



S-0865-0001-14-00001

Expanded Number **S-0865-0001-14-00001**

Title **Items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Middle East - envelope No. 5 - aides-memoire and notes for the file**

Date Created **07/06/1967**

Record Type **Archival Item**

Container **S-0865-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Middle East**

Print Name of Person Submit Image

Signature of Person Submit

First resol.

Israel
UAR }
Syria } 4
Jordan }

Sent cables
to For. Offices

(next day - Iraq)

Second one

Israel
UAR
Syria
Jordan (for information)
Iraq (aldb. with resol. N1)
Kuwait (— — —)
S. Arabia (— " —)
~~Saudi~~ (— " —)

Sent letters ~~sent~~ to
missions for information

14 arab countries
+ Israel

The Security Council adopted resolution No. 233 on ⁶th June at its 1348th meeting. Immediately after the resolution was adopted, I transmitted the text of the resolution by cable to the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic - the Member States who, on the basis of available reliable information, ^{appeared to be} ~~were~~ actually engaged in the hostilities.

The next day, that is on ⁷th June at its 1350th meeting, the Security Council adopted resolution No. 234. This resolution was promptly communicated by me by cable to the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic. In the light of the information that had become available by that time, I also communicated the texts of the two resolutions by cable to the Foreign Ministers of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Sudan.

I have also sent copies of the two resolutions to the Permanent Missions of Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia and Yemen for their information.

1. Cables sent to the Foreign Ministers

First Resolution: Israel
Jordan
Syria
United Arab Republic

Second Resolution: Israel
Jordan
Syria
United Arab Republic

also Iraq (together with First Resolution)
Kuwait " " "
Saudi Arabia " " "
Sudan " " "

2. Note Verbale sent enclosing copies of both Resolutions

all the above plus

Algeria
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
Mauretania
Tunisia
Yemen

80
7/6/67

7 June 1967

Note for the Record

Mr. Demos Hadjimiltis, Counsellor of the Cyprus Mission to the United Nations came to see me this afternoon in connexion with Lord Caradon's letter of 7 June 1967, addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7939), concerning an investigation by the United Nations of the allegations that British aircraft took part in the fighting in the Middle East on the side of Israel. Foreign Minister Kyprianou wishes the Secretary-General to know of Cyprus interest in being associated with any UN investigation conducted in the British bases in Cyprus. For the time being, the Government of Cyprus has no intention of raising the matter officially. Foreign Minister Kyprianou only wishes the Secretary-General to bear in mind the interest of Cyprus.

I informed Mr. Hadjimiltis that there were no indications, as of now, that any such investigation would be initiated. No member of the Council had expressed any views concerning the United Kingdom suggestion - nor, for that matter, on the similar invitation extended by the United States. In any event, however, I told Mr. Hadjimiltis that I would convey Mr. Kyprianou's message to the Secretary-General.



José Rolz-Bennett

TO: Secretary-General
A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

As requested, I attach herewith
a note for your information.

Thanks.
15/6

Date:
12 June 1967
CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:
DE: A.E. Nesterenko
A. E. Nesterenko

12 June 1967

Note for the Secretary-General

On 6 June 1967, the Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/233, the text of which was communicated upon the decision of the Secretary-General by cable to the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic. This decision was based on information available at that time that the above four countries were involved in the fighting.

On 7 June, the Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/234, the text of which was also communicated by cable to the Foreign Ministers of Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic. In addition, the text of resolution S/RES/234, together with the text of resolution S/RES/233, was communicated to the Foreign Minister of Iraq, since a statement of the Foreign Minister of Israel had indicated that Iraq was also participating in the fighting. Following consultations with their Permanent Representatives, the texts of these two resolutions were communicated on the same day to the Foreign Ministers of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Sudan.

The texts of both resolutions were also sent with a note verbale to the Permanent Missions of Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen.

