


DSS
CEB

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18

UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM



SYSTEME DES NATIONS UNIES

23 April 2008

Dear Secretary-General,

This is with reference to your interoffice memorandum of 22 February 2008 on operational security issues for consideration in the CEB, HLCM and IASMN.

We are pleased to inform you that the IASMN discussed these matters at its 26-28 February meeting. Based on the report of the IASMN, the HLCM discussed the same issues at the 17-18 March meeting.

The HLCM and IASMN underscored that security and safety of staff of the UN system organizations should be treated as one of the highest priorities, requiring the urgent attention and commitment of Executive Heads. Furthermore it noted that security must be considered as an integral part of every activity undertaken by the organizations of the UN system. Staff security and safety aspects should be included in the earliest stages of planning at all levels and especially at the country level.

The nature and content of the discussions in the IASMN and HLCM is substantially documented in the reports from their respective meetings. Copies of the reports are attached to this memo for your information.

That notwithstanding, through this letter we would like to provide you with a synthesis of the discussion from the HLCM and IASMN, and the recommendations made as they refer to the particular points raised by you in your 22 February 2008 interoffice memorandum. This can be found in Annex I.

We recognize that all recommendations will be subject to review depending on the outcome of the Independent Panel on Staff Safety and Security led by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi. Once the outcome of the panel's work is known and you have had a chance to review it, the HLCM and IASMN stands ready within their area of responsibility to move forward as directed.

We look forward to the opportunity at the coming CEB to further discuss issues related to the security and safety of staff.


Yours sincerely,

Thoraya Ahmed Obaid
Under-Secretary-General

David Veness
Under-Secretary-General

His Excellency
Mr. BAN Ki-Moon
Secretary General
United Nations
New York

| CdC | | SG | |
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| For SG's approval | <input type="checkbox"/> | Approved | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| For SG's attention | <input type="checkbox"/> | Noted | <input type="checkbox"/> |
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Under-Secretary-General

David Veness
Under-Secretary-General

His Excellency
Mr. BAN Ki-Moon
Secretary General
United Nations
New York

APR 25 2008

Annex I

Recommendations for the CEB

Below are the recommendations made by the HLCM based on the discussions that took place at the 15th Session of the HLCM from 17-18 March 2008. They build on the report of the IASMN.

a. A proposed strategy to secure substantial additional resources for staff security, both technical and financial

The HLCM recommends that Member States should be engaged with UN system organizations to ensure that security is provided with appropriate and sustainable funding, including through the establishment of an appropriate framework for extra-budgetary funding of safety and security based on an objective assessment of needs in this field.

Consideration of alternative sources of funding for security-related requirements should be consistent with the principle that security and safety are an integral part of any programme, project or activity of the UN system organization, and that the corresponding costs should be fully transparent, as well as clearly identifiable in their fixed versus variable nature.

Analysis of funding sources should be developed taking into consideration alternative business models. Financial support from public and private channels should be sought, as appropriate. It was decided that the Finance and Budget Network under the HLCM, in consultation with the IASMN, will assist in identifying alternative budgetary and programming mechanisms for inclusion of security-related resources in programme costs.

b. The need to improve financial and psychosocial support for survivors and families in the event of crisis

The HLCM has decided that human resources offices of UN system organizations will undertake a review of the 269 families of victims who have lost their lives to malicious acts since 1992 to determine the lessons learned and to develop strategies for the future. The HR Network of the HLCM will coordinate this review.

It was also decided in terms of financial and psychosocial support, that the HR Network, in consultation with the FB Network and the IASMN, as well as with the network of stress counselors, should develop a proposal to improve and harmonize financial and psychosocial support for survivors and families in the event of a crisis, building on lessons learned from the attacks in Algiers and Baghdad.

c. Sharing information and statistics on security casualties across the spectrum of UN entities and activities

The HLCM decided that all organizations collect and forward to UNDSS all the data regarding security-related incidents which might have been captured by insurance, and medical and buildings managers, so that a comprehensive data base on security casualties across the UN system can be established and maintained on a regular and consistent basis.

The IASMN was asked to prepare an updated project plan, with costs, for the development, implementation and maintenance of a UN Security Information Management System. Such a system would also provide the necessary tool for sharing information and statistics on security casualties across the spectrum of UN entities and activities to support a more comprehensive analysis of the types of risks UN staff face.

d. Promoting the full implementation of the accountability framework for the UN security management system and examining more closely the Designated Official system

Accountability Framework

It is recommended that the Executive Heads re-affirm their commitment to the established governance mechanism for the UN security management system, i.e. the IASMN, HLCM, and CEB. Further Executive Heads should ensure that the Framework for Accountability for the United Nations security management system, as adopted by both the CEB and the General Assembly, is fully and actively implemented, is periodically reviewed and updated to include lessons learned, and that all aspects of its implementation are auditable.

It is further recommended that Executive Heads should ensure that appropriate disciplinary measures are taken against those individuals who are in breach of policies, procedures and practices of the UN security management system, and that reports are produced regularly on such actions taken. The IASMN should develop proposals for a range of appropriate measures, to be considered within the context of the regulatory framework in place for each organization.

A recommendation was also made that the Executive Heads should finalize the model supplementary agreement that has been circulated to all agencies, to be signed by the Designated Official on behalf of the UN system, so that Member States at the country level can be engaged to put in place such supplementary agreements, outlining their specific responsibilities on safety and security of UN system personnel and premises.

Finally it was recommended that senior security managers/security focal points should have immediate and unimpeded access to executive level management in the UN system and should be provided with adequate resources, both human and financial, to enable them to discharge their responsibilities under the Accountability Framework. The IASMN should provide guidance on the level and nature of resource requirements.

Designated Official System

The HLCM is of the opinion that a review of the Designated Official system is an immediate need. In this respect the Committee highlighted a number of issues for consideration by the Independent Panel.

The HR Network, in consultation with the IASMN and the UNSSC, has been asked to formulate costed plans of action to ensure that the appropriate level and amount of training is provided to all Designated Officials prior to their deployment. It is also recommended to include safety and security in the assessment programme for the UN Resident Coordinators who are the Designated Officials in the majority of countries with a UN presence.

In light of the discrepancies in the application of the General Assembly resolution requiring that the Designated Official function is entrusted to the most senior official in the country, the value and appropriateness of such resolution should be analysed in the context of changed security and safety related requirements.

Noting that the function of the Designated Official is often the third or fourth one for an individual who is already tasked to be the Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator, etc., a comprehensive analysis of the requirements and delimitations of such function should be carried out.

Consideration should be given to include the functions and authorities of the Designated Official in the country level agreement signed between the United Nations and the host country.

Executive Heads of UN system organizations together with DSS should ensure that challenges regarding the management of security risks and phases and re-locations that cannot be effectively resolved at the country level should be subject of coordinated action. The decision process must be quick but based on local realities. A differentiated approach

would be required in determining security risks and the appropriate security phase, depending on specific local conditions.

e. Considering how staff security aspects may be included in the earliest stages of planning at the country level

Security must be considered as an integral part of every activity undertaken by the organizations of the UN system. Staff security and safety aspects should be included in the earliest stages of planning at all levels and especially at the country level.

Any risk management framework should provide for the different types of risks linked to the variety of mandates of UN system organizations, as current and future security challenges are not and will be not solely linked to terrorism and criminality, including cyber criminality, but also to conflict situations, to diseases and to an increasing number of natural and manmade disasters, including those resulting from climate change. Security-related assessments and analyses should also cater for sociological and cultural variables.

Risk management training programmes for managers and staff should be implemented as critical steps in managing risk and crises. The risk model developed by UNICEF offers a good starting point for consistent application under the aegis of UNDSS, considering generic and specific risk factors applicable to each of the UN system organizations.

f. Establishing a comprehensive mechanism for information management as it relates to the security of UN staff and operations

ICT Network, in consultation with IASMN, should prepare a costed plan of action to put in place commercially available secure telecommunications and information technology systems which are compatible across the UN system and with full inter-connectivity and inter-operability at all levels, in support of risk and security-related issues.

The IASMN is to prepare an updated project plan, with costs, for the development, implementation and maintenance of a UN Security Information Management System. Such a system would also provide the necessary tool for sharing information and statistics on security casualties across the spectrum of UN entities and activities to support a more comprehensive analysis of the types of risks UN staff face.

g. Consolidating all previous recommendations arising out of the reviews, investigations, lessons learned, and studies conducted on the UN security management system

The IASMN should consolidate a list for consideration by the HLCM, of estimated financial implications of all previous recommendations arising from the reviews, investigations, lessons learned and studies conducted on the UN security management system, including a summary list of all activities in need of funding submitted to or recommended by HLCM.



**Chief Executives Board
for Coordination**CEB/2008/HLCM/5
5 March 2008

HIGH-LEVEL COMMITTEE ON MANAGEMENT (HLCM)

Fifteenth Session

FAO, Rome, 17-18 March 2008

Agenda item 3

**REPORT OF THE INTER-AGENCY SECURITY
MANAGEMENT NETWORK****Washington D.C., 26-28 February 2008****I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) met at the Headquarters of the World Bank, Washington, D.C., from 26 to 28 February 2008. A list of participants from organizations, agencies, programmes and funds (hereafter referred to as the Organizations) is attached as Annex A. The agenda and list of documents considered by IASMN members are attached in Annex B. The IASMN wishes to express its gratitude to the World Bank for hosting the meeting and welcomed the presence of Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, Chairperson of the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of United Nations personnel and premises around the world, and his colleagues, who came to observe and listen to the first day of deliberations.
2. In the aftermath of the tragic incident in Algiers on 11 December 2007, on 19 February 2008, the Policy Committee, chaired by the Secretary-General and attended by a number of Executive Heads of United Nations agencies, programmes and funds (or their representatives), discussed the issue of how the United Nations system can operate in high risk/complex environments. The Policy Committee agreed that the matter should be considered by the IASMN, which was requested to make recommendations to the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) and subsequently the Chief Executives Board (CEB), on what actions can be taken to address vulnerabilities of the United Nations security management system.
3. The Policy Committee specifically requested IASMN and the HLCM to develop recommendations for the CEB to consider during its session in late April on a number of urgent issues which are outlined in para. 26 below.
4. The IASMN wishes to reiterate at the outset that any recommendations contained in this report will have to be considered in conjunction with the report to be provided by the Independent Panel on Safety and Security of United Nations personnel and premises which will evaluate the strategic issues vital to the delivery and enhancement of the security of UN personnel and premises and the changing threats and risks faced by it.
5. The IASMN also wishes to point out that over the past years it has presented a large number of security recommendations which have been endorsed by the HLCM. Regrettably, a significant number of these recommendations, which directly impact on the safety and security of personnel of the United Nations

system, have yet to be implemented. The IASMN therefore believes that the time has come to turn these decisions into actions.

6. The IASMN points out that it had less than one week to consider this matter and develop substantial recommendations for the consideration of HLCM and CEB. Given these time constraints, in many instances the IASMN has been able only to identify a strategy or a framework that will require further inter-agency discussions before agreement can be reached on the way ahead. The IASMN intends to follow up on these matters and report to HLCM at its next meeting.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

7. As this entire report consists of recommendations in response to the Secretary-General's direction, it would be duplicative to list individual recommendations in an Executive Summary.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE IASMN

8. The unanimous view of the IASMN is that the United Nations security management system is very robust and, although there is always room for improvements and fine tuning, it is the failure to implement successfully the security policies, practices and procedures at all levels of the United Nations system that has resulted in deficiencies in a number of areas. At the same time the IASMN strongly reiterates that the essential responsibility of the UN security management system is "to enable the deliveries of UN programmes while maintaining the safety and security of staff as a high priority". The IASMN points out that there seems to be a tendency to forget this clause in the discussion regarding the enabling of UN programmes.

9. Following extensive discussions, the IASMN recommends that Executive Heads consider the following broad strategy with regard to the implementation of the UN security management system:

- a) Decide on the level of acceptable risk that they are prepared to ask or allow their staff to take in the implementation of the mandates entrusted to them by Member States;
- b) Agree a Risk Management Strategy that achieves a balance between the delivery of programmes and the maintenance of safety and security of staff and assets of the organizations of the UN system;
- c) Ensure that security is an integral part of any programme, project or activity of the organization they represent and for which they are accountable;
- d) Ensure that training programmes are implemented as critical steps in managing risk and crises;
- e) Ensure that security is provided with appropriate and sustainable funding; and,
- f) Ensure that the established governance mechanism for the UN security management system, i.e. the IASMN, HLCM, and CEB, is adhered to in order to avoid confusion, duplication and decision-making on security matters outside the framework for accountability for security.

10. To implement this strategy, the IASMN recommends a series of actions outlined below.

11. The Framework for Accountability for the United Nations security management system, which was adopted by both the CEB and the General Assembly (copy attached at Annex C), outlines the responsibilities

and accountabilities of all actors of the United Nations, including Executive Heads of UN system organizations. The IASMN strongly recommends the full and active implementation of this Framework.

12. In order to fulfil these responsibilities and accountabilities, it will be necessary for all Executive Heads and their senior managers to understand the concept of risk management and the steps that can be taken to implement mitigating strategies. In summary, the challenge will be to decide what level of risk is acceptable depending on the importance of a programme goal. Unacceptably high risks must be avoided or brought within acceptable levels with risk management strategies. These can be categorized in four groups, namely, a) the acceptance of risk (no further action required); b) controlling the risk (prevention and mitigation measures e.g. Minimum Operating Security Standards); c) avoidance of risk (temporarily distancing the potential target from the threat); d) transference of the risk (sub-contracting or insurance). This concept is outlined in a very useful guide prepared by UNICEF, the principles of which have been endorsed by the IASMN, which is attached as Annex D. The IASMN recommends that this guide be utilized to develop a common framework for risk management strategy that can be adopted across the United Nations system.

13. In this regard, the IASMN takes note that there are a number of emerging related risk management strategies in various organizations such as Early Warning/Emergency Preparedness and Response Planning, Enterprise Risk Management/Business Continuity Planning. The IASMN points out that, although there is some interaction between these mechanisms, they are operating in mainly independent silos. Whilst pointing out that security risk management is the clear remit of DSS, the IASMN nonetheless recommends that risk management be mainstreamed in the work of organizations and that common approaches, where possible, be developed to ensure greater coherence, inter-operability and inter-dependence. This matter will be taken up by the IASMN Steering Group.

14. The IASMN recommends that security must be considered as an integral part of every activity undertaken by the organizations of the UN system and must not be treated as an add-on either for programmatic or budgetary purposes. The IASMN recommends that the existing mechanism for security risk management must be integrated into programme planning and design, including in the development of individual project proposals and in planning frameworks such as CCA/UNDAF and CHAP/CAP. The IASMN also points out that future security challenges will not solely be linked to terrorism and criminality but also to the management of an increasing numbers of natural and manmade disasters including those resulting from climate change, and that security must also be considered in this context.

15. Noting the need for system-wide coherence and crisis response at Headquarters levels of the UN security management system, the IASMN recalls that the management and administration of security policies and procedures within each organization rests with the senior security managers/security focal points. The IASMN recommends that it is critical that such officials have immediate and unimpeded access to executive level management and to be provided with adequate resources, both human and financial, to enable them to discharge their responsibilities under the Accountability Framework.

16. The IASMN notes that there remains a lack of systematic information exchange between various entities of the United Nations security management system. The IASMN recommends that risk information and analysis, which is developed by a number of UN organizations, must be shared by all concerned to avoid duplication of time and effort and to ensure consistency and accuracy. In this connection, the IASMN has already adopted Information Sharing Protocols outlining how to share information without violating confidentiality.

17. The IASMN also points out that it will not be possible to manage risk and security-related issues in the absence of commercially available secure telecommunications and an information technology system

which is compatible across the UN system with full inter-connectivity and inter-operability at all levels. The IASMN recommends that the HLCM instruct the IT Network to address this issue as a matter of priority.

18. In order for any risk management strategy to be successful, it requires that information be provided on a timely and accurate basis at the country level. In this regard, the IASMN strongly recommends that a security analyst be employed as part of the DSS team to support Designated Officials and Security Management Teams in the gathering, analysis and dissemination of relevant information. The IASMN also recommends that where there are existing Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) and/or Security Information Operation Cell (SIOCs), the terms of reference and remits for these entities would need to be broadened to ensure that they are operating on an inter-organizational and inter-departmental basis and need.

19. The IASMN points out that the adoption and implementation of a Risk Management Strategy will require a significant education and training programme for Executive Heads and their Managers at the headquarters, regional and country levels. The IASMN notes that, more often than not, senior staff are selected and deployed with little or no training to be able to discharge the significant responsibilities placed upon them. IASMN recommends that DSS be given the resources to develop and implement a highly focused training programme in conjunction with resources and capacities of other training entities, to be provided to managers, prior to assuming their responsibilities, to include leadership, risk and crisis management skills. This training should further be complemented by a continuing, rolling programme involving table-top and practical exercises to further develop, maintain and enhance the skills of individual managers and management teams to deal with crises and emergencies that impact on the ability to maintain business continuity and the safety and security of staff and assets.

20. The IASMN points out that a risk management strategy involves the acceptance of a certain level of risk by both the employer and the employee. In this connection, the IASMN recommends that an urgent review, to be carried out by the Human Resources Network, is required of the contractual arrangements in place to ensure that personnel are compensated commensurate with the security risk they are being asked to take.

21. The question of adequate and sustainable funding for security continues to be a fundamental stumbling block. The IASMN recommends that this matter must be addressed through a shift in perception. The IASMN points out that in many organizations of the UN system, measures required for programme delivery are more often than not exclusively included under the security budget. Instead, the IASMN recommends that a system-wide determination must be made as to what measures belong under programme delivery costs, and what measures properly constitute security cost. For these strictly security costs, the IASMN recommends that the HLCM consider how best to ensure that each organization provide adequate sustainable funding for all its security activities. For example every organization of the UN system could have a dedicated budget line for the application of safety and security, including for every project (also comprising technical cooperation projects). Alternatively, security costs could be included as a percentage of common staff costs within each organization.

22. Further to the above, with regard to the issue of funding of security, at its meeting in October 2006 the HLCM, whilst agreeing that DSS was significantly under-resourced, decided that, due to zero growth budgets across the system, no further funding of security was possible. The impact of this decision is that many of the recommendations regarding security and safety of staff put forward by IASMN and approved by HLCM, have not been implemented because, out of necessity, they involve additional costs. The HLCM had requested that DSS demonstrate that the resources were being utilized effectively for the purposes for which they were provided and requested that a more results-based management approach be adopted. This has been achieved, as is reflected in the 2008-2009 strategic framework for DSS. Whilst the concept of providing value for money is fully accepted, the inescapable outcome from the Lessons Learned reports for Lebanon in 2006, DRC in 2007 and more recently the tragedy in Algiers has shown that a lack of resources (particularly

a lack of surge and crisis management capacity) has impacted the effectiveness of the UN security management system and, thus, the ability to enable UN programmes and keep staff and assets safe at the same time. The IASMN therefore recommends that the HLCM revisits the specific issues of ensuring that security is provided with the requisite funding.

23. The IASMN also considered possible alternative sources of funding to be considered by HLCM. The IASMN has already recommended (in its October 2007 report) that the unspent balance from the cost-shared budget should be retained in a contingency fund and utilized in accordance with inter-agency agreements. In order to enhance an unexpected crisis response capacity, the IASMN recommends that DSS be authorized to engage with Member States to enter into stand-by agreements for the provision of specialized expertise such as telecommunications surge capacity, blast engineers, etc. The IASMN also recommends that, for those organizations whose financial rules allow such actions, consideration should be given to raise funds from private and public channels, notably through the utilization of consultant firms.

