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NOTE FOR THE FILE

The Chargé d'Affaires of Poland, Mr. Czarkowski, visited me at 12 noon on 13 December on instructions from his Government. It appears that General Siilasvuo has informed the Polish Contingent Commander that, according to its present position, Israel will not accept Polish personnel of UNEF in Israeli-occupied territory. The Government of Poland cannot accept the position that any one contingent of UNEF has a different status from other contingents. Mr. Czarkowski emphasized that the Government of Poland had no wish to raise this matter formally at the present time, when delicate negotiations are about to commence, but merely wished to state its views to the Secretariat.

I told Mr. Czarkowski that it was also the position of the Secretariat that UNEF had to function as an "efficient and integrated military unit" and that the Secretariat could not accept in principle any limitations on this concept. I also told him that the matter had been raised with Israel and also with the United States and that it was the intention of the Secretary-General to proceed pragmatically in the hope that difficulties would not arise. If difficulties do in fact arise, obviously the matter will have to be reported to the Security Council.

Brian E. Urquhart

13 December 1973
23 November 1973

Sir,

It is with deep regret that I have learnt from the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East that Private Dino Henrik Siniluoto, a member of the Finnish Contingent of UNIEM, died as a result of injuries sustained in an automobile accident on Thursday, 22 November 1973.

I would be grateful if you would convey to your Government and to the bereaved family my heartfelt condolences over the death of Private Siniluoto, as well as my appreciation of the service rendered by him to the United Nations peace effort in the Middle East.

I deem it fitting on this occasion to express to you once again my appreciation of the contribution of the Finnish Contingent to this United Nations peace-keeping mission.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Kurt Waldheim

His Excellency
Mr. Aarno Karhilo
Permanent Representative of
Finland to the United Nations
836 United Nations Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10017

cc: Mr. I. Kittani
Mr. B. Urguhart
Mr. R. Ryan
OUSCSSPA

E. Kira

bf. filing: GH
The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Canada/Poland to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the memorandum of understanding which is the result of discussions between the Secretariat and the delegations of Canada and Poland concerning the organization and composition of the logistics support element for the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), in accordance with the agreement reached by the Security Council on 2 November 1973.

On the basis of the memorandum of understanding, the Secretary-General now requests the Government of Canada/Poland to make available to the United Nations Emergency Force as soon as possible the following units:

The Secretary-General will issue the necessary directives to the Commander of UNEF concerning the organization and control of logistics units provided by the two Governments on the basis of agreements reached in the course of the discussions at United Nations Headquarters. The Secretary-General wishes to draw the attention of the delegations of Canada and Poland to the relevant sections of these directives designed to elaborate on the sections of memorandum of understanding concerning the organization of the logistics component of the Force, and the interrelationship between the Canadian and Polish contingents. The Secretary-General would appreciate confirmation that these arrangements are acceptable.

The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to express once again to the Government of Canada/Poland the assurances of his highest consideration.
Directive to the Force Commander on the organization of logistics services

1. The present directive is in amplification of the arrangements agreed upon in the memorandum of understanding between the Canadian and the Polish delegations, which is attached. These arrangements are accepted by the Secretary-General.

2. The Chief of Logistics Services will be directly responsible to the Force Commander for directing the Logistics Branch of UNEF headquarters and hence for controlling logistics operations in support of all UNEF forces. As such he will be responsible for the coordination of functions and efficient operations of any logistics base or detachment established by the Force Commander in support of the Force. It is the intention of the Secretary-General and the Force Commander to appoint a Canadian officer as Chief of Logistics Services.

3. The Chief of Logistics Services will be supported by an appropriate logistics staff composed of:

   (a) Canadian personnel for each of the logistics functions assigned to Canada;

   (b) Polish personnel for each of the logistics functions assigned to Poland.

4. Logistics support in the context of this operation includes movement control, supply, maintenance, road transport, military police and postal functions as defined in the following subparagraphs:
(i) Movement control function:

The movement control function will involve the movement control of all UNEF personnel, equipment and supplies through both sea and airport facilities in the theatre by the establishment of movement control detachments to receive and forward to their final destination all UNEF personnel, equipment and supplies.

(ii) Supply function:

The supply function will involve the requisitioning, receiving, storing, issuing and accounting for all UNEF supply items which will include spare parts, radios and vehicles owned by UNEF, rations, barrack and office stores, construction materials, UNEF procured items of clothing and general stores in accordance with all scales of issue established by Headquarters UNEF.

(iii) Maintenance function:

The maintenance function will involve the repair of vehicles, equipment, refrigeration and electrical appliances, cooking equipment, weapons and radios beyond the limited repair capabilities of each of the contingents within the UNEF. In addition, the function will include the inspection of all UNEF equipment within the force to assess unit maintenance standards and to provide limited instruction in the operation and maintenance of UNEF equipment where necessary.
(iv) Road transport function:

The road transport function will involve the provision of general road transport to meet force requirements beyond the capabilities of contingent unit transport. This includes road transport at the ports of entry, between the ports and any logistics base or detachment, road transport of daily requirements of food, petroleum, oil and lubricants, water, and general stores to the deployed units, and the provision of road transport for troop lifts beyond unit resources.

(v) Military police functions:

Pending the elaboration of arrangements for an integrated military police force to be worked out between the Force Commander and the contingents of Canada and Poland and of other contingents that may provide such detachments, the military police detachments provided by Canada and Poland will have jurisdiction over their own respective contingents.

(vi) Postal function:

The postal function will involve the receipt, distribution and despatch of all mail both internationally and within Egypt and Israel for all UNEF personnel in accordance with established UNEF regulations and procedures, with the exception of mail for which particular contingents may make alternative arrangements.\(^1\)

\(^1\) It is understood that the Polish contingent will make alternative arrangements for its mail.
Dear Captain Kjelstrup,

The Secretary-General has asked me to acknowledge receipt of your thoughtful letter of 1 November 1973 concerning the composition of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East.

We fully understand and sympathize with the feeling of frustration of soldiers who have been trained and are ready to participate in United Nations peace-keeping operations and whose services are not being used for the task which we know they are highly qualified to perform.

Your letter seems to be based on the premise that the Secretary-General is empowered to select contingents for service with UNEF as he deems fit. This is not the case. The Security Council on this occasion decided that, "The contingents will be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with the parties concerned, bearing in mind the accepted principle of equitable geographic representation". As you may know, the nucleus of UNEF was provided by Austrian, Finnish, Irish and Swedish troops from the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus. Subsequent additions were determined by the Security Council; a copy of the agreement arrived at by that body is attached.

I can only express the hope that the Norwegian officers and soldiers who have trained with such great devotion for the standby units earmarked for United Nations service will not allow themselves to be discouraged by this development. The fact that Norway was not selected on this occasion does not mean that it will not be selected for other operations, where the political requirements may be different. Indeed, Norwegian military observers are rendering distinguished service in United Nations operations in the Middle East (UNTSO) and Kashmir (UNMOGIP).

Sincerely yours,

Brian E. Urquhart
Assistant Secretary-General

Captain Reidar Kjelstrup
SVI, Terningmoen
2400 Elverum
Norway
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim
UN Headquarters
New York
USA

Dear Sir

I and my fellow officers are puzzled and astonished because of your obvious neglect of the Norwegian Forces earmarked for United Nations. We have spent every summer - holiday since 1967 on training for these demanding and difficult service. We have to our astonishment seen that other nations whose UN forces for several years have taken part in UN duties on Cyprus are transferred to the Middle-East.

It is also very curious that troops without UN experience at all have been preferred.

The Norwegian UN force, composed of officers with UN experience and handpicked soldiers with good education, are far more competent to solve problems in the Middle-East than totally unexperienced forces. You have asked us to transport troops and material from other nations with Norwegian aircraft. We can not understand why not Norway too have been asked to send ground forces. We clearly understand the political implications, but in our opinion the General-Secretary has to take strong measures to fullfill the resolution made by UN Security Council.

It is now as much as 2 weeks since the Security Council made its resolution. Since then only 600 Finish and Swedish troops have arrived in the Middle-East. The obvious reason for this is that the nations asked to do the job was, in our mind, unprepared.

The Norwegian UN force (1300 soldiers) could have been in their positions in the Middle-East after 4-6 days, if they had been called upon.

We, the officers and soldiers, are prepared to do our duty.

If we are not called upon this time, we are afraid that it will be very difficult in the future to get qualified officers and soldiers to stand voluntarily in the forces.

Captain Reidar Kjelstrup
SVI, Terningmoen
2400 ELVERUM
NORWAY
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim
UN Headquarters
New York
U. S. A.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Poland</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engineers</td>
<td></td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signals</td>
<td>280</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road Transport</td>
<td></td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supply Company</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics HQ</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repair Company</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Control</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>306</td>
<td>Total?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Unit</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>Total?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Unit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Handwritten note:*

- Please provide full report on request.
Composition and Command of the Force

1. On 12 November 1973, the strength of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), exclusive of headquarters staff, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (evaluation team)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,708</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, one staff officer each from Austria and Finland, and six officers detailed from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) make up the UNEF temporary headquarters staff in Cairo.

