

Cable File
New York Code Cables
Incoming and Outgoing

01/05/1961 - 31/05/1961

1/4

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

SC
CC

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 5-0736

BOX 9

FILE 2

ACC. DAG 13/1.6.1.2.0

DECLASSIFIED

TO : MACEOIN
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 31 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3850

Reference ONUC 3065.

This message, perhaps by inadvertence, was addressed to
"Unations Newyork " from "Force Commander" . We prefer the established
cable headings.

cc : Linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER FOR DESEYNES
FROM : MACFARQUHAR
DATE : 31 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3847

Your ONUC 3062.

1. Agreed . We would expect bulk of these services to be organised as part of Congolese cadres in ministries, some in National Bank and very few in Civilian Operation set up unless you, Linner and Gardiner think differently.

We shall reply on PL 480 after Secretary-General's return. Meanwhile, could you cable commodities and quantities you have in mind ? Our understanding is that, in addition to 5600 tons of wheat flour already delivered plus 500 tons of corn and 1500 tons of rice diverted from famine relief, you have still to receive, under present agreement, commodities mentioned in ONUC 1765 and 1966 as confirmed in my letter of 14 April.

Fresh agreement with Congolese should be unnecessary if modifications reported in your A-781 to agreement initialed on 28 March give you sufficient scope for future use of counter-part.

Original To
Mr. DeSuyne

URGENT

M. Fabry

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER , MACEOIN
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 31 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3846

A-1360
A-1402

Reference ONUC 3084.

Greatly deplore this new incident . Suggest Linner follow up with strong protest to Stanleyville authorities, text of which should be cabled here for Secretary-General's review before presentation. He returns afternoon of June 1st.

cc : Maceoin.

URGENT

: Mr. Tabor, Col. Egge

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 31 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3845

A-1364

Reur A-1350, paragraph 2.

We have contacted British delegation here and they have promised to do everything to have Mr Browne evacuated from Eville. Before any drastic measures are being taken to arrest Browne we would advise you to contact British Consul. It is expected that they will take all possible measures to have him disappear from the scene, if not within the 48 hours specified by you, at lease shortly thereafter.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER, MACEOIN
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 31 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3844

*June
5/6*

A-1460

Belgian mission requests assistance to Surcraf in reopening their sugar factory at Kiliba in Ruzizi valley in Kivu. Surcraf representatives in Usumbura will get in touch with ONUC representative at Bukavu directly. We have informed Belgian mission that UN troops could not be stationed at Kiliba ; however, ONUC would be asked to examine conditions and report . Appreciate your views earliest. Also see Macfarquhar's letter on this subject.

Please note

RR to put it for me

cc : Maceoin

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : MACEOIN
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 31 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3843

Sc

ONUC-3114

Reference ONUC 3057.

1. Preparatory study of problems involved in running a school of instruction for ANC officers and NCOS would be useful. We suggest that at this juncture this study be kept internal and carried out by your headquarters and that special personnel not be detailed for this purpose.

2. Before making request for the services of LT Col Adams, please advise if he is fluent in french. This qualification would seem essential for personnel detailed for ANC training . Please also advise if officers recommended in your A-301 are fluent in french.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNIE MACBOIN
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 31 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3842

SL

ONUC-3102

Reference A-1346.

Is negative position on Malayan request for reinforcements at Bukavu determined by inability through lack of numbers to provide them or by other considerations ?

cc : Maceoin

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNEN FOR GARDNER
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 31 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3841

Your 1351.

We have sent reply today to Maceoin's ONUC 3057 which you will
no doubt see. We shall send further cable after secgen's return
tomorrow.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER *h*
FROM : NARASIMHAN
DATE : 31 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3833

A-1374

Alive, pl. find out (Cruise Obrien would like to meet Dumontet for briefing enroute to Leopoldville and Elisabethville from New York. Please cable information Dumontet's home leave and travel plans to enable us arrange this.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

To : Gen. Mac Boin
From : Mr. Bunche
Date : 31 May 1961
No. : 3832

62

ONUC-3096

Swedish Mission informs that major Landergren and lieutenant commander Resen are being sent by Swedish Command to Congo for purpose of assisting in current rotation of Swedish Contingent, and to study future rotation, respectively. Landergren is due to arrive in Elizabethville by SABENA flight on 4 June. Resen is to leave Stockholm on 5 June at 3.30 AM by first cargo serving present rotation, arriving Kamina 8 June at 7 AM. Both officers intend to return to Sweden by commercial flight from Leo on 9 June. We assume there is no objection to these visits at your end. Please advise soonest.-

cc Dr. Linner

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To : Dr. Linner. *h*
From : Narasimhan.
Date : 30 May 61.
No. : 3820

2
Reference your A-1340 and 1341 regarding Kasongo. We shall
cable reply on paragraph five after Secretary-Generals return probably
Thursday. Endit.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To : Dr. Linner, General MacEoin. *SW*
From : Bunche
Date : 30 May 61.
No. : 3819

Reference A-1339.

1. We agree on approach to Kasavubu for immediate return of UN troops to Matadi as suggested your paragraph 3. However, as indicated in Secgens 3812, approach should be undertaken by MacEoin alone. We are dubious about giving any assurance to Congolese on their wish for UN troops of European origin only in Matadi. How explicitly and strongly was this wish expressed by Congolese? Reasons for seeking to avoid any ethnic distinctions in deployment of force are obvious. Suggestions that unit be accompanied by Senior UN and ANC Officers is a good one.

2. We note in your para 2 (f) that you have "serious apprehensions" about security of UN personnel who would return to Matadi under proposal involving Nigerian police. Tenor of previous cables from you on this subject as for example, ONUC 2766, had led us to assume that there was no basis for strong misgivings on this account.

3. Your para 4 is first word we have had about a Swedish Naval unit. We will explore and advise you.

c.c. Gen. MacEoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ROUTINE)

TO : MR. LINNER
FROM : SEC GEN
DATE : 30 May 61
NO : 3814

Famine relief, your A-1322. Given your military disabilities I still remain unhappy about entrusting distribution of supplies to Kalonji's refugee commissioner. If we are unable to operate in reasonable security, I revert to item 3 of your ONUC 2795 and suggest Licross representative in Congo be encouraged to negotiate observers qualified to report on health as well as distribution. Unless we maintain at least a skeletal supervisory organization, we may be manouvered into position of supplying food which is very likely to go astray.

What other areas in Kasai require relief?

You may also find it useful to remind President Kasavubu that I await a reply to my messages of 30 April and 22 May.

New subject Angola refugees. Early reply to our 3726 would be helpful.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

82

(ROUTINE)

TO : MR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 30 May 61
NO : 3813

ONUC-3039

Reference A-1230 and our 3531.

Yugoslav aircraft scheduled to arrive Stanleyville between 25 and 30 May has been delayed. New schedule and details as follows;

ETD Belgrade 0600Z 4 June

ETA Stanleyville 1220Z 4 June

ETD Stanleyville 1200Z 7 June

Type of aircraft DC-6B, Markings YUAAF. Aircraft has a crew of 6, Captain is Semix, Milisav.

Yugoslav mission has also requested that arrangements be made for provision of approximately 7000 Kilos of fuel 108/130 octane. Please transmit this request to Stanleyville authorities.

cc. Linner, Maceoin

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ETAT PRIORITE
(~~ROUTINE~~)

TO : MR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : SECGEN
DATE : 29 May 61
NO : 3812

Sh

Reur A-1338.

