

MIR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - HAC

15 AUG - 1 DEC 1994

OPERATIONS

[ 2 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL ]

[ 3 CONFIDENTIAL ]

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 5-1062

BOX 120

FILE 3

ACC. 1998/0283



UNAMIR - MINUAR

FACT SHEET

THE NUMBERS GAME

10  
17

UNAMIR

HAS IMMUNISED OVER 60 000 RWANDANS

HAS TREATED WELL OVER 170 000 RWANDAN PATIENTS AND CONTINUE TO TREAT AN AVERAGE OF 200 TO 300 PATIENTS A DAY

HAS TRANSPORTED WELL OVER 45 000 DPS BACK TO THEIR COMMUNES

HAS CLEARED SEVERAL THOUSANDS OF UNEXPLODED MUNITIONS (2 420)

HAS LAUNCHED MINE AWARENESS PROGRAMS FOR LOCAL COMMUNITIES

IS PROVIDING SECURITY AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS AND ARE PRESENT IN MOST OF THE DP CAMPS IN SOUTH WESTERN RWANDA

IS CONDUCTING DAY CLINICS IN VARIOUS AREAS OF THE COUNTRY TO ASSIST THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN RETRAINING

HAS REPAIRED ELECTRIC LINES, BRIDGES, ROADS, INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM AND WATER SERVICES FOR VARIOUS TOWNS AND COMMUNES

HAS ESCORTED HUNDREDS OF HUMANITARIAN AID CONVOYS

THE FACTS TO SUPPORT THE NUMBERS

The following information is presented as a brief synopsis of the UN involvement in Rwanda. This document will be updated as required and as information becomes available to this office. Please refer to the date below for updates.

Armed interventions:

Canadian soldier at front gate of UNAMIR saved two UNAMIR staff who were held at gunpoint by Drunk RPA soldier

Zambia intervened in Musabeya when RPA opened fire in crowd during market day

• Provision of security:

UNAMIR troops provide security on a permanent basis to many establishments such as: UNREO offices, HSF and MSF facilities, Kamembe airport, Factories, ICRC (Ethiopia).

Presence in camps:

UNAMIR troops are present in many DP camps such as: Mururu, Nyagatare, Nyarushishi, Cyimbogo, Kitambo, by (Ethiopia)... In Cyanika, Kaduha, Rukondo, Muko, Musabeya, by (Zambia).

Immunisation:

UNAMIR medical staff conducted an immunisation programme for over 60 000 Rwandan, (various contingents).

Mine clearing:

More than 1 420 mines were cleared in various sectors of the country (British).

More than 500 pieces of unexploded munitions were cleared in the month of August in the Kigali region (Canadian Contingent)

Well over 500 unexploded munitions were cleared in the Byumba area in the last several months (Nigeria)

Mine awareness program is under way in the Byumba area (Nigeria)

Water purification:

Aide to local communities:

UNAMIR troops help the local community by working on farm lands with the locals and by providing assistance to the Shagasha water purification plant, (Ethiopia)..

Day Clinics:

UN medical staff conduct day clinics in various communities. (Australia and Canada in Kibungo)

UN medical staff conduct clinic in Musabeya area (Zambia).

UN medical staff conducted Day clinics in Byumba and Mukono, (British)

Repair of infrastructure:

Help in repairing the damaged electric lines in the Cyangugu area, (Ethiopia).

- Helping Rwanda Telephone to restore services throughout the country, (Canada).

- Assist several communities in restoring water services, (Canada).

Repaired the bridge at Kanzenze (British). During this operation, Saper Robert Copsey lost the lower part of his right leg after stepping on a TS 50 land mine

Road repair and maintenance in the Kitabi area

Escort of convoys:

Over 48 UNHCR in Cyangugu area, (Ethiopia).

Transport of Rwandans:

Over 19 171 in Cyangugu area, (Ethiopia).

Over 5 000 from South west to home communes (Canada)

Medical:

Statistics for the months of August and September, show that UNAMIR has provided direct medical assistance to over 45 000 Rwandans in the months

Over 1 586 patients in the Cyangugu area, (Ethiopia).

An average of 100 patients per day receive medical treatment from UN troops in the Byumba area (Nigeria)

An average of 20 patients per day receive medical treatment from UN troops in the Kigali area, (Canada).

An average of 34 patients per day receive medical treatment from UN troops in the ???????? area, (Zambia).

Humanitarian:

UN contingent initiatives have resulted in charity drives back in home countries and will soon see delivery of several tons of humanitarian assistance such as medicine, food, clothe, fridges, sewing machines and more to orphanages in Gitarama, Butare, Kigali, Byumba, Kigeme etc (Nigeria, Canada, British)

LAST UPDATE ON.....December 6, 1994





Humanitarian Cell  
UNDP Building  
KIGALI

5000.1(HAC)/OPS/33

1 December, 1994

INDBATT

MAP OF KIGALI AND LOCATION  
OF NGOS AND UN AGENCIES

1.. Fwd is a Map of Kigali showing location of NGOs and UN Agencies, and NGOs list for your information and necessary action.

2. Please acknowledge receipt.

*Received the map of Kigali copy  
and NGO list.*

*01 Dec 94*

BM MANDE  
Maj  
for HACO



File No 5000.1(G3 PLANS)

To: Mr Randolph Kent

From: Lt Col Tom Mullarkey

Info: SRSG  
FC  
CAO  
DFC  
DCOS Ops  
DCOS Sp  
HAC

28/11

Date: 26 Nov 94

Subject: IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Reference: Our discussions 24/25 Nov 94.

1. The immediate operational requirements to support our operation, are listed below, as we have discussed.

2. Government Support. The first priority for us is to receive Government endorsement of the plan, and to ensure that this is communicated to the lower levels of the political and military bureaucracies. At Task Force level, current Government insistence on emptying the IDP camps by 1 Jan 95, is counterproductive; similarly every aggressive act carried out by the RPA in the camps makes our confidence-building task that much more daunting. I recommend that this should be the first point on the Policy Cell agenda, when SRSG takes the operational guidelines to the Government.

3. Financial Assistance. We have discussed the immediate payment needs within the Government. The money may now be available, although a method of payment may need to be evolved. I suggest you deal with the SRSGs office initially in plotting the way ahead.

4. Public Relations/Affairs. The development of an information strategy is an essential element of operational progress, and **we need a professional expert soon**, and you intend to pursue this requirement with UNICEF initially. As well as coherent advice on how and when to initiate information on this operation, we need a comprehensive plan to cover:

- a. IDP confidence building.
- b. Internal public information in Rwanda.

c. External public information particularly the fund-building needs of our approach to donors.


5. Transport. The current consolidated fleet of vehicles will not meet our initial transport requirements. Later, we hope that much movement will take place on foot, but first, we will need to generate some momentum. The need is for our off-road capability to be improved, and we have identified the following two avenues of approach:

a. Fleet Restructuring. Attached please find a list of those vehicles which have been requested as priority issues from UNOSOM. These vehicles will have the effect of reconfiguring UNAMIR's current fleet, thus offering up a large number of personnel-carrying off-road vehicles, many of which are used now for less efficient purposes. Pressure from our own CAO, as well as support from Peter Hansen's IDP Task Force in New York, would help to free up these vehicles early.

b. Enhanced Capability. We need a dedicated military transport squadron, with its own command and control facilities. The flexibility this would confer on our fleet would be significant, and we could use this resource throughout the country, to plug the inevitable gaps in our necessarily fluid transport plan. The squadron would need about 100 off-road personnel-carrying trucks - the UK would be an excellent donor choice. It is believed that the UK might be prepared to consider a clearly defined contribution, of say three months; this would give us an excellent momentum-building capability for the operation, and should further enhancement be required, we could then seek a replacement unit from another donor. Help from the IDP Task Force to move this request along would be most useful - we would aim for a deployment date of 1 Feb 95. I would recommend that you write to Peter Hansen, and that UNAMIR make a request for Force enhancement, through normal channels, at the same time.

6. Capital Project. The bridge at Shinga (GR 9547) is out and requires a rebuild. As well as having major infrastructural advantages for Rwanda, this project would greatly enhance the efficiency of our IDP movement plan, linking Butare and Kibungo Prefectures without the complexities of a vehicle transfer, or an Overnight Way Station in Kigali. In the latter stages of the operation, we believe that this could improve our transport and Way Station capacity by 30%, potentially saving months of time and considerable fleet management costs. A reconnaissance on this bridge will be conducted on Mon 28 Nov; the Force Engineer's report will give us some idea of the scale of the project and then allow us to consider how UNAMIR and the DHA could help to realise it, using the various funds available.

7. Op NAME. Our need for an Op NAME is clear. TAHA is semantically inappropriate! Perhaps the next NGO meeting is the time to receive a consensus/ownership suggestion which will suit all. I think it is important to find something both evocative and which will help in the PR strategy - your turn, I think!



T A P MULLARKEY  
Lt Col

From: Log Coord Cell

UNOSOM ASSETS REQUIRED FOR IMMEDIATE SUPPORT OF OP TAHA

SER	DESCRIPTION	SERIAL/ STOCK NUMBER	UNIT OF ISSUE	UNOSOM LOCATION	QUANTITY REQUIRED (HIGH PRIORITY)	QUANTITY REQUIRED (LOW PRIORITY)	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
1	FLATBED SEMI-TRAILER M872A3		Each	CTO		10	
2	7500gal TANKER M1062		Each	CTO		10	
3	5000gal TANKER M967		Each	CTO		10	
4	PRIME MOVER M915		Each	CTO		30	
5	DAF SEMI-TRAILER 70 tonne		Each	CTO		2	
6	DAF 4x4 CARGO TRUCK		Each	CTO		20	
7	MERCEDES 6x6 DUMP TRUCK		Each	CTO		10	
8	CHEV PICKUP 4x4		Each	CTO		100	
9	CHEV SHORT WHEELBASE		Each	CTO		101	
10	CHEV TRUCK 2.5 tonne 6x6		Each	CTO		208	
11	TOYOTA FOUR RUNNER		Each	CTO		100	
12	TOYOTA LANDCRUISER		Each	CTO		51	
13	NISSAN DC PICKUP		Each	CTO		50	
14	MAZDA TRUCK CARGO		Each	CTO		10	

Note:- These vehicles may not be directly used to support OP TAHA.

However, they will serve to release resources that would not otherwise be available.



1390/5/1

①  
HQ BRITCON  
AMAHORO STADIUM  
KIGALI

See Distribution:

21 Oct 94

BRITCON DISENGAGEMENT PLAN

GENERAL

1. At UN request, the UK dispatched a 600 man contingent to provide UNAMIR with medical, engineering, vehicle repair/recovery, second line transport and bulk fuel capabilities. The role of the contingent was two fold:

a. There was a short term requirement to underpin UNAMIR's engineering and logistic structure, while arrangements were made to develop UNAMIR's logistic support and civilian contract.

b. To support UNAMIR in its humanitarian programme along with other UN agencies and NGOs. The deployment of the contingent is limited to a period of 3 calendar months and will end on 17 Nov 94.

2. As the additional engineering and logistic support is introduced to UNAMIR and civilian contracts are let, so there is a need for a formal hand over of responsibility. BRITCON will be non-operational from 17 Nov 94, but it is suggested that 7 Nov 94 is the optimum time by which the handover be completed. This will then allow for a transitional period during which any problems can be resolved before BRITCON becomes non-operational.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to review the functions which BRITCON currently perform, both directly for UNAMIR and as part of the RWANDAN Emergency Normalisation Plan (RENP). It will also outline the timescale for the proposed handover of these functions and highlight perceived shortfalls in the capabilities of the agencies identified to take over from BRITCON.

4. The wide scale activities performed by BRITCON will be discussed by geography.

MEDICAL SUPPORT.

5. The main medical effort is now within Sector 4 as follows:

a. Humanitarian Medical Support. 23 PFA currently provide substantial medical assistance to DP camps within

②  
Staff  
File  
JH

sectors 4A and 4B. Much of the plan to hand over these functions has already been agreed with a variety of NGOs and with other medical units within UNAMIR. Listed below is the proposed hand over of 23 PFA commitments.

(1) Musange Camp 4A/21. TROCAIRE have conducted a recce and have declared that they will take on all medical responsibility for this camp by 21 Oct 94.

(2) Busanze Camp 4A/02. MERLIN will take over the responsibility of running the clinic within the camp by 22 Oct 94.

(3) Kamana Camp 4A/08. MERLIN are due to take over this camp between 7-12 Nov 94.

(4) Kibeho Camp 4A/11. This is the largest camp in which 23 PFA are currently involved. In addition to the medical treatment facilities, BRITCON has also assumed responsibility for the organisation and distribution of water within the camp. (see para 4d)

(a) Central Treatment Facility. The section from AUSMED based in BUTARE will take on this commitment, once their responsibility for the satellite facility has been handed on. As yet, there is no firm date for this to happen. MSF have already assumed responsibility for the treatment of cholera and dysentery.

(b) Satellite Clinics. CARE AUSTRALIA will take over the 3 satellite clinics as soon as they have the necessary staff and supplies. No firm date can be set at the moment but it is expected that all will be handed over by 10 Nov 94.

b. Support to Rural Communities. As a consequence of the war, the majority of the primary medical care for the indigenous population outside the DP camps has been lost. 23 PFA have provided an invaluable service to the villages within sectors 4A and 4B in the form of mobile clinics, dispensing primary medical treatment. With the extraction of 23 PFA, there is currently no group able to take on this function and the indigenous medical facilities are not yet re-established.

c. Kigeme. General medical facilities provided by 23 PFA include the surgical team at the Kigeme maternity hospital which will not be taken over by any agency once 23 PFA leave. In addition to this, the patient transport facility currently provided by BRITCON ambulances will not be taken over by anyone as there are no NGOs that possess ambulances.

d. Clean Water Supply. The provision of water to DPs Within Sector 4 is grouped as a medical task because of the significance that clean, drinkable water has on the health of the DPs in the camps; this then has a knock on effect to



the amount of medical care required within the camps.

(1) Kibeho Camp 4A/11. The NGOs MSF and PWSS are in the process of installing a short term water system which is presently dependant upon BRITCON drivers for the distribution of the water using MSF and UNHCR vehicles. This is due to be replaced by a longer term production and distribution system currently being installed by OXFAM which is expected to be in place by 1 Nov 94. The water transportation function will be taken over by MSF. Quality control of this water will be provided by AUSMED in the short term.

(2) Gikongoro Pumping Station. UNICEF are due to take over the supervision of the environmental health aspects at the Gikongoro pumping station by 20 Oct 94.

#### ENGINEER SUPPORT

6. With the exception of the bridge at KANZENZE grid 0173, BRITCON are currently not undertaking any significant construction or maintenance work in support of UNAMIR. Now that the Building Maintenance Services (BMS) has been fully established, there is greater scope to use Brown and Root (B&R) as well as local contractors. With the transfer of expertise from UNISOM, B&R will have the capability of filling the gap left by 9 PARA Sqn after 17 Nov 94.

7. There is considerable work to be done to the roads within RWANDA as well as the runway at CYANGUGU. Although B&R do not yet have the capability to perform major reconstruction tasks, this is not a function that 9 PARA Sqn currently perform. Therefore, although there is a significant capability gap within the present structure of UNAMIR, the departure of BRITCON will not add to the problem.

8. The arrival of an engineer company as part of INDBATT will greatly assist UNAMIR to cover the tasks that 9 PARA Sqn currently perform in support of the RENP, if that support is still required. Even if the deployment of INDBATT is delayed, all the tasks being carried out by BRITCON can be easily handed over through the engineer cell within HQ UNAMIR. The majority of this work is financed by NGOs who have a clear understanding of the requirement and the handover will consist of an exchange of contacts.

9. Although the overall quality of the dirt roads leading to the DP camps within sector 4A and 4B is acceptable, the effect of the heavy rain season on them in April is an unknown quantity. Currently, all the work maintaining the roads is at the request of 23 PFA for routes critical to their mission. The work mainly involves replacement and maintenance of culverts to assist with the drainage; the work to grade the roads was stopped when the grader broke and the lease for it became untenable. B&R are not contracted to maintain these roads but the number of NGO vehicles which travel along them daily means that they will soon require

attention once BRITCON become non-operational.

10. Within KIGALI, BRITCON have provided significant engineering assistance within the scope of the RENP by providing technical expertise. This assistance has focused on the establishment of mains water and electricity supply to KIGALI city and has involved 9 PARA Sqn officers and NCOs working directly with their civilian counterparts in ELECTROGAZ and MINITRAPE. Additional specialist tasks have included the provision of a draughtsman who has been involved with the design of the UNAMIR 500 man camp outside the AMAHORO stadium. It is not known whether or not the engineer company which forms part of INDBATT will have these specialist tradesmen.

11. The restrictions associated with the use of the BRITCON EOD team are widely known. However, the team does provide UNAMIR with the ability to clear mines that directly affect the UNAMIR mission. In addition, the team also mans the EOD tasking and information cell within HQ UNAMIR. Beyond this, the team has lectured to and advised NGOs and other civilian organisations on the procedures for cordon and evacuation around unexploded ordnance (UXO). Although AUSMED have a limited EOD capability, unless INDBATT have a similar capability to that of BRITCON then UNAMIR will be limited in its EOD capability.

#### SECOND LINE B VEHICLE REPAIR/RECOVERY

12. Currently, the CTO organisation has only 3 mechanics working on civilian pattern service vehicles (CPSVs) who are supplemented by 3-6 mechanics from 10 AB Wksp to assist with the servicing and repair of them. B&R will take on the repair of all B vehicles between 1-7 Nov 94 and continue to operate from their current location in the IVECO factory; B&R currently have the responsibility for the recovery and repair of all A vehicles.

