct lack of capacity in (or unwillingness of agencies to work in) lower profile, but nevertheless crucial, preventative activities. This situation must reflect, at least in part, the influence of the media and the competition among agencies to be seen to be working in the most 'mediatic' sectors.
185. Body collection and burial was a vital role that was particularly difficult and unattractive. Only one international NGO was prepared to take on this role, and then only with a local organisation providing the labour²⁰. Despite the best efforts of the agency concerned, the reality was that for a long period there were piles of decomposing bodies around Goma and the camps. For instance in Mugunga camp a pile remained near the cholera treatment centre until almost the end of July.

4.4 Treatment of Cholera Cases in Goma

186. The case load in the rudimentary cholera centres that had been set up was initially extremely high. Between 21 July and 9 August, 60,848 patients were treated for dehydration in the health facilities in Goma and around the camps²¹. The conditions in the cholera centres were extremely difficult, being overcrowded and with scores of sick people lying on the ground. Most centres were newly established and were 'rough and ready' and suffered from lack of routine, experience and basic infrastructure, including adequate perimeter fencing²². The vast majority of those treated at the centres were those able to present themselves. A substantial proportion of those who died were not able to reach the centres²³ either because of a lack of means for transporting patients to the centres, or a lack of awareness as to where the centres were located. Case finding through outreach programmes, though recommended practice in cholera epidemics, was rarely undertaken. Given the inadequate number of treatment centres during July, and the pressure to focus on setting up new centres and treating the cases presented, the conditions and the lack of water in the camps, such programmes were probably not feasible during the height of the epidemic.
187. In most cholera outbreaks, oral rehydration can be an effective form of treatment in the vast majority of cases, and ideally few patients should require intravenous rehydration. However, in Goma, adequate oral rehydration was problematic for a number of reasons. Water was extremely scarce in the camps and this placed pressures on staff in the centres to distribute both water and Oral Rehydration Solution (ORS) outside the centres and the lack of secure perimeters contributed to this problem. Even treatment centres ran out of water periodically as a result of a combination of problems of supply, limited on-site storage capacity and inadequate control of usage. Because of the lack of security in the camps at night, most expatriates left the treatment centres at dusk and returned at daybreak. Not only did this severely restrict the supervision of treatment by the local staff who remained, but it occasionally resulted in the removal of patients and their replacement by others who were members of the RGF and militia or were their relatives and friends. Morale among the local staff was low as a result of the accumulation of

decomposing bodies near the centres, high levels of sickness amongst the local staff, and their recent flight and experiences. This too served to reduce the effectiveness of oral rehydration therapy. As a result of all these problems there was an excessive reliance upon intravenous rehydration. Supplies of the recommended IV fluids (Ringers lactate) were frequently exhausted, and some agencies reverted to using inappropriate fluids such as dextrose.


188. Though it is difficult to criticise agency personnel who were working in such difficult conditions, there does appear to have been wide variations in the effectiveness of the 30 or so agencies which established cholera centres. Some agencies took considerably longer than others to bring the case fatality rates down in their treatment centres from the extraordinarily high rates of 50%. Local factors such as insecurity, lack of perimeter fences, problems of water supply, etc. may have been as much to blame for the delay as poor centre management and lack of experience in cholera treatment, so even if the data were reliable it would be inappropriate to calculate agency performance on the basis of which they reduced case fatality rates. Nevertheless, the team heard many anecdotal examples of poor performance.
189. One agency (Operation Blessing) sent six medical teams each with 15 people after an appeal for doctors on a TV programme produced by its parent organisation, Christian Broadcasting Corporation. Staff were rotated every two weeks and most had no previous experience in Africa²⁴. The teams undertook inappropriate activities, such as putting-up IV infusions in patient's shelters and leaving them unsupervised, and because of its reliance on donated drugs only had one antibiotic available for all prescriptions²⁵. Americares, another US-based NGO, airlifted 10,000 cases of Gatorade, a popular sports drink²⁶. Following a campaign in Germany requesting volunteers to work in Goma, CARE-Deutschland was swamped by applicants and devised a scheme whereby every two weeks a charter flight would take 200 new volunteers to Goma and would return with the previous batch. Lack of personnel with previous emergency experience and French speakers, and a decision taken by the CARE-Deutschland board to operate independently from other agencies²⁷ resulted in a poorly integrated, inappropriate operation with overstaffed facilities and dispensaries sometimes being set up next to existing Zairean facilities²⁸. Other studies have concluded in the need for more training of NGO personnel²⁹.

4.5 Could Cholera Have Been Prevented or the Fatality Rate Reduced?

190. Given the endemic nature of cholera in the Kivu Region it was virtually inevitable that a large population concentration with inadequate sanitation arrangements and utilising open water sources would experience a cholera epidemic. Most probably, the source of the epidemic was the water from Lake Kivu³⁰. Whether the lake was polluted before the influx or whether the particular *cholera vibrio* responsible for the epidemic was introduced to the water by refugees wading-in to fill their buckets and jerrycans cannot be known. If the lake water was the source of the outbreak then adequate control measures (such as bucket chlorination to kill any pathogens in the water being drawn from the lake) could, theoretically, have prevented the outbreak.
191. The idea of setting up bucket chlorination teams at those points along the lake where the refugees were drawing water appears not to have occurred to agencies in Goma until it was too late. On the 23 July, (three days after the first cholera case was diagnosed,) a CDC epidemiologist and WatSan specialist made a rough estimate of the volume of water being drawn from the lake, and proposed the organisation of bucket chlorination teams at a water and sanitation coordination meeting in Goma. A commitment to organise the teams was apparently given at the meeting by a representative of the UK ODA, but this was not followed through³¹. Subsequently, UNHCR organised a team of about 20 people to inject chlorine into jerry cans at 12 sites along the shoreline around Goma.
192. The epidemic was remarkable for the rapidity of its spread through the population, the peak being reached just one week after the first case was diagnosed. Consequently, relief agencies had very little time to establish themselves so as to be able to treat more effectively those cases presenting at the cholera centres (ie. reducing the case fatality rate) and engage in recommended practices such as early case finding. If the spread had been slowed, the peak would have been delayed and less acute than actually occurred (see Figure 13). More time could have effectively been bought for more infrastructure and

resources (material and personnel) to have been put in place and agencies to have had a greater impact upon the case fatality rates.

Figure 13 Number of Bodies Collected and Diarrhoea Cases Reported, North Kivu Region, 21 July - 13 August



193. Even if the start of the outbreak could not have been delayed, it is still the case that greater preparedness for the influx could have slowed the spread of the outbreak and allowed more time for the establishment of treatment centres and their more effective operation. Among the measures that would have slowed the spread were:

- earlier introduction of bucket chlorination teams at the lakeside
- prepositioning of more pumping and storage equipment in Goma
- prepositioning of water tankers or the identification of tankers in the area that could be mobilised quickly and pre-agreements with their owners
- the identification of more potential sites, preferably near to the lake
- the demarcation of defecation areas for those sites and potential locations for service points
- prepositioning of heavy equipment or the identification of bulldozers in the area that could be mobilised quickly and pre-agreements with their owners.

194. The opportunities for such preparedness measures to have been undertaken, and the reason they were not, are explored in Section 6.2.

4.6 Dysentery

195. Dysentery was the cause of more deaths, probably substantially more, than cholera during 1994. However, its effects were spread across the whole area, affecting refugee camps in Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire, IDP camps inside Rwanda and Rwandans outside the IDP camps. Both geographically and temporally, it was therefore less concentrated than the cholera epidemic in Goma and, in stark contrast to that epidemic, attracted little if any media coverage. Epidemiological information on the dysentery epidemics inside Rwanda during 1994 is very patchy³².

196. Over the last decade or so, dysentery epidemics caused by *Shigella dysenteriae* type 1 have increasingly

affected countries of Central Africa during the rainy season (October to March)³³. During late 1993 and early 1994, dysentery was the major health problem and principal cause of mortality among the Burundian refugees who moved into Tanzania, Rwanda and Zaire and resulted in the death of several thousands. Agencies which were involved in the problematic response to that situation were therefore aware that during the response to the Rwandan crisis, dysentery was likely to be the principal factor contributing to excess mortality.

197. Sure enough, though beginning some four months earlier than normal, a major dysentery epidemic affected the Great Lakes region between June and November 1994. Cases of bloody diarrhoea were reported from an early stage in virtually all camps for which there is data, though there were differences in the dynamic of the outbreak between camps. In Benaco, for instance, the outbreak (defined as an incidence greater than 5 cases per thousand people per week) began in May, grew steadily to a peak of 10 cases/thousand/week in July, and did not end until mid-September. In the neighbouring Lumasi Camp which was opened in June, the outbreak began within two weeks and peaked at 12 cases/thousand/week at the beginning of August, and ended in September. In Goma, dysentery outbreaks were more severe, reaching levels of between 26-34/thousand/week. Precisely when the outbreaks began is unclear because watery diarrhoea (associated with cholera) and bloody diarrhoea (associated with dysentery) were not differentiated in surveillance data until mid-August when the outbreaks were well underway. Most likely, the dysentery outbreaks began shortly after the cholera outbreak, ie. in late July. However, unlike cholera, the dysentery outbreak persisted in all camps until November with peaks occurring in August and October in Kibumba, and the beginning of September in both Mugunga and Katale. Of all the camps in the region, it appears that the IDP camps in south-west Rwanda experienced the most severe outbreaks, with incidence rates reaching 30 cases/thousand/week in Rukondo during August. In Kibeho, which is generally regarded as having experienced the greatest problems, the incidence rate in the second week of October was no less than 40 cases/thousand/week³⁴.
198. It is not possible to estimate with any accuracy the number of people who died of dysentery as a result of the lack of comprehensive surveillance data. On the basis of rough approximations, and the assumption that where data is available it can be taken as being representative of camps in the same area³⁵, it appears that the dysentery epidemic resulted in the deaths of approximately 50-60,000 people.
199. The 1994 epidemic was earlier and more severe than in previous years, as a result of the massive population displacements, the lack of water and sanitation whilst the population were on the move, high population densities in the refugee and IDP camps and, at least in the initial stages in the camps, poor sanitation and inadequate supplies of potable water³⁶ and soap.
200. Guidelines on the control and treatment of dysentery recommend three 'equally essential' elements³⁷ namely:
 - **public and personal hygiene** through the provision of potable water, soap, health education and the provision of latrines
 - **supportive care** in the form of nutritional support for those infected and those recovering from the illness, together with active rehydration of patients presenting with dehydration
 - **antibiotic treatment** for those most likely to die from the disease.
201. Maintaining a balance between these three elements is important to the overall effectiveness of the response to dysentery outbreaks. Whether or not such a balance was maintained during the response is a difficult generalisation to make, given the different contexts in which the outbreaks occurred, and the specialisation of some agencies on particular approaches. However, it does appear that the response was characterised by a general overemphasis upon curative approaches and an underemphasis upon preventive approaches in the response.

Public and Personal Hygiene

202. The provision of water and sanitation in the Goma case has already been examined in relation to the

cholera outbreak, and many of the points made in Section 4.3 relate also to dysentery. Delays in the provision of latrines and/or managed defecation areas will have contributed to the high rates of dysentery, as will the high population densities in the camps and the delays experienced in improving the layout of the camps. Though water production and delivery increased dramatically in the last week of July and the first week of August when the total deliveries reached 4 million litres per day and the immediate target of 5 litres/person/day was broadly achieved, thereafter the increase in water deliveries was much slower. It was only in December that total deliveries to camps in the Goma area reached 6 million litres³⁸. The long term target of above 15 litres/person/day has still not been achieved. In April 1995, consumption reached 10.5 litres/day.

203. In Ngara, water provision was, initially at least, a success story. The artificial lake next to Benaco camp served as the main source and Oxfam and MSF quickly established a pumping, storage and distribution system that provided satisfactory levels of water in the camp. It was recognised from the outset that the capacity of the lake to provide a guaranteed year-round supply was questionable and that it would need to be complemented from other sources, especially as the number of refugees continued to increase. UNICEF quickly mobilised a drilling rig from Uganda and succeeded in drilling 21 boreholes which fed water to service new sites in an attempt to reduce congestion in Benaco. By July 1994, average water consumption in Benaco and Lumasi camps was 12.3 litres/person/day.
204. Since then, however, the situation has deteriorated rather than been improved further. In June 1995, water consumption in Benaco and Lumasi had fallen to just 5.7 litres/person/day, and the average daily water consumption in the five camps now supplied by the Ngara programme during June was 6.8 litres. In part, this reflects the failure of production to keep pace with the steady growth in the number of refugees; whilst the refugee population in Ngara has risen by 194% between July 1994 and June 1995, total water production has risen only by 109% over the same period³⁹. Though the UNICEF borehole programme represented a very effective emergency input, they were poorly designed, their sustainable yield was overestimated, several subsequently collapsed and the actual yields from others have been below the levels indicated by UNICEF's initial pump tests, which appear to have been poorly carried out.
205. The only large volume perennial surface water source in the area is the Ruvubu River which runs between Benaco camp and Ngara town (see Figure 5). The river is ten kilometres from Benaco and the two are separated by a ridge of hills 400 metres above river level. A study commissioned by UNHCR in September 1994 estimated that the construction of a piped supply system from the Ruvubu River would take several months to complete, and would cost \$5.1 million. Such an investment raises difficult questions about the expected time that the refugees will remain in Tanzania and the Government of Tanzania's reluctance to see the camps become long term features. UNHCR's position throughout 1994 was to plan on the basis of an 'early return'. The killings in Kibeho camp in April 1995 have necessitated the adoption of a longer planning period, though it is not clear whether the piped scheme will attract the necessary donor funding and be implemented⁴⁰.
206. Other factors that appear to have contributed to the failure of water production to keep pace with requirements include the high turnover of UNHCR Water Coordinators in Ngara, and the consequent difficulties of sustaining momentum on the production issue⁴¹. Another was Oxfam's early withdrawal from the water programme, and questions over the technical and managerial suitability of the successor NGO - the Tanzanian Christian Refugee Service (TCRS)⁴². A commitment to handover management of the water programme to TCRS was made in June at a time when Oxfam felt its capacity in the region was being overstretched (due to unwillingness to become involved in the development of alternative sources), and TCRS was keen to become more involved in the Ngara operations. Despite no date being indicated, Oxfam pressed ahead with the handover and was unwilling to press for the development of alternative, more secure sources.
207. The sanitation situation in the camps in Ngara appears to be less well documented. UNHCR and IFRC encouraged the construction of communal pit latrines soon after the initial influx at the end of April. The nature of the soil type and the availability of the heavy equipment operated by the road construction company considerably helped these initial efforts. Subsequent efforts to move from communal to semi-

communal and finally family latrine units have been less successful. As of May 1995, the ratio was one latrine/10.3 people. From an early stage, efforts have been made to open new sites to enable the decongestion of Benaco. Though the new sites are of much lower density than Benaco, the population of Benaco has not been reduced as planned due to the steady influx of new refugees.

208. Water and sanitation programmes in the IDP camps in the Gikongoro area were late starting, and this fact alone was largely responsible for the high rates of dysentery experienced in these camps. The principal agencies involved in water and sanitation activities in the Gikongoro area were ICRC, MSF-France, AICF, UNICEF and Oxfam. However, factual information on their activities during the crucial July-September period is scanty, presumably in part because these agencies were having to establish offices from scratch in Gikongoro during this period. However other factors contributing to the lack of factual information appear to be the lack of a UN technical coordination capacity in the area⁴³ and the quality and experience of the initial agency personnel in the area⁴⁴. Attempts to 'reconstruct' the sequence of events and agency activities has proven difficult, in part because of the strength of feeling about agency personnel involved in the response. It appears that promises of actions were made which were either slow to materialise or were never actually fulfilled. That this situation existed and such feelings still persist reflects the failure of coordination in the sector and also that agency personnel allowed disagreements about responsibilities to overshadow their objectives. In September, Oxfam significantly scaled up its programme in the area, and at the end of the month UNICEF contracted PWSS to transfer their operations from Goma to Kibeho camp.
209. Information on soap distributions during the response is patchy. Many agencies undertook soap distributions though it is often unclear precisely when they took place, the coverage of the population achieved and the degree of coordination between agencies. Several interviewees indicated that soap distributions had often been late and the quantities inadequate.

Supportive Care

210. The early establishment of community outreach services to ensure earlier case finding and to undertake rehydration within the community can have a significant effect on the case fatality rate. Similarly the provision of therapeutic feeding and extra supplementary rations for children recovering from dysentery can significantly benefit their chances of recovery.
211. In Goma, the difficulties of establishing community outreach services in the weeks immediately following the influx were described above. Nevertheless, it does appear that more effort could have been put into the development of such services at an earlier stage, as one NGO (MSF-Holland in Katala Camp) organised community rehydration teams before the end of July. Interviews suggest that many NGOs involved in the operation of treatment centres were reluctant to complement these efforts with community outreach services, and UNHCR coordinators admit that they could have pushed such NGOs harder. In Ngara community outreach was seen as an early priority and proceeded very quickly. Within two weeks of the influx 70 HIT (Health Information Team)⁴⁵ had been identified by MSF-Holland from previous health training programmes in Rwanda, and by the end of the first week of June, there were 370 preparing ORS and disseminating public health information. In Bukavu the refugee population was well educated and contained a substantial part of the Rwandan health services, including the ex-Minister of health, 30 doctors and over 300 nurses. However, it appears that the choice of many of the better educated refugees to settle in Adi Kivu Camp and the initial lack of a UNHCR Health Coordinator contributed to the unequal deployment of these considerable personnel resources.
212. The establishment of therapeutic feeding programmes for children was hampered throughout the response in all locations by problems in the supply of commodities for use in such programmes, particularly blended foods and the unsuitability to children of the form in which cereals were provided for the General Ration. These problems are discussed in Chapter 5.

Antibiotic Treatment

213. *Shigella dysenteriae* type 1 (Sd1) displays degrees of resistance to traditional antibiotic treatments. Decisions on the appropriate treatment protocols therefore required resistance surveys to be undertaken to determine whether the traditional antibiotics would be sufficiently effective to justify their use or whether newer antibiotics would be more effective.
214. The first resistance surveys in Tanzania were not conducted until July when the outbreak in Benaco was well underway. These were conducted by MSF-Holland and the local Mwanza hospital. Despite showing significant levels of resistance to traditional antibiotic treatments such as cotrimoxazole and nalidixic acid, these treatments were utilised, in part it appears out of concern by the local authorities at the high cost of newer treatments such as ciprofloxacin⁴⁶. Subsequent resistance surveys showed the quick progression of resistance to the traditional treatments and the use of cotrimoxazole was abandoned but nalidixic acid treatment was continued despite its limited effectiveness.
215. In contrast in Goma the Bioforce laboratory which was supporting the French military involved in Opération Turquoise conducted the first resistance study in late July at the very beginning of the outbreak. The majority of the strains isolated were found to be resistant to both cotrimoxazole and nalidixic acid and alternative treatments were sought. This decision and the identification of a supply source for the costly ciprofloxacin was assisted by the presence in Goma at that time of international experts in the field of diarrhoeal disease. The US Army offered to donate substantial quantities of ciprofloxacin, nearing its expiry date, which was airlifted to Goma and used with considerable effect in the treatment of severe cases.
216. In Rwanda, resistance surveys were not undertaken until October. During the course of the outbreak in the IDP camps, nalidixic acid was the recommended treatment. In October, it became clear from the resistance surveys that the majority of strains were resistant not only to cotrimoxazole but also to nalidixic acid.
217. The variations in experience between the three contexts are revealing. In Tanzania and in Rwanda, the curative efforts to tackle the outbreak were severely hampered by the late undertaking of resistance surveys, lack of awareness of the alternative, more effective treatments potentially available, and concern at the cost of the alternative treatments. In Goma, with the fortuitous presence of a first rate medical laboratory and a much higher profile stemming from the cholera outbreak and the presence of the world's media, expensive, but highly effective, antibiotics were provided. In short, there were substantial inequities in the efficacy of the treatment and the amount effectively spent per dysentery patient between Goma and elsewhere in the region, and this was reflected in the higher case fatality rates experienced by in-patients in Tanzania and Rwanda than in Goma. Patients treated with ciprofloxacin had a risk of dying that was 8-times lower than those treated primarily with nalidixic acid.

4.7 Other Diseases

218. *Measles* outbreaks are common amongst displaced populations and can be responsible for high mortality rates in the absence of effective vaccination programmes. In Ngara there was a well coordinated, collaborative initial vaccination campaign. However, during July there was a breakdown in the vaccination of new arrivals for a period of 2-3 weeks and this resulted in an outbreak which peaked in late August and early September and resulted in several hundred deaths. In Goma there was a prompt and effective vaccination campaign which was well coordinated by UNHCR and which benefitted from good technical backup. The success of the initial campaign and the fact that there were no new population influxes meant that there were no major measles outbreaks in the Goma camps, though, towards the end of the year, limited outbreaks did occur.
219. The situation in the IDP camps in south-west Rwanda was much less satisfactory. UNICEF was unable to adequately fulfil its technical coordination mandate or supply drugs to the agencies in a position to carry out vaccinations until mid-September. Several NGOs did carry out vaccinations but the initial

coverage was poor partly due to the constant movement of the IDPs in and out of the camps and partly due to lack of experienced personnel. Outbreaks occurred, though information on their effects is limited. Subsequent campaigns organised by MSF-France and Merlin were more successful.

220. *Malaria*⁴⁷ was a major cause of morbidity in most of the refugee and IDP camps, accounting for between 22% and 52% of all cases of illness in Rwanda and the camps. Its effect on mortality is more difficult to ascertain due to the difficulty of actual diagnosis.
221. *Meningitis* outbreaks can occur amongst displaced populations and have been known to result in substantially increased mortality. Though major outbreaks were not experienced during 1994, the organisation of the meningitis campaigns again reflects considerably better coordination and effectiveness in the refugee camps, Goma in particular, than inside Rwanda. In south-west Rwanda, in UNICEF's effective absence, MSF-France assumed responsibility for meningitis surveillance in mid-August, but there were disagreements with the British military medical contingent as to the appropriate vaccination protocols and so two different protocols were used.
222. *Tuberculosis (TB)* was neither a major cause of morbidity or mortality yet the approach to its treatment by agencies reveals fundamental problems stemming from the length of time needed to treat the condition effectively and the difficult questions this generates for emergency programmes. There was considerable confusion over the guidelines for the treatment of TB following the revision of the WHO Guidelines in 1994, and inadequate technical backup to agencies provided by WHO. This led to substantial technical disagreements between agencies, particularly amongst those agencies operating from Kabale into RPF-controlled areas between May and August. Coordination was poor, with agencies starting TB programmes at different times and using different treatment protocols.

4.8 Programmes for Unaccompanied Minors

223. The killing of parents during the genocide and subsequent violence, the death of parents during the cholera and dysentery epidemics and the separation of children from their parents during the forced displacements resulted in a thousands of unaccompanied children requiring special programmes for their care. The numbers involved were unprecedented. In August, UNICEF estimated there to be 100,000 of which 50-70,000 were in Rwanda⁴⁸, 10,000 each in Ngara/Karagwe, Goma and Bukavu and 3,000 in Uganda.
224. There appear to have been significant differences between Goma and Ngara in the way the UAC problem was approached. In Ngara, the UAC programme commenced soon after the initial influx and placed a strong emphasis on non-institutionalisation. 350 'mobilisers' set up volunteer groups to identify families willing to look after children, and most children were rapidly placed in the care of such families. The fact that the community structures of the refugees were more or less intact greatly assisted this approach, as did the high degree of coordination and collaboration between the agencies involved in the initial response. Though broadly successful, the aversion to the creation of UAC centres appears to have created problems at the feeding centres, where as many as 10% of the selective feeding beneficiaries were UACs who could not be discharged from the programmes because they had nowhere to be discharged to. Towards the end of the year, the policy was modified and several UAC centres were established.
225. In Goma, the scale of the influx, the almost immediate cholera outbreak, the resultant confusion, the apparent disruption to the community structures and the sudden influx of NGOs led to a very different approach, and within three weeks from the start of the influx there were 21 UAC centres established. The extent to which these were planned is unclear. From an early stage, children either presented themselves, or were presented by adults who had been caring for them during their displacement in Rwanda, to the two existing Zairean orphanages and to agency offices. Several centres appear to have been set up spontaneously. Within a few days, UNICEF, in line with earlier agreements in New York about its responsibilities, assumed overall coordination of the care of UACs. The policy adopted was to establish UACs run by NGOs under UNICEF supervision. Information on the policy and the centres was disseminated within the camps and the number of UAC increased. At least 12 NGOs participated in the

programme - in marked contrast to the number of agencies prepared to work in sanitation and body burial activities.

226. The quality of care in some of the UACs were extremely poor, with rates of malnutrition that were considerably above those experienced in the camps⁴⁹ and crude mortality rates that, during the cholera outbreak, ranged varied widely from 20/10,000/day to over 100/ten thousand/day. These rates compare with rates of 31-40/ten thousands/day for children between 6 months to 5 years in Kibumba and Katale camps. Caring for large numbers of UACs was a new experience for many of the NGOs, and no guidelines were available for setting up such centres and monitoring their performance⁵⁰. Some of the NGOs responsible for the UACs performed very poorly. Inadequate oral and intravenous rehydration practices, inappropriate fluids, the use of breast milk substitutes of questionable appropriateness and inadequate levels of supervision and ratios of children to carers. UNICEF's ability to coordinate was overwhelmed and the agency appears slow to have deployed appropriate personnel, introduced standards and imposed its authority over some of the less competent NGOs. Once certain basics (such as keeping infants in nappies, providing intensive training for staff and having a paediatrician responsible for overall medical supervision) were put in place, mortality rates dropped dramatically. By late October the quality of care had improved dramatically and the rates of severe wasting and crude mortality had dropped to a level where they were below those of children in the camps. This in turn led to problems of parents viewing the UAC centres as preferable places for their children and children being presented to the centres falsely claiming to be orphaned or recently separated.

Notes on Chapter 4

1. Paquet, Christophe 'The 1994 Epidemic of Dysentery in the Displaced Populations of Central Africa'. Paper prepared for Study III, August 1995. Epicentre, Paris/ODI, London.
2. On the basis of the available data and realistic assumptions, it appears that the approximate number of dysentery deaths by geographical area were: Goma (25,000), Ngara-Karagwe (4,500), Bukavu (4,000) and Rwanda IDPs (19,500).
3. A retrospective survey in Mugunga Camp indicated 50% of all deaths during the first month were due to watery diarrhoea (associated with cholera), 38% to dysentery (bloody diarrhoea), 8% to trauma and 4% to other causes.
4. It is understood that UNICEF has a limited stock of small water bladders in Goma at the time of the influx.
5. Nick Stockton Oxfam interview, 27/07/95.
6. The experience of agencies providing water supply in the IDP camps in Rwandan IDPs prior to 1994 suggested that in the absence of showers and washing points 7-8 litres per person per day would satisfy water consumption demands. (Joe Comerford personal communication 22/7/95).
7. Oxfam Interview 27/07/95.
8. Assuming a total population of 800,000, these units were only capable of producing one-tenth of a litre/person/day. By 26 July, Oxfam was producing and distributing 600,000 litres which equates to three-quarters of a litre/person/day.
9. Portable Water Supply System Co. Ltd is a commercial US based company with links to the San Francisco Fire Department. The owner of the company had contacted the Governor of California impressing her with his assessment that a large capacity pump of the sort possessed by the company was needed to boost production from the Lake. The Governor in turn contacted President Clinton who instructed that the company be flown non-stop from California to Goma (requiring two inflight refuellings). The company's costs were met by the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA).
10. Joe Comerford, formerly UNHCR WatSan Coordinator, Goma (Interview April 1995).
11. It is not clear that all the water produced was effectively used. Anecdotal report indicate some was drained back into the lake.
12. MSF-Holland reported that having agreed a rate one morning they returned to the contractor the same afternoon to find that UNICEF had hired them at twice the rate.
13. Joe Comerford, UNHCR Watsan Coordinator personal communication.
14. UNHCR Goma. Evaluation of First Six Weeks of Goma operation: Water and Sanitation 25/09/95.
15. In July 1995, of the 15 tractor units donated by the US military as they left Goma, only 2 were in a serviceable condition. Non-availability of spare parts was cited as the main reason by the Crown Agents who now manage the fleet.
16. CDC report 14/8/94 and Les Roberts personal communication. The very poor ratio in Mugunga may reflect the reluctance of some of the larger more experienced NGOs to work in this camp on the grounds that it contained substantial elements of the RGF.
17. USAID Interview Washington DC 19/07/95.
18. This was an observation made by a number of interviewees from different agencies.
19. These attempts do not appear to have been as energetic as they ought to have been. COGEFAR was not approached for fear that it would divert capacity from Ngara and Sterling Astaldi were not approached as they were already being used by UNHCR in the layout of a refugee camp in Burundi.

20. Initially, the French Army undertook this role but suddenly withdrew, apparently when officers decided it was too difficult on their men. Subsequently, GOAL took over with two Irish soldiers on release to the agency organising the labour of Zairean Boy Scouts.
21. CDC report 14/8/94.
22. The hard volcanic rock made the digging of post-holes difficult. In Mugunga for instance the cholera centre was built on bare rock and until the 28 of August, ie after the peak of the cholera the perimeter fencing was quite inadequate. In Katale logistic/construction support to the agencies running cholera centres (*apparently from military contingents*) speeded up the process there. Many agencies hired guards to establish and protect cordons around the centres but their ability to prevent people who were not patients pushing through could not always be relied upon, particularly in the case of the militia and RGF personnel. Pilfering of water and IV fluids was common.
23. In the case of Mugunga camp, the proportion was 47%. CDC Mugunga Survey 31/8/94.
24. Hanan Kassir Head, International Centres, Operation Blessing (Telephone interview, July 1995)
25. Claire Bourgeois, UNHCR Medical Coordinator, Goma. (Interview July 1995). Interestingly perceptions of the agency's performance when it operated on its own differ from MSF-Holland personnel who worked with the agency in Katale camp for its first two weeks in Goma and felt the agency performed a useful role despite requiring close supervision and its work being constantly filmed by a TV crew from its parent organisation, Christian Broadcasting Corporation, in the USA.
26. Raymond Bonner 'Compassion Wasn't Enough in Rwanda' New York Times August 1994.
27. Manuela Rosper Programme Officer CARE-Deutschland (Interview July 1995).
28. In the words of Joël Boutrou, the Head of the UNHCR Sub-Delegation in Goma the agency 'came late... a lot of students giving the wrong drugs, creating resistance to disease and giving inadequate treatment. They were working in total isolation and created a lot of havoc'. Interview July 1994. UNHCR formally requested that their agency withdraw from the camps, a move which received substantial media coverage in Germany. Eventually, after discussions between UNHCR Geneva and the German Government and mediation by the German Ambassador in Kinshasa who deployed to Goma for August, it was eventually agreed that the agency could continue its work in Bukavu, which it did until the end of the year.
29. Goma Epidemiology Group 'Public health impact of Rwandan refugee crisis: What happened in Goma, Zaire, in July 1994?' *The Lancet* Vol 345 February 11 1995.
30. The possibility that the municipal water system itself was the source in limited parts of the town with functioning water collection points cannot be ruled out. In need of rehabilitation long before, the influx systems for cleaning and chlorinating the municipal water supply were unreliable. In the light of the positive role of the municipal water system in Bukavu in coping with the additional demands made of it during the July-September period by refugees in the town, it is interesting to speculate whether prior investment in the Goma system in the years before the influx would have enabled the system to cope better during the influx. This is highly speculative. The scale and speed of the influx in Goma was much greater than that in Bukavu and it is unlikely that even a rehabilitated system would have had a significant impact on the course of events.
31. CDC staff member observation.
32. As part of this study, a paper on dysentery epidemics in the displaced populations during 1994 was commissioned from Epicentre in Paris. This study drew on surveillance data collected by MSF agencies in the region, as well as CDC and UNHCR data.
33. *Shigella dysenteriae* type 1 is extremely easy to transmit. The commonest modes of transmission are via food contaminated by faeces from unwashed hands or flies. The organism produces a bloody diarrhoea that is frequently accompanied by severe life threatening systemic complications. Recovery from the disease is associated with variable and short term immunity to the same strain of shigella.


34. Data on the incidence of dysentery in Kibeho only starts on 9 October. Judging by the data on the crude mortality in the camp (which starts in early September) and the timing of the peak outbreak in other camps, it is probable that the incidence rates for dysentery in Kibeho would have been even higher, perhaps in excess of 50 cases/thousand/week in late August and early September.
35. From the account given of the differences in the course and severity of the outbreaks between neighbouring camps, this assumption is clearly not satisfactory. However, in view of the lack of data and the need to make an approximate estimate for the purposes of this study we regard the assumption as being acceptable.
36. Analysis of the relationship between water and sanitation indicators and diarrhoea (bloody and non-bloody) in Goma in November 1994 found the strongest relationship between bloody diarrhoea to be with litres of treated water delivered per day. Joe Comerford November 1994.
37. Eg. UNHCR Guidelines for the control of dysentery, Goma August 1994.
38. By that time, the total refugee population had fallen to around 650,000 as a result of repatriation during August and the high mortality rates during the cholera and dysentery outbreaks.
39. In July 1994, the estimated refugee population was 264,000 and water production was 3.2 million litres/day. In June 1995 the estimated population was 514,000 and water production was 3.5 million litres/day.
40. The issue of the planning horizon has affected other aspects of the water production problems. When asked by UNHCR in June 1994 in a draft letter of understanding to undertake hydrological and hydrogeological surveys and perform additional pump tests, UNICEF refused the components aimed at developing information on the viability of the groundwater resources on the grounds that the refugees would soon repatriate and that the existing boreholes would be sufficient for (reduced) future needs.
41. There appear to have been four successive individuals in this post between May and December 1994.
42. An example was the five month delay in equipping boreholes drilled in early 1995 which apparently stemmed from the use of standard rather than emergency procurement procedures.
43. Whilst UNREO had overall responsibility for coordination within Rwanda, UNICEF had responsibility for coordination in the water and sanitation sector. It appears that UNICEF did not open an office in the area until October. The lack of coordination was so apparent to the UK military medical unit that was redeployed to Gikongoro from Ruhengeri in August that they claim to have taken on an informal coordination responsibility. (Interview with Major Hawley 23 Field Parachute Regiment, June 1995).
44. Most of the agencies concerned were preoccupied with their response in Goma during late July and early August and their most capable staff were deployed there. During the course of interviews, several agencies admitted that they had had difficulty locating and placing adequately trained personnel in the south-west before September. CARE had no less than 5 coordinators for its operations in the south-west between July and the end of the year.
45. Group of refugees trained to provide health information and very basic diagnostic, curative and referral services.
46. Whilst treatment with traditional antibiotics costs, such as cotrimoxazole, an average of \$1 per patient the cost increases to \$35, if ciprofloxacin is used.
47. This term as used here includes the malaria-like condition *pyrexia* of unknown origin (POU).
48. Information on the initial programmes set up for UACs inside Rwanda is extremely patchy. The response to the needs of UACs in Rwanda from August onwards is being addressed by Study IV and so will not be covered here.
49. During August, anthropometric measurements were undertaken at two centres and repeated 11 days later in one. Children with oedema were not included so the results under-represented the actual situation. Nevertheless, 6.9% of children were severely wasted as against an average of 2.8% during August for children in the camps.
50. In late September, UNICEF organised a Task Force to prepare such guidelines.

Chapter 5 Assessment of Performance: Logistics, Food Supply and Feeding Programmes

5.1 Introduction

227. The fluidity of the Rwanda emergency, the long distances involved in transportation to the programme area from the nearest ports (700-1,000 miles), the lack of direct railway links to the ports as well as the difficult topography of Rwanda and eastern Zaire, all served to place enormous demands upon the logistical capacities and capabilities of the international community in ensuring an adequate and timely supply of food and non-food items (see Figure 14). The Team included two logisticians, one focusing on the airlift operations and the other on the overland transport of food items. The results of their assessments have been combined in this chapter with that prepared by the nutritionist as the nutritional status of the beneficiary population represents a valuable measure of the performance of the logistics systems in terms of the provision of food commodities.

Figure 14 Map of East Africa Showing Principal Overland Transport Routes Used During the Response



NB: Course of railways is approximate only.

5.2 Food Logistics: the regional perspective

228. Between April and the end of 1994, approximately 270,000 tonnes of food aid were dispatched to beneficiaries in Rwanda, Tanzania, Eastern Zaire and Burundi. This figure is approximate because information is not available on the importation and local purchases of the numerous NGOs involved in the response. However these amounts were limited and probably did not account for more than 3,000 tonnes in total. Figure 15 shows the total monthly deliveries to the principle locations and their relative significance within the overall operation.

Figure 15 Dispatches to Rwanda by Supply Source, April-December 1994




Figure 16 Dispatches to Goma (Zaire) by Supply Source, July-December 1994




Figure 17 **Dispatches to Bukavu (Zaire) by Supply Source, August -December 1994**




Figure 18 **Dispatches to Ngara (Tanzania) by Supply Source, April -December 1994**





Figure 19 Dispatches to Karagwe (Tanzania) by Supply Source, April-December 1994



229. Of total food aid deliveries 75% was provided by or channelled through WFP and 22% by the ICRC. The ICRC distributions were principally within Rwanda itself where WFP accounted for only 32% of the total despatches during the April-December period. Both agencies had a substantial involvement in the area prior to April 1994 (see Section 2.2) and so, had a logistical and management capacity which enabled them to respond more rapidly and effectively to the subsequent demands than if they had not had any prior involvement.
230. Most of the food aid distributed was imported into the region through either Mombasa or Dar es Salaam. WFP Kampala purchased 23,000 tonnes of maize and beans locally and from the information available ICRC appears to have purchased over 42,000 tonnes some locally, but mostly in the region. For WFP's imports Dar es Salaam was by far the most significant port of entry. Of the 233,000 tonnes of imported food despatched to distribution points during the April-December period Dar es Salaam accounted for 70% and Mombasa 30%. In 1994, Mombasa was used for imports destined for Rwanda and Eastern Zaire only between the months of June and October. The port has been used during 1995 for supplies to Kigali and Goma which are routed almost entirely through Kampala.
231. WFP's heavy utilisation of Dar es Salaam reflected a number of factors. Prior to April 1994 all food aid for WFP programmes in Burundi and Tanzania and much of the food used in the IDP and refugee programmes in Rwanda¹ entered via Dar es Salaam. Prior to the introduction of the new port-rail arrangements in July 1994, imports destined for Burundi and the Burundian refugees in Tanzania and Uvira in eastern Zaire were transported by road using commercial truckers across Tanzania and entering Burundi at Kobero. With the increased requirements in Burundi (principally, as a result of the Rwandan refugees entering Burundi), this slow and not always reliable route was complemented in June by an airlift of 1,600 tonnes of commodities from Dar es Salaam to Bujumbura using US Air Force planes. With the first outpouring of refugees from Rwanda occurring into Tanzania, it was logical to expand the Tanzanian or 'southern' corridor.
232. In May 1994, following the dramatic expansion of the refugee caseload in Ngara, Karagwe and northern Burundi WFP initiated discussions with the Tanzanian Harbour Authorities and Tanzanian Railway Corporation to encourage a more integrated and effective approach to the management of the port-rail operations. The authorities were encouraged to regard WFP's 'business' as an opportunity for

invigorating the route. Not only did this dramatically increase WFP's capacity to supply its rapidly expanding programmes in western Tanzania, Burundi and South Kivu, but it also enabled WFP to obtain cheaper rates than available on the Mombasa-Kampala route (see Section 5.8). With the switch to rail in July, imports destined for Burundi and, eastern Zaire (the Bukavu influx adding substantially to the Uvira caseload) were routed either to Isaka where they were transferred to commercial trucks for transporting to northern Burundi and Bujumbura by road or by rail the entire distance from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika and then transferred by barge to Bujumbura and then by road to programmes in Burundi, southern Rwanda, and eastern Zaire. During the 6 months from July to the end of the year, over 105,585 tonnes was moved by rail along the southern corridor to Isaka (for Ngara/Karagwe) and Kigoma.

