

INAMIDR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - CORRESPONDENCE
GENERAL

10 APR - 18 JULY 1975

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

[5 CONFIDENTIAL]
RH/W6 JUNE 2001

UNARCHIVES

SERIES 51002

BOX 125

FILE 5

ACC. 1975/0223

TO: 95 FLSG

11263

Other Ops

UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

From: Milob Sect 5C Kibuye

RECOVERY REQUEST

Demande de dépannage

Call Sign LQ, Channel 11

Indicatif d'appel LQ, Canal 11

date: 18 Jul 95

msge taken by:

A: Requesting Unit / NGO <i>Milob Sect 5C</i> Unité demandante / ONG <i>5C</i>		B: Location / Telephone: <i>Kibuye; 11232</i> Endroit / Téléphone: _____	
C: Contact Person / Call Sign / Channel Personne à contacter / Indicatif d'appel / Canal <i>Log O CS4</i>		<i>MAJ Moukline V</i>	
D: UNAMIR Number <i>1069</i> Numéro MINUAR		Type of Vehicle <i>Toyota-4-Runner</i> Genre de véhicule	
E: Nature of Breakdown Nature de la panne		Precise Location <i>Mabanza</i> Endroit précis <i>(3443)</i> <i>Malawi Platoon Camp</i>	
F: Can vehicle be Towed? Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No _____ Est-ce que le véhicule peut être remorqué? Oui Non		Straight _____ Suspend <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Direct Suspendu	
G: Passengers / Crew Yes _____ No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Passagers / Équipage Oui Non		Number with Vehicle _____ Nombre de passagers avec le véhicule	
H: Recovery Info ie. Dangerous Cargo, Weight of Cargo Information détaillée ex. Chargement dangereux, poids du chargement			
K: Additional Info ie. Ambulance Required, Number of Casualties Information additionnelle ex. Besoin d'une ambulance, Nombre de blessés			
<i>Urgent, Malawi Coy'll leave on 19 Jul</i>			
L: Are Police / RPA involved? Yes _____ No <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Est-ce que la police / ARP impliqué? Oui Non			
M: Security Situation <i>Good</i> Sécurité des lieux			

E. The pin which holds front right wheel in vertical position is broken.



→ Position of the wheel.

② (135)

19/7

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

From: Col W J Fletcher
DCOS (Sp)
HQ UNAMIR

Extn 11109

To: CO Nicoy

Info: COS, CISS, STO, MA/FC, G3

File Reference: 4000.1/LOG-12

Date: 17 July 1995

Subject: BYUMBA SITE - WORK REQUIREMENTS

Reference: A. STO Memo 17 Jul 95

B. DCOS SP Site Visit to Byumba All Girls School

1. Following discussions with CISS and STO resultant from reference A, I visited the Byumba All Girls School site with the Sector FSA, Mr Kidane to assess the quality of the clearance and clean-up of the area subsequent to the departure of the Nigerian Battalion. I was not impressed with the state in which the site was left. Apart from loose garbage strewn about the area, stores were left abandoned and the facility was not restored to its original state prior to UN occupancy and acceptable to the landlord. As agreed at ref B, FSA will undertake to identify the extent of work to be undertaken by contractors or otherwise to make appropriate repairs to the facility. CO Nicoy is to despatch a clean-up party to the school to meet with Mr Kidane and ensure the facility grounds and buildings are cleaned to the satisfaction of the Reverend Sister.

2. Specifically Nicoy is tasked to despatch a clean-up party to Byumba to:

- a. Remove all loose garbage from the area of the school including the slope behind the former kitchen area and the open field between the former HQ location and the workshop area;
- b. Remove all military stores left behind (concertina wire, sand bags, ammo boxes etc;
- c. Clean-up all fire pits used during the occupancy;
- d. Remove corrugated tin structure located in the living area;
- e. Replace basketball and volleyball poles in original court locations;

Actioned
So20757
18/7

② SO2
DRAFT to Contingents as per para 5
18/7 (MB)

f. Remove contaminated soil in the former workshop areas and generator site; and

g. Other work as directed by Mr Kidane to enable the facility to be returned to the Reverend Sister.

3. Mr Kidane will inspect the work with the Reverend Sister prior to the departure of the Nicoy personnel. In addition, G3 Ops has tasked the Force Engr to dispose of a cache of munitions found in an open drainage trench in the area of the FM Repeater Station. Additional work to repair the damaged fence, windows and install door latches will be documented and coord by Mr Kidane through STO as discussed.

4. It must be appreciated that the success of UNAMIR is partially realized in the respect that we afford the people of Rwanda. The intention must always be to return that which we have used in somewhat better condition than received. Work by Nicoy is to be completed by 19 Jul 95.

5. STO is requested to ensure that all FSAs are aware of the need to police areas prior to departure of contingent personnel and to declare the site fit for return to the landlord.

G3 is requested to advise all contingents of the standards expected for vacating accommodation to avoid future embarrassment to UNAMIR.

3000.42

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

HQ UNAMIR MED BR

FILE: 640-1-4

MED 745/95

To: DCMO

→ For info: D COS OPS

From: FMO

Date: 13 Jul 95

Subject: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON PERSONNEL WITHIN MILOB ORGANISATION

Reference:

A. Discussion at Force Commander's conference - 13 Jul 95

1. As advised at reference A, there is a possible requirement to man the Medical Branch of Headquarters UNAMIR from within existing staffing levels following the withdrawal of the Australian contingent. No donor country has been identified to replace AUSMED and as a consequence no replacement staff officers will be available to man the medical branch.

2. It is understood that some personnel within the MILOB organisation may have formal qualifications in the health field or at least work experience in that area. You are requested to examine your records and canvass your personnel to identify those that may be suitable for employment as staff officers in medical branch. A response, listing the officers by name, country and qualifications is requested by no later than 21 Jul 95.

3. Further information on this request can be sought from the point of contact in medical branch. LTCOL Curren G3 Med Ops on ext 11116.

② AD COS OPS
MB

18/7

UNAMIR

2000.1/CMPO/DEP

To : See Distribution

From : CMPO

Date : 10 July, 1995

Subject : REPLACEMENT OF STAFF-UNAMIR HQS AND MILOBS

1. The attached fax which is dated 08 Jul 95 from UN HQs New York has reference to the downsizing of the UNAMIR Force Headquarters staff as a result of the new mandate. As we all are aware, the current number of staff would be cut down to 35 in compliance of that mandate.

2. In the past few weeks, D COS (SP) through numerous correspondences has suggested to UN HQs New York the number of staff positions which need to be retained and or DDMS extended where necessary, until the end of the current mandate. The UN HQs is taking necessary action with the various Governments whose personnel's DDMS have been recommended for extensions to seek their concurrence. In the fax attached (para 3 in particular), UN HQs New York is suggesting the conversion of the affected officers into Military Observers and would like to obtain the opinion of those concerned.

3. It would therefore be greatly appreciated if your opinion/comments on the UN HQs New York suggestions could be forwarded to this office by Saturday 15 Jul 95. I have also attached herewith some of the faxes referred to on para 2 above for necessary guidance.

4. Best regards.

Distribution
Action:

D COS (OPS)
G3 (PLANS)
FMO
C LOG O
FPM
CLO

② OK for staff who are volunteers

1 MAJ ABARA ADM 27 Oct Getachew TEFFERRA
2 MAJ OGUNJABI ADM 27 Oct Lt Col
3 CAPT NTACHA ADM 18 Oct CMPO
4 MAJ CHUNGU SCAPT NAULU

(2 D COS / OPS)

Info: MA TO FC
MA TO DFC/CMO
COS
D COS (SP)

③ CMPO

Pls note 5 volunteers from
op br as appropriate.

18.8

④

Comments
fwd to cmpo
18.8

KGMF 3002

ALL INFORMATION
CONTAINED HEREIN
IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05 JUL 95 BY 00 082

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

JUL 1995

POSTAL ADDRESS—ADRESSE POSTALE UN FÉD NATIONS, N.Y. 10017
CABLE ADDRESS—ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE UNATIONS NEW YORK

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

1	Action completed
2	
3	
4	
Acknowledged 26010	
08 JULY 1995	

TO: TOUSIGNANT UNAMIR, KIGALI	FROM: VAN KAPPEN FOR ANNAL UNATIONS, NEW YORK
Fax No:	Fax. No: 212-963-4879
SUBJECT: REPLACEMENT OF UNAMIR STAFF AND MILOBS	
ATTN: DCOS(SP), CMPO	ROOM NO: 3650 EXT: 3721
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

1. PLEASE REFER TO YOUR FAXES:
 - A. MIR 2398 OF 29 JUNE AND MIR 2455 OF 05 JULY 1995.
 - B. MIR 2494 OF 07 JULY 1995.
2. MILITARY OBSERVERS. THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS ARE BEING TAKEN:
 - A. THE ROTATION OF ALL MILITARY OBSERVERS IS BEING ARRANGED ON SCHEDULE.
 - B. SINCE ANY NEW MILOBS INDUCTED AT THIS STAGE WILL HAVE A TRUNCATED TOUR OF DUTY, WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO REDEPLOY MILOBS FROM UNOMIL WHERE A REDUCTION IN THE STRENGTH OF MILOBS IS LIKELY TO BE AFFECTED BY THE END OF THIS MONTH. WE SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.
3. STAFF OFFICERS. WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF REQUESTING EXTENSIONS FOR THE STAFF OFFICERS PROPOSED TO BE RETAINED BEYOND THEIR PRESENT DDM. ALTHOUGH WE APPRECIATE YOUR POSITION ON LETTING THE STAFF OFFICERS WHO COMPLETE THEIR TOUR OF DUTY IN OCTOBER CONTINUE IN THE MISSION BEYOND 9 OCTOBER 1995, WE CANNOT AGREE TO THEIR RETENTION AS THE AUTHORIZED STRENGTH OF STAFF OFFICERS WILL BE EXCEEDED FOR THAT PERIOD. HOWEVER, WE ARE CONSIDERING AN OPTION WHEREBY THE STAFF OFFICERS RENDERED SURPLUS COULD BE CONVERTED TO MILITARY OBSERVERS TO OVERCOME ANY SHORTFALLS IN THE STRENGTH OF MILOBS THAT MAY ARISE EVEN AFTER REDEPLOYING A LIMITED NUMBER OF OBSERVERS FROM UNOMIL. THIS CONVERSION COULD BE EFFECTED DURING AUGUST AFTER OBTAINING THE CONCURRENCE OF THE COUNTRIES CONCERNED. IF NECESSARY, SHORT EXTENSIONS OF THE TOUR OF DUTY COULD BE CONSIDERED TO COVER THE ENTIRE PERIOD OF THE CURRENT MANDATE.
3. BEFORE WE CAN PROCEED FURTHER WITH THE PLANNING FOR THE OPTION ABOVE, WE REQUIRE A LIST OF STAFF OFFICERS, BY COUNTRY, WHO WOULD BE AVAILABLE AND WILLING FOR SUCH A CONVERSION AND THE DATE FROM WHEN THEY WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR THIS PURPOSE. BASED ON THIS INFORMATION WE WILL FINALIZE THE REDEPLOYMENT FROM UNOMIL AND ANY CONVERSIONS THAT MAY BE NECESSARY.
4. BEST REGARDS.

FC DCOS (sp) (CMPO)

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING FAX NO. 4590MIR NO. 2494

MISC NO. _____

UNAMIR ARCHIVES

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE

08 JUL 1995

RECEIVED

KN/ERS

TO: MR. VAN KAPPENILI UNITED NATIONS, NY	From: MGEN TOUSIGNANT FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
	DATE: 07 JULY 1995
FAX NO: 1(212)963-4879	PHONE: 212-963-3097(Radio Room) FAX NO: 212-963-3090
ATTN: LT COL MARTIN ROOM 3650	INTERNAL: D COS SP, CMPO, DCMO DRAFTED BY: LT COL GETACHEW CMPO
SUBJECT: REPLACEMENT OF MILOBS UNAMIR	

REFERENCE:

A. OUR FAX MIR 2245 DATED 16 JUNE 1995.

1. WE ARE CURRENTLY SHORT BY 11 MILOBS AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THESE VACANCIES TO BE FILLED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. AS MENTIONED IN REFERENCE 'A' WE HAVE A MAJOR TURN OVER OF 83 MILOBS IN AUGUST AND ARE ALSO CONSIDERING A POSSIBLE CONTINGENT PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF MILOBS OUT SIDE RWANDA.

3. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EARLY ACTION TO BRING OUR MILOBS AUTHORISED STRENGTH UP TO DATE.

FC DCOS SP (CMPO) DCMO

81 21 1-13 96
12 13
UNAMIR

UNAMIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS

T/O-4512
MIR-2398

OUTGOING FACSIMILE

29 June 1995

TO: VAN KAPPEN UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: MAJ GEN TOUSIGNANT FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
FAX: (212) 963 - 4879	FAX: 1-212-963-3090
ATTN: LT COL MARTIN (ROOM 3650)	DRAFTED BY: TUTT DCOS (SP)
INFO:	INTERNAL: MA TO FC, DFC, DCOS(OPS), CMPO, DCMO
SUBJECT: REPLACEMENT OF STAFF HQ UNAMIR	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THE COVER: 5	

1. REFERENCE YOUR FAX 24912 OF 28 JUNE 95 ON DRAWDOWN OF UNAMIR HQ STAFF. THE INFORMATION BELOW ANSWERS YOUR POINTS. I MYSELF DEPART NEXT WEEK THANK YOU FOR ALL OF THE EXCELLENT COOPERATION.

2. WHERE STAFF ARE DUE TO DEPART IN OCTOBER THE FORCE COMMANDER IS MOST KEEN THAT THEY COMPLETE THEIR FULL TOUR WE HAVE NOT THEREFORE BROUGHT FORWARD THEIR DDM.

AUSTRALIA

FMO	COL WARFE DDM 20 AUG 95. REPLACE. SUCCESSOR REMAINS TO END OF MISSION
MED OPS	LT COL CURREN DDM 20 AUG 95. REPLACE. SUCCESSOR REMAINS TO END OF MISSION
MED LOG	MAJ WILTSHIRE DDM 20 AUG 95. REPLACE. SUCCESSOR REMAINS TO END OF MISSION
MED CLK	WOII SMITH DDM 20 AUG 95. REPLACE. SUCCESSOR REMAINS TO END OF MISSION
SO MAINT	MAJ BARRY DDM 20 AUG 95 DO NOT REPLACE
SO MOV	MAJ MACKAY AUSTRALIA DDM 20 AUG 95 DO NOT REPLACE
SO LOG	MAJ TAYLOR DDM 20 AUG 95 DO NOT REPLACE

SO FOOD CAPT BRAMWELL DDM 20 AUG 95 DO NOT REPLACE.
G3 PLANS LT COL DUNN DDM 20 AUG 95 DO NOT REPLACE.

CANADA

FC MAJOR GENERAL TOUSIGNANT DDM TO BE CONFIRMED
DCOS(OPS) CURRENTLY COL ARP HE DEPARTS ON DDM 15 AUG.
DCOS (SP) COL FLETCHER DDM 30 JUN 96. NEW DDM END OF MISSION
IF EARLIER
MIL SPOKESMAN LT(N) PAGE DDM 1 AUG 95. HQ NY TO IDENTIFY
REPLACEMENT OF ANY NATIONALITY. IF FUTURE FC IS
FROM CANADA THEY MAY BE WILLING TO EXTEND LT PAGE
OR REPLACE HIM.

G2 CAPT EAST CURRENT DDM 2 MAR 96. NEW DDM TO END OF
MISSION

SO AIR MAJ SUNDMAN CURRENT DDM 31 MAR 96. NEW DDM TO END OF
MISSION

CHAD

CLO LT COL MOUSSA DEPART AT DDM 28 OCT 95 DO NOT
REPLACE

LO MAJ MOUDALBAYE DEPART AT DDM 7 NOV 95 DO NOT REPLACE

ETHIOPIA

CMPO LT COL TEFFERRA DEPART AT DDM 20 AUG 95 DO NOT
REPLACE.

PERS MAJ SENNAY NEGGA DEPART AT DDM 20 AUG 95 DO NOT
REPLACE

LO CAPT DESSALEGN DEPART AT DDM 20 AUG 95 DO NOT
REPLACE

G3 MAJ TESSFAYE TADDESE DEPART AT DDM 28 AUG 95 DO NOT
REPLACE

GHANA

DCOS(OPS)

NEW OFFICER TO ARRIVE BY 10 AUG 95
DDM 10 AUG 96. NEW DDM END OF MISSION IF EARLIER

HAC

COL OSAE - ADDAE DEPART AT DDM 14 AUG 95 DO NOT
REPLACE

CLK

SSGT BLAME DEPART AT DDM 26 JAN 96

GHANA IS TO PROVIDE ONLY 2 CLERKS FROM THE FOLLOWING THREE.
SURPLUS WILL BE HAVE DDM OF 9 OCT 95. THOSE STAYING WILL REMAIN TO
END OF MISSION:

CLK

SGT OPUKU DEPART AT DDM 14 AUG 95 GHANA REPLACING
WITH SGT DWAMENA WITH CURRENT DDM 24 MAY 96.

CLK

WO1 GYENIAW DEPARTED AT DDM 5 JUL 95 GHANA HAS
REPLACED WITH WO1 ARHIN WITH CURRENT DDM 24 MAY 96

CLK

CPL ANDOW DEPARTED AT DDM 5 JUL 95 GHANA HAS
REPLACED WITH CPL APPIAH WITH CURRENT DDM 24 MAY 96

INDIA

OPS

MAJ PITRIE CURRENT DDM 21 NOV 95 EXTEND TO END OF
MISSION. INDIA NEEDS TO AGREE

PLANS

MAJ MALIK CURRENT DDM 21 NOV 95 EXTEND TO END OF
MISSION. INDIA NEEDS TO AGREE

WELFARE

MAJ DAS CURRENT DDM 21 NOV 95 EXTEND TO END OF
MISSION. INDIA NEEDS TO AGREE

TPT/SUP

MAJ ARORA CURRENT DDM 21 NOV 95 EXTEND TO END OF
MISSION. INDIA NEEDS TO AGREE

ENGR

MAJ AGRAWAL CURRENT DDM 21 NOV 95 EXTEND TO END OF
MISSION. INDIA NEEDS TO AGREE

SO3 PLANS

CAPT CHOUDHURY CURRENT DDM 21 NOV 95 EXTEND TO END
OF MISSION. INDIA NEEDS TO AGREE

COS

COL SIVAKUMAR CURRENT DDM 18 DEC 95 EXTEND TO END
OF MISSION. INDIA NEEDS TO AGREE

DO

CAPT KUMAR CURRENT DDM 10 FEB 96 EXTEND TO END
OF MISSION. INDIA NEEDS TO AGREE

CLK

WO1 JAGAN CURRENT DDM 21 NOV 95 EXTEND TO END
OF MISSION. INDIA NEEDS TO AGREE

MALAWI

PERS

MAJ KUNSIYA CURRENT DDM 18 OCT 95 EXTEND TO JAN 96 OR END OF MISSION. HE IS A VOLUNTEER. MALAWI NEEDS TO BE ASKED TO AGREE THIS.

DO

CAPT MTACHI DEPART ON DDM 18 OCT 95 DO NOT REPLACE

HAC

MAJ MHONE DEPART ON DDM 18 OCT 95 DO NOT REPLACE

G2

MAJOR KAMANGE DEPART AT DDM 26 AUG 95 DO NOT REPLACE

NIGERIA

PERS

LT(N) DANAGUNDI DEPART AT DDM 19 SEP 95 DO NOT REPLACE

BOI

LT COL OJO DEPART AT DDM 22 OCT 95 DO NOT REPLACE

CLOGO

LT COL AWO FISAYO CURRENT DDM 22 OCT 95 EXTEND TO JAN 96 OR END OF MISSION. HE IS A VOLUNTEER. NIGERIA NEEDS TO BE ASKED TO AGREE THIS.

DO

MAJ ABARA DEPART AT DDM 27 OCT 95 DO NOT REPLACE

SO AIR

SQN LDR OGUNJOBI DEPART AT DDM 27 OCT 95 DO NOT REPLACE

HAC

LT CDR DUKOBU DEPART AT DDM 8 APR 96 OR AT END OF MISSION

CLK

WO2 EDET CURRENT DDM 27 OCT 95 EXTEND TO JAN 96 OR END OF MISSION. HE IS A VOLUNTEER. NIGERIA NEEDS TO BE ASKED TO AGREE THIS.

SENEGAL

G3 OPS

LT COL NDIAYE DDM 23 APR 96 NEW DDM END OF MISSION IF EARLIER

TUNISIA

LO

CAPT ANOUAR DEPART AT DDM 5 SEP 95 DO NOT REPLACE

MA TO DFC

LT COL CHABIR CURRENT DDM 5 SEP 95 MAY BE EXTENDED DFC HAS TO CONFIRM LENGTH OF EXTENSION.