1. Understand your reasoning and in general concur as to timeliness and substance of your proposed action. However, we advise a variation in the procedure you suggest. Our view is that it would be more advisable for Maceoin alone to tackle Matadi problem, thus keeping the De Seynes proposals and you as well completely clear of the Matadi approach.

2. We understand you to mean that Matadi line now proposed involves dropping previous idea of the Nigerian police as entering ledge. However, agreement on Nigerian police should be protected as call-back line.

cc. Linner, Maceoin

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ROUTINE)

TO : MR. LINNER *SL*
FROM : SECGEN
DATE : 29 May 61
NO : 3811

Reur A-1330.

1. You and Gardiner may pursue quiet contacts as indicated our previous cables.

2. We assume question of Gardiners follow-up visits and talks in provincial centers will be reviewed in light of talks and developments in Leo in next few days. Pending this we reserve our position.

3. Agree on visits of you and Schwarz to Eville, this being quite natural for both of you.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(ROUTINE)

TO : MR. LINNER, GEN. MACEOIN
FROM : SECGEN
DATE : 29 May 61
NO : 3810

We presume you will keep a close watch on withdrawal of Kalonji's forces to within borders of "Sud Kasai" and will appropriately follow up with own troops.

cc. Linner, Maceoin

INCOMING CODE CABLE

5
(ROUTINE)

TO : GEN. MACBOIN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 29 May 61
NO : 3803

Reference ONUC 3032. Canada requested accordingly.

cc. Linner.

INCOMING CLEAR

TO : ONUC, LEOPOLDVILLE
FROM : ONUC, NEW YORK
DATE : 29 May 1961
No. : 3801

Following extracts Secretary-General's press conference 29 May:
Questioned regarding "new Secretariat set up" for directing operations
Congo Secretary-General replied "I would rather start with the developments
on the Congo side. We already have the civilian operations. We have the
Force. We have negotiations going on concerning implementation of paragraph
A-2 of the Security Council resolution, which, as you may remember, is the
one that talks about withdrawal and evacuation of military and paramilitary
personnel, mercenaries and political advisers. Parenthetically, I would say
that these negotiations are going on in Leopoldville and in Brussels, with
discussions of a less formal nature also in other places in the Congo.
Further, we have under way implementation of paragraph B-2, which is the
question of reorganization of the army, arrangements for retraining, and so
on and so forth. We have not got far, but I hope we will make progress soon.
We also have a commission for the investigation of the circumstances relating
to the assassination of Mr. Lumumba and others. And, finally, we have the
Conciliation Commission.

Over and above that, I think that there are one or two operations
which may become necessary very shortly within the civilian field in the
Congo.

These things are, as you see, rather heterogeneous. There is a
common denominator -- the Congo -- and there is another common denominator
in the policy-making here. I think it is clear to you that it is unreasonable

to expect anybody to sit in the Congo and be the co-ordinator for those activities, because they would go beyond what anyone can bring within his own sphere of competence. We have to activate our best resources here and give directives from here to those in charge of the various operations, and see to it that it all fits together within the framework of the resolutions and the general United Nations policies.

For that reason, I had intended to build up a special quasi-executive office. I have found it very difficult to recruit broadly the people I would have liked to have for it, and for that reason we are continuing a somewhat intensified activity with the people whom we have already engaged on the Congo operation. We have our daily meetings, we have current contacts on it, and I believe that, putting our best efforts into this matter here, we will be able very well to keep these operations together within a pattern of planned co-ordination.

There is also a coming and going, as you know. At present, for example, on the financial side, Mr. de Seynes, for this headquarters, is out there with experts; Mr. Gardiner, who really belongs now to the executive office, is out there for A-2; and so on and so forth. But I do not have in my mind to put a formal hat, so to speak, on the operation here as a substitute for what we have had on another level so far in the Congo."

Later on SecGen was asked about reported Secretariat assignment for Doctor Conor O'Brien of Ireland. He replied "Be able to use Dr. Conor O'Brien's services, which I am very, very happy to get, in the co-ordination to which I referred, the co-ordination of the various activities in the Congo; but he will formally join, so to say, the Secretary-General's more or less personal staff in the Secretariat."

SecGen was asked about prospects for meeting of Congo Parliament based on "understanding" between Gizenga and Kasa-Vubu also whether Kamina was possible site. He replied "it is practically impossible to make any safe forecast as to the likelihood of a meeting. However, there is one important development at least, and that is the parallel expressions of the wish to see Parliament get together which we have had from Mr. Gizenga and Mr. Kasa-Vubu. You know our stand on it; it has been said again and again by the Security Council and the General Assembly that we must get Parliament back in order to re-establish legality and in order to get a Central Government the legality of which cannot be disputed. Naturally, those expressions have had a parallel in as solid efforts as we have been able to make on the Secretariat level in the same direction, efforts which will continue on the basis which now is established by these two declarations. However, there is a lot of work to be done, because parallel declarations of intention are not enough; there must also be common ground on which the meeting can be arranged. I think you hinted at it, and I am quite agreed that a meeting in which at least those two sides are not fully represented and do not take part does not make sense. That is to say, common ground must be found between Leopoldville and Stanleyville in order to get Parliament together in a form that really is constructive and helps the Congo, and thereby helps us all.

We have various means, direct and indirect, by which we can further the finding of what I call the common ground, and we shall certainly do all we can in that direction. But, in the final analysis, it is of course for the Congolese themselves to decide the circumstances under which they will meet. We cannot impose anything. We can help them with whatever professional training we have in smoothing out what may sometimes prove to be rather unnecessary differences of opinion. We should also give them all practical

assistance in getting people together, making security arrangements, and so forth.

That brings me to the other question that has been raised. In our view, Kamina is perfectly possible. The conveniences there are perhaps not the best, because, after all, the entire place is a military installation. But I do not think that we need worry about that. Security-wise, we can arrange matters there. In fact, since Kamina is a rather isolated place, it would be easier for us to provide what would come close to 100% security there than in most other places".

Questioned about Congo's finances SecGen referred question to Sir Alexander MacFarquhar, his special adviser for civilian affairs in the Congo, who replied "The general financial situation is this: the Congo has had some small advances from the United Nations and has also had some projects based on the contributions to the United Nations fund for the Congo. Apart from that, it has been living very largely on its own Central Bank advances. There is a limit in the neighbourhood of 150 million dollars on Central Bank advances, and the Congolese are getting very close to that limit. The Central Bank has indicated that it is unwilling to increase the limit. The President has therefore appealed to the Secretary-General for assistance. This has been agreed to, in principle, but no money has actually been given. This week, Mr. de Seynes is investigating with the Congolese authorities what budgetary disciplines can be imposed if assistance is to be given.

In regard to the debt and the Congolese portfolio, those matters are still in abeyance because there was no financial settlement between the Congo and Belgium at the time of independence and there has been none subsequently."