233. WFP's cross-border operations into northern Rwanda were supplied and managed by WFP-Kampala, using a sub-office at Kabale. With the Goma influx in mid-July, WFP Kampala's role in the Rwanda operation increased dramatically. Initially using borrowings from other programmes in Uganda and south Sudan, WFP operated an airlift from Entebbe to Goma for 6 days and, in a spectacular effort by personnel from the Uganda office and from WFP HQ in Rome, sent two convoys to Goma by pioneering the difficult route from Kabale to Rutshuru, thereby freeing-up the very constrained capacity at Goma airport to other incoming cargoes. By the end of July the Kabale, Kigali, Gisenyi route to Goma had been re-established and this served as the principal overland supply route from August 1994 until March 1995 when the new Government closed the border to food aid destined for the refugees in Eastern Zaire. Since then all of Goma's food supplies have been routed along the Kabale-Rutshuru route, the condition of which prevents the passage of truck-trailer combinations.
234. WFP's heavy utilisation of the southern corridor contrasted with ICRC's pattern of food imports which relied heavily on Mombasa throughout the response. Of the 52,740 tonnes of food commodities imported to the region by ICRC, 95% entered at Mombasa and only 5% through Dar es Salaam. Whilst this reflected traditional import routes used by the ICRC and the location of the regional delegation office in Nairobi and the focus of ICRC regional airlift operations on Nairobi International Airport, it is reasonable to ask whether ICRC could not have taken advantage of the lower rates available on the southern corridor after June.

5.3 Food Logistics: Performance In Relation To Needs

235. General ration distribution systems were established very quickly after the initial influxes in the refugee camps in Ngara/Karagwe, Goma and Bukavu. Given the rapidity and scale of the influxes and the difficult logistics involved, this represents a considerable achievement. However, maintaining the regularity of supply has proved difficult in all areas.
236. In Ngara the initial distributions were made by borrowing commodities from ICRC food stocks held near Benaco. These stocks were being built up by the ICRC in anticipation of mounting cross-border operations from Tanzania into Rwanda. In the first week of May, WFP began drawing from the Government's Strategic Grain Reserve at Shinyanga, and over the next 6 months drew a total of 10,350 tonnes of maize which were subsequently replenished by WFP. Beans were provided by borrowing from a WFP programme in Tanga. Though such arrangements enabled rations to almost reach the minimum calorific requirements by the third week², WFP's food supply operation remained fragile in that it was unable to build up adequate working stocks at the Extended Delivery Points (EDPs). As a result it was not until the end of May, (ie. week 5 after the influx) that sufficient stocks existed in Ngara to enable a shift from a three-day to a weekly distribution cycle. During the first few weeks, the factors contributing to WFP's difficulties included: a lack of commercial trucking capacity in the area; a steady growth in the caseload after the initial influx which meant that there was little opportunity for consolidation³; and the heavy rains during the first few weeks which delayed trucks carrying maize from the SGR depot in Shinyanga which for part of the way involved untarred roads. Initially, WFP's system for tracking trucks which had been despatched was inadequate and this, combined with the low stock levels and the general uncertainty about the pipeline, meant that their Ngara sub-office was unable to provide UNHCR and the NGOs undertaking general ration distributions in the camps (CARE, IFRC and Concern) with adequate

information on when supplies would arrive, and when they should plan to introduce a weekly distribution cycle. This was perceived as a lack of transparency and led to tension between the two agencies, and in August to UNHCR supporting NGOs in commencing a blanket supplementary feeding programme (see Section 5.6).

237. Such problems may have changed over time, but they did not go away, and the operation has continued to be what is effectively a 'ship-to-mouth' operation. Nevertheless, apart from October and November when rations were significantly reduced, food supplies to the camps remained generally adequate throughout 1994. The continual growth of the caseload in Ngara and Karagwe has been a particular source of difficulty. The variable performance of the Tanzanian Railways Corporation was also a problem, as was the need for WFP to respond to the pressing needs in South Kivu which resulted in diversions or borrowings from the Tanzanian programme. Frustration at these continuing problems led the UNHCR Sub-Office to make an ill-judged attempt in October to by-pass WFP and obtain food donations directly from representatives of a major donor. Though the precise details of this episode are unclear, and also involved the representative of another donor attached to UNHCR, it was both regrettable and revealing of the inherent tensions that exist between different members of the UN system.
238. In Bukavu, general rations were not distributed to the refugees in the town, partly out of fear of encouraging permanent settlement, though in August an on-site feeding programme was set up at several sites with WFP support. The high levels of malnutrition found in Bukavu town in August probably reflects the absence of a general ration and delays in establishing new camp sites for this population. Instead, efforts were concentrated on setting up new camps, and ensuring the supply of general ration commodities. This WFP was able to do quite rapidly and just as impressively was also able to maintain near full rations throughout 1994. The two routes through Tanzania and Burundi were initially used, being complemented by the airlift of 1,480 tonnes of food by the New Zealand and German Airforces and commercial charter flights operating principally out of Kampala. From late August, trucks operating out of Kampala were able to take the Kigali-Cyangugu route to Bukavu and this became the principal route until the border closure of April 1995.
239. In Goma, initial distributions after the influx were made using ICRC food stockpiled in preparation for planned cross-border operations into RGF areas (see Section 6.3). Thereafter, WFP and UNHCR's initial plan was to provide 200 grammes of high energy biscuits and 200 grammes of CSB as a temporary ration until a proper general ration could be established - this was achieved after 15 days, using the pioneered overland route from Kabale via Rutshuru, and from August the tarred route via Kigali and Gisenyi. In the confusion of the first few weeks, the high level of insecurity and poor camp layout resulting from the lack of heavy equipment saw considerable variations in mean energy intakes between camps and over time, with apparent fluctuations between 900 and 1,700 kcals. During September however, the general ration stabilised considerably at around the 1,600 to 1,800 kcal level with adequate supplies of cereal and oil, but beans were generally in short supply with the shortages intensifying in November resulting in disturbances during distributions in some camps. Rations were theoretically sufficient for the first 7 weeks of 1995, but thereafter fell sharply as WFP experienced pipeline shortfalls, and convoys passing through Rwanda were subjected to considerable delays at the border crossing. During March and April mean intakes were only around 1,000 kcal, though some improvement occurred during May.
240. For the refugee camps therefore, the overall picture is generally impressive in terms of responding to the initial influxes, and supplies were maintained during 1994 at satisfactory levels, though with problems in the supply of particular commodities and some fluctuation occurring in the size of the general ration. As will be seen in Section 5.5, one of the principle causes of malnutrition in many camps was not the overall levels of supply to the camps by WFP, but rather the inequitable systems of distribution within the camps.
241. Within Rwanda, the picture is inevitably more complicated than in the refugee camps as a result of the insecurity, sporadic access, involvement of ICRC as well as WFP in the supply of general ration commodities, the short duration of the population displacements in the north and south-east, lack of reliable data capable of demonstrating deliveries in relation to need, and the greater role of ICRC than

WFP during the emergency phase.

242. Both WFP and the ICRC provided food for distribution among the displaced and war affected populations in the RPF-held areas. In WFP's case this amounted to approximately 3,000 tonnes of commodities delivered from Uganda to NGOs working in the displaced camps between May and July 1994, whilst in the ICRC's case the tonnage distributed directly to the camps and rural populations was 1,700 tonnes. Initially ICRC rations were set at fixed level for all areas and types of beneficiary group (1,300 kcal), but after an assessment in June by ICRC (nutritionist and agronomist), differential rations were introduced, the size depending on the estimate of food sources available locally and the level of need as estimated by ICRC personnel.
243. The RPF discouraged quantitative surveys being undertaken in the areas they controlled, and consequently no nutrition surveys were undertaken in the area between April and July. Even in the absence of such surveys most accounts suggest that there were not serious nutritional problems in the RPF-controlled Zone, with the possible exception of the area around Butare which traditionally has higher levels of malnutrition. Whilst this situation may be attributed in part to the food distributions by the ICRC and WFP/NGOs in the area, probably of greater significance were the locally available food sources, notably the standing crops which were ready to be harvested around the June-August period and were apparently substantially up on the production of previous years. Also the much reduced population in the northern and eastern areas of the country will have substantially increased the per capita availability of local food sources. After the installation of the new Government, food distributions by WFP and the ICRC continued in many areas. However, efforts were concentrated on agricultural rehabilitation activities and, in the absence of unusually high rates of malnutrition, widespread general ration distributions were soon phased out.
244. The picture in relation to the IDP camps in the southwest however was less satisfactory. Both WFP and ICRC were comparatively late in starting general ration distributions in the camps for which they had taken responsibility. Most of these camps had begun forming in June and grown substantially during July, but it was not until August that WFP agency was able to provide sufficient food in Gikongoro for its implementing partner agencies to commence distributions in the camps to the north of Gikongoro. Delays in transferring WFP trucks (by sea and land) from Ethiopia to Bujumbura and in identifying suitable NGOs to organise the distributions within the camps appear to have been responsible for the delays. Using supplies trucked from Uganda, ICRC was able to commence distributions to its camps south of Gikongoro in July, but the tonnages involved were limited (695 tonnes) and it was not until the following month, when 4,100 tonnes were distributed, that it was able to provide an adequate general ration. High rates of malnutrition were recorded in the two camps where surveys were undertaken in August, and both of these were WFP's responsibility.
245. Early in 1995, the performance of the food 'pipeline' to the region worsened⁴. Trucks in transit to Goma and Bukavu through Rwanda were subjected to severe delays as the Rwandan authorities carried out rigorous searches for arms that might reach the refugee camps, and specific crossing points were closed for several days at a time following insecurity in the area. In early April, matters escalated and the Rwandan authorities closed the border with Zaire to all transit food aid traffic. Equally significant however were the shortfalls and delays in food aid donations to WFP by the donor community, so that supplies to Ngara and Karagwe, (which were unaffected by the position of the Rwandan authorities regarding transit traffic,) were also substantially reduced. The combined effect of these two factors forced severe reductions (in some cases of up to 50%) for periods of several weeks in the general ration in the refugee camps.
246. Yet, in spite of this ration reduction, the nutritional status of the refugees remained excellent, largely, it appears, as a result of the refugees having developed alternative means of food procurement, such as working on farms in the area⁵ or cutting and selling wood. In many cases, such 'coping strategies' involve considerable exertion and potential risk to the refugees. For instance, many women were having to leave the camps well before dawn in order to walk tens of kilometres to farms providing employment and were not returning until after nightfall. Without wishing to belittle the additional stresses placed on

the refugees during this period of unplanned rations reductions, the experience does suggest that if full rations had been delivered, part of the ration might have been surplus to requirements for many households. This in turn indicates a need to assess whether existing mechanisms for estimating ration needs are sufficiently sensitive and flexible to respond to the requirements of refugee populations as and when these change.

5.4 Appropriateness of the Rations

247. The traditional diet of Rwandans, though with considerable regional variation, consists of sweet potato, beans, taro (plantain), cassava, groundnuts, sorghum (for young children) and with fish and meats occasionally eaten as condiments. Such diets are potentially deficient in fats and certain micro-nutrients and conditions such as goitre (due to iodine deficiency and consumption of goitrogenic foods), vitamin A deficiency (related to low fat intakes), and high rates of anaemia are endemic in Rwanda.
248. The WFP general ration for refugees in Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi consisted of: 420 gms of maize grain or 350 gms of maize meal, 120 gms of pulses, 25 gms of vegetable oil, 50 gms of CSB and 5 gms of salt. This provided 2,045 kcs. The same ration, but excluding CSB, was planned for IDPs in Rwanda. The ICRC ration for IDPs in Rwanda consisted of varying amounts of maize flour and maize grain, pulses and oil depending on assessments of vulnerability carried out on at least three occasions during 1994.
249. Throughout the emergency, reports indicated that beneficiaries had certain difficulties with the preparation, and in some cases acceptability of these commodities. Maize grain in particular was singled out as a problematic commodity. During the response to IDPs in Rwanda in the 1992-4 period, both WFP and ICRC found that maize grain had very low acceptability among the beneficiaries who were unfamiliar with maize grain, though found maize flour acceptable because of its similarity to cassava flour. WFP tried to take this into account in designing its response to the Burundian refugees in late 1993 and again also in setting the ration for use in its response during 1994. Cereals were to be provided as sorghum, maize flour or rice. However, the agency was unable to provide these commodities all the time and often had to resort to maize grain, particularly in the case of the refugee camps in Tanzania (see Figure 20). The problem was particularly acute in Tanzania where the Tanzanian Strategic Grain Reserve at Shingyanga and local purchases accounted for the bulk of maize distributions in 1994.

Figure 20 Cereal Distributions to Refugees in Zaire and Tanzania From Date of Influx to End 1994

	Maize grain	Maize flour	Sorghum	Rice
Goma	6,531 (21%)	24,141 (79%)	0	0
Bukavu	2,449 (19%)	10,039 (79%)	0	191 (2%)
Ngara	24,480 (83%)	4,999 (17%)	0	0
Karagwe	7,987 (71%)	3,333 (29%)	0	0

Source: WFP distribution records

250. Faced with a commodity that they found unacceptable, many recipients made the maize grain palatable by cooking it for extended periods ranging of several hours, or they traded it for preferred commodities - often for fresh staple foods like cassava. The additional cooking time of maize grain has had significant environmental implications as it led to the utilisation of substantially more fuelwood than if it had been provided as flour⁶. Anecdotal reports from Ngara describe substantial trading of maize rations in markets in the camps, and some even suggest that trucks delivering rations to the camps left carrying maize grain which had been sold by the refugees and the maize grain would be sold in local Tanzanian markets where whole grain white maize was a traditional staple. However, the terms of trade between the commodities in markets in Ngara meant that refugees selling maize grain in order to purchase say cassava would lose a lot of food energy as a result of terms of trade ranging from 4.3:1 to 8.8:1. Even if it is argued that

inflated beneficiary numbers in the camps compensated for the loss in energy, the provision of a commodity which was unacceptable to many recipients represents a substantial inefficiency on the part of WFP and its donors.

251. Efforts were made by both WFP and ICRC to obtain maize flour by encouraging their donors to provide the preferred commodity or through regional purchasing operations in Uganda and South Africa. The ICRC, with greater flexibility in the use of its resources, appears from interviews with personnel⁷ to have been more successful in these efforts than WFP, which was obliged to accept maize in whole grain form from donors who it appears were unwilling to provide funds to cover milling costs. The fact that there was no multi-donor/WFP/UNHCR Food Aid Needs Assessment in the region during 1994 may have been significant, as the findings and high profile of such a technical assessment may have given greater encouragement to donors to provide food in a more appropriate form.
252. With the support of the UK ODA, WFP attempted to address the maize grain problem in Tanzania grain by purchasing and airfreighting four mills to the region August 1994. For reasons which are unclear the mills have remained unused in a warehouse in Isaka. Apparently, WFP was unable to obtain sufficient funding to cover the operating costs of the mills, though ODA officials appeared unaware of this problem when interviewed.
253. Beans form a traditional part of the diet of Rwandans and the unusually large quantity of beans provided in the general ration (120 gms per capita) reflected WFP's attempts to cater for local consumption patterns and preferences. Agency reports on items appearing in markets in the camps indicate that beans were rarely sold by beneficiaries. However, the varieties distributed took longer to cook than traditional Rwandan varieties and therefore required lengthy soaking. However the soaking of beans is not a traditional practice in Rwanda, and refugees claimed that it diminished the taste. Thus, cooking time was lengthy⁸ and in areas where fuelwood was scarce this seriously added to environmental problems. Though it was UNHCR's responsibility to advise beneficiaries on optimal preparation and cooking practices for different bean varieties under the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between WFP and UNHCR, it appears that the efforts made to advise beneficiaries were very limited.

5.5 Appropriateness and Effectiveness of Food Distribution Systems within the Camps

254. Whilst information on mean intake indicates a more or less satisfactory picture during 1994, food basket monitoring ie. measuring what refugees actually received from the regular distributions, indicates that distributions within the camps were often highly inequitable, with some groups receiving general rations that were quite inadequate. For example, a mid-October survey in Kibumba found that 40% of households received less than 2,000 kcals/capita, whilst 13% received more than 10,000 kcals/capita. A review of surveys undertaken in the four main camps found that the percentage of families receiving less than 1,000 kcals/capita was 32% in Kahindo, 29% in Kibumba, 9% in Katale and 19% in Mugunga. Such inequities were often reflected in high rates of malnutrition in certain camps and for certain groups⁹.
255. In Benaco camp in Ngara and in all the camps in Goma, food distributions were initially organised on a commune basis with commune heads preparing lists and assisting in the distribution itself. This was the same type of distribution system as that utilised in the IDP camps in Rwanda between 1990-93, but one found to be open to abuse by commune leaders and inequitable. The great advantage of this system was that the distributions could start almost immediately and it required fewer agency personnel than a system distributing on a sector, cellule or head of household basis. The principal disadvantages were that in large camps distributions were often lengthy and chaotic and above all that they were more open to abuse by the commune leaders who were placed in a position of being able to influence the size of ration received by particular groups and potentially also to divert a proportion of the food for their own use, if necessary for raising funds. Given the context which produced the refugee exodus (at least in the case of Goma and Bukavu), ie. the call for Hutus to 'leave the country and continue the struggle from across the border'; the role of the militia in instigating and spreading the genocide; and the involvement in the militia of many Commune and Prefecture leaders, the use of commune leaders was politically charged and potentially beneficial to the militia and those who had been involved in the genocide.

Figure 21 Levels and Ranges of Malnutrition* Recorded in Nutritional Surveys Conducted during 1994 and Early 1995 in Refugee and IDP Camps

	Zone Turquoise	Ngara	Karagwe**	Goma	Bukavu***	Uvira
May		7.1%	2.6%			
June			4.5%			
July						
August	15-17%	8.8- 12.7%	10.9%	17-23%	1.8%	0-7%
September						
October				6.3-17%	11.8%	
November		2%	2%		0.4%	
December	11.9%	4%	4%	2.4- 8.3%	4.3%	
January				2.5-5%		
February						
March						

*Levels of malnutrition are based upon the percentage of children under five years of age who are less than 2 standard deviations below the median weight-for-height.
**These results do not include Chyabalisa camp which showed very high levels of wasting throughout 1994 ranging from 11.4% in June to 22.5% in September.
***These results do not include a survey in Bukavu town in August which found 15% levels of malnutrition and a survey in Kabira camp which found 20.8% of children under five to be malnourished.

256. The initial experience in Ngara and Goma contrasts with that in Bukavu and the WFP-supplied IDP camps in Zone Turquoise where from the outset food distributions in the majority of camps were organised, either at a cellule level or head of household level. According to the head of the WFP RRT, this was a deliberate policy to limit the ability of the commune leaders to abuse the distributions¹⁰.
257. Because of the scale and rapidity of the influxes in both Ngara and Goma, it is unreasonable to have expected agencies to have utilised distribution systems at a lower level of social organisation than the commune level. The Bukavu experience, in which the town effectively served as a holding camp whilst the agencies prepared for the movement of the refugees out to newly established, smaller sized camps, was qualitatively different from that in Benaco and Goma. Nevertheless, it is valid to ask how quickly agencies were able to move to distribution systems that were more equitable and less open to abuse by those whose positions ought, if anything, to have been explicitly weakened.
258. In Ngara, the transition to lower level systems was initially hampered by the persistence of the three day distribution cycle which meant that agency personnel had little time for planning or lee-way for implementing the introduction of new systems. However, once the registration exercise had been carried out in July, (some 10 weeks after the initial influx cf. approximately 30 weeks in the case of Goma and Bukavu,) agencies were able to move quickly to household systems based on ration cards. Nevertheless commune leaders remained involved in the distributions and were often employed in that capacity by agencies.

259. In Goma, the process of introducing 'lower level' distribution systems took place at different times depending on the agency and the camp. For instance in Kahindo camp where IFRC managed the food distributions, a cellule-level system was introduced as early as September/October, whilst in Katale as late as April 1995 some of the distributions in Katale camp were still carrying out the distributions on a commune level¹¹. The poor security situation, lack of vehicle access to the camps and limited personnel capacity and experience within some agencies certainly hampered the introduction of lower level systems. For instance in late August, once the cholera epidemic was under control the UNHCR coordinator proposed a self-policing distribution system which had been implemented in Eastern Ethiopia and elsewhere¹³. However the system was not introduced, principally because it was realised that inadequate vehicle access to the camps made it difficult to establish the required number of distribution points. The registration exercise planned for October, which would have greatly facilitated the introduction of household-level distribution systems, was cancelled for security reasons. Some agencies have argued that UNHCR could have done more to organise another registration, perhaps even using the October meningitis vaccination campaign as the opportunity as it involved the inoculation of all people from 0-35 years.
260. The general ration programmes in the IDP camps in the southwest of Rwanda were also negatively affected by problems with types of distribution system used. The ICRC were distributing food to eight camps south of Gikongoro with an estimated population of 260,000. The agency encountered considerable difficulties in ascertaining the populations of each camp, and their distribution system relied upon distribution to commune heads, rather than the heads of household system used by the NGOs distributing WFP supplied food in the four camps to the north of Gikongoro. Why the hard learnt lessons of the Rwandan Red Cross and ICRC delegates managing food distributions in the IDP camps in Rwanda during the 1990-94 period were not transferred to those involved in managing food distributions is due to staff turnover and lack of experience. The high level of wasting (17.5%) found by MSF in a survey in the largest ICRC camp in August was thought to be in large part a reflection of the inequitable distribution system. Various early attempts to improve the distribution system in Kibeho failed, and it was October before the situation was brought under control.

5.6 Selective Feeding Programmes

261. Selective feeding programmes consist of supplementary feeding programmes and therapeutic feeding programmes¹⁴. Such programmes were established in most refugee and IDP camps during the response. In the refugee camps they were undertaken by NGOs and the IFRC, using commodities supplied by UNHCR, UNICEF and the agencies own procurement systems, whilst in the IDP camps the ICRC ran its own selective feeding programmes, whilst those implemented by NGOs used commodities provided by UNICEF and their own procurement systems. The decision to implement such programmes is generally taken by the implementing agency though in the refugee camps the agreement of UNHCR Coordinators is required, particularly if UNHCR is being requested to contribute funding and commodities to the programmes. However, in two cases UNHCR itself encouraged the introduction of unusual blanket supplementary feeding programmes. Because of the lack of centralised control, monitoring, and resourcing of such programmes, accurate information was not readily available on the scale of resources allocated to such interventions.
262. A review of experience with these programmes inside Rwanda and in the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania reveals a number of issues.
263. Inside Rwanda, no single agency had responsibility for coordinating the supplementary feeding activities of NGOs and the ICRC, and consequently it appears that some camps were not properly covered¹⁵. In addition, there was no standardisation of programme monitoring, which made it difficult to compare programme performance between different camps. Furthermore, as nutritional and food basket monitoring surveys were poorly coordinated, their implementation was largely ad hoc. In some camps this led to late implementation with consequent delays in identifying the need for selective feeding programmes.

264. In Ngara, following an initial suggestion by MSF, UNHCR encouraged the establishment of a blanket supplementary feeding programme for all children under five years. UNHCR's enthusiasm for such a programme appears to have been influenced by the fragility of WFP's general ration supply system and also WFP's apparent unwillingness to share pipeline information with local UNHCR officials. A blanket supplementary feeding programme commenced in August¹⁶ and was due to run for a three month period. However, it was ended in October for a variety of reasons, including the cost in terms of personnel time and resources, and its inability to cover new arrivals whose nutritional status was often worse than established refugees. During its implementation there were no major breaks in the general ration distributions. As an intervention it was of questionable necessity and thus not cost-effective¹⁷.
265. In Goma, UNHCR, again following an initial suggestion by MSF, proposed the establishment of a blanket supplementary feeding programme in August. However it was never implemented due to a lack of agreement among the NGOs which would be responsible for much of its implementation. Many of these NGOs felt that attention should be focused on addressing the problems of inequitable distribution of the general ration programme, and that for its part HCR should concentrate on carrying out the vital registration exercise. In Bukavu, a blanket SFP was established early on in the response, even though the general ration supplies were adequate, and nutritional status information indicated that there was no need for a curative supplementary feeding programme. However, in a short period of time, unnecessary curative supplementary feeding programmes were established by a variety of NGOs reflecting limited control of NGO activities.
266. The effectiveness of selective feeding programmes in the region was variable and at times unimpressive. In Ngara for instance, many such programmes experienced unusually high mortality rates which were apparently attributable to marked overcrowding, poorly trained staff, a shigellosis outbreak and food shortages. In the same camps coverage of curative supplementary feeding programmes was extremely poor.

5.7 Assessment of the Airlift Operations

267. Air transport was used extensively throughout the period after April 1994 and particularly during the period from mid-July to the end of September when a massive airlift operation was operated into Goma, Kigali and to a lesser extent Bukavu.
268. Assessment of the airlift operation was hampered by the variable quality and availability of information. Information on the air transport operations between April and mid-July is particularly patchy as no single agency was responsible for coordinating the operations or even for recording the number of flights or the loads carried. This period includes the airlift operations to Mwanza in response to the refugee influx into Ngara and Karagwe Districts as well as the operation of the Canadian AirForce Hercules into Kigali and a one-off operation by the US Air Force transporting WFP food commodities from Dar es Salaam to Bujumbura. From 20 July until 30 September the UNHCR Air Operations Cell was responsible for coordination of the airlift and for this period there is substantially more information available, though even this appears to have important gaps¹⁸. Because of the data problems encountered, only the period covered by the UNHCR Air Operations Cell was examined in detail.
269. UNHCR records indicate that some 14,500 tonnes of supplies and equipment and hundreds of passengers¹⁹ were transported on a total of 3,007 flights during the ten week period covered by the Air Operation Cell in its coordination role. Goma accounted for 79% of the tonnage of supplies and equipment carried. This total figure for the number of flights is substantially greater than the 1,627 cargo flights to Goma, Kigali and Bukavu indicated in Figure 10 in Chapter 3 - the difference being accounted for by the long distance flights into the regional hubs such as Entebbe for transshipment onto smaller aircraft and by the use of light passenger aircraft to fly agency personnel and media teams to the various locations. At least 17 countries contributed air transport capacity of either a military or commercial nature and in addition the EU utilised the Nairobi-based ECHO Flight. Sixteen NGOs chartered their own flights and the Lutheran World Federation provided 157 Hercules flights free of charge to the ICRC and NGOs using aircraft based in Nairobi which had been supplying food to southern Sudan and Somalia.

Among the UN agencies UNHCR, WFP and UNICEF undertake their own air transport operations using commercial charters and/or military aircraft.

270. UNHCR staff involved in the contingency planning efforts had banked on the airport at Goma providing a critical lifeline in the event of a major influx (see Section 6.2) and this was indeed the case. However, nothing was done in advance of the influx to increase the capacity of Goma airport to handle a sudden increase in cargoes²⁰ and consequently the first weeks of the airlift were chaotic and inefficient. Security, the lack of ground handling equipment, coordination and lack of information on incoming flights were particular problems in the Goma case.
271. Due to lack of maintenance the airport perimeter fence was ineffective and streams of refugees crossed the airport moving from the centre of Gisenyi into Goma town centre. Many settled temporarily on the land beside the runway. The lack of storage capacity at the airport and transport to move the offloaded cargoes to stores in the town or to agency stores nearer the refugee camps resulted in supplies being stacked in the open on the airport apron during the in the initial weeks of the operation. It appears that two to three weeks elapsed before a secure perimeter was established using razor wire and during that time supplies were pilfered. Because of the inadequate manifests of flights arriving in the first days of the operation, it was not possible to establish the volume or significance of the supplies involved, though anecdotal evidence indicates that vaccine were lost.
272. The small size of the apron at Goma airport limited the number of aircraft which could be on the ground at any one time to just two or three. The turn-round time for aircraft was therefore a critical bottleneck to the number of flights which could handled. Apart from US Air Force aircraft which usually brought their own unloading equipment (fork lift trucks, etc.) many incoming flights, particularly those without ramp access were dependent on the equipment at the airport which during the initial stages was quite inadequate²¹.
273. Because of the number of aircraft trying to deliver cargoes to Goma and the intense pressure on the ground handling capacity, the problem of lack of advance information on incoming cargoes was a particular problem in Goma. However lack of advance information was a common complaint in relation to Bukavu, Entebbe and Kigali as well. In Bukavu, for instance, the airport is 20 kilometres from the town and those responsible for managing the incoming cargoes had difficulty in arranging for adequate truck and personnel to be present when the aircraft arrived as they were uncertain of the time of arrival, details of the cargo and the intended recipient agency. When combined with the inadequate handling equipment at Bukavu, the lack of advance information resulted in turn around times for C-130 aircraft of up to two hours which should have taken only 15-20 minutes. In Goma, there were reportedly several cases of 'unannounced' flights arriving above the airport, but which could not be fitted in to the landing and unloading 'slot' schedules and after hours of circling the aircraft then had to fly back either to their originating airport or to one in the region. Whilst some of these 'unannounced' flights may have been the result of lack of advance information, it is also possible that some resulted from 'rogue' behaviour by agencies with non-priority cargoes which were not prepared to wait several days until the Air Operations Cell could allocate them a 'slot'.
274. To a certain extent, the lack of advance information on incoming flights stemmed from communications problems between the various locations involved in managing the operation. For instance, many of the flights to Goma, Bukavu and Kigali originated from the Airhead in Entebbe. For reasons which are not entirely clear, it was not until the end of August that the UNHCR office in Entebbe received the Pactore equipment necessary to communicate reliably with the Goma, Bukavu and Kigali²². The inadequate communications in Entebbe also hampered the operation of the Airhead in receiving advance information on 'strategic' flights arriving from North America and Europe.
275. An important factor contributing to the lack of advance information on incoming flights was the lack of standardisation in the terminology used by despatching agencies to describe cargoes and vague or incomplete manifests. This severely hampered the efficient unloading of the cargos and their onward despatch to agencies working in the vicinity. In addition, it appears that some agencies may have

deliberately misrepresented the cargoes being despatched in order to ensure that their flights were accorded priority by the Air Operations Cell²³.

276. The problems of lack of standardisation and inadequate information provided by despatching agencies have been a persistent feature of most large-scale humanitarian airlift operations²⁴. Whilst the rapid establishment of operations involving numerous agencies from around the world is bound to be problematic, the fact that such problems persist after so many years is a reflection of the lack of investment in the necessary capacities and systems required to undertake such operation at short notice. Significant improvement could be obtained by measures such as the preparation of standard manuals for use by agencies participating in large humanitarian airlifts, the preparation of the necessary forms in relevant languages, the preparation of kits of equipment (computers, software, printers, forms, communications equipment) and mechanisms to ensure adherence to the agreed procedures.
277. UNHCR played a central role in the management of the airlift operation. The Air Operations Cell, which had been established in UNHCR in 1992 to coordinate the Sarajevo Airlift, was tasked with coordinating the airlift operations in and around Rwanda from midnight on 20 July. As part of the strategy adopted, a forward Airhead was established by UNHCR at Entebbe a few days later. UNHCR Entebbe began scheduling and controlling flights from Entebbe on 30 July using aircraft resources put at the agency's disposal by the US Air Force, the Royal New Zealand Air Force and the UK ODA charters. In Nairobi UNHCR staff became involved in the airlift operations by virtue of the decision by the German Air Force and later the Japanese Self Defence Forces to base their aircraft in Nairobi rather than Entebbe or Kigali and the availability of commodities in Nairobi that were not available in Kampala/Entebbe.
278. The central management role of UNHCR in the airlift operations was commented on negatively by several interviewees during the course of the study with some complaining that UNHCR had given priority to UNHCR cargoes and that UNHCR had treated the airlift as a UNHCR Airlift rather than as a common resource being coordinated on behalf of all agencies. Whilst such complaints may reflect an unwillingness to accept the rigour required by the prioritisation process (theoretically) being followed by Geneva, Entebbe and Nairobi, there does appear to be some truth in the complaints. UNHCR personnel interviewed in Nairobi for instance readily admitted that they had regarded operations out of Nairobi 'as a UNHCR airlift' carrying goods requested by UNHCR Goma and only allowing NGO cargoes when space was available²⁵. UNICEF had particular cause to complain as the six water tankers procured in Finland shortly after the start of the Goma influx took two weeks to arrive in Goma even though these were clearly priority cargo. Despite the inter-agency nature of the role of the Air Operations Cell other key UN agencies in the response such as DHA, WFP and UNICEF did not second personnel to the Cell.
279. One way of assessing the effectiveness of the management of the airlift is to assess the extent to which cargos conformed to the priority lists emanating from the field. The problem of vague and incomplete manifests limited the ability of the Study III team to undertake such an assessment. Records for the critical early flights into Goma which were checked in the field were quite inadequate. Records maintained centrally in Geneva included references to unspecific terms such as 'relief goods' and 'humanitarian supplies'. Where items were specified in the centrally maintained database the cargos arriving in the first weeks in Goma included food aid, kitchen sets, vehicles, soap, tents, medical kits, Rubb Hall warehousing, angle pipes, Unimix, electrical equipment, dried biscuits and water trailers - all items for which there was a critical need. However, as with all rapidly established airlifts there were cases of quite inappropriate cargoes, for instance 'Evian' bottled water arrived in Goma from Europe on 24 July and a consignment of orange juice was noted on another occasion.
280. However, according to key staff involved in the operation, cargo did not always conform to the priorities established in the field, certainly during the initial stages of the operation. Given the data problems and the lack of precise information on decision-taking by the Air Operations Cell, the Entebbe Airhead and UNHCR Nairobi, it was not possible in the limited time available to identify the factors that contributed to the apparent lack of conformity between the cargos and the priorities established by the field.

281. One factor may have been that inadequate inventory management and lack of control of donor supplies resulted in the consignment of whatever was readily available, rather than whatever was requested. Another factor may well have been that there was not always agreement between agencies at the field level as to what the priorities actually were. In addition, there may have been lack of awareness of, or even lack of regard for, the priorities as seen from the field in Geneva, Entebbe and Nairobi. For instance, some of those interviewed claimed that the priority lists issued to donors did not correspond to those emanating from the field. The dispersion of responsibility for determining and communicating priorities among the Special Unit for Rwanda and Burundi, the Logistics Unit in the Supplies and Transport Section, the Emergency Section and the Air Operations Cell may have contributed to this problem²⁶. Staff based in Bukavu complained bitterly that Goma was over serviced whilst they were underserved, implying that the Air Operations Cell which had previously been managing a single-destination airlift had difficulty in balancing priorities between locations in what was a much more complex multi-destination operation.
282. Finally, there is ample evidence that the airlift, or at least substantial parts of it, continued for several weeks, longer than was required. In addition, it appears that the use of the Entebbe Airhead to supply Goma and Kigali, may not have been necessary. On the 19 July, two WFP food convoys totalling 27 trucks arrived in Goma having travelled on the northern Kabale-Rutshuru-Goma route²⁷. This impressive achievement was just five days after the start of the influx, one day before the Air Operations Cell began coordinating the airlift, four days before the US Air Force began operations out of Entebbe and ten days before UNHCR began coordinating movements from the Entebbe Airhead. Before the end of July the overland route from Kabale-Kigali-Gisenyi-Goma was reopened to WFP convoys operating out of Kampala. It is perfectly conceivable that much of the cargo airlifted from Entebbe to Goma and Kigali could have been trucked instead²⁸ potentially saving several million dollars (see Section 5.8).
283. There can be no doubt that key aspects of the airlift were critical and could not be replaced in the time available by cheaper forms of transport. For instance, the water equipment, Rubb Hall warehousing and medical kits were not readily available within the Kampala or Nairobi and had to be flown from Europe and North America. The CSB purchased in South Africa was required immediately after the influx and there was no choice but to use an airlift to transport it to Goma and Bukavu. However, the need for the airlift operations based in Entebbe and Nairobi is highly questionable and there is powerful anecdotal evidence that a substantial portion of the commodities, vehicles and equipment airlifted from Europe, North America and elsewhere could have been procured in the region and delivered by road transport.
284. The reasons why large parts of the airlift operation were established and maintained after overland routes had been opened are complex and it is only possible to surmise some of the factors here. The selection of Entebbe as a an Airhead reflected sound military logic of having a secure Airhead in the region, the uncertain security situation in Goma and Kigali and the excellent runway and airport facilities at Entebbe. The reason why cargos were despatched by UNHCR-Entebbe to Goma on aircraft rather than by road may be attributed to a lack of awareness among UNHCR-Entebbe and UNHCR-Geneva personnel of the substantial use that WFP was making of the overland routes. However, the most important factor is likely to have been the very substantial aircraft resources that were made available to the agency by the US Air Force and the UK ODA²⁹ following decisions taken in Washington and London in the days immediately following the start of the influx. Particularly in the case of an operation as large as Operation Support Hope it would appear that, once they have been taken, decisions about the type of deployment are very difficult to modify during the life of what was a comparatively short, but nevertheless extremely costly, operation.

5.8 Cost-Effectiveness and Logistics

285. As noted in Chapter 1, cost-effectiveness was one of the key evaluative criteria employed by Study III, yet the lack of readily available data severely limited the ability of the team to assess cost-effectiveness in the water and health sectors. However, in the logistics sector it was possible to obtain representative data which enabled a comparison between overland and air transport over comparable routes, different modes of overland (road and rail) for the movement of large tonnages of food aid, and different corridor

usage by ICRC and WFP.

Airlifts

286. As a result of the differences in terms of loads carried, aircraft types, routes taken and the uncertainty over the charging basis used by military operators, it is difficult to establish the average cost per tonne carried by aircraft. Large capacity commercial charters using jet aircraft (eg. a 100 tonne cargo carried on an Antonov 124) operating from Europe to the region cost approximately \$3,800/tonne (equivalent to \$475/flying hour or \$0.6/tonne/kilometre). Whilst a smaller capacity commercial turboprop aircraft (most probably a Hercules) carrying a 16 tonne load between Kampala and Goma cost approximately \$450/tonne for the hour long flight (equivalent to approximately \$1.0/tonne/kilometre). The latter compares with a commercial trucking charge of approximately \$120/tonne between the same locations (on the less direct tarred road via Kigali) giving a rate of just over \$0.20/tonne/kilometre. Thus commercial air transport within the region was approximately 4-5 times more expensive than road transport³⁰.
287. As noted in Section 3.5 military aircraft accounted for almost half of the flights carrying humanitarian cargo to the key locations of Goma, Bukavu and Kigali and were significantly more expensive than commercial flights over equivalent routes. On the basis of the limited evidence available it appears that military air transport is between 4-8 times more expensive than commercial air transport. Thus in those instances where military aircraft were operating over the same routes as were possible using road transport, such as between Entebbe and Goma

Use of Road and Rail

288. As would be expected rail transport of food aid was significantly cheaper than road transport over the same routes. Analysis by the transport economist on the Study III team revealed a cost of \$70.8/tonne by rail from Mombasa to Kampala (total distance 1,333 kilometres giving a rate of \$0.053/tonne/kilometre) as against \$115/tonne by road (\$0.086/tonne/kilometre). For Dar es Salaam to Ngara via the railhead at Isaka (total distance 1,363 kilometres giving a rate of \$0.052/tonne/kilometre) the mixed rail/road rate was \$85/tonne compared to a road-only rate of \$134/tonne (\$0.098/tonne/kilometre).
289. Where rail transport was available, WFP made more intensive use of it than did the ICRC. For instance between Mombasa and Nairobi the ICRC relied entirely on road transport for the 8,800 tonnes moved during 1994 whereas 90% of WFP's 55,000 tonnes moved from Mombasa to Kampala during the year went by rail. Similarly between Dar es Salaam and various distribution points in eastern Tanzania and Rwanda only 35% of ICRC's 15,000 tonnes was moved by road/rail as against 92% for the 82,000 tonnes moved by WFP. It appears that the smaller tonnages moved by the ICRC limited the agency's ability to make effective use of the block train operations utilised by WFP.