2. These figures reflect modest increases in the Finnish and Swedish contingents, as well as the arrival in greater numbers of elements of the signals unit being provided by Canada. Advance elements of the engineering unit being provided by Poland are expected in the area on 15 November.

3. Consultations between Secretariat officials and officials of Governments which have been requested to provide contingents are being actively pursued.

4. The Security Council having given its consent at its 1755th meeting on 12 November 1973, I have appointed General Siilasvuo as Commander of the Force.

Deployment

5. The main change in the deployment of the Force from that described in the previous report has been the completion of the move of the Irish contingent to the Rabah area, where it has reconnoitred its area of operations for the siting of possible observation posts (OPs).
6. The risks of operating in a heavily mined area have been emphasized by an incident on 12 November in which a Swedish landrover was extensively damaged by a mine although the driver had only slight injuries (see S/11056/Add.3, para.11).

 Supervision of the cease-fire and return to the positions of 22 October 1973

7. The discussions between the Israeli and Egyptian military representatives, under the auspices of the Force Commander, on the modalities of the implementation of the agreement signed on 11 November 1973 (S/11056/Add.3, Annex) resumed on 12 November at kilometre marker 101 on the Cairo-Suez road.

8. At the meeting of 11 November, the Force Commander had announced his intention, pursuant to paragraph E of the agreement, to have the Finnish contingent establish two United Nations checkpoints, the first at kilometre 101 and the second at kilometre 119 on the Cairo-Suez road. The checkpoint at kilometre 101 was established on 12 November at 1330 hours GMT and the checkpoint at kilometre 119 at 1505 hours GMT.

9. At 1510 hours GMT Israeli forces demanded that the Finnish contingent withdraw from the checkpoint at kilometre 119. By 1534 hours GMT Israeli forces were deployed in the checkpoint area. The Finnish contingent remained at the site and was joined by the Contingent Commander and additional troops.

10. General Siilasvuo immediately lodged a protest against this action with the Israeli military authorities.

11. Immediately on the receipt of the above information, the Secretary-General contacted the Acting Permanent Representative of Israel to protest against this action by members of the Israeli forces and to ask him to take immediate steps with the appropriate authorities for the restoration of the United Nations checkpoint at kilometre 119. The Acting Permanent Representative of Israel stated that the matter was being clarified and that General Dayan, the Defence Minister of Israel, had invited General Siilasvuo to meet with him on the morning of 13 November. The Secretary-General again asked the Government of
Israel to take all necessary measures for the maintenance of the UNEF checkpoint at kilometre 119.

12. General Siilasvuori met with General Dayan in Tel Aviv on 13 November. After this meeting, the Force Commander, with the concurrence of the Secretary-General, concluded that, in the light of the current situation, the best course would be for the UNEF troops at kilometre 119 to be temporarily withdrawn. After further discussion, both in the area and at United Nations Headquarters, it was decided that the UNEF checkpoint at kilometre 119 would be re-established at first light on 14 November. The checkpoint was re-established at hours GMT on that date.

13. The next meeting between the parties to discuss the full implementation of the agreement of 11 November is scheduled for 1400 hours GMT on 14 November at kilometre 101.

14. Reports of the Secretary-General on the situation regarding the observance of the cease-fire in the UNEF area of responsibility, based on reports of UNEF units and UNTSO military observers, continue to be circulated in the S/11057/Add.... series.

Humanitarian activities

15. The Force has continued to participate in the previous arrangement described in paragraph 19 of document S/11056 for the transfer of supplies through Israeli-held territory to the Egyptian troops on the east bank of the Suez Canal. By 12 November, 161 trucks had been driven by United Nations drivers and unloaded at the ferrying point on the west bank.
No. 522

Excellency,

I have the honour to inform you upon instructions from my Government that the Irish contingent of the United Nations Emergency Forces was prevented by the Israeli forces twice from deploying their troops across the Suez Canal in the East Bank, in order to take their positions between the Egyptian and Israeli forces in the area East of Devresoir. These acts of defiance to the international will represented in the latest Security Council resolutions took place on the 4th and 6th of November 1973, and the Commander of the Irish contingent had to return with his troops to Ismailia, unable to carry out this Mandate due to Israeli obstructions. Furthermore, the Commander of the Irish contingent had to return to Cairo to report this serious situation to the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Emergency Forces.

I am reporting this, in the hope that the necessary steps be taken to prevent any further obstructions by the Israeli forces, preventing United Nations Emergency Forces from carrying out their Mandate entrusted to them by the Security Council of the United Nations.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

DR. A. ESMAT ABDEL MEGUID
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

His Excellency
Mr. Kurt Waldheim
Secretary General
of the United Nations
New York, N.Y. 10017
7 November 1973

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

Pursuant to our recent conversation on the possibility of Kenya’s contributing a contingent to UNEF, I am transmitting herewith a personal message to President Kenyatta on this subject with the request that it be forwarded to him as soon as possible.

Yours sincerely,

Kurt Waldheim

His Excellency
Mr. Joseph Odhur-Jowi
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Kenya to the United Nations
866 United Nations Plaza, Room 466
New York, N.Y. 10017
Dear Mr. President,

I have the honour to address myself personally to your Excellency with reference to the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East pursuant to Security Council Resolution 340 (1973). Ambassador Odero-Jowi has no doubt reported to you that the Council has asked me to hold consultations with various countries in order to constitute that Force. It has in particular expressed the view that contingents from at least three States from the African regional group should be included in the Force.

On the basis of these consultations, which showed a wide measure of agreement among members of the Security Council that Kenya would be a most suitable country for this purpose, I now wish to request your Government formally to provide a contingent for service with the United Nations Emergency Force.

I have informed Ambassador Odero-Jowi that a contingent in the range of 400 to 600 men would be a valuable addition to the Force and would enhance its international character. I hope your Government will be able to respond favourably to this request, in which case the Secretariat is prepared to enter into urgent consultations with the Permanent Mission of Kenya with a view to making detailed arrangements for the despatch of the Kenyan contingent to the mission area.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Kurt Waldheim

His Excellency Mr. Jomo Kenyatta
President of the Republic of Kenya
Nairobi


Le Secrétaire général saisit cette occasion pour exprimer au Représentant permanent du Sénégal, les assurances de sa très haute considération.

le 7 novembre 1973
UNEF INTERIM COMMANDER LEAVES CAIRO FOR JERUSALEM FOR TALKS
WITH ISRAELI AUTHORITIES

(The following was received from the Chief Information Officer of UNEF in Cairo.)

The Interim Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), Major General Ensio Siilasvuo, left this morning for Jerusalem where he will have a meeting with Israeli authorities to discuss the UNEF operation and other urgent matters, the Chief Information Officer of UNEF announced at a press briefing in Cairo today.

The Chief Information Officer, Rudolf Stajduhar, also gave the actual strength of UNEF as follows: Austria, 150 in Cairo, 55 in Ismailia and Suez; Canada, 11 in Cairo; Finland, 55 in Cairo, 374 in Suez; Ireland, 231 in Cairo, 21 in Ismailia; Poland, 5 in Cairo; Sweden, 97 in Cairo, 435 in Ismailia; total strength 1,442.

He added that between 40 and 50 Finns were expected on Wednesday evening.

In a further announcement, he explained that the Polish group of five, that had arrived on Tuesday evening, was an evaluation team for UNEF logistics. The team was briefed on Wednesday morning by the UNEF Commander.

Mr. Stajduhar also announced that seven trucks had delivered supplies to the Egyptian Third Army on Tuesday, bringing the total number to 122.

Answering questions about UNEF positions in Israeli-held territories, he took the activities of the Finnish battalion in Suez as an example. The battalion is stationed in bases in both Israeli- and Egyptian-held territories and patrols from these bases were interposing themselves between the forward defended localities (FDLs) of the parties.

In answering a question on whether correspondents could see the map showing the 22 October cease-fire lines handed over to General Siilasvuo by the Egyptians, Mr. Stajduhar stated that this was a document handed over by one of the parties and would be treated as a matter of trust. It was not for UNEF to disclose such documentation. He said firmly "no" to a question whether General Siilasvuo had asked for United States or Soviet satellite maps of the cease-fire lines.

In reply to a question about maps or charts showing the location of minefields, he said UNEF did not have such charts.

* *** *
Mr. Secretary-General:

I have the honour to confirm the offer of the Government of Liberia to supply a contingent of Liberian forces up to 300 to constitute a part of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

The Liberian Government is conscious of its responsibilities and obligations, as a Charter Member of the United Nations, to the cause of peace and it is in this light that this offer is being made to assist the efforts of the United Nations in restoration and eventual preservation of peace in the Middle East.

