

MIR

FINAL REPORTS OF SECTORS

8 JUNE 1995 - [28 FEB 1996]

AND HANDING/TAKING OVER CERTIFICATES

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DRAFT

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FROM : CMO

FILE : MILOB/OPS/45

TO : COS

INFO : MA to A/FC
ADCOS (OPS)

DATE : FEB 96

SUBJECT: END OF MISSION REPORT (09 DEC TO 08 MAR 96)

Refs:

- a. MILOB GP HQ OPS/1122.23 dated 28 Nov 95.
- b. Your letter on mn subject dated 23 Feb 96.

GENERAL

1. The End of Mission Report covering the 3rd Mandate (09 Jun 95 to 08 Dec 96) was submitted vide reference A. This report is for the current Mandate, covering the period, 09 Dec 95 to 08 Mar 96.

AIM

2. The aim of this report is to highlight MILOBS operations during the current Mandate.

SCOPE

3. The following will be covered:
 - a. Security Situation in Rwanda.
 - b. Humanitarian Situation.
 - c. Repatriation of Refugees.
 - d. Reconciliation Process.
 - e. MILOBS' operation in current Mandate.
 - f. Conclusion.

SECURITY SITUATION IN RWANDA

4. The overall security situation in RWANDA, particularly in Central and Eastern parts, remained calm and well under the control of the RPA. On the whole, there was a lull in insurgent activities by the FRGF in Rwanda from the end of Nov to mid Dec 95. This was in contrast to the

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situation prevailing in Oct / Nov 95. The Iswawa Island episode in Nov 95 seriously demoralized the FRGF rank and file operating in Rwanda. This possibly accounted for this lull. Insurgent activities however picked up again in the second week of Dec in the Western part of the country, notably in the Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and Cyangugu prefectures. This trend saw a steady increase through Jan and Feb 96. A number of sabotage activities have been carried out. These took the form of planting of land mines, blowing up of bridges, electricity pylons as well as water supply lines. The number of armed robberies and killings have also been on the increase. Most of these activities have been traced to the FRGF.

5. A number of encounters have been reported between the RPA patrols and FRGF, in which the RPA suffered a lot of casualties. Banditry activities have increased in some prefectures (notably, GITARAMA, KIBUYE, GIKONGORO and BUTARE). Livestock and other valuables are forcefully taken from locals. They are manhandled or sometimes killed if they had nothing to offer.

6. Arbitral arrests by RPA continue unabated.

7. **Assessment.** It is assessed that, insurgent activities will continue in future with renewed vigor and are likely to spread to Central and Eastern Rwanda.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

8. There has been an improvement in the humanitarian situation during the period. Most of the local officials have been seen to be assisting people, particularly, returnees. The local authorities have been helping returnees to get back their land and houses. They have on the whole, been fairly treated, even though some of them are arrested on arrival.

9. The effect of the expulsion of 38 NGOs from Rwanda is seriously being felt all over the country. The most badly affected sector is the Medical Service. There is an obvious shortage of drugs and medical equipments as well as medical/para-medical staff, leading to a decline in health care in the rural areas .

REPATRIATION OF RETURNEES

10. Despite concerted efforts by all concerned, the repatriation of refugees remained at a rather low key. Returnee figures recorded during the period stands as follows:

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Month/Year	No of Returnees	Remarks	
(a)	(b)	(c)	
Dec 95	13,583		
Jan 96	13,264		
Feb 96	25,498	Figures up to 22 Feb	
Total	52,345		

These low figures were recorded, despite the fact that UNHCR expected a massive repatriation in Dec 95 / Jan 96. The noticeable increase in returnee figures in Feb is primarily due to the fact that, the refugees are constantly being caught up in the violence between the Burundian Army and the Hutu Militia, operating in the northern Province of Burundi. Despite this increase, there are over 1.6 million refugees still living outside Rwanda. The possible reason for large numbers still living outside is, either they are too apprehensive of the security situation in Rwanda or they are quite comfortable in their camps and have no desire of coming back to face the hardships and intimidation in their home communes.

11. Zaire is reported to have deployed additional troops in some camps (KIBUMBA in GOMA and KASUSA and NYANGAZI in BUKAVU) to expedite repatriation. The repatriation however has so far not been forced.

12. **Comments.**

- a. This exercise seems to have failed to achieve the desired goal, since there was hardly any increase in repatriation from these camps.
- b. Repatriation is not likely to increase dramatically in the near future, unless repatriation is forced.

RECONCILIATION PROCESS

13. Although on the surface, it appears that there has been some improvement in the reconciliation process, the hatred between the ethnic groups seems to be too much deeply rooted.

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The memory of the genocide is still too fresh in their minds. Political leaders and high ranking officials have been seen making some attempt at reconciliation but they need to do more at the grassroots level to achieve tangible results.

MILOBS OPERATIONS IN THE CURRENT MANDATE

14. The strength of MILOBS was drastically reduced from 320 to 146 for the period. This necessitated the redemarkation of the hitherto 10 sectors into 5. It greatly hampered the operational capabilities of MILOBS, as there were larger areas of responsibilities for the MILOB sectors with less human resources to cover. Despite the handicap, MILOBS continued to monitor the Refugee/Returnee situation as required by the Mandate.

15. Most of the MILOB Sectors faced the challenge of operating without Formed Troops during the Mandate. This had no adverse impact on their capabilities except that incidents of theft increased on their office premises. A remedial action of hiring civilian night guards was taken.

16. **Achievements.** The frequent visits of MILOBS patrols to the sectors and cellules has been a great source of inspiration to the locals. It among other things gave them a feeling of insulation, to some extent, against RPA excesses. No wonder, a large number of locals and officials have been requesting for continued presence of UNAMIR. Politicians and the RPA however have their own reservations.

17. **Failures.** Even though MILOBS tried as much as they could to monitor the returnee situation as required of them by the mandate, they were unable to effectively monitor issues relating to their resettlement because of manpower problems. It was impossible to cover the crooks and nooks of Rwanda with 146 observers.

CONCLUSION

18. The Western portions of Rwanda have been characterized by infiltrations and insurgent activities since Jan 96. This trend is most likely to continue with renewed vigor and possibly spread to the Central portions of the country in the near future.

19. Even though the UNHCR anticipated a massive repatriation of refugees during Dec and Jan 96, very low figures were recorded. The deployment of Zairian troops at the refugee camps had virtually no effect on the repatriation of refugees. The figures from Zaire are likely to remain low

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unless repatriation is forced.

20. MILOBS worked with a very low strength of 146 during the mandate. Notwithstanding this handicap, they worked tirelessly and won the hearts of most locals and officials. They would have however done better with the right manpower.

CHARLES NELSON
Col
CMO

SD
Send to all Sects
SD
04/03/96.

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04 MAR 96

UNAMIR HQ INFORMATION SUMMARY ON GENERAL SITUATION IN RWANDA
FOR FEB 1996

1. The general situation in Rwanda over the past one month has been relatively stable. However, a series of continuous banditry activities, Clashes between the RPA and the FRGF, sabotage, robberies, mine incidents, and killings took place in the month of Feb 96.

SABOTAGE.

2. The most significant act in the month of February was the sabotage relating to the electricity pylon in Gisenyi. The explosion of the electricity pylon resulted in the killing of approximately 10 people who were present at the scene of the incident. In the same instance the pipeline supplying water to a local brewery was also damaged.

KILLINGS / AMBUSHES

3. Of late, the trend has moved to **Gitarama** where two councilors were killed. The councillor of Meyambe Sector was killed on 25 Feb and the councillor of Muko Commune was murdered alongwith four of his family members on 26 Feb 96.

4. Apart from the assassinations directed against political figures the killings have been random ranging from deaths during armed robberies to innocent killings or shall we say killings without any evident motive.

5. 03 locals were killed, two injured and one kidnapped in the early hours of 26 Feb 96 in Bugarama in **Cyangugu**. This is the second incident where a man has been kidnapped. In Jan 96, an alleged FRGF group had stolen some cattle and kidnapped a man to Burundi.

6. Another incident which has caused a lot of concern especially to the NGOs is the ambush of an NGO vehicle in Bweyeyein **Cyangugu**, on 27 Feb 96.

MINE INCIDENTS

7. During the past one month, four incident of mine explosions were reported. The first and the second were reported on 06 Feb 96, where a woman lost her leg and a man was injured in an incident

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which happened at Kinhira in **Gisenyi** at 0800HRS where the victims were assisting a previous victim of another mine explosion in the same place on the same day.

8. The third was on 20 Feb 96, when an anti tank mine blew off an IRC Mobile Clinic vehicle at about 1000HRS at Rusuyu Sector in **Gisenyi**. nobody was injured but the engine compartment was completely damaged.

9. The last was an incident in **Cyangugu** where a light Daihatsu truck belonging to Cemerwa Cement Factory hit an anti tank mine at about 1100HRS on the road between Karengera and Nyakabuye. Six people were injured .

INFILTRATIONS

10. Although there was no substantial evidence, locals of Cyangugu and Gisenyi have constantly complained of frequent infiltrations by the ex-FAR.

11. The bougermestre of Kibungo in **Cyangugu** Prefecture reported having seen ten armed men in his commune at 2300HRS on 21 Feb 96 heading towards the Nyungwe Forest. The following day RPA soldiers were observed combing the general area.

12. Although there was no substantial evidence, locals of Cyangugu and Gisenyi have constantly complained of frequent infiltrations by the ex-FAR. In **Gitarama**, 07 persons alleged to be infiltrators, were arrested on 20 and 23 Feb 96. Two were arrested around the RPA Bde commander's residence while the rest were arrested near the Sector headquarters in Kabgayi.

13. On 21 Feb a local patrol clashed with a suspected group of infiltrators. In a bag left behind by the alleged infiltrators, two grenades were found.

14. On 29 Feb locals of Gacundura Sector in **Gisenyi** reported the circulation of leaflets. The leaflets asked the Hutus to collaborate and be prepared for the return of the ex-FAR. The authorities suspect presence of infiltrators in the islands of the lake and have subsequently restricted movements on Lake Burela.

ROBBERIES.

15. A number of robberies took place. The figures are not alarming. The broad pattern is

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tabulated below:- (Details are at Appendix attached) :-

<u>COMMUNE</u>	<u>BY</u>	<u>TIME/ DATE</u>	<u>ITEMS STOLEN</u>	<u>INJURIES KILLINGS</u>	<u>ARRESTS</u>
<u>BUTARE</u>	?	1000H 07 FEB	Music System & Household Items	-	Nil
<u>GITARAMA</u>	?	15 FEB	Bicycle, Food Items & Cash (?)	-	Nil
<u>GITARAMA</u>	4 Armed Bandits	18 FEB 2300 H	14000FRW 2 Cases Beer	1 Person Shot Dead	Nil Nil
<u>GITARAMA</u>	?	22 FEB	4000FRW	Woman Beaten	Nil
<u>GISEYNI</u>	5 Armed Men	09,16 & 17 FEB	1,690,000FRW		3 Persons Identified As RPA by victim.
<u>GISEYNI</u>	05 Armed Men	24 FEB	Unspecified Amount of Cash	Man Shot in thigh 04 Others Injured.	Nil
<u>GISEYNI</u>	Some Armed Men	27 FEB	Goods from Shop	Shopkeeper Attacked	Nil
<u>CYANGUGU</u>	Group of armed Men	08 FEB	House-hold Goods	1 Man Killed	Nil

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COMMENT

16. The robberies could be ascribed to actions by the ex-FAR who are operating from nearby refugee camps in Zaire, stealing food items and money for their survival. Combined with this are the other acts of infiltration extortion and killings which are indicators that insurgency (though in the nascent stage) is possibly gaining a foothold in the region in question.

17. On the other hand, is the allegation by the old woman in Gisenyi who has claimed to have recognized three of the five bandits in the armed robbery as RPA soldiers. Another instance is the one on 30 Jan 96 when 08 armed men wearing military uniform forced a guard at Kivumu Health Clinic to knock on the door of an med asst of nutrition dept and the perpetrators who forced their entry were later identified as RPA soldiers by a bourgemestre who refused to go to the RPA camp to identify the culprits for fear of his life.

18. There are chances that some of the lower ranks in the RPA cadre are involved in an odd case. If this be the case, it is imperative that the miscreants be identified and disciplined so that the name of the RPA is not unduly maligned and the Government of Rwanda can continue to instil confidence in the minds of its population.

REFUGEE SITUATION

19. The refugees are said to be very apprehensive of the security situation in Rwanda hence their refusal to come back. To this is added the spate of rumours and intimidations which abound in the camps.

20. An exchange programme of confidence-building in the refugees was initiated during the last week by the UNHCR. On 26 Feb 96, a group of 33 refugees drawn from various camps in Tanzania and accompanied by UNHCR officials, visited their respective communes in Kibungo to study the situation so as to give a true account of the situation to their colleagues on their return to Tanzania. Nine of them touring Kibungo found their houses occupied by other returnees but were assured by their respective buorgermestres that the same would be vacated when they finally returned. Another refugee confidence building team is said to have visited the Prefecture of Gisenyi where, among other places, they were expected to visit Kigali.

21. Despite reports by the Zairian government that it would not allow international aid workers to continue working in Rwandan Refugee camps in Zaire in an effort to persuade the refugees to go back to Rwanda, activities by the UN aid workers were still going on as of 22 Feb 96.

22. On 21 Feb, the government of Zaire announced a package of measures to implement the so

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called "guided repatriation" in which UNHCR and other organizations it funds would not operate in camps sealed off for closure.

23. With the appointment of a new Minister of Interior, Kamanda wa Kamanda, a hardliner, it is likely that there will be more camps being closed down and some more refugees returning in the month of March. But the Rwandan Hutu refugees have warned of possible catastrophic violence in the event of forced repatriation if it is implemented.

COMMENT

24. It is becoming increasingly clear that the voluntary repatriation programme sponsored by the UNHCR is not working. However, visits to their respective prefectures by Refugees from across, are likely to attract a number of refugees to return to Rwanda. Rwanda looks set to receive returnees from refugee camps in neighbouring countries of Tanzania Burundi and Zaire. This is evident by the zeal displayed by the Rwandan Government to reform its judicial system as seen from the dismissal and detention in Kigali Central Prison of the former prosecutor for Kigali, Mr Silas Munyangishali who was initially suspended from duties and confined to his home under armed guards. Mr Munyangishali was charged with complacency during the genocide.

EXHUMING OF MASS GRAVES

25. The UN Tribunal on Rwanda's genocide is expected to start a second round of mass exhumations in July after the completion of work on a first site last month. The Forensic Anthropologists have already worked on grave sites in Kibuye and are likely to start working on grave sites identified in the Central Gitarama Region.

26. The exhumations are aimed at investigations to document violence and provide crucial evidence to facilitate further indictments of genocidaires.

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Appendix

DETAILS OF ROBBERIES IN FEB 96

1. It was reported that at 1000 hrs on 07 Feb, the house of a Human Rights official in Butare was burgled. A music system and some household items were made away with. The perpetrators of the robbery were neither identified nor arrested.
2. In Gisenyi, on 09, 16 and 17 Feb, 05 armed men robbed houses and a shop at different times. From the houses they are said to have stolen 1,690,000 FRW, while all valuables were stolen from the shop. The locals suspected the involvement of the RPA because one old lady recognized three of the five as RPA soldiers.
3. On the night of 15th Feb, bandits raided the sectors of Rugalika and Kinyami in Gitarama and stole a bicycle and food items and an unspecified amount of money. There has been no arrest so far.
4. In Gikoma Sector of Gitarama, 04 armed bandits shot dead one person at about 2300 HRS on 18 Feb 96. The wife of the deceased was severely beaten and robbed of 14,000 FRW and two cases of beer. On the same day, in Musamo Sector, armed bandits attacked a family and demanded money. As money was not forthcoming, they severely beat the members of the family. No arrest was made.
5. In Gitarama, a woman was beaten and robbed of 4,000 FRW on 22 Feb 96 at Ginhira Commune.
6. On 24 Feb in Mutanda commune in Gisenyi, a local was attacked and robbed by 05 armed men. The man was shot on the thigh and four other people were injured in the incident.
7. On 08 Feb 96, a group of gunmen believed to be FRGF went into a man's house to rob him and in the process got him killed. This was in Karengera at Cyangugu.
8. Three FRGF were killed with machettes early on 08 Feb 96. They were reported to have indulged in stealing in the area.
9. On 27 Feb, in Nkumba, Gisenyi, some armed men attacked a shopkeeper and looted his goods.

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TO : A/COS

FILE : MILOB/OPS/54

INFO : A/FC

FROM : CMO

DATE : Mar 96

**SUBJECT : UNAMIR OPERATIONS
LESSONS LEARNT**

Ref :

a. Your Letter dated 04 Mar 96.

GENERAL

1. Even though the points raised in this paper have a greater bias towards MILOBS' efforts within the confines of UNAMIR operations, I have included general points that I feel must be looked into for improvement in future. Noting that the team coming is military, I have confined my inputs to military aspects only.

PERFORMANCE OF UNAMIR

2. UNAMIR has performed extremely well in this country. As can be seen now, the situation is gradually coming back to normal. It is evident that, normal life is slowly returning to RWANDA. The population in the big towns is slowly gaining confidence in the government. Notwithstanding these good signals, tension and fear still exist in the villages, especially those bordering ZAIRE. The HUTU majority population is still apprehensive about total peace and reconciliation. The MILOBS who have had the opportunity to patrol the real remote areas have always reported;

- a. Intimidation and daily execution of people by the RPA.
- b. Increased infiltrations and sabotage activities, despite RPA resolute reprisal actions.
- c. The wish of the locals to have UNAMIR continue its mandate, fearing annihilation by RPA, once UNAMIR withdraws.

LESSONS LEARNT

3. The lessons learnt in the course of execution of MILOBS tasks are inexhaustive. Suffice it to highlight a few important ones. These are listed below, but not in order of priority.

a. The restrictions imposed by the government of RWANDA, by declaring certain areas No-Go-Areas, worked against the achievement of UNAMIR goals. MILOBS patrols, for example, could not enter the AKAGERA National Park and therefore did not know whatever went on there. This should not have been allowed. If MILOBS are the ears and eyes of the Secretary General, then they should be allowed to go to all areas without hindrance. Appreciating the fact that countries have restricted areas, UNAMIR moved into RWANDA when all such infrastructure or areas totally collapsed. Investigations have proved that, this restricted area has actually nothing of any significance. Governments must be made to create enabling environments for the fulfilment of UN mandates.

b. MILOBS must be allowed to operate independently and not under the control of Formed Troops HQ, as happening in the case of UNAMIR and must have their own contracted security agencies. This will give them greater flexibility in the performance of their duties.

take place
c. A lot of activities *take place* in the night without the knowledge of MILOBS. MILOBS need to be authorised to conduct night patrols and be accordingly equipped.

d. Health care of MILOBS is of great concern. The ~~hazardous~~ duties they perform in remote areas call for arrangements for proper medical care. In RWANDA, most areas outside the cities have no organised health facilities. This renders MILOBS to danger in case of emergencies. The spirit of self reliance is well understood but flexibility must be exercised.

e. MILOBS worked in collusion with certain NGOs and certain UN Agencies. Liaison Officers only may not be effective.

f. The strength of MILOBS plays an effective role in the correct, accurate and timely information gathering. The reduction of MILOBS' strength in the last mandate hampered their efforts in this regard. The repatriation exercise which came as a result of this, left larger areas of responsibility for fewer MILOBS. Sporadic killings that needed confirmation were never confirmed because of this factor.

g. Logistical problems were much felt by MILOBS mainly because of lack of vehicles to support them. Individual civilians had personal to holder cars at their disposal, at the expense of MILOBS who were gathering information in the field for use by the UN. This point further strengthens independent operations by MILOBS.

h. Co-operation between the MILOBS and government officials and the military was

bad. Whereas co-operation at higher levels was seen to be flourishing, it was very poor at the lower levels. The RWANDESE must be made to understand the roles of the UN and especially UNAMIR. The government, through the media, has not helped the situation. They make it as if UN is to blame for RWANDA's woes. As a result of this, MILOBS were exposed to rebuke and jeers by the ordinary person. Sometimes those who volunteered information are subjected to reprisal action by the RPA and government officials.

I. As much as the sovereignty of a country must be recognised, the UN as a world body must control the situation, once they move into a particular country. The UN should not fall to the dictates of the country in which they are trying to bring peace as we see happen in RWANDA.

j. Human Rights abuses must not be covered but exposed. MILOBS were privileged to patrol far and near and listened to the young and old, local authorities and peasant alike and gave accurate reports. These reports are sometimes so much reframed in very diplomatic language that they lose their essence and are sometimes omitted altogether. This does not help bring out the true situation in the country.

k. It has become very clear to MILOBS that, no amount of force will make the refugees return. What they need is confidence in the ruling government and an impartial and effective judicial system, which does not exist in RWANDA.

l. The government and people of RWANDA became skeptical and fed up with UNAMIR at a stage because of the very large number of armed troops, staff officers and UNAMIR civilian staff that mill around KIGALI, administering just a handful of operations in the field. They see them as just riding in big cars and enjoying themselves at the expense of the RWANDESE, and doing nothing else. In fact government officials and the ordinary people alike, feel that all UN facilities in RWANDA belong to RWANDESE. They therefore see UNAMIR as being in their way and want them out as early as possible.

CONCLUSION

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TO: UNAMIR OPS
INFO: COS
FROM: MILOB GP HQ

FILE: OPS/1122.23

DATE: 28 NOV 95

SUBJECT : END OF MISSION REPORT

GENERAL

1. Since the inception of UNAMIR on 05 Oct 93, Military Observers, as part of the force, have played a crucial role in assisting in the peace process in Rwanda. Initially, the observers' primary job was that of monitoring the cease fire, particularly the 19-km wide Demilitarized Zone created in the northern part of the country to separate the warring factions.
2. After the war had broken out in April 94, Milobs became predominantly useful when the force was reduced from 2,517 to just under 500. They were deployed to cover the whole country and southern part of Uganda bordering Rwanda.
3. Today, Milobs continue to monitor the security situation and provide certain amount of humanitarian assistance to the needy. It is therefore important to review Milobs activities at this crucial time of an anticipated pull out of UNAMIR from Rwanda.

AIM

4. To highlight Milobs operations in Rwanda.

SCOPE

5. This paper covers the following:
 - a. Milob Operations.
 - b. Humanitarian Activities.
 - c. UN Agencies / NGO cooperation.
 - d. Local Authorities / Military cooperation.
 - e. Achievements.
 - f. Limitations.
 - g. Conclusion.

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MILOB OPERATIONS

6. Milobs carry out diverse operations in ten (10) sectors, each representing a Prefecture in Rwanda. These include patrolling, escorting, visiting communes and investigation.

7. **Patrolling.** Milobs conduct daily patrols to most of the communes by foot, road and air. It is estimated that Milob patrols cover more than half of the country everyday. These patrols are essential for observing, dominating, enquiring and assessing the prevailing security situations in the communes. It is also a tool for confirming, verifying and supervising an incident, agreement or violation. The general situation of the communes are best assessed through these patrols. There was the need for Milobs to show UN presence in the hinterland to instil confidence in the local populace. Monitoring of refugees was carried out on daily basis by Milobs in conjunction with UNHCR officials at all entry points and Refugee/Transit Camps.

