

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE (Repeated Berendsen, Eville for info)
FROM: SEC GEN
DATE: 26 August 1960
NUMBER: 1231

Following is text my reply to Belgian Ambassador's letter relayed to you in my 1216:

"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

J'accuse reception de votre lettre du 25 août. Vous avez bien voulu attirer mon attention au soucis du gouvernement Belge de la sécurité de ses ressortissants.

Je desire attirer votre attention au fait que nous aurons en quelques jours un effectif militaire au Katanga qui surpassera celui que à la Belgique. Je vais que vous etes d'accord avec moi que ce n'est pas le deploiement dans chaque lieu où les troubles pourraient se manifester qui donne la securité voulue romma mais plutot l'ambiance générale qui est creee par une presence militaire assez forte. Tout de même, nous le savons, il y a des situations de troubles internes où rien, ni personne, ne peut donner de garanties absolues. Ce que nous pouvons faire c'est notre mieux afin d'assurer en général la continuité de la sécurité tout en reconnaissant qu'il y a des incidents que personne ne peut prevenir. ~~XXXX~~

Vous adressant cette lettre je veux vous faire mention du fait que la presence à Kamina de l'entite irlandaise, adjoutant à la presence considerable des troupes ethiopiennes, doit donner l'assurance que les ressortissants belges qui resteront à la base auront une protection suffisante, ainsi rendant superflu tout autre arrangement.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, les assurances de
ma haute considération.

Le Secrétaire Général/ Dag Hammarskjöld"

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER, info BUNCHE
FROM: BERENDSEN, ELISABETHVILLE
DATE: 26 AUGUST 1960
NUMBER: CODE 32

Reur 12 Belgian staff here reports that 330 troops from E'ville and 280 troops from Kamina now scheduled to be flown out on 30 August could be flown out by midnight 29th if additional US planes were provided on ~~that~~ day.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: HQ EASTERN COMMAND
DATE: 26 AUGUST 1960
NUMBER: CODE 31

Following message received from Lt;Col.Goidis:

"Subject repatriation of the bodies of two buried Belgian soldiers in Bunia.

1. It was agreed with HQ Leo, that the exhumation from the Roman Catholic cemetery in Bunia should be done by Belgian soldiers in civilian clothes transported by Sabena, the recent events no longer show to complete this arrangement.

2. I suggest therefore that the exhumation be done care of the Catholic Mission and that the coffins be taken to Kamina by UN.

3. I advise that HQ Leo has the information as to the locations of these coffins."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: CORDIER Rptd. SEC GEN
FROM: BERENDSEN
DATE: 8 SEPTEMBER 1960
NUMBER: CODE-92

1. Following are extracts from note received from Katangese government concerning closing airport "Le gouvernement Katangais élève contre cette déclaration unilatérale ~~et~~ et non expliquée une protestation solennelle.

1. Elle ~~est~~ est en contradiction formelle avec les arrangements en date du 3 Aout en vertu desquels toutes les pistes d'atterrissage du territoire, à l'exclusion des pistes de la base de Kamina, étaient ouvertes à tout trafic légitime, sous réserve de contrôles conjoints de la gendarmerie Katangaise et des forces de l'ONU.

2. Pareille mesure est de nature à paralyser les activités de toutes les forces de l'ordre Katangaises. En effet, celles-ci sont approvisionnées, comme elles l'ont toujours été, en vivres, soldes, armements et munitions par le réseau d'aviation de la gendarmerie. La fermeture des pistes immobilisera complètement ces forces et, dans certaines régions troublées, les mettra à la merci de réactions hostiles éventuelles.

3. Les autorités Katangaises sont incapables de voir sur quelle base juridique repose pareille décision: elle leur semble au contraire en contradiction flagrante avec les principes généraux de la charte relatifs à la non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des états, principes réaffirmés à plusieurs reprises par le Secrétaire général depuis le début de la crise dans le Congo-Belge. Les autorités Katangaises sont en conséquence dans l'obligation de faire connaître au conseiller politique:

(a) Que dans l'esprit qui les a sans cesse animés de collaboration complète et loyale avec l'ONU, estimeraient que les arrangements actuels ne sont pas suffisamment efficaces.

(b) Au cas où les autorités de l'ONU n'accepteraient aucune disposition nouvelle à ce sujet, les autorités Katangaises se verraient dans l'obligation de requérir de l'ONU la mise à l'approvisionnement des forces de

gendarmerie Katangaise. Faute de mesures de cette nature prises dans les douze heures, les forces de police Katangaises se trouveraient, comme il a été dit précédemment, dans l'incapacité complète de continuer à exercer leurs activités et la responsabilité des désordres éventuels qui pourraient en résulter, retomberait entièrement sur l'ONU. Il est évident qu'en pareil cas les autorités Katangaises seraient amenées à devoir reconsidérer leur position antérieurement quant aux arrangements arrêtés lors du passage du Secrétaire général à Elisabethville".