OPS

MAJ METHNANI DEPART AT DDM 5 SEP 95 DO NOT REPLACE

ADC TO DFC CAPT GHOUL CURRENT DDM 21 OCT 95 MAY BE EXTENDED
 DFC HAS TO CONFIRM LENGTH OF EXTENSION.

G2 LT COL BEN CHEIKH DEPART AT DDM 21 OCT 95 DO NOT
 REPLACE

HAC CAPT BEN KHELIFA DEPART AT DDM 21 OCT 95 DO NOT
 REPLACE

CLK WOII MAHMOUD BEN DEPART AT DDM 5 SEP 95 DO NOT
 REPLACE

ZAMBIA

SO3 MAINT CAPT MUZYAMBA CURRENT DDM 8 OCT 95. EXTEND TO JAN 96
 OR END OF MISSION. HE IS A VOLUNTEER. ZAMBIA
 NEEDS TO BE ASKED TO AGREE THIS.

SO FOOD CAPT CHIMBA CURRENT DDM 29 OCT 95. EXTEND TO JAN 96
 OR END OF MISSION. HE IS A VOLUNTEER. ZAMBIA NEEDS
 TO BE ASKED TO AGREE THIS.

OPS MAJ LIENDA DEPART AT DDM 8 OCT 95 DO NOT REPLACE

DO CAPT MAULA CURRENT DDM 8 OCT 95. EXTEND TO JAN 96
 OR END OF MISSION. HE IS A VOLUNTEER. ZAMBIA
 NEEDS TO BE ASKED TO AGREE THIS.

OPS ~~CAPT~~ ^{MAJ} CHUMBU DEPART AT DDM 8 OCT 95. DO NOT REPLACE

FPM MAJ SICHILIMA CURRENT DDM 30 MAR 96. POST GOES TO
 MP COMPANY COMMANDER. NEW DDM 8 OCT 95 ZAMBIA NEEDS
 TO BE INFORMED. REPATRIATE ON 8 OCT 95

CLK SSGT LINYANGA CURRENT DDM 8 OCT 95. EXTEND TO JAN 96
 OR END OF MISSION. HE IS A VOLUNTEER. ZAMBIA
 NEEDS TO BE ASKED TO AGREE THIS.

CLK SGT CHILESHE DEPART AT DDM 29 OCT 95. DO NOT
 REPLACE



UNAMIR - MINUAR

14 July 1995

TO: Lt Col Ahsamullah Senior Ops Offr ✓

INFO: Mr. W. Clive, CISS
Mr. K. Nilsvang, CCPO
Mr. T. Woods, BRSC PGM

FROM: Mr. G. Briere, CCM *Briere*

SUBJECT: REQUIREMENT OF INTERPRETERS FOR MILOBs

Ref: Letter to CCM dated 11 July 1995

1. I acknowledge receipt of your letter with regard to the requirement for Milob interpreters located in the various sectors of Rwanda.
2. I have reviewed your requirement and agree with your request. I have therefore authorised to hire as soon as possible 8 interpreters and once the contract with BRSC is signed (hopefully within 2 - 4 weeks), I will proceed to hire the additional 7 interpreters.
3. I trust this is acceptable with you, but should you require any further clarification, please do not hesitate to contact me on ext. 11133.

② Ahsamullah
17/7
[Signature]
[Signature]
17/7 802 OPS

3000.42

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

HQ UNAMIR MED BR

FILE: 640-1-4

MED 745/95

To: DCMO

→ For info: D COS OPS

From: FMO

Date: 13 Jul 95

Subject: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON PERSONNEL WITHIN MILOB ORGANISATION

Reference:

A. Discussion at Force Commander's conference - 13 Jul 95

1. As advised at reference A, there is a possible requirement to man the Medical Branch of Headquarters UNAMIR from within existing staffing levels following the withdrawal of the Australian contingent. No donor country has been identified to replace AUSMED and as a consequence no replacement staff officers will be available to man the medical branch.

2. It is understood that some personnel within the MILOB organisation may have formal qualifications in the health field or at least work experience in that area. You are requested to examine your records and canvass your personnel to identify those that may be suitable for employment as staff officers in medical branch. A response, listing the officers by name, country and qualifications is requested by no later than 21 Jul 95.

3. Further information on this request can be sought from the point of contact in medical branch, LTCOL Curren G3 Med Ops on ext 11116.

[Signature]
17/7

② ADCOS OPS
[Signature]



UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR ARCHIVES

08 JUL 1995

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGE
RECEIVED

OUTGOING FAX NO. 4590

MIR NO. 2494

MISC NO.

KN/ERS

TO: MR. VAN KAPPENILI UNITED NATIONS, NY	From: MGEN TOUSIGNANT FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
	DATE: 07 JULY 1995
FAX NO: 1(212)963-4879	PHONE: 212-963-3097(Radio Room) FAX NO: 212-963-3090
ATTN: LT COL MARTIN ROOM 3650	INTERNAL: D COS SP, CMPO, DCMO DRAFTED BY: LT COL GETACHEW CMPO
SUBJECT: REPLACEMENT OF MILOBS UNAMIR	

REFERENCE:

A. OUR FAX MIR 2245 DATED 16 JUNE 1995.

1. WE ARE CURRENTLY SHORT BY 11 MILOBS AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR THESE VACANCIES TO BE FILLED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

2. AS MENTIONED IN REFERENCE 'A' WE HAVE A MAJOR TURN OVER OF 83 MILOBS IN AUGUST AND ARE ALSO CONSIDERING A POSSIBLE CONTINGENT PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF MILOBS OUT SIDE RWANDA.

3. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR YOUR EARLY ACTION TO BRING OUR MILOBS AUTHORISED STRENGTH UP TO DATE.

② G3 ops
G3 plans) for info
AS cos/ops
MB

③ EC
copy to
plans
11/7
Treated

FC (DCos sp) CMPO DCMO

01 21 12 13
UNAMIR
1-700 961



TO : All Sects

File : MOG/50001/5

FROM : OPS OFFR
MILOBS GP HQ

INFO : DFC/CMO
COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
HAC
G3 OPS ✓
G3 PLANS
G2 INFO
G3 LIAISON
G4 LOG
G1 CMPO
G4 MED
G4 MOVCON

INTERNAL : SO TO DCMO
SMPO
SLOGO

DATE : 09 Jul 95

SUBJECT :

REVISED DEPLOYMENT OF MILOBS IN NEW MANDATE

Kindly refer to Force HQ FRAG ORDERS No 16 dated 14 Jun 95 and No 18 dated 29 Jun 95 and our letter No MOG/50001/1 dated 19 June 95 on above subject.

2. Sectors and Sector Boundaries. New MILOB sectors are based on prefectures. Revised MILOB sectors are given at Appx A attached. These will come into effect from 10 Jul 95.


3. MILOB Gp Organisation. Keeping in mind the MILOBS sectors, the organisation of MILOBS Group will undergo minor revision. The revised MILOBS Group organisation is given at Appx B attached.

5. Tasks. MILOBS will be the eyes and ears of SRSG/Force Cdr/CMO/DCMO. They will continuously monitor, assess and report on the prevailing situation in Rwanda. They will also assist various agencies operating in Rwanda in their humanitarian activities. The detailed tasks of MILOBS are given at Appx C attached.


⑨ L3 obs!
L3 obs) for info


At
11/8/97

6. Communications. Each sector will be provided with dedicated communications both on radio and tele (voice and FAX) as and when made available. The call signs and radio channels are given at Appx D attached.


(S. N. Yadav)
Maj
Ops Offr
MILOBs Group HQ

MILOB SECTORS





LEGEND
 DO DUTY OFFICER
 C COMMUNES

MILOBS TASKS IN REVISED MANDATE

1. Deploy in new MILOB sectors by 10 Jul 95.
2. Constantly monitor, assess and report on the prevailing situation in the area of responsibility.
3. Monitor border crossing of Rwandan refugee returnees from Zaire, Burundi, Tanzania and Uganda.
4. Carry out regular patrolling in area of responsibility.
5. Monitor security situation in the area of responsibility.
6. Report the following in communes:-
 - (a) Security situation.
 - (b) Population.
 - (c) Returnees, their numbers, resettlement and their problems.
 - (d) Development activities.
 - (e) Agricultural activities.
 - (f) Health and hygienic conditions in commune and commune prisons.
 - (g) Other humanitarian needs.
7. Having obtained the humanitarian needs and other problems contact concerned authority/agency including NGOs to solve their problems to the maximum extent that is feasible.
8. Humanitarian team of MILOBs will maintain close liaison with HAC .
9. Provide unarmed escorts to VIPs and NGOs if required.
10. Assist humanitarian agencies in coordinating their activities.
11. Assist NGOs in coordinating their activities.
12. Be prepared to coordinate and if possible provide transport for the repatriation of refugees.
13. Motivate refugees, where feasible, to return to their homes.
14. Monitor refugee movement within Rwanda.
15. Maintain good liaison and coordinate activities with armed troops as required.
16. Maintain liaison with local authorities and RPA.

CALL SIGNS AND RADIO CHANNELS

SECTOR	LOCATION	CALL SIGN	CHANNEL
1A	KIGALI	CK	14
1B	GITARAMA	CB	13
2A	BYUMBA	CA	14
2B	KIBUNGO	CU	15
3A	GIKONGORO	CR	12
3B	BUTARE	CE	12
4	CYANGUGU	CG	12
5A	RUHengeri	CH	10
5B	GISENYI	CY	10
5C	KIBUYE	CS	13

L3 015 (125)
L3 0152
L3 0153

TIME FILLED 4 JUL 1618LT
TIME SENT: " " 1730LT

①

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE NO
MIR NO 4517
MISC NO 2454

04 July, 1995

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK	FROM: SHAHARYAR KHAN SRSG UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA.
INFO: SITUATION CENTRE, NEW YORK	
UN SECUR COORD SEVAN	
FAX: 001 (212) 963 9069 FAX: 001 (212) 963 9053	FAX: (250) 86877
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG FC UNAMIR HQ MAIN FILE	
SUBJECT: CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY OBSERVERS IN ZAIRE	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS ONE: THREE REF: YOUR CODE CABLE 2091 27 JUNE 95.	

1. FURTHER TO REF, PLEASE FIND ATTACHED A PRELIMINARY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY OBSERVERS TO ZAIRE.
2. APPROXIMATED OPERATING AND INCREMENTAL COSTS WILL FORWARDED TO YOU ASAP.

② DCOS SP

Suggest your staff,
CMO's staff and
CAO staff begin an
outline log sp system
concept.

A/COs
5.7

Authorized for
transmission

AK
05/7

copy sent to ACOS (SP)
05/07

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
FOR
THE DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY OBSERVERS TO ZAIRE

ASSUMPTIONS

1. This concept of operations was developed without the political guidance which should stem from the Secretary General Special Envoy's report based on consultations with neighbouring countries from 22 to 29 June 1995.
2. This concept of operations relates only to the option where military observers would be deployed to Zaire.
3. The possibility of deploying observers under the banner of the OAU should be considered if deemed politically preferable. To expedite this deployment, UNAMIR could second military observers from its African Troop Contributing Nations. The sustainment and financing of such a mission would have to be examined closely.
4. No reconnaissance has been conducted to evaluate the feasibility of the deployment, either technically or in terms of the cooperation to be expected from local authorities (SOMA), UNHCR, elected representatives of refugees, FRGF etat-major and NGOs. Accordingly, all parameters are approximated and could be the object of major changes once a proper reconnaissance has been conducted.

MISSION

5. The mission given to this group of military observers in Zaire would be as follows:

To defuse the risk of armed confrontation in Rwanda and to facilitate the return of refugees by reporting the sale or supply of arms and related materiel to parties which could plan, train or threaten to use force beyond the Rwandese border.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

6. The United Nations Zaire Observer Group (suggested acronym would be UNZOG) would preferably be separate from UNAMIR in order to facilitate relations with the refugee population in Zaire. UNZOG would submit its reports through UNAMIR to coordinate a more efficient regional approach. UNZOG headquarters would be in Goma with four sectors: Goma, Katale, Bukavu and Uvira.
7. The full cooperation of the Zairian government would be required to allow an unrestricted freedom of movement for

military observers and supporting personnel in pre-determined sectors (including airfields), both within Zaire and across the Rwandese border. The same cooperation will be required from the Rwandese government to ensure free border crossing for authorized personnel.

RESOURCES

8. In terms of personnel, 132 personnel (90 military observers and 42 support personnel for communications, medical, maintenance and interpreter support) would be required. The breakdown is as follows:

a.	UNZOG HQ in Goma:	8;
b.	Goma Sector:	25;
c.	Katale Sector:	22;
d.	Bukavu Sector:	19;
e.	Uvira Sector:	16; and
f.	Supporting personnel (location TBD):	42.

To expedite the deployment, UNAMIR could second the required number of military observers to UNZOG once approval from Troop Contributing Nations would have been received. These positions should then be backfilled in order to maintain operational efficiency within Rwanda, especially if an important return of refugees is initiated.

9. In terms of materiel, a table of organization and equipment has been designed on the model used for military observers in UNAMIR. It includes provisions for communications, transport, office equipment and stores.

10. The logistical concept for the support of UNZOG would be closely linked to UNAMIR, thus the importance of free border crossing between Rwanda and Zaire. The 42 supporting personnel would constitute a forward logistical group detached from UNAMIR and could include civilians.

11. Approximate operating costs for UNZOG are \$_____ based on a six month mandate. Incremental costs for the same period are \$_____.

Our Ref: 521-1-2

TO: DCMO

FROM: SO2 LEGAL

INFO: DCOS OPS

DATE: 29 Jun 95


①
② MA to FC

For consideration in
the final report

A/COS
29.6

SUBJECT: LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS OF DEPLOYING MIL OBS IN ZAIRE,
BURUNDI AND TANZANIA

1. Consideration should be given to the following matters before any deployment of MIL OBS to Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania as a result of Security Council Resolution 997 of 1995:
 - a. Immunity from national laws in relation to criminal and civil liability;
 - b. No restriction on the movement of MIL OBS within the country;
 - c. No restriction of movement of MIL OBS into and out of the country;
 - d. No restriction on the importation of personal effects and other stores required for MIL OBS to both live in, and perform their duties within the country;
 - e. The Rules of Engagement (ROE) of the troops tasked to protect the MIL OBS;
 - f. The policy on the carriage of weapons by MIL OBS for their personal security.
2. With the exception of sub paras e and f, the other considerations should be part of the Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) between the UN and the various national governments. The draft model UN SOMA contains these protections, but their inclusion should be confirmed to ensure adequate coverage for the MIL OBS.
3. Consideration should also be given to the inclusion of all participating governments, including Rwanda, in the one SOMA to facilitate smooth operational and administrative functioning in and between the various countries.
4. For the security of the MIL OBS it is important to know what ROE the protection force will be operating under in order to determine whether the ROE are legally and practically adequate for the various situations the MIL OBS may encounter.


C. K. McCONAGHY
MAJOR
SO2 LEGAL

② G3 Ops

Ensure
of details

HRFOR is aware

ATCOS
14-6

CC

Copy to HRFOR

Jmm
21/6 502603SECTEUR 4C-CYANGUGU- RAPPORT D'UN DOUBLE MEURTRE ET BLESSURE
D'UNE TROISIEME PERSONNEDate et Lieu des faits : Dimanche 21 ~~avril~~ 1995 à Mururu, Secteur de la Commune de
Cyimbogo *mais JR.*

Nombre de victimes : deux personnes décédées et une blessée

Copy sent, Fri

21/6

Arme utilisée : arme à feu

Renseignements concernant la personne déclarante :

Nom et Prénom : Mme NYIRABATUZI Dorothée

Profession : Cultivatrice

Etat : mariée, mère de 5 enfants mineurs, veuve depuis les événements décrits ci-dessous

Qualité : victime par ricochet et victime directe

Renseignements concernant les personnes tuées :

Nom du principal visé : Mr MPAKANIYE Jean-Pierre

Profession : Commerçant

Qualité : mari de la Déclarante

Ethnie : Hutu

Victime des circonstances : nièce du principal visé

AT
22/6

Exposé des faits :

Le dimanche 21 mai 1995 pendant la journée (la Déclarante ne se rappelle plus l'heure), deux militaires de l'APR sont venus chercher son époux, en l'absence de la Déclarante de son domicile familial. Ils sont partis à l'église, puis sont revenus au domicile des victimes. Après quelques causeries banales, les deux militaires sont partis.

Vers 19 heures, trois autres militaires de l'APR sont arrivés au domicile des victimes, passant par la porte de la cuisine. Ceux-ci étaient bien connus par les victimes ; notamment, un d'entre-eux disait aux deux autres que le maître de céans était son ami. Ils se sont assis au salon pour discuter avec le mari.

Vers 21 heures, un des trois soldats a dit au mari qu'il y avait quelqu'un qui voulait le voir ; alors le mari a demandé s'ils pouvaient aller voir cette personne ensemble, mais la réponse a été négative. Par ailleurs, d'après le même soldat, il disposait d'une information selon laquelle un interahamwe aurait déposé des grenades chez le malheureux ; il fallait leur remettre ces grenades.

Dès ce moment, l'homme, réalisant qu'il était en danger a tenté de prendre fuite ; mais

il a tout de suite été rattrapé par un des trois soldats qui a eu raison de lui en lui nouant les mains à l'aide d'un foulard et en lui ordonnant de s'asseoir à même le sol. Pendant ce temps, ses deux compagnons commençaient à fouiller la maison, l'un dans la chambre des époux, l'autre dans la chambre de la nièce. Ils ont trouvé et pris 200 000 zaïres et 25 000 francs rwandais. Puis, ils ont dit aux victimes qu'ils savaient qu'elles avaient encore de l'argent, notamment, une femme leur a dit que les victimes possédaient des dollars ; alors il fallait leur donner tout cela.

Les discussions ont continué par le fait qu'on leur aurait dit que le malheureux tenait des réunions avec les gens venant de l'autre côté (Zaïre), mais ne leur disait pas quel genre de réunions c'étaient.

La femme, voyant la gravité de la situation a proposé aux tueurs de fouiller la maison de fond en comble, y compris le plafonds pour bien se rendre compte que toutes leurs allégations n'étaient point fondées, car ils ne trouveraient pas de grenades. Mais cela fut inutile.

C'est alors que la fusillade a commencé. Le mari a été tué sur place, de même que sa nièce qui se trouvait dans la maison ; quant à la femme, elle a pu échapper en allant se cacher dans une bananeraie, d'où elle a pu alerter les voisins ; ceux-ci, arrivés sur les lieux du crime vers minuit n'ont pu que constater le décès du mari et sa nièce. Avant de quitter les lieux, les tueurs ont tout mis en désordre, renversant du riz et du café par terre. Ils ont, par ailleurs emporté des assiettes, casseroles et radio.

Bien avant ces événements, le mardi 16 mai, deux soldats étaient allés chercher le mari à leur domicile ; les deux étaient des amis du mari ; la Déclarante ne sait pas quel est leur degré de participation dans tout ceci. De plus, tous ces soldats, elle ne les connaît que de visage ; elle ne sait pas leur nom, mais elle les reconnaîtrait si elle les revoyait. Elle se dit d'ailleurs prête à les désigner si on lui demande et qu'on lui en donne l'opportunité.

D'après elle, la cause profonde du meurtre de son mari est qu'il possédait et exploitait des terrains ayant appartenu à des personnes disparues lors des événements d'avril-mai 1994, ce qui était fortement désapprouvé par les voisins. De plus, le mari était assez proche d'un Magistrat, juge au Tribunal de Première Instance de Cyangugu, Mr MANGARA Pontien ; ils se voyaient souvent tous les deux. Mais la dame pense que ce Magistrat n'y est pour rien ; il a simplement appris le décès de Jean-Pierre comme la plupart des habitants de la commune.

Trois de ses enfants sont au Zaïre : deux filles de 13 et 10 ans, un garçon de 12ans. Ils sont dans sa famille. Les deux autres de 5 ans et demi et 4 ans, une fille et un garçon sont avec un parent au lieu du meurtre.

A la sortie de l'hôpital, elle n'a pas l'intention de retourner chez elle, par peur ; elle compte aller chez des parents qui habitent non loin de là ; elle pense qu'elle y sera en sécurité.

Enfin, elle est certaine que ce sont des militaires de l'APR qui ont commis ce double meurtre tout en attendant à sa propre vie.

Pour ce qui est d'une possible relation de son défunt mari avec les interahamwe, elle dit n'en rien savoir et pense qu'il n'en est rien.

Lecture faite de ce récit, la Déclarante signe avec nous ce 25 mai 1995 :

PROCES-VERBAL DU MATERIEL MEDICAL LAISSE PAR L'ORGANISME HELP-GERMANY
REPRESENTÉ PAR LE Dr. MARTIN HEYDECK A L'HOPITAL DE BUSHENGE REPRESENTÉ PAR
LE Dr. RUGAMBA ERNEST.