I shall be grateful to be notified when this contingent of Liberian forces will be required for service as part of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

With sentiments of esteem,

H. E. Kurt Waldheim
Secretary-General of the United Nations
New York, New York
Note for the File
on a Meeting in the Secretary-General's Office on 6 November 1973

Present were:  The Secretary-General
               Ambassador T. Bennett of the U.S. Mission
               Mr. H. Reis of the U.S. Mission
               Mr. Anton Prohaska

During his call on the Secretary-General Ambassador Bennett mentioned that they had received reports to the effect that Liberia was now willing and prepared to participate in the UN Emergency Force. Ambassador Bennett spelled out in detail that the Government of Liberia would respond positively to a request by the Secretary-General for participation in the UNEF, provided that Israel and Egypt did not object to such a participation.

The Secretary-General took note of the foregoing and assured the Ambassador that he would consider this possibility in the further increase of the Force.

cc: Mr. R. Guyer
    Mr. B. E. Urquhart
    Mr. Berendson
    GH bef. filing
Excellency,

In reply to your note dated 3 November 1973, by which you confirmed the request addressed to the Government of the Polish People's Republic that it makes available a Polish contingent for the United Nations Emergencies Force /UNEF/ in the Middle East, pursuant to Security Council resolution 340/1973/ and the agreement reached among Members of the Council on 2 November 1973, I have the honour, under instructions of my Government, to confirm the information conveyed to the Under-Secretary-General Mr. Roberto E. Guyer on 3rd November 1973.

The above-said information was to the effect that the Polish Government complying with the request made by the United Nations Secretary-General have taken the decision to dispatch a contingent of the Polish army to the United Nations Emergency Force /UNEF/ in the Middle East.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

A. Czarkowski
Acting Permanent Representative

H.E. Kurt WALTHEIM
Secretary-General
of the United Nations
Meeting of the Secretary-General with Ambassador Odero-Jowi of Kenya on Tuesday, 6 November 1973.

Present: H.E. Mr. Joseph Odero-Jowi
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
The Secretary-General
Mr. Georg Hennig

The Ambassador called on the Secretary-General to inform him that he had received instructions from his Government that Kenya would be willing to contribute troops to UNEF, if it were formally approached. Such an approach should, if possible, be directly addressed to the President.

Ambassador Odero-Jowi furthermore informed the Secretary-General that he had also talked with the Ambassadors of Nigeria and Ethiopia about the same subject. Both countries were apparently also ready to provide troops for UNEF, if formally asked to do so. In reply to a question of the Secretary-General regarding a representation of French-speaking African countries the Ambassador promised to contact the Permanent Representative of Zaïre and Senegal immediately and report back to the Secretary-General.

The Ambassador and some other African representatives were apprehensive of the delay in regard to the implementation of the cease-fire resolution. Such a delay will in their opinion probably agitate the situation. They had not yet asked for a Security Council meeting because they wanted to see the results of Dr. Kissinger's visit to Cairo. It however was envisaged to ask for a Council meeting - either on 7 November in the evening or 8 November in the morning. The Secretary-General felt that
it might be advisable to wait until the morning of the 8th, in order to have the results of Dr. Kissinger's talks.

The Secretary-General then briefed the Ambassador shortly about his meeting with the Egyptian Foreign Minister on 4 November. At the end of the conversation the Secretary-General thanked the Ambassador again for his Government's offer and asked him to forward his formal request for the contribution of troops for UNEF to his Government. A note containing the request would be sent the following day.
At a Press briefing in Cairo on Tuesday, 6 November, the Chief Information Officer of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), Rudolf Stajduhar, stated that no cease-fire violations were reported by UNEF on 4 November.

He also stated that the strength of UNEF as of Monday evening, 5 November, was as follows: Austria, 171 in Cairo and 34 in Ismailia and Suez; Canada, 11 in Cairo; Finland, 64 in Cairo and 230 in Suez; Ireland, 202 in Cairo and 31 in Ismailia; Sweden, 113 in Cairo and 417 in Ismailia; totalling 1,273.

A group of 135 Finns had arrived on Tuesday morning, and an additional 160 Finns were expected on Tuesday through Thursday. He added that the 11 Canadians who arrived on Monday were an evaluation team for UNEF logistic back-up.

The spokesman said that 13 supply trucks had reached the Egyptian Third Army on Monday, making a total of 115. He also said that the Israelis had accepted 50 more trucks in addition to the 125 agreed on previously.

Replying to questions, the spokesman said that the advance group of 31 Irish UNEF men were still in Ismailia. The Israelis were still examining the practical aspects of their support to UNEF.

Replying to other questions, the spokesman said that five meetings had taken place so far between military representatives of the two sides in the presence of United Nations officers.

To a question about whether UNEF forces were expected to land in Israel or Israel-held territories, the spokesman said this was understood.

(more)
Replying to another question, the spokesman said that General Siilasvuo did not have any maps taken by American or Soviet space satellites on 22 October.

Replying to a question about UNEF forces operating on the Israeli side, he said that UNEF patrols were operating in Israeli-held areas.

In answer to another question, the spokesman said that the Egyptian side had given General Siilasvuo a map of the cease-fire line of 22 October. When asked to bring the map to the next briefing, he said that correspondents should address themselves to the Egyptian authorities.
6 November 1973

Amb. Barnes of Liberia spoke with Mr. Urquhart and requested him to kindly inform the Secretary-General that the Liberian offer of approximately 300 troops is now reinstated.

SG informed by A.P.
Further progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force

Composition of the Force

1. By hours\(^1\) on 3 November 1973, the strength of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), exclusive of Headquarters staff, was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total

In addition, six officers detailed from the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO) made up the UNEF temporary Headquarters staff in Cairo.

2. The movement to the UNEF mission area of personnel of the Irish contingent of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus was completed on 31 October 1973. At the request of the Secretary-General, transport aircraft for these soldiers were provided by the Government of the United Kingdom, free of charge to the United Nations. The additional Irish personnel requested by the Secretary-General to bring the total strength of the UNEF Irish contingent to approximately 250 all ranks are scheduled to be flown to the mission area on November 1973.

3. The movement of the additional Swedish troops requested by the Secretary-General to bring the total strength of the UNEF Swedish contingent to approximately 500 all ranks (S/11056/Add.1, para. 2) began on November 1973 and was completed on 3 November 1973. These troops were flown in by aircraft made available at the request of the Secretary-General.

\(^1\) All times GMT
by the Governments of Norway and Sweden, free of charge to the United Nations, as well as by some commercial craft.

4. The movement from Finland of the additional Finnish troops requested by the Secretary-General to bring the total strength of the UNEF Finnish contingent to a maximum of approximately 600 all ranks began early on 3 November 1973. At the request of the Secretary-General, the Government of the United States of America has provided transport aircraft for the advance elements, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is providing transport aircraft for the main body and the heavy equipment of this Finnish group. These services are being made available free of charge to the United Nations.

5. The movement from Austria of the additional Austrian troops requested by the Secretary-General to bring the total strength of the UNEF Austrian contingent to approximately 500 all ranks is expected to begin shortly. At the request of the Secretary-General, the Government of the USSR is providing transport aircraft free of charge to the United Nations for the movement of this group.

6. Consultations on the despatch of additional troops to the area continue with a view to implementing the consensus adopted at the meeting of the Security Council on 2 November 1973. As indicated below (para. 11), it is considered a matter of urgency that, subject to the necessary consultations, the Canadian and Polish logistical support advance parties should arrive in the mission area as soon as possible.
Deployment

7. The Austrian contingent, acting temporarily as the Headquarters unit of the Force, has been responsible for organizing the Force transit and staging areas near Cairo, assisting at aircraft arrivals, laying out, transporting and UNEF stores and providing escorts and drivers for the shipment of supplies from Israeli-held territory to Egyptian troops on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Most of these duties in Cairo will shortly be taken over by incoming Swedish troops. In addition, Austrian troops have been running patrols to the Ismailia area, and on 3 November an Austrian advance party was scheduled to proceed to its area of responsibility west of the Bitter Lakes to prepare for the contingent's deployment there.

8. The Finnish contingent deployed in the Suez City area is composed of battalion headquarters, one rifle company and a supply company. The battalion headquarters and the supply company have been set up in the Israeli-held area at the road junction 7 kms. north-west of Suez. The base of the rifle company in the Egyptian-held city of Suez with eight observation posts (OPs) between the forward defended localities (FDLs) of the two armies, north-west and south of the city centre. Each platoon is responsible for three or three OPs. Another OP was to be set up on 3 November in the area of OP Lima (formerly an UNTSO OP). Patrons have been run north and north-east of Suez City and in the area under Egyptian control east of the Canal with a view to further deployment.

9. The Swedish contingent has established seven OPs in the area south and south-west of Ismailia, deployed between the FDLs of the two armies, and is running patrols from and between these OPs. Each OP is manned by one officer and approximately ten other ranks.
10. The Irish contingent is making arrangements for deployment along the FDLs in the area east of the Canal and north of Ismailia. In preparation for this move, the contingent commander was to establish liaison on 3 November with the Officer-in-Charge of the Kantara Control Centre of UNTSO.