Use of Corridors

290. Port and rail charges on the southern corridor were significantly below those for the northern corridor³¹. Largely as a result of the lower cost WFP used the southern corridor intensively transporting 70% of its imports along the southern corridor as against 30% along the northern corridor. In part the costs of the southern corridor were lower because WFP made use of its power as a major customer of the Tanzanian Railway Corporation and the Tanzanian Harbours Authority to negotiate preferential tariffs for its cargoes entering Dar es Salaam and transiting to Isaka and Kigoma. These preferential tariffs resulted in net savings during the second half of 1994 of \$0.9 million³². Drawing from the positive experience of 'Corridor Groups' during the response to the southern African drought of 1991-92, WFP encouraged the holding of regular coordination meetings of the organisations involved in operating the southern corridor. Weekly meetings involving WFP, the Tanzanian Harbour Authority, the Tanzania Railway Corporation, Customs authorities and principal forwarding companies were held from July 1994 onwards. No such 'Corridor Group' emerged for the northern corridor.


UNHCR and WFP though subsequently it is widely agreed that the number in the third week of July was around 850,000. In both cases the degree of initial overestimation was at least 40%.

295. Two factors appear to have contributed to such overestimates: inadequate resources allocated to the task of obtaining more accurate initial estimates; and possibly also as a result of 'inflationary pressure' from within agencies and the media.
296. In all three cases, efforts to count or make sample counts of the numbers crossing appear to have been inadequate. Whilst in Goma the scale of the influx and the number of crossing points made initial estimation extremely difficult³⁴, the initial influx in Ngara and the two waves into Bukavu were channelled through one or two crossing points and it should have been possible for UNHCR to have made more accurate initial estimates. In the Bukavu case it was WFP rather than UNHCR which positioned monitors at the Ruzizi I crossing point to make sample counts, only being replaced by UNHCR monitors two weeks later. In the Goma case the use of aerial photography by MSF and the US military contributed to a more accurate estimation of the total number of refugees and also made an invaluable contribution to site planning activities, though this was not done until early August³⁵. In view of the importance of more accurate initial estimates it would appear preferable for the capacity to undertake aerial photography should be developed within UNHCR rather than UNHCR having to rely on other agencies³⁶.
297. The phenomenon of 'fact inflation' by the media during emergency operations is well known - the highest possible estimate, even if only weakly supported by the evidence available, will invariably be the figure used in headlines. Such a phenomenon may also be affecting relief agencies themselves as a result of an increased concern for 'visibility' and possibly as a way for agencies to 'jolt' donor organisations so as to encourage a rapid mobilisation of adequate resources in response to a sudden influx. Where, as in the Goma case, the media have a substantial presence and are providing real-time reports using satellites the division between estimates by agencies and estimates by journalists may become blurred and relief agency personnel actually become influenced by media 'fact inflation'. Such a phenomenon is extremely difficult to study and thus to prove. However, three examples during the evaluation lend support to the idea that 'fact inflation' is also practised by agency personnel.
298. On the basis of information received from UNHCR that there were 200,000 refugees in Bukavu and reports circulating in Geneva and Paris referred to up to 400,000, on 16 July MSF-France sent a team to Bukavu followed two days later by an aircharter carrying additional medical personnel and drug kits. The decision to deploy the agency's resources in Bukavu rather than Goma where the influx was receiving considerable coverage was made on the basis of the figures and the sense that the situation in Bukavu was almost as serious as that in Goma. On arrival the team were surprised to find that situation was not as severe as they had been led to believe and the agency's estimate of the number of refugees at that time was that there were about 80,000 refugees most of whom were in the town. Whilst the MSF-France team made a valuable contribution to relief efforts in Bukavu, a second charter flight was diverted to Goma and in retrospect the agency feels that it should have deployed initially to Goma rather than Bukavu. Had it done so its considerable resources would have been available for the efforts in Goma 3-5 days earlier. MSF-France personnel feel that the inflated figure originated from the UNHCR Field Office in Bukavu in an attempt to draw attention to the situation in Bukavu at a time when the focus was almost exclusively on Goma³⁷.
299. The origins of the 1.2 million figure for Goma are unclear, but what did emerge from interviews was that UNHCR and WFP personnel appear to have concurred in delaying a downward revision of this gross overestimate as a way of keeping pressure on their head offices and donor organisations to provide adequate supplies for the more realistic figure of 850,000³⁸.
300. Finally, in the south-west of the country in August there was an instance of a journalist and a relief worker travelling together and witnessing the same movements of displaced along the roads leading to Bukavu. The journalist filed a report of seeing 'several thousand' on the road whilst the relief worker gave an interview to another journalist and estimated one million displaced were moving to Bukavu. The

291. Despite WFP's intensive use of the southern corridor, it appears that, with additional investment in and support to the Tanzanian Railway Corporation (TRC), the agency could have made even greater use of the southern corridor and thereby made substantial savings. For instance, since the July influx Goma has been supplied entirely by the northern corridor route at a cost of approximately \$228/tonne. From the end of August until the closure of Rwanda's borders to transit food aid in early April 1995, the southern corridor could potentially have been used at a cost of approximately \$150/tonne, implying a potential saving of around \$0.7 million each month, or almost \$5 million over the period when the cross-Rwanda route from the railhead at Isaka was feasible.
292. The performance of the TRC from the start of the arrangement with WFP in mid-July and the end of the year can be seen in Figure 22. Apart from the poor performance in September, which was due to an accident which stranded 300 of the TRC's 1,200 wagons at Tabora, there was an improving trend during the period. However, the principal limitation on better performance was the inadequate availability of locomotives and wagons. WFP requested donor organisations to contribute to the establishment of a Transport Infrastructure Contingency Fund designed to address such key bottlenecks, but the TICF did not materialise due to lack of donor support³³.

Figure 22 Total WFP Rail Despatches ex Dar es Salaam

5.9 Estimating the Number of Refugees and IDPs



293. Estimating the numbers requiring assistance and the accuracy of those estimates is critical to the management and effectiveness of humanitarian assistance programmes. If the numbers are underestimated the amount of assistance will be bound to be inadequate and the objectives of reducing suffering and loss of life will not be met. If the numbers are overestimated it may well result in more assistance being provided than is required resulting in unnecessary expenditures and increase the likelihood of assistance being misused. Estimation of the numbers of refugees and IDPs was a very problematic aspect of the response.
294. The degree of overestimation involved in the initial influxes of refugees into Ngara at the end of April and into Bukavu and Goma during July was notable. In Ngara, the figure of 'over a quarter of a million' was widely used to describe the initial influx on 29-30 April though the figure of 170,000 has since been adopted as more accurate. In Goma the figure of 1.2 million was used as the initial planning figure by

Notes on Chapter 5

1. During 1993, Rwanda had also been supplied from Kampala by air and overland convoys as a result of the substantial local purchase operations which had been possible in Uganda, as a result of the good harvests there.
2. Estimates of mean intake are made by dividing the caloric value of the food distributed by the estimated number of beneficiaries and then comparing these to the minimum calorie requirements which are in the order of 2,000 kcals/person/day.
3. In the words of the HCR Coordinator in Ngara, 'It has been a continuous emergency not a sudden influx followed by stability' (M. Connelly Interview June 1995).
4. Because of the limited time available and the very substantial amount of data to be analysed, the transport economists efforts were focused upon 1994. Consequently, the pipeline problems of early 1995 were not studied in detail.
5. Such employment is likely to be reduced outside of the rainy season.
6. Average fuelwood consumption by refugees was 2.64 kg/person/day, whilst that by local resident was 1.75. Much of the difference can probably be attributed to the additional fuelwood required to cook the maize given and beans supplied to the refugees. In the specific case of maize, it was estimated by various African women that whole dry yellow maize takes at least 6 times longer to cook than maize meal.
7. Unfortunately, data showing the balance between the maize grain/flour distributions by the ICRC were not readily available, so it is not possible to provide quantitative support for this impression.
8. One report by AICF (1995) for Cyanika and Kibeho camps in Zone Turquoise indicated that un-soaked red beans took from 4-10 hours to cook while white beans took far longer.
9. For instance, surveys in Katale and Mugunga camps in Goma during August found malnutrition rates were significantly higher among female-headed households compared to the rest of the camp population. Food basket monitoring surveys showed that this may largely have been due to inequities in the food distribution system. A subsequent second round of nutritional surveys in October in the same two camps found that malnutrition rates remained at very high levels - again being partly attributable to the inequitable food distribution system.
10. 'It was obvious that with all the soldiers and militia about that a commune level system would quickly become abused'. Trevor Page Interview May.
11. For instance, a UNHCR report on Katale camp in April 1995 indicated that those refugees from Kigali whose distributions were organised on a cellule level received 80% of their planned ration, whilst those from Butare whose distribution was organised at the higher sector level received only 58% of their planned ration.
12. The volcanic rock necessitated heavy equipment to cut and lay roads into the camps. Delays in the provision of adequate heavy equipment created substantial site planning and problems.
13. Under such a system, refugees are divided into groups of 20 ration card holders of the same family size and food is handed over to these groups who are in charge of redistributing it.
14. Supplementary feeding programmes are intended to provide nutritionally vulnerable groups such as young children and pregnant/nursing mothers with a ration to supplement the general ration. Therapeutic feeding programmes are designed to restore severely malnourished children through an intensive regime of regular feeds.
15. For instance, Kiraro and Ndago camps near Gikongoro were only surveyed in October and December and so selective feeding programmes in these two camps began much later than in other camps in the southwest.
16. The programme was operated from 22 distribution sites, each covering unto 3,000 children who received a weekly ration of 1,025 kcals/day. The programme required over 200 staff to run it.

first journalist's newspaper saw, and used, the relief worker's estimate rather than that made by their own employee³⁹. Less than 100,000 displaced subsequently crossed into Bukavu.

301. Whilst techniques such as aerial photography, sample surveys and numbers vaccinated during certain vaccination campaigns may generate reasonably accurate information on the number of refugees, the most accurate technique is that of a physical count or 'registration' of all refugees⁴⁰. Often they are combined with the issuance of registration cards and new ration cards and potentially can have a very positive impact on ensuring the equitable distribution of food rations and other services. If combined with questionnaires physical counts or registrations can yield valuable information for planning purposes on gender, age profiles of the population and on the range of skills available within the refugee population. Such information can be valuable in efforts to involve the refugee community in the planning and management of efforts to improve their welfare and possibly also political matters.
302. In Ngara, a registration was held in July, ten weeks after the initial influx. Such a short time lag between a large influx and registration was very unusual. By that stage the planning population being used by UNHCR and WFP, which was based on the numbers indicated by commune leaders, stood at 350,000. The registration resulted in a figure of 230,000. Thus the pre-registration figure was 52% higher than the actual population. In Goma and Bukavu registrations⁴¹ were not undertaken until the end of February-beginning of March 1995 roughly 30 weeks after the initial influxes. The delay resulting from the high levels of insecurity, particularly in the Goma camps. These registrations resulted in reductions of the planning figures from 850,000 to 722,000 in Goma and from 350,000 to just under 300,000 in Bukavu.
303. The resource savings that could have been made if registrations had been carried out earlier in Goma and Bukavu were very substantial. During the initial stages of a refugee operation it is generally estimated that total resource inputs (food, non-food, water, health, agency infrastructure, security, etc) are equivalent to \$1/day/refugee⁴². If it is assumed that registrations had been undertaken in mid-October, ie. 13 weeks after the initial influx and 19 weeks earlier than the actual registration and that the registrations had resulted in the same reductions in the numbers then potentially approximately \$23.7 million could have been saved. It is of course debatable whether registrations could have been carried out in mid-October. A registration had been planned to be undertaken in Goma in October 1994, but was cancelled for security reasons. Some agency personnel interviewed felt that in view of the importance of the registration in the effort to control the inequitable food distribution systems the October, let alone the potential resource savings, the October registration should have gone ahead (see Section 5.5). Had the camp security issue been addressed much earlier by the international community it would have facilitated an earlier registration and resulted in considerable resource savings, in addition to reducing the considerable loss of life and suffering (see Section 3.2).
304. Because of the steady increase in new arrivals in camps in Ngara, a re-registration was planned for early 1995 but was postponed until June 1995. On the eve of the exercise in June⁴³, it was postponed once again following the realisation that the registration equipment sent from Geneva was substandard and unusable⁴⁴. It was anticipated that the re-registration would result in a reduction in numbers of around 100,000. If it is assumed that the re-registration was delayed by 90 days and that the cost of total assistance per refugee by mid-1995 was around \$0.8/day, then the postponement effectively resulted in the unnecessary expenditure by UNHCR, WFP and other agencies of \$7.2 million. For an agency which has been involved in repeated registration exercises over many years, the failure of UNHCR-Geneva to ensure that the field office was provided with the equipment which had been requested was remarkable.
305. Though physical count registrations are very demanding in terms of personnel resources and difficult to undertake in the initial, immediate relief stages of a refugee emergency, the importance of the process in terms of ensuring equitable distributions of food and other forms of assistance and in terms of potential resource savings suggest that they should be carried out within the first few weeks following an influx. This may require the development of a specialist capacity to undertake registrations without interfering in the immediate relief activities.

32. On the railways net savings were \$7.20 for the Kigoma route and \$4.10 for the Isaka line. Savings in the port were \$2.50 for wharfage of maize, beans and blended foods, \$1.00 for the shore handling of non-containerised cargo and \$3.00 for the stevedoring and bagging of bulk cargo.
33. In mid-1995, WFP was exploring leasing arrangements for two locomotives from South African Railways.
34. In Goma, the situation was more complex: large numbers crossed into the town at two points but large numbers also crossed the border well north of the town near Kibumba.
35. Apparently, it was several weeks before the US Air Force unit in Entebbe actually provided UNHCR Goma with the aerial photos of the main camps which were used for site planning. Craig Sanders Technical Coordinator, UNHCR Goma. Interview April 1995.
36. This need only involve the procurement of equipment that can be attached to the wing of the light aircraft that the agency operates for the movement of personnel.
37. Marc Gastellu-Etchigory, MSF-France, Paris. Interviewed 6 June 1995.
38. Bernie Doyle UNHCR Food Coordinator Goma. Interviewed June 1994.
39. Lindsey Hilsum 'Reporting Rwanda: The Media and the Aid Agencies' Background paper prepared for Study III, August 1995.
40. Physical counts are often referred to as 'registrations' though this is something of a misnomer as they do not confer any legal asylum status to the refugees. As the term registration was used by all agencies to describe the physical counts undertaken this term is used here.
41. These were very much just physical counting exercises and the information collected on the refugees was minimal. Even information on the gender composition of the refugee population was not gathered.
42. Of this amount the general ration (ie. resources provided by WFP) accounts for at least \$0.40.
43. To enable all agencies to focus on the registration and ensure that sufficient staff were available to assist, all agencies working in the camps had cancelled staff leave and a 14 day (rather than the usual 7 day) ration had been distributed.
44. Several thousand metres of high quality woven nylon cord for use in the pre-registration 'braceleting' stage had been requested by UNHCR-Ngara and the selected samples sent back to Geneva. Instead the supplier contracted by UNHCR-Geneva had sent simple nylon twine which could be easily melted and reformed. Substantial abuse of the braceleting and registration process was anticipated as a result and the process postponed for at least 2-3 months until it could be rearranged.

17. One study estimated that the weekly cost for each beneficiary was as high as US\$18 which compares very unfavourably with the general ration which provided more food but at a cost of \$2.8/beneficiary (WFP estimate made in October 1994).

18. It appears that a substantial, but indeterminate, number of flights were not recorded by the Air Operations Cell. For instance many ICRC flights do not appear to have been recorded were not included in the records; the WFP coordinator in Bukavu claims that many of the WFP food aid flights to Bukavu do not appear in the records (T. Page interview) and in addition a proportion of the unsolicited, unannounced flights to Goma and Kigali during the peak of the response do not appear to have been recorded.

19. Recording of the number of passengers carried was patchy. In Goma, such records were not begun until 5 August.

20. For instance, six days elapsed from the start of the influx to the Air Operations Cell being given the task of coordinating the airlift operations in the region.

21. For instance, conventional airliners converted to a cargo role require high lift handling equipment. If two Boeing 707 aircraft arrived simultaneously they had to be unloaded one at a time, because there was only one set of high lift equipment.

22. A satphone was received on 2 August but was unable to cope with the volume of voice and fax traffic and the only reliable form of communication with Goma, Bukavu and Kigali was Pactor equipment (effectively, a radio-based electronic-mail system) used throughout the region by UNHCR (Eva Demant, Entebbe Airhead Mission Report 24 July - 30 September 1994).

23. Two interviewees noted instances where agencies had declared all of their cargoes to be a priority (eg. cholera kits), whereas the bulk of the cargo was made up of many other, lower priority, items.

24. For example, during the response to the Armenia Earthquake the lack of information on manifests caused major problems in the management of incoming drug consignments.

25. Interview with Linda Telles and Robert Coberly UNHCR Nairobi March 1994. With the LWF Airlift also operating out of Nairobi, UNHCR Nairobi felt that NGOs were comparatively well served in terms of flights to Goma and Kigali. There was no attempt at coordination at the Nairobi level between LWF and UNHCR.

26. That relevant information from the field did not always reach those sections from which a response was required is indicated in the Mission Report prepared by the UNHCR Coordinator in Goma from 15 July - 17 September. Apparently, the weekly Commodity Tracking System reports recording *inter alia* the contents of incoming flights to Goma were not received by the Air Operations Cell. 'It appears as if nobody is really responsible for circulating information'. F. Grandi, Senior Emergency Officer.

27. The route was not regularly used by trucks due to steep inclines and the poor state of the road between the Ugandan border and the Zairean road system at Rutshuru. Using a grader hired from a Ugandan contractor the first convoy pushed through the route. During the course of this operation a senior officer from the Logistics Division in Rome was sustained mild injuries.

28. The route to Bukavu via Kigali was not reopened to WFP convoys from Kampala until the end of August so the issue of duplication of road and air modes is less stark.

29. The Royal New Zealand AirForce operated almost exclusively between Entebbe and Bukavu.

30. There were cases during 1994 of air transport being used over the same mixed rail-road routes that were used by WFP which as a result of the lower cost of rail transport would give even greater differences in cost between overland and air transport. For instance carried by rail. For instance, 1,600 tonnes of WFP food was transported from Dar es Salaam to Bujumbura by the US Air Force in June. Such airlifts were used to accelerate movement and complement the capacity of the road-rail routes.

31. Port charges at Mombasa were \$29/tonne compared to \$24/tonne for Dar es Salaam and rail charges were \$0.53/tonne/kilometre for goods from Mombasa to Kampala as against \$0.28/tonne/kilometre from Dar es Salaam to Isaka.

310. Despite these problems some comments can be made about the way the different mechanisms were utilised.
311. The response to the Rwanda crisis, at least in its initial stages, benefitted substantially from unspent funds allocated in response to the events in Burundi in late 1993 but which were remaining unused as a result of the repatriation of many of the refugees during late 1993 and early 1994. For instance in late April 1994 UNHCR wrote to all donors supporting its Burundian refugee response activities requesting permission to reallocate the unused funds for use in its response to the Rwandan refugees then entering neighbouring countries. Food aid donated to WFP for the Burundi refugees arrived in time for use in the response to the Ngara/Karagwe influx. Unused ECHO funds that had been allocated for use in responding to the Burundian IDPs and refugees were subsequently redirected to fund European NGO activities in Ngara/Karagwe after April and in south-west Rwanda in July/August. That such funds were available for reallocation was fortuitous. Had they not been so readily available it is likely that the initial response to the Rwandan crisis would not have been so prompt or effective.
312. Over the last few years, there have been two important initiatives within the UN system for resourcing the provision of humanitarian aid by UN agencies. One has been the creation of the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) with the objective of facilitating a 'timely response in the initial phase of an emergency' and the other is the mechanism of Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals.
313. A total of \$18.2 million was drawn from the CERF during 1994 for the responding to the Rwanda crisis: UNREO drew \$200,000 in April 1994 to cover its start-up costs; UNHCR drew \$10 million at the beginning of May to help fund its response to the Ngara/Karagwe influx; in the week following the start of the Goma influx WFP drew \$5 million and UNICEF \$3 million. All drawings were subsequently reimbursed by the agencies using funds from other sources. Whilst the total amount drawn represented only 3.2% of the total funding channelled through or utilised by UN agencies during 1994 the CERF does appear to have performed a useful role in enabling agencies to recruit and deploy staff and resources ahead of funding from other sources. It is likely that the pressure upon the CERF was reduced by the availability of funds originally destined for Burundian refugees⁴.
314. The mechanism of Consolidated Appeals was developed within the UN system during the late 1980s as a way of minimising overlap and improving coordination amongst UN agencies requesting resources from the donor community for use in humanitarian aid operations. Consolidated Appeals are now central to the work of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs created by General Assembly Resolution 46/182 in 1991, the same resolution that was responsible for the creation of the CERF. Considerable effort is put into the preparation of Inter-Agency Appeals, not just by DHA personnel but by personnel in the field and head offices of 6 or 7 UN agencies. It is therefore valid to examine how well the Consolidated Appeal process worked during 1994. Two points stand out. First, the process was cumbersome in the face of what was a highly dynamic emergency. Second, WFP and UNHCR (which between them accounted for 85% of resources channelled through or utilised by the UN system) effectively operated resourcing mechanisms which were tailored to their needs and relationships with donor organisations and therefore effectively paralleled the Consolidated Appeals process.
315. During 1994, there were two Inter-Agency Appeals: the first on 23 April was a DHA/UNREO 'Flash Appeal' (prepared immediately after the decision to create UNREO) which requested \$11.7 million for the immediate needs of UN agencies (except UNHCR) and \$ 5.4 million for the immediate needs of several NGOs. The second was the July Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal which was prepared over a period of several weeks, finalised in the third week of July and launched at a meeting in Geneva at the beginning of August. As originally prepared, the Consolidated Appeal requested \$ 274 million but the late revisions to take account of the influxes in to Goma and Bukavu increased the global total to \$434 million, making it the fourth largest Consolidated Appeal ever. The July Consolidated Appeal also included the amounts indicated by several UN agencies in the UNREO Contingency Plan document presented to donor organisation representatives in Nairobi on 22 June (see Section 6.2).
316. UNHCR resourced its response through a combination of appeals, specific requests to donors, allocations

Chapter 6 Assessment of Performance: Resourcing, Contingency Planning and Coordination

6.1 Resourcing the Operations

306. As indicated in Section 2.2, the humanitarian response by the international community involved the expenditure (as recorded by the DHA Financial Tracking System) of approximately \$1.2 billion worth of resources during 1994. In addition, substantial financial and in-kind contributions were made by the governments of those countries which hosted Rwandan refugees and by the populations in the areas of those countries where the refugee camps were established. The volume of resources involved are extremely difficult to quantify and, as will be discussed in Chapter 7 it is not at all clear that the contributions by governments and populations in the neighbouring countries have been offset by the financial and in-kind flows and benefits from the rest of the international community. For the purposes of the following discussion, only the recorded international flows are considered.
307. Whilst it is appropriate to visualise recorded international flows as ultimately emanating from the public and private funding sources in donor countries, it is apparent that a large and complex humanitarian response such as that to the 1994 crisis in Rwanda is actually resourced through a wide range of mechanisms. During the course of the study, the Team identified at least eight types of resourcing mechanism that were used during 1994:
- Emergency funds and standby arrangements maintained by most UN agencies¹, the Red Cross Movement and the larger international NGOs;
 - Specific requests by UN agencies and NGOs to donor organisations to provide support to particular activities;
 - Reallocations of resources approved for other purposes, notably funds approved as part of the response to the Burundi refugee and IDP crisis of late 1993;
 - General funding appeals to donor organisations by individual UN agencies and the Red Cross Movement²;
 - Allocations from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) administered by DHA;
 - UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals;
 - Public appeals by NGOs, either individually or in consortia, and by UNICEF National Committees;
 - Direct responses by donor organisation emergency teams, civil defence teams or by military contingents in a humanitarian delivery or support role.
308. Unfortunately, it was not possible to break down the overall known funding of \$1.2 billion into the various mechanisms so as to establish their relative significance. The principal data source, the DHA FTS, does not record the actual mechanism by which an action is provided or the particular budget line it is resourced from. Such detail would anyway have been extremely difficult to have recorded as it appears to have been common practice during the response for:
- funds allocated for one activity to be used for another activity;
 - funds allocated in response to a specific request to be subsequently counted as a response to an appeal;
 - agencies to make arrangements for borrowings and reimbursements at a local level³.
309. A particular problem with tracking resource flows during 1994 is that the largest appeal during 1994, the July UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal which (including the late inserts by DHA and UNHCR) requested a total of \$ 434 million, was presented to donor organisations just after the start of the Goma influx - an event that substantially altered many of the assumptions upon which the various UN agencies had estimated their resource requirements and rendering it extremely difficult to relate the resources actually provided against the needs indicated in the Appeal.

from its Emergency Response Fund and the CERF. The agency did not join other agencies in the DHA/UNREO Flash Appeal in April, relying instead on reallocations from the Burundi refugee programme and drawings on its Emergency Response Fund to fund its mobilisation of the Emergency Response Teams to the region and the initial response to the limited numbers of Tutsis seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. Following the initial influx into Ngara and Karagwe at the end of April the agency launched an Urgent Appeal requesting \$50 million to cover the needs of Rwandan refugees and also the remaining Burundian refugees for a three month period until mid-July when the Consolidated Appeal was planned. In mid-July it had prepared a budget covering the needs for the whole year estimated at \$143 million which subsumed the amounts contained in the Urgent Appeal. Of this amount UNHCR had already received \$87 million so the needs for the rest of the year were estimated at \$55 million. Immediately following the Goma influx UNHCR hurriedly prepared a Flash Appeal for \$115 million to cover anticipated needs in Goma and Bukavu for a three month period (using a planning figure of 1.2 million refugees in Goma and 0.5 million in Bukavu) which resulted in a combined requirement of \$174 million in the revised Consolidated Appeal.

317. WFP resourced its food and cash requirements after April 1994 through a series of general appeals and specific requests to donors as well as borrowings of food commodities from other programmes, allocations from its Immediate Response Account and the CERF⁵. The total value of WFP's requirements for the region during 1994 (including Burundian IDPs and refugees in neighbouring countries) was \$281 million of which it received food and cash valued at \$213 million. The highly dynamic nature of the emergency and the sudden increases in refugee caseloads meant that the agency could not rely on the shipment of in-kind contributions which, from some of its key donors, could take 4-6 months to arrive. It therefore had an unusually heavy requirement for cash contributions to enable it to purchase commodities in the region to ensure shorter deliver times. Of the food delivered during 1994 70% was purchased by WFP and 30% provided in-kind. Yet the agency experienced considerable shortfalls in its cash contributions. Thus the Immediate Response Account which had been created in 1992 was supposed to contain 'at least \$30 million'⁶ yet in 1993 it had only received \$12 million from donors. By October 1993 much of this amount had been utilised and the consequent lack of cash resources had hampered WFP response to the Burundian refugee crisis. The shortfall in IRA funding was even greater in 1994 - by June only \$8 million had been received from five donors. In June the agency appealed for \$2.5 million to establish a transport contingency fund to enable investments designed to increase the capacity of key routes. This appeal did not result in any funding from donor organisations.
318. The lack of cash resources hampered the agency's response in two ways. First it reduced its ability to purchase food in the region to increase supplies to the refugee and IDP programmes. Had the IRA been fully funded the agency would have been able to purchase and distribute up to 40,000 tonnes of commodities. Second, the lack of support for the proposed Transport Contingency Fund meant that WFP's ability to build-up the capacity of the Dar es Salaam corridor was limited. In a recent paper presented to a Working Group of its governing body, the agency has argued that had it been able to invest \$2.5 million in upgrading the Dar Es Salaam corridor, shipments could have been diverted from the more expensive Mombasa-Kampala corridor, resulting in a cost saving of \$2.5 million every three weeks⁷.
319. A lack of 'upfront' cash resources would appear to be a common problem within the system. As discussed in the next section there was inadequate preparedness particularly in the case of Goma. Had UNHCR and other agencies undertaken a range of preparedness measures, the cost of which would probably not have amounted to more than \$2 million⁸ many thousands of lives could probably have been saved and the cost of the response to the Goma influx substantially reduced. The extent to which this lack of preparedness was due to lack of resources is debatable as UNHCR's regard for the position adopted by the Zairean authorities and its apparent lack of regard for the UNREO-led Contingency Planning Exercise appear to have been important factors. However, the fact that an Inter-Agency Appeal was necessary at the outset (see below), and that the UNREO-led Contingency Plan had to include a request for additional resources for UN agencies to prepare themselves for the westward population movements, indicates a level of resourcing within the UN system and arguably within the system as a whole that substantially reduced the effectiveness of the response⁹. When asked why WFP had not prepositioned food in Goma a senior WFP official involved in the response replied 'By June we were still

struggling to get sufficient resources deployed in Tanzania for the refugees in Ngara and Karagwe. How could we be expected to divert some of the available resources for an event, that might not happen, in Goma'¹⁰

320. Another way of assessing the adequacy of resource availability is to examine the timing of resource provision. The four graphs on the following page show resource provision at three different levels within the system - the aggregate level (using DHA FTS data); the donor organisation level (using the UK ODA as an example) and the private donor level (using the monthly response to the UK Disaster Emergency Committee Appeal for Rwanda as an example¹¹). For comparison the extent of international print media coverage of Rwanda is included in the bottom graph. Each shows a similar pattern of the initial response, principally to the Ngara/Karagwe influx beginning at the end of April being substantial but quickly plateauing and, measured on a monthly basis, beginning to decline. The virtually simultaneous events of late July and early August (ie. the Goma influx; the cholera outbreak; the ending of the conflict and the installation of the new Government in Kigali; and the launching of the UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal) saw a dramatic increase in resource allocations both by donors and the general public. From the extraordinary peak of August from September onwards the level of resource allocations declined almost as steeply as they had risen. These graphs clearly show the extent to which resource availability from the international community during the response was *reactive* to events. Because of the virtually simultaneous occurrence of several key events in the three weeks following the Goma influx it cannot be assumed that the influx and the ensuing cholera outbreak explaining the dramatic increase in resource availability after mid-July. With the ending of the conflict and the installation of the new Government in Kigali and the launching of the UN Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeal, there would almost certainly have been a significant increase in the level of resources allocated to Rwanda in late July and August. Nevertheless, it is readily apparent that the Goma influx, the cholera outbreak and the intense media coverage of events in Goma had an extraordinary impact in releasing resources from the governments and general public in dozens of countries.
321. Many of the agency personnel interviewed during the Study referred to the dramatically greater availability of funds during the July to September period, some referring to it as the period when the 'tap was turned on' and it was possible 'to do anything' including actions that would have been inconceivable before mid-July, such as airlifting water and bulldozers from Europe to Goma and treating dysentery cases with expensive drugs that would not normally be available in an African context. Certainly the needs were greater after mid-July than before and the early development of cholera added considerably to the pressures upon donors and agencies to be responding as quickly and effectively as possible. However, visibility and access were clearly critical in determining the sudden unleashing of resources in Goma. The people who became refugees on 14 July had been IDP's a few kilometres away on the 13th yet the resources provided to them by the international community whilst they were inside Rwanda were minimal. The insecurity and the advancing front line were clearly important factors in deterring a substantial relief effort in the north-west at that time, particularly when compared to the south-west where the improved security and access resulting from Opération Turquoise was resulting in agencies and the media focussing their attention on relief needs in the Safe Zone.
322. That there is a close correlation between the volume and intensity of media coverage and the level of resources provided is readily apparent from the graphs. Many of those interviewed referred to the pressures placed upon their agencies by the intense media coverage of the cholera epidemic and the pressure from the general public and their supporters to respond. One NGO interviewee used the phrase 'be there or die' to describe the pressure on relief NGOs. The Head of the emergency aid section of a bilateral donor organisation said: 'There was day in day out pressure from the media. What can you do? You throw some money at the problem. I'm sure we gave more money because of that'.
323. However, the way in which media pressures influence resource allocation decisions by donor officials is probably not straightforward. It would probably be wrong for instance to see the dramatic increase in expenditures in the July-August period as reflecting conscious decisions by donor officials that the situation in the last week of July required ten times the level of resources provided in the first week of July. In several cases donors¹² have subsequently included all or part of the costs of their military

contingents as part of their declared contributions to the Rwanda emergency as recorded by the DHA FTS. Decisions to deploy the military were often not taken by officials but by politicians who authorised the substantial additional expenditures involved.

324. A final point on resourcing is that the ability of NGOs to raise funds from private sources appears to be even more related to donor coverage than the resource allocation behaviour of the donors. In the UK the initial response to the DEC Appeal which used film footage from Ngara was substantial rather than dramatic. The reminder to viewers of national TV news at the time of the Goma influx that the Appeal remained open resulted in a dramatic response. In the USA several NGOs, including CARE-US and CRS launched fundraising appeals in the April-June period but the response was unexpectedly poor and it was only with the Goma influx that they received a dramatic response. Several agency personnel working in Tanzania referred to the lack of private funding during May as a significant factor in explaining UNHCR'S ability to closely coordinate NGOs working in the camps. Most were heavily dependent on direct funding from UNHCR and/or ECHO funds which were tied to UNHCR'S approval.
325. As shown in Section 2.2 the US Government and the Commission of the European Union were by a substantial margin the two largest donor organisations during 1994. Section 6.3 below on coordination describes the activities of the US Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DARTs) and the attachment of ECHO personnel to UNHCR and the work of ECHO personnel inside Rwanda. The DART concept coupled with the ability to approve grants to NGOs (including several non-US NGOs) appears to have been very flexible and a generally positive experience. ECHO'S decision in July to give allocative responsibility for all its refugee funding to UNHCR was also very positive and substantially strengthened UNHCR'S ability to coordinate operations in Goma and Bukavu. Had all donor organisations followed this strategy it is likely that fewer NGOs would have operated in Goma and many of the coordination difficulties encountered might not have arisen.

6.2 Preparedness, Contingency Planning and the Build-Up to the Goma Influx

326. During the response several agencies made explicit preparations for events which they perceived as being likely to occur. Thus in deploying its Emergency Response Teams to Ngara, Goma, Bukavu and Burundi during the second and third weeks of April UNHCR correctly anticipated the Ngara influx of 29 April. Though UNHCR already had a programme in Ngara as a result of the Burundian refugee crisis of late 1993, the presence of the ERT immediately prior to the April influx was critical to the effectiveness of the initial response. Good relations had been established with the local authorities who were to prove highly supportive of UNHCR throughout the operation. The presence of the ERT resulted in key decisions which were to have a positive impact during the response, such as that to limit the number of NGO implementing partners and to invite CARE to establish a programme. The excellent contacts of the ERT personnel probably contributed significantly to the mobilisation of assistance by donor organisations and NGOs.
327. Other positive examples of agencies preparing for anticipated events included the ICRC'S prepositioning of supplies in Ngara and Goma in preparation for cross-border operations inside Rwanda, or if need be other eventualities. These stocks enabled the first distributions of food and non-food items to commence within hours of the start of the influxes in these locations. In Goma, Oxfam had prepositioned approximately £400,000 of water equipment prior to the influx using its own privately raised funds. These supplies enabled the agency to rapidly establish water production, storage and distribution systems in Mugunga and Katale camps.
328. Such prepositioning of supplies and personnel in the period immediately before and anticipated event might be termed 'tactical preparedness'. The only example of longer term 'strategic preparedness' encountered by the Team was MSF-Holland'S creation and development of a local drug supply NGO in Goma. In 1993, through its involvement in the response to the Hunde/Banyarwanda conflict the agency had formed the view that the Great Lakes region was unstable and likely to witness violence and major population displacements in the years ahead. Yet, the capacity of the Zairean health services in the area were very limited and the supply of drugs and medical equipment erratic. Consequently, MSF-Holland




Figure 23
DHA FTS Record of
Expenditures by Month




Figure 24
ODA Approvals by Month




Figure 25
DEC Income by Month




Figure 26
International Print Media
Coverage

336. This process continued for the next 19 days being released on the 22 June (the day after the completion of the UNHCR Contingency Plan for Katale). The process took longer than originally planned because of differences amongst the UN agencies and the need to gain agreement on the version to be released. WFP representation at the meetings preparing the plan was sporadic due to the high turnover of WFP staff with responsibilities for Rwanda in Nairobi.
337. UNREO worked on the basis of three scenarios with the 'worst case' scenario envisaging up to 1.5 million people moving into Eastern Zaire. To ascertain the capacities and existing stockpiles in the relevant areas a questionnaire was prepared and sent to all the relevant UN agencies. No replies were received. Meetings were convened with representatives of the relevant agencies¹⁴ including UNAMIR. The Force Commander did not regard the worst case scenario as unrealistic - on 6 June he cautioned media representatives visiting Kigali that a two million figure for refugee outflows was 'a reasonable planning figure'. Three days later whilst in a meeting with UNREO personnel in Nairobi he urged that UN agencies create stockpiles at the likely points of outflow, a point that the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordinator reiterated at a Disaster Management Team meeting the following day (10 June) which was attended by four representatives from UNHCR including the person preparing the Goma contingency plan.
338. UNHCR's attitude towards the UNREO-coordinated Contingency Plan is unclear and is subject to differing recollections of events between UNHCR personnel and those of other agencies involved in the process and the DMT meetings in Nairobi¹⁵. Apparently UNHCR representatives attending the DMT meetings argued against specific mention of the possibility of 1.5 million refugees moving into Zaire, fearing that it would jeopardise the agency's ongoing discussions with the Zairean authorities. The wording finally agreed in the document presented to donor representatives on 22 June was so coded in its avoidance of mentioning Zaire that many donors could have been forgiven for not understanding what was actually meant¹⁶. Just over three weeks later approximately 850,000 refugees moved across into Goma and during July and August approximately 350,000 moved into Bukavu. Within one month of their arrival approximately 50,000 of the refugees in Goma had died as a result of dehydration, cholera, dysentery and violence.
339. It is clear that UNHCR faced considerable difficulties in preparing for a substantial movement of refugees into Goma. First, the actual point of outflow was unclear until perhaps the five days immediately prior to the Goma influx. In the case of a movement into Zaire Lake Kivu would force outflows into either the Goma or the Bukavu areas. Though the security situation in Burundi was very poor an outflow into Burundi was always a possibility. To have prepositioned supplies in late June would therefore have necessitated prepositioning in three separate locations, implying a substantial allocation of funds for an uncertain use. The agency had developed a contingency stock of non-food items for around 500,000 refugees held in storage facilities in Amsterdam and viewed this as being its regional contingency stock for rapid deployment to wherever the outflow occurred. Second, UNHCR's efforts to plan for a major movement into Goma were considerably hampered by the Zairean Government's refusal to approve sites suggested by UNHCR and this made it difficult to physically prepare contingency sites in advance of any influx¹⁷.
340. In the face of such difficulties the UNHCR strategy appears to have become pinned on the proximity of Goma airport and its capacity to cope with an airlift of supplies from the Amsterdam stock and elsewhere in the event of a major influx¹⁸. Yet the agency did not follow-through either on its plans for Katale camp or in ensuring that the airport would have the capacity to cope with a massive airlift operation in the event of a major influx. Even though the Katale contingency plan contained sound proposals such as the improvement of the road between the Ugandan border and Rutshuru and the need for water tankers and heavy equipment, the ERT Leader who prepared it left Goma on the day it was finalised and there was no follow-up to operationalise the plan before the influx began three weeks later.
341. Within UNHCR it is standard practice that the ERT Leader is replaced after two months by personnel appointed by the Regional Bureau. The ERT Leader's mission in Goma had already been extended by two weeks. However, it is not at all clear when he was replaced by staff appointed by the Regional

decided to encourage and support the creation of a Zairean NGO working in the health sector supplying drugs to the local health services and in addition to deliberately build up a stock of drugs for use in medical emergencies. By July 1994 substantial stocks had been built up and both MSF-Holland and MSF-Belgium were well placed to supply not only their own medical activities after the influx but also those of several other agencies.

