

Interview Reports

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## HISTORICAL RECORDS

### H R XI, INTERVIEW REPORTS

Note: This folder contains reports of forty-seven interviews granted to the Historical Records Officer, Balkan Mission, between November 1944 and July 1945, by officials of UNRRA and organizations such as the British Embassy, the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees, and the International Red Cross, whose work has been connected with that of the UNRRA Balkan Mission. The Historical Records Officer interviewed some other UNRRA staff members, and used the information received in her report on the origin of the Balkan Mission, but the interviews themselves did not produce enough new information to warrant the writing of a separate report. Some of the interviews in this folder are not fully reported, as the officials concerned gave some background information, off the record, on condition that it should not be written down.

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39	SCRANTON, L.L. (Mr.)	Director, Agr. & Fisheries Div., Balkan Mission	7 March '45	92
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Report of Interview with Miss Margaret Arnstein, ~~Director of Nursing~~ *Consultant*  
20 Apr 45

Miss Arnstein thinks the British military administration has done very well. She dealt with Col. Jacsic, Tito's liaison officer here.

Miss Arnstein joined OFFRO in Washington on 15 Sept 43, to go to Italy, but this trip was cancelled as a result of the Azores Agreement. She then spent 4 months with OFFRO in Washington.

As of 1 Jan 44 all Washington OFFRO staff transferred to UNRRA or FEA, and Miss Arnstein came to Cairo with UNRRA on 24 Feb 44. She arrived with Col. Wright, Chief Sanitary Engineer for the Balkan Mission, and Col. Brown, Chief Medical Officer and Director of Health for the Balkan Mission, came two weeks later.

& Moses Wells

Miss Arnstein and a group visited El Shatt/during the first week in March. They found no MERRA nursing or medical consultant for the entire camp system, but different British medical officers in the individual camps. British Army nurses were loaned for three weeks periods, but the British Army threatened to withdraw them. She wired at once for six nurses from Washington & Miss Kerze from North Africa, the Chief Nurse of the Yugoslavia Mission.

The first week in April Dr. Brown went to Nuseirat with her!

Dr. Dodd of N.E.F. was at El Shatt with Miss Ruth (?) Faust. Dr. Parmelee and Miss Emily Williams (~~Wilms?~~) were at Nuseirat, and Mrs. Penelope Kallergis was matron at Moses Wells. These three were loaned from N.E.F., and Dr. Yoder, a Mennonite, was at El Shatt from January on. Thus there was no single authority responsible for health functions in the MERRA camps.

Until the end of November 1944 they were acutely short of nurses. At El Shatt, during the measles epidemic in the summer, Miss Connolly housed 265 cases in the NAAFI building, and put one graduate nurse on each shift. To assist here she taught squads of ~~xx~~ illiterate refugee women to perform one function each--one squad took temperatures, another gave liquids, etc.

Miss Arnstein also had as part of her duties the training of the "Bolnicarki", or Nurses Aides. The requirements for this course were 6 years of school, and applicants had to be between the ages of 16 & 45.



Miss Arnstein's interview--cont'd.

At first when the need was great, training lasted only one month, but the course was later extended to three. A similar system was installed for Greek girls, under a law passed by the Greek Government.

After 1 Mar 44 Miss Arnstein was de facto first in command of MERRA nursing services. Under a gentlemen's agreement, she saw all applicants.

Health teams consisting of one nurse, one driver, etc., sent out by the British don't work in practice, and must be split up.

There must be a nursing supervisor in camp, and not one for every 200 or 300 ~~nurses~~ nurses in widely separated areas.

Except for 12 nurses who were deflected to Philippeville, liaison with Washington has been good. Miss Johnson was needed in August, and visited in December. Functional people from Washington are needed at frequent intervals.



REPORT OF INTERVIEW WITH Miss ELIZABETH BROWN, DISPLACED PERSONS  
DIVISION, ON 14 MARCH, 1945.

Up to November 1943, MERRA paid rent of Souk el Garb Greeks (in hotels and houses) in 6-month blocks. The British Army still gives them rations, which they sell to hotel keepers and natives. The Greek Ministry of Social Welfare tries to get them clothes, fuel, etc. Miss Brown believes UNRRA did not take over the Souk el Garb area because it was in Lebanon which is not one of the United Nations.

The Polish Delegatura (Delegation) was established by the Polish Government in Exile, in London, and was sent out by the Polish Ministry of Social Welfare. The Palestine Delegatura has about 670 Poles on its list. The British Government loans the Polish Government money which it passes out to refugees (twelve pounds for one person, 23 pounds for two, etc.). It also arranges billets, schools, etc. The British Liaison Unit (BLU) makes arrangements between the British and Polish military.

The British had expected 60,000, but 120,000 Poles came from Russia in 1942. There is no record of how many of this group were sent on by the British military to Palestine and India.

The Polish military takes care of 4,500 Poles in Palestine, including real troops, and boys and girls in military schools.



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Report of Interview with Mr. A.E. Brownbridge of UNRRA Welfare Division  
7 Mar 45

From June 43 to Jan 44 Mr. Brownbridge was in North Africa, mainly in Tunis, working on two major projects:

1.) Planning program for repatriation of 1500 Tripolitarians. Responsibility for this was turned over to the British and French Governments to complete repatriation.

2.) From beginning of September 43 till January 44 in conjunction with the Director of the Welfare Division, he worked on a plan for coordination of distribution of clothes and shoes in Tunisia. OFFRO in North Africa was a part of the North African Economic Board (its Welfare Division). Acted as advisors and consultants on welfare.

From January to March he was in Algiers. On 1 March 44 he started with UNRRA. Came to Cairo early in March 44 and toured camps to draw up reports for Washington. Then he was temporarily Acting Director of the Welfare Division, to hold together the beginning of UNRRA's relationships with the military.

Consolidating UNRRA's relations with ML: acted as observer and listener in sessions held by ML officials at Maadi and offered suggestions when asked. Ambiguous position--UNRRA's status was not clear. Concerned mainly with organization and definition of functions of relief teams. (This went on during late April, May, and early June.)

Mr. Brownbridge was general assistant to Mr. Greenstein. In August 44 he was made responsible for liaison with the voluntary societies. Since November 44 he has been doing general assistant's work--general relations with American voluntary societies, and seconded personnel. (Mr. Linney did the British voluntary societies work while Mr. Brownbridge was in the hospital during the summer.) He helped to draw up the report on the functions of the repatriation section of the Displaced Persons Division.

As observer on welfare matters with ML, Mr. Brownbridge talked about organization of relief teams. (Col. Burke, in ML, drew up names and functions of relief teams along medical lines, as he was a doctor. Mr. Brownbridge got them changed.) The military were drawing up plans of relief teams on the theory that they would be operating in the Balkans directly under ML, and composed only of British voluntary society people. Reason for this was that at that time UNRRA did not exist. The military began planning use of voluntary society teams in August 1943, or about then. ML had been at Maadi about a year before UNRRA started.

Plans for calling voluntary society personnel from London started in earnest in Sept 1943. The original idea was that voluntary society teams would operate refugee camps, mobile hospitals, distribution of medical stores, first aid or hygiene units (mobile), and water purification. They were to come in as self-contained and equipped units. American voluntary society personnel came as individuals, to be assigned to whatever UNRRA job they could fill. The British came as teams.

The original ML idea was that relief teams would be assigned to the ML district relief officer and medical officer (CRO--Chief Relief Officer, and PMO--Principal Medical Officer). ML has a map of planned camps and hospitals in Greece. Plans for Yugoslavia and Albania were less far advanced. ML at first was wholly British, & therefore had only British voluntary society teams. The plan was for the military period only.

UNRRA in the person of Mr. Brownbridge came on the scene as observer in the discussions. (April through early June) He was an observer only,



because the status of UNRRA's relations with the military was uncertain till September (from the 16 Sept 44 ?) agreement. Until then, ML continued its relief plans as if UNRRA didn't exist. (had to)

After September AML--UNRRA agreement, voluntary society personnel and COBSRA (Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad) changed their attitude and began to do more planning with UNRRA. (They had thought they would be responsible solely to the military.)

A written statement of conditions of service of the voluntary societies personnel will be ready this week-end. There has up to now been no signed agreement between UNRRA and the voluntary societies regarding division of responsibility, only ad hoc relations. Mr. Brownbridge's document of this week-end is the first real agreement. The voluntary societies agreed generally and informally to be under UNRRA's direction, and with the UNRRA document saying the Welfare Division was responsible for liaison with the voluntary societies. (This is probably dated May or June.)

The voluntary societies agreed generally to have UNRRA as the buffer, and as channel of orders from the military. In Greece medical supply units have been operating as such, and maybe the water purification units, and some others. (Ask Greenstein about this--they operate more or less like the first ML plan, about half way between the team principle and the individual principle.)

The American idea emphasizes participation by individual voluntary society members, on the same level as regular UNRRA staff members (lieutenants), while the British teams will work under UNRRA staff members (privates). There was some feeling about this last summer. Some British personnel from the teams have left them and been seconded to UNRRA.

The British have always planned to do direct, practical work in an emergency in teams. The American idea was to provide technical advice to governments, who should do the actual work. The American idea emphasizes national planning (which Mr. Brownbridge thinks shouldn't be done for 6 months). The American welfare staff will make plans in Athens and the British teams will do practical work in the districts.



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Report of Talk given by Col. R.E. Butler of the Health Division on  
UNRRA's Health Program. Late November, 1944

#### Plans of Medical Division

Detailed plans for the 3 countries have been established. UNRRA medical section will largely give advice and supervision in medical and public health fields.

Monthly reports will be made to Principal Medical Officer of AML Balkans, during the military phase, and to Health Division, UNRRA, during the post-military phase.

The basic UNRRA problem will always be to coordinate and advise the governments and the military, and not to make and carry out plans.

We must let the Greek authorities carry out the medical practices they think are correct, even if we think them wrong. We can try to persuade them to use our methods, but that is all.

The country missions will have to operate largely as independent units. Over-all policies will be decided by the military during the military period and by UNRRA Health Division later. Principal Medical Officers must make spot decisions, but inform UNRRA later.

The Health Division has not had a single really useful, specific report on nutrition and vitamin deficiency in Greece. Nor have they had detailed reports on food supplies. AML diet reports say "meat and flour" --but it's necessary to know what "meat and flour". All divisions want accurate information on what conditions will be, so they can estimate their problems.

There won't be enough UNRRA doctors and nurses to do much case work in person, except in case of emergency.

Interview with Dr. Constandulis, Medical Officer,  
on May 29, 1945

Greek Ministry of Social Welfare. There was no service set up to deal with Greek refugees until El Alamein. One officer, Col. Karavitis, was appointed to deal with refugees in Palestine and Syria. He was appointed in March 1942 to report to the Greek Government on the state of refugees arriving in the Middle East. Billeting was done by the British, the Col. was only Liaison Officer.

At the end of April 1942 Dr. Constandulis was appointed by the Greek Government to deal with all health and medical problems for Greek refugees in the Middle East. He was informed of his appointment in mid-May.

The approach of the Germans at Alamein forced Allied Authorities to move the refugees southwards. The Greek Naval Authorities got a ship released via British Naval Authorities for refugees. It was in fact, a British ship, the RIZWANI. The ultimate purpose of sending refugees from Palestine to Egypt was to move them southwards. During this move the Germans approached Alamein and the refugees were rushed from Gezira to Suez and embarked. I followed the refugees as I was in Moses Wells for a reconnaissance at the time. I had been sent by Mr. Matthews to make health reconnaissance. There was chaos at Suez. All refugees were billeted in the Greek Community School. I followed their embarkation and remained with them on board ship for two days.



Col. Binopolous was in charge of the refugees. At the same time the Greek Refugee Service was founded in Cairo after a decision taken by the Greek Vice-Premier, Mr. Panayotis Kanellopoulos. The exact date is unknown as the RIZWANI moved on the 4th June. At the head of this service was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. M.P. Argyropoulos. I was Director of Medical Services. This Service was formed on the theory that as the refugees were being moved south and since this flow had all the possibilities of continuity, the Services could deal with this problem and especially would be in contact with the newly-appointed MERRA who took care of these matters. By this time the repatriation Office evaporated and MERRA took over.

Miss Simeon asked whether the refugees from Palestine intended only to remain in Egypt for transit purposes.

This first move of refugees was planned by the Military. MERRA had nothing to do with it. The main fact is that it was the responsibility of the Military, to move the first batch of refugees down to East Africa. On account of the German advance they had to hurry things.

1600 refugees were in this first move to East Africa, etc. and the Officer Commanding the Flight was Lieut. Col.(?) Binopolous who went up to Aden with them and was then recalled and came back to Egypt. Police Officer Thomaides took over from Aden. The party moved off to Mombassa where they

arrived after a very long journey. The date of their arrival in Mombassa is unknown. They then went through Kenya and established themselves in the Belgian Congo. It took 17 days to reach Mombassa where they had an outbreak of illness and they remained there for a long time. Records of exact time they were there can be obtained from Nicolaus.

To come back to the Service in Cairo; this was developing all the time MERRA was developing. The activities of this Service constituted supplying the medical needs of refugees because the Greek Government had the task of providing medical care as regards personnel only. This was an agreement between the British and Greek Governments. The British were to provide accommodation and food and medical care as regards supplies and the Greek Government were to provide medical personnel, teachers. At this particular time all supplies were in short supply and the Greek Government received the help of Voluntary Societies and especially the Greek Red Cross, who gave substantial help of all kinds of supplies, medical, clothing and babies' and invalid's foods, even though the British were supposed to provide these. This assistance covered approximately 90% of the requirements.

All supplies given by the British <sup>were</sup> ~~was~~ given on a repayment basis, including food, lodging, installation of camps etc. I was the person authorised to sign on behalf of the Greek Government for Moses Wells camp and all Egypt. I countersigned all bills and other payments for the expenses and these included about 50 tents. The



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Greek Government are to repay the cost of the tents and from this time the tents were the property of the Greek Government. The cash was actually put up by the British and will be repaid after the war by the Greeks.

The Greek Refugee Service, of course, started to deal not only with the Greek refugees in Egypt but also those in Palestine, Cyprus, Aleppo etc. The whole of the refugee camps came under the Greek Refugee Service's jurisdiction.

MERRA was responsible for Moses Wells camp. Another category of camps comes under the jurisdiction of the 9th Army. Those are Souk el Gharb, Aleppo and Tripoli.

There was also a small batch of refugees who could not come under the title of a camp. These were 200 living in Jerusalem. This was entirely a Greek responsibility. These people were looked after by the Greek Legation in Ankara.

Another category were the ones who arrived in Cyprus and were the responsibility of the Cyprus Government. In some cases MERRA had a big say in the Camps and in some camps they had nothing to say at all and the Greek Refugee Service took care of everything. In Cyprus the Refugee Service dealt with the Cyprus Government, not MERRA.

Gradually MERRA established its authority and it was recognised as the official body looking after the refugees and had official contact with the 9th Army, the Cyprus Government etc. All Cyprus refugees will

be paid for and no one is supported by cash gifts.

The Greek Refugee Service was a Greek service and was not administered by MERRA but was developed by its own efforts and cooperated with MERRA.

At this stage the Chief of the Greek Refugee Service decided to go on a reconnaissance trip to Abyssinia, Tanganyika, Belgian Congo and Kenya to find out conditions for a further establishment of refugees. Mr. Argyropoulos decided to contact the Governments concerned and settle the difficulties with which <sup>we</sup> were always faced. This was at the beginning of August 1942. Mr. Argyropoulos spend 1½ months on this trip and came back to Cairo with agreements that they will accept refugees. The refugees established themselves temporarily in these countries. No one had the right to claim permanent status. The Greek and British Governments took responsibility for everyone who was established in these countries.

When the first Flight of Refugees entered Cairo in the Gezira Camp Sir Miles Lampson made an agreement with the Egyptian Ministry of Interior that the British Government would be responsible for the repatriation of the refugees after the war. The 2nd commitment to the British Colonial Government was made jointly in the name of the Greek and British Governments by Mr. Argyropoulos on his trip in August-September 1942. The beginnings of all these dealings were made by the Military so that the actual signed documents were made by Mr. Argyropoulos on behalf of the Greeks and by a British official. Mr. Argyropoulos



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merely concluded negotiations begun by the British Military.

There was no time limit on repatriation from the British and Belgian territories as long as it was sometime, presumably as soon as possible. Actually there was a time limit with the Egyptians of 90 days. When both services had to face a constant flow of refugees through Egypt to the south they decided to use Moses Wells Camp as a transit camp so that all refugees from Syria and Palestine were prepared in Moses Wells as regards medical care. This was all after Alamein, after the first batch had gone south and after the creation of MERRA and the Greek Refugee Service who, as a result had to establish more refugees in the Congo etc. This meant that more and more refugees had to pass through Egypt. Because the Public Health Station for refugees was not on a high level, they decided to use Moses Wells Camp as a Transit Camp for these people and they asked immediate permission from the Egyptian Government to use Moses Wells Camp, which had been intended originally for Greek children, for this purpose. The Egyptians asked that these people should not remain on Egyptian soil more than 90 days and I believe that this authority is still in force. (Proclamation 298). We nevertheless had all the power in our hands by saying that the people were not fit to travel. This was merely a "gentlemen's agreement" between us and the Egyptian Government.

1. The Repatriation Office was formed in April 1941 (to July 1942) with first Flight and Sir Miles Lampson

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agreed with the Egyptian Government that these people should be allowed to come in. There was no time limit on those people.

2. The British and Greek Governments negotiated with the German and Italian Governments via the International Red Cross for the bringing over of approximately 5000 Greek children to go to Moses Wells and the Egyptian Government agreed to permit these children to stay in Moses Wells indefinitely

3. The negotiations for the release of the children collapsed at the time of Alamein and there was no formal termination of negotiations. Instead of the children who would be sent out with the cooperation of the German Government (negotiations for which collapsed at the time of Alamein) a large mass of approximately 8000 escapees arrived through Turkey. It was decided by the British Military authorities that these 8000 (who were in Turkey) should be removed through Syria, Palestine and Egypt to East Africa. Turkey was a neutral country and was accused by the Germans of facilitating Greek escapees and the Health situation of the people got worse. They were in Tsesme camp in Turkey. Their removal was partly political and partly humanitarian. Tsesme camp was supported by the British and Greeks.

4. The British Authorities then arranged with the Egyptian Government that these adults and children be permitted to use Moses Wells as a Transit Camp and they would be permitted to remain in Egypt for 90 days. Because Moses Wells got crowded and because of Alamein it was decided to move them out of Moses Wells to East Africa faster than anticipated.



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5. It was agreed with the British Colonial Authorities that these refugees should be repatriated from East Africa at some indefinite time after the war. The Belgian Authorities and the Ethiopian Governments were also concerned with this agreement. The Ethiopian agreement was signed by Haile Selassie and the British Ambassador. The Egyptian agreement, Proclamation 298, <sup>was</sup> signed on June 12th 1942 and is still in force, although constantly overlooked.