24. The United Nations security management system cannot act in isolation of host governments, especially in light of the increase in threat and risk. It will therefore be necessary to engage more closely with host country authorities to explain the threats against the organizations of the UN system and to establish effective liaison with them to assist the UN in becoming more secure. In this connection the IASMN points out that it may be necessary to put in place supplementary agreements either between the organizations of the United Nations system and the Host Country, or on a system-wide basis at the duty station, outlining the latter's specific responsibilities of the safety and security of United Nations system personnel and their premises. To further this process, the IASMN requests the Office of Legal Affairs to circulate a model agreement so that members can finalize the content the Security Management Team in their discussions with host country authorities.

25. The IASMN wishes to point out that the existing governance mechanism for the UN security management system which was established by HLCM, endorsed by CEB and approved by the General Assembly provides an all-inclusive system which has successfully taken security forward over the past few years. The IASMN does not believe that creating any new mechanisms or structures would add any value to the existing mechanism. Instead, the IASMN believes that the inclusion on a systematic basis of those entities which have significant field presence and which do not at present fully participate in the work of IASMN (such as the Office for Drug Control, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department for Field Support and the Department for Peace-keeping Operations), would further strengthen and enhance the existing governance mechanism. The IASMN also wishes to point out that its membership consists not only of senior security professionals but also Directors of Administration and Operations, thus ensuring that discussions incorporate the perspective of a wide range of disciplines.

26. As outlined in paragraph 3 above, IASMN considered a letter from the Secretary-General to the Chairperson of the HLCM and the Under-Secretary-General of DSS transmitting specific requests from the Policy Committee. Following extensive discussions, the IASMN recommends the following with regard to the each request:

- (a) **"HLCM and IASMN should develop a proposed strategy to secure substantial additional resources for staff security, both technical and financial. This should include the significant investment that will be required to establish secure premises for the UN system in high-risk locations, as well as additional resources for the UN's crisis response capacity."**

The IASMN considered the three parts of this request:

i. The requirement for additional technical and financial resources;

- The recommendations of the IASMN regarding financial resources are contained in paras. 9e, 21-23 above. With regard to technical resources, the IASMN points out that the number of professional security advisers, analysts, trainers, and critical incident stress counsellors is still far from sufficient, given the existing requirements. For example, there are still 58 countries of the 180 where the UN has a presence where there is no professional security adviser and others where the SRA identifies shortfalls. The IASMN recommends, subject to the outcome of the independent panel, that there be an urgent review of staffing levels across the UN security management system.
- The IASMN strongly reiterates that the implementation of Minimum Operating Security Standards is the cornerstone of the UN security management system and must be commensurate with the Security Risk Assessment. In this connection the IASMN recalls that providing for the safety and security of personnel of the United Nations system remains the responsibility of the employing organization irrespective of their physical location. In light of the step change which has occurred, the IASMN believes that further refinement of the MOSS is required and has established a working group to consider how the MOSS can be redesigned to make it more effective.

ii. The establishment of secure premises

- The IASMN recommends that the establishment of security premises must be based on a duty-station specific evaluation, using the security risk assessment process, which will determine whether common UN premises or single-agency premises are required to respond to the particular threat in that location. In this regard, in order to ensure a degree of consistency in consideration of this matter, the IASMN recommends that a project be established to consider the ideal design of UN common premises and compounds which will require the development of standards. This project will require expertise (architectural, engineering, etc.) which currently is not available within the UN system. Using this as a basis it will be necessary to consider a long term funding and business investment strategy requiring input from the Member States. The IASMN believes that this falls within the remit of the HLCM.

iii. The additional requirements for crisis response capacity.

- The recommendations of the IASMN regarding this matter are in paras 11 and 22 above.

(b) "The need to improve financial and psychosocial support for survivors and families in the event of a crisis, building on lessons learned from the attacks in Algiers and Baghdad"

The IASMN considered the two parts of this request:

i. The requirement to improve the financial support for survivors and families of a crisis

- The IASMN does not have the mandate to make recommendations on this matter and believes that this should be considered by the HLCM.

ii. The requirement to improve psychosocial support for survivors and families.

- The IASMN points out that, whilst there is some capacity within the UN system to provide psychosocial support to staff, there are not enough critical incident stress counsellors to respond to a major crisis. In addition, in the aftermath not only of Baghdad and Algiers but also of the dozens of other incidents involving the death and injury of staff, what has been lacking is the long-term follow-up and support. Noting that there are only 72 counsellors responsible for providing psycho-social support to 400,000 staff and dependents at 185 duty stations, the IASMN recommends that the number of such counsellors must be significantly increased across the UN system.
 - With regard to long-term follow up and assistance, the IASMN also recommends that an urgent review be undertaken of the 269 families of victims who have lost their lives to malicious acts since 1992 to determine the lessons learned and to develop strategies for the future.
- (c) **“Sharing information and statistics on security casualties across the spectrum of UN entities and activities to support a more comprehensive analysis of the types of risks UN staff face.”**
- The IASMN points out that statistics are only indicators and that what must be assessed is the impact of the various incidents on the delivery of programmes. Although some data bases have been created to capture the statistics, the recording of the data is not consistent. The IASMN recommends that, in addition to capturing the incidents reported to security, there must be a link into insurance, medical and buildings managers to have a comprehensive indication of the number and type of incidents that are occurring.
 - The recommendations of the IASMN with regard to information sharing and information analysis are contained in paras 16-18 above.
- (d) **“Promoting the full implementation of the accountability framework for the UN security management system and examining more closely the Designated Official system.”**

The IASMN considered the two parts of this request:

- i. **Promoting the full implementation of the framework for accountability for the UN security management system**
- The IASMN recalls that the Framework for Accountability for the UN Security Management System has been approved by the CEB and mandated by the General Assembly and is a fundamental management tool to identify and correct deficiencies in the security management system. The IASMN recommends that the CEB direct each of its members to ensure that the accountability framework has been implemented as a policy within their own organization as a means of ensuring that comparable security policies are in place across the UN system.
 - The IASMN recommends that Executive Heads thoroughly familiarize themselves with the accountability framework. Thereafter, IASMN recommends that Executive Heads direct that all personnel of their organization be trained at every level, in security and risk management. The recommendations of the IASMN with regard to training are contained in para. 19 above.
 - The IASMN also points out that there appears to be a lack of understanding amongst the Department Heads of the United Nations Secretariat and Tribunals regarding their accountability with respect to security of staff and recommends that urgent action be taken to correct this lacuna.

- The IASMN recommends that internal oversight mechanisms within each organization incorporate compliance with the UN security management system in their assessment process, also utilizing information available in the DSS Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit. The IASMN also recommends that there be a greater exchange of information and coordination between DSS and the internal Audit departments of the organizations of the United Nations system.
- ii. **Examining more closely the Designated Official system**
- With regard to the Designated Official system, the IASMN points out that, in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly, the Designated Official function is entrusted to the senior most official in the country. However, the IASMN points out that this decision is not being applied consistently since in many cases there are representatives of agencies, programmes and funds who outrank the UN Resident Coordinator but who are not appointed as Designated Officials. In most instances the Designated Official is either a Special Representative of the Secretary-General or a Resident Coordinator. The IASMN recommends that, subject to the outcome of the Independent Panel, a review of the decision of the General Assembly should be undertaken to determine whether this approach is still appropriate, given the step change in security.
 - The IASMN also points out that the function of Designated Official is often the third or fourth hat of an individual who is already tasked to be the Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator, etc. These individuals are being asked to be superhuman in carrying out these functions where there will necessarily be tension, if not conflict of interest, between the deliveries of the various functions. The IASMN therefore recommends that this issue be urgently considered by the UN Development Group as well as the HLCM and CEB.
 - In order to strengthen the position of the Designated Official vis-à-vis the host country authorities, the IASMN recommends that the functions of Designated Official be included in the letter of accreditation which is sent to the Government. This is particularly critical for Resident Coordinators and SRSGs. In addition, the IASMN recommends that consideration be given to including the functions of Designated Official in the country level agreements signed between the United Nations and the host country.
 - The IASMN recommends that Designated Officials be empowered by the CEB to ensure compliance with security policies, practices and procedures by all organizations of the UN system present at the duty station. In this regard, Designated Officials should be supported by all organizations in implementing appropriate sanctions under the applicable rules, as required. For example, this could include the withdrawal of security clearance for any individuals and/or organizations who act in violation of security policies, practices and procedures. In addition, the IASMN recommends that the Secretary-General urge CEB members to take appropriate measures against those individuals who are in breach of policies, procedures and practices of the UN security management system and to provide a yearly report on such actions taken.
 - The IASMN also considered the concerns expressed by the small group of Designated Officials who met in Cairo regarding the support provided to them. Whilst fully cognizant of the need to support Designated Officials, the IASMN notes that these Designated Officials have made a number of suggestions which would fundamentally change the UN security management system and its system of checks and balances. The IASMN cannot endorse proposals related to the reporting lines of security advisers or security budgets; the IASMN also does not believe that the creation of yet another consultative group as suggested by some Designated Officials is desirable as this would unnecessarily complicate and add another tier to the security management process. Instead the

IASMN decides that it would be more practical and beneficial to invite one Designated Official from each region on a rotating basis, to attend an IASMN meeting each year in order to exchange views on matters and resolve issues which are of concern to them with the entire UN security system instead of piecemeal.

- The IASMN points out that at present, DSS is only given a very limited amount of time to provide Designated Officials and Designated Officials, a.i. with training prior to their deployment. The situation is even more serious for Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, few if any of whom come for security training. The IASMN recommends that urgent action is required to ensure that the appropriate level and amount of training is provided to all Designated Officials prior to their deployment. Other recommendations of the IASMN in connection with training are located in paras 9d and 21 above.
- e) **“Considering how staff security aspects may be included in the earliest stages of planning at the country level, particularly in high-risk/complex environments;”**
- The IASMN recommends that references to high-risk/complex environments should be discontinued. In the view of the IASMN such definition is unnecessarily restrictive since situations can change rapidly. Given the global terrorist threat against the UN, whilst it may be possible to identify locations which today meet the criteria for high risk, it would be irresponsible not to implement identified strategies across the board for each duty station and area of operation. Instead, the IASMN recommends that, whilst taking into account the need to prioritize resources, a security risk assessment must be conducted on a regular basis at all duty stations at country, capital and sub-regional level to ensure that the requisite mitigating measures have been identified and implemented.
- f) **“Establishing a comprehensive mechanism for information management as it relates to the security of UN staff and operations, i.e. how this information is processed, analyzed and disseminated.”**
- The recommendations of the IASMN are contained in paras. 16-18 above.
- g) **“Consolidating all previous recommendations arising out of the reviews, investigations, lessons learned and studies conducted on the UN security management system.”**
- The IASMN has considered a consolidated matrix of recommendations prepared by DSS and is in the process of prioritizing those which have not been implemented. These will be forwarded to the Independent Panel, at the request of its Chairman.

27. In conclusion to this part of the report of the IASMN which has addressed the direct request of the Secretary-General, the discussions of the IASMN were very full and frank and focused primarily on furthering the agenda of security management. The IASMN wishes to reiterate yet again that the purpose of security is not only to enable the effective delivery of UN activities but also to maintain the safety, security and well-being of staff as a high priority. By ensuring that the concepts of security management are mainstreamed into every day activities, and given the necessary level of importance within each organization, the goals of the organizations that make up the UN security management system can be achieved without unnecessarily sacrificing the lives of staff.

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OTHER ISSUES

28. The IASMN also considered a number of items which had been on its agenda prior to the meeting of the Policy Committee and has made the following recommendations:

HUMAN RESOURCES STRATEGY

29. The IASMN considered and recommends approval of the report prepared by DSS on a human resources strategy with the following specific recommendations:

- i) Noting the dearth of women applicants for security positions, the IASMN requests its members to develop additional strategies to identify and recruit women security officers, including identifying women who could be trained to be security advisers;
- ii) With regard to language training, the IASMN encourages security staff to improve their language skills in the official languages and, subject to criteria to be developed by DSS, recommends that these staff be provided support and, if possible, financial assistance to defray part of the costs.
- iii) Noting the concerns expressed regarding the UNDP Results and Competency Assessment (RCA) in the assessment of security advisers, the IASMN requests DSS to consider the use of 180 or 360 degree assessments; The IASMN also requests that the role of DSS in the assessment process be clarified. On a related matter, the IASMN requests that for short-term staff on mission, appraisals be prepared to reflect the performance of the officer
- iv) The IASMN requests DSS to develop a strategy to identify and mentor qualified officers in the Safety and Security Services who have the potential to become security advisers.
- v) Given the specialized technical nature of the professional security field, the IASMN requests DSS to raise with OHRM the possibility of obtaining exemptions from Human Resources requirements for security personnel that inhibits the movement of personnel across categories of staff.
- vi) With regard to the exchange of security personnel amongst organizations of the UN system, the IASMN requests DSS to prepare a framework agreement for this purpose, to include SSS officers.
- vii) With regard to background checks for security personnel, the IASMN requests DSS, in conjunction with OHRM and OLA, to consider establishing a mechanisms to identify officers who have been removed from their functions for non-performance of their responsibilities or for disciplinary reasons.
- vix) With regard to entry level screening, the IASMN requests DSS to discuss with the medical directors to consider the possibility of establishing specific entry level screening requirements for security personnel

COMPLIANCE ISSUES

30. The IASMN considered a report by DSS regarding the activities of the Compliance, Evaluation and Monitoring Unit. The IASMN reiterates that the role of the Compliance Unit is primarily to help Designated Officials and members of Security Management Teams to identify gaps in the system and to recommend

remedial action. This provides a very positive support mechanism. The only time a more adversarial approach is required is when there is a persistent failure to act upon and correct identified deficiencies which impact on the safety and security of staff. The IASMN recommends the following :

- i) In the first instance, cases of non-compliance should be reported to the relevant security focal point. In cases where there is no improvement in the situation, then the matter should be brought to the attention of the Executive Heads by the USG/DSS for action.
- ii) In the event that an organization at a particular duty station does not implement the recommendations of a compliance mission, the IASMN recommends that consideration should be given to denying security clearance to staff from that organization in the country.
- iii) The IASMN requests DSS Compliance Unit to carry out spot checks of responses provided to it during compliance missions.
- vi) The IASMN approves the overall MOSS country appraisal compliance rating system proposed by DSS.

MORSS

31. The IASMN considered a conference room paper prepared by WHO regarding the implementation of Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards (MORSS). The IASMN notes with concern that MORSS, which is designed to reimburse residential security measures at the home of internationally-recruited staff members, is being used for other purposes. In this connection IASMN recalls that the original intent of residential security measures was to provide reimbursement for bars, alarms and guards. The IASMN reiterates that all proposed MORSS measures must be justified by the Security Risk Assessment.

32. The IASMN recommends that reimbursement or payment for residential guards normally will be provided for guards who are security professionals hired through private guard companies which have been vetted by the Security Adviser.

33. In light of the concerns expressed in para. 31 above, the IASMN recommends that the Human Resources Network review MORSS arrangements with a view to clarifying the domain of its application.

CRITICAL INCIDENT STESS MANAGEMENT

34. The IASMN was briefed by DSS regarding efforts to resolve the continuing disagreements amongst some stress counsellors of the UN system. The IASMN welcomes the positive steps being taken in this regard and looks forward to the outcome of the forthcoming critical incident stress counselling working group.

35. The IASMN commends the DSS Critical Incident Stress Unit (CISMU) for its decisive and positive response to the needs of staff in the aftermath of the incidents in Algiers, Chad and Kenya and recommends that the staffing of CISMU be increased to ensure that DSS is in a position to fulfil the mandate given to it by the General Assembly.

36. The IASMN recommends that the field coordination pilot project for hiring of stress counsellors be extended for one year and a detailed report provided to the IASMN at its February 2009 meeting.

MEDICAL SUPPORT IN THE FIELD

37. The IASMN considered a recommendation that the United Nations Medical Director participate in the IASMN. The IASMN welcomes this proposal which will help ensure that medical issues related to the safety and security of staff are included in its deliberations.

38. The IASMN notes with concern the variety of different contracts between organizations of the United Nations and a private emergency medical service provider. The IASMN wishes to bring this matter to the attention of the HLCM so that the appropriate entities within the UN system could be requested to review this matter.

AVIATION SAFETY

39. The IASMN expresses grave concern regarding the lack of any significant progress on the critical issue of aviation safety. The IASMN points out that each of its members is required on a daily basis to address issues of aviation safety for which they do not have expertise. The IASMN also points out that there is no centralized expertise within the UN system to address this issue. The IASMN recalls that it has already recommended that a centralized Aviation Safety Unit must be established within DSS to provide the system-wide guidance which is required. The IASMN has made a number of recommendations regarding the issue of Aviation Safety which have been adopted by the HLCM but which have not been implemented. In light of the above, the IASMN decides that there is no value in developing further policy initiatives unless there is an Aviation Safety Unit in place to foster implementation.

40. Given the need for specific expertise authoritatively to handle the issues related to aviation safety, the IASMN therefore has no choice but to suspend all activities of the Aviation Safety Working Group until a centralized Aviation Safety Unit has been established and resourced.

POLICY ISSUES

41. The IASMN considered how best to systematize the means by which security policy is developed. Given the scope and breadth of this issue, the IASMN requests a Working Group, consisting of IASMN principals to consider this matter and report back to the full IASMN.

DSS LIAISON PROJECT DARFUR

42. The IASMN was provided with a progress report on the implementation of the NGO Liaison project in the Darfurs. The IASMN requests that DSS continue its evaluation of this project, to include full lessons learned, before expanding this project to other locations. In particular the IASMN expressed concern that, at a time when efforts were being undertaken to correct deficiencies in the UN security management system, the extension of this project to other locations needed to be carefully considered.