329. Unfortunately, preparedness initiatives such as these were limited throughout the period. During the course of interviews with donor, UN and NGO personnel the standard response as to why this had been the case was the difficulty of obtaining resources for preparedness activities or where resources were available actually allocating them for an eventuality that might not arise.
330. For a donor official to approve funds for an UN agency or an NGO to airlift food or water equipment to the site of a *possible* refugee flow is highly improbable¹³. If the anticipated event does not happen and the resources have to be moved elsewhere or (if perishable) to be disposed of locally, the official may be censured. Consequently, civil service organisations are inherently 'resource cautious' and find it easier to be reactive rather than proactive. The increasing role of the media in mobilising public and political pressures on civil servants in certain high profile, 'mediatic' emergencies may be increasing the 'reactive tendency' within the system (see below).
331. There were two critical points during 1994 when the information available called for an investment in a greater level of preparedness which had these been made may have substantially reduced mortality and also subsequent levels of expenditure. The first point was in January when the Force Commander of UNAMIR was made aware of alleged plans for the Interahamwe to provoke an incident with troops of the Belgian contingent and to exterminate thousands of Tutsis. Requests from the Force Commander for additional equipment to bring the force up to the authorised level and for permission to undertake arms searches to thwart the alleged plans did not receive a positive response. Had they been, the course of history could have been substantially different.
332. The second point was the period of several weeks leading up to the influx into Goma in which a flow of over a million refugees into Eastern Zaire was anticipated by parts of the UN system but which found UNHCR still operating with a contingency planning figure of only 50,000 at the start of the influx. This is a revealing story, essentially of two parallel processes within the UN system, and will be discussed in some detail here.
333. At the end of May, the UNHCR ERT Team Leader in Goma was asked by telephone from Geneva to prepare a contingency plan for an influx of 50,000 refugees into the Goma area. Lengthy discussions ensued with the Provincial Governor and a number of potential sites were considered but then dropped as a result of the authorities claiming the site was unacceptable 'for security reasons.' This process continued over the following three weeks until a site at Katale was agreed upon and a contingency plan for 50,000 refugees was finalised on 21 June. The following day the ERT Team Leader left Goma and there was no follow through to operationalise the plan prior to the influx.
334. At the beginning of June in a UN Disaster Management Team meeting in Nairobi the visiting Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF urged the agencies to prepare a contingency plan for IDP and refugee flows. It was agreed that UNREO as the coordinating body for all UN agencies should take the lead in preparing it, though substantial support was provided by UNICEF personnel. It was also agreed that if additional resources were required these should be indicated as part of the contingency plan which should be kept separate from the planned UN Consolidated Appeal Process scheduled for launch on 15 July. The UNREO Sitrep of 3 June announced:
335. 'The UN agencies are elaborating with UNREO a comprehensive contingency planning strategy to increase preparedness for a possible massive displacement of people into south-west Rwanda or even into Zaire and Burundi. Given the current political tensions and the relief capacity limitations, such an influx would have serious implications.'

operated at different levels of the system.

346. Coordination can be defined in many different ways²⁶ and it can function in many different ways, ranging from *facilitation* at one extreme to *management/direction* at the other. In the former coordination may simply consist of efforts to encourage agencies to exchange information about their on-going and planned programmes in the hope that this will reduce duplication and increase beneficiary and sectoral coverage. The latter may involve agencies being requested to undertake particular activities by an agency which has mandated responsibility for coordination and perhaps also controls the funding of implementing agencies. In between these two extremes lies many other forms of coordination²⁷. Donor agencies may meet to agree strategy towards the resourcing of a particular sector or key agency. Groups of implementing agencies, perhaps only representing a subset of the total number of agencies present, may meet to agree on a common strategy and division of labour among themselves.
347. Given the complexity of the response system and the numerous ways in which coordination took place it is extremely difficult to objectively assess the effectiveness of 'coordination'. Objective assessment is more feasible at the operational level as a result of the availability of indicators on process and outcome which can be used to measure not only agency performance but also the effectiveness of operational coordination. Assessment of coordination at the resourcing and strategy setting levels of the system is necessarily more subjective.
348. It is not proposed to exhaustively describe and assess all the coordination arrangements during 1994 as this would be very broad and space does not allow it. Instead the principle coordination arrangements and coordination-related points that emerged from the Study are considered under the following headings:
- coordination of activities inside Rwanda
 - coordination of activities in relation to refugees
 - coordination at the regional and extra-regional²⁸ level
 - coordination between the humanitarian system and the political and diplomatic domains.

Coordination of activities inside Rwanda

349. As a result of the February 1993 RPF advance and the dramatic increase in the numbers of IDPs requiring assistance, humanitarian coordination structures developed inside Rwanda which were to have a bearing on the structures that developed after April 1994. The UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal of March 1993 proposed the creation of a humanitarian coordination unit in Kigali and it was decided by UNDP and DHA to establish an Emergency Unit within the UNDP office. This arrangement was in accordance with the 1991 General Assembly Resolution which had led to the creation of DHA which provided for DHA being represented in-country by the UNDP Resident Representative, except in those instances where the position of Humanitarian Coordinator was established. The establishment of the Emergency Unit took several months and it was not until January 1994 that the first staff, under UNDP contracts, took up their posts in Kigali. In the meantime, ECHO had decided to support the creation of a *Cellule de Crise* in collaboration with the Government. For much of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, the *Cellule de Crise* meetings, which were chaired by an ECHO official, were the principal forum for coordination among the agencies responding to the needs of Rwandan IDPs. With the influx of Burundian refugees at the end of October 1993 the *Cellule de Crise* provided a ready forum for UNHCR to chair coordination meetings of those agencies involved in the response.
350. The events after the 6 April saw the termination of the *Cellule de Crise* structure and the relocation of the UNDP office, including the two expatriate staff from the UNDP Emergency Unit, to the UN complex in Nairobi. On 14 April the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) meeting in Geneva agreed on the establishment of a UN Rwanda Emergency Office (UNREO) which would *inter alia*:
- be a joint UNDP/DHA emergency coordination unit

Bureau as apparently in the week preceding the influx the international staff consisted of just a Protection Officer and a Logistics Officer¹⁹. Given the likelihood of an influx occurring in Goma and the massive numbers that could potentially be involved in such an influx it seems almost incredible that UNHCR did not expedite the operationalisation of the Katale contingency plan and allowed the withdrawal of the ERT Leader who had prepared it to go ahead and did not replace him with adequately trained personnel.

342. For their part the donor organisations do not appear to have attached much importance to the UNREO-led Contingency Plan. It is not even clear that all those attending the presentation of the Plan in Nairobi on 22 June passed the document back to their Head Offices²⁰. Moreover, the status of the Plan may have been ambiguous particularly in relation to the resourcing question as indicated the contingency resource needs of the various agencies just three weeks ahead of the Consolidated Appeal. In addition its final wording probably obscured the straightforward point being made. Those attending the meeting apparently were apparently more interested in hearing a presentation by the French Ambassador outlining Opération Turquoise which had just commenced.
343. The French-led intervention certainly appears to have diverted attention away from Goma and the likelihood of an influx occurring there. Whilst initially Turquoise Forces pushed westwards on a broad front covering the north-west as well as the south-west, within a week it had been decided that they should concentrate on establishing a Safe Zone in the south-west. Within the Safe Zone the French encouraged relief agencies and donor organisations, in some cases quite vigorously to work in the area. In the two weeks immediately preceding the Goma influx key figures in the humanitarian aid community, including the Deputy Head of UNREO and the DART Team Leader, were touring the south-west or working in Bujumbura and Bukavu to plan and set up the response in the south west²¹. Though it is hard to believe that the Turquoise Forces stopped monitoring the progress of the conflict and the developing humanitarian crisis in the north-west, particularly as aircraft and helicopters continued to fly over the area, no warning of the flow of thousands of people towards Goma was given to the agencies²². Thus it was left up to the agency personnel on the ground to monitor and initiate a response to the population build-up in the north-west.
344. During the 7-10 days immediately prior to the 14 July, the limited number of agency personnel then in Goma were certainly not unaware of the build-up in the north-west and the rapidly swelling population in Gisenyi²³. The ICRC, which under the 'division of labour' agreement with WFP was responsible for general ration provision to IDPs in the north-west, had teams regularly visiting the area. At the beginning of July they raised this with other agencies and Oxfam sent an assessment team to tour the north-west including Ruhengeri. The large number of IDPs was reported back to Oxford and, on the assumption that the IDPs would remain in the hills between Ruhengeri and the border, clothing and blankets were requested. Despite these signals agency personnel²⁴ generally believed that an influx was unlikely as the rump of the FAR was in the north-west, the RPF had not been able to advance beyond Ruhengeri for months and the Zairean authorities were informing agencies that the border would be closed in the event of an influx. The extent to which agency personnel in Goma were aware of the scenarios envisaged by the UNREO-led Contingency Plan or the UNAMIR Force Commanders views about the likely outflows and need to stockpile is unclear. However, it does appear that information produced by UNREO and UNAMIR tended to travel vertically through the UN system to New York and Geneva, rather than laterally to field and sub-offices in the region.

6.3 Coordination

345. The overall response involved an unprecedented number of agencies operating in Rwanda and the four neighbouring countries. During 1994 at least 8 UN agencies, one intergovernmental agency²⁵, approximately 250 NGOs including those involved in Tanzania and Zaire which did not have programmes inside Rwanda, at least 8 third party military contingents, the ICRC the IFRC and various National Societies of the Red Cross Movement were involved in either a delivery or support role. The system was resourced by over 20 donor organisations and private donations from the general public in as many countries, with at least eight different, clearly identifiable, resourcing mechanisms being employed. Inevitably this placed prodigious demands on the various coordination mechanisms that

personnel in the south-west and appreciated the 'agency neutral' forum provided by the UNREO meetings in Kigali and in the regions. In contrast ECHO personnel were critical of UNREO's approach to coordination which rarely moved beyond that of information-sharing, of the poor management of UNREO and the poor calibre of some of the UNREO personnel. Many NGOs, particularly those which had not previously worked in Rwanda, valued the information and briefings provided by the UNREO NGO Coordination Cell from late August onwards³³. However other NGOs, particularly the larger international NGOs with considerable emergency experience were critical of UNREO's lack of technical personnel to provide an informed basis for operational coordination and of the calibre of some of the personnel. Whilst UNICEF was particularly supportive of UNREO the attitude of many UN personnel was that UNREO was peripheral to their operations.

356. Such an extraordinary range of opinion reflects several points. First, it reflects the continuing diversity of views within the international humanitarian aid system over what coordination means and whether 'light' coordination which allows donor organisations, UN agencies and NGOs to more or less decide their own actions, is preferable to more 'directive' coordination with consequent reductions of agency autonomy. Second, it reflects an extraordinary lack of clarity as to UNREO's identity and its role. The team regards this lack of clarity as an inevitable product of the long history of unsuccessful attempts to address the issue of humanitarian aid coordination within the UN system.
357. In late 1994, DHA undertook a review of the UNREO experience³⁴. Whilst many of the findings of that study are supported by Study III it is revealing that the authors of the DHA study were firmly of the opinion that UNREO was part of DHA³⁵. In reality for the critical period of the emergency (ie. April to August) UNREO was a joint UNDP/DHA entity drawing the majority of its staff from UNDP and largely funded by and through UNDP. Thus the Humanitarian Coordinator was the UNDP Representative and his deputy was the UNDP Deputy Representative. Three of the expatriate personnel were UNDP staff members, two were UNDP consultants recruited for UNREO on UNDP contracts and three were seconded staff from NGOs (ADRA and SCF-US). Though CERF funds were approved by the same IASC meeting that agreed to establish UNREO it appears that these funds were not actually used until August. From April until the end of July the bulk of UNREO's funding came from UNDP's Special Programme Resources and a grant by the UK ODA which pre-dated April 1994. DHA support to UNREO during the April-August period was limited to the temporary secondment of a Senior Emergency Officer, the provision of administrative support shared between DHA-Geneva and UNDP-Nairobi, and the dissemination of UNREO Sitreps.
358. In the third week of August, the UNDP/UNREO office in Nairobi was moved to Kigali. This was 3-4 weeks after most other UN agencies, the delay stemming from the Humanitarian Coordinator's highly questionable view that the move should not take place until the legitimacy of the new Government had been recognised by key UN member states³⁶. The re-establishment of the UNDP office in Kigali and a desire, apparently emanating from UNDP Head Office, that the agency have a higher profile, coincided with an increasing separation of UNREO from UNDP and a closer relationship between UNREO and DHA³⁷. Consultants formerly contracted through UNDP changed to DHA contracts; DHA-Geneva arranged for a self-contained team of 12 Swedish Rescue Board personnel to provide telecommunications, administrative and logistics support to UNREO³⁸; arrangements were made with NGOs for additional personnel secondments³⁹ which enabled UNREO to open regional offices in Gikongoro, Butare and Cyangugu⁴⁰ and to establish an NGO Coordination Cell next to its office in Kigali.
359. Many of the criticisms made of UNREO relate to this central issue of the lack of clarity over its identity and role. Whilst some criticisms are undoubtedly justified many would appear to stem from a lack of understanding of the considerable constraints which UNREO faced. As a quickly assembled, ad hoc entity with all but two of the staff being newly appointed and many of the new staff being provided on secondment from other agencies it was hardly surprising that some staff were of unimpressive calibre and many interpreted UNREO's role in different ways. The ambiguity inherent in the arrangements between DHA and UNDP meant that UNREO never had the personnel or the authority to carry out its own financial and personnel management⁴¹. As differences between UNDP and DHA emerged over UNREO's

- build upon the existing UNDP Emergency Unit
 - be headed by a newly appointed UNDP Representative/Humanitarian Coordinator
351. The IASC meeting also approved the release of \$200,000 from the CERF to DHA to cover the start up costs of UNREO.
352. The period from the evacuation until mid-May saw a remarkable turnover of key personnel as UNREO was established and the UN Disaster Management Team previously in Kigali tried to establish itself in Nairobi. The SRSG, Ambassador Booh-Booh, was transferred at the end of April and not effectively replaced by Ambassador Khan until the 4 July when the RPF finally took Kigali. During May and June the Force Commander effectively served as a *de facto* SRSG by virtue of the Secretary General's request that he attempt to broker a ceasefire between the Interim Government and the RPF. The UNDP Resident Representative was replaced by a more experienced UNDP official who, following the IASC meeting would also serve as the Humanitarian Coordinator and Head of UNREO. The new Humanitarian Coordinator visited Nairobi for the last week of April and formally took up his post on 11 May. The extraordinary efforts of the UNDP Deputy Resident Representative²⁹ during the evacuation process resulted in his exhaustion and an extended recuperation period. From 10 May, the post which now doubled as Deputy Head of UNREO, was filled by a UNDP official with considerable emergency aid experience. The UNHCR Country Representative in Kigali before the evacuation left to take up another posting under a prior arrangement. The UNICEF Country Representative who had been emotionally affected by the events following 6 April began an extended period of leave.
353. Undoubtedly such personnel changes and temporary gaps in key positions resulted in a hiatus within the UN's humanitarian coordination structure during the first weeks of the crisis. Staff involved in the initial DMT meetings talk of a sense of 'floating', unsure about their role or who was in charge. It is not clear whether this hiatus resulted in some things not being done that ought to have, in part because the role for humanitarian agencies in the midst of what was evidently a protection crisis was itself not clear. Actions which formed a central part of the UN's initial humanitarian coordination efforts went ahead despite the hiatus. Thus the UNAHT was deployed to Kigali; UNREO opened a sub-office in Kabale enabling liaison with the RPF Social Wing in Mulindi and the holding of coordination meetings for UN agencies and NGOs beginning to start cross-border programmes in RPF-controlled areas³⁰; Operating Principles were prepared for agencies working inside Rwanda which were cleared, with some difficulty, through the Interim Government and the RPF; the UNREO office in Nairobi began producing Sitreps assembled from information from a variety of UN and other sources which were much valued within the donor and NGO communities; in May UNREO opened an office in Bujumbura³¹. That such things went ahead despite the hiatus reflects well on the personnel involved and on the timely provision of a Senior Emergency Officer from DHA on temporary assignment to help UNREO establish itself.
354. The UN Advance Humanitarian Team, as noted earlier in Section 3.2, represented a determined and courageous effort by the principal UN humanitarian agencies to maintain a presence and, to the extent that the security situation allowed, to undertake coordinated relief distributions in and around Kigali. In the event the security situation was so poor that the volume of assistance distributed was small. Nevertheless, such inter-agency operational collaboration is rare within the UN system and those agency personnel who were seconded to the UNAHT were extremely positive about the model and its potential usefulness in future operations. However, it should be pointed out that in terms of coordination the demands placed upon the UNAHT personnel were not great as apart from the ICRC the UNAHT were the only humanitarian agencies with an effective presence in Kigali at that time³². In that sense the utility of the UNAHT model may be limited in other contexts where more agencies are likely to be present.
355. UNREO was the principal humanitarian coordination body for operations within Rwanda. Widely varying opinions about UNREO's performance were expressed during the course of the Study. Bilateral donor organisation personnel were generally positive, valuing the UNREO Sitreps and UNREO's central role in the coordination of efforts to discourage the IDPs in the south-west from moving into Bukavu at the time of the withdrawal of Opération Turquoise. Donor organisations with representation in the field (ie. DART and ECHO) differed in their opinions. DART personnel worked closely with UNREO

outcome of UNHCR's coordination and the effectiveness of the overall response. UNHCR's experience in Ngara and Goma provide interesting insights into the factors that make for effective coordination and the difficulties the agency faces in ensuring that all NGOs working in camps conform to certain standards.

365. In Ngara it was decided at an early stage to limit the number of agencies working in Benaco to those already working in Tanzania. In addition, CARE which did not have a prior presence in Tanzania but whose logistical expertise was highly valued, was invited to establish a programme⁴⁹. Letters of Intent were then signed with these agencies - numbering 12 in all. Other agencies which subsequently visited Ngara expressing a desire to participate in the relief efforts were, apart from a few exceptions, not allowed to work in the camps⁵⁰. This approach was supported by the local authorities and also by ECHO which required any NGO receiving ECHO funding to have the support of UNHCR-Ngara. In this way, the number of NGOs involved in the camps was kept to a manageable number and most of the agencies involved had participated in the earlier response to the Burundian refugee influx. The limited number of agencies and personnel involved in the operation engendered an unusually collaborative approach between UNHCR and the NGOs and there is almost universal agreement that this was one of the key factors contributing to the highly effective initial response in Ngara. The competition between NGOs and 'flag-planting' that was a characteristic of the response in Goma, Bukavu and inside Rwanda was almost absent.
366. UNHCR's approach was resented by those NGOs that wanted to participate in the response in Ngara but were effectively prevented from doing so. Some of these agencies proceeded to establish programmes to assist the local Tanzanian population and in one case refugees outside the camps⁵¹. No foreign military contingents assisted the operations in the camps. EMERCOM provided substantial logistical support and the UK ODA provided a logistics team to forward supplies from Mwanza and work with CARE to receive and allocate them to agencies working in the camps. ECHO seconded a member of staff to work with the UNHCR team who was given the position of a Field Officer⁵².
367. In Goma the situation was quite different. There was no attempt by UNHCR to limit the number of NGOs and even if there had been it would almost certainly not have succeeded as the intense media coverage exerted considerable pressure upon agencies to participate in the response and it is unlikely that the Zairean authorities would have been as supportive of such an approach as their counterparts had been in Tanzania. The number of NGOs peaked at between 90-100⁵³ all of which had ready access to the camps. In addition there were several military contingents and civil defence units nominally operating under the framework of the UNHCR Service Packages request of 20 July. Several donor organisations provided teams and individual consultants to assist in particular sectors. As in Ngara ECHO seconded a member of staff who worked alongside the UNHCR Technical Coordinator.
368. ECHO's decision, taken shortly after the influx, to channel all its refugee funding to UNHCR rather than respond bilaterally to funding requests from individual NGOs, was both bold and positive. Even if the resources allocated by UNHCR still only accounted for a small proportion of the total resources being deployed in Goma, they considerably strengthened UNHCR's ability to ensure greater coordination among NGOs. However, despite such 'power of the purse', UNHCR'S ability to encourage NGOs into the poorly covered, low-profile areas of body collection and sanitation remained limited (see Section 4.3). When working in a high profile response, it would appear that whilst NGOs may be encouraged to work in 'unattractive' sectors they cannot be forced to do so. If UNHCR is to ensure that it is able to implement programmes in such critical preventive activities it may be necessary to enter special stand-by and funding arrangements with particular NGOs or to encourage private sector companies to develop the capacity to undertake such activities.
369. The number of NGOs directly funded by UNHCR-Goma during 1994 was 21. These included many of the large international NGOs with good emergency experience. Some of these NGOs may have on-funded other NGOs in a type of sub-contracting role. However, there remained some 70-80 NGOs working in the camps with which UNHCR had no funding relationship and thus little or no 'clout'. In many cases these other NGOs did attend coordination meetings and cooperated willingly with UNHCR

role so UNREO personnel had to engage in unnecessary 'politicking'.

360. Lack of clear authority, lack of control over financial or in-kind resources to allocate to implementing agencies and the need to preserve good relationships with agencies, restricted UNREO's coordination efforts largely to the modest role of information sharing. This it did quite effectively through its facilitation of meetings, preparation of Sitreps and collation of information designed to highlight gaps in sectoral and geographical coverage⁴². Where the calibre of its personnel in the field was impressive, as was the case in the south-west in August, UNREO was able to participate fully in setting strategy and then encouraging other UN agencies and NGOs to collaborate in implementing the strategy. In terms of technical coordination within sectors, such as water and health, this responsibility had been given to UNICEF in July. In view of UNICEF's unimpressive performance in coordination, particularly at the regional level between July and September, it would have been preferable in retrospect for UNREO personnel in the field to have had technical backgrounds and an understanding that their role extended beyond sectoral and geographical 'gap filling'. As it was, there was no attempt to standardise drug treatment protocols or collate data on morbidity and mortality rates in the IDP camps until September.
361. The two largest donors within the international community (ie. the US Government and the European Union) established teams in the region and inside Rwanda which, through their allocation of resources to agencies had a potential coordinating role. The US Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) was established in the region in mid-May⁴³ and performed assessments of requirements, liaising with other agencies to establish a coordinated strategy and in allocating grants directly to UN agencies and NGOs (not all of which were US-based) in the field⁴⁴. Because of co-location of several UNREO offices and DART Field Offices, DART helped strengthen the UNREO role and worked closely with UNREO personnel in developing the strategy for encouraging IDPs to remain in Rwanda after the departure of the Opération Turquoise forces in August. Because of the security situation DART personnel were not allowed to enter Rwanda until early-July.
362. As noted below ECHO personnel were attached to UNHCR in Ngara and Goma. Within Rwanda ECHO personnel performed a broadly similar role to that of DART though with less autonomy and ability to allocate funds⁴⁵. ECHO perceived ICRC rather than UNREO as playing the critical role in relation to IDPs and provided generous support to the ICRC⁴⁶. It received a total of 60 funding requests from NGOs but limited its funding to 20 so as to reduce the coordination problems. Considering the importance of DART and ECHO there was a remarkable lack of contact between the two sets of personnel. It was not until November that regular meetings were established between the two and these were soon discontinued when ECHO personnel perceived that their provision of information to DART was not being reciprocated⁴⁷.

Coordination in Relation to Refugees

363. UNHCR had mandated responsibility for the care and protection of refugees crossing into Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire, a role it performed in conjunction with the relevant local and national authorities. Within the UNHCR hierarchy the offices in Ngara, Goma and Bukavu were Sub-Offices whilst that in Karagwe was a Field Office⁴⁸. In all Sub-Offices Technical Coordinators were appointed (the key ones arriving with the Emergency Response Teams) in the sectors of health, water, food, site planning, logistics, security, communications and community services. In most cases the calibre of the technical coordinators was impressive. The technical orientation of the structure, the monitoring of indicators of the status of the refugees from soon after the influxes, the existence of internationally recognised per capita targets (eg. litres of water per person) and good practice in managing large camp populations resulted in rational and generally well organised approaches to coordination.
364. As a non-executing agency, UNHCR was reliant upon the collaboration of NGOs in actually distributing the material assistance and providing other services in the camps. Thus the work of the various technical coordinators largely consisted of agreeing particular tasks with particular NGOs, monitoring their performance and providing advice and occasional support to overcome problems. Thus the calibre of the NGOs working in the camps and the quality of UNHCR's relationship with them was central to the

partner NGOs established selective feeding programmes as a precaution against breaks in the WFP general ration in Ngara and Bukavu and attempted to do so in Goma. Such programmes were of questionable necessity and therefore represented an inefficient use of scarce financial and staff resources that (assuming such resources were fungible) would have been better deployed in support of WFP's efforts to ensure the regular supply of general ration commodities. WFP was reportedly poor at sharing pipeline information with HCR at the field level in Ngara and Bukavu⁵⁹. In Ngara in October 1994 HCR personnel attempted to persuade visiting USAID and State Department officials to consign general ration commodities directly to UNHCR, by-passing WFP in clear contravention of the MOU. This incident resulted in letters of complaint being sent by the WFP office in Ngara to UNHCR Ngara and by WFP Dar es Salaam to the WFP Head office and was reportedly resented by the US officials⁶⁰. In July 1994 UNHCR procured 1,575 tonnes of CSB in South Africa and airlifted it to Goma when it became clear that WFP was unable to obtain sufficient supplies from its principal supplier in the USA even though under the MOU WFP had responsibility for supplying CSB⁶¹.

376. A recurring source of differences between the two agencies was that of the number of refugees actually requiring assistance and the delay by UNHCR in undertaking the enumeration/registration exercises which invariably resulted in substantial reductions in the planning figures (see Section 5.9). Overestimation of refugee numbers placed unnecessary performance demands on WFP as well as resulting in potential oversupply of commodities. Paradoxically the costs of undertaking a registration (equipment costs and staff time) are largely borne by UNHCR whilst the costs of delaying a reduction in the planning figures are largely, but not entirely, borne by WFP⁶². It could be argued that UNHCR's unimpressive performance on enumeration/ registration in Goma and Bukavu and in the second count in Ngara in June 1995, may be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that it is WFP rather than UNHCR itself which has to bear the bulk of the costs of a delayed registration.
377. During the course of the study team members noted the tendency for staff from one agency to attribute blame for a problem to the other agency. Thus, UNHCR staff might attribute the malnutrition rates in the camps to WFP's failure to supply sufficient general ration commodities whilst WFP staff would criticise UNHCR for not carrying out the enumeration/registration or for the delay in changing from commune level to cellule or household-level distribution systems in the camps. The worst example encountered of such 'blaming the other' concerned the very high rates of mortality experienced by Burundian refugees in Tanzania in late 1993 which resulted in the death of several thousand people. Whilst WFP saw principal cause of mortality being dysentery caused by UNHCR's tardiness in the provision of adequate water and sanitation, UNHCR saw inadequate supplies of food by WFP as being the principal cause⁶³.
378. The conclusion drawn from the above is that the splitting of responsibility for critically linked emergency functions⁶⁴ between the two dominant UN humanitarian agencies is highly problematic and unlikely to be resolved by further modifications to the MOU.

Coordination at the regional and extra-regional level

379. Study I of the overall evaluation has demonstrated that for decades before 1994 Rwanda was part of a wider regional problem⁶⁵. From a humanitarian perspective the sudden movement of populations over Rwanda's border into Tanzania, Burundi, Zaire and also into Uganda gave the emergency a particularly regional dimension. Despite this the coordination mechanisms that developed concentrated upon Rwanda itself and, at least until mid-1995 appear to have shied away from seeing the crisis in regional terms. Significantly both the SRSG and the Force Commander's remits were limited to Rwanda. The remit of the Humanitarian Coordinator and Head of UNREO theoretically included Rwandan refugees as the wording used to describe his role referred to humanitarian assistance 'for Rwandans', but in practice UNHCR's mandated role limited that of the Humanitarian Coordinator in relation to the refugees.
380. For its part UNHCR had created the post of the Special Envoy of the High Commissioner prior to the emergency and this allowed for a certain integration of UNHCR's activities in the region. However, the

Coordinators. However, there were cases where UNHCR Coordinators felt that the competence and actions of certain NGOs was inappropriate and they would have preferred that the agencies withdrew from the camps.

370. In such cases, UNHCR's ability to effect a withdrawal was initially at least quite limited, particularly if the Zairean authorities were not supportive of UNHCR's position. For instance there were examples of NGOs being asked to leave the camps who simply moved their facility to just beyond the boundary of the camp and continued operating. With the deployment of the Zairean Contingent in March 1995 and more careful preparation of the case against particular NGOs and liaison with the Zairean authorities, UNHCR was better able to achieve the closure of the most inappropriate NGO programmes. In April 1995 for instance UNHCR suspected that an NGO which was running an orphanage in Mugunga camp was doing so under false pretences. Efforts by UNHCR personnel to gain access to the orphanage compound were prevented and eventually with the support of an unit from the Zairean Contingent entry was gained and the identities of the children checked against UNHCR records. Approximately 90% of the children had parents in the camp and the 'orphanage' appeared to have been established as a way for the NGO to falsely raise funds and receive in-kind resources⁵⁴.
371. In the case of CARE-Deutschland, UNHCR was able to achieve a success of sorts (see Section 4.4). Following UNHCR-Goma's request that the agency not work in the camps the agency eventually left Goma and worked in Bukavu from September until December, principally providing assistance to the spontaneous refugee settlements on Ijwi island. However, this outcome was only achieved in the face of stiff resistance, including apparently requests from German Government officials that UNHCR-Geneva overrule the Goma Sub-Office and a reluctance by the Zairean authorities to support UNHCR in the face of the German position⁵⁵. One result of the CARE-Deutschland affair was the close involvement of German Ambassador from Kinshasa in the overall assistance efforts by the German Government and NGOs in Goma. Regular coordination meetings of the various German agencies were held throughout August. From the perspective of overall coordination efforts the precedent of separate national coordination efforts by donor governments and NGOs would appear highly questionable.
372. The ability of UNHCR to coordinate the various military contingents in Goma was briefly covered in Section 3.5. Some were more amenable to responding to requests than others depending on their command structures and orders. Opération Turquoise forces undertook body collection and burial activities but stopped without warning and it was several days before GOAL and the Zairean Scouts were able to take over. UNICEF took responsibility for coordinating the Unaccompanied Children's Centres in Goma. As discussed in Section 4.9 its initial efforts were unimpressive and the rates of malnutrition, morbidity and mortality were often above the levels experienced by children in the camps.
373. A notable aspect of the overall response was the central role of UNHCR and WFP, with the two agencies accounting for over 85% of the resources received by, or channelled through, the UN system during 1994⁵⁶. Since 1992, as a result of problems previously encountered by UNHCR in the mobilisation, procurement and transport of general ration food commodities for distribution to refugees⁵⁷ WFP has gradually taken over these responsibilities under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the two agencies⁵⁸. The way in which the MOU arrangements worked and the relationship between the two agencies is central to the effectiveness of the overall system.
374. As discussed in Chapter 5, the supply of general ration commodities to the refugee operations was more or less satisfactory, though there were occasional gaps in the provision of some commodities, notably beans and CSB, and periods of inadequate overall supplies leading to reduced ration sizes as a result of logistical problems and resourcing problems. In addition there was a particular problem in Tanzania of WFP supplying maize grain rather than maize flour. Compared to previous refugee emergencies where high rates of malnutrition-related mortality had been experienced the provision of general ration commodities in 1994 was a success.
375. Despite these positive achievements there were several indications that all is not well with the operation of the MOU or the relationship between the two agencies. For instance UNHCR and its implementing

387. As this study progressed so evidence of a lack of coherence between the strategies of the majority of humanitarian agencies and the political and diplomatic domains began to emerge as an important characteristic of the overall response to the crisis. The TOR for Study III had not anticipated this issue and the study was not designed to examine it closely. Nevertheless, its importance warrants a number of observations.
388. The first is that the key humanitarian strategies established and pursued during 1994 appear to have been developed without a significant appraisal of the political and diplomatic context and can consequently be criticised for their political naivety. For instance, almost immediately after the Goma influx it quickly became accepted by many humanitarian agencies, though with the key exception of UNHCR, several NGOs and the US military⁶⁷, that the best strategy was to encourage an early return of the refugees to Rwanda. Quite how this strategy originated and why it became accepted so readily is unclear. Several senior international political figures visited Goma during July and the appalling suffering in the camps and the patent unsustainability of such large populations in those locations when juxtaposed with the installation of the new Government in Kigali seems to have led many to express the view that the refugees should return to Rwanda as soon as possible. The extent to which these views influenced their widespread acceptance or whether humanitarian agencies were already of the same view is not clear. Certainly in Kigali the Force Commander and the newly appointed SRSG appear to have been active in pushing for an early return to the extent of authorising the airdropping of leaflets over the camps at the beginning of August advising refugees to return, apparently without consultation with UNHCR.
389. Expectations of an early return were unrealistic from a number of perspectives. Instances of large refugee populations in Africa or elsewhere repatriating within days of their flight are rare. The fact that the movement of the refugees had been preceded by a genocide in which a not insubstantial proportion of the refugees had been involved made an early return extremely unlikely⁶⁸. That this was not perceived by those responsible for developing and adopting the strategy is remarkable. Possibly they did not realise at that point that the genocide had involved substantial numbers of people rather than just the militia and elements of the FAR and Gendarmerie, and felt that the majority of refugees could return with clear consciences and without fear of reprisals.
390. With its knowledge and experience UNHCR was much more cautious about the prospects for an early return. The agency commissioned a study of conditions within Rwanda that reportedly found evidence of systematic revenge killings in which the RPF had been involved. The 'Gersony' report was suppressed, apparently at the request of the UN Secretariat, because it undermined a new government at a time when the UN and several donor countries were attempting to support it and its international image. However, sections of it found their way into the media and received widespread international coverage in the third week of September 1994. In the absence of a thorough examination of the factors influencing particular decisions, the reasoning which underlay the repatriation policy can only be surmised. It would appear that a combination of inadequate understanding, wishful thinking and perhaps an awareness of the very substantial costs involved in the international community sustaining some 2 million refugees, resulted in the adoption of a strategy that was unrealistic and therefore unlikely to succeed. Having adopted the strategy it appears that some of those involved in ensuring its implementation were prepared to suppress evidence that all was not well in Rwanda and that the fears of the refugees about their safety on returning may well have been justified.
391. Similar arguments can be used to question the strategy adopted in the south-west during August to discourage the movement of IDPs across the border by ensuring that they were provided with adequate relief assistance and protection. Relief agency personnel were rightly anxious to 'avoid another Goma', however the result of their actions was the presence of a large number of (Hutu) IDPs in camps in the south-west for almost eight months. The conditions in these camps and differences over how best to ensure their return to their home communes was to become the dominant issue in the new Government's relations with the international community and eventually, in April, over 3,000 IDPs were killed, principally by RPF soldiers, in the camp at Kibeho. Following the tragedy, several donor organisations

Special Envoy's role appears to have been more concerned with the general protection principles rather than operational matters of aid delivery.

381. Above the level of coordination mechanisms based in the region there were several organisations, committees and working groups which had either responsibility for coordination or contributed to the coordination efforts. Assessing the effectiveness of these mechanisms is much more difficult in the absence of a detailed study of the minutes of the various meetings, interviews with the participants in the meetings and an attempt to detect the effect of decisions upon the operational efforts in the field.
382. In terms of coordination within the UN system the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) composed of the heads of the principal agencies and chaired by DHA was the most important. It met four times during 1994 and considered Rwanda on each occasion. The Humanitarian Liaison Working Group composed of representatives of diplomatic missions to the UN agencies in Geneva, UN agencies and some NGOs met in Geneva met three times during 1994 and considered Rwanda on each occasion. Members brief the group on their humanitarian activities and discuss policy in relation to the main operations around the world. Responsibility for chairing the meetings rotated among members.
383. Created in March 1992 with the express objective of improving coordination amongst humanitarian agencies the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) occupied a central coordinating position in relation to UN agencies and the international efforts as a whole. As part of its role it coordinated the IASC meetings and in conjunction with UNDP, DHA provided support to UNREO, though from the discussion above it appears that DHA's role in relation to UNREO only became substantial once the critical period of the emergency had passed, rehabilitation efforts were commencing and UNREO'S coordination efforts became focussed on the IDP camps in the south-west.
384. The Department undoubtedly played an important role in the dissemination of information through a range of activities which included:
 - sending UNREO weekly situation reports on e-mail to donor organisations, NGOs and other organisations capable of accessing the UNIENET system;
 - providing briefings for the Humanitarian Liaison Working Group, the weekly UNHCR coordination meetings in Geneva, and occasionally the Security Council;
 - preparing the Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and tracking contributions against these Appeals;
 - increasing the profile of the situation by, for instance the Under-Secretary General's visits to Kigali in April and July 1994.
385. At the IASC meeting at the beginning of August 1994, DHA presented a matrix intended to clarify the division of labour between UN agencies and this took it from a concentration on information coordination into the realm of management coordination. The matrix appears to have reproduced accepted generalities about mandated and planned roles of the principal UN agencies but did not relate these to the actual situation on the ground which was strongly influenced by the funding position and personnel capacity of the agencies concerned. It is not clear how much influence the DHA matrix had upon subsequent decisions by those agencies or whether these were monitored in relation to the matrix by DHA. Where field personnel of the principal UN agencies were aware of the DHA matrix they appear not to have regarded it as a significant step.
386. Perhaps reflecting the relatively recent establishment of the DHA, as well as the predominance of security issues during the response to the Rwanda crisis during 1994, the UN Secretariat's principal channels during 1994 appear to have been the Special Representative of the Secretary General and the UNAMIR Force Commander rather than the USG for Humanitarian Affairs and the Humanitarian Coordinator. Significantly it is understood that it was not until December that the USG for Humanitarian Affairs was included in the circulation list of the SRSG's confidential reports from Kigali which were received by the USG for Peacekeeping and the USG for Political Affairs⁶⁶.

reduced their planned levels of assistance to the country (see Study II and Study IV).

392. To question the wisdom of the 'discouragement' strategy is clearly easier 'post-Kibeho' than it would have been in August 1994. Moreover, there can be no way of knowing what would have happened if an additional 500,000 or so refugees had indeed arrived in Bukavu during late August and September. Nevertheless, the strategy appears to have been devised largely by humanitarian agency personnel with inadequate understanding of the political context and the likelihood that the IDP camps contained those who had been involved in the genocide. Had the relief agencies working in RPF-controlled areas been monitoring the human rights situation more closely it is probable that the evidence of 'systematic' revenge killings apparently detected by the Gersony report would have been detected earlier and used to inform thinking about the most appropriate strategy for the IDPs. In retrospect it would probably have been preferable for the international community to have arranged a phased movement of the IDPs across into Zaire as the capacity to receive them improved.
393. That two key strategies adopted during the response by humanitarian agencies were so politically unrealistic and were to prove, in the case of the refugees, unsuccessful, and, in the case of the IDPs, counterproductive, suggests something seriously amiss within the international community's system for managing complex political emergencies. The conclusion drawn by Study III is that this stemmed from the combined effects of:
- a lack of an agreed strategy within the international community (between Permanent Members of the Security Council, donor organisations and regional governments) as to how best to 'manage' the crisis;
 - the inadequate harmonisation of humanitarian and political/diplomatic policies.
394. Differences in approach to the Rwanda crisis by key members of the Security Council in the April-May period are examined in Study II and differences in the approach by key donor governments to the new Government after July 1994 and questions over its legitimacy are examined in Study IV. It is evident from these studies that there were very substantial differences in the positions and approach of key members of the international community and that the persistence of such differences has substantially contributed to the lack of resolution of the situation in the Great Lakes region. The need for political solutions to the situation was widely recognised⁶⁹ and UNHCR and other agencies were involved in several intra-regional meetings in particular the Nairobi and Bujumbura Conferences early in 1995. However, these efforts were unlikely to succeed in the absence of a very substantial and coordinated commitment from the Security Council, key donor governments and governments in the region.
395. The conclusion that there was inadequate integration of humanitarian and political/diplomatic policies of donor governments is hardly surprising. Neutrality and impartiality are central to the ethos, mission statements and mandates of most humanitarian agencies and for many years most agencies have striven, though not always successfully, to maintain a distance between their own actions and the foreign and diplomatic policies of governments. Within many donor governments themselves there is often a separation organisationally and budgetarily between the administration of humanitarian aid and the design and management of foreign policies, with the former often being located outside Foreign Ministries/Departments or occupying an off-line position within such departments. In recent years, ECHO has become one of the largest single source of funds for humanitarian operations, yet within the structure of the European Union and in the absence of a common EU foreign policy the linkage between funding decisions and political/diplomatic policies is especially weak. One example of this was ECHO's support in late 1994 to NGOs which were resisting the Ministry of Rehabilitation's attempt to register NGOs operating in the country. This action contributed to the new Government's sense that the international community was being deliberately obstructive at a time when many EU member states were keen to provide support to the Government.
396. During 1994, the Security Council provided the principal forum for decisions which were critical in setting the context for the humanitarian aid operations (ie. deployment of UN peacekeeping missions, the authorisation of third party military interventions and, occasional discussion of regional security

issues). Whilst Study III did not directly analyse the role of the Security Council, it appears not to have been well informed on humanitarian matters⁷⁰. Potentially the Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs could have played an important role in bringing together the humanitarian and political domains, but as noted above he does not appear to have been included in the flows of political information within the Secretariat until towards the end of 1994.