8. **Escorts.** Milobs provide unarmed escorts to VIPs, NGOs and IDPs being transported to their communes, as occurred during Operations Hope and Retour. It is interesting to note that some representatives of Human Rights and NGOs often insist on Milobs accompanying them to the communes for their duties.

9. **Visits to the Communes.** Milobs do visit various communes in their areas of responsibility to enquire about commune problems, take commune details and assess the living conditions of the local population. They check availability of food and water in the communes. The number and conditions of orphans in the communes are normally reported upon so that sympathizing NGOs can assist them. Milobs do check on the conditions of prisoners, human rights violations and the judiciary system available in the communes. They also assess the security situation in the communes and report on cases of banditry, arrests and killings carried out by RPA or any faction. They undertook information collection tasks assigned them by the SRSG and UNAMIR Ops from time to time.

10. **Investigations.** As the eyes and ears of the FC, Milobs obtained information on the movements and actions of FRGF/Iterhamwe as well as RPA. Sources of information were mainly the communal authorities, local population, NGOs, UN Agencies and at times, the RPA themselves. In many instances such as acts of sabotage, killings and ambushes Milobs carried out joint investigations with UNCIVPOLs.

HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITIES

11. Milobs monitored the humanitarian situation in their respective communes. Each sector has a Humanitarian Officer who works in close liaison with HAC, Human Rights Monitors and NGOs. Weekly visits are made to some schools, hospitals, health centres and orphanages to assess their requirements for onward transmission to the appropriate NGOs for assistance.

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Milobs have physically assisted in distribution of drugs to some commune health centres, conveyed farming implements, seedlings, fertilizer and food items to the required areas. Humanitarian assistance to the population was generally a success.

COOPERATION WITH UN AGENCIES/NGOS

12. Milobs maintained close working relations with UN Agencies and NGOs. they enjoyed a very good rapport and participated fully in the activities of the agencies. Interactions with the agencies have helped Milobs to gather certain valuable information which formed the basis of most patrols conducted. Information gathered by Milobs on the state of refugee camps across the borders were mainly received from these agencies. More often than not, weekly security meetings are held with these agencies in the sectors to update them and thereafter, coordinate their activities.

COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES/MILITARY

13. Our relationship with the local authorities and RPA could not be said to be the best. This was mainly due to the attitudes and policies of the authorities. Some local authorities even issued orders that people who communicated with Milobs would be punished, preventing Milobs of having free access to information and observation. The situation where a Milobs heli-patrol was prevented from performing its normal duties in the Kibuye Prefecture is a clear case in point. It can be said, however that the authorities only cooperate when they need assistance from Milobs.

ACHIEVEMENTS

14. Milobs tried to fulfil the requirements of UNAMIR HQ within the framework of the mandate. Their achievements, among others are:

- a. Successfully monitored and reported human rights violations within prisons and camps. The reported maltreatment in commune cachots as well as the mass killings in the Kibeho Camp and the Kanania massacre are good examples. This function helped the weak to have justice administered to them.
- b. Gained the confidence of the locals through constant patrolling of the rural areas. No wonder the locals volunteered information even when they had been warned against such an act. The presence of Milobs in the communes is seen as a security against likely RPA hostilities. For that reason, when rumours of UNAMIR withdrawal spread, there was a significant sense of insecurity amongst the locals.

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- c. Established good working relations with all NGOs and UN Agencies to the extent that they responded to requests for various requirements of the communes without hesitation. The UN Agencies and NGOs consider Milobs as elements of protection. With the anticipated withdrawal of UNAMIR, they seem worried about their future in Rwanda.
- d. Notwithstanding the limited resources, Milobs provided transport assistance to convey the sick, farming implements, seedlings, textbooks, ration and other items to the communes in aid of the local authorities and RPA. They also obtained body bags, plastic sheeting, rubber gloves and chemicals for reburial programmes.
- e. Milobs supported Operations Hope, Retour and all the events surrounding the Kibeho incident. Milobs provided unarmed escorts for IDPs to their home communes and continued to visit them to ascertain their conditions of resettlement.

LIMITATIONS

15. The achievements of the Milobs did not come easy. They were confronted with certain limitations which are mainly:

- a. The extremely bad roads and difficult terrain posed as a serious challenge to Milobs patrols. These roads deteriorate fast during the rainy seasons, as a result, Milobs are unable to physically reach certain areas by road.
- b. Milobs are also limited in their operational capabilities due to depleted vehicle resources. The current fleet of vehicles are very old and cannot withstand the rigours of long patrols. The vehicles often breakdown yet there are no effective spare parts backing.
- c. Though the current mandate was to provide humanitarian assistance to the locals, Milobs in particular and UNAMIR in general, had inadequate resources to fulfil the requirements of the local authorities.
- d. More often than not, there is lack of cooperation between Milobs and the local authorities. The authorities tend to hold back essential information from the Milobs. In certain communes, RPA intimidate the locals and demand that they avoid any contact with Milobs. Information gathering as a result, becomes difficult.

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CONCLUSION

16. Milobs have had a relative success in influencing the situation in Rwanda. They have actually contributed to the confidence building of the locals. Milob patrols visit, escort and provide the necessary information to the appropriate agencies to give meaning to the new mandate.

17. However, Milobs have their limitations in the execution of their tasks. Extremely bad roads, old vehicles and denial of information coupled with local authorities' hostilities at times, made the Milob mission a trying one.

(Signature)
MD AHSANULLAH
Lt - Col
SOO

UN CONFIDENTIAL

TO : CMO

FILE :MILOB/OPS 56

FROM : SOO

DATE : Mar 96

SUBJECT : ASSESSMENT OF MISSION

Ref:

a. MILOB/OPS/53 dated)! Mar 96.

GENERAL

1 I arrived in the mission area in mid September 1995 and was appointment Sector Commander of Sector 5 (KIBUYE) in mid October. I was appointed SOO in January 1996 during the downsizing exercise and have held on to that appointment till date. I will endeavour to asses the mission, as I saw it during my tour of duty.

2. The period of my stay in KIBUYE as Sector Commander was very difficult and challenging. I was blatantly exposed to the hostility of the local population to UN personnel who in essence had come to stabilise the post genocide situation in RWANDA. Lessons learnt from the locals' attitude and from the MILOBS' point of view, are numerous and varied from area to area. These are enumerated below. They may not necessarily be common to all other areas;

a. MILOBS are capable of effectively performing their duties without formed troops. The good will of government necessitates this possibility. This fact augments the need for the MILOBS to be independent of the force. During the period, duplication of efforts was evident, as the CMO was subjected to the Force Headquarters. This made it impossible to advance the point that the mission can effectively survive as a MILOB mission.

b. Because the MILOBS are physically in the field, gathering information, it was not generally proper to pass their requirements to those not mandated to gather information in the field. There should have been an organic component to specifically deal with

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MILOBS problems. This is evidenced by the fact that, whenever MILOBS reported an incident, a blown bridge for example, it took time for the Force HQ to attend to the problem.

c. The above point (b) brings me to the Mandate content vis-a-vis its implementation. A UN Mandate needs not be ambiguous. The last UNAMIR mandate (09 Dec to 08 Mar) for instance, was silent on MILOBS reporting on the security situation. The MILOBS found themselves in a quandary because, they, as military personnel found it difficult to ignore the security situation in the country which affect their own security as well as those of UN property, just because the mandate was silent on it. The government through the RPA, rightly tried to prevent MILOBS from probing to know about security violations because it was outside their mandated responsibility.

d. The RWASDESE expectations of the UN were clearly out of proportion. This gave a lot of problems to the MILOBS. They acquired the extra responsibility of explaining to the people that, it was not their duty to provide but to pass on their plight to the organisations concerned, through the higher headquarters. This alienated the locals from the MILOBS. This expectation was unfortunately held by government officials as well. They feel that the UN should pay back to RWANDA as if the former is to blame for the calamity that befell their country.

e. The UN expected MILOBS to supply it with accurate information on the situation in RWANDA. In the attempt to do so, MILOBS reported the imposition of restrictions on certain areas. This seems not to have been followed up. This essentially means that, certain things went on and are still going on which cannot be authenticated by MILOBS, on the grounds that, each country has restricted areas. Reliable MILOBS' sources however indicate that, nothing of security interest existed in such areas but they merely want to stall MILOBS reporting on certain weird activities that went on in those areas.

f. The administration of MILOBS by the Force HQ was good. However, the fact that MILOBS have completely different terms of reference strengthens the argument of their independence. Observations have been raised on the administration from the Force Coordinating teams in NAIROBI. The team comprises of MILOBS but the Force Welfare Officer controls them. Proper terms of references should have been made so that the office falls directly under the SMPO, through the CAO. Alternatively, all the cells concerned could have had representatives at such an office.

g. Logistically, the MILOBS, to a great extent, were not adequately equipped

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to cover their area of responsibility effectively. This is a sad point, as the UN solely depends on MILOBS to supply them with adequate information. There is the need to specifically allot vehicles to the MILOBS effort.

h. The current mandate (09 Dec to 08 Mar) placed a lot of emphasis on the monitoring of the refugee situation, as against provision of security. The draw down plan for the mandate however cut down drastically on the strength of MIOLBS, leaving a sizeable strength of formed troops behind. This also drew a lot of formed troops to KIGALI to add to an already disproportionately large military and civilian staff. This, in a way alienated UNAMIR from the populace because they saw the large number of UN personnel as just milling round KIGALI and doing nothing. MILOBS whose task was to monitor the return of refugees from the crossing points should have maintained their strength.

CONCLUSION

3. The points to effectively assess the mission are inexhaustive. The ones tabulated are the commonest and most noticeable from my point of view, first as a Sector Commander and then as a Senior Operations Officer.

RECOMMENDATIONS

4. It is recommended that:

- a. MILOBS must operate independently, with the CMO directly answerable to the SRSG, in order to be more effective
- b. UN mandates must specify clearly, the complete roles of MILOBS.
- c. The UN must endeavor to implore governments concerned to educate their population, through their national media, on the actual reasons for UN presence in their country, in order to curtail ridicule from both government officials and locals.

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- d. The UN must not let a country dictate terms when a decision to move into a country has been made. The decision to move in itself is enough to warrant total control of that country until the Security council is satisfied that the situation has normalised.
- e. Enough vehicles has to be put at the disposal of MILOBS in order to enable them cover their area of responsibility effectively.

WM CHOMBA
Lt Col
SOO

UN CONFIDENTIAL

TO : CMO

FILE : MILOB/OPS 56

FROM : SOO

DATE : 06 Mar 96

SUBJECT : ASSESSMENT OF MISSION

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to cover their area of responsibility effectively. This is a sad point, as the UN solely depends on MILOBS to supply them with adequate information. There is the need to specifically allot vehicles to the MILOBS effort.

h. The current mandate (09 Dec to 08 Mar) placed a lot of emphasis on the monitoring of the refugee situation, as against provision of security. The draw down plan for the mandate however cut down drastically on the strength of MILOBS, leaving a sizeable strength of formed troops behind. This also drew a lot of formed troops to KIGALI to add to an already disproportionately large military and civilian staff. This, in a way alienated UNAMIR from the populace because they saw the large number of UN personnel as just milling round KIGALI and doing nothing. MILOBS whose task was to monitor the return of refugees from the crossing points should have maintained their strength.

CONCLUSION

3. The points to effectively assess the mission are innumerable. The ones tabulated are the commonest and most noticeable from my point of view, first as a Sector Commander and then as a Senior Operations Officer.


RECOMMENDATIONS

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- d. The UN must not let a country dictate terms when a decision to move into a country has been made. The decision to move in itself is enough to warrant total control of that country until the Security council is satisfied that the situation has normalised.
- e. Enough vehicles has to be put at the disposal of MILOBS in order to enable them cover their area of responsibility effectively.

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of a large, stylized 'S' or 'C' shape with a horizontal line crossing through it.

WM CHOMBA
Lt Col
SOO

UN CONFIDENTIAL

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To: Milobs GP HQ

Date: 6 Mar 96

From: HQ Milobs Sector 1

File: Ops/03

FINAL REPORT

Reference:

A. Milobs/Ops/43 dated Feb 96.

1. Attached is above mentioned report in respect of Sector 1 for your retention and necessary action.
2. Please acknowledge receipt.

GA BIAH Maj
GA BIAH
Maj
Ops Offr
for Sect Comd

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FINAL REPORT COVERING PERIOD 01 JANUARY 96 TO 08 MARCH 96

SECTOR 1 (KIBUNGO)

Reference :

A. MILOB/OPS/43 DATED 22 FEB 96.

General

1. This report covers the operations of MILOBS in reorganized/amalgamated Sector 1 from Jan 95 to 08 Mar 96.

Deployment during Various Mandates.

2. Present day Sector 1 is the largest Sector covering about half the geographical landmass of Rwanda. It came into existence with effect from 15 Dec 95 as a result of amalgamation of three Sectors which hitherto existed as independent entities. Details of these three Sectors were as follows:

Ser No	Sect	Prefecture	No of Com-munes	HQ Location	Establish ed Str	Posted Str	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)
1.	1A	Kigali	17	Kigali			
2.	2A	Byumba	17	Byumba	36	25	
3.	2B	Kibungo	11	Kibungo	28	22	

3. The creation of the Sector was part of a general reorganization of MILOBS operation in Dec 95. This was necessitated by the mandate of Dec 95 which not only reduced logistics but also drastically downscaled MILOBS strength from an all time high of 320 to just 140.

4.
 - a. Prior to the creation of Sector 1, there was co located with Sector 2 B a Ghana battalion. This was reduced to a company in the wake of the general troop reduction in the last mandate. The company has however since 26 Jan 96 been redeployed in Kigali.
 - b. Former Sector 2 A on the other hand had no formed troops in their AOR immediately before becoming part of current Sector 1. However at the inception of the operation in 1994, a Bangladesh battalion was deployed alongside MILOBS. This was succeeded by a Nigerian battalion which was subsequently redeployed to Gisenyi in Jun 95.
 - c. Sector 1 A has since the beginning of the operation and before joining up as part of Sector 1, always had formed troops in location. These have at one time or the other, been troops from Belgium, Bangla Desh, India and subunits from Ghanbatt. Sector 1A AOR has also ever been the location of the Force HQ and logistics units.

Historical Background of Sector 1

5. The geographical location of Sector 1 coupled with its majority Tutsi makeup, has had a significant contribution to the situation in Rwanda at various times. Its position, bordering three countries, Uganda to the North, Tanzania to the East and Burundi to the South gave its Tutsi majority easy access to safe havens in these countries especially Uganda during the ethnic clashes of 1959. Again it was through the Uganda approach that the Rwandese Patriotic Front now the Rwandese Patriotic Army used to launch the attack that secured for them the reins of government in 1994.
6. Consequently a lot of returning exiled Tutsis are being settled in this Sector. Large concentrations are there in the Akagera National Park to the North East and the Nasho areas of Rusumo Commune to the South East.

Importance of the Prefecture

7. The three prefectures making up sector 1 have certain features/facilities that are of National and International Importance. The most important ones are detailed below.
 - a. Kigali Prefecture.
 - (1) Kigali, the capital of the Prefecture is also the capital of the country and the seat of government.
 - (2) It is essentially a Hutu dominated Prefecture but with the current Tutsi dominated Government much is not being seen of the Hutus, especially in the Capital and other Urban areas.

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(3) Kigali also houses the major International airport of the country at Kanombe and various international agencies and business houses.

(4) The prefecture has one border post at Rutete and one transit camp for returnees at Dihiro.

b. Kibungo Prefecture.

(1) The Kibungo prefecture is dominated by Tutsis, with most of the Bourgemestres being Tutsis.

(2) It has two international roads passing through it. From Kigali, one passes through Kayonza to Kagitumba border post with Uganda and the other to the Rusumo border post on the Tanzanian border.

(3) There is a big hospital at Kibungo manned by Chinese doctors but it is yet to pick up from the adverse effects of the 1994 civil war.

(4) There are two large refugee transit camps at Birenga and Nyakarambi.

(5) There is an RPA Brigade and a Gendarmerie company at Kibungo.

(6) Kibungo prefecture is the leader in the production of bananas.

(7) The Rwanda Communal Training School is located in Gishali in the Muhazi Commune.

c. Byumba Prefecture.

(1) The Byumba Prefecture is Tutsi dominated and is currently receiving a large number of returnees into the Akagera National Park area.

(2) Akagera National park, a major game park is located in the prefecture. The park remains a restricted area for UN troops/MILOBS and other agencies.

(3) There are two major international road links with Uganda through Gatuna and Kagitumba and a less important one through Buziba.

(4) There are two refugee transit camps at Nyagatare and Byumba.

(5) The prefectures have two tea factories at Muhindi (Rushaki Commune) and Kinihira (Cyungo Commune). These factories are being rehabilitated by a European Union Company and is projected to be completed by end of Mar 96.

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- (6) There is also some small scale gold panning in Cyungo commune.

Important Events.

8. a. The visit of the Rwandan Prime Minister, MR Pierre Rwigema, and holding of meetings with Rwandan refugees in Tanzania. He spoke to an audience of 10,000 refugees in Benaco Camp in Tanzania and answered questions on property and security. After that the number of returnees from Tanzania showed a significant rise in the month of Feb 96.
- b. During the fourth meeting of the Tripartite Commission of Rwanda/Burundi/UNHCR, it was decided to have the remaining camps in Burundi progressively closed, starting with Ntamba camp. Around 4,000 Rwandans returned through Rutete border post in this Sector.
- c. There has been a dramatic decongestion in Kibungo Prison as a result of the transfer of over 3,000 prisoners to Nsinda prison in Jan 96.

Returnees.

9. In the period under review 14,914 refugees have returned to Rwanda through entry points in the sector. Details at Annex A.
10. The resettlement of these returnees has been satisfactory. There have been positive signs of reconciliation between the ethnic groups. A deliberate attempt has been made by the local authorities and various agencies to increase the rapprochement despite a few isolated cases.
11. However the resettlements of old case loads in isolated settlements could create ethnic pockets and affect their integration into the mainstream. Some of such pockets are in Nasho area in Rusumo Commune and Akagera national Park in Byumba Prefecture. It is also felt that the process of reconciliation here could be long drawn out as adequate confidence is only built up through coexistence.

Prison and Commune Cachot data.

12. The condition of prisoners in the Sector has improved remarkably with the transfer of 3,000 prisoners from Kibungo and other Byumba prisons to a newly renovated and expanded Nsinda prison in Kibungo Prefecture. This enabled the shifting of prisoners in commune cachots in Byumba and Kibungo prefectures who were living in squalid conditions to be shifted to Kibungo prison. Details of the prison population in the sector is at Annex B.

Achievements and Failures of MILOBS and UNAMIR and Lessons to be drawn

13. **Achievements of MILOBS.** MILOBS have contributed in a great measure to the success of the mission of UNAMIR as also in bringing a degree of normalcy to Rwanda. Some of the Major achievements have been;

- (1) Observing and feeding necessary info on the prevailing situation at the grass root level.
- (2) Providing a platform for all UN agencies and NGOs to share info and project their problems.
- (3) Providing a degree of confidence to the locals by their presence in relatively inaccessible areas.
- (4) Assisting local authorities and NGOs in disbursing of humanitarian aid.
- (5) Acting as anchor and coordinating agency for UN Agencies and NGOs.
- (6) Providing unarmed escorts to UNHCR in the repatriation of refugees especially the forced ones.
- (7) Carrying out joint patrolling with Human Rights in cases requiring joint investigations/sharing of similar info.
- (8) Acting as a deterrent to undesirable elements.

14. **Failures of MILOBS.** Some of the areas where MILOBS failed to exert their presence and thus achieve positive results were :

- a. MILOBS were unable to effectively monitor prisons and the condition of the inmates. Reports of Human Rights personnel were relied upon and independent observations were rarely done. This perhaps could have been improved upon with some coordination at HQ level as no person in authority would like his prisoners interviewed by independent international observers.
- b. The situation in communes were rarely monitored by positive frequent interaction with residents. Liaison was restricted mostly to commune officials and excessive dependence was placed on their version of local events.
- c. MILOBS were unable to investigate allegations and stories independently. For instance the statement given in the international media by the EX-PM regarding maltreatment of Hutus in the current regime was glossed over and MILOBS could not give an honest and independent assessment of the same due to their inability to establish

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themselves as an effective and credible body to which all parties could give their versions without fear or favour. They remained a group that did not earn the full faith of the common man. This perhaps was also due to the fact that personal contact and development of personal relationships over an extended period could not be achieved due to the frequent shifts and redeployment of MILOBS.

d. One of the major role of the United Nations in Rwanda was to instill hope and faith in refugees and motivate them to return. MILOBS, acting as the visible international presence on ground, could still not motivate the refugees to return. Perhaps deployment of MILOBS in these refugee camps across could have led to an improvement in this aspect.

e. The efforts of MILOBS sometimes appeared to be uncoordinated with MILOBS performing monitoring tasks that were the exclusive purview of agencies like UNHCR and Human Rights. This effort could have been better coordinated at the MILOBS HQ level.

f. The MILOBS in Rwanda were unable to function as the independent body that they were supposed to represent. Their activities were always linked to formed troops which must not be so. There is a need to ensure that in the command structure and the concept of operations, the MILOBS are kept distinct as an impartial tool of the SRSB by functioning directly under him.

g. MILOBS were tasked to ascertain humanitarian and reconstruction needs of communes without being given any authority to provide or even promise any sort of aid. This led to many embarrassing situations for MILOBS that degraded their credibility.

h. Lack of communications with UN agencies and even UNHCR led the MILOBS to miss out many valuable pieces of information and avoidable delay in emergency situations.

Future Prospects of Rwanda.

15. Though peace and stability seems to be returning to Rwanda gradually, the process of reconstruction is a long drawn out and painful one. With the majority of refugees still outside Rwanda, it is unlikely that the wounds of ethnic divide will heal early. The confidence building measures adopted by the local government, UNHCR and other international agencies for smooth repatriation of returnees does not seem to have borne fruits. The situation may thus be described as stable but is not normal.

16. As per the prevailing situation, despite the threat of an attack by the FRGF, the present government is likely to continue. The RPA seems to be concentrating on consolidating its power and curbing the activities of the insurgents. To achieve this it is resorting to repression and atrocities on the quiet and is trying to dominate the population/show its presence by screening at check points and carrying out foot patrols. This, besides exhausting its soldiers is also

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alienating the local population. Its aura of patriotic liberation seems to be slowly wearing off. For the RPA to be accepted in the mainstream of National life, it will have to start concentrating on nation building rather than behaving as an occupation army.

17. It is unlikely that the FRGF elements would succeed in their present campaign to unseat the present government. Their campaign is on a rather low scale and is not likely to give them a foothold or a launch pad for further operations. They are thus likely to continue their activities close to the border areas and may increase these into the heartland with the withdrawal of UNAMIR.

18. Having considered the above aspects, it is evident that a stalemate is likely to continue for the next two or three years. A long term degeneration of the RPA may lead to a political and military vacuum which may be exploited by the FRGF. However this looks unlikely in the present context. The ultimate solution on which the future of Rwanda can be pitched would need to be based on a long term reconciliation amongst the warring ethnic groups and a genuine power sharing between them.