11. The interim Commander, Major-General E.G. Silasvuo, has reported that at present, except for some locally-provided transport and tentage, all units of the Force are living on the resources carried in with them and will therefore face critical problems when these are exhausted. Especially in view of difficulties relating to local procurement, a large proportion of UNEF's needs will have to be provided from outside for some time to come. This particularly applies to transport, communications equipment, repair facilities of all kinds, tentage and furniture. The Force Commander has therefore recommended that when the four contingents now composing the Force have been brought up to full strength, no new contingents should be sent in until an adequate logistical system has been established.
Supervision of the cease-fire and return to the positions of 22 October 1973

12. At its informal meeting on 21 October, before the adoption of resolution 341 (1973), the members of the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to instruct the Force Commander immediately to request the commander of the Israeli armed forces to return his troops to positions occupied by them at 1650 hours on 22 October. The Secretary-General immediately despatched the necessary instructions to General Silasvuo.

13. The Force Commander, having taken the first measures to establish and deploy the Force and having had extensive consultations with the Egyptian military authorities, flew to Tel Aviv to meet with General Dayan on 29 and 30 October. The purpose of these meetings was to hold preliminary talks concerning the terms of reference of the Force and the best method of implementing them. In a meeting on the morning of 30 October, the Force Commander informed General Dayan that, pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973), he had been instructed to request that Israeli armed forces return to positions occupied by them at 1650 hours on 22 October. General Dayan could not give an official reply, but undertook to see the Prime Minister on the afternoon of 30 October to convey the Force Commander's request, which in the Secretary-General's understanding relates both to the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, would be forthcoming shortly. Since that time the Force Commander has continued to make efforts to ensure that the official reaction of Israel to his request is received as soon as possible.

14. The deployment of UNEF has been proceeding in close consultation with both parties. The contingents composing UNEF have all arrived through, and been deployed out of Cairo, with the close co-operation of the Egyptian authorities. At the meeting with General Dayan on 29 October, the Israeli
Defence Minister agreed to the stationing and deployment of UNEF troops in and from the Sinai and other Israeli-held areas, and he offered the use of Israeli airfields for that purpose. The question of the freedom of movement of the Force was discussed, and it was agreed that the crossing of lines for operational and logistic purposes would be permitted. Further exchanges will take place concerning the freedom of movement of UNEF aircraft, including helicopters.

15. At a meeting between General Silasvuo and Mr. Ismail, the Minister of War of Egypt, on 3 November, the deployment of UNEF and its initial activities were discussed, as were specific problems relating to certain areas of confrontation. The return of all forces to the positions of 22 October was considered in some detail. In addition, officials discussed practical problems concerning accommodations for the Force Headquarters and for a staging area for arriving troops.

16. In the area of responsibility of the Finnish contingent north of Suez City, a dispute arose on 30 October between Egyptian and Israeli forces, with the imminent danger of a breakdown of the cease-fire. On 31 October, the Finnish contingent commander arranged a meeting between local commanders of both sides which resulted in certain readjustments in the FDLs designed to facilitate the maintenance of the cease-fire, and an agreement to permit freedom of movement of civilians between the FDLs of both armies.

17. The Finnish contingent commander has received complaints from the Egyptian authorities in Suez that Israeli armed forces were requesting civilians to move from the area mentioned above, with the consequent destruction of livestock and dwellings. It was agreed that the UNEF contingent commander would investigate these charges and as appropriate arrange for another meeting between local commanders.
Humanitarian Activities

18. The second, third and fourth meetings of Egyptian and Israeli representatives took place on 29 and 30 October and 1 November at kilometer marker 109 on the Cairo-Suez road in the presence of the commander of the UNEF Austrian contingent and an Irish officer from Force Headquarters (see S/11056, paras. 13-19 for an account of the first meeting). Among the matters discussed were the return to the position of 22 October, possible mutual disengagement, establishment of buffer zones manned by UNEF troops, supply convoys, prisoners of war, provision of water, food and medical supplies to and evacuation of the wounded from Suez, and return of the bodies of the dead.

19. Substantial progress was made on the questions of the exchange of wounded prisoners of war, provision of lists of names of other prisoners to the International Red Cross, Red Cross visits to such prisoners, and the return of the mortal remains of soldiers of both sides. To complete arrangements for the evacuation of wounded prisoners, a meeting was held on 2 November attended by military representatives of Egypt and Israel and delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

20. Lieutenant Dan Avidan, a wounded member of the Israeli forces, held prisoner by Egypt for the past three years, was released to the Israeli representatives at the third meeting of Egyptian and Israeli representatives on 30 October. The bodies of five dead Israeli soldiers were transferred from the Egyptian to the Israeli forces on 31 October and the body of one more Israeli soldier on 1 November; these handovers were witnessed by UNEF Finnish soldiers.
21. At the fourth meeting on 2 November, it was agreed to evacuate in two
groups 400 Egyptian wounded prisoners of war held by Israel, and 45 Israeli
prisoners of war held by Egypt. No date has been set. At the same meeting,
it was agreed that medical supplies would be permitted to move to Suez City.

22. As of 1000 hours on 2 November, 75 trucks with supplies for Egyptian
troops on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal had moved across Israeli-held
territory and reached their destination. This represented only a portion of
the loads brought by UNEF drivers to the ferrying point on the west bank of the
Canal in the area of CP Nilo (a former UNEF CP). Efforts have been undertaken
to speed the trans-shipment across the Canal of the loads brought in by
UNEF drivers.

23. At the meeting between the Force Commander and the Minister of War of
Egypt on 3 November (paragraph 15 above), it was that agreement
had been arrived at for a second supply convoy for Egyptian troops on the
east side of the Canal, consisting of 50 trucks. Various efforts, being
undertaken to remedy the water shortage in Suez City were reviewed.
1 November 1973

Sir,

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 25 October 1973, in which you informed me of the readiness of your Government to provide both Bulgarian nationals as observers and an appropriate Bulgarian contingent for the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

I would like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the Government of Bulgaria for its offer. As stated in my progress reports to the Security Council (S/11056 and Add.1) consultations are proceeding with regard to further additions to the present Force.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Kurt Waldheim

His Excellency
Mr. Guerio Grozov
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to the United Nations
11 East 84th Street
New York, N.Y.10028
Sir,

In reply to your cable and Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973, in which all Members of the United Nations are requested to extend their full co-operation to the Organization in the implementation of that resolution as well as resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973) of October this year, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, guided by the interests of world peace, is prepared to provide both Bulgarian nationals as observers and an appropriate contingent of Bulgarian armed forces for inclusion in the United Nations force for the supervision of the cease-fire in the Middle East in implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions of the Security Council.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Guero GROZEV
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs
Permanent Representative of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria
to the United Nations

His Excellency Kurt Waldheim
Secretary-General of the United Nations
Ваше Превосходительство,

В ответ на Вашу телеграмму и резолюцию 340 Совета Безопасности от 25-го октября 1973 года, в которой все члены ООН призываются оказать полное содействие Организации для выполнения этой резолюции, а также резолюций 338 и 339 от месяца октября сего года, имею честь сообщить Вам, что Правительство Народной Республики Болгарии, руководствуясь интересами мира во всем мире, выражает свою готовность предоставить, как болгарских граждан в качестве наблюдателей, так и соответствующий контингент болгарских вооруженных сил для включения в состав войск ООН по наблюдению прекращения огня на Ближнем Востоке в выполнении вышеупомянутых резолюций Совета Безопасности.

Пользуюсь случаем вновь заверить Вас в своем высоком к Вам уважении.

Геро Грозев,
Заместитель министра иностранных дел
НРБ, Постоянный Представитель НРБ при ООН

Его Превосходительству
Г-ну Курту Вальдхайму,
Генеральному Секретарю ООН
Meeting of the General Committee  
Wednesday, 31 October, 9.30 a.m.

Note for the Secretary-General

1. You may wish to make a very brief opening statement in a low key to introduce the item. This could read as follows:

   <Mr. President, although the explanatory Memorandum in document A/9198 is brief, it does contain the facts essential for the purpose of deciding on the inscription of the item I have proposed and its allocation by the General Assembly to the appropriate committee, that is to say, the Fifth Committee. I wish at this stage to add only two points: a) It might be useful here to quote the exact words of paragraph 2 of Article 17 of the Charter. It reads as follows: "The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly". b) Should the item be inscribed and allocated to the Fifth Committee I shall at the earliest possible time provide that Committee with detailed cost estimates for the financing of the United Nations Emergency Force. It goes without saying that my report on the cost estimates would then, in the usual manner, be scrutinized by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions prior to its consideration by the Fifth Committee.>

2. We all feel that should there be any proposal to change the wording of the item as proposed by you (beyond any minor drafting changes), you should strongly oppose it on the grounds - a) that the new item you are proposing deals solely with the question of the financing of the Force, and b) that it is not appropriate for the General Committee (and indeed for the General Assembly when considering the question of inscription and allocation) to go into the substance of how the General Assembly should deal with the item once it is inscribed.
It is imperative that you impress President Benites of the critical importance of the proper handling of the item which will be before the General Committee, at your request, on Wednesday morning.