397. The result of the lack of coherence in the setting of strategies and of carrying them through is that despite the massive loss of life, disruption in the Great Lakes region and expenditures by rich countries and neighbouring states, solutions to the Rwanda crisis appear to have come no closer.

requested for the meeting to be reconvened the next day. Unfortunately, this proposal did not get the support of other participants' (Fax from the Director of Inspection and Evaluation Service and the Director of the Regional Bureau for Africa to ODI dated 15 September 1995). Other UN officials involved in the meeting have no record of UNHCR attempting to brief the meeting on its contingency planning activities in Goma or of any proposal to reconvene the meeting.

16. The introduction stated 'The escalation of the war creates a continuous growing displacement of population into the southern, south-western and western parts of the country, which is difficult to quantify at this moment. The situation over the next weeks may evolve in such a way as to reach crisis proportions with serious humanitarian consequences for the displaced population concentrated along the border areas and also for those who may cross the border into the neighbouring countries. This will represent a major challenge to the international humanitarian assistance community to be able to provide positive and rapid response to the plight of the people trapped in the emergency situation.' Scenario C read: 'The bulk of the displaced population has been on the move for several weeks during which they will have suffered exhaustion, exposure to the elements with the related health problems. It is assumed that changing circumstances will enable the relief community to gain wider access to the population. Taking into consideration the very fragile security situation in Burundi and the intensification of the war inside Rwanda, it is difficult to determine where such a population will be at the time the international community gets full access to it. It is assumed however that supply by land routes will be limited and the initial delivery of even bulk items like food will have to be by air from Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Air dropping may be considered. The people will essentially be in a refugee like situation with urgent needs for shelter material, household items, etc.'

17. Even the contingency site at Katale was only formally approved by the Governor of North Kivu the day before the start of the influx. Sites at Mugunga and Lac Vert had also been pre-identified by UNHCR, but these were not approved by the local authorities until after the influx.

18. Fedde Groot EPRS, UNHCR. Interviewed June 1995.

19. Véronique Robert, Protection Officer UNHCR Bukavu (formerly Goma). Interviewed April 1995.

20. Some donor officials involved in the response within their Head Offices could not recollect having seen the document when interviewed.

21. UNREO had established a liaison office in Goma following the start of Opération Turquoise. DART did not establish an office in Goma until after the start of the influx.

22. Indeed, two days before the influx began a French minister visited WFP and denied that an influx into Goma was imminent Daan Everts WFP Deputy Executive Director. Personal communication, January 1995.

23. Some even noticed the increased number of Rwandan registered cars in Goma in the 2-3 days before the 14 July.

24. The agencies with offices in Goma included UNHCR, UNREO, WFP, Oxfam, MSF-Holland, Caritas and the ICRC. With the departure of the UNHCR ERT leader two weeks earlier the HCR office comprised two expatriate staff: a Protection Officer and a Logistician.

25. The International Organisation of Migration (IOM).

26. The definition of coordination used by Study III is that of 'orchestration of effort' which is helpful in that this notion of coordination is acceptable to most agencies and in that it enables consideration of all the different types of coordination which took place in 1994.

27. The team found it helpful to consider four broad categories of coordination: information coordination; coordination through common representation (eg. for negotiating access, briefing the media, negotiating funding); framework coordination (requiring a shared sense of priorities); and management/directive coordination.

28. The term extra-regional is used to differentiate coordination involving the key donor countries and the UN head offices in New-York, Geneva and Rome from coordination within the region at the Kampala, Bujumbura level, as well as between the agencies working in Goma, Bukavu, Ngara and Karagwe.

Notes on Chapter 6

1. The International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR) and the Immediate Response Account (IRA) in the case of WFP; the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) in the case of UNHCR; and the Emergency Programme Fund (EPF) in the case of UNICEF.
2. For instance, the ICRC launched a Rwanda Appeal, requesting CHF 40 million, at the beginning of 1994 principally for its IDP programmes. Two budget extensions requesting an additional CHF 109 million were presented to donors at the beginning of June and in mid-November. The IFRC had its own appeal process for its activities in response to the Rwanda crisis with an initial appeal being made in mid-April and being subsequently revised to a total of CHF 91 million.
3. For instance, in responding promptly to the Goma influx, WFP-Kampala borrowed food destined for distribution in South Sudan and Uganda. In some cases, time did not allow for the donor's permission to be obtained first.
4. It is interesting to note that, in November 1993, WFP and UNHCR each drew \$5million from the CERF to assist their response to the Burundian refugee crisis at a time when the availability of donor funding appeared inadequate. Proportionally, in terms of the overall costs of that response, the CERF played a much more significant role than its role in relation to the Rwanda crisis in 1994.
5. Of the 224,930 tonnes delivered in the region during the June-December period, 41,350 tonnes (18%) was resourced by borrowings, the IRA and the CERF.
6. Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes 'Review of IEFR Modalities' CFA:32/P/5 December 1991, Rome.
7. 'Rwanda/Burundi Regional Emergency Operations (1994) WFP's Response Capacity: Resource Factors' Paper presented to the Long-term Financing Working Group 24 March 1995.
8. This figure is no more than a guesstimate of what it would have cost to have undertaken the following: the identification of more potential sites near Lake Kivu, the pre-organisation of bucket chlorination teams, the demarcation of defecation fields, the pre-positioning of pumping equipment, water tankers and heavy equipment either in Goma or if necessary just across the border in Uganda, or alternatively the arrangement of call-down contracts with regional contractors to provide such equipment when needed, and the improvement of the 10 kilometre stretch of the Kabale-Rutshuru-Goma between the Ugandan border and Rutshuru so that trucks could use the road thereby reducing pressure upon Goma airport in the event of an influx.
9. A former SRSG to Somalia at the height of the famine in 1992 has likened the need for UN agencies to ask for funds in order to respond as equivalent to firemen asking for voluntary contributions before putting out a fire. Mohammed Sahnoun Oxford Conference, January 1992.
10. Trevor Page. Interviewed in London, March 1995.
11. The Disasters Emergency Committee is a consortium for the organisation and management of joint funding appeals of which 7 UK NGOs (Oxfam, SCF-UK, British Red Cross Society, Christian Aid, CAFOD, Help the Aged and ActionAid) are full members.
12. The USA, Israel, Australia and Japan counted costs arising from their military contingents as part of their overall contributions.
13. The fact that Oxfam had used its own resources to preposition the water equipment in Goma and that the traditionally well-resourced ICRC was able to airlift over 1,000 tonnes of food to Goma without having to specifically approach donor organisations for such an activity was felt to be significant by the Team.
14. ie. UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, FAO, WHO.
15. For instance, four UNHCR officials, including representatives from Geneva and the person then preparing the Goma Contingency Plan, attended a critical DMT meeting in Nairobi on 10 June. Having seen the preliminary results of this study, the agency maintains that 'Concerned about UNREO's estimate of massive potential outflow from Rwanda, the UNHCR participants insisted that the meeting continue to develop a concrete contingency plan and they therefore

29. The Deputy Resident Representative was the UN Security Officer and was thereby responsible for planning and directing the evacuation of UN personnel.

30. As well as enabling liaison with the RPF Social Wing, the UNREO office in Kabale played an information clearing house role for NGOs working inside Rwanda together with communication facilities and a mailbox system. It chaired weekly coordination meetings enabling discussion outside the sphere of influence of the RPF. It allowed UNAMIR, via UNOMUR, to remain abreast of NGO activities, but provided no management or framework coordination, a role jealously reserved by the RPF. The UNREO office in Kabale closed in August 1994.

31. The purpose of UNREO Bujumbura was to strengthen the Resident Coordinator in Burundi. Tensions inside Burundi overshadowed any concern agencies may have had for Rwanda, and a small sub-system established itself around the UNICEF and UNREO teams, with weekly information coordination meetings, and the pooling of common resources for convoys particularly during Operation Turquoise.

32. The UNAHT was operational in Kigali from 23 April to 16 July when the component agencies started establishing their own separate offices.

33. In late August, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) proposed the establishment of an autonomous NGO Coordination Unit. Such a unit would have paralleled UNREO'S own activities which included the dissemination of matrixes showing which agencies were working in which sector in which Prefecture. The ICVA proposal was opposed by several large international NGOs and the outcome was the NGO Coordination Cell within UNREO run by personnel seconded from SCF-US.

34. Antonio Donini and Norah Niland, 1994 'Rwanda: Lessons Learned. A Report on the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities' Department of Humanitarian Affairs, New York.

35. On page 8, it states 'Some of the most extreme examples of this conceptual confusion were to be found within UNREO itself: several staff members were unaware that UNREO was part of DHA.'

36. One result of this delay was that UNREO's administrative capacity was reduced in its last 3 weeks in Nairobi as office equipment which it had been sharing with the relocated UNICEF-Kigali staff was taken by the UNICEF staff when they returned to Kigali in July.

37. Inevitably this separation resulted in differences of perspective and some tension over matters such as office space, access to telecommunications equipment and administrative support services. These tensions were still in evidence during the periods of fieldwork undertaken by Study III.

38. Apparently the Humanitarian Coordinator did not initially agree with the need for such support but the arrival of the Swedish Team and the late informing of the Humanitarian Coordinator of the arrangement made the provision of such support a *fait accompli*.

39. SCF-US, the Danish Refugee Council and the Norwegian Refugee Council.

40. The office in Gikongoro played an important role in the sharing of information among agencies working in the IDP camps. However, it was not established until mid-August, relied on the Kigali offices for cash resources and for several weeks had no photocopier. The UNREO staff member in the office was seconded from the Danish Refugee Council but had no previous emergency experience.

41. One remarkable aspect of the use of UNDP personnel policies was that UNREO personnel working at considerable personal risk to themselves in Rwanda during the April-August period missed out on the relocation allowance received by colleagues remaining in Nairobi. Despite the relocation, Rwanda was considered the 'duty station' for UNDP personnel and so personnel relocated to Nairobi received a daily allowance of \$120/day which was not paid to those crossing into Rwanda. Those working in Rwanda during the conflict received a personal risks allowance of \$600/month.

42. With the dramatic increase in the number of NGOs in Kigali during late August and September, the close knit regional coordination regime which UNREO field personnel had established grew into a much wider pool of different regimes. UNREO's meetings soon became too large (up to 65 participants) to tackle operational issues, and sectoral coordination meetings emerged.

43. Initially based in Nairobi, Field Offices were opened in Bujumbura, Kampala, Entebbe and Kabale. With the influx into Goma and the establishment of the new Government in Rwanda, offices were opened in Goma and Kigali in July. At the height of the crisis, DART-Rwanda consisted of 17 persons in five countries.
44. The ability to approve grants locally was unusual for OFDA and reflected the critical and highly dynamic nature of the emergency and also the recognition that the grant processing channels in Washington were already overburdened by the Rwanda response. From the information available it appears that a total of \$27 million was allocated by the DART during 1994 to a total of 20 NGOs and 3 UN agencies.
45. Whereas DART could approve funds locally funding requests from European NGOs and the ICRC were sent back to Brussels for approval with a recommendation from the field personnel.
46. Marie Spaak ECHO Kigali. Interview June 1995.
47. Mark Mullin and Daryl Sexton ECHO Kigali. Interviewed March 1995.
48. Representation in Kinshasa, Nairobi and Dar es Salam was at the level of Branch Office.
49. CARE took responsibility for the warehousing and management of non-food items and initially food items supplied to the main store by WFP. In addition, CARE undertook final distributions to one-third of the population of Benaco. Apparently, SCF-UK whose health care expertise was also valued was asked to establish a programme in Benaco, but was slow to respond and eventually took on certain activities in Karagwe District including upgrading access roads to the camps. Maureen Connelly Senior Emergency Officer Ngara, Interview June 1994.
50. Those NGOs 'turned away' included Americares, Samaritan Purse, MdM and World Vision. Those which were subsequently admitted include three which worked in the community services sector, one to manage a small Rwandan mixed marriage camp and one to coordinate an aids education programme.
51. World Vision distributed food and blankets to refugees who had just crossed the border en route to the camps. This was contrary to the policy adopted by UNHCR and the 12 agencies as it raised the possibility that refugees would settle near the border away from the main camps. Maureen Connelly Senior Emergency Officer UNHCR Ngara. Interview June 1994.
52. Though this arrangement appears to have worked satisfactorily, UNHCR and NGO personnel expressed reservations about having an official from a major donor working in the UNHCR team. NGOs, many of which were receiving funding from ECHO tended to regard him primarily as an ECHO official reporting back to Brussels rather than as a UNHCR Field Officer.
53. The precise number is unclear. A comprehensive list of agencies which had worked in Goma was not available during the Team's stay in Goma.
54. The NGO in question was headed by a Rwandan and supposedly supported by funds from an address in the United Arab Emirates.
55. Joël Boutrou, Head of Sub-Office, UNHCR Goma. Interview April 1995.
56. During 1994, UNHCR received cash and in-kind assistance valued at \$307 million and whilst WFP received resources, mostly in-kind assistance, valued at \$226 million.
57. UNHCR previously undertook its own procurement or received food aid destined for refugees directly from donor organisations and these arrangements had often resulted in the uncoordinated arrival of commodities and food distributions often missing essential items.
58. Under phase one of the MOU, which commenced in January 1992, WFP took responsibility for the mobilisation of general ration commodities and the necessary cash resources for related costs such as internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) and milling. Since 1993 WFP has been responsible for all operational arrangements up to the Extended Delivery Points (EDPs) which are generally located at or near to the refugee camps being served. Since early 1994 under the version of the MOU that applied to the response to the Rwanda Crisis WFP was responsible for the management of warehouses at the EDP. In terms of commodities WFP is responsible for the procurement/mobilisation

and transportation of cereals, beans, oil CSB and sugar up to the EDP whilst UNHCR is responsible for arranging transport from the EDP to the camps and for coordinating NGO implementing partners undertaking general ration distributions. Monitoring of the distributions is shared by UNHCR and the NGOs. Supplementary feeding programmes utilising oil, CSB and sugar rely on WFP to procure and supply the commodities whilst UNHCR and the NGOs are responsible for procuring other commodities such as High-Protein Biscuits, Dried-Skim-Milk and therapeutic milk (nutraset).

59. Eg. Susanne Jaspars 'The Rwandan Refugee Crisis in Tanzania: Initial Successes and Failures in Food Assistance. RRN Network Paper 6. September 1994. ODI, London.

60. Holdbrook Arthur Director of Operations WFP Dar es Salaam; Jeff Lewis Head of Sub-Office WFP Ngara. Interviewed June 1995.

61. This incident may reflect UNHCR's readier access to cash resources than is the case with WFP. Whereas WFP obtains its supplies in the USA at around \$200/tonne UNHCR's contract with the South African supplier was \$400-500/tonne. Luc Stevens UNHCR Geneva Interviewed September 1995.

62. The cost of providing the general ration forms just under half of the daily cost of sustaining a refugee in the emergency phase a proportion which rises once the investments in water, shelter and other systems have been made.

63. Eg. Nicolas Coussidis, Senior Emergency Officer UNHCR, Mission Report 'Burundi Refugee Emergency Tanzania 1:11:93 - 20:2:94. In reality of course the high death rates probably resulted from a combination of **both** factors with malnutrition reducing resistance to dysentery which itself would have resulted from the use of untreated water and poor sanitation.

64. The splitting of functions can be seen **within** the general ration provision function (ie. the supply of general rations to the camps being separated from the distribution and monitoring within the camps) and also **between** the provision of critical survival needs (ie. provision of food and provision of shelter, water, sanitation and health care).

65. Aspects of the regional dimension include: the development of Banyarwanda populations in neighbouring countries and their occasionally violent interactions with local populations; the effect of developments in Tutsi/Hutu relations in Rwanda upon the dynamics of ethnic relations in the Burundi and *vice versa*; and the effect of changes in the national politics of Uganda on the formation and strategies of the RPF.

66. Interview with Senior UN Official in Kigali, April 1995.

67. A US Intelligence Estimate which accompanies a review document on Operation Support Hope dated 23 August 1994 contains the following points: 'Repatriation of refugees in large numbers is unlikely in near to mid-term; Many of the estimated 2 million Hutu refugees in countries bordering Rwanda will be unwilling to return home for the foreseeable future as they fear reprisals by the new, Tutsi-dominated government; some returning Hutus have in fact been murdered by Tutsis seeking revenge, but these attacks do not appear to have been sanctioned by the new regime'.

68. Expectations that those involved in perpetrating a genocide could be readily accepted back into a society containing survivors of the genocide and friends and relatives of those who were killed are difficult to comprehend.

69. For instance, the first conclusion of a US military report on Operation Support Hope is 'This refugee crisis is a political problem'. Similarly, the UNHCR ERT Leader in Goma from mid-July to mid-September stated during a television interview 'The only solution to this humanitarian crisis is a political one. There is no humanitarian solution to this crisis, there can only be a political one and I want to stress it' (Filippo Grandi Interview shown on British Channel 4 News 18 July 1994).

70. For instance on the first day of the Goma influx it recorded that the situation inside Rwanda was stable and returning to normal. Security Council Proceedings 7 and 15 July 1994.

406. It is important to note that there have been winners, as well as losers, as a result of the refugee influxes, principal among which have been the Tanzanian ports and railways. They have benefitted from a huge surge of business activity associated with the emergency, with WFP transporting the bulk of the foodstuffs for the refugees in Goma and Bukavu, as well as for those in Ngara and Karagwe, through the port of Dar es Salaam, and then inland by rail (see Section 5.2).
407. Other winners have been those with houses and warehouses near to the refugee settlements. They have been able to gain windfall profits from hiring out their premises to the international agencies involved in the relief operation. Many new jobs have been created as a result of the relief operation, either with the agencies themselves or in the business sector providing services to them. In addition, trading opportunities have grown up around the camps - the buying of excess food commodities from the refugees and the selling, in return, of cloth, soap, radio batteries etc. However, it is also true that in some areas local businesses have suffered as a result of direct competition from newly-emerged refugee enterprises while that in others local residents have had more difficulty in finding casual labour as a result of the presence of many refugees prepared to work for lower wages.
408. A lack of solid data has meant that it has not been possible to accurately quantify the various gains and losses, and come up with any overall balance of either net gain or net loss to Tanzania. Even were this possible, the exercise would be largely academic, as redistribution mechanisms do not exist whereby the gainers can recompense the losers. It is also important to be aware that many of the benefits will cease once the refugees go home, or once the relief programme winds down, while the costs, particularly environmental, will last well into the future.
409. The losers have tended to be geographically fairly concentrated, with those closest to the refugee settlements and transit routes generally having lost the most. Some have been reduced to as precarious a state of survival as the refugees themselves, having lost land, livestock and crops. This limited geographical concentration of losers means that mitigation efforts should have been relatively straightforward.

7.3 Assessment of Efforts to Mitigate the Impact

410. Although UNDP, FAO, UNICEF and other agencies have been helping the Tanzanian government draw up project proposals to reduce the impact of the refugees on the local environment, the overall response in regard to problems amongst the host population can only be compared unfavourably with that for the refugee population.
411. Huge amounts of funding have been readily available for the refugees, with UNHCR able to implement construction and other activities immediately. The fund-raising and disbursement procedures for UNDP and FAO, on the other hand, are slow and cumbersome and, a year after the influxes, little progress can be observed, yet the cost of repairing the damage done to local infrastructure during the influx into Ngara and Karagwe has been estimated² at only slightly over US \$1 million.
412. While it is true that UNHCR has funded the provision of extra police officers in Tanzania, as well as the Presidential Guard in Goma, and has supplied office equipment to some local government departments, these initiatives have been designed essentially to support local structures in their work with refugees, and the primary beneficiaries are not the local communities. Indeed, on occasions, UNHCR appears to have been over legalistic in the application of its mandate, with local residents having been treated as second-class citizens in relation to the refugees. For example, a plane spraying one of the camps for vector-control purposes turned off the spray as it overflowed the adjoining village. While Team III was in one of the camps in Zaire, they witnessed an injured Zairean who was denied emergency treatment in the camp hospital, as this was for refugees only. Other agencies have also been insensitive, supplying some refugee schools in Tanzania with brand new desks, though many local schools also lack such amenities.
413. The imbalance between the level of international support designed to meet refugee needs and the level of support designed to meet the needs of the host community and the delay in actual provision of the latter has

Chapter 7 Assessment of Performance: Mitigating the Impact on Host Communities and Taking Account of the Views of Beneficiaries

7.1 Introduction

398. Although not within the terms of reference for Study III, it was considered important to review the attempts by the international relief community to mitigate the impact of the refugee presence and the associated relief programmes on local communities in Zaire and Tanzania, particularly as it appears that host community perceptions of (this impact/these mitigation attempts have directly influenced the local and regional political environment, with negative consequences for the relief operation itself.
399. The following analysis focuses principally on western Tanzania, where documented information on the effects of the refugee presence was more readily available¹. However, the issues are much the same for those communities hosting large refugee populations in the other neighbouring countries of Rwanda.

7.2 An Account of Impacts

400. The impact of the large refugee presence in western Tanzania has been dramatic, with those living close to the transit routes and the refugee settlements having seen their local environments transformed. During the initial influx, crops were trampled or stolen from the fields, while doors, window frames and furniture were removed from schools and health posts along the transit routes and used as firewood. Subsequently, roads and airstrips have been damaged by relief traffic, and water sources over-burdened by refugees and their cattle,
401. The most serious impact of the refugee presence on the local population at Ngara has been the indiscriminate felling of trees near the camp, for use as firewood - by November 1994, tree resources within 5 km of Ngara had been completely depleted. Natural resources have been strained to the point where it is possible that they will no longer be adequate for the local population afterwards, and currently all households are having to walk increasingly long distances to collect firewood.
402. The most likely long-term problems may stem from the removal of the gallery forests along watercourses, since these protect both quality and quantity of water flows at normal times. Loss of tree cover over the steep hilly terrain will also cause much increased soil erosion rates, and has led to a reduction in the availability of game.
403. A particularly unsettling effect of the refugee presence has been the large increase in the incidence of violent crime in the areas around the camps, even though the violence has mostly been between refugees, and has not involved local people. The Tanzanian police have had to spend more time investigating incidents around the camps, and the Ngara prison has been holding five times the normal number of suspects. Indeed, in local and national government in general, there has been a diversion of managerial and administrative resources away from normal activities to those associated with the relief programme.
404. The arrival of the refugees has led to increased volatility in the prices of basic commodities, with the prices of some products tripling or quadrupling in the months following the influx. However, although the prices of a number of commodities have risen sharply, others have fallen equally dramatically (notably maize, cooking oil and other 'refugee' goods), and it is not clear whether, overall, the refugee presence and the associated relief operation has improved or worsened the local food security situation.
405. In those rural areas where farmers traditionally produce for on farm consumption, and little commercialisation takes place, the changes in the prices of commodities will not have had a significant impact. Urban consumers, however, will be more severely affected, and anecdotal evidence exists to suggest that major dietary changes have taken place.

anthropologists has demonstrated clearly that, in general, beneficiary views have had almost no impact on programme design and implementation. Indeed, refugees are regarded by some foreign aid workers almost as the 'opposition', there to cheat at registrations and food distributions and to thwart agency attempts to efficiently and equitably organise their existence.

422. This state of affairs may have its origins in the events of the early days of the refugee crisis: when traditional Rwandan authority structures were used by the relief organisations to organise food distributions, very high levels of theft were registered, and vulnerable groups often received very little. High rates of malnutrition were recorded amongst weaker sectors of the camp population, despite sufficient aggregate levels of food being delivered to the camps.
423. Attempts to rectify these failings were met with sometimes violent resistance. In addition, relief workers were aware that the perpetrators of the genocide were living in the camps, and this may have influenced their overall perception of the refugee population. Attempts to isolate suspected perpetrators of genocide and banish them from the camps were highly unsuccessful. In Ngara, relief workers who had sought to remove one notorious individual from the camp were forced to seek refuge in a compound from angry refugees. Such incidents, and the general lack of security in the camps, resulted in most expatriates leaving the camps before nightfall, and have made the successful establishment of communication mechanisms that much harder.
424. The anthropologist working in Bukavu found that the power structures of the old Rwanda emerged very quickly within the new refugee setting. There are camps mainly for the wealthy, camps for the destitute, camps for those with political ties to the old regime, etc. Within the camps there is also a stratification, with those attached to the former regime often controlling the vantage points and the access routes. The level of control is such that it may have been difficult for refugees with grievances to meet with UNHCR officials. Furthermore, the refugees are a far from homogenous group, classifiable, on the basis of their own criteria, by sex, ethnic group, class, education, area of origin within Rwanda, whether having former experience of life in camps, etc., etc. There is no such thing as a single point of view of the beneficiaries.
425. The situation has been made more difficult by the fact that a large number of the relief workers have not previously worked in the region, know little about Rwandan society and, as a result, are blind to many of the issues of concern to the ordinary Rwandan. Contacts that they do have with the refugees are more likely to be with those who are educated and who can speak French, and whose views may not represent the poorer sections of the camp population.
426. Another constraint for refugees is that their grievances may relate to the operation of a particular NGO or UN agency, yet the only people from the outside world that they come into contact with are personnel from those very same organisations. There is no independent body to whom they can talk, not only to complain, but also to request information.
427. Despite the very many difficulties in developing a dialogue between refugee and NGO/UN worker, better communication is a pre-requisite for more appropriate interventions, and it is important for the self esteem of the refugees that they are involved in the decisions that affect their lives.
428. Had more effective feedback mechanisms been created from the outset, the switch from prefecture or commune level to household or cellule level for food distributions (the single most important change for the average Rwandan refugee household) may have taken place much sooner than it did. UNHCR in Zaire may have realised earlier that registration was essential, not only to find out aggregate numbers, but so that the food distribution system did not need to be organised through representatives of the old regime who used the resources obtained to bolster their own position to the detriment of the vulnerable members of the refugee population.
429. Good communication mechanisms also need to be accompanied by a sound understanding of the refugees' culture, so that information received may be correctly interpreted. For example, it is important to appreciate

caused tensions between local people and refugees in both Tanzania and Zaire. Tanzanian politicians have made capital out of this issue, and this may have contributed to the border closures that occurred in mid-1995. Had a quick-disbursing fund been available it could have been used to rapidly repair the initial damage and reduced the tensions between the refugees and the host population.

414. UNHCR and other agencies such as CARE and GTZ did commission environmental assessment reports on the camps and the local communities in both Tanzania and Zaire after the arrival of the refugees. However, ideally, environmental task forces should be involved in the selection of sites as part of the contingency-planning process, before any influx takes place and, wherever possible, camps should be relatively small settlements, scattered to avoid over exploitation of the natural resource base.
415. The need for fuelwood has been the most critical determinant of environmental damage. Easily cooked foods should have been distributed to the refugees in Ngara (eg. maize flour rather than whole grain), and refugees should have been encouraged to use fuel-saving cooking devices (eg. soaking beans before cooking, using lids on pans, etc.). However, it is possible that much of the wood collected by refugees is used for 'social' fires in the evenings - for light and companionship and for warmth and protection against biting flies. Any fuel not needed for cooking may only have led to greater use of fuel for social purposes. Ultimately, only the dispersement of refugees to smaller settlements offers a sustainable long-term solution.
416. UNHCR has attempted to preserve trees near the camps which should be retained for the future by marking them with white paint - a good idea which should be respected as long as other sources of fuel are relatively abundant.
417. In the short-term, however, fuelwood needs to be trucked in, not only to the refugees themselves, but to the local residents who are now in the same position as the refugees. Some agencies, along with private entrepreneurs, are already involved in such activities. NGOs must also be aware of the impact of their operations: in Ngara, tens of thousands of poles were cut down within easy trucking distance of the camps for pit latrines and medical clinics, etc..
418. The relief programme itself, rather than the refugees, has also had an impact on the local environment: for example, the high salaries paid by international NGOs have attracted local health workers away from government service and into the health structures within the refugee camps. Officials in eastern Zaire have reported that the establishment of a cost-recovery health system has been jeopardised by the loss of experienced staff, and the reluctance of patients to pay for treatments when they can be seen for free at refugee clinics.
419. There is no easy solution to this problem, and the issue of better managing the relationships between emergency and national structures needs further research. A salary policy is needed before a relief programme begins, to avoid unnecessary weakening of local structures. Zairean health officials have suggested that, at the very least, there should be a rotation of the local staff working for international NGOs, so that more people would have the chance to earn the large sums available and to benefit from working alongside experienced expatriate staff, without being lost to the local system. This would reduce the feelings of discontent that seem to be felt by some of those 'left behind' in national structures.

7.4 Taking Account of the Views of Beneficiaries

420. Two anthropologists, with extensive experience of Rwandan society, worked in the refugee camps of Tanzania and Zaire, and in Rwanda itself, as part of Study III. They interviewed Rwandan refugees, as well as host country citizens and aid agency personnel. The IDP camps inside Rwanda had been closed by the time the anthropologists' field work took place, and it was not possible to track down former IDPs to their home communes. As a result, this section focuses on the refugee camps, with 'beneficiary' meaning Rwandan refugee.
421. Although channels of communication do exist between refugees and agency personnel, the work of the

Notes on Chapter 7

1. cf report by Government of Tanzania: 'Assessment Report: On the Impact of Refugees On the Local Communities in Kagera and Kigoma Regions', December 1994.
2. Green, Reginald. 'That they May be Whole Again: Offsetting Refugee Influx Burdens on Ngara and Karagwe Districts'. A report for UNICEF, September 1994.

that there is a critical divide in Rwandan society between those Hutu who come from the north of the country and those from the south: southerners may feel that they will be discriminated against if northerners are involved in food distributions. The early involvement of anthropologists with experience of working in Rwanda could have helped agency personnel to understand the political and social dynamics of the camps, and been of considerable benefit to both beneficiaries and agency officials. The refugees talk approvingly of the work of those NGOs who had previously been involved in the IDP camps in Rwanda, as their projects have been better suited to Rwandan habits.

430. However, the inflexibility, and supply-driven nature of the international relief system does mean that there are limitations to the benefits to be gained from an enhanced understanding of the beneficiary population. Maize, lentils, even cooking oil, are not characteristic of a normal Rwandan diet, yet these are the major commodities supplied as food aid. When it comes to such fundamentals as type of food supplied, beneficiary views are very much secondary. But though a change in the composition of rations may not have been possible, an understanding of Rwandan dietary habits would have helped relief workers understand that the outward flow of food from the camps was not only related to over-distribution and fraud, but rather that the refugees were selling some of those commodities received in order to buy more culturally appropriate foods. (In some camps, perhaps 90% of the cooking oil received was sold.) A realisation that calories are not the only criteria of success for food aid may have led to more appropriate interventions or, at the very least, a greater official tolerance of small marketing activities.
431. Another area where beneficiary needs seems to clash with the relief agenda is in the area of reproductive and women's health. Indeed, in Bukavu, due to oversight, sex of refugees was not recorded during the registration exercise. There is a clear need for sanitary towels for the women. At present, menstruating women, due to a lack of towels, may stay in their shelters and thus miss out on food distributions (though a proxy may well be sent) and hospital consultations. Condoms and other contraceptive devices are also needed.
432. The work of the anthropologists has shown that the refugees greatly appreciate being kept informed of developments in the world outside the camps, as well as the reasons behind changes in their own environment. However, it is important that information is not filtered solely through the elites, who may have reason to misrepresent the actual facts for political purposes.

retainer charges and the hiring and deployment costs, but they may be attractive in that the equipment could come with operators and full maintenance support and the overall cost may still work out less than reliance upon building up capacity which remains idle between emergencies. The use of NGOs would appear advantageous from several respects given the extensive emergency experience of many of the larger international NGOs and their, frequently lower, personnel costs. Several donor organisations and UNHCR have already embarked upon stand-by arrangements with NGOs and these ought to be further encouraged, though some NGOs take the view that such arrangements bring them too close to governments and may restrict their future independence.

438. Building up the pool of experienced and trained personnel is another means of increasing capacity within the system. The study did not explore this issue, but it appears that despite several recent initiatives, including that by ECHO in a European context, much remains to be done in terms of developing professional training courses, internationally recognised technical and professional qualifications in specialist fields. Perhaps of even greater importance is the need to retain experienced personnel between emergency operations. Difficult and often dangerous working conditions and the lack of job security result in an unusually high turnover and a young age profile in most relief agencies. It would appear that additional funding from donor organisations to encourage agencies to retain experienced staff would go some way to addressing this particular barrier to greater professionalisation within the international response system.

8.3 Visibility and the Role of the Media

439. The issue of visibility and media coverage and its apparent influence upon relief agencies and the system generally has been touched on at various points throughout the report. For instance: the phenomenon of the intense media coverage in Goma was briefly described in Section 2.7; the fact that media coverage and public pressure encouraged the deployment of military contingents before reconnaissance teams had adequately assessed needs was indicated in Section 3.5; that more NGOs were prepared to work in high profile 'mediatic' activities, such as Unaccompanied Children's Centres, than in sanitation was noted at several points in Chapter 4; that there is a strong correlation and probably a causal link between media coverage and the level of resources allocated was discussed in Section 6.1.
440. The influence of the media was strongly determined by access and the power of the 'story' and the images that were portrayed. The lack of security in Kigali during the April-July period limited access by journalists. UNAMIR, which took responsibility for protecting them, limited the numbers to just 6 or 7 at any one time because of the difficult conditions and lack of resources. The lack of security meant that real-time, satellite broadcasting facilities were not established in the city until late May. Coverage was therefore more limited than was subsequently the case in Goma. Images of dead bodies and deserted streets, the genuine uncertainty over what was happening for the first few weeks and a tendency by some journalists to describe events solely in terms of traditional Tutsi/Hutu cleavages resulted in coverage that tended to convey a sense of helplessness. The large refugee influx into Ngara at the end of April coincided with the ending of the South African elections and many international journalists who had been covering the elections moved to Tanzania for much of May. Not only did the media have greater access, the concentration of refugees had a clearer 'story' and visual image. In the words of a senior ICRC official 'Suddenly it was a humanitarian problem. The refugee situation suddenly translated the crisis into terms which could be understood by the world at large'¹. In Goma, real-time satellite broadcasts began within one day of the influx starting. A powerful story, strong visual images and a palpable sense of urgency were only reinforced when the cholera outbreak began a few days later. Very quickly a 'media frenzy' developed drawing in scores of TV companies and journalists which gave enormous coverage to the story and, for much of the period from mid-July to mid-August, the story was given lead status in news broadcasts and the print media.
441. It is clear the media plays an influential role within the international humanitarian aid system. However, for a variety of reasons it is difficult to determine precisely how influential this role is and how it varies between different contexts and between different types of agency. The decision-making processes within relief agencies and donor organisations are often strongly influenced by factors other than media coverage.

Chapter 8 Cross-Cutting Issues

8.1 Introduction

433. The report has assessed performance sectorally. Whilst this has been beneficial, inevitably a number of important issues cut across the main sectors and are generic to the response systems. This chapter examines the four principal cross-cutting issues as identified by the Team.

8.2 Capacity Problems

434. That the system encountered problems arising from limited organisational capacity has been indicated at various points in this report. UNHCR's concept of Service Packages and the recourse to the use of military contingents in late July was strongly influenced by the perception that the scale of tasks was simply too great for the existing UN and NGO capacities to handle without additional capacity being brought to bear. In addition, there are strong indications that the overstretching of the system's capacity resulted in a slower and less effective response in Bukavu and to the IDP situation in the south-west in August 1994 than would have been the case if the system was not already having to cope with the refugee influxes into Tanzania and Goma. Within the system generally, there were numerous agencies, perhaps even a surfeit, which were prepared to undertake high profile activities, such as Unaccompanied Children's Centres which contrasted with the very limited number of agencies willing and able to work in the water and sanitation sector and undertaking activities such as burying bodies.
435. An important manifestation of this overstretching of capacity was the quality of personnel that agencies were able to deploy. Again, there are strong indications that agencies had literally 'run out' of experienced, Francophone personnel by August, if not earlier in some cases. Even the ICRC, generally regarded as the most professional and experienced agency, appears to have had difficulty in placing staff in the south-west in the July-August period, a factor which contributed to the difficulties initially experienced at Kibeho camp. The absurdly high staff turnover experienced by some agencies in regard to key positions must have been a reflection of this. Such turnover, at the rate of every 4-5 weeks in the team leader positions of at least two agencies, must have reduced the effectiveness of the programmes of these agencies.
436. The ability to expand programmes rapidly is critical to the effective operation of relief agencies and of the response system generally. Over the last decade or so, many agencies have invested in mechanisms designed to facilitate the rapid expansion of their programmes. Such mechanisms include stockpiling commonly used commodities and equipment, preparing databases of specialist personnel who can be called upon at short notice, and establishing organisational stand-by agreements with other organisations to provide personnel or logistics capacity. A characteristic of such mechanisms is that they are particular to individual agencies and do not represent a central pool of capacity open to the system as a whole. Whilst such mechanisms appear to have been widely used during the response, the evidence indicates they were not adequate. Whether additional investment in these and other mechanisms is justified depends in part on assumptions about the likelihood of other humanitarian crises of the scale and complexity of the Rwanda crisis of 1994. Though unique in some respects, the response to the Rwanda crisis was broadly comparable to those by the international community in Northern Iraq and Somalia and it would seem prudent for further investments in such capacity.
437. The question which then follows is whether it is preferable to look to the military for such capacity, to civilian contractors or to NGOs, or some combination of all three. The difficulties of using the military and the difficulty of assessing whether or not they represent a cost-effective stand-by capacity was discussed in Section 3.6. Much depends upon the extent to which the military capacity is cut-back in a post-Cold War context and upon the way the deployment costs are attributed between the Defence and humanitarian aid budgets within the respective countries. The study did not explore the options in relation to commercial contractors in relation to stand-by capacity, but it appears a potentially fruitful route. Large agencies could agree draw-down or turn-key contracts with civil engineering companies, under which bulldozers and other equipment might be deployed at short notice. Such approaches are likely to be expensive in terms of

late 1994. The large number of NGOs involved in the response in Goma and inside Rwanda contrasts with the 20 or so which have been involved in the more closely controlled operations in Tanzania. This contrast points to the particular combination of intense media coverage and ineffective government control structures as being central to explanations of the unprecedented numbers involved in Goma and Rwanda. The pressures upon NGOs to respond stemming from media coverage and pressure from their supporters were noted in Section 6.1. That high profile emergency programmes offer NGOs the ability to access and raise resources necessary for their organisational development was noted above, and gives rise to the telling phrase from one NGO interviewee 'be there or die'.