Recommendations

19. Future role of the UN. Of late, the essential role of the UN has been reduced to assist and reconstruct Rwanda. But it would be incorrect to mandate that as the only task for the UN in this country. With a majority of refugees still outside Rwanda, the situation can by no stretch of imagination be described as normal. Security of the returnees and of the majority of the vulnerable ethnic group continues to be a cause of concern. Therefore the role of UN should encompass :

- (1) Providing assistance in the reconstruction of Rwanda in economic and material terms.
- (2) Act as a honest broker and as a deterrent so as to infuse a degree of confidence amongst the locals.
- (3) Monitor the security situation on either side of the border which may impede the smooth repatriation of refugees.

20. Suggested strategies for more effective UN Operations. For more effective operations in the future, the following should be considered :

- a. Need for a central UN Coordinating structure at the prefecture or sector HQ level to coordinate the activities of all UN agencies, MILOBS, UNHCR, UNDP, UNICEF and UNHR in a given area. This will ensure better sharing of info and more coordinated planning and execution of UN operations.
- b. Concept of joint patrols of various UN agencies to ensure a cohesive response to


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emergency situations be evolved.

- c. Need to have a single common system of communication between various UN Agencies to so as to allow them to monitor each other's activities and, share information on an as required basis and come to each other's assistance in case of an emergency.
- d. Avoid overloading the military component with humanitarian tasks thereby diluting its role as a deterrent force.

Conclusion.

21. As the mandate of UNAMIR comes to a close, a honest self appraisal reveals that UNAMIR has contributed in large measure towards the establishment of peace and security in Rwanda by its operations in the last two years. People are getting on with their lives and there is a relative state of security. At the same time it must be acknowledged that UNAMIR is looked upon with misgiving by both the ethnic groups. The ruling Tutsi class feel that no positive steps has been taken by The UN to bring the genocide perpetrators to book whereas the Hutu refugees are disappointed with the inability of the UN make them feel assured that a state of adequate security exists for them to return. This feelings makes one realise that lasting peace has not been brought to the region. With 30% of the population sitting across the borders looking yearningly home, the peace as it exists now can at be best described as fragile. History will judge the role of UNAMIR, but if the mission had been able to ensure the safe resettlement of refugees in their homes, all of us could have gone home fully satisfied with hope for the future.



(V S Dadhwal)
Lt Col
Sector Commander

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PRISON AND COMMUNE CACHOT DATA

Annex B
To Final Report
Dated 5 Mar 96

1 PRISON DATA

Srl	Prison	Men	Women	Minors	Total	Infants	Capacity	Date	Remarks
1	BYUMBA	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	NIL	1000	DEC 29	1995
2	KIBUNGO	1395	65	44	1504	13	400	FEB 14	1996
3	KIGALI	9642	370	353	10365	87	2000	DEC 29	1995
4	NSINDA	5007	114	74	5195	25	5000	JAN 01	1996
5	RILIMA	3385	102	53	3540	17	1200	DEC 29	1995
	TOTAL	19429	651	524	20804	142	9800		

2 COMMUNE CACHOT DATA

A KIBUNGO

Srl	Commune	Number	Date	Remark
1	BIRENGA	141	JAN 24	1996
2	KABAROND	10	JAN 30	1996
3	KAYONZA	37	FEB 14	1996
4	KAGARAMA	100	JAN 18	1996
5	MUGESERA	346	FEB 09	1996
6	MUHAZI	278	FEB 15	1996
7	RUKARA	60	JAN 17	1996
8	RUKIRA	86	JAN 31	1996
9	RUSUMO	60	JAN 17	1996
10	RUTONDE	143	JAN 25	1996
11	SAKE	216	FEB 02	1996
	TOTAL	1477		

B. KIGALI. NOT AVAILABLE

C. BYUMBA. NOT AVAILABLE

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RETURNEE STATISTICS BY ENTRY POINT

JAN 95 TO MAR 96

Annex A
To Final Report
Dated 5 Mar 96

Srl	Month	Byumba			Kibungo			Kigali			Sector
	1995	Old	New	Total	Old	New	Total	Old	New	Total	Total
1	JAN	18850	NIL	18850	1511	384	1895	NIL	NIL	NIL	20745
2	FEB	14625	NIL	14625	1318	482	1800	NIL	1070	1070	17495
3	MAR	20964	NIL	20964	629	433	1062	NIL	338	338	22364
4	APR	16652	NIL	16652	1111	63	1174	NIL	NIL	NIL	17826
5	MAY	17513	NIL	17513	35	175	210	NIL	58	58	17781
6	JUN	3376	NIL	3376	36	672	708	NIL	1639	1639	5723
7	JUL	2474	NIL	2474	804	227	1031	NIL	689	689	4194
8	AUG	1860	NIL	1860	226	425	651	NIL	4046	4046	6557
9	SEP	1076	NIL	1076	187	797	984	NIL	3860	3860	5920
10	OCT	1238	77	1315	27	2042	2069	NIL	470	470	3854
11	NOV	617	4	621	56	619	675	NIL	214	214	1510
12	DEC	897	NIL	897	96	166	262	NIL	2746	2746	3905
	TOTAL	100142	81	100223	6036	6485	12521	NIL	15130	15130	127874
	1996										
13	JAN	942	NIL	942	NIL	613	613	NIL	2831	2831	4386
14	FEB	633	NIL	633	NIL	2322	2322	NIL	6524	6524	9479
15	MAR/03	140	NIL	140	NIL	12	12	NIL	23	23	175
	TOTAL	1715	NIL	1715	NIL	2947	2947	NIL	9378	9378	14040
	GRD TOT	101857	81	101938	6036	9432	15468	NIL	24508	25508	141914

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FINAL REPORTMILOBS SECTOR 2GENERAL

1. Sector 2 existed through the various mandates as Sector 3 (Gitarama, Butare and Kibuye), Sector 1B (Gitarama) and with the final mandate, it covered the Gitarama and Kibuye prefectures. Gitarama remained central to the various redeployments, thus information gathering was easier and more accurate than the other prefectures which at one time or the other formed part of the sector. In this report, only the Gitarama and Kibuye prefectures will be covered. Information on Gitarama will be mostly used as the measuring rod for the sector as details are readily available. The situation in Gitarama is not much different from Kibuye and details provided herein can be used to assess the general situation prevailing in the sector.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

2. Gitarama was the centre of HUTU emancipation and still remains a strategic centre of political and social activity in Rwanda. With the catholic diocese in KABGAYI as a key institution, Hutu intellectuals have strong links with the town. The last major battle between the ex-government forces and the RPA was fought in Gitarama. The only significant things about Kibuye are its remoteness and the fact that it suffered one of the worst atrocities committed during the genocide.

a. Gitarama. Gitarama Prefecture is predominantly Hutu. It has 17 communes. Both the Prefect and the RPA Brigade Commander are moderate Hutus. Majority of the Bourgmestres are Hutus, but the communes bordering Kigali Prefecture have Tutsi Bourgmestres who can be considered as hardliners (resulting from the loss of relatives during the genocide). Kabgayi remains the centre of education, but even though Hutus are in high positions, power really rests with a minority of Tutsis strategically placed in the corridors of power. The Prefecture like any other one in Rwanda has no known natural resources. Majority of the locals are peasant farmers, although tea and coffee in addition to bananas, are widely grown. Roads are reasonably good.

b. Kibuye. Kibuye is a very remote Prefecture with almost impassable commune roads. It has 9 communes. The Prefect is a hardliner Tutsi and so are majority of the bourgmestres. The RPA Battalion Commander comes under the 305 Brigade in Gitarama but whether he takes any orders from Gitarama is another story. Lake Kivu and its abundance of fish can be considered as the only natural resource. Tea and coffee

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are also widely grown.

c. Deployment during various Mandates.

The deployment in the sector during the various mandates is as below:

(1) Milobs Sector 3 : 30 MILOBS and one infantry company from MALI and a FRENCH battalion.

(2) Milobs Sector 1B : 24 MILOBS and one Mali Coy (until 8 Dec 95).

(3) Milobs Sector 2: 21 MILOBS and one Ghanaian platoon (ITR KIBUYE until 02 Mar 96).

IMPORTANT EVENTS

3. The sector did not record any significant events. Killings and arbitrary arrests with political undertones were rampant throughout the sector between August and December 1995. From January however, the situation changed with majority of the killings being carried out by armed bandits with no political connections.

4. Returnees. Returnees to the Gitarama prefecture since August 1995 total 2296. Out of this about 3% have been arrested and MILOBS confirmed the killing of 6. MILOBS confirmed majority of the returnees have been reasonably settled in their communes. Some however have found their houses occupied by RPA soldiers and are unable to reclaim them. Figures provided by UNHCR however differ from those who actually get to the communes. What happened to these group of returnees is not known. In the Kibuye prefecture 6800 were reported by officials as having returned. They were unable to say how many have been arrested but it is presumed the situation is not different from Gitarama. The general complaint is lack of food and shelter.

5. Prison/Commune cahots. The Gitarama prison is in fairly good condition. There are currently 6350 inmates including 219 women. The Kibuye prison holds up to 2000 prisoners in very appalling conditions. The most worrying fact is the state of the various commune cachots. Prisoners are crammed into small and poorly ventilated rooms with no space to lie down. Arrests are still continuing in frightening proportions. The frequency of arrests in the Gitarama prefecture between 25 Nov 95 and Mar96 is as shown at Annex A.

ACHIEVEMENTS/FAILURES OF MILOBS AND UNAMIR

6. The achievements of MILOBS cannot be quantified but suffice it to say that they created the necessary interface between the

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RPA and NGOs as well as the local population. MILOBS acted as a check on excessiveness by officials and the RPA. The sight of a UN vehicle in the countryside is a source of hope to the locals. The main problem which confronted MILOBS was language. Interpreters were bad and some MILOBS themselves spoke very little or no English which is the working language of UNAMIR. Information gathering suffered as a result.

7. On the part of UNAMIR, even though the mission rendered significant material assistance to the locals, the name of the mission itself can be described as having outlived its usefulness after the first mandate. An Assistance Mission which has not been equipped to assist can not be described as one. While locals were full of hope that UNAMIR could do everything for them MILOBS had the unpleasant task of explaining that UNAMIR could not meet their aspirations. The mandate was ambiguous as was the name.

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF RWANDA

8. Rwanda is a very backward and underdeveloped country which needs the support of the international community. Throughout the world, countries which tend to rely on their indigenous language are usually inward looking. With a rich countryside and fertile soils, Rwanda has a good future but with the present situation, it will be a while before it can realise its full potential. While some officials are determinedly committed to reconciliation, not much progress is being made at the grassroots where the real problem is. The abrupt manner in which the mission ended will surely put Rwanda in the category of Somalia and Cambodia.

LESSONS LEARNT

9. UNAMIR brought home forcefully the importance of consent in peace keeping. While some countries are committed to world peace, some (the developed ones) are only interested in their personal interests. The ambiguity of the name and the mandate often made the peacekeepers look stupid in the face of the RPA and local officials. The deployment of MILOBS with no English or French background was a big drawback for the mission.

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. The following recommendations are made:


- a. Mandates for future UN missions should be very clear to both the host nation and peacekeepers.
- b. Future missions should have adequate resources to meet their mandate.

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c. Rwandan government officials should be encouraged to extend their efforts at reconciliation to the grassroots.

d. Houses of returnees being illegally occupied should be returned to their legitimate owners.

4 March 1996



CHRIS NUTAKOR
Major
Sector Commander

ANNEX A**STATE OF PRISONERS**
(GITARAMA PREFECTURE)

SER NO	COMMUNE	GR	PRISONERS 25 NOV 85	PRISONERS 6 MAR 96	INCREASE	PERCENTAGE INCREASE
1	BULINGA	6679	72	107	35	49
2	KAYENZI	8389	196	308	112	57
3	KIGOMA	7649	133	231	98	74
4	MASANGO	6254	250	296	46	18
5	MUGINA	9267	225	406	181	80
6	MUKINGI	7160	115	147	32	28
7	MURAMA	6749	301	291	-10	-3
8	MUSAMBIRA	8274	187	265	78	42
9	MUSHUBATI	6970	77	136	59	77
10	NTONGWE	9057	439	467	28	6
11	NYABIKENKE	7292	93	187	94	101
12	NYAKABANDA	6597	55	109	54	98
13	NYAMABUYE	7570	160	269	109	68
14	RUNDA	9882	260	411	151	58
15	RUTOBWE	7781	102	109	7	6
16	TABA	8883	183	421	238	130
17	TAMBWE	7653	164	215	51	31
	TOTAL		3012	4375	1363	45

* GITARAMA PRISON AS AT 18 FEB 96 : 6350 (INCLUDING 219 WOMEN)

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TO: MILOB GP HQ

REF:MILOB/OPS/C18

FROM: MILOB SECTOR 4

DATE: 02 MAR 96

FINAL REPORT - MILOB SECTOR 4**THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF MILOB SECTOR**

1. After 1959 when the Hutus conveniently saw the exist of the Tutsis, economic, governance and other essential interests of Rwanda was taken over by the Hutus. The elites of Cyangugu prefecture legitimized its power by ethnicity forming Hutu parties against the Tutsis. Political parties here did not see much ethnic mix. The Hutus who were about 95% of the pre-war population of about 560,000 saw the Tutsis as conquerors, invaders, outsiders and oppressors. Tutsis have felt marginalised and neglected by the then Government of Rwanda. The perceived ethnic division and its use by the politicians transformed to the pattern of the genocide committed in the prefecture. The number of persons killed in the Prefecture as estimated by Human Rights was 68,000 with 90 per cent being Tutsis. Consequently, the political situation in the Sector has been that of mistrust and suspicion between mostly Tutsi heads (supported by RPA) and the Hutu subordinates.

2. The foregoing background made the history of Sector 4 unique and most eventful in the tenure of UNAMIR in Rwanda. Sector 4 was one of the 10 sectors created following the withdrawal of Organization of Africa Neutral Military Observer Group (OANMOG) and the formation of UNAMIR on 22 August 94. During the war the Prefecture was within the French Humanitarian Protection Zone (HPZ) like most parts of western Rwandan. Even though UNAMIR sectors were redelineated 3 times since Aug 94, Sector 4 remained the same but only changed its nomenclature from 4C TO 4.

3. There are 11 Communes in Cyangugu Prefecture, namely: Kagano, Kirambo, Gatara, Kamembe, Gisuma, Cyimbogo, Karengera, Gishoma, Bugarama and Nyakabuye.

IMPORTANCE OF THE SECTOR

4. Cyangugu Prefecture was one of the 3 (including Butare and Bukavu) ancient trade centers in the Rwanda-Burundi union.

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Its endowment with economic activities ~~dates~~ back to history. Agriculture here is basically subsistence farming, fishing and animal house-boundary. The only cash-cropping in the area are the tea plantations. The Prefecture has a few industries which are important to the development of Rwanda eg the Shagasha and Gisakura tea factories (run in conjunction with the European Union), Cemerwa Cement Factory, the Cocoshoma Cooperative. Some gold mining is done by the locals at Bweyeye. Though most of these industries are operating below their installed capacity due to the devastation of the war, they have high prospects. Considering also that the ex-Government officials, PRGF soldiers and most of Rwandan refugees are settled in Bukavu makes the Prefecture sensitive and very important to the Rwandese Government. The location of the Prefecture and its topology makes it vulnerable to infiltration of the FRFG elements from Zaire. Most of the attacks on the RPA and other Government interests have been through the Prefecture.

DEPLOYMENT DURING VARIOUS MANDATES

5. The deployment of MILOBs in the Sector has been the same until Dec 95 when it was changed. The Sector HQ had been in Kamembe Gihundwe sector with 3 subsectors located at Nyamasheke (north), Bugarama (south) and Kamembe (central) to facilitate effective coverage of the AOR. The operation of the subsectors continued until 17 Dec 95 when they were disestablished and all MILOBs pulled to Kamembe to centralize the operation of the Sector as requested by the last mandate. The strength of the MILOBs during the various mandate remained at an average of 30.

IMPORTANT EVENTS IN THE SECTOR

6. During the MILOBs stay in this Sector there was only one major event thus the force repatriation of refugees by the Zairian Government in Aug 95. About 7,442 refugees were forcefully repatriated and MILOBs participated by monitoring and escorting the refugees from the entry points to the transit camps. Security of the refugees was guaranteed by the MILOBs and their rehabilitation and resettlement were followed up through our patrols.

RETURNEES

7. Repatriation of refugee in 1995 progressed normally until Dec 95 when there was uncertainty on the renewal of the UNAMIR mandate. Refugee inflow stalled until the mandate was renewed. Repatriation of refugee through the Sector has depended

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largely on the security in the area. Constant confrontation between the RPA and the FRGF infiltrators results in killings and attacks. These activities have been limiting factor to voluntary repatriation of the refugees. Currently, refugee repatriation has remained at the lowest ebb (see Annex A). However the returnees in this Prefecture have been fairly resettled and rehabilitated in the communes with exception of four communes thus Kamembe, Gisuma, Bugarama and Cyimbogo. Problems in these communes were those of accommodation and farmland allocation.

a. Returnees Statistics. Since Jan 95 to date 22,654 (comprising 15,437 new case returnees and 7,217 old cases) refugees returned through Cyangugu prefecture. A total of 5,814 returned and resettled in communes in the Sector (see Annex B). The summary of returnee figures in the Prefecture is as follows:

Bugarama- 625	Cyimbogo- 300	Gafunzo- 405
Gatare - 122	Gishoma - 635	Gisuma - 671
Kagano - 434	Kamembe - 2101	Karengera- 232
Kirambo - 93	Nyakabuye- 124	Others- 72

b. Progress of Returnees Resettlement. Generally, the rehabilitation of returnees in the Prefecture had been without much problems with the exception of 4 communes namely Kamembe, Gisuma, Cyimbogo and Bugarama. New case load returnees do not face much problems settling down into their former accommodation and farmlands. Old case load returnees often encounter problems of accommodation and in most cases they pack into abandoned houses of the new case load who are yet to return to Rwanda. In some places where there are no free accommodation they live in make-shift houses. Cases of 4 communes with bad resettlement cases are as follows:

(1) Gisuma commune. At Gisuma commune, due to acute shortage of accommodation and farmlands, old case load returnees don't have temporary accommodation or abandoned houses of the new case load who are yet to return. Consequently, new arrivals from this commune stay further at the transit camp even after they might have been cleared.

(2) Cyimbogo commune. Due to lack of accommodation in this commune, some 1,500 families

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are presently leaving in make-shift houses made with plastic sheets provided by the UNHCR.

(3) Bugarama commune. There exist here an acute food shortage for both new and old case returnees in the commune.

(4) Kamembe commune. Presently 252 old case load returnees in the commune are occupying houses belonging to new case load refugees who are yet to return. UNHCR and WFP are planning to build 80 housing units in the commune for the returnees. Arrangement to implement this is in advance stage.

PRISONS AND DETENTION CENTERS

8. Prisons and detention centers in the Prefecture are holding about 3500 inmates. The breakdown of the inmates holding in the prisons/detentions are as follows:

a. Central Prisons and Brigades

(1) Cyangu Central Prison	2074
(2) Kamembe Brigade	227
(3) Bugarama Cite Brigade	65
(4) Bugarama Cimerwa Brigade	83
(5) Gisuma Brigade	144
(6) Rwesero Brigade	32

b. Commune Cachots

(1) Kamembe	21	(7) Kirambo	85
(2) Nyakabuye	63	(8) Gisuma	156
(3) Kagano	267	(9) Karengera	59
(4) Bugarama	23	(10) Gishoma	55
(5) Cyimbogo	49	(11) Gatatare	238
(6) Gafunzo	165		

ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES

9. Achievements. The following achievements were realised:

a. MILOBs continued to operate effectively in the Sector. Monitoring of refugees and their resettlement in the communes were done on daily bases. Humanitarian activities such as distribution of drugs to the health posts and hospitals were carried out by the MILOBs during the period, especially December and January.

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- b. Created a sense of security for operation of UN Agencies and NGOs in the field.
 - c. Instilled a sense of security and confidence conducive to normal living by the local population in the rural and remote areas.
 - d. Coordinated and implemented humanitarian assistance of UNAMIR, UN Agencies and NGOs.
 - e. Above all, monitoring of security of own UN personnel and property have been all well covered. Nicoy was of tremendous assistance to the locals in the health aspect and also provided transport for local projects to RPA and NGOs on request.
10. Failures. Despite the above achievements, some failures were recorded as follows:
- a. Publicity and Public relations aspects highlighting the importance and benefits of UNAMIR's presence was found wanting at all levels including the international media.
 - b. Even though a lot of emphasis was given on the importance of humanitarian assistance, regrettably resources were virtually non-existent.
 - c. MILOBS and UNAMIR have also failed to encourage the safe and massive return of refugees. This could be attributed to the inability of MILOBS to have access to refugee camps in Zaire and other neighbouring countries.

FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR RWANDA

11. The long term prospects for Rwanda can only be considered with the safe and voluntary return and absorption of refugees now residing in Zaire and other neighbouring countries. Unfortunately this^{is} not occurring due to the fear of reprisal action against them and also due to threats by FRGF in refugee camps to discourage large scale return of refugees.
12. Also direct talks and negotiations between the present Government and the former Government is unlikely to occur in the near future. This is because both sides are unwilling to indulge in power sharing.
13. The FRGF will also continue its acts of insurgency to create an atmosphere of insecurity thus convincing the people

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of Rwanda that the Government is incapable of providing them adequate security. Low-intensity operations by the FRGF will therefore prolong their existence, avoid decisive action and allow them to feel that they have a say in their own destiny.

14. Therefore peace, stability and security in Rwanda for its effective development is not likely to occur in the immediate future. Both the present Government and former Government must forget the past and see themselves as one people, one nation with a common destiny. It is only in the light of this that one can see a bright future for Rwanda.

LESSONS LEARNT

15. The following are some of the lessons learnt:

a. Collation of Information. A wealth of information was collected on communes, operation of UN Agencies and NGOs but the collation and dissemination of the information was found wanting. Information which is not disseminated on time to where it is most needed is wasted effort.

b. Coordination of Effort to Avoid Duplication. In an effort to be seen doing some humanitarian work, there is often duplication of effort by UN Agencies and NGOs at the expense of other areas. Such acts could be avoided by effective coordination at regular meetings and conferences.

c. Importance of Publicity. Publicity should have been exploited in both the local and international media to get credit for a good job done and also to put across the limitations of UNAMIR. If this was effectively done, the present Government/RPA would not have accused UNAMIR for not stopping the genocide in Rwanda.

RECOMMENDATIONS

16. The following recommendations are made:

a. Future Role of UN in Rwanda.

(1) UN should assist the Rwanda Government in the reconstruction of Rwanda.

(2) There should be at least a company strength of

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armed troops to provide security for UN installations.

(3) There should also be military observer group for effective monitoring.

b. Alternate Strategies.

(1) Future UN intervention must be timely and decisive to avoid the type of genocide that took place.

(2) MILOBS should be allowed to visit refugee camps in neighbouring countries to encourage the safe return of refugees.

(3) UN should assist in the negotiations and reconciliation of the present Government and the former Rwandan Government.


c. Suggested Strategies.

(1) UN should have stand-by forces well equipped and trained in some UN contributing countries.

(2) The action of the stand-by forces must be timely and decisive.

(3) The UN must have an effective public relations and radio broadcasting system in any UN area of operation.

(4) The command and control of MILOBS should be completely parallel or different to that of formed troops since the two categories are entirely different.