The Security Council adopted resolution S/RES/235 on 9 June and S/RES/236 on 12 June. The texts of both resolutions were immediately transmitted by cable to the Foreign Ministers of Israel and Syria. Copies of these two resolutions are being sent to the Permanent Representatives of the thirteen countries to whom the texts of resolutions S/RES/233 and 234 had been sent.

6/29
TO: THE SECRETARY - GENERAL

The latest!

R-

Pl. Kemp - 29/6/67

27 June 1967

Note for the File

At 5.30 p.m. on 27 June 1967 I phoned Ambassador Gideon Rafael to remind him that Foreign Minister Eban in his meeting with the Secretary-General on the evening of 22 June had promised to give the Secretary-General an answer on the question of UNTSO's return to Government House "within a day or two" but that no word had been received as yet.

The Ambassador said he was just about to call me on this matter. He said he and the Foreign Minister had found that when they referred the matter to Jerusalem in their naïveté it was not as easy as they thought it would be.

The Permanent Representative said that his Government was determined to get away ^{from} /ties to the Armistice Agreements and that his Government would deal with UNTSO only on the basis of the current cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council. Rafael indicated that his Government would expect the Secretary-General to agree that UNTSO would henceforth have no connection with the Armistice Agreements. I advised him that it would be unrealistic for his Government to expect the Secretary-General to take it upon himself to nullify resolutions of the Security Council. In response to a question as to why his Government could accept UNTSO at the YMCA but not at Government House, since no question of principle was involved, the Permanent Representative said that he could not say.

Mr. Rafael said that the message from his Government indicated that

the Administrative Officer of UNISO had said that the YMCA would not be a suitable substitute for Government House for UNISO's use because it was being prepared for the tourist season, but that the YMCA in the Old City could be a possibility and that he would consider this although it would be without prejudice to the position on Government House. The Israel Government was much interested in this and wished to say that they wanted UNISO to have all necessary facilities which, indeed, they thought it was having now in the YMCA. I informed Ambassador Rafael that the Administrative Officer of UNISO had no authority to make any decision with regard to a change in the Headquarters of UNISO, that the Chief of Staff had firm instruction from the Secretary-General that he should stand on return of UNISO to Government House and that this continued to be the Secretary-General's position, and that the Secretary-General had had no response at all from the Government of Israel with regard to his repeated approaches on the matter and could not understand why there was any further delay. The Ambassador of Israel replied "Well, that is OK, if you wish to have a fight on the matter we can have a fight". I then informed him that we had a report on the issue of Government House for the Security Council which we would feel bound to present and that we had delayed presenting it thus far because of the conversation which the Secretary-General had had with Mr. Eban last Thursday night. I then said to the Ambassador of Israel that we here could not understand what the objection of the Government of Israel was to the return of UNISO to Government House since, if the Government of Israel was willing for UNISO to carry on at the YMCA there

was clearly no principle involved. The Ambassador said he himself did not know the answer to that. He then concluded by saying "hold up on the report and give us another two days. I will report to my Government that you find the offer of substitute headquarters unacceptable and will await their further reply."

RAB

*Pl. keep
29/6/67*

Note for the file

Ambassador Gideon Rafael phoned at 11:30 a.m. on Thursday, 29 June. The exact words with which he began the conversation were the following: "Ralph, do you people at the UN want war or peace with Israel?" I replied to him that at the UN we wish peace with everybody but not at the expense of honesty. I then asked him to what he was referring specifically and he said to the question of Government House, mentioning specifically the note of reminder which he had received yesterday. He said that this issue was now being considered at the "highest level" in his Government and that he and Eban were trying to get a "satisfactory solution". He thought something might be worked out along the lines of the formula indicated in the Secretary-General's note verbale of 28 June but that it would take time and we must be patient or the whole effort would be lost. I patiently explained to him that the Secretary-General also was subject to pressures and that this issue had been already pending for many weeks and there was ample evidence of our "patience". He specifically asked that the projected report to the Security Council be withheld for a while longer since this would inevitably result in a new issue for debate and a clash between the Secretary-General and Israel, thus creating an undesirable diversion. He added that if this occurred they would have to say a lot of unpleasant things they had learned "about UNEF, or rather, more about the UAR". He emphasized that if his Government had taken a negative position on UNTSO's return to Government House he would have informed us immediately and the issue would be drawn. But this, he said, is definitely not the case.

