

[10. CONFIDENTIAL]

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES 51002
BOX 159
FILE 5
ACC. 1998/0123

File

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: COO
TAC HQ BUTARE

1000.7(DFC)/G/8

FROM: DFC/COS

DATE: 5 December 1994

SUBJECT: WORK IN THE OPERATIONS ROOM

1. Attached are excerpts from a Staff College Precis on the above stated subject matter for the attention and guidance of all Watch Keepers/Duty Officers.
2. It is hoped that this will further enhance the efficiency and smooth running of the operations room.
3. Acknowledge receipt.

HK ANYIDHO
Brig Gen
DFC/COS

\\wp51\\wp51doc\\vant0504.mem

G8
5/12/94
SB

SOME USEFUL NOTES FROM
A STAFF COLLEGE PRECIS

WORK IN THE OPERATIONS ROOM

(Note: An experienced observer watching an operations staff at work - in this case in a command vehicle - might look for the points set out in this Annex.)

LAYOUT

1. Are chinagraphs and pencils (sharpened) readily to hand? Is there a tin of talc cleaning fluid and a rag?
2. Are stationery and reference books stowed neatly? Are there rough paper, log sheets, **message** pads (with carbons inserted), SOPs (own and higher formation) and any code books in use?
3. Is essential information displayed on boards or clips? This should include:
 - a. Communications information (eg callsign, address group, net identification sign, telephone exchange lists etc).
 - b. LOCSTATs.
 - c. Current operation and administrative orders.
 - d. Reserve demolition lists.
 - e. Messages IN and OUT for the last 24 hours.
 - f. Completed log sheets.
 - g. Grouping of units and sub-units into battle groups and combat teams.
 - h. Proformae for routine states and returns.
 - i. Current code words, nicknames, pass words.
 - j. Officers' locations.
 - k. Officers' duty roster.
4. Is there a map, suitable mounted, on which information is being displayed as it comes in? Does it include information on flanking formations?
5. Is the vehicle adequately lit and cooled or heated?
6. Is the staff cell clean, eg waste paper in a container, no old mess tins or glasses, ash trays emptied? Are there drawers or racks for gloves, torches, etc; pegs for hats and coats?
7. Are headsets, handsets, etc, accessible to those working in the vehicle? Are there spare headsets for voice nets, so that the commander can listen? Is there an electric bell or some other means of summoning a runner?

D-1

RESTRICTED

8. Are respirators and weapons close at hand?

WORK OF WATCHKEEPERS.

9. Is there an atmosphere of calm or do officers look harassed and unable to cope with the pressure?
10. Are watchkeepers masters of the communications: putting their hands immediately on the equipment they need, using correct voice procedure, referring easily to the necessary codes and SCANT lists? Are messages passed deliberately and confidently with no 'ums' and 'ers'?
11. Is information correctly logged, marked on maps and acted upon? Are completed log sheets duplicated and circulated promptly.
12. If the commander or senior staff officer asks the watchkeeper (or duty staff officer) what is going on, can he brief him promptly from the map?
13. Is there close liaison between officers manning communications in the same vehicle; do they sit side by side, where they can see each other's logs, and the same map? If they do, passage of information between them will be simpler and quicker.
14. Can the watchkeeper receive a fast flow of messages or are callers ignored or constantly told to 'wait out'? Are they well practised in logging only essential parts of messages? Has a system of log shorthand been worked out in the HQ?
15. Are SITREPs passed back and laterally at regular intervals? Is only essential, interpreted information passed back to the superior HQ? Are SITREPs sent in a methodical form, left to right on the map, dealing with each subordinate unit/formation in turn or are SITREPs sent in a shapeless form, as ideas come into the writer's head?
16. Is the information received being considered? Are senior staff officers and the commander being kept informed of important developments?
17. Are chance visitors kept away from the watchkeeper? If so, are they briefed elsewhere by a knowledgeable officer or soldier from an up to date map?
18. Is the system of reliefs working properly or are the 2 watchkeepers both relieved at the same time? Is there a proper handover sequence between watchkeepers?

SOLDIERS

19. If there are radio operators or clerks in the staff cell/vehicle, have they been trained to form a useful part of the team or does the radio operator sit in front of a radio set (which needs practically no attention) reading a comic?

MAPS

20. Is an operations master map maintained, kept up to date neatly, with correct symbols? Are the watchkeepers able to do this? If not, have other arrangements been made, eg log sheets passed to a duty map maker? Have NCOs or soldiers been trained to mark maps? Is the commander's map kept up to date?

21. What other maps are kept; are they all necessary; are they all up to date?

STEP-UP GROUP

22. Is the step-up group ready to go out at short notice? What arrangements are made to ensure that the responsible staff officer has the latest information with him? Is a box or bag kept with duplicate operation orders, SCANT lists, etc? Is a map kept marked for him to take, or is there a drill for making a quick overlay from the master map?

ALTERNATIVE HQ

23. Has an alternative HQ been nominated; is it being kept fully up to date?

BRIEFING

24. Are the soldiers in the HQ kept informed of the operational situation.

COVERING UN CONFIDENTIAL

To: Distribution List

From: Force Commander

Date: November 1994

Subject: Contingency Plans

Blouin

MA
*Let me see if I can
with CO Ghanbatt,
1 also want to ensure
all found units
understand these
instructions
H. J.
20/11
DSC/101*

1. Enclosed are the HQ UNAMIR contingency plans for:
 - a. Security Alert - Op Plan NIKE;
 - b. Reinforcement - Op Plan HECTOR; and
 - c. Withdrawal and Evacuation - Op Plan JASON.
2. Addressees are to develop outline operation/support plans for submission to G3 Plans, HQ UNAMIR, by 5 Dec 94 as follows:
 - a. Military, CIVPOL and MILOBS:
 - (1) Sector 1 - CO NICOY;
 - (2) Sector 2 - CO GHANBATT;
 - (3) Sector 3 - OCs MALAWI and MALICOY to submit plans through Sector Comd;
 - (4) Sector 4A - CO ZAMBATT;
 - (5) Sector 4B - CO FRAFBATT;
 - (6) Sector 4C - CO ETHIOBATT;
 - (7) Sector 5 - CO TUNBATT;
 - (8) Sector 6 - COs INDBATT, CANCON and AUSMED.
 - b. Staff:
 - (1) Personnel/Logistics Support - DCOS SP
 - c. Civilian:
 - (1) UNAMIR civilian staff,)
 - (2) FSA personnel;) - Special Task Officer to CAO (Mr Lombardo) to coordinate
 - (3) Brown and Root personnel.)
 - d. UN Agencies - HAC to coordinate with respective Security Officers.