13. It is planned that the hand over of responsibility for B vehicle repair to B&R be completed by 7 Nov 94 but that prior to the 17 Nov 94, BRITCON will continue to provide assistance to the CTO organisation as necessary. In addition, BRITCON will also provide technical advisory teams to visit contingents and report back to HQ UNAMIR on how well they are adhering to UNAMIR directed ES procedures and to offer advice as directed by FEME.

14. The repair and recovery of all BRITCON vehicles will remain the responsibility of 10 AB Wksp until the final withdrawal from theatre.

15. Although this plan has been generally agreed by both the CTO organisation and B&R, it is believed that both organisations currently lack sufficient manpower and equipment to deal with the task. The CTO organisation only has 3 skilled mechanics currently working and B&R have only 6. The CTO has sufficient B10 4x4 recovery vehicles to cover the recovery of the CPSVs and B&R are capable of recovering all A vehicles using the M578s. There is however, a significant capability gap in the recovery of B vehicles and the ability to off load ISO containers.

Although the ex-BELGIAN Berliet 6x6 recovery vehicle will remain, it is old and unreliable. B&R have a Volvo LT10 recovery vehicle which has a suspend tow capability of up to 4 tons. Thus, there will be a capability gap in the provision of wheeled recovery assets for vehicles over 4 ton once BRITCON leave; this will also affect the recovery of NGO vehicles which BRITCON currently assist with.

#### SECOND LINE TRANSPORT SUPPORT TO UNAMIR

16. Of the original 50 Bedford trucks sold to UNAMIR, 15 have already been handed over to B&R for second line transport duties and 11 have been issued to TUNBATT to form part of their own first line fleet. All these vehicles were handed over on direction from HQ UNAMIR and the remaining 24 have been retained for BRITCON first line details as well as continuing to form part of the Force second line task fleet.

17. On 1 Nov 94, a further 17 trucks will be signed across to B&R and MALICOY for UNAMIR second line tasks and MALICOY first line tasks; the remaining 7 being kept by BRITCON to assist with first line support and will be signed across to B&R on 20 Nov 94.

18. Although BRITCON will require the retention of the 7 trucks up to 20 Nov 94, there are no routine second line tasks that B&R cannot take on themselves. It is believed therefore that UNAMIR will not lose any significant transport capability when BRITCON leave.

#### PROVISION OF BULK FUEL INSTALLATION/DELIVERY

19. The provision of fuel through the indigenous supply system is slowly becoming re-established and more effective. Therefore the task of supply to non UNAMIR agencies has reduced which, coupled with the capability of 3 CSG has negated the need for BRITCON to provide a second line bulk fuel capability for the Force. Currently, BRITCON provides a daily resupply to UN interests within KIGALI and to the water pumping station at GIKONGORO.

20. These tasks are to be taken over by B&R but it is believed that they do not yet have the vehicles to take them on. The type of vehicle required for this task is ideally a small manoeuvrable tanker capable of holding approximately 4000L such as the unit bulk refuelling equipment (UBRE) held by BRITCON, CANCON and AUSMED.

#### SUMMARY

21. When BRITCON become non-operational on 17 Nov 94, UNAMIR should not lose any significant capability as there will be sufficient agencies with the right capabilities both within the


UN and through civilian contracts. It is recognised however that the departure of BRITCON will leave gaps in the following areas unless some form of remedial action is taken.

a. Workshop repair and recovery facilities to cover second line support for the UNAMIR contingents. B&R is not yet capable of taking on this task and the CTO organisation does not have resources to maintain CPSVs at the level currently experienced.

b. Any recovery task involving a vehicle weighing more than 4 tons will be beyond the capability of the remaining recovery assets.

c. With the exception of the CANCON and AUSMED UBREs, there will be no suitable vehicles available with which to resupply fuel to UNAMIR interests around KIGALI.

22. All other facilities provided by BRITCON are either not being tasked by UNAMIR or they are to be taken over by the UN agencies or by NGOs. The quick fix service which has been provided by BRITCON has given sufficient breathing space for other, longer term organisations to take over the combat support and combat service support tasks which BRITCON have performed since 17 Aug 94.



A J DUNCAN  
Capt  
for COMBRITCON

Distribution:

External:

Action:

HQ UNAMIR for DCOS OPS  
DCOS SP  
HAC  
FMO

Information:

JHQ

Internal:

Information:

COMBRITCON  
DEPCOMBRITCON  
23 PFA  
9 Para Sqn RE  
63 AB CS Sqn RLC  
10 AB Wksp REME  
Log Ops





File No 5000.8 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: FC

Date: 14 Oct 94

Subject: AMENDMENT TO RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Reference: A. HQUNAMIR OPDIR NO. 2 ROE dated 6 Oct 94

1. Please find enclosed, for your review and action, an amendment to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) which rationalizes the escalation of force procedures with the concept of minimum force. You are directed to remove the appropriate page and insert the amended page into the Reference. The affected change pertains to the proper sequencing of Sub-paragraphs 14c and 14d.

2. Commanders at all levels are required to:

- a. Have this directive translated and disseminated to every subordinate under their command if other than English/French; and
- b. Ensure that every subordinate under their commands understands the changes to this document.

G.C. Tousignant  
Major-General  
Force Commander

Enclosures: 2Distribution ListAction

MA/FC  
MA/DFC & COS  
DCOS Ops  
DCOS Sp  
HAC  
Tac HQ  
List B  
List D

cc  
In effect the amendment accordingly.

7 21  
10

10. Authority to Detain. Individuals shall only be detained if they commit a hostile act, display hostile intent or carry out any activity which would require that force be used against them under paragraph 8.

11. Once detained, only minimal non-deadly force is authorized to prevent the escape of a detainee, unless there is a necessity to act in self-defence, in which case minimum force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized. However, if the individuals flee and the threat of their use of force has thus been removed, further force of any kind shall not be employed to apprehend them.

12. Any individual detained shall be turned over as soon as possible to appropriate civilian police authorities as designated by the Force Commander. Any weapons seized from detainees shall be confiscated or rendered militarily ineffective.

13. Detainees shall not be subject to intimidation, deprivation or humiliation. Medical care and the attention of medical personnel will be provided when required. Detainees will be given rations and shelter equivalent to that of UNAMIR personnel.

#### CHALLENGE AND ESCALATION PROCEDURES

14. Except where a response is required in accordance with paragraph 15, the following procedures are to be followed:

- a. Verbal or Visual Warning. Warn the aggressor to stop the activity, which in normal circumstances, should follow the following sequence:

- (1) depending on the circumstances, a warning may be given orally, by a sign or by illumination (ie, hand-held red flares, search-lights, etc.). The issuance of a warning should also be passed up the chain of command with continuous Situation Reports;

- (2) repeat the verbal or visual warning as many times as is necessary to ensure understanding or compliance;

- b. Charge Weapons. If authorized under State B of ROE No.2 (paragraph 15 refers);
- c. Non-Deadly Force. If warnings are ignored, employ minimal non-deadly force;
- d. Warning Shots. If the threat continues, employ aimed warning shots in a safe direction so that there is no danger of personal injury or collateral damage;
- e. Deadly Force. If minimal non-deadly force is either not feasible or fails, on order and under the control of a superior, minimal deadly force, such as single aimed shots, may be used until the threat is removed;
- f. Escalation of Deadly Force. Escalatory weapons fire with other weapons systems shall only be on the order of the appropriate commander in accordance with paragraph 6.



- b. Charger les armes. Sur autorisation dans la situation B du Règlement d'Engagement N°.2(référence au paragraphe 15);
- c. Force non-mortelle. Si les avertissements sont ignorés, employer le minimum de force non-mortelle;
- d. Tirs d'avertissement. Si la menace persiste, utiliser des tirs d'avertissement diriger dans une direction certaine afin de ne pas se faire mal ou de causer des dégâts secondaires.;
- e. Force mortelle. Si un minimum de force non-mortelle n'est pas applicable ou n'a pas d'effet, sur ordre et sous le contrôle d'un supérieur, on peut recourir à une force minimale mortelle, notamment des tirs non-automatiques diriger, jusqu'à ce que la menace soit écartée;
- f. Escalade de la force mortelle. L'escalade des armes à feu avec d'autres systèmes d'armes sera placée sous les ordres du seul commandant habilité en conformité avec le paragraphe 6.

TIR SANS AVERTISSEMENT OU ESCALADE.

15. Le seul moment où il est permis de faire usage de force mortelle sans avertissement ou escalade est quand une attaque par un agresseur vient de façon si inattendue que même un petit retard pourrait:

- a. causer la mort ou un dommage grave au personnel de la MINUAR ou à tout autre personnel militaire ou civil autorisé par les Nations unies;
- b. causer la mort ou un dommage grave à des personnes placées sous la protection de la MINUAR; ou
- c. conduire à un dommage ou destruction immédiate des biens de la MINUAR dans les circonstances décrites au paragraphe 8.b(2).

PROCEDURE DANS LE PROCESSUS D'OUVRIR LE FEU.

16. Tout usage d'armes à feu comme moyen d'exercer une force mortelle consistera en des tirs ciblés, c'est-à-dire viser au milieu de la masse visible de la cible. Les tirs doivent être contrôlés pour ne pas tirer aveuglément. Les tirs automatiques ainsi que l'emploi des armes de support ne seront utilisés qu'en dernier ressort et seulement sur autorisation tel que mentionné au paragraphe 6. Les tirs ciblés continueront aussi longtemps qu'il sera nécessaire pour atteindre le but immédiat. A travers des ordres pour contrôler les

HAC ①

5000.1 (PLANS)

HQ UNAMIR  
KIGALI

15 October 1994

Distribution List

FORCE COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE ON MASS GRAVES AND  
ALLEGED MASSACRE SITE REGISTRATION, INVESTIGATION AND HANDLING.

GENERAL

1. Instances of widespread killing during the recent civil war in RWANDA are well known. The development of a strategy to investigate these occurrences is in progress. However, a comprehensive database on mass graves is required to focus the Human Rights Committee investigation and to provide the BBGNU with limited assistance from NGOs and UNAMIR to deal with the situation in a dignified manner.

2. Additionally, it has been revealed in recent reports that a number of mass graves discovered to date present a health hazard to the neighbouring population.

AIM

3. The aim of this directive is to outline the UNAMIR policy on registration and handling of mass graves.

PROCEDURE

4. Reports of mass graves and alleged massacre sites are random and do not identify a trend. The recording of relevant data has been equally sporadic. Accordingly, a database is to be established at HQ UNAMIR by the MILINFO cell in Operations Branch.

5. Reporting. Action addressees are to report the discovery of mass graves to HQ UNAMIR. Reports are to include the following details:

a. Location.

(1) map coordinates (8 figures).

(2) nearest town, village, commune or camp.

b. General description.

(1) dimensions.

(2) condition.

②  
Staff  
Orders + Instructions

- (a) sealed.
- (b) unsealed.
- (3) proximity to water source.
- (4) proximity to population concentration.
- (5) approximate age.
- (6) estimated number of persons buried therein.
- (7) cause of death where discernable.

c. Remarks.


6. Recording. MILINFO cell, HQ UNAMIR is to record mass grave reports in a format which will be useful to military, government departments, UN agencies and NGOs. Cooperation amongst all parties will ensure that maximum information is collectively made available. Accordingly, the MILINFO cell is to gather from and share information with all available sources.

7. Investigation. Investigation of all the circumstances surrounding mass graves and alleged massacres is the responsibility of Human Rights and the BBGNU of RWANDA. The involvement of UNAMIR personnel will be specifically ordered when necessary.

8. Handling. FMO staff is to inspect reported mass graves to ascertain the health risk if any. If a clear health risk to the civilian population and/or UNAMIR personnel is identified, the FMO inspection report, including recommendations to the Government on the appropriate procedure to effectively address the matter, is to be submitted to Operations Branch. Due to the limited resources currently at the government's disposal, UNAMIR is to be prepared to provide the resources and expertise required. Requests to provide such resources are to be approved by DCOS OPS in consultation with the FMO and DCOS SP.

CONCLUSION

9. The handling of mass graves has legal, moral and memorial implications which are properly the responsibility of the BBGNU of RWANDA to address. UNAMIR personnel are to treat mass grave issues with appropriate sensitivity and are to limit their involvement to the essential requirements of reporting unless specifically ordered otherwise.

  
G.C. Tousignant  
MGen  
Force Commander

Distribution List: (page 3)

Distribution List:

External:

Action:

CANCON  
AUSMED  
BRIT CON  
NICOY  
MALICOY  
GHANBATT  
MALAWI COY  
ZAMBATT  
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ETHIOBATT  
TUNBATT  
INDBATT

Information:

Human Rights Coordinator (UNDP)

Internal:

Action:

List A  
List B

Information:

SRSG's Office  
CC LOG O  
File

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNREO

*UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE  
BUREAU D'URGENCE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE RWANDA*

## **NOUVEAU BUREAU-TERRAIN UNREO**

Nous avons le plaisir de vous informer qu'à compter du vendredi 7 octobre, un nouveau bureau-terrain UNREO sera à votre disposition à Kibungo.

Ce bureau est situé à quelques mètres de la préfecture de Kibungo, de biais à l'établissement Primus qui sert présentement de base à une unité canadienne UNAMIR.

Les officiers-terrain, Douglas Higgins et Chentale de Montigny, anticipent le plaisir de travailler conjointement avec la communauté des ONG et les agences des Nations-Unies. Ils se feront une joie de vous y accueillir.

## **UNREO's KIBUNGO OFFICE TO OPEN**

We are pleased to announce that UNREO is to open a new Field Office in Kibungo on 7 October.

Located approximately 100m past Kibungo's Prefecture, the UNREO Office and residence is more or less across the road from the Canadian UNAMIR camp on the Primus compound.

UNREO's Field Officers Douglas Higgins and Chentale de Montigny look forward to working with UN agencies and the NGO community in the Kibungo region and welcoming you to our new premises.

X 10  
16





UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.8 (PLANS)

To: DISTRIBUTION LIST

From: FC

Date: 6 Oct 94

Subject: RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Reference: A. HQUNAMIR OPDIR NO. 2 ROE dated 22 Jul 94  
B. HQUNAMIR Amendment 1 to OPDIR NO. 2 dated 10 Sep 94

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1. Please find enclosed, for your review and action, the revised Rules of Engagement (ROE) which incorporates the amendments of Reference B into Reference A and adds minor grammar changes to the french version.
2. Commander's at all levels are required:
  - a. to have this directive translated and disseminated to every subordinate under their command; and
  - b. to ensure that every subordinate under their command understands the contents of this document.
3. References A and B are cancelled.

+ 7/10

G.C. Tousignant  
Major-General  
Force Commander

Enclosures: 2

Distribution List

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List D



SECTION 9:

OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE NO. 02

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

PART I

1. The conduct of military operations is controlled and regulated by the provision of international and national law, conventions and precedence. In the case of a United Nations (UN) conducted operation, it is the responsibility of the UN to set the parameters within which UN Forces will operate. Rules of Engagement (ROE) are the means by which the UN can provide to commanders at all levels the political and legal direction and guidance on the use of Force by UN personnel. ROE are drafted by the Force Commander, but are approved by the UN and may only be changed with UN authority.

2. These UNAMIR ROE are provided for UN Forces operating under the auspices of UN Security Council Resolution 925 dated 8 June 1994, which states in paragraph 4 that:

"... the consolidated mandate of UNAMIR includes the following:

- (a) To contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas;
- (b) To provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations; and
- (c) To act as an intermediary between the parties in an attempt to secure their agreement to a ceasefire;..."

Paragraph 5 of the resolution particularly recognizes that:

"UNAMIR may be required to take action in self-defence against persons or groups who threaten protected sites and populations, United Nations and other humanitarian personnel or the means of delivery and distribution of humanitarian relief." Therefore circumstances could arise where the use of force by UNAMIR personnel could be necessary and justified.

PART II

DEFINITIONS

3. The following key definitions must be clearly understood by all personnel in UNAMIR:

- a. Force. The use of physical means to impose one's will. Military force is the use of the physical means provided by formed, armed and disciplined bodies of troops under unified command to achieve the same end and generally implies the potential to use significant levels of violence.
- b. Self-Defence. The use of force to protect:
  - (1) oneself and the personnel in one's unit,
  - (2) other UNAMIR military or civilian personnel,
  - (3) non-UNAMIR humanitarian aid personnel,
  - (4) displaced persons, refugees and civilians in sites or among populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces, or
  - (5) other UN-authorized military or civilian personnel, against a hostile act or hostile intent, where there is no other choice or time for deliberation.
- c. Hostile Act. A hostile act is an attack or other use of force against those entities listed in paragraph 3.b. above.
- d. Hostile Intent. Hostile intent is the threat of the imminent use of force against those entities listed in paragraph 3.b. above.
- e. Minimum Force. The minimum degree of authorized force which is necessary, reasonable and lawful in the circumstances.
- f. Collateral Damage. Damage to persons or property adjacent to, but not part of an authorized target.
- g. Non-deadly force. Any physical means of forcing compliance that does not pose a risk of death or serious bodily harm to the individual against whom the force is directed. This is usually through the use of physical force short of the use of firearms or other deadly weapons. Examples include: pushing and lesser forms of striking or hitting, and physically or mechanically restraining persons. Warning shots are non-deadly force, even though they involve the use of firearms.
- h. Deadly Force. This is the ultimate degree of force. Deadly force is that level of force which is intended or is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm regardless of whether death or serious bodily harm actually results.