Ambassador Rafael also referred to the note about Camp Rafah and said he had immediately sent it to his Government for comment. He said that "if substantiated" this was very bad, but that in war things of this kind, unfortunate as they are, do happen because soldiers cannot always be controlled.

I told the Ambassador that I would convey all of this information to the Secretary-General and that it would be for him to decide the course of action to be followed.

29 June 1967

8/31

TO: THE SECRETARY - GENERAL

For your
information

R-

*Pl. Keep.
318*

31 August 1967

Note for the File

On 31 August at 12.45 p.m., Shabtai Rosenne of the Israel Mission phoned me in pursuance of the discussions we had been having on the question of the withdrawal of the map of Government House enclosed with his letter of 25 August to me. He stated that he is having to go abroad tonight, to return on 14 September, and appealed to me to hold any further action on the question of the map in abeyance pending his return when he would take it up again immediately. I made it clear to him that the Secretary-General is firm on the position that there are only two alternative courses of action:

1. For the Mission of Israel to withdraw the map with the Land Registry note and submit the same map without that note, or
2. For the Secretary-General himself to return the map, stating explicitly why he could not accept it with that note on it.

I pointed out that the sole purpose of the map was to delineate the area being returned to the United Nations and nothing else should be on it.

6/27
TO: THE SECRETARY - GENERAL

This was
shocking to
say the least!

R-

29 June 1967

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

The letter from the Permanent Representative of Hungary dated 22 June 1967, incorporating some comments from the Chairman of the Democratic Republic on the Near East crisis and including some statements attacking the Federal Republic of Germany for its policies, was discussed by the President of the General Assembly with the Secretary-General yesterday. Following this discussion, the President gave instructions that the letter from the Permanent Representative be issued as a document of the General Assembly. He was aware that normally communications from Non-Member Governments would be issued by the Secretariat under cover of a Note Verbale if so requested by a Member Government. However, he felt that in view of the fact that the communication dealt with a matter before the General Assembly, which was in emergency special session, it would be appropriate to issue the communication as a document of the General Assembly.

The Permanent Observer of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Egon von Braun, rang me up last night about this matter. He asked how the Secretariat would deal with any reply from his Government to the attacks of the German Democratic Republic on his Government. I told him that I would advise that, in all fairness, his reply should be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, without requiring sponsorship by a Member Government.

I am recording this note as the reply from the Federal Republic of Germany may arrive during my temporary absence.

C. V. Narasimhan

C.V. Narasimhan

cc: The President of the General Assembly
 The Secretary-General
 Mr. C.A. Stavropoulos
 Mr. I. Kittani
 Mr. J. Gasarian

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

TO: U Thant
A: Secretary-General

DATE: 19 July 1967

THROUGH:
S/C DE:

REFERENCE: _____

FROM: Aleksei E. Nesterenko
DE: Under-Secretary
Department of Political and Security Council Affairs

SUBJECT: Use of the term "cease-fire line"
OBJET: Use of the term "cease-fire line"

I have noticed that in some of the addenda to document S/7930 containing supplementary information received by the Secretary-General, the term "cease-fire line" is employed, both in quoting complaints by the Syrians and Israelis and in citing reports of UN observers, as well as in material drafted by the Secretariat.