When Mr. Argyropoulos came back from East Africa with such a splendid record of success he had to leave the Service because the Greek Service was developed to an Undersecretaryship and they appointed an undersecretary, un the Ministry of Social Welfare. His name was Mr. Tsellos, a personal friend of Mr. Kanellopoulos No. 2 in his party, and recently escaped from Greece. He needed a job and was therefore appointed although he was nevertheless a good man. From a simple administration the whole Service was developed into a grade for an under-secretary of State. At the beginning there were three persons in the Service: Mr. Argyropoulos, myself and Capt. Pilavachi who was Director of Military Personnel and looked after movements of Military attached to the Greek Refugee Service. The Greek personnel assigned to the different camps were Military as the Greek Government had no civil servants as all persons escaping who were of Military age had to enlist in the Greek forces. I was a civil servant and could not give orders to Military personnel. Therefore, we had to have a Military man in the Service. The exact number of personnel is unknown though not more than 150 including,

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doctors, nurses and guards and liaison officers. This change took place in mid-September 1942, when Mr. Argyropoulos came back from East Africa. The changes were: Increase in personnel. We doubled personnel both in Head Office and in the different camps by adding a Director General and a staff for the registration of personnel. The Director General was Lt.Col. Tsacoussopoulos, Director of Health was still myself but from a civil servant I was put into uniform. This increase of personnel was because of increase of numbers of refugees and inevitable increase of all forms of activities in the camps such as welfare and teaching. All teachers were again Army people.. The Refugees increased more and more. New ones came in from Turkey. Everyone going to East Africa passed through Moses Wells except people posted there for duty. Nicolau should give you a table prepared by Col. Green giving dates and numbers of people.

Moses Wells became a static camp because there were practically 8000 people passing through to the South. From these 8000 at least 800 people had to remain in Moses Wells for health reasons. This was a nucleus which transformed Moses Wells from a Transit Camp to a permanent camp. The Egyptians were more willing to agree by then. The refugees could not be sent back to Palestine.

In the meantime the Jugoslavs began to arrive and while the Egyptians accepted the Jugoslavs they had to accept the Greeks also. At one time 3,500 people were



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accommodated at Moses Wells. Refugees are now permitted to stay there for the duration of the war plus 90 days.

The last departure from Moses Wells southwards was the 2nd Flight to Abyssinia. After this and with the arrival of the Yugoslavs in El Shatt, it was decided that Moses Wells will act as a permanent camp.

This under-secretaryship lasted up to April 1943 when a reshuffle of the Greek Government resulted in the development of this Service to a proper Ministry with Mr. E. Emmanouil Sophoulis as Minister. Exact title was Minister of Social Welfare and Public Assistance.

The whole development was therefore from

1. Greek Refugee Service, to
2. Under-secretaryship of Social Welfare, to
3. Ministry of Social Welfare and Public Assistance, - Public Health and Social Welfare.

This new development brought new changes such as increases of personnel. As Mr. Sophoulis was from Samos many of his compatriots were taken in and given jobs. I myself continued to work as Director of Medical Services up to June 1943. I was also Liaison Officer to MERRA up to June 1943 when I was released and transferred to MERRA as Health Advisor.

After the liberation of Greece the Ministry was abolished and Mr. Sophoulis became a representative of the Greek Government in the Middle East dealing with all sorts of problems but chiefly with refugees,

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working jointly with MERRA and UNRRA. He countersigned checks in the name of the Greek Government and exercised general supervision over refugees. Two months ago in (1945) April this position of Representative of the Greek Government in the Middle East was abolished and at this time a Repatriation Service is functioning in Cairo dealing with repatriation of Greek refugees with Mr. Venardis at its head.

A month or two ago the Greek Government and UNRRA agreed that UNRRA should have complete control over the Middle East refugee question. At Souk el Gharb, the Greek Government bears the costs and are anxious to have these people moved first to Greece so that a big cost should be saved for the Greek Government. The fundamental principle in dealing with refugees was that the British authorities should provide everything which was needed for the physical welfare of displaced persons such as food and accommodation, and clothing and the Greek Government should provide medical personnel and means to look after the intellectual welfare of the people. All agreements were made on this principle. In the field in actual practice there were all sorts of shortages on both sides and one substituted the other and both were asking assistance from voluntary societies who had stocks of different supplies which were really given with an open hand. The Greek Red Cross which was founded a few years before war began, acted as a transit centre for different donations from all over the world to Athens. When the Germans occupied



Greece the Greek Red Cross in Cairo was in possession of large stocks of different parts of the world for the use of the Greek Red Cross. These supplies were given both to the Greek Forces and the Greek refugees.

This was the main source of supply. A large number of other voluntary societies also assisted including the Y.W.C.A. and the British Red Cross, Indian Red Cross, American Red Cross, the Greek War Relief and a few local organisations in Egypt. These all contributed towards the welfare of refugees.

All camps on Egyptian soil are wholly the responsibility of MERRA and therefore UNRRA.

All camps in Syria and Palestine are a Greek responsibility, as regards administration, organization and supply.

All camps in Cyprus are the responsibility of the Cyprus Government.

Camps in Belgian Congo are Belgian and Greek joint responsibility, paid for in cash at special prices by the Greek Government.

Camps in Ethiopia are responsibility of Greek Government.

All refugees wherever they are, are responsibility of UNRRA as regards repatriation.

Before Moses Wells became a refugee camp it was used by the Egyptian Government as quarantine centre for pilgrims. It was loaned by the Egyptian Government. Nuseirat and El Shatt was built from scratch and given by Military. Gezira was the property of the Agricultural Society. Aleppo was a Turkish barracks and given by the Military after requisition. Tripoli was a school which was requisitioned by the British Authorities and given for use of refugees. Souk el Gharb were different billets in the Beirut suburb, used as a summer resort,

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requisitioned by 9th Army.

Note: Dr. Constandoulis spoke from memory. A check of this interview report with other sources revealed that his memory for dates and figures is inaccurate. He was also somewhat confused about the terms of Proclamation No. 298. Refugees granted residence permits were required to have them renewed every ninety days - there was no ninety-day clause in the original immigration permit. Despite these inaccuracies, Dr. Constandoulis' remarks are of value in showing the viewpoint of an educated and intelligent Greek toward the services given his countrymen by MERRA and UNRRA. He is, moreover, the only available source for information on the Greek Refugee Service and its successors, since the Greek authorities will not grant outsiders access to their files.



The Greek Ministry of Social Welfare started functioning in 1943, very late. Before that there was the Refugee Service, which started functioning after the Alamein collapse.

Moses Wells camp was intended for Greek children, but the Italians wouldn't let them go. However, Alamein made it necessary to send the refugees from Moses Wells to the Congo, etc., and the Greek Government established the Refugee Service consisting of Dr. Constandoulis and a Greek diplomat.

[illegible]

Interview with Dr. Constandoulis, 13 Mar 45

The Relief Section of the Ministry of State was established to look after the Greek children who were to be evacuated from Greece with assent of the Germans and Italians and put in Moses Wells, under Sir William Matthews.

Correspondence re evacuation took a very long time, but at Alamein "flap" both Repatriation and Relief Officers started to fade for fear Germans would occupy Egypt.

There was a movement of about 2,000 refugees from Syria to Egypt and further south. This automatically caused the establishment of the Greek Government's Refugee Service to look after their own nationals, June, 1942.

There was no further hope of bringing in children from Greece.

Preston went south and left the Repatriation Office sans head. Sir William Matthews amalgamated both Relief Section and Repatriation Office into MERRA, in June or July, 1942.

The Relief Section also sent food to Greece through the blockade. The first load of wheat was sent from Haifa at the time of the takeover by NERBA.

January--February 1942 is the date of establishment of the Relief Section.

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010



INTERVIEW WITH MR. R.B. DURRANT - ADMINISTRATIVE  
ASSISTANT, REPATRIATION DIVISION, M.E.O.

on 20 July 1945.

Mr. Durrant has recently returned from an extended tour of the Polish Refugee settlements in India and Iran.

Polish Minister's reports on Polish Refugees (January 1944 ?) and on liability for support - 10 February 1944 are inaccurate in many respects. The Maharaja of Nawanagar has never supported 500 Polish orphans - he merely welcomed Polish refugee children in his state, and acts as benefactor (toys, vegetables, clothes) to a colony of 381 now in his state. Has never given them money.

The South African Government supports the orphan colony in South Africa as a gift, not a loan. (About 360 - used to be 500.)

Of the 42,000 Polish civilians who entered Iran in 1942, some joined the forces or went to England, etc., leaving about 40,000 <sup>be</sup> to/repatriated from the India-Middle East-Africa area.

British Government supplies the funds which support these refugees (except for Cyprus Group and South African colony, which are supported as a gift), nominally as a loan, debited to the London Polish Government. Funds are disbursed by the local authorities - E.A.R.A., Government of India, or British Ambassador to Iran. At first the funds were given to the Polish Delegatura to disburse, but they proved too extravagant, Government of India has never dealt directly with the London Polish Government, but always with British Foreign Office. Some 21,000 Poles from Iran passed through Karachi, Transit Camps to other Indian camps, Mexico New Zealand, East Africa.

In January February 1943 the Poles started moving from Iran to East Africa, India, New Zealand (700, mostly children), Mexico (about 800) etc.

Some 900 Poles worked for the American and British military authorities in Iran, With their dependents, they numbered about 2,250. The military authorities wouldn't evacuate them while they needed them, but now feel morally bound to do so as the British and Americans have left Teheran and Russians are coming in .



Isfahan children's colony number about 1,000 - roughly 1/3 adults.

Poles in India have to stay in the refugee camps. Some 270 have jobs in Bombay, but only 110 are legally released from camps. They work in the Polish Consulate, Delegatura and Red Cross. Over 6,700 Poles draw monthly subsistence allowances in Palestine alone.

UNRRA's Responsibility for Poles.

MERRA, by request of the British Ambassador in Iran, screened all Polish accounts, he insisted that UNRRA continue screening. We don't admit this as an UNRRA responsibility, but we do it - might put it under "advice on refugee administration", 3 August 1944 letter of Lehman to Lord Moyne. The British Ambassador wouldn't pay the budgets submitted by the Polish Delegation until they had screened by MERRA, MERRA officers were taken over by UNRRA, and just went on screening accounts. Later they got the best tender for Poles on vegetables, etc.,

We're responsible for repatriation of Poles according to an understanding with the Polish London Government - the new Government's existence reopens the question, as many refugees won't want to return.

In Iran, the Polish camp at Alwaz is maintained entirely by British Army rations, etc. The other two (one camp and one hospital in Tehran) are getting supplies purchased with British funds (nominally a loan) plus some British Army rations.

In the Levant, some 6,780 Poles are supported by grants from the Delegation,, which in turn borrows the money from the British Government. About 300 are at Syrian Universities, and about 5,000 get money direct from various British Government organizations.

The Polish Government recently gave the London office a check for £.12,603 (British) for services rendered in Iran - we don't know what for.

On 7th June 1945 some 625 Poles moved from India to Africa. Ther're split up into groups of 200, 300, etc., in various parts of British Africa.



TABLE OF POLISH REFUGEES.

Africa,	19,035	
(Includes East Africa, South Africa and the Rhodesias, also the 625 Poles who left India in June).		
Iran,	4,100	
India	5,200	
Palestine, Syria and Lebanon,	12,000	
	<u>40,335</u>	+

+ Approximate only. Figures of refugees in the Levant are estimates only. They include those in so-called military school, etc.



Report of Interview with Mr. F. M. Elliott

King's Hotel - 22 February 1945

The Division of Agriculture<sup>rehabilitation</sup> has been getting latest reports on conditions in the country - mostly Greek Government reports and requests - information on supply and shipping which will be available, and setting up a program for UNRRA to begin about 1 May 45 (ML to supply through April and perhaps later).

Three programs have been set up, one showing 100% of what the Agricultural Division thinks is needed, one showing 75%, and one 50%. Money and transport, rather than supply, will be the limiting factors.

Supplies have all been catalogued by nine ports - for example, so many tons of seed for Patras, etc.

Personal Information:

Mr. Elliott is on loan to UNRRA from the Near East Foundation which has been working in this area since the 1922 Smyrna disaster. He had long had a livestock breeding program - used artificial insemination of cattle in Greece as the quickest way to replenish the milk and cattle supply there (This is a new method, first used on a large scale in New Jersey in 1938). Mr. Elliott will be in charge of this work in Greece, with an assistant. He hopes later to have the Greek Ministry of Agriculture take over. Most agricultural men in Greece will be in the districts, discovering needs and supervising distribution of seeds, feeds, pesticides, etc.

Mr. Elliott joined the Near East Foundation full time on 1 July 1944. He had previously done part-time planning for them while on the Cornell staff. He went to College Park for two months - 10 July to 11 September 1944; spent a month at UNRRA Headquarters in Washington; went to New York on 12 October; and arrived in Cairo 20 November 1944. He conducted a forum during the voyage, in the afternoons, discussing international politics, different programs, etc. (Another UNRRA group had a near-strike among the crew.)

Interview with Mr. F. M. Elliott

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Once here he began the planning program, until he left for Alexandria about 2 or 3 December 44. He spent one night on the ship and returned to Cairo on 4 December. He began the Greece Mission School about ten days after his return. The people received ten-day leave while waiting. The school started about 15 December. Downie was then Acting Chief of the Greece Mission. The first contingent of returnees from Greece arrived on 19 December 44.

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Resolution No. 1 - Washington directive came saying UNRRA was not to be integrated with ML.

The civil war set back the whole Greek program by several months. The agricultural program had to be revised - they had planned for UNRRA to start on 1 January 45, and it was changed to 1 May 45. Different seasons mean different feed, seed, fertilizers, etc. Messrs. Archer and Kelsey, perhaps at ML's suggestion, planned for UNRRA to start supplies as of May; before that, ML supplies must be used, and perhaps later.

Bone of contention was the principle that UNRRA should be given tools and supplies and allowed to do the job; there was also some feeling that ML was inefficient and was jeopardizing UNRRA's chances.

Mr. Elliott remarked on the rumor current in Camps Division concerning certain officers reputed to be heavy drinkers. The camps were also sometimes called "concentration camps". A certain amount of criticism was extant against Sir William for permitting such conditions to go on.



Report of Interview with Miss Carolyn Flexner, Camps Division. 1 Mar 45

Mr Beck came out here in Aug 44. He was appointed in Washington, where he was told that Col. Ross (now Brig. Ross) was head of MERRA camps, but was going to leave. Mr. Beck was to come out to Egypt, learn all he could, and take over as Camps Director.

Col. Ross wouldn't let him learn or do anything. Mr. Beck had to send his own notice to camps that he was Director.

Mr. Beck's method of learning what was going on in <sup>the</sup> camps was to send in, as welfare workers, some 8 or 10 camps activities people (weaving, mechanics in schools, etc.). Mrs. Green, who was to be Officer in Charge, came in September. Mr. Beck's ambassadors were 8 or 10 people who were to run camps in the Balkans, if any materialized. They all had extensive administrative experience.

Their reports to Mr. Beck, ~~about~~ around August and September, 1944, show that there are many bad spots in camps, although the situation is improving. <sup>The</sup> Clothing situation in camps this winter was inexcusable, because Col. Ross would never have the camps fill out the Health, Welfare, and Displaced Persons questionnaire which Miss Flexner drew up for Lehman to bring over in March-April, 1944. Some answers came to this, but Col. Ross never answered her cables regarding supplies needed. Col. Ross asked Camps Commandants in <sup>the</sup> early summer of 1944 whether they needed clothes, shoes, etc.,. They said yes, but Ross never asked for any. (Clothes later had to be bought here.) (Rumor re Nuséirat, Vredenburg, Poole, canteen kickbacks ...)

Mr. Beck did nothing for two months. When he took over there was no budget and nothing for him to work on and no one on whom he could rely.

J. Benson Sachs arrived first. He had been on the War Relocation Authority in the United States, and was a graduate of Harvard Law School. Mr. Beck put him to work on the budget.

Mrs. Green came in September, 1944, in charge of Activities. Tesera Bullington came with her, and went to work with Greeks in Moses Wells. (Talk with Mrs. Green, Miss Pollock, & Mr. Beck re horrible situation in camps.) The attitude of the British Army men toward the Greeks was insufferable--they had no faith in them, so the Greeks reacted badly and were unreliable.



Tolman (ex Moses Wells) has gone back to Great Britain, and was awful. Many British and South African Army Commandants were awful! Bekker is an able administrator but a wolf.

No one could be sent in as an education specialist, so Dr. Rita Morgan was sent to Nuseirat as an activities officer. She did a wonderful job with the Greeks--established kindergartens, schools, etc. She is now trying to get OWI to draw up a manual for schoolteachers going back to Greece.

The prime fault of the whole setup is that Sir William and Mr. Roseman, etc., have never tried to educate the camp commandants to the difference between running a military camp and an UNRRA camp.

In the Yugoslavian camps there are the Central Committees which were practically appointed by Tito, and completely dominate the camps, even to censoring the refugees' mail. They have done fine things such as getting the ex-director of the Opera in Split to organize El Shatt chorus, etc., but they have too much control over the refugees' personal liberty. They're running a near-Communist dictatorship. Some 500 refugees have not signed the card saying they want to go back to Yugoslavia, even though the Central Committee insists that they should.

UNRRA should not have permitted mail censorship in camp and so much control over personal liberties. If we are operating in a country's territory, we must follow the line taken by its government, but we should not give a Central Committee such power in the Middle East Camps.

The Greek Government is not red, and therefore doesn't want fraternization between Greek and Yugoslavian camps--and the Yugoslavian Central Committee doesn't ~~xxx~~ for the opposite reason. They agreed, however, to send a Yugoslavian to teach the Greeks how to make lasts for shoes. The Yugoslavians are very clever with regard to shoemaking, woodworking, etc.

Many Yugoslavian girls are getting fine training as nurses' aides, etc.

The Greek Government ruined its people by giving them money for no work. The Greeks got an allowance and/or wage. The Yugoslavians got no pay because their soldiers didn't. Now all refugees get 15 p.t. per day.

The Greek doctors at Moses Wells didn't eat with British officers; there was a distinct line of demarcation maintained. The British treated the Greeks like dogs, and they reacted as such.

The chief trouble was wrong personnel as camp administrators. There should have been socially-minded camp directors in charge.

Miss Gilruth's report to Washington as of 1 Jan 45 gives background and general population of camps.



REPORT OF INTERVIEW WITH Mr. PETER FLOUD,SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF BALKAN MISSION, ON 14 MAR, 1945

Mr. Floud joined UNRRA on October 20, 1944 in London, having been keeper in Victoria & Albert Museum, and in the Home Security Ministry during the war.

He arrived in Cairo on November 11, 1944, and remained in the Office of the Chief of Mission until December 3rd. He "oriented himself" until he was attached, at Mr. Haskell's request, to the Albanian Mission as Special Assistant to the Chief of Mission. He remained, however, on the Balkan Budget, (he had been recruited for Yugoslavia).

During Mr. Haskell's absence in the hospital, Mr. Floud acted as Chief of Mission, until 2 Jan 45, when he was expelled from the Mission by Mr. Haskell, upon his return from the hospital.