Asked to elaborate Sir Alexander said "We have some estimates of what the budget deficit will be if it goes on at the present level, which is about 9 million dollars a month. But that does not necessarily determine the answer. Things are in a very bad way. There is a rate of unemployment of about 50% and, naturally, if and when that improves there will be an increase in expenditures. But at the same time we would hope to reduce the deficit by improvements in revenues." On same question SecGen then added "there is one restraining factor, and that is that, whatever financial arrangements we make, they cannot be made in a way which would prejudice a question of a constitutional nature or of a political nature within the country. That is to say, in that, as in other respects, we have to see to it that our operation is one which avoids so-called interference in internal affairs. In this specific case that is a badly restraining influence, because who is at the receiving end? What position does he hold under the constitution? And so on and so forth. These are questions which we can never leave out of account. There is one important element in this picture and that is that our limited financial operations have been, for all practical purposes, with the Central Bank which, as central banks in most countries, has an independent position." Asked whether Unations had taken any steps to guarantee security of possible Parliament meeting in Leopoldville or been asked to do so SecGen replied "No we have not so far and matter is for our part at the study."

Asked what Unations was doing "to protect" Tshombe SecGen replied "This brings up the whole question of protection which is one of the most misunderstood questions we have had in the Congo operation."

First of all, no protection is given unless a person asks for it. Naturally, we can never promise to give protection anywhere and under all circumstances.

In the case of Mr. Lumumba, we gave him, at his request, protection at his residence in Leopoldville. He left it without our knowledge, and he was arrested outside our control. From then on what we could do was to intervene by direct diplomatic means in relation to those in power.

In the case of Mr. Tshombe, when he came to Coquilhatville, he had not asked for any protection. He had no protection, and we were not equipped for that kind of protection for him if he had asked for it at that stage. If he had asked beforehand, we simply would have had to say that our resources are limited in such and such a way, and you must take that fully into account. However, his detention arose also in a situation entirely outside our control.

As in the case of Mr. Lumumba our activity, therefore, has to be limited to such intervention as we can make diplomatically and politically within the limits of our competence." Omnipress.

MESSAGE ADDRESSED BY MR.DAYAL TO
DR.LINNER ON 29 MAY 1961

No. 3791

May I convey to you, and through you to all members of ONUC, civil and military, and representatives of the Specialized Agencies, my sincere gratitude and appreciation of their work and their devotion to the high principles of the United Nations during these nine months that I have had the privilege of holding responsibility for the Operation as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the Congo. I would like particularly to express my admiration for the courageous and selfless work of ONUC civilian teams and military units which, scattered throughout that vast country, are performing their appointed tasks with such distinction and in the face of all manner of difficulties and privations.

The UN mission in the Congo is inspired by the loftiest motives, and its life-giving task of assisting the young Republic and giving to its newly won independence substance and meaning, is worthy of the highest principles of the Organization which we all have the honour to serve.

Rarely has the world witnessed so many men and women - from so many lands and from different walks of life - joining together in one brotherhood, serving with unity of spirit and purpose, a commonly held ideal. The UN Operation in the Congo has given to international cooperation a new dimension and a new significance. It is proving to the world that the moral strength derived from principles represents a greater force than the might of arms. It is establishing the fact that selfless concern for our common humanity can triumph over the pursuit of selfish and narrow national interests. It is demonstrating that adherence to principles can overcome the pressures of expediency.

During these difficult months, much has been accomplished, and while the road is a long and hard one, I am confident that the spirit which animates all those working in the Congo under the flag of the United Nations, will be able to surmount all difficulties. In taking leave of each and every one of you, I

may tell you that I shall always cherish the memory of our close association, the fine team spirit born of shared dangers and difficulties and the warm companionship of those engaged in a common task of dedication.

I wish all of you Godspeed and a safe return home when your task is done.

Incoming Cable

Immediate

To : Linner, Leopoldville
From : Secgen, New York
Date : 28 May 1961
No. : 3790.

Following is text of cable dated 12 May which, as you mentioned, Bomboko claims was not received:

" Son Excellence Monsieur Joseph Kasa-Vubu Président de la République du Congo - Léopoldville (Congo).

Le Président de la Commission d'enquête établie par la résolution 1601 (XV) de l'Assemblée générale présente ses compliments au Président de la République du Congo et a l'honneur de lui faire savoir que la Commission a commencé ses travaux. A la suite d'un échange de vues officieux avec Monsieur Bahizi Représentant permanent adjoint du Président auprès des Nations Unies la Commission désire faire part de son intention de se rendre au Congo afin d'y remplir les tâches qui lui ont été confiées par le Conseil de sécurité et l'Assemblée générale. Elle a donc l'honneur de demander les autorisations nécessaires à cette fin. La Commission serait heureuse de recevoir promptement une réponse favorable à sa demande et formule l'espoir d'une collaboration étroite et fructueuse avec le Président de la République du Congo.

U Aung Khine, le Président de la Commission. "

INCOMING CODE CABLE

(MOST IMMEDIATE)

TO : MR. LINNER *SL*
FROM : MR. NARASIMHAN
DATE : 28 May 61
NO : 3789

Your 1326. I shall repeat text of 10 May cable this evening.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : MACEOIN
FROM : BUNCHE
DATE : 27 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3788

82

Ref ONUC 2953 and our 3512.

Ghanaian Ferret Scout cars will be lifted by USAF aircraft after completion of lift of Ifish companies. Two C-124S will take part. Schedule as follows : Leo ETD 0615Z 29 May, ETA Lagos 1200A 29 May, ETD Lagos 1400A 29 May, ETA Accra 1550A 29 May, ETD Accra 0700A 30 May, ETA Leo 1300A 30 May, ETD Leo 0430A 31 May for France. The second aircraft will depart one hour later, following the same schedule.

cc : Linner.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : LINNER 82
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 27 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3785

Following discussion on parliament question in advisory Committee, my summing-up of which cabled to you separately, I believe that it would be wise for you and Gardiner to discuss the question of Parliament at an early time with Kasa-Vubu. As you will have noted, the question of the place of Parliament has been prominently mentioned here, and you will have concluded from my statement that there exists considerable sentiment for meeting place other than Leo. In this connection Kamina has been prominently mentioned. It would probably be unwise at this moment to push Kamina too forcefully, but Kasa-Vubu should be advised that, if he intends to have full meeting of Parliament, a place other than Leo would seem to be desirable.

You might also wish to give some early thought to question as to the kind of approach which in regard to this question could be made to Gizenga, particularly in order to persuade him to lend his full cooperation to meeting of Parliament. It would appear to us as advisable that a U.N. Staff Member, preferably not you, should contact Gizenga for this purpose.

I shall be glad to receive your considered views on this question, preferably after you have had your initial discussion with Kasa-Vubu.

Incoming Clear Cable

Confidential

To : Linner, Leopoldville-Confidential for Linner only
From : Secgen, New York
Date : 27 May 1961
No. : 3784.

Following is my summing up in Advisory Committee on 27 May 1961 of discussion concerning convening of Parliament as accepted by members of the Committee:

" First, quite apart from the fact that there is a clear injunction in the various resolutions that Parliament should be convened, it is obviously the consensus here not only that this is a most urgent requirement, but also that the time is now. Under such circumstances we should of course do our utmost to achieve the result. It has been said to-day that the United Nations can serve as a focus of conciliation for the convening of Parliament. I think that that correctly describes what should be the function of the United Nations. The other tasks - security, and so on - more or less follow automatically.