GB
17/12/94
SB

COVERING UN CONFIDENTIAL

COVERING UN CONFIDENTIAL

- e. NGOs - Sector Commanders (HAC to assist).
- 3. POC for enquiries is G3 Plans, HQ UNAMIR.

Distribution List

	Copy No 1
CO NICOY	2
CO GHANBATT	3
Comd Sector 3	4
OC MALAWICOY	5
OC MALICOY	6
CO ZAMBATT	7
CO FRAFBATT	8
CO ETHIOBATT	9
CO TUNBATT	10
CO INDBATT	11
CO AUSMED	12
CO CANCON	13
UNAMIR Civilian Security Officer	14
Special Task Officer to CAO	15
Security Officer UNREO	16
HAC	17
A/C Mil Obs Force	18
C UNCIVPOL	19
Brown & Root	20
FSA	

Internal

DCOSOPS	21
DCOS SP	22
G3 OPS	23
G3 PLANS	24
FSO	25
Camp Commandant	26

For Information

SRSG	27
MA/FC	28
MA/DFC/COS	29
CSS	30

COVERING UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN CONFIDENTIAL

5000.46 (Plans)

PART I

UNAMIR SECURITY ALERT CONTINGENCY PLAN

OP PLAN NIKE

GENERAL

1. This instruction covers the Security Alert Measures (SAMs) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan NIKE. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan NIKE are:

a. UNAMIR Reinforcement Contingency Plan - Op Plan HECTOR. Part II. It is likely that Op Plan NIKE SAMs could be activated concurrently with Op Plan HECTOR.

b. UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan - Op Plan JASON. Part III. Op Plan NIKE SAMs will be invoked if Op Plan JASON is activated.

2. Op Plan NIKE provides for the increase of UNAMIR security in the event of a deteriorating situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied locally or nationally, as the threat dictates.

3. It should be noted that the UNAMIR Rules of Engagement (ROE) levels of readiness/alert states may be applied independently or in conjunction with Op Plan NIKE.

THREAT

4. It is assessed that RGF has a developing capability to establish an insurgency threat against the BBGNU. The scale of this potential will increase with time. Current assessment is that the threat is likely to be manifest as follows:

a. Initially in Sector 4/5.

b. Concurrently in more than one border area.

c. In Kigali.

d. In the interior but not until the re-establishment of the population base in rural areas.

5. The threat to UNAMIR is likely to be:

a. A collateral threat caused by attacks on the BBGNU and RPA. Soft targets would be particularly vulnerable under these conditions.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN CONFIDENTIAL

- b. Direct attack on UNAMIR in order to achieve political ends.

PROTECTION

6. In either case, the protection of UNAMIR personnel must be paramount. Under the current mandate UNAMIR also has a duty to protect the following:

- a. UNREO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agency personnel.
- b. NGO Personnel.
- c. Displaced Persons, Refugees and civilians in sites or populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces.
- d. Any other person under UN protection.

7. UNAMIR resources are limited. It is accepted that the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited by an increased threat. In these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be problematic. Op Plan NIKE gives guidance on the level of security to be achieved by UNAMIR under these conditions.

SECURITY ALERT MEASURES

8. **Command**. The responsibility for adherence to Security Alert Measures (SAMs) devolves to Sector Commanders, under the orders of HQ UNAMIR.

9. **SAMs**. UNAMIR SAMs under Op Plan NIKE will be as shown below. A detailed description of the action to be taken under each SAM is to be found in the Annexes shown:

- a. **GREEN**. Low level threat. Normal Activities. - See **Annex A**.
- b. **YELLOW**. Medium level threat. Increased security activities. - See **Annex B**. Deployment options are further sub-divided as follows:
 - (1). **ALFA**. Withdrawal to platoon positions.
 - (2). **BRAVO**. Withdrawal to company localities.
 - (3). **CHARLIE**. Withdrawal to battalion defended areas.
- c. **RED**. High Level threat. Maximum security activity. Civil evacuation if required. UNAMIR evacuation plans in readiness for immediate execution. See **Annex C**.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

10. Activation. The activation of Op Plan NIKE will be sent by HQ UNAMIR, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy, at the earliest opportunity. An activation message will include the following information:

- a. The codeword - Op Plan NIKE.
- b. The unit/Sector to which the SAM applies.
- c. The SAM to be adopted.
- d. The time by which the SAM is to be activated.
- e. The ROE readiness/alert status
- f. Brief description of the reason for Op Plan NIKE activation.
- g. Confirmation details.

11. Example. An example Op Plan NIKE activation message (sent by radio) is given below:

4C THIS IS ZERO.

- A. OP PLAN NIKE.**
- B. ETHIOBATT SECTOR 4C.**
- C. YELLOW ALFA.**
- D. BY 241200B OCT 94.**
- E. ROE YELLOW**
- F. SIGHTINGS OF ARMED INSURGENTS IN GISAKURA AREA.**
- G. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW BY FAX.**

12. Reaction. On receipt of the Op Plan NIKE SAM message, the receiving unit is to:

- a. Follow the action outlined in the relevant Annex to this Instruction.
- b. Liaise with neighbouring Sectors to inform them of the location of sub-units.
- c. Prepare to carry out the action at the next SAM level.

13. Delegation. The authority to raise a SAM level is delegated to Sector Commanders, if they consider that this is warranted by the threat. They do not have the authority to lower a SAM level. In the event that a Sector Commander judges that a SAM level is to be raised, he must:

- a. Inform HQ UNAMIR by the fastest possible means, giving reasons for the increase in level.
- b. Liaise with neighbouring Sector Commanders.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

- c. Provide regular advice to HQ UNAMIR on his perception of the threat.