From December 3rd to January 2nd, Mr. Floud was Special Assistant 9 days, Acting Chief of Mission 10 days, and in a rumpus 6 days. After these events, he stayed in San Spirito with the Yugoslav Mission, unattached and doing nothing, until January 24th, when he returned to Cairo. From that date until February 8th he worked in the Chief of Mission's Office, and about February 9 became Special Assistant to the Chief of the Balkan Mission.

A letter of 28 December 1944 says Mr. Haskell was Chief of Mission for 3 months, but never held a formal policy discussion with top staff officers of the Mission. A cable of 1 Jan 45 states that 12 out of 14 heads of sections met on that day and passed a formal note of "No Confidence" against the Chief of Mission, and asked his immediate withdrawal or their return to Cairo for reassignment. This meeting was actually held on 31st Dec 44. The crux of the question was ML's plan to land 1,200 men and relieve Albania with or without Premier Hoxha's o.k., and Mr. Haskell's acceptance of this plan. The vote of No Confidence was chiefly because of this.

ML changed its plan about then, but Haskell was already on his way out. He was recalled as of February 5th, 1945.



INTERVIEW WITH MR B.C. FLYNN,BRITISH EMBASSY, CAIRO, ON 26 JUNE 1945

Mr. Flynn stated that the original guarantee (that refugees would be no charge on the Egyptian Government; and that the British Government would maintain them and eventually repatriate them) was made by Sir Miles Lampson to the Egyptian Prime Minister in April 1941, when the first batch of 784 refugees from Greece arrived. It covered non-British as well as British nationals.

The identity card given Gezira refugees was not the equivalent of a passport, and permitted them to move around Cairo but not freely through the country.

The agreement between the British Embassy and the Egyptian Military Governor (the Prime Minister, in time of war) of 1 Dec. 1941 stated that refugees enlisted in the British forces in Egypt should be demobilized outside Egypt. Greek refugees so enlisted were occasionally discharged for ill health, and returned to the Repatriation Office - MERRA Camps. This apparent inconsistency is explained by the fact that discharge of individuals is not the same as demobilization of units. Also, they could not be repatriated in time of war, so their return to the refugee camps was more or less tacitly ignored.

The British Government retained responsibility for the repatriation of refugees who found private employment.

The many loopholes and gaps in the matter of the repatriation guarantee were caused by the fact that it was a hasty ad hoc arrangement, and possible future difficulties could not be foreseen.



Report of Interview with Miss S. Gifford, Assistant Director, Welfare Division. 2 April 45

Miss Gifford arrived in Cairo at end of August 44, "to be assigned." Mr. Greenstein asked her to start work on problems of welfare in camps in the Middle East. She began conferring with Col. Ross, who was administrator of camps, to:

1) Get an agreement between him and the Welfare Division on what welfare services were. (There hadn't been a welfare program in camps as outlined by UNRRA's Welfare Division.) Col. Ross didn't approve of UNRRA's Middle East Camp Welfare Program. (For example, what to do with blind or orphan children. The Yugoslav Partisan Committee dealt with this sort of thing, but the Greeks did not.) Col. Ross had the British Army concept of welfare--food, shelter, and repatriation only. After some weeks an agreement was reached, as per terms of a letter to Col. Ross dated 7 Oct 44.

Two weeks after Miss Gifford's arrival, Brownbridge went to the hospital with typhoid, so Miss Gifford took over voluntary societies problems as well as camps.

Thereupon Miss Hansie Pollack was appointed Chief Welfare Officer in Camps. She had much trouble, because, although Col. Ross had agreed to the program, he never sent her out to the camps. Besides, there were no budget positions for such jobs. Request for budget was made in October, but approval came only on 7 Jan 45.

Col. Ross left in October or early November. Beck arrived in September, and for some weeks nobody knew who was head of camps. Miss Gifford in practice but not title was Mr. Greenstein's deputy. He was in Italy for two weeks in or around October.

A big batch of personnel for the Balkan countries, 78 UNRRA budget line or Voluntary Societies arrived in one week. Three convoys of around 80 Voluntary Society personnel arrived from Great Britain that week. All were assigned to country missions, but, since they couldn't go to the countries then, many were loaned to the camps. This was unsatisfactory from the Welfare Division's viewpoint, because many American Voluntary Society personnel were not recruited on the same basis as UNRRA budget line personnel. Also, they felt they were leaving any minute, and were often called forward at short notice. Hence the Camps never had a stable staff or one very well selected for the job.

In March 1945 the five Chief Welfare Officers approved by Washington arrived in Cairo. Now we are about to repatriate the refugees, but don't know how many blind, orphan, feeble-minded, and aged, etc., there are, because we never had the staff to do what was planned on October 7, 1944.

There was a staff morale problem--the jobs given were obviously made work.

Voluntary Societies

Three points are to be considered:

1. Reception & mobilization into teams, and plans for moving them into country missions for British Group. Three hundred thirty individuals have gone through this division and Maadi. They were all met, interviewed here, grouped into teams, given courses in driving, cooking, MT maintenance, etc. The Welfare Division cooperated with ML officer who arranged their actual movement into the countries. We worked out their equipment with the Army. Teams included mobile medical clinics, water purification, relief, field bacteriological & medical stores, and transport units, etc.

2. Ran camp at Maadi. Some voluntary society personnel have been at Maadi since last August. Because countries didn't open up as soon as expected, they've waited for months after finishing training. Also, morale problem arose when those who thought they had joined to go to Yugoslavia were shifted to Greece.

3. American voluntary society personnel came as individuals, and all were interviewed by the Welfare Division--doctors, nurses, architects, welfare workers. All are now assigned.

Everyone has agreed to conditions of service of the voluntary societies, both the societies and the Welfare Division, but Sir William left before he could sign it. The plan is in operation, however.

Work of the Division has been largely day to day problems, and personnel. There has never been a written program or plan for the Balkan Mission Welfare Division.



Report of Talk Given by Miss S. Gifford, Welfare Division (Assistant to Mr. Greenstein.) Late November, 44.

Welfare Division personnel planned the welfare programs for the three countries with the military authorities. Some persons are now in Bari, --new people arrive here for assignment.

A problem arises in that the Welfare Division budget didn't allow personnel for the camps in the Middle East, where some 40,000 people are gathered.

The extent to which UNRRA's services may be used in the different countries depends entirely on the military authorities and the government.

Plans differ for the three countries--we don't know yet what the governments will be.

Teams--before UNRRA was established, the British Foreign Office, Military, and voluntary societies agreed that welfare teams should be used in the Balkans. They worked in MERRA camps pending entering the Balkans. Some teams are medical and some relief and refugee teams. These teams will enter the Balkans when UNRRA does, and be under UNRRA's supervision. (Welfare Division) The teams will operate slightly differently from the UNRRA staff, but with close cooperation. These British voluntary teams are still arriving from Great Britain, and will be staged here. Some are already in Greece. All full teams have left the camps. Some individual members of the teams are still there, till the rest of their team arrives. The military may break up and separate a team if they wish.

The Welfare Division plans are still on paper, and subject to change on arrival. The deal with services for special groups which the Council thought should have special services--i.e., women, the aged, etc. Since there is not enough money for all the greatest difficulty will be to decide, in the countries, who can be helped. The UNRRA Council has responsibility for over-all division of supplies and services on the basis of relative needs among countries. With the countries division among groups will be made on the basis of relative needs.

#### MERRA Camps

These were operated by the British Military, and established to last as long a time as necessary and as short a time as possible. The welfare services in these camps were operated by British voluntary teams. Because these teams were intended for the Balkans, they had to be withdrawn to Maadi in July for training in convoy driving, etc. (All these teams are mobile, with their own trucks, etc.) Hence these camps are badly understaffed--some have no welfare personnel at all. UNRRA is sending some welfare personnel to these camps as replacements, and will send more when the Balkan program is established and needs are known.

The UNRRA Welfare Division must also keep up relations with the voluntary societies. Many of the people in the teams are real volunteers--they get only pocket money and UNRRA supplies their maintenance. Others are paid by their organizations.

The Balkan Mission HQ, at least of the Welfare Division, will probably stay in Cairo for some time, as it is the only place where teams can be organized and get equipment and trucks. Personnel will be coming in from the US and UK for some months.

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UNRRA is not the direct administrative agency, unless such an arrangement is agreed upon directly between UNRRA and the Government or the Military. UNRRA will fill a niche in the plan drawn up by the military or the government, when so requested.

Miss Gifford's speech--cont'd.

The military plans for relief in the 3 countries were drawn up in the Middle East, with an UNRRA opposite number for each military officer heading a section--transport, supply, relief, etc. Plans may be changed, but are so drawn that after the military period, UNRRA can step in and ~~take~~ take over at once if the Government so desires.

The Welfare Division helps determine which groups need special attention, and help organize supplies sent to them.

The Greek community in Egypt has not been asked to run the Middle East Camps because of political questions--relations with Greek and Egyptian Governments, and international relations. Some members of the Greek Red Cross have helped.



Report of Talk given by Mr. Tom Hall, Yugoslavia Mission, Deputy Chief of Finance and Administration. Late November 1944

The Chief of Mission has not yet been appointed. Mr Alan Hall is the temporary officer in charge.

Bari is largely Fascist-minded, but there are also many Reds there.

UNRRA is at San Spirito, a Bari suburb, and near ML--Military Liaison Yugoslavia, (Ex-AML) --which will be OC Yugoslavia, and UNRRA Yugoslavia at first.

Mr. Hall has 2 copies, one of which goes to Washington, of minutes of ML-UNRRA-Yugoslavian Government meetings.

The problem concerns the number of distribution people (observers and checkers) who will be allowed to enter Yugoslavia. United Yugoslavian Government (Subasic and Tito) are suspicious of an excess number. A deadlock was reached on this point. Washington demands agreement before supplies enter. We hope to agree and start shipment this week. Two of the four ports are open, and some ships are loaded in Bari.

Jugoslavia embraced UNRRA (though not ML) after learning what medical supplies, for example, UNRRA has to offer.

The Yugoslavian Government asked ML to train some 2,000 drivers to drive the 900-1,000 trucks, etc., that ML is supplying. Some top Yugoslavian mechanics will be brought to Bari MT school for training, later to train others and be forement in Yugoslavia. UNRRA will be largely trainers.

There will be 8 or so administrative centers and probably about 15 sub-administrative centers with supply centers, warehouses, etc. (A slightly different figure from Washington's.) There are no supply centers in North Eastern Yugoslavia, where there are food surpluses.

We have already had trouble with the Yugoslavian Government because UNRRA personnel gave their views on Yugoslavian internal politics. This must cease.

Report of Interview with Miss Hentsch of the  
International Red Cross, Cairo. on the 5 July 1945.  
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Miss Hentsch dealt with the Cairo I.R.C.'s part in the "Radmanso", "Hallaren" and "Stureborg" negotiations.

The three ships were all Swedish, with Swedish officers and masters. The "Hallaren's" first trip to Piraeus with Swedish relief supplies was the one mentioned in the M.E.R.R.A. J.R.C. report. Her Relief Section Cargo was flour. The two other ships carried wheat.

The I.R.C.'s function was to act as liaison between the belligerents in their negotiations on the ships' markings routes and crews, and to see that the latter were truly neutral. The food was addressed to the I.R.C. in Greece, and distributed under its supervision, but the I.R.C. had an agent on the "Stureborg" only (He went down with her.)

Swedes, Portugese, Turks and Swiss were considered the only real neutrals.

The "Radmanso's" crew included Swedes, Danes, Turks and Egyptians. No Danes were used on the other two ships because of the British Government's objections, the British OK'd them for that one trip only - and there was only one Egyptian on the "Stureborg" because of the Axis objections.

The I.R.C. never discussed insurance for the crews, and in fact turned down a request for compensation by the "Stureborg's" only survivor. It paid the insurance of its own agent only - a Swiss, who was lost with "Stureborg". Both the British and the Swedish Governments protested (through the I.R.C.) to the Italian Government on her sinking. The I.R.C. did not - it couldn't, by virtue of its character. The "Stureborg" carried blankets etc., from the British Red Cross for British P.W.'s in Greece, as well as wheat.



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The "Hallaren" was the easiest to arrange - just followed earlier routes.

The "Radmenso" left Port-Said for Haifa early in February 1942, without negotiations for safe conduct for that part of the run.

The I.R.C. handled three shipments only (not four as stated in M.E.R.R.A. report) from the Middle East during the period October 41. - August 42 - and those were the Relief sections. The British Government got the ship and wheat and hired the crew.

The "Kurtulus" was paid for with Greek Government money (from lend-lease) and the wheat she brought to Greece was given by Canada.

Greek War Relief, starting in September 42, chartered what eventually totalled (4 ships for the Canada-Piraeus run. (Mr. Vonder Muhl.?)

REPORT OF INTERVIEW WITH Mr. E.M. HOLCOMB  
DIRECTOR, REPATRIATION DIVISION  
MIDDLE EAST OFFICE  
ON 12 JULY 1945.

One of UNRRA's major difficulties has been the lack of accurate records on the commitments made by MERRA. Sometimes verbal commitments were made by a MERRA official, and were written down by the other party only. A recent example of this is the case of the Yemenite Jews, MERRA agreed to repatriate them and advance the necessary money for their trip, which MERRA expected to recover from the Jewish Agency. Major Angliker, now M.E.O. Liaison and Planning Officer (Repatriation) was in MERRA at the time and remembers that the commitment was made, although we have no record of it, and UNRRA has no way to collect from the Jewish Agency. The question is now under discussion.

The various Greek military and naval internment camps, (Monastir, Kabrit, Timimi, Sembal, Gabeit, Decamere) are the responsibility of G.H.Q. not of UNRRA. UNRRA has avoided this issue as it is largely political. All internees except those charged with disciplinary or criminal offences, in addition to mutiny, have been repatriated. Date of repatriation of the others is uncertain. Repatriation of internees is G.H.Q.'s responsibility.

UNRRA is not responsible for the Greek refugees at large in Egypt, estimated at about 400. The Greek Foreign Office in the last Government (before Voulgaris) asked for their return, but the Ministries of Social Welfare and Repatriation and Mr. Venardis all say they don't know much about them. UNRRA is keeping very quiet on the subject. The 400 are not included in the figure of 2000 Greeks still to be repatriated from UNRRA camps.

Registration in Palestine showed that the Greek Government has been supporting 104 Dodecanese there. It has requested their transfer to Museirat.



Moses Wells was closed on 12 June, Aleppo is closed, and Tolumbat will be closed by 21 July. That will leave El Arish, Nuseirat and El Shatt as the only remaining UNRRA camps.

All Greeks left Tolumbat and El Shatt to go to Nuseirat for staging this week. (After Moses Wells closed, some Greeks en route to Nuseirat stepped off at El Shatt, especially the most troublesome ones, who were kept out of Nuseirat as long as possible.) El Shatt was never a Greek camp - there were one or two Greeks there, more or less inadvertently, and those from Moses Wells, present total about 150.

There are about 6,000 Dodecanese at Nuseirat, who won't be repatriated till after the 2,000 Greeks in UNRRA camps and the 8,000 in Syria, Palestine and Cyprus. (Greek and Cyprus Govt. responsibilities).

UNRRA will press the Greek Government to accept more than the 3,000 monthly agreed on, on the ground that none have been sent for two months on account of shipping.

The Yugoslavs should be repatriated by mid-August, except the El Arish Royalists.

The East Africa Relief and Reception Administration supports refugees in Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and the Rhodesias - in all British Africa except South Africa. The South African and Belgian Congo Governments support the refugees in their territories.

Mr. Venardis, with whom UNRRA has unofficial relations, is the local representative of the Ministries of Social Welfare and Repatriation. His authority is not well defined.

In late May 1945, the Greek Ministry of Social Welfare split up into two branches. The present Ministry of Social Welfare is responsible for providing funds for the refugees supported by the Greek Government, its former repatriation duties were given to a new Ministry of Repatriation (Mr. Levidis is the Minister) which is also responsible for building roads and arranging inter-island shipping as necessary for repatriation. The old Ministry of Social Welfare has been responsible for

getting money for this work, but other Ministries spent it.

Ethiopia comes under G.H.Q., but one of the difficulties in arranging for the repatriation of refugees in the British African colonies is caused by the fact that the British Military Authorities have not decided who is responsible - G.H.Q. and the East Africa Command both claim the responsibility.



INTERVIEW WITH Mr. LL. A. HUGH-JONES4th JULY 1945.

Mr. Hugh-Jones was one of the original evacuees from Greece. He was Treasurer of Lady Lampson's Refugee Fund and Chairman of the Anglo-Greek Relief Committee in Cairo. He was Financial Adviser to the U.N.R.R.A. Greece Mission during the Greek crisis in the winter of 1944-45. A good deal of the interview he gave the Balkan Mission Historical Records Officer was devoted to background information, not for the record.

Lady Lampson's Refugee Fund.

Opened in April 1941, closed in July 1942. Paid for luxuries and comforts which the British Treasury did'nt provide, for example, 150 bedsteads (the Treasury paid for mattresses only), clothes pegs and 50 or 60 mirrors for the women's bedrooms in Cairo pensions, also paid for a nurse and a Greek medical student (who had almost finished his studies) at Gezira Refugee Camp. It provided a gymnasium and sports equipment there. Some British army sergeants volunteered to give P.T. instruction there free, during their off-duty hours, and did so until a delegation of scandalised Greek matrons complained that the sergeants were devoting most of their time to having the young girls jump over the mechanical horse. ~~Were~~ Mrs. ~~Where~~ was the moving spirit of the Fund. (Wife of Consul General at Alexandria). She mothered the whole camp, arranged for pregnant women to go to hospital for their confinement, tried to fix up broken engagements and in general dealt with the personal problems which the whole camp brought her. She got three or four R.A.F. flight sergeants who were suffering from combat fatigue to volunteer their services at the camp, which helped both them and the refugees. Toc H. lent the Fund an office and waiting room, and Shephard's lent part of a shop. Some of the Fund people (the women who ran the shop, for instance) were paid and some were volunteers.

The Anglo-Greek Relief Committee

Closed in August 1943. It administered part of the

Lord Mayor of London's Fund which had not been spent in Greece before the occupation. Only about £65,000 was subscribed to this fund, which was earmarked for relief in Greece. So the British Government put up an additional £25,000, less closely tied, of which £10,000 was sent to Egypt, to the Anglo-Greek Relief Committee, for the use of the refugees. Some of this money was given to the Greek Relief Services for refugees in Syria, some went to Lady Lampson's Fund, and some provided pocket money for the M.E.R.R.A. refugees. This helped to maintain their self-respect and to reduce pilfering of M.E.R.R.A. supplies of soap, etc. Very informal - M.E.R.R.A. or Greek officials would write Mr. Hugh-Jones requesting such and such a sum, and he would just send it or not, according to his view of the purpose of the fund.

The remains of the Lord Mayor's Fund (the £65,000) went to build the caique ~~M.E.R.R.A.~~ **IMERA**.



7 Mar 45

Col. Hyde arrived in UNRRA on 1 Feb 45, having served as director of the Medical Division, MESG, since 2 Apr 44. His letters to Dr. Sawyer tell of his work.

He has tried to straighten out personnel in line with budget; get Camps Division and Health Division under Maj. Newbury on its own feet; satisfy the Egyptian government on the subject of the quarantine station at Moses Wells; ME Mission--personnel movements; and arranged for Army medical care for UNRRA personnel.