To be a focus of conciliation it is, of course, necessary that we enter into contact in a discreet way, a fruitful way, with all the parties concerned. We have devoted our attention here mainly to Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Gizenga. ~~Next~~ Let us note that there are others who should be heard, others with whom contact is essential. Let us, however, also note - and I think that this is the view generally held - that Parliament short of co-operation between Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Gizenga is not Parliament in the sense in which we want to envisage it. They must co-operate, and Mr. Gizenga must be a party to it just as Mr. Kasa-Vubu. For that reason, we must try to find a common ground for the two gentlemen. The common ground exists to the extent that they both wish to have a meeting of Parliament, and in that respect we have no difficulty. Difficulties may arise in two respects. There may be different views as to who should, so to say, be the spear-head of the move, and there may be different views also as to the place where they should meet.

Regarding the first point, I believe that it is a point which we should try to convince the parties that they should leave aside. It is not essential: the essential one is that they agree on the substance and on getting together,

and I am sure that we can help them to find a form which does not involve anybody in a question of prestige. However, I should like to add that, in our own arguments, we must, of course, take due account of the legal arguments which may be brought forward on the two sides. In doing so, we need not in any way exaggerate them. We should, on the contrary, in my view, try to convince the gentlemen in question that this is basically not a question of law and that the fruitful development now before us as a possibility should not be allowed to stop for reasons of prestige.

In a certain sense, a similar attitude seems to me to be natural as regards the place. I have already said that, in my view, we should naturally stress the practical possibilities of providing for security and making other arrangements which are adequate. If we could get the two gentlemen to agree that this is a primary consideration I believe that this also is a point which we should be able to straighten out in direct contact with the parties concerned, because if they can forget for a moment about the prestige aspect and subordinate similar aspects to what is really essential, then the whole operation can be carried out. In that respect I must give first priority without hesitation to Kamina. However, that, as I said before, is for me a pragmatic question and not one which we should permit to develop, either from our side or from the side of others, into a question of prestige or principle which might render progress impossible.

Now, to get across these common sense views - because I regard them as common sense views - we should, of course, establish contact with the gentlemen concerned. And there is the question of the way in which we should establish the contact, and also the form in which it should be established. As to the way, I feel that, for the moment, those members of the Committee are right who consider that the new Conciliation Commission, as envisaged by the General Assembly, is a bit too clumsy. This is in fact a case for discussion in various smooth forms with closed doors. It is something where you argue sitting at the same side of the table with the various gentlemen trying to work out formulas which are mutually acceptable. For that reason, I believe that the contact should be a simple one. Of course, we should not forget that we also have in our pocket the possibility of introducing the Conciliation Commission on the stage as soon as that Commission has been constituted. But in the meantime I feel that we do not lose anything - on the contrary, we may gain - by choosing a simple approach. There has been reference to the absence, after Mr. Dayal's departure, of any Special Representative. I do not believe that, in the present situation, this weakens our case because, in fact,

it is a question of having people who, irrespective of their formal position, have access to the persons and can argue with them in the proper way. In such circumstances, I believe that with Mr. Gardiner on the spot and Mr. Nwokedi here, and the other people we have in the Congo, we certainly can play it in a way which is just as fruitful as any other and more formal arrangement.

I need not go into the question of why, for the time being, we feel that we should leave the post of Mr. Dayal vacant: it has no direct bearing on this immediate conciliation problem. Mr. Gardiner is on the spot. Mr. Nwokedi is here. The two have been mentioned. I would also like to indicate that Mr. Linner, who is in charge of the civil operation and, for the moment, Officer in charge, has also very good personal relations with the people concerned. I would not wish to establish any kind of special channel or special form. Anyone who can serve a useful purpose by arguing in the right way with those concerned has a function to fulfil - so much about the channel, about the way to approach the people.

Then there is the question of the form. As I have already indicated, I feel a little bit wary on that question because of the legal element which exists and also because of the sensitivity of the parties to their position. I believe that we could, by the wrong kind of approach to Mr. Gizenga, render it more difficult for Mr. Kasa-Vubu because he would see that - or might interpret that - as a kind of deflation of the position which he has in his own eyes and in the eyes of this Organization. Therefore, I believe that the approach should be made by those who speak for us in such a way as to mark the relationship which does exist for us with Mr. Kasa-Vubu, and also the kind of position which he has under the *Loi fondamentale* as recognized here.

For that reason also I believe that it is reasonable to begin the discussions with Mr. Kasa-Vubu, but to remark to him as a matter of course that contact must be established with others because it is, in fact, a problem of finding common ground, and we cannot let formal considerations bar us from trying to find such ground.

My conclusion, therefore, would be that, in the first place, those who have been mentioned here, but also anyone who can usefully be put in the picture, should, in the first instance, take this matter up with Mr. Kasa-Vubu, try to explore the ground, try to forestall hasty and premature statements which would tie anybody's hands, and seek as much of an approach as possible from his side to the stands which we know to be the stands of others - in the first place,

Mr. Gizenga's. They should also make it clear to Mr. Kasa-Vubu that, as a matter of course, we must explore the views held by Mr. Gizenga so as to be able to fit the pieces together. After that, the other necessary contacts would follow. That does not mean that we need to be without any current contact with Mr. Gizenga: it only means that we do not, so to say, open the game formally with him in a way which may render life more difficult on the other side.

This is roughly my own thinking on the matter and I must say that, around this table, it seems to me that there has been a very large concensus of opinion and nothing said which runs counter to the way in which we, when we have discussed it on the Secretariat's side, have envisaged the matter.

I would, however, like to invite you to make whatever corrections and amendments and to introduce whatever new answers you want in this attempt to outline an approach. Were you to agree with this approach, our first step would be to tell Mr. Kasa-Vubu that we would like to explore the field with him with a view to finding the common ground which would get the convening of Parliament under way very soon. We would then at the same time, of course, try to see to it that, as ~~is~~ I said, nothing is said which might render the operation more difficult.

The only thing which I have to add is that I believe it is wise not to formalize this or to put any kind of official hat on any of those who approach Mr. Kasa-Vubu and Mr. Gizenga and the others because if anything is a proper field for quiet diplomacy, this seems to be one. It is for the Congolese to decide what they want. We can never be anything but, so to say, midwives in this operation, and the greater discretion we show, the less we formalize our part in the story, the better I believe it is. "

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. S. Linner

ROUTINE

From : Secretary-General, New York

Date : 27 May 1961

No. : 3783

SW

Reur A-1302.

With qualifications stated below, I agree generally to Fabry negotiating on lines indicated in his letters to Schachter of 21 and 25 May, provided he makes it entirely clear that any agreed draft remain subject to SECGEN's approval.

Draft text of Article 2 para 2 in 25 May letter satisfactory in principle but it should be made clear that while "information" will be received, it must not lead to procedure that will delay employment of U.N. personnel in Congo or in any way make information check a condition precedent for such employment.

Regarding liaison article, essential that agreement does not impede contacts and negotiation when necessary on local level. No objection to statement of principle that liaison would normally be through office designated by central government.

Regarding visas, our experience shows considerable delays when visas were requested. Accordingly urge that notification procedure in Article 11 should be substitute for visas and avoid burden on government.

Regarding Article 9, we do not object to reciprocal provision. Would suggest inserting word "promptly" before "to deliver".

Finally, essential maintain our position on exclusive criminal jurisdiction as well as on PX and flags.