EJM AKPOR
Lt Col
Sector Comd

Annexes:

A. Refugee Returns Through Cyangugu Prefecture.

B. Summary Of Returnees Resettlement In Communes.

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ANNEX A TO
MILOBS/OPS/C18
DATED 02MAR96

RETURN OF REFUGEES IN SECTOR 4
CYANGUGU PREFECTEUR
JAN 95 TO MAR 96

MONTHS	BURUNDI			ZAIRE		
	OCL	NLC	TOT	OCL	NLC	TOT
JAN 95	00	00	00	1,306	611	1,917
FEB 95	03	00	03	719	393	1,112
MAR 95	14	07	21	470	173	643
APR 95	32	04	36	281	179	460
MAY 95	23	04	27	209	132	341
JUN 95	09	00	09	172	155	327
JUL 95	07	02	09	531	632	1,163
AUG 95	12	00	12	384	8,108	8,492
SEP 95	09	308	317	634	764	1,398
OCT 95	25	07	32	587	858	1,445
NOV 95	15	09	24	441	622	1,063
DEC 95	08	05	13	531	647	1,178
JAN 96	18	26	44	350	681	1,117
FEB 96	27	150	177	380	870	1,250
MAR 96	00	20	20	20	60	80
TOTAL	202	542	744	7,015	1,492	21,986

NOTES:

1. OCL - OLD CASE LOAD (1959 RETURNEES)
2. NEW CASE LOAD

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ANNEX B TO
MILOBS/OPS/C18
DATED 02MAR96

SUMMARY OF RETURNEES RESETTLEMENT IN COMMUNES
JANUARY 95

COMMUNES	OCL	NLC	IDPs	TOTAL
BUGARAMA	00	15	00	15
CYIMBOGO	01	28	00	29
GAFUNZO	01	39	00	40
GATARE	00	09	00	9
GISHOMA	01	27	00	28
GISUMA	00	32	00	32
KAGANO	00	99	00	99
KAMENBE	00	134	00	134
KARENTERA	00	11	00	11
KIRAMBO	00	04	00	4
NYAKABUYE	00	01	00	1
STRAY CASES	00	00	00	00
TOTAL	03	399	00	402

FEBRUARY 95

COMMUNES	OCL	NLC	IDPs	TOTAL
BUGARAMA	00	06	00	06
CYIMBOGO	00	06	00	06
GAFUNZO	00	04	00	04
GATARE	00	03	06	09
GISHOMA	00	14	00	14
GISUMA	03	10	03	16
KAGANO	00	01	00	01
KAMENBE	00	05	00	05
KARENTERA	00	03	00	03
KIRAMBO	00	06	02	08
NYAKABUYE	00	01	00	01
STRAY CASES	00	00	00	00
TOTAL	03	59	11	73

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SUMMARY OF RETURNEES RESETTLEMENT IN COMMUNES
MARCH 95

COMMUNES	OCL	NLC	IDPs	TOTAL
BUGARAMA	01	00	00	01
CYIMBOGO	00	00	00	00
GAFUNZO	00	00	00	00
GATARE	00	01	00	01
GISHOMA	05	02	00	07
GISUMA	08	02	00	10
KAGANO	00	01	00	01
KAMENBE	03	00	00	03
KARENTERA	00	06	00	06
KIRAMBO	00	04	00	04
NYAKABUYE	00	00	00	00
STRAY CASES	115	00	00	115
TOTAL	132	16	00	148

APRIL 95

COMMUNES	OCL	NLC	IDPs	TOTAL
BUGARAMA	00	06	00	06
CYIMBOGO	01	01	00	02
GAFUNZO	00	00	00	00
GATARE	00	01	00	01
GISHOMA	00	00	00	00
GISUMA	00	00	00	00
KAGANO	00	00	00	00
KAMENBE	01	00	00	01
KARENTERA	00	00	00	00
KIRAMBO	00	00	00	00
NYAKABUYE	00	00	00	00
STRAY CASES	101	00	00	101
TOTAL	103	08	00	111

B - 2

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UN RESTRICTED**SUMMARY OF RETURNEES RESETTLEMENT IN COMMUNES
MAY 95**

COMMUNES	OCL	NLC	IDPs	TOTAL
BUGARAMA	01	00	00	01
CYIMBOGO	00	02	00	02
GAFUNZO	00	05	00	05
GATARE	00	00	00	00
GISHOMA	00	03	00	03
GISUMA	00	07	00	07
KAGANO	00	00	00	00
KAMENBE	02	02	00	04
KARENTERA	00	00	02	02
KIRAMBO	00	00	00	00
NYAKABUYE	00	00	00	00
STRAY CASES	64	00	00	64
TOTAL	67	19	02	88

JUNE 95

COMMUNES	OCL	NLC	IDPs	TOTAL
BUGARAMA	00	00	00	00
CYIMBOGO	00	05	00	05
GAFUNZO	00	07	00	07
GATARE	00	03	00	03
GISHOMA	01	00	00	01
GISUMA	00	01	00	01
KAGANO	00	00	00	00
KAMENBE	00	00	00	00
KARENTERA	00	00	00	00
KIRAMBO	00	00	00	00
NYAKABUYE	02	00	00	02
STRAY CASES	58	00	00	58
TOTAL	61	16	00	77

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SUMMARY OF RETURNEES RESETTLEMENT IN COMMUNES
JULY 95

COMMUNES	OCL	NLC	IDPs	TOTAL
BUGARAMA	00	04	00	04
CYIMBOGO	02	14	00	16
GAFUNZO	00	72	00	72
GATARE	00	06	00	06
GISHOMA	01	38	00	39
GISUMA	00	56	00	56
KAGANO	00	44	00	44
KAMENBE	00	176	00	176
KARENTERA	01	02	00	03
KIRAMBO	00	01	00	01
NYAKABUYE	00	14	00	14
STRAY CASES	12	00	00	12
TOTAL	16	427	00	443

AUGUST 95

COMMUNES	OCL	NLC	IDPs	TOTAL
BUGARAMA	00	81	00	81
CYIMBOGO	00	101	00	101
GAFUNZO	00	96	00	96
GATARE	00	50	00	50
GISHOMA	00	101	00	101
GISUMA	01	264	00	264
KAGANO	00	193	00	193
KAMENBE	01	476	00	477
KARENTERA	00	20	00	20
KIRAMBO	00	49	00	49
NYAKABUYE	00	28	00	28
STRAY CASES	00	00	00	00
TOTAL	02	1459	00	1461

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SUMMARY OF RETURNEES RESETTLEMENT IN COMMUNES
SEPT 95

COMMUNES	OCL	NLC	IDPs	TOTAL
BUGARAMA	03	49	00	52
CYIMBOGO	01	16	00	17
GAFUNZO	00	17	00	17
GATARE	03	03	00	06
GISHOMA	01	109	00	110
GISUMA	00	46	00	46
KAGANO	00	24	00	24
KAMENBE	30	229	00	259
KARENTERA	00	17	00	17
KIRAMBO	00	06	00	06
NYAKABUYE	00	26	00	26
STRAY CASES	00	00	00	00
TOTAL	38	542	00	580

OCT 95

COMMUNES	OCL	NLC	IDPs	TOTAL
BUGARAMA	55	113	00	168
CYIMBOGO	00	14	00	14
GAFUNZO	00	22	00	22
GATARE	00	01	00	01
GISHOMA	03	85	00	88
GISUMA	01	71	00	72
KAGANO	00	17	00	17
KAMENBE	01	283	00	283
KARENTERA	00	02	00	02
KIRAMBO	00	02	00	02
NYAKABUYE	00	08	00	08
STRAY CASES	00	07	00	07
TOTAL	59	625	00	684

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SUMMARY OF RETURNEES RESETTLEMENT IN COMMUNES
NOV 95

COMMUNES	OCL	NLC	IDPs	TOTAL
BUGARAMA	31	132	00	163
CYIMBOGO	01	21	00	22
GAFUNZO	01	34	00	35
GATARE	00	02	00	02
GISHOMA	00	50	00	50
GISUMA	00	27	00	27
KAGANO	00	07	00	07
KAMENBE	01	160	00	161
KARENTERA	00	12	00	12
KIRAMBO	00	07	00	07
NYAKABUYE	00	16	00	16
STRAY CASES	03	00	00	03
TOTAL	37	468	00	505

DEC 95

COMMUNES	OCL	NLC	IDPs	TOT
BUGARAMA	06	30	00	36
CYIMBOGO	00	25	00	25
GAFUNZO	01	01	00	02
GATARE	00	16	00	16
GISHOMA	03	17	00	20
GISUMA	02	32	00	34
KAGANO	00	13	00	13
KAMENBE	06	243	00	249
KARENTERA	00	125	00	125
KIRAMBO	00	00	00	00
NYAKABUYE	00	10	00	10
STRAY CASES	03	03	00	06
TOTAL	21	545	00	566

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04/02/96

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FROM : CMO

FILE : MILOB/OPS/45

TO : COS

INFO : MA to A/FC
ADCOS (OPS)

DATE : 28 FEB 96

SUBJECT: END OF MISSION REPORT (09 DEC TO 08 MAR 96)

Refs:

- a. MILOB GP HQ OPS/1122.23 dated 28 Nov 95.
- b. Your letter on mn subject dated 23 Feb 96.

GENERAL

1. The End of Mission Report covering the 3rd Mandate (09 Jun 95 to 08 Dec 96) was submitted vide reference A. This report is for the current Mandate, covering the period, 09 Dec 95 to 08 Mar 96.

AIM

2. The aim of this report is to highlight MILOBS operations during the current Mandate.

SCOPE

3. The following will be covered:
- a. Security Situation in Rwanda.
 - b. Humanitarian Situation.
 - c. Repatriation of Refugees.
 - d. Reconciliation Process.
 - e. MILOBS' operation in current Mandate.
 - f. Conclusion.

SECURITY SITUATION IN RWANDA

4. The overall security situation in RWANDA, particularly in Central and Eastern parts, remained calm and well under the control of the RPA. On the whole, there was a lull in insurgent activities by the FRGF in Rwanda from the end of Nov to mid Dec 95. This was in contrast to the

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situation prevailing in Oct / Nov 95. The Iswawa Island episode in Nov 95 seriously demoralized the FRGF rank and file operating in Rwanda. This possibly accounted for this lull. Insurgent activities however picked up again in the second week of Dec in the Western part of the country, notably in the Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and Cyangugu prefectures. This trend saw a steady increase through Jan and Feb 96. A number of sabotage activities have been carried out. These took the form of planting of land mines, blowing up of bridges, electricity pylons as well as water supply lines. The number of armed robberies and killings have also been on the increase. Most of these activities have been traced to the FRGF.

5. A number of encounters have been reported between the RPA patrols and FRGF, in which the RPA suffered a lot of casualties. Banditry activities have increased in some prefectures (notably, GITARAMA, KIBUYE, GIKONGORO and BUTARE). Livestock and other valuables are forcefully taken from locals. They are manhandled or sometimes killed if they had nothing to offer.

6. Arbitral arrests by RPA continue unabated.

7. **Assessment.** It is assessed that, insurgent activities will continue in future with renewed vigor and are likely to spread to Central and Eastern Rwanda.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

8. There has been an improvement in the humanitarian situation during the period. Most of the local officials have been seen to be assisting people, particularly, returnees. The local authorities have been helping returnees to get back their land and houses. They have on the whole, been fairly treated, even though some of them are arrested on arrival.

9. The effect of the expulsion of 38 NGOs from Rwanda is seriously being felt all over the country. The most badly affected sector is the Medical Service. There is an obvious shortage of drugs and medical equipments as well as medical/para-medical staff, leading to a decline in health care in the rural areas.

REPATRIATION OF RETURNEES

10. Despite concerted efforts by all concerned, the repatriation of refugees remained at a rather low key. Returnee figures recorded during the period stands as follows:

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Month/Year	No of Returnees	Remarks	
(a)	(b)	(c)	
Dec 95	13,583		
Jan 96	13,264		
Feb 96	25,498	Figures up to 22 Feb	
Total	52,345		

These low figures were recorded, despite the fact that UNHCR expected a massive repatriation in Dec 95 / Jan 96. The noticeable increase in returnee figures in Feb is primarily due to the fact that, the refugees are constantly being caught up in the violence between the Burundian Army and the Hutu Militia, operating in the northern Province of Burundi. Despite this increase, there are over 1.6 million refugees still living outside Rwanda. The possible reason for large numbers still living outside is, either they are too apprehensive of the security situation in Rwanda or they are quite comfortable in their camps and have no desire of coming back to face the hardships and intimidation in their home communes.

11. Zaire is reported to have deployed additional troops in some camps (KIBUMBA in GOMA and KASUSA and NYANGAZI in BUKAVU) to expedite repatriation. The repatriation however has so far not been forced.

12. Comments.

- a. This exercise seems to have failed to achieve the desired goal, since there was hardly any increase in repatriation from these camps.
- b. Repatriation is not likely to increase dramatically in the near future, unless repatriation is forced.

RECONCILIATION PROCESS

13. Although on the surface, it appears that there has been some improvement in the reconciliation process, the hatred between the ethnic groups seems to be too much deeply rooted.

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The memory of the genocide is still too fresh in their minds. Political leaders and high ranking officials have been seen making some attempt at reconciliation but they need to do more at the grassroot level to achieve tangible results.

MILOBS OPERATIONS IN THE CURRENT MANDATE

14. The strength of MILOBS was drastically reduced from 320 to 146 for the period. This necessitated the redemarkation of the hitherto 10 sectors into 5. It greatly hampered the operational capabilities of MILOBS, as there were larger areas of responsibilities for the MILOB sectors with less human resources to cover. Despite the handicap, MILOBS continued to monitor the Refugee/Returnee situation as required by the Mandate.

15. Most of the MILOB Sectors faced the challenge of operating without Formed Troops during the Mandate. This had no adverse impact on their capabilities except that incidents of theft increased on their office premises. A remedial action of hiring civilian night guards was taken.

16. **Achievements.** The frequent visits of MILOBS patrols to the sectors and cellules has been a great source of inspiration to the locals. It among other things gave them a feeling of insulation, to some extent, against RPA excesses. No wonder, a large number of locals and officials have been requesting for continued presence of UNAMIR. Politicians and the RPA however have their own reservations.

17. **Failures.** Even though MILOBS tried as much as they could to monitor the returnee situation as required of them by the mandate, they were unable to effectively monitor issues relating to their resettlement because of manpower problems. It was impossible to cover the crooks and nooks of Rwanda with 146 observers.

CONCLUSION


18. The Western portions of Rwanda have been characterized by infiltrations and insurgent activities since Jan 96. This trend is most likely to continue with renewed vigor and possibly spread to the Central portions of the country in the near future.

19. Even though the UNHCR anticipated a massive repatriation of refugees during Dec and Jan 96, very low figures were recorded. The deployment of Zairian troops at the refugee camps had virtually no effect on the repatriation of refugees. The figures from Zaire are likely to remain low

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unless repatriation is forced.

20. MILOBS worked with a very low strength of 146 during the mandate. Notwithstanding this handicap, they worked tirelessly and won the hearts of most locals and officials. They would have however done better with the right manpower.


CHARLES NELSON
Col
CMO

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TO : ALL SECTORS

FILE : MILOB/OPS/49

FROM : MILOB GP HQ


DATE: 26 FEB 96

SUBJECT : WARNING ORDER (.) PREPARATIONS FOR CLOSING
DOWN (.)

ONE (.) ALL MILOB OPERATIONS TO CEASE BY 081800B MAR 96 (.) LAST SITREP
TO BE SUBMITTED BY SAME TIME (.)

TWO (.) ALL MILOBS TO BE IN KIGALI BY 10 MAR 96 (.)

THREE (.) ADMIN INSTRS TO BE ISSUED LATER///




WM CHOMBA
LT COL
SOO

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SENT

- SEC 1 by mail and PHONE.
- 2 by mail & FAX
- 1A by FAX.
- 3 by mail & FAX
- 4 MAIL & FAX
- 5 MAIL & FAX (NYNOD).
- AIR OPS FAX

MILOBs : OPS BRANCH MAIL (DATE...15/2/96....)

	REMARKS	SIGN	DATE
C M O			
S O O	✓		15/02
A S O O			
OPsOFFR			
SIG OFFR			
S D O			
S M P O			
SLOGO			

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HANDING/TAKING OVER CERTIFICATE

SECTOR 1

1. This is to certify that I, LT COL VS DADHWAL (M 11733) have taken over as Sector 1 Commander from MAJ GA BIAH (M 11919), Ops Offr and Outgoing Acting Sector Commander. All office equipment, vehicles and other files/documents of the sector are all accounted for and found correct.

DATE: 20 Jan 96

GA BIAH Maj

GA BIAH
Maj

Ops Offr and Outgoing Acting
Sector Commander.

DATE: 20 Jan 96

VS DADHWAL

VS DADHWAL
Lt Col

Incoming Sector Commander

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BRIEFING NOTES

HANDING/TAKING OVER OF SECTOR 1

1. Sir, these briefing notes are a supplement to the verbal briefing I have already given you.
2. The briefing notes will cover the following:
 - a. Organisation and Deployment.
 - b. Operations.
 - c. Refugee/Returnee Situation.
 - d. Administration and Logistics.
 - e. Security.
 - f. An assessment of the Situation.
 - g. Conclusion.

ORGANISATION AND DEPLOYMENT

3. As you are aware, with the revised mandate, Sector 1 now comprises former Sectors 1A, 2A and 2B with HQ in KIBUNGO, (Map). However, Sector 1A is still to maintain its identity with some modifications. It now includes part of former Sector 2A (Map) and a split command structure. Thus administratively, it comes under Sector 1 HQ, KIBUNGO, but operationally under Milob Gp HQ. On completion of the redeployment, the Sector would have 24 Milobs. Thirteen of these would be in KIBUNGO whilst the remainder would be located in KIGALI.
4. Presently there are 5 Milobs on ground here in KIBUNGO as against 11. This is due to the refusal of 6 Milobs posted in to

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report for unknown reasons. This has already been reported to Milobs Gp HQ.

5. Milobs in KIBUNGO have been divided into an HQ element, as per the structure in the revised mandate, and additions thereto, and 2 teams. But then this is only on paper as the personnel are not all with us now. Similarly, we have divided the area into 2 sub-sectors and assigned these to the two teams, (map). These are:

a. UM1. This team covers the following communes:

- (1) MUGESERA 4764.
- (2) SAKE 4354.
- (3) KIGERAMA 6070.
- (4) KAYONZA 5784.
- (5) BIRENGA 5959.
- (6) RUSUMO 7549.

b. UM2. Covers the following two communes:

- (1) NGARAMA 2527.
- (2) GITUZA 3021.
- (3) MUHURA 2905.
- (4) MURAMBI 4501.
- (5) RUKURA 5601.
- (6) MUHAZI 4590.
- (7) RUTONDE 4984.

OPERATIONS

7. In accordance with the new mandate, our operations are

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concentrated on issues concerning returnees. Teams visit the transit camps to monitor the inflow of refugees and thereafter follow up to the communes to ascertain how they are integrating into their communes.

8. We also liaise with and support the UNHCR, other agencies and the local authorities in the repatriation and settlement of refugees/returnees.

REFUGEE/RETURNEE SITUATION

9. The NYAKARAMBI and BIRENGA Transit Camps have capabilities for 2,500 and 2,000 persons respectively. Returnees to these camps come mainly, from TANZANIA and BURUNDI respectively.

10. In anticipation of an influx of refugees over and above the capabilities of these camps, we conducted a recce mission to the KAGITUMBA Border Post ^{liaised with} and the authorities there on the possibility of diverting some of the refugees from TANZANIA through those places. Conditions were found to be suitable but since then, there has been no cause to resort to this action.

11. Over the last mandate [REDACTED], our 2 transit camps have [REDACTED] normal returnees. There have also been forced repatriations within the period under review. However, these were not being made known until Dec 95. Since then, there have been 236 in Dec 95 and 57 in Jan 96 so far. These have come mainly from TANZANIA, through the RUSUMO Border Post 8737. They are always alleged to have committed various crimes in that country including

L and the NYAGATARE Transit Camp, in former Sector 2A

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poaching and stealing.

12. There seems to be a good effort in this prefecture to integrate returnees into their home communes. For example:

- a. KAYONZA Commune 5784. The Bourgemestre has directed sector leaders to ensure the return of properties belonging to returnees on their arrival to the communes. In addition, 94 plots of land have been earmarked for allocation to returnees without land. The construction of 70 houses is also under way for allotment to returnees.
- b. MUGESERA Commune 4764. In the MUGESERA Commune, plots of land have been acquired in 6 sectors to build about 800 family houses to accommodate returnees. In addition, the Roman Catholic Church in ZAZA 4859, also supplies roofing sheets to returnees free of charge on a scale of 30 pieces per family.
- c. SAKE Commune 4354. In the RUKUMBELI Sector 3562 of the SAKE commune, SNR/DRA in conjunction with the local authorities, are putting up 100 family houses to be distributed free of charge to poor returnees and other IDPs.
- d. RUSUMO Commune 7549. In the NASHO II area 9466 of the RUSUMO Commune, government has successfully settled some 12,000 returnees on well laid out communities. UNHCR has also assisted them with seed crop for planting.
- e. Medical Fees. In the health centres throughout the prefecture, poor returnees are being exempted from paying medical bills.

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13. Notwithstanding all these welfare packages, a number of returnees have been picked up and detained for allegations of having committed genocide. This number is however insignificant compared with other prefectures. A comprehensive data on returnees and other humanitarian matters are attached as Annex A.

SECURITY

14. The security situation in the KIBUNGO Prefecture is generally calm and stable. The populace including the RPA have surprisingly since the current mandate, become very friendly. It is difficult to tell what might have caused the change in attitude.

15. We have heard cases of infiltrations from across the border, but these have been rare in this prefecture. Indeed, within the last three months ^{there} have been no such acts.

16. Recent breaches of security in this sector occurred as far back as Sep 95. In any case, there were only 4 of such occurrences:

a. IDAGAZA 5739 - 05 Sep 95. One RPA soldier was wounded in a reported ambush along the BURUNDI border. However, the RPA later claimed it to be an accidental firing during weapon cleaning by one of its soldiers.

b. RUKIRA 6658 - 06 Sep 95. Three persons from across the border who were joined by three locals killed two persons and injured three others. This was a case of elimination of genocide witnesses.

c. KIGERAMA 6070 - 26 Sep 95. Attempted extortion. One

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person killed and two were injured.

d. GATORE 6548 - 28 Sep 95. One person killed and eight injured. Motive not known.

18. Security at the HQ has been very good. Perhaps this can be attributed to the vigilance of GHANCOY and to a large extent by the general calm in the prefecture. However, there have been petty thefts especially towards the end of ^{the} last mandate. It is feared this would likely become a problem when GHANCOY leaves this place later in the month.

There would therefore be the need for security guards in that event. We have already intimated this to Milobs Gp HQ.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

19. At the moment, there are no serious administrative and logistic problems and morale among MILOBS is very high. Problems may arise only when GHANCOY departs this camp. These would mainly be in the area of equipment and other facilities that we had jointly used with GHANCOY or depended on them for. These include :

- a. Fuel dump.
- b. Water reservoir/bladder.
- c. Fax machine.
- d. Repeater.
- e. Cleaners.
- f. Security guards.

20. All these requirements have already been made known to Milobs

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Gp HQ and have started receiving attention.