In this connexion, I should like to recall an exchange which took place at the 1357th meeting of the Security Council on 11 June 1967. The representative of the United Kingdom (page 28-30, 4th paragraph) mentioned the assertion that "there has been no advance beyond the cease-fire line". Later on the representative of Nigeria (page 87, first paragraph) noted that the phrase "cease-fire line" had come into circulation and added: "Lest it be accepted merely by default, let me say, for my delegation at least, that we do not understand that there is a cease-fire line. There are the armistice lines. There is the cease-fire order which means that troops should stay where they are and that any movement, north, south, east or west, except such movement as to return from the scene of battle to one's own home ground, is a violation of the cease-fire". At the same meeting, the representative of Syria (pages 88-90) stated that he was grateful to the representative of Nigeria because he really put the dots on the i's, - as it was said in French "Mettre les points sur les i" - when he, i.e. the representative of Nigeria, said that the troops should be halted wherever they were after the cease-fire. The representative of the United Kingdom (pages 98-100), expressing gratitude to the representative of Nigeria for raising the important point, said that his reference to the "cease-fire line" had been inadvertent, and that he entirely agreed with the Nigerian point. The actual words of General Bull were that he had "proposed a cease-fire together with no further movement of troops..."

While it is evident that at the time the above statements were made on 11 June the work of the Observers in mapping on the ground the positions of the Israeli and Syrian forces at the time of the cease-fire had not yet been undertaken, it may be observed that for some time the reports used the term "mapping of Forward Defended Localities" rather than "cease-fire line".

It may also be of interest to note that the parties themselves employ varying terms to describe the situation, as a reference to the following documents reveals: Israel in documents S/8059, S/8060, S/8068 and S/8074 refers to United Arab Republic "violations of the cease-fire", in document S/ 8026 to UAR violations of the "Israel cease-fire positions", and in document S/8049 to charges that "Syrian armed forces cross the Syrian cease-fire line, penetrate into the area between the lines...". Syria also used the term "cease-fire line" in document S/8035. Jordan, in documents S/8056 and S/8067, refers to violations or breaches "of the Security Council cease-fire resolutions". The United Arab Republic employed the terms "violated the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council" in document S/ 8025, "violations of the cease-fire order" in document S/8054, and "violations of the Council's resolutions on the cease-fire" in document S/8057.

In view of the various interpretations given to the Council's cease-fire resolutions and possible political implications of the use of the term "cease-fire line", it might perhaps be useful to seek legal advice on the use of that terminology by the Secretariat.

There is a serious new move by Pachachi, who is determined to try for a decision by the General Assembly, to reopen negotiations with the Latin American group with a view of reaching an Arab-Latin agreement. He is using the Spanish delegation as channel of contact with the Latin group.

As a first step he has suggested that immediate withdrawal could be coupled with the ending of belligerence, using the exact language of the several General Armistice Agreements. ^{1/} My information is that the first reaction from the Latin American group was not unfavourable at all.

^{1/} For example paragraph 3 of Article I of the Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel states, "The right of each Party to its security and freedom from fear of attack by the armed forces of the other shall be fully respected." Paragraph 2 of the same Article states, "No aggressive action by the armed forces - land, sea or air - of either Party shall be undertaken, planned, or threatened against the people or the armed forces of the other"

*Thoms.
20/7*

20 July 1967

Note for the Secretary-General

I understand that as a result of talks between Gromyko and Goldberg there is a new move with renewed hope towards reaching agreement on a substantive resolution in the General Assembly. Towards this end, there will probably be a move tomorrow to adjourn for a further period of consultations.

21/7

21 July 1967

Note to the Secretary-General

1) Attached are the two versions of the text being discussed now by the Arab group. I understand that the Soviet Union has already indicated its willingness to accept the text.

2) Apparently there was a long and rather stormy meeting last night between the Foreign Minister of Algeria and Gromyko. as a result of the new position taken by the USSR. Algeria says it will vote against the draft and I have no doubt that the meeting of the Arab group is also stormy and I doubt if they will be able to reach a unified position on the matter.