2. This is much milder in form than the original conversation I believe the substance deserves serious consideration.

PRIORITY

FM BYRNE BERDNDSEN/ELI 072150Z (EFTO)
TO CORDIER VON HORN LEO

1 WE PROPOSE TO IMPLEMENT YOUR EV 41 IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER. WE SHALL
INFORM KATANGESE AUTHORITIES AT OR IMMEDIATELY AFTER 0800 LT THAT WE
ARE GOING TO CLOSE AIRPORT AT 0900 LT WE SHALL INFORM SABENA THAT
PLANES EN ROUTE TO EVILLE AT THAT TIME MAY LAND BUT NOT TAKE OFF
EVILLE. AIRPORT IS CLOSED UNTIL DAWN BY KATANGESE AUTHORITIES

2 WE ALSO PROPOSE TO CLOSE OTHER AIRPORTS IN KATANGA PROVINCE AT
WHICH UN TROOPS ARE PRESENT

3 WHILE TAKING ALL PRECAUTIONS, WE CAN ONLY REPEAT OUR MISGIVINGS ABOUT
THIS OPERATION

3069/jlp/071100Z SEP 60

To : Von Horn,
From : SecGen
Date : 8 September 1960
Number : 1634

Our 40 To Byrne, Berendsen repeated to you as
Number 1632. Will you inform Berendsen directly as to your
best guess of time for lifting of present order concerning
closing of Airports.

Distribution: Gen. Von Horn

INCOMING CODE MESSAGE

nd

To : Byrne, Berendsen Repeated Von Horn
From : SecGen
Date : 8 September 1960
Number : E'ville 40 Leopoldville 1632

Your 91.

1. Order stands and must stand as long as this policy is pursued in rest of Congo. If developments in Leopoldville were to permit our doing so, closing of airports may be lifted there and then no further problem in Elizabethville, at least not in form.

2. When you are forced to give a reply to authorities- we are entitled to wait for their note, I guess, and also to play on 12 hour latitude - you should if order still generally valid, as I fear it will , tell them (a) that order stands; (b) that we cannot enforce it in Eville with military means; (c) that they must shoulder full international responsibility for disregarding our order, whatever their reasons to do so; (d) we can under no repeat no circumstances ~~become~~ become a party by any assistance in or acceptance of their logistics flights.

3. Tribal problem, need for logistic flights etc as presented by Katanga people closely parallel to Lumumba actions and arguments covering south Kassai. They will not carry weight internationally. The necessity of De Facto acquiescence by us in Eville, although under sharp protest and with clear indication their responsibility, weakens out stand all around, especially with stories about Belgian arms import all over the Press. On this point exact information, as already requested, is needed most urgently,

particularly in view of airport developments.

Distribution: Gen. Von Horn

INCOMING CODE

To : Cordier repeated SecGen.
From : Byrne, Berendsen.
Date : 8 September 1960
Number : Code 90

1. Airport closed this morning, Byrne and I informed Kibwe and Munongo (Tshombe being ill) Their reaction was most hostile. Main reason is that because of deterioration of security situation along lualaba river north of Bukama, They have twelve platoons entirely dependant on air supply against several thousand "Looters" and marauding lawless tribesmen.
2. Ministers and advisers maintained that provisioning of these men was so vital for security of state that it could not be interrupted and pressed for suspension of order. When we replied that our orders were mandatory, they said that we must within twelve hours be assured that we would supply their troops with our planes or they would be obliged to resume operations themselves. When warned of serious implications of this, they said each side must take its responsibilities. They intend to submit note setting forth their position.
3. We wish to emphasize that discussions were not emotional. They were prepared to recognize international background of decision, but based their objections on vital internal security conditions. Because of local situation, we believe this time in reality of their threats and regard clash at E'ville airport as not unlikely.
4. We are convinced of seriousness of security situation in area affected. Effective deployment of UN troops there is not

possible in immediate future.

5. We declined to alter decision, but agreed to report gist of meeting. If there is any possibility of rescinding or modifying closure of airport, we recommend it. If not we should welcome precise instructions as to the degree of force to be used by us at airport, if Katangese try to take off. We have only three ~~nm~~ hundred Swedes in E'ville and airport. This message also for Von Horn.

C.C. Cordier
 Von Horn

Copy sent to Van Horn

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL, N.Y., CORDIER, VON HORN
FROM: RIKHYE, BERENDSEN
DATE: 30 AUGUST 1960
NUMBER: CODE 54

We met Rothschild at 9:00 PM LT. He was appraised of Kamina and Tshombe stories. He was very apologetic in regard to non compliance on part of Belgian army. He said it was only after receiving assurance from the army that he had conveyed them to Berendsen. He was going to immediately inform Brussels and get Kamina orders to withdraw remainder combatants immediately. Therefore please arrange immediately a USAF lift for 500 troops.

As regards dispute with Tshombe, he thought problem was in part due to strain felt by Tshombe over difficult security situation. He appreciated necessity for UN to keep base neutralized. He promised to try and persuade Tshombe to avoid violent courses, but stated that he himself had had a difficult meeting with Tshombe today.

INCOMING CODE

TO: Secgen, info Cordier, Von Horn Leo.
FROM: Rikhye, E'ville
DATE: 30 August 1960
NUMBER: _ 53 Code

Tshombe visited Kamina on 29 August and was shown around the base by Belgian officials, he said that he had an agreement from UN representatives in E'ville to establish customs and controls at the base. He left behind eleven Katangese and Belgian officials including Kamingo Grand Chef to Baluba. They were to be picked up by plane which did not show up. We turned down their request to fly in UN plane with us. Col. Byrne who was on a visit, on my suggestion, issued orders to his men to persuade these officials to leave the base. In any event they will be kept under surveillance. Berendsen encountering demands from Tshombe and his Cabinet for native population of base remaining under judicial administrative and police authority of Katanga Government. Berendsens refers.