Fabry may discuss umbrella agreement for technical assistance and other civilian personnel. We favour single agreement for all civilian operation personnel as provided in draft sent last September.

Incoming Clear Cable

Most Immediate

To : King-Gordon, Leopoldville
From: Tanzer, New York
Date: 27 May 1961
No. : 3780.

Your ONUC 2991. Secgen's statement follows:

" On instructions of the Secretary-General experts of the United Nations have examined the financial position of the Republic of the Congo with Mr. Albert Ndele, the Governor of the National Bank. As a result of this review of the situation, it was recognized that immediate outside support was required.

In order to determine the scope of the support immediately needed the Congolese authorities have been requested to produce an estimate of budgetary requirements for the ninety days following one June and of essential imports required. Experts of the International Monetary Fund will proceed to Leopoldville to aid the Congolese authorities in the establishment of the list of imports.

A mission will be designated to proceed within a few days to the Congo for the purpose of determining the scope and character of the aid which the United Nations will have to supply.

This mission has been invited by the President of the Republic of the Congo in order to assist in laying down the guidelines for a fiscal policy and an import programme which will insure that the Congolese authorities will obtain maximum benefit from the utilization of these funds.

In the meantime, if there are clearly demonstrated needs, the Monetary Council of the Congo can obtain an advance of necessary funds. "

French text cabled 24 May.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To : Dr. Linner.
From : Secretary - General.
Date : 27 May 61.
No. : 3776

82

Reference A-1309. Obviously, request for our consent in writing is wrong and cannot be granted. Also inadvisable for us to go fishing in Rome. Our position, which Micuta may transmit orally if he considers it necessary, should be only that provided material involved is for regular, peaceful use, no repeat no consent from UN is required and UN has nothing to do with it.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To : Dr. Linner. *SL*
From : Secretary-General.
Date : 27 May 61.
No. : 3775.

Your A-1319.

We agree that you should ask Dumontet to try and obtain more information along lines suggested in your final paragraph. We do not quite understand your and Gardiners negative reaction to Munongos request to send UN official to Katanga for discussion of preparatory steps for implementation of A-2. Grateful for elaboration.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

To. : General MacEoin.
From : Bunche
Date : 26 May 61.
No. : 3748.

Ref ONUC 2926.

We are in full agreement with your line of thinking regarding forthcoming rotations. However, the Irish Defence Ministry has just informed us that sea transportation for the 34th and 35th battalions is not feasible mainly because 34th battalion must be back in Ireland by 4 July since liability for external service expires on that date. If the Irish authorities insist on Air rotation there would then seem to be need for only one ship. USNS Eltinge is now en route New York for overhaul and repairs and we propose to keep the ship here on a 14 days alert basis.

USNS Blatchford left Djakarta on 25 May, will bunker in Capetown on 9 June and arrive Monrovia 18 June. This ship should rotate both Liberians and Nigerians to Dar-es-Salaam as suggested by you and could arrive in Bombay in the middle of August for Indian and Ceylonese rotations, as recommended by you. Open question is whether rotation of troops from foregoing countries plus the first group of MSF should be undertaken in one voyage or two. From point of view of economy one voyage would be preferable, and is within the ships capacity. Question of rotation will be taken up with countries concerned but, before doing so, your comments on this tentative plan are desired.

Nigerian Government has informed that the 4QONR must be relieved in Congo between 12 and 17 June and they have requested that the rotation be undertaken by Air. Your figures on Indian personnel do not tally with information we have received from the Government of India. Movement between Congo and Dar-es-Salaam is preferable by UN aircraft and not by rail since USNS Blatchfords stay in Dar-es-Salaam should be limited to maximum extent. Since above plan needs co-operation from countries concerned your early comments will be appreciated. Endit.

c.c. Dr. Linner.

Incoming Cable

Immediate

To : Linner, Leopoldville
From : Secgen, New York
Date : 26 May 1961
No. : 3741.

Please transmit following reply to the President:

" Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre télégramme du 25 mai, contenant le texte d'un message destiné aux délégations du Ghana, de la Suède et de la Grande-Bretagne concernant les incidents survenus à Port-Francqui.

Je tiens à vous informer que le texte de votre message a été transmis aux délégations mentionnées.

Très haute considération.

Dag Hammarskjold.

"

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER *SL*
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 26 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3739

Your A-1300.

We should like to leave it to your discretion to use the staff you have in Leo for the interim arrangements between Dumontet's departure and arrival of his successor. Specifically, we have no objection to your proposal to put in Brackenbury as a stop-gap in Eville, in case Coq 's conference is prolonged.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER *SL*
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 26 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3738

Your A-1298.

Regarding paragraph 6, we have no objection to your proposal provided that Knechts contacts with interpol are informal and on aye personal basis.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER , GARDINER 62
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 26 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3737

Following received from Mestiri, Brussels :

J'ai rencontré ce jour jeudi 25 sur sa demande, Ambassadeur Hupperts.

Hupperts m'a fait part de réponse donnée par gouvernement Belge à note Bomboko en date 10 May. Selon Hupperts teneur réponse belge revêt caractère générale, et marque approbation Belge du contenu de note Bomboko du 10 Mai. Cette note Belge est suivie d'une autre qui, se référant à la résolution 21 Février , accord Congo ONU du 17 Avril et accord résultant échange de note Congo/Belgique, informe gouvernement Central du retrait en accord avec autorités locale d'une trentaine de Belges employés au Katanga et demande à gouvernement Central de " libérer" ressortissants Belges considérés comme tombant sous coup résolution Conseil de Sécurité; gouvernement Congo pourra mettre ces personnes à disposition Mission Liaison Belge à Léo qui les rapatriera. Note comprend en annexe liste nominative de dizaine Belges de Léo que gouvernement Belge se propose de retirer en premier lieu.

En ce qui concerne liste trentaine Belges à retirer du Katanga, Hupperts possède cette liste mais ne veut pas me la remettre, Spaak estime maintenant qu'il doit d'abord, je répète, d'abord, donner réponse à lettre Ambassadeur Shabani en date du 18 Mai. Cette réponse me serait remise Lundi. Elle serait suivie " peu après des listes nominatives ". Ai marqué mon étonnement à Hupperts car c'est Spaak qui a promis spontanément de remettre cette liste et qui a proposé qu'elle soit remise Mardi 23. J'ai demandé si dans l'esprit de l'interlocuteur Belge il y avait un lien particulier entre la réponse et la remise de la liste ou si la réponse constituait

une sorte de " préalable " avant la remise des listes. Hupperts répondit " qu'il n'y a aucun préalable ni aucune dépendance entre les deux choses " Mais Spaak a téléphoné de Paris pour que la liste ne soit remise qu'une fois réponse faite à lettre Ambassadeur Sahbani du 18 May..

Hupperts a ajouté que conseil ministres Katanga ne fait aucune objection au retrait de la trentaine de Belges qui comprendront sans plus aucun doute le Major Weber et Mr. Clemens.

cc : Gardiner

INCOMING CODE CABLE

PRIORITE

TO : LINNER
FROM : SECRETARY-GENERAL
DATE : 26 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3735

Please transmit following communication soonest to Kasa-Vubu :

Monsieur le Président ,

La Commission d'enquête établie par la résolution 1601 (XV) de l'Assemblée Générale m'a prié d'attirer l'attention de votre excellence sur le fait qu'elle n'a pas encore reçu de réponse à son télégramme du 10 Mai 1961.