### PART III

#### INSTRUCTIONS ON THE USE OF FORCE

##### APPLICABILITY

4. The ROE stated in this directive apply to all personnel provided by nations participating in UNAMIR under the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 925 dated 8 June 1994. These ROE are written in the form of either prohibitions or permissions. Issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Issued as permissions they are guidance to commanders that certain specific actions may be taken if they are judged necessary to achieve the aim of the mission.

##### COMMANDERS' RESPONSIBILITY

5. Commanders at all levels are required:
- a. to have this directive translated and disseminated to every subordinate under their command; and
  - b. to ensure that every subordinate under their command understands the contents of this document.

##### AUTHORIZATION LEVELS FOR THE USE OF FORCE

6. The use of deadly force for the different types of weapons will be authorized as follows:

- a. Force Commander or His Delegate:
  - (1) heavy support weapons (ie. rocket launchers, artillery pieces, light mortars, etc.); and
  - (2) heavy machine guns or cannons ( .50 cal, 20mm, etc.);
- b. In situations which are life threatening to UNAMIR troops, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, soldiers may use the following weapons:
  - (1) medium machine guns (i.e. FN MAG, M60, etc.)
  - (2) light machine guns; and
  - (3) all personal weapons on automatic or single shot fire.
- c. In situations which are not life threatening to soldiers, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, the use of deadly force for different types of weapons will be authorized as follows:
  - (1) Sector Commanders:
    - (a) medium machine guns (i.e. FN MAG, M60, etc.),

(b) light machine guns; and

(c) all personal weapons on automatic fire.

(2) Battalion Commander Down to NCO Level at the Scene of a Threat.

(a) Personal weapons for single shot fire.

NOTE: Commanders should be aware when using weapons of the principles of military necessity and proportionality.

PRINCIPLES FOR USE OF FORCE

7. When an incident occurs that requires the use of force, the following principles will be adhered to:

- a. if possible, negotiation and warnings must be exhausted before any use of force is initiated;
- b. only the minimum non-deadly and deadly force consistent with achieving the immediate aim shall be employed;
- c. except where authorized under paragraph 11, the escalation of force procedures pursuant to paragraph 14 must be exhausted before the use of any deadly force is initiated;
- d. deadly force is justified only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot reasonably be employed;
- e. escalation of the level of violence is to be minimized;
- f. collateral damage is to be minimized;
- g. the use of force in retaliation is prohibited; and
- h. use of force shall be controlled by the on-scene commander and is to cease once the aim has been achieved.

AUTHORITY TO USE FORCE

8. Force may be used as follows:

- a. Non-Deadly Force. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to use non-deadly force in the following circumstances:
  - (1) in self-defence ( as defined in paragraph 3.b.) against unarmed aggression;
  - (2) against unarmed attempts at infiltration or envelopment of UNAMIR units, compounds or locales;
  - (3) when UNAMIR premises are violated in unarmed attempts to steal UNAMIR property or property under the protection of the UN;



(4) when unarmed attempts are made to abduct or detain UNAMIR civilian or military personnel; and

(5) when unarmed attempts are made to prevent UNAMIR personnel from carrying out their responsibilities as ordered by their commanders.

b. Deadly Force. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to use deadly force in the following circumstances:

(1) in self- defence (as defined in paragraph 3.b.) against persons committing a hostile act or exhibiting hostile intent;

(2) to protect from damage or destruction, property or installations belonging to or under the protection of UNAMIR, including protected sites and the means for the distribution and delivery of humanitarian relief: -

(a) which have been designated by the Unit Commanding Officer, in consultation with the Force Commander, as essential to the success of the UNAMIR mission,

(b) which justify protection through the use of deadly force, and

(c) where there is no way to prevent the damage or destruction;

(3) to overcome forcible attempts to prevent UNAMIR Force discharging its duties, when authorized by the Force Commander;

(4) to resist armed attempts to disarm, abduct or detain UNAMIR military or civilian personnel;

(5) to resist armed attempts to compel UNAMIR personnel to withdraw from protection areas they were ordered to occupy by the Force Commander or his delegate; and

(6) to resist armed attempts to cut off a UNAMIR force.

#### AUTHORITY TO SEARCH AND DETAIN

9. Authority to stop and Search. UNAMIR personnel are authorized to stop all individuals attempting to enter or who are discovered inside any facilities under UNAMIR protection and to request that the individual submit to a consensual search of himself / herself and his/her vehicle where applicable. Any individual not willing to be searched shall be denied access, escorted from the premises or detained as appropriate. Searches of persons and their property are also authorized for the purpose of security. Such searches may be conducted with the minimal use of force necessary.

10. Authority to Detain. Individuals shall only be detained if they commit a hostile act, display hostile intent or carry out any activity which would require that force be used against them under paragraph 8.

11. Once detained, only minimal non-deadly force is authorized to prevent the escape of a detainee, unless there is a necessity to act in self-defence, in which case minimum force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized. However, if the individuals flee and the threat of their use of force has thus been removed, further force of any kind shall not be employed to apprehend them.

12. Any individual detained shall be turned over as soon as possible to appropriate civilian police authorities as designated by the Force Commander. Any weapons seized from detainees shall be confiscated or rendered militarily ineffective.

13. Detainees shall not be subject to intimidation, deprivation or humiliation. Medical care and the attention of medical personnel will be provided when required. Detainees will be given rations and shelter equivalent to that of UNAMIR personnel.

#### CHALLENGE AND ESCALATION PROCEDURES

14. Except where a response is required in accordance with paragraph 15, the following procedures are to be followed:

- a. Verbal or Visual Warning. Warn the aggressor to stop the activity, which in normal circumstances, should follow the following sequence:
  - (1) depending on the circumstances, a warning may be given orally, by a sign or by illumination (ie, hand-held red flares, search-lights, etc.). The issuance of a warning should also be passed up the chain of command with continuous Situation Reports;
  - (2) repeat the verbal or visual warning as many times as is necessary to ensure understanding or compliance;
- b. Charge Weapons. If authorized under State B of ROE No.2 (paragraph 15 refers);
- c. Warning Shots. If the threat continues, employ aimed warning shots in a safe direction so that there is no danger of personal injury or collateral damage;
- d. Non-Deadly Force. If warning shots are ignored, employ minimal non-deadly force;
- e. Deadly Force. If minimal non-deadly force is either not feasible or fails, on order and under the control of a superior, minimal deadly force, such as single aimed shots, may be used until the threat is removed;



- f. Escalation of Deadly Force. Escalatory weapons fire with other weapons systems shall only be on the order of the appropriate commander in accordance with paragraph 6.

#### OPENING FIRE WITHOUT WARNING OR ESCALATION

15. The only circumstance under which it is permissible to open fire without warning or escalation is if an attack by an aggressor comes so unexpectedly that even a moments delay could:

- a. lead to death or serious injury to UNAMIR personnel or to other UN-authorized military or civilian personnel;
- b. lead to death or serious injury to persons who are under the protection of UNAMIR; and
- c. lead to the immediate damage or destruction of UNAMIR property in the circumstances described in paragraph 8.b.(2).

#### PROCEDURE DURING FIRING

16. Any use of firearms as a means of applying deadly force, shall be aimed fire, ie, fired at the centre of the visible mass of the target. Fire must be controlled and will not be indiscriminate. Automatic fire and firing of support weapons will only be used as a last resort and only as authorized under paragraph 6. Fire for effect will only continue as long as it is necessary to achieve the immediate aim. Through fire control orders, the commander on the scene will indicate and control the fire, preferably directed at the leaders or instigators of the threat. Regular situation report will be forwarded through the chain of command.

17. Whenever possible, each escalation in the use of force should be authorized by the chain of command of UNAMIR. A request in clear by radio for authorization to fire can have a calming effect on its own. Permission to use higher level of force must be obtained from the appropriate commander in accordance with paragraph 6. The on-scene commander is responsible for assessing the situation and taking action appropriate to the situation.

#### PROCEDURE AFTER FIRING

18. After firing, commanders should ensure the following actions are taken.

- a. Medical. Any wounded, including those fired upon by UNAMIR personnel will be given first aid, if such an action can be done without further endangering the lives of UNAMIR personnel.

- b. Recording. Details of the incident will be recorded, including:

(1) date, time and place of firing;

- (2) unit and personnel involved;
  - (3) the events leading up to the firing;
  - (4) why UNAMIR personnel opened fire;
  - (5) who or what was fired on;
  - (6) the weapons fired; and
  - (7) the apparent results of the firing.
- c. Reporting. The above information and the current situation will be reported through the chain of command to Force HQ ATTN Force Commander and Deputy Chief of Staff Operations.

#### PART IV

##### RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

19. Rule No. one:            Authority to Carry Arms
- a. State A: No authority; and
  - b. State B: Authority granted to carry weapons.
20. Rule No. Two:            Status of Weapons
- a. State A: Weapons will be carried with loaded magazines.
  - b. State B: Weapons will be carried, charged and made safe.
21. Rule No. Three:            Response to Hostile Intent or Hostile Act without the Use of Fire
- a. State A: Observe and report but will withdraw in order to preserve own force.
  - b. State B: Stay in place. Make contact and establish liaison with opposing force(s) and/or local authorities concerned.
  - c. State C: Observe and Report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means without opening fire.
  - d. State D: Observe and Report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means. Demonstrative use of fire is authorized.

22. Rule No. Four:      Disarmament of Paramilitary Personnel or Civilians

- a. State A: No authorization granted.
- b. State B: Authorization is granted. In doing so, use minimum force and escalate to include use of deadly force if hostile intent is exhibited or a hostile act is committed. Hand over to appropriate authority at the earliest opportunity.

23. Rule No. Five:      Intervention and Warning Shots

- a. State A: Intervention between warring factions is prohibited.
- b. State B: Intervention with deadly force against positively identified and designated targets only after warning shots have been fired as part of the warning process.

24. Rule No. Six:      Control of Weapons Systems

- a. State A: Manning, preparation, movement and firing of weapons in the presence of the forces in conflict is prohibited.
- b. State B: Designated activity in the presence of the forces in conflict is permitted but will be specified by the following notes:
  - (1) Man (type of system);
  - (2) Prepare (type of system);
  - (3) Move (type of system); and
  - (4) Fire (type of system).

25. There are three ROE states that may apply in any given sector in Rwanda. These states are GREEN, YELLOW and RED and are described on UNAMIR Levels of Readiness/Alert pages in Annex A. In normal circumstances, the ROE status shall be GREEN.

Note: Changes in the normal status of the ROE for UNAMIR Forces as a whole will be ordered by the Force Commander or his delegate. Sector Commanders may order changes in normal status of the ROE for their sectors, if authorized by the Force Commander or his delegate. Contingent Commanders will inform or, if necessary, seek approval from national authority for the change in status.

PART V

CONCLUSION

26. The aim of this directive is to provide guidance to commanders and soldiers at all levels in the use of force. However, no definitive directive can be created that can detail every possible course of action for every possible situation. It is critical and mandatory that all members of UNAMIR understand these ROE and apply them to any and all situations that develop requiring the use of force.

27. Amendments to this directive will be issued as required and as approved by the UN.

Annex:

Annex A Aide-Memoire for Members of UNAMIR.



**INSTRUCTIONS FOR ALL MEMBERS OF  
THE UNAMIR MILITARY COMPONENT  
REGARDING OPENING FIRE IN RWANDA**

1. You are to avoid the use of force, if it is possible to do so, and your conduct must cause the least possible concern, fear or danger to the local population.
2. Your immediate commander will order any change in the states of weapon readiness. While your commander will normally issue the order to open fire, you have the right to use appropriate force in self-defence to protect yourself and those it is your duty to protect. Whenever possible a warning should be given before opening fire (see over).
3. If you have to use force, you must only use the **MINIMUM FORCE** necessary. **MINIMUM FORCE** normally involves the following sequential actions:
  - a. open display of weapons.
  - b. verbal warning.
  - c. barring access to the point being protected.
  - d. physical restraint.
  - e. warning shots.
  - f. pointing weapons, and
  - g. firing weapons.

**WARNINGS**

4. **WARNING BEFORE FIRING.** Whenever possible a warning should be given before firing. The warning should be given in a loud clear voice in ENGLISH/FRENCH or KINYARWANDA:

STOP-HANDS UP/ ARRETEZ LEVEZ LES MAINS/  
HAGARARA, AMABOKO HEJURU

(PAUSE)

STOP OR I WILL SHOOT/ ARRETEZ OU JE TIRE/  
HAGARARA, CYANGWA BAKURASE

5. **FIRE AFTER WARNING.** After warning you may fire on a person in order to avoid death or grievous bodily harm only if:

- a. the person is carrying a dangerous weapon (e.g. firearm, improvised firing device or machete); AND
- b. you believe the person is about to attack you, your unit, or any person it is your duty to protect; AND
- c. the person refuses to stop when called upon to do so; AND
- d. you believe there is no other way of stopping the person.

6. **FIRE WITHOUT WARNING.** You may fire without warning on a person in order to avoid death or grievous bodily harm only if that person:

- a. has used or is using a fire arm or other dangerous weapon against you, your unit or persons it is your duty to protect; OR
- b. is carrying what you believe to be a dangerous weapon, AND is clearly about to use it, AND you believe that there is no other way to protect yourself, your unit, or the persons it is your duty to protect.

7. If you have to fire, you must account for all rounds expended in an after action report submitted in writing to your immediate commander.

**UNAMIR LEVELS OF READINESS/ALERT**

SER	STATUS	UNITS/HQ	ACTION
1	GREEN	ALL	1. Normal activities 2. ROE: Rule 1-Status B, Rule 2-Status A, Rule 3-Status B, Rule 4-Status A, Rule 5-Status A, Rule 6-Status A.
2	YELLOW	HQ	1. Planning for next higher status commences. 2. Liaison increased. 3. VIP visits postponed. 4. No leave granted except on compassionate grounds.
		UNITS	1. Precautionary stage. 2. Double sentries. 3. Night movement restricted. 4. Test shelters. 5. Stand To/Local alarm practice. 6. No leave granted except on compassionate grounds. 7. Backup comms/units/wpns. 8. Reserves put on 3 hrs notice to move.
		ALL	ROE: Rule 1-Status B, Rule 2-Status B, Rule 3-Status C, Rule 4-Status A, Rule 5-Status A, Rule 6-Status A.
3	RED	HQ	1. General Alert. 2. VIP visits cancelled. 3. No leave granted.
		UNITS	4. Emergency movement only. 5. Special SITREPS to UNHQ. 6. Civilian evacuation if the situation warrants
		ALL	1. Troops in defensive positions. 2. Troops in Stand To positions. 3. Reserves put on one hour notice to move. 4. No leave granted. 5. Troops on duty outside to wear flak jackets.  ROE: Rule 1-Status B, Rule 2-Status B, Rule 3-Status D, Rule 4-Status B, Rule 5-Status B, Rule 6-Status B.

AIDE MEMOIRE - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

NOTE: GREEN status indicated in boxes

**RULE ONE: AUTHORITY TO CARRY ARMS**

STATE A: No authority granted.

STATE B: Authority granted to carry weapons.

**RULE TWO: STATUS OF WEAPONS**

STATE A: Weapons will be carried with loaded magazines.

STATE B: Weapons will be carried, charged and made safe.

**RULE THREE: RESPONSE TO HOSTILE INTENT OR HOSTILE ACT WITHOUT THE USE OF FIRE**

STATE A: Observe and report but will withdraw in order to preserve own forces.

STATE B: Stay in place. Make contact and establish liaison with opposing force(s) and/or local authorities concerned.

STATE C: Observe and report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means without opening fire.

STATE D: Observe and report. Stay in place. Warn aggressor of intent to use force and demonstrate resolve by appropriate means. Demonstrative use of fire is authorized.

**RULE FOUR: DISARMAMENT OF PARAMILITARY PERSONNEL OR CIVILIANS**

STATE A: No authorization granted.

STATE B: Authorization is granted. In doing so, use minimum force and escalate to include use of deadly force if hostile intent is exhibited or a hostile act is committed. Hand over to appropriate authority at earliest opportunity.



**RULE FIVE: INTERVENTION AND WARNING SHOTS**

STATE A: Intervention between warring factions is prohibited.

STATE B: Intervention with deadly force against positively identified and designated targets only after warning shots have been fired as part of the warning process.

**RULE SIX: CONTROL OF WEAPON SYSTEMS**

STATE A: Manning, preparation, movement and firing of weapons in the presence of forces in conflict is prohibited.

STATE B: Designated activity in the presence of the forces in conflict permitted but will be specified by the following notes:

- (1) Man (type of system);
- (2) Prepare (type of system);
- (3) Move (type of system); and
- (4) Fire (type of system).

**SECTION 9 :****DIRECTIVE OPERATIONNELLE NO. 02****REGLEMENT D'ENGAGEMENT****1 ère PARTIE**

1. Le commandement des opérations militaires doit être contrôlé et réglementé par la clause de loi, de convention et de jurisprudence nationale et internationale. En ce qui concerne l'opération sous le commandement de l'Organisation des Nations Unies (ONU), il est du ressort de l'ONU de déterminer les paramètres dans lesquels doivent opérer les Forces de l'ONU. Les Règles d'Engagement (RDE) est le moyen employé par l'ONU pour fournir, aux commandants de tous les niveaux, des conseils et des instructions politiques et légales concernant l'usage de la Force par le personnel de l'ONU. Les RDE sont préparées par le Commandant des Forces; de plus elles doivent être approuvées par l'ONU et ne peuvent être modifiées que sous l'autorisation des Nations unies.