1. Appareil d'Anesthésie un (1)
2. Masques d'a nesthésie trente-cinq (35)
3. Tubes pour intubation différents calibres 64
4. Pressure infusion set un (1)
5. Preferateurs (2) deux [Perforateurs (deux)]
6. Sonographe (sonic aid) un (1)
7. ECHOGRAPHE ADUL TRANSDUC un (1) ayant fait l'objet de litige devant etre
tranché par le Ministère de la Réhabilitation
Circonstance du litige:

Le Dr. Martin veut reprendre cet appareil qu'il atteste avoir empreinté au
Projet MUSASA-RULI, tandis que Dr. Rugamba dit que l'appareil doit rester
à l'Hôpital de Bushenge parce que ça fait l'objet de matériel de Réhabilitation
de l'Hôpital.

Fait à Bushenge, le 09 juin 1995;

Pour remise

Dr. Martin Heydeck

Pour reprise

Dr. Rugamba Ernest

- Témoins:
1. R.P.A. Mugabe Angele, Commandant de la Région Bushenge
 2. MILOBE: Major William Rose et Major Idriaga Traoré
 3. R.S. : Dr. Cyridien Ukuliyimfura

SECTOR 4C-CYANGUGU- REPORT ON A DUAL MURDER AND
INJURY OF A THIRD PERSON

Date and place of facts: Sunday 21 May 1995 at Mururu, a secteur of
Cyimbogo Commune

Number of victims: two persons dead and one injured

Weapon used: firearm

Information on the declarant:

Name and First Name: Mrs NYIRABATUZI Dorothy

Occupation: Farmer

Marital status: Married, mother of 5 minor children, a widow since
the events described below

Quality: direct and indirect victim

Information regarding the persons killed:

Name of the main target: Mr MPAKANIYE Jean Pierre

Occupation: Trader

Quality: Declarant's husband

Ethnic group: Hutu

Victim of circumstances: niece of the main target

Exposition of facts:

On Sunday 21 May 1995 during day time (the Declarant does no longer remember the hour), 2 RPA have come to look for her husband, in her absence from the family domicile. They went to the church and then came back to the victims' domicile. After some banal causeries, the two RPA military left off.

Towards 19:00 hrs, three other RPA military arrived at the victims' domicile through the kitchen door. They were well known to the victims; notably, one of the them was telling the others that the master of the house was his friend. They sat in the living-room to discuss with the husband.

Towards 21:00 hrs, one of the soldiers told the husband that someone wanted to see him; then the husband asked whether they could go to see that person together, but in vain. Besides, according to the same soldier, he had information according to which an "Interahamwe" would have put grenades at the unfortunate victim's; therefore the latter had to hand them over.

From that moment, the man, realizing he was in danger, attempted to flee; but he was immediately caught again by one of the soldiers who got the better of him by tying his hands with a neckerchief and by ordering him to sit down straight on the ground. During the time, his two fellows started searching the house, one in the spouses' room and the other in the niece's. They found and took away 200,000 Zaires and 25,000 RWF. Then, they told the victims that they were aware that they had more money, notably a

woman had told them that the victims owned dollars; then they had to give all that.

The discussions went on with the fact that the soldiers had been informed that the unfortunate was holding meetings with people from the other side (Zaire), but they were not told of what kind of meeting it was about.

The wife, realizing the gravity of the situation, proposed the killers to search the house from top to bottom, including the ceilings, to see that all their allegations were unfounded, since they would not find any grenades. But that proved useless.

It was then that the shooting started. the husband was killed there, as well as the niece that was in the house. As for the wife, she managed to escape by hiding in a banana plantation, wherefrom she alerted the neighbors. The latter, arriving on the scene of the crime around midnight were only able to find out the husband and the niece dead. Before departing the scene, the killers put everything upside down, knocking over rice and coffee on the ground. In addition, they took away plates, casseroles and a radio set.

Well before those events, on Tuesday 16 May, two soldiers had come to look for the husband at their domicile; the Declarant does not know to what extent they took part in the crime. Furthermore, she knows them only by face; she has no knowledge of their name but she would recognize them if she saw them again. She is ready to designate them if she is requested and given the opportunity to do so.

According to the declarant, the deep reason for the murder is that her husband owned and exploited land that had belonged to persons that were killed during the massacres of April-May 1994, which was strongly disapproved by the neighbors. Moreover, the husband was quite close to a Magistrate, Mr MANGARA Pontien, a judge at the Cyangugu Tribunal of First Instance; both would often see each other. But the lady thinks that the Magistrate has had no hand in the matter; he simply learnt of John Peter's death like most of most inhabitants of the commune.

Three of her children are in Zaire: two daughters aged 13 and 10, a son aged 12. They are in her family. The two others aged 5 and a half and 4, a daughter and a son stay with a relative at the scene of the murder.

Once out of the hospital, she does not intend to return home out of fear. She plans to go to her parents' who are not far from hers. She feels it is safe there.

Finally, she is certain it is RPA military who committed the double murder all the while attempting to her own life.

Regarding the possible relation between her late husband and the "Interahamwe", she admits not knowing anything about it and believes that such is not the case.

After reading this account, the Declarant signs with us today on 25 May 1995

REPORT ON MEDICAL EQUIPMENT HANDED OVER BY HELP-GERMANY ORGANIZATION REPRESENTED BY Dr.MARTIN HEYDECK TO BUSHENGE HOSPITAL REPRESENTED BY Dr.RUGAMBA ERNEST.

1. Anaesthesia appliance (1) one
2. Etherization masks (35) thirty-five
3. Intubation tubes various sizes (64) sixty-four
4. Pressure infusion set (1) one
5. Perforators (2) two
6. Sonic aid (1) one
7. ULTRASONOGRAPH ADR ULTRASOUND (1) one : it has given rise to a dispute that has to be settled by the Ministry for Rehabilitation Circumstances surrounding the dispute:

Dr. Martin wants to take the appliance back as he confirms having borrowed it to MUSASA-RULI project, whereas Dr. Rugamba says that the appliance must be left at Bushenge Hospital because it is part of the equipment meant for the rehabilitation of the Hospital.

Done at Bushenge, 9 June 1995:

For handing over

For taking over

Dr. Martin Heydeck (signed)

Dr. Rugamba Ernest (signed)

- Witnesses:
1. R.P.A Mugabo Anselme, Commanding officer in Bushenge area
 2. MILOBS: Major William Pose and Major Idrissa Traoré
 3. Regional Medical officer: Dr. Cyridion Ukuliyimfura



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO : D COS OPS/
G3 PLANS

DATE: 05 JUN 95

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

REF : MILOB/6604.0/LOG

SUBJECT : HELMETS, FLAK JACKETS HELD BY UNITS


Reference:

A. MILOB/6604.0/LOG dated 27 May 95

1. The three Sectors referred to in ref 'A' have now submitted their returns on the above subject. Their holdings are as follows:

SRL	SECTOR	FLAK JACKETS	HELMETS	REMARKS
1.	3	NIL	NIL	
2.	4A	1	NIL	
3.	4B	15	15	

2. Please accept for action.


FA AYAMGHA
Sqn Ldr
for DCMO


08/06

② G3 Plans

Pls place on pri list
for issue /alloc.


DCOSOPS
8.6

③

Invd to G3 Plans
08.6

①

TO : DCOS (OPS), FHQ
INFO : DCMO, MILOBS GP HQ

FROM : HQ SECTOR 3, GITARAMA

SUBJECT : REPORTED ARREST OF BISHOP OF KABGAYI

DATE : 10 MAY 95

Sey
A
11/5
Thant
11/5

1. THIS REFERS TO THE FHQ DIRECTIVE TO INVESTIGATE THE REPORT OF THE ARREST OF FATHER SIBOMANA ANDRE, BISHOP OF KABGAYI AND OUR SUBSEQUENT CONFIRMATION THAT THE BISHOP WAS IN FACT A FREE MAN AS AT 1700 HRS ON 02 MAY 95.
2. CONSIDERING THE APPREHENSIONS OF THE BISHOP AND THE IMPORTANT POSITION HE OCCUPIES IN GITARAMA AND WITHIN THE CLERGY OF RWANDA I FELT IT NECESSARY TO INVESTIGATE THE MATTER IN GREATER DETAIL.
3. FATHER SIBOMANA ANDRE IS IN FACT ONLY THE ACTING BISHOP OF KABGAYI. HIS ACTUAL APPOINTMENT IS ADMINISTRATEUR APOSTOLIQUE DU DIOCESE DE KABGAYI AND HE TOOK OVER THE SAME ON 12 APR 94 WITHIN A WEEK OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR. HIS PRESENT POSITION WAS OCCUPIED AFTER THE DEATH OF HIS PREDECESSOR, BISHOP THADEE NSEGIYAMUA, WHO WAS ALLEGEDLY KILLED BY THE RPA IN JUN 94 FOR, IN THEIR PERCEPTION, HAVING SUPPORTED THE GENOCIDE.
4. FATHER SIBOMANA IS A HUTU, WHO BESIDES HIS POSITION IN THE KABGAYI DIOCESE IS A REGULAR CONTRIBUTOR TO THE RWANDESE PRINT MEDIA. HE IS ALSO AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE ASSOCIATION RWANDAISE POUR LE DEFENSE DU DROITS DE LE PERSONNE ET DES LIBERTES PUBLIQUES (ABL), A SUPPOSED HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANISATION OF RWANDA. HE CLAIMS THAT HE IS BEING TARGETED BY THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE OF HIS OUTSPOKEN CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND INHUMAN PRISON CONDITIONS IN RWANDA-- AN ASPECT HE HAS BEEN WRITING AND SPEAKING ABOUT. HE WAS NOT PRESENT AT KABGAYI DURING THE KILLING OF THE LATE BISHOP, ALLEGEDLY BY THE RPA, AND THEREFORE CLAIMS THAT HE WAS NOT A WITNESS TO THIS, HAVING BEEN AWAY AT MASANGO AT THAT TIME. HOWEVER, HIS SECRETARY JANE YANKULIJE HAD WITNESSED THE SAME AND WAS THUS CONSIDERED A THREAT BY THE AUTHORITIES. ALTHOUGH THE SOUS-PROSECUTOR OF GITARAMA HAD ISSUED A WARRANT OF ARREST FOR JANE YANKULIJI THE ARREST HAS NOT BEEN EXECUTED. IN FACT, FATHER SIBOMANA'S APPREHENSIONS OF HIS OWN ARREST CAME ABOUT BECAUSE OF THE THREATS OF ONE RPA SERGEANT, CLAVER BUNGWVE WHO HAD BEEN DETAILED TO EXECUTE THE ARREST OF THE SECRETARY, JANE YANKULIJE ON 01 MAY 95. THE SERGEANT WAS INFURIATED BECAUSE IN HIS TWO VISITS TO KABGAYI TO EXECUTE THE ARREST THE SECRETARY WAS NOT AVAILABLE. THE THREATS HAD LED FATHER SIBOMANA TO APPROACH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE VATICAN IN RWANDA AND RESEON DES CITOYENS (RON) WHICH IN TURN LED TO THE MESSAGE REACHING THE SRSG.
5. FATHER SIBOMANA PERCEIVES THAT WITH ALL THE INTERNATIONAL CONCERN ABOUT HIS SAFETY IT IS UNLIKELY THAT HE WILL BE ARRESTED BUT HE DOES NOT RULE OUT HIS PHYSICAL ELIMINATION THROUGH

② COS

Suggest we show A/FC and ask him to consider bringing this matter to the SRSG's attention for OSRSG action as per para 8. *ccos ops 11.5*

Cops Sent to
COS
11/5


ASSASSINATION MADE TO LOOK LIKE AN ACCIDENT.

6. FATHER SIBOMANA HAS BEEN MORE THAN HELPFUL TO UNAMIR AND HAS ASSISTED US IN EVERY WAY IN GITARAMA. IT IS LEARNT THAT IT WAS HIS FINANCIAL BACKING WHICH LED TO THE ONGOING EXPANSION OF THE HOLDING FACILITY OF THE GITARAMA PRISON TO CREATE MORE HUMAN CONDITIONS FOR PRISONERS.

7. ON MY SUGGESTION THAT HE SHOULD LIE LOW FOR SOME TIME TO ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT'S ANGER TO BLOW OVER, HE EXPRESSED HIS INABILITY TO ACCEPT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS WITHOUT RAISING HIS VOICE. HE IS GRATEFUL TO UNAMIR FOR HAVING DISPLAYED CONCERN FOR HIS WELL BEING AND FEELS THAT IT IS DUE TO THE CONTINUOUS VISIT BY GITARAMA MILOBS TO HIS OFFICE THAT AN ADEQUATE MESSAGE HAS BEEN SENT HOME TO THE AUTHORITIES. IN FACT, HE PERCEIVES THAT IT IS DUE TO THIS THAT THE WARRANT OF ARREST AGAINST HIS SECRETARY IS NOT BEING EXECUTED.

8. I RECOMMEND THAT UNAMIR SHOULD APPROACH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE VATICAN IN KIGALI ASKING HIM TO STRONGLY PROJECT THE VATICAN'S CONCERN FOR THE SAFETY OF FATHER SIBOMANA AND PERHAPS OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF OTHER FOREIGN MISSIONS TO DO THE SAME. IN THE MEANTIME THIS SECTOR HQ WILL CONTINUE TO DISPLAY OUR CONCERN WITH THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES AND MAINTAIN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE FATHER.

9. THIS MAY KINDLY BE BROUGHT TO THE NOTICE OF ACTING FC AND THE SRSG TO WHOSE OFFICE THE INTERNATIONAL CONCERN HAD BEEN ADDRESSED.



SA HASNAIN
COLONEL
SECTOR CDR

Desors

For your info

31/5

Date : 23 May 95
Milobs Sector 4b, Butare

From : Maj Gaspar Barrabino
Humanitarian Offr, Sector 4b

To : Maj Craig Mc Conaghy
Legal officer - Australian Contingent

Info : Sector Cdr 4B, Butare
: Force Humanitarian Offr

sub : Co-operation between Milob-Butare and HRFOR-Butare.

Introduction

With the closing of the camps of Gikongoro prefecture and the return of more than 100,000 IDP's in Butare prefecture. It became essential to improve our collaboration with HRFOR-Butare. Since the first movement of the closing of Kibeho camp, we were present at the site under milobs sector commander 4A-Gikongoro with member of HRFOR-Butare.

Our collaboration with HRFOR-Butare benefit from the assistance of Major Craig Mc Conaghy, legal officer of UNAMIR. It fully started with the evacuation of IDP's from Kibeho by UNAMIR and IOM Trucks where we worked together with HRFOR-Butare to organized monitored and evaluated numbers of IDP's and provides escort to the convoys. This first phase of close collaboration with HRFOR was formally approved in a meeting between milobs sector cdr, sector 4B Butare, (lt col Isyaku Abubakar), Major Craig Mc Congaghy, and HRFOR-Butare team leader (Mr. Luc Cote) held on April 28th, 1995. It was decided that the collaboration will cover those issues :-

(1) Briefing on legal aspect of Human Rights, protection of witnesses proceeding of interrogation, protection seeker, UNAMIR Policy, Rwandeese justice system and the whole question of confidentiality of information to all the sector 4b, Milobs and all those who were supported us from other sector during that period.

(2) Co-ordination of our patrols between visits of commune by HRFOR so that a continuous presence of United-Nation Organization every day.

(3) Monitoring the Detainees transfer program of HAFOR under the responsibility for RPA Gendarmerie to insure the respect of basic Humanitarian laws. Our presence was requested by HAFOR to show a UNAMIR Military presence in those delicate operations.

② FMO

For your info to gain an insight into the very good, innovative work that 'your' Legal O 'is doing for 'us'.

Desors
2.6

③ Fmo
Copied
2.6

(4) Monitoring and helping to transport the judicial officers in some communes on specific screening tasks of detainees in the communal cachet. This is a concrete collaboration for the rehabilitation of the justice system.

(5) Ex-change of information with HRFOR concerning:-

- (a) Number of IDP's registered by communes.
- (b) Number of IDP's arrested.
- (c) Number of persons detained.
- (d) incidents relating to security in the communes.
- (e) Movement of population from or to Burundi.

This exchange allow us to obtain and confirm our own information.


(6) Encouraging exchange between our team covering specific commune with Human Right Officers operation in the Sectors so to insure security for them in any event of emergency or needs of assistance.

(7) Nominatioin of a liaison officer to insure the co-ordination on a daily basis (Maj Gaspar Barrabino - Humanitarian Offr Sector 4B).

Conclusion

My experienced after one month as a liaison with Luc Cote, team leader of HRFOR-Butare was friendly professional and profitable for both of our organization and proved to be very fruitful.

I think that this type of structured collaboration can be profitable to all sectors of Rwandan territory.


Gaspar Barrabino
Maj
Humanitarian Officer
Sector 4B, Butare

GABH1

③ A Copy Sent to G3 Plans
13.5

To: FC
Info: DFC/CMO
COS
DCOS/OPS
DCMO
From: MILOBS HQ SO2 (G2 EP)
Date: 06 May 1995

② G3 Plans

G3 Ops

Pls review and comment in the margin. Although personally do not agree 100% with the premise, I do support the recommendations.
Return.

DCOSops
13.5

Subject: SITUATION ESTIMATE - LONG TERM VISION

I. INTRODUCTION:

Situation in Rwanda will be more tense in the weeks to come with many indicators pointing out to a very presumable deterioration, more harassment, more violence and more harsh measures by the Rwandan government/RPA against the civilian population. The government is not satisfied with the present mandate of UNAMIR. The ongoing propaganda campaign against UNAMIR plus harassment and criminal activities against UNAMIR personnel and property, evidently carried out with the knowledge the authorities if not tacitly condoned by them, point out to the final target which might be a reduction or even a withdrawal of the mission from Rwanda. This is however contingent on clarification of policies by the Rwanda leadership and results of frictions among the moderates and the extremists among that leadership. In view of the above a number of possible actions may be expected.

II. POSSIBLE ACTIONS:

A. By the government of Rwanda:

1. The government will embark on the road of terror to control the population. The predominant factor in the government's policy towards the civilian population will be imposition of the reign of terror, fear and intimidation. More developments like the 22 - 23 Apr 95 Kibeho camp manslaughter may be expected in the foreseeable future. Ambushes at the borders, particularly at the Burundi border, will be set up to prevent escapees from leaving the country.

2. Further evacuations of IDPs camps should be expected with the final goal being to have all of them closed as genuine or potential sanctuaries for Hutu militias and FRGF infiltrating into the interior. The random use of force and fire arms against civilians should be considered as a matter of course.

3. Networks of informers reporting on everything in their vicinity will expand and people will be encouraged to spy more effectively on each other. The government and local authorities will exploit the readiness of many people to get their neighbors incarcerated and conduct more mop-up operations.
4. More arrests and harassment of the local population will be approved of and effected, particularly in the areas with a high degree of interahamwe and FRGF activity. In the general zeal to find and arrest anyone suspected of genocide more people will be detained and liquidated without trial. "Demonstrations of people's justice" in form of verdicts announced at public gatherings against criminals and political opponents should be expected.
5. Congestion in prisons and detention centers will continue and there is a strong possibility that it might be intentional as due to a lack of the qualified judicial personnel not many trials of those accused of or suspected to have committed genocide last year could be expected soon. There may exist a possibility to solve the problem of incarcerated interahamwe members (genuine or imagined ones) in another way: by physically eliminating them through tough conditions in prisons and detention centers.
6. Anti-UNAMIR campaign will continue, however on a variable scale. Even if that campaign abates for some time and local newspapers and radio stations publish news and comments favorable to the UN operation, it does not mean that the public mood could not be steered on the anti-UNAMIR course by local authorities. The campaign may easily resume as a part of the psychological and political pressure against UNAMIR.
7. The combination of psychological and physical elements in Rwanda government's hostile actions against UNAMIR will rather tend to increase over the next weeks attributing to more pressure and tension and even serving as an excuse to demand the mission's reduction or withdrawal.
8. There is a strong supposition that the Rwandan authorities are fully aware of and provide a cover-up for perpetrators of all kinds of crimes against UNAMIR, NGOs and cooperating agencies/companies, their personnel and their property. "Ordinary criminals" or interahamwe elements will be preferably blamed for that sort of criminal activities.
9. The government is extremely arrogant, self-confident and not ready to perceive any danger of their country being completely ignored by the international community if the mission fails. That attitude seems to be gaining more and more ground at all echelons of power in Rwanda.

B By the RPA:

1. As political atmosphere deteriorates the RPA will increasingly impose its will and orders onto civilian authorities and will

virtually subdue the administrative structures. Civilian authorities will have less and less control over armed elements in the country.

2. Extremists in the RPA high command will gain the upper edge which means a hard time to be given to any opposition, including their own ranks. Purges and reshuffles are therefore very likely, both at the central and the grassroot level.

3. RPA will actively fulfill all orders to the effect of intimidating the population and preventing the people from expressing any dissatisfaction with the existing government. In case the RPA high command considers those orders not to be sufficient for attaining that goal, own measures - including summon executions - will be easily sanctioned.

