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ORIGINAL ORDER

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18 October 1994

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For your information please find attached a summary of the results of the UN Life and Peace Institute Consultations on Rwanda.

Isel Rivero

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Isel
Thank you for the information.
I have made some comments against each
paragraph as I read on. If you have
time let us discuss sometime.
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EX DIR.

For your information please find attached a summary of the results of the UN Life and Peace Institute Consultations on Rwanda.

Isel Rivero

conclusions

Debate paper, I agree with it. Esp
Bel. 20/10

**UN/LPI Consultations on Rwanda
October 7-10 1994**

Summary of Experts' Observations

The specialists on Rwandan convened for the UN/LPI consultations on Rwanda did not share consensus on the aspects of analysis and policy recommendations on Rwanda. What follows is a summary of a few of the most interesting and potentially useful ideas generated by their discussions. A full transcript of the discussions will be available to the UN.

Analyses of History of the Conflict and of Ethnic Relations:

1. -- emphasized that Hutu and Tutsi ethnic identity in the past was fluid and interactive, not such a polarizing element. The two groups have a history of extensive intermarriage, cultural absorption, geographic intermingling. Contrary to the myth, they have NOT been engaged in fighting for hundreds of years. Ethnic identity has been exploited for political reasons by leaders, and is now a powerful force, but it is by no means immutable. It is crucial then that the UN and international community NOT pursue policies which fossilize or reinforce ethnic cleavages in Rwanda.
2. -- Most conflict in past has been within the Tutsi. Class and even region have been more important sources of division in the past than has ethnic identity.

3. -- Rwanda has long history of very centralized, state-centered political culture, unlike much of Africa. Must be careful not to overgeneralize from places like Somalia as a result.

Political analysis:

4. -- the crisis in Rwanda cannot be seen in isolation. All agree that it is part of a broader crisis in the entire region. Solutions and policies must be based on this regional perspective.
5. -- Key concerns of the refugee will be both a desire for security, and the long-term conflict over land.
6. -- There is group agreement that unless moves are taken immediately to defuse the crisis, there will be a slide into a renewed war with dire consequences for the region. It is a question of weeks, perhaps two months.
7. -- One imperative move must be separation of militia and military from refugees in the camps, in order to provide a space for moderate leadership to emerge there. The group urged that all diplomatic means possible be used to achieve this, and were split over whether forceful measures would succeed or only make things worse.

8. -- A series of other measures designed to create a political dialogue space for civilian, and for the inclusion of moderate elements among both parties to the conflict are enumerated below.

Create a secure environment to include:

- a) UNAMIR to assist and strengthen its CIVPOL;
- b) Human Rights monitors to work with UNAMIR;
- c) UNAMIR to establish safe corridors for refugee return;
- d) UNREO to stimulate and foster activities of Rwandese NGOs in areas of reconciliation, Human Rights, Democratization etc;
- e) list of identified criminals to be made public specially of those in camps and abroad.
- f) Government should allow family visits to prisons and should broadcast names of those in prison so that the population is informed of their whereabouts;
- g) Basic needs and agricultural implements should be made available to displaced and returnees;
- h) Government must launch a widespread information campaign to welcome all returnees;
- i) international community must assist urgently in establishment of civilian administration capacity of Government.

9. -- the government must be for its part be pressured take all other measures necessary to provide confidence to the returnees who are not guilty or suspect of genocide.
10. -- international presence in Rwanda is essential to guarantee an atmosphere of accountability.
11. -- Establish International Tribunal as soon as possible.

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- 2) SMSG

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InterAfrica Group

By

Abdul Mohammed

and

Seifulaziz Milas

When the cattle-keeping Tutsis arrived in Rwanda some five to six centuries ago, they came with tight and well-defined social, political and military structures, typical of the pastoral peoples of their land of origin. This eventually enabled them to gain political control and establish their own kingdoms, as related groups, the Bahima had already done during the course of the Hamitic migration through Uganda where they established the Hima-led kingdoms of Bunyoro, Toro and Ankole, incorporating their predecessors, the Bairu and other Bantu agriculturalists who preceded them.

It was a long process, but by the end of the 19th Century when the Germans brought Rwanda and Burundi under their colonial rule, the two kingdoms were already long-established. The German colonial administration found it more practical from their point of view to use the already-established political-administrative hierarchy, rather than replace it entirely. Later, when Rwanda fell under Belgian rule as a Trusteeship territory after World War I, much the same held true. Under the new colonial rulers, the Tutsi monarchy and feudal structures continued to function with little friction between the Tutsi feudal overlords and their Hutu and Tutsi clients.

Not all Tutsis were rulers or rich. Most were simple herdsmen, with little but their cattle to distinguish them economically from the Hutu. The arrival of colonial rule and of the missionaries who introduced the rudiments of modern education while spreading their religions, also brought in new means of gaining a livelihood, mainly through employment by missionaries, traders or the colonial administration.

Nevertheless, under colonial rule, the seeds of conflict were sown. Both the German and Belgian administrations found it cheaper and more convenient to use the Tutsis to rule the Hutus, rather than do it themselves. The Tutsis were exempted from forced labour and some other unpleasant pillars of both German and Belgian colonial administration, leaving the burden for the Hutus. "Indirect rule" tended to increase the powers of the Tutsi feudal aristocracy and their control over their Hutu clients. As in a number of African territories where indirect rule was in force, this led to increased exploitation of the local peasants who then had two levels of overlords to support rather than one.

Relations between Tutsis and Hutus were generally calm and non-antagonistic until the 1950s when the Tutsi leadership, understanding the implications of Rwanda's Trusteeship status, and inspired by changes elsewhere, began to agitate for independence. This led to deterioration of their relations with the Belgian administration and the missionary establishment who turned against the Tutsi monarchy and began to promote a distinct Hutu rather than Rwandan nationalism and to incite the Hutus against the monarchy as well as against Tutsi feudalism.

This was not extremely difficult. Rwanda is a small country with very limited resources. With over 400 inhabitants per square kilometer, it is the most densely

menace, diverting attention from such basic problems as the concentration of resources in the hands of the Ruhengeri group, in the context of the growing impoverishment of the country's rapidly expanding population.

One aspect was the establishment of an apartheid-like system of ethnic separation and discrimination in education and employment. As the results of generations of inter-marriage made it difficult in many cases to readily distinguish between Hutus and Tutsis, ethnic origin was inscribed in their identity cards.

Three decades of sporadic anti-Tutsi massacres in Rwanda eventually led to creation of a population of more than one million mostly poor and often destitute Tutsi refugees and children of refugees in the surrounding countries. In most cases there were marginal populations in the countries where they sought asylum, with little opportunity and a precarious future. Many grew up in refugee camps at the mercy of often hostile host governments. They came to see their only hope as a return to Rwanda, which was not prepared to accept them.

In Uganda, where Rwandan refugees had often been subject to harsh repression under the Obote regime, many joined in Yoweri Museveni's guerrilla war against Obote and after Museveni's victory stayed on as members of his army. Even then, however, they were reminded of their precarious position when the Ugandans who they had helped to liberate began to see them as a source of competition. This too helped to fuel their desire to return to Rwanda.

Small, poor and over-populated, Rwanda did not want to take them back and Habyimana's government made it clear that the Tutsi refugees would not be allowed to return. Eventually, Rwandese members of Museveni's army decided to return by force.

THE CAUSES OF CONFLICT

Rwanda: Population, Environment and Conflict

A situation which can lead tens of thousands of ordinary people to take part in the systematic murder of a million of their compatriots; neighbours, friends, colleagues, even relatives by blood or marriage, because they belong to a different ethnic group, is obviously very complex.

The Rwandan genocide is no exception. There were many distinct and often interrelated factors which made it possible for Hutu extremists in Rwanda to create the wave of ethnic hatred, fear and hysteria which opened the way for the largest, most systematic and brutal wave of genocide that Africa, if not the world, has ever seen. It needs to be studied carefully as the first step towards ensuring that it never happens again.

incessantly. Little land lies idle on Rwanda's thousand hills, each carved up into a patchwork of tiny gardens, or carpeted by the tea and coffee estates of wealthier commercial farmers.

A significant proportion of the land outside the national parks has limited potential for cultivation. Rwanda has 1 ha. of cultivable land for every 5.5-6 inhabitants, but much of it is in the hands of commercial farmers who grow the tea and coffee that provides most of Rwanda's foreign exchange. That leaves comparatively little land for the poverty-stricken subsistence farmers who constitute most of the population.

One of the most basic facts about Rwanda is that there is not enough of it to go around. There is not enough land for the number of people who try to eke out a meagre survival from it. Another basic fact is that the amount of arable land per capita is decreasing rapidly, a serious matter in a country where most of the population depends on subsistence farming for survival. Rwanda has one of the world's highest rates of population growth, over 3.4 percent per year. The total fertility or number of births in a woman's reproductive life is 8.2, among the highest in the world. The population has increased by some 150 percent since independence. The numbers of farm families has increased accordingly, while average size of their small subsistence plots, has sharply decreased. By 1990 it was estimated that there were 5.5 people per hectare of arable land. The results are obvious; increased poverty, malnutrition and environmental degradation.

The environmental degradation arising from the combination of population increase putting ever more pressure on the land, and growing poverty which constrains subsistence farmers from buying inputs which could help restore fertility and increase productivity, leads to further land degradation. It is a vicious circle; more overcultivation of marginal lands which should never have been farmed, leading to the destruction of what little potential it had and leading to greater pressure on the remaining land. In Rwanda, as in Burundi and some densely populated highland areas of Ethiopia, it is a worsening spiral which leads to disaster.

Another result of course, is conflict. Conflict over land and resources is an increasingly common feature in many parts of the region as rapidly growing populations compete for increasingly scarce resources. This is particularly true in Rwanda where it underlies many of the salient factors in Hutu-Tutsi conflict. It has been suggested that fierce competition for land increased susceptibility to the hate campaigns carried out by the former Hutu regime which convinced many Hutus that the Tutsis were a threat to their land holdings. Rwandese sources are quoted as saying that some villagers killed their Tutsi neighbours, not necessarily because they were Tutsis, but because the government-sponsored massacres provided an opportunity to take their land (Dennis D.Gray "Rwanda woes blamed on high population", Daily Nation, 9 September 1994, Nairobi).

Land resources are dwindling fast and in Rwanda in particular, farmers are pressing the limits of cultivation and surpassing them, farming steep slopes and other marginal lands. As much as 10 years ago, Rwanda was already farming more than 90 percent of its cultivable land. At first, production increased, between 1971 and 1981, per capita food

of increased inputs, and improved to produce higher yields from less land, and to conservation to stem the ongoing loss of the country's already inadequate land resources. Emphasis must also be placed on the development of new means of livelihood and the use of such aid as may be available, to develop means. The alternative is increased conflict over land resources in a situation in which the sources of conflict are already overwhelming.

Modernization of Rwandan agriculture and increased use of farm inputs could help considerably in increasing Rwandan agricultural productivity. But it could only be a partial solution, if that. According to FAO surveys of a decade ago, Rwanda is among the group of countries which have already outstripped their resource base to the extent that with an 'intermediate' level of agricultural inputs, they would still be unable to feed themselves by the end of the century. And the end of the century is not very far away.

The problem is one of continuing rapid population growth. Rwanda's population is growing far more rapidly than its possibilities of increased agricultural output. With a good deal of external aid, and using all available land for food production, it might be able to grow enough food for its current population, but perhaps not for the population that it can expect to have 10 years or 20 years from now. For Rwanda, serious attention needs to be given to family planning, or more directly, to population control. The alternative could be a Malthusian nightmare come true.

Rwanda's high population density also has political implications. It was used by both the Kayibanda and Habyarimana regimes as an excuse for not allowing the return of the Tutsi refugees. It was also used as a basis for propaganda among the Hutu population to convince them of the supposed danger to them of a Tutsi return. They were told that the Tutsis of the RPF wanted to take their land. The Hutu peasant saw this as a question of survival.

That made it easier for Hutu extremists of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, and local politicians and aspirant commercial farmers to organize anti-Tutsi pogroms to remove the owners and enable them to take over Tutsi-owned land and property. Some observers say that the land problem has played an important role in most of the anti-Tutsi pogroms organized by the previous two regimes over the past three decades.