2. Ces Règles d'Engagement de la MINUAR sont prévues pour les Forces de l'ONU opérant sous les auspices de la Résolution no.925 du Conseil de Sécurité de l'ONU, Résolution datant du 8 Juin 1994, qui stipule dans son paragraphe 4 ce qui suit:

"... le mandat consolidé de la MINUAR comprend les clauses suivantes:

(a) contribuer à la sécurité et à la protection des personnes déplacées, des réfugiés et de personnes menacées au Rwanda, y compris, dans la mesure du possible, l'établissement et le maintien de zones humanitaires sûres;

(b) garantir la sécurité et l'assistance pour la distribution de l'aide ainsi que pour les opérations d'aide humanitaire; et

(c) agir comme intermédiaire entre les parties en essayant de garantir leur accord de cesser-le-feu;..."

Le paragraphe 5 de la résolution reconnaît particulièrement que:

"La MINUAR peut être obligé de prendre une action d'auto défense contre des personnes ou même des groupes s'attaquant soit à des sites ou des populations protégés, soit au personnel humanitaire ou des Nations Unies ou soit aux autres équipements de livraison et de distribution de l'aide humanitaire." Par conséquent, des circonstances peuvent surgir où l'usage de la force par le personnel de la MINUAR pourrait être nécessaire et justifié.

## DEUXIEME PARTIE

### DEFINITIONS

3. Les définitions clés suivantes doivent être bien comprises par tout le personnel de la MINUAR:

- a. La force. L'usage des moyens physiques pour imposer sa volonté. La force militaire est l'usage des moyens physiques fournis par des corps de troupes formés, armés et disciplinés sous un commandement unifié pour atteindre une même fin, ceci impliquant généralement la possibilité de l'usage de la violence à des niveaux importants.
- b. Auto- défense. L'usage de la force pour protéger:
  - (1) soi-même et le personnel de son unité,
  - (2) autre personnel militaire ou civil de la MINUAR,
  - (3) le personnel d'assistance humanitaire n'appartenant pas à la MINUAR,
  - (4) des personnes déplacées, réfugiées ou civiles se trouvant dans des sites ou parmi des populations sous la protection des forces de la MINUAR, ou
  - (5) autre personnel militaire ou civil autorisé par les Nations Unies, contre une intention ou un acte hostile où l'on n'a pas d'autre choix ni le temps de délibérer.
- c. Acte hostile. Un acte hostile est une attaque ou autre emploi de la force contre les entités énumérées au paragraphe 3.b. ci-dessus.
- d. Intention hostile. Une intention hostile est une menace d'usage imminent de la force contre les entités énumérées au paragraphe 3.b. ci-dessus.
- e. Force minimale. Le degré minimum de force autorisée qui est nécessaire, raisonnable et légale dans les circonstances.
- f. Domage collatéral. Domage causé aux personnes ou aux biens adjacents mais ne faisant pas partie de la cible autorisée.

- g. Force non-mortelle. Tout moyen physique pour contraindre à accepter qui ne comporte pas de risque de mort ou de dommage physique grave contre l'individu sur lequel la force est exercée. Il s'agit généralement de l'usage de la force moins l'emploi des armes à feu ou d'autres armes mortelles. Les exemples comprennent le fait de pousser et donner des formes de coups légers, contraindre des personnes par des moyens physiques ou mécaniques. Des tirs d'avertissement relèvent de la force non-mortelle même si ça comporte l'usage des armes à feu.
- h. Force mortelle. C'est le dernier degré dans l'usage de la force. Il s'agit de ce niveau où la force exercée vise à causer ou peut causer la mort ou un dommage corporel grave indépendamment de l'effet réel qui en résulte.

### TROISIEME PARTIE

#### INSTRUCTIONS SUR L'USAGE DE LA FORCE

##### DOMAINE D'APPLICATION

4. Les Règles d'Engagement citées dans cette circulaire s'appliquent à tout le personnel fourni par toutes les nations participant à la MINUAR selon les dispositions de la Résolution 925 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies du 8 Juin 1994. Ces Règles apparaissent sous forme d'interdiction ou de permission. Sous forme d'interdiction, elles sont des ordres de ne pas mener des actions spécifiques. Sous forme de permission, elles servent de guide aux commandants sur certaines actions qui peuvent être menées si elles sont jugées nécessaires pour atteindre les objectifs de la mission.

##### LA RESPONSABILITE DES COMMANDANTS

5. Les commandants à tous les niveaux sont chargés de:
- a. faire traduire cette circulaire et la diffuser à chacune des personnes sous leurs ordres; et
  - b. s'assurer que toute personne sous leurs ordres comprend le contenu du présent document.

##### NIVEAUX D'AUTORISATION POUR FAIRE USAGE DE LA FORCE

6. L'usage de la force mortelle avec les différents types de systèmes d'armes sera autorisé comme suit:



a. Le commandant de la Force ou son Représentant

(1) Armes de couverture lourdes (càd lance-roquettes, pièces d'artillerie, mortiers légers, etc.); et

(2) Mitrailleuses lourdes ou canons ( .50 cal, 20mm, etc.).

b. Dans des situations où leurs vies, celle des membres de leurs unités ou de ceux qu'ils sont chargés de protéger sont menacées, les soldats peuvent utiliser les armes suivantes:

(1) mitrailleuses moyennes (càd. FN MAG, M60, etc);

(2) mitrailleuses légères; et

(3) toute arme personnelle automatique ou non-automatique.

c. Dans des situations où leurs vies, celle des membres de leurs unités ou de ceux qu'ils sont chargés de protéger ne sont pas menacées, l'usage de la force mortelle avec les différents types d'armes sera autorisé comme suit:

(1) Commandants de Secteurs :

(a) mitrailleuses moyennes (càd. FN MAG, M60, etc.);

(b) mitrailleuses légères; et

(c) toute arme personnelle automatique.

(2) Du commandant de bataillon au Sous-Officier se trouvant sur la scène de menace:

(a) Armes personnelles non-automatiques.

NOTE: Au moment de l'utilisation des armes, les commandants doivent se souvenir de la nécessité et la proportionnalité militaires.

PRINCIPES REGISSANT L'USAGE DE LA FORCE

7. Quand un incident survient où l'usage de la force est nécessaire, l'on devra s'en tenir aux principes suivants:

- a. Si possible, les moyens de négociation et d'avertissement doivent être exploités à fond avant de commencer tout usage de la force;

- b. Il faudra employer seulement le minimum de la force mortelle ou non-mortelle requis pour atteindre l'objectif immédiat;
- c. Excepté là où c'est autorisé sous le paragraphe 11, l'échelle des procédures de force selon le paragraphe 14 doit être épuisée avant de faire appel à l'usage de la force mortelle;
- d. La force mortelle est justifiée seulement dans des conditions d'extrême nécessité et en dernier ressort quand tous les moyens plus simples ont échoué ou ne peuvent pas être pratiquement employés;
- e. La violence utilisée doit être réduite au minimum;
- f. Les dommages secondaires doivent être réduits au minimum;
- g. L'usage de la force en représailles est interdit; et
- h. L'usage de la force est contrôlé par le commandant présent sur la scène et il doit cesser une fois que l'objectif a été atteint.

#### PERMISSION DE FAIRE USAGE DE LA FORCE

8. La force peut être employée comme suit:

- a. La force non-mortelle. Le personnel de la MINUAR est autorisé à faire usage de la force dans les circonstances suivantes:
  - (1) en cas d'auto-défense( telle que définie au paragraphe 3.b.) contre un groupe non-armé;
  - (2) contre des tentatives non-armées pour infiltrer ou encercler des unités, enceintes ou locaux de la MINUAR;
  - (3) quand les bâtiments de la MINUAR sont violés dans des tentatives non-armées pour voler les biens de la MINUAR ou des biens placés sous la protection des Nations Unies.
  - (4) contre des tentatives non-armées pour enlever ou détenir le personnel militaire ou civil de la MINUAR; et
  - (5) quand des tentatives non-armées sont faites pour empêcher le personnel de la MINUAR d'exécuter les ordres de leurs commandants.

b. Force mortelle. Le personnel de la MINUAR est autorisé à faire usage de force mortelle dans les circonstances suivantes:

(1) en cas d'auto-défense (telle que définie au paragraphe 3.b.) contre des personnes qui posent un acte hostile ou montrent une intention hostile;

(2) pour protéger, contre dommage ou destruction, des biens ou installations appartenant à ou placés sous la protection de la MINUAR, y compris des sites protégés ainsi que les moyens de livraison et de distribution de l'aide humanitaire:

(a) qui ont été jugés essentiels pour le succès de la mission de la MINUAR par l'officier chargé du commandement de l'unité en consultation avec le Commandant de la Force,

(b) qui justifient la protection moyennant l'usage d'une force mortelle, et

(c) là où il n'y a pas d'autre moyen d'empêcher le dommage ou la destruction;

(3) pour maîtriser des tentatives armées voulant empêcher les Forces de la MINUAR de remplir leurs devoirs, quand ils sont autorisés par le commandant de la Force;

(4) pour résister à des tentatives armées voulant désarmer, enlever ou détenir le personnel militaire ou civil de la MINUAR;

(5) pour résister à des tentatives armées voulant contraindre le personnel de la MINUAR à se retirer des régions sous sa protection occupées sur ordre du Commandant de la Force ou de son représentant; et

(6) pour résister à des tentatives armées voulant couper la Force de la MINUAR.

#### AUTORISATION DE FOUILLE ET DE DETENTION

9. Autorisation de stopper et de fouiller. Le personnel de la MINUAR est autorisé à arrêter tout individu qui tente d'entrer ou qui est découvert à l'intérieur des bâtiments sous la protection de la MINUAR et d'exiger de lui ou d'elle de se soumettre à une fouille unanime de soi-même et de son véhicule, le cas échéant. A toute personne qui n'accepte pas d'être fouillée on lui refusera l'accès et elle sera conduite hors du bâtiment sous escorte ou détenue selon les normes en vigueur. Des fouilles de personnes

ainsi que de leurs biens sont aussi autorisées pour les besoins de la sécurité. De telles fouilles peuvent être menées avec le minimum nécessaire d'usage de la force.

10. Autorisation de détention. Les personnes ne seront détenues que quand elles auront commis un acte hostile, affiché une intention hostile, mené toute activité qui requerrait l'usage de la force contre elles tel que stipulé par le paragraphe 8.

11. Une fois que quelqu'un est détenu, seule une force minimale non-mortelle est autorisée pour prévenir son évasion, à moins qu'il y ait une nécessité d'agir pour s'auto-défendre, dans lequel cas une force minimale est autorisée, y compris la force mortelle. Cependant, si des gens parviennent à s'enfuir et que par conséquent la menace de leur usage de la force est éloignée, aucune force de quelque nature que ce soit ne peut plus être exercée pour les appréhender.

12. Tout détenu sera remis aussitôt que possible aux autorités de police civile habilitées désignées par le Commandant de la Force. Toutes les armes saisies sur des détenus seront confisquées ou rendues militairement inefficaces.

13. Les détenus ne doivent pas être soumis à l'intimidation, la privation ou l'humiliation. Les soins médicaux ainsi que l'attention du personnel médical seront accordés chaque fois que de besoin. Les détenus auront droit aux mêmes rations et abris que ceux du personnel de la MINUAR.

#### PROCEDURES DE DEFI ET D'ESCALADE

14. Sauf dans le cas où une riposte s'avère nécessaire en conformité avec le paragraphe 15, autrement les procédures suivantes doivent être suivies:

a. Avertissement verbal ou visuel. Avertir l'agresseur d'arrêter son activité, ce qui, dans des circonstances normales, devrait suivre la séquence suivante:

(1) selon les circonstances, un avertissement peut être oral, un signe ou une illumination (càd des feux signalisateurs tenus en mains, des lampes-torches, etc.). Le fait de donner un avertissement devrait être communiqué au niveau supérieur de commandement accompagné de rapport continuuel sur la situation;

(2) répéter l'avertissement verbal ou visuel autant de fois que nécessaire pour s'assurer qu'il est compris ou accepté;



- b. Charger les armes. Sur autorisation dans la situation B du Règlement d'Engagement N°.2(référence au paragraphe 15);
- c. Tirs d'avertissement. Si la menace persiste, utiliser des tirs d'avertissement diriger dans une direction certaine afin de ne pas se faire mal ou de causer des dégâts secondaires.;
- d. Force non-mortelle. Si les tirs d'avertissement sont ignorés, employer le minimum de force non-mortelle;
- e. Force mortelle. Si un minimum de force non-mortelle n'est pas applicable ou n'a pas d'effet, sur ordre et sous le contrôle d'un supérieur, on peut recourir à une force minimale mortelle, notamment des tirs non-automatiques diriger, jusqu'à ce que la menace soit écartée;
- f. Escalade de la force mortelle. L'escalade des armes à feu avec d'autre systèmes d'armes sera placée sous les ordres du seul commandant habilité en conformité avec le paragraphe 6.

#### TIR SANS AVERTISSEMENT OU ESCALADE.

15. Le seul moment où il est permis de faire usage de force mortelle sans avertissement ou escalade est quand une attaque par un agresseur vient de façon si inattendue que même un petit retard pourrait:

- a. causer la mort ou un dommage grave au personnel de la MINUAR ou à tout autre personnel militaire ou civil autorisé par les Nations unies;
- b. causer la mort ou un dommage grave à des personnes placées sous la protection de la MINUAR; ou
- c. conduire à un dommage ou destruction immédiate des biens de la MINUAR dans les circonstances décrites au paragraphe 8.b(2).

#### PROCEDURE DANS LE PROCESSUS D'OUVRIR LE FEU.

16. Tout usage d'armes à feu comme moyen d'exercer une force mortelle consistera en des tirs ciblés, c'est-à-dire viser au milieu de la masse visible de la cible. Les tirs doivent être contrôlés pour ne pas tirer aveuglément. Les tirs automatiques ainsi que l'emploi des armes de support ne seront utilisés qu'en dernier ressort et seulement sur autorisation tel que mentionné au paragraphe 6. Les tirs ciblés continueront aussi longtemps qu'il sera nécessaire pour atteindre le but immédiat. A travers des ordres pour contrôler les

tirs, le commandant sur place indiquera et contrôlera les tirs dirigés de préférence sur les meneurs ou sur les instigateurs de la menace. Un rapport régulier sur la situation sera transmis à travers la chaîne de commandement.

17. Chaque fois que possible, l'intensification de l'usage de force devrait être autorisée par la chaîne de commandement de la MINUAR. Un appel explicite par radio pour demander l'autorisation d'ouvrir le feu peut à lui seul provoquer un effet pacificateur. La permission de passer à un niveau supérieur de force doit être obtenue du commandant habilité en conformité avec le paragraphe 6. Le commandant sur place est responsable de l'évaluation de la situation et de la prise d'une action appropriée à la situation.

PROCEDURE APRES L'OUVERTURE DU FEU.

18. Après l'ouverture du feu, les commandants devraient s'assurer que les actions suivantes sont menées.

- a. Action médicale. Toute personne blessée, y compris celles sur lesquelles le personnel de la MINUAR a tiré, bénéficiera de l'assistance de première nécessité à condition qu'une telle action puisse se faire sans mettre davantage en danger les vies du personnel de la MINUAR.
- b. Enregistrement. Les détails sur l'incident seront enregistrés, y compris:
  - (1) la date, l'heure et le lieu où l'ouverture du feu a eu lieu;
  - (2) l'unité et le personnel impliqués;
  - (3) les événements qui ont conduit à l'ouverture du feu;
  - (4) pourquoi le personnel de la MINUAR a ouvert le feu;
  - (5) sur qui ou quoi est-ce qu'on a tiré;
  - (6) les armes utilisées; et
  - (7) le résultat apparent des coups tirés.
- c. Rapport. Les informations ci-haut ainsi que la situation qui prévaut doivent être transmises à travers la chaîne de commandement au Quartier Général de la Force à l'attention du Commandant de la Force et de l'Officier Chef des Opérations.

## QUATRIEME PARTIE

### REGLES D'ENGAGEMENT

19. Règle No. Un: Autorisation de porter des armes a feu
- a. Situation A : Pas d'autorisation; et
  - b. Situation B : Autorisation accordée de porter des armes a feu.
20. Règle No. Deux: Etat des armes
- a. Situation A: Les armes seront portées avec des chargeurs remplis.
  - b. Situation B: Les armes seront portées chargé mais sécurisés.
21. Règle No. Trois: Riposte à une intention ou un acte hostile sans faire usage des armes a feu
- a. Situation A : Observer et transmettre un rapport, mais se retirer en vue de préserver sa propre force.
  - b. Situation B : Rester sur place. Contacter et établir une liaison avec la(les) force(s) opposée(s) et/ou les autorités locaux concernées.
  - c. Situation C : Observer et faire un rapport. Rester sur place. Prévenir l'agresseur de votre intention de faire usage de la force et montrer votre fermeté par des moyens appropriés sans ouvrir le feu.
  - d. Situation D : Observer et faire un rapport. Rester sur place. Prévenir l'agresseur de votre intention de faire usage de la force et montrer votre fermeté par des moyens appropriés. L'usage de l'arme a feu à titre démonstratif est autorisé.

