Subject files Regarding Political and Security Matters
Reports and Correspondences
C/POL/113(10) - Matadi

17/03/1961 - 02/11/1962

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

SC
CC

UN ARCHIVES
SERIES S-0735
BOX 13
FILE 4
ACC. DAG13/1.6.1.0

DECLASSIFIED

ROUTING SLIP

TO Mr. Taft

	APPROVAL		NOTE AND RETURN
	SEE ME, PLEASE		YOUR COMMENTS
	YOUR SIGNATURE		YOUR INFORMATION
	NOTE AND FILE		FOR ACTION

I believe that unless a claim is being actively pursued against the Congolese govt these papers should not be held by legal.

DATE 6/11

FROM Moncella

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE: ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

SVYBD/1/10
Ref: SVYBD/1/5
SVYBD/1/8

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

2 November 1962

To : Mr Z. Marcella, Legal Adviser

From : B. Halbert, Secretary, Property Survey Board

Subject : ONUC and Contingent losses arising from Matadi and Port Francqui incidents

At the request of the former Chief Administrative Officer I prepared a statement on ONUC and Contingent losses resulting from ANC attacks in Matadi and Port Francqui. These were transmitted to Mr Ahmed in March of this year.

From a copy of a memorandum held by this office it would appear that Mr Ahmed transmitted the statements to you on 7 April 1962 requesting that the matter be examined with a view to preparing a claim for submission to the Congolese Government.

On 27 September last, Mr Taff returned the statements to this office. As there was no reason given for this action I am re-submitting all relevant documents to you as there is no reason that I should hold these.

... ENCLS

R/R without enclosures

C/POL 113(10)
Matt

Mr. B. Halbert, Secretary, Property Survey and Claims Board

C. Taff, Special Legal Adviser

ONUC losses at Matadi and Port Francqui

... I am returning herewith your files on Matadi and Port Francqui, together with copies of other pertinent correspondence taken from the files of the CAO and Officer-in-Charge.

... Encl.

CT/mm

C/Pol 113(10)
V 14
C/ADM 610

20 September 2

Mr. B. Halbert, Property Survey and Claims Board

C. Taff, Special Legal Adviser

Claim with Congolese Government arising out of Matadi incident

With reference to our conversation of this morning, I would be grateful if you would provide me at the earliest opportunity with the following information, which is required to enable CNUC to present a claim to the Congolese authorities for damages arising out of the incident in Matadi in March 1961:

a) The value separately of the five vehicles and nine field kitchen trailers listed on page 3 of appendix A of your statement on Matadi losses.

b) The revised figure for the losses of contingent owned stores and equipment sustained by the 57th Canadian Signal Unit.

c) Appendices G and H which were not included in the statement sent to me.

d) The total value of the claims submitted separately by the individual members of the Sudanese contingent and the 57th Canadian Signal Unit for compensation for loss of personal effects.

CT/mm

Duplicate sent to Claim office

UNITED NATIONS

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM C/Pol 113

Via ONUC Pouch
31 May 1962

To : Mr. S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer

From : Carey Seward, Chief Field Operations Service
Office of General Services

Subject: Vehicles on Loan to ANC

1. I refer to your memorandum of 3 May 1962 and attachments, titled as above, which in view of the political connotations was referred to Dr. Bunche for his comments.

2. In his reply Dr. Bunche states that since you seem to think it is useless to insist on return of the five vehicles on loan he feels we should write them off, especially since they are unlikely to be in usable condition. Therefore, I would suggest that you initiate local Survey Board write-off action for submission to Headquarters Survey Board in due course.

3. Regarding the 29 vehicles seized by AND during the Matadi incident, they should eventually be the subject of a formal claim on the Government of the Congo.

Inter - Office Memorandum

Q 126 420 GES 3 May 1962

To: Mr. Carey Seward, Chief of Field Operations Service
New York

From: S. Habib Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer

Subject: Vehicles on Loan to ANC

1. In October last year, the Force Commander, at the request of General Mobutu, agreed to the transfer to the National Congolese Army of five (5) vehicles. The vehicles in question were three-ton trucks, one Chevrolet and four Bedford. When this matter was mentioned to me by the Force Commander, I explained to him that under the United Nations regulations such a transfer could not be made without proper authorization, and I followed up our conversation with memorandum dated 13 October 1961, copy attached.

2. The matter was subsequently discussed on a number of occasions with General Rechain as well as with Mr. Linner. The latter shared our objections to the transfer and asked General Rechain to obtain return of the vehicles as soon as possible and in the meantime to secure a receipt from the National Congolese Army that the vehicles were on loan.

3. Prior to General Rechain's departure, the matter was again taken up by us, and we understood that he spoke with General Mobutu. We have now received a memorandum dated 15 April 1962, copy attached, from which you will note that the receipt from General Mobutu has been obtained. However, we do not think that it will be possible to retrieve the vehicles from the ANC, and in view of the time which has elapsed since they were loaned and the wear and tear that they have undergone, we would like to have your advice as to whether they can be written off our books. In the event that the vehicles are eventually returned, they could, of course, again be included in our inventory.

cc: Officer-in-Charge
Force Commander
Chief of General Services

C O P I E

REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
MINISTERE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE
QUARTIER GENERAL DE L'ARMEE
NATIONALE CONGOLAISE
ETAT-MAJOR
DIRECTION DU GENIE

Léopoldville, le
29 JAN 62 0371

No 1033/ /BM.214

Réf. no: Votre lettre du 27/12/61.

Objet: Immeuble Dr E.FORGET
à Matadi.

A Monsieur Edouard Forget
2, rue de la Duchesse
Bruxelles 4

Monsieur,

Me référant à votre lettre du 27 décembre 1961, j'ai le regret de vous faire savoir que l'Armée Nationale Congolaise n'est nullement responsable des dégâts causés à votre immeuble lors de l'accrochage qui avait opposé nos troupes à un détachement de l'ONU à Matadi.

En effet, après un examen minutieux de ce litige, il ne fait pas l'ombre d'un doute que les responsabilités de l'ONU sont entières et n'engagent que l'organisme international et pas l'ANC. Nos troupes attaquées, se trouvaient en cas de légitime défense et par ce fait, elles devaient se défendre.

Veuillez, en conséquence, prendre contact avec les dirigeants de l'ONU à Léopoldville ainsi qu'avec les autorités congolaises qui possèdent des procès-verbaux établis à Matadi après ces tristes incidents.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

signature: illisible

Le Commandant en Chef
MOBUTU, J.
Général-Major

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

31 October 1961

To : Mr. W. Cox

From : S; Habib Admed

Subject: Losses at Matadi

Attached is the reply from Headquarters on the question of claims for compensation for losses suffered by ONUC as a consequence of actions by the local authorities. I take it that our letter to the Prime Minister listing the vehicles seized by the ANC at Matadi has already gone forward. If so, no action is required for the time being as far as Matadi is concerned. However, I am collecting information on similar losses sustained by ONUC elsewhere and will follow up with the Government.

Please return the attached letter.

UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK

CONFIDENTIAL

Via Pouch
23 October 1961

Dear Habib,

The procedure proposed in your letter of 15 October 1961 in answer to my letter of 29 September 1961 concerning the losses suffered by the United Nations as a result of the seizures of our goods by the ANC and the closing of the Port of Matadi has been discussed with Dr. Bunche.

The Field Operations Service suggested that we follow the line set out in your letter of 15 October 1961, that is begin consultations with the Congolese Government concerning the equipment and materials seized by the authorities and reserve any discussion of indirect damages for a later date when the magnitude of such damages can be more accurately determined.

Dr. Bunche agrees to this approach and I suggest that you arrange for the implemantation of the proposed consultations with the Congolese Government accordingly.

Sincerely yours,

Sd/-

Carey Seward, Chief
Field Operations Service

Mr. S. Habib Ahmed
Chief Administrative Officer
ONUC
Léopoldville, Republic of the Congo

cc. ANC

Léopoldville, le 18 octobre 1961

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre N° 2148/61 du 9 courant dans laquelle vous m'informiez "qu'en prévision des opérations de police prévues dans le Nord Katanga, l'Armée Nationale éprouve des difficultés pour le transport des troupes dans la région de Lulua-bourg". Ce faisant vous demandiez que l'ONUC mette à la disposition de l'Armée Nationale congolaise 25 camions de trois tonnes et dix jeeps.

J'ai le regret de devoir vous informer qu'aucune prévision n'a jamais été faite dans le programme de l'ONUC en ce qui concerne de tels équipements et que par conséquent les conditions préalables, légales et budgétaires couvrant une aide de ce genre nous font complètement défaut.

A ce sujet j'aimerais rappeler que les cinq camions qui ont été mis à la disposition de l'Armée Nationale congolaise à Léopoldville à la demande du Général Mobutu, lequel n'a jamais fait état d'une opération quelconque au Katanga, ont été ainsi remis sur la base d'un prêt à court terme étant donné que l'ONUC n'est en possession d'aucun mandat légal qui lui permette de traiter d'une telle affaire d'aucune autre manière.

A ce propos j'aimerais attirer votre attention sur le fait que l'Armée Nationale congolaise ne nous a toujours pas restitué les véhicules qui avaient été saisis à tort au contingent soudanais de Matadi et j'ose espérer que votre Gouvernement prendra toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour qu'ils

Son Excellence M. Cyrille Adoula,
Premier Ministre de la République du Congo
Léopoldville

2 / . . .

nous soient rendus dans un proche avenir. La liste de ces véhicules s'établit comme suit :

16 jeeps
2 jeep Pickup, 1 tonne
2 camions Chevrolet
2 camions Bedford
7 camions Mercedes Benz

Veuillez croire, M. le Premier Ministre, à l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

Sture Linnér
Chargé de la Mission
des Nations Unies au Congo

CONFIDENTIAL

15 October 1961

Dear Carey,

Thank you for your letter of 29 September concerning losses and additional costs sustained at Matadi.

We have given careful consideration to the suggestion made in para 3 of your letter and have also discussed it with Bill Cox. The losses suffered or additional costs incurred by the United Nations at Matadi and elsewhere in Congo during the course of ONUC operations fall broadly under two categories. The first includes direct losses of United Nations property and stores resulting from seizure or confiscation through actions of the local authorities. The second category includes indirect losses arising as a consequence of actions taken by local authorities.

At Matadi a number of United Nations vehicles and some materials and stores were seized by the ANC and have not yet been returned to us. Some losses of a similar character were sustained at Port Francqui and elsewhere.

Additional expenditures caused to the United Nations as a consequence of actions by local authorities are not confined to Matadi alone. They also extend to other areas. Among these the major one was the decision of the President of the Republic to impose a complete embargo on barge traffic over the river Congo to Stanleyville and Kindu. Several representations were made to the President during the period the embargo remained in force but he declined to lift it even for supplies of goods and services for United Nations personnel stationed in Orientale and Kivu. As a result we were forced to raise our fleet of aircraft to a considerable extent to supply our troops in these two areas by air. The same can be said about the obstruction of rail traffic through South Kasai and North Katanga areas which forced us again to use additional aircraft for supplying our positions in these regions.

A close examination of ONUC operations would bring out numerous incidents of diverse character which have indirectly contributed to additional costs on the part of the United Nations. It is therefore our view that pending further examination of the legal aspects of the responsibility of the Central Government for consequential losses suffered or additional expenditures incurred by the United Nations we should hold any direct approach to Prime Minister Adoula in this matter in abeyance. In other words we might at the present time limit our consultations with the Government to direct losses suffered by the

. . . 2

Mr. Carey Bakeard
Chief, Field Operations Service
United Nations Headquarters
New York

United Nations by way of seizure or confiscation of United Nations property and stores through the actions of the local authorities. Losses suffered at Ratadi top the list under this category and we suggest that we take up informal consultations with the authorities of the Government that the equipment and materials seized by local authorities at Ratadi be either restored to the United Nations or alternatively compensation should be considered which may be set off, as you suggest, against charges made to the United Nations by the Government for facilities provided to us.

We would appreciate your further views in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

S. Habib Ahmed

cc: Mr. W. Linner, Officer-in-Charge
Mr. W. Cox

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

NEW YORK

CABLE ADDRESS - UNATIONS NEWYORK - ADRESSE TELEGRAPHIQUE

FILE NO.:

CONFIDENTIAL

Via Pouch

29 September 1961

Dear Habib,

Your letter of 27 August concerning the losses suffered by the United Nations as a result of the seizures of our goods by the ANC and the closing of the port of Matadi has received careful consideration here.

This is a thorny problem. It is certainly true that we can not overlook a loss of so large a sum. On the other hand, as you point out, a formal claim at this point is also a tough choice.

Dr. Bunche has suggested that we ask you whether you consider it feasible, now that our relations with the Central Government are on a reasonable basis, for Mr. Linner or Mr. Khiari to discuss this informally with Prime Minister Adoula. The impossibility of our completely ignoring the loss might be pointed out, along with the fact that we are not making a formal claim now but asking Mr. Adoula's views on some suitable way of meeting the situation, e.g. the Congo Government voluntarily offering not to charge the United Nations for certain facilities up to an equivalent of the cost of the Matadi losses.