4. Local RPA commanders will be empowered to upgrade security levels at their respective areas at will if they consider that measure to be effective against any threat on the part of RGF, interahamwe and/or any other opposition force.

5. Cases of intimidation against soft targets (the civilian UN personnel, UNVs, UN agencies, military observers, civilian police, international organizations, NGOs etc.) will tend to increase with RPA soldiers participating in criminal activities with or without the knowledge of their superiors. More burglaries, thefts, armed robberies, provocations and even physical violence should be expected at locations where UN and NGOs presence is heavy and their activity may become a sort of annoyance for RPA (Kigali, Gisenyi, Kibuye, Cyangugu, Butare). RPA may/will be involved in such incidents. The situation may be compounded by the fact that some NGOs are or may be implicated in anti-government activities in Rwanda: the RPA tends to perceive some NGOs to be tacit allies of the old regime still assisting it inside and outside the country.

6. Clandestine actions against UNAMIR formed units should be also considered as presumable, resulting from various reasons (revenge, misunderstanding, pilferage, ill will). Sector 1 and sector 4B could be targeted first as problems have cropped up there in the relations between UNAMIR troops and the locals in the past.

C. By FRGF and the former Rwandan government:

1. The anniversary of their defeat in the last year Rwandan civil war (04 July - Kigali taken over by RPA, mid-July - transitional government left Gitarama and settled down in exile in Zaire) as well as the upcoming dry season will provide an opportunity to launch operations against RPA and civilian targets within the Rwandan territory. Guerilla-type operations should be expected on a mounting scale (e.c. mines being planted at public places, assassinations of administrative leaders, banditry, ambushes, even violence against the UNAMIR personnel in retaliation for the mission's alleged "inaction" and a "hand-over of power" to the RPA last year).

255
20
5000

2. The upcoming period of the next 4 to 5 weeks may see an intensification of FRGF and the former government's activities in the military and political areas. Mistreatment of IDPs and other civilian Hutu population by the RPA will provide an excellent excuse for the erstwhile government elements to step up their military activities, beef up their ranks, expand their sanctuaries in the Rwandan interior, increase the number of infiltrations, expand their network of informers and conduct all sorts of harassment against the civilian population.

3. An intensified propaganda campaign will be carried out against the present government and the RPA in a bid to win more support among the predominantly Hutu population. One of the very presumable elements of that campaign will be a call for "national disobedience" towards the RPF dominated government in Kigali and/or even a call to arms when situation is reckoned as ripe for armed resistance (insurrection).

IV. COUNTERMEASURES AND PRECAUTIONS;

As far as any countermeasures and precautions are considered one question has to be addressed first: a. will the UNAMIR mandate continue in its present shape ? or b. will it be modified ? or c. will it be cancelled ? A clear-cut attitude has to be expressed by the Rwandan government at the earliest possible date. Given those three options following measures might be taken:

A. In case the mandate is extended or modified:

1. Effective measures have to be adopted in order to provide maximum protection for UNAMIR personnel and property. Preferably, UN troops' presence should be established at all UNAMIR compounds, both civilian and military ones. As more and more targets will be exposed to criminal activity a point has to be brought to the locals that thefts, robberies, unauthorized searches and confiscation of property, abuses of the UN personnel, raids into UN and NGOs personnel's accommodations would not go unpunished and will be stoutly repelled.

a. Specific measures should include e.c.:

- positioning armed UN military sentries at all UN civilian offices, hotels accommodating the UN personnel, parkings, both in Kigali and in the field, as well as at all MilObs and CivPol offices. Maintaining additional personnel or increasing the number of personnel in those offices for the night shift is not advisable as a waste of human resources.

- all facilities identified as vulnerable targets should be located within military compounds with round-the-clock sentries and operational communications equipment (if the option mentioned in the previous paragraph turns out not to be feasible).

- communications equipment should be therefore more properly allocated (e.c. no motorolas for civilian personnel performing merely office duties but more communications means to be allocated to the personnel in the field).

- in case of armed infiltrations and breaks-in there should be no hesitation to use fire arms against assailants (as the case was in other UN missions, e.g. in Cambodia). Frame-up operations against car and property thieves could be considered. Keeping low profile is only an invitation for criminals to continue and intensify their activities.

- expansion of the Rapid Reaction Force could/should be considered as an urgent task to prevent presumable hostilities toward UNAMIR and its personnel.

2. More attention should be paid to the UNAMIR propaganda effort and those measures could include:

- exploiting UN achievements in Namibia, Mozambique and Cambodia to counteract association of its African operations with failures and errors in Somalia and Liberia.

- UNAMIR should more effectively and intensely emphasize that the mission was not able to prevent an all-out war waged by everybody against everybody in Rwanda last year but, however, it did assist a great number of people (providing e.g. shelters at the Amahoro stadium and Mille Collines Hotel, food, medical care, transportation etc.) at the time of hostilities and after the war.

- propaganda effort by the UNMIR information services should be more offensive, stressing all positive elements (assistance for returnees, medical care, grants for the Rwandan people etc.). Broadcasts to that effect should appear more frequently on the air of radio Rwanda even in the form of pre-paid programs.

- more pressure should be exercised onto the Rwandan government and local authorities to ensure respect for and observation of human rights according to international standards. In caaaaaase of hardliners taking the upper edge within the government a clear linkage could be shown between any continuation of aid and assistance programs for Rwanda and the respect for universal human rights.

In case the mandate is cancelled:

1. Measures should be taken to provide maximum security for the UN personnel and property. In this respect specifically:

- Most UNAMIR personnel and property should concentrate in Kigali in expectation of prompt evacuation.

- Formed units could abandon their outposts and concentrate in their respective battalion headquarters.

TO: DCOS/OPS

FROM: ETHIOBATT-2

UNCLAS..... 030/2

DATE: 14/05/95

SUBJECT: COMMENT ON SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLANREFERENCES: 500.46(PLANS) DATED 18 APR 95
500.46(PLANS) DATED 11 MAY 95

THE SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLAN IS ESSENTIALLY A BRIEF AND COMPREHENSIVE DOCUMENT ENCOMPASSING ONLY THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO BE FOLLOWED. HOWEVER, WE HAVE TWO POINTS TO COMMENT ON.

1. THE GENERAL INTRODUCTORY PART OF THE SECURITY AND EVACUATION PLAN STATES THAT THE TUTSIS FIRST ENTERED THIS REGION FROM ETHIOPIA. MENTIONING OF ETHIOPIA AS COUNTRY OF ORIGIN FOR TUTSIS, WOULD KEEP OUR IMPARTIALITY IN DOUBT FOR PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN RWANDA. TO AVOID SUCH INCONVENIENCE, IT WOULD BE APPRECIATED IF IT IS IMPROVED. TO DO SO, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER TO MENTION "HORN OF AFRICA" AS THE REGION OF ORIGIN.

2. IN THE REINFORCEMENT INSTRUCTIONS, IT IS STATED THAT ALL SECTORS NEED TO BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE AND RECEIVE REINFORCEMENTS TO/FROM ANY SECTOR. WE THINK THAT THIS WILL NOT BE ENOUGH, AND DETAIL PLANNING SEEMS TO BE NECESSARY TO COORDINATE THE OUTER AND INNER OR ADJACENT UNITS' WITHDRAWALS.

UNITS IN THE CENTER SHOULD SECURE CERTAIN AREAS AND FACILITATE FOR THE FALL BACK OF THE OUTER UNITS i.e AREAS TO BE COVERED BY THE INNER OR NEIGHBORING UNITS, TIME THE OUTER UNIT TAKES TO FALL BACK, COMMUNICATION FREQUENCIES AND CODE NAMES, FORMATION AND COMMAND OF THE TWO UNITS AFTER THE FALL BACK ENROUTE TO THE NEXT INNER OR ADJACENT UNITS HAVE TO BE DEVELOPED IN DETAIL. EXAMPLE ZAMBATT SHOULD COVER AND WAIT FOR OUR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL AND SENBATT ALSO COVER AND WAIT FOR THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF THE TWO BNS, ETC. IF THE ROUTE OF EVACUATION IS ALONG THE MAIN ROAD TO KIGALI.

IT MIGHT BE THOUGH THAT COORDINATION WILL BE IMPLEMENTED AS THE NEED ARISES, HOWEVER, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE UNITS DIFFERENCE IN NATIONALITY AND THE DIFFICULTIES THAT MIGHT BE ENCOUNTERED, ITS PREFERABLE TO PLAN AHEAD IN DETAIL AND MAKE UNITS REHEARSE AND KNOW EACH OTHER DURING PEACE TIME.

THIS TYPE OF COORDINATED WITHDRAWAL WILL ENABLE UNITS LIKE OURS NOT TO MOVE ALL THE WAY TO KIGALI FIGHTING ALONE.

② G3 Plans

1. Pls incorporate
2. Para 2 should as a minimum be incl in gen outline

③

Copy Sent to
G3 PlansDZ
16.4

15.4

- Sentries at all UN compounds and facilities should be vastly strengthened as the end of a mission usually invites a lot of crime (thefts, pilferage, looting, robberies, burglaries etc.). Maximum security precautions should be effected immediately.
- Military observers' activities should be reduced to monitoring situation along main roads and in towns.
- Civilian components' activities in the field should be reduced to a minimum or suspended.
- Strenuous propaganda efforts should be made to the effect of ensuring a smooth termination of the mission in cooperation with local authorities. The government and its territorial branches should be discouraged from taking any steps against UNAMIR.
- Rwandan authorities should be made responsible for the security and safety of the mission's personnel by virtue of relevant agreements.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : See Distribution

DATE 7 March 95

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

REF : Plans 47/95

SUBJECT: FAMILIARISATION TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR
NEWLY ARRIVED MILOBS/CIVPOL

[Handwritten signature]
8/3

1. Attached is a programme for orientation of newly-arrived MILOBS/CIVPOL to UNAMIR. Instructors can introduce subjects they consider vital to the Observers while performing duties. This HQ would appreciate being informed to enable adjustments to next programme.
2. Venue for programme shall be KIGALI MIL DB Sector 6 HQ. Sector 6 is to assist throughout.
3. Programme is to start on 8 Mar 95. Those involved shall be informed in advance if there are any changes.
4. Participants are required to adhere to the programme.
5. SLOGO MILOB HQ is to organise transport to be used by the MILOBs during their training.

[Handwritten signature]
ALEX ANOCHKINE
Lt Col
for DCMO

Distribution

External:

Action:

FORCE MEDICAL OFFICER (FHQ)

CHIEF PLANS OFFICER (FHQ)

CHIEF TRANSPORT OFFICER (FHQ)

COMMISSIONER CIVPOL

COMD MILOB SECTOR 6

OPS BRANCH

AUSMED

CMPO

Internal:

Action:

CMO

DCMO

HAC

SOO

SMPO

S LOGO

S PLANS/TRG OFFR

MILOBS SIG O

FAMALIRIASATION TRAINING PROGRAMME FOR AS FROM
8 MARCH 95

SRL	DATE	FROM	TO	SUBJECT	PRESENTED BY
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
1.	8 MAR 95 WED	0830 HRS	0855 HRS	WELCOME ADDRESS	CMO
		0900 HRS	1050 HRS	POLITICAL & HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	SDO2
		1100 HRS	1150 HRS	UNAMIR FORMATION AND MANDATE	OPS BRANCH (FHQ)
		1200 HRS	1400 HRS	LUNCH	-
		1400 HRS	1450 HRS	ORGANISATION OF UNAMIR	CPLANS (FHQ)
		1500 HRS	1550 HRS	ORGANISATION OF FHQ	CMPO (FHQ)
		1600 HRS	1650 HRS	ORG OF MILOB GP HQ & SECTORS	SDO2
2	9 MAR 95 THUR	0800 HRS	0850 HRS	ADMIN, PERSONAL CONDUCT, DISCIPLINE, LEAVE/CTO AND ENTITLEMENTS	SMPO
		0900 HRS	0950 HRS	BOARDS OF INQUIRY	SMPO
		1000 HRS	1050 HRS	MEDICAL BRIEF	AUSMED
		1100 HRS	1150 HRS	INTRODUCTION, CARE AND MAINT OF COMM EQUIPMENT	MILOB SIGNAL OFFR
		1200 HRS	1400 HRS	LUNCH	

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
		1400 HRS	1450 HRS	VOICE PROCEDURE AND COMM SEC	MILOB SIGNAL OFFICER
		1500 HRS	1550 HRS	UNAMIR LOGISTICS SYSTEM AND PROCEDURE	MILOB S LOGO
		1600 HRS	1645 HRS	PATROLLING, ESCORTS, CHECK POINTS, OBSERVATION POSTS AND MONITORING	SOO
3	10 MAR 95 FPI	0800 HRS	0850 HRS	COMPLAINTS AND INVESTIGATIONS	SOO
		0900 HRS	0950 HRS	OPS REPORTS/ RETURNS	SOO
		1000 HRS	1050 HRS	BRIEF ON MILOB SECTOR OPS	SOO
		1100 HRS	1150 HRS	RULES OF ENGAGEMENT	CPLANS (FHQ)
		1200 HRS	1400 HRS	LUNCH	
		1400 HRS	1450 HRS	HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS	HAC
		1500 HRS	1550 HRS	CARE & MAINT OF VEHICLES	CTO
		1600 HRS	1650 HRS	ACCIDENT PROCEDURE	CIVPOL

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
4	11 MAR 95 SAT	0800 HRS	0850 HRS	CIVPOL OPERATIONS	CIVPOL
		0900 HRS	1230 HRS	DRIVING TEST	CTO
		1230 HRS	1330 HRS	LUNCH	
		1330 HRS	1400 HRS	POSTING INSTRUCTIONS	SMPO
		1405 HRS	1430 HRS	CLOSING ADDRESS	CMO

LEGEND

CMO : CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER
DCMO : DEPUTY CHIEF MILITARY OBSERVER
SMPO : SENIOR MILITARY PERSONNEL OFFICER
SLOGO : SENIOR LOGISTICS OFFICER
FHQ : FORCE HEADQUARTERS
CTO : CHIEF TRANSPORT OFFICER
CIVPOL : CIVILIAN POLICE
HAC : HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE CELL

TO : DCOS (OPS), FHQ
DCMO MILOBS GP HQ

FROM : HQ SECTOR 3, GITARAMA

SUBJECT:- DETAILED INCIDENT REPORT

DATE : 07 MAY 95

ARREST OF BOURGEMESTRE OF MUSAMBIRA

1. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT RECEIVED ON 06 MAY 95 INDICATED THAT KALISSA MARTHA, BOURGEMESTRE OF MUSAMBIRA COMMUNE HAD BEEN ARRESTED. SINCE THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT EVENT IN THE MAZE OF ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN GITARAMA PREFECTURE IN THE RECENT PAST, THE MATTER WAS PERSONALLY INVESTIGATED BY THE SECTOR CDR. DURING MY VISIT TO THE BUREAU DE COMMUNE I QUERIED THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNE, MR NICHOLAS ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE BOURGEMESTRE INDICATING MY DESIRE TO MEET HIM SINCE HE WAS A PERSONAL FRIEND. MY ENQUIRIES WERE MET WITH EVASIVE REPLIES THAT THE BOURGEMESTRE WAS PRESENTLY NOT AVAILABLE AND WOULD NOT BE SO FOR SOME TIME. THERE WAS SOME EXCHANGE OF GLANCES BETWEEN ALL PRESENT AND NO DIRECT REPLY WAS FORTHCOMING. I WAS THEN REQUESTED TO DIRECT ALL MY QUESTIONS TO THE PERSON SELECTED TO LOOK AFTER THE BOURGEMESTRE'S APPOINTMENT FOR THE TIME BEING. THIS INDIVIDUAL TURNED OUT TO BE A NON ENGLISH AND NON FRENCH SPEAKING PERSON EXTREMELY WARY OF MY PRESENCE. HE FELT RELUCTANT ABOUT GIVING ME HIS NAME UNTIL I PRESENTED MY NAME PLATE TO HIM WITH THE ADVICE THAT SINCE WE WERE TO WORK TOGETHER IT WOULD BE BEST TO KNOW EACH OTHER'S NAMES. THE ACTING BOURGEMESTRE TURNED OUT TO BE MR NSABIMAMNA MATHIEU, A TUTSI WHOSE TITLE WAS GIVEN AS COUNSELLER SUPPLE'ANT.

2. THE ABOVE APPEARS TO CONFIRM THE FACT THAT THE ERSTWHILE BOURGEMESTRE HAS IN FACT BEEN ARRESTED ALTHOUGH IT IS AS YET UNKNOWN AS TO WHERE HE HAS BEEN LODGED - IN THE GITARAMA PRISON OR IN THE COMMUNE CACHOT. IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH THE RPA BDE CDR THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS CONFIRMED. EFFORTS ARE ON TO TRACE HIS WHEREABOUTS AND CONFIRM WHETHER HE IS ALIVE OR NOT. THE ARREST POSSIBLY WAS EFFECTED ON 02/03 MAY 95. ON BEING QUERIED ON THE REASONS FOR THE ARREST, THE RPA BDE CDR INFORMED ME THAT IT HAS BEEN REVEALED THAT MR KALISSA MARTHA HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE GENOCIDE. WHEN I ENQUIRED AS TO HOW A TUTSI COULD BE ACCUSED OF THIS, HE REPLIED THAT PERHAPS MOST UNAMIR PERSONS WERE UNAWARE THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF TUTSIS WERE IN FACT GUILTY OF HAVING PARTICIPATED IN THE GENOCIDE.

ASSESSMENT

3. IT MAY BE RECALLED THAT DURING FEB-MAR 95 MUSAMBIRA WAS THE WORST AFFECTED COMMUNE WHEN A REIGN OF TERROR HAD BEEN LAUNCHED IN PARTS OF GITARAMA PREFECTURE. THERE WERE REGULAR INDISCRIMINATE ARRESTS OF HUTU MALES FORCING THE POPULATION TO SLEEP IN THE FIELDS AT NIGHT. ONE CELLULE IN FACT HAD ONLY 3 MALE INDIVIDUALS LEFT, ALL

OVER 65 YEARS OLD, THE REMAINING HAVING FLED TO AVOID ARREST. AT THE HEART OF THIS CAMPAIGN WAS THE FORMER BOURGEMESTRE OF MUSAMBIRA, WHO WAS AMONGST THE MOST FEARED INDIVIDUALS IN GITARAMA PREFECTURE. THE GITARAMA PREFECT HAD MADE IT KNOWN TO ME THAT HE WAS FINDING IT A PROBLEM REINING IN THE BOURGEMESTRE AS THE LATTER WAS MOSTLY ACTING ON HIS OWN WHIMS. MR KALISSA MARTHA IS A TUTSI WHO, AS PER UNCONFIRMED SOURCES, ALSO SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL LOSSES DURING THE GENOCIDE. HE HELD EXTREMIST VIEWS ON THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE AND WAS SEEN TO BE TOTALLY HOSTILE TO THE HUTU POPULATION. DESPITE THE PREFECT'S VIEWS, THE ACTIONS OF THE FORMER BOURGEMESTRE FITTED PERFECTLY WITH THE APPARENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN FEB-MAR; A POLICY OF SUBJUGATION OF THE MAJORITY POPULATION.

4. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION THE ARREST OF THE FORMER BOURGEMESTRE MAY INITIALLY APPEAR BAFFLING. HOWEVER, A CLOSE LOOK AT THE CHANGING FACE OF GITARAMA PREFECTURE IN THE POST KIBEHO PERIOD WOULD POSSIBLY EXPLAIN THE EVENT MORE CLEARLY. THE ENVIRONMENT IN GITARAMA PREFECTURE OVER THE LAST TWO WEEKS APPEARS TO HAVE TAKEN A POSITIVE TURN, AS IS EVIDENT FROM THE FOLLOWING:-

(A) THE BOURGEMESTRES ARE MUCH MORE FRIENDLY AND FORTHCOMING IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS UNAMIR.


(B) ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED AT THE PREFECT LEVEL, TO STOP ALL ARRESTS EXCEPT WHERE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, OSTENSIBLY TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT OF STABILITY TO ALLOW THE RETURNING IDPS TO SETTLE DOWN.

(C) THE RPA SOLDIERS AT CHECK POINTS AND COMMUNE BUILDINGS ARE LESS SULLEN AND MORE POSITIVE IN THEIR APPROACH TO UNAMIR.

(D) THE RPA HAS GIVEN US UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO ALL COMMUNE PRISONS.