14. Reporting. Under NIKE YELLOW and RED, units and sub-units are to make reports as follows:

- a. Any unusual activity related to the threat to be reported immediately.
- b. Specific reference to Op Plan NIKE activity is to be made as part of the SITREPs at 0600 and 1800 hrs.
- c. A weekly summary of Op Plan NIKE activities.

15. Status of MILOBs. MILOBs have special status under the UN Convention, wherein they are defined as "experts". Because they are unarmed, early consideration for their security should be given by Sector Commanders. MILOBs are to be controlled as described in Annexes A-C.

16. Status of UNCIVPOL. UNCIVPOL authority can offer some advantages over military authority, in certain circumstances. Sector Commanders are to consider requesting UNCIVPOL support to enhance their security arrangements, particularly for the following:

- a. Crowd control.
- b. Personal search.
- c. Law and order enforcement.
- d. Guarding of Key Points.
- e. Liaison with Gendarmerie.

FURTHER ACTION

17. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Sector commanders are to develop formal RRF contingency plans, which match Op Plan NIKE escalation as follows:

- a. NIKE GREEN. One section per company at 30 mins NTM.
- b. NIKE YELLOW. One section per company at 10 mins NTM.
- c. NIKE RED. One platoon per company at 10 mins NTM.

18. Sector Plans. Sector Plans for Op Plan NIKE are to be developed immediately. Sector Commanders are to submit Op Plan NIKE sub-plans to HQ UNAMIR by 5 Dec 94.

19. Protected Personnel. Sector Commanders are to submit initial estimates of the numbers and deployment of Protected Personnel to HQ UNAMIR by 5 Dec 94.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

20. Warning and Reporting Procedures. G3 Ops is to develop Op Plan NIKE Warning and Reporting Procedures by 5 Dec 94.
21. Test Exercise. G3 Ops is to plan to exercise Op Plan NIKE measures as a CPX, as soon as Sector plans have been cleared by DCOS Ops.
22. Administration and Logistics. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan NIKE by 5 Dec 94.
23. Review. G3 Plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan NIKE, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

PART I ANNEXES

- A. Op Plan NIKE GREEN - Normal Activities.
- B. Op Plan NIKE YELLOW - Medium Level Threat.
- C. Op Plan NIKE RED - High Level Threat.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX A TO
PART I TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED NOV 94

OP PLAN NIKE GREEN - NORMAL ACTIVITIES

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
2. Reconnaissance. Carry out reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under NIKE YELLOW and RED.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
3. Protected Personnel. Establish the identity, numbers and locations of Protected Personnel within AOR, and brief them on the procedure to be followed under NIKE YELLOW and RED. This must be done discreetly in a manner which avoids alarmism.
4. MILOBs. Ensure that all MILOB personnel within the Sector are briefed on Op Plan NIKE contingencies.
5. UNCIVPOL. Consider how UNCIVPOL deployment could be utilised to enhance military security arrangements.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

OP PLAN NIKE YELLOW - MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT

1. Passage of SAMs. All units and sub-units within AOR are to be informed of the change of Op Plan NIKE SAM, by the fastest possible means.
2. Normal Operations. Units and sub-units are to continue to carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
3. Reconnaissance. Carry out further reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under NIKE RED.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
4. Protected Personnel.
 - (1). Establish identity, numbers and locations of UN and NGO personnel within AOR.
 - (2). Maintain a register of these details.
 - (3). Inform those personnel of the reason for an increase in the threat and of the need to remain vigilant.
 - (4). Develop plans to marshall those personnel into UNAMIR Safe Areas.
 - (5). Inform those personnel of the action to be taken to withdraw them to UN Safe Areas.
5. Withdrawal to Safe Areas. Under Op Plan NIKE, withdrawal to Safe Areas will be ordered as required. Safe Areas are designed to provide increased protection of Protected Personnel, not to defend an area from direct attack, although they must be capable of doing so. The occupation of Safe Areas will be ordered as follows:
 - a. NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Section outposts to withdraw to platoon positions. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of section level.
 - b. NIKE YELLOW BRAVO. Platoons to withdraw to company localities. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of platoon level.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

- c. NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE. Companies to withdraw to battalion defended areas. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of platoon level. National contingents operating independently at company level, will remain in place. Sectors will not be vacated.
6. Withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas. During execution of NIKE YELLOW or RED, Protected Personnel may be withdrawn to Safe Areas, **on a voluntary basis**. UNAMIR personnel are not in a position to enforce withdrawal. Advice which can be given as a professional recommendation only. Withdrawal of these personnel should occur under the following conditions:
- a. At the request of the personnel concerned.
 - b. On the advice of the Sector Commander.
 - c. On orders from HQ UNAMIR.
7. Reception. Platoon, company and battalion locations must have provision for the inclusion of Protected Personnel within the relevant AOR. Arrangements should be made for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of those personnel.
8. Fixed Installations. Sector Commanders are to increase the security of fixed installations, which include communications repeater sites, under NIKE YELLOW. In practice, it may practical to co-locate platoon, company and battalion positions with fixed installation. In other cases, this may not be possible and the following minimum security is to be provided:
- a. NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Minimum of one section to augment security at fixed installations.
 - b. NIKE YELLOW BRAVO AND CHARLIE. Minimum of one platoon to augment security at fixed installations.
9. MILOB Withdrawal. MILOBs are to adhere to Op Plan NIKE SAMs. Arrangements for the reception and administration of MILOB personnel are to be coordinated by Sector Commanders. MILOBs may be given military tasks in the AOR under NIKE YELLOW, provided that the following criteria are fulfilled:
- a. They are not sent to the site of a known or suspected threat.
 - b. They travel as a minimum party of six in two vehicles.
 - c. They have guaranteed communications.
10. Movement. Convoy movement is permitted under the following conditions:
- a. Minimum convoy is four vehicles.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

- b. Minimum protection is one section per convoy or packet.
 - c. Movement off MSRs is minimized.
 - d. All convoys or packets have guaranteed communications.
 - e. Movement at night is minimized.
11. Administration. The following administrative actions are to be carried out:
- a. Combat Supplies. Seven days combat supplies are to be maintained at first line.
 - b. Stockpiling. A further seven days combat supplies are to stockpiled at unit level.
 - c. Destruction Plans. In accordance with Op Plans HECTOR and JASON.
 - d. Leave. Leave is restricted to compassionate cases only.
 - e. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be consumed when units are placed on NIKE YELLOW or RED.