ANNEX A

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

CHAIRPERSON: Ms. Diana Russler (DSS)
SECRETARY: Ms. Kathy Qi (DSS)

AGENCIES, PROGRAMMES AND FUNDS AND OTHER ENTITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

| | |
|------------|-------------------------------|
| ADB | Mr. Ken Chee |
| CBD | Mr. Victor Ogbuneke |
| CTBTO | Mr. Robert Erenstein |
| EBRD | Mr. Alan Drew |
| FAO | Mr. Michael Hage |
| IAEA | Ms. Maria E. Bermudez-Samiei |
| | Ms. Lodi Wazir |
| IFAD | Mr. Antonio Kamil |
| ILO | Mr. Brian Wenk |
| IMF | Mr. David Androff |
| | Mr. Warren J. Young |
| | Mr. Charles Gleichenhaus |
| ITU | Mr. Claude Vadeboncoeur |
| OPCW | Mr. Robert Simpson |
| PAHO | Mr. Edward Harkness |
| | Ms. Sofia Benegas |
| UNAIDS | Ms. Susie Bolvenkel-Prior |
| UNDP | Mr. Andrew Lukach (first day) |
| | Mr. Jab Swart |
| UNESCO | Ms. Magda Landry |
| UNFPA | Ms. Janie McCusker |
| UNHCR | Mr. Daniel Endres |
| | Mr. Svante Yngrot |
| UNICEF | Mr. Bill Gent |
| UNIDO | Mr. Ranko Vujacic |
| | Mr. Paul Maseli |
| UNOPS | Mr. Richard Nasereddin |
| UNRWA | Ms. Laura Londen |
| UNU | Mr. Anthony Powers |
| UNV | Ms. Michele Rogat |
| UPU | Mr. David Bower |
| WFP | Mr. Mick Lorentzen |
| WHO | Mr. Patrick Beaufour |
| WIPO | Mr. Drew Donovan |
| WMO | Mr. Michel Nicolas |
| World Bank | Mr. Van Pulley |
| | Mr. Chris Shorter |
| | Ms. Autumn Hottle |

DEPARTMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING
OPERATIONS**

Mr. Tom Hojbjerg (first day)

**DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY
AND SECURITY**

Mr. David Veness (first day)

Mr. Gerard Martinez

Mr. Gerry Ganz

Mr. Bruno Henn

Ms. Neeta Tolani

Mr. Igor Mitrokhin

Mr. John Logan

**INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA**

Ms. Sarah Kilemi

**OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION
OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS**

Mr. David Kaatrud

**OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS**

Mr. Stuart Groves

OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS

Mr. Antonio Menendez-Zubillaga

OBSERVER

CCISUA

Mr. George Odoom

ANNEX B

AGENDA OF THE IASMN

1. Consideration of the Report of the Policy Committee and Letter from the Secretary-General
2. Briefing on Heightened Threat to United Nations (Step Change) by Under-Secretary General for Safety and Security
3. Lessons Learned – Algiers
4. Global Threat Assessment
5. Information Sharing Protocols
6. Compliance
7. Minimum Operating Security Standards
8. Policy Issues
9. Human Resources Management for Security Professionals
10. Host Country Agreements
11. Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards
12. Critical Incident Stress Management
13. Aviation Safety
14. Lessons Learned – NGO Project
15. Other Matters
Medical Support in the Field

INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY MEASURES; FRAMEWORK FOR ACCOUNTABILITY FOR THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The primary responsibility for the security and protection of personnel employed by the United Nations system organizations, their spouse and other recognized dependants and property and of the organizations' property rests with the Host Government. This responsibility flows from every government's normal and inherent function of maintaining order and protecting persons and property within its jurisdiction. In the case of international organizations and their officials, the government is considered to have a special responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations or the government's agreements with the individual organizations.

II. MISSION STATEMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

2. The goal of the United Nations security management system is to enable the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities while ensuring the security, safety and well-being of staff as a high priority.

III. ACTORS WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

A. The Secretary-General

3. Under Article 97 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Secretary-General is the chief administrative officer of the Organization; the mandates promulgated by the principal organs are entrusted to him for their implementation under Article 98. The Secretary-General is thus accountable to the Member States for the proper running and administration of the Organization and implementation of its programmes to include, in the context of this framework, ensuring the overall safety and security of United Nations personnel at headquarters locations and in the field, as well as United Nations premises and assets at headquarters and field locations. The Secretary-General can delegate authority to the various Under-Secretaries-General who are in turn, individually or collectively, accountable to him, as appropriate.

B. The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security

4. The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security is directly accountable and reports to the Secretary-General. He/she is responsible for the executive direction and control of the United Nations security management system and the overall safety and security of United Nations civilian personnel and their recognized dependants at both headquarters locations and in the field, as well as United Nations premises and assets at field and headquarters locations. He/she represents the Secretary-General on all security-related matters. He/she is responsible for developing security policies, practices and procedures for United Nations system personnel worldwide, and coordinating with the organizations of the United Nations system to ensure implementation, compliance and support for security aspects of their activities; preparing

reports of the Secretary-General on all security related matters; and advising the Secretary-General on all matters related to security and safety of civilian personnel of the United Nations system.

C. Executive Heads of United Nations systems organizations¹

5. Executive Heads of the United Nations funds and programmes are responsible and accountable to the Secretary-General for ensuring that the goal of the United Nations security management system is met within their respective organizations. Without prejudice to their accountability to their own governing and legislative bodies, Executive Heads of the United Nations specialized agencies and of other organizations participating in the UN security management system recognize the coordinating role and authority of the Secretary-General in matters related to safety and security of United Nations personnel and commit themselves to ensuring that the goal of the United Nations security management system is met.

D. Senior Security Managers and/or headquarters Security Focal Points

6. The executive heads will appoint a Senior Security Manager and/or headquarters Security Focal Point to be responsible for coordinating the organization's day-to-day response to safety and security and providing all the relevant actors with advice, guidance and technical assistance.

E. Designated Officials

7. In each country or designated area where the United Nations is present, the senior most official is normally appointed as the Designated Official for Security. The Designated Official is accountable to the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, for the security of personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants throughout the country or designated area. The Designated Official is responsible and accountable for ensuring that the goal of the United Nations security management system is met at the duty station.

F. Representatives of organizations participating in the United Nations security management system

8. Representatives of organizations (the "country representative", "agency head" or "head of mission") of the United Nations system participating in the United Nations security management system are accountable to the Secretary-General through their respective executive heads, under the overall guidance of the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, for all matters related to the security of their personnel at the duty station.

G. Security Management Team

9. The Security Management Team shall normally consist of the Designated Official, who acts as chair, the head of each United Nations organization present at the duty station, and the Chief Security Advisor. The Security Management Team advises the Designated Official on all security related matters. In peacekeeping missions, where the Head of Mission serves as the Designated Official, the Security Management Team may also include Heads of Offices or Sections, as specified by the Designated Official. Members of the Security Management Team have a collective responsibility to support the Designated Official in the discharge of

¹ The term 'organizations' includes: the major organizational units of the Secretariat that have heads officially accountable to the Secretary-General; other bodies subsidiary or related to the United Nations such as the United Nations funds, agencies, and programmes; and organizations participating in the United Nations security management system.

his/her mandate related to the safety and security of all personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants.

H. Area Security Coordinators

10. Area Security Coordinators are staff members appointed in writing by the Designated Official, in consultation with the Security Management Team, in areas of larger countries that are separated from the capital in terms of both distance and exposure, in order to coordinate and control security arrangements applicable to all personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants in their area of responsibility. Area Security Coordinators are accountable to the Designated Official for their security-related responsibilities, in accordance with their respective Letters of Appointment.

I. Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser

11. The Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser is a security professional appointed by the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security to advise the Designated Official and the Security Management Team in their security functions. The Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser reports to the Designated Official and maintains a technical line of communication to the Department of Safety and Security. In the absence of a Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser, the Designated Official, in consultation with the Department of Safety and Security, should appoint a Country Security Focal Point for the Security Management Team.

J. Country Security Focal Point (if applicable)

12. In the absence of a Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser, the Designated Official, in consultation with the DSS and the staff member's employing organization will appoint an international staff member to act as Country Security Focal Point for the Security Management Team. CSFPs are accountable to the Designated Official for the security-related responsibilities, in accordance with their respective letters of appointment.

K. Other Security Personnel of the Department of Safety and Security

13. Security personnel of the Department of Safety and Security are responsible for assisting the Chief Security Adviser and the Designated Official, and are accountable to their respective heads of office.

L. Single-Agency Security Officers

14. Single-Agency Security Officers are security professionals hired by organizations of the United Nations security management system to advise their respective organizations and to be responsible for the security aspects of activities that are specific to their organizations. Single-Agency Security Officers report to their agency's Head of Office, while at the same time supporting the Designated Official under the coordination of the Chief Security Advisor.

15. When required to act as the Chief Security Adviser ad interim for a specified period, in the absence of the Chief Security Adviser for a given duty station, this will be confirmed in writing by the Designated Official and include the terms of reference of the Chief Security Adviser for accountability purposes.

M. Wardens

16. Wardens are appointed in writing by the Designated Official, in consultation with the Security Management Team, to ensure proper implementation of the security plan in a predetermined zone of a large

city. Wardens are accountable to the Designated Official/Area Security Coordinator for their security-related functions, irrespective of their employing organization.

N. Personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations system

17. Personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system are accountable to their respective organizations. All such personnel have the responsibility to abide by security policies, guidelines, directives, plans and procedures of the United Nations security management system and their organizations.

IV. CONCLUSION

18. This framework for accountability provides clear guidance as how to enable “the effective and efficient conduct of United Nations activities, while ensuring the safety, security and well-being of staff as a high priority”. This goal may be attained by ensuring that all actors of the United Nations security management system are empowered by providing them with the necessary resources, training and a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

19. The roles and responsibilities of all actors of the United Nations security management system for which they will be held accountable are attached at Annex.

ANNEX

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ACTORS WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

A. The Secretary-General

The Secretary-General ensures the overall safety and security of United Nations personnel at headquarters locations and in the field, as well as that of United Nations premises and assets at headquarters and field locations.

B. Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security

The Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security:

- a) Advises the Secretary-General on all matters related to security and safety of civilian personnel of the United Nations system;
- b) Represents the Secretary-General on all security-related matters;
- c) Manages the Department of Safety and Security;
- d) Manages the development of security policies, practices and procedures for personnel employed by the United Nations system worldwide;
- e) Coordinates with the organizations of the United Nations system to ensure implementation, compliance and support for security aspects of their activities;
- f) Prepares reports of the Secretary-General on all security related matters; and
- g) Directs the organizational response to crisis management as required.

C. Executive Heads of United Nations organizations²

The Executive Heads:

- a) Ensure that safety and security are core components of all programmes and activities;
- b) Ensure that all managers and personnel working for them not only support the Secretary-General but also discharge their responsibilities in ensuring compliance with the United Nations security management system;
- c) Ensure the resources necessary to achieve the goal of the United Nations security management system are provided;
- d) Liaise closely with the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security to ensure a coherent system-wide approach to security;
- e) Have a collective responsibility to work together to implement and contribute to the development of the United Nations security management system and to support the Secretary-General in ensuring that the legislative mandates given to him by the General Assembly are discharged;
- f) Have an obligation to advocate in all available forums to ensure that Member States provide for the safety and security of all personnel employed by the organizations of the

² The term 'organizations' includes: the major organizational units of the Secretariat that have heads officially accountable to the Secretary-General; other bodies subsidiary or related to the United Nations such as the United Nations funds, agencies and programmes; and organizations participating in the United Nations security management system.

- United Nations system and their recognized dependants and that crimes against such personnel will not be tolerated and the perpetrators brought to justice;
- g) Have a "duty of care" to ensure that personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants are not exposed to exceptional risk and that all measures are taken to mitigate risks;
 - h) Appoint one individual as the senior security manager and/or headquarters security focal point;
 - i) Recognize and reward good performance in security management; and
 - j) Ensure that provision is made to address specific security concerns for women as required.

D. Senior Security Managers and/or headquarters Security Focal Points

The Senior Security Manager and/or headquarters Security Focal Point is responsible for:

- a) Advising the Executive Head or Senior Programme Manager on security matters and keeping him/her updated on security management issues;
- b) Ensuring that Country Representatives or Heads of Mission of the organization are aware that they must participate fully in the Security Management Team, as applicable;
- c) Assisting/supporting in the mobilization of resources to assist field offices in the implementation of security requirements;
- d) Serving as a member of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network;
- e) Working in close association with the Department of Safety and Security and other members of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network, as well as supporting the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security in the discharge of his/her responsibilities;
- f) Providing advice to field representatives for the implementation of minimum operating security standards and minimum residential security standards, as applicable;
- g) Ensuring that all personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants of the agency are aware of the training requirements and facilitating the provision of security training and briefings to all personnel of the organization and their dependents;
- h) Disseminating information and education regarding security matters; and
- i) Monitoring and reporting on compliance with security policies, practices and procedures.

E. Designated Officials

The Designated Official is responsible for:

- a) Ensuring the observance of the arrangements detailed in the United Nations Field Security Handbook and subsequent security policies and directives, as well as developing and implementing the required plans for the duty station with the aim of maintaining the security and safety of personnel employed by the United Nations system and their property, or that of the organizations.
- b) Supervising and enabling the security personnel at the duty station to effectively discharge their functions;
- c) Recommending to the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security a suitable nomination to act as Designated Official ad interim. Such appointees normally will be the head of an organization. At those locations where there is a peace-keeping mission the Designated Official ad interim is normally the Resident Coordinator;
- d) Keeping the Secretary-General informed, through the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, of all developments in the country that have a bearing on the security and

protection of the civilian personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants and their property, or that of the organizations. In the event that operational matters affect security or inter-agency security issues, this information must be communicated to the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security;

- e) Implementing any arrangements decided by the Secretary-General in support of the Host Government's measures for the security and protection of personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system, their recognized dependants and their property and of the organizations' property, as well as maintaining liaison with the Government of the host country on matters concerning the security and protection of these individuals;
- f) Ensuring collaboration on security with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations working as operational partners of the United Nations system in accordance with established guidelines;
- g) Ensuring the regular functioning of the Security Management Team and identifying staff members who will have special responsibilities in this regard;
- h) Keeping the members of the Security Management Team, as well as the senior officials of each organization at the duty stations (as applicable) fully apprised of all security-related information and measures being taken in the country;
- i) Ensuring that all personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system are appropriately equipped with required safety and security equipment as specified in minimum operating security standards and trained in its use;
- j) Including staff members and the recognized dependants of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations that have signed the Memorandum of Understanding in security arrangements at the duty station;
- k) Ensuring that there is a fully integrated functioning and operational communications system for security management;
- l) Appointing, together with the Security Management Team, Area Security Coordinators and Wardens and verifying that the team has adequately trained and equipped them; as well as providing their parent agency with input for the individual's performance appraisal;
- m) Ensuring that the special arrangements, agreed on an inter-agency basis to be implemented when internationally-recruited personnel are evacuated, are in place for locally-recruited personnel to include options for relocation within the country, as required;
- n) In an emergency where it has not been possible to communicate with the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, the Designated Official uses his/her best judgment in carrying out relocations/evacuations and reporting to the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, immediately thereafter;
- o) Establishing a briefing system that will ensure that all personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants are advised of specific precautionary measures that they should take in relation to the security plan, and ensuring that all such personnel receive adequate and appropriate security training;
- p) Submitting all requested reports to the Department of Safety and Security, as outlined in the United Nations Field Security Handbook or other directives from the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security;
- q) Upon being advised of instances of non-compliance with United Nations security policies, practices and procedures, the Designated Official takes appropriate actions, including referral to the organization concerned, as well as reporting serious instances of non-compliance to the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security; and

- r) Ensuring that provision is made to address specific security concerns for women as required.
- s) If applicable, appointing, in consultation with the employing organization, a Country Security Focal Point and ensuring that the Country Security Focal Point receives appropriate training to fulfil his/her responsibilities.

F. Representatives of organizations participating in the United Nations security management system

The representatives of organizations participating in the United Nations security management system are responsible for:

- a) Being responsible for the safety and security of personnel of their organizations at the duty station and their recognized dependants and for the implementation of the security plan;
- b) Ensuring that safety and security is a core component of all programmes in the country and that appropriate funding is provided based on need;
- c) Consulting with and assisting the Designated Official on all matters concerning security and the implementation and maintenance of both the security plan and minimum operating security standards and compliance with both;
- d) Serving as members of the Security Management Team;
- e) Advising the Designated Official, Chief Security Advisor and agency Security Focal Point on the particular concerns of his/her organization regarding security;
- f) Ensuring full and complete compliance by his/her personnel and their recognized dependants with all security-related instructions;
- g) Taking action on instances of non-compliance of security policies, practices and procedures and advising the Designated Official on actions taken;
- h) Ensuring that specialized activities of the organization are conducted in a way that manages the risks to personnel;
- i) Ensuring that the Designated Official is provided, on a regular basis, with updated lists of all personnel of the agency and their recognized dependants in the area;
- j) Ensuring that the Designated Official is at all times informed of the whereabouts and the movement of agency personnel and their recognized dependants in the area, in accordance with procedures established at the duty station;
- k) Reporting to the Designated Official and agency Security Focal Point all security-related incidents;
- l) Ensuring that recognized dependants left in the duty station by internationally-recruited staff who are serving elsewhere, are accorded the same provision for security as dependants of international staff serving at the duty station;
- m) Ensuring that arrangements are in place for intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations working as operational partners with the concerned United Nations agencies;
- n) Ensuring that movement of all personnel is undertaken in accordance with United Nations system rules and procedures;
- o) Ensuring that personnel have adequate and operating communications equipment in line with the minimum operating security standards;
- p) Ensuring that all his/her personnel attend appropriate security awareness training and briefing; and
- q) Personally attending all training programmes.

G. Security Management Team

Under the overall authority of the Secretary-General, through the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security and the Designated Official in the country, the Security Management Team has a collective responsibility for:

- a) Working in close collaboration with the Designated Official;
- b) Meeting on a regular basis to review the prevailing situation and ensuring that security is being managed effectively at all locations throughout the country where personnel employed by the United Nations system are present;
- c) Ensuring that there are functioning and effective security and contingency plans that are maintained and implemented for all locations throughout the country where personnel employed by the United Nations system and their recognized dependants are present;
- d) Ensuring that lists of personnel and their recognized dependants are up-to-date;
- e) Ensuring that each Area Security Coordinator and Warden is trained and equipped to carry out his/her functions and ensuring that they understand fully and implement the complete range of these responsibilities;
- f) Establishing minimum operating security standards and minimum residential security standards, based on a credible threat and risk assessment, at all locations throughout the country where personnel employed by the United Nations system and their eligible dependants are present, including the monitoring of its implementation, and ensuring compliance;
- g) Ensuring that resources are available to implement all measures that are approved;
- h) Providing input, as appropriate, on the performance appraisal of all security officers employed in the country by the United Nations system, where they have personnel operating; and
- i) Ensuring that provision is made to address specific security concerns for women as required.

H. Area Security Coordinators

The Area Coordinator is responsible for:

- a) Acting on behalf of the Designated Official from whom they have delegated responsibility to coordinate and control the security arrangements for sub-office operations outside the capital;
- b) Appointing wardens for their area of responsibility;
- c) Developing and maintaining area-specific security plans;
- d) Maintaining lists of personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants at their location;
- e) Implementing minimum operating security standards, based on an up-to-date threat and risk assessment;
- f) Keeping the Designated Official systematically informed regarding incidents or developments in their area of responsibility that have a bearing on the security and safety of personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants;
- g) Convening meetings of the Area Security Management Team; and
- h) Managing the security clearance system for their area.

I. Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser³

The Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser is responsible for:

- a) Serving as principal adviser to the Designated Official and the Security Management Team on all aspects of security management, crisis readiness and preparedness at their respective duty stations and in the execution of responsibilities with regard to the security of personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their eligible dependents, and their property;
- b) Participating in and providing security inputs to operational planning;
- c) Cooperating closely on security matters with Security Focal Points of the organizations of the United Nations system;
- d) Managing the security unit to include personnel, finance, budget and logistics.
- e) Cooperating closely on security matters with all other officers of the United Nations system at the duty station to ensure the best possible security management;
- f) Assisting security operations conducted by agencies as requested;
- g) Establishing and chairing a security coordination cell for duty stations where there are also Single-agency Security Officers, in order to ensure that all security officers at the duty station are working together to further security management;
- h) Ensuring an appropriate record of meetings undertaken by the security coordination cell is undertaken.
- i) Developing good contacts with national security agencies, with a view to obtaining the best possible protection for personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants, and their property;
- j) Serving as a member of the Security Management Team at the country level;
- k) Undertaking security risk assessments for all locations in the country where personnel of the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants are present and facilitating the implementation of recommended mitigating measures;
- l) Preparing, maintaining and updating the country-specific security plan, contingency plans and security listings of personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants;
- m) Ensuring that plans for relocation/evacuation to a safe area are current, feasible and implementable;
- n) Ensuring that an effective and functioning security and emergency communications system is in place;
- o) Ensuring that all personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants receive briefings upon initial arrival, local security training as necessitated by changes in the security environment, and are kept informed of matters affecting their security;
- p) Maintaining up-to-date instructions for personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their eligible dependents on precautions they should take in relation to the implementation of the security plan, including comprehensive listing of emergency supplies they should have on hand and guidance on their behaviour during a variety of emergencies, including natural disasters and political crises;

³ The term 'Chief Security Advisor' will apply to the senior security professional within a Designated Official's area of responsibility. This term replaces previous titles such as Chief Security Officer, Chief of Safety and Security Services, Field Security Coordination Officer and Regional Security Coordination Officer, as appropriate.