Sincerely yours,

Carey Seward
Chief
Field Operations Service

Mr. S. Habib Ahmed,
Chief Administrative Officer,
ONUC,
Leopoldville, Republic of the Congo.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

27 August 1961

Dear Carey,

We have been trying to collect information on losses and damages suffered by ONUC as a result of the closing of the Matadi port. A first preliminary estimate covering such losses which includes additional costs incurred by ONUC during the period the port remained closed has been made by the Procurement Section, the details of which are enclosed. To these has to be added the cost of equipment and materials of ONUC forces which were seized by the ANC during the troubles of 3 and 4 March and the loss of personal belongings of ONUC personnel for which compensation claims have been submitted.

Apart from Matadi there are other losses which have been suffered by ONUC through wilful actions on the part of the local authorities or by elements operating in their name. This includes, of course, the loss of lives of several ONUC personnel in the performance of their duties.

We have now to consider what action, if any, should be taken to deal with losses of the kind mentioned above. There are two alternatives. We may consider - and in a way quite rightly - that all losses or damages suffered by ONUC had their origin in the exigencies of our work and despite the circumstances of each case should be considered as a part of our normal operational costs. On the other hand we may collect complete information on all losses of the kind in reference and submit a claim to the Government of Congo for compensation. We may set off against this claim any payments which are due to the Government from our side such as for rental of buildings or other facilities made available to us.

The Government of Congo and the Provincial authorities have placed at our disposal some facilities such as buildings, airports, etc. In the case of buildings, rental is charged to us in some cases and in others they have been made available free of charge. For the airports the only claim which the Government has so far made is for additional cost of power and water supply incurred as a result of the stationing of our forces at the N'Djili airport. We have, of course, used public roads and other similar facilities throughout the country for the movement of our forces.

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Mr. Carey Seward
Chief, Field Operations Service
United Nations Headquarters
New York

Should ONUC make a claim for compensation for damages suffered in the course of its operations in Congo attributable to hostile actions against ONUC by the authorities this will inevitably open the door for counter-claims for compensation both from the Central and Provincial authorities for the use of public facilities by ONUC in the country as a whole and for rental of buildings and facilities so far made available to us free of charge. The negotiations can become extremely complicated and time-consuming. The financial position of the Government of Congo will be such for some time to come that we would have no hope of actually recovering any compensation from them. On the other hand any action on our part to suspend payments of rent or for the use of utilities where claims of this kind have been made is likely to create an unpleasant atmosphere as this would be interpreted as an attempt on our part to retract from our commitments wherever they have been expressly made.

I should be grateful if you would kindly have the problems outlined above considered by all concerned at Headquarters and let me know the line which we should follow here. If it is decided that a complete estimate of all losses and damages ONUC has suffered should be made, we would then need two or three professional officers with administrative-legal training to examine the records and to compile a claim which can be fully substantiated. I am not too happy, for instance, with the estimate of losses on account of Matadi worked out by the Procurement Section as it is clear that each one of the items needs to be further examined and sifted.

My own view in the matter is that in the present situation when the Government has not yet had time to organize itself and with so many matters of great importance for the normalization of political and economic life in the country to be taken up by them we are not likely to be able to engage their attention in the negotiations for compensation for some time to come. These will inevitably mean protracted discussions and in the final analysis there may be no option but to reach a compromise under which no significant material gain may result to the United Nations.

Yours sincerely,

S. Habib Ahmed

cc: Mr. S. Linner, Officer-in-Charge
Mr. V. Fabry, Legal Adviser

cc : Force Commander
Mr Ahmed

GVT 30/ 61

Le 28 Décembre 1961

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de me référer à l'entretien que nous avons eu le 26 courant au cours duquel nous avons discuté, entre autre, de l'utilisation du port de Matadi par l'ONUC.

Vous avez bien voulu marquer votre accord pour que les rotations des différents contingents mis à la disposition de l'ONU au Congo s'effectuent par le port de Matadi et vous m'avez également confirmé que votre Gouvernement n'avait aucune objection à ce que les importations et les exportations de matériel et équipements militaires, y compris les munitions, afférents à ces divers contingents transitent aussi par ce même port.

Dans le cadre de ces nouveaux arrangements je vous ai également annoncé l'arrivée prochaine à Matadi du transport de troupes américain (SS Blatchford) lequel doit amener au Congo le contingent malais qui doit remplacer celui qui se trouve actuellement déployé en majorité dans la province du Kivu.

Ainsi que vous en avez exprimé le désir j'ai demandé au Commandant de la Force des Nations Unies de rapporter directement au Général Mobutu le résultat de notre entrevue. De votre côté, je vous saurais gré de bien vouloir en informer les autorités civiles compétentes et en particulier celles du territoire de Matadi.

Je tiens à vous exprimer ma vive reconnaissance au sujet de ces nouveaux arrangements qui vont permettre à la mission de l'ONU de réduire considérablement les frais énormes qu'elle a encourus puisqu'elle a été obligée, jusqu'à présent, de recourir à l'affrètement aérien pour mener à bien ces divers mouvements.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

Sture Linnér
Chargé de la Mission
des Nations Unies
au Congo

Monsieur le Premier Ministre
de la République du Congo
LEOPOLDVILLE

JP/sl

was discussed with RM by lawyer on 26 XII 61

I will confirm in writing
F.C will inform Institute and US Embassy
I will inform NY of all the above

File

Prime Minister 29 XII

BRIEF ON THE USE OF MATADI PORT BY UN FORCES IN CONGO

The Secretary General has accepted a contribution from the Central Government in the form of a reconnaissance force and an infantry battalion from the Central Government. It is therefore obvious that the cooperation between ONUC and the Central Government is improving daily. This can only happen if there is understanding between these two parties and hence we are of the opinion that any request by us to the Central Government for affording us certain additional facilities would be acceptable to them.

The USA have very kindly made available to us the troop-ship "Blatchford". This ship is bringing a Malayan contingent of approximately 600 and is due to arrive at Dar Es Salaam on 26 January, but may be diverted en route to Bombay to pick up the balance of ammunition for the Indian Brigade. A certain amount of other ammunition for the Indian Brigade in Congo is being sent by a commercial liner, S.S. "State of Bombay", arriving at Dar es Salaam on 12 January. The ammunition itself weighs over 100 tons and the baggage with the Malayans approximately 30 tons. These personnel and ammunition will have to be flown from Dar Es Salaam to Congo using own aircraft. This will be an expensive proposition in terms of expenses as also time. We therefore consider that it will be advisable for us to have this ship come to Matadi, move personnel, stores and ammunition from Matadi to Leo by train and thereafter move the Malayan personnel and their baggage by air to Goma/Bukavu and Elisabethville. The airlift from Leo is more convenient to us as our aircraft are all based at Leo.

The question of economy was also discussed by Gen. MacEoin with Mr Ahmed and Mr Ahmed is of the view that the cost of this rotation if the troop-ship "Blatchford" is allowed to berth at Matadi will be cut down by approximately 50%. Similarly, if future rotations of the various contingents could take place by sea from Matadi, considerable savings would be effected.

It is, therefore, imperative to get the Central Government's agreement to allow "Blatchford" to berth at Matadi. We should give an undertaking that only for the duration of the stay of "Blatchford" at Matadi a certain amount of UN troops will be located at Matadi for the purpose of loading and unloading stores/ammunition and their onward despatch by train to Leopoldville, and once the ship departs status-quo will again be established.

26.12.61

JP/jg

NOTE VERBALE

Le Chargé de Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires étrangères et a l'honneur de faire suite à la note adressée au Ministère en date du 14 juin 1961 concernant une unité de 100 policiers nigériens envoyés à Matadi.

Le Commandant de la Force des Nations Unies nous informe qu'à présent la situation à Matadi est très calme, que l'ordre y règne et que les relations entre la police nigérienne, l'Armée Nationale congolaise, la police de Matadi et la population locale sont excellentes et empreintes d'un esprit d'amitié et de coopération.

Etant donné ces circonstances favorables il a été décidé de retirer de Matadi environ 50 policiers du contingent nigérien et le Chargé de Mission serait reconnaissant au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de bien vouloir en informer les autorités gouvernementales intéressées.

Le Chargé de Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Ministère des Affaires étrangères les assurances de sa haute considération.

Léopoldville, le 8 décembre 1961.

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO
UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

cc: Force Cmdr.

22 Novembre 1961

2750

Rapatriement des troupes
ONUC par Matadi.

NOTE POUR LE GENERAL-MAJOR J. MOBUTU, COMMANDANT EN CHEF DE L'ARMEE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire parvenir, en annexe en communication, copie des correspondances qui m'ont été adressées par le Chargé de la Mission des Nations-Unies au Congo et se rapportant à l'utilisation par les Nations-Unies du Port de Matadi.

J'ai déjà marqué mon accord pour que le rapatriement s'effectue par voie maritime à partir de Matadi.

En conséquence je vous prie de donner toutes consignes utiles aux troupes de l'Armée Nationale Congolaise afin que cette opération s'effectue en toute sécurité et que tout heurt soit évité.

LE PREMIER MINISTRE

Cyrille ADOULA

Annexes mentionnées.

Copy sent to A/EC on 27 XI 61

JP/sl

Le 18 Novembre 1961

Monsieur le Premier Ministre ,

J'ai l'honneur de vous rappeler nos lettres du 14 aout, 26 septembre et 10 novembre 1961 dans lesquelles je vous demandais que votre Gouvernement sanctionne l'utilisation par les Nations Unies du port de Matadi pour le rapatriement et le remplacement de ses divers contingents militaires au Congo.

Je vous saurais gré, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, de me faire parvenir votre réponse dans les plus brefs délais vu le caractère d'urgence qui s'impose maintenant, étant donné la décision qui a été prise de rapatrier la Brigade Nigérienne sur Lagos par voie maritime à partir de Matadi. Ce mouvement est prévu du 27 novembre au 6 décembre et il est essentiel pour en assurer sa bonne execution que les divers services gouvernementaux à Matadi en soient informés.

Dans l'attente de votre prompte réponse, je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

S. Linnér
Chargé de la Mission
des Nations Unies
au Congo

Son Excellence Monsieur le Premier Ministre
de la République du Congo
LEOPOLDVILLE

cc Acting Force Commander

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

18 November 1961

A : M. J. POUJOULAT

De : Force Commander's Office

Objet :

CLEARANCE PORT MATADI.

letter to PM 18/11

1. In view of the decision to repatriate Nigerian Bde HQ and 3QONR by sea to LAGOS, it is necessary to have clearance from the Central Government offices concerned.

2. I am directed by the Force Commander to ask you to take up this matter with the Central Governement and to obtain clearance for use of the Port of MATADI between 27 November to 6 December to repatriate about 800 men.

K O'Brien Comdt.

(K. O'BRIEN)
MA to Force Commander.

cc: Chief Logistics
Chief Mov Control
Major Normandin.

18 XI
written to PM.

Léopoldville, le 10 novembre 1961

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous rappeler la lettre que je vous ai adressée en date du 26 octobre 1961 se rapportant à l'utilisation du Port de Matadi pour le mouvement des contingents militaires de l'ONUC, et je vous saurais gré si vous pouviez me communiquer dans le plus proche avenir la réaction de votre Gouvernement à la requête qui était contenue dans cette lettre.

Je vous prie de croire, M. le Premier Ministre, à l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Sture Linnér
Chargé de la Mission
des Nations Unies au Congo

Son Excellence M. Cyrille Adoula,
Premier Ministre de la République du Congo
Léopoldville

cc: Force Commander

26 Octobre 1961

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

J'ai l'honneur de vous rappeler la lettre que vous avait adressée Monsieur Khiary le 14 Août 1961 ainsi que l'entretien que vous avez bien voulu accorder à Monsieur Poujoulat le 17 Octobre 1961.

Au cours de cet entretien, Monsieur Poujoulat vous a réitéré le pressant besoin qu'a l'ONUC d'utiliser les installations et autres facilités qu'offre le port de Matadi pour assurer le repatriement et le remplacement de ses divers contingents militaires au Congo accompagnés de leur équipement et autre matériel nécessaires pour assurer le plein accomplissement de leur tâche.

Ainsi qu'il en était fait état dans notre lettre du 14 Août, l'ONUC a eu recours, ces derniers mois, à l'affrêtement aérien pour mener à bien ces mouvements, entraînant ainsi des dépenses considérables prélevées sur les fonds mis à la disposition de l'ONUC pour son action au Congo.

J'ose espérer, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, que votre Gouvernement, dans le cadre de l'étroite collaboration que nous ne cessons d'avoir avec lui, autorisera dans les plus brefs délais cette requête dont le seul but est de faciliter l'action que poursuit l'ONUC dans la République du Congo, et l'aide qu'elle lui apporte.