In view of above, Byrnes and I feel that we must reinforce Kamina immediately. Byrne has already ordered only available platoon of Ethiopians to move today. Request permission to move 100 Swedes from here early 31 August. One DC-3 available and would like permission to use Convair also for ferrying. Request Leo arrange move 100 Irish from Goma by air earliest to Kamina.

INCOMING CODE

TO: Secgen, rpt. Cordier, VonHorn.
FROM: Rikhye, E'ville.
DATE: 30 August 1960
NUMBER: Code 52

1. Plaza, I and party reached Kamina 1430L.T.
Belgian combat troops consisting of a battalion of paratroopers of 400 men, airfield guard company of 120 men and flying school of 50 instructors and pupils yet to be evacuated. Belgians propose to move 70 evening 30 August and 39 on 31 August by air. Remainder will be moved by trains on 1 and 2 September and thence by boat from Albertville on 3 and 4 September.
2. Belgian base Commander has not received any orders regarding procurement of equipment by UN.
3. Came to Elisabethville to see Berendsen and Belgians to arrange immediate departure. Berendsen had just received similar information which conflicts with all previous assurances.
4. Apparent to me Belgians never intended to comply with arrangements made with us.
5. Details follow.

INCOMING CODE

TO: Secgen, rpt. Cordier
FROM: Berendsen
DATE: 30 August 1960
NUMBER: Code 51

I met with Tshombe and his cabinet and explained to him your decisions with regard to the neutralization of Kamina base. These decisions were greeted with the utmost irritation and emotion by the Ministers present and in particular by Tshombe himself who, in a highly emotional manner, accused the UN of intervening in the internal affairs of Katanga, of acting in bad faith and preparing the country for the entry of Lumumba's forces. Tshombe declared that, if the UN persisted in excluding the civil authorities from the base and preventing their control of the fifteen thousand Africans by the Katangese authorities, the Katangese authorities would resort to force whatever the consequences and would "make our life impossible". I explained that the UN controls the base without prejudice to the rights of any party concerned and was designed to avoid any possible trouble on the international plane. The Ministers continued to regard in particular UN authority over the civilian population as an affront and in contradiction with what had been the legal position under the Belgian Administration, during the period 1 to 10 July and also under the Katangese Government. I asked for additional information on the legal position of inhabitants of the base and promised to forward it to you. Pointing out that such information might form the basis for a practical solution.

1. Warned against the seriousness of threats of force against the UN and of disastrous effect actual use would have on Katangese interests.

2. Ministers continued to make violent criticisms of and showed

.... /

...2...

~~complete~~ misunderstanding of purposes of UN. Meeting adjourned with threat on Tshombe's part to prepare some sort of ultimatum.

3. I believe Katangese Ministers are working up for ~~some~~ real trouble. A preliminary warning order has been sent to all units.

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INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECGEN (Info BUNCHE)
FROM: BERENDSEN, EVILLE
DATE: 27 August 1960
NUMBER: CODE 33

Reur 14 and 15.

1. Information contained therein conceding mandatory withdrawal of Belgians by 29 was conveyed to Gen. Gheysen with request that Byrne and I should have an interview with him immediately to carry out details. No appointment have been received in three hours. I rang up Gheysen's office and was told by Col. Chambion that Gheysen would not see us and that he intended to recommend that withdrawal of Belgian troops should be suspended until 15 soldiers held prisoners in Leo be released. I told Chambion that we insisted that the evacuation be completed by 29.

2. I called Rptscjo,d, Belgian Technical Mission; to complain of military non-compliance. He stated that Gheysen had delayed withdrawal arrangements so that it is now physically impossible to complete it before 30 and that he was sending a message through Belgian Government to that effect. We agreed that Gheysen had been undiplomatic and dilatory; but said all combat troops would certainly be returned to Belgium on 30 and that Gheysen would go with them. I told him that failure to withdraw a
.....(Note: Message incomplete - balance of which will follow when received.)

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECGEN (Info BUNCHE)
FROM: BERENDSEN, EVILLE
DATE: 27 August 1960
NUMBER 34

Continuation of Code 33

3. Von Horn on brief interrupted visit rang up Gheysen, dissuaded him from pressing condition concerning release of prisoners, persuaded him to make an effort to get away on 29, if airlift arrived but found him full of difficulties.

4 I have been as tough as I know how. Gheysen has been emotional ^{and} ~~and~~ misleading but I believe Rotschild is sincerely pressing for evacuation as soon as possible. We shall keep on trying.

INCOMING CODE

TO: BUNCHE

FROM: Berandson

DATE: 26 August 1960

NUMBER: Code 24

Reur 242230, Katanga authorities admit they are
recruiting officers for Gendarmerie in Belgium but not
through official channels.

INCOMING CODE

TO: Berendsen, Bunche
FROM: Secgen
DATE: 25 August 1960
NUMBER: 1212

Your 21.

It is about time that private insurrection of Generals and Diplomatic representatives of Belgium in Katanga ceases. The commitment of the Belgian Govt. was confirmed today, and it is not our but their responsibility that promises are kept. Do Geysen and Aspremont wish to show up to the world Belgium as not worthy of trust and its own word?

As to specific points: there has been no word from Govt. about any condition re Belgian retreat. Link to UN relief has been dropped in recent formal assurances from Govt. and its introduction by Geysen is out of order.