- q) Reporting all cases in which personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and/or their recognized dependants have been victims of crime and submitting required reports on such cases;
- r) Conducting security surveys of residential areas and premises;
- s) Ensuring that the appropriate level of confidentiality is maintained with regard to security matters;
- t) Advising the Designated Official and the Security Management Team on operational security requirements consistent with the minimum operating security standards; and
- u) Reporting to the Designated Official all instances of failure or non-compliance with security policies, practices and procedures.

J. Country Security Focal Point (if applicable)

The Country Security Focal Point is responsible for:

- a) Managing the day-to-day security related matters;
- b) Ensuring that lists of personnel and their recognized dependants are up to date.
- c) Preparing, maintaining and updating the country-specific security plan
- d) Ensuring that all mandatory reports are provided in a timely manner to DSS;
- e) Immediately reporting all security related incidents involving UN staff and their recognized dependants to the Designated Official and DSS;
- f) Assisting the Designated Official and Security Management Team in the development and implementation of MOSS and MORSS;
- g) Serving as a member of the Security Management Team;
- h) Conducting residential security surveys for UN internationally-recruited staff.

K. Other Personnel of the Department of Safety and Security Personnel

Chief of Security and Safety Services/Sections

The Chief of Security and Safety Service/Section is responsible for:

- a) Providing for the security and safety of delegates, staff, visiting dignitaries and other visitors within a United Nations complex at Headquarters and Offices away from Headquarters;
- b) Assisting the Chief Security Adviser and participating in the work of the security cell for the development of security policies and procedures;
- c) Providing strategic and executive direction on managing and optimizing its resources, determining priorities and allocation of resources to carry out the security and safety programme;
- d) Providing strategic and executive direction on executing, monitoring and maintaining safety and security standard operation procedures and systems, emergency preparedness and crisis management, as well as conducting threat and risk assessments;
- e) Providing strategic and executive direction on human resources, finance, budget and logistical matters for his/her Service/Section;
- f) Providing strategic and executive direction on standardized and specialized training for staff and security personnel;

- g) Providing the ultimate responsibility for personal protection of United Nations senior officials and dignitaries present and/or visiting his/her area of responsibility as and when needed;
- h) Providing strategic and executive direction on the implementation of relevant minimum operational security standards;
- i) Coordinating and liaising with local authorities and local law enforcement agencies;
- j) Cooperating closely on security and safety matters with all other offices of the United Nations system at the duty station to ensure the best possible security management; and
- k) Retaining day-to-day operational responsibility and reporting to their respective Directors-General or Executive Secretaries, who will serve as designated officials, working in close cooperation with their Chiefs of Administration, if located at an Office away from Headquarters⁴.

Chief Security Officer for Peacekeeping Missions

The Chief Security Officer is responsible for:

- a) Heading the security section and serving as the mission Security Adviser to the Head of Mission on all security-related matters;
- b) Assisting the Chief Security Adviser and participating in the work of the security cell for the development of security policies and procedures;
- c) Contributing to threat and risk assessments for all locations in the mission area where personnel are present and actively participating in the planning, evaluation of effectiveness of the country security plans and other aspects of security operations;
- d) Reviewing and monitoring activities related to the mission Security Programme and mission security plans. Identifying air and land evacuation requirements to be used in emergencies;
- e) Ensuring availability of emergency communications by making periodic checks to determine if the system is adapted and functioning properly;
- f) Establishing a 24-hour emergency response system;
- g) Maintaining continuing awareness of prevailing local security conditions, identifying probable threats and advising mission and project personnel to follow appropriate preventative steps;
- h) Arranging protection detail for senior personnel or visiting VIP's as necessary;
- i) Compiling and maintaining an updated staff list that includes all mission personnel, including visiting missions and consultants;
- j) Monitoring and evaluating office physical security measures, and conducting security surveys of installations and facilities;
- k) Determining the need for, and providing training and advice to mission personnel on residential security measures;
- l) Establishing procedures for and conducting investigations on all deaths and all accidents and incidents in which mission personnel have been victims of crime, and following up on all arrests of mission personnel; and
- m) Assuming responsibility for guard force management and issuance of identity cards.

⁴ The Chief of the Security and Safety Service, United Nations Headquarters in New York reports to the Director, Division of Security and Safety Services, Department of Safety and Security.

Field Security Officers

The Field Security Officer is responsible and accountable to the Chief Security Adviser/Security Adviser for the following:

- a) Implementing all aspects of security management, crisis readiness and preparedness at the duty station;
- b) Preparing, maintaining and updating country-specific security plans, contingency plans and security listings of personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants;
- c) Undertaking threat and risk assessments for all locations in the country where personnel employed by organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants are present;
- d) Developing good contacts with national law enforcement agencies, with a view to obtaining the best possible protection for personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants; and
- e) Conducting security surveys of residential areas and premises.

L. Single-agency Security Officers

The Single-agency Security Officer, in addition to agency-specific responsibilities, is responsible for:

- a) Advising and assisting the agency country representative, situation or operations manager, on his/her security responsibilities, including participation in operational planning, and providing security inputs, as well as compliance with United Nations security policies, practices and procedures;
- b) Advising and assisting the area security coordinator or Designated Official in the discharge of his/her responsibilities, when requested to do so;
- c) Participating as a member of the security cell established by the Chief Security Advisor;
- d) Advising the security cell on particular concerns of his/her organization regarding security;
- e) Acting as the Chief Security Advisor ad interim, during the absence of the Chief Security Advisor for a given duty station, as appropriate and when required.

M. Wardens

The Warden is responsible for:

- a) Functioning as a channel of communication between the Designated Official and personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system and their recognized dependants in his/her zone;
- b) Ensuring that such personnel are regularly informed with regard to security arrangements and the emergency phases in effect;
- c) Ensuring that one person is designated to maintain contact with United Nations system visitors residing temporarily at residences or hotels within the warden's zone;
- d) Carrying out other security-related duties as assigned by the Designated Official or the Chief Security Advisor;

- e) Ensuring that recognized dependants left in the duty station by internationally-recruited staff who are serving elsewhere, are accorded the same provision for security as dependants of international staff serving at the duty station; and
- f) Visiting every family living in their area to ensure that they are aware of the security arrangements.

N. Personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system

The personnel employed by the organizations of the United Nations system are responsible for:

- a) Familiarizing themselves with information provided to them regarding the United Nations security management system at their location;
- b) Receiving security clearance prior to travelling;
- c) Attending security briefings and signing a document certifying that they have been briefed;
- d) Knowing who their Warden and Chief Security Advisor or Country Security Focal Point is;
- e) Being appropriately equipped for service at all duty stations;
- f) Applying and complying with all United Nations system security regulations and procedures at the duty station, whether on or off duty;
- g) Comporting themselves in a manner which will not endanger their safety and security or that of others;
- h) Reporting all security incidents in a timely manner; and
- i) Attending and completing security training relevant to their level and role; and
- j) Completing the Basic Security in the Field CD-ROM.

ANNEX D

Security and Risk Management: A Guide for UN Managers

Introduction

The terms *risk* and *risk management* have evolved into more common use in the UN, often in the context of security, business continuity, emergency preparedness, and audit. Despite their increased use, the terms are not clearly or commonly understood. This paper sets out to explain *what* risk management means, *why* it is important to UN managers, and *how* to use a simple but structured decision-making model to help us better achieve our goals. This paper aims to help you better understand and use risk management tools in the UN, including the *Security Risk Assessment* (SRA) and *Security Risk Management* (SRM) processes.

What is Risk Management?

Any UN objective, from global strategic goals to local program plans, may fail because of various obstacles. In the security context, obstacles are called *threats*. Think of threats as “disenablers.” All managers must identify threats and evaluate how these threats may affect their objectives. In many of the places where we work, the effect of threats, if not managed, can be fatal.

An organization’s vulnerability to threats is called “risk.” The process whereby a manager identifies and systematically deals with obstacles to success is called risk management. Risk management is the systematic selection of cost-effective approaches for minimizing the effect of threat realization to the organization. Risk management *enables* success by managing “disenablers”.

*Risk Management is the **systematic** selection of **cost-effective** approaches for **minimizing the effect** of threat realization to the organization.*

Why is it Important?

Risk management is an essential management tool. It is key to achieving the best possible results in complex and dangerous environments. It increases our chances of success by decreasing the effect of threats. Risk management offers a structured approach to help make good decisions and allows for clear accountability. Proper risk management allows managers to maximize opportunities. Risk management is “good for business.”

*Risk Management is key to achieving the **best possible results** in complex and dangerous environments.*

A Simple and Structured Approach

The risk-management process is a structured, problem-solving mechanism. It is a six-step process:

| | | |
|---------|---|--|
| Step 1: | Goals | <i>(What are my program priorities?)</i> |
| Step 2: | Threat Identification & Assessment | <i>(What are the obstacles to achieving goals?)</i> |
| Step 3: | Risk Assessment & Prioritization | <i>(How will they affect us and which require the most attention?)</i> |
| Step 4: | Risk Management Decisions | <i>(What can we actually do about it?)</i> |
| Step 5: | Implementation & Review | |
| Step 6: | Goals are achieved! | |

The following explains this process in more detail:

Step 1: Goals

Managers set goals and they manage people, resources and risk in order to achieve those goals. Managers also establish priorities among these goals.

Step 2: Threat Identification & Assessment

Threat identification is a process whereby you decide what you are up against. In the security context, a manager should sit down with security and other advisors to list people and events that may block success (i.e., threats). The next step is to assess the threats. In the UN security context, a professional security officer is the key player in the threat assessment process to guarantee that senior managers get the best information for their decisions. When human beings are the potential cause of harm, the threat they pose can be assessment by looking at three components:

1. **Mind-Set** (mental orientation toward harming the target)
2. **Capability** (to harm the target)
3. **Context** (that permits the harm to happen)

Having carried out the threat assessment, the next step is to carry out a risk assessment. Not all threats carry the same risk to the UN's staff, assets and programmes.

Step 3: Risk Assessment & Prioritization

Human beings make subjective risk evaluations daily, but research shows that these evaluations are often inaccurate. The most common error is the "optimistic bias", whereby people believe that they will not be the victim of an undesirable incident because it has never happened to them before. Most people find it impossible to imagine themselves as the victim of a dangerous event and say "it can't happen to me." A common error among humanitarian workers is "danger habituation." As the

Most people find it impossible to imagine themselves as the victim of a dangerous event and say "it can't happen to me."

dangers increase, people get used to them, become complacent and neglect to take the necessary security precautions. These errors can lead to programme cancellation, or worse, the death or serious injury of staff.

Here's an example of the dangers of subjective risk evaluations. In the US in 2005, there were more than 6 million vehicles accidents that injured 2.9 million people and killed more than 43,000. Of those who died, more than half were not wearing seatbelts. It is a safe assumption that none of those who died thought that they were acting irresponsibly or that they were going to die.

To avoid the problems that come with subjective risk evaluations, you need to assess risk in a structured way. To do so, you must first understand that risk is a product of:

1. The **Likelihood** of being affected by a threat, and
2. The **Impact** that such an event would have on the organization (impact is evaluated in both financial and other types of costs like human resources, lost productivity, public image, loss of life, etc.).

| |
|-----------------------------------|
| Risk = Likelihood x Impact |
|-----------------------------------|

The easiest way to assess likelihood and impact is to evaluate a potential threat on a five-point scale for each category. Combining the two scales on the matrix below gives the risk.

| | | Risk Matrix | | | | |
|-----------------------|---|----------------|-------------|------------|---------------|---------------|
| | | Impact | | | | |
| | | Negligible | Minor | Moderate | Severe | Critical |
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Likelihood | | | | | | |
| Very Unlikely | 1 | Negligible (1) | Low (2) | Low (3) | Low (4) | Low (5) |
| Unlikely | 2 | Low (2) | Low (4) | Medium (6) | Medium (8) | Medium (10) |
| Moderately Likely | 3 | Low (3) | Medium (6) | Medium (9) | High (12) | High (15) |
| Likely | 4 | Low (4) | Medium (8) | High (12) | High (16) | Critical (20) |
| Very Likely /Imminent | 5 | Low (5) | Medium (10) | High (12) | Critical (20) | Critical (25) |

Two examples help illustrate how to undertake a risk assessment using this matrix. **Example 1:** Based on a threat assessment, you assess that the likelihood of staff members stealing office supplies as “very likely”. You also note that, if this occurs, the impact would be “not serious.” Therefore, the risk is “low.” **Example 2:** If you assess that it would be “moderately likely” that a certain group would bomb your building, but that the impact would be “Critical,” then the risk from a bomb is “High.”

The higher the risk, the more attention we must pay to lowering that risk. Managers must prioritize critical and high risks and then work downwards. Low risks that nonetheless have critical impacts must not, however, be forgotten.

Various aspects of the threat assessment will influence your judgment about both the likelihood and impact of a certain threat. To illustrate, we can use an example about armed crime. If the threat assessment identifies a threat from large, well-armed criminal groups working in a city with poor lighting at night and a weak police force, then the likelihood of a successful attack will be high. If a criminal group is known to use automatic weapons during armed robberies, then the potential impact would be loss of life, so the risk associated with this group would be greater than if they did not have such weapons.

As well, your present vulnerability to an attack also affects the risk assessment. The risk associated with an attack by even a small, unarmed criminal group will be higher if the target is not properly protected. A lack of ability to control the after-effects of a serious incident is also a form of vulnerability and needs to be examined. The risk of someone dying after being shot in an armed robbery, for example, will increase if proper medical attention is not given to the victim.

*A lack of ability to **control** the **after-effects** of a serious incident is also a form of vulnerability and **needs to be examined**.*

Once you have identified all the major threats and established their corresponding risks, you are ready to make sound decisions on how to lower risks.

Step 4: Risk Management Decisions

Risk management is the process where by an organization attempts to lower risk by influencing likelihood and/or impact. Because we have little influence over the cause of a threat, it is best to concentrate on lowering risk.

There are 4 main strategies for managing risk (**ACAT**):

1. **Accept** the risk (no further action)
2. **Control** the risk (using prevention and/or mitigation measures, e.g. MOSS)
3. **Avoid** the risk (temporarily distance the target from the threat)
4. **Transfer** the risk (insurance, sub-contract, etc.)

The risk management strategy you choose will depend on the level of risk. Below are some suggested risk management strategies you may consider based on the level of risk:

| Likelihood | | Impact | | | | |
|-----------------------|---|------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| | | Negligible | Minor | Moderate | Severe | Critical |
| | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 |
| Very Unlikely | 1 | Accept | Transfer & Accept | Transfer | Transfer | Transfer & Control |
| Unlikely | 2 | Control & Accept | Control & Transfer | Transfer & Control | Transfer & Control | Transfer & Control |
| Moderately Likely | 3 | Control | Control & Transfer | Control & Transfer | Control & Avoid | Avoid & Control |
| Likely | 4 | Control | Control & Transfer | Control & Avoid | Control & Avoid | Avoid & Control |
| Very Likely /Immanent | 5 | Control | Control & Transfer | Control & Avoid | Control & Avoid | Avoid |

Senior management must decide what level of risk is acceptable depending on the relative importance of a program goal. Unacceptably high risks must be avoided or brought within acceptable levels with risk-management strategies.

The risk strategy for highly-likely events is to try to lower their likelihood. Security measures and procedures lower the likelihood of a successful attack on your organization. A professional security officer can provide advice on security strategies.

The strategy for high impact events is to attempt to lower the impact. Contingency planning, communication and response strategies (police/medical) lower the impact once an event has occurred.

Ideally, you should try strategies that will lower both likelihood and impact. You are encouraged to be creative in the ways you can lower likelihood and impact. The best risk management strategies available in the UN to lower both likelihood and impact of security threats are *Minimum Operating Security Standards* (MOSS).

Step 5: Implementation & Review

Once the risk-management decisions are made, you must then implement the risk-management strategy and then continually monitor the threat and risk environments to ensure that your strategy is providing best protection in the most effective and efficient way. Once again, the objective is to achieve our goals.

Conclusion

For managers to achieve their goals, they must approach risk in a structured way. The risk-management approach laid out in this paper is the easiest and most effective way of managing risk. The UN would be seriously inhibiting its ability to achieve its humanitarian objectives if it did not effectively manage the risks to its staff and assets. Safe staff and assets are keys to achieving goals.

Because risk-management decisions include concerns of cost and benefit, as a manager, you are best placed to evaluate such issues. Although managers may worry about the costs of risk management, it is also important to consider the costs of not managing risks. Not managing risk can be unacceptably expensive because undesirable events have more than just a primary impact on the organization. Risk events will always have secondary and tertiary costs. Therefore, risk management saves money by lowering loss.

*Undesirable events have **more than just the primary impact** on the organization. Risk events will always have **secondary** and **tertiary** costs.*

We hope that this guide will help you undertake the difficult task of identifying and managing the risks you face, especially security risks.

Prepared by: **Paul J. Farrell**, UNICEF Deputy Security Coordinator.
To discuss Security and Risk Management in more detail or in relation to your specific context, please contact the UNICEF Security Team the Office of Emergency Programmes (EMOPS).

**Chief Executives Board
for Coordination**CEB/2008/3
11 April 2008**Conclusions of the Fifteenth Session of
the High Level Committee on Management
(FAO, Rome, 17-18 March 2008)****TABLE OF CONTENTS**

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ANNEXES

Annex I – List of participants

Annex II – HLCM recommendations to CEB on operational security issues

Annex III – Statement by FICSA

Annex IV – Statement by CCISUA

INTRODUCTION

1. The High Level Committee on Management held its fifteenth session at the Headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, in Rome, on 17-18 March 2008. The meeting was chaired in alternate sessions by the Committee's Chair, UNFPA Executive Director, Thoraya Obaid, and by the Vice-Chair, WHO Assistant Director-General, Representative of the Director-General, Denis Aitken.
2. In her welcoming remarks, the Chair welcomed new participants and, in particular, Mr. Thomas Stelzer, newly appointed Assistant Secretary General for Policy Coordination and Inter-Agency Affairs, Secretary of CEB, and Mr. Manoj Juneja, new HLCM representative for FAO and generous host of the meeting. She asked that through him, HLCM also sends its appreciation to the Director-General of FAO for the organization's hospitality. The Chair also welcomed Mr. Wolfgang Stoeckl, Vice-Chairman of ICSC, who was participating as an Observer in the discussion on some agenda items.