La Commission m'a chargé de faire savoir à votre excellence toute l'importance qu'elle attache à la demande présentée dans ce télégramme. Elle estime que la prompte réception d'une réponse favorable à cette demande est indispensable pour lui permettre de mener à bien la tâche que l'Assemblée Générale l'a priée d'entreprendre dans le plus bref délai possible.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, l'assurance de ma considération la plus haute .

Dag Hammarskjöld
Secrétaire Général.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

TO : LINNER, AHMED
FROM : FIELDSERVICE
DATE : 26 MAY 1961
NUMBER : 3731

Your 1288

Ja Schumacher now designated Administrative Officer for
Ruanda Urundi eliminating need for Hazou release.

cc : Ahmed

Incoming Clear Cable

Most Immediate

To : Linner, Leopoldville
From : Dayal, New York
Date : 26 May 1961
No. : 3729

Grateful if Rikhye could bring two or three suitcases with him containing clothes of wife and self. Heavier luggage can be sent later by Raja. My programme is to leave by sea May 31 for London where staying fortnight at Dorchester Hotel. If Rikhye already left, perhaps someone going London could lend his good offices. Greetings to all of you.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

ROUTINE.

To : Mr. Linner, Leo.
From : MacFarquhar, New York.
Date : 26 May 1961.
No. : 3726

Our 3663 Angola refugees. Secretary General has had following further cable from HCR "To Secretary General from Schnyder Geneva. Have just had discussion with Egger regional director of UNICEF who advises me as follows: A four party plan initiated by UNICEF and worked out with UNOC, league of Red Cross societies and Congolese Red Cross has been devised to build up infrastructure able to deal effectively with emergency situation in Congo providing especially for necessary food supplies and distribution. The plan has been agreed to by all concerned and will be submitted to the UNICEF board for approval at its session in two weeks time. More detailed information should be available at UNICEF secretariat New York. Such undertaking could constitute proper base to help congolese Red Cross also to deal with refugee needs in this way unfortunate duplication and highlighting of refugee situations could be avoided. Under this assumption my role under good offices resolution could be quite limited. You may of course have information or particular reasons unknown to me. From my perspective however would suggest that I have a representative attached to the coordination committee composed of UNOC, UNICEF, League and congolese Red Cross established in Congo. By this means my office could give technical advice regarding any special aspects of the problem of refugees. In addition my office could if necessary appeal for funds for aid to refugees which would be channelled into the operation conducted by the coordinating committee. My readiness to advance limited credit for purchase of light trucks and finance other immediate measures stand."

We also have from UNICEF draft of project for emergency prevention services which proposes inter alia to maintain emergency resources of food at key points throughout Congo. Project requires supply of food to come from your famine relief stocks and also apparently needs Unations guarantee for priority movement of these supplies. UNICEF have report from local representative that project entirely acceptable to you and recommendation on kay to us. We have not repeat not received such recommendation.

Please let us have your advice immediately on these propositions, with particular reference to our relations with "infrastructure" and responsibilities assigned to ONUC.

YC6 NEW YORK 796 25 MAY 1961
2347Z ETAT PRIORITE

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

ONUC
LEOPOLDVILLE

MOST IMMEDIATE 3725 Linner following communiqué to be released at 2 pm New York time tomorrow 26 May by Dayal : "I came in August 1960 at the request of Mr. Hammarskjöld to assist him for some time in the discharge of the onerous responsibilities entrusted to him by the Security Council in the Congo. During these nine months I have tried to serve the United Nations and the Congolese people to the best of my ability and in a spirit of impartiality and objectivity.

The United Nations Mission in the Congo is unique in the history of International Organization. The United Nations went to the help of the young Republic of the Congo at its request, to give life and substance to its freedom and to strengthen its sovereignty and independence. Despite enormous difficulties, a substantial degree of progress has been achieved in that task.

At a time when political crises are erupting in different parts of the world, the danger of the internationalization of any conflict in the Congo has been avoided, thanks to the presence and activities of the United Nations. The exclusion of all forms of foreign interference is also an essential factor in the stabilization of the internal situation. The United Nations' action in the Congo has prevented the outbreak of civil war degenerating into tribal strife threatening the very existence of the Republic. The early reorganization of the National Security Forces would contribute greatly to the development of a sense of security in the country and facilitate the processes of political conciliation. The United Nations has consistently maintained that the settlement of political differences can be brought about only by peaceful means and not by resort to force. It is therefore hoped that a fully representative meeting of the Congolese Parliament, which the United Nations Operation has tried indefatigably to promote will soon meet with the assistance of the United Nations.

The extensive training programme which has been launched to enable the Congolese people to shoulder their heavy responsibilities, is making progress. At the same time, the devoted labours of the United Nations civilian personnel are helping to keep the essential services in the country functioning while the United Nations troops, in conditions of great danger and difficulty, are succeeding in maintaining some measure of law and order. Famine has been averted and epidemics held in check, while the economy has been protected from collapse. In the context of the situation which faced the country at its birth, these achievements, while helping to stabilize the situation in the country, hold out perspectives for future growth.

The United Nations has established a sound organizational machinery which has been able to withstand through these difficult months, the strains and stresses of recurring crises and pressures from different directions. The stage has now been reached where many of the initial problems have been surmounted and adequate means have been provided for furthering the objectives of the United Nations. If the operation receives the cooperation of the entire Congolese people from all the six provinces, as well as the International political support to which it is entitled, I am convinced that in the fullness of time, it will enable the Congo to take its place as a stable, self reliant member of the International community.

In the course of the development of the operation, there has inevitably been a reorientation of its functions, and a change in emphasis from the diplomatic to the administrative. This has necessitated a diversification of the organizational arrangements in the field, the responsibility for the direction and coordination of the operation falling increasingly on United Nations Headquarters at New York. In view of these developments, I feel that the time has now come for me to resume my interrupted duties as India's High Commissioner in Pakistan, and I have the Secretary-General's permission to leave. In doing so, I have the satisfaction of

feeling that I have had the high privilege of assisting to the best of my capacity and strength, the United Nations in its historic new role. I am grateful to the Secretary-General for his unfailing guidance and support. I am also grateful to all the colleagues who have served with me in the Congo, both civil and military as well as representatives of the Specialized Agencies for their loyal and selfless contribution to the humanitarian and life-giving task of the United Nations operation in the Congo." SECGEN.

INCOMING CODE CABLE.

ROUTINE.

To : Mr. Linner, Leo.
From : MacFarquhar, New York.
Date : 25 May 1961.
No. : 3716

Re Secgens 3693.

Umbricht arrives Brazzaville Air France flight 403 Sunday 28 May
at 08.55 A.M.