First version:

Affirms the principles under the UN Charter of :

- a) Without delay withdrawal by the parties to the conflict of their forces to the positions they occupied before 5 June 1967 in keeping with the inadmissibility of conquest of territory by war;
- b) Without delay acknowledgement by all Members/^{States}of the United Nations in the area that each enjoys the right to maintain an independent national state of its own and to live in peace and security and renunciation of all claims and acts inconsistent therewith

Second version:

2) Affirms the principles that conquest of territory by war is inadmissible under the UN Charter, and consequently that the withdrawal by parties to the conflict of their forces to the positions they occupied before 5 June 1967 is expected;

3) Affirms likewise the principle that acknowledgement by all Member States of the United Nations in the area that each of them enjoys the right to maintain an independent national state of its own and to live in peace and security, and renunciation of all claims and acts inconsistent therewith are expected

Mr. A.E. Nesterenko
Under-Secretary for Political and
Security Council Affairs

22 July 1967

U Thant
Secretary-General

Use of the phrase "cease-fire line"

1. I refer to your memorandum of 19 July 1967 on the subject.
2. Whenever the phrase "cease-fire line" has been used by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, by United Nations Military Observers in the field and by Secretariat members here in connexion with the cease-fire observation operation in the Israel-Syria sector, it has been based on the agreements which have been reached by General Odd Bull with Israel and Syria regarding the establishment of a cease-fire line on their respective sides. The agreement signed by Israel (S/7930, Annex I) defines the Israel foremost defended localities which are stated by the Israel Representative to be those occupied by the Israel forces at the cease-fire time and "to represent the cease-fire line on the Israel side". The agreement with Syria (S/7930, Annex II) defines the limits of the Syrian FDLs, "which constitutes the cease-fire line on the Syrian side". In this regard, it is relevant to point out that in agreeing to the establishment of a cease-fire line on the Syrian side the Syrian Representative stressed that "the cease-fire line thus established is a purely practical arrangement for the specific purpose of facilitating the observation by the United Nations of the cease-fire line and should not affect or prejudice the claims and positions of the Syrian Government."

3. The situation is quite different as regards the cease-fire in the Suez sector. Here, no similar agreements have been reached and therefore the Chief of Staff, the United Nations Military Observers and the Secretariat members should avoid using the phrase "cease-fire line" and have been advised accordingly.

4. Although there is thus a valid basis for the use of the phrase "cease-fire line" in connexion with the cease-fire observation operation in the Israel-Syrian sector, I do understand and appreciate your misgivings in this matter in view of the various interpretations given to the Security Council's cease-fire resolutions and the possible political implications of the use of the phrase "cease-fire line". Accordingly, in preparing reports on the cease-fire the Secretariat should avoid this expression and use instead such expressions as "forward defended localities (FDL)" or "front".

8/8

8 August 1967

Lucien,

We just put a call through to Dr. Bunche in Ballston Spa close to Saratoga Springs and talked with him. Because the office put the call through he could not be transferred to speak with the Secretary-General. He therefore asked if you would please explain this to the Secretary-General. Mr. Bunche also asked that you tell the SecGen that he talked with Brian Urquart and that unless the SecGen sees an urgent need to put out immediately Bull's report on Suez and the Government House Report, he would suggest that they be held until Thursday morning when he will be in the office to look at them.

Mr. Bunche added that he has discussed with Brian Urquart all the other questions.

End of message. ld

Lydia

TO: The Secretary-General
 A:

FOR ACTION	POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL	POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE	POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT	PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS	POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?	POURRIIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION	VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED	COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED	SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE	NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN	NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	POUR INFORMATION

Following our discussion, I am forwarding herewith a paper : The Situation in the Middle East in the General Assembly., for your personal information.

Pl. keep.
Mar
8/11/70

Date: 6 November 1970
 FROM: *L. Kutakov*
 DE: *L. Kutakov*
 CR. 13 (11-64) L. Kutakov

6 November 1970

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The make up of the Arab vote on draft resolution A.L/602/Rev.2 while not unprecedented reflects to a large extent the deepening of diversions of the Arab world itself. It should be said from the outset that the discussion of the item in the plenary was requested by the United Arab Republic without consulting any other Arab country and therefore a measure of bitterness prevailed during the debates, and it was not unusual to have seen some Arab delegates absent from the General Assembly Hall while the United Arab Republic foreign minister was making a statement. This bitterness was also expressed in private conversations. Many Arab delegates asserted that the item "The Situation In The Middle East" was not an Egyptian item and the United Arab Republic should not deal with it at the exclusion of other Arab countries. The United Arab Republic's contentinn was that all these years Egypt bore the major responsibility of the conflict with Israel and lost about ten thousand men since the 1967 war until the standstill agreement, while other Arab countries were contented to pay lip service to the conflict.