Qu'il me soit permis également de souligner que le Commandant de la Force n'estime pas nécessaire, dans les conjonctures actuelles, de renforcer le contingent des Nations Unies qui se trouve actuellement à Matadi lors de l'utilisation de ce port aux fins sus-mentionnées.

Je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, à l'expression de ma haute considération.

Signed for by Force Commander

Sture Linnér
Chargé de la Mission des Nations
Unies au Congo

Son Excellence le Premier Ministre
de la République du Congo
LEOPOLDVILLE

CONFIDENTIAL

15 October 1961

Dear Carey,

Thank you for your letter of 29 September concerning losses and additional costs sustained at Matadi.

We have given careful consideration to the suggestion made in para 3 of your letter and have also discussed it with Bill Cox. The losses suffered or additional costs incurred by the United Nations at Matadi and elsewhere in Congo during the course of ONUC operations fall broadly under two categories. The first includes direct losses of United Nations property and stores resulting from seizure or confiscation through actions of the local authorities. The second category includes indirect losses arising as a consequence of actions taken by local authorities.

At Matadi a number of United Nations vehicles and some materials and stores were seized by the ANC and have not yet been returned to us. Some losses of a similar character were sustained at Port Francqui and elsewhere.

Additional expenditures caused to the United Nations as a consequence of actions by local authorities are not confined to Matadi alone. They also extend to other areas. Among these the major one was the decision of the President of the Republic to impose a complete embargo on barge traffic over the river Congo to Stanleyville and Kindu. Several representations were made to the President during the period the embargo remained in force but he declined to lift it even for supplies of goods and services for United Nations personnel stationed in Orientale and Kivu. As a result we were forced to raise our fleet of aircraft to a considerable extent to supply our troops in these two areas by air. The same can be said about the obstruction of rail traffic through South Kasai and North Katanga areas which forced us again to use additional aircraft for supplying our positions in these regions.

A close examination of ONUC operations would bring out numerous incidents of diverse character which have indirectly contributed to additional costs on the part of the United Nations. It is therefore our view that pending further examination of the legal aspects of the responsibility of the Central Government for consequential losses suffered or additional expenditures incurred by the United Nations we should hold any direct approach to Prime Minister Adoula in this matter in abeyance. In other words we might at the present time limit our consultations with the Government to direct losses suffered by the

. . . 2

Mr. Carey Seward
Chief, Field Operations Service
United Nations Headquarters
New York

United Nations by way of seizure or confiscation of United Nations property and stores through the actions of the local authorities. Losses suffered at Matadi top the list under this category and we suggest that we take up informal consultations with the authorities of the Government that the equipment and materials seized by local authorities at Matadi be either restored to the United Nations or alternatively compensation should be considered which may be set off, as you suggest, against charges made to the United Nations by the Government for facilities provided to us.

We would appreciate your further views in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

S. Habib Ahmad

cc: Mr. S. Linner, Officer-in-Charge
Mr. W. Cox

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : KHIARY, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 16 August 1961

No : A- 1948

La note sur Matadi objet de votre 5645 a été remise le 14 courant au Gouvernement congolais. Ci-dessous le texte de cette note:

"A Son Excellence M. Cyrille Adoula
Ministre de la Défense Nationale
République du Congo

Je me permets de porter à votre connaissance que le Commandement de la Force des Nations Unies a reçu des renseignements d'après lesquels une quantité importante d'armes et de munitions seraient importés illégalement dans les régions de l'embouchure du Congo.

Ces importations clandestines d'armes pour des fins illicites suscitent des appréhensions en ce qui concerne le maintien de la paix et de l'ordre public dans cette région.

Je suis sûr que vous conviendrez avec moi qu'en raison de son importance économique et de sa position géographique particulière, le Bas Congo devrait obtenir priorité dans l'assistance que peuvent fournir les Nations Unies au Gouvernement de la République du Congo, en vertu de la résolution du Conseil de Sécurité du 14 juillet 1960, afin de prévenir et d'empêcher tout trouble qui pourrait y surgir.

Le Commandement de la Force des Nations Unies considère, compte tenu des renseignements ci-dessus, qu'il serait indiqué de déployer dans la région de l'embouchure du Congo, une unité militaire des Nations Unies d'environ 500 à 600 hommes, qui seraient basés sur Kitona et Matadi, et qui assisteraient les unités de l'Armée Nationale Congolaise dans leur tâche de veiller à l'intégrité du territoire de la République et au maintien de l'ordre public.

Le mouvement de troupes des Nations Unies ainsi proposé s'impose également pour deux autres raisons. Vous vous souviendrez certainement, Monsieur le Ministre, que l'envoi de la Police Nigérienne à Matadi avait été toujours considéré comme une mesure temporaire seulement; comme il avait été convenu au cours de l'entretien qui a eu lieu en votre présence le 1er juin entre le Général Mobutu et le Général MacGain, la présence de cette unité nigérienne ne devait durer que quelques semaines et en tout état de cause elle est maintenant presque arrivée au bout de son terme qui se situe plus exactement à la fin de ce mois.

D'autre part, nous envisageons, au cours du mois prochain, de pouvoir nous servir du port de Matadi pour effectuer le rapatriement d'un nombre important de troupes avec leur matériel, ce qui requiert la présence d'une unité militaire pour le maintien de l'ordre et la garde du matériel militaire pendant l'embarquement.

Dans le cas où les Nations Unies ne pourraient effectuer ce rapatriement par voie maritime, elles se verront obligées d'avoir recours à l'affrètement aérien qui est excessivement coûteux. En effet, à la suite de l'évacuation forcée de Matadi au mois de mars dernier, le dommage causé aux Nations Unies à ce titre s'est élevé à la somme de 1.650.000 dollars et tout nouvel affrètement aérien entraînerait des dépenses supplémentaires qui pourraient même dépasser ce montant.

J'espère, Monsieur le Ministre, que le Gouvernement de la République du Congo partagera l'avis du Commandement de la Force des Nations Unies sur l'urgence de ce déploiement de troupes et que les mesures ainsi prises seront une nouvelle fois la preuve de l'esprit de coopération mutuelle existant entre la République du Congo et l'Organisation des Nations Unies.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Ministre, l'assurance de ma haute considération.

Mahmoud Khiary, Chargé de Mission des Nations Unies au Congo p.i."

LEOPOLDVILLE OUTGOING CLEAR
15 June 1961

UNATIONS
NEWYORK

A-1458 SECGEN FROM LINNER

Following from Kelly who is now in Matadi on refugee business CLN QUOTE Have circulated throughout Matadi in UN car with flag flying meeting with intense interest and friendliness from population and authorities. All very calm and most helpful. UNQUOTE

61

CONGO BELGE — *BELGISCH-CONGO*

SERVICE DES TÉLÉCOMMUNICATIONS

DIENST DER TELEVERBINDINGEN

NUMERO *Nummer*	ORIGINE *Oorsprong*	MOTS *Woorden*	DATE *Datum*	HEURE *Uur*	VIA *Via*

Arrivé à :
Aangekomen te :

LEOPOLDVILLE 5 6 61

Heure : 1430
Uur :

Indications de service taxées
Betaalde dienstaanwijzigingen

TÉLÉGRAMME
Telegram

NATIONS UNIES LEO-

Explications des abréviations admises pour les indications de service taxées :
Verklaring van de afkortingen toegelaten voor de betaalde dienstaanwijzingen :

RP = Réponse payée.
Antwoord betaald.
LT = Télégramme lettre.
Brieftelegram.
CR = Accusé de récep.
Kennisgeving van ontvangst.
TC = Collationnement.
Te collationneren.

L'Administration n'est soumise à aucune responsabilité en raison de la correspondance privée par voie télégraphique.
De Administratie is niet verantwoordelijk wat betreft de private correspondentie langs telegrafische weg.

(Ordonnance législative n° 254/Téléc. du 23 août 1940.)
(Wetgevende ordonnantie nr. 254/Telev. van 23 augustus 1940.)

nations unies leopoldville =

p 283/175 matadi 33 15 1055 =

A-1458

for linner have circulated throughout matadi in un car with flag flying meeting with intense interest and friendliness from population and authorities stop all very ~~an~~ calm and most helpfull =

kelly +

cfm 283~~/175~~ ~~kelly ++~~

Le Chargé de mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires étrangères et a l'honneur de lui donner les renseignements suivants :

Le Gouvernement nigérien ayant retiré ses objections contre l'envoi de la police nigérienne à Matadi, le Commandant de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo désire effectuer, dans le plus bref délai, le mouvement d'une unité comprenant 100 policiers nigériens ainsi que le personnel technique nécessaire pour assurer les communications et le contrôle du mouvement des marchandises, comme convenu à la réunion qu'il a eue le 1er juin avec Monsieur le Ministre Adoula et le Général Mobutu.

Le Commandant de la Force des Nations Unies est entré en rapport avec le Commandement de l'Armée nationale congolaise pour faire tous arrangements utiles afin de préparer le déplacement et la réception à Matadi de l'unité mentionnée ci-dessus, le samedi 17 juin. Ces arrangements incluent, en particulier, la notification de l'arrivée de cette unité et la désignation des officiers de liaison du Quartier général de l'ANC et de la garnison à Matadi qui seront attachés au commandement de la police nigérienne, ainsi que l'assurance que la liberté de mouvement nécessaire pour maintenir le ravitaillement et les contacts personnels entre les détachements de la Force des Nations Unies à Matadi et leur Quartier général à Léopoldville ne sera en aucune façon entravée.

Le Chargé de mission des Nations Unies au Congo espère que, avec l'appui et le concours des autorités congolaises, le personnel des Nations Unies envoyé à Matadi ne tardera pas à y établir avec la garnison et la population de cette ville des liens d'amitié et une coopération fructueuse dans l'accomplissement de leur tâche.

Le Chargé de mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo saisit cette occasion pour renouveler au Ministère des Affaires étrangères les assurances de sa haute considération.

Léopoldville, le 14 juin 1961

Ministère des Affaires étrangères
Léopoldville

CONFIDENTIAL

14 June 1961

Dear Commissioner Edet,

With reference to your inquiry No. CG/C/22/7, I should like to confirm that the proposal of the Secretary-General to deploy at Matadi a unit of Nigerian Police was meant to be a temporary measure and that it is intended to replace the Nigerian Police by another unit of the Force as soon as the conditions for such a move are appropriate. This was clearly stated to the Congolese authorities in the Aide-mémoire transmitted to them by the Secretary-General in April 1961, as well as in subsequent negotiations. In the latest discussion that took place on the subject between the Commander of the Force and the Minister Adoula in General Mobutu's presence on 1 June, it was agreed by all concerned that the Nigerian Police unit would be replaced by other UN troops "in a matter of weeks". I do not therefore expect that the stay of the Nigerian Police in Matadi would exceed three months.

Yours sincerely,

S. Linner
Officer in charge
of the United Nations Mission
in the Congo

Deputy Commissioner L.O. Edet
Commanding Officer
The Nigeria Police
Leopoldville

OUTGOING CODE IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 13 May 1961

No : A-1221

The delivery of supplies to us is at present not repeat not held up because of the argument about the claims for storage, handling, or demurrage charges to ONUC. This being the case, I do not want to proceed along the lines of your 3414 before I clear one important point with you. In your 2137 to Bomboko and your 2171 to me, you insist that OTRACO is a private company whereas now you say in para. 2 of 3414, "OTRACO is a public institution enjoying transport monopoly by law and acting as agent of Congolese Government". I am sure that the Government will tell us we are inconsistent. I await your advice before I go any further.

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 12 May 1961

No : A-1204

I am now informed that a mobile signals unit can be sent immediately to Matadi, which will serve as a temporary arrangement pending the return of the equipment damaged during the incident. Such being the case, it seems to me that I can now ask Kasa-Vubu for the dispatch of the 100 Nigerian police, the Signals and the Movement Control officers all at once. But before I do so, I would like your confirmation that there is no objection by the Government of Nigeria to our sending the 100 police. Please cable most immediately.

(P-62)

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : POUJOULAT, COQUILHATVILLE

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 10 MAY 1961

No : CV-86

YOUR SECRET P46.

WILL YOU PLEASE INFORM KASA-VUBU, BOMBOKO AND MOBUTU THAT I HAVE NOT YET HAD A VISIT FROM KIEMBE WHO WOULD BRING WITH HIM MAJOR ENGILA WHO WOULD TAKE THE CANADIAN SIGNALS TO MATADI TO EXAMINE THE EQUIPMENT THERE. AS THIS MATTER IS URGENT AND THE RETURN TO MATADI HAS BEEN SO LONG DELAYED, PLEASE PRESS THEM TO INSTRUCT KIEMBE AND ENGILA TO COME AND SEE ME WITHOUT DELAY TO TAKE THE CANADIAN SIGNALS TO MATADI. PLEASE ALSO EXPLAIN THAT ONLY CANADIAN TECHNICIANS WILL GO. MOVEMENT CONTROL PERSONNEL WILL GO WITH THE NIGERIAN POLICE.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 6 May 1961

No : A-1157

Further to my A-1146.