It would be appropriate for you to advise the President that you personally may wish to make a brief statement to the General Committee.

Most important, you should underline the fact that the President should insist that that portion of Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure which prohibits the discussion of the substance of an item proposed for inscription except in so far as this bears upon the question of inclusion or rejection, be scrupulously respected.

With respect to consideration by Plenary of the General Committee's recommendation (assuming that the Committee does so recommend) you may want to discuss with the President Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure which states:

"Debate on the inclusion of an item in the agenda, when that item has been recommended for inclusion by the General Committee, shall be limited to three speakers in favour of, and three against, the inclusion. The President may limit the time to be allowed to speakers under this rule."

The danger will come if Delegations other than those inscribed under Rule 23 seek to explain their votes before the vote. Rule 90 controls this situation. That Rule provides:

"After the President has announced the beginning of voting, no representative shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connexion with the actual conduct of the voting. The President may permit members to explain their votes, either before or after the voting, except when the vote is taken by secret ballot. The President may limit the time to be allowed for such explanations. The President shall not permit the proposer of a proposal or of an amendment to explain his vote on his own proposal or amendment."
It is clear that the second sentence of Rule 90 gives the President discretionary authority to permit members to explain their votes either before or after the voting and it is hoped that the President can be persuaded to accord explanations of vote only after the vote has taken place. If this procedure is followed it will be possible to limit the debate on the question of inscription to six speakers.

Points of order may, of course, be made at any time (see the first sentence of Rule 90 above). If points of order are made during the Plenary consideration of the question of inclusion, the President hopefully will be strict in his application of Rule 73 and will require any representative who makes a point of order to state the point of order at once so that he, the President, may make a ruling on the point of order as required by Rule 73. Rule 73 provides

"During the discussion of any matter, a representative may rise to a point of order, and the point of order shall be immediately decided by the President in accordance with the rules of procedure. A representative may appeal against the ruling of the President. The appeal shall be immediately put to the vote, and the President's ruling shall stand unless overruled by a majority of the members present and voting. A representative rising to a point of order may not speak on the substance of the matter under discussion."

If the President exercises the parliamentary leadership which the foregoing describes, I am confident that the outcome will be favourable.
Note for the Secretary-General

What Baroody is referring to is not that the Assembly has suspended the application of Article 19 of the Charter. Obviously the Assembly cannot suspend an Article of the Charter.

What he is referring to is that for the purpose of the second sentence of Article 19 there was an understanding that the acceptance of Member States for the expenses of the first United Nations Emergency Force and the operations of the Congo should not be counted in the total arrears of Governments under Article 19. This is what he means by: suspension of Article 19.

Article 19 is attached.

Needless to say, this is not a matter for you to get involved in, but entirely up to the Assembly to decide. I need hardly add that this is out of order when the Assembly is only discussing an inscription of an item and it should not go into a discussion of the substance.

I.Kittani
The resolution on unforeseen and extraordinary expenditures provides that should estimates as a result of a decision of the Security Council exceed $10 million, the Secretary-General shall convene a special session of the General Assembly to consider the matter. It follows logically that it would seem that if a matter warrants a special session of the General Assembly there are sufficient grounds for a special item to be added to the agenda of the current session.
Points in favour of proposing a new item on financing of UNEF

If a new item is not proposed, the costs of UNEF will have to be introduced under the two existing items: Supplementary estimates for 1973 and Revised estimates for 1974-1975. That is to say, under the regular budget of the United Nations. This is not advisable for the following main reasons:

1. In the case of expenses for the Congo operation - the closest parallel - the Assembly is already on record "... that the extraordinary expenses for the United Nations operations in the Congo are essentially different in nature from the expenses of the Organization under the regular budget and that, therefore, a procedure different from that applied in the case of the regular budget is required for meeting these extraordinary expenses." (resolution 1732 (XVI) of 20 December 1961)

2. Except for the first year 1960-1961, the expenses for the Congo operations were under a separate item on the budget.

3. In the case of both the first UNEF and the Congo separate accounts were opened to cover these expenses.

4. From the outset a separate scale of assessment was applied to the Congo inter alia, giving the developing countries first 50 per cent and then 80 per cent reduction in their shares. Also, an appeal was made to the five permanent members and other countries to make additional contributions over and above their normal assessments.

5. When at the 16th session the Assembly decided to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice, the question submitted to the Court was as follows:

"Do the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions ... constitute 'expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter of the United Nations?"
There was no mention of the regular budget. The Secretary-General, by proposing similar language in his report to the Security Council and avoiding the mention of the budget, is fully in accordance with the affirmative decision of the Court, but for him to go back and propose that these expenses should come out of the regular budget would be risky, since it would reopen all the debates and objections which were presumably settled in 1961.

6. Finally, the present situation can be summarized as follows:

The Security Council, in resolution 340, decided to establish a United Nations Emergency Force under its authority; the Secretary-General in his report S/11052/Rev.1 stated to the Council that "the costs of the Force shall be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter". He deliberately did not mention that these expenses should come under the regular budget.

The Council has formally approved the Secretary-General's report; it is now for the General Assembly to decide how these expenses shall be apportioned among Member States in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Charter, which reads as follows:

"The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly."
The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations and has the honour to acknowledge receipt of his note of 26 October 1975 in which he states that his Government is prepared to participate in the United Nations Emergency Force established under Security Council resolution 340 (1975).

The Secretary-General expresses his appreciation to the Government of Czechoslovakia for its offer. As stated in his progress report to the Security Council (S/11056) consultations are proceeding with regard to further additions to the present Force.

The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia the assurances of his highest consideration.

30 October 1975
The Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honour to advise the following:

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, being aware of the danger residing in the present situation of crisis in the Middle East for international peace and security and proceeding from the necessity of an immediate cessation of firing and all military action in this region, is convinced of the obligation of all States-Members of the United Nations to contribute to a maximum degree to the implementation of the requests embodied in the Security Council resolutions of 22, 23 and 25 October 1973 to which the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic lends its full support. The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is prepared to participate in the United Nations emergency forces set up in accordance with Article 3 of the Security Council resolution 340 of 25 October 1973 to supervise and secure the implementation of the Security Council resolutions. The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations to advise, at his earliest convenience of the kind of a contingent of the emergency forces from the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic and of where to dispatch it on the request of the Security Council.

The Permanent Representative of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the United Nations avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurances of his highest consideration.

New York, 26 October 1973
DELEGACIÓN DEL URUGUAY
EN LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

NU802/973
CG/rach

Nueva York, 30 de octubre de 1973

Excelencia,

Completando la información relativa al ofrecimiento de mi Gobierno de un contingente de las Fuerzas Armadas del Uruguay, así como de los Observadores Militares que puedan ser necesarios para servir a la Organización en el Medio Oriente, tengo el honor de comunicar a Vuestra Excelencia que el día 26 del corriente, el Presidente de la República dictó un Decreto en acuerdo con el Consejo de Ministros, y con la Asesoría del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional, por el que se resuelve ofrecer al Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, la participación de los efectivos que acabo de mencionar.

Puedo agregar a Vuestra Excelencia que el contingente de doscientos hombres mencionado, incluye la oficialidad correspondiente de carrera con dominio de los idiomas inglés y francés, y contará asimismo con la presencia de un Coronel, como oficial superior de dicha fuerza.

Debo hacer mención también de la segunda parte del ofrecimiento, que incluye la posibilidad del envío de un grupo de oficiales en calidad de Observadores Militares.

Deseo por último manifestar que las fuerzas que

A Su Excelencia
Kurt Waldheim
Secretario General de la
Organización de las Naciones Unidas
Nueva York.
DELEGACIÓN DEL URUGUAY
EN LAS NACIONES UNIDAS

//.. que

se ofrecen podrían ser eventualmente aumentadas a una proporción que dependerá de las consultas a realizarse entre mi Gobierno y Vuestra Excelencia.

Al dejar expresado así la disposición de mi Gobierno de contribuir en la medida de sus posibilidades, al funcionamiento efectivo de los mecanismos de las Naciones Unidas, bajo el orden jurídico internacional, me es grato reiterar a Vuestra Excelencia las seguridades de mi más alta consideración

Carlos Giambruno
Embajador
Excelencia,

Completando la información relativa al ofrecimiento de mi Gobierno de un contingente de las Fuerzas Armadas del Uruguay, así como de los Observadores Militares que puedan ser necesarios para servir a la Organización en el Medio Oriente, tengo el honor de comunicar a Vuestra Excelencia que el día 26 del corriente, el Presidente de la República dictó un Decreto en acuerdo con el Consejo de Ministros, y con la Asesoría del Consejo de Seguridad Nacional, por el que se resuelve ofrecer al Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas, la participación de los efectivos que acabo de mencionar.