I. Adoption of the Agenda

Documents:

- ✓ CEB/2008/HLCM/1 - Agenda
- ✓ CEB/2008/HLCM/2 - Programme of work

3. The agenda as adopted by the Committee is reflected in the table of contents.
4. The complete list of participants is provided in Annex 1.
5. All documents related to the session are available on the CEB website at: <https://hlcmm.unsystemceb.org/documents/200803/>
6. Before moving to the regular agenda items, the Chair recalled that for the second time at this session the Committee was experimenting an "open hour" informal session. The Chair reminded the group that no decisions could be taken during this informal session.
7. UNESCO suggested that a discussion on budget management issues, and more precisely on how to preserve the flexibility in the monitoring of the budget in the framework of IPSAS adoption, be taken up in the "open hour" session. In consideration of the delicate nature of the subject and of the need to obtain guidance on it from the financial offices of respective organizations, the Committee recommended that such issue be taken up and comprehensively discussed at the next meeting of the Finance and Budget Network, with a view to making recommendations for further discussion at HLCM.

II. Dialogue with FICSA and CCISUA

8. In accordance with the established practice, the Committee conducted an exchange of views with the representatives of the Federation of International Civil Servants' Associations (FICSA) and the Coordinating Committee for International Staff Unions and Associations of the United Nations System (CCISUA). FICSA was represented by Mr. Edmond Mobio (President) and Ms. Valerie Séguin (General Secretary); CCISUA was represented by Mr. Nasr Ishak (Vice-President). The statements of the representatives of FICSA and CCISUA are provided in Annexes III and IV, respectively.
9. HLCM was informed at its 14th session in September 2007 that FICSA and CCISUA had started a dialogue on working closer together. The two Federations had continued their discussion and had made progress towards developing a joint vision and a common approach for fulfilling this shared objective.

10. In November 2007, CCISUA held an Extraordinary General Assembly to consider an amendment to its Statute. The amendment, which was unanimously adopted, allows for greater and more effective participation by all the membership of CCISUA in the decision-making process. CCISUA's strategy is geared towards strengthening its partnerships and increasing its engagement in the various *fora* that deal with the conditions of service of staff.
11. On the harmonization and system wide coherence issues, FICSA and CCISUA stressed that the UN Charter should remain the fundamental reference document for any proposals for reforming or harmonizing the UN system. Such proposals should take into consideration their impact on Staff Representation.
12. On Security and Safety of Staff, CCISUA re-iterated its expectation to have a robust, fully funded, and comprehensive security management system run by competent staff, and highlighted the need to seriously address the security and safety requirements in the "Delivering as One" pilot countries.
13. FICSA reported that several expressions of concern had been received from staff on the impact of currency fluctuation on pension benefits. FICSA re-iterated its commitment to work closely with administrations, through its members participating in the Pension Board, to develop proposals to alleviate the impact of currency fluctuation on pension benefits.
14. The accreditation to HLCM and ICSC meetings of a third staff representative body was indicated to be of great concern to both FICSA and CCISUA. In their opinion, the reported process for strengthened collaboration and a possible unification held considerably more promise than further diversification. In addition, they believed that clear and transparent criteria should be established and applied for granting accreditation, such as democratic elections, annual general meetings, contributions from members and an operational budget.
15. The HR Network Spokesperson (UNESCO) informed HLCM that the newly-formed federation of staff associations, UNISERV, had not participated in the HR Network session of 12-14 March. The HR Network was going to request confirmation and supporting evidence that UNISERV complied with all ACC/CCAQ criteria before newly-formed federation could be invited to participate in the next session of the Network.
16. The HR Network Spokesperson shared the views of many Committee members on the need to examine, within the context of staff management relations, the issue of representation and functioning of staff associations, and that this effort should precede the re-definition of accreditation criteria.
17. In connection with FICSA's dialogue with the HR Network on financial support for participation in common system *fora*, the HR Network would continue to work with the newly elected President of FICSA to develop a business case on this subject: this had been previously requested but had still not been finalized. In the view of many member organizations, the submission of any such business case by FICSA should not lead to expectations for additional financial resources, as organizations already contribute significant resources to staff associations.

Conclusions and Action Points

18. The Committee thanked FICSA and CCISUA for their statements and invited them to take part to the discussion on the Harmonization of Business Practices.
19. HLCM requested the HR Network to continue its dialogue with the staff associations, reflecting the views expressed by the Committee, specifically on the need to examine, within the context of staff management relations, the issue of representation and functioning of staff associations, and to report back on this at the next session of HLCM. The Network would organize an ad-hoc video conference with the staff associations on this particular subject.

III. Security and Safety of Staff

Documents:

- ✓ CEB/2008/HLCM/3 - Report of the IASMN Meeting, 8-9 October 2007
- ✓ CEB/2008/HLCM/5 - Report of the IASMN Meeting, 26-28 February 2008
- ✓ Memo by the Secretary-General to Ms. Obaid and Mr. Veness of 22 February 2008 on "Operational Security Issues for consideration by CEB, HLCM and IASMN".

20. As is customary, the Committee received a briefing by the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security on the general security environment within which the staff of the United Nations System were currently operating and on the nature and relevance of emerging threats, following the tragic bombing of the UN offices in Algiers.

21. The Under-Secretary-General explained that, in the wake of the attack in Algiers, the Secretary-General had appointed Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi to chair an Independent Panel on Staff Safety and Security. In the meantime, there was an urgency for the UN to continue to take action to strengthen security for all UN staff and premises. At the request of the Secretary-General, UNDSS had therefore completed a preliminary analysis of the attack on the Algiers premises. This analysis was carried out through an extensive consultation process with a large number of agencies, through agency security focal points in the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN), as well as through meetings the USG held with 23 Designated Officials in the Middle East and Africa and with Ministries of Interior in the same regions.

22. The results of such work were detailed in a report submitted to the Secretary-General in January, which was subsequently considered by the Policy Committee, and which included two main recommendations: 1) the absolute necessity to determine the truth on the modalities with which the attack had been carried out and the precise responsibilities behind it; and 2) the need to proceed with a deep re-thinking of the strategic framework and the practical means to ensure the security and safety of all UN system staff.

23. Following the meeting of the Policy Committee, the Secretary-General had formally requested that HLCM and IASMN develop recommendations for CEB to consider at its session in late April on a number of operational security issues.

24. The extensive discussion by HLCM on this matter was preceded by a presentation by Mr. Igor Mitrokhin (Chief, Threat and Risk Unit, DSS) on "Threats Facing the United Nations system in the aftermath of the Algiers Bombing", and by a briefing by the Chair of IASMN on the conclusions of the Network meeting of Washington D.C. of 26-28 February 2008.

25. In the discussion on paragraphs 25-26 of IASMN report CEB/2008/HLCM/3 regarding the applicability of the UN Security Management System to "Headquarters" versus "Field" locations, it was underlined that, while the same paradigm would need to apply to both, it remained important to recognize the difference of kind, not only of degree, as regards security operations at "Headquarters" and "Field" locations. It was also suggested that IASMN's purview should be limited to the "Field" locations.

Conclusions and Action Points

26. The conclusions, action points and recommendations for CEB by HLCM, as developed by the Committee based on a careful review of the IASMN report and on the discussion that followed, are detailed in Annex II. Such conclusions would be transmitted to the Secretary-General and to the Independent Panel on Staff Safety and Security as the HLCM's response to the Secretary-General's memo to Ms. Obaid and Mr. Veness of 22 February 2008 on "Operational Security Issues for consideration by CEB, HLCM and IASMN".

27. The nature and scope of all such recommendations would be subject to review depending on the outcome of the Independent Panel on Staff Safety and Security led by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, including those in connection with staffing requirements. HLCM would hold an inter-sessional meeting soon after the Brahimi report is released to discuss its content and follow-up action.

28. The implementation of HLCM's recommendations would take into account the individual governance structures of HLCM member organizations.

29. With respect to paragraph 38, CEB/2008/HLCM/5, concerning the variety of existing contracts between organizations of the United Nations system and a private emergency medical service provider, the Committee requested its Procurement Network, in consultation with the Chair of IASMN, to review the issue and recommend action.

30. Recognizing that chairmanship of IASMN requires considerable secretariat support, which only UNDSS is in a position to adequately ensure, the Committee recommended that, following internal consultations, IASMN nominate a member organization to act as a Co-Chair. The role of Co-Chair would be rotating among Network members.

IV. Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) of operational activities for development of the United Nations system: Management implications

Document:

- ✓ A/C.2/62/L.63 – (to be issued as General Assembly Resolution A/RES/62/208)
- ✓ HLCP-XV/CRP.4 – DESA Note on the implementation of above GA Resolution on TCPR

31. The Chief, Development Cooperation Policy Branch, Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination, UN/DESA, offered an overview of the TCPR resolution, providing some background and historical references on this document and describing the management process UN/DESA would be leading for the full implementation of the resolution.

32. The representative of UN/DESA explained that, every three years, the General Assembly undertakes a comprehensive review of UN system work at the country level. The resulting TCPR document is a key tool for Member States to provide policy guidance to the UN system development cooperation activities. The objective is to increase the operational relevance, coherence, effectiveness and efficiency of this work. The last TCPR resolution, A/RES/62/208, also provides for a very systematic follow-up process.

33. UN/DESA is responsible for the preparation of a Management Report on the implementation of resolution 62/208, which ECOSOC would be reviewing in July 2008. This year, the General Assembly would conduct a review of the financing of operational activities, and would consider the possibility of moving from a triennial to a quadrennial review of operational activities, in order to ensure that strategic plans of UN Funds and Programmes are guided by the review. Subsequently, in 2009 and 2010, ECOSOC would review the status of implementation of the TCPR resolution.

34. Negotiations of TCPR followed intensive consultations on the recommendations of the Secretary General's High-level Panel on System Wide Coherence. The process resulted in a resolution that is detailed and rich in recommendations, with a strong focus on implementation and on national ownership and leadership. It addresses very concrete recommendations to the UN system, Resident Coordinators, UN Country Teams and Governing Bodies; it also envisions an important role for CEB. The resolution encourages the Secretary-

General, through CEB and UNDG, to make efforts to enhance the coherence, effectiveness and efficiency of the UN system.

35. The TCPR resolution also addresses numerous and important management issues. Together with general calls for results-based-management, accountability and transparency of the UN development system as an integral part of sound management, as well as for harmonization and simplification of rules and procedures, the TCPR resolution includes a number of recommendations with clear links to the current and potential programme of work of HLCM. Among these, the following were highlighted:

a) **Financing**

- Need for a comprehensive data and reporting system on financing of operational activities;
- Linkage of resources with increased effectiveness, efficiency, effectiveness and coherence of the UN development system;

b) **Human Resources**

- Secretary-General to improve the transparency and competitiveness of the recruitment process for senior posts in the UN development system;
- Heads of agencies, funds and programmes to fully cooperate with the Secretary-General, through CEB, in harmonizing recruitment processes for senior staff by 2009;
- UN system to adopt comprehensive policies for human resources and workforce planning and development; Secretary-General to prepare a report identifying human resources challenges within the development system at the country level;
- Secretary-General, through CEB, to intensify efforts on inter-agency staff mobility, re-profiling and training.

c) **Measures related to transaction costs and efficiency**

- Agencies, funds and programmes to accrue to development programme any savings resulting from reductions in transaction and overhead costs;
- Governing Bodies to review cost recovery policies to ensure that core resources do not subsidize projects undertaken through extra-budgetary resources;
- UN system organizations to make further progress on the harmonization of cost recovery policies;
- UN system organizations to continue harmonization efforts such as IPSAS; standardization of audit and ratings; and HACT;
- Agencies, funds and programmes to harmonize and simplify their business practices in the areas of human resources, ERP systems, finance, administration, procurement, security, IT, telecommunications, travel and banking.

d) **ICT**

- UN system organizations to increase usage of ICT to facilitate the contribution of agencies, funds and programmes to the UNDAF, as well as to enhance overall information sharing.
- United Nations development system to continue efforts to strengthen evaluation across the system and to promote a culture of evaluation.

36. In the ensuing discussion, member organizations commented that the TCPR is comprehensive and ambitious and that there is a need to continuously interact with Member States, in particular on issues related to efficiency gains, cost recovery rates and use of administrative savings for programme, in order to make a stronger link between the expectations of Member States and what can be achieved.

Conclusions and Action Points

37. HLCM thanked UN/DESA for the comprehensive briefing. The Committee noted that the management-related recommendations included in the TCPR document had many links to the Plan of Action for the Harmonization of Business Practices. This indicated that HLCM was already acting in line with the TCPR resolution.

38. The various HLCM Networks, in cooperation with relevant undg mechanisms, would conduct a detailed analysis of the TCPR recommendations in their respective areas, with a view to evaluating the feasibility, resource requirements and possible timeframes of any required follow-up actions that were not already part of their programmes of work. Networks would report back on this to HLCM at its next session.

V. HLCM Plan of Action for the Harmonization and Reform of Business Practices

Document:

✓ CEB/2008/HLCM/4

39. The HLCM Vice-Chair (WHO) introduced this agenda item recalling that at the second regular session of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination last October Executive Heads had welcomed the HLCM plan of action for the harmonization and reform of business practices in the United Nations system and had endorsed its methodological framework and implementation modalities.

40. The plan of action had been developed by the relevant HLCM Networks, under the guidance of a Steering Group led by the HLCM Vice-Chair and composed by the Chairs of all HLCM Networks, and had received the approval of the Network membership, where all organizations are represented.

41. Following CEB's approval, the plan of action had been packaged for resource mobilization on an extra-budgetary basis and had been shared with Executive Heads with a view to reconfirming their support to this initiative in order to allow the submission of the Funding Proposal for such plan of action to all Member States, to inform them about the launch of this initiative and to solicit extra-budgetary contributions.

42. The Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chair of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination, had agreed kindly to transmit the Funding Proposal to Member States. He would do so shortly after receiving the Executive Heads' confirmation to go ahead.

43. The Committee was also informed that the HLCM Chair had been invited informally to brief the General Assembly on this initiative during the GA's second resumed session in the spring. This would present a valuable opportunity to provide Member States with greater detail on each initiative and to raise awareness in as open and transparent a manner as possible.

44. During the discussion that followed, a number of refinements regarding working modalities and governance mechanisms for the implementation of the HLCM plan of action were suggested and agreed upon. Corresponding conclusions and action points are summarized below.

45. The staff representatives and the Vice-Chair of the ICSC participated in the discussion, appreciated the work done by the Committee as an important step towards enhanced coherence for better programmatic delivery of the UN system organizations, and assured their support and commitment to the implementation of this initiative.

46. A number of organizations offered their availability to take a primary role in some of the projects still to be assigned to a lead agency. Such offers were appreciated by the Committee and would be formalized following consultations within the relevant HLCM Network and the Business Practices Steering Group, as per normal procedure.

Conclusions and Action Points

47. The Committee approved the launch of the HLCM plan of action for the harmonization and reform of business practices in the UN system, as outlined in document CEB/2008/HLCM/4, integrated with the points that follow.

48. Recognizing the critical role that UN organizations with strong field presence have for the successful achievement of the objectives outlined in the plan of action, the membership of the Steering Group, currently led by the HLCM Vice-Chair and composed by the Chairs of the HLCM Networks and by the Director of the CEB Secretariat, would be expanded to include HLCM representatives of UNDP and UNICEF.

49. HLCM organizations can voluntarily commit their participation in any of the proposed initiatives (cluster approach). Working groups of interested organizations are then formed around the lead agency, which carries ultimate responsibility for delivery of results and retains financial authority over and accountability for the resources allocated to the project for which it is responsible.

50. Financial support for the Plan of Action as one package would be sought from all Member States.

51. The Steering Group, based on input from the full membership of HLCM, gathered in the Networks, would identify "quick win" projects and determine the prioritization and sequencing of all initiatives included in the plan, according to financial resources provided by Member States, with a particular attention to the relevance of projects for the field level. The Plan of Action would evolve to include projects that have not yet been developed, such as the creation of an independent system-wide capacity for evaluations and initiatives that would be proposed by the Legal Network.

52. The HLCM Procurement Network would submit its contribution to the Plan of Action by 4 April, for review and endorsement by the Steering Group.

53. Projects would be grouped in the Business Practices Funding Proposal in three categories: 1) projects ready for implementation; 2) feasibility studies leading to the implementation of one of the alternative options that the study will identify; and 3) feasibility studies whose outcome would determine whether to proceed to any implementation phase or to decide for alternative solutions.

54. The Funding Proposal would highlight its direct link with the mandates outlined in the "Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (TCPR) of operational activities for development of the United Nations system".

55. The channeling of contributions towards the HLCM plan of action would be arranged through the establishment of a separate Trust Fund for Business Practices, administered through the United Nations Secretariat. As an exceptional measure for this particular fund raising initiative, a programme support cost rate of 7% would be applied by the United Nations for the recovery of all indirect costs in connection with the administration of this Trust Fund, as opposed to the regular 13% rate, and with the understanding that all direct costs would be charged to individual project budgets.

56. For projects whose management and implementation would be assigned to a lead agency other than the United Nations or the CEB Secretariat, funds would be channeled through the Trust Fund for Business Practices and then allocated to the lead agency. The United Nations would charge, on an exceptional basis, a pass-through

rate of 1% as “administrative agent”, with a common rate of 7% to be applied by the lead agency for the recovery of all indirect costs. Project budgets included in the final Funding Proposal would be adjusted to reflect the US dollar depreciation.

57. The CEB Secretariat would retain responsibility for central oversight, coordination and reporting for the complete package of projects included in the Business Practices plan of action, preserving unity of direction and central accountability to the CEB membership and to the Member States providing financial support.

VI. UNDG Programme of Work on Management Issues: Coordination with HLCM

58. Continuing an established practice of information sharing and coordination, the Committee was provided with an overview on the recent re-organization and streamlining exercise carried out by UNDG following its integration into the CEB framework, with particular references to activities related to the management area.

59. Ms. Susana Malcorra (WFP), in her capacity as Chair of the former UNDG Management Group and Mr. Ashok Nigam of UNDGO explained that the streamlining exercise had been conducted in an extremely thorough manner and had resulted in a new structure and a programme of work which was rooted in the distinctive competencies and specific mandate of UNDG as the CEB pillar providing support to country-level operations and addressing the integration needs posed by the “Delivering as One” pilots. In carrying out such functions, maximum coordination with HLCM would be pursued on system-wide issues.

60. The Committee underlined that any discussion leading to implications for the system and not limited to the country level, as well as discussions on policy and general guidance, should be channelled through HLCM for comprehensive consideration and buy-in by all UN system organizations. While safeguarding the needs of the pilot projects and, more in general, the requirements for guidance and support emerging from the country level, coordination between HLCM and UNDG on system-wide policies should be ensured upfront. This was considered important to ensure an effective contribution to the discussion and decision-making process by all HLCM member organizations, and to avoid the risk that a late involvement of a broader audience in any discussion be transformed in a ratification of decisions already taken.

61. The Committee also suggested that the TCPR resolution could provide a useful lens through which the operationalization of the revised CEB structure could be seen, and a means to facilitate a clear division of labour between the three pillars of CEB.

Conclusions and Action Points

62. The Committee thanked Ms. Malcorra and Mr. Nigam for presenting the draft UNDG programme of work on management matters and an update on the new proposed UNDG structure and took note of them. HLCM and UNDG would pursue the maximum level of coordination in all management policy and guidance issues with relevance at the system-wide level. In particular, any discussions leading to implications for the UN system would be coordinated through HLCM and its Networks for comprehensive consideration and buy-in, while UNDG would ensure guidance and support for piloting solutions in countries and, more in general, for the requirements emerging from the country level.