See Col. Hyde's letters to Dr. Sawyer, the minutes of Health Division Meetings, and the report on conferences with the U.S. Typhus Commission on division of responsibility. UNRRA is to take over the Commission's field activities in the Balkan countries after awhile.

Report of interview with Mr. M. Irwin, of the Yugoslavia Mission.  
27 March 45

Personal files of the Yugoslavi Mission have been sent to Yugoslavia.

Mr. Irwin arrived in Cairo early in October 44, and kicked around for several weeks. Tom Hall went back to Bari, so Irwin gradually took over more detail, and at beginning of Jan 45 was designated Cairo representative of Yugoslavia Mission. (Tom Hall has since resigned.)

Mr. Irwin was appointed as a district director, and was assigned to the Yugoslavia Mission. (Norbury, Marks, Rezek, Smiles, Nathan, and Irwin was sixth.)

When Dr. Bicanic was in Washington in November as unofficial Yugoslav representative, he showed that the Tito Government would be very tough with UNRRA observers. The unofficial Yugoslav delegation in Bari said the same. (UNRRA personnel to be limited to 50, according to first Bari talks.)

About 25 Jan 45, Brig. Hughes & Sadler went to Belgrade, & got the limit of observers upped to 300. But it was made clear that UNRRA should have nothing to do with supplies after they're landed.

Jugoslavia Mission will be small, but will have strong agricultural & industrial rehabilitation arms. Thrupp says he hasn't been given a single tangible industrial rehab problem.

(Irwin)

Letter of 7 Feb 45 says he/wants to leave if there will be no Senior Regional Officer job as planned.

The Yugoslavia Mission in Bari lived very badly (at San Spirito) in unheated villas. Poor mess, British army rations, no PX. Mr. Irwin did planning work with the Yugoslavian delegates and ML--planned for Dalmatia, for example.

Only Tito representatives in Bari all during the winter. They are very dictatorial and have very definite ideas on UNRRA's limits. UNRRA will mostly do accounting. Observation will be very casual.



## INTERVIEW WITH MR. SAMUEL JACOBS, DISPLACED PERSONS, UNRRA.

16th July 1945.

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Mr. Jacobs recently returned from a seven month's trip around Africa where he registered or tried to register, the various refugees. He succeeded in registering the Poles in Uganda (23 Jan - 9 Feb. 1945), at about the time that Poles in Iran were being registered. Some camps in India were later registered, but the other Poles refused on account of the Yalta Conference and fear that Russia would dominate Poland.

UNRRA is responsible for repatriation of Poles to Poland, if they want it - but not for supplies for Poles in Iran. These come from British Army stocks and the British Treasury.

Finance of Polish Refugees

1. Northern Rhodesia - Cyprus Group of intellectuals - originally 430 - now about 150 - are guests of British Government. The Rhodesian District Commissioner pays their L. and Q. and recovers from the <sup>(British)</sup> London Government. These Poles live in hotels at Livingstone, not in camps, and are not considered refugees. They refused to meet the trains of Polish refugees and translate for them, etc. Many now have jobs on the staff of Polish camps, etc., and have scattered. They are not under the E.A.R.A.

2. E.A.R.A. - Poles

Kenya - 400

Uganda - 6,500

Tanganyika - 6,500

Northern Rhodesia - 3000 (not counting Cyprus Group)

Southern Rhodesia - 1500

Greeks - 500 in Tanganyika.

E.A.R.A. supports all these refugees, theoretically on a repayment basis from Polish or Greek Government - and pays outright the salaries of British Officials in the camps.

3. South Africa

360 Polish orphans in camp and schools. Not under E.A.R.A. - under jurisdiction of Polish Delegation in Nairobi and South African Ministry of Social Welfare. South African Government advances

money on a loan basis - theoretically to be repaid by Polish Government.

#### 4. Iran

Now about 4,000 Poles supported by British Government on loan basis. (Some more Poles sent to Mexico, India, New Zealand, etc.)

#### 5. India

About 5500 in five camps in India - supported on loan from British Government, except for 500 orphans supported by an Indian Maharajah.

#### 6. Overseas

New Zealand, Mexico, etc., probably supported on some loan basis.

<u>Greeks</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>supported by</u> *
<u>Number</u>		
2,600	Belgian Congo	Belgian Congo Govt.
500	Tanganyika	E.A.R.A.
1100	Ethiopia	Ethiopian Govt.

\* On loan basis theoretically against repayment by Greek Government.



Interview with Mr. J. Jacobson, Distribution  
and Transport Division, Greek Mission.

27 February 1945

Mr. Jacobson joined UNRRA as Price Control Specialist on 21 August 1944. He left Washington on 22 September 1944 and arrived in Cairo on 28 September 1944. On 12 November 1944 he left Cairo to join the Greek Mission, arriving in Athens on 13 November 1944. On 18 December 1944 he left Athens to return to Cairo, arriving here on the same date. At the date of this interview - 27 February 1945 - Mr. Jacobson was about to leave Cairo to return to Greece.

I. Activities in Cairo - (Sept.-Oct.- Nov.)

Mr. Jacobson drew up a plan for an appreciation and distribution manual for the Distribution and Transport Bureau, which is now mimeographed in loose-leaf binder form.

He worked out the medical distribution program, and plans for distribution generally, from ship-side to ultimate consumer. He also drew up tentative plans for submission to the Greek Government and ML, including techniques of rationing.

He collaborated in the development of a plan for the collection of olive oil and grain, for the purpose of integrating domestic production with relief imports.

The manual of distribution reports the objectives and program of operations which the Distribution and Transport Bureau wants to achieve, and contains all of the above mentioned plans.

II. Activities in Athens - (Nov. and Dec.)

The first three weeks were devoted to making a survey of operations of the Joint Relief Commission (Swedish-Swiss) in Athens and Greece (in Intelligence Division). Conferences were held with ML and UNRRA officials re price-wage correlations, for submission to the Greek government.



44.

Conferences were also held on the subject of integration, UNRRA with ML. Bureau heads and Chiefs of Mission agreed unanimously that there should be no integration. Mr. Hugh Jackson and Sir William Matthews agreed to compromise - that part of UNRRA should be integrated and part not. ML liked this compromise no better than UNRRA. In addition, Mr. Jacobson's military opposite number objected to being under a civilian.

Some of the reasons why integration was considered to be undesirable were:

- 1) Personal friction
- 2) No opportunity for UNRRA to develop its own organization when it was dismembered
- 3) Factor not openly apparent on 24 November, but which developed by 3 December, was that ML had taken a one-sided interest in Greek affairs, and UNRRA could not be impartial as a subordinate of ML.

Mr. Jacobson seems to think, but does not wish to say for quotation, that the troubles of the Greek Mission were caused by some of the following factors:

(1) Integration with ML, which was largely the fault of Mr. Jackson and could have been avoided by insisting, as UNRRA did later, on the October interpretation of CCAC agreement.

(2) The ML Distribution and Transport men were not trained in this particular specialty. One of them was an ex-professor of English. They knew only the military manner of operations; did not know how to re-establish civilian economy; gave orders, and failed to listen. It was therefore hard for the Greek Mission personnel to get along with their military opposite numbers, whom they felt to be incompetent.

(3) Greek Mission personnel objected to one-day excursions to distribute food and move furniture under fire.



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The outbreak of hostilities in Greece meant that the plans which had been drawn up were never submitted to the Greek Government. UNRRA had expected a stable Greek Government which could assume some of its sovereign functions. Obviously this could not be done, and about 18 November the Greek Government requested J. R. C. to continue its operations there for six months. This was apparently due to the fact that UNRRA was agent of ML, and the Greek Government believed that ML had intended to direct price and wage policies while operating ostensibly through the Greek government. Knowing this, the Government wanted JRC as a buffer.

UNRRA wanted to take over and expand the JRC program and to establish a quasi-government agency on which UNRRA was represented.

The JRC organization was the only one which could carry out distribution. UNRRA, Washington, Cairo, and the military had been criticizing JRC and wanted to liquidate it as soon as possible. But the military had made no survey of JRC, even though they were there some time before UNRRA. UNRRA suggested a survey of JRC and the military agreed. Jacobson made such a survey of the capital area. UNRRA, the Greek Government and probably ML then thought that JRC was a useful organization which had done well under bad handicaps and hardships. JRC made the only distribution of ML supplies that was made.

Mr. Jacobson wanted to transfer the direction of JRC to the quasi-governmental agency which UNRRA wished to establish. The organization of the JRC program as it stood was a government within a government which had been established by the Axis and the Swedish government. It had responsibilities outside the jurisdiction of the Greek government, special immunities and special privileges. It had a staff of 32 neutrals and employed about 5,000 Greeks. UNRRA wanted to retain the functional organizations of JRC, but to revise its administrative direction, and to put the Greek government organization in place of the staff of 32 neutrals then directing operations.



After his return to Cairo, Mr. Jacobson drew up a plan of administration and transition from JRC to the government agency, which Mr. Gerstenzang is to submit to the Greek government.

In Cairo, Mr. Jacobson also kept the Distribution and Transport staff together and working on projects. In organizing this division, he broke down the distribution branch into four large committees:

- (1) Coordination with Requirements and Supplies and other bureaus of the Mission program. The function of this committee was to find out all plans and programs of the Bureau of Requirements and Supplies - what quantities and types of supplies were planned for what ports; and then to determine what the distribution problems were from these ports. It arranged conferences with Industrial and Agricultural Rehabilitation divisions to learn their problems, so that plans could be made for distribution of their supplies.
- (2) Internal Administrative Procedures and Personnel Problems of the Distribution and Transport Staff, in the light of experience gained in the field. This Committee determined from reports from the field, etc., what equipment and communications the Mission needs in various districts, etc. Another of its functions was recommendations on the organization of the internal chain of command.
- (3) Intelligence Committee. This committee sifted all available data in Cairo which would be useful to the Mission Distribution and Transport staff - procured maps and economic data - and made analyses of newspaper reports on Greek distribution problems.



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- (4) Analysis of JRC Operations and submission of plan for taking over administration of JRC, and extending its operations.

Plans were made for the mechanics of supply. About 16 December 1944, the majority of the Greek Mission submitted a resolution to the Chief of Mission that the Mission should return to Cairo for re-examination of the whole problem. They felt that this was necessary, in part because of the integration with ML and in part because better planning was needed. The first draft of the resolution was lost by Marie Berger on 3 December 1944 when she was wounded. She was to have presented it that morning for 30 signatures.

Mr. Jacobson's plan for operations in Greece establishes a governmental agency for the purpose of effecting distribution. The agency would consist of:

- (1) Representatives of the Government
- (2) Representatives of UNRRA
- (3) Representatives of ML (during the ML period)
- (4) Non-voting representative of the Swedish-Swiss Commission, as we would still be using Swedish ships and they would have to guarantee their neutrality. It is assumed that the 32 JRC staff will stay 30 days after the beginning of the plan.

The plan has two 30-day phases of operation.

- (1) UNRRA distribution officers would go in as opposite numbers of administrative heads of the several departments, taking over positions of the Swedish and Swiss neutrals. These officers would be aided by a Greek named by the Greek government. No changes in JRC operations would be made. Thus, UNRRA officials would have an opportunity to learn operations from the ground up, learning the weaknesses of the existing system, and to plan expansion of operations.



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(2 ) At the end of thirty days, the Swedish and Swiss delegates could withdraw and UNRRA and the Greeks could work out revision, expansion, personnel to be retained or released, etc.

The whole plan's major purpose is that, after a period of stability, the Greek assistants would become the heads of their departments, and UNRRA officials would just observe. The flow of operations would thus be continuous.



REPORT OF INTERVIEW WITH Mr. Nicholas KALMER,

GREECE MISSION, 6 Mar. 1945

Mr. KALMER joined UNRRA in Washington on 22 Aug. 1944, as a Deputy District Director, after having been Office Manager of the Pittsburgh Investors' Syndicate since 1934. He holds the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science. He also organized Army language classes (University of Pittsburgh A.S.T.P.) and arranged 7,500 daily meals in the cafeteria.

Mr. Kalmer arrived in Cairo on 16 Oct. 1944, went to Athens, arriving there on 17 Nov. 1944, and returned to Cairo on 19 Dec. 1944. In October, 1944, he read the files for the transport, housing and medical set-up. He was assigned to District II, met with his staff, and proceeded to organize it.

Once in Greece he had expected to go to Patras, District II, but didn't get there because of the civil war. He volunteered to deliver food for the Red Cross.

After leaving Athens, he spent a week each in Moses Wells and Nuseirat Camps. Reports on these camps are for public relations, and therefore show the good side only. The situation in Nuseirat is bad. Mr. Kalmer here discussed off the record, certain difficulties in the camps. He felt that the military and the UNRRA welfare workers did not always see eye-to-eye on the welfare needs of the refugees. One hundred troops there, but nightly Arab thefts. The conflict is between the welfare officers and the military, not between the U.S. and G.B.

Reasons of difficulties of the Greek Mission were a combination of ML leader, a conflict of personalities at the top (Archer vs the Brigadier, Archer vs some of the Balkan Mission, higher vs lower Greek Mission staff), and the policy on integration - the staff had not shaken down when the war broke out. Had there been no civil war the Mission would have shaken down o.k. The integration agreement brought things to a head. Also many of UNRRA's rank and file felt neglected, though it wasn't easy for Archer to travel. Further, the Americans were pro-EAM and the British pro-Great Britain. Most of the Greeks had never heard of UNRRA, and others mistrust it as a capitalistic organization to promote our trade by selling American and British goods to the Greek Government.

UNRRA has become the football of international politics and is being killed by circumstance (i.e. no shipping for supplies).

Forty percent of the pre-war Greek budget went for the national debt, and 25% - 30% for the armed services. Thirty cents of each dollar of the national income went into direct taxes.



Report of interview with Sir William Matthews, February 45.

Relief Section of Ministry of State: Owing to poignancy of the situation in Greece, the Allies agreed to lift the blockade and let the SS Radmanso go in with wheat. The Germans and Italians gave safe conduct through the International Red Cross--about 8,000 tons of wheat were in the first shipment. Other shipments followed, the SS Stockholm and the SS Hallaren. The Italians sank the Stockholm on the way back about 85 miles from Haifa. All this was antecedent to laying on a regular system of relief under Swedish-Swiss auspices--the Swedish-Swiss Commission. The Relief Section sort of grew, like Topsy. There was no definite date of establishment.

MERRA's one-page charter came from the Ministry of State or the Middle East Relief Council.

MERRA and the Poles: The British military authorities took most of the care of the Poles in the Caspian--internal administration by Polish Delegatura, expenses paid by loan from the British Government. MERRA took the responsibility for care, maintenance, ultimate repatriation, and moving, but Poles had internal administration of the camp.

UNRRA could only take responsibility for MERRA camps which were directly administered by UNRRA. It would take responsibility for ultimate repatriation of Poles if Poles are repatriable.

This is written up in exchange of letters between the Ministry of State and Governor Lehman.

Sir William wanted UNRRA to take over all MERRA camps, including those which the Cyprus Government, etc., was administering for reimbursement. Lehman didn't want to take them over because of an excess of financial caution.

Reduction of Poles: 40,000 were left after recruiting for ATS and Army. Some were sent to East Africa, some to India, etc. (I.e., ~~the~~ staging camps only were MERRA's responsibility, and people in them were normally still in transit. This satisfies the Iran Government--same sort of arrangement as obtains at Moses Wells.)



Report of Interview with Col. E.M.F. Maxwell, Legal Adviser to the Balkan Mission.  
3 April 45

Col. Maxwell joined UNRRA from Civil Affairs Branch of the British Army on 30 Sep 44, and went on the same day to Bari to advise on negotiations with the Yugoslavian National Committee of Liberation.

About the time he arrived, Mr. Broad, the English Charge d'Affaires, wired the Foreign Office questioning whether any such negotiations should be allowed to take place. They were therefore postponed. In consequence of Broad's intervention, thousands of Yugoslavians starved. For two and one-half months two loaded food ships stayed in Bari harbor while the Yugoslavians starved. Cochrane was weak on this.

Col. Maxwell returned to Cairo. In late September, he and Lloyd went to Portici to see Gen. Hughes to see whether the talks could be resumed.

Two delegates from London Yugoslavian Government and five from the National Committee of Liberation came to Bari to discuss with UNRRA and ML. Washington then told Alan Hall not to commit UNRRA in any way. Two cocktail parties were held, then Hall was sent to talk to Gen Wilson at Caserta.

Technical discussions were started, but the talks broke down on the question of equitable distribution and observers. (The two London delegates were left 22 hours unmet and unfed at the Bari Airport--then went to the Partisan hotel overnight.)

In mid-November Col. Maxwell returned to Cairo, and began negotiating re immunities with the Egyptian Government--and also to consider UNRRA's conditions of service which Maxwell thought hard, unjust, and inconsistent with Egyptian law.

In mid-December Col. Maxwell went to Kuvo to help draw up an UNRRA-Army agreement, as it was then thought that UNRRA would enter Albania with Col. Warner's force.

On his return to Egypt he found they had altered the personnel regulations. Col. Maxwell's note of 15 Jan 45 criticizes the new regulations.

Diplomatic immunities negotiations were completed in February--Egyptian legal department ok'd it, but change of ministry, assassination of the Prime Minister, change of Foreign Minister, and Egypt's entry into the war caused delay in final approval.

At the beginning of February, Sir William decided that the Balkan Mission could take a hand in negotiating the Greek and Yugoslavian agreements. The question was discussed through February and March, but Washington insisted on doing it all.

It is a waste of money to have a legal adviser because they don't keep files and his opinions are lost. (Papers filed by source, and should be filed by subject--so you can't know the facts.) Also, documents are taken off the file instead of being kept permanently in the archives.

Col. Maxwell couldn't get a copy of the Personnel Regulations--Young had the only copy, and there were no typists. Col. Maxwell copied it himself at Christmas, and then the new regulations came out.

Col. Maxwell arrived at UNRRA Cairo on 13 Sept 44. He was away in September and half of October, and most of December. His 17 Jan 45 memo was never answered.

Col. Maxwell tried to get a legal advisor appointed for each of the country missions, but it was no go.



Report of Interview with Mr. Neville Miller,  
Senior Deputy Chief of Balkan Mission, on 2 March 1945.

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Mr. Miller joined UNRRA on 5 June 1944, left Washington on 9 July 1944 and arrived in Cairo on 14 July 1944.

From mid-July to the first of September the Balkan Mission was being organized along the line of the functional units. About the first of September, however, "we started breaking up the functional units and assigning personnel to the three country missions". During September, a part of the Yugoslavia Mission and a part of the Albania Mission moved to Bari.

On Mr. Miller's arrival the Balkan Mission was beginning to work with M.L. at Maadi, so that the staff of about 85 made practically daily trips to Maadi to work with M.L. There was to be a relief period (presumably about 6 months) of military responsibility followed by a period of UNRRA's responsibility. Because of this arrangement, M.L. was very anxious to have the UNRRA staff come out to Maadi and find out what M.L. was planning to do. Mr. Miller arranged meetings which were broken down into small groups. After the 2nd week in August it was obvious that M.L. & UNRRA were not working together as closely as M.L. wished. To help alleviate the situation, Mr. Miller helped to organize meetings of large groups, then small groups for discussions, finally a series of several lectures on what M.L. was doing, its organization, work in Greece, etc.