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Carlos Giambruno
Embajador
REQUEST FOR THE INCLUSION OF AN ADDITIONAL ITEM IN THE
AGENDA OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION

FINANCING OF THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE
ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL

Note by the Secretary-General

1. Pursuant to rule 15 of the General Assembly's rules of
procedure, the Secretary-General has the honour to request
the inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-eighth session of
an additional item entitled "Financing of the United Nations
Emergency Force established pursuant to Security Council
resolution 340 (1973): report of the Secretary-General".

2. In accordance with rule 20 of the rules of procedure,
an explanatory memorandum is attached.
Explanatory Memorandum

The Security Council at its 1750th meeting, held on 25 October 1973, adopted resolution 340 (1973) by which inter alia, it decided to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations, except the permanent members of the Security Council, and requested the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on the steps taken to that effect. The required report concerning the implementation of the Security Council's decision was submitted by the Secretary-General on 26 October (S/11052/Rev.1) and was approved by the Security Council by its resolution 341 (1973) on Saturday 27 October 1973.

Paragraph 7 of the Secretary-General's report states that:

"The costs of the Force shall be considered as expenses of the Organization to be borne by the Members in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter."

The Secretary-General now wishes to place before the General Assembly for its consideration the question of the financing of the Force, and, therefore, has the honour to request the inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-eighth session of the following item:


Should the General Assembly approve the inclusion of the item, it is requested that it be allocated to the Fifth Committee.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations and has the honour to refer to the establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force pursuant to Security Council resolutions 340 (1973) and 341 (1973).

The Secretary-General would be most grateful if the Government of Canada would make available to the United Nations Lieutenant-Colonel Donald Harrison, Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations, to assist the United Nations headquarters staff with the task of maintaining liaison with contributing governments in matters relating to the operation of UNEF, particularly as regards air support and other logistics arrangements. This assignment would be for a period of six months, subject to extension. In view of the great urgency of this matter the Secretary-General very much hopes that Colonel Harrison can be made available at an early date, if possible in early November 1973.

The Secretary-General takes this opportunity to renew to the Permanent Representative of Canada the assurances of his highest consideration.

29 October 1973
Note to R. E. Guyer/B. E. Urquhart

For your information, as of 0835 hours GMT, 27 October 1973, 503 all ranks had left Cyprus for Cairo.

Breakdown by contingents:

Finland 208
Austria 138
Sweden 157

G. L. Sherry
Ваше Превосходительство,

В ответ на Вашу телеграмму и резолюцию 240 Совета Безопасности от 25-го октября 1973 года, в которой все члены ООН призываются оказать полное содействие Организации для выполнения этой резолюции, а также резолюций 288 и 329 от месяца октября сего года, имею честь сообщить Вам, что Правительство Народной Республики Болгарии, руководствуясь интересами мира во всем мире, выражает свою готовность предоставить, как болгарских граждан в качестве наблюдателей, так и соответствующий контингент болгарских вооруженных сил для включения в состав войск ООН по наблюдению прекращения огня на Ближнем Востоке в выполнении вышеупомянутых резолюций Совета Безопасности.

Пользуясь случаем вновь заверить Вас в своем высоком к Вам уважении.

Геро Гросев,
Заместитель министра иностранных дел
Постоянный Представитель НРБ при ООН

Его Превосходительству
Г-ну Курту Вальдхайму,
Генеральному Sekretarю ООН
General Situation: "V"

First unit will move at 05.00 LT (03.00 Z) 

50 men.

All UN cars.

20:45 NY time
CAIRO (UPI) -- ADVANCE UNITS OF THE 7,000-MAN UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY MILITARY FORCE TO POLICE THE MIDDLE EAST CEASE-FIRE ARRIVED IN EGYPT FRIDAY NIGHT AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THEIR PRESENCE WOULD HELP BRING PEACE TO THE AREA.

"I SURE HOPE WE CAN CONTRIBUTE TO BRINGING PEACE HERE," SAID CANADIAN COL. CLAY BEATTIE, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF OF U.N. FORCES ON CYPRUS, ON LANDING IN CAIRO.

HE STEPPED FROM A CAMOUFLAGED BRITISH ROYAL AIR FORCE HERCULES TROOP TRANSPORT AT THE HEAD OF A 30-MAN FINNISH DETACHMENT, THE FIRST UNIT TO BE RUSHED TO THE WAR ZONE.

THE RAF PLANE WAS THE FIRST TO BEGIN A SHUTTLE OF TROOPS FROM NICOSIA, CYPRUS. U.N. OFFICIALS SAID THEY EXPECT 600 MEN--FINNS, SWEDES AND AUSTRIANS--TO BE IN EGYPT BY EARLY SATURDAY.

EIGHT TRANSPORT PLANES WERE BEING USED TO COMPLETE THE TRANSFER OF ALL U.N. PEACEKEEPING PERSONNEL DESTINED FOR THE MIDDLE EAST IN 40 SORTIES BY MIDNIGHT (5 P.M. EDT) SATURDAY.

THE CONTINGENT WAS TAKEN FROM U.N. FORCES IN CYPRUS, WHERE THEY HAVE BEEN STATIONED FOR THE PAST NINE YEARS TO KEEP THE PEACE BETWEEN GREEK AND TURKISH-SPEAKING RESIDENTS.

A TOTAL OF 7,000 U.N. TROOPS WILL EVENTUALLY BE DEPLOYED TO ACT AS A BUFFER BETWEEN ISRAELI AND ARAB FORCES.

THE U.N. FORCES BEGAN ARRIVING HERE WHILE EGYPT SAID ISRAEL CARRIED OUT CONCENTRATED AIR-STRIKES AGAINST EGYPTIAN FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN SECTOR OF THE SUEZ CANAL.

"THE MEN WILL SLEEP IN AN EGYPTIAN ARMY BARRACKS TONIGHT," SAID BEATTIE. "AND WE EXPECT THEM TO BE DEPLOYED TO THE FRONT SATURDAY."

THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCE WAS TAKING WITH IT EQUIPMENT FOR A LONG-STAY. SIX LAND ROVERS, EQUIPMENT AND FOOD RATIONS WERE LOADED ABOARD THE PLANES.

UPI 10-26 07:00 PED
26 October 1973

OFFERS OF CONTINGENTS FOR UNEF

AFRICA

Ghana
Kenya
Senegal

ASIA

India
Indonesia
Nepal

WESTERN EUROPE AND OTHER STATES

Austria
Belgium
Canada
Finland
Greece
Norway
Sweden
Australia
EASTERN EUROPE
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Romania
Yugoslavia

LATIN AMERICA
Argentina
Panama
Peru
Uruguay
The members of the Security Council met for informal consultations on
the morning of 1 November 1973 and heard a report from the Secretary-General
on the progress so far made in the implementation of Security Council
resolution 340 (1973).

After a lengthy and detailed exchange of views it was agreed that in
regard to the next stage of implementation of resolution 340 (1973):

(i) The Secretary-General will immediately consult, to begin with,
Ghana (from the African regional group), Indonesia and Nepal
(from the Asian regional group), Panama and Peru (from the
Latin American regional group), Poland (from the Eastern European
regional group) and Canada (from the Western European and Other
States group), the latter two with particular responsibility for
logistic support, with a view to dispatching contingents to
the Middle East pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973).
The Secretary-General will dispatch troops to the area from these
countries as soon as the necessary consultations have been completed. The Council members agreed that at least three
African countries are expected to send contingents to the Middle
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a better geographical distribution of the United Nations Emergency
Force.

(ii) The Secretary-General will regularly report to the Council on the
results of his efforts undertaken pursuant to paragraph (i) so that
the question of balanced geographical distribution in the force
can be reviewed.

The above-mentioned agreement was reached by members of the Council with the
exception of the People's Republic of China which disassociates itself from it.
UNEF (Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973)

Implementation, second phase

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(ii) The Secretary-General will regularly report to the Council on the results of his efforts undertaken pursuant to paragraph (i) so that the Council can keep under continuous review the question of balanced geographical distribution in the force.
Irish - Germans
as long as no logistics no troops
Papa Friend

Egypt
15 - O.88
French
French
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French
s

UNEF (Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973

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UNIF (Security Council resolution 340 (1973) of 25 October 1973)

Implementation, second phase

1. The members of the Security Council met for informal consultations on the morning of 1 November 1973 and heard a report from the Secretary-General on the progress so far made in the implementation of Security Council resolution 340 (1973).