VII. HLCM Networks

A) Procurement

63. The Committee received a briefing by the Chair of the Procurement Network (WFP) on the discussion and conclusions of the meeting held in Amman on 12-14 March 2008.

64. In his introductory remarks, the Chair indicated that the Network had been in place for less than a year (it replaced the Inter Agency Procurement Working Group) and that significant work had been done in establishing working modalities to be incorporated in the statute, as well as in developing work plans and priorities. The chosen approach was not to spread the capacity too thin but, instead, to work on things the Network could actually deliver through structured working groups.

65. The Procurement Network was going to record its carbon footprint and aimed at having almost paperless meetings, with audio and video conferences to be used as an operating modality between formal meetings. Secretariat support to the Network was provided by UNDP.

66. Among the activities featuring prominently on the Network's work plan, the following were listed and briefly described:

- (a) UN Global Marketplace (UNGM): this is the result of the collaboration of 23 UN system organizations to harmonize and simplify supplier registration and sourcing processes. The supplier database on the UNGM is available to all UN system and World Bank procurement personnel, and is the main supplier database for the 23 subscribing organizations. A great deal of work is planned to enhance this tool, especially in connection with its potential as a knowledge sharing and e-tendering platform, as well as with the issue of suspect vendors. A project proposal covering the latter UNGM upgrade is being finalized for inclusion in the HLCM Business Practices Plan of Action. A Service Level Agreement is in place with UNOPS as a service provider. A Steering Committee (Chair: WIPO, Members: IFAD, ILO, UNICEF and UN Secretariat, Alternate Members: FAO, UNFPA) provides oversight functions on the UNGM.
- (b) Suspect Vendors: a first proposed way forward on this matter has been agreed upon, taking into account feedback received from the UN Office of Legal Affairs. The administrative procedures from the World Bank could form the basis for a common UN system approach; criteria for qualifying vendors are already "common", while common criteria for "disqualifying" vendors would now have to be agreed upon. The timeframe for finalization of a UN system common approach to suspect vendors was set for end of 2008.
- (c) Vendor Access: a dedicated working group was developing a second project proposal for the HLCM plan of action, mainly aimed at improving access to the UN system by vendors from developing countries.
- (d) Financial Rules and Regulations (FRRs): the Network was actively reviewing the procurement-related paragraphs of the FRRs of all UN system organizations, with a view to providing the Finance and Budget Network with substantive input in the harmonization process currently undertaken by the UN, WFP, UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF. The Procurement Network would complete this effort by June 2008.

- (e) Support to the "Delivering as One" pilots and other country operations: this item was high on the Network's agenda and included a number of activities, support for which would also be sought through the HLCM Plan of Action. Such activities included: improvement of scope and usage of the Practitioners Handbook; and work on generic specifications, procurement tools & training materials, also for requisitioners and other parties involved in the supply chain.
- (f) Professionalization: the Procurement Network would link up with the HR Network to offer its substantive expertise on the issues of job profiles and mobility. Some useful tools like the competency framework and the Practitioners Handbook are already in place, but further work is needed to enhance joint training documentation and delivery, as well as sharing of business processes and practices through the UNGM.
- (g) Environment: the Network is working closely with the Sustainable United Nations (SUN) group and with the Environment Management Group (EMG) through the working groups already in place to produce a practice guide and standard specifications for sustainable procurement. Training modules would be ready by May 2008.

67. While acknowledging the need to prioritize, in the light of the role of the United Nations in capacity development, and of the focus on national ownership and leadership and the move towards the use of national systems, including for procurement, the Procurement Network was encouraged to consider how it could contribute to capacity development of national partners in the area of procurement and, more broadly, of the supply chain management, through capacity assessments and capacity building interventions. The Network was also encouraged to explore possibilities for the harmonization of procurement policies and procedures, which could be part of the procurement practitioners development effort.

Conclusions and Action Points

68. The Committee welcomed the work done by the Procurement Network since its institutionalization within the HLCM framework, and encouraged member organizations to provide active support to the Network in all activities undertaken in this critical area.

69. Recognizing the high value of procurement issues in the HLCM effort towards harmonization of business practices across the UN system, the Committee asked the Network to finalize its proposed contributions to the HLCM Plan of Action by 4 April, so that they could be included in the final version of the Plan, before submission to Member States.

70. The Committee also asked the Network to formalize its programme of work and working procedures and to submit them to its next session in the fall of 2008. The list of expected deliverables and corresponding deadlines provided under paragraph 66 (a) through (g) above will serve as a reference programme of work until the final one would be formalized.

B) Legal Advisors

Document:

✓ CEB/2008/HLCM/6

71. The HLCM Chair invited Mr. Giuliano Pucci, FAO's Legal Counsel and representative of the Legal Network, to introduce a proposal for a systematic consultation procedure with the HLCM Networks on documents having legal implications. The proposal had been developed further to consultations with representatives of the various HLCM Networks as well as with all members of the Legal Network.

72. The Committee appreciated the value of such proposal in ensuring that the adoption of draft recommendations, decisions, policy documents or inter-agency agreements initiated within the framework of HLCM Networks be supported and therefore reinforced by a common legal opinion, which would facilitate consistent and uniform implementation and/or application across the UN system.

73. The Committee was of the opinion that consultation procedures should provide reasonable timelines within which the requested advice would have to be rendered, and underlined the need for full reciprocity in any such consultative mechanisms between HLCM Networks, as well as the importance for representatives of HLCM Networks to always conduct internal consultations with their respective legal offices prior to discussion of substantive matters within the Networks.

74. While recalling that the Legal Network had been endorsed by HLCM, at its 13th session, to become a formal network under the HLCM framework, reporting “... to the Committee regularly, following the model already in place for the other HLCM Networks, i.e. providing a short briefing on the network’s recent activities and referring to the Committee any issues in need of further endorsement/approval”, some organizations were of the opinion that the necessary consensus had not emerged yet among the representatives of the Legal Network on the desired institutional and operational modalities of its relationship with HLCM.



Conclusions and Action Points

75. The Committee encouraged the Legal Network to carry out internal consultations within its full membership with a view to reaching a formal agreement on the structure, working modalities and governance mechanisms of the Network and on its institutional links with HLCM.

76. HLCM indicated its agreement in principle with the systematic consultation procedure presented by the Legal Network, and asked the Network to review its proposal for submission at the next session of the Committee, taking into consideration comments and suggestions received during the discussion.

C) Finance and budget

Document:

✓ CEB/2008/HLCM/7

77. The Committee received a briefing by the Co-Chair of the Finance and Budget Network and Chair of the Task Force on Accounting Standards, Mr. Jay Karia (UN Secretariat), on the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) implementation project, as well as on the most relevant items discussed at the FB Network meeting of 3 March 2008.

78. A priority for the IPSAS team during 2007 had been the development of a ‘stable platform’ of harmonized accounting policies. Accounting guidance during the last six month period had focused on resolution of three outstanding IPSAS guidance issues, guidance on ‘consolidation’ issues, and detailed guidance on specific issues identified during the first half of 2007.

79. Since the last report to HLCM, the project team had made significant progress on the procurement of training packages: it was anticipated that a contract with the winning bidder would be concluded by March 2008. Also, communication with external auditors had been a particular focus throughout 2007, because of the importance of support required from auditors during IPSAS implementation.

80. Overall, good IPSAS adoption progress continued at both the system-wide and individual organization level. For a number of organizations critical steps required to be in place by the end of 2007 remained at an

early stage of implementation. Should an organization need more time than the 2010 target date allows, then this fact should be recognized early enough to allow a stable roll-out of the organization's IPSAS adoption project and, at the system-wide level, to allow clear communication and coordination with respect to IPSAS adoption.

81. After the IPSAS progress report, the Controller of the United Nations informed the Committee that an important meeting on the Financial Management Framework Agreement (FAFA) with the European Commission was planned for 10-11 April 2008. The most critical item under discussion would be the single audit principle in connection with contributions to UN system organizations by the EC. Negotiations would take into consideration the difficulties that may be encountered by the EC to completely remove from the existing FAFA the so-called "verification clause", which is a *de facto* audit, since this clause is part of the EC's Financial Regulations and Rules and, at the same time, the need by UN system organizations to find appropriate mechanisms to implement the clause in a manner that is compatible with the single audit principle and with their internal financial management requirements. A preparatory meeting would be held on 9 April to develop a common position of UN system organizations.

82. A UNDG Controllers Group composed of the United Nations, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and WFP was working towards the harmonization of the Financial Rules and Regulations of this subset of UN system organizations. It was foreseen that, upon completion of this first stage, this effort of harmonization would be expanded to the rest of the UN system organizations. A project to this end has been included in the HLCM Business Practices Plan of Action. A first draft version of the harmonized Financial Rules and Regulations would be shared with the organizations that are not part of the current working group after reflecting input received from the UN Office of Legal Affairs.

83. The FB Network considered and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations of its Working Group on Cost Recovery Policies (reactivated in 2007), led by UNESCO, which built on the work of its Task Force on Costs Categorization, led by FAO. The Working Group reached the conclusion that UN Organizations were willing to harmonize their cost recovery policies, but that the proposed harmonization should encompass the PSC rate together with the other components of the project budgets, in order not to undermine the capacities of organizations to deliver the expected results. In the short term, in order to best respond to situations in the "Delivering as one" pilots, where PSC rates are *de facto* harmonized at reduced levels, the Working Group made recommendations on the cost items which should/could be budgeted and recovered as staff costs (direct costs of the projects), other direct costs, and the typical types of services that are covered by the PSC rate of most UN system organizations. Harmonization goals were also identified for the medium to long-term, such as: the link between an organization's ability to reduce its PSC rates and (i) the level of its fixed indirect costs, particularly at the country level, and (ii) the size of its projects (economies of scales); and the establishment of common price lists.

84. A joint HLCM-UNDG session of consultations between a subset on FB Network member organizations, namely UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA and WFP, interested specialized agencies and non-resident agencies, and the UN, with the participation of the World Bank, was planned for 4 April 2008, in New York. The work of this subgroup would build on the conclusions and recommendations of the FB Network Working Group on Cost Recovery Policies, and would report to HLCM through the FB Network.

85. Specialized agencies expressed concern at the movement towards a lower cost recovery rate, especially for many joint initiatives with a recovery rate of 7% and suggested that the FB Network revisit this issue and report back to HLCM. Many of the specialized agencies have been mandated by their Governing Bodies to recover costs from voluntary contributions at a rate of 13%, which too was considered inadequate to cover the indirect costs. It was also suggested that this item be discussed in greater depth at the next HLCM.

86. Finally, the Co-Chair of the FB Network joined the Co-Chair of the HR Network in committing to work in a coordinated manner on subjects where both technical competencies were required, especially where decisions or recommendations would have financial implications for member organizations. Among these, the issue of

Long Term Care and the review of the current mechanism and functioning of the Appendix D to the Staff Rules, governing "Compensation in the Event of Death, Injury or Illness Attributable to the Performance of Official Duties on Behalf of the United Nations".

Conclusions and Action Points

87. The Committee took note with appreciation of the extensive work carried out by the FB Network, noted the progress report on the IPSAS project and invited the Task Force on Accounting Standards and the IPSAS Project Team to report again to HLCM at its next session.

D) Human resources

88. The HR Network Spokesperson (UNESCO) briefed HLCM on the discussion conducted by the Network at its 15th session, held in Rome on 12-14 March 2008.

89. Support to the "Delivering as One" pilots was identified as one of the priority areas in the programme of work of the Network. A video conference was held during the session with two of the pilot countries, Tanzania and Vietnam, with the participation of UNDG. Both country teams requested the urgent assistance and involvement of the HR Network with various HR constraints and problems, identified as follows:

- Differences in remuneration and benefits resulting from the variety of contracts used for locally recruited staff;
- Issues of inequity for staff performing similar functions but ranked at different levels as a result of different standards in post classification and grading;
- Alignment and integration of Performance Appraisal Systems;
- Review and harmonization of the role and functions of staff representatives in the field.

90. The HR Network would establish a dedicated working group which would deal with "Delivery as One" issues with a two-fold approach: in a first phase it would address "quick win" issues, and in a second phase it would concentrate on policy issues that are linked to staff rules and need longer-term solutions.

91. Other key issues reviewed by the HR Network during its meeting included:

- (a) **Inter-Agency Mobility Accord:** Organizations are experiencing problems in the implementation of the Inter -Agency Mobility Accord approved by HLCM in 2005. By offering multiple options and allowing flexibility, the application on the Accord can result in inconsistencies. Also, the implementation is not yet system-wide. A joint Legal and HR Network working group would review existing concerns and propose agreeable solutions.
- (b) **Long Term Care:** a joint working group with the FB Network is being formed to explore the opportunity of developing a common approach to providing Long Term care insurance coverage as part of the overall social insurance, with particular attention to the financial implications.
- (c) **UN Cares Programme:** the Programme is funded with contributions from 15 organizations and amounting to US\$1,316,000 for 2008. Its continuation would depend on the confirmed commitment by these organizations and others to provide funding for the upcoming years.
- (d) **Dual Career and Staff Mobility Programme:** as agreed by HLCM in 2007, the administration and management of the Programme would be transferred from WFP to the CEB Secretariat as of April

2008. There are now 15 participating organizations which made financial commitments for 2008-2009. The Network encouraged all organizations to join the Programme.

- (e) **Work/Life Balance:** the CEB Secretariat has finalized a report identifying work/life balance initiatives in place within the UN system and making further recommendations on adopting best practices. The HR Network would review the report and present recommendations to HLCM at its next session.
- (f) **Guidelines on employment of persons with disabilities:** the Network reviewed draft guidelines on employment of persons with disabilities, covering four areas: reasonable accommodation; working environment; management of disability in the workplace, and confidentiality of information. The Network would finalize the guidelines with input from the Medical, Legal and FB Networks, and report back to HLCM at its next session.
- (g) **Senior Management Network Learning Programme (SMNP):** the first cohort of the SMNP took place at the end of November 2007. Based on the generally negative feedback received from participants, including the assessment by the Staff College, a proposal for a major re-design of the programme was developed by the Staff College and endorsed by the HR Network.

92. In the ensuing discussion on the Senior Management Network Learning Programme, strong concerns were expressed regarding the negative assessment of the programme's first cohort. Many organizations suggested they would not be willing to commit to a re-design as proposed by the Staff College.

93. The HLCM acknowledged the critical importance of addressing the long standing need to improve leadership and management across the United Nations system, to support the present effort to increase system-wide coherence through harmonized business practices, and to promote a common corporate culture with a renewed framework of responsibility, authority and accountability. Consensus emerged on the need to carry out a deeper assessment of the first cohort of the SMNP, in light of the objectives originally set by CEB.

94. The newly appointed Secretary of CEB, recognizing the importance of the subject under discussion, assured his personal engagement in any effort by the Committee to put in place a successful programme for training and development of the senior management of the UN system.

Conclusions and Action Points

95. The Committee thanked the HR Network for the extensive work it is undertaking, and suggested that an effort of prioritization be made in order to ensure that adequate consideration be given to issues to be addressed, depending of their urgency and importance.

96. On the Senior Management Network Leadership Programme, a Steering Group with a strong oversight role and decision-making authority would be formed with representatives of HLCM and of the Staff College, and including the Spokespersons of the HR Network. The Steering Group would be tasked with the following specific mandates:

- Undertake a comprehensive assessment of the Senior Management Leadership Programme in light of the objectives originally set by CEB;
- Examine the various options available to meet such objectives, including a minor re-readjustment of the current Programme, a major re-design as proposed by the Staff College, and alternative leadership development tools and modalities, either internally-developed or partly/entirely outsourced;
- Assess the capacity and availability of the Staff College to undertake the implementation of any suggested options;

- Develop recommendations for HLCM, to be considered at an inter-sessional meeting of the Committee.

97. The Committee highly appreciated the commitment towards the requirements of the "Delivering as One" pilots, and supported the two-phase approach adopted by the Network to deal with "quick wins" that can be implemented in the short-term, as well as with more complex issues that would require longer discussions and policy changes.

98. Re-iterating its support for the UN Cares Programme, HLCM strongly encouraged organizations to commit financial resources for the continuation of this Programme in their budgets for the biennium 2010-2011, and requested the UN Cares Global Coordinator to submit formal letters towards this end to HLCM member organizations.

99. Recognizing the value of a good balance between working life and personal/family life of UN system staff, also in terms of efficiency and effectiveness gains for the organizations they belong to, the Committee strongly encouraged all its members to promote and implement work/life balance within their organizations. HLCM would await recommendations by the HR Network on the adoption of best practices in this domain.

E) Information and communication technology

100. The Chair of the ICT Network briefed the Committee on the three major areas of activity and discussions within the Network: the Plan of Action for Harmonization and Reform of Business Practices, the data communications study and collaboration with UNDG. Regarding the business practices proposals, the ICT Network Chair noted that much of its recent work focused on this subject, with the lead agencies working to refine the proposals and commence planning activities pending the arrival of funding.

101. The ICT Network Chair then informed the Committee that the Network remained unable to commence its study on common data communications services due to the extraordinary amount of time it has taken to collect the funds from agencies. She reported, however, that the final contributions were confirmed in the past week and that the only remaining obstacle was the finalization of the MOU between the CEB Secretariat and UNICEF, the procuring agency. The Chair concluded her remarks by reporting on the excellent collaborative efforts between the ICT Network and the UNDG Working Group on ICT, especially in the area of country-level ICT coherence.

☞ Conclusions and Action Points

102. The Committee thanked the ICT Network for its work and asked to finalize the Network's discussion regarding nominations for lead agencies on the ICT projects included in the Business Practices Plan of Action.

VIII. Status of ERP implementation across the system

Document:

✓ CEB/2008/HLCM/XV/INF.2

103. The Vice-Chair of the Committee (WHO) introduced this agenda item noting that the report before the Committee on the recently-conducted survey on the subject was intended to allow organizations to be more fully aware of current activities across the system in this critical management area.

104. During the discussion, the Chair of the ICT Network (WFP) noted that, from a technical standpoint, many organizations were already practicing cross-fertilization, and quoted WFP's experience of leveraging the

work done by UNICEF for its own SAP implementation as one example. She underlined that more work was needed in the sharing and harmonization of the underlying business processes. Also noted in the discussion was the need to ensure that the few organizations who have not already implemented an ERP took full advantage of the range of existing implementations, as well as the need to identify areas where organizations can begin to evaluate opportunities for common services in specific functions, with payroll presented as one example. Finally, the Committee stressed the importance for organizations that use the three major applications (SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft) to intensively share experiences on the implementation and usage of such platforms. One organization for each of the three major applications should be nominated as lead agency for the ERP-related project in the Plan of Action for Business Practices.

Conclusions and Action Points

105. The Committee encouraged organizations that have adopted the same ERP systems to intensify the sharing of information and experiences on implementation challenges and process and business issues. This would provide an opportunity for organizations which are advanced in the setting up of the ERP systems to provide advice and support to those who are beginning this process; therefore possibly save time and costs as well.

106. The Committee called upon the ICT Network to identify potential member and leading organizations for the project on: "Harmonization of ERP operational and administrative practices and processes" within the HLCM Business Practices Plan of Action, so that all three major software packages (SAP, Oracle and PeopleSoft) are best leveraged for maximum synergies across the UN system.