We have not accepted and will not accept any Security Police but only technicians at Kamina and Kitona. Maintaining of one battalion of parachutists in training at Kamina is breach of promise and cannot be accepted. Nor can it be accepted that detachment be maintained for transit of vehicles and supplies to and from Ruanda Urundi. Anyway, it is unthinkable that Trust territory of Ruanda Urundi will in any sense be run from Belgian foothold in independent Republic of the Congo. Idea that Geysen would stay as technician shows sense of humour but utter lack of judgement.

As to your point 6. Definite ruling is that all Geysens proposals of exceptions from complete and

...../.....

unconditional withdrawal are unacceptable repeat unacceptable.

I have immediately briefed Belgian Ambassador who got in touch with Brussels. Result seems to be that orders are issued that no further statements are to be made by Geysen or other officers on the spot.

INCOMING CODE

CODE 16 - MOST IMMEDIATE

To : BUNCHE-VON HORN
Repeated to Sec for info
From : BYRNE-BERENDSEN
Date : 23 August 1960
No : 16

1. The following letter was handed to us by Tshombe and his Cabinet this evening:

" J'ai l'honneur, en suite de ma lettre du 23 courant de porter à votre connaissance que les rapports concernant la situation à Albertville deviennent de plus en plus alarmants.

Ceux-ci font état des faits suivants qui auraient été constatés par des témoins oculaires:

Transport d'autochtones armés dans des camions de l'ONU et leur acheminement vers la ville d'Albertville.

Arrestation d'Européens à des barricades érigées et gardées conjointement par des civils congolais armés et des soldats du Mali.

Distribution d'armes par des soldats du Mali à la population civile congolaise.

Par ailleurs ces rapports font état des menaces de plus en plus graves qui pèsent sur la vie et les biens de la population.

Il semble que des détachements du Mali demeurent étrangement indifférents devant cette grave détérioration de la situation.

Il me paraît opportun qu'une commission d'enquête composée de membres de l'ONU et de mon Gouvernement se rende sans délai sur place afin de vérifier la véracité des faits exposés ci-dessus et qui constitueraient, s'ils devaient s'avérer exacts, une immixtion des troupes du Mali dans les affaires intérieures du Katanga.

D'autre part les rapports reçus ce jour révèlent que certains détachements du Mali échapperaient au contrôle des officiers supérieurs qui assument le commandement de ces troupes. Sans doute faut-il

rapprocher cet état de choses des événements survenus dans la Fédération du Mali.

Si ces informations devaient se confirmer il y aurait lieu à mon sens de procéder sans tarder à la relève de ces troupes indisciplinées qui semblent être d'une part incapables d'assumer le maintien de l'ordre et de la tranquillité alors que l'ONU avait solennellement pris l'engagement de les faire respecter et d'autre part partiellement responsables de la détérioration du climat d'ordre et de paix qui régnaient avant leur arrivées.

Je vous prie, Monsieur le Représentant, de prendre immédiatement les mesures qui s'imposent pour faire cesser cet état de choses à défaut de quoi mon Gouvernement se réserve le droit d'agir d'initiative.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Représentant, à l'assurance de ma haute considération."

2. Our comments follow separately.

INCOMING CODE

TO: Secgen info Bunche
FROM: ~~Bunche~~ *Beunbun*
DATE: 25 August 1960
NUMBER: Code 23

1. I redeived formal assurances from Gheysen that he would withdraw all combat troops by deadline.
2. Since Security troops at bases are not acceptable he states he will have to evacuate families, who will be followed by most technicans and he bleieves by majority of white population of Katanga.
3. In view of current threat to Katanga border, I regard this as likely.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE
FROM: BERENDSEN
DATE: 22 August 1960
NUMBER: Code 11

Intentions of local Belgian commanders concerning withdrawal of their troops do not appear to have changed from those described in my message 20 August. BBC reports this morning statement by SecGen that Belgian troops will be entirely withdrawn from Congo in eight days. Please clarify situation and advise if action is required here.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE and von HORN
FROM: BERENDSEN and HQ Eastern Command
DATE: 20 August 1960
NUMBER:

Liaison Officer Mali Battalion reports that political disturbance in Mali have so far had no repercussions on battalion. CO wishes, however, to have his troops concentrated so he can maintain fullest influence over them. Orders are accordingly being issued for the Mali Battalion to concentrate at Albertville and Kabalo. He also requests special plane tomorrow from Leopoldville so that he can visit all his troops. Battalion takes over remaining posts. This will delay concentration of Mali Battalion. Please rule on this decision.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE, von HORN
Repeated to SecGen, NY

FROM: BERENDSEN

DATE: 20 August 1960

1. Reur 122 AM. Present strength Belgian forces in Katanga including Kamina Base is twelve COYS (approximately 17 hundred men) distributed as follows: Elisabethville two COYS, Jadotville one COY, Kolwezi one COY, Albertville two COY, Kongola one COY, SANDOA-KAPANGA one COY, Lubudi one COY; Manono one COY, other COYS in small detachments.
2. Rate of withdrawal of these forces into Kamina Base, approximately one COY a day. Local commander has given assurance that if UN Forces are fully deployed it will be completed by end of August. We are urging somewhat earlier completion.
3. Present number of combat troops in Kamina is approximately six hundred. Gheysen says combat troops now at base or subsequently arriving there will be evacuated as rapidly as possible.
4. Present number of combat troops now in Kitona is three hundred. One hundred fifty will be evacuated. Remainder will remain as guard for three hundred base troops.
5. 12 hundred combat troops have been evacuated from Congo as of twelve August.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE, copy SECRETARY-GENERAL