YC 13 S NEW YORK 203/582
25 MAY - 1631Z Pi/54/50
ETAT PRIORITE

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

ONUC
LEOPOLDVILLE

3702 MOST IMMEDIATE LINNER FROM SECGEN.

Following my 3700 , following is French text of communiqué:
"A la suite de consultations qui ont eu lieu au siège de l'Organisation au sujet de l'Opération des Nations Unies au Congo et en particulier de la réorganisation des dispositions administratives concernant cette opération, réorganisation en préparation depuis un certain temps, le Secrétaire général annonce que l'Ambassadeur Dayal, sur sa propre demande, reprend maintenant ses fonctions de Haut-Commissaire de l'Inde au Pakistan. Répondant à une demande immédiate du Secrétaire général, le Premier Ministre de l'Inde a bien voulu dans des délais très brefs, en août 1960, libérer M. Dayal, pour une période limitée, de ses fonctions de Haut-Commissaire de l'Inde au Pakistan. M. Dayal a accepté la mission de Représentant spécial au Congo étant entendu que la durée de celle-ci serait déterminée par la mesure dans laquelle il pourrait s'absenter de son poste permanent et par le besoin que l'on aurait de ses services au Congo. Lors de sa visite à Léopoldville au début de janvier 1961, le Secrétaire général a demandé à M. Dayal d'accepter de poursuivre ses fonctions de Représentant spécial jusqu'à ce que les progrès réalisés dans l'Opération des Nations Unies au Congo indiquent qu'il est opportun de prendre de nouvelles dispositions administratives. A la lumière des développements récents, M. Dayal, se référant à l'engagement initial qu'il avait pris en août 1960 et à l'entretien qu'il a eu avec le Secrétaire général en janvier dernier, a maintenant demandé à être libéré de sa mission au service de l'Organisation des Nations Unies afin de reprendre ses fonctions auprès de son Gouvernement. Dans ces conditions, le Secrétaire général a dû accepter, à regret, d'accéder à la demande de M. Dayal. Ce faisant, il saisit cette occasion afin d'exprimer toute sa gratitude à M. Dayal pour les services qu'il a accomplis, tant au Congo qu'au Siège de l'Organisation. Dans la tâche qu'il a réalisée pour l'Organisation des Nations Unies en tant que Représentant spécial, M. Dayal

a fait preuve des qualités et du niveau d'accomplissement les plus élevés, égalés seulement par sa loyauté aux buts des Nations Unies et par son intégrité inaltérable. Une déclaration sera faite ultérieurement en ce qui concerne les dispositions administratives qui seront désormais en vigueur au Congo. Les fonctions primordiales du Représentant spécial au Congo sont en train de passer du domaine essentiellement diplomatique au domaine administratif, le principal besoin actuel ayant trait à la coordination, du côté de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, de ses activités croissantes concernant l'assistance au Congo. Cette coordination doit se faire dans une large mesure au Siège de l'Organisation à New York. En attendant qu'interviennent les changements que l'on se propose d'apporter aux dispositions administratives, aucun nouveau Représentant spécial ne sera nommé et les activités au Congo seront coordonnées par le plus ancien fonctionnaire de l'Organisation à Léopoldville qui assumera la direction des services. "

INCOMING CLEAR CABLE

ETAT PRIORITE

ONUC

LEOPOLDVILLE

3701 Most immediate Linner from Secgen. Following my 3700, following is French text of communiqué :

"A la suite de consultations qui ont eu lieu au siège de l'Organisation au sujet de l'Opération des Nations Unies au Congo et en particulier de la réorganisation des dispositions administratives concernant cette opération, réorganisation en préparation depuis un certain temps, le Secrétaire général annonce que l'Ambassadeur Dayal, sur sa propre demande, reprend maintenant ses fonctions de Haut-Commissaire de l'Inde au Pakistan. Répondant à une demande immédiate du Secrétaire général, le Premier Ministre de l'Inde a bien voulu dans des délais très brefs, en août 1960, libérer M. Dayal, pour une période limitée, de ses fonctions de Haut-Commissaire de l'Inde au Pakistan. M. Dayal a accepté la mission de Représentant spécial au Congo étant entendu que la durée de celle-ci serait déterminée par la mesure dans laquelle il pourrait s'absenter de son poste permanent et par le besoin que l'on aurait de ses services au Congo. Lors de sa visite à Leopoldville au début de janvier 1961, le Secrétaire général a demandé à M. Dayal d'accepter de poursuivre ses fonctions de Représentant spécial jusqu'à ce que les progrès réalisés dans l'Opération des Nations Unies au Congo indiquent qu'il est opportun de prendre de nouvelles dispositions administratives. A la lumière des développements récents, M. Dayal, référant à l'engagement initial qu'il avait pris en août 1960 et à l'entretien qu'il a eu avec le Secrétaire général en janvier dernier, a maintenant demandé à être libéré de sa mission au service de l'Organisation des Nations Unies afin de reprendre ses fonctions auprès de son gouvernement.

Dans ces conditions, le Secrétaire général a dû accepter, à regret, d'accéder à la demande de M. Dayal. Ce faisant, il saisit cette occasion afin d'exprimer toute sa gratitude à M. Dayal pour les services qu'il a accomplis, tant au Congo qu'au siège de l'Organisation. Dans la tâche qu'il a réalisée pour l'Organisation des Nations Unies en tant que Représentant spécial, M. Dayal a fait preuve des qualités et du niveau d'accomplissement les plus élevés, égalés seulement par sa loyauté aux buts des Nations Unies et par son intégrité inaltérable. Une déclaration sera faite ultérieurement en ce qui concerne les dispositions administratives qui seront désormais en vigueur au Congo. Les fonctions primordiales du Représentant spécial au Congo sont en train de passer du domaine essentiellement diplomatique au domaine administratif, le principal besoin actuel ayant trait à la coordination, du côté de l'Organisation des Nations Unies, de ses activités croissantes concernant l'assistance au Congo. Cette coordination doit se faire dans une large mesure au siège de l'Organisation à New York. En attendant qu'interviennent les changements que l'on se propose d'apporter aux dispositions administratives, aucun nouveau Représentant spécial ne sera nommé et les activités au Congo seront coordonnées par le plus ancien fonctionnaire de l'Organisation à Leopoldville qui assurera la Direction des services. "

INCOMING CLEAR CABLEETAT PRIORITE

ONUC

LEOPOLDVILLE

3700 Most immediate Linner will release news re Dayal with special communiqué at 2 pm NewYork time today. English text follows : Following consultations at Headquarters regarding the Congo operation and in particular a reorganization of the administrative arrangements for this operation which has been in planning for some time, the Secretary-General announces that Ambassador Dayal, at his own request, is now returning to his office as India's High Commissioner to Pakistan. Responding to an immediate request from the Secretary-General, the Prime Minister of India kindly agreed at very short notice in August 1960 to release Mr. Dayal for a limited period from his duties as High Commissioner of India to Pakistan. Mr. Dayal accepted the assignment as Special Representative in the Congo on the understanding that its duration would be determined in the light of the extent of his ability to remain away from his regular post and of the need for his service in the Congo. In the course of the Secretary-General's visit to Leopoldville early in January of this year, he asked Mr. Dayal to agree to continue as Special Representative until progress in the UN Operation in the Congo would indicate the advisability of other administrative arrangements. In view of recent developments, Mr. Dayal, referring to his initial undertaking of August 1960, and to his discussion with the Secretary-General last January, has now asked to be relieved from UN service in order to return to his duties in his government's service.

In the circumstances, the Secretary-General to his regret, has found it necessary to accede to the request of Mr. Dayal. In so doing, he takes the occasion to express his full gratitude to Mr. Dayal for his services, both in the Congo and at Headquarters. Mr. Dayal's work for the UN as Special Representative, has been marked by the highest ability and level of performance, equalled by his loyalty to the purposes of the UN and his unfailing integrity.