IX. Institutional links between HLCM and the Representatives of Internal Audit Services of the United Nations System (UN-RIAS)

Document:

✓ CEB/2008/HLCM/8

107. The Committee considered a proposal prepared by the representative of UN-RIAS (UNICEF) as per request of HLCM at its 14th session on the modalities and mechanisms for UN-RIAS' participation in the HLCM framework.

108. It was recalled that UN-RIAS is an affiliation of chief audit executives of United Nations system organizations. UN-RIAS provides a framework and a forum to promote the development and exchange of UN internal audit and oversight related practices and experience, and the collaboration on and identification of the common positions of its members, to add value to their organisations and to enhance the professional capacities of its members. UN-RIAS is a part of RIAS, the Representatives of Internal Audit Services of United Nations organizations and multilateral financial institutions and other associated intergovernmental organizations. RIAS is an autonomous and independent forum that is accountable to its members only. Compliance with RIAS decisions is voluntary.

109. UN-RIAS' proposal provided for the UN-RIAS and HLCM to promote the exchange of experience and knowledge on areas of common interest. The partnership arrangement recognized the mutual benefit of working together to promote coherent, efficient and cost-effective oversight and management of the organizations of the UN system. The working arrangement recognized UN-RIAS as the audit and oversight forum that brings together those responsible for the oversight and audit of organizations of the United Nations system; it also recognized the HLCM as the Committee comprised of the most senior administrative managers of the organizations of the United Nations system, to which UN-RIAS wishes to address itself.

110. In the ensuing discussion, it was underlined that the list of indicative areas of common interest outlined in CEB/2008/HLCM/8 was, indeed, indicative, and could be expanded to include any current or emerging issues that both UN-RIAS and HLCM would consider appropriate to consider jointly, such as, for example, IPSAS implementation and harmonization of Financial Rules and Regulations.

111. The experience of some organizations also suggested that external reviews of the internal audit functions could be valid means to develop authoritative and legitimate recommendations for governance and structural arrangements of such functions that are in accordance with best practice and can provide valuable support to management.

Conclusions and Action Points

112. The Committee confirmed its support for strengthened institutional links between HLCM and the Representatives of Internal Audit Services of the United Nations System (UN-RIAS), and approved the conceptual framework and the *modus operandi* of the HLCM/UN-RIAS working arrangement, as outlined in CEB/2008/HLCM/8.

113. The recommendations and decisions that would result from the exchange of practices and experience between UN-RIAS and HLCM would not be binding for their respective members. UN-RIAS and the HLCM would remain accountable to their own constituencies and would not receive instructions from each other.

X. Mobility/portability of pension benefits & impact of currency fluctuations

114. The Committee received a briefing by the Controller of the United Nations on two issues:

- Mobility/portability of pension benefits, and
- Impact of a weakening US\$ on pension benefits.

115. The most recent actuarial valuation, carried out in December 2007, confirmed the Pension Fund's strongly funded status, with an actuarial surplus that is expected to be around 3%. Within the bounds of actuarial possibilities, to be assessed also in light of the recent negative performance of financial markets, some measures to improve benefits or to reduce contributions – or both – could be considered by the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board at its upcoming Rome meeting.

116. Among the possible measures that could be considered, the following were briefly outlined:

- Reduction of the current five-year threshold for the development of the right to regular benefits;
- Re-indexation of deferred benefits - an economy measure introduced some years ago currently makes the deferred benefit option financially non-viable;
- Right to buy contributions from other pension systems – this possibility has been agreed by the Board in the past but it is not in the Fund's regulations;
- Improved adjustments for inflation;
- Additional measures to promote portability of pension benefits – a mandatory element in pension systems of many Member States.

117. Regarding the weakening of the US dollar, notably *vis-a-vis* the Euro, the Committee joined the UN Controller in acknowledging that this situation was creating an issue of serious generational and geographical

inequity among UN staff, and that representatives of UN system organizations and of the staff would need to address such concern with the highest attention at the upcoming meeting of the Pension Board.

118. In this respect, the completion of an actuarial study on the double track system of pension adjustment was becoming urgent. Also, knowledgeable of the fact that pension is a replacement value for the salary, it was underlined that any longer term review of the UN pension system would have to cover the whole compensation system of UN system staff, not the pensions only.

119. The UN Controller underlined that the transfer of After Service Health Insurance (ASHI) liabilities was an important issue in connection with staff mobility, and that the funding of such liabilities was unrelated to pension benefits: ASHI beneficiaries are a different group than pension beneficiaries, and UN system organizations are in very different situations with respect to the funding of ASHI liabilities.

120. Finally, several organizations stressed the importance of considering interim measures to address the urgent concerns in connection with the weakening of the US dollar, including UNJSPF voluntary contributory programmes for staff and retirees who wish to protect themselves against currency fluctuations.

Conclusions and Action Points

121. The Committee recommended that the representatives of Executive Heads at the upcoming Rome meeting of the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board pursue, within the bounds of actuarial possibilities, proposals for:

- (a) changes which would promote staff mobility through improved portability of pension benefits; and
- (b) changes to the pension adjustment system to ameliorate the effects of the weakened US dollar pending an overall review of such structural adjustments as may be required in United Nations Pension arrangements to respond to any long term changes in the foreign exchange value of the US dollar.

XI. Standards of accommodation for air travel in the UN system

Document:

✓ CEB/2008/HLCM/XV/INF.1

122. Consideration of the standards of accommodation for air travel in the UN system had been included in the agenda of the Committee as a follow up to the recent request (A/62/563/Add.1) by the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly to:

“...the Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chairman of the Chief Executives Board, to report on the feasibility of harmonizing standards of travel for staff members, members of organs and subsidiary organs of the United Nations and organizations of the United Nations system, on the basis of a review and proposals by the Chief Executives Board, taking due consideration of the specificity of the work and mandates of the different entities of the system”.

123. As summarized in document CEB/2008/HLCM/XV/INF.1, the General Assembly consideration of system-wide harmonization of the standards of travel goes back many years. Recent discussions of the issue began with a Fifth Committee consideration of a 2004 report of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU/REP/2004/10) and of the CEB comments thereon. The resolution that emerged, A/RES/60/255, had called upon the Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chairman of CEB, to initiate a review of the standards of travel with a view to adopting a common policy.

124. As part of the review, CEB had conducted a survey on the existing standards of travel throughout the UN system, the results of which are outlined in Secretary-General's report A/61/801 of 15 March 2007. In considering the SG's report, the ACABQ concluded (A/62/351) that CEB had not fully responded to the mandate of A/RES/60/255, and reiterated its recommendation that:

"...the Secretary-General be requested to submit a comprehensive report, on the basis of a CEB review and specific proposals, with a view to harmonizing standards of travel for staff of the United Nations common system, indicating the measures that can be implemented under the authority of the Secretary-General, as well as those that will require the approval of the General Assembly (see A/60/78/Add.1, para. 4). These should take into account the study of the International Civil Service Commission on the subject (see A/60/78/Add.1, para. 2) and the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit (see A/60/78), as well as the various recommendations made by the Advisory Committee and the decisions taken by the General Assembly in this regard."

125. The ICSC study had concluded recommending business class for flights longer than 6 hours, underlining that this matter was, in any case, under the purview of organizations' Governing Bodies.

Conclusions and Action Points

126. The Committee agreed to conduct a system-wide discussion with a view to developing a common recommendation on harmonized standards of air travel, taking due consideration of the specificity of the work and mandates of the different entities of the system on this matter. This task would be carried out through the establishment of a joint HR/FB Network working group, in consultation with any appropriate technical body.

127. The working group would build on the recommendations and conclusions of ICSC, JIU and Medical Doctors, as well as on comparative analysis of standards applicable in Member States and in other international organizations. Resulting recommendations would have to cover all travel-related entitlements, such terminal expenses and rest and recuperation, and would have to be supported by an analysis of the financial implications.

XII. Any other business

A) Update by the Environment Management Group (EMG) on the UN Climate-neutral project

128. The Director of the Environment Management Group (EMG) (UNEP) recalled that, at the CEB second regular session in October 2007, Heads of the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes had committed themselves *"to moving their respective organizations towards climate neutrality in headquarters and UN centres for their facility operations and travel"*.

129. In particular, by the end of 2009 UN system organizations would:

- Estimate their greenhouse gas emissions consistent with accepted international standards;
- Undertake efforts to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to the extent possible; and
- Analyze the cost implications and explore budgetary modalities- including consulting with governing bodies as needed - of purchasing carbon offsets to eventually reach climate neutrality.

130. This commitment was made with a view to achieving the goal of climate neutrality at a date to be set in the future, by reducing emissions first and then offsetting the remainder through the purchase of offsets.

131. The Director of EMG noted the importance of the United Nations system leading by example, and underlined that this initiative was both symbolically important and administratively possible. He also informed that EMG was already working in support of this process on a number of related initiatives, like the SUN (Sustainable United Nations), in collaboration with the HLCM Procurement Network.

132. The Committee was also informed that, in a successfully coordinated and highly-visible initiative, the Bali meeting on Climate Change had set an example of climate-neutrality through the purchase of carbon offsets for all meeting-related emissions.

133. In the discussion that followed, some organizations suggested that extra-budgetary funding could be sought for activities and interventions for sustainable climate neutrality, not only for one-time initiatives.

Conclusions and Action Points

134. The Committee thanked EMG for the briefing, and re-iterated its support for the United Nations Climate-neutral project.

B) Dates and venue for next HLCM session

135. The dates for the next session of the Committee would be determined shortly, with due regard to avoiding overlapping with organizations' Governing Body meetings, and taking into consideration document submission requirements for the second regular session of CEB, scheduled for 24-25 October 2008.

136. As per normal practice, the next HLCM session would take place at a venue in North-America. The Chair encouraged organizations that would be willing to host the meeting, to inform the CEB Secretariat accordingly.

C) Closing remarks

137. In her closing remarks, the HLCM Chair congratulated Ms. Susana Malcorra on her appointment as Under-Secretary-General, Head of the Department of Field Support, United Nations Secretariat. The Committee joined the Chair in applauding the tremendous contribution Ms. Malcorra had consistently provided to the work of HLCM through her leadership in the ICT Network and through her active and constructive participation in all the meetings and follow-up initiatives of the Committee.

Annex I – List of Participants

Chairperson: Ms. Thoraya Obaid (UNFPA)
 Vice-Chair: Mr. Denis Aitken (WHO)
 Acting Secretary: Mr. Remo Lalli (CEB Secretariat)

| Organization | Name – Title – Division |
|----------------|--|
| United Nations | Mr. David Veness Under-Secretary-General, Department of Safety and Security |
| | Ms. Jan Beagle Deputy Director-General, United Nations Office at Geneva |
| | Mr. Warren Sach Assistant Secretary-General and Controller |
| | Ms. Diana Russler Deputy to the USG for Safety and Security |
| | Mr. Jay Karia Director, Division of Accounts |
| | Mr. Igor Mitrokhin Chief, Threat and Risk Unit, Department of Safety and Security |
| ILO | Ms. Patricia O'Donovan Executive Director, Management and Administration |
| FAO | Mr. Manoj Juneja Assistant Director-General Department of Human, Financial and Physical Resources |
| UNESCO | Mr. Amine Khene Assistant Director-General for Administration |
| | Ms. Dyane Dufresne-Klaus Director, Bureau of Human Resources Management |
| | Ms. Yolande Valle Director, Bureau of Budget |
| WHO | Mr. Denis Aitken Assistant Director-General, Representative of the Director-General for Partnerships and UN Reform |
| | Ms. Namita Pradhan Assistant Director-General, General Management |
| ICAO | Ms. Fang Liu Director, Bureau of Administration and Services |
| UPU | Mr. Michael Mauer Director, Human Resources |
| World Bank | Ms. Autumn Hottle Global Security Operations Coordinator, Office of Corporate Security, |

| Organization | Name – Title – Division |
|--------------|--|
| IMF | Mr. Frank Harnischfeger Director, Technology and General Services Department |
| ITU | Ms. Yajaira Freudiger Chief, HR Administration Division |
| IMO | Mr. Andrew Winbow Director, Administrative Division |
| WIPO | Ms. Magdi Bona Head, Budget Section, Office of the Controller |
| IFAD | Ms. Jessie Rose Mabutas Assistant President, Finance and Administration Department |
| | Ms. Theresa Panuccio Director, Administrative Services |
| | Mr. Carlo Borghini Controller |
| | Mr. Jose Stigliano Director, Management Information Systems |
| UNIDO | Ms. Amita Misra Director, Financial Services Branch, Division of Administration |
| | Mr. Ranko Vujacic Director, Operational Support Services Branch Programme Support and General Management Division |
| UNWTO | Mr. Peter Shackleford Director, Administration Division |
| IAEA | Mr. David Waller Deputy Director-General and Head of Management |
| UNDP | Ms. Akiko Yuge Assistant Administrator and Director of Bureau of Management (BOM) |
| | Ms. Irina Stavenscaia , Planning Advisor, BOM |
| UNICEF | Mr. Omar Abdi Deputy Executive Director |
| | Ms. Cecilia Lotse Director, Governance, UN & Multilateral Affairs |

| Organization | Name – Title – Division |
|--------------|--|
| UNFPA | Ms. Thoraya Obaid Executive Director |
| | Mr. Subhash K. Gupta Director, Division for Management Services |
| | Mr. Klaus Beck Special Assistant to the Deputy Executive Director (Management) |
| UNHCR | Mr. L. Craig Johnstone Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNOV/UNODC | Mr. Franz Baumann Deputy Director-General, UNOV and Deputy Executive Director, UNODC |
| WFP | Ms. Susana Malcorra Deputy Executive Director |
| UN-HABITAT | Mr. Antoine King Director, Programme Support Division |
| UNEP | Mr. Theodor Kapiga Officer-in-charge, Corporate Services Section |
| UNAIDS | Ms. Deborah Landey Deputy Executive Director |
| ITC | Ms. Eva K. Murray Director, Division of Programme Support |
| UNOPS | Mr. Vitaly Vanshelboim Deputy Executive Director |
| WTO | Mr. Miguel Figuerola Director, Human Resources Division |
| CTBTO | Mr. John Sequeira Director, Division of Administration |
| UNSSC | Mr. Carlos Lopes Director a.i. |
| | Mr. Paolo Ceratto Deputy Director, Administration and Management |
| UN-DESA | Ms. Marion Barthelemy Chief, Development Coordination Policy Branch Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination |
| UN-RIAS | Mr. Claus Andreasen Director, Internal Audit, UNICEF |
| UNDGO | Mr. Ashok Nigam Associate Director |
| EMG | Mr. Janos Pasztor Director |

| Organization | Name – Title – Division |
|---------------------|---|
| ICSC | Mr. Wolfgang Stoeckl Vice-Chairman |
| CCISUA | Mr. Nasr Ishak Vice-President |
| | Mr. Philip Scarr Deputy Chairperson, FSU Brindisi |
| FICSA | Mr. Edmond Mobio President |
| | Ms. Valérie Seguin General Secretary |
| HR Network | Ms. Dyane Dufresne-Klaus Director, Bureau of Human Resources Management, UNESCO |
| FB Network | Mr. Jay Karia Director, Division of Accounts, United Nations |
| ICT Network | Ms. Susana Malcorra Deputy Executive Director, WFP |
| Legal Network | Mr. Giuliani Pucci Assistant Director-General, Legal Counsel, FAO |
| | Ms. Patricia Georget Legal Officer, Office of the Legal Counsel, United Nations |
| Procurement Network | Mr. Dominik Heinrich Director, a.i., Management Services Division, WFP |
| CEB Secretary | Mr. Thomas Stelzer Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Coordination and Inter-Agency affairs United Nations |
| CEB Secretariat | Mr. Adnan Admin Director |
| | Mr. Kamran Kousari Principal Inter-Agency Advisor on Policy Coordination |
| | Mr. Remo Lalli Acting Secretary, HLCM |
| | Ms. Marta Lechner-Boyce Senior Inter-Agency Advisor, HR Management |
| | Mr. Ken Herman Senior Inter-Agency Advisor, ICT |
| | Ms. Cristina Milano Associate Expert |

Annex II – Security and Safety of UN system Staff

Recommendations by HLCM for transmission to CEB

The High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) at its 15th session of 17-18 March 2008 considered the report of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) meeting of 26-28 February 2008 and identified a number of issues for transmission to CEB. The HLCM also noted that there are a number of urgent issues which fall within the purview of the IASMN and encouraged IASMN to proceed with implementation, given the urgency of the matter.

HLCM points out that the HLCM and IASMN reports would be submitted to the Independent Panel on Staff Safety and Security led by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi. It also recognizes that the nature and scope of all the recommendations in both reports, including those related to staffing requirements, would be subject to review depending on the outcome of the Independent Panel.

The implementation of HLCM's recommendations would take into account the individual governance structures of HLCM member organizations.

BROAD STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Security and safety of staff of UN system organizations should be treated as one of the highest priorities, requiring the urgent attention and commitment of Executive Heads.
2. UN system organizations should act cohesively on all actions and recommendations that will be formulated both as a result of the inter-agency discussion of this matter, and of the outcome of the Independent Panel.
3. Security must be considered as an integral part of every activity undertaken by the organizations of the UN system. Staff security and safety aspects should be included in the earliest stages of planning at all levels and especially at the country level.
4. Security risk assessment should be conducted regularly by the SMT through the Chief Security Advisor at all duty stations at country, capital and sub-office/deep field location levels to ensure that the requisite mitigating measures are identified and implemented. This should be done in accordance with a structured risk management strategy, which would take into consideration the delivery of programmatic mandates, staff security and safety at all levels, in accordance with the specificities of security requirements of individual organizations.

5. Any risk management framework should provide for the different types of risks linked to the variety of mandates of UN system organizations, as current and future security challenges are not and will be not solely linked to terrorism and criminality, including cyber criminality, but also to conflict situations, to diseases and to an increasing number of natural and manmade disasters, including those resulting from climate change. Security-related assessments and analyses should also cater for sociological and cultural variables.
6. Recognizing that a risk management strategy involves the acceptance of a certain level of risk by both the employer and the employee, HLCM recommends that the Independent Panel consider an urgent review of the entitlements (for injuries suffered, or for the families in the case of deceased staff members) associated with various contractual arrangements in place, to ensure that personnel, including national project staff and temporary contract holders, are compensated commensurate with the security risk they are being asked to bear. The Human Resources Network is available to offer its technical expertise to support such effort.
7. Risk management training programmes for managers and staff should be implemented as critical steps in managing risk and crises. The risk model developed by UNICEF offers a good starting point for consistent application under the aegis of UNDSS, considering generic and specific risk factors applicable to each of the UN system organizations.
8. The UN system should project itself as an impartial actor to facilitate conflict resolution, both from a substantive and from an external communication perspective, without prejudice to its duty to pronounce itself on violations to the principles of the UN Charter.

FUNDING

9. Member States should be engaged with UN system organizations to ensure that security is provided with appropriate and sustainable funding, including through the establishment of an appropriate framework for extra-budgetary funding of safety and security based on an objective assessment of needs in this field.
10. Consideration of alternative sources of funding for security-related requirements should be consistent with the principle that security and safety is an integral part of any programme, project or activity of the UN system organization, and that the corresponding costs should be fully transparent, as well as clearly identifiable in their fixed versus variable nature.
11. Analysis of funding sources should be developed taking into consideration alternative business models. Financial support from public and private channels should be sought, as appropriate. The FB Network, in consultation with IASMN, can assist in identifying alternative budgetary and programming mechanisms for inclusion of security-related resources in programme costs.
12. IASMN should consolidate a list, for consideration by HLCM, of estimated financial implications of all previous recommendations arising from the reviews, investigations, lessons learned and studies conducted on the UN security management system, including summary list of all activities in need of funding submitted to or recommended by HLCM.