21. An area that has been of great concern to us, is that of accommodation, both office and living for Milobs. Fortunately, we have recently been able to reach an agreement with our Landlord, the Bishop, to continue to use his property until the end of the mandate. What is left is for the accommodation outfit to meet the Bishop and reduce this understanding into a contract agreement. We have already informed SLOGO accordingly. Further details on administration and logistics is at Annex B.

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

21. The general security situation in Sector 1 (KIBUNGO Prefecture) is expected to remain calm throughout the rest of the mandate. The generally increased friendliness of the populace, including the RPA coupled with the near absence of infiltrators and other breaches of peace are indicators.

22. It is not likely that refugees would flow in, in any bigger numbers than has been recorded in the past. Visits to transit camps and communes by representatives of refugees about insecurity in RWANDA. This has been worsened by awful stories about poor prison conditions and a slow, nearly non-existent, judicial process for the determination of justice.

CONCLUSION

23. Sir, in conclusion, I would say that this sector, particularly the KIBUNGO Prefecture, is likely to remain calm throughout the

L does not seem to have disabused the minds of the refugees

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rest of the mandate. However, there is ^{not} likely to be an increase in
the inflow of returnees in the near future.

Abusiah Maj

GA BIAH
Maj
Outgoing Ag Sector Comd

HUMANITARIAN MATTERS

GENERAL

1. The humanitarian situation in the prefecture during the last mandate was relatively calm and stable. There was a steady in flow of returnees during the earlier months and these were handled without any major problem by the relief agencies and the local administration. However, during the last quarter of the year this in flow dwindled down to a trickle. The situation in the refugee camps remained volatile and uncertain. There were persistent problems of shortage of housing for the returnees and that of water in the communes. Problems of health care and education also continued to manifest themselves from time to time. However, there were no outward signs of any problems between the two ethnic groups and the process of integration of returnees in the communes has been going smoothly.

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2. The MILOBS continued to effectively co-ordinate and assist in humanitarian tasks. Some of the humanitarian activities of the MILOBS during the period were :

- a. Bi-weekly meetings with NGOs and other UN agencies to co-ordinate humanitarian tasks and exchange information of humanitarian value were conducted at the MILOBS Sect HQ.
- b. The MILOBS also attended the co-ordinated meetings of NGOs and aid agencies at the Prefecture from time to time.
- c. The MILOBS formed part of the Crisis Committee to handle any situation arising out of sudden influx of returnees into the prefecture.
- d. The MILOBS were instrumental in distribution of blankets to the health centres and hospitals in the prefecture.
- e. The MILOBS distributed over 120 cartons of ^{ORS}~~CARS~~ to the various health centres, hospitals and orphanages in the prefecture.
- f. The MILOBS distributed over eleven cartons of penicillin and other life saving medicines normally available in short supply to some of the hospitals and health centres in the area.

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g. The MILOBS assisted the local authorities and Human Rights in transfer of prisoners from KIBUNGO to NISINDA prison.

h. The MILOBS organised for widening of road leading from BIRENGA transit camp to KIBUNGO water pump house.

j. The MILOBS organised the distribution of 1325 Christmas gifts to the orphans in Dec 95.

GENERAL LIVING CONDITIONS

3. Food. The food situation in the prefecture during the initial months was relatively critical. Considerable effort was put in by WFP and UNHCR to obviate possible chances of starvation. UNHCR issued the basic rations to last the returnees for over a month on their arrival at the transit camps. Other NGOs like PAM, LWF, ACIST and IRC were also effectively involved to carry out a regular distribution of food items. This distribution was carried on a food for work basis. An attempt was also made to encourage the people with self-help income generating jobs that would ensure their reduced dependence on food aid over a period of time. However, from time to time reports of shortage of food and other basic items have been received from the NASHO area.

4. Water.

a. The water supply in the prefecture was badly disrupted during the civil war. The situation had become critical during the summer months in 1995. The onset of rains helped to considerably ease the situation. However, an in depth analysis after a detailed ground study of the recurring problem of shortage of water revealed the lack of basic infrastructural facilities like pumping stations, water pipelines and reservoirs. Where ever these did exist it was seen that these were in a poor state of maintenance or were unserviceable. The repairs at most places were hampered by shortage of funds or lack of spare parts.

b. As of now running water supply to the two urban centers of KIBUNGO and RWAMAGANA has been partially restored. At KIBUNGO out of the three pumps at the pumping station only one is functional thereby inhibiting full use of the facilities and providing water only to limited areas. Thus, the water pipelines laid in KIGERAMA commune are being underutilised.

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At RWAMAGANA the water pumping station at MUHAZI lake is providing only to RWAMAGANA township and not to any of the surrounding areas.

c. Most of the communes are having their own pumping stations but these can cover a very small percentage of the population. At most of the communes the water pumps are out of order for want of spare parts or diesel. As of now the communes which are facing an acute shortage of water are KABARONDO, KIGERAMA, MUGESERA, RUKARA, Nasho and Musaza areas of RUSUMO commune, Jarama area of SAKE commune and parts of MUHAZI commune.

d. Some of the major water restoration projects undertaken in the prefecture during the period were :

(i) Restoration of existing water supply and boring of new wells in RWINKWAVU area by OXFAM (UK).

(ii) Restoration of spring water sources in KABARONDO and RUKIRA communes by LWF.

(iii) Establishment of gravity water systems by IRC in NYAMUGALI and RUSUMO areas and establishment of a water pump in SAKE area.

(iv) Construction of a 23 Km water pipeline in SAKE commune by Terres Sans Frontiers and COFORWA. Terres Sans Frontiers has since been expelled from the country. The project earlier to be completed by Jun 96 is likely to be delayed. The project has the active support of UNICEF.

e. Running water supply to the transit camps has been restored. However, during emergencies water is required in UNHCR water tankers from KIGALI. However, the present infrastructure can cater for a limited number of upto 3000 returnees. Any number above that may require additional back up from available sources. However, UNHCR has faced a persistent problem of storage of water in the transit camps during the dry season. Hence, there is a dire need to construct water storage tanks in these camps.

f. Shortage of water was experienced by most of the health centers.

5. Agriculture. Seasonal cultivation of land was delayed due to delayed onset of rains. Gradual cultivation and tilling in mid-september with the NGOs and relief agencies encouraging formation

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of agriculture co-operatives to ensure balanced distribution of seeds, fertilizers and farming implements. Most the returnees have been allotted some agricultural land for sustenance but for the old case of returnees who have been allotted plots in areas not previously cultivated it will be an uphill task and they are bound to face considerable difficulty before the land actually becomes productive. It may take them more than one harvest to become totally self-sufficient and start getting effective returns.

6. Health Care.

a. There are a total of 04 hospitals (KIBUNGO, RWAMAGANA, GAHINI, RWINKWAVU) and 26 health centers in the prefecture. Out of these the hospital at RWINKWAVU has been taken over by the RPA and converted into a military hospital though limited treatment to the locals is still reportedly being provided.

b. All the above hospitals have been facing an acute shortage of basic laboratory equipment, surgical equipment, X-ray equipment, essential medicines, mattresses, beds and ambulance vehicles. The health centers have been facing a shortage of beds, mattresses, basic medicines and staff. An acute shortage of water continues at the health centers at NYARUBUYE 8359, MUHAZI 4590, RUHUNDA 4692, MUSAZA 6844 and MUGESERA 4764.

c. The most prevalent disease in the area is malaria. Besides this gastronomic diseases caused by polluted water and respiratory infections are rampant. There was an increased incidence of meningitis that was reported from SAKE commune in Jul 95 and from RWINKWAVU area in Sep 95. However these were brought under control by timely action. Of late there have been increased number of cases of mal-nutrition amongst children of old case load of returnees settled in the MUSAZA area.

d. Regular health screening of returnees is being carried out by IMC and AEF at BIRENGA and NYAKARAMBI transit camps respectively.

e. A special awareness programme spread over two weeks was carried out mark the World AIDS Day on 01 Dec 95.

f. A polio eradication drive was carried out from 20 - 26 Nov 95 and a record number of children were administered the polio vaccine during the period.

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7. Housing.

a. Despite the innumerable schemes undertaken for construction of houses for the returnees the progress in this important field remains slow.

b. A general shortage of houses for returnees has been reported by the commune authorities in all communes. The food for work programmes initiated by various NGOs have been slow to yield results.

8. Education. A majority of the schools in the prefecture are now open and classes are now being conducted normally. However nearly all the schools have been facing a shortage of text books, writing material, basic furniture and staff.

PEOPLE WITH SPECIAL NEEDS

9. Returnees.

a. The influx of returnees had shown a steady rise during the months of Jun, Jul, Aug and Sep 95. However, there has been a steady decline in their numbers since Oct 95. The sudden drop has been inexplicable even though repeated attempts have been made by the UNHCR authorities to convince the refugees about their safety on their return. To this end a number of visits by delegations of refugee leaders have been organised. Reports of intimidators and armed groups being active in the camps have been received. The Tri-partite commission which had met in Sep and Oct 95 had agreed to establishment of separate security camps for such elements. However nothing further has been heard on that. Of late there has been an increase in the number of people forcibly re-patriated from Tanzania. These people have been reportedly involved in poaching and such other criminal activities in Tanzania and have been jailed inside Tanzania. They are not being routed through the normal channel of transit camps. Instead they are being handed over directly to RPA by Tanzanian Army in the presence of UNHCR and Human Rights representatives.

b. The prefecture has been getting returnees essentially from Tanzania and Burundi. The returnees from Zaire are mostly old case load of returnees who are being resettled in specially earmarked areas. A total of eleven (11) areas have been earmarked for re-settlement of these old case load of returnees (See Sketch P attached). Each of these areas are required to take up to 5000 returnees thereby bringing the total number of old case load of returnees in the area to between 55000 to 60000.

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c. A deliberate process is also on to re-settle the new case load of returnees. An attempt is being made by the local authorities to have their houses and properties where illegally occupied to be vacated before these people come back to the area.

d. The infrastructural facilities available for handling 6 returnees are adequate by current standards. The transit camps at BIRENGA and NYAKARAMBI can each take up to 2000 returnees each at any one time. There is a proposal to expand the transit camp at NYAKARAMBI to take up to 3500 returnees. These facilities may however be in adequate in case there is an influx witnessed of the type that took place from Zaire in Aug 95.

e. The number of returnees who have come to the prefecture since Jun 95 are as under :

	Burundi	Uganda	Tanzania	Zaire	Total
Jun 95	1359	29	672	1909	3969
Jul 95	4512	27	753	1766	7058
Aug 95	3969	86	489	729	4973
Sep 95	4512	289	797	3634	9232
Oct 95	403	-	1794	975	3172
Nov 95	293	17	715	245	1270
Dec 95	1531	-	271	80	1882

f. There have been no reports of outward harassment of returnees or that of mass scale arrests.

10. Prisoners.

a. There are two prisons in KIBUNGO prefecture at KIBUNGO and NISINDA respectively. The conditions at these two prisons were squalid and rather unhygienic. Till Oct 95 there were a total of 3008 prisoners at the KIBUNGO prison and 943 prisoners at the prison at NISINDA. In addition there were a total of over 2500 prisoners in the commune [REDACTED] in the prefecture.

b. On 05 Oct the President of RWANDA inaugurated the new

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prison complex at NISINDA. The new prison complex can accommodate upto 5000 prisoners. A total of 3008 prisoners were transferred from KIBUNGO to NISINDA prison in the third week of Nov 95. . Besides prisoners from BUYUMBA prison were also transferred to this prison. A process of transferring from the commune [REDACTED] of the prefecture to the prison at KIBUNGO started in the third week of Dec 95.

11. Orphans.

a. Till May - Jun 95 there were nine orphanages in the prefecture. However , in Jun - Jul 95 most of the smaller orphanages were amalgamated and since then there are only four orphanages .There details are as under :

	No of children	Run by
(i) Kibungo	120	Missionaries of Charity
(ii) Rwamagana	121	IRC
(iii)Gahini	100	Sussie Rwanda
(iv) Abatangana	196	Compassion International

b. As on date there are a total of 537 orphans in the orphanages and another about 22000 staying with foster families and relatives.

ACTIVITIES OF NGOS AND OTHER UN AGENCIES

12. There are over thirty (30) NGOs and UN aid agencies working in KIBUNGO Prefecture. The major amongst these are :

a. UNHCR - Organising the re-patriation of returnees and their subsequent re-settlement in communes in close co-ordination with prefecture authorities.

b. WFP and PAM - Organising distribution of food items for returnees and various re-settlement projects based on food for work basis.

c. LWF, IRC, ACIST ,AEF , German Agro Action, GTZ , ARDENT - Involved in community development programmes.

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d. IMC , MSF, AEF ,IRC ,AFRICARE - Involved in providing medical support and running of health centers. AEF and IMC are also carrying out health screening of returnees at the transit camps.

e. OXFAM (UK), COFORWA, LWF,IRC - Restoration of water projects.

f. Red Barnet, Compassion International , BORNEFONDEN, IRC Sisters of Missionaries of Charity and Sussie Rwanda - Assistance for re-habilitation of orphanages and running of orphanages.

13. The only NGO expelled by the Rwandese Govt from the prefecture in Dec 95 was Terre Sans Frontieres which was working on a water project in SAKE commune.

CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT

14. The humanitarian situation in the prefecture has been showing a gradual improvement , however there is still considerable work to be done in housing, water, agriculture, health care and education sectors. It is unlikely that there will be any increase in the voluntary re-patriation of returnees from either Tanzania or Burundi in the near future.

15. The process of integration of returnees in the communes is likely to proceed smoothly and their security does not seem to pose a major problem in the prefecture.

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ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS MATTERS

SECTOR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

1. Sect 2b (KIBUNGO) was opened in this theatre of Operation in Oct 94 with a Sub Sect then at Rilima. At the time, the then Sect Comd, Lt Col R Gorg was renting a house for his accommodation which also served as the office. Half of the rental charges being met by the UN. Location of this house was beside present UNHCR compound. The arrangement was in place until Mar 95 when the Landlord repossessed the house at the expiry of the contract. The Sect remained without offices until July 95 when the present offices were renovated and occupied. The contract for renting the premises for office use expired on 31 Dec 95 but was extended up to 31 Jan 96. Serious efforts are now being made to negotiate with the landlord for a further extension till the end of the current mandate.

PERSONNEL STATE

2. In accordance with the new mandate, a total of 25 MILOBs have been posted to this newly designated Sector. Seven (7) of these are from the former 2B whiles eleven (11) are from former Sect 1A. The remaining seven (7) were posted from other sectors. At present the personnel strength in KIBUNGO is fifteen (15). Four (4) Milobs are due for repatriation during the month whiles another four (4) are yet to leave on posting to their respective sectors. The consolidated list of Milobs in the sector and the proposed deployments into KIBUNGO/KIGALI Sub Sectors is as attached.

OFFICE ACCOMMODATION

3. The Sector has four (4) office rooms which are considered adequate to meet the operational demands of the sector. The toilet facility located at the northern end of the office block was recently rehabilitated by the BMS. This is however been shared with locals who patronise the landlord's canteen.

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OFFICE FURNITURE/EQUIPMENT

4. Save for skeleton pieces of furniture and equipment, the Sect lacks adequate furniture and equipment for its smooth functioning. The Sect has made frantic efforts in the past to secure furniture and equipment and despite assurances as far back as Jul 95, that the items were going to be issued, nothing has been forthcoming. In the absence of sufficient chairs for Milobs and NGO's during briefings, two(2) long benches have been acquired through a local arrangement. The list equipment of holding is as attached.

COMMUNICATION

5. The sector has eleven Motorola Gp 300 radios which are considered adequate for the time being. In Addition there are two (2) base stations, one of which is located in Ghancoy Ops Room. The sector continues to use the Ghancoy fax machine for despatches and receipts of messages. Efforts are being made to secure own machine as Ghancoy winds up from the sector.

VEHICLE STATE

6. There are eight (8) vehicles assigned to the sector, three (3) of which are reassigned to KIGALI Subsector. All the vehicles are in sound mechanical condition.

MILOBS ACCOMMODATION

7. The general state of the officers' rented accommodation is not very conducive. In Kibungo, one cannot find suitable and appropriate houses available for rent. At present MILOBS squat in twos in rented accommodation within GhanCoy loc. The Milobs have been asked to vacate the residential premises by the end of the month as the contract has expired. Milobs are still pleading for an extension.

SRL	ITEM	QTY	SERIAL/DECAL No	REMARKS
01	COMPUTER	01	3322534346/BO-UNCL/1043	
02	PHOTOCOPIER	01	2483020-103/BR-900/468	
03	TELEVISION	01	F2G04790/BT.4800/388	
04	VIDEO CASSETTE PLAYER	01	A9345-32196/BT-5600/500	
05	TABLES COMPUTER	02		
06	CHAIRS FOLDING	05		
07	CHAIRS OFFICE	07		
09	SINGLE BATTERY CHARGERS	11		
10	VEHICLES	08	1204, 1091, 1089, 1006, 1008, 1106, 423 & 418.	
12	HAND HELD RADIOS	11	174IUU3865 174FSG2657 174FSQ1810	

	HAND HELD RADIOS		174FUCE032 174ISY6349 174IUU3488	
			174FVA9714 174FSQ1757 174IUU3501 174IUU3523 174FSS4655	
13	BASE STATIONS	02	624ASU1501 159TUJFI60	ON T/LOAN TO GHANCOY
14	CHEST CABINETS	02		
15	BOX KEY	01		
16	WALL CLOCKS	03		
17	METAL SHELF	01		
18	COFFEE TABLES- SMALL	02		

FROM : SECTOR -5A (RUHENGERRI)
TO : MILOB GP HQ-OPS BR
DATE : 08 JAN 95.
REF : MILOB GP HQ LTR NO MILOB/OPS/02 DATED 02 JAN 96.
SUBJECT: FINAL REPORT FOR CLOSING DOWN SECTOR

1. SECTOR 5A WAS ESTABLISHED IN THE FIRST WEEK OF DECEMBER 1994 WITH 7 MILOBS AS A SUB-SECTOR (5B) UNDER GISENYI .AT THAT TIME THE OFFICE WAS IN ONE FACTORY CALLED "ETIRU",ONE KILOMETER AWAY FROM RUHENGERRI TOWN. THE OFFICE WAS SHIFTED TO IT'S PRESENT LOCATION IN JANUARY 1995.SUB-SECTOR 5B CARRIED OUT ASSIGNED OPERATIONAL TASKS WITH 10 TO 12 MILOBS UNTIL JULY 1995 WHEN IT WAS UPGRADED TO FULL SECTOR STATUS.IT WAS THEN RENAMED SECTOR 5A AND AN ESTABLISHMENT OF 22 MILOBS WAS AUTHOURISED.THE THEN SUB-SECTOR HAD FORMED TROOPS OF ONE COMPANY STRENGTH STATIONED IN BUSOGO SOME 15 KILOMETERS AWAY FROM THE PRESENT LOCATION. BUT IN JUN 95 WHEN A NEW MANDATE CAME INTO FORCE THEY LEFT THE AREA. AND SO FROM JULY TILL TODAY IT BECAME A SECTOR OPERATING WITHOUT FORMED TROOPS.

2. THIS SECTOR IS IMPORTANT TO MILOB GROUP HEADQUARTERS IN PARTICULAR AND UNAMIR IN GENERAL. THIS IS BECAUSE THE PREFECTURE SHAPES BORDERS WITH UGANDA AND ZAIRE. FURTHERMORE, MOST OF THE FRGF TOGETHER WITH LOCALS IN THIS AREA FLED TO ZAIRE. IT IS THEREFORE OBVIOUS THAT DURING ANY FORCED OR VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF REFUGEES,THIS SECTOR WILL RECEIVE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF THEM. BESIDES THAT,SECTOR 5A IS LIKELY TO BE SERIOUSLY AFFECTED IN CASE OF ANY INVASION OR INSURGENT OPERATION. FINALLY, IT COULD ALSO SERVE AS A SECURE BASE SINCE THE LOCALS WOULD EASILY ACCEPT THE FRGF.

3. ACHIEVEMENTS BY MILOBS IN THIS SECTOR DURING THE PAST FEW MONTHS ARE STATED BELOW:

A. MONITORED HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM WHICH HELPED LOCALS TO GET JUSTICE THUS OVERALL UNAMIR EARNED A GOOD NAME.

B. GAINED CONFIDENCE OF LOCALS WHO WERE READY TO PROVIDE ANY SORT OF INFORMATION TO US VOLUNTARILY AND EXPRESSED THEIR GRATITUDE FOR BEING WITH THEM.

C. ESTABLISHED EXTREMELY GOOD WORKING RELATIONS WITH CIVIL AUTHORITIES STARTING FROM PREFECTURE DOWN TO SECTOR LEVEL.WE WERE NEVER DENIED ACCESS TO ANY CORNER TO OBTAIN INFORMATION OF ANY NATURE.

A/560

1. Prepare for me a closing down file as directed by Cmo. We shall have to make a final report that will be useful to us at time of submitting the final Mission Report. All closed sections have ^{been} submitted.
2. Refer to accn pob in Kibungo. Brief me on what we will have to do.
3. If Canadians are going start thinking of a sec unit for Cutarama.

SD 13/01/96

D. EXEMPLARY RELATIONSHIP IS STILL MAINTAINED WITH RPA WHO GAVE US ACCESS EVERYWHERE IN THE PREFECTURE. WE DID NOT FIND ANY NO GO AREAS AND NEVER HAD PROBLEMS WITH THEM. OFTEN JOINT PATROLLING WAS CONDUCTED WITH ALL LEVELS OF RPA COMMANDERS EVEN IN THE FRONT LINE. OCCASIONALLY RPA USED TO PROVIDE US WITH INFORMATION OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE BOTH ON FRGF AND THEMSELVES.

E. ESTABLISHED VERY GOOD WORKING RELATIONS WITH ALL THE NGOS PRESENT IN THE AREA TO AN EXTENT THAT THEY USED TO RESPOND TO OUR REQUEST FOR VARIOUS REQUIREMENTS OF COMMUNES.

F. WITH VERY LIMITED RESOURCES, MILOBS STILL PROVIDED TRANSPORT ASSISTANCE TO SICK PEOPLE, TO CARRY SEEDS, FOODS, TEXT BOOKS AND OFFICE EQUIPMENT TO ALL SIXTEEN COMMUNES.

G. ALTHOUGH THE CURRENT MANDATE WAS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, IT IS WIDELY KNOWN, THAT WE HAD INADEQUATE RESOURCES TO FULFILL THE REQUIREMENTS OF LOCALS/LOCAL AUTHORITIES. TO SOME EXTENT THESE REQUIREMENTS WERE FULFILLED BY THE NGOS WHICH WAS ONLY POSSIBLE DUE TO GOOD RELATIONS WITH THEM.

H. PRESENCE OF MILOBS IN THIS SECTOR, THOUGH WITHOUT FORMED TROOPS, STILL CONFIDENTLY CAN BE SAID THAT LOCALS, PARTICULARLY HUTUS CONSIDER US AS PROTECTION AGAINST HOSTILE RPA. FOR THAT REASON, WHEN RUMOURS OF UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL SPREAD TO LOCALS, THERE WAS A SIGNIFICANT SENSE OF INSECURITY AMONG THEM.

J. THE VARIOUS NON UNAMIR AGENCIES AND NGO'S CONSIDERED US AS AN ELEMENT OF PROTECTION AND NOW THEY SEEM TO BE VERY WORRIED ABOUT THEIR UNKNOWN FUTURE AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF MILITARY COMPONENTS OF UNAMIR.

4. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING IT WAS OBSERVED THAT THIS PREFECTURE ALWAYS HAD PROBLEMS OF SECURITY. THERE WERE LOTS OF KILLINGS IN THE MONTH OF MAR/APR /MAY 95 BY RPA AND FROM OCT 95 TO DATE KILLINGS/EXPLOSIONS BY THE FRGF. MORE SO, THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS THOUGH VERY SLOW INDICATES THAT HOSTILE ATTITUDES STILL EXIST IN THE MINDS OF BOTH TRIBES. RETURNEES OF 1994 ARE YET TO SETTLE THEMSELVES AS THEY HAD BEFORE THE WAR. FROM THIS PREFECTURE MANY REFUGEES ARE IN ZAIRE AND IF THEY AT ALL COME BACK, THE QUESTION REMAINS AS TO HOW THEY WILL BE ACCEPTED BY THE PRESENT POPULATION. CONSIDERING ALL THIS, RUHENGIRI PREFECTURE (SEC 5A) THEREFORE BECOMES AN AREA OF CONCERN AND SHOULD BE MONITORED CLOSELY DURING THE REPATRIATION PROCESS.

SEC 5A
SEC 5A


UN CONFIDENTIAL

HANDING / TAKING OVER CERTIFICATE

SECTOR 5 A

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT I, LTCOL A-B SIBANDA, (MO 8838) HAVE HANDED OVER SECTOR 5 A TO LTCOL V. BELSKI, (MO 8814) AS SECTOR COMMANDER. ALL OFFICE EQUIPMENTS, RADIOS, VEHICLES AND OTHER FILES / DOCUMENTS OF THE SECTOR ARE ALL ACCOUNTED FOR AND FOUND CORRECT.


DATE: 08 JANUARY 1996


A-B. SIBANDA
LTCOL

OUT-GOING SECTOR COMMANDER

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT I, LTCOL V. BELSKI (MO 8814), HAVE TAKEN OVER AS SECTOR 5 A COMMANDER FROM LTCOL A-B. SIBANDA, (MO 8838). ALL OFFICE EQUIPMENTS, RADIOS, VEHICLES AND OTHER FILES / DOCUMENTS OF THE SECTOR ARE ALL ACCOUNTED FOR AND FOUND CORRECT.

DATE: 08 JANUARY 1996


V. BELSKI
LTCOL

IN-COMING SECTOR COMMANDER

UN RESTRICTED

TO : MILOBS GP HQ

FILE : SECT 5C/OPSGEN

FROM : SECTOR 5C, KIBUYE

DATE : 08 JANUARY 1996

SUBJECT : FINAL REPORT ON THE CLOSURE OF THE KIBUYE SECTORGENERAL

1. The reduction in the UNAMIR forces, as passed by the UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL created a situation that warranted the restructuring of the actual MILOBS operations. The restructuring involved the closure of certain sectors that were active in the previous mandate. Operations in the KIBUYE Prefecture, sectorised as 5C, were amalgamated into those of GITARAMA.

AIM

2. The aim of this report is to give an overview on the operations, achievements, and failures of UNAMIR and MILOBS in the sector.

BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3. KIBUYE suffered the heaviest human carnage during the genocide. The KIBUYE prefecture was first occupied by the FRENCH Coalition Forces (FCF) which came into RWANDA through ZAIRE on "OPERATION TURQUOISE" between Jun and Aug 94. The AFRICAN component of FCF was absorbed by UNAMIR under the acronym FRABATT, when the FRENCH mandate ended. The last component of this force was the MALAWICOY, which parked off by Jul 95.

4. Throughout the period, MILOBS have been the peace brokers between the formed troops and the RPA. The prefecture was first designated Sector 4A and later changed to Sector 3B, with its headquarters at GITARAMA. Before the current restructuring exercise, the sector was known as 5C. Presently, it is being liquidated and amalgamated into GITARAMA and redesignated Sector 2. All these redesignation occurred with changing UNAMIR Mandates.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF THE KIBUYE PREFECTURE

5. The Prefecture is politically very sensitive due to its proximity to ZAIRE and it's long indented coastline, dotted with numerous islands. This makes it possible for small groups of FRGF/INTRERHAMWE and sometimes refugees to infiltrate into the prefecture. The GISHWATI, MUKURA and the NYUNWGE forest reserves provide good sanctuaries for infiltrators to hide in and operate from. Even though the prefecture suffered the worst form of atrocities during the civil war, it is still predominantly a HUTU abode. This makes it very prone to TUTSI vengeance. The KIBUYE prefecture is therefore a peculiar one.

6. As a result of it's peculiarity, mostly "hard liners" are appointed as political leaders in the prefecture. Similarly, it is believed that, mostly elite RPA troops with uncompromising officers are assigned duties in the prefecture, so that they can effectively contain the HUTU majority. This is evidenced in the ruthless manner in which they deal with "the enemies to their course", within the prefecture.

ACHIEVEMENTS OF MILOBS /UNAMIR

7. It is very difficult and almost impossible to pin-point tangible achievements by MILOBS and UNAMIR in the prefecture because of obvious reasons. However, it can be proudly said that the RPA and the nation at large, benefited and continue to benefit tremendously from the UNAMIR repeater station at Mt KARONGI. The importance of this station to RPA communications and radio broadcast within the prefecture cannot be overemphasised.

8. Our presence in the prefecture inspired a lot of confidence into the otherwise fear stricken HUTU majority. They were too glad to see us in the communes and volunteered information, even though they first had to ensure there were no RPA around to take any reprisal action against them. They were quite sad in November about the uncertainty of the UNAMIR mandate and equally sad when the sector was winding up.

9. Our humanitarian activities, even though, far below expectation, went a long way to improve the quality of life of the people in the prefecture. Some of the Humanitarian activities undertaken include lifting of relief items to the needy areas, casualty evacuation and treatment of the sick among others. In instances where we could not help, we forwarded the requests of the communes to agencies which had the capacity to do so.

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10. Even though we were not directly involved in the activities of NGOS and other UN Agencies, our presence inspired a lot of confidence in them and influenced their activities in several ways. Our daily, morning briefs updated them before they went out into the field. This also enabled them to plan joint patrols with us especially into areas of mine threats i.e. RWAMATAMU and RUTSIRO communes. Our weekly security briefs analysed military and political activities in and around RWANDA and came out with political/security implications, as they would affect the prefecture vis-a-vis their job. This enabled them to apprise their long term programs.


11. We tremendously assisted NGOS and other UN agencies, the RPA and the prefecture office by placing our office and communication equipment at their disposal. The liquidation of the sector will definitely slow down work in their offices since they would be missing these facilities.

FAILURES

12. It is a pity, we were not able to get the people to understand that reconciliation is the best option that they have under the present circumstances. Those wielding political and military authority in the prefecture were the most reluctant.

CONCLUSION

13. The KIBUYE prefecture is a peculiar and difficult one. MILOBS/UNAMIR went in to undertake a task. Even though they could not achieve total success at the time of liquidation of the sector, we made an impact in our own small way and our absence from KIBUYE will ever be felt.



W M CHOMBA
LT COL
Sector Comd

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Milobs Sector 1 HQ
KIBUNGO

Kibungo 11145

2B/01/G

26 Dec 95

See Distribution

INSTRUCTIONS ON TASKS
FOR MILOBS IN NEW MANDATE

References:

- A. UN Security Council Resolution 1029 (1995) adopted on 12 Dec 95.
- B. Tasks for Milobs in New Mandate.
- C. Verbal Briefing of Milobs Sector 2B by Ag Sector Comd on 18 Dec 95.

GENERAL

- 1. The new mandate for Milobs tentatively came into force on 13 Dec 95. It ends on 8 Mar 96 after a period of 3 months.
- 2. As a consequence to the down-scaled strength of Milobs, it is proposed to restructure and re-deploy Milobs into 5 Sectors from the previous 10 Sectors. In this reorganisation, former Sectors 1A, 2A and 2B have been merged to form Sector 1 with a Milob strength of 24 to be headquartered in KIBUNGO. Details of the proposed reorganisation and redeployment are at Annexes A and B respectively.
- 3. Whilst this proposed reorganisation is yet to take effect, firm tasks have been issued by Milobs Gp HQ to Milobs. The aim of these tasks, ultimately, is to assist the government of Rwanda in creating a congenial atmosphere for the voluntary and safe return of refugees. These tasks are attached as Annex C.

AIM

- 4. The aim of these instructions, therefore, is to outline the duties and modus operandi for Milobs of Sector 1 in the new mandate.

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DUTIES OF MILOBS

5. In line with the tasks in the new mandate, Sector 1 will perform duties in connection with returnees as follows :

a. Patrol/visit Communes, transit camps and border posts and monitor the following:

(1) In Transit Camps

- (a) Flow of returnees into the camps.
- (b) Country from which repatriated.
- (c) Status - old or new case load.
- (d) Final destination in RWANDA (Communes).
- (e) Condition of returnees (Health, Feeding, Morale, etc).
- (f) Condition in camps (Water sup, ration stocks, accn etc).

(2) Communes

- (a) Number of returnees arrived (Compared with despatches from Transit Camps).
- (b) Distribution to Sectors.
- (c) Detention /arrests if any.
- (d) Conditions of returnees:
 - (i) Accommodation.
 - (ii) Availability of food and clothing.
 - (iii) Any welfare and allied schemes undertaken by Govt/NGOs in the commune to assist returnees.
 - (iv) Self sustaining activities by returnees (farming, trading etc).

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(e) Integration:

(i) Acceptability by neighbours.

(ii) Participation by returnees in commune level activities (sports, commune labour, etc).

(f) Problems faced by returnees.

(g) Discernable pattern of life and implications.

(3) Teams should also endeavour as much as possible to monitor returnees below the Commune level.

b. Assist UNHCR and other international agencies in the repatriation of refugees (unarmed escort, communications, etc). Daily liaison with UNHCR to monitor the arrival of returnees and conditions prevailing in the camps in the neighbouring countries.

c. Provide assistance to NGOs and other UN agencies regarding returnees if within our capability.

d. Assist in the coordination of humanitarian activities of humanitarian agencies as related to returnees (Obtaining data/information on returnees' needs, monitoring and reporting on their human rights violations, etc)

e. Assist the local authorities in whatever way possible within means on positive matters concerning returnees.

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS

6. a. General Outline

(1) In view of the new Milobs organisation, Sector 1 is reorganised as at Annex D.

(2) The Sector's AOR is now also divided into three sub-sectors. These follow Commune boundary lines and are allocated to the three teams as follows:

- | | | | |
|------|---------------------|---|------|
| (a) | <u>Sub-Sector 1</u> | - | UM 1 |
| (i) | RUKARA | - | 5601 |
| (ii) | MUHAZI | - | 4590 |

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(iii)	RUTONDE	-	4984
(iv)	KAYONZA	-	5784
(v)	KABARONDO	-	6278
(vi)	KIGERAMA	-	6070
(vii)	MUGESERA	-	4764
(viii)	SAKE	-	4354
(ix)	BIRENGA	-	5959

(b) Sub-Sector 2 - UM 2

(i)	RUKIRA	-	6658
(ii)	RUSUMO	-	7549

(c) Sub -Sector 3 - UM 3.(KIGALI and BYUMBA prefectures). This team will be based in KIGALI. Specific orders will be issued later.

b. Tasks.

(1) All teams will perform duties as stated in para 6 of these instructions. Teams will also visit border posts in their respective team AORs on a daily basis to monitor and report on border crossings.

(2) Despite our new tasks, teams are reminded that the need to continue to observe and report on other incidents and activities is still of paramount importance . These could include activities of RPA, FRGF and acts of banditry.

(3) The teams will also provide duty officer of the day as per programme and be ready to detail a stand by patrol as and when required.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Weekly Patrol Programme. Teams should ensure that their weekly patrol programmes reach Sect HQ by 0900 hrs

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every Friday.

(2) Patrols. Patrols will be conducted daily.

(3) Daily Patrol Reports. Daily patrol reports are to be submitted to Sect HQ not later than 1600 hrs as per laid down format.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

7. a. Leave/CTO. Team Ldrs are to plan their team's leave/CTO programme in such a way as not to affect the operational efficiency of their teams. The total persons on leave/CTO should not exceed 25% of the posted strength.

b Transport. Teams are allocated vehs as follows:

(1) UM1 - 1006.

(2) UM2 - 1089.

(3) UM3 - To be allocated later.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

8. Comd and con in respect of UM1 and UM2 will be exercised directly by this HQ. However, for UM3 detailed orders regarding operational and administrative comd will be issued on receipt of clarification from Milobs Gp HQ.

CONCLUSION

9. The above instructions though not exhaustive, do provide broad guidelines for the execution of the assigned tasks as per the new mandate. I would therefore like you to use your own ingenuity and initiative where the situation so demands. It should be our endeavour to carry out the tasks at hand with dedication and a sense of purpose. I am confident that you shall be able to stand up to the challenge.

G A BIAH Maj
G A BIAH
Maj
Ag Sect Comd

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Annexes :

- A. Organisation of Milobs.
- B. Redeployment of Milobs.
- C. Tasks in new mandate.
- D. Organisation of Sector 1.

Distribution:

Internal:

Action:

UM1

UM2

UM3

Ops Offr

Pers/Log Offr

Hum Offr

External:

Information:

Milobs Gp HQ

MILOB GROUP HQ

C M O
SO TO CMO

(140)

ANNEX A TO

26/01/9

DATED 26 DEC 95

OPS BRANCH (8) S O O OPS OFFR 1 OPS OFFR 2 SIG OFFR SENIOR D O D O x3	ADM/PERS BRANCH (3) SMPO SO (PERS) SO(FIN)	LOG BRANCH (2) SLOGO ALOGO	FCT,NAIROBI (2)
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(17)


KIBUNGO/ KIGALI HQ STAFF - 3 * TEAMS(3) x 7 (24)	SECT 2 GITARAMA HQ STAFF - 3 * TEAMS(3) x 7 (24)	SECT 3 BUTARE HQ STAFF - 3 * TEAMS(3) x 4 (15)	SECT 4 CYANGUGU HQ STAFF - 3 * TEAMS(3) x 9 (30)	SECT 5 GISENYI HQ STAFF - 3 * TEAMS(3) x 9 (30)
--	---	---	---	--

* HQ STAFF

SECT CDR
OPS OFFR
LOG/PERS OFFR

TANZANIE

ANNEX B TO
26/01/0
DATED 15 Dec



ANNEX C TO
28/01/96
DATED 15 DEC 95

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

TASKS FOR MILOBs IN NEW MANDATE

1. Reorganise and redeploy in five sectors.
2. Assist the Govt of Rwanda in facilitating voluntary and safe return of refugees.
3. Assist the Govt of Rwanda in its effort to promote a climate of confidence and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks.
4. Continue to monitor communes, transit camps and border crossings.
5. Monitor progress of refugee repatriation, their movement and settlement.
6. Assist UNHCR and other international agencies in repatriation of refugees.
7. Assist in coordination of humanitarian activities of humanitarian agencies.

ANNEX D TO
2B/01/G
DATED 18 DEC 95

MILOBS SECTOR 2B
TEMPORARY DEPLOYMENT
WEF 18 DEC 95

SECT HQ: 1204, 1106, 423

01.	Maj	GA BIAH	GHANA	Ops Offr & Ag/Sect Comd	CU3
02.	Maj	K SINGH	INDIA	Ops/Sec offr	CU3A
03.	Maj	MK YADAV	INDIA	Hum Offr	CUH
04.	Lt Cdr	S AMOAMA	GHANA	Pers & Log Offr	CU4

UM 1: 1006

05.	Maj	HV AGUILERA	URUGUAY	Team Leader	UM1A
06.	Maj	N SIANGA	ZAMBIA	Team 2IC	UM1B
07.	Maj	AE AIRENDE	NIGERIA	Team Member	UM1C
08.	Capt	C NYONI	ZIMBABWE	Team Member	UM1D
09.	Capt	Y CISSE	GUINEA	Team Member	UM1E

UM 2: 1089

10.	Maj	I MAULANA	MALAWI	Team Leader	UM2A
11.	LtCdr	OH OKUNBOR	NIGERIA	Team 2IC	UM2B
12.	Maj	P KAHUNI	ZIMBABWE	Team Member	UM2C
13.	Maj	ND ROSADILLA	URUGUAY	Team Member	UM2D
14.	Capt	F TRAORE	GUINEA	Team Member	UM2E
15.	Capt	D CHISANGA	ZAMBIA	Team Member	UM2F

STANDBY VEHS : 1008, 1091, 418

GA BIAH Maj
GA BIAH
Maj
Ag/Sect Comd

TO: SOO
FROM: CDR SECT 1B - GITARAMA

28 NOV 95

FINAL REPORT - SECTOR 1B

REF: YOUR 1273/OPS DATED 25 NOV 95

1. FURTHER TO YOUR REFERENCED FAX, PLEASE FIND ENCLOSED THE "FINAL REPORT" FOR SECTOR 1B.
2. I HOPE THIS FORMAT WILL MEET YOUR NEEDS. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO ONLY REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN THE GITARAMA PREFECTURE; YOU WILL NOTE THAT I HAVE MADE SOME COMMENTS THAT WOULD APPLY TO THE WHOLE OF RWANDA.
3. GREETINGS.



R.V. BLANCHETTE
LT-COL
CDR SECT 1B - GITARAMA

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SECTOR 1B - GITARAMA

FINAL REPORT

COVERING THE MANDATE CONFERRED BY UNSCR 997 (9 JUNE 95)

27 NOVEMBER 1995

GENERAL

SECTOR 1B SHARES ITS BOUNDARIES WITH SIX SECTORS. IT CORRESPONDS TO THE PREFECTURE OF GITARAMA WHICH COUNTS 17 COMMUNES FOR A POPULATION JUST UNDER 800 000 INHABITANTS. AT ANY GIVEN TIME, THIS SECTOR PERSONNEL CONSISTED OF 21 TO 27 OFFICERS OF 13 DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES.

THE GENERAL SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE MANDATE HAS BEEN RELATIVELY ACTIVE WITH NUMEROUS KILLINGS, ARBITRARY ARRESTS AND ACTS OF BANDITRY. THE POPULATION IN GENERAL DOES NOT SUPPORT THE RPA WHICH IS STILL THE DRIVING FORCE BEHIND MOST ARRESTS.

AIM

THE AIM OF THIS REPORT IS TO PROVIDE AN OVERVIEW OF MILOB ACTIVITIES DURING THIS MANDATE AND, AS THE MANDATE MAY NOT BE RENEWED, TO REFLECT ON THE MISSION AS A WHOLE.

SCOPE

THIS REPORT IS ADHERING TO THE FRAMEWORK OF THE FIVE TENANTS OF THE CURRENT MANDATE, AS EXPRESSED IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 997 DATED 9 JUNE 1995.

A LAST SECTION WILL COVER A BRIEF ANALYSIS OF THE MISSION AS A WHOLE, IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE RENEWAL OF THE MANDATE.

REVIEW OF THE FIVE TENANTS OF THE MANDATE

FIRST TENANT - RECONCILIATION

"(A) EXERCISE ITS GOOD OFFICES TO HELP ACHIEVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WITHIN THE FRAME OF REFERENCE OF THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT;"

RECONCILIATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE GENOCIDE HAS BEEN A REAL CHALLENGE. INDICATORS SHOW THAT THE POPULATION IN GITARAMA DOES NOT, IN GENERAL, SUPPORT THE RPA. IN FACT, THE RELATION BETWEEN THE RPA AND THE POPULATION IS MORE ONE WHERE AN ARMY OF OCCUPATION IS PRESSURING A FEARING POPULATION IN

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ORDER TO MAINTAIN SECURITY IN THE COUNTRY. THE REAL RESULT OF THIS BEHAVIOR IS A WORSENING SITUATION WHERE THE MAJORITY CONTINUES TO FEAR THE ARMED MINORITY. TO A LARGE EXTENT, THIS CONFRONTATION CAN ALSO BE TRANSLATED IN TERMS OF THE MILITARY COMPONENT (MINORITY) OPPOSING THE CIVILIAN COMPONENT (MAJORITY). IN THIS RESPECT, MILOBS HAVE HAD A MAJOR IMPACT IN "PUTTING SOME BALM" ON THE ROUGH RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE TWO COMPONENTS.

MILOBS IN SECTOR 1B HAVE ATTEMPTED TO IMPROVE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE RPA AND TO GAIN ITS CONFIDENCE. THIS HAS PROVED SUCCESSFUL WITH THE THREE RPA BRIGADE COMMANDERS WHO HAVE SUCCESSIVELY COMMANDED THE 305 BDE WHICH COVERS ALMOST ALL GARRISONS IN THE PREFECTURE: LT-COL NGOGA (NOW IN GISENYI AND RUHENGERI), LT-COL KAYONGA (PRESIDENT OF THE WAR COUNCIL AND 2/IC OF 305 BDE) AND COL NDEGEYINKA (ACTUAL COMMANDER FROM THE FRGF).

TO ACHIEVE THIS AIM, SPORTS AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES WITH THE RPA WERE ORGANIZED AT VARIOUS LEVELS. THIS PROGRAM, COMBINED TO AN ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP AT THE SECTOR COMMANDER / BRIGADE COMMANDER LEVEL HAS GREATLY IMPROVED THE SECTOR'S ABILITY TO INFLUENCE EVENTS BETWEEN THE RPA AND THE LOCAL POPULATION. THE REQUEST AND NOMINATION OF A PERMANENT LIAISON OFFICER WITH AN OFFICE AT THE PREFECTURE ALLOWED BETTER COOPERATION NOT ONLY BETWEEN MILOBS AND THE RPA BUT ALSO BETWEEN THE PREFECTURAL AUTHORITIES AND THE RPA. JOINT PATROLS WITH THE RPA (WITH LIMITED AIMS), HAVE HELPED SOLVED NUMEROUS PROBLEMS IN AREAS WHERE BANDITRY (OFTEN BY UNIFORMED MEN) CREATED FEAR AMONG THE POPULATION. HELIPATROLS WITH RPA AUTHORITIES HAVE PROVEN ESPECIALLY FRUITFUL IN TERMS OF OBTAINING BETTER COOPERATION IN THE VARIOUS RPA DETACHMENTS IN THE PREFECTURE.

THE RPA HAS RECENTLY AGREED TO HAVE THE LOCAL POLITICAL COMMISSAR TO BRIEF MILOBS ON RPA STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. IT IS ALSO SIGNIFICANT THAT THE RPA HAS REQUESTED THE SECTOR COMMANDER TO BRIEF RPA OFFICERS ON VARIOUS MILITARY TOPICS SUCH AS OFFICERS' ETHIC AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PROFESSIONAL ARMY. THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A GOOD SIGN OF AN ARMY ON THE ROAD TO PROFESSIONALISM. SENIOR RPA OFFICERS FULLY REALIZE THAT RECONCILIATION WILL BE POSSIBLE ONLY ONCE THE POPULATION SUPPORTS THE RPA. THE POPULATION WILL SUPPORT, OR MAY SUPPORT, THE RPA WHEN ITS TRACK RECORD AS A PROFESSIONAL ARMY WILL HAVE REACHED A "DECENT" LEVEL. WITH THE SMALL MINORITY THAT THE RPA REPRESENTS, RECONCILIATION IS NOT A CHOICE FOR THE CURRENT POWER IN THE COUNTRY. ON THE LONG RUN, IT IS ONLY A MATTER OF TIME BEFORE THE PENDULUM OF POWER STARTS MOVING IN FAVOR OF THE MAJORITY. THE RPA MUST GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION IF IT WANTS TO RETAIN POWER OR A REASONABLE SHARE OF IT.