Politics Underlying the Humanitarian Crisis

The fall of Obote and his successor, General Okello, and Museveni's rise to power, owed a great deal to the support of the young Banyarwanda who formed the mainstay of his rebel forces at the beginning of his fight against the Obote regime. Some of them were refugees, or Uganda-born children of refugees from Rwanda. Others were descendants of those Banyaranda, left in Uganda by the drawing of the colonial boundaries through their home areas, and thus, as Ugandan as any other citizen of that country, and some were descended from early migrants

displaced by the war. Even without the war, Rwanda had a population too large and unskilled to sustain on the available land. All of the arable land had long been divided into small plots and brought under cultivation, including many erosion-prone hillside plots which should never have been cultivated at all. All this has led to accelerated exhaustion of the land and falling yields, with increasing numbers of people trying to eke out a living from ever smaller and poorer pieces of land. Meanwhile, years of decline in prices of coffee, the country's main export crop, led to increased cultivation of coffee to maintain income levels, at the expense of food production. Pressure on the land has accelerated tendencies towards famine, war and pestilence.

Eventually it came. Habyarimana's regime had no choice. On 4 August 1992, after three years of increasingly difficult guerrilla war, the Habyarimana regime signed an agreement with the RPF to end the fighting, allow power-sharing and the return of the refugees. After signing however, Habyarimana was reluctant to implement the agreement. There were other pressures from different sides. The Ruhengeri clique around Habyarimana saw their supremacy and their future threatened by the looming prospect of democratically-elected government, a situation in which the Ruhengeri group could expect to lose ground to other Hutu parties.

The Habyarimana Government and particularly the Ruhengeri Group have always tended to base their politics on the ethnic question. For decades the "Tutsi Menace" was used as the answer to political and economic questions, or as a diversion, to avoid the necessity of answering. The Tutsi Diaspora became an essential ingredient of the Ruhengeri Group's political style. Decades of ethnic propaganda have made this into reality for the largely illiterate Hutu peasantry.

For France it was distasteful to contemplate the displacement of its friends in the Ruhengeri clique by what it considered as Anglophone Rwandans from the Ugandan refugee camps. The influence of France would tend to be diminished. Furthermore, in Rwanda as in most francophone African countries, the French Government's relationships with the local African rulers has tended to be at a personal level and has resulted in a personalized support by the French Government for individual leaders who have not infrequently turned out to be unpopular and eventually unsustainable dictators.

Politics Underlying Humanitarian Intervention

When Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana overthrew President Kayibanda's increasingly corrupt regime in 1973 and assumed the Presidency, it was not just a change of presidents; Rwanda's deep-set rivalries are both ethnic and regional. In effect, it was a coup of Habyarimana's Ba-Kiga clan from the north, displacing Kayibanda's southern Banyanduga. Loss of the presidency meant loss of control of the sources of power and wealth.

The shock to Habyarimana of the October 1990 invasion triggered a new wave of human rights violations at a moment in which international acceptability of such activities was declining. During 1991- 1992 thousands of Tutsis and dissident Hutus were arrested and detained or killed. By 1992 even the Belgians, formerly firm supporters of the Habyarimana, began to protest against the repeated massacres of civilians by the Rwandan Army, the MRND's 'Zero Network' of death squads and the Hutu extremist Committee for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR).

Rwanda's neighbours were also tired of the violence which threatened to trigger new waves of refugees across their borders. They too pressured Habyarimana to negotiate with his RPF adversaries. Other pressures came from donor countries who began to find Habyarimana's activities embracing to them. Due to these increasing pressures, Habyarimana entered into peace talks with the RPF, leading to a cease-fire in July 1992. The war flared up again in February 1993, leading to massive population displacement within northern Rwanda. But in March, new peace talks were held in Arusha, Tanzania which covered the military and political situations well as the refugee question and led to the Kinyinya Agreement in May 1993. Further discussions led to the Arusha Peace Accord in August 1993.

The Arusha Agreement provided for establishment of a transitional government including all political parties including the RPF, to be replaced after 22 months by an elected government. The two sides also agreed to request an international peacekeeping force to assist in the implementation of the agreement. The United Nations agreed to this following United Nations Security Council Resolution 872 of October 1993 and 2,500 troops comprising the UN Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR), were deployed in Kigali and in northwestern Rwanda.

The six politicians selected as RPF representatives in the new cabinet, arrived in the capital on 28 December 1993, along with 600 RPF troops to ensure their security, but Habyarimana was reluctant to accept the reduction of his powers under the agreement. After being sworn in as President, he refused to swear in the new cabinet. This resulted in a new crisis and escalating violence as the Akazu hard-liners reacted against the agreed sharing of power with the opposition. In March 1994, one of the leaders of the moderate Hutu opposition was assassinated, apparently by the Akazu hard-liners. This was soon followed by the murder of a hard-line Hutu member of parliament, apparently in retaliation for the earlier murder. The violence continued to escalate along with massive MRND propaganda campaigns against the RPF, the Tutsi population, the Hutu moderates and the Belgians who were accused of supporting the RPF.

Meanwhile, the French has refused to arrest the known instigators of and participant in the massacres so that they may eventually face trial for war crimes and genocide. The French claim to be awaiting UN guidelines on what action to take.

Factors Underlying the French Intervention

France, on the other hand remained closely linked to the Habyarimana regime. Until November 1993, France maintained a large force of elite troops in Rwanda, officially to protect French expatriates working in the country. However, they also trained the Rwandan army and gendarmerie, and reportedly played the key role in repulsing the main RPF offensive aimed at Kigali. France also supplied and maintained the heavy weaponry used by the Rwandan army in the war against the RPF. The French Government financed, equipped and trained the Rwandan Army and para-military gendarmes who in turn, armed trained and financed the Interahamwe militias, soon to implement the most carefully planned and extensive genocide ever seen in Africa. The close relationship between France and the Habyarimana regime was reflected in, or perhaps, based upon the close links between Habyarimana and Jean Christophe Mitterand, President Mitterand's son and personal adviser on African affairs.

While France expressed support of the Arusha Agreement and concern about the murders committed by the death squads, it continued to provide strong support to the Habyarimana regime until its collapse. In response, the RPF has consistently opposed the French intervention in southwestern Rwanda authorized by the UN Security Council on 22 June. The controversial deployment of 2,500 French troops, ostensibly to protect the surviving Tutsis trapped in the area controlled by the remnants of the former regime. The RPF and other critics point out that the intervention was undertaken too late to save the Tutsi population of the region and consider it aimed at protecting the remnants of the former regime and the Hutu troops and militia who have taken refuge there. They also point out that the hard-line Hutu radio stations have continued to operate under the protection afforded by the French presence, to incite the population against the RPF and frighten them into fleeing to Zaire where they remain under the control of the officials and militias of the former regime.

The Refugee Crisis: causes, implications, consequences

Causes

The current Rwandan refugee crisis has its origins in the desperate attempts of the remnants of the Habyarimana regime to retain control of the population and to use it for cover among which to hide from the consequences of what have been described as crimes against humanity. Having lost the war, they saw continued control of a large population as their only hope of avoiding eventual trial for war crimes and genocide, of maintaining some personal status, and of eventually, perhaps with support from their foreign patrons, recovering control of Rwanda.

polluted by the outbreak of cholera. Deep wells were few, due in particular to the strata of volcanic rock underlying the region's thin soils and making it difficult even to bury the dead. The masses of cholera dead, unburied or in shallow graves, soon polluted all the remaining water sources.

Food shortages also soon reached crisis proportions. The humanitarian agencies quickly responded. Food relief was flown into Goma, difficult to deliver and at enormous expense, but enough to keep alive the refugees and the thousands of Hutu troops and militia who continued to dominate the refugees in camps of the Goma region. The sustainability of such relief is however, questionable, as the number of refugees continues to grow. The withdrawal of French forces from southwestern Rwanda was expected to lead to a further massive exodus of refugees, this time towards the Zairean town of Bukavu and its environs, already host to over 300,000 Rwandan refugees and the scene of growing tensions between the refugees and the local population.

Even without further large-scale influxes of refugees into the Bukavu region, the Rwandan refugee population on the Zaire border is clearly unsustainable on any long-term basis. It is unlikely that the massive flow of resources to keep alive those already in Goma can be long sustained, much less those needed for a further wave of refugees moving into Bukavu. The resources, thus far are simply not available, and funding pledged by major donors is far from adequate for the task. Even with more food and funding, the region's logistics and infrastructure may not support the added burden.

If the refugees do not return home in the coming weeks, there will be no one to work their fields, the maturing crops will rot in the fields and by the end of the year the country will depend on food aid to avert famine.

The only hope for long-term survival of the refugees is to return to Rwanda, resume cultivation of their farms. There is no other viable solution but to undo the exodus. But that too, is more easily said than done.

The humanitarian implications of the continued presence of the refugees in the border camps, can be seen in the soaring rates of morbidity and mortality, and the impending collapse of their resource base at their homes in Rwanda. The political implications are also serious, one such is the possibility of future sporadic warfare along the Rwanda- Zaire border if the former regime's troops and militia are maintained intact.

Political

The new RPF government is making a determined effort to persuade the refugees to return home, but the members of the Hutu rump regime are desperate. Their soldiers and militia have demonstrated their willingness to use violence against refugees attempting to return to Rwanda. According to reports from

As always, what happens in Rwanda also has implications, often very serious ones, for the delicate and volatile situation of neighbouring Burundi. The massacres in Rwanda, and reported incursions of armed groups of Hutus from Zaire and Rwanda, have led to extreme tension in Burundi's Tutsi-controlled army. The Burundi Army has long seen itself as the only serious bastion between Burundi's Tutsi population and Rwandan-type massacres. The arrival of more Hutu refugees from Rwanda in northern Burundi, where serious incidents related to Rwandan refugees have occurred, could further exacerbate tensions and the threat of serious clashes in Burundi.

COUNTING THE COSTS

THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF WAR

Rwanda is a small country and densely populated. Its population is nearly half the size of Uganda's but with only a fraction of Uganda's land area. It is severely overpopulated and largely dependent on semi-subsistence agriculture. For most of the population, there is not enough land to go around and agriculture, at their level of technology and investment capability cannot take them far beyond mere subsistence. Rwanda is poor, its economic problems are no passing cloud, they grow out of the country's basic economic realities; lack of capital, lack of technology, and far too many people for the available resources. One result is over-cultivation of the land in the struggle for food, leading to cumulative impoverishment of the soil, and erosion, making it capable of supporting ever fewer people as the population seeking to live from it, is rapidly and inexorably increasing.

The war made it worse. Rwanda's small income from coffee largely skimmed off by the country's small political and commercial elite, leaving little enough for the peasants who grow it, could hardly support the costs of even the most inexpensive war. The Rwandan conflict however, was costly even with the help of France, which provided the Habyarimana regime with considerable military assistance including a large military training mission.

The economic costs were high and ever-increasing as resources were spent to multiply the size of the government army and to recruit, arm and train large numbers of para-military militia. The unbearable strains on the Rwandan economy led inexorably to its collapse.

The outbreak of war in 1990 severely damaged Rwanda's economy already weakened by rapid population growth and diminishing per capita food production and GNP. In 1991, GNP per capita dropped from \$310 to \$260 and external debt rose from \$691.8 million to \$845 million. By 1992, inflation had become a serious problem for the poor and those on fixed incomes. Civil unrest and eventually, civil

Particular Crises Posed for Humanitarian Problems of Children and Women

The survival of the displaced and particularly of the children and women among them, remains at high risk, from malnutrition, disease, lack of potable water and of health care. The facilities which assist in the survival of the most vulnerable members of society have been largely destroyed as a result of war and population displacement. Administration, social services and food production have collapsed. Even most sources of safe water have been destroyed or polluted.

Poverty was rampant in Rwanda even before the recent collapse, and the mortality rate among children under five was reported in 1991 at 189 per 1,000, down from 201 per 1,000 in 1989, but still among the world's highest. Escalating rates of malnutrition, lack of access to unpolluted water and the disappearance of the health care system due to war and displacement, can only drive such rates higher. The 1991 rate of life expectancy at birth at 50 years, and 50 percent adult literacy will be much lower now.

Thousands of survivors of the massacres, many of whom have witnessed the brutal murder of their families, friends and members of their ethnic group, and who themselves have fled or hid for weeks or months in fear of a similarly brutal death, will inevitably bear a heavy burden of trauma, which may take years to overcome. Those affected include thousands of orphans whose families have been slaughtered or dispersed. Those who have been forced by the militias to participate in the murder of their friends, colleagues and neighbours as the price for their own lives, will also face the effects of trauma, and the fear of revenge.

Child Health and Mortality

The civil war and ethnic killings have had other disastrous impacts on the survival and socio-economic conditions of children and women in Rwanda. Health care services are crucial, both for the refugees and the large numbers of internally displaced. For the great majority of Rwandan children and women, access to health care services has almost entirely disappeared apart from the immunization and other emergency services provided by UNICEF and partner organizations in the refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania. Such services need to be vastly and rapidly expanded, both in the camps and within Rwanda itself.