22. Règle No. Quatre : Désarmement du personnel paramilitaire ou des civils.
- a. Situation A : Aucune autorisation.
  - b. Situation B : Autorisation accordée. Au cours du désarmement, faire usage de force minimum et monter jusqu'à l'usage de force mortelle si une intention hostile est démontrée ou un acte hostile est commis. Remettre l'affaire à l'autorité appropriée à la première occasion.
23. Règle No. Cinq : Intervention et tir d'avertissement
- a. Situation A : L'intervention entre les partis en guerre est interdite.
  - b. Situation B : Intervenir avec une force mortelle contre des cibles bien identifiées et désignées après que des coups d'avertissement aient été tirés dans le cadre du processus d'avertissement.
24. Règle No. Six : Contrôle des systèmes d'armes
- a. Situation A : Il est interdit d'obtenir, préparer, déplacer et de faire usage des armes à feu en présence des forces en conflit.
  - b. Situation B : L'activité nommée ci-haut peut se dérouler en présence des forces en conflit mais elle sera spécifiée par les notes suivantes:
    - (1) Obtenir (type de système);
    - (2) Préparer (type de système);
    - (3) Déplacer (type de système);
    - (4) Ouvrir le feu (type de système).
25. Il existe 3 situations de Règles d'Engagement qui peuvent s'appliquer dans n'importe quel secteur du RWANDA. Ces situations sont dénommées VERTE, JAUNE et ROUGE et elles sont décrites sur la rubrique "Niveaux de préparation/Alerte de la MINUAR" qui suit l'Annexe A. Dans les conditions normales, la situation des Règles d'Engagement sera VERTE.



NOTE: Les modifications de la situation normale des Règles d'Engagement pour les Forces de la MINUAR en général seront faites sur ordre du Commandant de la Force ou de son Représentant. Les Commandants des Secteurs peuvent ordonner des changements dans la situation normale des Règles d'Engagement pour leurs secteurs, sur autorisation du Commandant de la Force ou de son Représentant. Les Commandants des Contingents aviseront ou, si nécessaire, requerront l'approbation des autorités de leurs pays pour changer de situation.

#### CINQUIEME PARTIE

#### CONCLUSION

26. L'objectif de cette circulaire est de fournir un guide aux commandants et soldats de tous les niveaux en cas d'usage de la force. Cependant, il n'est pas possible de faire une circulaire définitive qui puisse détailler toute action possible pour toute situation possible. Il est important et obligatoire que tout le personnel de la MINUAR comprenne ces Règles d'Engagement et les applique à toute situation qui se produit nécessitant l'usage de la force.

27. Les amendements à cette circulaire seront faits tels que requis et approuvés par les Nations unies.

#### Annexe:

Annexe A      Aide-Mémoire pour le personnel de la MINUAR.

**DIRECTIVES POUR TOUT LE PERSONNEL MILITAIRE DE LA MININUAR  
CONCERNANT L'OUVERTURE DU FEU AU RWANDA.**

1. Vous devez éviter l'usage de la force, si c'est possible de le faire, et votre comportement doit causer le moins d'inquiétude, de peur ou de danger possible à la population locale.
2. Votre commandant immédiat pourra ordonner des changements dans les niveaux de préparation d'armes. Alors que normalement votre commandant donnera l'ordre d'ouvrir le feu, vous avez le droit de faire usage de la force nécessaire en cas d'auto-défense pour vous protéger vous-même et ceux dont il est votre devoir de protéger. Chaque fois que possible, un avertissement devra être donné avant d'ouvrir le feu (voir verso).
3. Si vous devez absolument faire usage de la force, vous ne devez employer que le **MINIMUM DE FORCE** nécessaire. Normalement, le **MINIMUM DE FORCE** implique la succession des actions suivantes:
  - a. exhibition d'armes.
  - b. avertissement verbal.
  - c. refus d'accès à l'endroit sous protection.
  - d. restriction physique.
  - e. tirs d'avertissement.
  - f. pointer les armes, et
  - g. faire feu.

**AVERTISSEMENTS**

4. **AVERTISSEMENT AVANT D'OUVRIR LE FEU.** Chaque fois que c'est possible, un avertissement doit être donné avant de tirer. L'avertissement doit être clairement donné à haute voix en ANGLAIS/FRANCAIS ou en KINYARWANDA:

**STOP-HANDS UP/ ARRETEZ, LEVEZ LES MAINS/  
HAGARARA, AMABOKO HEJURU  
(PAUSE)**

**STOP OR I WILL SHOOT/ ARRETEZ OU JE TIRE  
HAGARARA, CYANGWA BAKURASE**

5. **FAIRE FEU APRES AVERTISSEMENT.** Après avertissement, vous pouvez tirer sur une personne afin d'éviter la mort ou un dommage corporel grave si et seulement si:

- a. la personne porte une arme dangereuse (ex. une arme à feu, un engin improvisé pour faire feu ou une machète); ET
- b. vous croyez que la personne est sur le point de vous attaquer vous-même, votre unité, ou toute personne dont il est votre devoir de protéger; ET
- c. la personne refuse de s'arrêter quand elle est appelée à le faire; ET
- d. vous estimez qu'il n'y a pas d'autre moyen d'arrêter la personne.

6. **FAIRE FEU SANS AVERTISSEMENT.** Vous pouvez tirer sur une personne sans avertissement en vue d'éviter la mort ou un dommage corporel grave si et seulement si la personne:

- a. a employé ou est entrain d'employer une arme à feu ou autre arme dangereuse contre vous, votre unité ou des personnes dont il est votre devoir de protéger; OU
- b. porte ce que vous estimez une arme dangereuse, ET elle est visiblement sur le point de l'employer, ET vous estimez qu'il n'y a pas d'autre moyen de vous protéger vous-même, votre unité, ou les personnes dont il est votre devoir de protéger.

7. Si vous devez absolument tirer, vous devez rendre compte de tous les coups tirés dans un rapport rédigé et soumis à votre commandant immédiat après l'action menée.

NIVEAUX DE PREPARATION/ALERTE DE LA MINUAR

No	SITUATION	UNITES/QG	ACTION
1	VERTE	TOUS	1. Activités normales 2. RDE: Règle 1-Situation B, Règle 2-Situation A, Règle 3- Situation B, Règle 4- Situation A, Règle 5-Situation A, Règle 6- Situation A.
2	JAUNE	QG	1. Début de préparation pour la situation qui suit. 2. Augmentation des liaisons. 3. Visites des personnalités importantes annulées. 4. Pas de congé excepté pour des raisons humanitaires.
		UNITES	1. Stade de précaution. 2. Double Sentinelle. 3. Restriction du mouvement nocturne. 4. Tester les abris. 5. Alerter les troupes. 6. Pas d'accord de congé sauf pour des raisons humanitaires. 7. Consolider les communications, les unités et les armes. 8. 3 heures de préparation accordées aux troupes en réserve pour se mettre en mouvement.
		TOUS	RDE: Règle 1-Situation B, Règle 2-Situation B, Règle 3-Situation C, Règle 4-Situation A, Règle 5-Situation A, Règle 6-situation A.



3	ROUGE	QG	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Alerte générale.</li> <li>2. Visites des personnalités importantes annulées.</li> <li>3. Pas de congé.</li> <li>4. Seuls les mouvements d'urgence sont permis.</li> <li>5. Envoi des rapports spéciaux sur la situation au Quartier Général des Nations Unies.</li> <li>6. Evacuation des civils si la situation le permet.</li> </ol>
		UNITES	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Les troupes en position défensive.</li> <li>2. Les troupes en position d'alerte.</li> <li>3. Une heure de préparation accordée aux troupes en réserve pour se mettre en mouvement.</li> <li>4. Pas d'accord de congé.</li> <li>5. Les troupes de garde à l'extérieur portent des flak jackets.</li> </ol>
		TOUS	RDE: Règle 1-Situation B, Règle 2-Situation B, Règle 3-Situation D, Règle 4-Situation B, Règle 5-Situation B, Règle 6-Situation B.

**AIDE MEMOIRE - REGLES D'ENGAGEMENT**

NOTE: La situation VERTE est encadrée.

**REGLE UNE:       AUTORISATION DE PORTER DES ARMES A FEU**

SITUATION A:    Pas d'autorisation.

SITUATION B:    Autorisation accordée de porter des armes a feu.
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**REGLE DEUX:       ETAT DES ARMES**

SITUATION A:    Les armes seront portées avec des chargeurs remplis.
--

SITUATION B:    Le armes seront chargées mais sécurisées.

**REGLE TROIS:     RIPOSTE A UNE INTENTION OU ACTE HOSTILE SANS FAIRE USAGE DES ARMES A FEU**

SITUATION A:    Observer et transmettre un rapport mais se retirer pour ses propres forces.

SITUATION B:    Rester sur place. Contacter et établir une liaison avec la(les) force(s) opposée(s) et/ou les autorités locaux concernées.
--

SITUATION C:    Observer et faire un rapport. Rester sur place. Avertir l'agresseur de votre intention de faire usage de la force et se montrer ferme par des moyens appropriés sans ouvrir le feu.

SITUATION D:    Observer et faire un rapport. Rester sur place. Avertir l'agresseur de votre intention de faire usage de la force et se montrer ferme par des moyens appropriés. L'usage du feu à titre démonstratif est autorisé.

**REGLE QUATRE: DESARMEMENT DU PERSONNEL PARAMILITAIRE OU DES CIVILS**

SITUATION A: Pas d'autorisation.
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SITUATION B: Autorisation accordée. Au cours de cette activité, faire usage de force minimum et monter jusqu'à l'emploi de la force mortelle si une intention hostile est démontrée ou un acte hostile commis. Remettre l'affaire à l'autorité appropriée à la première occasion.

**REGLE CINQ: INTERVENTION ET TIR D'AVERTISSEMENT**

SITUATION A: Intervention interdite.
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SITUATION B: Intervention avec usage de la force mortelle contre des cibles bien identifiées et nommées après que des coups d'avertissement aient été tirés dans le cadre d'un processus de d'avertissement.

**REGLE SIX: CONTROLE DES SYSTEMES D'ARMES**

SITUATION A: Il est interdit d'obtenir, préparer, déplacer, et de faire usage des armes à feu en présence des forces en conflit.
--

SITUATION B: l'activité ci-haut décrite est permise en présence des forces en conflit mais elle sera explicitée par les remarques suivantes:

- (1) Obtenir (type de système);
- (2) Préparer (type de système);
- (3) Déplacer (type de système); et
- (4) Faire feu (type de système).

7/10 - 3396  
 NYK PLS DELAY  
 TO KIGALI. TICK.

INFORMATION  
 CENTRE  
 HEADQUARTERS

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA  
 UNAMIR

1994 OCT -4 A 9:40

(MISSION DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA)  
 (MINUAR)

NAIROBI KENYA

OUTGOING FAX NO. 1762  
 MSC 1619

PAGE 1 OF 1

TO: MAJ GEN TOUSIGNANT	FROM: A H GOLO OIC ADMINISTRATION UNAMIR
PREFIX/NO: MIR/	DATE: 04 OCT 1994
ATTN: CHO, SMPO-KIGALI AND WELFARE OFFICER	PHONE: (254)(2) 62 2508 (CAO)
FAX NO: 72-80-3-3090	FAX NO: (254)(2) 62 2668
INFO: FHQ(PLANS), HAC FAX NO:	DRAFTER: CAPT CB ALIYAN FILE REF:
Internal Dist.:	
SUBJECT: SITREP AS OF 2000 HOURS, 03 OCT 1994	
REF.	

1. THE GERMAN AIRFORCE RELIEF FLIGHT TEAM IN NAIROBI IS TO BEGIN FLIGHTS TO KIGOMA AND NGARA AT THE RWANDA-TANZANIA BORDER SOON. THE TEAM REQUESTS THE FOLLOWING ASSISTANCE FROM UNAMIR:

- MAP OF THE AREA AND OF NGARA AIRFIELD.
- APPROACH PLATES TO THE AIRFIELD.
- RADIO FREQUENCIES USED BY AIRCRAFT APPROACHING THE AREA.
- ANY OTHER USEFUL INFORMATION.

2. PLEASE CONFIRM THE POSSIBILITY OF PROVIDING THIS ASSISTANCE IF AVAILABLE, AND SEND IT THROUGH THIS OFFICE AS SOON AS PRACTICABLE.

E/DIR, FC COO CAO CMD SMPO WELFARE OFFR FHQ, HAC

↑ 6/10



UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

Kigali,  
October, 1994

3000.15(Ops)

Dear Minister,

Subject: MASS GRAVE HEALTH RISK AT CYANKA

I wish to draw your attention to a serious health problem which has been identified at the Displaced Person Camp at CYANKA, UNAMIR No 4A/03 at Grid Reference 5629. Within the camp, and adjacent to the drinking water supply, there is a mass grave site which is a serious potential health risk. I seek your authority to resolve the matter speedily.

The British military medical staff who are providing humanitarian aid to the camp have established that the site will contaminate the water supply with typhoid and cholera if the bodies are not properly dealt with soon. They believe that the only way to effectively deal with the problem is to lime the area and cover it with a large amount of topsoil, which will have to be brought in by vehicle. Inevitably, this will mean that the bodies will be neutralised and they will decompose at a much faster rate than if they had been left in their current condition.

I realise that this may pose legal, moral and memorial questions for you to resolve. Equally, I have no wish for a precedent to be set and would hope that this matter could be dealt with as a unique case. However, the urgency with which a response is needed and the potential risk of not taking action soon, means that I must seek your early advice on how the problem should be resolved. Should you wish for the grave site to be properly contained, UNAMIR will undertake to coordinate the necessary work.

V. 05/10

Cy to: IHAC

to S/w

SHAHARYAR KHAN  
SRSG  
UNAMIR

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR  
BROAD-BASED GOVERNMENT  
NATIONAL UNITY OF RWANDA  
KIGALI

MA TO FC

UNITED NATIONS  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM



NATIONS UNIES  
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

(UNAMIR)

①

TO: Dr. A.H. Kabia  
Executive Director

DATE: 1 October 1994

FROM: Ike Minta *KSC*  
Legal Adviser

SUBJECT: Mass Graves - Health Policy

Reference: 538-12-1 MED BR 78/94 Dated 29 September 1994

1. Under the circumstances, I think that health considerations should prevail.
2. As far as possible, any health safeguards should still preserve the evidence as to the number of graves, their location, and contents.
3. All graves must thus be properly identified and secured, and, if possible, estimates made as to the number of persons buried therein.
4. Any health safeguards taken now should allow future exhumation of the graves if considered necessary pursuant to any investigations.

③ G3 Plans

This is a BBGNU task with NGO assistance and limited advice from G2 re locs etc and PMO re health considerations. UNAMIR does not wish to become involved in this issue to any extent. unless UNAMIR pers exposed to health risks. *[Signature]*

② G3 Plans 3

Above is in response to your request for advice  
RKH  
20 2/10



(UNAMIR)

TO: Dr. A.H. Kabia  
Executive Director

DATE: 1 October 1994

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Legal Adviser

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*Staff  
Pls file  
dir 04/10*

*G3 Plans 3  
Above is in  
response to your  
request for advice  
20 2/10*

HQ BRITCON  
AMAHORO STADIUM  
KIGALI

See Distribution

2 Oct 94

PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH MASS GRAVES

Reference:

A. Med Branch 538-12-1, 78/94 dated 29 Sep 94.

1. In the reference, the problems of the health risk associated with the mass graves in camp 4A03 (CYANICA) were outlined. So far, BRITCON has received no guidance on the subject and none of the lime requested.

2. As the rainy season continues, the degeneration of the mass graves in camp 4A03 will accelerate. The cosmetic action already performed by BRITCON will not prevent the degeneration of the situation. With the proximity of the graves to the water supply and being located within the camp, the likely outcome of insufficient action being taken now is:

a. Increased spread of disease.

b. Exhumation of bodies by action of water and contamination of the camp with washed up decomposing human remains.

3. It is impractical to relocate the grave and although BRITCON has the equipment to tackle the problem, the lack of lime will hamper any further efforts. To enable BRITCON to deal with this problem, it is requested that 3000 lbs of lime be made available from UNAMIR. BRITCON will then cut topsoil from the local area to allow the following action:

a. Cover the bodies with one inch of lime.

b. Build up a 3 foot layer of topsoil.

c. Wire off the sites and dig ditches around them.

4. The scale of the problem is as follows:

a. Site one, 50 x 20m area.


b. Site 2, 20 x 10m area.

c. Site 3, 10 x 10m area.

Staff  
pls file  
Kw 04/10



5. HQ UNAMIR is requested to hasten any action already taken to obtain the required amount of lime, for this short term solution and advise BRITCON on the long term solution. It is estimated that unless remedial action is taken immediately, the problems outlined above will result in a serious health risk which will then lead to the inevitable loss of life.

  
A J DUNCAN  
Capt  
for COMBRITCON

Distribution:

External:

Action:

HQ UNAMIR - HAC  
G3 Ops  
G4

Internal:

Information:

CO  
23 PFA  
9 Para Sqn RE

+ 3/10

UNCLASSIFIED

HAC

5000.7 (PLANS)

01 03 271000Z SEP 94 PP UUUU

PLANS 017

HQ UNAMIR

LIST A

LIST B

LIST C

UNCLAS PLANS 017

SUBJ: ACTION TO BE TAKEN ON UNAMIR PERSONNEL OPENING FIRE

REFS: A. HQ UNAMIR OP DIRECTIVE 02 - ROE - 22 JUL 94.

B. AMENDMENT 1 TO REF A DATED 10 SEP 94.

1. THE PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED IN THE EVENT OF UNAMIR PERSONNEL  
OPENING FIRE IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. HQ UNAMIR DUTY OFFICER IS TO BE INFORMED THAT THE EVENT HAS  
OCCURRED BY THE FASTEST POSSIBLE MEANS. THE SECTOR COMMANDER OR  
COMMANDING OFFICER CONCERNED IS TO FOLLOW THIS UP:

- (1) WITH A DETAILED REPORT WITHIN ONE HOUR OF THE EVENT.
- (2) WITH A WRITTEN REPORT WITHIN 3 HOURS OF THE EVENT.