2. After a lengthy and detailed exchange of views it was agreed that in regard to the next stage of implementation of resolution 340 (1973), the following steps should be taken:

(1) The Secretary-General will consult Ghana and Liberia (from Africa), Indonesia and Nepal (from Asia), Yugoslavia (and the German Democratic Republic) (from Eastern Europe), and Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay (from Latin America) with a view to dispatching contingents to the Middle East pursuant to Security Council resolution 340 (1973). The Secretary-General is further authorized to dispatch troops to the area from one or more of these countries as soon as he is satisfied that the necessary consultations have been completed in accordance with paragraph 4 (c) of the Secretary-General's report of 27 October 1973. The Council members agreed that at least two African countries are expected to send contingents to the Middle East. The present authorization to the Secretary-General is intended to bring about a better geographical distribution of the United Nations Emergency Force.

or to take account of the principle set out in paragraph 4(c) of the Secretary-General's report of 27 October 1973,
it being understood that further consultations and further measures may be undertaken to this end as the situation develops and conditions make desirable. It is also understood that the strength of the contingents, the time of their departure and the other appropriate details would be worked out by the Secretary-General in consultation with the authorities concerned in consultation with the Governments of the above mentioned States.

(ii) The logistic support to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East, approved by resolution 340 (1973), should initially be supplied by Canada and Poland. The Secretary-General is authorised to enter into negotiations with these two countries for working out speedy, effective, and timely logistic support for the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

The Secretary-General is to complete his consultations about the earliest possible formation of a logistic component.

(iii) The Secretary-General will regularly report to the Council on the results of his effort undertaken pursuant to paragraphs (i) and (ii) above, so that the Council can keep under constant review the balanced composition of the Force.
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the evening of 1 November 1973 and heard a report from the Secretary-General
on progress so far made in the implementation of Security Council
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the next stage of implementation of resolution 340 (1973), the following steps
should be taken:

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(from Africa), Indonesia and Nepal (from Asia), Yugoslavia (from
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distribution of the United Nations Emergency Force, it being
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Middle East, approved by resolution 340 (1973), should initially
be supplied by Canada and Poland. The Secretary-General is authorised to enter into negotiations with these two countries for working out speedy, effective, and timely logistic support for the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East.

(iii) The Secretary-General will regularly report to the Council on the results of his effort undertaken pursuant to paragraph (i) and (ii) above.
1. As there are no appropriations for the purpose, I hereby authorize you, under the authority granted to me in Paragraph 1 (a) of General Assembly resolution 3045 (XXVII), on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses for the financial year 1973, to enter into the necessary commitments up to the maximum of $2 million, subject to such commitments as have been previously authorized against this maximum, to meet expenses arising under Security Council resolution 340 (1973).

2. I certify these expenses as relating to the maintenance of peace and security.
1. At its 1725th meeting, on 30 October 1975, the Fifth Committee considered agenda item 107, entitled "Financing of the United Nations Emergency Force and of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force: report of the Secretary-General".


3. In view of the fact that the present authority of the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the United Nations Emergency Force, as provided in section II, paragraph 4, of General Assembly resolution 3211 B (XXIX) of 29 November 1974, expires on 31 October 1975, the Fifth Committee endorsed a draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1237/Rev.1) which would authorize the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the United Nations Emergency Force (including the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force) for the period from 1 November to 30 November 1975 inclusive, in order to allow adequate time for consideration by the General Assembly of the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of the Force.

4. The draft resolution (A/C.5/L.1237/Rev.1) read as follows:

"The General Assembly,

"Recalling that the present authority of the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, as provided in section II, paragraph 4, of General Assembly resolution 3211 B (XXIX) of 29 November 1974, expires on 31 October 1975,"
TO: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The attached speech gives a reasonably concise account of the reasons for withdrawing UNEP.
The United Nations and Some Problems of Public Understanding
The United Nations and Some Problems of Public Understanding

Address delivered by the Secretary-General, U Thant, to the News Media Seminar on 3 December at United Nations Headquarters. The Seminar, sponsored by the Stanley Foundation, Muscatine, Iowa, was held from 2 to 4 December.

In the United Nations we are often criticized for failing to make the Organization—its achievements as well as its shortcomings—understood to the general public. Today I shall speak of this problem with special reference to one or two specific situations.

I would be the first to admit that, so far, we have not succeeded adequately in making the nature and activities of the United Nations understood to the public at large. This failure is closely related to the character of the United Nations itself, to the way Governments use it, and to the nature of some of the situations with which the Organization has to deal. The United Nations as such cannot, in the effort to put itself across to the general public, conduct an intensive information campaign such as sovereign Governments sometimes employ—an activity which other Governments have been known to characterize as propaganda. As an association of 127 sovereign States which have conflicting views on almost every subject under the sun, the United Nations cannot indulge in propaganda or in selling a particular line of policy. The United Nations, in its public information activities, can only attempt to give an objective and factual record of what is happening and to explain as far as possible the actions taken on the decisions of its principal organs.
The United Nations as such has no sovereignty, and its authority for direct action is usually very limited indeed. To get anything done through the United Nations one must usually work by persuasion, argument, patient negotiation and an endless search for consensus. This is, by and large, not the stuff of which heroic actions or striking policies, let alone news, are made. The Secretary-General, as the chief civil servant of the United Nations, although he is sometimes wrongly believed to have wide and independent powers, can for the most part only do what one or other of the principal organs of the United Nations can agree that he should do. If he feels obliged to take an initiative himself, as he often should, he must first be sure that the attitudes of most Member States will not make it useless or even counter-productive. Otherwise he will squander what little authority the Charter gives him in premature and unfruitful actions.

I said that our failure to make the United Nations understood is in part related to the way in which Governments use the Organization. It is a fact that many of the problems on the United Nations agenda, especially on the political side, are there largely because Governments have been unable to think of anything else to do about them. This is true of hard-core problems such as Palestine, apartheid, Kashmir, Cyprus or the question of Namibia (South West Africa), and it is also true of some international crises which even the strongest nations do not wish to face head-on. To some extent, at least, the United Nations has become a dumping ground for apparently insoluble or excessively dangerous problems, and it follows that the Organization attracts a good deal of popular criticism when it too fails to solve them. In this process the Organization itself, and its servants, sometimes provide a convenient scapegoat for hard-pressed Governments. This seems to me to be a valuable, if largely negative, function, and its servants, sometimes provide a convenient scapegoat for hard-pressed Governments. This seems to me to be a valuable, if largely negative, function, although it has sometimes been abused or over-exploited, and I mention it only because it is important to an understanding of our public relations difficulties.

I mentioned the nature of some of the questions with which the United Nations has to deal, as another factor in the public relations problem. The fact is that there are some problems which Governments cannot or do not wish to face alone, but on which public opinion requires them to take a stand. The fact that such problems are not susceptible to a quick or easy solution is usually concealed at the moment of crisis by the public emotion which they have aroused. The United Nations is a very convenient place for such problems. At the United Nations the responsibility can be shared—or shifted; concern can be publicly expressed, and a valid formal reason for not taking unilateral action can be created. I think, for example, of the Hungarian crisis of 1956. There was, as far as I know, no Government which was prepared to react to that crisis with significant force, although the United Nations reached its conclusions on the situation by a very large majority. When the General Assembly's resolutions on Hungary had little or no immediate practical effect, however, there was a persistent tendency, especially in the Western Press, to ascribe the failure of the United Nations to act to my predecessor, Dag Hammarskjöld, and it was even implied in some quarters that he had failed to act in Hungary because he was more interested in taking measures in the Middle East against the triple attack on Egypt. Quite what he was expected to do in a situation in which no sovereign Government was prepared to take action was never explained. This was a classic example of the United Nations, and for that matter the Secretary-General's scapegoat role.

Especially in critical times, it is widely believed that because a moral assessment requires that something should be done, it can be done, and in the United Nations there sometimes seems to be a view that if Governments are unwilling to take a certain course of action, the Secretary-General should take it anyway, even if he has been given no authority and no support to do so by the Members of the Organization. The recent tragic civil war in Nigeria provided an example of this phenomenon. Not one of the then 126 Members of the United Nations ever moved, as far as I know, to bring the Nigerian civil war to the Security Council. The reason is obvious. Nigeria is a Member of the United Nations, and the Nigerian Government strongly maintained that the war was an internal matter in which no other State or outside agency had a right to interfere, a view shared by the Organization of African Unity.

I attended all the assemblies of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity when the question of the civil war in Nigeria was discussed. The African Heads of State and Heads of Government attach very great importance to the Charter of the OAU, which stresses the determination of African States to safeguard and consolidate their hard-won independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of their States. With this provision in view, they adopted year after year resolutions recognizing the territorial integrity of Nigeria and they even proposed a three-step plan to end the starvation, misery, death and destruction in the areas of conflict in Nigeria. The Government of Nigeria accepted these proposals and the insurrectionists rejected them: A very influential section of the world Press criticized the Government which accepted the proposals and applauded the side that rejected them. I made a lengthy observation on this subject at one of my press conferences here, so I do not wish to elaborate on this matter at this time.