Before the outbreak of war in Rwanda, the mortality rate for children under five years of age had dropped to 201 per thousand from the 1980 rate of 231 per thousand. No accurate figures are available for the period since the upsurge of the civil war in 1991-1994. However, in view of the large scale population displacement that has since taken place, the destruction and pollution of clean water sources and thus, drastic decrease in access to potable water; and the widespread outbreak of lethal diseases in the camps of displaced people both in Rwanda and in the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania, mortality rates are undoubtedly much higher.

The lack of basic education has far-reaching consequences, among which the lack of means to address the trauma affecting large numbers of Rwandan children and women. The physical and psychological consequences of war, displacement, ethnic murder and terror, have left most of the country's children and women psychologically and often physically scarred.

Poverty

Rwanda is affected by a poverty arising from its overpopulation in terms of inadequate land resources and possibilities of investment. The land is already fully used and mostly divided into small family plots. The numbers of landless, unemployed and under employed youth, is growing rapidly and relentlessly. In 1989 28 percent of the urban population and 89 percent of the rural population lived in absolute poverty. Since that time, the number of youth who cannot be absorbed in the country's economy has increased rapidly as a generation matures.

Psychological Effects

The human costs of the Rwandan conflict are enormous. Following the horrors of mass murder and massive displacement, the remaining population, particularly the children, are almost entirely traumatized by the massacres that they have witnessed, or in some cases, forced to participate; by the brutal murder of family members of many of them; and for fear of their own lives.

The number of orphans is as yet unknown, but according to some estimates may exceed 100,000. There would have been many more, had so many children not been killed. Even where one or more parents may have survived, many children have lost so many of their closest family members, or have witnessed their closest relatives and neighbours taking part in atrocities and killings, that they cannot cope with the trauma.

UNICEF consultants in Rwanda have described the Rwandese children as the most badly-hit child population ever seen as a result of armed conflict. According to relief workers almost every child they have encountered has lost at least one close family member in the war or massacres. Many children have lost all or most of their family members. Most of the children had witnessed mass killings. They had seen people rounded up and killed in en masse in schools, churches, or other such places by shooting, shelling or killing them one by one by hand, in many cases slashing them with machetes, hoes or axes, or beating them to death with clubs.

Large numbers of children have been exposed to the most grotesque atrocities. They have seen the killers drop dead bodies into latrines. They have seen them drowning people or seating them on the points of spears until they die in agony, or cutting off the victims' legs and leaving them to die, hours or days later. They have seen people, including other children thrown alive into mass graves and

Following are some of the problems identified with respect to Operation Restore Hope and UNOSOM:

- (a) "Military priorities were determined without the participation of humanitarian relief organizations";
- (b) "Lack of information before military intervention, created security risks for relief workers";
- (c) "Different agendas for NGOs/US military/UN";
[In effect, this meant that their agendas were not only different, but were not always made clear, there was often a lack of transparency, and sometimes these different agendas conflicted, further complicating existing problems]
- (d) "Too few Somalia experts were consulted and/ or included";

[As a result of this, there was often a lack of knowledge and understanding of the local situation, and important decisions often appeared to be made without adequate knowledge of the country and other factors of critical relevance to those decisions. The results were frequently disastrous.]

What Needs to be Done?

Peace is essential to the resolution of Rwanda's humanitarian crisis and peace requires the removal of the threat of an early return to war or mass ethnic or political violence. It implies the establishment at least a minimum level of security to allow the people to resume work and begin to rebuild their lives.

An essential aspect of any sustainable peace in Rwanda is the return home and resettlement of the millions of refugees and internally displaced victims of civil conflict and genocide. Another is reconciliation between Rwanda's ethnic and regional groups. Rwanda is a small and densely populated country, these groups must learn to live together and that will require an important level of reconciliation between them.

The return home and resettlement of the estimated two million mainly Hutu, refugees, is a high priority for the new government in Kigali. Preventing this is an important priority of the members of the former Rwandan regime and their allies. According to reports from the refugee camps around Goma, Zaire, former Rwandan government officials, soldiers and militia, threaten the lives of refugees who try to return to Rwanda.

difficult for governments which support the members of the former Rwandan regime, to openly harbour them and to allow them the use of its territory for future military adventures already being threatened by some of them.

President Ali Hassan Mwinyi called attention to this danger on 17 August 1994 when he called for a major effort to persuade Rwandan refugees to return home, for fear that their camps will become breeding grounds for a new civil war. The Tanzanian leader was quoted by Kenya's Daily Nation as saying "The urgency of stemming the tide of refugees and their subsequent repatriation is of paramount importance. The refugees must not be allowed to acquire the character of permanence in the camps of eastern Zaire or northwestern Tanzania. He said that this could create an environment for the killers to regroup and encourage the political and even military mobilization of the refugees.(Daily Nation 19/8/1994, Nairobi).

Effective means of communication with the refugee population and displaced populations within Rwanda; need to be urgently established. They need to be provided with other information than that provided to them by the former regime and its militia. This is particularly important to a sustainable re-establishment of order and to efforts to prevent effective mobilization by the members of the former regime.

The international community and the United Nations in particular, has a crucial role to play in seeking peace and possible solutions to the Rwandan crisis. Fulfilling that role will be neither easy nor simple. Like Somalia, Rwanda is a very complex situation with little room for mistakes.

The priority should be on effective measures to forestall further outbreaks of fighting. The fielding of a UN peace keeping force in the southwest of the country is a first step, but barely that. Following the initial reduction of UN peacekeeping forces in Rwanda, the new contingents arrived far too late to save the 500,000 to one million Tutsi civilians who died at the hands of Hutu soldiers and militias. The managers of the genocide who fled to neighbouring countries continue to promote violence and genocide from their safe havens. The UN needs to request those countries to put an end to such activities and to separate the military forces and militias of the former Rwandan regime from the mass of ordinary refugees.

The UN also needs to accelerate its investigation of genocide in Rwanda. Where evidence is available against particular individuals among the former officials, military and militia who continue to promote violence and efforts to renew the conflict from havens in neighbouring countries, those countries should be requested to detain them, pending formation of tribunals to try them.

1. UNICEF should take urgent measures to address the problems of an estimated 100,000 unaccompanied children in Rwanda, as well as, in refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania.
2. UNICEF needs to consider the rapid expansion of emergency relief activities within Rwanda, particularly in the areas of maternal and child health care, nutrition, water and sanitation, and revival of child education.
3. Basic education for children should be linked with intensive efforts to address conflict-related trauma among children in a situation in which virtually the entire child population is severely traumatized.
4. A great deal needs to be done to promote reconciliation through all available media of communication to help children and others to understand what happened to their society and how they can help to prevent any recurrence. Reconciliation should be pursued through basic education linked to efforts to address child trauma and through extensive use of radio to focus attention on the causes of the disaster, the principle of individual rather than ethnic responsibility, and the need for reconciliation.
5. Particular attention needs to be focussed on re-establishment of the very basic principle of individual responsibility for individual actions as opposed to ethnic or tribal responsibility. This has been obscured by political and ethnic extremists in Rwanda over more than three decades and has been a key factor in creating an environment in which ethnic murder with impunity became possible and widely acceptable.

CONCLUSIONS

The Rwandan conflict, genocide and resulting problems are all linked to very basic and complex problems which must be identified and seriously addressed if viable solutions are to be found. These include unsustainable population growth and related environmental deterioration that in turn diminishes the capacity of Rwanda's land resources to sustain its population. They include a spiral of landlessness, increasing poverty and growing competition for the country's meagre resources. All have helped to fuel a growing desperation which has contributed to civil war and genocide in Rwanda.

There are also basic social and legal problems which continue to contribute to the causes of ethnic conflict and murder in Rwanda and these must be addressed as a prerequisite to resolving the conflict. Rwanda's history has helped extremist groups to promote ethnic killing. The previous regimes in Kigali which ruled Rwanda for more than three decades, fanned the flames of tribal animosity and provoked ethnic conflict in pursuit of their own ambitions, or to permit the takeover of Tutsi-held land. In the process they created what new Rwandan President Bizimungu, describes as a 'culture of murder with impunity'.

its remaining population, including both the internally displaced and the nearly two million refugees in camps in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi. The RPF government is also concerned about the strategy of the former Rwandan regime, its troops and militia, who are still armed and waiting in camps in Zaire. The leaders of the former regime have stakes their hopes on retaining the refugees in Zaire as a recruiting base for their plans to renew the war in Rwanda. During September 1994 there were reports of infiltration of armed men from across the Zaire and Burundi borders into southwestern Rwanda, apparently Hutu militiamen aiming to terrorize Hutus who had refused to follow the fleeing militia to the refugee compassion Zaire.

The current Rwandan government has tended to say all the right things and thus far, appears to be making a determined effort towards reconciliation. The RPF has established a government that is ethnically and politically mixed, including members from moderate Hutu parties, as well as a moderate Hutu President and Prime Minister, in an obvious effort to calm the fears of the Hutu population and encourage the return of the refugees.

The RPF has also taken a firm stand on human rights and due process of law, even in the case of persons suspected of involvement in the massacres of most of the country's Tutsi population. This has been highlighted by the arrest and punishment of RPF personnel suspected of illegal treatment of suspects. In September 1994, some 65 RPF personnel were reportedly in prison awaiting trial for illegally taking revenge against Hutu suspects and several were reportedly executed.

The RPF is disciplined and determined, but that alone is not enough. Their capacity is limited and not adequate to the tasks with which they are confronted. Their discipline and apparent good intentions are commendable, but far from sufficient to even begin the process of reconciliation and reconstruction that is essential to peace in Rwanda and the survival of its children and women, those who remain. There is a great deal which must be done and done in the near and foreseeable future. It is essential for the international community to take on much of the responsibility.

The Current Administration

Rwanda needs an effective administration to provide the minimum needs for humanitarian relief and rehabilitation, and creation of a reasonably stable environment for pursuit of reconciliation. The RPF arguably has the responsibility for this, but lacks adequate capacity. The co-operation of the international community is essential to fill the gaps in various key areas.

One such area is for capacity-building for the officials and cadres who must build a virtually new administration from scratch. The need is for short-term training for officials with the possibility of added support by military civil affairs officials.

It is particularly important that the trials be limited to the perpetrators of the crimes and the leadership responsible for those crimes. Care must be taken to avoid any semblance of group or ethnic responsibility. It must be made clear at every step and stage that the issue is the responsibility of individuals for crimes committed by individuals, and their punishment as individuals for their actions. The Rwandan government should accept the jurisdiction of an international tribunal to deal with the war criminals, and in the case of questions of procedure and legal codes to be followed, should be prepared to accept international arbitration.

The Refugee Issue and Threats of Renewed Conflict

The disarming of the former Rwandan Army forces and the Hutu militia in the refugee camps in Zaire is essential. This too, can only be ensured by the international community. The primary responsibility for this should rest with Zaire and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with UN assistance. It should be very clear that the presence of the former Rwandan Army and militia, still armed and based on Zairean territory within easy reach of Rwanda, constitutes a serious threat to peace in the region.

The militia maintain their control over the civilian population of the camps by force of arms and the threat and practice of violence. Once disarmed, they would cease to be a threat to civilians and this would facilitate the growth of a new and less extremist leadership in the camps. It would also remove the principal obstacle to the return to Rwanda of the refugees who appear to fear the depredations of the Hutu militia who control the Zairean camps far more than they fear the RPF.

Repatriation of the refugees needs to be in well-organized phases, with security being provided for their departure from the camps up to their destinations in Rwanda. A wider deployment of UN troops within Rwanda would help to provide refugees with encouragement and a secure environment.

The repatriation and resettlement of refugees as well as the resettlement of the internally-displaced people in Rwanda, is far beyond the capacity of the new Rwandan government. The responsibility for this should be taken up by the international community. Rehabilitation of the internally and externally-displaced population is a major issue which will require major efforts by the humanitarian community. In this respect there is a need for organization of a major humanitarian conference, as in Somalia, to determine how the international community may help Rwanda, and to what extent it is prepared to commit the necessary resources.

Restoring confidence in individual security is important to any normalization of the situation, but it alone is not enough. The international community and the UN will need to play a much larger role and assume a visible responsibility for the political and economic revival of the country. An important starting point for this could be in relation to the resettlement and rehabilitation of the internally-displaced people in Rwanda.

The Role of UN Humanitarian and Development Agencies.

The UN Agencies will play the major role in the revival and rehabilitation of Rwanda, and eventually, its further development. The principal humanitarian agencies are already there, actively engaged in the relief and rehabilitation process, or in the process of defining their role.

In the case of UNICEF the role is clear and the engagement is well under way. UNICEF is thus in position to take an active role in the search for solutions that go beyond those of immediate survival and to influence the approaches taken by other actors on the Rwandan scene.