5. IT APPEARS THAT THE POSITIVE CHANGES IN GITARAMA ARE A REFLECTION OF HIGHER GOVERNMENT POLICY WHICH MAY BE AIMED AT THE CREATION OF A BETTER ENVIRONMENT WITH REDUCED CONFRONTATION WITH UNAMIR. IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO READ THE BASIC REASONS FOR THIS WHICH APPEARS TO BE THE DESIRE OF THE GOVT TO BE SEEN IN SANER LIGHT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY--- THE MEANINGFUL THREAT OF AID DRYING UP MAY HAVE FINALLY DAWNED UPON THE LEADERSHIP. IN THIS NEW MILEU KALISSA MARTHA, THE FORMER BOURGEMESTRE, MAY POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN SEEN AS ONE OF THE STUMBLING BLOCKS AND HIS INTRANSIGENCE AN OBSTACLE TOWARDS PROJECTION OF A POSITIVE IMAGE. TO SIMPLY REMOVE HIM FROM POWER WOULD HAVE ALLOWED HIM TO CONTINUE POISONING THE MINDS OF THE MINORITY POPULATION-- THE NEXT BEST STEP OBVIOUSLY WAS TO ARREST HIM. THE CHARGES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE GENOCIDE APPEAR TO BE A COVER UP FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION.

6. THE EVENT MAY SIGNAL THE BEGINNING OF A REVERSE POLICY OF ARRESTS OF INTRANSIGENT TUTSI HARDLINERS - THE BOURGEMESTRE OF NTONGWE MAY BE THE NEXT ON THE LIST. IF THIS DOES COME ABOUT, IT WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT VICTORY FOR THE MODERATES AND A SIGNAL OF BETTER THINGS TO COME IN RWANDA.


S A HASNAIN
COL
SECTOR CDR

TO : DCOS (OPS), FHQ
HAC, FHQ
DCMO MILOBS GP HQ

DATE : 18 MAY 95

FROM : HQ SECTOR 3

SUBJECT : KIBUYE PRISON

1. PLEASE FIND ENCLOSED A REPORT ON PRISONS IN KIBUY PREFECTURE PREPARED BY SUB SECTOR 3A.

2. BEST REGARDS.

S BANERJEE
MAJOR
OPS OFFR

G3OPS

For info.

FEO

Have we carried out a rec of this prison. I thought we could assist if another organisation provided the finance. Pls speak.

19/5

RPA XO

Pse address this issue of illegal prisons

Copy sent to FEO

19-5

②

cc

Pse send a copy to the RPA LO don't include this page

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Copy sent to RPA LO

RPA

LO

Pse address the
issue of illegal
prisons

UN RESTRICTED

REPORT ON PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTRES
IN THE KIBUYE PREFECTURE

Introduction

1. At present there are approximately 2500 prisoners in the prisons and detention centres in Kibuye Prefecture.

Official Prison in Kibuye

2. There is one official prison in Kibuye. The number of inmates as of this date is 1112. The prison was originally built for 250 prisoners. The population is expected to rise to 2000 within the next month. Despite the extreme lack of space, there is enough food and medical care provided by ICRC and the local hospital run by MSF.
3. The male and female prisoners are kept in separate parts of the jail. Three small rooms of 10m² house the estimated 50 female prisoners. All other rooms, with the exception of one which has no electricity, are used for the male population. ICRC is to provide plastic sheets to cover one of the two courtyards to gain some additional space. The doors of the rooms are not locked and the prisoners are free to move about during the day. It should be emphasized that the space problem is acute as all the prisoners cannot lie down at the same time.
4. The hygienic situation is already critical. There are six toilets and three showers that attempt to fulfill the sanitary requirements of these 1112 inmates. These prisoners produce 22 tons of sewage within one month; this is already difficult to remove and will only become worse as the prison population increases.
5. The deputy director of the prison assures us that the soldiers are not allowed to enter in the prison area where the prisoners are kept; nevertheless, ICRC reports that soldiers are coming in during the night and harassing inmates.

Commune Prisons

6. Apart from the official prison in Kibuye there are two types of transit centres in every commune. One type of prison, the commune prison, run by the civilians(?), is normally located behind

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the commune office or in the vicinity. The other type, the numerous "gesho militaire", are quite difficult to find and no officials are willing to tell us where they are. They are usually normal houses that are guarded by RPA. ICRC even has difficulties locating some of these "RPA prisons". The number of inmates in these two types of prisons vary due to movement of prisoners and size of commune. However, the average number of prisoners at the commune level is approximately 125.

7. While prisoners are supposed to be transferred within three days records show some prisoners are being kept for as long as six months. The overall situation in these prisons is far worse than that in the official prison in Kibuye. The families supply food and even when medical dispensaries are near by, medical assistance is rarely given. For example, in Mabanza, after the local medical assistant from MSF provided medical treatment at the commune detention centre he was arrested. ICRC is attempting to provide some food and at least water jerry cans at these sites but nobody is cooperating.

Other Detention Centres

8. As recent information is now showing, individuals do not only get detained in the abovementioned facilities. We are finding, with the help of ICRC, that some people are simply being locked in houses or huts without guards. The number of such places appears to be quite large and is predominantly in the communes of Gisovu and Rwamatamu. No exact sites have been located so far. Though officials deny their existence, transferred prisoners tell of such places when they are interviewed and questioned.

9. The other type of detainment facility is much more sinister and inhumane. We have learned of some locations where prisoners are kept in holes in the ground and are guarded by soldiers. We have been made aware of two such locations, one in Mabanza commune and the other in Gishyita commune. We have attempted to gain access to the camp in Mabanza commune but have been denied. We have flown over the area and can confirm the existence of holes in the ground but are unsure as to whether they are trenches or are used to hold people.

Cooperation with Local Officials

10. Although we have no mandate to visit prisons we have managed to gain access into the Kibuye prison and the commune prisons at

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
Bwakira and Mabanza. This is usually done by accompanying Human Rights or another official visit (i.e. FC). When attempting to gain accurate information regarding numbers of inmates and location of prisons we are always met with blank stares and excuses.

Recommendations

11. While these recommendations are probably redundant and obvious they must nevertheless be stated.

i. In an effort to alleviate the space problem in Kibuye prison a wall should be built surrounding the prison to give the prisoners space to lie down and move about. It is highly unlikely the government will have the resources or even provide them if they were available so this project would have to fall on the support of UNAMIR or the international community.

ii. UNAMIR, specifically MILOBS, should be given clearance from the Rwandan government to locate the prisons, not to enter, but simply to locate them.


R.A. Macintosh
Captain
Operations Officer
Sector 3A - Kibuye

15/05 '95 13:41

811235

GITARAMA

93 OPS

7w info. pls
return a copy to me
for DCOS OPS file

001

16/5

TO : DCOS (OPS), FHQ
HAC, FHQ
MILOBS GP HQ,

FROM: SECTOR 3 HQ

SUBJECT : UNAMIR MEETING WITH NGOS as requested above?

GENERAL

1. A MEETING WITH THE NGOS OPERATING IN THIS SECTOR WAS CONDUCTED BY THE SECT CDR. THE AGENDA WAS BASICALLY DESIGNED FOR ASSESSING THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY SITUATION AND COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES. IT WAS ATTENDED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF CARE, CONCERN, ICRC, ACIST, LWF AND MSF.

POLITICAL SITUATION

2. THE SECT CDR GAVE OUT HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE KIBEHO CRISIS AND THE ENSUING INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE. MOST NGOS AGREED THAT THIS EUPHORIA OF VICTORY OF THE MODERATES, IN THE POST KIBEHO CRISIS PERIOD, IN THE FORM OF PURGING THE HARDLINERS IN THE GOVT MACHINERY AND REDUCED ARRESTS MAY JUST BE A FACADE TO DILUTE INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION AND PROJECT AN IMAGE OF GRADUAL RETURN TO NORMALCY ON THE EVE OF REVIEW OF THE UNAMIR MANDATE. THIS WOULD PROBABLY ENABLE THEM TO ENSURE A LEESER UNAMIR PRESENCE. THE NGOS HOWEVER WERE QUITE SATISFIED WITH THE COOPERATION BEING EXTENDED BY THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES.

HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

3. THE SECT CDR BROUGHT OUT THE PLIGHT OF THE IDPS WHO HAVE RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM KIBEHO ALONG WITH THE APPALLING CONDITIONS IN THE COMMUNE CACHOT, WHICH WOULD PROGRESSIVELY WORSEN WITH INCREASED ARRESTS. ICRC AND LWF STATED THAT THEY HAD ALREADY LAUNCHED THEIR PROGRAMME OF FOOD AND NON - FOOD AID. COMMUNES OF NTONGWE, MUGINA AND TAMBWE HAVE RECEIVED THE AID AND THE OTHER COMMUNES WOULD RECEIVE THE AID THIS WEEK. HOWEVER IT SEEMS NO ONE IS PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE OF THE COMMUNE CACHOTS WHICH NEED FOOD AND MEDICAL CARE. THE ISSUE IS A GRAVE ONE AND IF NOT ADDRESSED NOW WOULD PROBABLY RESULT IN FRUITLESS FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES BEING ADOPTED ONCE AGAIN.

4. THE SECT CDR BROUGHT OUT THE ASPECT OF TRACING PROGRAMME FOR THE ORPHANAGES AND OFFERED TO ASSIST THE NGOS IN THEIR PROGRAMME SINCE THE UNAMIR HAS A LARGER NETWORK ALL AROUND THE COUNTRY AND THE MILOBS ARE IN A POSITION TO MONITOR SPECIFIC CASES IN THEIR AOR. ICRC WAS VERY POSITIVE AND HAS ASKED FOR A MEETING IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE TO COORDINATE THEIR TRACING EFFORTS. SOME OF THE NGOS DEALING WITH ORPHANAGES HOWEVER HAS REMAINED SCEPTICAL AS THEY HAVE THEIR RESERVATIONS OF DISLOCATION OF ORPHANAGES AS ALSO THEY ARE FEEL THEIR TRACING PROGRAMME IS COMPREHENSIVE. IT WOULD REQUIRE

CERTAIN LUCKY BREAKS AND PROVING OUR WORTH IN THIS EFFORT ON GROUND TO HAVE THEM REASSURED.


5. SOME NGOS FELT THAT IN THE FUTURE HOUSING WOULD BE A MAJOR PROBLEM ESPECIALLY IF AND WHEN THERE IS AN INFUX OF REFUGEES FROM ACROSS THE BORDERS. THE PRESENT RETURNEES HAVE BEEN HOUSED IN THE STANDING ABANDONED HOUSES AND COMMERCIAL CENTRES TEMPORARILY BUT REBUILDING PROGRAMME MUST START AT THE EARLIEST TO MEET THE DEMANDS OF THE FUTURE.

SECURITY

6. IN THE LIGHT OF THE VEHICLE THEFT AT GITARAMA ON 13 MAY THE SECT CDR ADDRESSED THE NGOS ON CERTAIN BASIC SECURITY IMPERATIVES. HE ALSO OFFERED SAFE PARKING OF THEIR VEHICLES IN THE SECT HQ COMPOUND AT NIGHT SHOULD THEY SO DESIRE.

CONCLUSION

7. IN THE END THE SECT CDR REQUESTED THE NGOS TO COOPERATE WITH INFO EXCHANGE AS IT WAS IN MUTUAL INTEREST TO MONITOR EFFECTIVELY THE DEVELOPMENTS. THE NGO BODY WERE IN TOTAL AGREEMENT TO THAT FACT AND ALSO STATED THAT UNAMIR HAS ALWAYS BEEN A FRIEND IN NEED AND WILL NOT LET IT DOWN.


S BANERJEE
MAJOR
OPS OFFR

TO : DCOS (OPS), FHQ
DCMO MILOBS GP HQ

FROM : HQ SECTOR 3, GITARAMA

SUBJECT:- DETAILED INCIDENT REPORT

DATE : 07 MAY 95

ARREST OF BOURGEMESTRE OF MUSAMBIRA

1. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT RECEIVED ON 06 MAY 95 INDICATED THAT KALISSA MARTHA, BOURGEMESTRE OF MUSAMBIRA COMMUNE HAD BEEN ARRESTED. SINCE THIS IS A SIGNIFICANT EVENT IN THE MAZE OF ACTIVITIES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN GITARAMA PREFECTURE IN THE RECENT PAST, THE MATTER WAS PERSONALLY INVESTIGATED BY THE SECTOR CDR. DURING MY VISIT TO THE BUREAU DE COMMUNE I QUERIED THE SECRETARY OF THE COMMUNE, MR NICHOLAS ON THE WHEREABOUTS OF THE BOURGEMESTRE INDICATING MY DESIRE TO MEET HIM SINCE HE WAS A PERSONAL FRIEND. MY ENQUIRIES WERE MET WITH EVASIVE REPLIES THAT THE BOURGEMESTRE WAS PRESENTLY NOT AVAILABLE AND WOULD NOT BE SO FOR SOME TIME. THERE WAS SOME EXCHANGE OF GLANCES BETWEEN ALL PRESENT AND NO DIRECT REPLY WAS FORTHCOMING. I WAS THEN REQUESTED TO DIRECT ALL MY QUESTIONS TO THE PERSON SELECTED TO LOOK AFTER THE BOURGEMESTRE'S APPOINTMENT FOR THE TIME BEING. THIS INDIVIDUAL TURNED OUT TO BE A NON ENGLISH AND NON FRENCH SPEAKING PERSON EXTREMELY WARY OF MY PRESENCE. HE FELT RELUCTANT ABOUT GIVING ME HIS NAME UNTIL I PRESENTED MY NAME PLATE TO HIM WITH THE ADVICE THAT SINCE WE WERE TO WORK TOGETHER IT WOULD BE BEST TO KNOW EACH OTHER'S NAMES. THE ACTING BOURGEMESTRE TURNED OUT TO BE MR NSABIMAMNA MATHIEU, A TUTSI WHOSE TITLE WAS GIVEN AS COUNSEILLER SUPPLE'ANT.

2. THE ABOVE APPEARS TO CONFIRM THE FACT THAT THE ERSTWHILE BOURGEMESTRE HAS IN FACT BEEN ARRESTED ALTHOUGH IT IS AS YET UNKNOWN AS TO WHERE HE HAS BEEN LODGED - IN THE GITARAMA PRISON OR IN THE COMMUNE CACHOT. IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH THE RPA BDE CDR THE ABOVE INFORMATION WAS CONFIRMED. EFFORTS ARE ON TO TRACE HIS WHEREABOUTS AND CONFIRM WHETHER HE IS ALIVE OR NOT. THE ARREST POSSIBLY WAS EFFECTED ON 02/03 MAY 95. ON BEING QUERIED ON THE REASONS FOR THE ARREST, THE RPA BDE CDR INFORMED ME THAT IT HAS BEEN REVEALED THAT MR KALISSA MARTHA HAD PARTICIPATED IN THE GENOCIDE. WHEN I ENQUIRED AS TO HOW A TUTSI COULD BE ACCUSED OF THIS, HE REPLIED THAT PERHAPS MOST UNAMIR PERSONS WERE UNAWARE THAT A LARGE NUMBER OF TUTSIS WERE IN FACT GUILTY OF HAVING PARTICIPATED IN THE GENOCIDE.

ASSESSMENT

3. IT MAY BE RECALLED THAT DURING FEB-MAR 95 MUSAMBIRA WAS THE WORST AFFECTED COMMUNE WHEN A REIGN OF TERROR HAD BEEN LAUNCHED IN PARTS OF GITARAMA PREFECTURE. THERE WERE REGULAR INDISCRIMINATE ARRESTS OF HUTU MALES FORCING THE POPULATION TO SLEEP IN THE FIELDS AT NIGHT. ONE CELLULE IN FACT HAD ONLY 3 MALE INDIVIDUALS LEFT, ALL

OVER 65 YEARS OLD, THE REMAINING HAVING FLED TO AVOID ARREST. AT THE HEART OF THIS CAMPAIGN WAS THE FORMER BOURGEMESTRE OF MUSAMBIRA, WHO WAS AMONGST THE MOST FEARED INDIVIDUALS IN GITARAMA PREFECTURE. THE GITARAMA PREFECT HAD MADE IT KNOWN TO ME THAT HE WAS FINDING IT A PROBLEM REINING IN THE BOURGEMESTRE AS THE LATTER WAS MOSTLY ACTING ON HIS OWN WHIMS. MR KALISSA MARTHA IS A TUTSI WHO, AS PER UNCONFIRMED SOURCES, ALSO SUFFERED CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL LOSSES DURING THE GENOCIDE. HE HELD EXTREMIST VIEWS ON THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE AND WAS SEEN TO BE TOTALLY HOSTILE TO THE HUTU POPULATION. DESPITE THE PREFECT'S VIEWS, THE ACTIONS OF THE FORMER BOURGEMESTRE FITTED PERFECTLY WITH THE APPARENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES IN FEB-MAR; A POLICY OF SUBJUGATION OF THE MAJORITY POPULATION.

4. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE INFORMATION THE ARREST OF THE FORMER BOURGEMESTRE MAY INITIALLY APPEAR BAFFLING. HOWEVER, A CLOSE LOOK AT THE CHANGING FACE OF GITARAMA PREFECTURE IN THE POST KIBEHO PERIOD WOULD POSSIBLY EXPLAIN THE EVENT MORE CLEARLY. THE ENVIRONMENT IN GITARAMA PREFECTURE OVER THE LAST TWO WEEKS APPEARS TO HAVE TAKEN A POSITIVE TURN, AS IS EVIDENT FROM THE FOLLOWING:-

(A) THE BOURGEMESTRES ARE MUCH MORE FRIENDLY AND FORTHCOMING IN THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARDS UNAMIR.


(B) ORDERS HAVE BEEN ISSUED AT THE PREFECT LEVEL, TO STOP ALL ARRESTS EXCEPT WHERE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, OSTENSIBLY TO CREATE AN ENVIRONMENT OF STABILITY TO ALLOW THE RETURNING IDPS TO SETTLE DOWN.

(C) THE RPA SOLDIERS AT CHECK POINTS AND COMMUNE BUILDINGS ARE LESS SULLEN AND MORE POSITIVE IN THEIR APPROACH TO UNAMIR.

(D) THE RPA HAS GIVEN US UNRESTRICTED ACCESS TO ALL COMMUNE PRISONS.

5. IT APPEARS THAT THE POSITIVE CHANGES IN GITARAMA ARE A REFLECTION OF HIGHER GOVERNMENT POLICY WHICH MAY BE AIMED AT THE CREATION OF A BETTER ENVIRONMENT WITH REDUCED CONFRONTATION WITH UNAMIR. IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO READ THE BASIC REASONS FOR THIS WHICH APPEARS TO BE THE DESIRE OF THE GOVT TO BE SEEN IN SANER LIGHT BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY--- THE MEANINGFUL THREAT OF AID DRYING UP MAY HAVE FINALLY DAWNED UPON THE LEADERSHIP. IN THIS NEW MILEU KALISSA MARTHA, THE FORMER BOURGEMESTRE, MAY POSSIBLY HAVE BEEN SEEN AS ONE OF THE STUMBLING BLOCKS AND HIS INTRANSIGENCE AN OBSTACLE TOWARDS PROJECTION OF A POSITIVE IMAGE. TO SIMPLY REMOVE HIM FROM POWER WOULD HAVE ALLOWED HIM TO CONTINUE POISONING THE MINDS OF THE MINORITY POPULATION-- THE NEXT BEST STEP OBVIOUSLY WAS TO ARREST HIM. THE CHARGES OF PARTICIPATION IN THE GENOCIDE APPEAR TO BE A COVER UP FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION.

6. THE EVENT MAY SIGNAL THE BEGINNING OF A REVERSE POLICY OF ARRESTS OF INTRANSIGENT TUTSI HARDLINERS - THE BOURGEMESTRE OF NTONGWE MAY BE THE NEXT ON THE LIST. IF THIS DOES COME ABOUT, IT WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT VICTORY FOR THE MODERATES AND A SIGNAL OF BETTER THINGS TO COME IN RWANDA.


S A HASNAIN
COL
SECTOR CDR

TO : DCOS (OPS), FHQ
DCMO MILOBS GP HQ

FROM : HQ SECTOR 3, GITARAMA

SUBJECT:- DETAILED INCIDENT REPORT

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12/5

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S A HASNAIN
COL
SECTOR CDR

TO : UNAMIR PHQ
MILOBS GP HQ
INFO : ALL SECTORS

FROM : SECTOR 3 GITARAMA

DATE : 14 MAY 95

SUBJECT : VEHICLE STOLEN

VEHICLE NO UNAMIR 1044 HAS BEEN STOLEN BY RPA SOLDIERS FROM CB4'S RESIDENCE. THE SOLDIERS SHOT AT THE HOUSE IN ORDER TO THREATEN HIM UNTIL THEY MANAGE TO TAKE THE VEH OUT OF THE FENCE. IT IS BELIVED THAT THEY HAVE GONE TOWARDS KIGALI DIRECTION. THIS INCIDENT HAPPENED AT 2240 HRS. (13 MAY 1995)

IF ANY SECTOR FOUND THIS VEHICLE IN THEIR AREA INFORM TO SECTOR 3 HQ.