B. DURING NORMAL WORKING HOURS, THE DUTY OFFICER IS TO INFORM:

- (1) DCOS OPS OR HIS SUBORDINATE.
- (2) MA/FC OR MA/DFC.
- (3) CONTINGENT COMMANDER CONCERNED, IF HE IS NOT ALREADY

*Staff ops file  
Ser, day 28/8*

UNCLASSIFIED

AWARE OF THE INCIDENT.

C. IN SILENT HOURS, THE DUTY OFFICER IS TO INFORM:

- (1) FC OR DFC.
- (2) DCOS OPS OR HIS SUBORDINATE.
- (3) CONTINGENT COMMANDER CONCERNED IF HE IS NOT ALREADY AWARE OF THE INCIDENT.

2. THE DUTY OFFICER IS TO LOG AND DISTRIBUTE SUBSEQUENT REPORTS FROM THE SECTOR COMMANDER/COMMANDING OFFICER TO THOSE LISTED ABOVE, AS THEY ARE RECEIVED.

3. SECTOR COMMANDERS/COMMANDING OFFICERS ARE TO BE PREPARED FOR A FULL INVESTIGATION IF ORDERED BY HQ UNAMIR. THEY SHOULD BE PARTICULARLY AWARE OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR:

- A. PRESERVING/RECORDING EVIDENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE INCIDENT.
- B. WITNESS LISTS.
- C. WITNESS STATEMENTS.
- D. STATEMENTS BY THE INDIVIDUAL(S) WHO OPENED FIRE.
- E. MP INVESTIGATION UNDER NATIONAL AND/OR UNAMIR AUSPICES, AS ORDERED BY HQ UNAMIR.

4. ADDRESSEES ARE REMINDED OF THE NEED FOR ALL PERSONNEL TO BE FULLY

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.7 (PLANS)

03

UUUU

PLANS 017

BRIEFED ON THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER CURRENT ROE, REFS A AND B.

7  $\frac{29}{9}$

MAJ T.A.P. MULLARKEY, G3 PLANS 3

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS

*for Jettapri.*

UNCLASSIFIED





UNITED NATIONS  
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES  
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: All Section Chiefs

DATE: 26 September 1994

FROM: A.H. Golo  
OIC/ADM  
UNAMIR

REF: PERSONNEL/NS

SUBJECT: FOPA - Field Operations Performance Appraisal Form

Please find attached, a new performance evaluation form to be completed specifically for staff on mission service. This form has been approved by OHRM on a trial basis. It must therefore be used as the only tool to evaluate mission staff. Effective immediately, all section chiefs are required to comply with this new format which must be completed in its entirety when performance appraisal is being carried out.

A copy of this form can be obtained from Personnel Section or if you wish to copy it on your hard disk, please do not hesitate to contact Ms. Sohun personally in room 3053.

Thank you for your usual cooperation.

cc: Office of the SRSG  
Office of the Force Commander  
AO's Sectoral Offices  
Finance Section, Nairobi

cc  
For the moment, this does  
not concern us. Pse file

8 27  
9



## FIELD OPERATION PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL FORM

Name (last, first, middle)		EOD in UN service:	EOD in mission:
Category/Grade/Level/Functional title in mission:		Type of appointment:	
Name of Mission:	Parent Dept./Off.(if applicable):	Period covered by this Report:	

## PART I : TO BE COMPLETED BY THE STAFF MEMBER ON MISSION SERVICE

1. Describe briefly your major assignments during the period under review; were they clearly defined and explained?
2. What would be your preferred next assignment in terms of both challenge and hardship?

## PART II : TO COMPLETED BY THE STAFF-MEMBER'S SUPERVISOR

<p>If you deem it appropriate, comment on the staff member's responses to parts I above, specifying which item are you commenting upon. You may further add any additional information regarding the specific nature of the staff member's assignments that merit particular attention (e.g., responsibilities beyond those usually performed at staff member's level)</p>
<p>For each of the following items, please answer the question as precisely as possible and rate the performance in accordance with the following scale.</p> <p>5 = Unusual contribution (top 2%): truly exceptional and rare performance which far exceeds reasonable expectations, inclusive of creativity, originality and initiative;</p> <p>4 = Exceeds expectations (top 24%): distinctly better performance than reasonably expected, inclusive of consistent willingness to undertake additional work;</p> <p>3 = Fully satisfactory (64%): competent and adept performance that fully meets reasonable expectations;</p> <p>2 = Partly satisfactory (8%): performance meets some of, even most requirements but is in needs of improvement;</p> <p>1 = Unsatisfactory (2%): performance does nor meets reasonable requirements;</p> <p>0 = Not Applicable: performance has no relevance to the specific item in question.</p> <p>Please, in ranking the staff member's performance, refer to the relevant peer group.</p> <p>Please bear in mind that a 3 rating is fully acceptable in any consideration relating to the staff member's future mission assignments or extension of appointments. Indeed most personnel are expected to perform at this level.</p>

ITEM EVALUATED	RATING	SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE RELATED COMMENTS
<b>A. QUALITY OF WORK:</b>		
1. Professional knowledge/skills		
2. Thoroughness and accuracy		
3. Analytical ability to access and synthesize information		
4. Creativity in problem-solving		
<b>B. QUANTITY OF WORK:</b>		
1. Volume of work		
2. Promptness of response		
3. Ability to organize/prioritize		

<b>C. WORKING UNDER PRESSURE/HAZARD</b>		
1. Ability to maintain quality of work		
2. Readiness to accept added duties		
3. Willingness to volunteer when necessary		
4. Moral and poise under stress		
<b>D. INTERPERSONAL SKILLS:</b>		
1. Ability to work harmoniously with supervisor		
2. Ability to work harmoniously with peers/in teams		
3. Ability to establish and maintain external contacts		
4. Sensitivity to local culture and custom		
<b>E. COMMUNICATION SKILLS:</b>		
1. Written presentation		
2. Oral expression		
<b>F. DEPENDABILITY AND ADAPTABILITY</b>		
1. Reliability in working with minimum supervision		
2. Willingness to adapt to new requirements		
3. Adaptability to conditions of hardship/hazard		

G. SUPERVISION SKILLS (complete only if relevant)		
1. Ability to set and prioritize goals		
2. Ability to organize available resources		
3. Ability to monitor and evaluate subordinates		
4. Ability to motivate subordinates		
5. Ability to delegate work		
6. Ability to build and sustain teams		

Please respond to the following summarizing questions by indicating the appropriate column adding a comment when appropriate

QUESTION	YES	NO	COMMENT
Given what you know about mission assignment, is the staff member suited for such assignment physically? Psycologically? Attitudianlly? Please explain.			
Would you choose this staff member to participate in particularly demanding assignments?			

The FOPA is the culminating point of a continuous period of appraisal. It is advisable that the performance be periodically discussed with the staff member. Please indicate in the appropriate spcae provided.

Have such discussions taken place ?    YES\_\_\_\_\_ NO\_\_\_\_\_

Has such discussion taken place in connection with this report ?    YES\_\_\_\_\_NO \_\_\_\_\_

Name and title of reporting supervisor\_\_\_\_\_ Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Date\_\_\_\_\_



PART III : TO BE COMPLETED BY CHIEF OF MISSION FOR SUBSTANTIVE STAFF BY/CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER FOR ADMINISTRATIVE STAFF (If the size of the mission justifies if the above mentioned officials may delegate this authority to designated official):

Name and title: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

In your view and experience how you rank the performance of the staff member according to the following parameters from best to worst in reference to the relevant peer group:

- 1) Best 2% \_\_\_\_\_ (i.e., unusual contribution);
- 2) next 24% \_\_\_\_\_ (i.e., exceeds expectations);
- 3) next 64% \_\_\_\_\_ (i.e., fully satisfactory);
- 4) next 8% \_\_\_\_\_ (i.e., partly satisfactory);
- 5) last 2% \_\_\_\_\_ (i.e., unsatisfactory).

Your comments are appreciated but are optional except when the staff member's performance was ranked either by the reporting supervisor or by yourself as either above (2) or below (3)

After the FOPA has been completed the staff member must sign the original of the report and be given a copy thereof. The signature merely acknowledges receipt and does not necessarily indicate agreement with the evaluations contained in the report. Within one month of receipt of this report, the staff member may submit a brief written explanation or rebuttal in accordance with administrative instruction ST/AI/240/Rev.2.

Signature of staff member: \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

①

UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
OPS BRANCH

19<sup>th</sup> September 1994

3000(Ops)


See Distribution:

SUBJECT: PURCHASE OF UNAMIR ITEMS OF IDENTIFICATION BY EX RGF PERSONNEL

1. Reports reaching Force HQ indicate that ex-RGF personnel may attempt through other locals or Zairian nationals to purchase or acquire UNAMIR items of identification or accoutrement for possible future insurgent activity in Rwanda.

2. In view of the above, all UNAMIR units/cells are advised to educate their troops/personnel about the serious potential implications to UNAMIR and the stability of this country, of selling or giving away items such as UN insignia, head gear and contingent uniforms etc which associate individuals with the UN to unauthorised persons as souvenirs.

3. For your necessary action.

  
H. ANYIDOHO  
Brig-Gen  
DFC/COS

Distribution:

External:


Action:

US Forces  
Canadian Contingent  
AUSMED  
BRIT CON  
MILOB GP HQ  
Sector 1  
Sector GHANBATT  
Sector MALAWI COY  
Sector ZAMBATT  
Sector FRAFBATT  
Sector ETHIOBATT  
Sector TUNBATT  
UNCIVPOL

Internal:

Information:

SRSG's Office

②  
Staff A  
File 

FM: DCOS OPS *for* *Don Fella*

TO: ETHIOBATT  
HAC

DATE: 10 SEPTEMBER 1994

SUBJECT: REPATRIATION OF ALLEGED CRIMINALS TO KIGALI

1. YOU ARE REQUESTED TO TRANSPORT ALLEGED 32 CRIMINALS CURRENTLY IN YOUR CUSTODY TO FORCE HQ BY 131400B SEP 94.
2. CRIMINALS WILL BE HANDED OVER TO G3 OPS ON ARRIVAL FOR THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTATION.
3. HAC WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE HANDING OVER OF THE CRIMINALS TO THE APPROPRIATE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES.
4. FOR YOUR NECESSARY ACTION.



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES


MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE TO THE DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER

1. At this morning briefing, the designated Military Officer-in-charge of humanitarian cell informed that Prof. Runyinya Barabwiliza who had been under UNAMIR protection was handed over to the government at 4 p.m. in the presence of a Ministry of Justice official and a representative of the Red Cross.
2. I was personally surprised that no contact was established with my office during this procedure, especially since I had a long interview yesterday with the Professor where he handed me some documents.
3. May I ask your kind cooperation in ensuring that matters which have political overtones automatically involve my office from beginning to end.

Kind regards.

  
Isel Rivero  
9/9/94

Isel  
There must have been a communication gap somewhere. The professor was expected to have been handed over a day after his arrival but the RPA did not seem to be ready to accept him immediately. This was announced at early morning briefing yesterday. I am sorry if you were not specifically informed but I am sure you can certainly follow-up with Min of Justice.  
Thank you  
JLi  
9/9/94  
DFC/cos.



①

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.1 (PLANS)

01 02 06<sup>1200Z</sup>~~1430Z~~ SEP 94 PP UUUU

PLANS 001

UNAMIR HQ

TAC HQ BUTARE

GHANNBATT GIKONGORO

FRAFBATT KIBUYE

ETHIOBATT CYANGUGU

ZAMBATT UNICEF BLDG KIGALI

MILOB GP HQ

UNCIVPOL

NICOY BUYUMBA

UNCLAS PLANS 001

SUBJ: SUSPECTED CACHEING ACTIVITIES

1. MILITARY INFORMATION COLLECTED TO DATE INDICATES THAT CACHEING ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY IN SECTOR 4, ARE BEING CARRIED OUT BY SUBVERSIVE ELEMENTS. THE MOST RECENT INCIDENT INVOLVED THE THEFT OF A LARGE QUANTITY OF FOOD FROM MBOGO REFUGEE CAMP. IT IS ASSESSED THAT INCIDENTS SUCH AS THIS ARE NOT SIMPLE ACTS OF BANDITRY AND THEREFORE CONSTITUTE A DELIBERATE CAMPAIGN TO AMASS SUPPLIES TO SUSTAIN PRESENT/FUTURE INSURGENT OPERATIONS.

2. ADDRESSEES ARE TO THOROUGHLY SCREEN AND CLEARLY ESTABLISH THE

②  
Staff A  
Put in Com Room file  
May

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.1 (PLANS)

02

UUUU

PLANS 001


LEGITIMACY OF ALL VEHICLES CARRYING FOOD AND SUPPLIES WHICH ARE NOT  
CLEARLY UN OR HUMANITARIAN NGO SPONSORED. PATROLS ARE TO REMAIN ALERT  
TO THE CONDUCT OF CACHEING ACTIVITIES AND ARE TO INVESTIGATE ALL  
ASSOCIATED CIRCUMSTANCES.

UNREO, MA TO FC, DFC, DCOS OPS, G2, G3, G4

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS, 11148  
CACHE.MSG

LCOL A. BRIMELOW, G3 PLANS, 11148

UNCLASSIFIED

 6 Sep 94

①

UNAMIR  
FORCE HQ  
OPS BRANCH

3 September 1994

3000.15(Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: FC DIRECTIVE FOR HANDOVER OF EX-RGF SOLDIERS TO  
RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FOR INTEGRATION INTO RPA

GENERAL

1. Ex-RGF soldiers continue to respond positively to the Rwandese Governments integration policy. Hundreds have already voluntarily requested to be integrated into the RPA and many more are expected to follow.

AIM

2. The aim of this directive is to streamline the procedure for the handover of ex-RGF soldiers by UNAMIR to the Rwandese Government.

PROCEDURE

3. All ex-RGF soldiers who voluntarily surrender to UNAMIR Troops/units will be disarmed and evacuated to the appropriate sector/sub-sector HQ as applicable for documentation under the supervision of the sector/sub-sector UNMO and ICRC or UNHCR representative.

4. After documentation a consolidated list will be forwarded to UNAMIR Force HQ for the necessary clearance to be sought from the appropriate government agency through the RPA Liaison Officer to transport the ex-RGF soldiers to Kigali.

5. On receipt of clearance, the clearance certificate is to be forwarded to the sector HQ concerned for the necessary transportation of the soldiers to be effected under MILOB escort to Force HQ.

6. The convoy commander must carry the clearance certificate to be shown at each RPA check point en route if necessary.


7. Units requiring transport assistance will request Force HQ to make the necessary arrangements to move the soldiers to Kigali.

HANDOVER

8. The convoy commander will report to G3 Ops on arrival for the necessary transfer of the soldiers to be made to the

②  
Staff A  
Orders / Instr file

appropriate Rwandese authority under the supervision of ICRC or UNHCR representative and the press.



GC TOUSIGNANT  
Major-General  
Force Commander

Distribution:

External:

Action:

Sector 1  
Sector 2  
Sector 3  
Sector 4A  
Sector 4B  
Sector 4C  
Sector 5  
MILOB GP HQ  
HAC  
CANSIGS  
BRITCON  
AUSMED

Internal:

Info:

DFC  
CAO  
DCOS OPS  
Tac HQ  
G3 Plans  
G4 Log  
CMPO  
G3 Engr



REPUBLICQUE RWANDAISE  
MINISTRE DU COMMERCE, DE  
L'INDUSTRIE ET DE L'ARTISANAT  
B.P. 73 KIGALI.

Kigali, le 26/08/1994

N° 544 /13/02/94

Monsieur le Directeur de  
l'Usine à Thé GISAKURA

Objet: Mission de service à  
l'Usine à Thé Gisakura.

③ HAC

Please take for action.  
FC considers that NGOs  
may be able to  
assist. He does not  
wish to commit military  
vehicles.

MA 43/8

Monsieur le Directeur,

J'ai l'honneur de porter à votre  
connaissance que, suite aux problèmes urgent que connaissent  
plusieurs usines à thé notamment dans la collecte des feuilles  
vertes et l'évacuation du thé sec, je m'empresse de dépêcher une  
mission composée de Monsieur MUNYESHULI Athanase et NTAGANZWA  
Innocent auprès de votre usine, en vue d'identifier les moyens  
dont dispose votre usine et devant épauler certaines unités en  
difficulté.

En effet, il existe certaines unités  
dont les responsables ont disparu avec tous les moyens spécialement  
les véhicules, si bien que le thé sec éparpillé ici et là est à la  
merci des voleurs.

C'est dans le but de sauver ce qui peut  
l'être que vous êtes prié de disponibiliser tous les véhicules pouvant  
rouler, ne fût-ce temporairement, pour nous permettre de mettre en  
sécurité le thé disponible à la vente. En cas de nécessité, ces  
véhicules pourront également aider au transport des feuilles vertes  
vers les usines.

Compte tenu de l'enjeu que présente  
cette opération, je vous demanderais de faire votre possible pour  
la remise à l'Etat des véhicules qui ne sont pas en mesure de rouler  
et dont les réparations ne sont pas assez compliquées.

Vous voudrez également payer les frais  
de mission aux trois membres de mission.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Directeur,  
l'assurance de ma considération distinguée.