UNICEF has a wide range of experiences that are relevant to the Rwandan crisis. In particular, UNICEF has extensive experience of the difficulties related to war and the breakdown of civil society, and has been able to devise creative responses. Its previous experiences can provide important lessons on how to cope with the Rwandan disaster. Interventions in Somalia, Southern Sudan, Uganda, Southern Africa and the former Yugoslavia have provided UNICEF with valuable lessons in working with all parties to a conflict and finding effective ways to carry out its mandate. These interventions have provided UNICEF with a relevant and in many ways unique base of experience and collectively, have generated credibility for UNICEF as the UN agency most flexible in the face of, and at the same time, most capable of effective response to the challenges posed by the intersection of human emergencies and conflict.

UNICEF's mandate together with its experience and store of credibility, represents a certain strength. While other agencies may be hampered by structural requirements in their relation with UN member states, UNICEF's mandate to serve the needs of children, give it a certain flexibility which enables it to cross lines impenetrable to other agencies. While UNICEF's status as a UN agency requires that it operate in accordance with the rules and regulations of the United Nations and coordinate its efforts with those of other agencies, its flexibility has allowed UNICEF to make the link between the immediate and longer-term needs of children, and thus between relief and development.

UNICEF's principal constituencies, children on one side, and women on the other have been the greatest sufferers in the Rwandan genocide. First of all, children are the largest group in a country in which nearly half the population is under 15 years of age. They suffered more as well, as those who survived the

(f) resuscitation of commerce and trade.

In considering the Rwanda emergency, the international community needs to take into account its almost unique nature involving the total collapse of the civil society and the needs to revive civil society, and ensure the survival of the most vulnerable members of Rwandan society. There is a need for the international community in general and UNICEF in particular, to examine the situation from the perspective of enhancing the economic and social welfare of women, children and other vulnerable groups. UNICEF Consultant Regional H. Green's analysis of a similar situation of a failed society Somalia, is equally relevant to Rwanda when he stresses the importance of enhancing the livelihoods of poor households and of facilitating the economic actions and access to services directly related to them, and the infrastructural support and cross-sectoral linkage that render interventions effective.

Green recommended that "Therefore UNICEF needs to take a macro perspective on reconstruction/rehabilitation/restructuring in Somalia today as it has done over the past decade on Structural Adjustment." The international community needs to take a similar approach with respect to Rwanda, where it will be vital to the effectiveness of efforts to avert further conflict.

The Role of NGOs/Churches

The NGOs and churches will continue to play a key role in humanitarian activities in Rwanda. While they are normally much smaller than the UN agencies and have fewer of their own resources, they are able to do many things that the agencies can not do and play an essential role as implementing agents of the UN humanitarian agencies.

A Strategy for Maximum Impact:

UNICEF operates in at least three different capacities in Rwanda. First, it is a UN-member agency. Second, it is a member of the humanitarian (as opposed to political or military) community. Third, it is a sectorally-based relief and development agency.

This multiplicity of functions provides UNICEF with clear opportunities to have an impact at both the micro- and macro-levels in Rwanda, and reinforces the necessary linkage between relief and rehabilitation efforts, on the one hand, and conflict resolution goals, on the other.

In order to be proactive rather than only reactive, UNICEF must consider at least four elements when designing interventions:

- (a) What is the long-term goal?
- (b) What are the specific objectives?

As a sectoral humanitarian agency, UNICEF should:

(a) review the current situation with a view to:

- (i) effecting micro-macro linkage;
- (ii) enhancing the sustainability of proposed interventions; and
- (iii) addressing, where possible, long-term economic goals over and above immediate emergency needs;

(b) increase the level and amount of skills training in the fields of health, education, water and sanitation and other sectors in which UNICEF may operate. Training should be expanded to include instruction for community organizers.

(c) consider expanding its educational programs to include "peace education" for children and relevant social history. Importantly, UNICEF has pointed to the need for trauma-management for and children in Rwanda. The identification of and response to trauma is important, but only addresses the crisis in its present phase; trauma-management can be enhanced, and sustainable peace encouraged, if children are taught about peace and conflict resolution issues and provided with relevant education about their own circumstances;

(d) UNICEF's existing support for radio programming as a means of providing practical information about its programs should be extended to Rwanda and expanded to include programming in the areas of conflict resolution;

(f) similarly, UNICEF should increase its ability to monitor the movements of returnee populations. The probable consequence of this return-movement will be "social and individual stress" which will, in turn, lead to "the deterioration of the children's nutritional status, which will obviously put relief organizations in an embarrassing situation."

REGIONAL SECURITY AND PERSPECTIVES

GOMA TRIP REPORT 28 - 29 SEPTEMBER 1994 USAID-DART/UNREO

CONTEXT

This report concludes the mission's travel around the region in an effort to gain a regional perspective of the Rwanda emergency.

The findings of the initial mission were rather pessimistic as to the sustainability of refugee camps in Tanzania and political stability in Burundi. However, the mission report tried to highlight some opportunities and positive ongoing initiatives in the region such as a holistic plan for repatriation of refugees (notwithstanding the effects of the "UNHCR report") and the political compromises in Burundi.

Unfortunately, the conclusions of this mission to Goma leave little hope for optimism as concerns the future of Rwanda and even the region. The return of Rwandans to Zaire with reports of RPF exactions has effectively shut off spontaneous repatriation and has further reinforced the authority of the interahamwe and other hardliners within the refugee population. Under these conditions prospects for reconciliation in the short term are exceedingly dim. Information supporting this conclusion:

- The Hutu population in Goma perceive themselves as victims of an RPF aggression dating back to 1990 and, as a result, downplay the gravity and significance of the events that followed the downing of the President's plane in April.
- In the eyes of the refugees RPF committed atrocities from 1990 and continue to do so with impunity. The fact that bodies cannot be found is attributed to careful execution of their plan.
- Refugees' stated preconditions for return to Rwanda include, general amnesty combined with judgment of the leaders/organizers of both parties, a return of properties seized by Tutsis since April, and recognition of the government in exile as a legitimate political institution.

Refugees further state that the only way they would return to Rwanda would be to retake power. Any attempt at discussing with refugees their peaceful return under the present RPA regime leads to immediate hostility.

GENERAL FINDINGS

- Over the last month or more spontaneous repatriation of refugees from Zaire, while small compared to the size of the refugee population, has nevertheless been fairly steady with UNHCR counting up to 2,000 refugees per day crossing at monitored checkpoints. Seeds and tools distributions by NGOs working in the Gisenyi and Ruhengeri areas have been prepared with resettlement of these populations in mind. Since the 20th of September this trend has reversed. Rwandan Hutus are returning from Rwanda to Zaire with stories of RPA exactions. As many as 350 per day have crossed in recent days while the flow into Rwanda has fallen to as low as 129 at monitored checkpoints.
- There is fear that the international community's plan to relocate the military far from the camps will further strengthen the interahamwe's grip on the refugee population.
- Notwithstanding the above, the FAR, which heretofore has been a visible presence in Mugunga camp, appears to have withdrawn, possibly south towards/to Bukavu. According to some, the former army is rearming and training for a push back into Rwanda. It is said that the refugee community will be used as a human cover for the preparation and execution of this plan.
- However the view of the departing French commander is that the FAR have withdrawn voluntarily from the general refugee population in order to receive humanitarian assistance. Having been disarmed when they crossed into Zaire, the FAR present no threat to the general situation and should be supported by the relief community. Note was made by the commander that the interahamwe, more than the military, are implicated in genocide yet they are receiving humanitarian assistance in the camps.
- Security in the camps has become more precarious. Recent efforts by UNHCR to move refugees from school rooms into camps were sabotaged when interahamwe spread the word that UNHCR was trying to force people back to Rwanda. Rival gangs ("scouts" who had been assisting UNHCR with the move versus "Sagesse" comprised of interahamwe) fought in Katale on September 28, resulting in several dead.
- Without special security forces, evacuation of expatriates in the event of a major security incident in the camps will be nigh impossible. The imminent departure of the French military force and the deployment of a Japanese contingent with a purely humanitarian focus raises this question more urgently.

- The Zaire military continue to prey on the local Zairean population and in return the population reacts violently, demonstrating against and killing the guilty parties.
- More worrying is the resurgence of ethnic tensions in the North Kivu region around Masisi, an area where conflict occurred in recent years between indigenous Zairean groups (notably the Hunde) and longtime Rwandan immigrants (Banyarwanda, comprised of Tutsis and Hutus). In a new spin, the influx of some 9 -10,000 Tutsi refugees forced from Goma by the Rwandan Hutus to the area, appears to have caused a split in the Banyarwanda. The Hutu elements are being supported by the Hunde against the Tutsi with local churches also implicated in taking sides in this new conflict. Reportedly several villages have been burned and a movement of displaced to the north has been noted. ICRC and other NGOs are following the situation.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Office of the DFC/COS
UNAMIR Force HQ
KIGALI
Rwanda

1000.7 (DFC) /G/1

17th September, 1994

Force Commander

**RE-APPRAISAL OF UNAMIR'S ROLE
IN THE AFTERMATH OF A SUCCESSFUL
TAKE-OVER OF SECTOR 4 BY THE RPA
AND GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES**

OVER-VIEW

1. Sector 4 of UNAMIR's operational area is the portion of Rwanda in which the French Operation "TURQUOISE" took place. France's operations effectively terminated on 22 August, 1994 when the control of the area was successfully transferred to UNAMIR.

2. Prior to handing over the area, there was a lot of apprehension in many circles as to what Sector 4 would look like following the end of French mandate in Rwanda. Security Council Resolution 929 of 22 June granted the French force two months within which it should complete its humanitarian operations in the South-western sector of Rwanda. Whilst UNAMIR had a lot of set-backs in receiving troops for the Sector, a daring effort was made in commencing deployment of the only battalion on the ground then (Ghanbatt) on 10th August, 1994. By a stroke of luck, the Government in Kigali accepted the retention of the Franco-African Battalion that co-operated with France's Coalition Forces in Operation "TURQUOISE". With a lot of desperation, the Ethiopian Battalion commenced deployment in the Cyangugu area just before 22nd August, 1994. UNAMIR then felt confident we would be able to take control of Sector 4 from the French since the government in Kigali was very vehemently opposed to their continued stay in that part of Rwanda. So far, the sector has been without any serious incidents. The isolated cases of murder and arrests occurring in the sector are also happening in other sectors of the country.

**INTRODUCTION OF RPA AND PREFECTS
INTO SECTOR 4**

3. Accordingly, UNAMIR in a planned programme with the government in Kigali started introducing RPA soldiers into Sector 4 from Tuesday 6th of September, 1994. By the third week of September, Gikongoro, Kibuye and Cyangugu prefectures would have each had a battalion of RPA in their locations. In addition, new prefects were appointed to the three areas with the first elements of RPA offering them intimate protection.

4. We in UNAMIR have observed with satisfaction that the introduction of RPA in the South-western Sector did not cause any violent re-action or panic from the mainly Hutu population. Rwandese are staying where they have been. Others are leaving the displaced people's camps for their homes, even though in small numbers.

CONTINUED EMPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR TROOPS
IN SECTOR 4

5. The question that UNAMIR needs to address now is if the RPA assumes full security duties in Sector 4, is there still the requirement for our formed troops to be in the Sector? The obvious answer is no. However, immediate pull out of the troops will not be viewed kindly by the mainly HUTU population in the zone. The Franco African Battalion is already questioning the rapidity with which RPA is getting into the zone. We should therefore be working towards the end of the year before considering pulling out our troops completely. Indeed the eventual programme of leaving the zone should be that of a gradual and spaced out withdrawal not pulling out all the troops at once.

So
USA

yes
I agree

REQUIREMENT FOR FORMED TROOPS AFTER
STABILIZATION IN SECTOR 4

6. After stability is achieved in Sector 4, I envisage the following duties to be performed by formed troops in Rwanda as a whole.

- ✓ a. Monitoring of Rwanda's borders with her neighbours to check infiltration of arms and ammunition. Observer group alone will not be the answer. UNOMUR in Uganda never succeeded in checking arms flow into Rwanda.
- ✓ b. The formed troops will protect refugees in various part of the country.
- ✓ c. Protection of Human Rights monitors is another task they can undertake. Also Humanitarian Relief Agency & NGOs.
- ✓ d. The troops will give confidence to the returnees so that they can feel free to live in their own country.
- New ✓ e. Through arrangement with Rwandese authorities, the formed troops can help in restructuring the Rwandese Army.
- New ✓ f. Development assistance, for example, artisans of various grades among the formed troops in support of NGOs and the world bank can carry out a lot of repairs on existing infrastructure.


New

g. Training of the military to perform civilian duties is another area that can be handled by formed troops. Presently the RPA soldier does not seem to be aware of his civic responsibilities. Hitherto, he has only been taught to handle weapons. Formed troops from countries that had taken the lead in their own countries in such roles can also lead the RPA to rise up to the occasion.