M.L. Yugoslavia and M.L. Albania moved from Cairo to Italy the last of August 1944. M.L. Greece remained in Cairo. The question then arose as to whether UNRRA should follow. Mr. Miller left Cairo on September 28th and spent October in Portici, Naples and Caserta working with M.L. on details of our operations in the Balkans through A.F.H.Q. On this trip he also visited the Italian Mission in Rome and helped work out the General Order which gave UNRRA privileges under A.F.H.Q.

Mr. Miller returned to Cairo at the end of October, but in mid-November went back again to Caserta for two weeks, to attend conferences in connection with Mr. Hugh Jackson's visit there.

Early in December, Sir William Matthews left for London to confer with Governor Lehman, leaving Mr. Miller in charge in Cairo. Beginning at the first part of December, 1944, Sir William Matthews asked Mr. Miller to be chairman of a committee consisting of himself, Mr. Pierce and Mr. Beck to work up with G.H.Q. and A.F.H.Q. the whole question of repatriation of refugees. (The development of the Middle East Mission really started during the last part of October, when Sir William first broached the subject to Mr. Miller in Caserta.) By mid-January the work of the committee with the military led to the beginning of the Middle East Mission. In connection with this work, Mr. Miller visited the UNRRA camps and made a trip to Greece in February.

<sup>returned to</sup>  
~~Egypt~~ In mid-December a part of the Greece Mission staff was repatriated and Mr. Miller spent a good deal of time with them. From mid-January to mid-February he was largely occupied with setting up the Middle East Mission and liquidating the Balkans Mission.



In addition to his work with the Middle East Mission, Mr. Miller took a large part in staff and administrative affairs in Cairo. He was chairman of the personnel committee which held hearings on employee cases and made recommendations to Sir William concerning them. He was also the administration's contact with the Staff Organization. He has been very interested in developing staff activities and to that end arranged a meeting of the entire staff at Maadi in late September, besides Sunday sightseeing tours.

When Sir William was away (most of December and 10 days in February) Mr. Miller was acting head of the Balkan Mission. He spent a good deal of time from December 1944 on working on the mail and registry systems; he was chairman of the committee on the registry. He also had charge of allocation of office space in connection with renting King's Hotel in Cairo. The Mission went to Greece about when he got it rented and then returned in time to fill it. - Fortunately, from Mr. Miller's point of view, as he had made the arrangements on his own hook, knowing that more space would soon be needed.

He was chairman of the Tuesday and Friday Health, Welfare, etc., and Director's Staff Meetings, he helped work out the program for reception of new members of the staff, and he drew up the organization chart of the Balkans Mission.

Report of Interview with Dr. Rita Morgan 7 Mar 45

Col. Edwards is hard-boiled. He was Ross' interpreter.

There were 8500 people (Greeks) at sea level, plus 250 Jews, and 35 at the officers' mess.

The Army's basic objective is to feed, clothe, and house the Greeks on a permitted ration scale, and to provide security. They haven't protected the population from the Arabs' nightly thefts. (Haven't enough men, and don't (want to?) organize a Greek civilian police.)

UNRRA in camps is being used as an instrument of British foreign policy. (Greek edition.)

at Nuseirat

November 44--Dr. Morgan arrived/to find tents for 4000 down in a rain because they had failed to dig trenches in May to take through the summer and carry off the Fall floods.

There was incompatibility between the military and the UNRRA welfare personnel, and between the British-foreign-policy and the UNRRA objectives.

Election of the Greek Committee, first tent election, then area, then central committee, took place last week.

See Dr. Morgan's reports to Miss Flexner and Mrs. Green, Ed Wright's report on finance, George Wood and Arthur Brice on supply, Drs. Chapman and Mendelov's medical report, and the canteen report on thefts by sergeants.

Dr. Morgan has been at Nuseirat since November. There has been improvement in the American welfare program--in physical conditions, atmosphere, and surface respect for the Greek refugees.



REPORT of Interview with Mrs. K.M. Murray, Personal Assistant to Sir  
William Matthews - 14 May 1945

The Greek Relief Section of the Office of the Minister of State was formed at the beginning of 1942 with Sir William Matthews as Chief (he was then Mr. W.T. Matthews) and Sgt Suthers as Confidential Clerk. On April 13th 1942 Mrs. Murray joined Sir William as Personal Assistant, and office premises consisting of three rooms were taken at No. 13 Midan Ismailia, Cairo. A little later Mr. C.S. Pickard, Miss McKenna, and Mr. Robson joined the staff.

The Greek Relief Section was established in order to arrange for the evacuation of children from Greece. Later it also arranged, with the aid of the International Red Cross and the Swedish-Swiss Commission, for supplies of wheat and flour to be sent to Greece to feed the starving population. On the 22 May 1942, the "S.S. Stureborg" left for Piraeus carrying 1800 tons of flour, and on 30 May 1942 the "S.S. Halloren" left Haifa for Piraeus carrying approximately 4500 tons. Unfortunately the "Stureborg" was sunk on the return journey by Italian planes, and there was only one survivor who drifted about for nine days before being picked up.

The Egyptian Government were finally persuaded to allow 3000 Greek children to remain in Egypt, and they provided Moses Wells Lazaret for this purpose. Under the extremely capable and efficient management of Major Ralli (who so tragically died last year) and with the guiding hand of Sir William, and assistance from the British Army Authorities, this Lazaret was converted and transformed into a Camp capable of receiving 3000 children. (it was later enlarged). It must be remembered that at this period of the War it was extremely difficult to get the necessary personnel for running such a Camp, as the German threat to the Middle East was by then becoming a serious menace, and Major Ralli together with three or four ORs were considerably harassed and overworked in the early stages before more assistance was forthcoming. Eventually considerable help was forthcoming from the various Red Cross Societies, and Charitable funds, and from the Voluntary Societies.

At the time of the Alamein "flap", for operational reasons it became necessary to remove many mothers and children to a safer place, and they were therefore despatched to East Africa and the Belgian Congo and taken care of by the East African Refugee Administration

In August 1942 MERRA took over the Repatriation Office, which had been established in Cairo in April 1941. The Repatriation Office was originally started by Mr. T.H. Preston in October 1940 in Istanbul, on the instructions of Sir Knatchbull-Hugessen, the British Ambassador to Turkey, to deal with the many refugees who were then coming from the Balkans. When the Repatriation Office transferred to Cairo, the Gezira Camp was started for Greek refugees. The staff of MERRA in August 1942 consisted of Sir William Matthews as Chief, Mr. Preston as No. 2., Mr. Pickard as Special Assistant, Mrs. Murray as Personal Assistant, Sgt. Suthers as Chief Clerk, Miss McKenna, Mr. Robson, Miss Coleridge, Mr. Inglessis, Mr. Falzon, Mr. Nicolaou, Mr. Walter, Col. Green, Mrs. Loney, Mr. Guthrie, Major Ralli (Camp Commandant Moses Wells), Mr. Gerakis<sup>and</sup> Mr. Price (Camp Commandant, Gezira). Gradually more staff were needed and later arrivals included Miss Gilruth, Mr. Young, Miss Davis, Miss Scott, Miss Bradley, Mr. Kneen, Col. Ross and numerous Officers and British O.Rs, and local personnel.

Again for operational reasons it became necessary to remove as many Poles as possible from Persia. These Poles had trekked all the way from Russia, having been deported from Poland in 1939. Col. Ross, with the assistance of two or three other Officers, arranged for the assembly of these Poles at Ahwaz, feeding and care, and onward transportation either to the Polish Forces, or to Camps in East Africa for the mothers and children, and those who were above military age or unfit for service.



In 1943 the first batches of Yugoslav refugees arrived in the Middle East, and Camps were set up at El Shatt, Tolumbat and Khatatba, and an increase in staff was consequently necessary in order to cope with the new influx. This staff was largely forthcoming from the British and South African Forces and Voluntary Societies.

On May 1st MERRA was taken over by UNRRA who also took over some, though not all of the MERRA Camps i.e. only those in Egypt and Palestine, owing to financial caution.



Report of Interview  
with Mr. Nicolaou - 12 June, 1945

The Greek Army opened a recruiting office in Cairo late in 1941. Refugees could choose the army they wished to join, and many Greeks preferred to join the British forces.

For book-keeping purposes, the Repatriation Office may be said to have closed as of 31 July, 42, though 1 July 42 is the best date.

At the time of Alamein, Gezira held Greeks, British Maltese and British Jews. The Greeks were sent south by the Greek Government. Some 6 to 8 British subjects of Greek origin went with them. Nearly all the British went to Palestine. Some British Jews returned to Gezira after Alamein. They went to Cyrenaica or got permits to stay in Egypt, etc. About 12 Greeks were sent to Moses Wells. The Maltese stayed at Gezira all during the Alamein period.

When MERRA had the Gezira Camps (July 42 - June 43) it housed only about 80 to 100 refugees at a time.

Thomas Cook and Son had authority from the Principal Sea Transport Officer (British Navy) to arrange the refugees' travel accommodation on ships. Cook's did all the booking for the Repatriation Office, which only had to phone Cook's for so many berths to India. Refugees had a high priority. The PSTO was the final authority on shipping accommodation, and sent the bills to the Repatriation Office. The Repatriation Office had a temporary responsibility for steamer bills, but was repaid by the refugees' Government. Foreign Office paid for Anglo-Saxons and any British subject from the British Isles, the Governments of Cyprus and Malta paid for Cypriots and Maltese and the Polish Government for Poles.

The R.O. served as an employment bureau for refugees. It had special employment forms which were filled out by the refugees, vetted by security, and filed by R.O., until, for example, the Embassy phone for three English speaking wardens. No pressure was needed to induce refugees to undertake war work, as they were eager to get jobs. The department hiring a refugee was responsible for repatriating him after the war.

Residence Permits

At first (before Moses Wells was started) a number of Greek boys from Egypt were released from Gezira at the request of the Egyptian Government. They were members of the Greek community in Egypt who had been sent to Greece to study, and evacuated to Egypt.

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They were release because they were permanent residents of Egypt, not refugees, and as such had a right to live there.

Later, after the big camps started, a relative of a refugee would write a letter of guarantee to the R.O., guaranteeing to maintain the refugee, and repatriate him after the war. The Minister of the Interior (Department of Public Security, Passport Section, Ministry of the Interior) would consider the appeal, and might or might not grant the residence permit. The refugee had to be a close relative (father, mother, husband, wife, brother, sister, child) of the sponsor.

At first the Ministry granted them easily, but got more and more difficult as the numbers of refugees increased. The guarantor had to deposit a small sum (L.E. 50 to L.E. 100) with the Ministry of the Interior to ensure the payment of the refugee's repatriation expenses. The Greek Community is the largest foreign community in Egypt, and the Ministry feared the refugees might be assimilated into it and fail to leave the country after the war.



Report of Interview  
with Mr. Nicolaou - 30 May, 1945

There were 500 refugees billeted in Cairo hotels and pensions, on an average, under the Repatriation Office besides those at Gezira.

The Agricultural Society's Exhibition Hall was divided into cubicles to show off the different crops. The R.O. billeted one family (usually 4 - 5 persons) per cubicle. (Later camps had one tent per family) Some lived in huts.

Refugees who got jobs or joined the forces were written off the R.O.'s books, responsibility for them passing to the office employing them. Exception - a few who were invalided out of the Army were returned to Gezira, and the R.O. reassumed responsibility for their repatriation.

Mrs. Elinor Were was in charge of the Lady Lampson Refugee Aid Bureau. This fund paid refugees' hospital bills, and had people meet and feed refugees arriving late at night. Bureau had 5 or 6 on staff - some paid, some volunteer.

Pocket money for Gezira refugees came from Greek Welfare Committee headed by the Greek Red Cross in Egypt under Mr. Mouratiadi, its President. Mr. Lamera and Mr. Jean Tricoglu of the local Greek Community did most of the work for this committee - which also provided the teacher for the school for refugee children in the Gezira band-stand.

About 70 refugees were sent by train to Libya and Palestine from Gezira.

Report of Interview with Mr. Nicolaou

UNRRA Camps Division, 26 May, 1945

NOTE: Mr. Nicolaou, who had been on the staff of the British Consular Office in Athens, was one of the first group of evacuees billeted at Gezira. He later joined the staff of the Repatriation Office, MERRA and UNRRA.

1. Gezira Refugee Camp

The first refugees moved into Gezira at the end of April 1941. Gezira was being prepared for single men. Fifteen or twenty male British subjects were moved in at first. Around 10 May they went to hotels and were replaced by Greek refugees of the lower classes.

Greeks were in the majority at Gezira at first. Greatest number lodged there was 1200 of all nationalities.

On 12 July 41, about 150 Maltese refugees, in transit for India, arrived at Gezira. About 100 more Maltese, ex Turkey, came on 27 August 41.

Refugees were given an identity card while in Gezira. (Compare with current DPI repatriation cards) They were free to move around Cairo, go to movies, restaurants, etc. Refugees in present camps aren't free to leave camps without an escort and movement orders. Refugees arriving at Gezira registered at Repatriation Office, giving age, name, passport number, nationality, financial means, future plans (Army, country to which to be repatriated, etc.) etc. Then got identity card. The Moses Wells identity card, slightly longer than that for Gezira, and had a photograph of the refugee.

In principle, educated refugees were sent to hotels and boarding houses in Cairo, and uneducated ones to Gezira camp. In practice, division of refugees into "A" and "B" category for billeting was done in a hit or miss fashion.

Mr. Ellis Price was the Camp Administrator of Gezira, and had a staff of 10 or 12 British Officers and local Greeks, plus cooks and Arab servants. The caterer, Mr. Evangelos Macris, a Greek resident of Egypt, provided food for the camp. It had the right number of calories, though the refugees complained that it was inadequate and tasteless. Refugees made their own beds, etc, but Arab servants cleaned. It saved money, stoves and space to cook all the camp's food at once, rather than let each family cook its own.

The average number of refugees at Gezira was 700 to 800, not counting those in Cairo proper. On 31 December 41, there were 3,124 refugees in Gezira and Cairo both, billeted by the Repatriation Office.

The Gezira site was rented from the Royal Agricultural Society after the first three months (when it was loaned rent-free.)



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Gezira Camp was closed in July 1942, on account of El Alamein. (Note by EKS - On checking with other sources, I found that Gezira was never completely closed as a refugee camp until June 1943, when the UKCC took it over as a warehouse. This information was later confirmed by Mr. Nicolaou.) There were 849 refugees in the camp in July, 1942, mostly Greeks of British nationality and Greeks, who were sent south to Kenya on the insistence of the Greek Government, which provided the ship and originated the move. Some landed in the Belgian Congo and others in Tanganyika, etc. This was the origin of the East African Refugee Administration. Most of the refugees left for the south on 4 July 42. A few stayed a few days longer, and then were sent to Moses Wells.

## 2. Repatriation Guarantee

For the first two months after the opening of the Repatriation Office, boatloads of refugees from Greece arrived in Egypt unannounced. Security (SIME) would interrogate them and tell the R.O. that so many would come to Gezira.

Later they began to come overland via Turkey and Syria. The Greek and British Consuls in Turkey sent them to a transit camp in Aleppo for interrogation and recruitment of single men into the Greek Army. The Egyptian Government generously let them enter Egypt, with few formalities.

The big influx of refugees through Turkey, Syria and Palestine (Palestine couldn't hold so many) let the Lampson-Nahas Pasha talks culminating in Proclamation 298. They started after Gezira camp was founded, when refugees began arriving from Palestine in large organized groups, and Lampson requested permission for 10,000 to enter Egypt.

Proclamation No. 298, of 12 July 42, regulating the entrance of refugees (must stay in camps, get jobs only with consent of Egyptian Government, supply nominal role of all movements, etc.) and their repatriation is still valid, though some of its provisions were never enforced. (The Refugee Office in the Passport Division was never opened. We have often told the Egyptian Government that refugees have escaped from camps but they were never prosecuted.)

Until the publication of 298, the Repatriation Office just told the Egyptian Government that some 200 refugees under escort were coming from Palestine to Gezira - for example,

### Destination of Refugees

Gezira was a semi-transit camp. The Maltese were mostly evacuated to India. The original plan had been to send all refugees to India. Some 2,071 were evacuated from Egypt, others disappeared, got jobs in GHQ, etc, and joined the Greek or British Armies. (There was no Greek recruiting office in Cairo at first, so Greek refugees were recruited into the British Army.)

Any refugee who got a job with the Allied forces, the Repatriation Office, etc, and whose identity card was approved and in order, could by agreement between the Embassy and the Egyptian

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Government, leave the camp and stay in Egypt to do war work. The same applied to those entering the Allied armed forces.

The British Embassy was responsible for sending the refugees out of Egypt when the war jobs were over.

3. Summary on the Repatriation Office

The Repatriation Office was the first to deal with the refugees, and MERRA and UNRRA followed in its footsteps. Gezira was fundamentally like the MERRA - UNRRA camps, except that the latter had many more refugees, more staff and more welfare activities.



Report of Interview with Mr. J. T. Patterson, Assistant  
to the Deputy Chief (Balkan Mission) for  
Distribution and Transport  
February 19, 1945.

In September 1943 a survey of MERRA camps was made by James Harakas, R. Youdin, Dimitri Shuetzoff; Chauncey Truax visited Moses Wells only, but all other camps were visited by Mr. Patterson, Mr. Youdin and Mr. Shuetzoff.

Mr. E. R. Fryer was also in Cairo in September and visited Moses Wells, as did also Lt.-Col. Reekie, of USPHs, then attached to OFFRO as Chief of Mission in North Africa.

The visit of the above four to all camps took place from September 10, 1943 to October 3rd, 1943, from Algiers to Algiers. Mr. Truax, starting at the same time, spent about two weeks on the trip. Messrs. Fryer and Reekie started out in advance of the rest of the party to ascertain what the chances of future operations were and to establish friendly relations with the MERRA organisation, and returned before the other members of the party.

Brig.-Gen. Chickering was Chief of Mission for USAFIME during 1941 and 1942, and was chosen by the War Department to accompany Governor Lehman to Cairo because of his knowledge of the area and for his contacts here. At one time he was in charge of the Army V-mail, and was attached to Governor Lehman as Military Aide. When in Cairo he was able to arrange many

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facilities for UNRRA, such as the A.P.O.

Distribution and Transport Division

This Department did not exist until the creation of the Balkan Mission organisation and conferences were held for the selection of staff for different posts.

Discussions with Governor Lehman resulted in Sir William Matthews being offered the post of Chief of Mission, and Mr. Roseman of Deputy Chief for Finance and Administration, Mr. Gerstenzang as Head of Distribution and Transport and Mr. Elkington for Requirements and Supplies. The Senior Deputy Chief was to be appointed later.

At this conference it was decided that there should be three bureaux, each headed by a Deputy Chief, as opposed to the Divisions, whose heads did not have this rank.

The essential structure was determined in conference between Governor Lehman, Sir Wm. Matthews, Mr. Gerstenzang et al held in the month of April, 1949, or earlier. Mr. Patterson assumed his duties in Distribution and Transport early in April and he and Mr. Gerstenzang composed the staff of that Bureau until July, with the exception of one or two other members who were taken on locally.