MILOBS IN SECTOR 1B HAVE BEEN QUITE ACTIVE PROMOTING THIS VIEW AND IT IS IN THAT SPIRIT THAT A LETTER WAS DRAFTED BY THIS SECTOR HQ AND SIGNED BY THE RPA BRIGADE COMMANDER TO AUTHORIZE ALL MILOBS TO VISIT PRISONS, COMMUNAL CACHOTS AND MEDICAL FACILITIES WITH DETAINEES. THIS INITIATIVE HAS TURNED

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OUT TO BE A REAL SUCCESS. THROUGH THESE VISITS AND CONTACTS WITH THE "INSPECTEUR DE POLICE JUDICIAIRE" (IPJ), MILOBS WERE ABLE TO DAILY ORIENT OFFICERS OF THE HIGH COMMISSION ON LEADS INVOLVING HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. THE MERE PRESENCE OF MILOBS AT THE CACHOT WAS OBVIOUSLY (AS SEEN BY THE REACTION OF THE DETAINEES) PROVIDING A "RAY OF HOPE" TO THE INMATES. THE VISITING FAMILIES WHO HAVE TO PROVIDE FOOD TO THE PRISONERS HAVE, ON NUMEROUS OCCASIONS, EXPRESSED THEIR GRATITUDE TO THE VISITING MILOBS.

THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE GITARAMA PRISON, PROBABLY THE MOST OVERCROWDED PRISON IN THE WORLD, IS QUITE TELLING IN TERMS OF THE INFLUENCE THAT MILOBS HAVE HAD ON RECONCILIATION. THIS SECTOR HAD MADE THE MONITORING OF THIS "THERMOMETER OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN RWANDA" ITS HIGHEST PRIORITY. WHEN, IN THE SPRING, THREE PEOPLE WERE DYING EVERYDAY IN THE PRISON, THE MEDIA WAS TALKING OF A "GENOCIDE IN SLOW MOTION". THE SITUATION HAS NOW CHANGED A LOT. THE ICRC, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT AND THE HUMAN RIGHT OFFICERS PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN MAKING THIS PRISON MORE HUMANE, WITH ONLY A FEW DEATHS PER MONTH FOR A POPULATION OF 6500 INMATES.

MILOBS HAVE OFTEN PLAYED THE ROLE OF "INTERMEDIARY" BETWEEN THE PRISON AUTHORITIES, THE RPA, VISITORS AND OTHER NGOS. FREQUENT VISITS TO THE "INTELLECTUALS ROOM" (WHERE THE PRISONERS' LEADERS LIVE), HAVE ALLOWED THE PRISONERS TO HAVE A MUCH BETTER PICTURE OF THE "OUTSIDE" THAN WHAT THE RUMORS AND PROPAGANDA CAN PROVIDE FROM "THE INSIDE". WITH THE OFFICIAL OPENING OF THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE PRISON ON 9 NOV 95 AND ITS FIRST USE ON 19 NOV 95, THE SITUATION, ALBEIT APPALLING TO A PRISTINE OBSERVER, HAS IMPROVED TREMENDOUSLY. WHAT IS STILL TROUBLING IS THE RISK THAT THE NEW LOWER DENSITY OF INMATES IN THE PRISON BE CONSIDERED AS A PRETEXT FOR MORE ARRESTS. SOME INDICATORS SHOW THAT THIS IS A REAL POLICY AND MILOBS ARE MONITORING THE SITUATION, ESPECIALLY IN THE COMMUNES WHERE WAVES OF ARRESTS DEVELOP.

IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT THE REHABILITATION OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IS AT THE BASIS OF THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS. ON THIS AVENUE, MILOBS HAVE BEEN PARTICULARLY USEFUL. EXPECTING MOVEMENT OF 4108 DETAINEES TOWARDS OTHER DETENTION FACILITIES MOSTLY IN KIGALI, THIS HQ HAS ORCHESTRATED VARIED SUPPORT TO IPJs, FROM THE MOVING OF THEIR FURNITURE TO THEIR NEW WORKING PLACE TO THE PROVISION OF GASOLINE FOR THEIR MOTORCYCLES. UNAMIR MILOBS HAVE ARRANGED FOR THE LENDING OF A PHOTOCOPY MACHINE AND A GENERATOR FOR THE QUICK TREATMENT OF PRISONERS' FILES. MILOBS HAVE ALSO MADE A REQUEST TO PROVIDE THE DIRECTOR OF THE PRISON WITH A VEHICLE TO MAKE HIM MORE EFFICIENT IN HIS ENDEAVORS. IT MUST BE UNDERLINED THAT BOTH THE PRISON AUTHORITIES AND THE RPA SECURITY FORCE AT THE PRISON HAVE BEEN VERY COOPERATIVE WITH MILOBS.

ONE OF THE MAJOR SCAR LEFT BY THE WAR IS THE RIFT BETWEEN THE RPA AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. IN KABGAYI, WHERE THE MILOB HQ IS LOCATED, THE TERM "TUG-OF-WAR" HAS BEEN USED TO DESCRIBE THE SITUATION. HISTORY REMINDS ALL THAT THE 1959 REVOLUTION EMANATED FROM GITARAMA, AND MORE SPECIFICALLY FROM KABGAYI

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WHICH HAS "PRODUCED" THE HUTU INTELLECTUAL CLASS AT THE HELM OF THIS REVOLUTION. IT SEEMS THAT THE RPA HAS WELL REGISTERED THIS HISTORICAL FACT AND IS KEEPING A CLOSE EYE ON THE SITUATION IN KABGAYI. THE THREATS TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE DIOCESE, MONSEIGNEUR ANDRE SIBOMANA, HAS CRYSTALLIZED THIS TENSION AND MILOBS HAVE FOUND THEMSELVES IN THE MIDDLE OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, DOUBTFUL ARREST PROCEDURES, COMPLAINTS AND EVEN AN AMBUSH ATTEMPT. THE INFLUENCE THAT MILOBS HAVE HAD IS PARTICULARLY EVIDENT THROUGH SIBOMANA'S WILLINGNESS TO DEAL WITH MILOBS AS SOON AS THERE ARE TENSIONS IN THE AIR.

OVERALL, NO AGENCY CAN CLAIM ABSOLUTE SUCCESS IN RECONCILING THE MINORITY WITH THE MAJORITY, THE MILITARY WITH THE CIVILIAN OR THE TUTSI WITH THE HUTU IN RWANDA. HOWEVER, MILOBS CAN LEGITIMATELY CLAIM TO HAVE POSITIVELY INFLUENCED THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS IN SECTOR 1B. THE MOST TELLING TESTIMONY SUPPORTING THIS CONTENTION IS THAT THE POPULATION AT LARGE, THE CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES AND EVEN THE RPA HAVE EXPRESSED THEIR APPRECIATION TO MILOBS AND WOULD RATHER SEE UNAMIR'S MANDATE RENEWED.

SECOND TENANT - REFUGEES

"(B) ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA IN FACILITATING THE VOLUNTARY AND SAFE RETURN OF REFUGEES AND THEIR REINTEGRATION IN THEIR HOME COMMUNITIES, AND, TO THAT END, TO SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA IN ITS ONGOING EFFORTS TO PROMOTE A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE AND TRUST THROUGH THE PERFORMANCE OF MONITORING TASKS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY WITH MILITARY AND POLICE OBSERVERS;"

MILOBS FROM THIS SECTOR HAVE BEEN USED ON A "AS NEEDED BASIS" TO SUPPORT OPERATION HOPE, OPERATION RETOUR AND ALL THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE KIBEHO INCIDENT (OPERATION OVERTURE). THESE OPERATIONS WERE PLANNED AT UNAMIR'S HQ AND CAN BE BETTER DESCRIBED IN USING THAT LEVEL OF REVIEW.

IN TERMS OF THE PRESENT MANDATE, THERE HAS BEEN A MAJOR IMPROVEMENT IN LOOKING AFTER RETURNEES BY COORDINATING EFFORTS WITH THE SEMI-PERMANENT UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE IN GITARAMA. SHE HAS PROVIDED THIS HQ WITH USEFUL INFORMATION CONCERNING THE NUMBER OF REFUGEES TO BE EXPECTED IN EACH OF THE COMMUNES. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE HAVE USED THESE STATISTICS TO "PROD" BOURGMESTRES WITH RESPECT TO THEIR LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS FOR THE RECEPTION OF THESE RETURNEES. MILOB TEAMS HAVE BEEN PRESENT AT COMMUNE OFFICES FOR MOST OF THE ARRIVALS OF RETURNEES SINCE 26 AUG 95, WHEN THE POLICY OF "REFOULEMENT" BEGAN IN ZAIRE. FURTHERMORE, IN PREPARATION FOR A POTENTIAL MASSIVE RETURN OF REFUGEES IN THE MONTHS TO COME, THIS HQ HAS RECEIVED FROM THE UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE AN OPTION PAPER FOR INPUT OR COMMENTS. THE UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE ENVISAGES A USEFUL ROLE FOR MILOBS IN ANY OF THE OPTIONS DEVELOPED TO

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CATER FOR THE RETURNEES. MEANWHILE, MILOBS ARE COORDINATING WITH HER THE VISIT OF CERTAIN COMMUNES BY GROUPS OF REFUGEES.

CLOSE TO 1300 RETURNEES HAVE NOW BEEN CONFIRMED BY MILOBS AND THE FLOW HAS SIGNIFICANTLY DRIED OUT IN THE LAST FEW WEEKS. MILOBS HAVE DISCUSSED AGAIN AND AGAIN WITH THE RPA THE AGREED UPON DEFERRAL OF ARRESTS UNTIL THE RETURNEES HAVE SETTLED ON THEIR RESPECTIVE HILLS. LESS THAN 3 % OF ALL RETURNEES HAVE BEEN ARRESTED AND IN MOST CASES IT WAS THROUGH THE CORRECT PROCEDURES INVOLVING AN IPJ. THE REFERENCE USED WHEN DISCUSSING ARREST PROCEDURES WITH THE RPA OR CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES IS A TWO DAY SEMINAR ON ARREST PROCEDURES THAT WAS FUNDED BY THE UNHCR IN AUGUST 95.

MILOBS HAVE FOLLOWED THE TRACE OF RETURNEES RIGHT DOWN TO THE HOUSEHOLD TO SEE WHAT PARTICULAR DIFFICULTIES THEY WERE ENCOUNTERING. THIS INFORMATION HAS FILTERED DOWN TO THE UNHCR REPRESENTATIVE, TO HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICERS OR VARIOUS NGOS WHO WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO HELP THEIR FLIGHT.

THIRD TENANT - HUMANITARIAN AID

"(C) SUPPORT THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN AID, AND OF ASSISTANCE AND EXPERTISE IN ENGINEERING, LOGISTICS, MEDICAL CARE AND DEMINING;"

THE PROVISION OF HUMANITARIAN AID IN RWANDA IS A VERY COMPLEX PROCESS WHICH REQUIRES A STRUCTURED REVIEW. THE FOLLOWING SUB-TITLES WILL FACILITATE THIS SURVEY.

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION AFTER THE WAR

THE WAR HAD WIDELY DEVASTATED THE INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE PREFECTURE. APART FROM THE LARGE NUMBER OF IDPS, WIDOWS AND ORPHANS WHO NEEDED SUPPORT, BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE LIKE ELECTRIC SUPPLY AND WATER SUPPLY HAD TO BE RESTORED. MOST OF THE HOSPITALS/HEALTH CENTERS WERE RANSACKED AND FURNITURE AND MEDICAL EQUIPMENT STOLEN. THEIR RESTORATION WAS A MAJOR TASK. SIMILARLY, A LARGE NUMBER OF HOUSES WERE DAMAGED AND THEIR RECONSTRUCTION WAS A PRIORITY TASK. THE TRACING AND RE-UNIFICATION PROGRAM FOR THE ORPHANS AND THEIR REHABILITATION NEEDED GREATER ATTENTION.

GENERAL MODE OF OPERATION

IN ORDER TO COORDINATE AND STREAMLINE THE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO BE RENDERED, THERE WAS A NECESSITY TO OBTAIN BASIC DATA. THE BASIC DATA WHICH WAS COLLECTED BY MILOBS OVER A PERIOD OF TIME DURING THE PATROLS WAS AS FOLLOWS:

NUMBER, LOCATION AND CONDITION OF HOSPITALS/ HEALTH CENTERS IN THE COMMUNES.

DETAILED LIST OF IDPS AND WIDOWS, THEIR LOCATION, CONDITION AND PROBLEMS.

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DETAILED LIST OF ORPHANS (ACCOMPANIED/
UNACCOMPANIED) THEIR LIVING CONDITIONS AND
ASSISTANCE REQUIRED.

DATA REGARDING DAMAGED HOUSES, BUILDINGS AND
SCHOOLS.

STATE OF ROADS AND TRACKS, CONDITION OF BRIDGES AND
EVALUATION OF THE ENGINEERING SUPPORT REQUIRED TO
IMPROVE THEIR STATE.

AGRICULTURAL INFORMATION TO INCLUDE THE CURRENT
STATE AND THE EVALUATION OF THE ASSISTANCE IN TERMS
OF PROVISION OF SEEDS, AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENTS,
FERTILIZERS AND INSECTICIDES.

REQUIREMENT AND MODALITIES OF DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD
DONATED BY WORLD FOOD PROGRAM TO POOR FAMILIES,
WIDOWS AND ORPHANS.

CONSTANT MONITORING OF THE PLIGHT OF IDPs AND
RETURNEES IN THE COMMUNES.

AFTER THE BASIC DATA WAS OBTAINED, IT WAS SIFTED,
EVALUATED AND PRIORITIZED ACCORDINGLY. THIS WAS SUBDIVIDED
INTO VARIOUS CATEGORIES TO CATER FOR THE FORM OF ASSISTANCE
REQUIRED SUCH AS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE, MEDICAL ASSISTANCE,
AGRICULTURAL ASSISTANCE, SOCIAL WORK AND ASSISTANCE IN TERMS
OF FOOD SUPPLY AND PROVISION OF BASIC AMENITIES.

MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS

ALTHOUGH RESOURCES AVAILABLE WITH UNAMIR IN TERMS OF
FUNDING WAS RESTRICTED, A LARGE NUMBER OF TARGETS COULD BE
ACHIEVED. THESE ARE SUMMARIZED BELOW:

ASSISTANCE IN REFURBISHMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE.

- ▲ INITIATION AND COORDINATION OF THE EXPANSION OF
GITARAMA PRISON IN COORDINATION WITH LOCAL
AUTHORITIES.
- ▲ REPAIR OF SEVERAL COMMUNE GENERATORS IN
KAYENZI, NTONGWE, RUTOBWE AND NYAKABANDA
COMMUNES.
- ▲ REPAIR OF THREE BRIDGES IN RUNDA COMMUNE ON THE
ROAD LEADING TO "POLE DE DEVELOPMENT" CENTER.
- ▲ LEVELLING AND REPAIR OF THE ROAD IN THE CHURCH
COMPLEX AT KABGAYI IN GITARAMA.
- ▲ RESTORATION OF WATER PUMPS AND PIPELINES IN
SOME COMMUNES WITH THE ACTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
NGOs.

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TRANSPORTATION OF CARGO.

- ▲ THROUGH THIS SECTOR'S COORDINATION, TRUCKS WERE REGULARLY PROVIDED TO NGOS AND LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF FOOD, MEDICINES, SEEDS, FERTILIZERS, FIRE WOOD AND BUILDING MATERIAL.
- ▲ REGULAR ASSISTANCE FOR THE TRANSPORTATION OF TIMBER FOR THE REPAIR OF BRIDGES TO INCREASE THE MOBILITY OF NGOS.
- ▲ ASSISTANCE IN THE TRANSPORTATION OF STATIONARY ITEMS DONATED BY UNICEF FROM GITARAMA PREFECTURE TO COMMUNE OFFICES. THIS PARTICULAR ENDEAVOR WAS UNDERTAKEN BY MILOBS IN THE COURSE OF THEIR NORMAL PATROLS AND WAS FOUND TO BE AN EXCELLENT WAY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES.

SOCIAL WORK.

- ▲ CONSTANT MONITORING OF THE PLIGHT OF RETURNEES AND IDPs IN THE COMMUNES AND ASSISTING THEM TO A MAXIMUM EXTENT.
- ▲ OBTAINING BODY BAGS, PLASTIC SHEETINGS, RUBBER GLOVES AND CHEMICALS FOR REBURIAL PROGRAMS.
- ▲ EFFORTS TOWARDS RE-UNIFICATION OF FAMILIES BY TAKING LISTS OF ORPHANS TO ALL COMMUNE OFFICES AND TRACING FAMILIES WITH THE HELP OF NGOS.
- ▲ DONATION OF BLANKETS AND CLOTHING TO ORPHANS IN ORPHANAGES AT KABGAYI AND NYANZA.

MEDICAL ASSISTANCE.

- ▲ MILOBS PARTICIPATED IN THE PREFECTURE VACCINATION PROGRAM BY CONVEYING MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND POLIO VACCINES TO NYAKABANDA COMMUNE DURING NOV 95.
- ▲ THIRTY THOUSAND ORS (ORAL REHYDRATION SALTS) PACKETS WERE DISTRIBUTED TO ALL THE HEALTH CENTERS IN THE PREFECTURE.
- ▲ MEDICINES FOR COMMON AILMENTS WERE DONATED TO VARIOUS HEALTH CENTERS IN THE COMMUNES.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE.

- ▲ ENGINEERING SUPPORT WAS PROVIDED TO DIFFUSE UNEXPLODED GRENADES AND MORTAR BOMBS DISCOVERED FROM TIME TO TIME.

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- ▲ MINE AWARENESS LECTURE FOR NGOS WAS CONDUCTED AT SECTOR HQ TO FAMILIARIZE THEM WITH THE THREAT OF MINES IN RWANDA.

REHABILITATION EFFORT.

- ▲ MILOBS DREW THE ATTENTION OF NGOS TO THE PLIGHT OF WIDOWS/ ORPHANS (RESCAPEES HAD BEEN LARGELY FORGOTTEN TO THE BENEFIT OF RETURNEES) IN THE COMMUNES TO SOLICIT SUPPORT FOR THEIR REHABILITATION WHICH WAS VERY SUCCESSFUL.
- ▲ MILOBS POINTED TO NGOS THE AREAS MOST SEVERELY AFFECTED WITH DESTROYED HOUSES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE "FOOD FOR WORK PROGRAM" IN THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSES.

COOPERATION WITH NGOS

MONTHLY MEETINGS WITH NGOS WORKING IN GITARAMA PREFECTURE WERE ORGANIZED ON A REGULAR BASIS TO DRAW THEIR ATTENTION AND SOLICIT THEIR PARTICIPATION IN RESOLVING OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. ALSO INTERESTED IN FRESH INFORMATION ON THE SECURITY SITUATION, NGOS WOULD EVALUATE THE POSSIBILITY OF SUPPORT AND WOULD WORK OUT THE MODALITIES OF ASSISTANCE TO BE RENDERED. MORE SPECIFICALLY, THE PROGRAM FOR THE FEEDING OF PRISONERS WITHOUT FAMILY SUPPORT IN THE COMMUNE CACHOTS (WHICH IS BEING LAUNCHED) AND THE SUPPORT TO NYANZA ORPHANAGE IN KIGOMA WERE INITIATED IN THIS FORUM ATTENDED BY 10 TO 15 DIFFERENT NGOS.

THIS SECTOR HAS ALSO INSTITUTED A WEEKLY SOCIAL FUNCTION (ON THURSDAYS TO MAXIMIZE ATTENDANCE) AT THE "RECONCILIATION ROOM" WHICH ALL NGOS ARE INVITED TO ATTEND TO CREATE YET ANOTHER FORUM, ALBEIT MORE INFORMAL, TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS IN THE SECTOR.

PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

ALTHOUGH HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE WAS RENDERED WITH RELATIVE EASE, SOME PROBLEMS WHICH WERE ENCOUNTERED ARE:

LACK OF RESOURCES IN GENERAL IN UNAMIR AND THE NECESSITY TO RELY ON NGOS FOR RESOURCES.

LACK OF BRIDGING MATERIAL AS MOST OF THE ENGINEERING TASKS IDENTIFIED IN THE PREFECTURE COULD NOT BE EXECUTED FOR LACK OF RESOURCES.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

IN THE HUMANITARIAN FIELD, MILOBS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ESTABLISH A GOOD RAPPORT WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES, THE POPULATION, UN AGENCIES AND NGOS. THE MAGNITUDE OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE REQUIRED WAS COLOSSAL AND THE ASSISTANCE RENDERED SO FAR HAS GONE A LONG WAY IN ALLEVIATING SOME OF THE HARDSHIP THAT THE LOCAL POPULATION IS FACING.

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FOURTH TENANT - TRAINING OF NATIONAL POLICE

"(D) ASSIST IN THE TRAINING OF A NATIONAL POLICE FORCE UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA HAS ENTERED INTO BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF OTHER TRAINING PROGRAMMES;"

MILOBS WERE ONLY REMOTELY CONCERNED WITH THIS TENANT OF THE MANDATE. HOWEVER THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP DEVELOPED WITH CIVPOL AT THE SECTOR LEVEL WARRANTS A FEW COMMENTS. IN SECTOR 1B, THE COOPERATION RECEIVED AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL WAS EXCELLENT. IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE DIFFERENCE OF DUTIES BETWEEN A MILITARY OBSERVER AND A CIVILIAN POLICE WERE VERY SHADY AND THAT IT MADE SENSE THAT CIVPOL MEMBERS BE UNDER THE "DE FACTO" OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE SECTOR COMMANDER. ACCORDINGLY, CIVPOL MEMBERS WERE SENT ON PATROLS MOSTLY LINKED TO A PARTICULAR CRIMINAL ACTIVITY OR WERE SENT TO INVESTIGATE THE NUMEROUS ROAD ACCIDENTS WHICH PLAGUE THE DANGEROUS GITARAMA SEGMENT OF ROAD. ELSEWHERE, CIVPOL MEMBERS WERE PARTICULARLY USEFUL TO DEAL WITH THE UNENDING SERIES OF BREAK-INS WHICH OCCURRED AT THIS HQ. THEIR THOROUGH INVESTIGATION, IN COOPERATION WITH THE RPA, LED TO A CORDON AND SEARCH OPERATION WHERE 11 THIEVES WERE ARRESTED AND JAILED.

IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS TENANT OF THE MANDATE MOSTLY DEALS WITH THE TRAINING OF GENDARMES IN RUHENGERI. HOWEVER, ONE MUST POINT OUT THAT THERE IS A DANGEROUS VACUUM OF GENDARMES OR COMMUNAL POLICES IN THE GITARAMA PREFECTURE. CIVPOL ELEMENTS SHOULD HAVE A LARGER MANDATE THAN THE SOLE TRAINING OF GENDARMES. THE DEPLOYMENT OF A RELIABLE POLICE FORCE COULD HAVE A DRAMATIC IMPACT ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY AND UNAMIR, THROUGH THE CIVPOL COMMISSIONER, SHOULD HAVE INFLUENCED THIS POTENTIAL CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE.