FROM: BERENDSEN, ELISABETHVILLE

DATE: 19 AUGUST 1960

1. Katangese Ministry of Interior has informed me that Jason Sendwe, leader of cartel Katangais, intends to arrive in Elisabethville from Leopoldville by plane on Sunday. Authorities intend to divert plane to Kamina, detain Sendwe while plane proceeds to Elisabethville and return and place him on the plane again on return journey to Leopoldville. He asked my views as to possible UN reaction.
2. I explained UN policy as set forth in SecGen's reply to your B 503. I stated that a temporary detention of Sendwe at Kamina would presumably not give rise to any UN diplomatic action, but expressed some concern at possible international implications of their carrying out operation at base now occupied by Belgian forces and which UN intends to take over completely to the exclusion of Katanga authorities.
3. Katangese officials replied that if the operation was carried out at Elisabethville airport greater publicity and possible disturbance would arise. I informed them that I would report their

information to you. In the absence of any further representations from us, they intend to proceed as described in para 4. UN troops at Elisabethville airport and at Kamina will be alerted, instructed not to intervene, but to report any possible incidents.

4. Deputies "on vacation" referred to in your B 503 were allowed to land here and will not be troubled unless they undertake "illegal activities".

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL, copy BUNCHE
FROM: BERENDSEN, ELISABETHVILLE
DATE: 19 AUGUST 1960

UN military staff here has not yet worked out with Belgian staff detailed plans for withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga, which is still being carried on slow piecemeal basis. UN staff is handicapped by initial organization and communication difficulties. I am pressing them, nevertheless to work out complete plan as soon as possible. They claim that at least two or three days will be required before plan can be completed.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECRETARY-GENERAL, copy BUNCHE
FROM: BERERNSUN, ELISABETHVILLE
DATE: 19 AUGUST 1960

1. Following is the reply of Tshombe to your personal message:
"J'ai pris bonne note de votre message personnel qui ~~ma~~ été remis
par monsieur le Conseiller Politique de l'Organisation des Nations
Unies à Elisabethville.

Je tiens à vous remercier pour le souci que vous y montrez
de faire participer mon gouvernement à la mission d'apaisement
entreprise par l'Organisation des Nations Unies dans les territoires
de l'ancien Congo Belge.

Je comprends fort bien le point de vue de l'Organisation des
Nations Unies et je partage entièrement vos vues personnelles au
sujet de la situation des détenus politiques, en particulier
ceux qui appartiennent à l'opposition dans un état démocratique.

Je desirerais ardemment montrer ma bonne volonté et celle de mon
gouvernement pour mettre en pratique les principes que vous énoncez
dans votre message.

Déjà actuellement le nombre des détenus politiques retenus
en résidence surveillée au Katanga est très réduit. Par ~~la~~ Je fais

liberer immediatement toute personne nayant commis aucun delit de droit commun ou atteintes graves et delibérées à la sûrete de l'etat.

Ces derniess seront jugés régulièment par les tribunaux officiels en fonction, suivant les regles de procedure judiciaires en vigueur dans tout etat civilisé.)

2. I have asked the Katangese authorities for details concerning the practical effect of the decision to liberate political prisoners.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BERENDSEN, Elizabethville, and
BUNCHE, Leopoldville

FROM: New York

DATE: 18 August, 1960

NUMBER: 1001

Please transmit urgently the following personal message from me to Tshombé:

"Comme vous le savez, l'évolution de la situation au Congo et de la position de l'ONU au Congo arrive rapidement à une étape décisive. Dans cette situation, il s'impose absolument que tous les hommes de bonne volonté, animés uniquement par le souci du bien-être du peuple congolais, agissent pour renforcer et protéger cet effort majeur en vue d'aider le peuple congolais à sortir d'une crise profonde et qui s'aggrave.

Pour que l'ONU réponde à son objet et aide ceux qui méritent une assistance, il est nécessaire que l'ordre public soit respecté même au prix de ce qui peut sembler des sacrifices temporaires. Cela étant, je considère que la plus grande contribution que vous pourriez actuellement apporter pour l'avenir du Congo serait de relâcher avec effet immédiat les détenus politiques au Katanga, sans exception et en particulier ceux qui appartiennent à l'opposition. Je sais que vous pouvez considérer que vous prendriez des risques excessifs en agissant de la sorte. Je crains, cependant, qu'en suivant une autre ligne de conduite, vous ne vous heurtiez à des risques plus grands. C'est pourquoi j'estime de mon devoir de vous demander d'agir

.../...

comme je vous le propose. Je le fais dans la conviction profonde de servir ainsi la cause que vous-même souhaitez servir, et j'y vois une simple expression de la loi qui est au-dessus de vous comme de moi.