LE MINISTRE DU COMMERCE, DE  
L'INDUSTRIE ET DE L'ARTISANAT,

HIGIRO Prosper

Copie pour information à:

- Monsieur le Représentant Spécial  
du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU  
KIGALI.-

②  
There has been  
looting from the  
tea factory in  
Gisenyi. This  
group is going  
investigate and  
put matters  
right. Our  
local comrades  
will be  
informed and  
assist  
E.D.M. 29.8.  
FC



UNAMIR - MINUAR

Office of the DFC/COS  
UNAMIR Force HQ  
KIGALI  
Rwanda

1000.7(DFC)/G/11

25 August, 1994

See Distribution

MINE AND MUNITION ACCIDENT QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Find attached copy of Mine and Munition Questionnaire for your retention and necessary action.
2. Kindly treat with utmost importance.

HK ANYIDOHO  
Brig Gen  
DFC/COS

Enclosure:

A. MINE AND MUNITION ACCIDENT QUESTIONNAIRE

Distribution:

Action:

MILOB Gp HQ  
GHANBATT (Sector 4A)  
MALAWI COY (Sector 3)  
9 Parachute Sqn RE  
Force Engr Coy  
Force Sig Sqn/FSO  
Force Fd Hosp  
UNCIVPOL  
ETHIOBATT (Sector 4C)  
FRAFBATT (Sector 4B)  
TUNBATT (Sector 5)  
CANSIGS  
HAC  
AUSMED

Information:

FC  
CAO  
C Med O

②  
Staff A  
for photocopying and  
place copy in boxes  
outside of ICRC,  
Emergency, MSF, MDM  
Samaritans House.

MEMORANDUM

RWA

Date: 12 August 1994


To: Chief Medical Officer

Copy to: FC, CAO, DFC/COS

From: Paddy Blagden

MINE AND MUNITION QUESTIONNAIRE

1. There is still little hard information as to where mines and munitions may be located, either in areas left over from the previous phases of the war, or the recent battles.
2. One unfortunate method of locating mined areas is through mine victims. We need some method of systematically questioning such victims when they reach hospital. I have therefore produced the attached letter and questionnaire, for distribution within UNAMIR medical units and the local hospitals.
3. Could this please be distributed as necessary.

  
PM Blagden  
UN Demining

MEMORANDUM

RWA

Date: 12 August 1994

To: Chief Medical Officer, King Feisal Hospital  
Chief Medical Officer, Kigali Hospital  
Commanding Officers, UNAMIR Medical detachments

From: Paddy Blagden, UN Demining Expert

MINE AND MUNITION ACCIDENT QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Many landmines have been laid in Rwanda, both during the previous phases of the war and during the recent conflict. Unfortunately few maps exist of where the mines are located, and many of the mines were laid by the Government Forces, so access to those who laid them is now denied.

2. One unfortunate method of locating mined areas is through mine victims. We need some method of systematically questioning such victims when they reach hospital, and we have therefore produced the attached questionnaire, which we would be grateful if you could distribute to your medical staff. The questions are designed to tell us where and when the incident happened, and what kind (and even model) of munition was involved.

3. It would be appreciated if completed questionnaires could be returned as soon as possible to:

The Mines/Explosive Ordnance Coordination Cell  
HQ UNAMIR  
Kigali

4. Your help in this matter would be greatly appreciated.

  
PM Blagden  
UN Demining



## MINE AND MUNITION ACCIDENT QUESTIONNAIRE

1. When did the accident take place?
2. Where did the accident take place?

Village?  
District?  
In a house?

(We need to locate the exact area if possible, because other mines may be present at the same spot)

3. Were there any marks to show that the place was dangerous?
4. What age was the victim?
5. What happened? Try to establish:
  - a. Was it a mine explosion?
  - b. Was it a grenade?
  - c. Was a tripwire involved?
  - d. Was the munition put near a fire?

### For the medical staff.

6. Was there loss of limb?
7. Was the damage to upper limbs?  
Lower limbs?  
Trunk?
8. Was there fragment damage?
9. Were the fragments of plastic or metal?
10. Any other marks that would indicate type of munition?

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR HELP

MEMORANDUM


9300-1

24 Aug 94

Distribution List

ENGINEERING TASKS PERFORMANCE

1. Please find att a sample requisition form for engineering task requirements.
2. It is anticipated that this requisition system will speed up the improvement of engineering on the roads; an activity which is crucial for all assistance actions carried out in Rwanda by various organizations.
3. Your timely response will be appreciated and will ensure that all engineering tasks are completed in a timely fashion.

  
J. Arp  
Col  
D Cos Ops

Distribution List

Action

MILOB GP HQ  
GHANBATT (Sector 4A)  
Malawi COY (Sector 3)  
9 Parachute Sqn RE  
Force Engr COY  
Force Sig Sqn/FSO  
Force Fd Hosp  
UNCIVPOL  
Ethiobatt (Sector 4C)  
Frafbatt (Sector 4B)  
Tunbat (Sector 5)  
Cansigs  
HAC  
Ausmed

Info

DFC/Ops  
D Cos Sp  
G3 Ops

TO: DCOS (OPS) UNAMIR FHQ

FROM: Contingent/NGO/Others

SUBJECT: ENGINEERING TASKS.

...../..../9

SPECIFICATION OF ENGINEERING TASKS TO BE CARRIED OUT  
BY UNAMIR ENGINEERING UNITS IN GIVEN PRIORITIES.

SN	ENGINEERING TASK	LOCATION (GRID)	MATERIALS REQUIRED	MANPOWER REQUIRED	ESTIMATED DURATION OF A TASK	REMARKS


.....  
(signature of CO/Chief)

R E M A R K S   O F   D C O S   ( O P S )   F O R   F E C  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

8

# UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE

## ORGANIZATION



SST Swedish Support Team  
F.O Field Office

②  
Staff  
ops file  
ten



## Staffing

### Management

Humanitarian Coordinator	Arturo Hein
Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator	Charles Petrie
Coordination Manager	Mark Froehart? <sup>1</sup>
Secretary x 2	vacant

### Information Cell (4+0+1)

Info Collection/Analysis	Info Officer	Emery Brusset
Meetings/NGO Liaison	Info Officer	Anita Menghetti
Media	Press Officer	Sybella Wilkes <sup>2</sup>
Reporting	Info Officer	Gerard Leclaire <sup>3</sup>
	Secretary	vacant

### Operations Cell (3+1)

Operations Planning	Operations Officer	Gromo?
Operations Monitoring	Operations Officer	vacant
Operations Tracking	Ops Systems Officer	Steve Falces
Tracking and display	Operations Assistant	vacant

### Logistics Cell (2+1)

Logistics Support	Logistics Officer	Buddy Tillet <sup>4</sup>
Resource Monitoring	Logistics Officer	Deborah Owens
Airport Liaison	Logistics Assistant	vacant

### Administrative Unit (1+1)

Admin. Officer	vacant
Admin. Assistant	vacant

### Support Unit (13+2+1)

Chief	SST
Communications Officer (Deputy Chief)	SST
Communications Operator	SST
Communications Operator	SST
Communications Operator	SST
Communications Operator	vacant
Support staff x 7	SST
Assistants x 2	SST
Secretaries x 1	SST

<sup>1</sup> seconded by OFDA, arriving coming week (22 - 28/8)

<sup>2</sup> leaving for one week's leave

<sup>3</sup> arriving 21/8 replacing David Harshbarger

<sup>4</sup> in Nairobi

(1)

## UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE PHASE 2 IMPLEMENTING STRUCTURE

### Overall Situation

The Government of Zaire closed on 20 August the Bukavu border crossing into Zaire. As a result between 30,000 to 50,000 people amassed in the town of Cyangugu. In the late afternoon of 21 August, the Government announced to the displaced that the border crossing at Ruzisi 2 was open. It is expected that today the groups in Cyangugu will travel the fifteen to twenty kilometers to the second border crossing. On their way they will pass by two displaced camps, of a 30,000 person capacity each. UNREO is monitoring the situation, and specifically possible inflows into the camps.

The assessment of the overall situation in the southwest remains the same. The majority of the populations in the zone have opted to see how events unfold before moving to the west. The groups congregating in Cyangugu are those who had decided a few days ago to move west (though not necessarily into Zaire). NGO and UN Agency coverage of the area is becoming adequate.

### Operational Implications

The partial closing of the border by the Zairian authorities offers an "opportunity" for the implementation of Phase 2 of the Southwest Contingency Plan. By having the option of crossing into Bukavu at the Ruzisi 1 site denied, the displaced may find it more attractive, as they move further south on their way to the Ruzisi 2 crossing point, to settle in sites prepared and monitored by the international community. Consequently, the humanitarian partners of this operation have agreed to accelerate the pace in establishing the four camps in the Cyangugu area as well as those in the Gishoma area.

The following operational structure has been agreed to by the humanitarian organisations operating in the Prefecture of Cyangugu:

#### 1. Kigali

##### Overall coordination

UNREO, under the authority of the SRSG and through the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, is maintaining a number of daily and twice-weekly inter-active forums where UN Agencies and NGOs are informed of the latest developments in the southwest area. In these forums contingency plans are up-dated, reviewed and elaborated. UNREO is also responsible for keeping the political and military components of the UN effort apprised of the situation as it evolves.

##### Logistical back-up

A logistical cell has been set up under UNREO to receive requests for assistance from the humanitarian partners in the field, identify the location of the resources and request the WFP Land Transportation Cell to organise onward movement to the the

(2)  
Staff A  
Op Orders on.

requesting organisation. The cell maintains a running inventory of relief assets in country. The cell is run by a UNHCR secondee, and staffed by representatives from the UNAMIR Humanitarian Cell and CMOC. UNHCR management of the cell will give greater flexibility to the southwest operation. It will enable UNHCR to tap into Rwanda resources were displaced to move in large numbers into Zaire. UNREO also assists in identifying immediate funding sources for the acquisition of relief goods.

## 2. Cyangugu

### Coordination

UNREO has established a coordination forum in Cyangugu. The overall southwest operation is managed and run from Cyangugu. Two teams are currently operating in the southwest zone. One team headed by Jacques Bandelier is focused on maintaining the coordination forum and facilitating NGO, UN Agency activities in the Cyangugu Prefecture, while the other, under Trevor Feeney, is responsible for information gathering and situation assessment in the Kibuye and Gikongoro Prefectures. UNREO will collect and immediately forward to the logistics cell in Kigali all requests for relief inputs. Requests can be received from organisations working in any of the three Prefectures.

### Operational support

While restating their desire not to be responsible for the coordination of relief operations in the southwest, UNHCR has agreed to offer operational support to UNREO and the relief organisations working in the Cyangugu Prefecture. Assistance has been offered in the process of site identification and the rapid establishment of camps. UNHCR while endorsing the humanitarian community's response to the situation in the southwest, will appraise UNREO Kigali of changes in the situation as well as their professional advice on modifications to the agreed response.

## 3. Camp Site

### Coordination

Eight camps have been or are in the process of being identified in the area around and to the south of Cyangugu. Each camp is or will be managed by an individual NGO. To date two camps with a capacity of 30,000 people each are being set up by MDM as are two additional camps of similar capacity by MSF. These four camps are located near Cyangugu on the Gikongoro-Cyangugu road. IRC and CARE are establishing two camps of theoretical capacity 50,000 in an area around Gishome. Sites for these two camps are being rapidly identified as are sites for an additional two camps in the same general area. Efforts are on-going to identify the organisations willing to manage the two proposed sites.

22 August 1994

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM


To: ALL NGOS / UN AGENCIES

From: UNAMIR HAC

Date: 20 Aug 1994

Subject: MINES AND UXOs

1. Find, enclosed with this memorandum, a copy of the UNAMIR mine/UXO report.
2. If you suspect that you have found a mine / bomb / UXO, leave it alone and fill up this form properly (including the diagram of the area with any major landmark) then give the form to the UNAMIR engineers cell at UNAMIR HQ or to the HAC LN cell at the UNDP. An EOD team will then come to check out your discovery: Remember it is better to be safe than sorry!
3. For you action.



Maj MacNeil  
HAC Ops

①

PRIORITY

HAC

UNAMIR FORCE HQ  
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

NUMBER OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCLUDING THIS : 1

<b>TO :</b> GHANBATT MILOBS CIVPOL FRABATT ETHIOBATT TAC HQ BRITCON AUSMED CANSIGS	<b>FROM:</b> G. TOUSIGNANT MAJ GEN FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
<b>INFO:</b> LIST A (INTERNAL ONLY)	<b>DATE:</b> 20 AUGUST 1994
	<b>ORIGINATOR:</b> G3 PLANS
<b>FAX :</b> 00-873-151-5560 00-873-383-020021 00-871-383-020051 00-873-383-020056 00-871-151-5556 00-873-383-020026 00-871-144-6462 00-873-154-5273	<b>FAX :</b> 1-212-963-3090 <b>TEL :</b> 3 3091

**SUBJECT:** OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF UNAMIR

1. RECENT SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES IN SECTOR 4 AND THE GENERAL SENSE OF INSECURITY AMONGST THE RWANDAN POPULATION REQUIRES VIGILANCE BY UNAMIR FORCES DURING THE FRENCH WITHDRAWAL FROM THE HPZ AND, IN PARTICULAR, DURING 21 AND 22 AUG 94.

2. ALL UNITS ARE TO INTENSIFY OPERATIONS ACCORDINGLY. EMPHASIS IS TO BE PLACED ON MAXIMUM VISIBILITY OF ALL UN PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES IN SECTOR 4 WITH EMPHASIS ON CEASE FIRE LINE, REFUGEE CAMPS/CONCENTRATIONS AND BORDERS. SECURITY, OVERT PATROLLING, SURVEILLANCE AND MOBILE OPERATIONS MUST BE VIGOROUSLY CONDUCTED BOTH DAY AND NIGHT. PERSONNEL EMPLOYED ON ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES SHOULD BE MINIMIZED TO ENSURE MAXIMUM OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY.

3. ACK.

②  
 Stage A.  
 ops 0 files.  
 Jm  
 mer



UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

Humanitarian

To: ALL UNAMIR UNITS

19<sup>th</sup> Kigali  
August 94

From: G3

3000.(Ops)


Subject: LOCSTAT OF SUB-UNITS

1. This Headquarters requires a complete list of all locations of ALL sub-units that are deployed in each area in order to update the operational map.
2. All units should include their update Locstats with their daily sitreps.
3. Returns are needed not later than 2400 hrs date.

②

ROS

DM

  
EC QUIST  
Lt Col  
G3

NATIONAL DEFENCE	DÉFENSE NATIONALE	Designation-Désignation	Security classification-Cote de sécurité
<b>MINUTE SHEET - NOTE</b>		File No. - No. de dossier	
SUBJECT - SUJET <b>REQUEST FOR UN SUPPORT - AIR DROP OF PAMPHLETS OVER GOMA REFUGE CAMPS</b>		DATED - DATÉE <b>13 Aug 94</b>	
REFERRED TO TRANSMISE À	REMARKS - REMARQUES (To be signed in full showing appointment, telephone number and date) (Attaché de signature, fonction, numéro de téléphone et date)		
<p>Dr Kabia</p> <p>④ HAC What do you think of this? <i>[Signature]</i> 17/8</p> <p>② Mr. [unclear] may we discuss? 14/8</p> <p>③ Capt. [unclear] General Dallaire promised to look to the air drops. He says we should go to the 14/8</p> <p><i>[Signature]</i> S. Grenier Capt CC UNAMIR</p>	<p>1. I am confident that the production of pamphlets for distribution over Goma can be completed by 19 Aug 94.</p> <p>2. To maximise the impact that these pamphlets will have on the refugees, they will be designed in a way that lets the refugees understand that the piece of paper that the UN has dropped from the sky is a ticket to return home.</p> <p>3. In order to increase the chances of success of this campaign I recommend that the Force Commander be requested to provide the following support:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. that one day prior to drop, several UN vehicles patrol areas surrounding the camps to alert refugees;</li> <li>b. that an armed UN presence be established as of the 20 Aug 94, 08h00 on the Rwanda side of border as a confidence builder;</li> <li>c. that MLVW-HLVW be at the border to help transport the sick or injured;</li> <li>d. that one Cdn Hercules be re-directed (Fm Nairobi to Goma) for distribution of pamphlets on 20 Aug 94 - Time over target to be 08h00; and</li> <li>e. that air drop be carried out in as many phases as possible to increase UN visibility and presence;</li> </ul> <p>4. Although I am not convinced that a single air drop will be enough to convince everyone, it will certainly give UNAMIR a good foundation on which to build the next campaign.</p> <p>④ Staff to the file under Ops Gen. <i>[Signature]</i></p>		

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE  
PLAN OF ACTION FOR OPERATIONALISING PHASE 2

Overall Situation

Following discussions held with representatives of the humanitarian community operating in the Southwest of Rwanda and a rapid field visit to Gikongoro, it would seem that the flow of displaced westward has stabilised. Those opting to move have done so, while the bulk of the population within the sector seem to be staying put, though prepared to move on extremely short notice. To date probably between 50,000 to 100,000 people have left the Prefecture's of Kibuye and Gikongoro and moved towards the western part of the French controlled zone. For the most part these people are residents of the Prefectures and not displaced. Fear of the RPA remains the principal factor which would trigger a massive outflow.

Since a significant number of people are on the move and in anticipation of a growing caseload, MSF and MDM are establishing four camps east of Cyangugu. These camps will be able to support up to 120,000 people. Given the precariousness of the present situation it has been decided to initiate preparations to receive an additional 200,000 people in an area to the south of the Cyangugu Prefecture. In intervening in the area around Gishoma maximum emphasis needs to be given to flexibility, in order that resources can be rapidly transferred elsewhere were a massive influx of displaced not to materialise.