I agree

7. It must be emphasised that, there should not be a rush in pulling out the formed troops completely from Rwanda. The fact that BRITCON has set up itself a target date of 17 Nov 94 and CANSIGs are likely to leave in January 1994 does also not mean UNAMIR does not require assistance in the fields being covered by those contingents. In addition, formed troops should be replaced by new ones from the troop contributing countries. After such a bitter civil war, it will be perhaps wrong to assume that all will be well too soon. In South Lebanon, there are at times over three months without any incident occurring but UNIFIL is still in position to ensure stability. A hasty withdrawal will negate the gains so far made. It must be borne in mind that Rwandese government itself has set a target period of 5 years transition. They will need the UN for a long time. It could be that the battalions will be reduced in numbers and a call for Specialist Units in the battalions to support the infantry role will be encouraged. G3 Plans will be tasked to start working out a new organisational diagram with these points in mind.

8. MILOBS & CIVPOL. These groups will remain in Rwanda for a long time to come. It will depend basically on how quickly gendarmerie can be trained in sufficient numbers. That is the only way law and order can be restored. I foresee the mission changing at one stage to an Observer Mission even though not so suddenly.



HK ANYIDOH
Brig Gen
DFC/COS

Info:

DCOS OPS

SRSG



UNAMIR - MINUAR

OFFICE OF THE DFC
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1000.7(DFC)/A/1

15th September, 1994

See Distribution

A VISIT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO RWANDA AND
A TEAM OF THE STAFF TO ZAIRE MON-TUE 12-13 SEP 94

INTRODUCTION

1. The SRSG led a team of six officers of his own staff to Zaire from Mon-Wed 12-13 September 1994. The purpose of the visit was to meet the Zairian authorities and foreign diplomats to discuss with them issues related to the various categories of Rwandese nationals that have taken refuge in Goma/Bukavu since the end of the civil war in Rwanda in July 1994. Upon arrival in Kinshasha - Zaire, the SRSG held a brief meeting with his delegation and outlined the various categories of Rwandese in Zaire as follows. Top politicians of the former Government, the former Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), Interahamwe and the Presidential Guards, then the common Rwandese who are harmless. He then continued to discuss the strategic approach to the discussions. The pivot points would be to stress to the Zairian authorities what they stand to gain both politically and economically by encouraging the Rwandese to go back home.

AIM

2. The aim of this report is to bring out the salient points of the discussions that took place with the view to finding the best approach to finally evacuating the refugees from Zaire back to their own country.

PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE REFUGEES

3. During the SRSG's initial briefing it became clear that the problems associated with the separation and eventual evacuation of the refugees are as follows:

- a. Identification of the various groups.
- b. Their new locations within Zaire.
- c. Cost of repatriating the harmless elements.
- d. The procedure for disarming those that possess weapons.
- e. Psychological operations prior to or in conjunction with other measures to facilitate easy evacuation

IDENTIFICATION

4. This should not pose too much problem. The politicians are known and can easily be sorted out from the lot. They still enjoy the respect of their citizens in the camps with them so taking them away should not pose a problem if only the rest are assured of the fact that they are going to a safe place.

5. The military men in uniform should also be easy to identify. The only problem here is the Presidential Guards wearing the same uniforms and so are some of the notorious Interahamwe. Aside from the uniform, the militias and the Presidential Guards are still in position to intimidate the Regular Forces and the ordinary Rwandese. What can be done however is for the regular soldiers under a capable leadership should defy the Interahamwe and the Presidential Guards. Under a capable, a neutral force preferably UN operating under Chapter VII, it should not be too difficult to separate them provided the RGF itself is willing to do so. The ordinary Rwandese can then be given the option of selecting to go back home or stay in Zaire.

NEW LOCATIONS IN ZAIRE

6. The new camp for about 20,000 former RGF soldiers is to be located in Ituri. This place is located in the North-Eastern part of Zaire about 100-150 km from Goma. It appears the Zairian authorities are willing to get the ex-soldiers into the new camps but they are not in position financially or security-wise to undertake the task. There must be an outside help.

COST OF REPATRIATION

7. UN must find donors and agencies that will be willing to assist in this. This was later discussed at length with the officials of USA and Belgium.

THE PROCEDURE FOR DISARMING

8. This is perhaps the most delicate part of the whole operation. It will be necessary to find out what level of propaganda had gone out to get these soldiers back to Rwanda or fight the Government in Kigali. Is there a foreign power encouraging or training them for a show down on the RPA? Do they have leaders that will lead them on a counter-offensive? If investigation reveals that they are weak and frail and that even with foreign encouragement they do not seem prepared to go back for a fight, disarming them will be relatively easy. If, however, they have a use for the weapons in the immediate future then how will they give them up?

9. Zaire, we are told, cannot help in disarming the RGF or in any form of security duties. The Zairian troops in the camps constitute enough insecurity already. The only obvious choice is a neutral force operating under chapter VII. A credible force from countries accepted to Zaire given the right mandate to

execute their task within a short period of time. The existing camps as well as the new ones to be created must all be protected by UN Forces.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

10. Already there have been some contacts between the Rwandese and Zairian authorities. If they are all committed to what came out of those meetings then intensified efforts in the following ways will help.

- a. Radio broadcast directed to the camps.
- b. Direct contact between the politicians in Kigali and the Refugees. Zairian politicians could accompany their Rwandese counter-parts on such trips.
- c. Bringing back from Rwanda some of opinion leaders that used to live in the camps and had gone back and currently living in Rwanda.
- d. With concurrence of the Zairian government, distribute leaflets in the camps re-assuring them of sincerity of the government in Kigali.
- e. Perhaps the most important of all is the demonstration of faith by the government in Kigali. They must show beyond any reasonable doubts that they are committed to reconciliation and truly want to build a harmonized nation.

VISIT TO US EMBASSY

11. We met the Chargé d'Affaires of the US Embassy at 1200 hours local time. In a short discussion with him, the following points were emphasized.

- a. Zairians are sincere in the re-locating the refugees and their eventual repatriation but are not in position to do it. The Zairian Army itself is plagued with indiscipline and the Govt has no money to undertake the task.
- b. An area (Ituri) has already been earmarked as the camp site for RGF.
- c. It is obvious that when the military elements of the refugees are moved away from the border with Rwanda, confidence between the two countries can be restored.
- d. United States troops will not participate in such an exercise but the US Government will be prepared to provide money and logistics support.

MEETING WITH BELGIAN CHARGE d'AFFAIRES

12. At 1300 hours on the 12th of September, the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires met the delegation in the Hotel Inter-Continental and he emphasized the following points to us.

- a. The Prime Minister of Zaire is sincere about supporting the repatriation of the refugees but he does not have the means to do so.
- b. Our delegation must try to see President Mobutu and get his approval of whatever plans we have. He has the final say. The fact that the President intends building a Mausoleum for the late President Habyarimana in Gbadolite underscores the relationship that existed between the two and therefore one wonders whether or not President Mobutu would want to see the mainly Hutu soldiers go back home.
- c. Belgian Government will offer assistance but will not contribute troops.
- d. The European Union is favourably disposed to assisting.

VISIT TO ZAIRIAN AUTHORITIES

13. On Tuesday 13th September 1994, the SRSG's delegation visited three statesmen in Kinshasa. The Prime Minister, Ministers of Interior and Defence. In all cases it was clear that the Zairian authorities are sincere about the evacuation of the Rwandese refugees but they do not have the means of doing so. In all three places they made it clear that Rwandese must not be coerced into any movement against their wish especially to Rwanda. They however wish no more refugees into Zaire but will instead help in encouraging those that wish to go back to Rwanda. The Minister of Defence stated that the presence of the refugees has affected their reputation and a lot of money is being spent on them daily. Even within the country the citizens especially opposition politicians and some members of the Armed Forces are vehemently opposed to the role Zairian government is playing in the whole affair. The Minister of Defence went on to say that the Rwandese refugees themselves are not behaving well in the camps. It is, therefore, in the interest of the government of Zaire to send them back home. He re-iterated that if they had the means, they would have evacuated them long ago. He further stated that the Zairian Army has disarmed some of the military men in the camps but others still possess weapons. The total figure of the RGF refugees was given by the PM to be 16,000 but Minister of Defence stated 90,000 including their families.

A JOINT WORKING GROUP - UNAMIR/ZAIRE

14. At the end of the discussions it was agreed that a joint working group made up of UNAMIR/UNHCR/ZAIRE should carry-out a reconnaissance and come out with a detailed report on how the whole refugee situation must be handled. This view is to be

conveyed to the UN Secretary General immediately for approval to be given for the reconnaissance to be carried out. The terms of reference for such a group could be as follows.

- a. Over-all strength of the refugees.
- b. Security.
- c. The various groups ie. the top Politicians, RGF, the Interahamwe and Presidential Guards; the ordinary Rwandese. How to identify them.
- d. Cost
- e. Where are they to be sent to - the camps.
- g. Intelligence on the people and the camps.
- h. Duration of the operation - Timings.
- i. Assessment of troops to task.
- j. Cost element.

THE COST OF THE RECONNAISSANCE

15. This issue was to be taken up with UN New York to enable speedy execution of the task.

MEETING PLACE

16. The Minister of Defence strongly suggested that the first meeting place of the working group should be in Kinshasha then to the existing and proposed camp sites.

MEETING WITH PRESIDENT MOBUTU **WED 14 SEP 94**

17. The SRSG's delegation visited President Mobutu in Gbadolite on Wednesday 14 Sep 94. As in the previous meetings, the SRSG after fraternal greetings outlined the purpose of our visit. He had hardly gone half-way when the President assumed the discussions. There was no doubt that the case of the Rwandese refugees was very dear to his heart. He, however, remained vague on the question of moving the RGF Solders to different camps. He instead chose to dwell at length on the fact that the government in Kigali has the onus on itself to prove beyond reasonable doubts that it is safe for the Rwandese to return home. In addition, he indicated that there is a long standing treaty between East/Central African States that refugees from neighbouring states should be located 150 kilometers from the borders and that such refugees should be treated humanely. We would have preferred a more positive answer from the President. All the same, it was good having face to face meeting with him after which he referred us to his Director of Cabinet Mr Kugulunda to discuss the details with him. I did not benefit

from the translation of those details which were done mainly between Mr Kugulunda, the SRSG and Mr Michael Mussali of the UNHCR.

CONCLUSION

18. Despite a few hitches here and there, our mission was quite successful. Zairian authorities demonstrated during the discussions that they would want the refugees problem sorted out as quickly as possible. One thing that came out clearly is that they can not undertake the task by themselves. They need the assistance of United Nations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

19. Whilst we await the setting up of the joint working group/reconnaissance Team, and its subsequent detailed report, I recommend the following course of action.

- a. The psychological operations referred to in paragraph eight (8) should be vigorously pursued. Among those points is the need to stress the utmost need of the Rwandese government in Kigali to show absolute faith in their professed reconciliation.
- b. A known ally of President Mobutu should prevail on him to come out clearly with his personal views on the situation so that he does not pursue clandestine operations to thwart the efforts of any UN Force that will be put in place.
- c. The OAU should be brought into the picture now.
- d. The UN should be quick in responding to whatever the SRSG will come up with.
- e. The Reconnaissance Team from UNAMIR should be made up of both Civilian and Military experts.



HK ANYIDHOHO
Brig Gen
DFC/COS

Distribution:

SRSG
FORCE COMMANDER
EX DIRECTOR

Report on mission to UNAMIR
concerning the establishment of a
United Nations radio station in Rwanda
by Jeffrey Heyman
(17 - 23 August 1994)

30 August 1994

Mr. Kofi Annan
Under-Secretary-General,
Department of Peace-keeping Operations

Mr. Jeffrey Heyman
UNPROFOR Radio Unit Head,
Radio Project Manager

Report from my mission to UNAMIR concerning the establishment of a United
Nations radio station in Rwanda

1. Introduction

Convincing the millions of refugees who have fled the country that it is safe to return home is the fundamental problem facing the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, humanitarian organizations, and the new Rwandan government. During my mission to Rwanda (17 - 23 August 1994) on behalf of the Department of Peace-keeping Operations to assist in the establishment of a United Nations radio station, it was made clear to me that a credible radio station would be by far the most effective means by which the UN's repatriation message could be delivered to the whole of the mission area. I was greatly assisted by numerous UNAMIR and UN agency personnel, and others, whose knowledge of Rwanda and its people was extremely helpful. Many of their thoughts and experiences, as well as much of their fine work, has found its way into this report.

In the eight sections and four attachments comprising my report, I have attempted to outline the historic background concerning broadcasting in Rwanda, as well as the justification, technical requirements, structure and editorial strategy by which the United Nations could establish and operate a radio station in Rwanda.