OP PLAN NIKE RED - HIGH LEVEL THREAT

1. Passage of SAMs. All units and sub-units within AOR are to be informed of the change of Op Plan NIKE SAM, by the fastest possible means.
2. Operations. Where possible, units are to continue to carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
3. Reconnaissance. Carry out further reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under Op Plans HECTOR AND JASON.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
4. Protected Personnel.
 - a. Establish identity, numbers and locations of UN and NGO personnel within AOR, if this has not been done under NIKE YELLOW.
 - b. Maintain a register of these details.
 - c. Inform those personnel of the reason for an increase in the threat and of the need to remain vigilant.
 - d. Advise those personnel of the need to move into Safe Areas immediately.
 - e. If ordered by HQ UNAMIR, plan to escort those personnel to Kigali or a neighbouring country.
5. Withdrawal to Safe Areas. If withdrawal to battalion defended Safe Areas has not been ordered under NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE, an increase in SAM to RED automatically orders this withdrawal. National contingents operating independently at company level, will remain in place. Sectors will not be vacated.
6. Withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas. During NIKE RED, Protected Personnel may be withdrawn to Safe Areas, **on a voluntary basis**. Sector Commanders are to give those personnel strong advice to withdraw to Safe Areas immediately.
7. Reception. Safe Areas must have provision for the inclusion of the UN and NGO personnel within the relevant AOR. Arrangements should be made for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of those personnel.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

8. Further Withdrawal. UN and NGO personnel may be further withdrawn, **on a voluntary basis**, as ordered by HQ UNAMIR. They may be escorted to Kigali or a neighbouring country.
9. Fixed Installations. Under NIKE RED, the minimum force required to augment security at fixed installations is one platoon. Sector Commanders are to recommend whether or not fixed installations should continue to operate in this security environment.
10. MILOB Withdrawal. MILOBs are to adhere to Op Plan NIKE SAMs. Arrangements for the reception and administration of MILOB personnel in Safe Areas are to be coordinated by Sector Commanders. MILOBs may not be given military tasks in the AOR under NIKE RED, without the specific authority of the Force Commander.
11. Movement. Convoy movement is permitted under the following conditions:
 - a. Minimum convoy is eight vehicles.
 - b. Minimum protection is two sections per convoy or packet.
 - c. No movement off MSRs.
 - d. All convoys or packets have guaranteed communications.
 - e. No movement at night.
12. Administration. The following administrative actions are to be carried out:
 - a. Combat Supplies. Seven days combat supplies are to be maintained at first line.
 - b. Stockpiling. A further seven days combat supplies are to be stockpiled at unit level.
 - c. Destruction Plans. In accordance with Op Plan HECTOR and JASON.
 - d. Leave. No leave is to be granted.
 - e. Dress. All personnel are to wear ballistic protective equipment and headgear where issued.
 - f. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be consumed when units are placed on NIKE RED.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

5000. 46 (Plans)

PART II

UNAMIR REINFORCEMENT CONTINGENCY PLAN

OP PLAN HECTOR

GENERAL

1. This instruction covers the Reinforcement Measures (RMs) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan HECTOR. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan HECTOR are:
 - a. UNAMIR Security Alert Contingency Plan - Op Plan NIKE. Part I. It is likely that Op Plan NIKE SAMs will be linked to Op Plan HECTOR RMs.
 - b. UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan - Op Plan JASON. Part III.
2. Op Plan HECTOR provides for the reinforcement of UNAMIR units and locations in the event of a deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied locally or nationally, as the threat dictates.
3. It should be noted that the ROE levels of readiness/alert states may be applied independently or in conjunction with Op Plan HECTOR.
4. Scenario. It is not possible to anticipate specific scenarios. Op Plan HECTOR seeks to generate additional formed bodies of troops to enhance the security cover provided in certain Sectors. It is expected that such reinforcement would be in a scenario in which an additional presence would improve the security situation, or provide better protection for UNAMIR personnel or those who UNAMIR has a duty to protect. In other scenarios, reinforcement would not be the appropriate response.

REINFORCEMENT MEASURES

5. Command Responsibility. The responsibility for implementation of RMs devolves to Sector Commanders, under the orders of Main HQ. The two key players are:
 - a. Reinforcing Sector Commander (RSC). The Sector Commander from whose Sector formed bodies of troops will be deployed to reinforce another Sector.
 - b. Gaining Sector Commander (GSC). The Sector Commander receiving reinforcing formed bodies of troops.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN CONFIDENTIAL

6. Command Relationship. The delegation of command to the GSC will be coordinated by HQ UNAMIR. In principle, the GSC will assume TACON of reinforcing troops, subject to national command restrictions.

7. Requirement for Reinforcement. HQ UNAMIR will determine whether a Sector is to be reinforced on the basis of the following:

- a. At the request of the GSC.
- b. On evidence of a deteriorating security situation in the Sector(s) concerned.
- c. To preempt a threat which is expected to materialize.
- d. In response to a changing political situation.

8. Level of Reinforcement. Under Op Plan HECTOR, reinforcement up to multiple company level, by **formed platoons and companies**, can be ordered as required. Reinforcement by a complete battalion is unlikely, but can be ordered by HQ UNAMIR if required. Reinforcement of Kigali at battalion level is to be coordinated under the Force Evacuation Plan, Op Plan JASON.

9. RMs. UNAMIR RMs under Op Plan HECTOR will be as shown below. A detailed description of the action to be taken under each RM is to be found in the Annexes shown:

- a. GREEN. Low level threat. Normal Activities. - See **Annex A**.
- b. YELLOW. Medium level threat. - See **Annex B**. Deployment options are further sub-divided as follows:
 - (1). ALFA. Reconnaissance. Main Body at 24 hrs NTM.
 - (2). BRAVO. Deployment of Advance Party. Main Body at 12 hrs NTM.
 - (3). CHARLIE. Main Body at 6 hrs NTM.
- c. RED. High Level threat. Deployment of Main Body. See **Annex C**.