Seen
15/5
believed
Hand
DUTY OFFR
SECTOR 3

Hand
15/5

From : MILOB Sector 4C Cyangugu

To : MILOB GP HQ Kigali

INFO : UNAMIR HQ KIGALI // G2/G3/HAR //
SECT 4C MILOB TMS // G4/G5/G6/G7 //

SUBJ: SITREP NO 013 121800 MAY TO 131800 MAY 95

Thur J. A. Bileau
15/5
Major
OPS

1. General Situation:

The sector is relatively calm. Two patrols were conducted and the situation was found normal. No incidents were reported. The reburial of the genocide victims took place in Kiramba today. Approx. 500 bodies were accounted for. The official figure from the RPA was 1000. The ceremony was attended by several people, among them were one Minister and several UN and NGO personnel.

2. FRACTIONAL ACTIVITIES

A. RPA The checkpoint at Shagasha tea factory (SHAGASHA) (GR 847 260) was removed. Another checkpoint was installed at (GR 753 227)

B. RGF NTR
C. RGF NTR

3. CIVIL AFFAIRS

NTR

(3)
treated
or
15-5

Pse fwd Copy
to G3 PLANS
for action at
Para 7

15/5

B. STATUS OF VEHICLES:

- (1) UNAMIR 1077 : DUE FOR "A" MAINT NOW
(2) UNAMIR 1127 : VEH STILL IN GISUMA
AWAITING RECOVERY FROM KIGALI. REQUEST
SENT ALREADY.

7. MISC

- A. SECTOR 4C HQ EXPERIENCES A SHORTAGE OF MAPS, THE
FOLLOWING MAPS ARE THEN REQUIRED:

CYANGUGU	MAP #28	QTY 4
RWESERO	#29	5
MUSHUBI	#30	3
MIBILIZI	#37	5
BUGUMYA	#38	5
KITABI	#39	2

- B. SECTOR STRENGTH. (INCL UNCIVPOL)

TOTAL:	30
ON DUTY:	21
ON DUTY IN KIGALI:	0
ON CTO:	9

13/05 '95 18:19

11267

KABALI

001

INFO UNAMIR FHQ

①

FAX

FROM: MILOB SECT 5

TO: MILOB GP HQ (OPS)

DATE: 13 MAY 95

SUBJECT: CLARIFICATION OF THE GISENYI BORDER POST STATUS

② COS

Suggest 4th floor
opens discussions
to alter restr.

Seen

15/6

③

CC

Copy for COS

Sol. Unit
ops

14/5

1. Refer your letter dated 12 May 95 on the above subject, the clarifications sought for are follows:

a) The restriction has been in force since November 94.

b) The reasons for which UNAMIR civilian and military persons are barred from going across to Zaire are as follows:

④ CC
Treated
15/5

* UNAMIR has no mandate in Zaire, and therefore the Zairian government sees no reason as to why UNAMIR persons, in their official capacity should come to Zaire. It is pertinent to point out here that, UNAMIR persons can still go across to Zaire as sightseers or tourists using their diplomatic passport.

* The presence of the Kibumba, Katali and Kidaho camps in the vicinity of Goma with their confirmed interhamwe presence, makes it undesirable for the UNAMIR to come to Goma. They could become targets of the former government who see them as the eyes of the government in power in Rwanda(sic).

AK
15/5


* Somewhere during last Oct/Nov, leaflets with message for refugees in the camps were supposedly dropped from UNAMIR aircrafts into the Goma camps. This reportedly led to unrest in the camps and was strongly resented by the Zairian Government.

This impasse could be solved if dialogue is initiated at the higher levels with the Zairian Government.

Per Adv
UNAMIR

c) It may be realised that the current situation in the country, sensitivity of the Zairian border and the frequent interhamwe activities from the camps makes the security at the border checkpoint extremely suspicious and stringent. On the 11th of May, three UNHCR security persons from Goma crossed the border on their way to UNHCR Gisenyi. One of them, Jacoba Hartman, a new arrival to Goma was in possession of a document which made a political statement issued by the camp leaders in Goma, expressing their desire to return to Rwanda and expressing their solidarity with a newly formed political

party in Rwanda, which is sympathetic to their views. The lady in question says that this leaflet was distributed some days back and there was nothing secret about it. In fact she claims that she was not aware that it could have other implications in Rwanda. In light of what has been stated before it is obvious that the RPA did not share the same view as her and those of her other companions. Under instructions from higher hq they detained all three persons for the night in Gisenyi UNHCR house and had them go upto Ruhengeri/Kigali to explain themselves. Negotiations by UNHCR chief Goma, UNHCR Gisenyi and MILOBS earlier, had no effect. The matter has now been resolved today with the intervention of the special envoy UNHCR. The concerned persons have been released and allowed to go back to Goma.



ASHOK SARKAR
MAJ
FOR SET COMD

FROM : MIKOB SECTOR 4C CYANGHGA

for copy to
JLOS ops

TO : MIKOB GP HQ KIGALI

INFO : HNAMIR HQ KIGALI // G2 / G3 / HAC //

③ ACOS
Copied

TAC HQ BUTARE / OPS //

DE
14.5

SECT 4C MIKOB TMS // GM1 / GM3 / GM5 // ZEN

SUB: ADDITIONAL INFO TO SITREPS No 010, 011 AND 012.
AND TWO ADDITIONAL REPORTS PROVIDED - INTERV
SITREP

1. FURTHER TO THE KILLING OF THE WIFE OF THE ACTING
BOURGMESTRE OF KAGANO COMMUNE, THE FOLLOWING
INFO IS PROVIDED BY NYAMASHEKE SUB SECTOR:

A. ON WED 10 MAY AT 2200 HRS, A GROUP OF SOME
(COUNTED BY RPA) SURROUNDED THE HOUSE OF THE
ACTING BOURGMESTRE AT KAGANO COMMUNE AND
BEGAN SHOOTING THROUGH THE WINDOWS. THE
ACTING BOURGMESTRE WAS SLEEPING OUTSIDE THE
HOUSE FOR FEAR OF BEING KILLED IN HIS HOUSE.
THE KILLER OF THE WIFE (A TUTSI) WAS A BOY
WHO LIVED NEXT TO THE ACTING BOURGMESTRE'S HOUSE.
HIS NAME IS "KARORI". KARORI KILLED THE
BOURGMESTRE'S WIFE WHO WAS TUTSI AND WAS
KILLED HIMSELF IN EXCHANGE OF FIRE WITH
RPA SOLDIERS WHO WERE NEARBY AND HEARD
THE SHOTS. THE WIFE HAD BEEN CONFRONTED 1
MONTH EARLIER FOR BEING TUTSI. SHE PAID AN
UNKNOWN AMOUNT TO SAVE HER LIFE. THE GROUP
CAME BACK ON WED, 10 MAY AND KILLED HER.
THE ACTING BOURGMESTRE RAN TO THE

- 2 -

RPA POSITION BUT FOUND NO ONE. HE THEN RAN TO THE ETHIOBATT POSITION AT THE SCHOOL AND MET SIX ETHIOBATT SOLDIERS. THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO COMMUNICATE AND UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER. PRECIOUS TIME WAS LOST. COMMENT: INTERPRETERS FULL TIME IN "HOT SPOTS".

B. THE SAME GROUP ATTACKED AN RPA POSITION AT ISHARA PENINSULA, FOLLOWING THE KILLING OF THE ACTING BOURGHESE WIFE AT THE KAGANO COMMUNE. THIS IS THE INCIDENT IN WHICH A MEDIUM MACHINE GUN AND RIFLE GRENADE LAUNCHERS WERE USED. ONLY THE LAUNCH GRENADE PIECE WAS RECOVERED BY RPA. ONE BANDIT WAS KILLED DURING ENCOUNTER. NAME WAS "HABRIARIME".

C. THE INTERIM SITREP OF 12/2008 MAY SPECIFIED A HOUSEHOLD HAD BEEN ROBBED OF ALL ITS PROPERTY. THE NAME OF THE OWNER WAS "EVERISTO YAMUREMI" AND HIS SON, WHO WAS KILLED MISTAKENLY BY RPA SOLDIERS DURING THE AMBUSH WAS "VOSTIN AUGIMANA".

D. FURTHER TO ADDITIONAL INFO TO SITREP 010, THE RPA COMMANDER AT ISHARA PENINSULA (SUB PARA B ABOVE) WAS "SGT KARENZI".

E. AT KIRAMBO WHERE THE EXAMINING OF BODIES BEG ON TUES, 9 MAY THE NAME OF THE RPA COMMANDER MENTIONED IN SUB PARA D, IS CAPT THEONESTE RURA BURIAL PROCEEDING SAT, 13 MAY. PHOTOGRAPHS WILL BE FORWARDED YOUR HQ SOONEST.

TO : MILOB GP HQ (OPS)

INFO : HQ UNAMIR KIGALI (DCOS OPS)
TUNBATT

FROM : SECTOR-5 MILOB HQ, GISENYI

SUBJECT : SITREP COVERING PERIOD 111700 TO 121700 B MAY 95

1.A. CALM.

1.B. ZAIRIAN/RWANDESE BORDER IS OPEN FOR ALL TRAFFIC EXCEPT UNAMIR PERSONNEL. NORMAL BORDER TRAFFIC BETWEEN UGANDAN / RWANDESE BORDER AT CYANIKA BORDERPOST. RPA AT GISENYI HAS STATED THAT THEY WILL NOT ALLOW FOOD GOING TO CAMPS IN GOMA TO GO THROUGH GISENYI.

1.C. THE CONTINGENT COMD OF THE ZAIRIAN ARMY AT GOMA ADDRESSED THE THE INHABITANTS OF KIBUMBA CAMP AND WARNED THEM TO STOP ACTS OF INSURGENCY INTO RWANDA. THEY WERE ALSO WARNED THAT ANY ONE CAUGHT IN UNIFORM OR CARRYING WEAPONS WOULD BE ARRESTED.

2.A. NTR.

2.B. THERE HAS BEEN AN ONE TO ONE EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE BIGOGWE BATTALION 3520 AND THE GISENYI RPA BATTALION. MAJ KWIKIRISA IS THE NEW BATTALION COMD IN GISENYI. LT COL CHARLES KAYONGA THE PREVIOUS BATTALION COMD IN GISENYI HAS NOW BEEN TRANSFERRED TO GITARAMA AS THE BRIGADE COMD.

2.C. THERE WAS AN ATTEMPTED INFILTRATION ACROSS THE LAKE ON 10/11 MAY NIGHT. THE SUSPECT BOAT WAS FIRED UPON. IT ESCAPED. NO CASUALTIES.

3.A. ONE MILOB TEAM AND TUNBATT ARMED GUARD ESCORTED THREE UNHCR OFFICERS FROM GOMA TO KIGALI. THESE OFFICERS HAD BEEN ILLEGALLY DETAINED BY THE RPA AT THE GOMA BARRIER ON ACCOUNT OF SOME SUPPOSEDLY OBJECTIONABLE DOCUMENT BEING FOUND WITH ONE OF THEM, NAMELY, JACOBA HARTMAN. IN SPITE OF NEGOTIATION BY THE SECURITY CHIEF GOMA, UNHCR GISENYI AND MILOBS, THE RPA FORCED THEM TO SPEND THE NIGHT IN GISENYI UNHCR. TODAY THE DETAINED LOT WAS SUPPOSED TO GO TO KIGALI TO EXPLAIN THEMSELVES TO THE RPA AUTHORITIES. THEY WERE HALTED AT RUHENGARI TO MEET THE RPA BRIGADE COMD THERE. THE BRIGADE COMD WAS NOT AVAILABLE.

3.B. ONE MILOB TEAM VISITED THE NDUSU IDP CONCENTRATION. A MEETING SCHEDULED BETWEEN THE BOURGEMESTRE OF NDUSU AND THE COUNCELLORS OF THE COMMUNE TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF IDPS

REMAINING, DID NOT TAKE PLACE. THE BOURGEMESTRE WAS CONTACTED AND HE SAID THAT OUT OF A TOTAL OF 1209 IDPS IN THE COMMUNE, 1048 HAD LEFT ON FOOT TOWARDS UNKNOWN DESTINATIONS. A TOTAL 161 STILL REMAIN. THESE ARE MOSTLY THE SICK, WEAK, WOMEN AND CHILDREN. THEY ARE EXPECTED TO LEAVE WITHIN THE NEXT 5-7 DAYS. THE SITUATION SEEMS TO BE UNDER CONTROL. A MILOB PATROL IS MONITORING THE SITUATION ON A DAILY BASIS.

4. A REQUEST FOR A TRACKED DOZER WAS PLACED FOR CARRYING OUT OF AN URGENT REPAIR WORK AT ELECTROGAZ GISENYI AND FOR MAKING A SHORT TRACK TO THE GARBAGE PITS DUG AT THE COLLEGE COMPLEX.
- 5.A. NUMBER OF RETURNEES THROUGH CYANIKA BORDER-POST WAS 4.
- 5.B. NUMBER OF RETURNEE FROM ZAIRE AT GISENYI\GOMA BORDER-POST WAS 330.
6. THREE VEHICLES FROM THE SECTOR, 1032, 1012 AND 1231 ARE PRESENTLY IN THE WORKSHOP [KIGALI] FOR REPAIRS.
- 7.A. AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 37

PRESENT: 25

LEAVE/CTO: 09

MAJ SIDIBE
MAJ ALAM K.
CAPT MILED A.
MAJ MENON GOPI.
MAJ SINA KONE

CAPT SANKON - MECCA
MAJ DIARRA - MECCA
COMDT CAMARA - MECCA
MAJ KHALEQUE - MECCA

DEFICIENCY: 03

FROM: MILOB SECTOR 4C CYANGUHA

TO: MILOB GP HQ KIGALI

INFO: UNAMIR HQ KIGALI // G2 / G3 / HAC //

TAC HQ BAHARE // OPS //

SECT 4C MILOB TMS // GM1 // GM3 / GM5 //

Seen
12/5

SUBJ: INTERIM SITREP - 12 1200B MAY

1. AT 121106B MAY, NYAMASHEKE SUB SECTOR REPORTED THAT LAST NIGHT TWO BOATS CAME FROM ISWI ISLAND, TO A HOME IN KAVUNE (GS 9740) AND ROBBED THE HOUSE OF COFFEE, BEAN ENTIRE HOUSEHOLD. THE BANDITS FORCED THE YOUNG SON OF THE OWNER TO BRING THE STOLEN GOODS TO SHORE OF LAKE KIVU WHERE TWO BOATS WERE WAITING. THE TWO BOATS WERE SPOTTED BY AN RPA PATROL ALONG THE SHORE. THE RPA PATROL ON LAND LAID AN AMBUSH AND SHOT THE SON, KILLING HIM. THE BANDITS (12-14 MEN) FLED TOWARDS KAVUNE. THE TWO BOATS WERE SEIZED BY THE RPA. NO GOODS WERE RECOVERED.

2. TWO OTHER AREAS WERE THE SCENE OF SHORT INCIDENTS: MAKIYIA + KININE (GS 9535). ALSO, TWO BANDITS APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN KILLED ON ISHARI PENINSULA LAST NIGHT. MORE IN SITREP OF 12/800H.

Jo A. B. B. B.
Major
OPS OFFER

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS

TO: SECTOR 5 MILOB HQ

INFO : MILOB GP HQ

DATE: 12 MAY 95

SUBJECT: UNAMIR RESTRICTIONS ON BORDER CROSSING INTO ZAIRE

REF: Your SITREP covering period 101700 to 111700B MAY 95

1. You are requested to investigate why border between RWANDA and ZAIRE is closed to UNAMIR.
2. UNAMIR acknowledges that we have no mandate , but why can we not transit for liason etc.
3. Regards.



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

ACTION
REQUEST

FICHE DE
SERVICE

To - A

G3 Ops

Date

12.5.95

Time - Heure

From - De

DCOS Ops

802 ops!

Actioned

Language spoken - Langue utilisée

☐ English
Anglais

☐ French
Français

Telephone No. - N° de téléphone

Ext.

Poste

☐ Please call
Prière d'appeler

☐ Returned your call
Vous a rappelé

☐ Will call again
Vous rappellera

☐ Wants to see you
Désire vous voir

☐ Action
Donner suite

☐ Approval
Approbation

☐ Note and return
Noter et retourner

☐ Comments
Commentaires

☐ Draft reply
Projet de réponse

☐ Note and forward
Noter et faire suivre

☐ As requested
Comme demandé

☐ Signature

☐ Note and file
Noter et classer

File No. - N° de dossier

Message taken by - Message reçu par

P/s send msg to Sect 5
reg them to investigate why
border is closed, ask that we
do not have a mandate, but why
can we not transit for In etc.

GC 218 (89/08)

7540-21-907-3351

TO : MILOB GP HQ (OPS)
INFO : HQ UNAMIR KIGALI (DCOS OPS)
TUN BATT

FROM : SECTOR-S MILOB HQ, GISENYI

SUBJECT: SITREP COVERI PERIOD 101700 TO 111700
MAY 95

1. A. CALM

B. ZAIRIAN / RWANDESE BORDER IS OPEN
FOR ALL TRAFFIC EXCEPT UNAMIR
PERSONNEL. NORMAL BORDER TRAFFIC
BETWEEN UGANDAN / RWANDESE BORDER
AT CIJANIKA BORDERPOST.

2. A. NTR

B. NTR

2. A.

ONE TEAM PATROLLED "H" ROUTE: (RUKENGERI - NYAMUTERA GS 6019 - RUSORO GS 7609). ROAD CONDITION REPORTED TO BE VERY BAD. DUE TO RAINS. HELIS WILL BE REQUESTED N WEEK.

B.

ONE TEAM PATROLLED "BRAVO" ROUTE: GISENYI - JABA GS 4521 - KABAYA GS 5006 - NGORORERO GS 6095 RULINGA GS 6779. BOURGEMESTI AND LOCALS REQUESTED AN

INCREASE IN THE SUPPLY OF DRUGS AND MEDICAL STAFF AT HEALTH CENTRES. LOCAL NGOS INFORMED FOR NECESSARY ASSISTANCE.

3.C. ONE TEAM PATROLLED ROUTE ALONG LAKE KIVU: SITUATION IS NORMAL.

3.D. SECTOR HQ OFFICE MOVED TO A NEW LOCATION, A FEW METRES FROM THE OLD LOCATION BUT ON THE SAME PREMISES OF THE HOTEL MERIDIEN.

4. NTR

5.A. NUMBER OF RETURNEES THROUGH GYNIKA BORDER POST WAS 15.

B. NUMBER OF RETURNEES FROM ZAIRE AT GISENYI/GOMA BORDER POST WAS 448.

6. THREE VEHICLES FROM THE SECTOR, 101 1032 AND 1231 ARE PRESENTLY IN THE WORKSHOP (KIGALI) FOR REPAIRS.

7.A. AUTHORISED STRENGTH : 37
PRESENT : 23
LEAVE / CTD : 09

CAPT MILLED
CAPT M'RABET

MAJ SIDIBE

MAJ MENON GOPI

MAJ SINA

CAPT SANKON - MECCA

MAJ DIARRA - MECCA

COMDT LAMARA - MECCA

MAJ KHALEQUE - MECCA

DEFICIENCY : 05

FROM: MILOB SECTOR 4C CYANGUHU

TO: MILOB GP HQ KIGALI

INFO: ANAMIR HQ KIGALI // GZ / G3 / HAC //

TAC HQ BUTARE // OPS //

SECT 4C MILOB TMS // GML / GM3 / GM5 //

Seen

4/12/5.

SUBJ: ADDITIONAL INFO TO SITREP 010 OF
09/800 MAY TO 10/800 MAY

1. REF BANDITS AT ISHARA WHO KILLED WIFE OF BOURGMESTRE (PARA 1) ACCORDING TO RPA COMMANDER, BANDITS LAUNCHED ATTACK ON RPA POSITION USING MEDIUM MACHINE GUN AND GRENADES. IT WAS NOT CLEAR IF GRENADES WERE LAUNCHED OR RIFLES OR THROWN. ONE BANDIT WAS KILLED. NO CAS ON RPA SIDE. THE BANDIT WAS IDENTIFIED AS A BOY BORN ON ISHARA PENINSULA AND LATELY RECRUITED BY RWANDAN GOVERNMENT FORCES. HIS NAME WILL BE SUBMITTED ON 12 MAY SITREP.

2. AT KIRAMBO (HUMANITARIAN PARA), THE EXHUMING OF BODIES STARTED TODAY. RPA COMMANDER SAID THAT 700 BODIES HAVE BEEN EXHUMED. SOME BODIES WERE IDENTIFIED, ESPECIALLY THE NURSES AT THE KIBOROGA HOSPITAL IN KIRAMBO COMMUNE. THEY WERE IDENTIFIED BECAUSE OF THEIR DRESS. THEY WERE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN BURIED IN SHALLOW GRAVES. ABOUT 100 PEOPLE CAME FROM KIGALI AND OTHER OPD RESIDENCES. SOME OF

- 2 -

THEM WANTED REVENGE BUT WERE STOPPED SO FAR,
THE CEREMONY IS PEACEFUL AND EVERYTHING IS QUIET.
BODIES ARE STILL BEING EXHUMED AND THERE HAS
BEEN NO REBURIAL YET. THE BODIES ARE BEING
STORED IN AN EMPTY HOUSE NEXT TO THE NORTHERN
GATE TO THE ETHIOBATT PLATOON IN KIRAMBO.
A SHRINE IS BEING PREPARED NEXT TO THIS HOUSE.
ALL THE BODIES WILL BE REBURIED ONCE ALL THE
BODIES ARE EXHUMED. HOUSE IS AT GR 044420.
PHOTOGRAPHS WILL BE TAKEN, IF POSSIBLE, BY MILOB
TEAM IN KIRAMBO.