At a meeting on 3 November on the eve of the vote to decide the position to take in the draft sponsored by a number of countries from Africa, Asia and Europe, the question of voting came up and some delegations - Algeria, Southern Yemen, Yemen and Iraq, to name some - informed the Arab group that they received instructions to vote against the draft. However, for the sake of consensus the formula of non-participation in the vote was adopted in order to avoid giving the impression that the Arab countries' dissention over the question of Palestine, was growing deeper. As a result of this consensus, Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Southern Yemen, Syria and Yemen declared, during the roll call vote on the draft, that they were not participating in the vote.

The causes underlying the non-participation in the vote was explained by the representative of Kuwait in the plenary session of 4 November. However, they go beyond the adherence of these delegations to a position of their respective countries towards the Palestinian question.

It is doubtless and even obvious that the Arab countries hold different positions on the question of Palestine in general, especially following the acceptance by the United Arab Republic and Jordan of the Rogers plan for the peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict. After this acceptance, diversions became deeper and only the influence and prestige of the late President Nasser thwarted a polarization on the issue. After his death this became inevitable and, as could be now seen, those countries which objected to the peaceful settlement became vociferous in their opposition and tried to pull ^{to} their side countries that may have kept their objection nominal and far from reaching the point of denying support to a United Arab Republic inspired draft on the question. This applies in particular to Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, countries which would have refrained from opposing the United Arab Republic policy for a peaceful settlement had President Nasser remained alive.

There is no doubt that the vote phenomena was one of the consequences of Nasser's death. The present leadership of the United Arab Republic has not yet inspired the confidence and has not commanded the prestige and authority that were the tributes of the United Arab Republic under Nasser. The grouping of the Arabian Peninsula countries, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen and to some extent Southern Yemen could mean a revival of King Faisal's quest for leadership, either on a regional basis or under the aegis of the "Islamic Alliance". The positions of Syria and Iraq were not unexpected. For ideological reasons, the two countries opposed the peaceful settlement and rejected resolution 242 of the Security Council. While Syria remained

silent or voiced a mild opposition to the peaceful settlement, Iraq on the other hand, mounted a campaign of vilification against the United Arab Republic because of its acceptance of the peaceful settlement and one could recall the bitter exchanges between the President of Iraq, General Al-Bakr and President Nasser who chided the Iraqi leader for waging a war from his desk. Iraq after having solved the kurdish question at least temporarily, found itself with enough energy and resources to recapture some of the leadership it has lost in the area due to its internal troubles. Finally, Algeria has rejected the peaceful settlement from the outset. The country that has won independence after a continuous and victorious rebellion against the colonial power, was by no means expected to advocate a rather different course of action in order to win the struggle. This position is also consistent with its support of the National Liberation Movements mainly in Africa. Such a position could be used by Algeria to rally those Arab countries opposing the peaceful settlement. Algeria has always espoused the cause of the Palestine people and called for a recognition of their self determination and liberation.

The picture will never be complete without adding thereto the element of the Palestinians represented by their liberation movement, which has vowed to fight until the ultimate objective of establishing a secular state in Palestine was achieved.

These currents and trends in the Arab world are by no means static. The change could be seen towards a deeper polarization that would encompass in one group or another, countries of different government systems, for, the issue involved is not progress and socialism, but rather a question of erasing humiliation and restoring Arab dignity.