The Nigerian police officers and the Canadian Signals officer returned to-day from Coquilhatville having secured agreement on all points I raised in my letter to Kasa-Vubu. The next step is that an ANC officer, a certain Major Engila, will accompany Canadian Signals officers as early as possible next week to Matadi where they will examine the damage done to the equipment and make arrangements for the necessary repairs.

The dispatch of the 100 Nigerian police and Procurement officers will have to be delayed pending the repair and installation of the telecommunications equipment. Bearing in mind the attack on the Sudanese in Matadi and the lesson of Port Francqui, I feel very strongly that we should not send the Nigerian police there before the communication system is fixed. In fact, Commissioner of Police Edet said to me that he would never agree to the Nigerians going before this is done. He asked me if the Nigerian Prime Minister has been kept informed and has given his approval for the Nigerian police to go, because Edet is afraid that after hearing the news of Port Francqui the Prime Minister might not agree to the dispatch of the Nigerian police to Matadi. I assured him that you would be keeping the Nigerian Permanent Delegation fully informed and they would, in their turn, keep their Prime Minister fully in the picture.

SECRET

PRIORITY NATIONS

CANADIAN CIPHER

Matadi

FM ONUC COQ 052145Z

TO ONUC LEO

AC Paraphrase NOT required. No unclassified reply or reference

BT

SECRET P46 FOR ABBAS FROM POUJOULAT RE YOUR FC215 I MET SSP HALLAM, DSP JAMES AND LT NEWMAN AT COQ AIRPORT AT 1625Z. HAD PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED WITH BOMBOKO FOR THEM TO MEET WITH PRESIDENT. MEETING WITH KASAVUBU HELD AT 1900Z ATTENDED BY GENERAL MOBUTU, MINISTER OF DEFENCE ADOULA BOMBOKO MAJOR EBEYA CAPTAIN MWENDO MISS BRADETTE AND MYSELF. DURING ENTIRE MEETING WHICH LASTED UNTIL 1905Z ATMOSPHERE WAS CORDIAL HOWEVER BOMBOKO AND MOBUTU EXPRESSED GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT OVER CONTENTS YOUR LETTER TO PRESIDENT KASAVUBU CLAMING THAT POINTS NOW UNDER DISCUSSION WERE DETAILS WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN SETTLED BY GARDINER WHEN HE VISITED COQ AND PRIOR TO THE AGREEMENT WHICH WAS REACHED WITH HIM WHICH IN THEIR OPINION WAS I OF BASIC PRINCIPLE. THEY ALSO EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT AFTER HAVING PRESSED THEM SO HARD FOR EARLIEST DESPATCH OF NIGERIAN POLICEMEN TO MATADI WE WERE NOW DELAYING NIGERIANS TRIP BECAUSE OF TECHNICAL DETAILS. I NATURALLY STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF RESUMING ADEQUATE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM AT ONCE AS WELL AS THE NECESSITY OF HAVING MOVEMENT OFFICERS PRESENT AT MATADI TO ENSURE SAFE RECEIPT AND TRANSHIPMENT OF ALL UN SUPPLIES. AFTER HAVING MADE SOME RATHER EMBARRASSING REMARKS GENERAL MOBUTU WAS EXTREMELY HELPFUL AND AGREED TO SEND FOR MAJOR ENGILA MATADI ANC COMMANDING OFFICER, IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN NEW MISSION. MOBUTU PROMISED TO SEND WIRE TO ENGILA

24-26-27/1

SECRET

...../2

TOMORROW MORNING WITH A REQUEST THAT HE TRAVEL TO LEO AND REPORT TO COLONEL IKEMBA WHO WILL THEN BRING HIM TO YOU SINCE MOBUTU EXPRESSED THE DIFFICULTIES WHICH THEY WERE CONFRONTING IN OBTAINING ADEQUATE TRANSPORTATION, I INDICATED THAT SINCE UN PLANE WAS LIKELY TO COME HERE SUNDAY MY P42 REFERS WE WOULD BE QUITE AGREEABLE TO PROVIDE A SEAT FOR MAJOR ENGILA. UPON ARRIVAL HERE GENERAL MOBUTU WILL INFORM ENGILA THAT HE IS TO GO BACK TO MATADI THROUGH LEO WHERE HE WILL PICK UP AND ACCOMPANY CANADIAN TECHNICIANS SO THAT COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT CAN BE TAKEN STOCK OF, DISMANTLED IF NECESSARY AND SENT TO LEO FOR REPAIRS OR REPAIRED THERE. MAJOR ENGILA WILL ALSO BE TOLD BY MOBUTU THAT ONCE COMMUNICATION SYSTEM REESTABLISHED NIGERIAN POLICEMEN WILL COME TO MATADI BEARING ARMS WHICH ARE NECESSARY FOR THEIR NORMAL EXERCISES, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD SPECIFICALLY THAT DURING THEIR NORMAL DUTIES AS POLICEMEN THEY WILL ONLY WEAR BATONS. COLONEL HALLAM GAVE HIS ASSURANCE THAT THIS WOULD BE THE CASE. GOVERNMENT IS ALSO QUITE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE MOVEMENT CONTROL OFFICER BUT YOU MUST INDICATE WHETHER YOU WANT THEM TO GO TO MATADI WITH CANADIAN TECHNICIANS OR WITH NIGERIAN POLICEMEN SO THAT MAJOR ENGILA CAN BE SO INFORMED UNEQUIVOCALLY. FINALLY BOMBOKO REQUESTED THAT SUCH MATTERS BE BROUGHT TO HIS SOLE ATTENTION IN FUTURE AND THAT PRESIDENT SHOULD ONLY BE CONTACTED FOR MATTERS OF HIGHER POLICY. BOMBOKO ASKED ME TO GO AND SEE HIM LATER TONIGHT AND UNLESS THERE ARE NEW AND URGENT ELEMENTS ARISING FROM MY CONVERSATION WITH HIM I WILL ONLY REPORT FURTHER TOMORROW. SINCE MAJOR ENGILA UNLIKELY TO COME BEFORE SUNDAY AND SINCE FURTHER TECHNICAL EXPLANATION REQUIRED BY GOVERNMENT, I HAVE AGREED HALLAM, JAMES AND

NEWMAN COULD RETURN TOMORROW LEAVING COQ 0800Z. HALLAM WILL REPORT IN GREATER DETAIL TONIGHTS MEETING. I HAVE SHOWN THIS MESSAGE TO HALLAM, JAMES, NEWMAN WHO CONCUR. AND END

BT

24-26-27/NL/060120Z APR 61

A-1146

Le 5 mai 1961

Monsieur le Président,

L'officier de l'ANC qui avait été envoyé à Matadi afin de mettre les locaux nécessaires à la disposition de la police nigérienne est revenu ce matin à Léopoldville. Il est venu en compagnie du Colonel Kiembe pour conférer avec moi ainsi qu'avec le Général MacEoin et le Commissaire de police nigérien. L'officier nous a informés qu'il avait trouvé les locaux nécessaires pour les membres de la police nigérienne et qu'il les accompagnerait à Matadi demain 6 mai. Je tiens à vous exprimer ma gratitude, Monsieur le Président, d'avoir bien voulu faire prendre ces dispositions. Mais je ne pense pas que la police nigérienne puisse partir avant que le personnel chargé de la manutention des marchandises soit parti à Matadi pour commencer son travail. Les techniciens nécessaires à Matadi comprennent 8 à 10 membres du Corps des transmissions ainsi que 5 officiers du Contrôle des mouvements. Nous ne pourrons commencer les travaux à Matadi avant que le système des communications soit en place. Une partie de l'équipement que nous possédions à Matadi a été endommagé au cours de l'incident de Matadi, et le bâtiment dans lequel il était monté a subi d'importants dégâts. Nous devons donc faire venir à Léopoldville les éléments d'équipement à réparer et transporter tout l'équipement à un nouvel emplacement. La première mesure à prendre consistera donc à faire accompagner les techniciens canadiens à Matadi par un officier de l'ANC pour organiser le transport par voie ferrée de l'équipement endommagé et trouver un emplacement convenable pour la mise en place de toute la section de transmission. J'espère que l'assistance nécessaire sera accordée à ces techniciens pour les aider à trouver cet emplacement. Après quoi, les 15 techniciens et les membres de la police nigérienne se rendront à Matadi. La seconde mesure consistera à trouver les locaux nécessaires pour le personnel du Corps canadien des transmissions et du Contrôle des mouvements

Son Excellence
Monsieur Joseph Kasa-Vubu
Président de la République du Congo

qui, comme indiqué plus haut, comprend 15 personnes au total. Etant donné qu'après le retour de l'équipement, le transfert de celui-ci du bâtiment détruit dans un nouvel immeuble, ainsi que son montage demanderont un certain temps, je vous serais très reconnaissant, Monsieur le Président, de bien vouloir donner les instructions nécessaires pour que ces dispositions soient prises sans délai.

Au cours des entretiens que j'ai eus avec vous, Monsieur le Président, j'ai toujours souligné l'importance qu'il y avait à ce que les membres de la police nigérienne emportent leurs fusils. La procédure appliquée à Matadi sera identique à celle qui est en vigueur à Léopoldville, à savoir que les membres de la police nigérienne laisseront leurs fusils dans leur cantonnement et accompliront leur tâche dans le port de la même façon que dans les rues et la ville de Léopoldville. La police a besoin de ses fusils pour ses exercices de routine, et l'effet psychologique sur la police elle-même sera bon si elle emporte ses fusils. En tout cas on ne peut considérer que 100 policiers avec 100 fusils constituent une force soupçonnée d'intentions militaires.

Je fais porter cette lettre par le Lieutenant-Colonel Hallam, Commandant en chef de la Police nigérienne, accompagné par le Capitaine James, de la Force nigérienne, qui est Commandant adjoint, ainsi que par un officier canadien du Corps des transmissions. Ils répondront à toutes les questions que vous-même, Monsieur le Président, ou vos Ministres désireront leur poser.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Mekki Abbas
Représentant spécial p.i.
du Secrétaire général

Letter to President Kasa-Vubu 5 May 1961

Mr. President,

The ANC Officer who was sent to Matadi to arrange accommodation for the Nigerian police returned to Leopoldville this morning. He was brought by Colonel Kiembe to meet me, General MacEoin and the Commissioner of the Nigerian Police. The Officer informed us that he had found accommodation for the Nigerian police and that he would accompany them to-morrow, 6 May, to Matadi. I appreciate very much your action, Mr. President, in having such arrangements made. But I do not think that the Nigerian police can go now before the personnel who operate the handling of supplies in Matadi go there to start their work. The technicians required in Matadi are 8 to 10 Canadian Signals plus 5 Movement Control officers. Until the communications system is established, it will not be possible for us to start the work there. The equipment which we had in Matadi was partly damaged during the Matadi incident and the building in which it was erected was severely damaged. Therefore, we have to bring to Leopoldville that part of the quipment which needs repair and we have to move all the equipment to a new site. The first requirement, therefore, will be that an ANC Officer should accompany Canadian technicians to go to Matadi to arrange for the transport by train of the damaged equipment and to look for a suitable place for the erection of all the communication branch. I hope that all necessary assistance with be given to find a suitable place. When this is done, all the 15 technicians and the Nigerian police will move to Matadi. Another requirement will be to find suitable accommodation for the Canadian Signals and the Movement Control personnel which, as I said earlier, total 15 persons. As the return of the

equipment, its transfer from the destroyed building to a new building and its installation there will take time, I will appreciate it very much, Mr. President, if you will issue instructions that arrangements are started forthwith.

I have always during my discussions with you, Mr. President, stressed the importance that the Nigerian police should take their rifles with them. The practice there will be the same as the one followed here in Leopoldville, that is, that the police will leave their rifles in their barracks and they will do their work in the port in the same way as they do ~~their work~~ it in the streets and the town of Leopoldville. The police would need their rifles for their normal drill and the psychological effect on the police themselves will be good if they take their rifles with them. In any case, it can never be considered that 100 police with 100 rifles are going to constitute a force which is going to have any military intentions.

I am sending this letter with Lt.-Col. Hallam, Senior Superintendent in the Nigerian Police Force, who is accompanied by Capt. James of the Nigerian Force, who is Deputy Superintendent and one of the Canadian Signals. They will answer any questions which yourself or your Ministers may like to put to them.

Accept, Mr. President, etc.

Sunday evening
30 April

from Mr. Gardiner

M.

The news of General Mobutu's trip to Matadi with a Nigerian Officer has seriously compromised the more cordial relations that had been established between the Congolese authorities and the United Nations. To wit :

1. During the negotiations conducted between the Acting Special Representative and the President of the Republic on the subject of the return of United Nations personnel to Matadi, there was never any question of the N'Djili Airport.

2. It was never considered that UN personnel would return to Matadi without arms, i.e.,without means of defence. We have always assumed that a unit in charge of communications would be installed at Matadi upon the return of the UN personnel. On the other hand, Congolese authorities have now raised a new question : that of housing of the Nigerian Police.