Bien que les pouvoirs qui me sont accordés en vertu des résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité soient considérables, je ne me fonde pas sur eux pour vous adresser le présent appel, mais sur ma propre conviction profonde de ce qu'est le bien du peuple congolais et du monde et sur ma confiance dans votre vrai patriotisme."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: ONUC, LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM: UNATIONS, EL ISABETHVILLE
DATE: 26 AUGUST 1960
NUMBER: CODE 30

Belgian Consulate here has reports that Tunisian troops in Katanga have disarmed local Europeans and given their arms to ex-members of the FP and are depriving them of access to the airports. It would like clarification of situation.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE, SHIELDS
FROM: BERENDSEN, ELISABETHVILLE
DATE: 26 AUGUST 1960
NUMBER: CODE 29

1. Secretary General BCK needs urgently to remit funds for end of month payroll of his workers in Kasai district. In absence of any other means, he suggests and I recommend that you pay approx five million Congolese francs to BCK manager Luluabourg while he pays us same amount here.
2. He also requests assistance in air travel and mail for his staff, who are only Europeans remaining in Kasai on work of urgent public utility.
3. Please cable if you agree to financial transaction which would also be subject to approval by Katanga authorities.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: SECGEN repeated BUNCHE
FROM: Berendsen, Elisabethville
DATE: 26 AUGUST 1960
NUMBER: CODE 28

Reurcode 9.

1. I have been informed that a commission has been set up to review urgently case of each political detainee and that those against whom no precise criminal charge lies will be released. I am informed that about 10 persons have already been released and have been promised more details.
2. Difficult to be certain of an adequacy of these measures, but am convinced that there is sincere intent behind them.
3. Further severe police measures and some hundred arrests occurred in Albertville incidents but many armed demonstrators attacked Katangese forces in quasi civil war situation.
4. Generally police methods here are tough but apart from Albertville, where casualties occurred on both sides, I know of no recent serious incident.

INCOMING CODE

TO: Bunche

FROM: Berendsen

DATE: 26 August 1960

Retransmitted to UNATIONS
New York 26 Aug.1960

NUMBER: Code 27

Please transmit following message to Secgen:

"Gheysen confirms that all combat troops will be concentrated at Kamina base by 29 August but that their evacuation by midnight would require additional US airlift to that already provided. I insisted on necessity to fulfil agreement".

INCOMING CODE

TO: Bunche

FROM: Berendse

DATE: 26 August 1960

Retransmitted to UNATIONS

New York 26 Aug.1960

NUMBER: Code 26

Please pass following message to Secgen

"Reur code 8. With cooperation of Belgians, deployment of Ethiopian troops will be completed today. Thus Loricans letter loses any point it might have.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BERENDSEN, Eville
(Info Bunche, Leopoldville)
FROM: SECGEN
DATE: 25 August 1960
NUMBER: 1230

Reur 23, point 2.

Sheer blackmail which does not impress me. Orally sharp demarche has been made to Bruselles which replied within two hours that General Gheysen had been given strict orders that expert should be left at Kamina. You need not pursue this matter.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE, also sent BERENDSEN
FROM: SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE: 25 AGUST 1960
NUMBER: 1216

Following letter received today from Belgian Ambassador:

"

New York

25 Aout 1960

Monsieur le Secretaire General

J'ai l'honneur de me referer a les communications d'hier au sujet du retrait des troupes belges du Congo et de vous informer que toutes les dispositions on ete prises pour que l'evacuation s'effectue dans les delais prevus.

Selon les informations du gouvernement belge, les tropes de l'ONU ne seront pas en mesure d'assurer immediatement la releve dans tous les points du Katanga qu'evacuent les forces belges. Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement belge, qui a le souci de la securite de ses ressortissants, me charge de vous rappeler que le principe de la continuite de la securite des personnes a toujours ete admis par les Nations Unies. Il vous appartient donc de determiner quelles sont les mesures a prendre en vue d'assurer cette securite.

Le Gouvernement belge attire votre attention sur l'extreme urgence du probleme etant donne que l'evacuation des troupes belges est en cours et que le probleme se pose des maintenant. Il vous serait reconnaissant de le tenir informe

...../

- 2 -

des dispositions que vous comptez prendre a cet egard.

Je saisis cette occasion, monsieur le Secretaire
General, de vous renouveler les assurances de ma tres haute consid-
eration

(signe) Walter Loridan

Representant Permanent de
la Belgique"

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: VON HORN, Leopoldville
Info BERENDSEN, Elisabethville

FROM: RIKHYE

DATE: 25 August 1960

NUMBER: 1211

I would like to inform US Air Force MATS the name of the senior UN officer in Kamina to be their contact. USAF is providing air lift to the Belgians to insure that all Belgian troops leave Katanga by 29 August. Presumably the officer will be the Irish Company Commander.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

✓
25/26 Aug?

TO; Berendsen, Elisabethville
(Info BUNCHE, Leo)

FROM: SECGEN

Reur ONUC-500.

I would suggest that you get in touch with Tshombé in order to ask him what has been done so far on the basis of his reply on prisoners transmitted by you 19 August. After that demarche next step, in case nothing has been done, would be written message from me.

INCOMING CODE

TO: VON HORN
FROM: Berendsen
DATE: 24 August 1960
NUMBER: Code 22

1. Gheysen asked me to pass you the following message:

"From General Gheysen to General Von Horn, suis vivement preoccupe du sort des quinze militaires qui se sont rendus en civil a Matadi sur proposition de sous la responsabilite des autorites ONU. Malgre mes demarches je n'ai obtenu aucun renseignement a leur sujet depuis cinq jours. Je vous demande de me tenir au courant de toute information que vous obtiendriez. Je suis persuade que vous voudrez bien engager votre responsabilite personnelle dans cette question et ne menagerez pas vos efforts ce dont je vous remercie".