Aide Mémoire

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has the honour to refer to the exchange of messages on 18 May 1967 between the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic and the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza and to request the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations to convey to his Government the following considerations relating to the withdrawal, which, with the agreement of the Government of the UAR, might constitute a basis for co-operation in effecting the withdrawal.

1. It is understood that the withdrawal of UNEF from the territory of the United Arab Republic will be orderly, deliberate and will be carried out with the dignity befitting an international force which has contributed greatly to the maintenance of quiet and peace in the area of its deployment. The phrase "as soon as possible" in the above-mentioned message from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic will be interpreted in the light of the foregoing with the understanding that the United Nations will move as expeditiously as possible in making and carrying out arrangements for the withdrawal.
2. It is understood that in the withdrawal of UNEF the United Nations will have full co-operation, as necessary of the authorities of the United Arab Republic.

/...

3. The date for the commencement of the withdrawal of UNEF will be 19 May 1967, and the Commander of UNEF has already been given the necessary orders to commence withdrawal. As of this date the Force will no longer carry out any of its established operational functions, and its duties, from this date until all elements have been withdrawn, will be concerned primarily with devising and carrying out arrangements for its withdrawal.

4. The Force will not cease to exist or lose its status, entitlements, privileges and immunities, as set out in the exchange of letters dated 8 February 1957 between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt, which constitutes the Status Agreement of the United Nations Emergency Force, until all of its elements have departed from the former area of operation.

5. The Force will remain under the exclusive command of its United Nations Commander and will take no orders from any other source whatsoever.

6. In continuance of the co-operation of the United Arab Republic authorities which the Force has enjoyed during its period of activity in Sinai and Gaza, it is the understanding of the United Nations that the United Arab Republic authorities will be prepared to co-operate and give assistance as necessary in the withdrawal of the Force in such specific matters as ^{the} ~~clearance for overflights~~ use of roads, railroads, airports, harbours and other forms of communications and in providing security where necessary for the personnel, stores, equipment and other properties of UNEF.

7. The Commander of UNEF has been instructed to take all possible measures to ensure continuing good relations between the UAR ^{authorities} personnel and all elements of the local population during the period before its withdrawal is completed. It is understood that the United Arab Republic authorities will give similar instructions with a view to ensuring that the withdrawal is completed without friction.

8. The Commander of UNEF has been instructed as a matter of urgency ^{contingents, similar} to prepare a plan and timetable for the evacuation of UNEF personnel, equipment, stores, etc. The timetable for the evacuation will be communicated to the United Arab Republic authorities as soon as it is received by the Secretary-General.

9. It is anticipated that small detachments ^{elements} of UNEF, or United Nations personnel may have to ^{remain in the area} ~~be maintained~~ for some time after the main body of UNEF has been evacuated for the purpose of protecting and disposing of various United Nations properties associated with UNEF. Such detachments will ^{remain} ~~be kept~~ for the minimum possible time, and it is understood that they will have the ^{full} co-operation of the United Arab Republic authorities.

10. Further details ^{and} information and requests for assistance will be forwarded to the United Arab Republic authorities as they become available.

The Secretary-General expresses his confidence that the Government of the United Arab Republic shares his wish that the withdrawal of UNEF may be carried out in co-operation with the United Arab Republic authorities in as dignified, orderly and expeditious way as possible.

Personal & Confidential

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: Secretary-General
A:

FOR ACTION	POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL	POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE	POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT	PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS	POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?	POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION	VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED	COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED	SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE	NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN	NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	POUR INFORMATION

I am sending herewith an assessment of the latest development in the UAR, prepared in the Department.