In May Mr. Patterson and Mr. Gerstenzang went to Italy for two weeks, studying the Allied Control Commission in Naples



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and spending part of the time in Bari which was Headquarters for Jugoslavia activities and ACC D.P. Divisions. Bari was the reception point for Yugoslav refugees from Dalmatia.

From June 1st to July 15th, 1944, Mr. Gerstenzang was in the United States for the purpose of, -

- 1) trying to get definition of basic policy from Washington re his Bureau,
- 2) pressing a recruiting program and giving Washington our ideas on the numbers and types of people.

In Mr. Gerstenzang's absence Mr. Patterson made plans and endeavoured to acquaint himself with Mr. L. personalities and set-up.

During July Distribution and Transport staff began to arrive from the United States, UNRRA joint planning with M.L. was speeded up and the office was very busy. ~~At this time~~ The Distribution and Transport staff were, perhaps, the storm centre of the Greece Mission's objection to M.L.

Distribution & Transport's interpretation of the April 3 Cairo Agreement was that it delegated to UNRRA the task of supervising distribution as an organisation (See Para A. 3 of the Cairo Agreement.)

SUPPLIES A total of sixty Distribution and Transport men was suggested for Greece -- ten teams of six each was the preliminary estimate.



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OFF THE RECORD -- Mr. Patterson thinks he knew most of the M.L. personalities involved for nearly a year -- Brigadier King, Colonel Stockton, U.S.A., Sadler and Hughes.

King is stubborn, military minded and didn't use good judgment with UNRRA. He never accepted the Cairo Agreement and its interpretation to the extent he should have and had his own ideas of relief in Greece which <sup>were</sup> proved wrong by events.

The question of personalities had much to do with the situation which arose. Most M.L. men went to Greece in September and thus had no chance to learn of the abilities of the UNRRA Distribution and Transport men, and so were loath to give them much responsibility. The UNRRA men began complaining before civil war broke out.

Athens was freed about 16th October. The bulk of Distribution and Transport staff arrived in Athens in mid-November, a few in early November. Proposed integration with M.L. was on November 23, and shooting started on 6th December. Complaining started with integration -- not with close association with a combat unit of one nation in a civil war.

Integration became a cause of friction chiefly in Athens. Some Distribution and Transport men didn't like working with M.L. in the districts but no refusals to work were recorded in Salonika, Patras, Aegean Islands nor in Cyclades.



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In all these places from the beginning UNRRA men have been working with and under M.L. and still are.

In Epirus, the Peloponnesus, Volos and Thessaly Distribution and Transport men worked with and under M. L. till they left with M. L.

In Athens and Cairo, however, there was almost a refusal to work with M.L. The causes of friction appeared to be the following:

- 1) American civilian feeling as opposed to that of British Military Officers;
- 2) The idealism of UNRRA personnel reacted badly to international politics in Greece. (Some Distribution and Transport men said ELAS would push the British into the sea in a week.)

The trouble in Athens was caused through

- 1) Lack of confidence in Mr. Archer on the part of some members of the staff.
- 2) The Greece Mission had no opportunity to shake down as an organisation before the country was thrown into civil war.
- 3) Most of the Greece Mission staff didn't know M.L.
- 4) Many UNRRA members had never been out of the United States before and were not familiar with foreign policy or conditions and had no foreign experience.
- 5) Brigadier King, Head of Supplies and Relief for M.L. in Greece, was an experienced officer and hadn't sufficient confidence in the UNRRA staff to hand over the responsibilities called for in the Cairo Agreement. This was the largest single factor in the insistence of the Military on integration.



- 6) Colonel Balfour, Head of Distribution and Transport Greece, arrive at the eleventh hour and had no knowledge of M.L. and the UNRRA Staff. He was thrown into action at a hard time and was shortly dismissed by M.L. with the concurrence of the Greece Mission. This left the Distribution and Transport Division leaderless and aggravated the conditions existing between M.L. and the UNRRA Distribution and Transport Division.

The original integration agreement of 23rd November was opposed by Mr. Gertenzenang, who was in Athens at the time, on the ground that it emasculated our ability to use the UNRRA personnel to the best advantage and prepare to take over later on. But it was agreed to by Mr. Hugh Jackson and Sir William Matthews, who were then in Athens, as the best arrangement then obtainable with the Military.

Mr. Gerstensenang then advised his staff to accept the agreement and to go to work. Too short a time elapsed between its acceptance and the outbreak of war to prove whether it could work satisfactorily.

The Distribution and Transport staff in Cairo felt that the November Integration Agreement was contrary to the CCAC Agreement and the spirit and letter of the 16th September directive from M.L. to UNRRA. However, they realised that the Military were supreme during the military period and that circumstances altered the working of the Agreement.



The August 29 directive from M.L. to UNRRA was the one to which the UNRRA personnel took the most violent objection. The subsequent directive of 16 September, which resulted from Mon. UNRRA discussions, was a material improvement.

Mr. Gersténzang felt that the November 23 integration agreement double-crossed UNRRA and was a reversion to the spirit of the August 29 directive. (It covered UNRRA-ML relations in the field, while the Nov. 23 Agreement was specific and dealt with supply in Athens H.Q.)

Discontent in the Distribution and Transport staff began before integration. Some senior members of Distribution and Transport were in Athens early in November, about three weeks before integration, and complained they were not given tasks commensurate with their abilities. M. L. seems to have been disorganised. Other grounds for trouble in the Greece Mission was that many staff members objected to integration on principle. There was also conflict between personalities, chiefly in Athens.

Report of Interview with Mr. J. T. Patterson, Assistant  
to the Deputy Chief (Balkan Mission) for  
Distribution and Transport.

February 16, 1945.

Mr. Patterson arrived in Cairo from North Africa on March 18, 1944. He had been with OFFRO in North Africa for 11 months - in Tunisia and Algeria, and in Corsica - doing administrative and distribution work, surveys for determining the extent of relief supplies needed in those areas, and working out with the authorities methods of distribution. He surveyed Corsica with two others in November 1943, and made recommendations on stock requirements in Algiers. On February 1, 1944, he transferred to UNRRA, to a job which had been offered him in December, 1943.

Mr. Gerstenzang arrived in North Africa with OFFRO in the summer of 1943. He was transferred to Cairo in the fall of that year, and to the UNRRA payroll in January 1944.

Mr. Archer arrived in Cairo with OFFRO and transferred to UNRRA.

The American Legation Finance Office handled many matters for UNRRA as late as May and June 1944.

UNRRA had its offices in the American Consulate during the months of March, April and May, 1944, and MERRA was



located in the Camps Division building. On June 1, 1944, both UNRRA and MERRA moved to the building on Dar-El-Shifa.

OFFRO became part of FEA and ceased to exist on September 26, 1943, by virtue of an Executive Order from President Roosevelt merging the Office of Lend Lease Administration, the Board of Economic Warfare, and OFFRO. But there was an understanding between Lehman and Crowley that OFFRO organization and staff would not be disturbed; the UNRRA Atlantic City Conference was about to start and the OFFRO staff would be needed for UNRRA; therefore, Xanthaky, Gerstenzang and others were put on the FEA payroll until such time as they would be taken over by UNRRA.

Just before Christmas 1943 UNRRA Washington offered jobs to some of the OFFRO North African staff. The OFFRO staff included:

- a) those who were not offered UNRRA jobs;
- b) those who were offered UNRRA jobs and accepted;
- c) those who were offered UNRRA jobs and declined them.

Later came Fryer, Brownbridge, Youdin, Patterson, Jacobs, McCandlish, and maybe James Harkash and James Falck.

Kelsey, Mrs. Severeid, Archer and Gerstenzang came as part of OFFRO or FEA. OFFRO, though put on the FEA budget, continued, on a gentlemen's agreement, to function as OFFRO for about three months, until UNRRA was organized; it was



technically absorbed, though actually just housed, waiting for UNRRA.

During this three-month period Lehman sent Gerstenzang to Cairo as advance representative, because he assumed there would be a field for UNRRA in the Mediterranean and the Balkans. Gerstenzang and Archer kept the United States in the picture here, in preparation for UNRRA in case UNRRA should be organized, or for OFFRO in the eventuality that OFFRO should continue to exist. Their work was primarily that of liaison.

Between December 1943 and March 1944 there was talk in Cairo of the creation of an UNRRA Balkan Mission, of the absorption by UNRRA of the MERRA Camps and staff, and of UNRRA operations in the Balkans. Until March, when Governor Lehman arrived, nothing but the take-over of the camps had been accomplished.

In September 1943 several of the OFFRO staff in North Africa were detailed for a month to inspect and report on the MERRA camps. Mr. Patterson visited Moses Wells, Haifa, Aleppo, and Souk-El-Garb/Refugee Camps (this last being just a shadowy MERRA responsibility). These were the only camps then in existence, excepting the camps for Poles and those



in East Africa. Mr. Patterson's report on these camps is filed in the OFFRO Library in Washington.

Haifa Camp went out of existence, or nearly so, by the time that UNRRA came into being.

Mr. Xanthaky has a report written by Mr. Patterson on the estimated cost of operating the MERRA Camps. Mr. Patterson came to the conclusion that no estimate could be made because of the accounts being in such a mess. (This report is a two-page one dated late March or early April, 1944.)

The reason that OFFRO sent Mr. Patterson to inspect the camps was that OFFRO believed it might operate similar camps; or that, if UNRRA was organized, UNRRA might either run similar camps or take over the MERRA camps.

Mr. Patterson's report of September 1943 was brought up to date by him in March, 1944, for Washington.

There were preliminary talks between OFFRO and MERRA on the possibility of a take-over, but nothing was really done until Governor Lehman arrived in March. Mr. Xanthaky (or Mr. Pickard) is the best source of information on the take-over of MERRA by UNRRA.

~~Messrs. Patterson, Youdin,~~

Messrs. Xanthaky and Youdin and General Chickering



arrived in Cairo on March 18, at the same time as Mr. Patterson. Governor Lehman arrived a few days later; as also did Mr. Jackson, from London.

Negotiations in Cairo were started between the Military and MERRA re:

a) arrangements between UNRRA and the Military for operations in the Balkans;

b) take-over of MERRA by UNRRA.

Messrs. Roseman and Gerstenzang participated in these negotiations. Satisfactory agreements were concluded on both points. The April 3, or Cairo Agreement with the Military was signed, and pursuant to this agreement MERRA and-staff organization, such of the MERRA staff as was willing, and the MERRA camps were to be taken over by UNRRA on May 1.

Sir William Matthews was offered and accepted the post of Chief of the Balkan Mission which was to be set up. Mr. Archer, who had been top UNRRA man here, was offered the post of Chief of the Greece Mission.

Prior to May 1 the UNRRA office and staff in Cairo was just an outpost.

The reason for the MERRA take-over was on a higher Washington-London level: principally because the British wanted to be relieved of the expense, and the British Military



wanted to be rid of the responsibility.

From the day of the signature of the MERRA agreement the British started to whittle down their responsibilities:

- 1) in the matter of supplies. The Military had agreed to continue to supply the Camps;
- 2) in the matter of personnel. The military had agreed to keep up their war establishment until UNRRA had had time to replace the military personnel.

The Cairo Agreement was not ratified until the fall of 1944, but UNRRA operated throughout the summer on the assumption that it would be ratified.

Due to a complete lack of clerical staff, Mr. Patterson had to do his own typing until June, 1944, and no records were kept.

UNRRA's operations up to May were limited to:

- a) planning the take-over of MERRA;
- b) planning Balkan operations; and
- c) making contacts.

The UNRRA organization grew slowly through May and June; but not until July could much more than planning be accomplished.

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REPORT OF INTERVIEW WITH MR. J. T. PATTERSON, ASSISTANT  
TO THE DEPUTY CHIEF (BALKAN MISSION) FOR

DISTRIBUTION AND TRANSPORT.

2ND FEBRUARY, 1945.

The memorandum to Sir William Matthews from Mr. Birk of the Public Relations Division, of 16 September 1944, shows that Brig. Forrester-Walker was will<sup>ing</sup> to exceed his authority if possible, and was not following the line of his own War Dept and Foreign Office. (This was also the view of the Distribution & Transport Division throughout the Autumn).

In the Autumn at least he was not much interested in UNRRA, and in Mr. Patterson's view he did not see it in the picture at all (though he probably does see it now). If pressed, he would say he had handled things all right on an officer-to-officer basis. His original plans were brutally simple -- to dump supplies at Yugoslav ports and then wash his hands of the matter. He spoke of M.L. supervision of distribution but had no officers for the purpose. UNRRA, working through Washington, the CCAC and back to Brig. Forrester-Walker, changed his views. He's the vague type.

General Zupancic was one of the main <sup>Colonel Jelic</sup> ~~General Jelic~~ representatives of the London Government and ~~General Jelic~~ was Tito's representative here.

Most of the discussions between Distribution and



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Transport Division and the Yugoslav representatives were attempts by Mr. Gerstenang to find out the ideas these representatives had of UNRRA and whether or not they wished UNRRA to enter the country to supervise distribution.

One of the main problems of the Distribution and Transport Division has been the lack of a clear policy ~~xxx~~ decision on supervision,-

- 1) To what extent will the countries permit supervision.
- 2) To what extent would UNRRA undertake supervision to protect the supplying countries.

This problem worried Mr. Gerstenang more than any other one in Cairo.

Distribution and Transport's view is that the country's Government is responsible for distribution, but to what extent shall UNRRA check up?

- 1) Shall we merely have a few auditors in Athens, accepting reports from the Greek Government and reporting to Washington.
- 2) Shall we have observers in the country, reporting on any unfairness to Washington, but taking no action.
- 3) Shall we attempt by tact to persuade the Government to act fairly; or
- 4) Shall we warehouse supplies at UNRRA expense, arrange for their transport by UNRRA means and try to stop distribution in areas where the Government is not playing fair; or
- 5) Shall we go all the way and do the distribution our self with Government help.



The same questions apply to the control of transport. How far should we control it?

Shall we have our own warehouses only at ports, or all over the country? or all over the country?

Many Greeks (including Kanelopolous, who didn't say so outright because of his official position) think, and have told Mr. Gerstenzang, that in view of the weakness of the Greek Government the maximum of UNRRA control is desirable for the welfare of the Greeks themselves (at least they thought so last summer.)

Mr. Gerstenzang made a very real effort for many months to approach the problem from the point of view of the people involved, trying to find out what their own prominent citizens thought UNRRA should do regarding distribution and supervision.

Mr. Gerstenzang has gone on record in reports to Washington that UNRRA should retain considerable control, especially in Greece, at least until the Greek Government could assume the responsibility for equitable and efficient distribution.

Prime Minister Tsouderos and Mr. Svoros when they were in Cairo also talked with Mr. Gerstenzang. (They should not be quoted.)

Mr. Gerstenzang made repeated efforts during all of 1944 to find out what policy of control and supervision should be established from the viewpoint of leading citizens, especially  
Greeks.



Mr. Patterson and Mr. Gerstenzang talked with Tito's men in Bari. There was considerable fencing to ascertain each side's point of view. (See Mr. Patterson's report).

The Greeks, whether of right or left, wanted UNRRA control of distribution because they feared the political advantage the other side might get from control of supplies. They also felt that the people would be better off with distribution controlled by a neutral authority.

Their views may change if one side is clearly on top. No Greek Government wants to be responsible for distribution of inadequate supplies. They wish to let UNRRA take the blame. The Greek Government has repeatedly asked JRC to continue temporarily, because it is neutral and can take the blame for failure to distribute or for inadequate supplies. When the Government is strong enough and there are sufficient supplies, the Government won't want foreign supervision.

Jacic, who had only very general authority to speak for the Tito Government, is not to be quoted. Mr. Gerstenzang talked with many more Greeks than Yugoslavs. There is not enough evidence regarding the Yugoslaves to count.

The three bureaux were established as being the most important and largest. Three Deputy Chiefs of Mission were appointed so that UNRRA could always have a man of standing to represent the Mission.

CAMPS DIVISION

The Camps Division is a definite cut and dried job.

Mr. Pierce came out with a directive from Mr. Hoehner, giving him very broad jurisdiction not only over Camps, but also over Iran, India, the Balkans, East Africa, etc. There was some criticism of this directive in letting Mr. Pierce be in the Balkan Mission or not as he saw fit. UNRRA as a whole has sometimes felt that Mr. Hoeler's Displaced Persons Division is too independent.

Camps Division, in effect, took over MERRA, except for its Balkan Planning Section.

Mr. R. F. Hoddinott's Dept. in <sup>MERRA</sup> J.R.C. helped Mr. Patterson. It had useful material and knew pretty well what was going on inside Greece.

MERRA had participated in the planning and bringing to the Middle East of the British Voluntary Society teams for relief work in the Balkans.

The relief supply program for Greece for the first six months after liberation was worked out entirely by M.L., which adopted some of UNRRA'S suggestions but not others.



Report of Talk Given by Mr. C.M. Pierce, Displaced Persons Division.  
Late November, 1944

This Division will probably last longer than the Balkan Mission.

The Displaced Persons Division will operate in the European, African, and Asiatic continents, though theoretically in the Balkan Mission. The Balkan Mission operations will be the largest outside of Germany.

The DP Division, Balkan Mission, used to include all DPs, but for operational reasons it no longer does. It is now concerned only with repatriation, not with internal displaced persons. In the Balkan Mission, the Welfare Division will probably take care of this work.

The Displaced Persons Division generally assumes responsibility for "United Nations Nationals displaced as a result of the war". These are carefully chosen words. Our authority is limited by Council's plans, etc., and there are some exceptions. The DP Division can assume responsibility for expulsion of enemy nationals from Greece, for example, if the Greek Government so requests. It will only get them over the Greek borders, and then wash its hands of them.

The Montreal Council of September 44 established a vague and difficult resolution allowing UNRRA to assist with the care and repatriation of enemy nationals who were persecuted and exiled on account of race, religion, or activities on behalf of the United Nations. Query--how to prove their claims.

UNRRA can also help Prisoners of War, if specifically requested by their government to do so. For example, if Polish Government asks, UNRRA can repatriate Polish Prisoners of War from Germany. (I.e., prisoners forced into labor in Germany. Polish government may feel they worked too voluntarily, and thus should not be given military repatriation, but civil, like other forced laborers.)

Hence the DP Division is limited by authority and resolutions. Also by geography. It has authority to operate in the United Nations liberated area, but not in neutral countries. We cannot send a repatriation mission to displaced persons in Switzerland, for example.

UNRRA authority in enemy countries is very limited. United Nations Nationals, Italians, and Dodecanese only. The Montreal Conference resolution extended certain UNRRA services to Italian Nationals, as partly pro-Ally, and to Dodecanese as Greek. The latter will receive the same treatment as Greeks.

UNRRA can only repatriate Poles from Greece to Poland if the Polish Government wishes. UNRRA is the servant of the government.

Another limitation concerns care for United Nations nationals in non-liberated areas. Care and repatriation is allowed for bona fide destitute refugees, having indigency and war refugee status. 1 Jan 38, pre-Anschluss, is generally accepted as the beginning of this war, and this date will be used to decide war refugee status. Indigency is harder to determine.