Unless steps are taken immediately, the Secretary-General will find himself in a very embarrassing situation. In addition, the exchange of letters that constituted the agreement between the President of the Republic of the Congo and the Secretary-General of the United Nations and that was the subject of persistent questions on the part of several members of the United Nations, has now become known to a certain number of the members of the Consultative Committee and United Nations members, and if Congolese authorities now refuse to implement the agreement, they could be accused of bad faith.

La nouvelle du déplacement à Matadi du Général Mobutu et d'un officier nigérien a sérieusement compromis les relations plus cordiales qui s'étaient établies entre les autorités congolaises et l'ONU. En effet:

1. Dans les négociations que le Représentant Spécial par interim et le Président de la République du Congo ont menées au sujet du retour du personnel de l'ONU à Matadi, il n'a jamais été question de l'aéroport de N'Djili.

2. Il n'a jamais été envisagé que le personnel de l'ONU retourne à Matadi sans armes, c'est à dire sans moyens de défense. Nous avons toujours présumé qu'une unité chargée des communications serait installée à Matadi lors du retour du personnel de l'ONU. D'autre part, les autorités congolaises ont soulevé maintenant une question nouvelle: celle du logement de la police nigérienne.

A moins que des mesures ne soient prises immédiatement, le Secrétaire général se trouvera dans une situation très embarrassante. De plus, l'échange de lettres qui constituait un accord entre le Président de la République du Congo et le Secrétaire général de l'ONU et qui a fait l'objet de questions persistantes de la part de plusieurs membres de l'ONU est certainement parvenu maintenant à la connaissance d'un certain nombre de membres du Comité consultatif et de membres de l'ONU, et si les autorités congolaises refusent maintenant d'appliquer l'accord, elles pourraient être accusées de mauvaise foi.

OUTGOING CODE

OK / Rom

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 27 April 1961

No : A-1068

Ahmed tells me that discussions began to-day about receiving the supplies which have already arrived in Leo from OTRACO. OTRACO and our Movement Control staff have come to an agreement which our staff regard as very reasonable. By this arrangement, OTRACO will begin to deliver the supplies to us about 2nd of May. In spite of the fact that Ahmed thinks that this is satisfactory, I have instructed him not to relax his efforts of buying supplies from outside and bringing them by the quickest possible means. My reason is that I do not want to be faced suddenly with very serious shortage of supplies in case the Congolese go back on their word and stop OTRACO handing over the supplies to us. I hope this has your approval, otherwise I will issue further instructions to Ahmed.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

MOST IMMEDIATE

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 26 April 1961

No : A- 1061, 1062

In my A-1058 I informed you that Commissioner Edett, Major Bouffard and Superintendent Willis were accompanied by three Canadian Signals personnel. The fact, as I know it now, is that only the first three officers went to Matadi and that the three Canadian Signals personnel were not allowed to go. When Mobutu asked at the airport this morning how many people would be going, Major Bouffard, who was making all the arrangements with Mobutu's ADC, told him that six people would be going. Mobutu said that the agreement was that only two officers would be going. It was only on the insistence of Major Bouffard that Superintendent Willis was allowed to accompany the two officers.

On arrival at Matadi airport they were met by General Mobutu and the reception was excellent. After that, they crossed the river with General Mobutu and drove to the ANC Camp. The three officers were driven by an ANC driver in a separate car. At the ANC Camp General Mobutu addressed his troops in Lingala. The troops were estimated at 400 on parade and about 80 loose standing around. Judging by references to ONU and police nigérienne, the officers gathered that he had informed his men about the impending arrival of the Nigerian police. After his address, he answered questions from his troops.

After the parade the officers accompanied Mobutu to his ANC Headquarters where they had a meeting with him and about 30 ANC officers. At this meeting, the three officers wanted to clear several points.

The first point was related to the question of the policing of the port area. Over this one, it was agreed that looking after the port area was a purely police function and that the Nigerians could be there.

The second point was about the question of the police going to Matadi with their rifles. In spite of the fact that it was made clear to

Mobutu that these rifles could be taken in boxes and would not be used while on duty at the port but that they would only be used on normal police parades, he insisted that the Nigerians should not bring with them any arms at all. Over this point we was uncompromising.

The third point was about the question of accommodation. On this point Mobutu referred the officers to the Civil Administrator who was also present at this meeting. When the question was put to the Administrator, he informed the officers that usual UN practice has been that UN troops on arrival live in tents until accommodation is found for them. At a later meeting after lunch, Mobutu said that the whole question of accommodation could be raised at a meeting which he would like to have with us on Saturday.

Mobutu then raised with the officers the question of the presence of the ANC troops at N'Djili and he gave them to understand that the dispatch of Nigerian police to Matadi would only be agreed to if we allow the stationing at N'Djili of an ANC force equal in number to the UN force stationed at the airport. Mobutu then told the officers that while he was confident that there would be no difficulty about the security of the Nigerian police as far as the ANC were concerned, he became doubtful after arrival in Matadi about the attitude of the civilian population which he considered to be hostile. He said this was not his business and he thought that the politicians had cleared that point. However, he said that he would be holding a meeting at the city stadium the next day, Thursday, at which he would address the civilian population and try to calm them down. He will come with the results of his meetings and his impression when we meet him on Saturday.

Mobutu himself did not raise the question of the Blatchford but Major Bouffard, who was instructed not to open the question of the Blatchford unless he was asked by Mobutu, asked him about the arrangements for the repatriation of the Indonesians. Mobutu took his previous stand that they should be repatraited from Boma or from a point near it.

When the question of the Canadian Signals was raised, Mobutu was in agreement but the Administrator intervened and said that he would be dead against any establishment of Canadian communications there.

The reason for Mobutu's absence until Saturday is that he is making his normal tour of inspection in Bas Congo.

Naturally Commissioner Edett is worried about the security of his police if they go without their rifles and without UN communications and I myself share his views because when I spoke to Acting Inspector General Hodge who was here recently and who expressed to me the anxiety of the Federal Prime Minister about the security of the Nigerian police, I told him that I was certain that they would be secure, but if the Congolese authorities insist on such conditions I would not be so sure about the safety of the Nigerians.

I am afraid that the hopes which I expressed to you in my 1058, which I drafted a little over an hour ago, have been completely shattered. I think if Kasa-Vubu agrees with the stand whihc Mobutu is maintaining, particularly about the arms of the police, N'Djili, the communications and also accommodation, we are back where we started and we must face the fact that in spite of all our efforts we have failed to reach any acceptable agreement.

With the President and all his Ministers away in Coquilhatville, fully occupied with their political troubles, I do not expect Kasa-Vubu back before Mobutu returns on Saturday.

Since I have been having all the negotiations with Kasa-Vubu, I do not intend to enter into any discussion with Mobutu. He can meet MacEoin on Saturday for a discussion, but I shall ask MacEoin not to enter into any bargaining or to raise the question of N'Djili or any other of the problems which are in the mind of Mobutu.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK MOST IMMEDIATE

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLOVILLE

Date : 26 April 1961

No : A-1058

I received following cable from Poujoulat in Coquilhatville:

"Bomboko held press conference at 1230 and told journalists about agreement reached with UN re Matadi. He also disclosed Mobutu's visit to-day to Matadi in company of two UN officers prior to occupation of port by Nigeria Police. Bomboko also told press UN was authorised to draw supplies from OTRACO Leo. He told me that formal announcement along the above would be made over radio this evening by President Kasa-Vubu. I told him I would advise you immediately also asking if he saw objections you making similar announcement at your discretion. He has none."

The only repugnant thing which Bomboko told the press is that "UN was authorized to draw supplies from OTRACO Leo". The correct version should have been that OTRACO was authorized to hand supplies over to UN but, as I told you in my previous cable, they would naturally like to say something which enhances their prestige locally. Since we have written documents exchanged, I do not think I should formally comment on this.

On the strength of this announcement I have authorized our Movement Control here to contact OTRACO and to start receiving from them the supplies which are already in Leo. I made it clear that the supplies that are now in Matadi should not be received in Leo but taking over at the port should await the establishment of our organization in Matadi.

This morning Mobutu went in his own plane ahead of our team which was scheduled to reach Matadi ten minutes after Mobutu and after that they will start their discussions and I hope they will come back with a plan for the sending of our technicians and the police to the port. The team which went consists of Nigerian Police Commissioner Edett (a Nigerian) and Assistant Commissioner Nigerian Police Willis (British) and Major Bouffard (Canadian Officer). They were accompanied by three Canadian Signals personnel, namely, Lt. Newman, Sgt. Botaill and Sgt. Beldotcie. Commissioner Edett and Major

Bouffard return to-night, leaving Assistant Commissioner Willis in Matadi who will be followed by Nigerian Police. He will be making arrangements for their accommodation etc.

Let us hope that this is going to be a good start and that the temporary agreement will be implemented in good faith and in a satisfactory way to us.

Mr. H. Ahmed, Chief Administrative Officer

Mekki Abbas, Acting Special Representative

Matadi

This is to inform you that I have reached agreement with President Kasa-Vubu about the U.N. return to Matadi. Two officers, one of them a Canadian Major and the other a Nigerian Police Officer, accompanied by the Nigerian Commissioner of Police here, a Nigerian Police Sergeant and some Canadian Signals went to Matadi this morning. They will be met there by General Mobutu who went ahead of them. They will be making arrangements for the return to Matadi of some 100 Nigerian Police and will be responsible for guarding U.N. supplies at the port, control Movement Personnel, and Canadian Signals.

Pending the setting up of the organization there and starting to receive goods from OTRACO in Matadi, you are hereby authorized to contact OTRACO in Leopoldville and receive from them the supplies which have already been transported to Leopoldville. Supplies which are still in Matadi and which will be coming from now onwards should await the establishment of our organization there as they should be taken over in Matadi and dealt with in the same manner as we used to deal with our goods prior to the eviction of our organization from the port.

FLASH

NNNNUC065

CUC 009

PRIORITE NATION

CUA

DE CUC 009/26

FM ONUC COQ

TO MR MEKKI ABBAS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE LEO

BT

UNCLAS BOMBOKO ANNOUNCED AGREENENT SENDING UNARMED NIGERIAN TROOPS TO MATADI STOP 2 UN OFFICERS LEAVING WITH MOBUTU AN UN GOODS UNLOCKED STOP TSHOMBE LEAVING RIGHT NOW FOR KATANGA SAID CONFERENCE IS TRYING TO CREATE NEW STATES AND FORGET SERIOUS PROBLEMS/LEAVES DOOR OPEN FOR FUTURE TALKS/OTHER LEADERS JEALOUS BECAUSE OF KATANGA PROGRESS/IF INDIAN TROOPS SHOULD START FIGHTING WOULD ALERT THE WHOLE POPULATION AGAINST THEM/EVEN HERE POPULATION COQ IS FOR HIM AND IF HE WOULD SPEAK AGAINST BUT IS WILLING TO HELP HIS BROTHERS ECONOMICALLLY BY EXCHANGE OF GOODS AND EVEN WILLING TO PAY HIGHER PRICES PRESSENTIAL GOODS FROM OTHER PROVINCES TSHOMBE WAS ESCORTED TO THE AIRPORT BY PROVINCIAL PRESIDENT EKITEBE

JACQUES LARGE

BT

CFN 2

26/1205Z APR CUC

RECEIVED
1224 Z
REFER QUERIES
HQ ONUC
MESSAGE CENTRE

SECRET

PRIORITY NATIONS

CANADIAN CIPHER

FM ONUC COQ 270740Z

TO ONUC LEO

AC Paraphrase NOT required. No unclassified reply or reference

BT

SECRET. P7 ABBAS FROM POUJOULAT

REUR CV57 EYE HAVE SEEN BOMBOKO EARLY THIS MORNING WHO TOLD ME THAT BECAUSE OF PRESSURE OF WORK AT CONFERENCE PRESIDENT WAS UNABLE TO MAKE PROMISED ANNOUNCEMENT. BOMBOKO INDICATED ANNOUNCEMENT IS READY AND HE IS CALLING A PRESS CONFERENCE THIS MORNING WHICH EYE SHALL ATTEND. ANNOUNCEMENT WILL MOST LIKELY BE MADE THEN BY BOMBOKO. ANNOUNCEMENT HAS YET TO BE CLEARED WITH PRESIDENT KASAVUBU BUT IN ANY CASE BOMBOKO ASSURES ME THAT IT WILL BE MADE TODAY EITHER BY HIM AS INDICATED ABOVE OR BY PRESIDENT HIMSELF.