*Pl. keep.
18/5*



Date: 18.5.71

FROM: L.N. Kutakov
DE:

Some observations on the recent events
in the United Arab Republic

1. It has been speculated that the recent dismissal of cabinet members and other officials in United Arab Republic's Arab Socialist Union, was attributed to an internal struggle for power. It was to be recalled that when Sadat was elected President, he was an underdog, and his choice was determined by the fact that he did not represent any complication or problem to the question of succession. Although the developments have taken place at a crucial period of the peace talks with Israel, the internal causes, until shown otherwise, are more plausible than those of external nature, and many feel that President Sadat, having been treated with ill respect by his subordinates who questioned his actions and decisions, decided to put them in their proper place. In the subsequent showdown, they have been dismissed.
2. A significant event in those development is the fact that President Sadat has put an end to the intelligence regime, abolished surveillance, and banned wire-tapping unless by court order. This may be explained by the fact that Sadat himself may have abhorred the intelligence methods in the past twenty years, being himself a man of sensational action rather than of dubious methods as those of the intelligence service. Having realized that the Egyptian people were distressed after almost two decades of surveillance and security measures, Sadat decided that nothing could bring him closer to the people than the relaxation of the security measures, and thus help him overcome the people who represented real power during Nasser's rule.
3. The developments in Egypt may allow speculations as to the future relationship of Egypt with the Soviet Union, the United States and the Arab world. With regard to the Soviet Union, nothing has surfaced to indicate that those developments would have any bearing on the relations with that power, although in some reactions, it was said that Sadat was liberalizing his regime and bringing Egypt closer to the West and farther from the Soviet Union. For one cannot disregard the basic elements in those relations, which have been building up since 1955, in terms of political, economic and technical assistance and reciprocal commitments towards policies in the Middle East.

Concerning the relationship with the United States, although the dismissal of Ali Sabri may indicate a more western policy on the part of Egypt, the fact remains that those who had been dismissed did not represent one tendency, but belonged to both protagonists and antagonists of the peaceful diplomatic campaign undertaken by Egypt for the past several months. Furthermore Sadat, in the peace talks, was more candid than Nasser, and accelerated the pace of discussions by avoiding lengthy stages of hesitation and disguised attitudes. In that respect he was not following a path advocated solely by the United States, but also by the Soviet Union which has stated repeatedly that it supported the peaceful and political settlement of the Middle East crisis.

With regard to the Arab world, there was nothing said in the capitals of the Arab countries, which indicated a displeasure at the developments in Egypt. No words came from Syria, which has itself reverted to a policy of relaxing security measures after so many coups and repressive regimes. The new Federation of Arab States would not be affected by those developments, since it was Sadat who willingly joined its ranks against the advice and the opposition of many of those who have been recently dismissed.

4. It was to be noted that both the United States and the Soviet Union have refrained from making any comments on the events. Unlike the first reactions when it was thought that the measures should be interpreted as pro-American and anti-Soviet, the recent reaction following more detailed information, indicated an increasing conviction that it was an internal matter and that no intervention should be envisaged. Israel itself, which needed another breathing spell to have more time to think before coming with answers regarding the opening of the Suez Canal, has abstained from moving either way, awaiting more information before committing itself to any new position.

5. In brief, although the developments have taken place at a crucial period of the peace negotiation, and in the middle of exchanges of ideas and suggestions regarding the opening of the Suez Canal, they should be placed in their proper context, and unless otherwise indicated in new information or developments, should be considered internal development which would only delay for a short period of time, the continuation of efforts to reach a settlement in the Middle East.

6. Sadat is not expected to face big difficulties in his attempt to consolidate his power. His direct appeal to the people - a style popularized by Nasser - gave him more strength and any one sitting on the fence would think twice before taking any step against him. Furthermore it is said in Egypt that a man has power as long as he is in power, and that the Egyptian people always respected authority and government. Therefore no difficulties are expected on the part of the civilians. The big question remains that of the Army. However Sadat, an officer himself, has his relations with the Army and his loyalties, among the officers. The Army itself may be divided on the question of the recent developments. It was only a year ago when many of the officers rebelled against Nasser when he attempted to try officers in the Shadwan Island case, when Israeli commandos surprised the Egyptian garrison on the Island and dismantled a five-ton radar installation. Many of the rebelling officers have ill-feeling towards many of the dismissed politicians who were then the right hands of President Nasser.

May 17, 1971.