2. He also enquired about transport of his helicopter from Matadi to Kitona.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE
(Repeated to SECGEN, New York)

FROM: BERENDSEN, Elisabethville

DATE: 24 August 1960

NUMBER: Code 21

1. Byrne and I held long meeting with Gheysen on question of withdrawal of Belgian troops. He began by stating that von HORN and he had agreed that Belgian troops would withdraw shortly after UN troops had arrived by each position. He had drawn up a plan for withdrawal by twenty-ninth on basis that UN Force would be fully deployed before that date. On this basis, Belgian Government had given assurance to SECGEN. He noted that deployment of UN troops had been delayed and that in particular Ethiopian Battalion had only today made its first move from Kamina, and had five other posts to occupy, three of which were remote. He did not see how Belgian troops could be relieved in time for departure by twenty-ninth and suggested an extension of several days for the withdrawal.

2. We then informed Gheysen of the matters mentioned in SECGEN's signal of 04250. It was admitted that the deployment of the Ethiopian Battalion had been tardy and it would now receive highest priority. The deployment in the other parts of Katanga was nearing completion and it would be possible to relieve all Belgian troops there in time for evacuation from Kamina by twenty-ninth August. I stated that although the principle of relief had been adopted in military planning, I did not believe that SECGEN regarded the necessity of prior relief as a condition for the withdrawal of individual Belgian detachments.

3. Gheysen admitted that the relief in the other areas could be effected on time but did not see how the Ethiopian deployment could be carried out by 29 August, though he promised to co-operate in facilitating their movements. We promised to report our practical difficulties to high levels and to seek clarification as to whether Belgian troops should withdraw without being replaced.

4. Gheysen said one thousand men at Kamina and five hundred at Kitona would include small security police.

5. He also proposed to ~~include~~ maintain at Kamina one battalion of parachutists in training for service in Ruanda-Urundi and at Albertville a detachment for transit of vehicles and supplies to and from Ruanda-Urundi. He himself proposed to stay at air base as a technician pending conclusion of agreement with the UN concerning transfer.

6. ~~It~~*expressed reservations about arrangements in para 5, particularly parachutists, and would welcome definite ruling as to which are unacceptable.

7. Gheysen will probably need additional airlift to clear his men at the end.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE, VON HORN
FROM: BYRNE, BERENDSEN
DATE: 24 AUGUST 1960
NUMBER: CODE 20

1. We met with Tshombe this morning and agreed to defer further discussions on Albertville incidents until we have fuller information.
2. Tshombe handed us a letter in which stated that Lumumba troops had occupied various positions near the Katanga border and asked that UN would avoid all involvement in any conflict. He also implied that UN could not permit aggressive action against Katanga. He also ~~expressed~~ expressed astonishment at reports that 800 Guineans had occupied Luluabourg and 450 Jshidapa and inquired if this was done under UN directives. He expressed concern that Lumumba forces apparently supported by Guineans were occupying by force territories entirely opposed to them.
3. During discussion Kalonji entered and made a long statement along same lines. He complained also that Tunisian troops were intervening against his regime, preventing aircraft from landing at Baqwanga, while Lumumba troops had been given access to arms at Kabinda. Tunisian troops were directed by commander in enemy territory at Luluabourg. Finally he asked that his region should be attached to the Eastern Command. We replied that all these matters were outside our jurisdiction but that we should report them to you in the framework of our veneral information reports.
5. Kalonji raised detention of his wife. Tshombe spoke of possible reprisals, which we strongly advised against.

INCOMING CODE

von Harin ✓

TO: Bunche, info Berendsen
FROM: Secgen
DATE: 24 August 1960
NUMBER: 1162

1. Gheysen should be informed through Byrne in Elisabethville that the Belgian Government have agreed to withdrawal of all their troops less 1,000 technicians at Kamina and 500 at Katina by 29 August. The Belgian Army therefore should solely devote itself to withdrawal operations which must be completed by 0001 hrs. 30 August. I would like to have details of Gheysens plan of withdrawal.
2. Gheysen should be warned that irrespective of situation that may arise Belgian troops should be confined solely to the operation of withdrawal.
3. In case the Belgians lack adequate air transport to complete this withdrawal in time I have arranged with the United States Air Force to have their aircraft standing by to provide the necessary airlift, to ensure that the Belgian Army is evacuated by due time.
4. You are advised to issue the necessary instructions to our troops at Elisabethville, Kamina and Katina to ensure that the Belgian Army confines itself to the withdrawal operation alone.
5. Re 1; Byrne is of course entitled to show Loidan letter of 20 re withdrawal, as already transmitted to Berendsen, to all it may concern.

✓
ONUC In 231026
Original C1
Copy

(36)

8 ELI 50 23 0940Z

ONUC LEO

BUNCHE FROM BERENDSEN STOP ONE STOP BRITISH CONSUL REQUESTS
SEAT ON NEXT UN PLANE TO LEO FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH HIS MINISTER
STOP DO YOU AGREE CMA PROVIDED KATANGESE AUTHORITIES ALSO
AGREE S TOP TWO STOP IN GENERAL EYE AM REFUSING USE OF UN
CHARTERED PLANES TO NON UN PERSONNEL

E - 23/8 0955Z VAR

23 11102
(T)

INCOMING CODE

TO: Bunche, Von Horn info Secgen N.Y.