So far, however, only 100,000 displaced persons have returned to Rwanda. The majority of people fear reprisals from the RPF and see the new government's call for punishment, even if it is through legal means, as proof a hidden agenda intent on intimidating and killing returning Hutus.

Rwanda will remain a crippled country until the staggering percentage of its population living outside the country returns home.

3. Radio in Rwanda

Due to the fact that nearly half the population is unable to effectively read or write, radio has historically had an important influence on the people of Rwanda. There are currently no newspapers or television broadcasting in the country; it is thought that these media were not an important means of communication previously. A national radio system was built in 1968 by the West German government in return for the right to establish a Deutsche Welle short-wave relay station at Kigali. In 1974, there were 14 radio receivers per thousand of population (approximately 50,000 sets). Figures for 1993 indicate that there were 650,000 radio sets in the country, which represents a large percentage increase in sets per number of population.

During my meeting with RPF officials at Radio Rwanda in Kigali -- the station was intentionally and heavily damaged by the former government during the war -- I learned that the non-commercial, government radio network had previously consisted of one 50 kW short-wave transmitter and a series of five FM transmitters, which provided coverage of approximately 96-percent of the country. The previous government had also acquired at least one, and possibly three 1 kW FM mobile transmitting stations as part of the Deutsche Welle scheme. These transmitters have disappeared with the toppling of the previous regime. One or more are thought to be currently in use by agents of the former government to spread messages of hate and

Goma, Zaire, where over 2.5 million displaced persons are living in an appallingly small area, indicate that it is virtually impossible to detach truth from fiction. The former Rwandan government, said to be in exile in Zaire, is reported to have hundreds of agents operating in the southwest of the country continuing to spread hatred between Hutus and the RPF, and to urge people not to return to Rwanda. Circulated stories that returning Hutus have had their eyes gorged out are backed up with Mafia-style killings in the camps. UNHCR says these killings are part of this systematic campaign to persuade refugees not to return home. There is little evidence that the RPF has harassed or killed returning refugees.

In the makeshift camps in Zaire, refugees reportedly hear endless tales of bloody reprisals by the RPF during Radio Mille Collines broadcasts. Although largely unfounded, these tales are widely believed. The Special Human Rights Rapporteur for Rwanda has expressed concern at Radio Mille Collines hate messages. Public comments by UN officials have been made that UNAMIR has been looking at ways to either jam the broadcasts of Mille Collines or to counter them with UN broadcasts.

Presently, UNAMIR is trying to reassure the millions of frightened people of Rwanda by simply sending in more peace-keeping troops. There is a plan to mount the biggest-ever human rights operation, with 200 human rights monitors being deployed throughout Rwanda. There is no information program, however, in place to back-up the UN's military and human rights deployment. People, presumably, are left to learn of the increased UN presence through first-hand observation or word-of-mouth.

It is said that Hutus do not trust the protection of UN forces, and anti-UN sentiment has been whipped up by the former regime's agents, who remind Hutus that after the massacres started UN soldiers were unable to protect them. Some people

Concerning radio, I witnessed a surprisingly large number of refugees in the camps and displaced persons on the road with portable radios listening to broadcasts. At the camp near Goma, I saw groups of people gathered around radios. I am told, batteries are readily being sold at make-shift markets in the camp, and that 800 radios have been distributed by humanitarian organizations.

Two humanitarian radio stations have been established at locations in Zaire. One man I ran across on a road in Rwanda about 35 km from Goma was listening to a French language broadcast of Radio Humanitaire, operating from Goma. On 5 August 1994, Radio Gatashya, a station reportedly operated by Journalists Without Borders for a "UN agency," began broadcasting one hour programs in Kinyarwanda, French and Swahili. I was not able, unfortunately, to visit either station during my brief trip.

Radio Rwanda, the government radio station run by the RPF, currently has only a limited coverage range and broadcasts from 6:00 - 8:00, 11:00 - 14:30, and 18:00 - 22:00. These broadcasts include news and programs in Kinyarwanda, French, English and Swahili. Program titles are Security, Peasant Rights, Women's Issues, Debate and Discussion, Announcements, Unity and Cooperation, and Musical Suggestion. I saw many people in the few shops open in Kigali listening to government radio. Upon listening to the French and English language programs myself, I found that the content clearly reflected opinions of the RPF. In one program, for example, the presence of French troops in the southwest of the country was described as having done "more harm than good."

All those listening to radio broadcasts were tuned to FM transmissions, as there are no MW stations operating in the country. External short-wave broadcasts have a minimal impact in Rwanda.

information specialists, and journalists experienced in the area that had a UN radio station been established months ago countless lives would have been saved. One military officer who had been in Cambodia said to a journalist before my arrival, "What we need in Rwanda is a Radio UNTAC," referring to the successful UN radio station in Cambodia.

One UN official with months of experience in Kigali said, "The most vital thing we need here now is Radio." Expressing disappointment, an official of the United Nations Rwanda Emergency Office told me that a UN radio station three months ago would have been absolutely critical and would have saved many lives. A month ago it would have been vital in getting word out to fleeing refugees. Now, the official said, a UN radio station, as badly needed as ever, had become "just a good idea" in the eyes of many who do not believe that its establishment would ever come to pass.

In spite of the frustrations of a number of officials of the UN and member states at the time lost in establishing a UN radio station in Rwanda, all believe it is still the only effective means by which the intimidation and violence being spread in the refugee camps can be countered. Further, they say, how else could displaced persons be convinced of UNAMIR's mandate to bring them home safely.

In many ways UNAMIR's anti-intimidation message is similar to the experience in Cambodia, where the information plan was to convince people that it was safe to go out and vote. Much of that plan, put forth in both broadcasts by Radio UNTAC and printed on posters and pamphlets, focused on countering a violent campaign of voter intimidation.

Establishing a UN radio station in Rwanda, therefore, is much preferable to either jamming Radio Mille Collines, which could be interpreted as political censorship, or using Radio Rwanda to broadcast UN material, as has been suggested.

I would strongly recommend against point "b," above, as it would not allow the UN to maintain full control over the station's equipment, and more importantly, editorial policy. I believe a similar situation took place in Somalia, and that that station was not effective. Further, any direct cooperation with a particular member state (i.e., a national contingent of personnel operating equipment as opposed to straightforward funding) could have unforeseen political implications.

Points "a," "c," and "d," above, seem to be the most viable options. Although from the experience in the former Yugoslavia with Radio UNPROFOR, it must be stated that the normal mission procurement process, should it be followed in Rwanda, would most likely mean that it could take four to six months before such a station would be operational. All indications are that a UN radio station in Rwanda is needed immediately. Points "a" and "d," above, might then provide the best combination of UN editorial independence, and provide the type of funding that would allow a radio station to be operational very quickly, perhaps within as little as one month's time, as is desperately needed in Rwanda.

Once the above funding and operational issues are determined the following steps will need to be taken in order to establish a UN radio station in Rwanda:

6.1 Legislative mandate

I understand that UNAMIR operates under Chapter VII of the UN charter which authorizes the Secretary-General to use "all necessary means to achieve the humanitarian objectives [of the mission.]" This alone may not be sufficient to mandate radio broadcasting in Rwanda. Although UNPROFOR operates under Chapter VII, there is nothing in its mandate allowing radio broadcasting. This has caused numerous budgetary and broadcast regulatory problems for UNPROFOR in establishing a radio station the former Yugoslavia. Radio UNTAC, on the other hand, was mandated by the Security Council in quite simple language:

6.3 Transmitter sites

A series of relatively low-cost, low-powered FM transmitters should be used to cover as much of the mission area as possible. There appears to be little history of listening to MW broadcasts in the country. There is no need, then, for expensive MW transmitters, as was included in an early plan. Although Rwanda is a small country, its terrain is such that care will have to be taken in determining transmitter locations. My preliminary findings, however, indicate that five 1 to 2 kW FM transmitters will provide near-total coverage of the country and areas of refugee concentration. Informative consultations with Canadian military and UNAMIR Communications personnel, as well as meetings with officials at Radio Rwanda, identified a number of potential transmitter sites. These sites are located on high features and are either currently in use as communications or broadcast transmission sites, or were used as such before the war. They are as follows:

- a) Mount Jari, 2,071m, 7.5 km north of Kigali, easily accessible by road.
- b) Mount Karissimbi, 4,507 m, in the west of the country, northeast of Goma, Zaire, accessible by foot or high altitude helicopter. Radio Rwanda 500 W transmitter reactivated at this site.
- c) Karongi, 2,584m, 9 km southeast of Kibuye, accessible by road by light vehicle or by helicopter. Radio Rwanda 300 W transmitter reactivated at this site.
- d) Kinanira, 2,100m, 10 km southeast of Cyangugu, accessibility unknown.
- e) Ngoma, 1,800m, 2.5 km north east of Butare, accessible by road. Radio Rwanda 500 W transmitter reactivated at this site.

The above referenced sites can all be fed programming either by repeating FM transmissions or through a network of micro-wave repeaters.

separating announcers from technicians. There must also be a talk-back system allowing conversation between the program director, technicians and announcers.

The broadcast studio should be in two joined single containers, and the production studio in a single container. The production studio would also act as a back-up broadcast studio should technical problems render the broadcast studio inoperative. If a reduced broadcast schedule is planned, such as six hours per day, the station could, perhaps, function with a single broadcast studio. This studio, if well maintained, could double for production during off-air periods.

So-called mobile transmitters are not recommended. They are expensive, and have generally a limited range. Further, they are generally used either to avoid detection or in an emergency situation providing the terrain or size of the intended target area is such to warrant their use.

Again, it is strongly recommended that all UN radio studios be housed in standard 20-foot ISO shipping containers. These portable steel containers will allow for easy deployment by plane, truck or helicopter to the mission area, and re-deployment to other missions once UNAMIR's mandate is accomplished. Attachment 1, below, suggests one such configuration. There are, however, a number of plans for such containerized studio which can be made available if necessary. Alternatives to containerized studios, although not recommended, include the costly conversion of existing structures into studios, as was done in Cambodia, or the installation of equipment into portable flight cases for use in an acoustically suitable space, such as a soundproofed basement area of UNAMIR Headquarters.

Equipment for the gathering of interviews, news and feature material is also advised. Signal processing equipment to allow the transmissions to be distributed to the transmitters is needed. The equipment list provided at Attachment 2, below, should be used as a guide to the type of professional broadcast equipment needed.

Deployment of transmitters would have to be made in often hard to access areas with close coordination for logistical support between the radio technical engineers and UNAMIR. Although in portable containers, the transmitters will have to be deployed by heavy truck, and in some cases, helicopter. Delays may be caused by cloud cover or adverse weather conditions at some of the higher elevations. Road conditions, also, vary greatly throughout the country.

6.5 UNAMIR radio unit budget

Once the technical requirements for a radio station have been finalized, it is vital that a budget for radio be included in the public information programs section of UNAMIR's budget. Even if funding or equipment is acquired from another source, this budget must be prepared, as supplies and staffing posts, both internationally and locally recruited, are considered part of a unit's budget.

The current information budget for UNAMIR, effective from 4 April through 9 December 1994, includes only \$150,000, and those funds are not for radio. Paragraph 122 from the UNAMIR budget states:

The radio stations are at present controlled by the RGF and RPF and as such it is unlikely at this stage whether UNAMIR would be allowed to broadcast on either or both stations, public relations programmes would therefore be limited to some extent. The cost estimate includes provisions for supplies such as tapes and films and for the cost of printing material such as posters, brochures, stickers and buttons.

The above paragraph is, of course, dated, but it is the current budget. There is no indication how the "tapes and films" are to be produced or distributed.

deployment. Both of these areas are specialized fields requiring professional broadcast technicians. It should be pointed out that although there are similarities between communications and broadcasting, field service engineers specializing in communications do not always have sufficient broadcast training. Care must be taken to hire trained broadcast engineers and technicians. Further, a UN project manager to oversee contractors' work is advisable, as is the need for a station manager to maintain the technical integrity of the station once broadcasting begins.

Beyond the technical aspects, a staff of radio journalists, announcers and producers must be hired. These people, again, should have radio broadcasting experience, as was not always the case in previous missions. Control of the unit would be held ultimately by the Director of Information in close consultation with the SRSG. The Radio Unit Head would be responsible for the unit, both administratively and editorially. Two Radio Coordinators, one for on-air staff, and one overseeing programming would manage program format, content and structure. Announcers, translators, studio technicians and some reporters and producers should be locally recruited. A number of internationally-recruited producer and editor posts would also have to be filled.

Local recruitment of studio technicians and others may be difficult. It was learned, however, that there existed a so-called Radio University about 40 miles southeast of Kigali at the town of Gitarama. If this facility was recently operating, it might provide a good source of personnel for the radio station.