AND END

BT

2/NL/AT/260900Z APRIL 61

SECRET

OUTGOING CODE **FLASH**

TO : ONUC, COQUILHATVILLE for POUJOULAT

FROM : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

DATE : 25 APRIL 1961

NO : CV-57

WE HAVE NO REPEAT NO INFORMATION HERE THAT PRESIDENT KASA-VUBU HAS MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT ABOUT MATADI WHICH HE PROMISED ME YESTERDAY THAT HE WOULD MAKE TO-DAY. PLEASE CONTACT PRESIDENT KASA-VUBU OR BOMBOKO AND SAY THAT WHILE I APPRECIATE THAT THEY ARE VERY BUSY WITH THEIR CONFERENCE, I FEEL THAT THE DELAY IN MAKING THIS ANNOUNCEMENT IS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF EITHER PARTY AND GET A FIRM PROMISE FROM THEM THAT THEY WILL DO IT RIGHT AWAY. PLEASE SAY THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ANNOUNCEMENT FROM THEM I SHOULD HAVE THEIR PERMISSION TO SAY THAT WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT AND ALSO TO PROCEED WITH CLEARING FROM OTRACO THE SUPPLIES WHICH HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO LEO. PLEASE ALSO SAY THAT AS THE TWO OFFICERS WILL BE GOING TO-MORROW EARLY WITH GENERAL MOBUTU TO MATADI, THIS WILL START SPECULATION AND WE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP THE NEWS ABOUT THE AGREEMENT SECRET ANY LONGER. PLEASE CABLE THE RESULTS OF YOUR CONTACT MOST IMMEDIATELY.

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 24 April 1961

No : A-1048

I have just returned from Coquilhatville where I had a meeting with Kasa-Vubu. The memorandum which I sent to him has been accepted and it is now agreed that their memorandum to me and mine to them constitute the temporary agreement on Matadi. Mobutu told MacEoin to-day that he would not be going to Matadi to-morrow but would go on Wednesday. This delay suits us because the Nigerian Head of the Police arrives here to-morrow from Lagos and it will be he who will accompany General Mobutu together with Canadian Major Bouffard. Kasa-Vubu promised that by mid-day to-morrow he will make the announcement from Coquilhatville to his people telling them about the agreement and the dispatch of the Nigerian Police to Matadi. I agreed with them that after the announcement is made we will begin to receive from OTRACO the supplies which have been brought to Leo. They promised that in the morning they would contact OTRACO and give them instructions. No doubt Kasa-Vubu would like to say, apart from something to calm down the feelings in Matadi, something which the politicians usually say for internal consumption. I therefore promised them that I was not going to make any announcement to the press until they had made their announcement. You will recall that I had agreed to this in the early days of our discussions.

Both Kasa-Vubu and Bomboko and Adoula who was with us at this meeting showed great anxiety about the Dutch boat about which I cabled you earlier to-day which, it is alleged, is carrying arms and ammunition for Tshombe. I told them about my cable to you and that you would no doubt take the necessary action with the Dutch delegation. They asked me to cable you again so that the Brazzaville authorities do not allow this ship to unload its cargo at Pointe Noire. I explained that you would naturally do this because the Member States are not only required by the resolution not to supply arms but also not to allow transit of arms and ammunition through their territories.

I have not had the pleasure of seeing either Tshombe or Kalonji. But both Khiari and Martin who were with me on this trip had a chat with Adoula who told them that Tshombe will be doing his best not only to torpedo any rapprochement with Orientale but also to try and strain relationships between the UN and Kasa-Vubu. Fortunately for the UN, Kasa-Vubu, Bomboko and the others appear to be determined to make a firm stand against Tshombe this time. Adoula also told Khiari that this morning they had a long argument as to who should be entitled to attend the Round-Table Conference. Tshombe took the line that only those who attended the Tananarive Conference should be entitled to attend. Kasa-Vubu and his team argued for a wider representation at this conference so that as many as possible of the political leaders of the Congo should attend, hence their insistence that Gizenga should be represented. Sendwe has now arrived at Coquilhatville. It is interesting to note that Delvaux has remained behind in Leo.

Tickner sent us a cable to say that Lundulla has inquired if we have a plane going to Coquilhatville to-day or to-morrow. The answer was no and Lundulla did not press the point. But because Kasa-Vubu asked me to send a further message to Gizenga inviting him to come, I cabled Tickner saying that if a request is made by Gizenga or the presidents or vice-presidents of Orientale and Kivu, I would be prepared to assist them by providing transport.

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 22 April 1961

No : A-1041

I handed this morning the memorandum sent in your 2804 with the omission of the word "only" which you suggested in your 2821. I gave the memorandum to Kasongo who is Minister of State under Bomboko and who is the only one left here after the others went yesterday to Coquilhatville. He said he would contact the President immediately and let me know whether it will be necessary for me to go and see him personally or to send Khiari and Martin. MacEoin and I are also seeing Mobutu in half an hour's time. Will keep you informed.

MEMORANDUM

Le Représentant spécial par intérim du Secrétaire général note que dans le mémorandum qu'il a reçu le 21 avril 1961, la République du Congo accepte sans réserve la nécessité et le droit, pour l'opération des Nations Unies au Congo, de faire stationner à Matadi des éléments militaires de l'ONU pour la protection de ses stocks et de ses lignes de ravitaillement. Il en a avisé le Secrétaire général.

Le Représentant spécial par intérim note aussi, et en a informé le Secrétaire général, que la République du Congo accepte en principe qu'une centaine de membres de la police nigérienne soit envoyée à Matadi dès que l'atmosphère locale le permettra.

Comme suite à la suggestion énoncée dans le mémorandum, où la République du Congo indiquait aussi son désir de voir prendre des mesures immédiates pour appliquer les points d'accord, l'ONU accepte de désigner sans délai deux officierx, dont l'un appartiendra à la police nigérienne et qui, avec le Général Mobutu, se rendront en inspection à Matadi pour y préparer l'entrée d'éléments de la police nigérienne.

Si l'ONU, il convient de l'indiquer clairement, prend cette décision d'envoyer les deux officiers à Matadi, c'est parce qu'elle compte fermement qu'il s'agit là d'une mesure qui mènera rapidement à une solution complète du problème de Matadi, ce qui, bien entendu, signifie le retour - dans les conditions jugées nécessaires par le Commandement - du personnel de l'ONU dans ce port en application du principe énoncé par le Congo et noté plus haut.

A cet égard, bien que je note que votre mémorandum ne précise pas spécifiquement que les mesures envisagées sont de caractère purement provisoire, il est évident que, puisqu'elle a reconnu la nécessité et le droit mentionnés au premier paragraphe de son mémorandum, la République du Congo reconnaît aussi le caractère temporaire de ces mesures.

Manifestement, il est souhaitable que l'entrée de la police nigérienne à Matadi se fasse aussi rapidement que possible, selon ce qui pourra être convenu entre les deux parties. En ce qui concerne les étapes et le moment de l'entrée de la police nigérienne à Matadi, je dois attirer votre attention sur le fait que le navire américain BLATCHFORD arrivera dans le port de Matadi le 28 avril pour y embarquer le personnel et le matériel du contingent indonésien, qui est sur le point d'être rapatrié. Il est indispensable qu'à ce moment la police nigérienne se trouve à Matadi en effectifs satisfaisants.

Léopoldville, le 22 avril 1961.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : ABBAS

FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL

DATE : 21 APRIL 1961

NUMBER : 2793 2794

Reference A-1032-33 .

1. We hope that this latest reply from congolese side may be properly interpreted as opening the door, at least a little more, on Matadi question.

2. The reference to 200 police in para 3 of our 2787 was not a mistake but was dictated by our interpretation that Nigerian police, if they would go to Matadi, might insist on going as a unit and not being split up. As a unit, of course , they would feel and would be more secure. But we do not press it now. We had noted in your A-932 an indication of possible reluctance on their part to serve anywhere but Leo.

3. Your views in 1033 are taken most seriously and we wish you to have as much latitude as overall circumstances will allow in carrying forward your discussions.

4. As aye follow-up to reply you have received, I propose that your response follow lines indicated below. Subject, of course to any revisions that you might wish to suggest. The form of your response would again be a memo. Thus, the congolese memo and yours in reply, if acceptable to them would be taken as constituting an agreement, and the congolese should be so informed.

5. Memo follows.

" The acting special representative of the Secretary-General notes that in the memorandum received by him on 21 April 1961, the Republic of the Congo accepts fully the necessity and the right of the United Nations operation in the Congo to have stationed at Matadi UN military elements for the protection of its stocks and of its supply lines. He has notified the Secretary-General of this.

It is further noted and has been reported to the Secretary-General that the Republic of the Congo agrees in principle that a hundred or so Nigerian police be sent to Matadi as soon as the local atmosphere permits.

In pursuance of the suggestion put forth in the memo, which indicated also the desire of the Republic of the Congo for immediate steps toward implementing points of agreement, the United Nations agrees to designate

without delay, two officers, one of whom will be of the Nigerian police, who, together with General Mobutu, will make a tour of inspection of Matadi as preparation for the entry of elements of the Nigerian police.

The step of sending the two officers to Matadi is taken, it must be clear, on the basis of a firm expectation that it is a measure which will lead quickly to a full solution of the problem of Matadi, which, of course, means the return, as deemed necessary by the command, of United Nations personnel to that port in implementation of the principle set out by the Congo and noted above.

In this regard, although it is observed that your memo makes no specific mention of the fact that the measures suggested are of a purely interim nature, it is obvious from the recognition of the necessity and right given in its first paragraph that the Republic of the Congo also agrees with the temporary nature of these measures.

Obviously, it is desirable to have the entry of the Nigerian police into Matadi accomplished as speedily as possible, as may be agreed between the two parties. As to the factor of the stages and timing of the entry of the Nigerian police into Matadi, I must draw to your attention that the United States ship Blatchford will be arriving in the port of Matadi on 28 April for the purpose of loading the personnel and equipment of the Indonesian contingent, which is being repatriated. It is essential that the Nigerian police will be in Matadi by that time in satisfactory number."

6. The spirit of our message of last night (2787) stands, of course. Orally you should make it clear that in the absence of such a safeguard, the Republic of the Congo would have to assume full responsibility for the safety of the ship and for United Nations personnel vis à vis both the government of the United States and the United Nations

7. French translation of memo will be sent soonest.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : ABBAS
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 21 APRIL 1961
NUMBER : 2804

Further to 2793 - 4, french text of memo follows :

" Le Représentant Spécial par intérim du Secrétaire-Général note que dans le mémorandum qu'il a recu le 21 Avril 1961, la République du Congo accepte sans réserve la nécessité et le droit, pour l'opération des Nations Unies au Congo, de faire stationner à Matadi des éléments militaires de l'ONU pour la protection de ses stocks et de ses lignes de ravitaillement. Il en a avisé le Secrétaire-Général.

Le Représentant Special par intérim note aussi, et en a informé le Secrétaire-Général, que la république du Congo accepte en principe qu'une centaine de membres de la police Nigérienne soit envoyée à Matadi dès que l'atmosphère locale le permettra.

Comme suite à la suggestion enoncée dans le mémorandum, ou la République du Congo indiquait aussi son désir de voir prendre des mesures immédiates pour appliquer les points d'accord, l'ONU accepte de désigner sans délai deux officiers, dont l'un appartiendra à la police Nigérienne et qui, avec le Général Mobutu, se rendront en inspection à Matadi pour y préparer l'entrée d'éléments de la police Nigérienne.

Si l'ONU, il convient de l'indiquer clairement, prend cette décision d'envoyer les deux officiers à Matadi, c'est ~~uniquement~~ parce qu'elle compte fermementqu'il s'agit là d'une mesure qui mènera rapidement à une solution complete du problème de Matadi, ce qui, bien entendu, signifie le retour - dans les conditions jugées nécessaires par le commandement - du personnel de l'ONU dans ce port en application du principe énoncé par le Congo et noté plus haut.

A cet égard, bien que je note que votre memorandum ne précise pas spécifiquement que les mesures envisagées sont de caractère purement provisoire, il est évident que, puisqu'elle a reconnu la nécessité et le droit mentionnés au premier paragraphe de son mémorandum, la République du Congo reconnait aussi le caractère temporaire de ces mesures.

Manifestement, il est souhaitable que l'entrée de la police Nigérienne à Matadi se fasse aussi rapidement que possible, selon ce qui pourra être convenu entre les deux parties. En ce qui concerne les étapes et le moment de l'entrée de la police Nigérienne à Matadi, je dois attirer votre attention sur le fait que le navire Américain Blatchford arrivera dans le port de Matadi le 28 Avril pour y embarquer le personnel et le matériel du contingent Indonésien, qui est sur le point d'être rapatrié. Il est indispensable qu'à ce moment - la police Nigérienne se trouve à Matadi en effectifs satisfaisants.

CONF

DR BUNCHE OT ARRIVED YET

TRANSMITTED
O.N.U.C.