10. Activation. The activation of a RM will be sent by HQ UNAMIR, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy, at the earliest opportunity. An activation message will include the following information:

- a. The codeword - Op Plan HECTOR
- b. The Reinforcing Sector(s).
- c. The Gaining Sector(s).
- d. The level of reinforcement.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

- e. The RM to be adopted.
 - f. RV location for YELLOW ALFA.
 - g. The time at which the NTM is to be achieved.
 - h. The ROE readiness/alert status.
 - i. Brief description of the reason for Op Plan HECTOR activation.
 - j. Confirmation details.
11. Example. An example Op Plan HECTOR activation message (sent by radio) is given below:

1,2 AND 5 THIS IS ZERO.

- A. OP PLAN HECTOR.**
- B. SECTORS 1 AND 2 TO REINFORCE SECTOR 5.**
- C. SECTOR 1 TWO PLATOONS.**
- D. SECTOR 2 ONE COMPANY.**
- E. YELLOW ALFA.**
- F. RV SECTOR 5 HQ AT 240800B OCT 94.**
- G. RM TO BE ACHIEVED BY 241200B OCT 94.**
- H. ROE GREEN**
- I. AUGMENT SECURITY IN RUHRENGERI AND NDIZA AREAS.**
- J. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW BY FAX.**

12. Reaction. On receipt of an Op Plan HECTOR message, addressees are to:
- a. Carry out the action described in the relevant Annex.
 - b. Liaise with neighbouring Sectors to inform them of the location of sub-units when RMs are in place.
 - c. Prepare to carry out the action at the next RM level.

13. Safe Area Contingency Positions. Sector Commanders are to carry out reconnaissance of contingency positions for deployment of reinforcing units. In principle, it is to be expected that reinforcing units would be withdrawn under NIKE RED. If the tactical situation prevents this, they will need to remain in the Gaining Sector. As a precaution, contingency reconnaissance should be carried out as follows:

- a. Within each company Safe Area, under Op Plan NIKE, one platoon position.
- b. Within each battalion Safe Area, under Op Plan NIKE, one company position.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

14. Summary of NTM Timings. Op Plan HECTOR.

RM	RECCE PARTY	ADVANCE PARTY	MAIN BODY
GREEN	6 hrs	12 hrs	48 hrs
YELLOW ALFA	Move	6 hrs	24 hrs
YELLOW BRAVO	-	Move	12 hrs
YELLOW CHARLIE	-	-	6 hrs
RED	-	-	Move

15. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Sector Commanders are to maintain RRF readiness as described under Op Plan NIKE.

FURTHER ACTION

16. Sector Plans. Sector Plans for Op Plan HECTOR are to be developed immediately. Sector Commanders are to submit Op Plan HECTOR plans to HQ UNAMIR by 5 Dec 94.

17. Test Exercise. G3 Ops is to plan to exercise Op Plan HECTOR measures as a CPX, as soon as Sector plans have been cleared by DCOS Ops.

18. Communications. FSO is to highlight communications issues concerned with Op Plan HECTOR by 5 Dec 94. Consideration should be given to:

- a. CNR compatibility.
- b. Frequency harmonisation.
- c. CEOI planning.

19. Logistic Planning. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan HECTOR by 5 Dec 94.

20. Review. G3 Plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan HECTOR, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

Part II Annexes:

- A. Op Plan HECTOR GREEN - Normal Activities
- B. Op Plan HECTOR YELLOW - Medium Level Threat
- C. Op Plan HECTOR RED - High Level Threat

OP PLAN HECTOR GREEN - NORMAL ACTIVITIES

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
2. Reconnaissance. Identify:
 - a. Possible locations for use under HECTOR YELLOW and RED, at platoon and company level.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
3. Administration of Reinforcing Troops. Make contingency plans to administer one three platoon company consisting of the following:
 - a. 120 personnel.
 - (1). Recce Party - 5.
 - (2). Advance Party - 10.
 - (3). Main Body - 105.
 - b. 10 vehicles.
4. Preparation of Own Troops. Prepare to deploy formed bodies of troops to another Sector. Battalion Sectors should initially plan on preparing one company; Company Sectors should initially plan on preparing one platoon, as follows:
 - a. Notice to Move(NTM).
 - (1). Recce Party at 6 hrs NTM.
 - (2). Advance Party at 12 hrs NTM.
 - (3). Main Body at 48 hrs NTM.
 - b. Equipment. Fully equipped and scaled for 7 days operations.
 - c. Combat Supplies. Self contained for 3 days.

OP PLAN HECTOR YELLOW - MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
2. Reconnaissance. If reinforcement is being planned, carry out detailed reconnaissance of locations earmarked for reinforcement under HECTOR RED, including routes.
3. Preparation for Reinforcement. If ordered to prepare to reinforce another Sector, reduce NTM to:
 - a. HECTOR YELLOW ALFA.
 - (1). Recce Party - Move immediately.
 - (2). Advance Party - 6 hrs.
 - (3). Main Body - 24 hrs.
 - b. HECTOR YELLOW BRAVO.
 - (1). Advance Party - Move immediately.
 - (2). Main Body - 12 hrs.
 - c. HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE. Main Body at 6 hrs NTM.
4. Reception Arrangements. If reinforcement of the Sector is planned:
 - a. Issue verbal orders on arrival of the Recce Party.
 - b. Appoint an LO to coordinate reception arrangements.
 - c. Provide guides, movement control and signing as required.
 - d. Coordinate C2 including communications electronic instructions.
 - e. Prepare accommodation, if available, taking into account the tactical situation.
 - f. Coordinate administrative support.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX C TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
PART II TO
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN HECTOR RED - HIGH LEVEL THREAT

1. Tasks. Carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
2. Deployment on Reinforcement. If ordered to reinforce another Sector, deploy the Main Body immediately.
3. Reception Arrangements. If receiving reinforcements:
 - a. Issue confirmatory orders.
 - b. Coordinate C2 arrangements.
 - c. Arrange administrative support as required.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN CONFIDENTIAL

5000. 46 (Plans)

PART III

UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL AND EVACUATION CONTINGENCY PLAN

OP PLAN JASON

GENERAL

1. This instruction covers the UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan (WECP) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan JASON. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan JASON are:

a. UNAMIR Security Alert Contingency Plan - Op Plan NIKE. Part I. Raising of Op Plan NIKE SAMs will inevitably precede implementation of Op Plan JASON.

b. UNAMIR Reinforcement Contingency Plan - Op Plan HECTOR. Part II.