JOE / 11/23/92
Bulore

(1)

Sent
11/5

TO : DCOS (SUPPORT)
INFO : DCOS (OPS)

FROM : SECTOR CDR, SECTOR 3 HQ

SUBJECT: COMMAND AND CONTROL OF FORMED TROOPS.

DATE : 10 MAY 95

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE SECTOR 3 IS THE ONLY SECTOR WHICH HAS A CONSOLIDATED COMMAND STRUCTURE WITH BOTH MILOBS AND FORMED TROOPS FUNCTIONING UNDER COMMAND OF THE MILOBS SECTOR CDR. THIS STRUCTURE APPEARS TO HAVE STOOD THE TEST OF TIME AND I CLASSIFY IT AT A SUCCESS STORY IN TERMS OF THE OPERATIONAL AND HUMANITARIAN ACHIEVEMENTS OF SECTOR 3. HOWEVER, THE ONE ASPECT OF WHICH THERE APPEARS TO BE NO FORMALISED DOCUMENTATION IS THE FIELD OF CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS. NEEDLESS TO SAY THAT WHILE I HAVE NEVER FELT THE NECESSITY TO BRING HOME THIS ASPECT TO THE COY CDRs IN A NEGATIVE WAY I FEEL HERE IS A NEED TO VEST THE POWERS OF INITIATING CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS ON THE COY CDRs WITH THE SECTOR CDR, SINCE HE IS THE PERSON WHO CAN BEST APPRECIATE THEIR CAPABILITIES AND OUTPUT. THE CR OF THE PREVIOUS OC MALAWI COY WAS NEVER INITIATED DUE TO THIS EXISTING ANAMOLY.

2. PERHAPS A DIRECTIVE ON THIS ALREADY EXISTS BUT IS NOT IN PLACE WITH MY HQ. IN EITHER CASE I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE A DIRECTIVE SPECIFYING THAT THE SECTOR CDR WILL EXERCISE THE POWER OF INITIATING CRs AND CONTROL OF LEAVE OF BOTH OCs MALI AND MALAWI COY. I MAY ADD THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A DIRECTIVE BOTH OCs HAVE BEEN AVAILING LEAVE AT THEIR DISCRETION WITHOUT CLEARANCE FROM ME.

(2) DCOS Sp

Although the FC should likely remain the final sign off for Coy Gp / Contingent Comd's, the Sect Comd should be involved. (2 & worth)

S A HASNAIN
COL
SECTOR CDR

DCOS

12/5

Copy sent
to DCOS Sp
11/5

IN.609

Page 3

UTC Time: 95-05-02 23:34:18

Sam
5.5

SOURCE		MILOBS	MILOBS	HR& MILOBS	DATE : 02 MAY 95
SRL COMMUNE	IDPS TRANS- PORTED BY IOO UNAMIR TRUCK	IDPS REGISTERS BY COMMUNES	(IDPS) DETAINED BY COMMUNES	REMARKS	
1. NYARISINDU(7138)	919	1651	138	?	
2. MBAZI (7117)	975	1221	329	(VERY BAD)	
3. MARABA(8631)	1139	818	114	(OK)	
4. RUSATIRA(6097)	1719	2500	122	?	
5. RUHASHYA(6926)	979	1347	250	BAD	
6. MUYAGA(9026)	603	849	060	BAD	
7. MUGUSA(8425)	1508	4184	210	(BAD)	
8. MUYIRA(8639)	2352	2137	159	(OK)	
9. SHYANDA(7718)	641	700	47	(OK)	
10. NTYAZO(8631)	2523	2048	102	BAD	
11. NDORA(8112)		247	339	93	(OK)

Seen
6/5

12. KIGEMBE (7007)	2610	7000*	52 (OK) *PLUS: 250 FROM BURUNDI
13. NYARUHENGIERI (7607)	482	595	180 (OK)
14. KIBAYI (8497)	87	126*	20 (BAD) *PLUS: 600 IDPS FROM BURUNDI LESS: 120 IDPS TO BURUNDI (DIFER : 480)
15. MVGANZA (8407)	76	100*	? *PLUS: 50 IDPS FROM BURUNDI
16. NYAKIZU (5694)	1916	18691	84 (OK)
17. HUYE (6714)	1808	3151	300 (OK)
18. RUNYINYA (6012)	1865	10925	391 (BAD)
19. NGOHA (9637)	935	1148	150 (BAD)
20. GISHAMVU (6505)	2076	8179	170 (BAD)

TOTAL	25.460	67.709	2.97 *IDPS FROM BURUNDI = 900 IDPS FROM BURUNDI = 120
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BAD, OK INDICATE STATE OF PRISON AND PRISONERS AS ASSESSED BY
HUMAN RIGHTS.
IN. 609



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

Deery
29/4

FROM : MILOB SECTOR 4C CYANGUGU

TO : MILOB GP HQ KIGALI

INFO : UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//G2/G3/HAC//

TAC HQ BUTARE//OPS//

SECT 4C MILOB TMS//GM1/GM3/GM5//

ZEN

SUBJ: SITREP NO. 030 FROM 271800 APR TO 281800 APR 95

1. GENERAL SITUATION. THE SECTOR IS RELATIVELY CALM. AN EXCHANGE OF FIRE BETWEEN UNKNOWN ELMS HAS BEEN REPORTED IN THE GENERAL AREA OF RAMBIRA (GR 0145). NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.

2. FACTIONAL ACTIVITIES.

A. RPA. RPA COMPANY HAS DEPLOYED IN BUTARE (GR 9615) AND IS CONDUCTING DAILY BORDER PATROLS IN THE AREA.

B. FRGF. NTR

C. OTHER. NTR

3. CIVIL AFFAIRS. RPA AND CIMERWA CIMENT FACTORY PERS (GR 9011) ORGANIZED A MTG ON 28 APR BETWEEN 0900-1200 HRS TO DISCUSS PROBLEMS RELEVANT TO THE CIMENT FACTORY AREA. THE BOURMESTRE OF THE SOUS-PREFECTURE ATTENDED THE MEETING.

4. OWN ACTIVITIES. FOUR PATROLS WERE CONDUCTED:

A. THE FIRST PATROL (NYAMASHEKE SUB SECTOR) WAS CONDUCTED

gr by fax at 281956 B
APR 1995
—

IN THE ISRA PENINSULA (GR 0142) DURING WHICH A LOCAL REPORTED THAT SIX BOATS LANDED AT NIGHT (TIMING UNKNOWN) IN GEN AREA OF RAMBIRA (GR 0145) DURING WHICH EXCHANGE OF FIRE OCCURRED BETWEEN UNIDENTIFIED ELMS. NO FURTHER DETAILS AVAILABLE DUE TO ABSENCE OF LOCAL INTERPRETER.

- B. THE SECOND PATROL (NYAMASHEKE SUB SECTOR) WAS CONDUCTED TO KITARI (GR 3521). THE SITUATION WAS FOUND TO BE CALM.
- C. THE THIRD PATROL WAS CONDUCTED IN THE CYANGUGU SUB SECTOR. REFER TO SITREP PARA 7A FOR DETAILS.
- D. THE FOURTH PATROL (BUGARAMA SUB SECTOR) CONDUCTED A TEAM PATROL (THREE MILOBS) ALONG ROUTE 6 TO MASHESHA (GR 8913) AND BUTARE (GR 9615). THE SITUATION WAS FOUND TO BE CALM.

5. HUMANITARIAN.

- A. SIX REFUGEES IN BUGARAMA CITE ARE AWAITING MOVE TO CYANGUGU.
- B. FUMIGATION PROGRAM FOR THE ORPHANAGES (KAMEMBE, NYAMASHEKE, KIBOGORA AND RUSHAYO) IS STILL PENDING.

6. LOGISTICS.

- A. VEH STATE: WORKSHOP/ACCIDENT = 1 (1070)
WORKSHOP REPAIRS & MAINT = 1 (1021)
OPERATIONAL = 7
TOTAL = 9

B. STATUS OF VEHICLES:

- (1) UNAMIR 1077: WAITING FOR REPAIRS FOLLOWING ACCIDENT.
VEH IS DUE FOR "A" MAINT WEEK OF 1st MAY;

- (2) UNAMIR 501: WAS SENT TO WORKSHOP FOR "C" MAINT ON FRI, 28 APR;
- (3) UNAMIR 226: WAS SENT TO COMMS WORKSHOP FOR RADIO INSTALLATION ON FRI, 28 APR;
- (4) UNAMIR 1282: BOTH REAR DOOR WINDOW HANDLES DON'T OPERATE AT ALL. REAR/FRONT PARKING LIGHTS (FENDER) GOT LOST IN PATROL; AND
- (5) UNAMIR 1061: THE TIRES HAVE NOT BEEN CHANGED.

7. MISC

A. VISIT: SECTOR COMD, LCOL JOUNITSYN VISITED CYANGUGU SUB-SECTOR ACCOMPANIED BY TWO STAFF OFFRS. IN PARTICULAR, THE FOLLOWING AREAS WERE VISITED: THE ROAD FROM CYANGUGU (GR 7926), TO SHAGATSHA (GR 3028), TO KAMEMBE (GR 3031) AND THE ROAD NORTH WEST FROM WHICH WE OBSERVED NKAMBO ISLAND (GR 785334). THE SECTOR COMD ALSO VISITED RUSIZI I (GR 768248) WHERE HE MET DURING LUNCHTIME WITH LT BAHATI (RPA), RESPONSIBLE FOR RUSIZI I AND MAJ KAGAME, LOCAL RPA SECTOR COMMANDER. FINALLY, THE SECTOR COMD VISITED RUSIZI II (GR 749228) UP TO THE ZAIRIAN BORDER AND SPOKE WITH MR. VIENNE, ONE OF THREE RWANDESE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS AT THIS CROSSING POINT. THIS VISIT WAS VERY PRODUCTIVE AND CORDIAL WITH ALL PARTIES INVOLVED ALTHOUGH SOME TENSIONS WERE EVIDENT BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS OF BOTH COUNTRIES AT RUSIZI II, IN THE COURSE OF OUR SHORT VISIT. A VISIT TO THE RWANDA-BURUNDI BORDER IS SCHEDULED FOR SAT, 29 APR 95.

B. SECTOR STRENGTH. (INCL CIVPOL)

TOTAL:	30
ON DUTY:	23
ON DUTY IN KIGALI:	6
ON CTO:	1

TO : MIBOB GP HQ (OPS)
FROM : MIBOB SECT 4A HQ

[Handwritten signature]

SUBJ. : REPORT ON ALLEGED EXHUMATION OF GRAVES AT KIBEHO BY RPA
REF. : OPS/SECT4A/1
DATE : 29 APR 95

1. ATTACHED FIND THE ABOVE-MENTIONED REPORT FOR YOUR FURTHER ACTION.
2. PLEASE ACK RECEIPT.

[Handwritten signature]
29/4

[Handwritten signature]
28/4

REPORT ON ALLEGED EXHUMATION
OF GRAVES AT KIBEHO BY RPA

1. THE SUDDEN CLOSURE OF DPCS AT KIBEHO AND OTHERS BROUGHT IN A LOT OF TENSE ATMOSPHERE UNTIL ALL IDPS HAVE BEEN EVACUATED TO HOME COMMUNES EXCEPT FEW HUNDREDS HARD-CORE STILL OCCUPING THE BUILDING COMPLEX.
2. SEVERAL INCIDENTS OCCURED DURING THE ENTIRE PROCESS OF THE CLOSURE AND EVENTUAL EVACUATION OF THE IDPS.
3. AMONG THE SEVERAL INCIDENTS WAS THE KILLING OF IDPS BY RPA AND THE SUBSEQUENT CONTROVERSES OF THE ACTUAL FIGURE OF IDPS KILLED.
4. IT IS IN LINE WITH THESE THAT SECTOR 4A STATIONED A TEAM AT KIBEHO TO PERMANENTLY OBSERVE, MONITOR AND REPORT ON ALL ACTIVITIES AROUND THE CLOCK.
5. OUR TEAM WAS STATIONED VERY CLOSE TO THE BUILDING COMPLEX TO BE ABLE TO OBSERVE AND MONITOR ALL ACTIVITIES OF THE HARD-CORE IDPS SINCE THE REST OF THE CAMP WAS EMPTY.
6. ON THURSDAY, 27 APR 95 AND BETWEEN THE HRS OF 1900 TO 2300, TEAM WAS DEPLOYED AT THE COMPANY HQ OF ZAMBATT, VERY CLOSE TO THE BUILDING COMPLEX SO AS TO SEE AT FIRST HAND ALL ACTIVITIES PERTAINING TO RPA AND IDPS.
7. TEAM HAD INFORMATION FROM ZAMBATT PL COMD 2NDLT MAWGOWELA WHOSE POSITION WAS ABOUT 700M FROM THE COY HQ THAT RPA HAD EXHUMED GRAVES NEAR HIS POSITION.
8. THE OFFICER AND A NUMBER OF SOLDIERS BETWEEN THE MENTIONED HRS OBSERVED RPA SOLDIERS CARRYING EXHUMED BODIES ON THE KIBEHO-BUTARE ROAD. IN ALL A TOTAL OF 16 BODIES WERE CONFIRMED COUNTED.
9. THE ZAMBATT PL COMD ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE BODIES WERE CARRIED IN BLANKETS AND LARGE POLYTHINE TAUPOLINES TOWARDS THE BUTARE ROAD.
10. THE WHOLE EXHUMATION EXERCICE BY RPA WAS CONFIRMED THE NEXT MORNING (FRIDAY, 28 APR 95) BY THE EXPOSURE OF FRESH TOP SOIL AT THE MASS GRAVES.
TEAM IDENTIFIED 3 GRAVES IN THE VALLEY AREA, WHICH HAD BEEN TEMPERED WITH. TEAM ALSO SAW IN THE SAME AREA ABOUT A PL OR MORE STRENGTH OF RPA CARFULLY CHECKING, MOST PROBABLY FOR OTHER GRAVES THEY (RPA) OVERLOOKED IN THE NIGHT.
11. SUBMITTED FOR YOUR ACTION, PLEASE.

TO : MILOB GP HQ (OPS)

INFO : HQ UNAMIR KIGALI (DCOS OPS)
TUNBATT

FROM : SECTOR-5 MILOB HQ, GISENYI

SUBJECT : SITREP COVERING PERIOD 241700 TO 251700 B APR 95

1.A. CALM.

1.B. ZAIRIAN/RWANDESE BORDER IS OPEN FOR ALL TRAFFIC EXCEPT UNAMIR PERSONNEL. NORMAL BORDER TRAFFIC BETWEEN UGANDAN / RWANDESE BORDER AT CYANIKA BORDERPOST.

2.A. A MEETING WAS HELD BETWEEN THE PREFECT GISENYI AND GOVERNOR GOMA AT THE HOTEL MERIDIEN TODAY , TO DISCUSS THE BORDER SITUATION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION TO CHECK INFILTRATION FROM ACROSS THE BORDER.

2.B. NTR.

3.A. ONE JOINT MILOB-HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM CARRIED OUT INVESTIGATION ON THE KILLING OF A PERSON ON 19 APRIL, IN MUTURA COMMUNE. THIS PERSON WAS REPORTEDLY AN INFORMER FOR THE MILITARY. HE WAS KILLED WHEN IN A DRUNKEN STATE, HE GOT INTO A FIGHT WITH SOME SOLDIERS RESULTING IN A SHOOT OUT. DETAILED REPORT WILL FOLLOW. THE TEAM ALSO CONFIRMED A RUMOUR ABOUT THE KILLING OF THE ASSISTANT BOURGEMEISTRE OF MUTURA COMMUNE ON 22 APRIL BY THE INTERHAMWE. THE SAME IS BEING INVESTIGATED.

3.B. ONE TEAM PATROLLED GISENYI, RUBAVU 2313, KAYOVE 2892 MURUNDA 3088. AREA REMAINS CALM. MURUNDA REPORTS INSTANCES OF FREQUENT ARRESTS AND TORTURE IN THIS AREA. THE SAME IS BEING INVESTIGATED.

3.C. ONE TEAM PATROLLED RUHENGARI, RUHOMBO 7534, NYAMUGALI 8722. AREA REMAINS CALM. HOSPITALS REPORT SHORTAGE OF MEDICINES.

3.D. MR. ANNABI THE DIRECTOR UN PEACE KEEPING MISSION AFRICA BUREAU, VISITED THIS SECT AND WAS BRIEFED BY THE TUNBATT COMD AND OWN SECT COMD. HE LATER VISITED GOMA.

4.A. NUMBER OF RETURNEES FROM ZAIRE AT GISENYI/GOMA BORDER POST WAS 208.

4.B. NUMBER OF RETURNEES THROUGH CYANIKA BORDER POST FROM 20 TO 25 APRIL TOTALLED TO 47.

5. NTR.

6. TWO VEHICLES FROM THE SECTOR, 1032 AND 428. ARE PRESENTLY IN THE WORKSHOP [KIGALI] FOR REPAIRS.

7.A. AUTHORIZED STRENGTH:37

PRESENT:28

LEAVE/CTO:05

MAJ M'SOMELA
COMDT DIARRA
MAJ TEMBO

MAJ CHIKURA
CAPT BAKARI

DEFICIENCY:04

Sam
22.4

See
28/4

TO : MILOB GP HQ (OPS) ✓
INFO : [REDACTED]

TUNBATT

FROM : SECTOR-5 MILOB HQ, GISENYI

SUBJECT : SITREP COVERING PERIOD 201700 TO 211700 B APR 95

- 1.A. CALM. AT AROUND 211500H A GROUP OF YOUTHS TRIED TO LOOT CIVILIAN TRUCKS IN FRONT OF GISENYI PREFECTURE. GENDERMARIE HAS BEEN DEPLOYED TO PREVENT THE SAME.
- 1.B. ZAIRIAN/RWANDESE BORDER IS OPEN FOR ALL TRAFFIC EXCEPT UNAMIR PERSONNEL. NORMAL BORDER TRAFFIC BETWEEN UGANDAN / RWANDESE BORDER AT CYANIKA BORDERPOST.
- 2.A. NTR.
- 2.B. NTR.
- 3.A. ONE TEAM PATROLLED RWERERE 2723, MUTURA 3023. THE AREA IS CALM. THE TEAM REPORTED THE KILLING OF ONE MAN NAMED BUDONI AT KIBAVU COMMERCIAL SANTE, IN MUTURA COMMUNE, ON 19 APRIL. THE MAN SUPPOSEDLY WAS KILLED IN A DRUNKEN STATE, DURING A BRAWL WITH THE RPA.
- 3.B. ONE TEAM PATROLLED KIDAHU 7247, BUTARO 8243, KIRAMBO 8335 AND BUSHOKA 7223. THE AREA IS CALM.
- 4.A. NUMBER OF RETURNEES FROM ZAIRE AT GISENYI/GOMA BORDER POST WAS 273.
- 4.B. NUMBER OF RETURNEES FROM CYANIKA BORDER POST COULD NOT BE OBTAINED. THE MATTER IS BEING DISCUSSED WITH THE RPA OPS O AND BATTALION COMD IN THE AREA. THEY HAVE AGREED TO GIVE A FEEDBACK ON THIS LATER THIS AFTERNOON.
5. NTR.
6. THREE VEHICLES FROM THE SECTOR, 1002 1115 AND 428 ARE PRESENTLY IN THE WORKSHOP FOR REPAIRS.
- 7.A. AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 37

PRESENT: 25

LEAVE/CTO: 07

LT COL BELSKI
MAJ M'SOMELA

COMDT DIARRA

MAJ TEMBO
MAJ YEPIFANOV
MAJ CHIKURA

CAPT LATORRE

DEFICIENCY:05

TO : MILOB GP HQ (OPS)
INFO : HQ UNAMIR KIGALI (DCOS OPS)
TUNBATT
FROM : SECTOR-5 MILOB HQ, GISENYI
SUBJECT : SITREP COVERING PERIOD 181700 TO 191700 B APR 95

1.A. CALM.

1.B. ZAIRIAN/RWANDESE BORDER IS OPEN FOR ALL TRAFFIC EXCEPT UNAMIR PERSONNEL. NORMAL BORDER TRAFFIC BETWEEN UGANDAN / RWANDESE BORDER AT CYANIKA BORDERPOST.

2.A. NTR.