QRA QRA

1961 APR 21

SRI

21:49

HR DR BUNCHE

THE SUBJECT IS MATADI. NOTING YOUR SUGGESTION OF ADVISABILITY OF A TELEX TALK IN YOUR CABLE OF TTEAY FRIDAY CONCERNING MATADI THE SECRETARYGENERAL ASKED THAT IT BE ARRANGED . UNFORTUN

UNFORTUNATELY HE IS NOW TIED UP TIGHTLY IN GENERAL ASSEMBLY MEETINGS - WE ARE TRYING DESPERATELY TO WIND UP THE FIFTEENTH SESSION BEFORE DAWN TOMORROW - HE AXX HAS ASKED ME TO TALK WITH YOU IN HIS PLACE

WE HAVE BEEN GIVING MOST SERIOUS ATTENTION TO YOUR TWO MESSAGES AXX TODAY ON MATADI AND A FULL MESSAGE ON THATT SUBJECT IS EVEN NOW ONRXXX ON ROUTE TO YOUI IIBELIEVE THAT YOU WILL FIND IT XXX WILL FIND THAT IT MEETS YOUR POINTS QUITE FULLYXXX FULLY BOTH IN TODAYS MEESSAGES AND IN THAT OF TENTH OF APRIL REFERRING TO THE IMPORTANCE OF A MARGIN FOR DISCUSSION.

IN THIS LATTER REGARD I WOULD LIKE TO STRESS THAT WE HERE FULLY REALISE THE DIFFICULTY OF YOUR POSITION IN NEGOTIATING ON THIS TOUGH SUBJECT UNDER CERTAIN UNAVOIDABLE LIMITATIONS WHICH OF COURSE WOULD APPLY TO ANY ONE IN YOUR SEAT. WUTHXXX WITHIN THESE LIMITATIONS WHICH ARE THOSE SPRINGING FROM THE FACT AHTXXX THAT THIS IS THE UN, THE OTHER PARTY IS NOT ANY OF US BUT THE UN WHICH MEANS GOVERNMENTS AND DELEGATIONS AND ALL ATTENDED RISKS. I COULD ADD HERE THAT THE SECRETARYGENERAL HAS HIMSELF OUT ON A LIMB ON THE MATADI QUESTION AND HE HIMSELF IN YOUR SPOT COULD NOT WISELY GO FURTHER THAN YOU ARE GOING. I AM SURE THAT YOU UNDERSTAND AND THAT MORE THAN THIS YOU KNOW THAT WE ARE ALL FOR YOU AND BACKING YOU TO THE HILT

AS TO THE MESSAGE ON ROUTE I CAN GIVE YOU A BROAD IDEA WITHOUT VIOLATING SECURITY. IT PROPOSES THAT YOU REPLY TO THE MEMO RECEIVED THIS MORNING WITH ANOTHER MEMO . THIS EXCHANGE OF MEMOS , ASSUMING THE ACCEPTABILITY OF YOURS, WOULD BE REGARDED AS AN AGREEMENT. YOUR REPLY WOULD TAKE NOTES OF CONGOLESE ACCEPTANCE OF THE ''NECESSITY AND RCGHT'' OF OUR BEING STATIONED IN MATADI AND ALSO THE ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE OF THE STATIONING OF NIGERIAN POLICE. WE DO NOT PRESS FOR THE HIGHER FIGURE TO WHICH YOU ALLUDED.

WE ONLY WISH ASSURANCE THAT THE NIGERIAN POLICE UNITS WOULD BE WILLING TO GO ON A DIVIDED BASIS. THE REPLY ALSO STRESSES THE INTERIM NATURE OF THESE ARRANGEMENTS AND ASSUMES RECOGNITION OF THIS BY THE OTTHER PARTY. THE FORMULA AS TO TIME IS ''AS SPEEDILY AS POSSIBLE AS AGREED BETWEEN THE PARTIES'' WHICH YOU WILL RECOGNIZE. TIED TO THIS FORMULA OF COURSE, IS THE IMPENDING ARRIVAL OF THE BLATCHFORD ON THE 28TH AND // THE ESSENTIAL FACT THAT A SATISFACTORY NUMBER OF POLICE SHOULD BE THERE AT THAT TIME. YOU OF COURSE WILL WISH TO STRESS THAT THERE MUST BE NO SNAGS WITH REGARD TO THE ARRIVAL OF THE BLATCHFORD AND ITS SOJOURN AT MATADI AND WITH THE LOADING ONTO IT OF THE INDONEESIANS BEING REPATRIATED. THERE MUST OF COURSE BE SOME TANGIBLE EVIDENCE FXX TOWARD A SOLUTION OF THE MATADI PROBLEM. THIS OF COURSE CAN BE RECONCILED WITH AN APPROACH IN STAGES PROVIDING THE TIME FACLOR XXXXX FACTOR IS NOT STRAINED TOO MUCH.

THAT IS THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF IT AND WE HOPE THAT IT WILL SERVE YOUR PURPOSES , SUITS YOU AND PRODUCE SOME FRUITS. N-G CONCURØ IN IT FULLY. WILL APPRECIATE YOUR COMMENTS OR QUESTIONS ..

OVER..

THANK YOU. WHAT YOU SAY IS VERY ENCOURAGINGNANXXX AND WE ALL WISH YOU THE VERY BEST. I SHOULD HAVE MENTIONED THAT OUR PROPOSED MEMO ALSO AGREES ON THE PRELIMINARY TOUR OF INSPECTIONIBYXXX INSPECTION BY THE TWO OFFICERS AND THE GENERAL AS A MEANS OF IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION. I WISH TO ADD ALSO THAT THE USUAL EFFORTS FOR BACKSTOPPING IN YOUR FIELD ARE BEING EXERTED HERE. THAT COVERS THE GROUND FROM OUR STANDPOINT. DO YOU FURTHER COMMENTS OR ANY QUESTIONS?

OVER..

VIN CONCLUDING I HAVE ONLY TWO COMMENTS, THE FIRST BEING PURELY PERSONAL IN EXPRESSING MY GREAT ADMIRATION FOR YOUR SPLEN

DID WORK UNDER INDESCRIBABLY DIFFICULT CONDITIONS THE OTHER TO EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE PEOPLE IN LEO WILL SEE HOW BENEFITIALXXX BENEFICIAL A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION LEADING SOLIDLY TO AN AXX EARLY COMPLETE SOLUTION OF THE MATADI ISSUE WILL ACTUALLY BE TO THEM AND TO THE CONGO. THAT IS ALL . GOOD NIGHT AND GOOD LUCK AND GREETINGS TO ALL OF MY FORMER COLLABORATORS IN THAT ARENA.

OVER..

THANKS VERY MUCH

NOTHING MORE

END OF CONFERENCE..

2145GMT

.. ANSMITTED
O.N.U.C.

1961 APR 21 21:50

THANKS YOU VERY MUH I ALSO HOPE WITH YOU THAT IT WILL PRODUCE SOME FRUITS STOP I THINK YOUR POSITION NOW IS VERY HELPFULL AND I WILL DO MY BEST TOMORROW ON RECEIPT OF YOUR FULL MESSAGE STOP I CABLES YOU TNITE TO SAY THAT ALL RESPONSABLE PEOPLE THAT IS THE PRESIDENT AND ALL HIS MINISTERS HAVE GONE TO COQUILHATVILLE STOP IF NECESSARY I WILL FLY THERE AND HAVE A DISCUSSION WITH THE PRESIDENT STOP I THINK THAT NOW WE WILL STAND A GOOD CHANCHE OF THE BLATCHFORD COMING TO MATAG X X X TO MATADI I THINK TAT WITH THIS NEW APPROACH TIMBERLAKE AND X X TIMBERLAKE ESCOTT WILL GIVE ME FULL SUPPORT STOP TIMBERLAKE WILL OF COURSE PUT ALL HIS WEIGHT ON THE SAFETY OF THE BLATCHFORD AND ITS CREW STOP I WILL CABLE EARLIEST IN THE MORNING IF I HAVE TO GO TO COQUILHATVILLE BUT I A M SURE WITH THE MARGING YOU ARE GIVING ME WE MUST BE ABLE A X X X ABLE TO REACH A SOLUTION THANK YOU VERY MUCH OVER

NO THANKS YOU NO FURTHER COMMENTS OR QUESTIONS FOR NOW ALL I WANT TO ASSURE YOU OF IS THAT WE ALL OF US HERE ARE DOING OUR BEST AND LETS HOPE THAT WITH YOUR SUPPORT WE WILL JUMPS OVER THIS HURDELL QUIET SAFELY BECAUSE I AM SURE THAT ONCE WE LEAVE IT BEHIND THE CONGOLESE AND OURSELF WILL WORK TOGETHER TO SEE THAT THIS OPERATION IS FINISHED ON THE BEST OF TERMS STOP I MUST ALSO THANK YOU ALL FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION OF MY PERSONAL PROBLEMS OVER

THANKS YOU VERY MUCH RALPH THE GREATEST TROUBLE HERE IS FEAR IF WE CAN MAKE THEM FEEL CONFIDENT THAT THERE IS NOTHING TO FEAR I AM SURE WE WILL SUCCEED MY BEST REGARDS TO ALL OF YOU AND AS I KNOW I HAVE YOUR THOUGHTS I WOULD LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT YOU HAVE MINE GOOD NIGHT AND BEST OF LUCK TO YOU MY REGARDS TO YOUR FAMILY OVER

OPR FROM OPR END OF CONFERENCE

OUTGOING CODE MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 21 April 1961

No : A-1032, 1033

The following was sent to us this morning in reply to my last memorandum :

"La République du Congo constate qu'il y a accord avec le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général sur la nécessité et le droit pour l'ONU de disposer à Matadi d'un effectif militaire limité pour la protection des stocks et des voies de ravitaillement de l'ONUC.

La République du Congo a marqué son accord de principe pour qu'un groupe de Police Nigérienne d'une centaine d'hommes se rende à Matadi, dès que l'atmosphère psychologique, qui y règne en ce moment, rendra cette mesure possible.

Les seules réserves de la République ont porté sur le caractère immédiat de ce retour et sur la responsabilité qu'assumerait l'ONUC en procédant prématurément au renvoi de forces à Matadi.

Désireux de donner suite sans délai à la mise en vigueur de l'accord qui existe sur ce point, le Gouvernement de la République prie le Représentant spécial du Secrétaire général de désigner deux Officiers, dont l'un au moins appartiendrait aux Forces de Police nigériennes, qui seraient mis en rapport avec le Général Mobutu, en vue de l'accompagner dans une visite d'inspection, à laquelle il procéderait incessamment à Matadi.

A la suite de cette visite, les modalités et la date de l'envoi à Matadi du contingent de Police nigérienne pourront être fixées de commun accord."

As you see, they maintain their previous stand about the signing of the memorandum which you sent me under your 2261-2262.

With regard to relationships with OTRACO and the principles involved, you are fully informed about our position with this firm and, therefore, you are in a much better position than myself to decide whether or not taking over from them all urgently needed items already in Leo would compromise the principle involved without prejudice to our future position on Matadi supplies. Therefore, I feel I must receive instructions from you. My view is that any dealings with OTRACO will definitely compromise the principle.

With regard to your para 3, I have made several attempts this morning to see Kasa-Vubu but I am told his time-table is so full up that he will not be able to see me. He leaves for Coquilhatville at 1300 hours. I would be quite prepared to take the first opportunity to go and see him in Coquilhatville and to inform him about your latest offer given in para 3. I am convinced, however, that he will not agree to sending the entire Nigerian police contingent by 27 April. My conviction is based on his previous stand, which he still maintains, that the sending of the police should be staggered. Again, as I said to you in an earlier cable, he will definitely regard this as a further ultimatum. If I am correct in my belief, the result of his refusal will, I imagine, be that you take the matter up in New York either to the Security Council or by the publication of all the documents, which will prove to the world his intransigent stand. This is all very well, but I ask myself the question, how much is it going to help the easing of our supply position and the coming of the Blatchford? I would like you to read again my A-928-931, particularly the part which starts with "My assessment of the situation and my views are as follows " to the end of the cable. I really believe that if I have your approval to negotiate on these lines and to have room for discussions and manoeuvres, I may reach some practical results. If, on the other hand, you insist that I should approach Kasa-Vubu on the lines of your para 3 of 2787,

I will certainly carry out the instructions and support them with all the important arguments that we have.

May I also say that we have already gone a long way to meet Kasa-Vubu and gave him a very generous compromise. It is definitely most regrettable that he has not accepted it. But our insisting on all the Nigerian police being there by the 27th can mean one of two things: either that this force of about 100 Nigerians can protect the Blatchford and our supplies against any attack by the ANC, or that we can argue that if all the police force goes, we have not compromised our principle. With regard to the first point, I feel that if we have 10 policemen or 100 policemen, we cannot do anything to stop any attack. In fact, we have asked Kasa-Vubu to guarantee the security of all the policemen when they reach Matadi. As far as the second point is concerned, since we have already gone so far in our compromise, would it not be better to go gradually and to do our best to see that the police go in the shortest possible time than to bring matters to a complete breakdown? Incidentally, in all our negotiations with them, we have been talking of a police force of about 100,but in your para 3 I note that now you talk about 200 police. I take it this is a mistake. I await your most immediate answer so that I can go to Kasa-Vubu and discuss with him on the lines of your latest instructions.

I am wondering whether it would not be possible for you to have a telex conversation with me in which both of us could discuss this matter without revealing any important information in a clear conversation.