The basic issue that the civil war was an internal matter and that the United Nations could intervene only at the request of the Nigerian Government, as in the case of the Congo, was recognized by other Governments, who are rightly concerned with upholding the principle expressed in Article 2 (7) of the Charter concerning the domestic jurisdiction of Governments. At the very outset of the civil war in Nigeria, I wrote to General Gowon and offered my good offices for the purpose of attempting to evolve some peaceful solution to the ominous situation which had arisen. For the reasons given above, General Gowon felt unable to accept my offer, which nonetheless stood and was repeated later on. I understand that various other leaders who made similar offers received similar replies. While I well understood General Gowon's response, I deeply regretted my inability as Secretary-General to help directly in forestalling the horrors of the war in Nigeria. I have since been accused in some circles of "passivity", and even of indifference, to the sufferings of the Nigerian people, as if the sovereign independence of its States Members was not, for better or for worse, a basic principle of the United Nations which is especially binding on its Secretary-
General, I might add that having failed to get acceptance of my offer of good offices, the United Nations did the best it could to alleviate suffering through humanitarian aid, and through my appointment of a personal representative in Lagos.

In my own experience as Secretary-General, the most misunderstood, misstated and deliberately distorted episode has been, without question, the withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) from the Middle East in 1967. I would hesitate to revert to this much publicized subject, were it not that totally misleading and fanciful accounts of it continue to appear, sometimes emanating from people who have every reason to know the true facts and to understand the real situation in the Middle East at that time. The full record has been published by the United Nations, and I shall not go over it again in detail. I merely wish to comment on it and on some of the mistaken judgements which persist in spite of that published record.

I may say that no one was more acutely aware than I was of the potentially fateful consequences of the Egyptian demand for the withdrawal of UNEF, and I was the first to point them out in no uncertain terms both to Cairo and to Lagos in my memoirs of a former Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, that UNEF was:

United Arab Republic, the Force could not subsist, let alone function.

measure of security for its personnel. If that cooperation was withdrawn by the United Arab Republic Government and would immediately comply with its request for withdrawal.

Furthermore, the Governments which supplied the two largest contingents in the United Arab Republic would immediately comply with the demand of the United Arab Republic side of the line, despite the original General Assembly intention that it should be deployed on the Israel side as well, active United Arab Republic co-operation was indispensable both to maintain the Force and to provide a reasonable measure of security for its personnel. If that co-operation was withdrawn by the United Arab Republic, the Force could not subsist, let alone function.

It is sometimes forgotten or ignored, as was most recently the case in the memoirs of a former Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, that UNEF was set up by the General Assembly, not the Security Council, and that its entry into Egypt was negotiated personally, and with great difficulty, with President Nasser by Secretary-General Hammarskjöld. The only provisos concerning withdrawal made in 1957 when UNEF was first stationed on the line between Israel and Egypt, were the so-called “good faith” agreement between Dag Hammarskjöld and President Nasser, which I immediately drew to Cairo’s attention when the question of withdrawal arose in 1967, and Hammarskjöld’s later undertaking that if Egypt requested the withdrawal of the Force from Sharm-El-Sheikh he would bring the matter to the attention of the UNEF Advisory Committee, which would determine whether the matter should be brought to the attention of the Assembly. The first of these provisos was a very brief agreement in which the Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General agreed to be “guided in good faith” by the relevant Assembly resolutions in actions related to UNEF. This was as near as Hammarskjöld could get to any commitment from Cairo concerning the maintenance of UNEF in Egypt.

In accordance with the latter proviso, I summoned the UNEF Advisory Committee on 18 May, as soon as I received the formal United Arab Republic request for withdrawal. Although some of the members of the Committee were most apprehensive, as I myself was, of the possible results of the withdrawal of UNEF and were reluctant to accede to the Egyptian demand, all recognized both the legal validity of the demand and the practical impossibility of insisting on UNEF’s continuance in the face of Egyptian opposition. No member of the Advisory Committee proposed bringing the matter to the General Assembly, and as a practical procedural matter it was highly unlikely that enough support could have been found to bring the problem before the Assembly. It was also obvious that the Security Council would be deadlocked in any discussion of the situation at that time. This was, I presume, the reason why no move was made by any Member Government to bring the matter before either body. Thus, since Israel was unwilling to accept the Force on the Israel side of the line, an action which I proposed to the Permanent Representative of Israel on 18 May, and which was rejected out of hand, there was literally no immediate practical alternative to acceding to Egypt’s request for withdrawal, and no Government at that time or since has been able to suggest any workable alternative.

This did not mean that the Force was immediately to leave the area. In my reply to Cairo I made it clear that the Force would be withdrawn in an orderly, deliberate and dignified manner, and for the time being it was simply to be concentrated in its unit areas behind the line, its functions on the line having in any case already been forcibly suspended by the United Arab Republic Army. In fact, it was not intended to move out any UNEF units for some weeks, and, with the exception of the Canadian contingent, they were all still there when Israel attacked in Gaza and Sinai on 5 June, two contingents suffering casualties at that time. The fate of the Canadian UNEF contingent was indicative of the real difficulties of the actual situation. When, as a result of certain public statements by Canadian Ministers and the published dispatch of two Canadian naval vessels to the Eastern Mediterranean, the United Arab Republic Government stated that it could no longer guarantee the safety of Canadian UNEF personnel
and requested their immediate withdrawal, the Canadian Government arranged for them to be flown out at once on 31 May, some weeks earlier than the scheduled withdrawal date. This unfortunate development deprived UNEF of its air unit and its logistical services.

In the light of these facts, which have been on public record from the start, I have always been puzzled at the persistent use in some Western capitals of the word “precipitous”—surely “precipitate” was the word they were looking for—to describe my reply to President Nasser’s demand for withdrawal. The implication that the troops had been “precipitously” withdrawn from the Middle East area was the opposite of the truth. They were not, in fact, scheduled to depart for some weeks. The hope, of course, was that in that time it would be possible to work out a formula by which the peace-keeping functions of UNEF could be resumed. Obviously the last way to persuade President Nasser to agree to such a course was to behave as if UNEF was an occupation force, which it very definitely was not, having neither the right nor the equipment to use force. But, unfortunately, many official statements in Western capitals did give precisely this impression and were deeply resented in Cairo. Such attitudes made it more difficult to argue for the continuation of UNEF.

I reported this sequence of events to the General Assembly on 18 May 1967, and on 19 May I also reported to the Security Council on the ominous situation in the Middle East as a whole. In that report I characterized the situation as “extremely menacing”, and drew attention to the steady deterioration along the line between Israel and Syria, the increase in Al Fatah activities, the intransigent and bellicose public utterances on all sides and the persistent rumours of troop movements. I drew attention to the new dangers which had arisen from the Egyptian request for the withdrawal of UNEF, but pointed out that UNEF was “a peace-keeping and not an enforcement operation” and had only been accepted by the United Arab Republic in the first place on this clear understanding. In stressing that UNEF’s removal from the line had created a “brutally realistic and dangerous situation”, I suggested that at least a limited United Nations presence on the Egypt-Israel line could be maintained if Israel would agree once again to participate in the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission. I concluded by saying that the situation in the Middle East was “more menacing than at any time since the fall of 1956”.

It has often been said that I should have tried to “negotiate”. This, of course, is precisely what I did do, but I did not believe at the time and I still do not, that, after my first effort to get President Nasser to change his mind had met with an uncompromising refusal, a useful preliminary to further negotiations in Cairo would have been a public refusal to recognize Egypt’s recognized sovereign rights in relation to UNEF, an attitude which in any case, as Secretary-General, I had no possible right to adopt toward a Member State of the United Nations.

I arrived in Cairo on the afternoon of 23 May, having learned only en route that President Nasser had announced his intention to reinstate the blockade of the Strait of Tiran. In response to my question as to the timing of this announce-
drawal of UNEF as the main and primary cause of a disaster the real cause of which was the failure over the years to tackle the underlying problems of the Middle East conflict. It was apparently easier to pretend that UNEF was an enforcement operation which could, and should, have prevented by force the movement of Egyptian troops on Egyptian sovereign territory, than to face the tough realities of the Middle East situation and the true nature of UNEF as a peace-keeping instrument which had no right to use force and which, from the beginning, had operated entirely on the basis of the consent of Egypt to its presence.

The full record of this episode has been available to the Press and public since June 1967, but it is surprising how few of the people who make public statements on the subject seem to have bothered to read it. Those who have read it seem, for the most part, to have been convinced, if reluctantly, of the true nature of the situation. Some, including one of the most distinguished living French journalists, have even gone as far as to publish a reappraisal of their original attitude.

Naturally I dislike and resent some of the personal accusations leveled against me as the supposed author of the 1967 war, but I have spoken at length on this subject today rather to illustrate some of the difficulties of making the United Nations understood, and also because I believe that the United Nations and its Member States cannot succeed in the immensely difficult tasks which face us if problems, however disagreeable, are not faced squarely, and if in difficult times there is a tendency to shift responsibility and find scapegoats rather than to face facts.