An announcement will be made later concerning the administrative arrangements in the Congo to prevail henceforth. The emphasis in the tasks for the Special Representative there is now shifting from being principally in the diplomatic field to the administrative field, the main need now being for coordination on the UN side of its growing activities in the assistance field to the Congo. This coordination has to be largely undertaken at UN Headquarters in New York. Pending the intended changes in the administrative arrangements, no new Special Representative will be appointed and activities in the Congo will be coordinated by the Senior UN official in Leopoldville, as Officer in Charge. As soon as translation ready, we shall send it. SECGEN.

INCOMING CODE

To : LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : MACFARQUHAR, NEWYORK

Date : 25 May 1961

No : 3695

Continuation of 3692.

Conscient de la nécessité de mettre rapidement en vigueur un programme de redressement financier et de relance économique, j'ai invité Monsieur le Secrétaire général de l'ONU à nous envoyer une petite équipe d'experts pour mettre au point -- en collaboration avec le Gouvernement -- les modalités de l'aide qui est envisagée. Cette mission arrivera à Léopoldville dans quelques jours et je désignerai bientôt un Comité ministériel restreint à cet effet.

L'aide qui nous est accordée devra contribuer à résorber le déficit budgétaire de l'Etat et aussi à la lutte contre le chômage. La partie en devises étrangères nous permettra de financer les importations essentielles dont notre économie a tant besoin.

Mes chers compatriotes, cette aide importante dont le principe a été reconnu grâce aux négociations du Gouverneur Ndele à l'ONU, doit nous permettre de mettre de l'ordre dans nos finances et de relancer notre économie. Toutefois, nous devons savoir que c'est à nous, Congolais d'abord, qu'il appartient de faire les efforts et les sacrifices nécessaires pour développer notre immense, riche et beau pays. C'est pourquoi dans les prochains jours, le Gouvernement mettra au point un programme de réorganisation des finances publiques et une série de mesures propres à déclencher et à favoriser une relance économique dont l'aboutissement -- je n'en doute pas -- sera : le bonheur et la prospérité de tous les citoyens du Congo.'

Secundo Déclaration du Secrétaire général

'Sur instructions du Secrétaire général, des experts de l'Organisation des Nations Unies ont examiné avec M. Albert Ndele, Gouverneur de la Banque Centrale, la situation financière du Congo. Cet examen de la situation a démontré la nécessité d'une aide immédiate. Aux fins de déterminer la portée de cette aide, on a demandé aux autorités congolaises de préparer immédiatement une estimation des besoins budgétaires pour une période de 90 jours à partir du 1er juin; on leur a également demandé une estimation des importations indispensables. Des experts du Fonds Monétaire International se rendront incessamment à Léopoldville pour aider les autorités congolaises à établir la liste des importations.

Une mission sera désignée, dans les jours qui viennent, pour se rendre au Congo afin de définir la portée et le caractère de l'aide que les Nations Unies seront appelées à fournir.

Cette mission se rendra à Léopoldville, sur l'invitation du Président de la République du Congo, dans le but d'aider à définir les principes d'une politique fiscale ainsi qu'un programme d'importation susceptibles de permettre aux autorités congolaises d'obtenir le maximum d'efficacité dans l'utilisation de ces fonds.

Des avances de fonds peuvent être entre-temps concédés au Conseil Monétaire de la République du Congo en cas de besoin urgent et clairement démontré.' "

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

To : Mr. Linner, Gen. Mac Eoin *L*
From : Secretary-General
Date : 25 May 1961
No. : 3694

Gen. Ritchie informant 810

Reur A-1301.

Proposals being studied here and comments will be forthcoming after further thought. Pending this, no approaches should be made at Coq, Stanleyville or Eville. Endit.-

Dist.: Gen. Mac Eoin.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

To : Mr. Linner
From : Secretary-General, New York
Date : 25 May 1961
No. : 3693

Please inform President Kasavubu that in response to his request of 12 May for a small highly qualified team to assess the economic and financial situation and to make recommendations for assistance, I have nominated Philippe de Seynes for this task.

Mr. de Seynes will be assisted by Dr. Umbricht. I look forward to a useful cooperation with the President in the interest of the Congolese people.

This message can be relayed any time after the President has made the statement mentioned in our cables 3692-3695. De Seynes arrives Leopoldville Sunday morning 0515 hours flight SN 529. Umbricht's arrangements will be cabled later. Please advise President and arrange reception and accommodation.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. S. Linner

PRIORITY

From : Mr. Macfarquhar, New York

Date : 25 May 1961

No. : 3692

Financial and economic situation your CUNCO 238.

Primo. Request to bank forwarded. Shall keep you advised whether Belgians are persuaded to join in matter vide my COCA 161.

Secundo. Reference request to SECGEN Ndele would like President to make statement this week. If President does so, SECGEN would issue simultaneous statement. These are timed provisionally for release Friday 1800 hours Leo time, midday New York time. We would require confirmation of arrangement by Thursday evening, failing which we suggest timing 24 hours later.

Tertio. Here is Ndele's message to Frasca with drafts of both statements.

(French text separate).

"Veuillez transmettre au Président Kasa-Vubu le texte suivant.

Gouverneur Ndele vous suggère allocution radiodiffusée vendredi à 18 heures, heure de Léopoldville, convenue avec ONU pour publication à New York. Cette allocution déposée ici sera publiée textuellement si vous êtes d'accord. Le Secrétaire général a l'intention de faire simultanément une déclaration dont le texte suit.

Primo Allocution suggérée pour Président Kasa-Vubu

'Mes chers compatriotes,

Je voudrais solliciter votre attention aujourd'hui pour vous entretenir de la situation économique et financière de la République et de son avenir. Que les finances de l'Etat soient mauvaises, vous le savez depuis longtemps. Que la vie économique soit aujourd'hui à un niveau inférieur à celui d'avant

le 30 juin, vous le savez aussi. Mais peut-être savez-vous moins ce qu'il faudrait faire pour redresser la situation actuelle.

En dépit de la "virulence" de la crise politique, le Gouvernement et moi-même sommes restés fort attentifs à la recherche d'une solution adéquate à la crise économique et financière du pays; de cette crise qui a privé nombre de nos compatriotes de leurs moyens de subsistance; de cette crise dont les experts, tant nationaux qu'internationaux, ont souligné la gravité.

Mes chers compatriotes, je viens vous annoncer enfin, aujourd'hui, un début de solution à nos difficultés financières et économiques. Il y a environ un mois, devant la dégradation progressive des finances de l'Etat et l'asphyxie graduelle de l'économie congolaise, j'ai chargé le Gouverneur de la Banque Nationale, Monsieur Ndele, d'une mission auprès des Nations Unies, afin de rechercher ensemble avec les experts de l'ONU une solution urgente. Il y a quelques jours, le Premier Ministre et moi-même avons été informés que ces discussions ont fait ressortir un accord sur certaines mesures immédiates.

Continues in 3695.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

ROUTINE

To : Mr. Linner *fl*
From : SECGEN, New York
Date : 25 May 1961
No. : Unnumbered

Reur 1294 to 1297.

Congratulations to clean and good operation. Your report much appreciated and certainly not too long when you shed so much light on essential elements in our position. ENDIT.-

cc : Mr. Linner only.-