2. Op Plan JASON provides for the withdrawal and evacuation of UNAMIR and associated personnel in the event of a seriously deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied on a national basis.

PROTECTION

3. Under the current mandate, UNAMIR has a duty to protect the following:

a. UNREO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agency personnel.

b. NGO Personnel.

c. Displaced Persons, Refugees and civilians in sites or populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces.

d. Any other person under UN protection.

4. UNAMIR resources are limited. It is accepted that the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited by an increased threat. In these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be problematic. Op Plan JASON gives guidance on the level of security to be achieved by UNAMIR under these conditions.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

PRINCIPLES OF EVACUATION

5. An Evacuation will be the Last Resort. Before it is ordered, UNAMIR will seek to continue the mission, whilst retaining security by:

- a. Increasing Security Alert Measures (SAMs). Op Plan NIKE.
- b. Reinforcing threatened Sector(s). Op Plan HECTOR.
- c. Withdrawing to Kigali, from where evacuated Sectors can be re-occupied, if there is a decrease in the threat.
- d. Evacuating Kigali at the end of the withdrawal process.

6. UNAMIR will Present Strong and Coherent Resolve. An evacuation will only be ordered where there is no alternative. Even when non-essential personnel have been withdrawn or evacuated, a high security core of troops will provide a presence until evacuated.

7. Protected Civilians will be Evacuated First. They will be offered early withdrawal to Safe Areas, escorted to Kigali and advised to leave when the security situation makes their presence no longer tenable.

8. Equipment will not be Abandoned. Where possible, only equipment of low value will be left in Rwanda.

9. Kigali International Airport will be the Primary Means of Evacuation.

10. Final Evacuation Phase will be Conducted by Road.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

11. A possible sequence of events for the implementation of Op Plan JASON is given below:

SER	EVENT	RESPONSE
1	Insurgent threat increases in Sector(s).	Security Alert Measures increased under Op Plan NIKE.
2	Greater presence required to ensure security in Sector(s).	Op Plan HECTOR invoked to threatened Sector(s).
3	Situation worsens in threatened Sector(s).	Protected Personnel withdrawn to Kigali.
4	Increase in threat in other Sectors.	Non-essential personnel withdrawn to Kigali. Op Plan HECTOR invoked if troops available.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

5	Threat increases in all Sectors.	Op Plan HECTOR concentrated on Kigali Sector.
6	Kigali comes under direct threat.	Op Plan JASON activated. Protected Personnel advised to leave.
7	Insurgency in Kigali worsens.	Non-essential personnel evacuated.
8	Situation deteriorates.	Destruction plans prepared Some operational personnel evacuated.
9	Government loses control.	Bulk of operational personnel evacuated by air/road. Destruction plans invoked.
10	Order to evacuate given.	Remainder of available personnel leave by air. Security Force leaves by road.

12. Alternative Scenarios. A number of other scenarios could invoke Op Plan JASON. In the main, however, a progressive deterioration, leading to a total collapse of security would be required before the full plan would be implemented.

13. Degree of Evacuation. Op Plan JASON may be only partially executed. A stabilisation of the security situation would limit the degree of evacuation. Similarly, the process of evacuation could be reversed if the situation were to improve.

STAGES OF EVACUATION

14. JASON GREEN. During JASON GREEN, normal operations will continue. Preparation for further stages will be carried out. Major changes to the security environment will include:

- a. Op Plan NIKE SAMs may be raised.
- b. Op Plan HECTOR RMs may be activated to increase presence in threatened Sector(s).
- c. For full details, see **Annex A.**

15. JASON YELLOW. Under JASON YELLOW, the WECF will be stage, as described in **Annex B**, as follows:

- a. JASON YELLOW ALFA. Orders for withdrawal to Kigali.
- b. JASON YELLOW BRAVO. Protected and Non-Essential personnel evacuated.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

c. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Bulk of personnel evacuated by air/road.

16. JASON RED. Kigali/Rwanda evacuated by air. Security Force leaves by road. See Annex C.

RESPONSIBILITIES

17. Overall Responsibility for WECF. Chief Security and Area Security Coordinator for Rwanda is responsible for the coordination of the UNAMIR WECF.

18. Military Aspects of WECF. G3 Plans is responsible for the planning of military aspects of Op Plan JASON within HQ UNAMIR. Within UNAMIR, military responsibility for the WECF devolves to:

- a. Sector Commanders to coordinate withdrawal of their Sectors to Kigali.
- b. Sector Commander Sector 6 (Kigali) for the reception of units withdrawn to Kigali prior to evacuation.
- c. G3 Ops for the coordination of deployment of units.
- c. DFC/COS for the coordination of evacuation of Kigali, devolved as follows:
 - (1). Security and Protection - DCOS Ops.
 - (2). Transport, Movement, Sustainment and Destruction - DCOS Sp.
- d. Contingent/unit/sub-unit Commanders for the coordination of contingent plans to conform with UNAMIR plans and national requirements.

19. Protected Personnel. Those organisations representing personnel protected by UNAMIR are responsible for briefing their personnel on the HQ UNAMIR WECF and for ensuring that their own instructions conform to the overall plan. These include:

- a. UN agencies.
- b. UN Aid agencies.
- c. NGOs.
- d. Contractors.

20. Destruction Plans. UNAMIR equipment will not be permitted to fall into the hands of an aggressor, unless there is no way to prevent this. **Sector Commanders and HQ Staff branches are to prepare lists of equipment which meet the criteria below.** In principle, all usable UNAMIR stores and equipment will be evacuated. The following categories of stores and equipment are to be used:

UN CONFIDENTIAL

- a. Essential. Those stores and equipment without which the Force cannot evacuate in good order. This category includes all weapons, vehicles, fighting equipment scales and combat supplies for 7 days. It may also include critical information which will enable the Force to resume operations in Rwanda with minimum loss of efficiency.
- b. Important. Those stores and equipment which are high value, and whose loss would involve difficulty in fulfilling the mission, or considerable expense to the UN. These include alternative communications equipment, computers, medical stores, support equipment scales and remaining combat supplies.
- c. Non-Essential. Those stores and equipment which are difficult to evacuate and whose loss does not incur considerable expense to the UN. These include defence stores, office and accommodation stores, and land line already in place.