There are many ways to structure a radio unit, but a general staffing chart is included at attachment 4, below.

for such things as food distribution announcements, however important. Programs devoted to messages seeking the whereabouts of displaced family members as a means of reuniting families are important and can go a long way in healing national wounds, as they did in Cambodia.

Countering rumor is often very difficult; some rumors do not deserve air-time. Factual news reporting, stressing impartiality is often very effective in this regard. Features about people who, for example have gone back to their villages and have not been killed would, of course, be effective. Certainly, detailed coverage of the RPF's legal prosecution of those responsible for crimes of genocide would be very important.

Trusting the UN is an important issue in Rwanda, one which can be dealt with in features on national contingents and their work. Personal interest stories about individual troops might be of interest. As far as the UN's ability to protect returning refugees, in my opinion, these should, again, focus on human interest stories and not military might.

The language in which broadcasts are made is vitally important. People are generally more trusting of a message when it is delivered in their own language. Although French and English are spoken in Rwanda, these languages have colonial and political implications. I would recommend broadcasting exclusively in Kinyarwanda. Care will have to be taken in the selection of announcers, as ethnic or regional accents may inflame certain people.

If it proves itself, people tend to see radio as a reliable friend. It is for this reason that program format should be regular and broadcast schedules strictly adhered to. News must be timely and accurate. Musical programming is important in drawing an audience. Hard news and features become tiresome. Radio UNTAC was successful partially because people stayed tuned to the station throughout the day. A

7. Recommendations

1. A solid information program needs to be established within UNAMIR and should be guided by a Director of Information.
2. Immediately begin the procurement of a UN radio station in Rwanda consisting of two studios at UNAMIR Headquarters and five 1 or 2 kW FM transmitters at selected sites throughout the country which will provide near-total coverage of Rwanda and border areas with concentrations of refugees. The use of mobile transmitters in such an environment is not recommended. All studios and transmitters, including power generation and antennae systems, should be installed in portable 20- or 10-foot ISO shipping containers for deployment by truck or helicopter, and re-deployment to other missions following the end of UNAMIR mandate. Approximate total project cost is \$528,461.00
3. Fund the radio station in such a way as to allow the entire system to be procured, deployed and fully operational in 30 days, as opposed to going through the normal four to six month mission procurement process.
4. Establish as soon as possible a legislative mandate ensuring the right for the United Nations through UNAMIR to broadcast in Rwanda and to neighboring countries.
5. Update UNAMIR budget to reflect the use of radio, the procurement of equipment, supplies and the recruitment of staff.
6. Radio station staff should at all times be recruited locally or internationally by DPKO as is standard practice. Member states should not contribute national contingent personnel to run any part of the station or its equipment.
7. The jamming of broadcasts of Radio Mille Collines, or any other radio station no matter how offensive the broadcasts, should not be undertaken by the United Nations. The jamming option was considered for use in Cambodia against a Khmer Rouge clandestine radio station which was calling for violence against ethnic Vietnamese. Wisely, jamming was rejected as too politically explosive.
8. The United Nations should not provide technical assistance or equipment to the RPF for the refurbishment of their radio station, as has been requested. A spirit of cooperation should exist, and in the case of transmitter sites, a joint effort to, say, provide power to the site could benefit both the UN and the RPF. UNAMIR must, however, maintain political neutrality in the eyes of all Rwandans. A member

8. Conclusion

A task force for information, like one for the rapid deployment of UN peace-keeping troops, should be created to avoid the often tragic consequences of the long procurement and deployment process facing missions throughout the world. The many months it takes to establish a UN radio broadcast capability, no matter how modest, diminished the early effect of radio in Cambodia, has impeded UN radio in the former Yugoslavia (which, after two years, still does not have a station), and, now, has proved tragic in Rwanda. Lives were most certainly lost in Rwanda because the UN was unable to quickly deploy a radio station. Two other stations, small but effective, have been organized by international humanitarian organizations.

The United Nations, through the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, should have the ability to set the standard for the quick deployment of radio, and other public information programs, in troubled areas around the globe. The Spokesman for the Secretary-General, pointing to the strong internal information components in successful UN operations in Namibia and Cambodia, recommended in a recent report that information in peace-keeping missions be given immediate, priority attention. To have the capability to deploy an equipped information task force is not costly. Such an information component might even save money by lessening the need for other costlier mission deployments.

We have learned from what took place in Rwanda, sadly at this late stage, that an operational information plan would have, in a very real way, saved lives.

Attachment 2 -- Suggested studio equipmentBroadcast Studio


<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Estimated Cost</u>	<u>Estimated Total</u>
One (1) SOUNDCRAFT MBI 10S mixing console	1 @ 10,599	\$ 10,599.00
Two (2) OTARI 5050 Mark III/2 tape recorders with remote control	2 @ 1,400	\$ 2,800.00
Two (2) TASCAM CD601 MkII CD player with one remote control	2 @ 1,600	\$ 3,200.00
	1 @ 1,130	\$ 1,130.00
Two (2) TASCAM 122 MkII, cassette tape recorder	2 @ 1,000	\$ 2,000.00
One (1) Dura Trak DT90 Cartridge record/playback unit	1 @ 3,135	\$ 3,135.00
One (1) Dura Trak DT90 Cartridge playback unit	1 @ 2,090	\$ 2,090.00
One (1) Sony DAT recorder PCM 2700A	1 @ 2,589	\$ 2,589.00
Four (4) GENELEC 1030A, studio monitors with grille and hardware	4 @ 645	\$ 2,580.00
Two (2) Crown D75 Monitor amplifiers	2 @ 427	\$ 854.00
Four (4) AKG C 391B, condenser microphones with suspension arms	4 @ 500	\$ 2,000.00
One (2) KLOTZ 48P 820, 2x48 TT Phone patch bay with patch cords.	1 @ 709	\$ 709.00
One (1) Gentner G-2500 Digital Telephone Hybrid	1 @ 2,980	\$ 2,980.00
One (1) Radio Systems DA-16 Distribution Amplifier Stereo 2x8	1 @ 370	\$ 370.00
Broadcast Studio Total		\$37,036.00

Production Studio

One (1) SOUNDCRAFT MBI 10S mixing console	1 @ 10,599	\$ 10,599.00
Two (2) OTARI 5050 Mark III/2 tape recorders with remote control	2 @ 1,400	\$ 2,800.00
Two (2) TASCAM CD601 MkII CD player with one remote control	2 @ 1,600	\$ 3,200.00
	1 @ 1,130	\$ 1,130.00
Two (2) TASCAM 122 MkII, cassette tape recorder	2 @ 1,000	\$ 2,000.00
One (1) Dura Trak DT90 Cartridge record/playback unit	1 @ 3,135	\$ 3,135.00
One (1) Sony DAT recorder PCM 2700A	1 @ 2,589	\$ 2,589.00
Two (2) GENELEC 1030A, studio monitors with grille and hardware	2 @ 645	\$ 1,290.00

Maxell C-60 RDAT tapes	100@8	\$ 800.00
Maxell C-60 cassette tapes	250@3	\$ 750.00
2400 foot reels low noise Ampex reel tape	200@17	\$ 3,400.00
Dynamax broadcast cartridges 1 min/5 min	50@15	\$ 750.00
Editing supplies, splicing tape, leader, razor blades, markers to be determined - appx		\$ 500.00
Miscellaneous Supplies and Equipment Total		\$ 25,070.00
Grand Total Studio Equipment Costs		\$114,661.00

RADIO UNIT



IN 2738

UNAMIR
94 SEP -8 07 19

FACSIMILE MESSAGE

To: Mr. Shaharyar Khan
Special Representative of the SG
to Rwanda
Kigali

Mr. Arturo Hein
Humanitarian Coordinator for Rwanda
Kigali

From: Qazi Shaukat Fareed *Qazi Shaukat Fareed*
Director
Department of Humanitarian Affairs
New York

Fax No. (212) 963-1312

Date: 7 September 1994

No. of Pages: 11 (including this page)

I know there is a surfeit of reading material in Rwanda, but attached is copy of a fax received from Mark Raper of the Jesuit Refugee Service concerning his recent visit to Burundi and Zaire which you may find of interest.

*This is an
excellent analysis.
Pl. send it back to us
after reading. SL*

Regard

(SRSS)

94/12972

NN

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* FAX MESSAGE *

Date: 1 August 1994 Total pages: 1 + 8
From: Mark RAPER SJ - Rome
To: +1-212 963 9489
Attn: Norah Niland
Re: Rwanda

REC'D

AUG 01 1994

Dear Norah,

Lovely to see you at Therese's place back in May.

It occurred to me now to send this little piece I wrote after my visit to Zaire and Burundi recently. Immediately on getting back I was called to give an "expert testimony" for the Development Committee of the European Parliament (now chaired by Kouchner). So this is basically the text of what I gave then, although my friends asked me to tone down the severity of my questions to the new transitional government. The EU responded very well and within a few days there was a delegation on the ground in Kigali.

I do hope you are OK and finding that you are in contact enough there.

Much love, Mark

cc Mr Bokel

Mr Fareed

To Mark = head of IRS



Jesuit Refugee Service

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Rome, 28 July 1994

RWANDA UPDATE

[Fr Mark Raper made site visits to Bukavu, Burundi, Kenya and Uganda during the second and third weeks of July. On July 28th he testified before the Development Committee of the European Parliament, and the following UPDATE is based on the report he gave. JRS has personnel in Bukavu, eastern Zaire; in Kirundo Province, northern Burundi (the province most touched by the events of October 1993); in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.]

First of all, many witnesses told me — what you never read in the press — that countless Hutu hid and saved countless Tutsi. Many Hutu lost their lives because they defended or refused to attack their Tutsi neighbour. Many Tutsi too were killed precisely because they took in refugees. In the hills, thanks to leadership and wisdom shown by elders, peaceful coexistence was possible at least at the beginning. Many of the peasants hold no ambition for power, see no reason to create difficulties with their neighbours, and in fact have need of one another's services. I heard many stories of heroism and of harmony.

Second, the root cause of this conflict is not ethnic. A small ruthless minority have maintained their wealth, power and security through international support, resisting the Arusha accords and refusing to dialogue with any opposition, especially the FPR. They systematically exploited ethnic differences in order to monopolize power.

Third, the drama we witness today on CNN did not happen overnight and will not disappear when our televisions switch off. Rwandans were victims of massacres in 1959, 1963, 1973, 1992 and 1993. A major reason for the succession of massacres is the succession of impunities. Further crimes against humanity in Rwanda were foreseeable and, to that extent, preventable. Yet the 1994 crisis is unprecedented in the history of the country and the African continent. The world is finally watching. This time, a farther-reaching solution must be found.

Fourth, whatever is happening in Rwanda has repercussions in Burundi. Burundi is a different society with its own political history and its own fine-tuned balance of power. Yet the similarity of pressures and tactics should also be noted. There also, unemployed disaffected youth are being trained and armed. The arms supply route through Zaire is the same as for Rwanda. There also is an extremist Hutu radio; there also extremist Tutsi responses are provoked. Burundi is explosive.

Important
analysis

what
solution?
with
general
presence

Situation Report

According to what I saw and heard, confirmed by UNHCR estimates as of 21st July:

- 1.2 million Rwandan refugees are now at Goma and in north Kivu, a region normally populated by Zairis of Banyarwandan origin. The new refugees came through Gisenyi in mid-July. On July 24th, there were confirmed reports that the border is open and a trickle of refugees are returning to Rwanda [30,000 by July 27th].
- 200,000 refugees are in Bukavu and up to 400,000 in south Kivu reaching down to Uvira (where there were already over 100,000 Burundi refugees after the October 1993 events).
- Burundi itself has received at least 140,000, and last week aid workers told me of thousands massing at the Rwanda/Burundi border to cross.
- 460,000 are in the Tanzania camps at Ngara and north along the Kagera River; most of them crossed at the end of April, but arrivals continue.
- At least 5,000 Rwandans took refuge in Kenya, the first evacuated with the European airlift of early April, others are arriving now by foot or vehicle from Tanzania.
- 10,000 are said still to be in Uganda, although the camps near Kabale from which the FPR recruited are now empty.

This adds up to 2.4 million refugees. A further 2 million displaced people are in the 'zone Turquoise', the humanitarian area protected by the French which reaches up to Gikongoro. To this displacement, unprecedented in the history of a small country, add around 300,000 believed to have been killed since April 7th. Thus some 5 million are affected, out of a former population of 7 to 8 million.

15%
official
12m
0.5m

Political, Human Rights, Security and Humanitarian Aspects

Having sketched the current situation in Rwanda and its immediate region, I will identify major lines of response under the following headings: political aspects, including human rights; security, including disarmament; humanitarian needs and assistance.

Political Aspects

The new Rwandan "Government of National Union" urgently needs the intelligent interest, generous support and solidarity of the international community during the transition as its policies take shape, and in the coming years as the Rwandan people recover from the gross mismanagement of the previous regime.