The UNRRA Displaced Persons Division works in a fairly rigid legalistic framework, which gives authority to do this, but not that.

A short time ago a multilateral agreement among all the United Nations was reached, in an attempt to standardize care and repatriation of displaced persons, with UNRRA, in general, to supervise. That is, standards of care and maintenance by Holland, for example, of French refugees in Holland.



There will probably be local agreements between countries, or between UNRRA and the countries, on what UNRRA will do with regard to displaced persons.

The Displaced Persons Division is in the Balkan Mission for administrative reasons--actually it has a much wider geographical scope--India, & Mauritius, to South Africa.

The Division is also responsible for reception of repatriated displaced persons--this and maintenance are joint duties with Camps and Welfare Divisions.

In the Middle East refugees include Greeks, Yugoslavians, and Poles. The first two are within the scope of the Balkan Mission, but the Poles are not. Nor are the Dodecanese to be returned to an enemy country.

Moses Wells---Greeks

El Shatt-----Yugoslavians

Jugoslavians (and Italians?)

Nuseirat-----Greeks and Dodecanese

Aleppo-----Greeks and miscellaneous

There are about 100,000 United Nations nationals to be repatriated from the Middle East, India, etc., by UNRRA Displaced Persons Division.

DP Division has a liaison officer near AFHQ in Italy, to get transport for refugees; also with the Dodecanese and troops there. There is a big London Displaced Persons office.

Cairo will remain the HQ of the Balkan Displaced Persons Division, regardless of where the Balkan Mission goes, because Cairo is the Middle East transport center. There will be District Displaced Persons Officers in Aleppo, Iran, India, and East Africa.

Registration of Refugees--system used earlier by the British. Duplicate cards are made out; one stays with but not on the refugee, and is visaed like a passport, to get him through transit countries and into his own. He carries an UNRRA information card, showing he's suitable for repatriation. The duplicate card stays with UNRRA HQ and is indexed three ways--by present billet, home town, and profession, so that country's wishes can be given priority.

No one is sent home by UNRRA till he has been approved in advance by a representative of his government (consul?). Some system will be used during the military period. No one should be returned if home politics would endanger his life.

Transport, war supplies needs, and politics, and crossing countries, are difficulties. In general the refugees are healthy and badly needed by their governments.



Report of Interview with Mr. T.H. Preston, Resident Representative of  
the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees in the Middle East.  
8 Jan 45

~~called by~~ <sup>of</sup>  
Nairobi Conference, / British Government ~~on~~ <sup>official</sup> colonial ~~affairs~~, etc.  
Consists of:

Governors of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and Nyassaland, of which Kenya is the most important. They confer at Nairobi every three or four months.

In the Spring of 1942, 10000 Poles got to Teheran--about 102,000 Poles got out of Russia, of 1½ million deported in 1939. About 80,000 Poles joined the Polish forces, and we have the rest.

The British Ambassador requested the release of the Poles to join the Allied Forces in the West. The Australian Government was protecting Polish interests in Russia; the Polish Government kept informed, but had no diplomatic relations with Russia then and therefore had no part in the negotiations.

All of South and East Africa were short of food.

A demarche was made to get more Poles out of Russia, but Russia refused.

The Poles in Persia were blocking the line of communication of the 10th Army, so the British Government asked the Governors' Conference to take 10,000 Poles. Now there are 17,800.

In June, 1942 came a request to take 5,000 Greeks and Yugoslavs. At the same time Preston started talks with the Belgian Congo authorities--their representative in Kenya--to take some Greeks.

#### *Relief and Reception Administration*

The East African Refugee Association was formed by the governors to administer these refugee camps. British Colonial Civil Service administers them, and expenses are charged to the Polish Government. The same expense system obtains with the Poles in Teheran--MERRA only has liaison.

The Repatriation Office was started in Istanbul in 1940 or 1941. HQ was transferred to Cairo--the Repatriation Office was a branch of the British Embassy (same building as MERRA) and started the first Gezira camp for Greeks. The Repatriation Office went on from April 1941 till MERRA took over in August 1942. ~~They sent~~ <sup>Relief and Reception</sup> Maltese refugees to India. In general, handled refugees who came out of the Balkans under the aegis of the British Fleet in the Spring of 1942. The British ambassador in Turkey told Preston to start the Repatriation Office, and the center was moved to Cairo in April 1941. The Office had the same functions as MERRA, on a smaller scale.

The Minister of State's Office established MERRA, and took over repatriation, because it was dealing with Poles in Persia which were not an Embassy commitment. Minister of State's Office was forming in 1941--Mr. Preston says the Relief Section of the Ministry of State was not established until the liquidation of MERRA, and is still going to deal with bills.

When the Ministry of State established MERRA, it wanted its own man, Matthews, as head, and Preston became No. 2.



Interview with Mr. Roseman.

Mr. Roseman arrived in Cairo on March 20, 1944.

He was to have met Governor Lehman here, but Lehman was detained in Algiers with a broken leg.

We were at that time negotiating with the military re MERRA and the question of the April 3 agreement, and talks on the subject were being held in Cairo between Lehman, Xanthaky, Jackson and Roseman. Archer, Kelsey and Gerstenzang were also here; they had originally come out as OFFRO employees, then transferred to FEA, and finally to UNRRA.

The chief points discussed at the talks on MERRA were:

1) The basis for the take-over. The policy had already been agreed on between London and Washington; but the question to be settled was whether the British Government would continue to give to UNRRA all the assistance and facilities it had previously given to MERRA, such as military personnel, rations, and other supplies.

2) The conditions of the transfer of MERRA civilian personnel.

It was realized that a final decision - especially in regard to military personnel and services - would have to



be made in London, and Hugh Jackson therefore departed for London to expedite a settlement of the matter.

Negotiations in London were not completed until the end of June, and May 1, 1944, was agreed on retroactively as the date for the take-over. The fundamental agreement for the take-over had already been made at Atlantic City, and the arrangements concluded in Cairo - for the take-over and conditions of service - were fundamentally approved in London.

Until around January 1, 1944, when the Military decided to bring down Yugoslav refugees (who by March were arriving by the thousands), MERRA was a small organization and dealt only with Greeks.

Patterson, Jacobs, Ioudin and McCandlish came from Casablanca to join the small UNRRA staff. There was very little change in camp operations, which carried on pretty much the same as they had under MERRA.

Around June 1 Colonel Moss was transferred from Teheran and Camps Division was established as an independent entity, with functions increasing gradually along Balkan lines. UNRRA doctors were arriving and began to strengthen the health program, this constituting the major change in Camps Operations.



Discussions with the Egyptian Government on the subject of the take-over of MERRA went on contemporaneously.

Two main questions came up in these discussions: the first was as to whether UNRRA would take over MERRA's responsibility for the repatriation of refugees who had come prior to the date of the take-over, May 1, 1944; the second was as regards who would assume responsibility for stateless persons.

Negotiations with the Military in regard to the Balkans.

The Balkans had been regarded as the responsibility of the British Military assisted by Voluntary Societies, and, to some extent, by MERRA. In February 1944 the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington (?) decided that, instead of being the responsibility of the British Military and MERRA, the Balkans should thereafter be a joint Allied-UNRRA responsibility.

When Governor Lehman arrived ML was just beginning to assume an Allied character, with American officers who were arriving. The agreement of April 3 was discussed between Governor Lehman, Jackson and Roseman representing UNRRA on the one side, and Brigadier Hughes, Smith-Dorian<sup>Orrison</sup> and Colonel Bellm representing ML on the other side. The major issues discussed were:

- a) the question of integration;
- b) the relative responsibility of UNRRA and the military;



c) the chain of command to be established; and

d) the Voluntary Society personnel required.

The point at issue was whether UNRRA would simply take over any tasks which the Military might assign to it, or whether it would be really integrated with the Military. The Military wanted full integration, with no separate chain of command, whereas UNRRA wanted to maintain its identity as an international organization.

The discussions turned on the question of responsibility for supplies, the Military agreeing to furnish all the supplies; and relatively little discussion was held on the actual plan of operations. Sir William Matthews had not at that time been appointed Chief of the Balkan Mission and was not therefore greatly involved in the talks, though he was consulted on the plans.

The question of a Balkan Supply Center arose because of the need of the Military for assistance in planning the non-military supply requirements of the Balkans. The function of such a supply center was to have been similar to that of MESG. As a result of talks between Governor Lehman and Commander Jackson, it was decided that a Balkan Supply Center would be unnecessary, as UNRRA supply specialists could assist the Military during the period before UNRRA would take-over.



take over. Power politics as well as personal questions were involved. Landis felt that the Balkan Supply Center would ensure U.S. participation in the Balkan supply picture, and also there was the consideration that Landis' job was done. The Scott-Linebaugh report on the subject resulted in the question of a Balkan Supply Center being definitely discarded. There was a press announcement to the effect that it had been established, but its implementation was never approved by either Washington or London.

The Russian Minister to Egypt, Mr. Novakov, discussed the question of the Balkan Supply Center with Lord Moyne and Mr. Roseman in May 1944, and Mr. Roseman asked Archer to take Mr. Novakov to see Levison in regard to the matter. Novakov was against the project because he believed it to be another Anglo-American agency.

The Military endeavored to whittle down its responsibilities in various ways:

- 1) It tried to diminish the amount of supplies furnished. UNRRA protested, claiming that we would have to repatriate the refugees.
- 2) It endeavored to get UNRRA to set a definite date for the repatriation of refugees, which UNRRA refused to do.
- 3) It tried to reduce its military personnel, UNRRA objecting on the grounds that: a) we needed all the military be-



cause of security reasons; b) unless the British civilianized their personnel, the Camps <sup>would</sup> ~~will~~ become an all American responsibility, which would not be a good thing.

We have continued our supply program, which has been our biggest worry.

About mid-August it looked as though we would soon begin to operate in Greece, and UNRRA personnel was arriving in good numbers. Conversations on the subject of responsibility for distribution were first held between Mr. Gerstenzang and Brigadier King.

Generals Sadler and Hughes went to Italy, and while they were away Brigadier Smith-Dorrian - who was very anti-American - issued the August 29 directive. Mr. Roseman immediately sent this directive to Washington. ~~Sir William Matthews~~ Sir William Matthews evinced great displeasure, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington declared that Smith-Dorrian <sup>was</sup> ~~had~~ gone too far. There was then issued the directive of September 16, which proved to be a generally satisfactory compromise.

Until August there had been no definite plan of operations. UNRRA was expecting to perform various tasks on its own responsibility, especially those of supply and distribution, which it was thought the Military would turn over to UNRRA in toto. But the Military were still not satisfied with this arrangement.



In the talks on the subject, Sir William Matthews and Mr. Pickard spoke for MERRA; Xanthaky, Lehman, Jackson and Roseman for UNRRA.

One of the main points discussed <sup>in the main however</sup> <sup>negotiations</sup> <sup>part of</sup> was whether the cost of British installations should be set down as <sup>1</sup> the British contribution. In the end the British Government decided to donate them.

No agreement was signed between Sir William Matthews and Governor Lehman. The actual negotiations regarding MERRA, conducted by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, took place in London. All the talks with Governor Lehman were held at Ambassador Kirk's house, to which Governor Lehman was confined with a broken leg.

Mr. Roseman acted as <sup>Senior Director Chief</sup> Deputy <sup>1</sup> until Mr. Miller arrived, in addition to heading Finance and Administration, and acting as general financial adviser. Mr. Hendrickson had not yet arrived.



Report of interview with Mr. Philip Sanford, Secretary, Cairo Council of Voluntary Societies, Dec. 44

There have 1600 volunteers from the societies, 500 from Great Britain, or between 20 & 25 teams.

The Cairo Council is international. Its "allies" are the Greek and Yugoslav Red Cross.

Miss Gifford of UNRRA Welfare Division has the minutes of meetings of the personnel sub-committee of Cairo Council. (She did all the real planning.) Barratt Brown was the chairman.

The Training Subcommittee functioned until June 44, when it was replaced by the General Committee.

The first British team was a group of 32 people who came to Cairo in Feb 44 (43?) The first American team came in May or June 1944.

The first teams were thought of in connection with refugee camps. The camp idea was subsequently dropped, but the team idea was kept. Also it is necessary to have disciplined teams, not individuals, working with the Army.

Formerly the Army notified MERRA which notified the Cairo Council which notified the individual societies. The Cairo Council allocated the teams. Now the Army notifies the Welfare Division of UNRRA which tells the Cairo Council, which takes the necessary steps to get the people moved. The Cairo Council is responsible for individual discipline and persons in the teams. The Army equips them.

Great changes have come since June of 1944 when the Welfare Division was established.

The British societies insist on autonomy, and their own uniforms when they have them. They expect to work in the Balkans long after UNRRA is dead and gone.

99% of a team is from the same society.



Report of Interview with Mr. L.L. Scranton, Agricultural & Fisheries  
7 Mar 45

The files were taken over from Central Registry only about a month ago. They are mostly re technical matters--what sort of supplies should be set up for country missions.

Mr. Scranton's division has worked very closely with ML opposite numbers, especially in Greece, where they had adjoining offices. There was much exchange of information on needs in the field, and travelling about the country with ML officers.

Agri. UNRRA and Agri. ML HQ talks took place last summer, before ML Balkans went to Italy. So at the Balkan level there has been little opportunity for talks with ML, who moved out 4 or 5 months ago.

Liaison & cooperation between UNRRA & ML has been best in Agricultural Division, primarily because they're the same type of people, with the same training and aims. ML Agri. was interested, as UNRRA was, only in doing a professional job. Some were trained agriculturalists, others farmers, a very fine bunch on the whole. Col. Dickey, the ML officer in charge of the Greek Agricultural program, was Officer in Charge of the Agricultural program in Italy for the Allied Commission, and agriculturally trained.

ML is responsible for bringing in agricultural supplies for the first 6 months. We helped them develop their supply plans and demands, and they took much of our advice in Greece. Agriculture is one of the few UNRRA divisions which have always had very good cooperation and relations with ML.

Col. Dickie (Dickey?)--Greece Agricultural officer in charge.  
Maj. Walker--Jugoslavia ML Agricultural officer in charge. Our men helped Walker set up his list of demands and scheduling to the various plants.

Maj. (?) McDougal Porter is ML Agricultural Officer for Albania, and has worked very closely with our McDaniels on planning and programming, which is about as far as they've gotten.

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Mr. Scranton:

Joined OFFRO in May 1943. He joined UNRRA on 1 Jan 44 (when it was formed), and arrived in Cairo in July 44, as Agricultural Rehabilitation Specialist, to help Mr. Kelsey who was then Director for the Balkans. He, Kelsey, Peck, & McDaniels drew up the first agricultural programs for Greece, Albania, and Jugoslavia.

In November 44, when the Bureau of Supply was set up in Naples, Kelsey appointed Scranton as his Deputy for agricultural supplies and requirements there. During October, November, and part of December, Mr. Scranton worked on agri. supply programs and shipping schedule. He helped the Missions at Bari and San Spirito.

Mr. Kelsey was appointed director for Greece in Dec 44, and Scranton was made Agri. Director for the Balkans and also for the Albanian Mission. At the beginning of February he went to Athens to meet the Greek Minister of Agriculture and his directors and bureau chiefs (no notes or minutes were taken of these discussions) and helped them draw up their final presentation of needs for agricultural supplies for the first three months of the agricultural period. Mr. Scranton carried on generally till Kelsey arrived in mid-February. About 21-23 February, he went to San Spirito



Agri.

and, as/Director for the Balkans discussed agricultural personnel needs (number and types) for the Yugoslavian Mission. He was at Ruvo when the Albanian Mission was dissolved, so he transferred their agricultural personnel to the Jugoslavia Mission.

He is now winding up the Balkan Mission, and getting staff transferred to the country missions. Our main job in Cairo was recruiting agricultural personnel for the country missions and that is now nearly done.



Interview with Mrs. Lois Severeid, Assistant to  
the Chief of the Greece Mission, on 28 February 1945

Mrs. Severeid joined the organization in Washington on 3 September 1943. She was alerted to go to Algiers, and was scheduled to sail on 15 October 1944. She was the first woman to go abroad for FEA, which was then under the State Department. She was disalerted on account of the Azores Agreement, since her scheduled sailing was on a Portuguese boat and the Germans would no longer guarantee its safety. She joined as a clerk-stenographer, having been previously on the Comité Internationale de l'Enfance, WPA, and with an organization to repatriate Americans wounded in Spain.

Originally, Mr. Ben Merriman was appointed Director of the Balkan Mission to do planning of operations for OFFRO, but he never came to Cairo. He was Professor of Archeology at Princeton. When Mr. Merriman failed to come, Mr. Laird Archer, who had been Near-East Foundation Director for twenty years in the Balkans and Middle East, took over this position. Mr. Archer arrived in mid-November. Two girls went to Algiers for OFFRO in June, and Mrs. Severeid followed, arriving in Cairo on 1 December 1943 by plane.

Mr. Gerstenzang had come from Algiers about the last of October, 1943, as the first OFFRO man in Cairo. The office was then a part of FEA, and was supervised in the American Legation by Mr. Landis.

Mrs. Severeid was Mr. Archer's secretary. Mr. Kelsey arrived on Christmas Day, 1943. These four people - Mr. Archer, Mr. Gerstenzang, Mr. Kelsey and Mrs. Severeid - set up files and an office in Cairo. The four of them lived in a villa ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ which became more or less semi-official headquarters for the Cairo office.

In December, a cable arrived asking if these four would like to join UNRRA. Mr. Landis was in the United States, but advised them not to join UNRRA because he was trying to organize the Balkan Supply Center. Mr. Landis returned to Cairo in February.



Interview with Mrs. Sevaried  
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About March, 1944, they were paid by both FEA and UNRRA, but an arrangement was later worked out whereby March 15th was established as the dividing date - the date on which they became officially UNRRA personnel.

Mr. Landis continued to supervise all cables from the office; but in spite of this control, he failed to give the office the equipment which was needed for the work to be done. Mrs. Sevaried took on the additional duties of chief accountant, and interviewed job-seekers, managed the office, etc. , as well as continuing her secretarial work.

About 12 February Margaret Arnstein and Colonel Wright arrived as UNRRA personnel, followed by Colonel Brown and later the Algiers OFFRO group. The situation was anomalous - under Mr. Archer's supervision, but without clear-cut lines of authority. As an example, the FEA Office Manager took away the cleaning service for the office, since in her view UNRRA was no longer OFFRO. The office was without funds and without supplies.

From the beginning, Mr. Archer was dealing with the Greek, Albanian and Yugoslav governments and planning UNRRA operations. He was also planning fusion with MERRA with Sir William Matthews. Important documents dealing with the UNRRA - MERRA fusion are letter of 11 December 1943 from Governor Lehman to Mr. Ben Smith of the British Embassy in Washington re the Balkan Supply Center and UNRRA; and wire of about 12-20 December re joining UNRRA. In February a letter arrived from Mr. Hugh Jackson to Mr. Archer, dated 4 January, which was the first indication to Mr. Archer that UNRRA wanted to take over MERRA with Sir William Matthews as head. This proposal is also in a letter of December \_\_\_\_ suggesting that Sir William would head the UNRRA Balkan Mission.