GOVERNANCE OF THE UN SECURITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

13. HLCM recommends that Executive Heads re-affirm their commitment to the established governance mechanism for the UN security management system, i.e. the IASMN, HLCM, and CEB.
14. Executive Heads should ensure that the Framework for Accountability for the United Nations security management system, as adopted by both the CEB and the General Assembly, is fully and actively implemented, is periodically reviewed and updated to include lessons learned, and that all aspects of its implementation are auditable.
15. Executive Heads should ensure that appropriate disciplinary measures are taken against those individuals who are in breach of policies, procedures and practices of the UN security management system, and that reports are produced regularly on such actions taken. IASMN should develop proposals for a range of appropriate measures, to be considered within the context of the regulatory framework in place for each organization.
16. Executive Heads should finalize the model supplementary agreement that has been circulated to all agencies, to be signed by the Designated Official on behalf of the UN system, so that Member States at the country level can be engaged to put in place such supplementary agreements, outlining their specific responsibilities on safety and security of UN system personnel and premises.
17. Senior security managers/security focal points should have immediate and unimpeded access to executive level management in the UN system and should be provided with adequate resources, both human and financial, to enable them to discharge their responsibilities under the Accountability Framework. IASMN should provide guidance on the level and nature of resource requirements.

ACTIONS FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION

18. Planning of Training: the HR Network, in consultation with IASMN and the UNSSC, to formulate costed plans of action to ensure that the appropriate level and amount of training is provided to all Designated Officials prior to their deployment. It is also recommended to include safety and security in the assessment programme for the UN Resident Coordinators who are the Designated Officials in the majority of countries with the UN presence.
19. Training: UNDSS to develop urgently training programmes for Executive Heads and their Managers at the headquarters, regional and country levels on adoption and implementation of a Risk Management Strategy.
20. MOSS: IASMN, through its already established working group, to examine the MOSS with a view to further refining and redesigning it, to make it more effective.
21. Telecommunications and information technology systems: ICT Network, in consultation with IASMN, to prepare a costed plan of action to put in place commercially available secure telecommunications and information technology systems which are compatible across the UN

system and with full inter-connectivity and inter-operability at all levels, in support of risk and security- related issues.

22. MORSS: The HR Network to review MORSS arrangements with a view to clarifying the domain of their application.
23. Review of past incidents: HR offices of UN system organizations to undertake a review of the 269 families of victims who have lost their lives to malicious acts since 1992 to determine the lessons learned and to develop strategies for the future. The HR Network would coordinate such review.
24. Review of past incidents: all organizations collect and forward to DSS all the data regarding security-related incidents which might have been captured by insurance, medical and buildings managers, so that a comprehensive data base on security casualties across the UN system can be established and maintained on a regular and consistent basis.
25. Financial and psychosocial support: the HR Network, in consultation with the FB Network and IASMN, as well as with the network of stress counsellors, to develop a proposal to improve and harmonize financial and psychosocial support for survivors and families in the event of a crisis, building on lessons learned from the attacks in Algiers and Baghdad.
26. UN Security Information Management System: IASMN to prepare an updated project plan, with costs, for the development, implementation and maintenance of a UN Security Information Management System. Such system would also provide the necessary tool for sharing information and statistics on security casualties across the spectrum of UN entities and activities to support a more comprehensive analysis of the types of risks UN staff face.
27. Premises: DSS, in consultation with the UNDG Working Group on Common Premises, to facilitate support to the Designated Official and the SMT with specialized expertise to review and assess the status of the existent and new UN premises from the safety and security point of view and suggest mitigating measures, based on security risk assessments. Such reviews and assessments should also offer Designated Officials and individual SMT members the necessary guidance for their decisions on the adoption of common vs. separate premises. Decision making on UN premises should be elevated to the Headquarters level based on the recommendation of the Designated Official.
28. Aviation Safety: ICAO to advise DSS on the options and corresponding costs for the provision of system-wide guidance on aviation safety, including on available solutions internal to the UN system.

ISSUED RELATED TO THE DESIGNATED OFFICIAL SYSTEM FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL

HLCM is of the opinion that a review of the Designated Official system is of an immediate need. In this respect the Committee highlighted a number of issues for consideration by the Independent Panel.

29. In order for any risk management strategy to be successful, it requires that information be provided on a timely and accurate basis at the country level. In this regard, the possibility that a security analyst be employed as part of the DSS team to support Designated Officials and Security

Management Teams in the gathering, analysis and dissemination of relevant information should be considered.

30. Where there are existing Joint Mission Analysis Centres (JMACs) and/or Security Information Operation Cell (SIOCs), the terms of reference and remits for these entities would need to be broadened to ensure that they are operating on an inter-organizational and inter-departmental basis.
 31. In light of the discrepancies in the application of the General Assembly resolution requiring that the Designated Official function is entrusted to the most senior official in the country, the value and appropriateness of such resolution should be analysed in the context of changed security and safety related requirements.
 32. Noting that the function of the Designated Official is often the third or fourth one for an individual who is already tasked to be the Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator, etc., a comprehensive analysis of the requirements and delimitations of such function should be carried out.
 33. Consideration should be given to include the functions and authorities of the Designated Official in the country level agreement signed between the United Nations and the host country.
 34. Executive Heads of UN system organizations together with DSS should ensure that challenges regarding the management of security risks and phases and re-locations which cannot be effectively resolved at the country level should be subject of coordinated action. The decision process must be quick but based on local realities.
 35. A differentiated approach would be required in determining security risks and the appropriate security phase, depending on specific local conditions.
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Annex III – Statement by CCISUA

CCISUA values this opportunity to engage in dialogue with the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM); and it is my privilege to speak to you today on behalf of some 25,000 staff members serving in 15 organizations across the globe:

From ECLAC in Santiago to UNU in Tokyo, the Federation's diverse membership comprises the Staff Unions and Associations of ECA, ESCAP, ESCWA, FSU, ILO, the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), ISAU (UNESCO), UNICEF, UNIDO, UNON, UNOV and my own organization, UNHCR.

CCISUA's Vision and Strategy:

At the outset, I would like to brief you on some developments relating to the vision and strategy of CCISUA:

As the Committee was informed at the 14th Session, CCISUA and FICSA are keenly aware of the need to work closely together on all issues of a system-wide nature. The two Federations have continued their dialogue and much progress has been made towards developing a joint vision and a common approach for fulfilling this shared objective.

For its part, CCISUA held an Extraordinary General Assembly, in November 2007, in order to consider an amendment to its Statute that would allow for greater and more effective participation by all the membership of CCISUA in the decision-making process. The amendment - which was unanimously adopted - includes some major changes to the Federation's modus operandi in order to **better serve the interests of the staff, particularly those serving in the field.**

CCISUA's strategy is also geared towards strengthening its partnerships and increasing its engagement in the various fora that deal with the staff's conditions of service. In spite of its limited financial and human resources, CCISUA pledges to remain fully engaged as a partner in these endeavours through active participation in the work of the relevant bodies including the ICSC, the HR Network, the CEB, the Fifth Committee and the Pension Fund.

FICSA will present you additional information on the ongoing joint efforts towards establishing a mutually reinforcing and eventually unified staff representation structure that would be more effective than further diversification.

Value and purpose of dialogue with the High Level Committee on Management

The Secretary-General and his top Management team have repeatedly stressed the importance of Staff-Management dialogue which they consider **"essential in making our Organization work better"**.

In the sphere of this Committee's work which brings together the most senior administrative managers of the organizations of the system, dialogue with the staff is indeed important particularly as this Committee is currently giving a great deal of attention to meeting the demands of the Member States for effective, efficient and harmonized UN system.

However, before discussing the items on the Agenda of this Session, I would like to share with you some thoughts which were inspired by what the Secretary-General said during a recent meeting he had with the US President on 15th February:

"We all know the value of leadership and sound judgment. We all recognize how fast our world is changing and the premium that places on engagement and partnership."

There are two points to be made about the **"value of leadership"** and **"engagement and partnership"**:

With regard to **"leadership"**, what is clear is that leadership has little value if the leaders do not give the good example. It would be fair to recognize that the Secretary-General – on numerous occasions - has given the good example. In the case of commitment to transparency and accountability, he decided to voluntarily disclose his financial assets to the public.

As regards “**engagement and partnership**”, the Secretary-General has demonstrated his commitment to work with the staff when, for example, he agreed to replace the Joint Advisory Committee in New York with the Joint Negotiation Committee (JNC).

These two tangible actions by the Secretary-General are symbolic and should – in our view – be followed by all CEB members. Should all Heads of UN organizations, Funds and Programmes follow the Secretary-General’s example, the UN system could indeed “**work better**” and regain much of the confidence and the credibility it has lost in the eyes of the public in recent years.

In any event, we would like to recommend to this Committee that **the standards introduced by the SGB on the Joint Negotiation Committee at Headquarters in New York should be implemented at all duty stations** as part of the harmonization Plan of Action.

The talented staff of the organizations we represent have continually proven themselves not only as an important source of innovative ideas for modernizing business practices in their respective organizations but also as a driving force for sustainable change and for improving performance and accountability. The staff needs a leadership that will give the example and a Management that will respect fully the Rules and Regulations of the organization. These conditions are essential for sound Staff-Management relations and are prerequisites for genuine Partnership between the Staff Representatives and the Management to emerge.

Follow-up on issues raised at the 14th Session of HLCM:

Before moving to the items on the Agenda of this Session, I would like to recall some important elements from the statements that CCISUA and FICSA representatives made to the 14th Session of HLCM held last September:

The Vice-President of CCISUA noted in her statement that “*As a Federation of Staff Unions and Associations we in CCISUA are seized by the imperatives that staff deserve the organization’s protection, regard, acknowledgement and consideration. We are all affected by the momentous changes which are taking place throughout the United Nations, from the effects of UN reform, to standardization of contracts, to something as mundane as common accounting standards*”.

For his part, FICSA President said that he was “*particularly concerned about the effects of out-sourcing, off shoring and other administrative initiative on staff*”. He posed the question: “*who will (and is) representing these people who are in some cases not considered staff*.”

Unfortunately, the above concerns do not seem to be taken seriously at least in some organizations. Cost cutting actions with major impact on the operations and the staff continue to be taken in the name of reform and efficiency; without regard to the relevant principles or genuine staff consultations. In some cases, these actions may be taken on the behest of donor governments or for financial reason; but these external factors can by no means justify the disregard of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

In order to highlight the seriousness of the above-mentioned concerns, I would like to provide the following two examples which are also reported on in detail by the Board of Auditors in document A/AC.96/1025 dated 13 September 2006:

(i) Establishing staffing quotas for Donors: UNHCR has signed with a donor government an agreement which contains a clause that requires UNHCR to increase the percentage of the nationals of that donor country to **13% of all Professional staff**. Such a clause is clearly contrary to Article 101 of the Charter and simply undermines all the principles of international civil service.

(ii) Replacing regular staff by temporary non-staff personnel: UNHCR had in the past hired non-staff persons (called “project staff”) either through implementing partners it funded or directly by **signing irregular service contracts** to carry out staff functions. Repeated audit observations had pointed out that persons recruited under such agreements were performing functions similar to those normally done by regular staff members and UNHCR was asked to phase out such arrangements. Although new arrangements have been developed in order to be compliant with the rules, the Board of Auditors still took the view that “*beyond their functional merits, these arrangements do not comply with the staff policy*”.

The premise is that we are all subject to the **UN Charter** which is the basis for all UN policies and practice. The Charter should remain the fundamental reference document particularly when it comes to proposals for reforming or harmonizing the UN system; be it for enhancing operational efficiency or for improving oversight and accountability.

System Wide Coherence cannot be achieved if some UN organizations are allowed to violate the UN Charter or to disregard the legitimate and fundamental rights of the staff purportedly to implement reforms or gain donors' support.

Security and Safety of Staff (CEB/2008/HLCM/3)

Turning now to the first substantive item on the Agenda, namely the Security and Safety of Staff, I am pleased to inform you that CCISUA has participated in the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) and has a number of important concerns with regard to operational Security in High Risk/Complex Environments. These will be discussed in greater detail when the above-mentioned report will be reviewed by the Committee.

However, CCISUA was gravely disappointed to learn from media reports that there were serious lapses and shortcomings in the UN security management system in Algeria. Mr. David Veness is quoted as saying that *"the hostile intent against the U.N. in Algeria was present and well-known before the attack"*

Last week, the Vice-President of CCISUA, Ms. Rita Wallace (in her capacity of the Chairperson of UNICEF Global Staff Association) met with Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, Head of the Independent Panel on Staff Security, to exchange views both in the light of Algeria bombings and in general. Among the issues raised with Mr. Brahimi that CCISUA fully shares are the following:

- The unequal treatment of national staff and the lack of protection at the time of evacuation.
- Lack of MOSS compliance in some offices.
- The need to determine whether common premises afford better protection or make UN offices easier targets.
- The pressure placed on staff by high stress environments, leading to high vacancy rates and consequent overwork.
- The need for the UN to be more insistent that governments protect UN staff and that those who target the UN should be brought to justice.
- The need to recognize the extra risk for female staff in countries where women's rights are not fully respected.

What CCISUA expects of the UN is to put in place a robust, fully funded, and comprehensive security management system run by competent staff.

Other HR issues of particular relevance to HLCM:

The large number of Unions and Associations that CCISUA comprises is a challenge that the Federation has been trying to effectively meet. Individual Unions and Associations may have concerns that are not necessarily shared by others. For example, job insecurity and lack of career prospects may be major issues in some duty stations while in others, the growing numbers of temporary staff or the threat of outsourcing can be the main concerns. While CCISUA plays an important role in consolidating and harmonizing diverging positions, it is sometimes necessary to convey to the advisory and decision making bodies its Members' views as is.

The following are some of the topics on which we would like to present staff views in the course of this Session but I will mention now only the headlines for the sake of time:

- **Staff Mobility:**

[Mobility policy must be incentive-based and not mechanical or forced; must balance staff needs with those of the organizations; should be accompanied by training, should take into account family situation and special constraints of the staff members concerned; should clearly lead to career development.]

- **Gender:**

[Progress towards parity is unsatisfactory and not adequately monitored. Some organizations are going backward by recruiting more male than female staff. Need to enhance dual career policy also as spousal employment is key also to a successful mobility policy. New measures are needed to enhance retention of female staff particularly at the senior level. Lack of affordable child care facilities was identified as one of the impediments to female staff. Need to provide education grant for the "under five" years old.]

- **Administration of Justice:**

[The exercise of delegated authority in disciplinary matters is an issue of concern in a number of duty stations. Lack of respect for the due process rights of the staff during investigations results in vitiating disciplinary decisions and moral damage to staff.]

- **Contractual Policies:**

[The Framework for contractual arrangements, the reform of the job classification system for General Service staff and the review of the salary survey methodologies are matters of high staff interests and CCISUA plans to coordinate efforts with FICSA in order to ensure effective staff participation in these important reviews]

- **Staff Representation and Staff-Management consultative machinery:**

[Need to extend substantial additional support to elected staff representatives to improve their capacity to perform their added duties and to meet the financial requirements for their participation in joint Staff-Management consultative machinery.]

- **Effect of the declining US\$ on pension:**

[The continuing decline of the value of the US\$ has serious impact on the pensions benefits. This situation requires collaborative efforts to develop measures to alleviate and mitigate the negative impact US\$ devaluation.]

We look forward to fruitful dialogue and I thank you for your attention.

Annex IV – Statement by FICSA

The last HR Network meeting held at FAO/Rome, 12-14 2008, offered the opportunity for the Federation of International Civil Servants' Associations (FICSA) to actively participate in discussions on the listed agenda issues: conditions of service of the professional and higher categories; conditions of service of the general service and other locally recruited staff; conditions of service in the field; gender issues; work-life balance, etc.

We will not reiterate the same concerns raised by our colleagues from CCISUA, especially on the harmonization and system wide coherence issues, as we fully share their opinions.

I would like to highlight few issues of great concern to FICSA which are:

➤ Impact of the Reform on Staff Representation

The Reform will have a profound impact on staff representation. In fact this impact is already being felt. It is essential that staff representation be independent, responsible and effective. To do this effectively, staff representation require the tools to carry out their function effectively, i.e., sufficient time, opportunities for training, resources and an enabling environment. Unfortunately in the environment of reduced resources the importance of staff representation can be forgotten or quietly dismissed.

On" the delivery as one" initiative and following the videoconference and papers presented on the progress report by some pilot projects (e.g., Tanzania, Vietnam), discussions ensued, mainly focused on how the program will be carried out and adjustments needed. However insufficient attention was given to how staff representation will be accommodated or how the staff security issue will be addressed. FICSA is very much concerned by the lack of consideration on these two issues, and is committed to work with administrations toward a defined system which takes these two issues on board.

➤ Staff/Management Relations

We would like to continue with our policy of reporting briefly on the on-going dialogue concerning Staff/Management relations. You may recall that this initiative began in the HLCM in 2002, with a request by FICSA for support to staff representation, primarily for participation in common system I, through cost-sharing. At your request, we took the issue to the HR Network. Dialogues continued over different meetings of the HR Network and finally at the last meeting of the HR Network, held in FAO/Rome, last week, an agreement was reached requesting the Network to provide FICSA with a skeleton plan of a business case, which will be completed and returned to the HR Network. It is a very important step reached for FICSA and we would like to seize this opportunity to sincerely thank the HR Network for its support in this matter, and reiterate FICSA's commitment to bring this issue through.

➤ Pension concerns

Over the past weeks and months, FICSA and probably pension units of organizations of the common system received considerable expression of concern from staff about the impact of currency fluctuation on pension benefits. While the issue will certainly be discussed at the next board meeting in July 2008 in Rome, FICSA reiterates its commitment to work closely with administrations, through Staff Pension Committee of its affiliated members to the pension board, to develop proposals to alleviate the impact of currency fluctuation on pension benefits.

➤ Accreditation of a third staff representation body

FICSA have been informed recently by the Chair of the ICSC that a third staff representation body, has again requested accreditation to participate in ICSC sessions. This is of great concern to FICSA for several reasons. Not only will yet another staff representation body possibly undermine the credibility of staff representation and disrupt what has become a satisfactory way that FICSA and CCISUA has contributed to the different bodies at the inter-agency level. In addition, FICSA and we believe CCISUA does too, believes clear and transparent criteria must be established and followed for giving

accreditation to participate. The most recent experience has been such. As reported at the 14th HLCM FICSA and CCISUA are in the process of strengthening their collaboration in view of a possible unification of their structures, which hold considerably more promise than further diversification.

FICSA attaches a great importance to true staff representation which is responsible, is effectively structured, whose officers are democratically elected, independent, and effective and whose membership is regularly consulted. The theoretical number of staff by itself does not constitute the basis for the creation of a staff association, union, nor a federation. There should be criteria that form the basis of a staff body (democratic elections, annual general meetings, contributions from members and budget) without these fundamental elements, any staff body cannot be called true staff representation.

I would like to thank you for your attention.