BBG:VJ

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reaction to the horror of genocide. They are not yet the fruit of negotiation and shared vision. The spirit of Arusha — balance, inclusiveness, the search for consensus — needs to characterize the entire Rwandan effort.

outlined — need

Commitments of the transitional authority need to include the key provisions outlined in the Arusha accords: an enlarged political base; an army which is reduced, restructured, and unified (with non-compromised members of both previous forces); respect for the sovereignty of the Rwandan people; establishment of a state of Law, respect for fundamental human rights; and the free repatriation of all who were exiled or forcibly displaced recently or over past decades.

The Arusha accords surely need to be revised, but they provide the concepts and the spirit of a new covenant between the government of Rwanda and all its people, that is, a non-ethnic, politically pluralist government of national reconciliation. The role of the international community is to ensure such a covenant be negotiated inclusively and to serve as its guarantors, and to support every attempt at reconciliation, however tentative.

ME →
yes

The new government has barely emerged from genocide and war, it exists in a hostile environment. It needs help to transcend its understandably defensive, militaristic stance. But the new government's legitimacy cannot be based only on the fact that it won power militarily. Such a narrow approach would rob the people of the real benefits which Arusha promised. It would inadvertently abet those extremists in exile who will avail themselves of every grievance to fight their way back to power.

They're
done so

Unfortunately, the first new government plan unilaterally chooses who will play and who is "disqualified"; it sees the FPR military as the new national army. The approach chosen, if fixed in stone, could create great structural problems. The five year transition period, where Arusha called for 22 months, is surely too long. Instead of summarily executing those suspected of genocide, the government should ask the international human-rights system to help establish the individual responsibility of those who perpetrated crimes against humanity.

Meanwhile tens of thousands of Rwandan Tutsi who have lived years in exile in neighbouring countries are returning with all their belongings by bus, pick-ups and by foot, especially from and through nearby Burundi and Uganda, to claim a place in the country of their birth. At present some 30% of the former population occupies the 80% of territory controlled by the victorious army.

Forced displacements and the commandeering of property on behalf of returnees are practices consistently reported in the areas controlled by the new government. Forced relocation is an apparent effort, some say, to begin afresh. Others say it is a provisional tactic to bring people out of hiding and "clean" the territory of any resistance. Whatever the rationale, such practices violate rights and destroy confidence, diminishing the new government's standing and making future conflict practically inevitable.

An empty Rwanda is encircled by millions of ex-patriates in the neighbouring countries living through a bitter humanitarian catastrophe which the world has been witnessing in

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virtual impotence. These millions are already or potentially hostile to the new government. Grave risk of instability and violence exists, beginning with the destabilization of the Kivu region and an already fragile Burundi. No serious or effective disarmament programme has been undertaken in the zone Turquoise or in the camps, especially in Eastern Zaire. Militia are re-grouping in one camp in Tanzania and two camps north of Goma. In Bukavu, the former interim government has established itself in complete freedom, with household appliances, weapons and the mobile radio "mille collines". They will inevitably attempt to destabilize the new government and to re-take power by force. Thus the earliest possible return of refugees should be encouraged, to deprive not only cholera and starvation, but also discontent and resistance, of their fertile breeding grounds.

Need to be
identified

Because of the armageddon unleashed by unscrupulous extremists, millions of Rwandans have lost not only their relatives, homes, livelihoods, but also their political voice. They feel punished for the sins of their leaders and, in fact, are discredited and disenfranchised. Many competent, independent and moderate Rwandans are still alive, but in the camps they certainly have no voice, and in Rwanda they risk being excluded a priori from the process. The international community must find concrete ways to offer protection to, and provide interlocutors for, the masses of Rwandans without political voice.

Confidence-building gestures especially on the part of African States, will encourage the new government to undertake a responsible transition towards a pluralist, non-ethnic constitution and thus contribute to regional stability. Full diplomatic recognition should be conditional upon clear commitment to and diligent fulfilment of the above conditions. (The international community tolerated delay and non-compliance of the Arusha accords on the part of the previous government, with the catastrophic consequences.) The OAU should assist the new Rwandan government in its negotiations with Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire.

Human Rights, Justice

In Rwanda

The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr R Degen Segui, was mandated:

- . to report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda, including the root causes and responsibilities;
- . to make available to the Secretary General systematically compiled information on possible violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law.

No mass
responsibility

On June 28th he submitted a preliminary report describing as genocide the massacres committed against the Tutsi people. They give the impression of being planned, systematic and atrocious. The causes named by the Special Rapporteur were:

- . the rejection of alternative political power,
- . incitement to violence by the media and
- . the role of the army.

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One very valid recommendation of the Special Rapporteur is that the "United Nations should establish an ad hoc international tribunal to hear the evidence and judge the guilty parties...." Those responsible must be prosecuted (excluding the death penalty, as Amnesty International urges).

Clearly an ethnically-balanced, competent, impartial and independent justice system is needed in Rwanda. Financial and technical support from the European Union should be offered so that, as soon as the opportunity arises, the EU may provide judges and lawyers, as well as finances, in full cooperation with the UN and with human rights bodies.

If under international law any violator of human rights or perpetrator of crimes against humanity is found within the territory of the EU, then Member States should themselves proceed with prosecution.

Mr Degni Segui proposes that the UN "establish in Rwanda a reinforced team of human rights observers under a high-level coordinator responsible to the Special Rapporteur." Based on precedents in El Salvador, Haiti and Cambodia and on experience in the human rights component of UN missions, a team of three or four independent human rights experts should be named to assess the situation and to draw up recommendations for the mandate, structure, staff and procedures of an international human rights mission in Rwanda.

- . to monitor respect for human rights and to help build confidence throughout the Rwandan population;
- . to contribute to a climate of security allowing all refugees to return;
- . to begin building up a functioning justice system and civilian police;
- . to assist generally in the de-militarization, disarming and pacification of Rwanda.

Two human rights missions sent by Amnesty International in mid-July and early August to examine the Burundi and Rwanda situations should provide a most helpful and fuller picture of the human rights situation.

In the refugee camps

Many refugees in camps feel they are being branded as "killers". It is necessary to identify the intellectual authors of crimes against humanity, the ring-leaders, those responsible for organizing the genocide. It is unjust, inaccurate and unhelpful to accuse the Hutu population as a whole.

A specific problem relates to the too common circumstance, for example in Zaire, that border officials receive little or no payment and must make their living off their "clients". This affects the asylum sought by refugees in neighbouring countries, which is diminished when border guards and soldiers violently demand payment for safe passage. Asylum should assure threatened people a secure passage to a safe haven. Kenya and Tanzania should be praised and rewarded for their open border policy.

The limited asylum available to Rwandans in Europe is problematic too, restricting refugees under the Schengen Convention to remain in the first country of asylum.

Needs to be
satisfied by
Lantern Refu

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Security

The Special Rapporteur for the Human Rights Commission reported graphically in June on three types of insecurity:

- . the physical and moral insecurity for the few who escaped the massacres;
- . food insecurity, with villages deserted and crops unharvested: "famine is at the gates of Rwanda";
- . health insecurity: the danger of epidemics with bodies rotting in the open or in water sources; many weakened because of their precarious existence as displaced persons.

In the camps:

While security in the camps is normally the host-state's responsibility, several countries are clearly unable to provide it. Therefore support, through cooperation with African states and the OAU is needed. Security procedures should separate people at enmity and prevent senseless acts of vengeance.

Disarming the camps: There is a window of opportunity for a disarmament programme, while international public scrutiny provides political support for disarmament. But as soon as the TV crews leave Goma, the chance will evaporate. The UN must take up the task now, to prevent the camps from becoming bases for another guerrilla movement. Since this is an issue of regional security, assistance must also be offered to host governments to help achieve the thorough disarmament desired.

A related question is the murderous, nonsensical commerce of arms, which the international community must put a stop to. Many believe that, despite all the horror that has been witnessed, arms-traffic continues. The producers, exporters, intermediaries, all who participate in introducing arms into Rwanda and Burundi, must be condemned and stopped. The embargo on movement of arms to Rwanda should be monitored closely and extended to include Burundi. The EU should take effective measures against Member States which violate the embargo.

Inside Rwanda:

Re-structuring and re-training the army: the reduction and restructuring of the Rwandan army and police, called for by the Arusha accords, has to be assessed, planned and carried out, in order to make realistic the claim that moderates are welcome to return. UN peace keepers can temporarily substitute some roles of military to make a protected return of refugees possible. Re-structuring the army is difficult, sensitive, but essential.

The mandate of the UN peace-keeping force must be re-negotiated with the new government; if an international military presence is needed, a principal role should be to protect civilian human rights monitors, and give confidence to returnees. Further, police and military monitors are needed who can monitor the military to perform civilian duties, but also help the new government, closely supported by the OAU and the UN, to plan and restructure its military.

UN role.
OAU has no money - why keep military if cannot follow?

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Humanitarian Aid

The humanitarian assistance provided by the European Union, 125 million ECU since October 1993, is very much appreciated. But Rwandans and humanitarian agencies alike have waited in despair for three and a half months while the international community squandered compassion for lack of statesmanship. NGOs watched the material for a UN force dribble into Entebbe and heard about squabbles over the leasing of the armoured vehicles.

Finally the CNN news network prompted a massive reaction, mobilizing material aid, human resources and technology. If what was suddenly disbursed in days for relief had been spent over the last ten years for development assistance and community development, peace would have been ensured for decades to come. Now there are huge humanitarian tasks for which incorrupt partners on the ground must be sought.

Concrete humanitarian tasks

Beyond the obvious needs now being attended to, such as clean water in Goma, I list:

- The coordinating role of UNHCR in the refugee areas deserves praise and support. The UNHCR emergency response unit has quickly coordinated the various interventions in response to the crises in Tanzania and Goma. To prevent any further mass exodus, the security of people in the French zone must be assured.

- Food should never be dropped from the air, unless no other way is possible, for what the refugees need is human contact above all. The World Food Programme has established an excellent, well managed pipe-line, and only the WFP can judge if it is adequate. Now the location of distribution is the issue: food should be distributed in a way that promotes the refugees' return to their own lands.

- Unaccompanied children: UNICEF is the lead agency in caring for the many children now separated from their families, gathering data on them, tracing relatives. Guidelines have been well worked out between UNHCR, Red Cross, UNICEF and the NGOs involved. This programme will need immediate and long term support.

- Youth: the militia were recruited from among the thousands of unoccupied and easily disaffected young people. Their grievances were nurtured and turned to violence. There must now be creative programmes for them.

- Widows: our Caritas partners in Burundi and Rwanda and in the camps have insisted that the most vulnerable persons should be identified and assisted first.

- Education should be started as soon as possible. 50% of the Rwandan population (as anywhere in Africa) are 15 years old and under. Education is a source of hope, the commodity perhaps most needed in Rwanda today. UNESCO, with the support of UNICEF, ECHO and implementing partners such as JRS, has been preparing "Emergency Education Kits" of primary school materials and teacher guides in Kinyarwanda and Kirundi languages, and began distributing them in the Kinyarwanda

Being done
effectively

yes

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camps. The reconstruction of an education system in Rwanda now needs support.

- Are NGOs free to operate? Foreign NGOs competing to provide services must also leave space for the local Rwandan, Zairian, Tanzanian NGOs and churches to offer their services. In Rwanda there is a healthy tradition of local NGOs. These also strengthen the moderate voice of civil society that will be needed in the process of reconciliation and recovery. NGOs, both local and international, must assist in the building of a society which respects law and human rights.

- Avoid diversion of development assistance to relief. NGOs support the Commission's current initiative to secure an additional 150 million ECU, in the light of the current catastrophe, from the unspent European Development Funds (EDF) of the Lome' Convention. But if these essentially development funds are used now, then Member States must provide additional generous funds to support reconstruction, rehabilitation and longer-term needs in Rwanda. These commitments for real development, which will really help towards peace, must be made soon.

- Reconstruction programme: the political will to provide immediate relief assistance has to be translated into willingness to help in the year(s) to come:

- clean water and wells throughout Rwanda, not just in Goma.
- infrastructure.
- communications.
- training programmes for the youth.
- support to community recovery and development, including support for the churches in re-building community.

* - Infrastructure: roads are important which will facilitate distribution of food and return of refugees. A particular road needing urgent political and physical attention is the one connecting Uvira and Bukavu in south Kivu, and thus connecting Bujumbura to Bukavu. During the conflict an escarpment road had been used to avoid entering Rwanda. Now the lower, shorter road through Rwanda, an important supply line, must be opened and repaired.

According to the High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs Sadako Ogata, "the humanitarian organizations cannot cope with the crisis; a political solution is imperative."

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