FROM: Byrne, Berendsen

DATE: 23 August 1960

No: 19

Gheysen informed that Belgian troops in CFL station in Albertville had been attacked by armed Africans, had fired in self-defence and had wounded one African. We urged that local Belgain Commanders should be instructed to use maximum restraint until they could be withdrawn.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE, von HORN
FROM: BYRNE, BERENDSEN - Elisabethville
DATE: 23 August 1960
NUMBER: Code 18

Gheysen asked us to draw your attention to case of fifteen Belgian soldiers arrested by Congolese at Matadi, although he claims their protection had been promised by UNHQS. He hopes that ONUC is seeking their release and would appreciate information on their case.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE, von HORN
(repeated to SECGEN for info)

FROM: BYRNE, BERENDSEN - Elisabethville

DATE: 23 August 1960

NUMBER: Code 17

Reference previous Code 16.

1. We informed Tshombe that a preliminary inquiry was already being carried out on the spot by our Chief of Staff. Pending his report, we could not accept allegations against Mali troops as established. If his report showed any grounds for complaint we should naturally make more detailed inquiries. We expressed doubt that a joint enquiry was desirable, but reserved a final answer until 1000 hours LT tomorrow.
2. We assured Tshombe that we were endeavouring, if airplanes arrive from Leopoldville, to ~~lift~~ lift additional troops to Albertville tomorrow morning.
3. We are seriously handicapped by having only ineffective direct communications with Albertville and having to rely largely on Belgian and Katangese reports for information.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE, von HORN
FROM: BERENDSEN, Elisabethville
DATE: 23 August 1960
NUMBER: Code 15

To my B-601

In view of deterioration of situation at Albertville Gheysens has ordered a coy of Belgian paratroopers to proceed to Albertville airport. This for protection of Belgian residents. We are warning Gheysxns of gravity from international point of view of any Belgian intervention in the situation. Imperative that we have UN aircraft earliest tomorrow for airlift of additional UN troops to Albertville.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: HQ ONUC
FROM: EASTERN COMMAND HQ
DATE: 23 AUGUST 1960
NUMBER: CODE 14

Reference DTO 231230 reports on situation at Albertville indicate that it may be desirable to move some troops of 33 battalion to Albertville quickly. Can one DC 4 aircraft for trooplift from Kamina to Albertville on 24 August be made available. Detailed timings later.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

von Horn

TO: BUNCHE, VON HORN
FROM: BYRNE, BERENDSEN, ELISABETHVILLE
DATE: 23 AUGUST 1960
NUMBER: CODE 13

1. Albertville between Katangese forces and opposition supporters have resulted in some deaths and a very tense situation.
2. Local authorities have accused Mali troops of improper intervention in these incidents. This charge has been received with all reservations, but our Chief of Staff is investigating ~~the~~ situation on the spot.
3. Signal concerning possible airlift of Irish troops from Kamina to Albertville follows.

yc28 s ny 211 22 2059z =

etat priorite

unations

elizabethville =

22 berendsen with reference to your message to bunche of 22 august
cma i send copy of letter received from belgian mission on 20
august 1960 stop you should show this letter to local belgian
commander stop quote jai lhonneur de vous confirmer ma lettre de ce =

p2 =

jour relative au retrait des forces belges des bases du congo
stop le gouvernement belge me charge de vous informer que les
bases de kitona et de kamina vont etre evacuees a lexception
dexperts stop il est entendu que ces bases ne peuvent etre
abandonnees et la condition expresse que =

p3 =

Le gouvernement belge met a leur evacuation est leur occupation
par les troupes de l'ONU stop le retrait seffectuera dans un delai
maximum de huit jours stop il est probable que le gouvernement
belge trouvera necessaire daccepter laide de laviation americaine
offerte par vote intermediaire cma cette aide sera acceptee =

p4 =

sous reserve de la confirmation de mon gouvernement stop le nombre
dexperts indispensables pour les services essentiels se monte a
mille au maximum pour kamina et a cinq cents pour kitona stop
les resolutions adoptees par le conseil de securite touchant la
releve militaire sont ainsi excecutees cma le sort definitif =

p5/11 =

des bases dependant de negotiations ulterieures stop unquote =

dag hammaraskjold

secretary-general +

22 22 20 1960 +

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE
FROM: BERENDSEN
DATE: 22 August 1960
NUMBER: Code 12

Presumably basing themselves on local newspapers, message sent to you in my 2113 10, report that Commander Mali battalion has requested repatriation of his troops. I have informed journalists that no formal request was made but that Commander was proceeding to Leo in order to get in touch with his authorities.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: VON HORN
FROM: EASTERN COMMAND, ELISABETHVILLE
DATE: 21 AUGUST 1960
NUMBER: CODE 10

In view of Mali situation have sent warning order to 32 Irish Battalion to be prepared to reinforce 33 Irish Battalion at Albertville with one Company. 33 Irish will have only two Companies as one remains at Kamina. If you concur and 32 battalion can release company please notify air planning that airlift one Coy. Goma to Albertville may be required soon.

cc: von Horn

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO: BUNCHE
FROM: BENENDSEN, ELISABETHVILLE
DATE: 21 AUGUST 1960

Tshombe has informed that an AirCongo DC3 with Madame Kalonji as passenger has landed at Luluaborg and is refused permission to proceed here. I promised to report the facts to Leo.