Mr. Hugh Jackson's letter to Commander Jackson of about 20 March 1944 was the first important letter re the MERRA takeover. Mr. Jackson had done preliminary negotiations with the Foreign



Interview with Mrs. Severeid  
Page 3

Office in London regarding the MERRA take-over, and then came to Cairo to talk with Sir William Matthews and the Minister Resident, Lord Moyne. All was settled, except for finance matters, in these talks and those with Governor Lehman.

Miss Arnstein, two doctors, and other U.S. Public Health Service nurses and doctors assigned to UNRRA, went into the MERRA camps as soon as they arrived - about February 1944.

Mr. Gerstenzang dealt with the Polish situation.

Governor Lehman arrived and finished off the talks about March, 1944.

Shortly before Governor Lehman left, Mr. Roseman arrived and began drawing up tables of organization for the Balkan Mission, with Sir William Matthews as Chief, Mr. Gerstenzang as Chief of Distribution and Transport, and Mr. Roseman Chief of Finance and Administration. Mr. Archer was Chief of the Greece Mission.

One problem of organization which caused much worry was the terms of service.

The fusion on paper was accomplished as of 1 May 1944, but Sir William Matthews was busy polishing off MERRA. The united offices of MERRA and UNRRA moved into Dar el Shifa as of 1 June 1944, when Sir William really took over.

The set-up was one of improvisation all along. There was never a sufficient staff. Mr. Greenstein arrived in June; Mr. Elkinton of Requirements and Supply arrived in July or August; so that, at first, non-experts made the policy decisions. The first six months were spent in planning: 1) the MERRA take-over; 2) Military Liaison; 3) Plans for operations in the Balkans - except that the Health Division supervised the medical operations of the Camps from the time of their arrival.

The cable files show when the first funds came to buy paper and other office supplies. Mrs. Severeid was sometimes forced to buy paper herself, or dickered with FEA for this and other supplies such as soap, cleaning equipment, etc. The U. S. Treasury did the



Interview with Mrs. Severeid  
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accounts until about June, 1944. The United States government paid the salaries - i.e., the Treasury did the disbursing during the UNRRA-FEA period as the disbursing agent. The last U. S. payment was the March salaries.

There was no Finance and Administration man until Mr. Rohrbach was procured two weeks before he went to Greece. Mrs. Severeid and Mr. Archer did almost all of the work themselves until the last minute, as people were not appointed to the Greece Mission till then. The Mission has never been all together. There were no staff meetings of the Mission until September because there was no staff. Progress Report of Greece Mission dated 15 September 1944, from the Mission to Sir William Matthews, contains appreciation and plans of the Mission to that date.

Mrs. Severeid believes that the Greek Mission would have worked satisfactorily if it had had time to "shake down" before the war. As it was, the top men went to Greece without staff, secretarial help, or office supplies, since the military was unwilling to provide more transport. The staff remained in Cairo without supervision.

Mr. Landis' idea was that UNRRA would not get under way soon enough, so the Balkan Supply Center should be established as a stop-gap. Possibly Mr. Landis wanted the Balkan Supply Center instead of UNRRA. For terms of reference of BSC as of 10 May 1944, see Mr. Linebaugh's report.

Because UNRRA believed that it would enter the Balkans almost immediately, it continued to improvise in the Cairo office. MESG had already started Balkan supply planning, and Mr. Kelsey worked with them on agricultural supply. He got coordination with agencies of all governments here.

The Balkan Supply Center died on the vine when killed by Mr. Linebaugh's report. It had done some progressing and planning.



Report of Interview with Mr. Waisdell Sharp, Displaced Persons Division,  
Albania Mission. 30 April 45

Mr. Sharp was a Unitarian Minister in Wellesley, Mass., from 1936 to 7 May 44. He arrived in Washington on 15 May 44 as Director of Displaced Persons for the Greece Mission. He felt that we had a debt to pay to Greece as one of the three sources of western civilization.

He remained at College Park until 26 June 44, and arrived in Cairo on 23 July, after having been detained 10 days in Miami on account of a document dispute between UNRRA and the State Department.

In Cairo from 23 July to 16 October he spent his time at Dar el Shifa and in the Greek School. On 13 Sept he transferred to the Albania Mission.

The purpose of the Maadi classes was to fraternize with ML and to read Intelligence Reports. They were specific where College Park was general. Mr. Sharp thinks both were pretty good for their purposes. He spent the summer in preparation of plans for displaced persons operations in Greece, and attended about 25 lectures at Maadi.

On 23 Oct he went to Ruvo & Bari. From mid Sept to 23 October he worked on the Albania displaced persons plans. At Ruvo he read Intelligence material on Albania, which was scanty at first. He did this until 4 Jan 45.

The trouble all along in UNRRA has been idleness. Mr Sharp thinks people should have been sent to the camps right off.

The Albania Mission was always cold, with acute congestion in the main office. Idleness was a big factor--the Germans were driven out of Albania on 28 Nov and UNRRA should have moved in on 1 Dec 44, but didn't. UNRRA was completely cut off from contact with Albania Gov't Mission in Bari. This made the Mission feel that its plans would never be used--and they didn't get information. The Mission didn't know whether their plans were based on correct information or whether they would be acceptable to the Albanian Government.

Military Security made ML ban contacts with Albanian Government.

UNRRA morale broke at 16 Dec meeting when they learned of proposed landing.

Mr. Sharp returned from the Albania Mission on 4 Jan 45 and arrived in Cairo on 13 Jan 45.



Interview with Mr. Sharp--cont'd.

UNRRA's troubles :

1. Confusion of motive--some disinterested and others full of self and material interest. This led to divergence between British & US staff.
2. Idleness.
3. Needed better training and warning that some motives would be mixed & that there would be long periods of waiting.
4. Personnel leadership needed--calisthenics, sings, etc.



Report of Talk given by Col. Shepheard, Greece Mission Intelligence Officer. Late November, 1944

In 1942 the first British Officers were dropped into Greece. They destroyed the Georgopatamos Bridge in December 1942.

The Germans and Italians didn't take much away from Greece. Mountain villagers were as well dressed and fed as before the war, except for no coffee, tea, and sugar, and run-down shoes. They always made their own clothes. But the plains villages of Thessaly and Macedonia (wheat) in people buy light town clothes, and in war couldn't get enough. Western Greece is a deficiency or starvation area--has fine stone houses but poor food.

Vlachs--Right Wing, often Royalist; ex-Roman Legion, anti-EAM.

The Greeks and Italians are accidental foes of ten years' standing; the Bulgars are enemies of 100 years. The Greeks hate them.

Epirus is the poorest area--best stone houses but very little food. Most are emigres to the U.S. and professional men. They have to be clever. Make their own clothes.

EAM has universal suffrage, including women, from 18 up--to get the women's votes. They have the Greek youth, so lowered the voting age from pre-war 21. Have women on committees, and say they will give equal rights between the sexes.

Villages from Athens to Thebes are Albanian, and collaborated with the Italians. Some raised armed bands which attacked Zervas (Right) and the EAM Andartes. They submitted when the Italians collapsed, but recently Zervas ordered all 20,000 Albanians to move to Albania bag and baggage. (They will probably lose it all.)

The Greeks thought the Germans were fools, but the Italians were much better at counter-espionage--clever, but no good as fighters.

Nearly 30,000 died of starvation in Athens in the winter of 41-42, but by 42-43 Athenians were less shabby than Londoners. No outward sign of starvation and malnutrition. Lower classes were no worse dressed than before the war. The middle and upper classes always loved clothes, and were living on their 4 or 5 good suits. But shoes were bad.

The people had lost weight, and had very little meat to eat, unless they could afford black market shopping. The upper 5% could live better than in London. These were largely black marketeers or contractors for the Germans.

There has been a tremendous change in possession of wealth. The working class did better than salaried class, as they were given food. Essential workers did almost as well as before the war, and some did better, counting food and real wages.

Workmen in a big tobacco factory got food, wages, and 400 packs of cigarettes to sell on the black market. Directors got about \$20 per month, --much less than necessary to eat well.

Army officers, civil servants, etc., never got enough to keep pace with inflation.



Col. Shepheard's speech--cont'd.

Greek middle and upper classes never lived on their small salaries, but partly from inherited land and houses. They had to sell all they owned cheap to the new rich--black marketeers, butchers, green grocers, millers.

Factory workers have been working about 4 hours daily, and office staff as they liked. Businesses kept on their staffs with no work. There will be a problem here.

Young men enjoyed fighting the Germans and political foes. This will mean conflict with the peaceful aged.



Report on Interview with Staff Sergeant Suthers. 16 Apr 45.  
(Sgt. Suthers was confidential clerk to Sir William Matthews from the inception of the Relief Section of the British Ministry of State, until the liquidation of the Balkan Mission of UNRRA.)

MERRA Charter: about June 1942. The Middle East War Council decided MERRA should be formed to 1) take over the increasing responsibility of refugees in and around the Middle East. 2) Merra will be guided in policy matters by decisions of the Middle East War Council (which met regularly in Ministry of State offices and consisted of representatives of each of the three services and the Ministry of State.)

Mr. S.S.M. Clayton, Min. of State's office, knows all about the Middle East War Council.

The Relief Section was established in Jan 42 when Littleton was Minister of State, in order to arrange evacuation of Greek children under safe conduct. Through Dr. Garvice of the Egyptian Ministry of Health we got Moses Wells Camp in March or February 1942. The Camp Commandant (Greek Relief Section File 1 Gk 1)--Maj. Ralli--arrived in April 1942.

In June & July 42 the Greek Red Cross in Greece didn't want to send the children out--wanted food sent in instead.

January to June--negotiations with Germans & Italians via legation in Berne re safe conduct for children.

Mrs. Murray was in the Relief Section after April 1942.

The camp is well written up--cards 11-1. Files on evacuation of Greek children (attempts to get safe conduct), January-June 1942, were destroyed. See cards 11/1 or 11/2 which give some detail. (Destroyed before Jul 42). File on food ship and Greek Relief was destroyed. (Relief to Greece thru blockade--cards 11/1 or 11/2.)

March 1942--SS Radmanso took in 7000 tons of wheat. Two smaller shipments--about 2500 tons each--were made--a ship sunk on the way back. The Stureborg it was. (In MERRA 8--Reports file.) One survivor only--sunk by Italian planes.

The Turks wouldn't agree to send more supplies--and this stimulated action to send supplies through blockade. (Turks withdrew (Ship) Dumlupinar.)



In October, 1943, Mrs. Tyson joined OFFRO, then part of the State Department in Washington, as a clerk-stenographer to go to OFFRO's Italian Mission. This never materialized because the Atlantic City Conference decided not to help enemy countries.

Mr. Keeny went in November to Italy to survey the situation. He is now Chief of UNRRA's Italian Mission. (Governor Cochrane in Caserta is in charge of supplies for all missions in Italy; he is Lehman's liaison man.)

OFFRO made area & language studies on Italy. When it concentrated on the Balkans. Mr. Bettelman of a Jewish relief committee went to Spain to see about taking the Sephardic Jews from Spain to a camp at Casablanca which had been built by the Army, at Fedhalla. OFFRO brought over about 850 people to this camp.

In November, OFFRO became FEA.

About 3 Feb 44 about 7 people, including Mrs. Tyson, came over to North Africa as members of FEA. Mrs. Tyson went to Casablanca to work on the camp. About 15 Apr 44 they moved to the camp, and the first group of refugees entered it around 15 May 44. Most of these were later moved to Philippeville.

On 6 May 44 Mrs. Tyson came to Cairo for UNRRA. She transferred to that agency about 1 April 44. In Cairo in May UNRRA was in the Legation, and had a staff of about 15. Landis had left just before she arrived. (He was a minister.)

On 1 June 44, when MERRA & UNRRA entered Dar el Shifa, both staffs were small, and amalgamated easily. She continued to do cables for about a month. At first there were 25 UNRRA people and 25 MERRA people.

Staff arrived in batches of 20.

The Greek School was in the UNRRA building for about 1½ months--late July and August.

UNRRA first had a few rooms at the Legation; then moved into Dar el Shifa. Later got the Greek School (one floor) temporarily; Agouza was also acquired in September. Kings' Hotel was rented on 28 Dec 44.

New arrivals were sent to Maadi for orientation courses. If they flew they arrived 3 days before the cable announcing them. The course lasted about a week. Division chiefs lectured to them.

OFFRO Casablanca group was about 16 or 17 people--came almost as a unit. Seven from the U.S. supplemented Algiers and London staff. What was needed was complete teams, but UNRRA sent 7 secretaries, 4 D & T men, etc.

(Beckelman was acting chief of the Casablanca Mission.)



REPORT OF INTERVIEW WITH Mr. F.E.M. THRUPP, INDUST. REHABILIT. DIVIS.  
Mar. 17, 1945.

Mr. Thrupp arrived in Cairo on July 20th, 1944, and began to assemble personnel for his division. This was extremely difficult, because Washington and London sent none for months.

He got one ~~personnel~~ <sup>staff member</sup> locally and found two here already. Adequate, trained engineers were hard to get. London and Washington didn't answer cables asking when men were coming.

The main task was to allocate men to the three country missions, when they were in the course of formation, and to prepare them for their work in the field. Therefore a paper called "Functions and Limitations of Industrial Rehabilitation" was prepared. The Division helped prepare preliminary programs based largely on assumptions because industrial rehabilitation consists mainly of repairing damage, the extent of which is now unknown.

When ML was at Maadi, during the summer of 1944, Mr. Thrupp endeavoured to consult with the members, but ML had no opposite members for industrial rehabilitation. The military definitely stated that they did not propose to be concerned with any industrial rehabilitation whatsoever, and in the matter of repairing dwellings, they indicated that in their opinion the damage had been very greatly exaggerated, for which reason they would only bring into the countries very limited quantities of materials for repairs to buildings, (the above statement was made by Col. Katzin, who was in charge of requirements for all ML).

The military also decided that shipping space for any such material which might be requisitioned by UNRRA for delivery during the military period could not be allocated.

Having spent the summer conferring with ML and collecting staff, Mr. Thrupp was occupied through the fall and winter preparing "guesstimates". Much thought was given to Mr. Thrupp's paper on functions and limitations of the division, and to the allocation of responsibility for the preparation of requirements of different commodities - determining which divisions should be responsible for demanding certain commodities. A certain amount of confusion arose from the fact that the guidance received from Washington was not specific, in that certain items which would seem to be the province of industrial rehabilitation were allocated to other divisions, (for instance, rehabilitation of food processing industries was put under Agricultural Rehabilitation; certain raw materials were allocated to some divisions and others to others, with no clear principle apparent).

Another very serious difficulty was that Supply and Requirements Division got all the documents in Washington and London, probably only in copy. Insufficient numbers of copies of important documents were sent to the Mission, so Industrial Rehabilitation often didn't get them. This situation was aggravated by the fact that Supply and Requirements Bureau was sent abroad to Naples in order to be in closer contact with the military at Caserta, (the whole Mission should have gone to Naples - Sir William's mistake in organisation - but sending one department handicapped all the others). Mr. Thrupp himself eventually went to Naples and found many documents which should have been sent to him earlier, (neither Registry nor the Bureau of Requirements and Supply had been told to distribute documents). The above are strictly confidential remarks, given to help in organising future missions.

Between December 15th and February 11th Mr. Thrupp visited Naples, Athens, and Ruvo, Italy, to discuss industrial rehabilitation questions with his staff there. He made two other trips to Italy to keep in touch with the industrial rehabilitation staff, give them guidance, and acquire information and knowledge of their differences. Mr. Thrupp's first trip, from Aug 22nd to Sep 23rd, was made to assist the Italian Mission on industrial subjects to be dealt with in their report, and to view damage sustained by industrial establishments in Italy with a view to getting an



idea of what would be required in the Balkans, for industrial rehabilitation. The second trip, which he took between October 20th and November 12th, he made to deal with certain personnel problems which arose in the Yugoslavia and Albania Missions.

The London E.R.D. Industrial Rehabilitation Division frequently sent very informative reports on different branches of industry and on sources of supply in the United Kingdom. (Washington did not). The Industrial Rehabilitation staff on the country missions also made "guesstimates".

Mr. Thrupp believes that ML has since begun to appreciate the need for repair of dwellings (saw damage after entering Greece, for example).

The Industrial Rehabilitation Division did not know until Mr. Hugh-Johnson came in late November how much money (i.e., supplies to what value) it might requisition. There was no decision and no action taken, till the 15th of December on Mr. Thrupp's November request to move the Division to Naples - and at that time Mr. Thrupp was told to go himself, without his staff.

In July, 1944, Mr. Hendrickson drew up a paper entitled "Commodity Classifications and Appropriate Price Quotations", to be sent to the various governments for them to use as a base for requirements schedules. Mr. Thrupp first saw this document in December, in Caserta. The Industrial Rehabilitation Division had not understood the governments' schedules because of the lack of this list. Furthermore, Mr. Thrupp never received complete sets of the governments' requirements schedules, which were sent to London for comment then supposedly to Cairo. There was no covering letter showing what was included and whether the document was complete. Mr. Barratt-Brown at Maadi, one of the Industrial Rehabilitation men, got some on Yugoslavia which he took with him and which Mr. Thrupp never received.

It is essential to have a distribution office under an experienced archivist and a good registry. (Mr. Thrupp received on March 16th 1945 the report covering a meeting of the Industrial Rehabilitation Sub-Committee held in London on September 5, 1944).



Report of interview with Paul Unger, Assistant to Director, UNRRA  
Camps Division, February, 1945

Although the same personnel remained in camp operations from May to November, 1944, the following six changes in policy/taking place after UNRRA took over the MERRA camps:

- 1) Establishment of a repatriation policy was begun.
- 2) Policy on Supplies--method of procurement and standard per person, etc.
- 3) Welfare--difference in voluntary personnel, and also a welfare man has been placed on the administrative staff, as a regular part of camp operation, similarly to the supply men, etc.
- 4) The activities set-up is new.
- 5) More people have been placed in the Health activities since UNRRA took over.
- 6) The change in policy between operation/as an arm of the military and as a part of UNRRA has not yet been effected.



Report of Interview with Lt. Col. P.B. Webb, Office of Chief of Mission  
1 March 1945

Two leaders of Yugoslavian refugees came to Cairo to discuss their problems. Col. Webb went to see Col. Velebit re these delegates.

The second report concerns Col. Webb's trip to fetch the two delegates.

The British Force 133 and the Partisans held Vis which was crammed with refugees from other Dalmatian islands. The British sent them to Italy--the ACC refused to keep them because there was already too little food for Italy. North Africa couldn't take them, so MERRA did.

Col. Webb's trip was also made to stop Jewish refugees from going into Italy.

The original agreement to remove refugees from Dalmatia was made between Great Britain and Tito, through Force 133, for operational rather than humanitarian reasons. There was no formal agreement between Tito and MERRA, although possibly there was one between Tito and the London Foreign Office or between Tito and Force 133. The two delegates in Cairo quoted such an agreement (made in Yugoslavia). Col. Deakin who was present at <sup>the</sup> Cairo and Yugoslavia discussions and is now in Bari said the Yugoslavian delegates misquoted this agreement.