SIMILARLY, LOCAL DEFENCE FORCES (LDF), WHICH WERE DISBANDED AND WERE THEN REBORN FROM THEIR ASHES, SHOULD HAVE BEEN A SPECIAL AREA OF INTEREST FOR CIVPOLS THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. THE FACT THAT LDF WERE WELCOME BY THE POPULATION IS INDICATIVE OF THE LEVEL OF INSECURITY IN THE PREFECTURE. PROVIDING SOME GUIDANCE TO THESE LDF WHICH ARE TRAINED BY THE RPA COULD HAVE BEEN A VERY WORTHWHILE ENDEAVOR.

FINALLY, IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE HIGH FREQUENCY OF POSTINGS FOR CIVPOL MEMBERS WAS NOT CONDUCIVE TO A GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF THE SECTOR.

FIFTH TENANT - SECURITY

"(E) CONTRIBUTE TO THE SECURITY IN RWANDA OF PERSONNEL AND PREMISES OF UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES, OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA, INCLUDING FULL-TIME

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PROTECTION FOR THE PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, AS WELL AS THOSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICERS, ANT TO CONTRIBUTE ALSO TO THE SECURITY OF HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES IN CASE OF NEED;"

THIS TENANT OF THE MANDATE COULD BE THOUGHT TO APPLY ONLY TO FORMED TROOPS BUT MILOBS' ACTIVITIES ARE ACTUALLY QUITE INTERTWINED TO THE NOTION OF SECURITY. FIRSTLY, THIS IS SEEN IN TERMS OF MILOBS' OWN SECURITY AND THE SECURITY OF THEIR MATERIEL AND PREMISES. THIS SECTOR HQ HAS SHARED THE "PETIT SEMINAIRE" GARRISON WITH A PLATOON AND THE HQ OF A MALI COMPANY DURING THE PREVIOUS MANDATES AND IN THE FIRST PART OF THE CURRENT ONE. DURING THIS PERIOD, THERE WERE VIRTUALLY NO SECURITY PROBLEMS. AS SOON AS THE COMPANY LEFT IN AUGUST 95, THIEVES STARTED INVADING THE PERIMETER WHICH HAD BEEN REDUCED IN SIZE TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF THE COMPOUND. WITH 17 BREAK-INS IN A THREE MONTH PERIOD, THE MESSAGE WAS CLEAR THAT THE AREA WAS THIEVES INFESTED. UNFORTUNATELY, IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN THE REDEPLOYMENT OF ANY OF THE ARMED TROOPS BECAUSE OF THEIR SCARCITY UNDER THE NEW MANDATE.

SECONDLY, MILOBS IN SECTOR 1B HAVE BEEN SEEN AND USED AS THE CHOSEN NEGOTIATORS WITH THE RPA WHEN THE SITUATION WAS TENSE IN A GIVEN AREA OR AT A CHECK POINT. WHETHER THE BENEFICIARY OF THESE SERVICES WERE NGOS OR HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICERS, MILOBS' INTERVENTIONS WERE TIMELY AND APPROPRIATE. AT A HIGHER LEVEL, THE REGULAR MEETINGS BETWEEN THE SECTOR COMMANDER AND THE RPA BRIGADE COMMANDER HAVE HELPED IMPROVE THE SECURITY SITUATION THROUGHOUT THE PREFECTURE, ESPECIALLY IN TERMS OF TIGHTENING RPA SOLDIERS' DISCIPLINE.

THIRDLY, THIS HQ HAS PROVIDED A CONSTANT STATISTICAL SURVEY OF SECURITY INCIDENTS IN THE PREFECTURE. THERE ARE NOW MORE THAN 3000 DETAINEES IN THE 17 COMMUNE CACHOTS AND THE FLUCTUATIONS IN THIS NUMBER HAS BEEN A CRITICAL FACTOR TO EVALUATE THE SECURITY CLIMATE IN THE PREFECTURE. BY EXTENSION, THIS MONITORING, ONCE COMMENTED AND FORWARDED TO UNAMIR HQ, SHOULD HAVE ALLOWED THE AUTHORITIES AT THIS HIGHER LEVEL TO PROPERLY INTERACT WITH GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITIES.

FOURTHLY, THE LEVEL OF SUSPECTED RPA / UNIFORMED BANDITRY IN THIS COUNTRY IS HIGH ENOUGH TO WARRANT THE PRESENCE OF MILITARY OBSERVERS TO UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEMS THAT THIS YOUNG ARMY IS RUNNING INTO. THE RPA'S REQUEST TO HAVE COURSES ON ETHICS GIVEN TO THEIR OFFICER SPEAKS ABUNDANTLY IN THAT SENSE. A COROLLARY TO THESE OBSERVATIONS IS THE GRAVE PAY PROBLEM IN THE RPA. A PAY SYSTEM OTHER THAN THE CURRENT ONE THAT IS STRAIGHT OUT OF THE BUSH HAS TO BE ORGANIZED FORTHWITH. SPECIALIZED MILITARY OBSERVERS/CONSULTANTS COULD BE OF GREAT HELP IN THIS PROJECT AND THE IMPROVEMENT ON THE SECURITY SITUATION WOULD BE FELT IMMEDIATELY.

FIFTHLY, FRGF FIFTH COLUMN ACTIVITIES HAVE VARIED IN INTENSITY AND IN NATURE IN THE SECTOR. MILOBS HAVE THE REQUIRED EXPERTISE TO EVALUATE AND TO INTERPRET THEM ADEQUATELY. CASES OF ELECTRICAL TRANSFORMERS EMPTIED OF THEIR OIL AND BURNT, EUCALYPTUS FOREST BURNING, "ECONOMY SABOTAGE"

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WHERE PEASANTS REFUSE TO GROW MORE THAN WHAT THEY NEED TO SURVIVE AND FRGF INCURSIONS INTO THE NORTHERN COMMUNES HAVE ALL BEEN RECORDED BY MILOBS. THESE DESTABILIZING OPERATIONS CAN ONLY BE PRECURSORY TO FURTHER MILITARY ACTION AT ONE POINT OR ANOTHER. THE FRGF IS ACTIVE, AS REVEALED BY THE ARSENAL FOUND AFTER THE ATTACK ON IWAWA ISLAND. MILOBS REPRESENT THE ONLY AGENCY WHO CAN PROFESSIONALLY ASSESS THE "CONFRONTATION" THAT IS LIKELY TO HAPPEN BETWEEN THE RPA AND THE FRGF.

SIXTHLY, CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN SEEN RELYING HEAVILY ON UNAMIR OBSERVERS TO PROVIDE THEM AT LEAST AN "INSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION". THIS EXPRESSION HAS BEEN COINED TO EXPLAIN THE URGE OF THE AUTHORITIES WHO FEEL THREATENED IN THEIR PERSONAL SECURITY TO ASSOCIATE WITH UNAMIR. IN MOMENTS OF TENSIONS, THE PREFET, BOURGMESTRES, TEACHERS, PRIESTS, DOCTORS AND OTHERS HAVE OPTED TO VISIT THE PETIT SEMINAIRE OR HAVE ASKED FOR OUR VISIT. WHETHER THIS HAVE HELPED OR NOT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO EVALUATE IN A GENERAL PERSPECTIVE. SPECIFIC CASES, HOWEVER, HAVE BEEN QUITE TELLING.

ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, REPEATED VISITS TO THE PETIT SEMINAIRE BY A FEARING BOURGMESTRE HAVE ACTUALLY ALLOWED HIS "CASE" TO BE DISCUSSED BETWEEN MILOBS AND RPA LOCAL AUTHORITIES WHO HAVE AGREED TO "LOOK AFTER THE PROBLEM". THE END RESULT WAS THAT THE BOURGMESTRE, WHO STILL EXPECTS TO BE FIRED, HAS NOW HOPE IN THE FUTURE AND WISHES TO PLAN A RETURN TO HIS PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT.

ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE, IT IS SAD TO REMEMBER THAT THE RUHANGO SOUS-PREFET WAS KILLED, ALONG WITH FOUR MEMBERS OF HIS HOUSEHOLD, THE DAY AFTER HE HAD REQUESTED A MEETING WITH THE SECTOR COMMANDER TO DISCUSS HIS PERSONAL SECURITY. NO ONE COULD TELL IF MILOBS COULD HAVE HELPED HIS CASE BUT IT IS CERTAIN THAT CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE A MAJOR INFLUENCE ON THE RWANDESE LEGAL SYSTEM (BOURGMESTRE ARE AUTOMATICALLY IPJs) AND MILOBS' RELATIONSHIP WITH BOURGMESTRES SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

ANALYSIS OF THE MISSION AS A WHOLE

FROM THIS SECTOR'S PERSPECTIVE, MILOBS HAVE HAD A RELATIVE SUCCESS IN INFLUENCING THE SITUATION IN FOUR OF THE FIVE TENANTS OF THE CURRENT MANDATE. THE EVALUATION OF THIS RELATIVE SUCCESS MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE COSTS OF SUCH A MISSION AND IT BOILS DOWN TO A COMPLETELY POLITICAL DECISION.

THE MANDATE SHOULD BE RENEWED, IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER, BECAUSE THE POPULATION, CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES AND LOCAL RPA AUTHORITIES WOULD PROFIT FROM A RENEWED PRESENCE OF UNAMIR. THIS SECTOR OPERATIONS HAVE SHOWN THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO FULFIL A MANDATE WITHOUT FORMED TROOPS BUT THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO REACH A REASONABLE LEVEL OF EFFICIENCY. THERE IS STILL A LOT OF GOOD WORK THAT CAN BE DONE BY MILOBS IN WHAT HAS TO BE CONSTRUED AS A PEACE BUILDING OPERATION.

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CONCLUSION

THE PREVIOUS MANDATES HAVE SEEN THE RWANDESE GOVERNMENT SLOWLY TAKING CONTROL OF THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY. THIS CONTROL IS NOW QUITE COMPLETE. HOWEVER, IT IS ONLY A QUESTION OF TIME BEFORE THE MAJORITY ORGANIZES ITSELF EITHER FROM THE INSIDE OR FROM THE OUTSIDE TO OBTAIN A LARGER SHARE OF THE POWER. FACING THIS PERSPECTIVE, THE RPA IS TRYING TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE POPULATION BUT ROGUE ELEMENTS OF THE MILITARY REVERT TO BANDITRY TO COMPENSATE FOR THE JAGGEDNESS OF THEIR PAY SYSTEM.

IN THE BACKGROUND, THE CLOGGING UP OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IS SEEN AS A MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCK IN THE RECONCILIATION PROCESS. THE INTERNATIONAL AID SHOULD BE CONCENTRATING ON THIS PARTICULAR MATTER.

DONOR COUNTRIES SHOULD REALIZE THAT THE SITUATION IN THIS COUNTRY IS QUITE VOLATILE AND THAT THE PRESENCE OF MILITARY OBSERVERS COULD BE A CRUCIAL ELEMENT FOR THE PROVISION OF A CLEAR AND PROFESSIONAL PICTURE OF THE RWANDESE SITUATION.



R.V. BLANCHETTE
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL
COMMANDER SECTOR 1B - GITARAMA

A:\RAPFIN

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TO :MILOBS GROUP HQ (OPS BRANCH)

FROM:SECTOR 5-A RUHENGARI

DATE:27 NOVEMBER 1995.

REF :YOUR LETTER NUMBER 1273/OPS DATED ON 25 NOV 95.

SUBJECT: MILOBS FINAL REPORT.

1. PLEASE FIND BELOW THE REPORT AS ANNEX 'A' TO THIS LETTER AS REQUESTED VIDE REFERENCE LETTER.

2. WITH BEST REGARDS.



AB SIBANDA
LT COL
SEC COMD-5A

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ANNEX A TO
SEC 5A LTR
DATED 27 NOV 95

ACHIEVEMENTS OF MILOBS SECTOR 5-A

1. **GENERAL.** MILOBS OF THE SECTOR TRIED THEIR BEST TO FULFILL THE REQUIREMENTS OF MILOBS GROUP HEADQUARTERS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CURRENT MANDATE.

2. **ACHIEVEMENTS OF MILOBS.**

A. MONITOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN CONJUNCTION WITH HUMAN RIGHTS TEAM WHICH HELPED LOCALS TO GET JUSTICE THUS OVERALL UNAMIR EARNED GOOD NAMES.

B. GAINED CONFIDENCE OF LOCALS WHO WERE READY TO PROVIDE ANY SORT OF INFORMATION TO US VOLUNTARILY AND EXPRESSED THEIR GRATITUDE FOR BEING WITH THEM.

C. ESTABLISHED EXTREMELY GOOD WORKING RELATION WITH CIVIL AUTHORITIES STARTING FROM PREFECTURE DOWN TO SECTOR LEVEL. NEVER EVER MILOBS WERE DENIED ACCESS TO ANY CORNER TO OBTAIN INFORMATION OF ANY NATURE.

D. EXEMPLARY RELATION IS STILL MAINTAINED WITH RPA WHO GAVE US ACCESS EVERYWHERE IN THE PREFECTURE. WE DID NOT HAVE ANY NO GO AREAS AND NEVER HAD PROBLEMS WITH THEM. OFTEN JOINT PATROLLING WAS CONDUCTED WITH ALL LEVELS OF RPA COMMANDERS EVEN IN THE FRONT LINE. OCCASIONALLY RPA USED TO PROVIDE US WITH INFORMATION OF SIGNIFICANT IMPORTANCE BOTH OF FRGF AND ALSO THEMSELVES.

E. ESTABLISHED VERY GOOD WORKING RELATIONS WITH ALL THE NGOS PRESENT IN THE AREA TO AN EXTENT THAT THEY USED TO RESPOND TO OUR REQUEST FOR VARIOUS REQUIREMENTS OF COMMUNES.

F. WITH VERY VERY LIMITED RESOURCES OF OURS, STILL PROVIDED TRANSPORTATION ASSISTANCE TO CARRY PERSONS, SICK PEOPLE, SEEDS, FOODS, TEXT BOOKS AND OFFICE EQUIPMENTS TO ALL SIXTEEN COMMUNES.

Limitation
G. ALTHOUGH THE CURRENT MANDATE WAS TO PROVIDE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, IT IS WIDELY KNOWN, THAT WE HAD INADEQUATE RESOURCES TO FULFILL THE REQUIREMENTS OF LOCALS/LOCAL AUTHORITIES. TO SOME EXTENT THESE REQUIREMENTS WERE FULFILLED BY THE NGOS WHICH WERE ONLY POSSIBLE DUE TO GOOD RELATION WITH THEM.

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H. PRESENCE OF MILOBS IN THIS SECTOR, THOUGH WITHOUT FORMED TROOPS, STILL CONFIDENTLY CAN BE SAID THAT LOCALS, PARTICULARLY HUTUS CONSIDERED US AS PROTECTOR AGAINST HOSTILE RPA. FOR THAT REASON, WHEN RUMOURS OF UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL SPREAD TO LOCALS, THERE IS A SIGNIFICANT SENSE OF INSECURITY AMONG THEM.

J. THE VARIOUS NON UNAMIR AGENCIES AND NGO'S USED TO CONSIDER US AS AN ELEMENT OF PROTECTION AND NOW THEY SEEM TO BE VERY WORRIED ABOUT THEIR UNKNOWN FUTURE AFTER THE DEPARTURE OF MILITARY COMPONENTS OF UNAMIR.

UN RESTRICTEDUNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDANATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

FILE: SECT 5C/OPS
DATE: 27 NOV 95
TO: MILOBS GP HQ//SOO//
FROM: SECTOR COMD 5C KIBUYE
SUBJECT: MILOB FINAL REPORTS - SECTOR 5C KIBUYE
REF: MILOB Gp HQ 1273/Ops dated 25 November 1995

GENERAL

1. The aim of subject reports is not to reiterate events as described in our daily SITREPS which amply and clearly defines them. Rather, the following headings will summarize the resultant affects of MILOBS operations in the Kibuye Prefecture as we are, probably, concluding our mandate:

- a. Military observation operations.
- b. Humanitarian operations.
- c. UN agencies/NGO cooperation.
- d. Local authorities/Military cooperation.

MILITARY OBSERVATION OPERATIONS

2. MILOBS operations have only been partially successful. Although the Kibuye Prefecture is geographically small, it is very hilly with not one metre of paved roads. These roads are extremely poorly maintained, owing to the economic difficulties of the region, and deteriorate rapidly during the rainy seasons. This resulted in our inability to physically reach certain areas by road. Thankfully, UNAMIR Hel Ops was most cooperative with our helicopter requests to visit the most far reaches of our AOR, and we are most grateful for their support.

3. However, in the long run, we began to and are still limited in operational capability due to our depleted vehicle resources. These vehicles, the majority being Toyota 4X4, did not, in the long run, really stand up to the poor road conditions. Their constant unserviceability due to wear and tear diminished, but did not at any time prevent our patrol programme.

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4. Communications by line and radio was very good, owing to the fine work accomplished by the det of Indian Signals Coy co-located with us. They did wonders in maintaining good and effective communications which were vital to our operational capability in this remote sector.

5. The number of MILOBS available to work in this sector was sufficient, averaging a strength of twenty-five (25) members. This sector deployed an average of no less than two (2) daily patrols any given week, which allowed us a reliable, constant observation of events developing in this sector. We found the local population and some of the local authorities most cooperative, even eager at times to orient our observations of the security conditions in the communes of the Prefecture. Regrettably, we achieved very limited success, and at times outright failure, when dealing with the local governmental authorities and, especially, the RPA.

HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

6. Humanitarian operations were generally considered a success. MILOBS monitored closely the living conditions of the local population; however, the overall quality of life for people in Kibuye was poor, but slowly improving. There remain significant challenges to humanitarian ops because of our poor quality of roads and great distance from Kigali. Despite these challenges the HAC was very cooperative in coordinating support in this Prefecture. The recent grouping of a UN medium lift truck for our use provides improved flexibility for us in providing humanitarian support. We would like to continue to bring in the maximum number of blankets, medications, food stocks, school supplies, and other support as possible while UNAMIR resources are available to assist this very deprived Prefecture.

UN AGENCIES/NGO COOPERATION

7. UN agencies. Our relationship with the UN agencies and NGOs operating in our AOR was a frank success. We enjoyed a very good rapport and participated closely with the activities of UNHCR and UNHDP. This helped us throughout the mandate, and they provided for us some very good sources of information towards which we would orient our patrols. We mutually shared our communications and transportation assets in the execution of our duties.

8. NGOs. There again, a success. They cooperated with us fully, especially in moments of deteriorating security conditions. They attended regularly our weekly security briefings and were, on the most part, a valuable source of information. Our Humanitarian efforts were best focused when we benefited from the involvement of the NGOs

UN RESTRICTEDLOCAL AUTHORITIES/MILITARY COOPERATION

9. Local authorities. Our relationship with the local authorities was a failure. This is due mainly to the attitude and policies, real or implied, of the Préfet de Kibuye. This gentleman is an extremist in his views and methods of dealing with the local population and the returnees from Zaire. The bourgmestres are mainly, especially in the southern communes, reactionaries who make no attempt at cooperating with MILOBS, save for when they desire assistance or resources that we can obtain for them.

10. Otherwise, some local authorities have even issued orders that those who even communicate with UNAMIR are to be punished. Repeated efforts on our part to get the local authorities to allow MILOBS to have free and open access to observation and information as per the agreed mandate have been met with objections, and at time outright refusal.

11. Military. Our relationship with the local military, 9TH BN RPA which is the known main RPA organization in the Prefecture, was also a failure. All our efforts at rapprochement with them, especially the BN CO, was met with non-compliance to date. I have yet to meet him, although this was formally requested. The BN DCO, and other officers did come, but only when they required assistance from us.

12. The RPA LO, a Cpl, was, we believe, deliberately involved in maintaining us in the dark, while attempting to gain as much information from us as possible. The RPA LO claimed that there were nine coys and one Bn HQ of RPA in this Prefecture. However, when we asked about their disposition, strength and tasks, he did not inform us, and as yet to give us any information for that matter. Mr. le Préfet, when we asked him if we could get any of this information, recommended: "have your higher HQ ask our higher HQ for this information". Although our teams occasionally got information that there are platoon or section size organizations in commune centres or villages, we could never obtain the certification of this disposition from the RPA itself.

13. The general population, either pacified or subdued, lives in constant fear of arrest or harassment by the RPA who is their actual, national armed force. In fairness, we had an amicable relationship with certain individuals in the RPA, a useful thing when it comes to contributions to their weddings. The RPA was never outwardly hostile to our presence, except in a few isolated incidents which were really local initiatives. However, they really only barely tolerated our presence. We believe that, along with the local government, the RPA was and is involved in a campaign of repression of the mainly HUTU population and returnees because of the events of 1994. Our observation of this behaviour was annoying to them.

UN RESTRICTEDCONCLUSION

14. In conclusion, the MILOBS mission in the Kibuye Prefecture enjoyed some success, particularly in the Humanitarian aspect of the mission. However, we were limited and at times denied, by the local authorities and the RPA, the execution of our mandated task. In retrospect, the atmosphere in our sector could be compared to an observer mission in Vichy France, 1943.



Webster Chomba
Lieutenant-colonel
Sector Comd 5C
Kibuye

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Army Headquarters
DHQ PO New Delhi - 110011

02806/3/R/MS3D1

08 Jun 95

Headquarters
Southern Command (MS)
Eastern Command (MS)
Western Command (MS)
Central Command (MS)
Northern Command (MS)

High Commission of India - By Diplomatic Bag
Rwanda

DEPUTATION OFFICERS : ABROAD

1. The following officers have been approved for deputation to UNAMIR (Rwanda) :-

Ser	Personal Particulars	Present Unit	New Appointment at Rwanda
(a)	IC-31672/Lt Col VS Dadhwal, SM, VSM, Garh Rif	MT-4, Army HQ	Mil Obs
(b)	IC-39076 Maj P. Dixit, Armd Corps	85 Armd Regt	Mil Obs
(c)	IC-39959 Maj KJ Singh, Arty	143 Fd Regt	Mil Obs
(d)	IC-39338 Maj Guresh Gupta, Arty	136 Fd Regt	Mil Obs
(e)	IC-40305 Maj Raghu Akella, Engrs	HQ 84 Inf Bde	Mil Obs
(f)	IC-40033 Maj S Sabharwal, Arty	321 Fd Regt	Mil Obs
(g)	IC-39698 Maj GS Dhillon, DOGRA	17 DOGRA	Mil Obs
(h)	IC-40710 Maj S. Dhawan, Engrs	10 Engrs	Mil Obs

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Copy to :-

Min of Def/D(GS-I)
Embarkation HQ Bombay
CDR (O) Pune
57 Mtn Div Sig Regt
28 Inf Bde
34 Armd Bde
74 Inf Bde
75(I) Inf Bde
84 Inf Bde
116 Inf Bde
HQ 6 Sector RR
17 DOGRA
85 Armd Regt
136 Fd Regt
143 Fd Regt
321 Fd Regt
MT-4, Army HQ
MO-7, Army HQ
MO Dte, Army HQ

AG/Org-9; AG/CW-4(B); GS/MISO(PHG); Q Mov Air; Q Mov P3;
MO 1; SD 1A;

Internal

MS 1; MS 2; MS 6A; MS 6B; MS 11; MS 12; MS 13; MS 16;
MS 17; MS 4;

R

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