447. As discussed in Chapter 1, Study III's efforts to obtain information on those NGOs which appear to have participated in the response inside Rwanda did not meet with a full response, so the backgrounds of many NGOs is not clear. However, it appears that a significant number had not worked in Africa before, many having been formed in response to relief needs in Eastern Europe or the former-Yugoslavia. A significant number appear not to have worked in emergency programmes before coming from a developmental background. Some appear to have been newly formed altogether. Of the 180 or so NGOs which appear to have worked in Rwanda after July 1994, perhaps 60 have since left. The majority of NGOs appear to have arrived in the country during the July-September period when the capacity of the Ministry of Rehabilitation was particularly limited. From the results of the questionnaire and interviews with personnel of the remaining NGOs, it appears that the relief activities in the IDP camps and waystations involved around 40 international NGOs with previous emergency experience and that the majority of NGOs which worked inside Rwanda during 1994 were involved in very small projects, such as supporting a health post or an orphanage.
448. Such a large numbers of NGOs implies substantial duplication of effort and inefficient resource-use. The same volume of activities could have been carried out by a much smaller number of NGOs with larger programmes. Competition amongst NGOs for the use of locally procured resources such as accommodation, office space, and equipment contributed to inflated prices. The sight of NGOs with their own imported vehicles and office equipment in Kigali at a time when the new Government had received very little material support from the international community appears to have had a significant detrimental impact upon the new Government's perceptions of NGOs and the international community and its relationship with them.
449. With its emphasis upon the performance of the system as a whole, Study III did not set out to directly assess the effectiveness of individual NGOs. The numbers involved would have prevented complete coverage and the deliberate selection of a sample for more detailed study would have been unfair and probably highly contentious. However, the assessment of performance within particular sectors involved the examination of the work of a range of NGOs which worked in those sectors. Broadly speaking, the performance of many NGOs was impressive. Whilst the larger international NGOs with extensive emergency experience featured strongly in this group, the Team did come across some small but highly effective NGOs and it would be wrong to associate 'small' with 'ineffective'. Instances of poor performance by NGOs were indicated in Chapter 4 and in Section 6.3. Significantly, most of these instances arose in Goma and Rwanda and none in the camps in Ngara. In Goma, some NGOs carried out programmes which undermined the overall effort, whilst others undertook programmes that provided an unacceptably poor standard of care and service to their beneficiary group. Though the data is not available to prove the point, it is likely that had some groups of beneficiaries been served instead by other NGOs, that their morbidity and mortality rates would have improved more rapidly. Significantly, beneficiaries rarely had any say in which NGOs served their needs or the area of the camp where they happened to be settled and, even if they did, informed choices would be difficult in the absence of detailed information on the NGOs in question.
450. It is unacceptable that an NGO with little or no relevant experience is able to send personnel to a humanitarian relief operation and engage in activities which discredit or undermine the overall effort; provide unacceptably poor standards of service and care to their beneficiaries; and then leave without any recourse. Such activities would not be tolerated in western countries where many of the NGOs in question are based. In situations, such as in Tanzania, where there are effective government authorities, the rights

Moreover, the routes by which the media effects influence are often multiple and indirect. For instance, media coverage simultaneously raises public awareness of an issue at the same time as bringing the issue more to the attention of politicians than was the case before the coverage. Where the 'story' and images are powerful (usually but not always synonymous with the scale and intensity of the humanitarian needs), pressure is inevitably brought to bear on the public to give donations and on politicians to authorise the provision of additional resources or even the deployment of military contingents. This process is invariably reinforced by NGO fundraising campaigns and NGOs submitting funding requests to the government agency responsible for administering emergency aid. Significantly, media coverage and its influence upon the operation of a particular humanitarian aid operation has never been subject to rigorous academic analysis.

442. The influence of the media upon individual agencies appears to be most marked in the case of those NGOs which are wholly or substantially dependent upon the privately raised funds, as media coverage strongly determines the success of their fundraising efforts. Where media coverage is intense and such agencies can literally 'buy a field presence' for the cost of sending a team to the area, then their ability to raise funds will probably be substantially increased. A field presence enables NGOs to justifiably claim to 'be there'; enables them to 'be seen' through the display of their logos; and increases their chance of benefitting from direct media coverage, particularly if they operate the type of programme that TV crews and audiences find 'mediatic', such as Unaccompanied Children's Centres and clinics. However, it should be added that at least two NGOs, SCF-UK and Feed the Children, deliberately chose not to work in Goma, but inside Rwanda because of the 'overcrowding' of agencies².
443. The practice of displaying agency logos in prominent positions was not confined to small NGOs. All agencies, even donor organisations, engaged in this practice, not only as a way of increasing their profile, but also as a way of showing their supporters (taxpayers in the case of donor organisations) who might see the logos on any TV coverage, that they were present in Goma. Interestingly, this concern for profile and agency differentiation appears to have had little meaning for beneficiaries. Interviews with refugees in Goma and Ngara during this study revealed that many did not differentiate between agencies, but lumped them together under the term 'Croix Rouge' - the only organisation known to Rwandans without previous camp experience to be dealing with emergencies³.
444. The influence of the media could also be positive in that it subjected agencies, particularly the larger agencies to scrutiny and pressure to respond more effectively and in the words of UNHCR's Public Information Officer in Goma 'the media kept everyone on their toes'⁴. Daily press conferences were held in Goma during late July and early August and Press Officers of several of the larger agencies, including UNHCR and WFP, led these with briefings and question sessions, which opened them to close questioning. Interestingly, such questioning could come from NGOs priming friendly journalists on matters where they felt the agency hosting the press conference was being unresponsive to their concerns expressed in the less public coordination meetings.
445. It is difficult to identify the policy implications of media coverage and the widespread concern among donor organisations and implementing agencies for profile, particularly when so little analytical information is available on the way the media influences agency behaviour. It is highly improbable journalists will ever be controlled by humanitarian agencies in the way that they were controlled by the military during conflicts, such as the Gulf War or that for the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. Educating journalists and editorial staff on the operation of the humanitarian aid system could be beneficial. The problem of many NGOs wanting to work only in 'mediatic' activities could be addressed by offering financial inducements to NGOs to work in the less attractive activities or by encouraging commercial contractors to do so.

8.4 Too Many NGOs?

446. Whereas previous large-scale operations have involved perhaps 40 or even 80 NGOs, it appears that over 200 were involved in the response to the Rwanda emergency, with approximately 100 present in Goma at the peak of the operations in the response to the refugee influx and around 180 present in Rwanda during

Notes on Chapter 8

1. Geoff Loane, Head ICRC Regional Delegation for East Africa. Interviewed June 1995.
2. Don Redding Press Officer SCF-UK; Stuart Crocker Deputy Director Feed the Children. Interviewed June 1995.
3. Relief agency personnel were often referred to as *abaCroixRouge* meaning 'the Red Cross people', though community leaders were more likely to use the term *abagiraneza* meaning 'the people who do good'. Pottier, Johan 'Beneficiaries Survey' Paper prepared for Study III.
4. Ray Wilkinson. Interviewed June 1995.
5. Eg. UK National Audit Study on Emergency Aid. Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, November 1993 (House of Commons paper 1993/94 No 933).
6. Interview with official in the UK ODA Emergency Aid Department.
7. 'Africa Rescue Mission: Emergency Water Supply Operations. Goma, Zaire/Southwest Rwanda, 26 July - 31 December. PWSS, Redwood City, California, USA.
8. BHR/OFDA Annual Report, FY 1994. USAID, Washington DC, USA.
9. Rwanda Emergency Programme Progress Report No 1, UNICEF Kigali, March 1995.

of these authorities to control NGOs should be respected. However, in situations where the government authorities are weak, the conclusion drawn by the Team is that a system needs to be created for monitoring the performance of individual NGOs and if necessary, barring access to those NGOs which do not meet acceptable standards.

8.5 Information and Mechanisms for Ensuring Accountability

451. The Team found a remarkable variation in the amount of information on what agencies had actually done depending on the geographical area and the particular agencies involved in the response in that area. Generally, considerably more information was available for refugee populations than inside Rwanda simply by virtue of UNHCR's coordinating and resourcing role in the camps and the presence of able technical coordinators. In the Goma case, where the US Centres for Disease Control fielded a team of epidemiologists in support of UNHCR, UNICEF and WHO, and Epicentre supported the work of MSF, an impressive amount of information was available on morbidity and mortality. This contrasted sharply with, for instance, the information on operations in the north-east between May and July or in the south-west between May and September where it proved necessary to 'reconstruct history' on the basis of interviews and the examination of the patchy agency documentation available. Information on the assistance delivered, the status of the beneficiary population and the success or otherwise of the assistance provided in these two areas was scanty. The lack of standardisation in the methods used to survey morbidity, mortality or the incidence of malnutrition and a similar lack of consistency between agencies in the way they presented the results of surveys that had been undertaken further limited the ability of the Team to assess effectiveness.
452. The Team did not explicitly assess the quality of reporting on the use of official funding by implementing agencies, as this would have required a detailed review of files within a number of donor organisations. Previous evaluations and audit studies of donor organisation emergency aid have highlighted inadequate and poor quality reporting as a particular problem⁵. It appears that some donor organisations did not increase their personnel capacity to undertake monitoring visits to the region commensurate with the increase in resource allocations⁶.
453. In a context of increased competition for funding and visibility and the proliferation of NGOs, it would appear that the pressures are increasing for agencies to highlight the positive aspects of their programmes and downplay or obscure the negative aspects. The Team came across examples of agencies telling, if not falsehoods, then certainly half-truths, in their reporting. For instance, PWSS claimed to have 'stopped cholera in Goma'⁷. This was incorrect as the extent of the epidemic was almost certainly limited by population immunity (see paragraph 174). Support was subsequently lent to this claim by US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance⁸. UNICEF implies that it had increased the water supply of Ngara town when in fact it had drilled, but failed to equip, a borehole⁹. The French military claim to have saved the lives of 80,000 to 100,000 Tutsis, though more realistic estimates are 13,000 to 14,000 (see paragraph 131). Such overemphasis on the positive and playing down of the negative is a distinctly unhealthy development within the relief system.
454. Whilst the media did provide a measure of accountability in some areas, particularly Goma, this was limited both in duration and in terms of its quality. The majority of journalists in Goma in late July had departed by late August. Moreover, journalists are often not sufficiently well-informed on technical issues to serve as an effective accountability mechanism. As noted in Chapter 7, the Team found a remarkable lack of attempts by agencies to seek the views of beneficiaries on the assistance being provided.
455. Combining these various points, the Team concludes that the mechanisms for ensuring accountability within the system should be radically strengthened. Given the funding context and concern for positive visibility, it is not adequate for donor organisations and UN agencies to rely solely on reporting by implementing agencies with the occasional *ex poste* evaluation. An organisation combining epidemiological, anthropological and other skills, to undertake on-the-spot monitoring of system performance would appear justified. Such an organisation would need to be independent of UN and implementing agencies and could provide information for use in conjunction with the NGO accreditation mechanism indicated above.

to substitute for political solutions to the crisis. In a society which had just experienced a genocide, apparently carried out by a substantial proportion of the society, a strategy of reintegrating Hutu refugees and IDPs into Rwanda was unrealistic and broadly unsuccessful. Reports or events which threatened to undermine these strategies by questioning the new Governments commitment to respecting human rights were suppressed or downplayed. Despite the massive loss of life and the expenditure of enormous sums of money (approximately US\$ 1.4 billion in 1994 alone), 1.8 million Rwandans remain in camps outside their country and many observers expect the civil war to be resumed at some point. A solution remains distant.

461. The Rwanda case demonstrates the need for the development of coordinated political strategies prior to, or at the outset of, a crisis and the need for coherence between the humanitarian and political strategies. The development of coordinated political strategies cannot be forced, but there may be room for encouraging coordinated political strategies through the mechanism of Task Forces or Contact Groups composed of key interested parties. To achieve the latter, closer linkage between the foreign and humanitarian assistance policies in the principal donor countries and the UN system will be required.
462. Turning to the actual operation of the humanitarian aid system, the response contained many commendable efforts: notably the initial response in Ngara which was a model of its kind; the impressive performance of UNHCR Emergency Response Teams and the courage and commitment shown by agency personnel in extremely difficult and often dangerous situations. Widespread starvation did not occur. In Rwanda, the combination of a good crop and the dramatic reduction in population meant that locally available foods were comparatively plentiful. However, for the refugees and many of the IDPs the food aid supply system, dominated by WFP and to a lesser extent the ICRC, performed well. Given the magnitude and scale of the population movements and the distance of the beneficiary populations from coastal ports, this was a substantial achievement.
463. However, a number of clear findings emerged from the study with regard to the weaknesses of the system and areas where the response was poor.
464. The influx into Goma resulted in approximately 50,000 deaths principally as a result of cholera and dysentery, but also from dehydration and violence. Given the massive scale of the influx, many deaths were likely. However, the lack of preparedness for the influx was staggering and UNHCR must take the principal blame for this situation. Whilst the ICRC, Oxfam and MSF-Holland had prepositioned supplies in the town UNHCR had not. The agency was aware of the likelihood of a massive population movement out of Rwanda having participated in an UNREO coordinated contingency planning exercise and of the possibility that Goma could be one of the possible 3-4 outflow points. It had prepared a contingency plan for a camp of 50,000 in the face of poor cooperation by the Zairean authorities but it had not operationalised this plan prior to the influx, largely it seems as a result of poor judgement and rules relating to the deployment and replacement of Emergency Response Team personnel. Despite the airport having been identified as being critical to the response in the event of a large influx no attempt was made ahead of the influx to ensure the airport had the capacity to cope with a large airlift operation. Not only did this poor performance result in the avoidable loss of life it also resulted in a response that was considerably more costly than it need have been.
465. The response was resourced through a variety of mechanisms but ultimately donor organisations and donor governments accounted for the bulk of the resources provided. Data on the scale of private funding is poor but this source probably accounted for between 15-20% of overall resources during 1994. The extent to which funding was reactive to events was striking. There was a marked contrast in resource availability between the 'tap-on' period from mid-July to September when funding appeared limitless and other periods when it was less readily available. The factors contributing to this reactive characteristic are many and their relationship complex. Media coverage and the concern of almost all organisations (donor organisations and the military as well as NGOs and UN agencies) involved in the response for profile and visibility were clearly significant. However in the absence of more rigorous studies of all the factors influencing resource allocation, including needs, access and the choice of response mechanism, it is not possible to comment on the relative importance of factors such as media coverage and organisational profile or whether these are

Chapter 9 Conclusions and Recommendations

9.1 Conclusions

456. As a result of the scale and complexity of the humanitarian assistance programmes undertaken during 1994, the scope of this study has been extremely wide. In approaching the subject matter, the study has attempted to combine detailed technical assessments of the principal sectors and phases of the response with efforts to draw policy conclusions from the overall experience. As a consequence, the study has generated a wealth of material which potentially contains a very broad range of conclusions and recommendations, from say the coordination of drug treatment protocols to the need for reform of the global structures for crisis management in complex, political emergencies. Bearing in mind the objective of the Joint Evaluation, to identify the principal lessons that might be learnt by the international community from the Rwanda crisis, and the limitations on space, this chapter will focus on the principal conclusions and recommendations and those with important policy implications. It is proposed that conclusions and recommendations of a more technical and detailed nature will be presented elsewhere through outlets, such as conferences and publications in specialist journals.
457. In drawing conclusions from this study, it is important to reiterate the point made in Chapter 3, that the humanitarian crisis of 1994 was the product of a security and physical protection crisis involving a genocide and civil war which resulted in the violent death of between half a million and one million Rwandans. By comparison, the numbers who died, not as a result of violence, but as a result of disruption to their livelihoods or their displacement and movement into camps, inside Rwanda or in neighbouring countries, was in the order of 100,000. Had the international community responded more effectively in the months prior to, or in the days immediately following, the shooting down of the Presidential plane many, perhaps most, of those who died would probably have survived and the massive expenditures on the provision of humanitarian assistance been unnecessary. The critical failings in the international community's response therefore lay within the political, diplomatic and military domains rather than the humanitarian domain.
458. Security correlated closely with the effectiveness of the humanitarian relief system. The number of agencies and their ability to provide assistance to populations in need in Kigali and FAR-controlled areas was severely constrained. More agencies were able to operate in the RPF-held areas, though their activities were closely controlled. Rwandans that crossed into neighbouring countries were more accessible and the response by the international community less constrained. In Ngara, the initial response led, and closely coordinated by UNHCR, was highly impressive. In Goma, security was a critical issue and the high levels of violence in the camps and threats of violence against relief agency personnel constrained their effectiveness. Once again, the performance of the international community in addressing the security issue in Goma was poor and it was not until March 1995, fully seven months after the influx that a satisfactory solution was developed.
459. The close relationship between the level of security and the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance highlights the need for coherence in the strategies adopted by the political/military and humanitarian domains. However, the Rwanda crisis has been characterised by the lack of a coordinated political strategy within the international community for 'managing' the crisis. Differences between key members of the UN Security Council and governments of neighbouring countries in terms of their attitude towards the RPF and the former Government and an apparent inability to confront and overcome these differences appear to have been responsible for the lack of a coordinated political approach. Despite this lack of an agreed framework, donor countries have been prepared to allocate substantial resources, particularly in the second half of 1994, to humanitarian assistance programmes. This readiness, with which the international community appears prepared to fund humanitarian assistance programmes, seems to contrast with the lack of concerted efforts to devise coordinated political solutions to the crisis. It is for this reason that the Study III Team chose 'Masking a Policy Vacuum' as the title for this report.
460. In the absence of a coherent political approach, it seems that humanitarian agencies, encouraged by the new Government and some western political figures, developed and pursued strategies that attempted (but failed)

becoming more important as many observers now believe.

466. What was clear from the study is that the way the system was resourced is sub-optimal, limiting the effectiveness of the response and substantially increasing the eventual costs. Preparedness and contingency planning were not encouraged and investments that would have yielded substantial savings, such as opening road routes and increasing the capacity of low-cost railway routes were not made. Whilst donor organisations did provide some 'upfront' funding this was quite inadequate in the face of such a large and highly dynamic emergency and in some cases did not even reach the levels previously agreed to by donor organisations.
467. The response involved an unprecedented number of agencies and organisations and this must have increased the overall costs of the response and the difficulties of ensuring a coordinated response. The extraordinary number of NGOs involved reflects not only a genuine and widespread desire to provide assistance but also the reality that participation in large-scale, high profile relief operations has become an important factor in the formation and development of NGOs. The performance of many NGOs was impressive and many cooperated closely with each other. However, there were numerous examples where this was not the case. Some NGOs sent inadequately trained and equipped personnel, some undertook to cover a particular sector or need and failed and others were unwilling to be coordinated. The conclusion drawn by the study is that the time has come to establish more formal and effective mechanisms for ensuring that NGOs adhere to certain professional standards. An accreditation system is required to ensure that beneficiaries receive an acceptable standard of service and care complemented by the development of operating principles setting down the obligations of agencies wishing to work in humanitarian aid operations.
468. Within a system involving so many agencies and organisations, there is a critical need for a strong capacity at the centre to provide leadership and overall coordination. UNHCR came close to fulfilling such a role in relation to refugee operations by virtue of its clear mandate, support from host governments, control over at least a proportion of the funding being allocated and highly competent technical coordination personnel. Approximately 50% of total resources allocated during 1994 were expended by or channelled through the UN system with WFP and UNHCR accounting for 85% of these. However, the overall humanitarian response system was characterised by what we term a 'hollow core' with DHA, UNREO, UNDP the SRSG and UNICEF all undertaking some form of coordinating role inside Rwanda but none enjoying clear role definition, control over the allocation of the humanitarian aid resources or a cadre of competent, readily available, technical personnel. The evacuation of UN agency personnel and their relocation to Nairobi in April disrupted the existing structures and resulted in a high turnover of key personnel. In this hiatus UNREO was formed as a joint DHA/UNDP ad hoc coordinating body. Paradoxically UNDP played the major role in UNREO during the critical emergency period and DHA's involvement did not become substantial until the August-September period when UNDP re-established its office in Kigali and focussed on rehabilitation activities leaving UNREO to focus largely on information sharing and coordinating the response to the IDPs in the south-west.
469. As the two largest agencies within the UN humanitarian system, WFP and UNHCR's performance was of critical importance to the overall response. Though the team were impressed by many aspects of the performance of the two agencies, the relationship between them was subject to unproductive tensions stemming from the division between them of the general ration supply/distribution chain. Despite the development of a detailed Memorandum of Understanding between them, these tensions persist and are likely to, given their different perspectives on the same problems and the inherent difficulty of splitting such a critical function between the two largest agencies. One aspect of this split is that accountability is diluted as each invariably attempts to shift the burden of responsibility for problems encountered onto the other. Such tensions resulted in unnecessary expenditures and reduced, though to an uncertain amount, the effectiveness of their combined actions. In the light of these problems and the conclusion that the system has a 'hollow core' rather than leadership by a strong, well-resourced, central agency, this Study has drawn the conclusion that the humanitarian aid functions within the UN system should be consolidated within one organisation.

470. Another principal conclusion drawn from the Study is that accountability mechanisms within the humanitarian aid system are quite inadequate and need radically strengthening. The Team found remarkable variation in the amount and quality of information on the situation in a given area depending on the agencies involved. Thus for some areas, especially the refugee camps, detailed information on morbidity and mortality was readily available whereas inside Rwanda such information was extremely patchy. In part this reflected UNHCR's clear coordination role in relation to refugees and the presence of highly competent technical coordinators which was in contrast to the unclear responsibilities inside Rwanda and the lack of technical personnel within UNREO. Thus large parts of the response could not be properly assessed either because information on process and impact indicators was not available or it had been collected differently by different agencies. This is an unsatisfactory state of affairs. A potentially more disturbing problem is that in a context of increased concern for profile by, and competition between, humanitarian agencies that the objectivity of their reporting may be suffering as a result of their emphasis on the positive aspects of their programmes and a downplaying of the negative. Finally, the Team was struck by the very limited attempts to obtain the views of beneficiaries on the assistance they were being provided with. To overcome these shortcomings an organisation, independent of UN agencies and donor organisations will need to be created which can undertake on-the-spot monitoring of system performance, rapidly generating reports for use in the field and by donor organisations and subsequent ex post evaluations. This would involve analysis of outcome indicators and surveys of beneficiary views of the assistance. This could be based on the CDC model - a strong epidemiological capacity complemented by anthropological and other technical skills.

9.2 Recommendations

Principal recommendations

1. Linkages between the humanitarian and political/diplomatic domains should be strengthened, so that the political/diplomatic framework for managing complex political emergencies includes humanitarian considerations from the outset and that the humanitarian system does not operate autonomously.
2. Much greater emphasis needs to be given to preparedness measures by donor organisations and implementing agencies. Substantially increased levels of advance funding are necessary for such measures to be effectively undertaken.
3. The emergency response functions of the principal UN humanitarian agencies (WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF) and DHA should be consolidated within one organisation.
4. A system of accreditation of NGOs, actively supported by donors, should be established to provide the basis for ensuring beneficiaries receive an acceptable professional standard of service and care. This should be complemented by the development of operating principles which outline the obligations of NGOs providing emergency assistance.
5. An organisation, independent of UN agencies and donor organisations should be created which can undertake on-the-spot monitoring of system performance, rapidly generating reports for use in the field, by donor organisations and in ex post evaluations. To ensure full account is taken of such reports, they should immediately be placed in the public domain.

Other Recommendations

6. DHA's Financial Tracking System should be given additional support to enable it to increase the sophistication and coverage of its database. The reports should be published annually and donor organisations not reporting should be listed. The costs of military support to humanitarian operations and the basis for their estimation should be listed separately from non-military humanitarian contributions.

7. All UN relief agencies and relief NGOs should standardise their epidemiological and nutritional survey methodologies and presentation of results to ensure comparability between agencies. Donor organisations should encourage and support these efforts and make use of official funds conditional upon adherence to these standards.
8. UN agencies, SRSGs and the humanitarian cells of UN military forces should adopt a common communications equipment procurement policy to ensure full compatibility between the equipment used by all field offices and sub-offices involved in an operation. The equipment should be stockpiled to ensure rapid deployment.
9. The costs of milling cereals supplied by WFP as part of the general ration should be included within the ITSH costs and therefore paid automatically by donor organisations.
10. Formal Food Aid Needs Assessments involving nutritionists should always be carried out early on in an emergency operation to ensure adequate attention is given to issues of ration composition and acceptability to beneficiaries.
11. Until UNHCR and the host government are able to establish more appropriate arrangements, UN Security Police should be automatically deployed immediately after large influxes to ensure an effective security presence in refugee camps.
12. Registration/enumeration specialists should be deployed with UNHCR's Emergency Response Teams to ensure that the registration/enumeration of refugees is undertaken as soon as possible after any influx.
13. A quick disbursing fund should be established to provide early compensation to the host communities in refugee impacted areas. The fund should be administered by UNHCR, until such time as Recommendation 3 is implemented, and possibly have access to the UNHCR's Emergency Response Fund.
14. Until such time as Recommendation 3 is implemented, UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF and DHA should develop common arrangements for stand-by capacity with the partners (NGO/civilian contactors/military contingents) most appropriate to the task.
15. To improve the response capacity of NGOs at a national level, donor organisations should develop schemes enabling their principal national relief NGOs to train and retain competent relief personnel between periods of deployment.
16. The use of airlifts should be given more careful consideration by UN agencies, donor organisations and NGOs. Where viable overland routes are available, they should be utilised.
17. Before approving the establishment of blanket supplementary feeding programmes in refugee camps, UNHCR, donor organisations and implementing NGOs should consider the potential improvements that could be made to the general ration supply pipeline if SFP resources were deployed instead in support of the general ration supply.
18. Governments likely to deploy military contingents in support of future humanitarian operations should, in conjunction with their military forces and principal relief NGOs, develop clear frameworks for civil military cooperation, areas of comparative advantage of military and NGO capacity and undertake joint training courses and exercises to develop familiarity between the military and humanitarian aid communities.

Acronyms

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
AICF	Action Internationale Contre la Faim (Intl. Action Against Hunger)
AMDA	Association of Medical Doctors of Asia
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier
BBTG	Broad Based Transitional Government
CAFOD	Catholic Fund for Overseas Development
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CDC	Centers for Disease Control, Atlanta
CDR	Coalition pour la Défense de la République
CEPZA	Communauté d'Eglise Pentecôte du Zaïre
CEPLA	Communauté d'Eglise Libre du Zaïre
CERF	Central Emergency Revolving Fund
CMOC	Civil-Military Operations Centres
COGEFAR	Italian Road Construction Company
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CSB	Corn-Soya-Blend
DART	Disaster Assistance Relief Teams
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DMT	Disaster Management Team
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN)
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EDP	Extended Delivery Points
EPF	Emergency Programme Fund (UNICEF)
EPRS	Emergency Preparedness and Response Section (UNHCR)
ERF	Emergency Response Fund (HCR)
ERT	Emergency Response Team (HCR)
EU	European Union
EUCOM	European Command (US Military)
FAR	Force Armée Rwandaise
FTS	Financial Tracking System
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (Society for Technical Cooperation)
HIT	Health Information Team
IASC	InterAgency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IEFR	International Emergency Food Reserve
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IRA	Immediate Response Account (WFP)
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ITSH	Internal Transport, Storage and Handling
JTF	Joint Task Force
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MdM	Médecins du Monde (Doctors of the World)
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MRND	Mouvement de Rassemblement National pour la Démocratie
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Overseas Development Administration (UK)
OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (US)

ODI	Overseas Development Institute
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PSF	Pharmaciens sans Frontières (Pharmacists without Borders)
PWSS	Potable Water Supply System Co. Ltd
RENP	Rwanda Emergency Normalisation Plan
RNIS	Refugee Nutrition Information System (ACC/Sub Committee on Nutrition)
ROWPU	Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Unit
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
RRT	Rapid Response Team (WFP)
SC	Security Council
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SFP	Supplementary Feeding Programme
SGR	Strategic Grain Reserve
SitRep	Situation Report
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
TB	Tuberculosis
TCRS	Tanzanian Christian Refugee Services
THW	Technisches Hilfswerk (Technical Help Organisation, German Govt)
TICF	Transport Infrastructure Contingency Fund (WFP)
TRC	Tanzanian Railway Corporation
UAC	Unaccompanied Children
UCC	Unaccompanied Children's Centres
UNAHT	United Nations Advanced Humanitarian Team
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIENET	UN Electronic Mail System
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission in Uganda/Rwanda
UNREO	United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
VOICE	Voluntary Organisations in Cooperation in Emergencies
WatSan	Water and Sanitation
WFP	World Food Programme
WTOE	WFP Transport Operation in Ethiopia

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LETTER DATED 29 DECEMBER 1995 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I HAVE THE HONOUR TO REFER TO THE STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL OF 9 MARCH 1995 (S/PRST/1995/10) REQUESTING ME TO CONTINUE TO KEEP THE SECURITY COUNCIL FULLY INFORMED OF DEVELOPMENTS IN BURUNDI. IN THIS CONNECTION, I SHOULD LIKE TO SHARE WITH YOU MY DEEP CONCERN ABOUT THE PERSISTENCE OF VIOLENCE AND THE FURTHER ESCALATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS COMMUNICATED TO ME IN RECENT REPORTS FROM THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE OFFICE OF MY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN BUJUMBURA AND OTHER SOURCES.

AT THE END OF JUNE 1995, THE SPECIAL RAPporteur OF THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN BURUNDI, MR. PAOLO SERGIO PINHEIRO, UNDERTOOK A VISIT TO THE COUNTRY. ACCORDING TO HIS REPORT, BURUNDI IS THE SCENE OF A SMOULDERING CIVIL WAR. THE SITUATION HAS CONTINUED TO DETERIORATE SINCE MAY 1995 AND IS CHARACTERIZED BY DAILY KILLINGS, MASSACRES, TORTURE AND ARBITRARY DETENTION. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION "REVEALS AN INCREASINGLY MARKED GENOCIDAL TREND OF A SOCIO-ETHNIC NATURE" AND PERPETRATORS ARE STILL ENJOYING IMPUNITY.

IN THE LIGHT OF HIS FINDINGS, THE SPECIAL RAPporteur PUTS FORWARD A NUMBER OF RECOMMENDATIONS RANGING FROM THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND THE REFORM OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL POLICE FORCE ACCEPTED BY BOTH COMMUNITIES AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVERS.

THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IS UNDERScoreD BY RECENT DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDING THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC), THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME AND MOST NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) TO CURTAIL OR SUSPEND THEIR ACTIVITIES IN BURUNDI FOLLOWING A SPATE OF VIOLENT ATTACKS AGAINST THEIR PERSONNEL AND ASSETS. FURTHERMORE, BURUNDI'S BORDERS WITH ZAIRE AND THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA HAVE REMAINED CLOSED FOR SEVERAL DAYS. THERE ARE ALSO RECENT REPORTS OF A CROWD NUMBERING SEVERAL THOUSAND GATHERING IN THE VICINITY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE IN THE CAPITAL.

IN THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES, I FEAR THERE IS A REAL DANGER OF THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI DEGENERATING TO THE POINT WHERE IT MIGHT EXPLODE INTO ETHNIC VIOLENCE ON A MASSIVE SCALE. IN VIEW OF THE EXTREMELY GRAVE CONSEQUENCES OF SUCH AN EXPLOSION, I SHOULD LIKE TO RECALL ONCE MORE THE PROPOSALS I MADE TO

THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON 19 AUGUST 1994 AND REPEATED IN MY REPORT OF 11 OCTOBER 1994 (S/1994/1152).

IN PARTICULAR, I SUGGESTED THE MAINTENANCE IN ZAIRE, SUBJECT TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT, OF A MILITARY PRESENCE CAPABLE OF INTERVENING RAPIDLY IN THE EVENT OF A SUDDEN DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN BURUNDI, A PREVENTIVE MEASURE THAT COULD HELP TO AVOID A REPETITION OF THE TRAGIC EVENTS IN RWANDA. MY PROPOSALS ALSO INCLUDED THE DEPLOYMENT OF A CONTINGENT OF GUARDS, SIMILAR TO THOSE SENT TO IRAQ, TO PROTECT THE HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATION TEAMS; AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVERS AS RECOMMENDED BY THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR AND SEVERAL OTHER MISSIONS THAT VISITED BURUNDI.

IN VIEW OF THE WORSENING SITUATION, THE SECURITY COUNCIL MAY NOW WISH TO GIVE RENEUED CONSIDERATION TO MY PROPOSALS FOR PREVENTIVE DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL AND GUARDS. AS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS OBSERVERS, I REGRET TO INFORM YOU THAT THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS HAS NOT YET BEEN IN A POSITION TO SECURE THE NECESSARY FUNDS FOR THIS PURPOSE DESPITE NUMEROUS AND REPEATED APPEALS TO POTENTIAL DONOR GOVERNMENTS.

IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION, I HAVE ASKED THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, MS. SADAKO OGATA, TO TRAVEL IMMEDIATELY TO BUJUMBURA AS MY PERSONAL ENVOY IN ORDER TO DISCUSS WITH THE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN ON AN URGENT BASIS TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION AND ENABLE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS TO FUNCTION EFFECTIVELY. I SHALL INFORM THE SECURITY COUNCIL ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF MS. OGATA'S MISSION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

FINALLY, I SHOULD LIKE TO CONFIRM THAT MY NEW SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR BURUNDI, MR. MARC FAGUY, LEFT FOR BUJUMBURA ON 28 DECEMBER 1995 AND WILL ASSUME HIS FUNCTIONS THERE WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT, UPON HIS ARRIVAL ON 30 DECEMBER 1995.
(SIGNED) BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI

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
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BURUNDI: A MANAGEABLE CRISIS?

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By Gerard Prunier, WRITENET (UK)

October 1994

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1. THE WEIGHT OF THE PAST (1850-1966)¹

1.1 Tutsi and Hutu in pre-colonial Burundi

The recent Rwandese tragedy has caused a strong and not unreasonable anxiety concerning the fate of Burundi, especially since its promising experiment in democratization was violently interrupted in October 1993. In this perspective, given their similar social structures and parallel histories, the two countries are seen as twins, with the sickness of one easily infecting the other. To a large degree, this is true. But to a degree only. For if these two countries are indeed twins, they are dissimilar twins, not identical ones. And the fact is evident as soon as one looks at their pre-colonial history. Although the famous dual social structure of Tutsi and Hutu existed in Burundi², its nature and functioning were from the start somewhat different from the Rwandese case³. Burundi was, like Rwanda, an old and centrally-organized kingdom dating back to at least the sixteenth century A.D. But it had grown according to a different pattern. While Rwanda grew from a royal centre which kept adding to its territory in a rather homogeneous fashion and carried out an iron-fisted centralization, Burundi grew in a more supple, more 'organic' sort of way. Although the *Mwami* (king) was, like his Rwandese counterpart, a sacred and absolute monarch, his role was subtly different. He was the 'Father' of the Nation, almost more a religious than political figure, in whose mystique everybody shared. And, more importantly, the Tutsi segment of the population did not 'rule' politically. This role was devolved to the *Abagamwa* (sing. *Muganwa*)⁴, a group of high-ranking nobles who dominated both Tutsi and Hutu. They were the provincial governors, ruling the various areas in the name of the *Mwami*. In turn, at the court, the king chose his close advisers among what was called the *abanyarurimbi*, 'those who can judge'. *Abanyarurimbi* were both Tutsi and Hutu by origin, but not *abagamwa*. And finally, in everyday life, the men who counted were the *abashingantahe*, 'those of the small stick', generally older gentlemen who were recognised as sort of social referees and common

¹ 1850 is the approximate date of the beginning of the reign of *Mwami* Mwezi Gisabo, the last ruler of independent Burundi. 1966 is the date of abolition of the monarchy.

² See the treatment of the question in Gérard Prunier, 'La crise rwandaise: structures et développement', *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, vol. 13, No 2/3 (Summer/Autumn 1994). The best comparative treatment of what it means to be Tutsi or Hutu in the two countries can be found in Jean-Pierre Chrétien, 'Hutu et Tutsi au Rwanda et au Burundi' in Jean-Loup Amselle and Elikia M'Bokolo (eds), *Au coeur de l'ethnie*, (Paris: La Découverte, 1985), pp 129-165.

³ For a very detailed analysis of Burundi pre-colonial society see Emile Mworoha (ed), *Histoire du Burundi des origines à la fin du XIXème siècle*, (Paris: Hatier, 1987), especially Chapter 10 for a description of the social and political order on the eve of colonization.

⁴ Bantu languages are divided into word classes, distinguished through their varying prefixes. Living creatures are prefixed m- in the singular and ba-, wa- or aba- in the plural. Hence the correct spelling for 'Tutsi' would be *mututsi* in the singular and *abatutsi* in the plural. For the sake of easy comprehension we will nevertheless keep using the grammatically incorrect but more easily identifiable form 'Tutsi' and 'Hutu' (correctly *muhutu* and *abahutu*).

law judges, arbitrating most of the ordinary quarrels and social problems⁵. We had thus a situation rather different from the Rwandese case. A king with a 'softer' political definition and stronger religious and social roles. A specialised feudal aristocracy of *abaganwa* ruling over Tutsi and Hutu alike, both categories being considered as *abanyagihugu* (subjects). A royal court where influential courtiers were both Hutu and Tutsi. And a society where, through the *abashingantahe* system, the whole population was drawn into a common judicial practice. This did not mean that Tutsi and Hutu were equal. The Tutsi definitely formed an aristocracy. But because of the very closed elite circle of the *abaganwa*, this aristocracy was not exclusively political and the social distance between the two groups was less than in Rwanda. The capacity for social mobility between the two groups was also higher than in Rwanda and the general social homogeneity was stronger than in the northern kingdom. Although a distinct social domination of Hutu by Tutsi was evident⁶, the cohesive nature of what could without anachronism already be called a nation-state, was stronger than the divisive potential of its social structure.

1.2 The colonial impact

Belgian policies in the two mandate territories of Ruanda and Urundi were generally similar⁷, notably in the general administrative reform started in 1929 which led to the 'tutsification' of the native civil service. But there was a definite difference of emphasis. For the Belgians, Rwanda was the 'perfect case'. The whole system of a 'higher' race, of a protected king who acted as 'modernising ruler', of catholicism as a religious and moral extension of colonial rule and as a vector of europeanization, was always more complete, more absolute in Rwanda than in Burundi. In Rwanda, it rose to the level of an ideology which was later to be taken over and turned around (but not destroyed) by the leaders of the Hutu 'democratic revolution' of 1959. The situation was never that extreme in Burundi. The king was protected by but not a direct tool of the Belgians. The action of Rwandese King Mutara III Rudahigwa devoting his country to Christ the King in 1946 was something which would have appeared bizarre to the Burundi court at the time, in spite of the national importance of the Catholic church. Also, at the level of the native administration, the 'tutsification' was in fact rather a 'baganwaization', most of the post-1929 chiefs being *abaganwa* rather than 'ordinary' Tutsi. Socially, Belgian policies had a more limited impact than in Rwanda due to the fact that the main client/patron system of contract, the *ubugabire*, was both more equalitarian and more resilient in the face of foreign regulations than the

⁵ Their name came from the small stick they carried and which they planted in the ground before them before speaking, causing everybody to fall silent.

⁶ See on this subject the remarks by one of the first German travellers who entered the kingdom: Hans Meyer, *Die Barundi*, (Leipzig: Otto Spamer Verlag, 1916).

⁷ The most complete analysis of Belgian colonial policies in Burundi can be found in Joseph Gahama, *Le Burundi sous administration belge*, (Paris: Karthala, 1983).