2.B. RPA NIGHT PATROL TEAM SPOTTED INFILTRATORS AROUND 0100HRS IN ONE CANOE ON LAKE KIVU NEAR GISENYI BREWERY AREA. FIRE EXCHANGES LASTED 5 MINUTES. GRENADE THROWN BLASTED FAR BEHIND THE SECTION. NO CASUALTY REPORTED ON RPA SIDE. COULD NOT ACCESS ANY DAMAGE TO THE ENEMY FLEEING IN THEIR CANOE. THE LAKE AREA IS A SENSITIVE AREA NOW AND NO ACTIVITIES THEREON AFTER 1830 HRS; THE RPA LO HAS ADVISED ALL.

3.A. ONE MILOB TEAM PATROLLED ROUTE ALONG THE BORDER--GISENYI TO KINOGO[2829] TO ACCESS THE SECURITY SITUATION AND TO INTERACT WITH THE LOCALS. IT WAS REPORTED CALM.

4. ONE MILOB TEAM WENT TO KIGALI TO COLLECT TYPEWRITERS AND STATIONERY FOR JUDICIARY OFFICE TO BE ESTABLISHED IN GISENYI PREFECTURE.

5.A. NUMBER OF RETURNEES FROM THE CYANIKA BORDER POST WAS NIL.

5.B. NUMBER OF RETURNEES FROM ZAIRE AT GISENYI/GOMA BORDER POST WAS 198.

6. THREE VEHICLES FROM THE SECTOR 1115, 1076 AND 428 ARE PRESENTLY IN THE WORK-SHOP FOR REPAIRS.

7.A. AUTHORIZED STRENGTH: 37

PRESENT: 25

LEAVE/CTO: 07

LT COL BELSKI
MAJ M'SOMELA

COMDT DIARRA

MAJ YEPIFANOV
MAJ TAIF

CAPT LATORRE

CAPT SANTOS

DEFICIENCY:05

7.B. HON AMBASSADOR OF JAPAN MR NAKATA VISITED THE SECTOR EN-ROUTE
GOMA.HE WAS BRIEFED ON THE SECURITY SITUATION.HE WAS LATER ON
ACCOMPANIED BY UNHCR RESIDENT CO-ORDINATOR TO AND FROM GOMA.

FOR IMMEDIATE
ATTENTION OF
DFC/CMD AND JCMC
804
20/4/95

IMMEDIATEINCREP

TO: FHQ/COS/G3OPS
MILOBS GP HQ/OPS/G2

INFO: SECTOR 3B HQ KIBUYE

FROM: SECTOR 3 HQ

SUBJECT: ARMED SEARCH OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND NGO RESIDENCES

DATE: 20 APR 95

1. THIS MORNING AT APPROX 0600, RPA SOLDIERS STAGED A SIMULTANEOUS SEARCH OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS, WFP, ENFANTS DU MONDE AND ICRC RESIDENCES IN KIBUYE. THEY CLAIMED TO BE SEARCHING FOR WEAPONS. AT THIS POINT, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THERE WERE NO INJURIES AND THAT NOTHING WAS STOLEN. THE SOLDIERS WHO CARRIED OUT THE SEARCH WERE NOT PARTICULARLY AGGRESSIVE.
2. WHILE STILL EARLY, THE RPA LO HAD NO EXPLANATION BEYOND THE CLAIM THAT A WEAPONS SEARCH WAS BEING CONDUCTED OVER THE WHOLE OF KIBUYE TOWN AND THAT NGOS WERE ON THE LIST SIMPLY BECAUSE THEY LIVE IN THE AREA BEING SEARCHED. THOUGH ONLY A CORPORAL, HE ADMITTED THAT HE WAS AWARE THAT ICRC HAS SPECIAL STATUS THAT EXEMPTS IT FROM THIS TYPE OF ACTION. NEITHER HE NOR THE PREFET, WHO WAS ALSO INTERVIEWED THIS MORNING, APPEARED CONCERNED ABOUT SUCH EXEMPTIONS. MORE INFO TO FOLLOW AS SOON AS AVAILABLE. MILOBS ARE INVESTIGATING NOW.
3. REQUEST PROTEST BE PREPARED TO HIGHEST LEVEL, ONCE COMPLETE INFO PROVIDED, SINCE THIS IS EITHER LOCAL INITIATIVE OUT OF CONTROL OR HAS BEEN SANCTIONED AT TOP. LOCAL BDE CDR IS OUT OF TOWN.
4. BEST REGARDS; AND GOOD MORNING.

PCB
P.C. LANCASTER
MAJ
OPSO

② Info received from MILOBS at
4A is circulated for your
info please.

Harish
(H S Ramaparehi)
maj
Ops Offr MILOBS
for SOO

③ COS
Suggest you fwd to
ED to add to list of
SOMA violations and possible
letter of objection to govt

Dec 504
204

④ Ctry fwd
COS.
02 204

17A TO FC.


TO: ALL MILOB SECTORS
FROM: MILOB GP HQ /OPS
DATE: 14 APRIL 1995
SUBJECT: REPORT OF INCIDENT AT GISENYI 12/13 APRIL 1995

1. A REPORT OF THE EVENTS OCCURRING AT GISENYI IS ATTACHED FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL SECTORS.

② DCOS OPs


It would appear
that the joining up of the
two HQs is of great help
in situations of that nature.

Everyone remained calm and
the SRSG was able to work
with updated information.
A job well done!


MCOMBER
MAJ
SOO


AK
20/4

Seen
A
20/4



15 Apr 95

③ SOO Milob HQ
Your accolade.


DCOS OPS
19.4

④ Copy forwarded to
COG MILOB HQ

SUBJECT : SPECIAL REPORT: DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST UNAMIR AT GISENYI
12/13 APRIL 95

1. DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST UNAMIR WERE MADE AT GISENYI AND NYUNDO ON 12/13 APRIL 95. DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS IS AS FOLLOWS:

12 APRIL 1995

- A. AT 0630 HRS, TUNBATT REPORTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A RD BLOCK IN THE GEN AREA NYUNDO (GR 2411) AND THE WINDOWS OF UNAMIR CAR CARRYING MP PERSONNEL WERE BROKEN IN BY THE DEMONSTRATORS. AS OF 1630 HRS, RD BLOCK STILL IN LOCATION AND NO UNAMIR VEHS ARE ALLOWED TO PASS THROUGH. UNAMIR HAS SUSPENDED THEIR OPERATION ON THIS AXIS. OPERATION WILL BE ASSUMED ONCE THE RD BLOCK IS DISMANTLED.
- B. AT 0700 HRS, MILOB PTL CONFIRMED THE PRESENCE OF THE RD BLOCK. AN AGGRESSIVE STANCE OF THE PEOPLE. PTL RETURNED TO BASE AT 0730 HRS.
- C. AT 0745 HRS, CS HRA2 REPORTED GATHERING OF CROWD IN FRONT OF HR HOUSE ON THE GISENYI-RUHENGERI RD, THE CROWD CARRYING PLACARDS AND CHANTING SLOGANS FOR UNAMIR TO GO AWAY. MILOB PTL WITH RPA LO DESPATCHED TO THE LOCATION AGAIN. THE CROWD WAS PEACEFUL AND ONLY SHOUTING SLOGANS.
- D. AT 0800 HRS CONTACT WAS ESTABLISHED THE RPA BN COMD AND HE WAS APPRAISED OF THE SITUATION. HE PROMISED TO DO SOMETHING ABOUT THAT.
- E. AT 0900 HRS, THE CROWD MARCHED TO THE MERIDIEN HOTEL. THE DEMONSTRATION WAS PEACEFUL AND CONFINED TO SLOGANS. THE CROWD LEFT THE LOCATION AT ABOUT 0925 HRS. THE LEADERS IN THE CROWD WERE IN FULL CONTROL. THE RPA, THE

GENDARMERIE AND SOME MEMBERS FROM THE PREFECT WERE PRESENT IN THE LOCATION (MERIDIEN HOTEL).

- F. AT 1030 HRS, THE CROWD CAME BACK TO THE MERIDIEN HOTEL AND PUSHED THEIR WAY TO THE HOTEL. THE SIT DETERIORATED. THE CHANTING OF SLOGANS CONTINUED AND CROWD TRIED TO INTIMIDATE THE MILOBS WHO WERE TRYING TO CONTROL THE CROWD. THE CROWD THREATENED TO SNATCH AWAY THE MOTOROLA HANDSETS BEING USED BY THE MILOBS ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS. 2 OBSERVERS WERE SUDDENLY ATTACKED BY THE CROWD AND 2 MOTOROLA HANDSETS WERE SNATCHED FROM THE CROWD. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CROWD RESORTED TO STONE THROWING WHICH CAUSED SOME MINOR INJURIES TO SOME OF THE MILOBS. GENDARMERIES WERE PRESENT ALL ALONG THE PERIOD AND DID NOTHING TO CONTROL THE SITUATION. HOWEVER WHEN THE MILOBS TRIED TO RECOVER THEIR HANDSETS FROM THE MOB, THE GENDARMES WARNED THEM AT GUN POINT AGAINST HURTING ANY MEMBER OF THE MOB. THE CROWD FINALLY LEFT THE HOTEL AT ABOUT 1240 HRS.

2. ATTITUDE OF GENDARMERIE. THOUGH THE GENDARMES WERE PRESENT DURING THE ENTIRE EPISODE NO ACTION WAS TAKEN BY THEM TO RECTIFY THE SITUATION. EVEN ONCE THE MILOBS ASKED THEM TO CONTROL THE MOB THEY FAILED TO RESPOND AS CONCERNS THE RPA WAS ABSENT DURING THE PERIOD. WHEN THE MOB CAME TO HOTEL FOR THE SECOND TIME AFTER THE INITIAL CONTACT OF WITH THE RPA, BN COMD AT 0800 HRS NO FURTHER CONTACT WAS POSSIBLE. RPA LO WAS ALSO NOT AVAILABLE DURING THE PERIOD OF THE SECOND INCIDENT. IN THE LATE AFTERNOON, HOWEVER, THE COMD OF LOCAL GENDARMERIE CONTACTED THE MILOB SECTOR HQ AND STATED THE FOLLOWING:

- A. THAT HE WOULD INVESTIGATE THE NON-COOPERATION OF HIS MEN;
- B. THAT HE WOULD PLACE GENDARMERIE GUARDS ON THE HQ; AND
- C. THAT HE WOULD ATTEMPT TO RECOVER THE MISSING MOTOROLA RADIOS.

13 APRIL 1995

3. ON 13 APRIL 95 THE FOLLOWING EVENTS OCCURRED:

- A. AT 0855 HRS THE UNHCR LOCAL HEAD OF OFFICE NEGOTIATED WITH RWANDANS AT THE NYUNDO ROAD BLOCK. SHE WAS SUCCESSFUL IN CONVINCING THEM THAT THEY SHOULD DISMANTLE THE ROAD BLOCK AND ALLOW THE PASSAGE OF MILOBS. SHE EXPLAINED THAT MILOBS WERE ASSISTING UNHCR AND NGOS IN CARRYING OUT THEIR GOOD WORKS IN THE AREA.
- B. AT 1000 HRS A CROWD OF APPROXIMATELY 70-80 PERSONS ARMED WITH ROCKS AND CLUBS WAS REPORTED TO BE ADVANCING THROUGH GISENYI IN THE DIRECTION OF MILOB SECTOR HQ. RPA LO INTERVENED AND THE CROWD DISPERSED INTO THE TOWN. THE INCIDENT ENDED AT 1105 HRS.
- C. MILOB SECTOR COMD FINALLY WAS MET BY RPA BN COMD, WHO EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD "NOT BEEN IN TOWN" DURING THE EVENTS OF THE 12/13 APRIL 95 AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO SAFEGUARD UN PROPERTY AND PERSONNEL. HE IMMEDIATELY RE-ESTABLISHED RPA PRESENCE AT THE MERIDIAN HOTEL, AUGMENTING THE GENDARMERIE PRESENCE.

4. COMMENT / LESSONS LEARNED:

- A. IT IS KNOWN THAT THE RPA BN COMD WAS PRESENT IN GISENYI AT THE START OF THE INCIDENT ON 12 APRIL 95. WHILE HE CLAIMS TO HAVE NOT BEEN PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE INCIDENT AND HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT WAS OCCURRING, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE BN COMD AT GITARAMA (A CLOSE FRIEND AND CONTACT OF THE GISENYI BN COMD) WAS FULLY AWARE OF WHAT WAS OCCURRING. THIS OFFICER MADE CONTACT WITH SECTOR 3 MILOBS AND STATED THAT SIMILAR ACTIONS WOULD NOT OCCUR IN SECTOR

THE SOURCE OF THE GITARAMA COMD'S INFORMATION COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN THE RPA COMD IN GISENYI. THE NON-ACTION OF THE RPA IN GISENYI IS BEING ASSESSED.

- B. IN THE COURSE OF THE EVENTS HQ UNAMIR CONTACT WITH RPA LO AT KIGALI AND SUBSEQUENT CONTACT BETWEEN SRSG AND RWANDAN GOVERNMENT WAS SLOW BUT ULTIMATELY SUCCESSFUL. ACTION OF RPA BN COMD AT GISENYI LATE ON 13 APRIL 95 MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM THESE EFFORTS.
- C. UNHCR WAS ABLE TO NEGOTIATE THE DISMANTLING OF THE NYUNDO ROAD BLOCK BY CONVINCING THE LOCALS THAT MILOBS AND AID AGENCIES WERE WORKING TOGETHER FOR THEIR BENEFIT. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT LOCALS BE MADE AWARE OF THIS COOPERATION AND THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THE ROLE OF MILOBS IN THE SECTORS. THE PRESENCE OF MILOBS WITH UNHCR / UNHCHR, ETC IN THE COURSE OF THEIR DAILY ACTIVITIES (I.E. JOINT PATROLS) WILL DO MUCH TO SHOW THIS.
- D. EFFORTS OF MILOB SECTOR 5 TO AVOID RAISING LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION WAS SUCCESSFUL. WHILE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF TUNBAT IRF WERE MADE THESE TROOPS WERE NOT DEPLOYED.
- E. SECTORS MUST BE ALERT TO INDICATORS OF IMPENDING INCIDENTS. FOLLOWING THE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST UNAMIR AT KIGALI ON 11 APRIL 95 ALL SECTORS AND MILOB HQ SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ANTICIPATION OF SIMILAR ACTIVITIES IN OTHER LOCATIONS.
- F. PASSAGE OF INFORMATION (REGULAR SITREPS AND CALM ANALYSIS) BY SECTOR 5 MILOB HQ THROUGHOUT THE INCIDENT WAS EXCELLENT AND WAS OF VALUE TO SRSG EFFORTS IN KIGALI.

①

TO : DCOS (OPS)
DCOS (SP)

INFO : DCMO, MILOBS GP HQ

FROM : SECTOR CDR, SECTOR 3

SUBJECT : HUMANITARIAN INITIATIVE

DATE : 10 APR 95

1. YOU MAY BE AWARE THAT THE KIGALI GITARAMA ROAD WHICH PASSES THROUGH THIS SECTOR HAS VIRTUALLY BECOME A DEATH TRAP IN TERMS OF TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS. ONE OF THE MAJOR REASONS FOR THIS IS THE PRESENCE OF A NUMBER OF DERELICT VEHICLES LYING ON BOTH SIDES OF THE ROAD WHICH BESIDES BEING A GRIM REMINDER OF THE WAR ARE ALSO MAJOR TRAFFIC HAZARDS. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH THE PREFET AND THE RPA CDR AND BOTH AGREED THAT AN INITIATIVE TO REMOVE THESE VEHICLES WITH THE HELP OF RECOVERY MEANS WOULD GO A LONG WAY IN REDUCING ACCIDENTS AND REMOVING WOUNDS OF THE WAR. THE PREFET HAS EVEN SELECTED A LOCATION TO WHICH HE PROPOSES TO MOVE ALL THESE VEHICLES.

2. I FEEL THAT SUITABLE GROUNDS EXIST FOR THE LAUNCHING OF AN INITIATIVE BY UNAMIR TO ASSIST THE PREFECTURE AUTHORITIES IN CLEARING THE ROAD. FOR THIS PURPOSE A TEAM OF RECOVERY EXPERTS WITH A RECOVERY VEHICLE AND A SUITABLE LORRY WILL BE REQUIRED AND THE OPERATION WILL BE COORDINATED BY THIS SECTOR. MAY I HAVE YOUR CONCURRENCE AND NECESSARY SUPPORT FOR THE PROPOSED HUMANITARIAN MISSION. I AM SURE IT WILL ASSIST IN KEEPING UNAMIR'S IMAGE AT A HIGH LEVEL BESIDES ACHIEVING A QUANTUM REDUCTION IN THE ACCIDENT RATE ON THE ROAD KIGALI - GITARAMA.

② DCOS SP

What resources do we have available if we decide to support this initiative?

DCOS Ops

11.4

SA HASNAIN
COLONEL
SECTOR CDR

③ Copy sent to DCOS SP

①

DCOS OPS.


TO: ALL MILOB SECTORS
FROM: MILOB GP HQ /OPS
DATE: 14 APRIL 1995
SUBJECT: REPORT OF INCIDENT AT GISENYI 12/13 APRIL 1995

1. A REPORT OF THE EVENTS OCCURRING AT GISENYI IS ATTACHED FOR THE INFORMATION OF ALL SECTORS.


MCOMBER
MAJ
SOO

② G3 Ops
Pls have Ops ① Timbott
indicate to deployments / actions
taken on 12 & 13th.


14-4

Actmed

14/4

SUBJECT : SPECIAL REPORT: DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST UNAMIR AT GISENYI
12/13 APRIL 95

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13 APRIL 1995

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- C. MILOB SECTOR COMD FINALLY WAS MET BY RPA BN COMD, WHO EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD "NOT BEEN IN TOWN" DURING THE EVENTS OF THE 12/13 APRIL 95 AND THAT HE WOULD HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO SAFEGUARD UN PROPERTY AND PERSONNEL. HE IMMEDIATELY RE-ESTABLISHED RPA PRESENCE AT THE MERIDIAN HOTEL, AUGMENTING THE GENDARMERIE PRESENCE.

4. COMMENT / LESSONS LEARNED:

- A. IT IS KNOWN THAT THE RPA BN COMD WAS PRESENT IN GISENYI AT THE START OF THE INCIDENT ON 12 APRIL 95. WHILE HE CLAIMS TO HAVE NOT BEEN PRESENT THROUGHOUT THE INCIDENT AND HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT WAS OCCURRING, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE BN COMD AT GITARAMA (A CLOSE FRIEND AND CONTACT OF THE GISENYI BN COMD) WAS FULLY AWARE OF WHAT WAS OCCURRING. THIS OFFICER MADE CONTACT WITH SECTOR 3 MILOBS AND STATED THAT SIMILAR ACTIONS WOULD NOT OCCUR IN SECTOR

THE SOURCE OF THE GITARAMA COMD'S INFORMATION COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN THE RPA COMD IN GISENYI. THE NON-ACTION OF THE RPA IN GISENYI IS BEING ASSESSED.

- B. IN THE COURSE OF THE EVENTS HQ UNAMIR CONTACT WITH RPA LO AT KIGALI AND SUBSEQUENT CONTACT BETWEEN SRSG AND RWANDAN GOVERNMENT WAS SLOW BUT ULTIMATELY SUCCESSFUL. ACTION OF RPA BN COMD AT GISENYI LATE ON 13 APRIL 95 MAY HAVE RESULTED FROM THESE EFFORTS.
- C. UNHCR WAS ABLE TO NEGOTIATE THE DISMANTLING OF THE NYUNDO ROAD BLOCK BY CONVINCING THE LOCALS THAT MILOBS AND AID AGENCIES WERE WORKING TOGETHER FOR THEIR BENEFIT. IT IS OBVIOUS THAT LOCALS BE MADE AWARE OF THIS COOPERATION AND THAT THEY UNDERSTAND THE ROLE OF MILOBS IN THE SECTORS. THE PRESENCE OF MILOBS WITH UNHCR / UNHCHR, ETC IN THE COURSE OF THEIR DAILY ACTIVITIES (I.E. JOINT PATROLS) WILL DO MUCH TO SHOW THIS.
- D. EFFORTS OF MILOB SECTOR 5 TO AVOID RAISING LEVEL OF CONFRONTATION WAS SUCCESSFUL. WHILE CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR DEPLOYMENT OF TUNBAT IRF WERE MADE THESE TROOPS WERE NOT DEPLOYED.
- E. SECTORS MUST BE ALERT TO INDICATORS OF IMPENDING INCIDENTS. FOLLOWING THE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST UNAMIR AT KIGALI ON 11 APRIL 95 ALL SECTORS AND MILOB HQ SHOULD HAVE BEEN IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ANTICIPATION OF SIMILAR ACTIVITIES IN OTHER LOCATIONS.
- F. PASSAGE OF INFORMATION (REGULAR SITREPS AND CALM ANALYSIS) BY SECTOR 5 MILOB HQ THROUGHOUT THE INCIDENT WAS EXCELLENT AND WAS OF VALUE TO SRSG EFFORTS IN KIGALI.