I dictated the above after long consultations with MacEoin and Linner and in their presence.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To : Mr. Abbas.
From : Secretary General **MOST IMMEDIATE.**
Date : 21 April 61.
No. : 2787.

Your A-1024-25.

1. Reference paragraph 6. Authority for local procurement already cabled in our 2783.

2. Reference paragraph 7. You may take over from OTRACO all urgently needed items already in Leo if you are satisfied this could be done without compromising principle involved and without prejudice to our future position on Matadi and supplies. Please report on any action taken on this.

3. Regarding our return to Matadi, approach should now be made along following lines. Kasavubu should be informed that we are prepared to send 2 ONUC Officers together with necessary technicians to Matadi on understanding that entire move of 200 Nigerian police to that port will be completed before arrival of United States ship Blatchford for repatriation of Indonesians from Kitona. This time factor is very important . Since Blatchford due on 28 April at Matadi, move of Nigerians would have to be completed by 27 April.

4. Please exploit all possible contacts to secure favourable response to this proposal. In this context, it has been suggested that Khiari has good contacts at several levels and you may see him if you think it desirable. At this end there will be usual effort to secure backstopping.

5. If no reply is given before Kasavubu's departure for Coquilhatville, suggest you promptly proceed to Coquilhatville yourself, accompanied by Khiari, if you consider it advisable, in quest of reply.

6. You are already aware of action unavoidable here if all this were to fail. Apart from everything else, Blatchford's arrival without any possibility to proceed with its intended use would break the whole story and give world-publicity to Congo attitudes to international commitments- which, for elementary protection of UN, we would have to

reveal by full and uncensored report on Matadi negotiations.

MEMORANDUM

The Republic of the Congo notes that there is agreement with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General regarding the need and the right of the United Nations to dispose of a limited military contingent at Matadi for the protection of stocks and shipment routes of supplies for ONUC.

The Republic of the Congo has signified its agreement in principle for a group of Nigerian police of about 100 men to go to Matadi, as soon as the psychological atmosphere that prevails there at this time, will make this measure possible.

The only reservations of the Republic had to do with the immediate character of this return and on the responsibility that would devolve on ONUC if it should proceed with a premature return of forces to Matadi.

Desiring to see the implementation of this agreement without delay, the Government of the Republic requests the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to appoint two officers, one of whom at least will belong to the Nigerian police force, who will be put in touch with General Mobutu, with a view to accompanying him on a visit of inspection that he will make at Matadi in the immediate future.

Following this visit, the circumstances and the date at which the Nigerian police contingent will be sent to Matadi may be fixed by mutual agreement.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Seal and signature)

Leopoldville, 20 April 1961

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 11 April 1961

No : A-942

Further to my 939.

As Kasa-Vubu will expect from me an answer to his letter of 7 April, and as Fabry, the legal adviser here, is now in Kamina with the team which went to interrogate the mercenaries, I will appreciate it if, in the light of your final instructions to me, an answer is drafted for me your end and cabled most immediately so that I can hand it to Kasa-Vubu when I see him to-morrow.

OUTGOING CODE MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 11 April 1961

No : A-939

Your 2441.

Your instructions to me, with one or two exceptions to which I will refer later in this cable, are clear and I will certainly follow them. When talking to Kasa-Vubu, I shall reflect your conviction about the soundness of the principles on which we insist, for I am in no doubt whatsoever about the importance of strictly adhering to these principles.

But before going ahead I feel it my duty to make the following observations on your instructions.

Before making these observations I had a long discussion with Linner who finds himself in agreement with me.

1. I agree with you that it is unwise for you to address a new letter to Kasa-Vubu for the reasons you mention. In any case the letter of 7 April which both Kasa-Vubu and Bomboko signed was addressed to me and not to you and I can easily say that the answer should go from me as your acting Special Representative.

2. Linner and I have gone very carefully over all the points of principle contained in your memo and we find that all the points have been accepted by them in their letter of 7 April. The only point which was not specifically covered is the question of the undertaking to guarantee the safety of the Nigerian Police. But we feel it was covered by implication. The apparent purpose for sending the police by stages is to ensure that no incident takes place. If you agree with us that all the points have been covered, is it not sufficient that this letter which is signed by Kasa-Vubu and Bomboko, be regarded as equivalent to signing your memo?

3. My strong feeling is that the President, and much more so Bomboko, would like to be sure that they are regarded by us as the authority which, is partner to, and has a say in, any agreement with us and would therefore prefer to put their signature to something which is their own rather than something which was drafted by us even if the meanings are identical. I have come across this attitude several times during my short stay here. Being a member of your team from whom the yoke of foreign rule has just been lifted, I can not only understand this psychological state of mind, but sympathize with it.

If I receive your approval to this line of action, I will follow it, otherwise I will faithfully carry out the instructions you sent me in 2441. Because I should wait for your further advise I am asking Kasa-Vubu to see me to-morrow instead of to-day. I realize there will be a delay of another day but I am convinced it is better for us to risk this delay than to risk getting involved in an argument about signing the memo which may last for days and at the end of which we may not succeed in obtaining the signature.

4. Regarding the modalities, you say that the "time-table they have laid down is impossible to accept and a better formula must be found." I will most certainly do my best but please advise me as to what you regard as a better formula. Sending all the police forthwith, or can I accept a limited shorter time, and how short a time?

5. I have gone over my 909 and 910 and I do not find that I made there any recommendations or suggested any line of action. In this connection you say, "Naturally the threat that the whole matter be brought to Secco is not eliminated," whereas you say in 2403, "Now he opens the door enough to make it unwise for me to carry matters straight on to Secco." I will appreciate your clarification and your advice as to whether I should hint to him that you will be forced to raise the matter in the Secco if he does not sign the memo.

I await a most immediate cable please.

OUTGOING CODE MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 10 April 1961

No : A- 928, 929, 930, 931

CODE (N.Y. 2441)

I saw Kasa-Vubu and Bomboko to-day at 10.45 and spent the rest of the morning with them.

My approach was as follows:

Being aware of his and his Ministers' worries about Tshombe's attitudes not only in North Katanga but also about his pronouncements about the Tananarive Plan in general and about the independent sovereign state of Katanga in particular, I started by giving them a full brief on what Tshombe's gendarmerie and his mercenaries are doing in North Katanga in spite of our repeated representations and warnings. I gave a full account of what happened at Manono, what is happening in North Katanga, our arresting 28 white military personnel, the killing of two Ethiopian soldiers and the wounding of seven others, the fact that we are denied access to airfields, except that of Kabalo which we hold, the fighting which has been going on between Tshombe's gendarmerie and the Balubas and the Jeunesse, and about the thousands of people who are seeking U.N. protection in Kabalo.

After giving them this brief I told them that the U.N. could not succeed in its mission unless the President gives it his full co-operation. The President should, first of all conclude with the U.N. the "status agreement". If both sides appoint their representatives who would work out the details of this agreement which would eventually be signed by the U.N. and the President, the President's authority over the whole of the Republic will be further enhanced, the U.N. right to freedom of movement will be further clarified, and the General Assembly will welcome this step in the right direction by the President.

From here I proceeded to the question of Matadi. I said that the U.N. has not got at the present time in the Congo sufficient troops to carry out A-1 and A-2 of the resolution of 21 February. Only a part of the Indian Brigade arrived by air and this part was sent to Kamina following the capture of Manono by Tshombe's forces. The balance of the Brigade has arrived in Dar-es-Salaam and the U.S. has undertaken to air lift only half of it to the Congo. The rest have to be taken by ship to Matadi for immediate dispatch to the areas in which they will be needed. Furthermore the solution of the problem of Matadi will not only ease our supplies situation, which might become very serious in Katanga because of Tshombe's attitude, but it will be necessary for the repatriation of Indonesian troops who are due to return home.

After the usual complaints by Bomboko about the U.N. not giving its recognition to the President by refusing to disarm the rebellious units of the ANC, and after my reminding him of your mandate prior to the resolution of 21 February, and drawing his attention to the Nwokedi-Gardiner mission which has been here for the last few weeks to discuss with the President B-2 of the resolution - a discussion which will afford the President a full opportunity to put his views for consideration - after all this Bomboko asked me what I wanted the President to do in order to help. I said I came to ask him to do three things:

Firstly, I think both sides should appoint the teams which would prepare the draft of the status agreement.

Secondly I came to request the President to issue instructions to Tshombe to give the U.N. in Katanga all the facilities to which it is entitled by the terms of the good faith agreement of 27 July 1960 and

Thirdly to ask him, not only as a matter of principle, but also in view of the Katanga situation to agree to the dispatch to Matadi of the Nigerian police, not by stages, but all of them together and forthwith.

Bomboko, who usually does most of the talking, and for whom Kasa-Vubu asks us to wait if he goes to speak on the telephone, said that the U.N.'s right to move freely in Katanga is ensured by the agreement of 27 July and he did not see that the exercise of such right should wait on the conclusion of the status agreement. I agreed but I said that the agreement of 27 July is an agreement in general terms whereas the status agreement will be a clear cut one which will cover all issues connected with the status of the U.N. operations in the Congo.

With regard to my second request, they definitely appeared to be shying off issuing instructions to Tshombe. No wonder. Kasa-Vubu said that for his instructions to have a moral value, they should be based on a decision freely arrived at by the Congolese authorities and not to be a reflection of U.N. unilateral decisions. Bomboko said that the U.N. wants the President to be an executor of its decisions. I said that was far from the truth, all I was doing was to make a suggestion to the President to use his powers under the good faith agreement to which he is a party to give effective co-operation to the U.N. so that it can carry out its efforts in preserving law and order. I suggested to them that they could discuss the matter among themselves after my departure and the President could issue his instructions if my suggestion is acceptable to him. They readily agreed.

On the question of Matadi Bomboko mildly denied that their answer implied long delays. When I reminded him that their suggestion was that only ten policemen could go to Matadi one full week after the two officers, and that the date of the dispatch of the rest of the policemen was not specified and was left to an assessment of the situation by both parties, he said it was not the intention to have long delays. In any case, he said, the answer on this point could be given after the receipt of a reply from the Secretary-General. I said that their letter to you was based on a simple clear cut proposal by you and that if they would agree to the immediate dispatch of the policemen, I would give them your full agreement there and then.

Bomboko insisted that they should receive your answer before they give me a final reply. On receipt of your answer they will consider in what way they can proceed to speed up the schedule of arrivals. Following this I said I was sure I would receive your answer very early the following morning and asked them for an appointment at 10 a.m. They gave me one for 15.00 hours to-morrow.

My assessment of the situation and my views are as follows:-

I am ignorant about the feelings of the civilian population in and around Matadi and the information I have is so fragmentary and so inadequate that I cannot say whether Kasa-Vubu's allegations and Timberlake's and Scott's views are correct or not. But from personal experience in Leopoldville there is sufficient evidence that there was great tension among the civilian population. It started after the passing of the resolution of 21 February, the Matadi incident, and the announcement of the agreement of the Indian Government to send troops. The feelings were whipped up by the utterances of responsible ministers and by the local press. I personally felt this. Twice I heard "communist United Nations" by two members of crowds when my car passed by. Congolese ANC and police would stare at me in front of offices or when I pass by. Recently I noticed a welcome change of attitude. The Congolese ANC and police who recognize me stand at attention and salute. The civilians go out of their way to be polite to me and to help me when I go for a hair cut or when I have time to go shopping.

Linner bears me out and says that since we sent the Indians to Kamina the scare about Indian occupation is gradually disappearing.

So there may be some truth in what Kasa-Vubu, his ministers, and the ambassadors say about the feelings of the civilian population in Matadi and Bas-Congo.

This being said, my experience of to-day with Kasa-Vubu and Bomboko is that they appear to be less intransigent than they were when I last saw them. I hope that my judgment is right and that I have not been led up the garden path.

I would therefore recommend to you that you write them a letter in which you praise the spirit in which their letter was written and say that you rely on their good faith in co-operating with me in sending the procurement officers, the two officers and the police. About the police I think it will be advisable to say that you would like them to allow them to go in the shortest possible time. There will be no harm, if you think it necessary, in saying that you would like all the police to be there by a time which you specify. But, because they are very sensitive to our telling them to do things by a certain time, as they take such specified times as ultimatums, I would suggest that you phrase your letter in a manner which cannot give any impression that we are ordering them about or that we are giving ultimatums.

I also suggest that, if you think fit, you allow me a margin for discussion and manoeuvre.

An assurance from us that we deal with them in good faith will, I think, bear fruit. If we go all this way to meet them and they later fail us, our hands will be very strong indeed if the matter has to be brought up before the Security Council.

The Liberian Ambassador, who came to see me a few days ago, and to whom I spoke about the Matadi problem, saw Kasa-Vubu before me this morning. He came to see me again a short while ago and he told me that he had spoken to Kasa-Vubu about the international implications if he, Kasa-Vubu, refuses to play. He said he was receptive.

If you agree on this line, let us hope that the Western Ambassadors will do all they can to help me.

Please cable your reply most immediately so that I can have time for reflection before I see Kasa-Vubu to-morrow.