FURTHER ACTION

- 21. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). G3 Ops is to develop a RRF plan for Op Plan HECTOR, taking into account RRF procedures adopted under Op Plan NIKE and the RRF to be provided by Comd Sector 6 during JASON YELLOW. See Annex B para 5.
- 22. Reception Plan. Commander Sector 6 is to develop a reception plan, in line with deployment under JASON YELLOW, as detailed by G3 Plans.
- 23. Protected Personnel. Parent Organisations of Protected Personnel are to develop their own evacuation plans, using Op Plan JASON as the template. These should be submitted ASP. UNREO is to ensure that the Parent Organisations of Protected Personnel are briefed on the security requirements of UNAMIR and that they submit, by 5 Dec 94:
 - a. Lists of all personnel in country.
 - b. Lists of vehicles, with stores and passenger capacity.
 - c. Location of assets.
 - d. Priority for evacuation.
 - e. Any call on evacuation resources which might be of use to UNAMIR.
- 24. Military Evacuation. Sector Commanders, Contingent Commanders and HQ UNAMIR staff branches are to submit outline lists of personnel and equipment to be evacuated by 5 Dec 94, to include:
 - a. Non-Essential Personnel.
 - b. Essential and Important Stores by tonnage and category.
 - c. Integral lift capability for personnel and stores.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

25. Communications. FSO is to develop an outline Force Communications Plan to support Op Plan JASON by 5 Dec 94.
26. Logistic Planning. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan JASON when initial civilian and military evacuation lists have been submitted.
27. Review. G3 plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan JASON, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

OP PLAN JASON GREEN

GENERAL

1. When JASON GREEN is in force, normal operations may continue, where the threat permits. This state is the opportunity for all preparatory action to be carried out, in the event that a higher Op Plan JASON state is ordered. Time utilised efficiently in planning Op Plan JASON activation during this period will pay dividends.

2. Op Plan NIKE. Op Plan NIKE may operate independently of Op Plan JASON. It provides for the raising of Security Alert Measures (SAMs), on a Sector or national basis as required. It is unlikely that Op Plan JASON would be activated unless the security situation had already warranted a SAM increase to NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE or NIKE RED. The withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas can be expected before Op Plan JASON states are increased. Their evacuation from threatened Sector(s) under Op Plan JASON would follow naturally from this situation.

3. Op Plan HECTOR. Op Plan HECTOR may also operate independently of Op Plan JASON. As the UN intends to present a robust resolve in the face of an increased threat, it is likely that Op Plan HECTOR escalation to HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE or HECTOR RED would be invoked before Op Plan JASON activation. The reinforcement of Kigali is a process which follows naturally from the reinforcement of other threatened Sector(s).

OUTLYING SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

4. Preparation. Sector Commanders of outlying Sectors (ie not Kigali, Sector 6), have specific command responsibilities under Op Plan JASON. These include:

- a. Preparation of Sector units and sub-units for Op Plan JASON activation.
- b. Briefing of all personnel.
- c. Contingency planning.
- d. Subsidiary Plans:
 - (1). Communications Plan.
 - (2). Logistic Plan.
 - (3). Movement Plan.
 - (4). Destruction Plan.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

5. **Military Information.** Sector Commanders are responsible for the provision of up to date military information, where the tactical situation allows the deployment of troops, specifically in the following key areas:

- a. Insurgent activity.
- b. Developing threat.
- c. Route information, between locations and to/from Kigali.

6. **Protected Personnel.** UN, NGO and other Protected Personnel are to be considered when planning Op Plan JASON contingencies. Sector Commanders **are to plan** to:

a. Ensure that OP Plan NIKE SAMs are promulgated to all Protected Personnel and that they are:

- (1). Listed and registered.
- (2). Briefed on the developing threat situation.
- (3). Encouraged to withdraw to Safe Areas, as the threat evolves.
- (4). Administered within Safe Areas if necessary.

b. Provide up to date information to Main HQ on Protected Personnel, if deployed to Safe Areas, to include:

- (1). Names & Parent Organisation.
- (2). Locations.
- (3). Medical Condition.
- (4). Available transport.
- (5). Stores and Equipment.
- (6). Capability for self-sufficiency.
- (7). Intentions.

c. Brief Protected Personnel on the means by which their parent organisation is planning to evacuate them. If Motorola communications are intact, this may not be required.

d. Escort Protected Personnel to Kigali for further evacuation to another country, if ordered to do so.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

KIGALI SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

7. Sector Command. Sector Commander Sector 6 Kigali, has specific responsibilities for the development of OP Plan JASON plans. He is responsible for coordinating the reception as ordered by HQ UNAMIR, within Sector 6 of the following:

- a. Those units, sub-units and contingents currently deployed in Sector 6.
- b. Those units and sub-units redeployed to reinforce Sector 6 under Op Plan HECTOR.
- c. Those units and sub-units redeployed to Sector 6 under Op Plan JASON.
- d. Protected Personnel occupying Safe Areas under Op Plan NIKE.
- e. Protected Personnel still occupying work locations in Kigali City.

8. Kigali International Airport (KIA). KIA is central to the UNAMIR WECP. The retention of security in the area of KIA is critical to the continued maintenance of the Force and of the evacuation of UNAMIR personnel, equipment and stores. G3 Plans is to plan to deploy elements of the Force under Op Plan JASON, to guard KIA as follows:

- a. Airport buildings including Control Tower.
- b. Marshalling apron work areas.
- c. Perimeter.
- d. Flight paths which could be threatened by low-level air defence systems.