Operational Responsibilities

A coordination meeting was held, on 18 August, between the humanitarian partners. Based on a possible caseload of 200,000 people needing assistance the following allocations of responsibility were agreed to:

1. NGOs begin reconnaissance of four camp sites in the Gishoma area (total capacity 50,000 each/site, operational starting figure 20,000)
  - IRC survey 19 August
  - CARE survey 20 August
  - SCF UK, MSF, CONCERN, or GOAL to be requested to assume responsibility for one of the two remaining camps
2. UNREO reinforces Logistic Cell to ensure identification and mobilisation of assets needed for the rapid establishment of camps, and manages Mount Cyangugu hospital compound (presently under French control) as an on site logistics base
  - Buddy Tillet Cell Coordinator
  - UNAMIR Humanitarian Cell Asset Identification
  - US Army Secondee (arrive 19/8) US Air transportation in theatre  
Coordination & general logistics support

3. Sectorial Responsibilities and Focal Points (estimated needs)

- Land Transportation WFP Logistics Cell (staffed by WFP, IOM and US Army personnel)
- Food (3,000 mts/month)
  - \* Cyangugu ICRC (stocks ??)
  - \* Gikongoro WFP (stocks 300 mts ??)
  - \* Kibuye ICRC (stocks ??)
- Water (1 million litres/day)
  - \* Production UNHCR (Swedish donation)  
UNICEF
  - \* Distribution OXFAM  
UNICEF
- Shelter (plastic sheeting 4,000 rolls)
  - \* UNHCR (4,000 rolls in country, additional 2,000 held by RPA authorities)
- Sanitation (5,000 hoes, 500 mts lime, 50 mts wood, 1,000 rolls plastic sheeting)
  - \* UNICEF assistance but responsibility of individual NGOs running the camps
- Medical (20 basic Kits, 10 OXFAM feeding kits, 20 mts high protein biscuits, CSB 120 mts/month)
  - \* UNICEF basic kits (???)
  - \* WFP high protein biscuits, CSB
  - \* OXFAM feeding kits (???)
- Logistics and Transportation of People
  - \* IOM 25 trucks

UNITED NATIONS RWANDA EMERGENCY OFFICE  
BUREAU D'URGENCE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LE RWANDA  
(UNREO)

c/o UNEP  
Conference West, Room 202  
P.O. Box 30552  
Nairobi, Kenya

Tel.: (254-2) 62-2491  
Fax.: (254-2) 62-2084  
Nairobi, Kenya

17 August 1994  
SITUATION REPORT # 69

General

Two major issues continue to preoccupy the international relief community in Rwanda. The first is the highly volatile and explosive situation in the Southwest. The second is the urgency of planting crops throughout the country in advance of the rainy season in 2-3 weeks time. There have been heavy rains in Kigali over the past few weeks.

A working group has been established to deal with the urgent matter of distributing seeds and tools before September. A joint FAO/WFP team has begun an assessment of agricultural needs, to be completed by August 17.

The Executive Director of WFP, Ms Bertini, has announced that 4 million Rwandans both inside and outside the country are in need of food aid. WFP will coordinate land transportation for food within Rwanda, providing information on the number of trucks available, where they are going and when. Ms Bertini also announced the establishment of a WFP information center in Nairobi to coordinate the movement of trucks and ships in and out of the harbours in Kenya and Tanzania.

DHA UNREO opened an On-Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) in Kigali on August 12. The OSOCC, which is located within the UNDP/UNREO premises, has three main objectives. 1. to provide a framework for the coordination of operational to the Rwanda emergency, 2. to provide real time collection and dissemination of information on developments in the emergency situation and on international relief activities, 3. to facilitate the sharing of resources for the timely and effective delivery of humanitarian relief. The OSOCC is divided into an information cell, an operations cell and a logistics cell with common services managed by a support team provided by the Government of Sweden. In addition to UNREO staff, representatives of the UNAMIR of the UNAMIR humanitarian cell, IOM, the United States Civil Military Operations Center (US C-MOC) and the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) are at present working in and supporting the functions of the OSOCC.

2/5



There are persistent reports of accidents involving land mines, grenades and booby traps in the Kigali area. Residents are advised to use extreme caution when travelling off the main roads or when entering abandoned buildings. A driver for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) was killed in Byumba Prefecture when his truck hit a mine on a secondary road.

NGOs in Nairobi have complained of a growing backlog of supplies in that location (up to 1,000 MT on the Nairobi to Goma flight operated by UNHCR) which cannot be flown in on the regular flights for lack of capacity. UNHCR has been obliged to suspend its flights into Goma for its personnel, due to maintenance work to be performed on the German 707, and is flying its own personnel through Bukavu, where it has now started regular flights. The NGOs request that a UNAMIR logistician attend the UNREO weekly coordination meeting in Nairobi so as to discuss ways of improving cargo transport coordination.

#### Southwest

Ms Bertini, Executive Director of WFP, travelled to Gikongoro on August 11 to review the situation. A request has been made to the US military in Entebbe to transport water bladders to Rwanda for eventual use in Gikongoro. UNICEF will take over control of the water facility in Gikongoro from the French.

Since Wednesday, 10 August, people have been fleeing the Kibuye Prefecture in large numbers, particularly Mabanza (commune on the edge of the Safe Haven Zone (SHZ)). Many others are packing their belongings in order to begin leaving in advance of the final withdrawal of the French on August 21. The perceived threat of an RPF takeover of the Southwest is very real for the vast majority of the population and is probably reinforced by pressure from the militia. This could be the beginning of a movement of up to 1 million people into Cyangugu and Bukavu. Ambassador Khan called an extraordinary meeting of the heads of UN agencies and other key operational organizations on August 13 to consider what measures can be taken by the humanitarian community. These meetings will now be held on a daily basis to monitor the situation in the Southwest, with the SRSG as chairman.

On Sunday, August 14, Amb. Khan travelled to Kibuye in the SHZ with the Minister of Interior of the new government and representatives of UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise. The Minister, who is himself from Kibuye, attempted to reassure the population regarding the policies of the new government. Observers reported that he received mixed reception from the populace. Also, ministerial visits to Gikongoro and Cyangugu have been scheduled.

UNREO staff report a westward movement of people from the SHZ. Accounts on the numbers of people leaving vary considerably from source to source. At this time UNREO cannot confirm that a mass exodus is under way.

3/5

150 Ethiopians have arrived to join the UNAMIR force. The remaining 450 are expected by the end of the week. Tunisian soldiers are expected to arrive this week also. French-speaking African troops, currently with Operation Turquoise, will join UNAMIR when the French leave on 22 August. As of 15 August there were 1624 UNAMIR troops in the Rwanda region.

UNREO is proposing that NGOs and UN agencies maintain the high levels of assistance currently being provided in kibuye and Gikongoro. In addition to this, UNREO is suggesting that NGOs and UN agencies move into Cyangugu prefecture to support the local population and prepare for a possible influx of people. An UNREO field office is being set up in Cyangugu.

Contingency plans are being drawn up by UNHCR in the event of a massive outflow of people from Cyangugu. UNHCR is seeking partners to provide shelter material to Bukavu as part of its contingency plan.

Ndaba, near Kibuye, has a camp of 4,500 people. Although they have significant pressure from "interahamwe" (militia) elements to leave, they are resistant to going to Cyangugu. They are guarded by the Senegalese Battalion. They want to return to Gitarama when they perceive it to be safe.

Bwakira near Kibuye has 15,000 people who are not receiving any assistance. MSF run a small hospital there.

#### Northwest

CARE reported on August 11 that six-way stations providing food and water along the Gisenyi-Ruhengeri road will be opened within 2 weeks. These will be in addition to and distinct from the health centres operating in that corridor. At Ruhengeri, the returnees will be given a 10-day food ration.

The Gisenyi Crisis Cell has decided that it will henceforth meet on a weekly basis. The number of returnees from Goma has dropped to a trickle, including those who do not cross the official border point. Cholera is no longer considered to be a major problem, but a large number of dysentery cases have been reported. The Gisenyi hospital is now operational with the help of the German Emergency Doctors. The British military team are operating the Ruhengeri hospital. Save the Children Fund (UK) has opened the hospital at Namba along the Ruhengeri-Kigali road. The Crisis Cell now believes that adequate facilities are operating in the Northwest, and organizations should be flexible about moving to other areas if the need arises.

#### Southeast

An UNREO team was in Kibungo prefecture on August 11. The city has suffered significant damage from the war and its aftermath. There are persistent rumours about militia activity in the region. The team also reported that there are live grenades and other weapons in the area. There is a regular flow of people who have been injured by the grenades at the Kibungo hospital.

4/5

The water system in Kibungo town only operates for a few hours each day. Many of the pipes are broken, and there is not enough fuel for the continuous operation of the generators. The government has started purchasing coffee from the local population, and markets have been reestablished throughout the prefecture. Some of the harvest has been saved, but there is a significant shortage of seeds and tools for the planting season which will begin in a few weeks.

**ZAIRE : GOMA**

There have been serious security incidents in Kibumba camp during the past days (with at least three deaths resulting). The most recent disturbance took place on 10 August, when people became violent during a food distribution. UNHCR suspended food distribution as a result.

WFP has two distribution points in the Kibumba area. Negotiations for the establishment of several other distribution areas are underway. This should minimize congestion at distribution sites.

Security in Goma town has been deteriorating in the past few weeks. Tension is mounting between the local Zairean population and the refugee population, as well as between the local Zairean population and the Zairean authorities (the reinforcements of Zairean troops in particular). UNHCR reported that the local population held a demonstration in Goma town on August 10. Fighting between the Zairean army and local population took place.

For further information, please contact:

Wilkes/Brusset

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Information Cell Kigali, tel: 871 137 0660

5/5

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(UNREO)

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11 August, 1994  
SITUATION REPORT # 64

### General

Two major issues continue to preoccupy the international relief community in Rwanda. The first is the highly volatile and explosive situation in the southwest. The second is the urgency of planting crops throughout the country in advance of the rainy season in 2-3 weeks time (there were heavy rains in Kigali on the night of the 10 August).

MSF has set up a separate tent to treat cholera patients on Kigali. MSF reported that the number of cholera cases is lower than expected.

MSF also reported the discovery of a camp of 40,000 refugees in the Bugesera region south of Kigali.

A working group has been established to deal with the urgent matter of distributing seeds and tools before September. This group currently includes ICRC, WFP, UNHCR, CARE, CRS, World Vision and Lutheran World Federation.

A joint FAO/WFP team has begun an assessment of agricultural needs, to be completed by August 17.

Ms. Bertini, Executive Director of WFP, announced that a WFP information center will be set up in Nairobi by next week to coordinate the movement of trucks and ships in and out of the harbours in Kenya and Tanzania.

### Southwest

UNREO Gikongoro reports that the people in the Humanitarian Safe Zone are already preparing to flee Zaire. Leaders from displaced camps in the zone have met with RPF representatives under the auspices of UNAMIR and the French Forces.

UNREO has sent a two-person team to Kibuye to provide an update on the situation there. An UNREO satellite office has been in place in Gikongoro since yesterday and will be in Kibuye and Cyangugu during the

2/3



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next week. These satellites will coordinate closely with UNAMIR and UN agencies operating in the southwest.

Ms Bertini, Executive Director of WFP, is in Gikongoro today to review the situation. A request has been made to the US military in Entebbe to transport water bladders to Rwanda for eventual use in Gikongoro. UNICEF will take over control of the water facility in Gikongoro from the French.

ICRC are currently providing 100 mt of food daily to the SW through flights into Bujumbura and Cyangugu.

#### Northwest

CARE reported today that six way-stations providing food and water along the Gisenyi-Ruhengeri road will be opened within 2 weeks. These will be in addition to and distinct from the health centres operating in that corridor. At Ruhengeri, the returnees will be given a 10 day food ration. Americares is operating a medical and food distribution center near Namba on the Ruhengeri-Kigali road.

#### Zaire

##### Goma

There have been three security incidents in Kibumba camp during the past three days (with at least three deaths resulting). The most recent disturbance took place on 10 August, when people became violent during a food distribution. UNHCR suspended food distribution today as a result. WFP has two distribution points in the Kibumba area. Negotiations for the establishment of several other distribution areas are underway. This should minimize congestion at distribution sites.

Security in Goma town has been deteriorating in the past two weeks. Tension is mounting between the local Zairean population and the refugee population, as well as between the local Zairean population and the Zairean authorities (the reinforcements of Zairean troops in particular). UNHCR reported that the local population led a demonstration in Goma town yesterday. Fighting between the Zairean army and local population took place.

For further information contact:

Wilkes/ Brusset,  
Information Cell,  
Tel: 622492



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Nairobi, Kenya

9 August, 1994  
SITUATION REPORT # 62

### Kigali

The Minister of Rehabilitation and Social Integration estimates that there are 89,000 people currently living in Kigali.

The first contingent of Australian troops have arrived in Kigali.

### South West Rwanda

According to Operation Turquoise, the estimated number of displaced persons in this region are as follows:

Gikongoro	600,000
Cyangugu	800,000
Kibuye	300,000

UNREO reported that the rumour that the RPF is killing people who leave the safe haven zone is spreading fear in the region. There is a worry that people will flee to Bukavu when the French withdraw.

WFP reported that malnutrition has risen to critical levels in Gikongoro. Food supply and delivery continues to be difficult.

### Burundi

The situation has continued to deteriorate in Bujumbura. The MSF France house was attacked and a vehicle destroyed on 8 August. Nobody was injured. Only one exit road from Bujumbura is now passable. Shooting and grenade attacks are widespread across the city. A number of international personnel have been evacuated from Bujumbura in the last 24 hours. ICRC reports that two flights scheduled for today managed to land.

Tribal clashes are continuing in Muyinga and Kirundo in Northern Burundi.

### Zaire

#### Goma

UNICEF reported that half the refugee population in Goma are children. The majority are cared for by at least one parent. However, a rapidly

increasing number (estimated at 5% of children) are separated from their families. There are 6,500 unaccompanied children at 20 UNICEF centres. UNICEF expects that by the end of August, this number will increase to 10,000.

UNICEF estimates that there are 700 deaths per day due to bacillary dysentery. These numbers are expected to rise. UNHCR estimates 3,000 cases of dysentery. 7 measles cases have been reported so far. 7 cases of meningitis have been reported. The Italian Government medical team has brought in vaccines for meningitis. Cholera deaths and cases are going down.

According to UNHCR 50 tankers are providing 4 million litres of water to the camps every day.

Radio Gatashya (of Reporters Sans Frontieres supported by HCR) began broadcasting on 7 August in Goma.

For further information contact:  
Wilkes/Brusset,  
Tel: 622492



Date: 13 Aug 94

TO: Force distr List

From: Capt M Hurlston RE

**MINE AND UNEXPLODED MUNITIONS SIGHTING QUESTIONNAIRE**

1. There are many unexploded munitions and mines throughout Rwanda, that have been left by previous conflicts and the last major war. However information on both mine fields and unexploded munitions is limited.

2. The method of locating these mine areas and unexploded munitions will have to come from the Units and personnel on the ground. The sighting procedure will be through a questionnaire designed to inform the Mine/Unexploded munitions Cell. The collation of information will enable this Cell to coordinate the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Units to deal with these problems effectively.

The Mine/Explosive Ordnance Coordination Cell  
HQ UNAMIR  
KIGALI

Capt M Hurlston RE (EOD)



**MINE AND UNEXPLODED MUNITION SIGHTING QUESTIONNAIRE**

1. WHEN DID THE SIGHTING TAKE PLACE ?
2. WHERE DID THE SIGHTING TAKE PLACE ?  
AREA ?  
DISTRICT ?  
TOWN ?  
BUILDING ?  
GRID AND MAP REFERENCE ? (IF POSSIBLE)
3. TYPE OF MARKINGS/COLOUR, SIZE/SHAPE ?
4. TYPE OF MUNITION THOUGHT TO BE  
IS IT A MINE ?  
IS IT A GRENADE  
IS IT A BOOBY TRAP ?  
ARE THERE TRIP WIRES ?

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE

**MINE AND UNEXPLODED MUNITIONS SIGHTING QUESTIONNAIRE**

1. WHEN DID THE SIGHTING TAKE PLACE ?
2. WHERE DID THE SIGHTING TAKE PLACE ?

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15 August, 1994  
SITUATION REPORT # 67

### Southwest

The major concern over the past 48 hours has continued to be the fluid situation in the southwest of the country, the Safe Haven Zone (SHZ). The Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) Amb. Khan has co-chaired two meetings together with UNREO with heads of UN agencies and major international organizations to review the situation on the ground, to engage in contingency planning and to generate a flow of information regarding assets available from the international community. On Sunday, August 14, Amb. Khan traveled to Kibuye in the SHZ with the Minister of Interior of the new government and representatives of UNAMIR and Operation Turquoise. The Minister, who is himself from Kibuye, attempted to reassure the population regarding the policies of the new government. Observers reported that he received mixed reception from the populace. Also, on August 14, UN agency heads and representatives of the various military contingents met at the UNREO offices to discuss the situation and share contingency planning.

UNREO staff are on the ground in Gikongoro and Kibuye to monitor the situation. They report a westward movement of people from both of these areas. Accounts on the numbers of people leaving vary considerably from source to source. At this time UNREO cannot confirm that a mass exodus is under way.

For now, UNREO is encouraging organizations to continue and enhance humanitarian relief operations in the Prefectures of Kibuye and Gikongoro. This will signal the population of those areas that the international community does not consider it a foregone conclusion that there will indeed be a mass movement from the Southwest into Zaire.

### General

There are persistent reports of accidents involving land mines, grenades and booby traps in the Kigali area. Residents are advised to use extreme caution when traveling off the main roads or when entering abandoned buildings.

2/2