Rwandese form of *ubuhake*⁸. As a result of these specificities, the political tensions in Burundi towards the end of the colonial period did not take at all the same shape as those in Rwanda. In both cases, the Belgians were shocked and panicked at the 'betrayal' of their erstwhile allies the Tutsi. But while in Rwanda the word 'Tutsi' meant a well-defined and socially identifiable group which had developed serious problems during the colonial period with the Hutu masses, in Burundi the word 'Tutsi' was much less precise and there was no gaping chasm between Tutsi and Hutu. As a result, proto-nationalist political parties regrouped both Hutu and Tutsi, and their divisions were rather along the lines of former *abaganwa* lineage rivalries. There were two main lineages among the *abaganwa* traditional 'professional politicians', the Batare and the Bezi. The royal family had sided with the Bezi early on during the colonial period, because the Germans had supported the Batare. Later, during the Belgian Mandate, favours ebbed and flowed according to political tactics. At first, the Belgians had sided with the Bezi. But the Batare had had in the person of Chief Pierre Baranyanka an extraordinary clever politician who had managed to ingratiate himself with Resident Pierre Ryckmans, the greatest of Ruanda-Urundi's colonial administrators. Later Baranyanka had played on the detestation Resident Robert Schmidt (1944-1954) felt for the *Mwami* (king) Mwambutsa IV in order to position himself politically. During the late colonial period, one can say that Chief Baranyanka certainly had more influence over the Belgians than the light-headed playboy-king Mwambutsa. Thus the colonial administration had had to tolerate and even favour Baranyanka's nationalist party, the Parti Démocrate Chrétien (PDC) because it was considered a lesser evil than the main nationalist group, the Union Pour le Progrès National (UPRONA). The vocabulary used by the last Belgian colonial Resident, Jean-Paul Harroy, about both the PDC and the UPRONA, is eloquently clear :

There was a certain connivance and even a direct complicity between our Authority and the PDC ... The main point of their program we caught upon was their refusal of immediate independence ... The PDC quickly became the bulwark we hoped to use in order to stop the cancerous metastasis of UPRONA's progress⁹.

Such an attitude on the part of colonial authority around 1960 was extremely damaging to an African political party and Resident Harroy's policy (fully supported by Brussels) had of course the opposite effect of considerably strengthening UPRONA and weakening the PDC. UPRONA was led by a very remarkable politician, Prince Louis Rwagasore, eldest son of King Mwambutsa IV. Far from being his father's tool, the young man was very much his own master and had managed to develop an original brand of nationalist politics. As the king's son he of course commanded considerable respect. But he had been educated in Belgium where he had acquired a then fashionable taste for radical left-wing politics. As a result, the 'Red Prince' could afford to play on several levels at the same time; as a Prince he could play on traditionalism; as a young radical intellectual, on fiery nationalist and socialist rhetoric; and as a person on a very enlightened approach to ethno-social politics. In September 1959 he had married Marie-Rose Ntamikeyvyo, a very good-looking Hutu young

⁸ See the remarks on *ubugabire* by Emile Mworoha in his *Peuples et Rois de l'Afrique des Lacs*, (Dakar: Les Nouvelles Editions Africaines, 1977), pp 187-190.

⁹ Jean-Paul Harroy, *Burundi (1955-1962)*, (Brussels: Hayez, 1987), p 399

lady and the marriage had carried a powerful political and ethnic message. The young Prince, the firebrand nationalist leader, had married a 'low caste' girl, thus embodying personally the concept of national unity. And his two closest advisers in the UPRONA power structure, Paul Mirerekano and Pierre Ngendandumwe, were both Hutu. Thus UPRONA turned into a nightmare for the Belgians because the policy of divide and rule which they had applied in Rwanda, so successfully at first and so disastrously in the long run, could not work in the Burundi case¹⁰. Here, the main contradiction lay between the various *abaganwa* families vying for power and influence as Belgian authority receded. Both main groups i.e. the administration-supported PDC and the ultra-nationalist UPRONA carried with them a full range of *abaganwa*, of 'ordinary' Tutsi and of Hutu. In despair, the colonial administration resorted to sponsoring a newly-born purely Hutu party, the Parti du Peuple (PP or People's Party). The PP remained marginal in pre-independence politics, although this attempt at ethnic division was a sinister portent of things to come.

The elections of 18 September 1961 were a triumph for UPRONA which got 82 per cent of the vote and put into Parliament 58 of the 64 MPs. All the other parties together, allied within the Front Commun ('Common Front') could only muster 18 per cent of the popular vote. Ethnically, out of the 58 UPRONA MPs; 25 were Tutsi, 22 were Hutu, 7 were *abaganwa*, a figure which showed a pronounced collapse of the old aristocratic elite, and 4 were 'uncertain', that is people of mixed parentage who cared little about displaying their ethnic tag.

Unfortunately, the *abaganwa* rivalries, socially and politically obsolete, were to have one last and enormously noxious effect before disappearing from the political forefront. On 13 October 1961, Prince Louis Rwagasore, UPRONA leader and logical future Prime Minister of independent Burundi, was shot dead by the young Greek settler Ioannis Karageorgis, while sitting at an outside cafe¹¹. The murderer had acted as a hired gun on behalf of his employer, a Greek trader who hated UPRONA and was close to the sons of Pierre Baranyanka. It rapidly became clear that the whole murder conspiracy was a revenge plot by ousted Batare *abaganwa* who anachronistically saw UPRONA's victory as a triumph for the rival Bezi family. This shortsightedness was to have catastrophic consequences.

Rwagasore had personified a trans-ethnic form of nationalism. A prominent member of the royal lineage, an anti-colonialist, intimately linked with the Hutu community, he was a living incarnation of national unity. His violent death shattered the image, especially since the 'Hutu revolution' then taking place in neighbouring Rwanda carried a divisive message to Burundi. UPRONA Tutsi cadres immediately started working on 'tutsifying' the party.

¹⁰ From that point of view, the two subtitles given by former Resident Jean-Paul Harroy to his two-part memoirs on the decolonization of Rwanda and Burundi are remarkably candid. The volume on Rwanda is triumphantly subtitled: 'Memories of a companion of Rwanda's march towards democracy and independence' while the volume on Burundi is sadly subtitled: 'Memories of a fighter in a lost war'. Jean-Paul Harroy, *Burundi (1955-1962)*, (Brussels: Hayez, 1987) and *Rwanda (1955-1962)*, (Brussels: Hayez, 1984).

¹¹ For a good account of the complicated murder case, see Jean-Paul Harroy, *Burundi*, pp 576-593.

1.3 The end of the monarchy (1962-1966)

Burundi became independent on 1 July 1962. The festive occasion was to a degree marred by the memory of the dead Rwagasore, the man everybody had expected to conduct the country wisely into its first years of autonomous existence. In a situation typical of the absence of real ideological or ethnic division in the country, parliamentary life was sharply divided between the so-called 'Monrovia Group' and its 'enemy', the 'Casablanca Group'.

These two groups had pretenses at divergent economic theories, not always very clear. The Monrovia group was supposed to be more pro-western while the Casablanca group was identified with the 'progressive' countries whose leanings were more towards socialism. In the Burundese context, these divisions were purely subjective and artificial.¹²

To make matters worse, the Monrovia Group had rallied 32 MPs out of 64 and the Casablanca Group the other half¹³. Politics became paralyzed in byzantine rivalries and personal conflicts between the various politicians. Nothing serious was undertaken and even business as usual became inordinately difficult.

The break - in itself an unhappy one - with that sterile situation came in 1965 after Pierre Ngendandumwe, Rwagasore's old lieutenant, briefly became Prime Minister. The various prime ministers between July 1962 and January 1965 had been a succession of rather lacklustre characters, with a brief period during which Ngendandumwe himself had been at the head of the government¹⁴. An accumulation of economic, diplomatic and administrative problems seemed to call for a firmer leadership. Ngendandumwe, a member of the 'Monrovia Group', but a national figure and an independent person, was called upon by the King to form a new cabinet after the preceding 'Casablanca' administration of Albin Nyamoya had accumulated a number of blunders. But on the very day he announced his new cabinet (15 January 1965), Pierre Ngendandumwe was shot dead. The event was to initiate a tragic course of events.

Although the circumstances of the murder were never fully clarified, it now seems reasonably certain that the killers were Rwandese Tutsi refugees with a deep hatred of the Hutu. The effect of that ethnic motivation to the killing was catastrophic. The Hutu, who had previously felt they were underdogs but that reasonable channels of redress were open to them, suddenly felt that they had become political and social outcasts, that any means, including murder,

¹² M. Manirakiza, *La fin de la monarchie burundaise (1962-1966)*, (Brussels: Le Mat de Misaine, 1990), p 43

¹³ The six non-UPRONA MPs had not chosen to create an opposition group but rather to join either 'Monrovia' or 'Casablanca' as they were popularly known. The style of the rivalry between the two groups (there was no ethnic connotation) was reminiscent of the rivalry between famous opposing soccer team rather than between political tendencies.

¹⁴ In spite of UPRONA's rampant 'tutsification' the fact that Ngendandumwe was a Hutu had never been a problem. In fact, there had been two other Hutu (Cimpaye and Bamina) among the various ineffectual Prime Ministers.

would be used to stop 'them' from participating in the power structure. The elections of October 1965 contributed to a deepening of ethnic antagonisms. UPRONA won with 73 per cent of the seats. But 70 per cent of the new MPs were Hutu, both within UPRONA and among the PP-linked 'independent' candidates. Nevertheless, the King chose a Tutsi Prime Minister in the person of Leopold Biha, his Personal Secretary and a particularly hapless politician. The radical Hutu leader Gervais Nyangoma, who was secretly hoping to be chosen for the job in spite of not even being an MP, experienced deep frustration at this nomination. Since Biha was so unpopular, even among the Tutsi, Nyangoma and his friends thought they could resort to violence¹⁵. The Nyangoma coup, aimed at killing the King and taking power, quickly fell through (18- 19 October 1965). But the Hutu insurrection which followed within days in the province of Muramvya killed an estimated 500 Tutsi before being crushed at the cost of around 2,000 Hutu lives. A new political pattern - Hutu against Tutsi - had emerged in Burundi. It was to cost thousands of lives and has not yet been changed into a more constructive framework.

An associated development related to this new violent ethnic pattern took place in the role of the Army. A young Army Captain, Michel Micombero, had personally directed the battle against the coup-makers in Bujumbura. In the following days he was the one who 'restored order' in a rather violent way in Muramvya. He emerged from the crisis as a 'strong man' on whom the Tutsi extremists quickly pinned their hopes.

King Mwambutsa IV, who was sharing his time between Geneva and the Spanish Costa del Sol, living in luxury hotels, looked completely unable to play his role in the increasingly tense situation. He was deposed on 9 July 1966 and replaced by his son Prince Ndizeye who adopted the regal name of Ntare V. But the real power behind the throne was more and more the military might of Captain Micombero who became Prime Minister on July 23rd. The enfeebled monarchy continued until 28 November 1966 when Captain Micombero simply declared it abolished.

The new regime threatened repression but did not have to use it. It was well known that the new Army Chief of Staff, Major Albert Shibura, was a Micombero supporter and would not hesitate to use force. Another Micombero crony, Arthémon Simbananiye, became Public Prosecutor. His very presence at the head of 'justice' was enough to intimidate all opponents for the time being¹⁶.

The emergence of an Army dictatorship sharpened ethnic antagonisms. Captain Micombero was himself a Tutsi extremist and he promoted like-minded people around him. Both Hutu and moderate Tutsi politicians were sidelined. But the regime was using 'ethnicity' for reasons which were far from being abstractly ideological. In fact, the new military course

¹⁵ For a description of these events see M. Manirakiza, *op. cit.*, pp 54-78 and René Lemarchand, *Rwanda and Burundi* (New York: Praeger, 1970), chapters XIII and XIV.

¹⁶ Simbananiye is the man who was later to acquire a most sinister reputation after he became credited with having drafted a plan for general genocide of the Hutu. The 'Simbananiye plan', which nobody has ever seen but in which many people in Burundi believe almost as an article of faith, was a major element in sparking off the 1972 massacres.

reflected, somewhat similarly to the Idi Amin period in Uganda, a marginalization of the old elites and a rise of new groups of parvenus, among whom the military were the most prominent. Mediocre personalities benefitted from lightning promotions while capable administrators were forced to resign. The old *abaganwa* elite became irrelevant, now that the monarchy was gone, thus removing a buffer between Tutsi and Hutu. And worse, the new brand of Tutsi politics Micombero was ushering in was, as we will see, divisive of the Tutsi themselves. The fierce Tutsi-Hutu confrontation which was to become typical of what had to pass for politics in Burundi between 1966 and 1987 was in fact rooted more in social and economic rivalry than in supposed 'ancient tribal hatreds'. The best summary of this tragic situation had probably been given by Burundese Army Commander Martin Ndayahoze, one of the last Hutu officers remaining in the Service, who had said in 1968, four years before being murdered during the 1972 massacres:

We can safely say that it is the elite, the bourgeoisie, which carries the virus of tribalism. The disease comes from the top ... Mediocre civil servants need gimmicks to survive in their position or to get promoted. Greedy politicians use ethnic divisiveness as a political strategy. So if they are Tutsi, they denounce a 'Hutu peril' which must be fought, even by violence. And if they are Hutu they clamour against a 'Tutsi apartheid' which must be ended.¹⁷

2. FROM MILITARY DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRATIZATION

2.1 The Micombero years: the establishment of a Tutsi dictatorship (1966-1976)

Captain Micombero's coup had several dimensions. First and foremost, it was a move by the Army as a social group, to take over power from the hands of a confused and divided civilian regime and to empower a new and less educated elite. But given the structure of the country's elite, it was also a new step towards the ethnicization of politics. Not only in the sense that Captain Micombero was a Tutsi, but because of the fact that he was a *Hima* Tutsi from Bururi, i.e. a member of a group which had been held in low esteem by the *abanyaruguru*, the high-ranking Tutsi clans of Muramvya Province. Micombero was a 'small' Tutsi using his Tutsiness to persuade the 'big' Tutsi to support him. Of course, in order to achieve this - imperfect - Tutsi unity around his person, he had to permanently brandish the real or imaginary threat of a Hutu insurrection. Thus the regime was to be permanently plagued by an ethnic double bind. On the one hand, the President-Dictator had to watch out for the partisans of the old monarchy and of a 'real' Tutsi regime who disliked him as an upstart. And on the other hand he had to face a largely self-manufactured Hutu 'danger', used as a Tutsi coagulant, but which in the long run would of course tend to become real.

The tension between the Micombero-led 'Bururi mafia' and the rest of the political class became increasingly dangerous. By late 1971 the Muramvya *abanyaruguru* circles were contemplating a *coup d'état*. The President pre-empted them and a series of arrests and

¹⁷ Commander Martin Ndayahoze, Radio Broadcast on Radio Burundi, 25 November 1968. Quoted in Jean-Pierre Chrétien: 'Les massacres de 1972', p 431, in *Burundi: l'Histoire retrouvée*, Paris: Karthala, 1993

rigged trials in late 1971 and early 1972 decapitated the neo-monarchist opposition¹⁸. This resulted in a double process: on the one hand the Muramvya 'high Tutsi' group felt it had to precipitate a monarchist restoration in order to eliminate the 'Bururi mafia', and on the other hand the marginalised Hutu elite felt it had to side, at least tactically, with the neo-monarchist plotters. For some of the extremists in the Micombero entourage, this was in fact a blessing¹⁹, an occasion to strike both at their Tutsi rivals and at the potentially dangerous Hutu mass which had so far showed almost infinite patience.

Their enemies fell into the trap. Former king Ntare V flew to Uganda from Europe where he had lived in exile since his deposition in 1966. For some of the Hutu extremist circles, this was the signal of a major showdown among the Tutsi which could be exploited for their own ends and they prepared an insurrection. King Ntare negotiated with President Micombero who guaranteed his safety. Trusting in his remaining popularity, the young king then flew from Entebbe to Bujumbura in late March and was arrested as soon as he stepped off the plane. After one very tense month the most extreme members of the 'Bururi mafia' prevailed: on 28 April 1972 President Micombero dismissed his whole cabinet and transferred *de facto* authority to the military and to a handful of civilian extremists. The next day, while the Hutu started - too late - their long-awaited uprising, Interior Minister Shibura shot king Ntare dead and gave overall orders for a general slaughter of the Hutu²⁰.

The result was appalling. At least 100,000 people and possibly up to 300,000 died²¹. The repression seemed at first to be aimed only at stopping the first wave of Hutu killing Tutsi. But once this had been achieved (within less than 48 hours) the killings went on, with a distinct social slant. The Hutu who were targeted were those possessing anything above the level of primary education. Army teams led by members of the State Security went around not only in the towns but even in the smallest villages, combing them for Hutu 'intellectuals'. They were all mercilessly slaughtered. The horror was such that everybody in Burundi, Tutsi or Hutu, still calls 1972 the year of *ikiza* (the catastrophe).

In the short run the regime had been superficially consolidated by this violence. But at a deeper level it had been contaminated by a sort of 'death fascination'. Since the massacres had no special East-West dimension, for the international community they were negligible. Soon, the violent extravagances of buffoon dictator Idi Amin Dada in neighbouring Uganda were to put the region back into the limelight. Since the massive and violent expulsion of the

¹⁸ On this crisis see M. Manirakiza, *Burundi: de la révolution au régionalisme (1966-1976)*, (Brussels: Le Mat de Misaine, 1992), pp 47-108

¹⁹ Their main leaders were the Minister of Information André Yanda, the Minister of the Interior Albert Shibura and especially the Minister for Foreign Affairs Arthémon Simbananiye, who had a decisive role in organising the 1972 massacres.

²⁰ Déo Hakizimana, *Burundi: le non-dit*, (Vernier: Editions Remesha, [1991]), pp 21-24

²¹ For an evaluation of the 1972 massacre, see R. Lemarchand and D. Martin, *Génocide sélectif au Burundi*, (London: Minority Rights Group, 1974) and B.F. Kiraranganya, *La vérité sur le Burundi*, (Sherbrooke: Editions Naaman, 1977), pp 76-81.

Asian minority in Uganda a few weeks after the Burundi massacres had definite and serious international consequences, not only in the framework of the East-West confrontation but also for the Arab-Israeli conflict²², world attention quickly turned away from Burundi to the new crisis. President Micombero could then conclude that his genocidal policy had been a success and he abandoned any sort of overall national policy-making to sink into increasingly parochial or even personal politicking. Darkly misanthropic, given to prolonged bouts of drinking, he retreated into a world of his own. On 1 November 1976, Colonel Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, another Tutsi officer from a Bururi *Hima* clan, who was born in the same Rutovu *commune* as the President and some say was even a distant cousin of his, deposed the sombre and withdrawn Micombero who seemed to have lost touch with reality²³.

2.2 The Bagaza regime and the continuation of Tutsi rule (1976-1987)

The first Manifesto of the new regime (30 November 1976) seemed to address real issues when it talked of the 'dark years of 1965, 1969 and 1972'. At first, the new regime seemed to try to play the card of a social and political opening, calling upon the UPRONA Party Youth, the Jeunesses Révolutionnaires Rwagasore (JRR), to denounce the social abuses they felt needed redressing. There was a moment of short-lived elation. But this was mere window-dressing and the Bagaza 'revolution' was soon seen for what it really was i.e. a simple palace coup, a change of the guard within the 'Bururi mafia'²⁴. There was no apology or attempt at reconciliation concerning the 1972 quasi-genocide. The Army became even more of a closed and all-powerful elite and its recruitment remained as narrow as always. Civil service recruitment was broader in intra-Tutsi terms (in order to soften the impact of the almost exclusively Bururi officer corps recruitment) but it remained largely discriminatory towards the Hutu majority. By 1985 there were still only four Hutu cabinet ministers out of 20, 17 Hutu MPs in the designated 'Parliament' (out of 65), two Hutu members in the UPRONA Central Committee (out of 52). Only one ambassador out of 22 was a Hutu and two provincial governors out of 15, while members of the majority social group represented only 10 per cent of the teachers and 20 per cent of the students at the 'National' University²⁵. As time went on, even the Tutsi elite felt the weight of the despotism it had had to support in order to keep the Hutu at bay and retain its privileges. With the help of such devoted allies as Interior Minister Charles Kazatsa, Education Minister Isidore Hakizimana and Security Chief Lt-Colonel Laurent Ndabaneze, President Bagaza built an iron-fisted dictatorship compared to which even the Micombero years seemed somewhat relaxed. Security men were everywhere, the press was tightly controlled, any form of

²² For a full treatment of the regional and international consequences of the expulsion of the Uganda Asians, see Gérard Prunier, *L'Ouganda et la question indienne (1896-1972)*, (Paris: Editions ERC, 1990), pp 166-197.

²³ Convinced of the reality of the ideological propaganda which since the colonial days had presented the Tutsi as 'Egyptians' or 'Ethiopians', he went to finish his life in exile in Somalia, 'to be near his ancestors'.

²⁴ See Filip Reyntjens, *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise*, (Paris: Karthala, 1994), pp 39-40.

²⁵ Jean-Pierre Pabanel, 'Statistiques tribales au Burundi en 1986', *Politique Africaine*, No 43 (December 1988), pp 111-115

meeting was spied upon and reported to the Secret Service and students abroad were subjected to regular police reports. Ordinary peasants were commonly thrown in jail for lack of identification, an offense normally punishable by a fine equivalent to US\$ 15 or less, but which could cause them to lose their freedom for six months and at times could cost them their life when jails were not properly supplied with food²⁶. By 1986 the President's power base had narrowed not only to the Tutsi group, but to the Tutsi of one province (Bururi), among the Bururi Tutsi to one precise group (the *Hima*) and among the *Hima* to the three small sub-clans of Rotovu, Matana and Vyanda.

Given the extreme tightness of the political space, the Catholic Church became the last bastion defending a minimum of freedom of speech. As such it soon fell into the sights of the regime which started to silence prelates and close down religious establishments. Even the Bishop of Bururi, Mgr Bernard Bududira, was not spared because he objected to the government policy towards the Church. He was submitted to constant harassment and attacked in the controlled press, and a nephew of his who was in the Army, Cdr Léonce Majanja, was detained. Seminaries were nationalised in 1986 and local charismatic community meetings forbidden. Catechists were detained and at times tortured under the vaguest of pretexts. The prisons started to fill up and several detainees died under torture²⁷.

Sensing Army opposition, by mid-1987 President Bagaza was preparing to expel large numbers of officers who opposed his authoritarian rule. He also wanted to force into retirement numerous NCOs in order to make room for young boys of his clan. Given the growing discontent, he ended up having to detain several prominent members of the Tutsi elite who increasingly questioned his despotic attitude²⁸. So when on 3 September 1987 a group of NCOs led a bloodless coup to overthrow Colonel Bagaza and replace him by Major Pierre Buyoya, relief was almost universal.

2.3 The Buyoya regime and the attempt at democratic transformation (1987-1993)

Major Buyoya was in many ways a traditional Burundi military ruler. Like former Presidents Micombero and Bagaza he was a Tutsi *Hima* from Bururi. He was also a pure product of the military establishment. But he was younger and intellectually more open. He also resented the heavy atmosphere of suspicion, palace plotting and constant backbiting which had made up the general political culture of the Burundi military elite during the last twenty years.

One could say at this point that there was a 'Burundese political pattern' just as there was

²⁶ Déo Hakizimana, *Burundi: le non-dit*, p 41

²⁷ C. Carral, 'Burundi: l'Eglise sous surveillance étatique', *La Revue Nouvelle* (Février 1986); Amnesty International, *Prisoners of conscience and political detainees held in Burundi*, (London: Amnesty International, May 1987).

²⁸ Many were very well-known people, such as businessman Didace Nzohabonayo, Térance Nsanze (the former Burundi Ambassador to the United Nations), Dr Dominique Gacukuzi (Director of Bujumbura's Medical Services), the President of Bujumbura's Court of Appeal Bernard Rukingamubiri, and several others (Personal recollections of the author).

a Rwandese one further north. But while the 'Rwandese model' was one of systematised ethnic antagonism, with the abstract but ever-present threat of military revenge from the Tutsi exile acting as a kind of bugaboo, designed to keep the Hutu masses in line and convince them that their dictatorship was democratic because it was run by members of the so-called 'democratic majority', the 'Burundese model' was rather different. First of all, it was much less 'tight'. Contrary to its Rwandese counterpart, it never had the benefit of ideological formalization and it consisted more of a set of practices than of a coherent collection of rules and values. Although similarly largely based on ethnicism, it was more complex. Most of the time, the main political tensions and contradictions had been not between Hutu and Tutsi but inside the non-Hutu elites, *abaganwa* families at first and then various Tutsi clans. The Hutu provided a sort of mute background, something like the extras in a costume movie. When the situation was favourable and the main Tutsi leader was a man of quality (the epitome having been the national hero Prince Louis Rwagasore), prominent Hutu would be allowed to play real political, social and even economic roles. But their situation always remained precarious, as the murder of Prime Minister Pierre Ngendandumwe had shown in 1965. In less favourable situations, the Hutu were downgraded to the role of passive onlookers, with a few token members of their community being given a handful of symbolic positions.

Contradictions between major Tutsi factions tended to be 'solved' through a 'confrontation' with the Hutu in order to tighten up the ranks of the ruling minority, the major and most horrifying example of this policy having been the 1972 *ikiza*. When the leader was violent or started to decline, as Bagaza did in his later years, the oppression of the Hutu masses could rise from mild to nearly intolerable. And even in the best of cases, ethnic discrimination was an everyday fact of life.

The 1959 Rwandese 'revolution' had had a terrible role in shaping this repressive system. At the back of every Burundese Tutsi's mind, there was always the fear of 'what would happen if they would all decide to rise and kill us to the last one'. The successive dictators had played on that fear, especially to keep the Army a nearly 100 per cent Tutsi preserve. The presence of several hundreds of thousands of exiled Rwandese Tutsi in Burundi had also considerably contributed to this atmosphere of latent paranoia.

The main problem lay in the development of a sick political culture, made up of spite and fear on the Tutsi side, of inferiority and hateful resentment on the Hutu side. But when all was said and done, the Burundese syndrome did not have character of machine-like ineluctability of its Rwandese counterpart. There were always men who stood on the 'wrong' side of the fence, Hutu members of UPRONA, liberal Tutsi who refused a black form of apartheid, and a hope that the ideals of Rwagasore were not dead. In a way, with limited ideological means, probably too late and with too little real help, President Pierre Buyoya was going to try to use that existing window of opportunity.

At first, the new regime, although more liberal in its everyday political practice and at the

human rights level²⁹, was still functioning largely on the model of the 'traditional' Burundi military dictatorships. The first Buyoya cabinet, announced on 1 October 1987, had only five Hutu ministers in it out of a total of twenty. There were only four Hutu out of fifteen provincial governors and there were no changes either in the officer corps, the judiciary or the civil service to open them up more to Hutu participation³⁰.

But the ethnic situation had become very tense. In May 1988 an aggressive communiqué issued by the PALIPEHUTU posed again directly the question of ethnic discrimination in terms of violence³¹. And Mgr Bernard Bududira, the Burundi Bishop persecuted during the last year of the Bagaza regime, called attention to the situation in a vigorous pastoral letter issued practically at the same time and trying to defend a spirit of peaceful reform³².

During the night of 14 to 15 August 1988, a sudden explosion of inter-ethnic violence started in the two neighbouring *communes* of Ntega (Kirundo province) and Marangara (Ngozi Province). For two days bands of Hutu peasants led by PALIPEHUTU activists scoured the *collines*,³³ killing the local Tutsi. On the third day, the Army arrived and massacred indiscriminately all the Hutu they could find without bothering to try to find out first who was guilty and who was not. The violence caused 5,000 casualties according to the government, probably nearer to 20,000 according to foreign observers³⁴. Over 60,000 refugees fled to Rwanda. What had happened? In fact, there was mixture of causes all meshing into each other to produce a bleak scenario:

1. The tensions between various sectors of the Tutsi elite, notably the arrests of people who had been closely associated with the Bagaza regime up to a few months before, were perceived by the Hutu as a prelude, as in 1971-1972, to a new spate of massacres. The PALIPEHUTU agents played on that fear and managed to trigger the ill-fated Hutu insurrection.
2. Some Tutsi elements in the Buyoya government were greatly alarmed by the

²⁹ One of the first measures of the new government was to rescind all the anti-Church legislation and to free all the political prisoners.

³⁰ Filip Reyntjens, *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise*, p 49

³¹ PALIPEHUTU, 'Communiqué No 6', (May 1988). PALIPEHUTU is the acronym of Parti de la Libération du Peuple Hutu (Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People), an extremist party created in 1980 by Rémy Gahuru, a Burundese Hutu living in exile in Rwanda. This party was based on a strict racist ideology strongly inspired by the 'Rwandese model'.

³² Mgr Bernard Bududira, 'Vivre en frères dans le Burundi aujourd'hui et demain', *Bulletin d'Informations Africaines*, No 136, (15 November 1988)

³³ Just as Rwanda. Burundi is a land of many nearly evenly-spaced *collines* (hills). Thus the hill is the natural ecological, human and even administrative unit of the country.

³⁴ On these events, see J.P. Chrétien, A. Guichaoua and G. Le Jeune, *La crise d'Août 1988 au Burundi*, (Paris: Centre de Recherches Africaines, 1989) (Cahiers, No 6)

liberalising intentions of the President and wished to put a stop to these before they could have time to get implemented. The best way was interethnic violence. The Minister of Education, Lt Colonel Jean-Claude Ndiyo, was probably the ringleader of a conspiracy aimed at frightening the Hutu through harassment and rumour, hoping that PALIPEHUTU would rise to the bait.

3. In fact PALIPEHUTU was almost sure to oblige because the Hutu extremists also knew about the liberalising plans of President Buyoya and, just like the Tutsi extremists, knew that they would risk losing their constituency if the regime opened up.

For President Buyoya, the Ntega-Marangara events constituted a violent eye-opener. He realised that after twenty-five years of independence, the life of the country was poisoned by ethnic discrimination, fear and hatred, and that he had to try to solve the problem before the problem destroyed the country. But it was obvious things were not going to change right away. Twenty-seven Hutu intellectuals who had addressed an open letter denouncing ethnic discrimination to the President (22 August) were all dismissed from their jobs and many had to flee the country³⁵. Hutu former MP Cosme Bibonimana, who in the past had criticised the practice of ethnic discrimination in examination marking, was summarily executed. The problem for Major Buyoya was the stubborn clinging to Tutsi supremacy on the part of a political, administrative, judiciary and military establishment used to twenty-five years of unbroken ethnic privilege. Any effort to democratise the country was going to be a two-way fight: first, to create the positive conditions for Hutu participation, that is go beyond the distrust and entrenched radical hostility of the Hutu elite; and second, to avoid the negative obstacles a fearful and privileged Tutsi power structure was going to put in the way of any effort at liberalization.

But the President's choice had been made: he was going to try. On 19 October 1988 he formed a new cabinet. The new Premier, Adrien Sibomana, was the first Hutu to occupy this post since the murder of Pierre Ngendandumwe in 1965 and he had been encouraged to select a significantly bi-ethnic team. Soon after, a Special Commission was created to study the question of national unity. On 13 May 1989 it made public a special report on the question of national unity i.e. an effort at understanding the reasons for the deep-seated national dis-unity³⁶. Professor Filip Reyntjens offers the following evaluation:

In itself, the document was disappointing. It simply offered once more the old Tutsi arguments on the plurisecular unity of precolonial Burundi, on the ethnic divisions being a pure product of Belgian colonial policies and on the Hutu responsibility in all the massacres perpetrated since the mid-1960s³⁷.

While agreeing with this, one must nevertheless recognise that the very fact that the central

³⁵ See Déo Hakizimana (who was among the signatories), *Burundi: le non-dit*, p 84-159.

³⁶ Burundi, Commission Nationale, *Rapport de la Commission Nationale chargée d'étudier la question de l'unité nationale*, (Bujumbura, 1989)

³⁷ Filip Reyntjens, *L'Afrique des Grands Lacs en crise*, p 70

problem of Burundese society was acknowledged, that the unspoken reality everybody knew about but nobody dared to mention publicly was finally brought out in the open, had an enormous collective therapeutic effect³⁸. The Hutu opposition attacked the report as 'too timid' and the cabinet changes as 'cosmetic', but lost no time in organising itself in order to be ready for the day political parties would be allowed to operate freely. In 1990 a group of militants headed by Melchior Ndadaye, a young bank employee who had returned three years earlier from exile in Rwanda, created the Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi (FRODEBU) in semi-clandestinity³⁹. And since he believed in free political competition, the President decided to overhaul the UPRONA single party and try to turn it back into the truly national party it had been in the days of Rwagasore. The December 1990 UPRONA congress elected a new Central Committee comprising 41 Hutu, 38 Tutsi and one Twa⁴⁰. Nicolas Mayugi, a Hutu, became the new Secretary General. Under this new political direction, Civil Service recruitment was opened up and school and university entrance exams began to be graded more and more according to merit and less and less according to ethnic origin. But the one bastion President Buyoya did not dare touch, because its recruitment reached so deep into the unspoken fears of the Tutsi minority, was the Army. This timidity, understandable as it may have been, was to have tragic consequences later on.

The adoption by referendum of the Charte de l'Unité Nationale (Charter for National Unity) on 6 February 1991 was the first public test of the new political orientation and it was ambiguous. On the one hand, with 89 per cent of favourable votes, it constituted an approbation of the liberalization process. But on the other hand, the whole new direction appeared as too 'clean', as too well organised and too controlled by the Government to be really representative of deep-seated and pent up Hutu popular feelings.

The clandestine PALIPEHUTU which was worried about losing its support lost no time in exploiting this 'emotional gap'. It organised various public demonstrations, especially in the North where its support was greatest (April 1991), tried to put together a tax boycott and finally when it realised that it was slipping anyway, organised a series of terrorist attacks (November 1991) in the hope of provoking the Army into a bloody repression. In spite of the fact that President Buyoya was abroad at the time (the terrorists had cleverly scheduled their action) and that the Prime Minister was a Hutu, the Cabinet managed to keep Army violence under control, while the Hutu masses did not rally to the uprising attempt. PALIPEHUTU drew the logical conclusions from this failure and decided from then on to change tactics. Since the organisation's aim of a Hutu-dominated state remained the same, since it was unlikely to be legalised under any circumstances and since the Hutu masses seemed more interested in the moderate FRODEBU tactic of playing along with the

³⁸ It is for example typical that the (moderate) Hutu opponent Déo Hakizimana had chosen as a title for the book he published in exile: *Burundi: le non-dit* (Burundi: the 'unsaid' or the 'unspoken').

³⁹ Although political parties were in theory not allowed, the Government's attitude was quite relaxed and the author was able at the time to meet FRODEBU cadres in Bujumbura without any hindrance. Party literature was also regularly printed and distributed without police interference.

⁴⁰ The Twa are the pygmoid populations who were the original inhabitants of Rwanda and Burundi, before the arrival of either the Bantu Hutu or the Cushitic Tutsi. Today they represent only about 1 per cent of the population in either country.

government and trying to remain within a legal framework, PALIPEHUTU cadres used their sympathisers to start infiltrating FRODEBU and the nascent democratic movement. This, too, was to have dire consequences for the future.

A new democratic constitution was adopted by referendum with a 92 per cent vote in favour on 9 March 1992 and independent political parties became legal by the following June. FRODEBU quickly asserted itself as the leading opposition force among the ten or so different parties which had asked to be registered.

The year which elapsed between the advent of completely free political activity and the general election of June 1993 showed the limits of the President's policy of political voluntarism. He had taken the proverbial horse to the water but making it drink was proving to be difficult. In spite of its 'new' overhauled Central Committee UPRONA carried out a generally slanderous campaign of ethno-political innuendoes against FRODEBU, accusing it among other things of being 'another version of PALIPEHUTU with a legal tag'. The Hutu who adhered to FRODEBU were described as 'subversives' and the Tutsi who did so (there were some) were branded as 'traitors'. This led Christian Sendegeya, a prominent Tutsi member of FRODEBU to attack the UPRONA leadership in an open letter where he wrote:

The great weakness I would reproach your government is to tend to portray any Hutu who does not agree with you as a subversive sympathiser of PALIPEHUTU and any Tutsi who thinks differently from you as a misguided soul⁴¹.

On the other hand, PALIPEHUTU militants and sympathisers did join FRODEBU and some of the smaller Hutu-identified parties such as the Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais (Rally of the Burundese People or RPB), the Parti Libéral (Liberal Party or PL) and the Parti du peuple (People's Party or PP). They obviously had ulterior motives which were hardly of a democratic nature.

Thus the parties went to the election with a mixture of democratic openness tempered by a belief in their own unshakable 'right to rule' on the part of President Buyoya and UPRONA, and an honest desire for a democratic alternative tainted by visions of ethnic revenge on the part of candidate Ndadaye and FRODEBU.

The first part of the election was the presidential contest which took place on 1 June 1993. There were three candidates: President Pierre Buyoya for UPRONA, Melchior Ndadaye for FRODEBU and Pierre-Claver Nsendegeya who ran in the name of the small monarchist party Parti de la Réconciliation du Peuple (Peoples Reconciliation Party or PRP). Over 97 per cent of the 2,360,096 registered voters went to the polls. The election was scrupulously honest and its results were a surprise for many observers who had expected President Buyoya to

⁴¹ *L'Aube*, 8 December 1992

receive the reward for his spirit of democratic openness⁴². But he got only 32.47 per cent of the vote against 64.79 per cent to his FRODEBU rival. The PRP candidate got only 1.4 per cent, which showed how irrelevant the monarchic question had become. Everybody behaved very responsibly. Disappointed President Buyoya sportingly congratulated Ndadaye on his victory. Col Michel Mibarurwa, the Army Chief of Staff conferred with Prime Minister Adrien Sibomana 'to coordinate our action and see how we can manage this transition period so as to avoid problems'.⁴³ The President-Elect immediately moved to reassure the vanquished, saying:

There has been an attempt to make the population believe that our party is set on revenge, that it is fighting against the interests of a certain category of the population. None of this is true.⁴⁴

Knowing how explosive the Rwandese question was in ethnic terms, the new President also declared that the (Tutsi) Rwandese refugees would be allowed to stay in the country and that he would even use his influence to try to convince President Habyarimana that they should be allowed to recover their lost citizenship, something which he called 'a justifiable ambition'⁴⁵.

On 8 June, the new President had declared a general amnesty both to free prisoners and to allow political exiles to come home. All prisoners and exiles were included, whatever their political persuasion. The PALIPEHUTU commandoes arrested in November 1991 were freed, but so were the (Tutsi) soldiers who had attempted to overthrow President Buyoya in March 1992 in the hope of stopping the democratization process. Exiled Hutu radicals came back from Rwanda and so did Tutsi supremacist former President Bagaza who had been living in Libya since 1988.

There were of course a few disturbing notes. Tutsi students marched through the streets chanting: 'No to the victory of division! No to the violation of the Unity Charter!'⁴⁶. In the interior, the Hutu peasantry took the FRODEBU victory as a personal victory over the 'State' which was perceived by them as a Tutsi matter. So they refused to pay taxes any more and

⁴² The local correspondent of the French press agency Agence France Presse had predicted that President Buyoya would be elected in the first round of voting with about 60 per cent of the vote.

⁴³ *La Libre Belgique*, 3 June 1993

⁴⁴ *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, quoting *Radio France Internationale*, interview with President-Elect Ndadaye, 3 June 1993

⁴⁵ *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, quoting *Radio Burundi*, interview with President-Elect Ndadaye, 25 June 1993

⁴⁶ This throws us back on the question of the 'emotional gap' we have mentioned earlier. The catchword of 'Unity' had been so used and overused during the democratization process since 1988 that the word had become associated with UPRONA and Tutsi domination. The feeling, on both sides of the ethnic divide, was that 'Unity' meant continued Tutsi rule with a mostly cosmetic opening up. This was what the Tutsi supremacists who had accepted Buyoya's political course had hoped for and this is what the Hutu population had feared. FRODEBU's victory was quickly denounced by the Tutsi supremacists as 'ethnically divisive'.

started to cut down the communally planted trees to use them for firewood. It took some persuasion to explain to them that the State was now theirs as well as the Tutsi's, and that unfortunately the continued existence of the State meant they still had to pay taxes and refrain from breaking the Law.

The second (legislative) round of elections took place on 29 June and its results confirmed those of the presidential vote. Apart from UPRONA and FRODEBU, the PRP also ran, together with three other small parties, one, the *Rallye pour la Démocratie et le Développement Economique et Social* or RADDES, which was linked with Tutsi supremacist circles, disgusted at UPRONA's 'softness', and the two others, the *Parti Populaire* (PP) and *Rassemblement du Peuple Burundais* (RPB) who were purely Hutu⁴⁷. Participation, at over 91 per cent of the registered voters, was almost as high as for the presidential election. The results were as follows:

Party Name	Vote %	Number of seats
FRODEBU	71.40	65
UPRONA	21.86	16
RPB	1.70	0
PRP	1.43	0
RADDES	1.25	0
PP	1.13	0

Note:

1. Twelve of the sixteen UPRONA MPs were former Ministers in the Buyoya regime, which shows that there was a 'political visibility premium'.
2. Twelve of the sixteen UPRONA MPs (although not the same twelve as the ex-Ministers) were Humu.
3. Eight of the sixty-five FRODEBU MPs were Tutsi.
4. Although the vote was obviously mainly ethnically motivated, it was not fully so. A non-negligible section of the Humu electorate had voted for UPRONA.
5. The small parties did not represent any sizable portion of the electorate. But they represented an extremist opinion (whether Tutsi or Humu) which felt that the two mainstream parties were too moderate for their taste.

By early July, Burundi seemed set to try to turn into economic, administrative and social reality what looked like a particularly successful political transition.

⁴⁷ One should keep in mind that in spite of the ethnic polarization, both UPRONA and FRODEBU made a point of having in their ranks members of the 'other' ethnic group. UPRONA was definitely more ethnically pluralistic (its Secretary General Nicolas Mayugi was a Hutu) but its Hutu members did not have much of a real say in the workings of the party. UPRONA had less Tutsi but they tended to play a more influential role in the mostly Hutu party. One of UPRONA's prominent (and founding) members was Jean-Marie Ngendahayo who was from an old and distinguished *ganwa* family and who was to play a key role in the political developments of 1993-1994.

3. THE NATURE OF THE PRESENT CRISIS (1993 - 1994)

3.1 The events leading to the murder of President Ndadaye (July-October 1993)

The general atmosphere of hope accompanying President Ndadaye's election had left a bitter taste in the mouth of the various extremist factions. The first to act were the Tutsi extremists in the Army. On 3 July, four days after the legislative polls, elements of the 2nd Commando Battalion from Muha Barracks tried to take power by force⁴⁸. The movement was led by Lt Colonel Sylvestre Ningaba who had been an ADC to President Buyoya⁴⁹. But it was quickly stopped by another officer, Major Isaie Nibizi, who managed to talk the men and the NCOs out of following their mutinous officers. The reaction in Army circles was ambiguous. Many officers criticised Ningaba not for attempting a coup but for doing so with little serious planning. Many in the officer corps seemed to be paying only lip-service to democratic principles in spite of the clear verdict of the polls. The feeling was clearly racist in tone: 'those people' (meaning the Hutu) were described as not being capable of actually governing the country⁵⁰.

Unfortunately, this criticism was not entirely devoid of foundation, even if its basis had nothing to do with 'race'. FRODEBU cadres were largely inexperienced for the simple reasons that, firstly, there had always been a marked anti-Hutu bias in Civil Service recruitment and, secondly, the 1972 massacre had achieved its purpose i.e. decimating the Hutu elite. The result was that many of the newly-nominated FRODEBU administrators at the regional level, and many of their men then entering the central administration were tragically incompetent. And this at a moment when the Hutu peasantry was expecting wonders from them, and many in the Tutsi administration were discreetly doing their best to complicate their work in the hope of seeing them fail.

Furthermore, FRODEBU leaders were led by the feeling of having to make up for an enormous backlog of discrimination and the fear of disappointing their electorate to adopt too quick a rhythm of changeover from the old personnel to the new. One of the main problems was the question of the refugees who, mostly living in Tanzania since 1972 but also with smaller pockets who had fled in 1988 and 1991 to Rwanda, were watching the situation in the hope of being able to come back⁵¹. During his inauguration speech President Ndadaye had mentioned the question, saying that he was going to send 'delegations to foreign countries in order to assess the numbers of the refugees, to find out how many wanted to

⁴⁸ Due to the difficulty of communicating with some isolated parts of the country, the results had not yet been proclaimed. They were published only on 9 July and it is probable that the mutineers were hoping to take the yet unformed government by surprise.

⁴⁹ President-Elect Ndadaye was quick to exonerate former President Buyoya of any involvement in the plot.

⁵⁰ Author's interviews with Burundese Army officers in Addis-Abeba (July 1993).

⁵¹ About 40,000 had already come back during the years of the Buyoya regime. But there were about 150,000 left in Tanzania, 25,000 in Rwanda and about 20,000 in Zaïre. On the problem see Catherine Watson, *Transition in Burundi: the context for a homecoming*, (Washington DC: US Committee for Refugees, September 1993).

come home and what their needs were'⁵². This rang a danger bell for the Tutsi minority which had taken over the lands and other properties left behind by those refugees.

The new cabinet had been announced on 10 July 1993. Led by Sylvie Kinigi, a liberal Tutsi UPRONA woman member, it was ethnically and politically balanced. It immediately drew fire from the Hutu extremists who had hoped for a 'radical Hutu' cabinet and found the new government much too moderate for their taste. From exile, extremist leader Kabora Kassan threatened an armed attack on Bujumbura if the Hutu did not get more cabinet posts and his guerilla troops were not allowed to join the national Army⁵³. President Ndadaye was very anxious to reassure the Army and he declared that no officer would be fired from the Forces⁵⁴.

But the Tutsi extremists remained unconvinced. They knew there were plans to 'open up' the Army to the Hutu and that the President was discreetly arranging for his own (Hutu) presidential guard to be formed. Government was functioning according to the principle of *intwari rusangi* (shared power). But this really worked only at the highest government levels. The expectations of the Hutu electorate were too great and in order to try to satisfy them, all the lower and regional echelons of the administration were being solidly 'frodebu-ised', with uneven results⁵⁵. Even at the highest level, clumsy errors were made. One of the biggest ones was the firing on 25 September of national Radio and TV Director Louis-Marie Nindorera by Information Minister Jean-Marie Ngendahayo for 'systematic sabotage'. Nindorera had been chosen by the Minister himself only a few weeks before and his only mistake had been to try to practice an open and vigorously investigative form of information, which spared neither the new government nor the opposition. Years of media control had taken their toll on peoples' minds, even among former opponents, and by this gesture the new government gave the impression not only of not tolerating criticism, but of having something to hide⁵⁶. This was most unfortunate since not only the issue of Army democratization but also the question of the return of refugees gave public debate a rather heated tone. In late August, the Commission des Réfugiés had admitted the principle according to which land illegally acquired during the last twenty years could be open to legal

⁵² BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, quoting Radio Burundi, 10 July 1993

⁵³ François Misser, 'Democrazia assassinata', *Nigrizia*, (December 1993). Kabora Kassan had been the PALIPEHUTU 'Chief of Staff' in Rwanda. After falling out with his erstwhile friends, he moved to Tanzania where he had started a new armed movement the Front de Libération nationale (FROLINAT), which was not considered a serious military threat at that time.

⁵⁴ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, quoting Radio Burundi, 5 August 1993

⁵⁵ This is the most important factor singled out by the Human Rights Watch Report on the violences of October-November 1993 as having been a major cause in the attempted Tutsi putsch which was to cost President Ndadaye his life. Human Rights Watch / Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, *Rapport de la Commission Internationale d'Enquête sur les Violations des Droits de l'Homme au Burundi depuis le 23 Octobre 1993*, (Brussels, July 1994), p 11. Henceforth referred to as *Burundi Report*.

⁵⁶ *La Libre Belgique*, Marie-France Cros, 'Première crise pour le pouvoir au Burundi', 4 October 1993

proceedings to ensure restitution to the rightful owners⁵⁷.

Thus the political situation was tense, but not overly so. This kind of debate seemed unavoidable with the advent of such a great and radical social change, and former President Buyoya's moderation coupled with President Ndadaye's obvious goodwill seemed to guarantee a basic framework of political reason in which the experiment had its chances of developing peacefully. This is why when on the evening of 20 October 1993 President Ndadaye was warned by his Defence Minister Lt Colonel Charles Ntakije of the possibility of a coup during the night, he did not seem unduly worried. Major Isaie Nibizi, the man who had foiled the 3 July putsch attempt and who had been made head of Presidential Security, only took minimal precautions. But at midnight elements of the 11th Armoured Battalion came out of their barracks and moved towards the Presidential Palace. A major crisis had started.

3.2 The October putsch ⁵⁸

When Major Nibizi ordered the Presidential Guards to take defensive positions in order to stop the mutineers from penetrating inside the Palace grounds, they obeyed him but, according to his words later, 'dragging their feet'. Outside the putsch was being carried out not as the type of technically clear-cut action which had brought to power Colonel Bagaza in 1976 or Major Buyoya in 1987 but in a confused and unclear manner. The elements from the 11th Armoured Battalion had been joined by a motley of troops from a variety of units (1st Infantry Battalion, some Gendarmes). All these were under the command of a low-ranking officer, Lt Jean-Paul Kamana. Shots were fired in a desultory way, mostly in the air. The only two soldiers wounded during this action were tank drivers who hurt themselves when crashing their vehicles through the Palace gates⁵⁹. At 1.30 a.m. Lt Colonel Ntakija, who was not present, advised the President by telephone to climb into an Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC). The vehicle remained parked on the Palace grounds with the President inside. Finally, at 6.00 a.m., the APC driver was ordered by unknown officers to drive to Camp Muha 'where the President would be safe'. Army Chief of Staff Colonel Jean Bikomagu was present at Camp Muha. He talked briefly with the President as he emerged from the APC and told him everything would be all right. The putschists had by then arrested the President of the National Assembly Pontien Karibwami and taken him to Camp Muha. Col. Bikomagu then walked away from the Camp, apparently without leaving any orders. At 10.00 a.m. Lt Kamana ordered the murders of Ndadaye and Karibwami. They

⁵⁷ *Marchés Tropicaux*, Jean-Pierre Chrétien, 'Tournant historique au Rwanda et au Burundi', 1 October 1993

⁵⁸ All the information on the confused coup and on the President's murder come from the above-mentioned *Burundi Report* and from conversations with one of its authors, Professor Filip Reyntjens of the University of Antwerp.

⁵⁹ This point is important because the military later argued that they had fought to defend the President, 'losing the lives of several of their men'. This is an absolute falsehood.

were bayoneted to death but not mutilated⁶⁰. Meanwhile, rebellious soldiers had searched the capital, killing the Minister of Territorial Administration Juvénal Ndayikeza, Gilles Bimazubute, National Assembly Vice-president and Richard Ndikumwami, head of the Secret Service. They had also tried to kill the Foreign Minister, Sylvestre Ntibantunganya. But he was not home and in frustration the mutineers killed his wife and a female visitor who happened to be present.

The situation appeared extremely confused. The rebels had freed Lt Colonel Sylvestre Ningaba, the leader of the abortive July putsch. But he himself seemed lost and not knowing what to do. The main public buildings had been occupied and the telephone cut off. A Comité de Crise (Crisis Committee) had been created, presided over by an UPRONA Hutu civilian, François Ngeze, who had been President Buyoya's last Minister of the Interior. Ngeze had called on four senior UPRONA members to advise him: Libère Bararunyeretse, Charles Mukasi, Jean-Baptiste Manwangari and André Kadege; but this bizarre Committee's legal or political standing remained extremely vague. It had announced a reorganization of the Army general staff, but at the same time stating that Col. Jean Bikomagu would keep his position as its head. The remnants of the government had taken refuge at the French Embassy. A shadow military committee had been formed in the meantime, with Colonel Bikomagu at its head, comprising Lt Colonel Jean-Bosco Daradangwe and Lt Colonel Pascal Simbanduku. This self-appointed Committee had given itself the job of 'managing the crisis' and was operating separately from Ngeze's Committee. On the 22nd, the governments of France, Germany, Belgium and the United States, as well as the European Union authorities in Brussels, announced the suspension of all economic aid to Burundi as long as the coup-leaders remained in power. All political parties, the churches and the various civil associations condemned the coup. On the 23rd, Colonel Bikomagu finally decided to do the same thing over Radio Burundi. The putsch immediately collapsed. But mass killings of Tutsi had started in the hills as early as the 21st when the news of the President's death had become public. And on the 23rd, when the Army moved to stop these killings, it immediately started its own indiscriminate killings of Hutu.

3.3 The October-November 1993 massacres

The first violent acts appear to have been spontaneous and to have been triggered by the news of President Ndadaye's arrest and death. But quickly FRODEBU local cadres 'organised the resistance', an ambiguous term since in the first two-three days nobody attacked them. In fact they organised the indiscriminate massacre of ordinary Tutsi peasants who were collectively scapegoated for the murder of the President. Pro-UPRONA Hutu were also massacred along with the Tutsi as they were considered 'accomplices' of the 'UPRONA coup'. In a minority of cases, local authorities did their best to protect the Tutsi citizens from the lynching mobs chasing them.

Within two or three days, Army units moved in to protect the Tutsi. They regrouped them

⁶⁰ This point is also important because the Hutu extremists later circulated stories of atrocious mutilations on the President's body in order to excite public violence. The Human Rights Watch Commission which authored the *Burundi Report* was able to disinter the President's body and examine it. There were no mutilations.

in towns and ensured their security. But they went beyond that. They entered the areas where the massacres had taken place and which were by then empty of Tutsi. And they started a violent and indiscriminate repression of ordinary Hutu peasants, who in some cases were indeed guilty of murder but who were often innocent of the massacres which had been carried out by more politicised FRODEBU supporters⁶¹. Later, everybody would try to occupy the moral high ground. But it was obvious that the violence came from the conjunction of a double bad faith refusing to play the democratic game. It has been well summed up by two Burundese journalists who wrote :

During the electoral campaign, Tutsi extremists kept repeating that a Hutu was not fit to rule over Burundi. And then, after the failed coup of 2-3 July, the Hutu extremists started to prepare on their side and to arm the population in case something would be done against the President⁶².

It is because of this twin and mutually reinforcing extremism that the violence of October-November could occur.

But the political dimension of this catastrophe was equally appalling. On the one hand, UPRONA and the Army gave the impression of being in an extremely ambiguous position. They did not openly condone the putsch but it took them three days before they finally declaring publicly against it. And their rallying to 'democratic legality' gave the impression not to have occurred because they were moved by a real deep-seated democratic commitment but much more because the coup was terribly poorly organised and because the international community had lost no time in rallying against it. On the other hand, the Government gave a terrible example. It remained holed up in the French Embassy in a state of utter confusion and irresolution. While Health Minister Jean Minani, who was in Rwanda kept, making incendiary proclamations on Radio Kigali, calling for the formation of a government in exile and the development of 'popular resistance' (which was understood to mean wider killings of Tutsi), Prime Minister Sylvie Kinigi kept floundering helplessly without establishing any kind of clear leadership. It took her government over one month to start working again on anything like a normal basis. In fact, the trauma - both the legitimate grievances and the mutual bad faith - on both sides was such that to this date (late October 1994) the country

⁶¹ Given the reciprocal nature of the massacres, sources often tended to contradict each other, some writers preferring to insist on the violence of FRODEBU and the Hutu, others on the Tutsi Army repression. Thus *Le Monde*, Jean Hélène, 'Des réfugiés Hutu font état de massacres après le coup d'Etat contre le Président Ndadaye', 24/25 October 1993, presents a relatively 'pro-Hutu' case, while *Libération*, Jean-Pierre Chrétien, 'Purification ethnique au Burundi', 28 October 1993, presents a 'pro-Tutsi' view of events. More objective accounts can be found in *Le Monde*, 'Les massacres continuent alors que le pays est coupé du monde', 28 October 1993, and *Libération*, Gilles Millet, 'Vengeances aveugles dans les campagnes Burundaises', 5 November 1993. While the already mentioned *Burundi Report* remains the best objective guide to these tragic events, a typewritten document issued by the civil servants of Karugli Province entitled 'Lumière sur les massacres d'Octobre-Novembre 1993 dans la Province de Karugli', 10 November 1993, constitutes a very serious indictment of local FRODEBU authorities' responsibility in the organization of the massacres. *La Libre Belgique*, Marie-France Cros, 'Juger, pas lyncher', 13 November 1993, is a fair assessment of the need to make a distinction between the criminal activities of Tutsi extremists and the actions of ordinary Tutsi peasants.

⁶² *Le Renouveau du Burundi*, A. Kwigize and C. Uwera, 'Ce sont nos voisins qui nous ont poursuivis', 23 November 1993

has not yet recuperated and returned to a normal state of affairs.

4. THE STRUCTURE OF THE CRISIS

4.1 A social and cultural crisis

The social and cultural aspect is often overlooked by the sources that concentrate on the violence done to the Tutsi minority⁶³. The Hutu had been progressively marginalised within the spheres of power as early as 1961, following the death of Prince Louis Rwagasore. Contrary to what had happened in Rwanda, and for political and cultural reasons which we have tried to outline in the first part of this paper, they had taken part in the independence movement on an equal footing with the Tutsi. They did not feel that there was a gap between the two communities and it is only with the murder of Pierre Ngendandumwe that the split became apparent.

The abolition of the monarchy had marked the end of the hopes for an integrated polity in Burundi. The military regimes of Presidents Micombero and Bagaza had institutionalised a most violent and hypocritical form of social discrimination which had been enforced in 1972 by torrents of blood. Given this historical context, it was to be expected that President Buyoya could only be partially successful in his honest and genuine attempt at liberalization⁶⁴. Pent-up feelings of rage, resentment and injustice remained general in the Hutu populace. President Ndadaye's victory had been a remarkable symbol of peaceful compensation, a fact that Hutu radicals had immediately understood. But if PALIPEHUTU and other radical groups had been disenfranchised almost overnight, their continued marginalization depended on the peaceful unfolding of the new democratic experiment. President Ndadaye was not only a Head of State, he was an almost Christ-like figure who had come to symbolically release his people from bondage. This feeling was due to history and symbolical politics, but it was also reinforced by the deepening economic crisis into which Burundi, like the other countries of the area, was gradually sinking after world coffee

⁶³ A perfect example can be found in the otherwise exact and well-informed article by Jean-Pierre Chrétien, 'Burundi: progromes sur les collines', *Esprit*, (July 1994), which uses the term 'genocide' to describe the Tutsi massacres of October-November 1993. This piece, written in the emotional aftermath of the genuine genocide in Rwanda, tends to obscure the extremely deep and traumatic effect of President Ndadaye's murder on the Burundi Hutu population and the fact that, horrible as it may have been, the massacre of the Tutsi in Burundi was of a completely different nature from what was to happen in Rwanda six months later. Even if FRODEBU extremists aggravated the Burundi massacres, they could do so only because the feeling of the population was one of rage, shock and frustration after President Ndadaye's murder. This admittedly cruel and irresponsible use of popular feelings is nevertheless quite distinct from the cold-blooded and administrative planning of the Rwanda genocide by a government fully in control of the situation.

⁶⁴ There was even a genuine problem of semantics. From this point of view an anecdote reported by the newspaper *Le Renouveau du Burundi*, 16 November 1993, is most illuminating: Secretary of State for Public Security Lt Colonel Lazare Gakoryo had gone to the market of the small town of Ndora (Cibitoke Province) to try to appease the crowds, and in his speech he used the expression: 'Tugire amahoro n'ubumwe bw'Abarundi' ('Let us create peace and unity for all the Burundi'). The crowd which had so far remained peaceful started to throw stones at him, shouting that 'unity (*ubumwe*), this is for the Tutsi'. This was the price to be paid for the unceasing appeals for 'unity' by the Buyoya regime during 1989-1993, a word which in the wake of President Ndadaye's murder did indeed seem like a rigged one-way slogan.

prices had started a rapid decline in 1987-1988. This has been remarkably well understood by a Burundese (Tutsi) College Professor, writing in April 1994:

A growing part of the peasantry gradually realised that, through the system of export cash crops, it was caught in a situation which completely blocked the way of any social and economic promotion for its children. In turn, these children realised that they could not escape from an agricultural economy whose remuneration steadily decreased ... The State remained the only hope ... For these poorly educated youths, these low-ranking civil servants and their peasant families, Ndadaye was more than a President. He was a King, a God, he was the only hope ... One should remember these women who took off their dresses to spread the cloth on the ground for Him to walk on. When one thinks of the sexual modesty of our Burundese women!⁶⁵

Thus economic interests and political symbolism reinforced each other. President Ndadaye would have been bound to disappoint such enormous hopes. But he was not given the time.

On the other hand, the motivations of the murderous political dinosaurs who confusedly tried to reverse the verdict of the polls were also linked with the exploitation of a social fear. And there we should quote again the same remarkable analysis by Ndarishikanye :

The nominations of Hutu in the administration after July 1993, followed by the replacement of both Tutsi and Hutu UPRONA Civil Servants, down to such low levels as Communal Secretaries and marketplace watchmen ... frightened a lot of people into thinking that they were going to lose not only the symbols of their hegemony but their permanent sources of monetary income and of familial patronage. The press magnified this feeling and the UPRONA party played on it ... Demonstrations such as those of the students after the FRODEBU victory and the two later ones organised by UPRONA to protest against losses of employment can be seen in the perspective of this organised panic. This led some members of the Armed Forces to think that the whole of Burundese society was in a state of upheaval.⁶⁶

Partly this crisis has been a crisis of identity, of habits, of culture. Life had functioned in Burundi for the last twenty-five years, well or badly, but according to a certain pattern. The election of Melchior Ndadaye and the restructuring of the administration at first, then of patterns of land tenure, of job opportunities and finally of Army structures, represented a tremendous jump into the unknown. Everybody had lost their bearings, positive or negative. Familiar reactions and past patterns of behaviour simply did not seem to operate any more.

In a way, the paralysis of the Cabinet following President Ndadaye's murder was in itself typical of this aspect of the crisis: the FRODEBU Cabinet, quite literally, did not know what to do. The Hutu could have faced another 1972 (in fact, this is what they thought would

⁶⁵ Barnabé Ndarishikanye. 'Quand deux clientélismes s'affrontent', *Komera*, No 3 (March-April 1994)

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

happen; hence the rush into 'defensive' massacres while they were not threatened) but they could not understand the incoherence of the quasi-putsch-cum-murder. This was also the case on the Tutsi side. The would-be coup makers did not seem to really believe themselves that they would be able to turn back the clock through their action. Hence its confused and indecisive character. Hence also the ambiguous attitude of the UPRONA and Army power structures which neither supported nor condemned the rebels.

All around, fear had become the dominant motivation. Fear of losing their prestige and even their livelihood in the case of the Tutsi minority, fear of being victims of another 1972-like *ikiza* on the part of the Hutu; then minority fears for the Tutsi, that is the fear of total physical annihilation, on the pattern of what was to happen later in Rwanda. It is largely this pyramid of meshing fears which caused the mutual massacres of October-November 1993. But the result has lived on even after the worst fears have somewhat been assuaged (or temporarily quietened). The result has been to create new pathological patterns of social behaviour. For example, in Bujumbura, both the Hutu FRODEBU civil servants and their Tutsi UPRONA colleagues go over in the evening to sleep in the Zaïrian town of Uvira if they can afford it, the Tutsi fearing a murderous mass uprising during the night and the Hutu fearing another Army coup. In the interior, the situation is even worse. The Tutsi are now all concentrated in the towns, under Army protection. Hutu farmers who wish to enter these towns do so at their own risk since the Army has become notoriously trigger-happy. On the other hand, the countryside itself is almost off limits for the Tutsi. The Army goes there only with armed convoys. Clashes remain frequent, especially in the North where PALIPEHUTU extremists are militarily organised. Communications between the economically mutually dependent towns and countryside can at times remind one of crossing the demarcation line in Beyrouth during the Lebanese civil war⁶⁷. One year after the symbolically sacrilegious murder of President Melchior Ndadaye, Burundi remains deeply divided and even more, basically lost. It is, according to the provocative formula of two British authors, 'the land that lost its head'⁶⁸. Beyond any sort of political analysis, ordinary peoples' consciousness seems almost paralyzed: there is no vision of the future. People go from one day to the next, living as they can, not even daring to imagine what will happen later. Any 'political' solution that will be somehow worked out will have to take into account this cultural and social anguish in order to have any chance of lasting success.

4.2 A military crisis

The failed putsch of 21 October 1993 was in itself a crisis of the Army as an institution. Half in and half out of the putsch, it cannot be considered a neutral institution any more. For the Hutu (and not only the Hutu radicals, but even the moderate FRODEBU cadres) the Army is a purely Tutsi entity, highly suspect because of its behaviour during the coup and guilty of having 'restored order' in a most bloody way. And for the Tutsi extremists, it is a dubious ally because of its desire again to become a national politically neutral body. Thus it is

⁶⁷ Personal interview with Professor Joseph Gahama, Paris, 23 July. Personal interview with Professor Christian Thibon, Paris, 30 September 1993.

⁶⁸ John Edlin and Colin Legum, 'Burundi: the land that lost its head', *The New African*, (February 1994)

trusted by nobody while having the formidable task of trying to maintain law and order not only against the constant attacks of PALIPEHUTU extremist guerillas operating with the backing of ex-Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR)⁶⁹ but also in spite of Tutsi extremist militias in Ngozi and Kirundo Provinces who are always keen to 'punish' supposed Hutu extremists.

On top of the problem of having to maintain law and order in rural provinces in spite of a tarnished image, the Burundi Army also has a major problem of law and order in the capital itself with the quasi insurrection of the Kamenge area of Bujumbura. Kamenge was a near-personal fief of Interior Minister Leonard Nyangoma, an extremist member of FRODEBU⁷⁰, who through his contact with the Police de l'Air et des Frontières (PAF - Air and Borders Police), headed by Festus Ntanyangu, a famous Hutu extremist, managed to arm his followers. There were constant skirmishes throughout February and March, until the Army finally moved in on 27 April 1994, occupying at the same time the Cibitoke, Kinama and Mutakura areas of the capital. Fighting lasted till early May and hundreds of weapons were confiscated while several dozen people were killed⁷¹. In a way, this only lead to a displacement of the problem, many of the extremists just moving to the hills surrounding Bujumbura and keeping tenacious guerrilla warfare going directly on the outskirts of the city⁷². Even the disarming of Kamenge was only partial: between 12 and 16 September fighting flared up again in that section of town and the Army had difficulty in re-establishing control.

Urban violence is endemic: riots on the occasion of the arrest of opposition leader Mathias Hitimana (8 August 1994: four people killed); a grenade thrown in the Bujumbura Central Market (11 August 1994: eleven wounded); FRODEBU MP Sylvestre Mfayokurera shot dead (20 August 1994; a grenade thrown in the Bujumbura Central Market (5 September 1994: fifty wounded); FRODEBU MP Norbert Ndihekubwayo wounded in an assassination attempt (16 September 1994) - these are the daily occurrences which are facing the Army, the Police not being really capable of dealing with the violence, especially as when, during the various phases of the Kamenge fighting, it takes the form of heavily armed urban warfare.

The Army, hampered by its dubious political and human rights track record⁷³, is faced with

⁶⁹ *Le Monde*, 'Burundi: affrontements entre l'armée et les extrémistes Hutu', 18 October 1994

⁷⁰ After living in self-imposed exile for over six months in Belgium, Minister Nyangoma was replaced in the new cabinet formed on October 5th 1994 by Jean-Baptiste Manwangari, an UPRONA Tutsi.

⁷¹ See *L'Humanité*, 3 May 1994; François Misser, 'Senza Uscita', *Nigrizia* (June 1994); and *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, quoting *Kenyan News Agency*, 29 April 1994.

⁷² *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, quoting *Radio Burundi*, 13 June 1994: fighting in the Isale and Kanyosha communes (at least 15 killed). *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, quoting *Kenyan News Agency*, 29 June 1994: fighting in the hills around Bujumbura (14 killed).

⁷³ The officers compromised in the coup of 21 October 1993, starting with Chief of Staff Colonel Jean Bikomagu himself, are still in charge today. The murderers of President Ndadaye such as Lt Jean-Paul Kamana himself and his accomplices Lazare Busokoza and Sylvestre Nyingaba were allowed to discreetly slip out of the country and take refuge in Uganda where media exposure eventually led to their deportation to Zaïre. *The New*

the double challenge of Hutu extremist militias (FROLINAT, Armée Populaire, PALIPEHUTU) and of Tutsi extremist urban youth gangs ('Les Sans-Echecs') who are holding the moderate population, whether Tutsi or Hutu, as hostages to their violent political aims.

4.3 A political crisis

Social, cultural and military, the present Burundi crisis is also, and perhaps overwhelmingly, so a political crisis. Its components are relatively simple, but they combine with each other to create an extremely difficult situation:

1. A radical Hutu fringe which is decided to go beyond 'victory at the polls' and to wrestle total political control from the Tutsi, preferably by massacring them. For them, the murder of President Ndadaye has been a godsend since it started the crisis of the moderate Hutu opposition and gave them a marketable cause. They are represented both by illegal organizations such as the PALIPEHUTU or the militias and by radical elements within FRODEBU itself.
2. A radical Tutsi fringe which believes that power has to be wrested back from the Hutu, whether extremists or moderates, by force if needed, and who thinks that a good Hutu is either a submissive or a dead Hutu. They are represented by the micro-parties such as RADDES, PRP or PARENA⁷⁴ as well as by some of the UPRONA mainstream opposition.
3. A moderate opposition (UPRONA) which is always pushed to make unreasonable demands because of pressure from its extremist fringe, and because the Army tells it that unless tremendous pressure is put on the FRODEBU Government, the Army might have to stage a coup. Colonel Bikomagu and his men present themselves as 'moderates' who are pushed by younger more radical officers, like those who carried out the confused action of 21 October 1993.
4. A moderate FRODEBU government which has had to give in time and time again to the demands of the Tutsi opposition because of the constant threat of another military coup, and which now begins to lack credibility with its own Hutu political base because it is seen as being feeble.

One could therefore say that the whole of the political game played for the last year has been a steady confrontation between the FRODEBU mainstream and the UPRONA mainstream, each one operating under the pressure of its own extremist fringes, but also using the threat represented by these extremist fringes to scare the other side into a better bargaining position.

Vision, (21 January 1994).

⁷⁴ Parti de la Réconciliation Nationale (Party for National Reconciliation), created in August 1994 by former dictator Jean-Baptiste Bagaza.

The first episode of this multi-faceted confrontation was the *opérations ville morte* ('operation dead city') organised by the opposition in January 1994 when they forced Bujumbura and other major towns to literally stop dead. It started as a 'protest' against the choice of Agriculture Minister Cyprien Ntaryamira as the new President on 5 January 1994⁷⁵. Then the confrontation grew when five (Tutsi) judges from the Supreme Court who had refused to accept the choice of the new President (in spite of a vote from the Assembly) were dismissed from their positions⁷⁶. The opposition immediately launched another *opération ville morte*, with dire consequences. Rioting broke out leaving twelve people dead⁷⁷. Eventually President Ntaryamira was confirmed in post on 5 February after an agreement with the opposition which meant a small reduction in FRODEBU's power. Two days after being confirmed, President Ntaryamira chose as Prime Minister Anatole Kanyenkiko, a moderate UPRONA Tutsi with a Hutu mother and married to a Rwandese Hutu⁷⁸. In the Kanyenkiko Cabinet inaugurated on 10 February, two fifths of the ministries went to opposition members. This did not prevent Joseph Nzeyimana, President of the RADDES Tutsi extremist micro-party⁷⁹, from protesting against the 'lack of concertation' of FRODEBU for its ministerial choices, and to threaten the new cabinet with further *opérations ville morte*. Tutsi monarchist extremist Mathias Hitimana simply accused the government of 'treason' and asked for the resignation of the Kanyenkiko cabinet.

In retaliation, Justice Minister Fulgence Dwima Bakana, a Hutu hardliner, ordered the release from prison of André Baryimare, one of the organisers of Tutsi massacres in Ryansoro *commune* (Province of Gitega). He also invited the Director of the Kibimba Secondary School, notorious for having burnt alive his Tutsi pupils, to the inauguration of President Ntaryamira⁸⁰.

The FRODEBU majority and the opposition were inextricably linked in government, like those couples who hate each other but who are forced by circumstances to live together. They were most of the time without a shred of good faith or genuine desire to collaborate in solving problems. Every event, every occasion was seen only as an opportunity to accuse the other side of various evils. And most of these accusations were indeed true since plenty of evil had been committed and plenty kept on being committed.

Interior Minister Léonard Nyangoma armed the Hutu bastions of the capital and encouraged them to insurgency⁸¹. The Army used its role as keeper of law and order to try breaking

⁷⁵ *Le Monde*, 7 January 1994; *Libération*, 7 January 1994

⁷⁶ *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, quoting *Radio Vlaanderen International* [Brussels], 30 January 1994

⁷⁷ *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, quoting *Panafrican News Agency* [Dakar], 31 January 1994

⁷⁸ In the tense and byzantine world of Burundese politics, descent, province of origin, marriage, marriages of your relatives, all these factors are relevant in terms of one's position within the field of political forces.

⁷⁹ For himself Nzeyimana had obtained the Ministry of Commerce.

⁸⁰ *Le Renouveau du Burundi*, 12 February 1994

⁸¹ *Le Renouveau du Burundi*, 9 March 1994

the back of opposition militias and to help the extremist Tutsi gangs³². In March alone, 30,000 people fled Bujumbura to escape the street fighting between the various militias³³. But in spite of this constant violence, things did not quite go to the bitter end. When 3 officers and 50 paratroopers attempted a coup on 24 April, they did not manage to get any sizable Army unit to follow them³⁴. The UN Special Representative in Burundi, Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, a rather outspoken and very courageous diplomat, expressed best the exhaustion felt by a number of observers at this perpetual game of brinksmanship, where the (relatively) safe politicians kept playing games while the population suffered, when he said:

The extremist elements do not want any solution. They play for time, one does not know what for I did not see any goodwill in June when the Government - the largest party - was dragging its feet, and I did not see it in July either when it was the turn of certain fractions of the opposition to drag their feet. Currently [late July 1994] there is a deadlock ... this is childish behaviour, when the population is in such a desperate situation. The Security Forces are tired. Since October [1993] they have been trying to hold the floodgates; they have had to provide security in the country and ensure security at the border³⁵; and in the meantime all the politicians on all sides are just sitting around in Hotel Novotel, talking.³⁶

And yet, this evil, dangerous and bloody political face-off slowly moved towards some kind of a solution, perhaps partial and temporary, but a solution anyway. By mid-August, Charles Mukasi, the new Secretary General of UPRONA, was coolly asking for three fifths of government portfolios (while his party had received 32 per cent of the vote in the Presidential election and 22 per cent in the legislative one), his argument being that 'FRODEBU has by now showed proof of its incompetence and technical incapacity to manage the crisis'³⁷. Haggling went on for another month, and then on 12 September a power-sharing agreement which for the first time looked serious was signed between the government and the opposition³⁸. Fifty-four precise and carefully-worded articles detailed the workings of the prolonged crisis government, defined what was and what was not acceptable, outlined peace-keeping mechanisms. Everything gave the impression of having been thought out and

³² *Le Renouveau du Burundi*, 26 March 1994

³³ *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, quoting *Radio France Internationale*, 30 March 1994

³⁴ *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, quoting *Africa No 1*, 25 April 1994; *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, quoting *RTBF* [Brussels], 25 April 1994

³⁵ By this Mr Ould Abdallah means the protection of the northern border with Rwanda during the hectic and violent days of April to June 1994.

³⁶ *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, quoting *Radio France Internationale*, 30 July 1994

³⁷ *Le Monde*, 18 August 1994

³⁸ A previous power-sharing agreement signed on 12 July had been a pragmatic, one could almost say indecent, carving up of important positions, allocating 9 Governorships to FRODEBU and its allies, 7 to the opposition, 14 Embassies to the government, 9 to the opposition and so on. It did not solve anything institutionally.

of being considered realistically. There were no abstract principles. Institutionalised defiance was the keyword. The whole document looked as if its draftsmen realised that 'peace was not around the corner', that they were going to have to live with the crisis and that the best way to survive it was not to deny its existence but on the contrary to design 'permanent crisis mechanisms'. The contending parties, in a sense, 'agreed to disagree' and to go on living in that state of tense but perhaps less violent confrontation.

On 30 September Provisional President Sylvestre Ntibantunganya was 'elected' by the Assembly³⁹. He confirmed Prime Minister Kanyenkiko in his position (3 October) and a new cabinet was assembled by 5 October. Everything had been quick and relatively trouble-free. Extremists gave a kind of reverse proof that the Agreement was serious this time when they tried, without too much success, to cause an uprising in Kamenge in the hope of breaking it up⁴⁰.

5. CONCLUSION

One has to be extremely careful in assessing a situation such as the one in Burundi today. The people who have cobbled together a working power-sharing arrangement and a cabinet, who have carved up the main positions in the country, are not idealist politicians. Most of them, if not all, are ruthless practitioners of a very rough brand of *realpolitik*. But they might have reached a point where the violent confrontation that has now lasted for a year is proving pointless to all except the most fiery and irresponsible extremists. Those could still derail everything, either if they are Hutu through well-coordinated massacres of civilian Tutsi, or, if they are Tutsi, by pushing the Army into a coup. Nevertheless, these catastrophe scenarios are less probable now than they were even six weeks ago. Prolonged political and even military attrition, with its attendant disastrous economic effects, is beginning to make an impact on peoples' consciousness of the situation. Long after the ordinary people and in much milder ways, the elite is also beginning to hurt. If not reason, then at least self-interest, begins to reassert itself.

Another factor is horror. Everybody has suffered. At least 100,000 people have died in a year. Grudges have been settled, and counter-settled, old wounds reopened, new ones made, fingers have been pointed at guilty parties and a certain nausea is setting in. The danger comes from the two opposite ends of the social spectrum. From the political 'elite' which is relatively safe through its bodyguards and protected villas and which can hope to get much from 'politics'; and at the other end from the unemployed youths who have very little hope of anything in the way of legal gainful employment and who can get something by 'working' as militiamen and through looting. Neither of these two categories is very sensitive to cruelty and violence. But they are a minority and they cannot quite go it alone. They need broader social support to organise killings or to carry them out. Extremist politicians and extremist unemployed youths can create real violence only when the ordinary people passively or

³⁹ President Cyprien Ntaryamira had been killed together with President Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda on 6 April 1994 when their plane had been shot down as it was about to land at Kigali Airport.

⁴⁰ BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, quoting Agence France Presse, 14 September 1994

actively condone their activities. From that point of view, the Rwandese genocide and its consequences have had a strong didactic value. People now realise how far politics can actually take them.

A sort of unconventional democracy is being developed whereby the opposition is learning how far it can go in its unreasonable demands and whereby the Hutu majority is also learning that arithmetical majority is not enough to monopolise a society and eliminate a minority. Rough rules of thumb are being developed. Hagglng has become a way of life; but, as it develops, guns are less likely to be used. There is no trust, but institutionalised distrust is bringing a measure of something that might look like peace after a time.

The greatest danger remains social anomy bred by poverty which can lessen self-interest and open the way for desperate gambles from actors who have little left to lose. This is why economic aid is very much needed; economic, and not humanitarian aid, that is aid with an economic global approach and not the kind of spoon-feeding given to traumatised refugees. Aid is the only lubricant that can guide a fragile situation of armed truce towards a progressively saner working mechanism.

Overall, limited violence should be expected to keep happening, causing possibly tens of thousands of refugees in quick short spurts. These refugees are very unlikely in the present situation to move north towards Rwanda as they used to. They will go to Zaïre and Tanzania. But extremely large numbers of refugees, of a 'Rwandese' type magnitude, are unlikely to occur in the near future; it would take an Army coup followed by an all-out repression on the 1972 model to cause such a movement. In any case, Burundi will remain a refugee-producing country for some time. But it is unlikely to spectacularly blow up on the Rwandese pattern because there is at present no group which has the organization and the will to carry out the type of thorough and coherent genocide we have seen in Rwanda.

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