9. Key Points (KPs). The protection of KPs will be essential to the implementation of Op Plan JASON. A full list of KPs, to be guarded by elements of the Force is to be evolved by G3 Plans, in discussion with other UN and NGO representatives. The number of KPs will be the minimum consistent with the threat and the maintenance of the Force. It is likely to include:

- a. Amahoro Hotel.
- b. Amahoro Stadium Complex including 500 Man Camp.
- c. Third Line Supply Compound.
- d. Wksps.
- e. Kigali City Hospital (AUSMED).
- e. UNDP Building.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

10. Contingency Planning. G3 Plans is to plan the deployment of all Force units within Sector 6 under JASON YELLOW ALFA. These plans are to include:

- a. Deployment areas for all units and sub-units, reced to platoon level.
- b. Requirement for defence stores.
- c. Development of RRF plans.
- d. Accommodation requirements.
- e. Administrative arrangements including the delivery of water.

11. Communications. FSO is to develop a communications plan for the use of Sector 6 units deployed under JASON YELLOW and RED.

LOGISTIC PLANNING

12. General. Preliminary logistic planning by DCOS Sp for the activation of Op Plan JASON YELLOW and RED should commence immediately. Information is required to predict the sustainment requirements for the Force deployed into Sector 6. Consideration should be given to providing raw data from which operational options can be developed. Some issues are:

- a. The number of personnel to be evacuated during JASON YELLOW and RED.
- b. The means by which evacuation can be achieved.
- c. The impact on Op Plan JASON caused by a closure of KIA.
- d. Practical guidance for comparison of Force sustainment/structure requirements, when the Force is deployed to Kigali.
- e. Minimum stocks required based on 14 days without resupply.
- f. Accommodation options.

ANNEX B TO
PART III TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN JASON YELLOW

GENERAL

1. JASON YELLOW is the trigger for the UNAMIR WECF to commence. It stages the withdrawal and evacuation process between JASON GREEN, the planning phase, and JASON RED, the final evacuation of Kigali and Rwanda.
2. JASON YELLOW is staged as follows:
 - a. JASON YELLOW ALFA. Outlying Sectors withdrawn to Kigali.
 - b. JASON YELLOW BRAVO. Evacuation of Protected and non-essential personnel.
 - c. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Evacuation of bulk of UNAMIR personnel.

JASON YELLOW ALFA - WITHDRAWAL PHASE

3. Outlying Sector Command Responsibilities. On the receipt of a JASON YELLOW ALFA message, outlying Sector Commanders are to:
 - a. Marshall units and sub-units in Safe Areas.
 - b. Marshall Protected Personnel into Safe Areas.
 - c. Prepare orders for a road move to Kigali, utilising routes reced under JASON GREEN.
 - d. Be prepared to receive detailed reception coordinating instructions from HQ UNAMIR, including timings.
 - e. Prepare Non-Essential stores for destruction.
 - f. Carry out route clearance and security.
 - g. Before departure, destroy Non-Essential stores.
 - i. Move to Kigali.
4. Sector 6 Commander Responsibilities. On receipt of JASON YELLOW ALFA message, Sector 6 Commander is to prepare reception arrangements for units withdrawing to Kigali as follows:

UN CONFIDENTIAL

- a. Escort convoys from release points within Sector 6 to deployment areas.
 - b. Provide guides down to platoon level.
 - c. Provide security to units which are occupying their deployment areas, until local defence has been established.
 - d. Allocate two platoons to act as RRF at 5 mins NTM during occupation of deployment areas.
 - e. Escort Protected Personnel to parent organisations, if the security situation permits.
5. Deployment Coordination. G3 Ops/G3 Plans will coordinate the deployment of units within Sector 6. This will involve:
- a. Identification of deployment areas.
 - b. Coordination between units.
 - c. Arrival procedures.
 - d. Issue of defence stores.
 - e. Key Point isolation and guarding procedures.
 - f. Development of Map/Locator list for Sector 6.
 - g. Control of movement.
 - h. Security procedures and ROE.
 - i. RRF allocation.
 - j. Administrative arrangements.
6. Arrival Procedures. On arrival in Sector 6, units and sub-units will deploy to designated areas. Immediate actions on arrival are:
- a. Establish perimeter defence of designated area(s).
 - b. Coordinate return of Protected Personnel to parent organisation with Commander Sector 6, if the security situation permits.
 - c. Allocate RRF for local defence and take over responsibilities from Commander Sector 6.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

- d. List non-essential personnel and manifest for evacuation under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.
- e. Identify Important stores for evacuation.
- f. Identify Non-Essential stores for destruction.

JASON YELLOW BRAVO - PRELIMINARY EVACUATION

7. **General.** JASON YELLOW BRAVO will be ordered if the situation deteriorates to the point that:

- a. The presence of a full complement of UNAMIR personnel in Kigali places an unmanageable burden on the logistic structure necessary to sustain it.
- b. A large number of personnel cannot be properly employed due to security restrictions on their tasks.
- c. Protected Personnel could be placed in direct danger.
- d. Further evacuation seems likely.

8. **Personnel.** Personnel to be evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO are:

- a. The bulk of Protected Personnel, less those required as a minimum presence on the ground by their parent organisations.
- b. UNAMIR civilian personnel whose work in the security environment is no longer deemed essential.
- c. UNAMIR military personnel whose role cannot be carried out in the current security environment.
- d. Formed UNAMIR units no longer required to enhance the security of Kigali.

9. **Equipment.** It is not intended to evacuate equipment under JASON YELLOW BRAVO except for:

- a. High value equipment which would be particularly difficult to evacuate in an increased threat scenario.
- b. Essential equipment of any formed unit which is ordered to evacuate at this stage.

10. **Personal Baggage.** Personnel evacuated during Op Plan JASON will be restricted to minimum personal baggage. Commanders should issue instructions for personnel to carry:

- a. Personal Weapon.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

- b. Equipment up to 30 kg in weight.
- c. Personal documents including passport.

11. Means of Evacuation. At this stage the primary means of evacuation will be by air. Evacuation by road will be carried out by any formed unit which is ordered to evacuate at this time.

12. Destruction. Destruction will not be authorised for Non-Essential stores left by any formed unit which withdraws at this time.

JASON YELLOW CHARLIE - MAIN EVACUATION

13. General. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE will be ordered if the security situation deteriorates to the extent that:

- a. The Force can no longer be easily sustained.
- b. The presence of a large body of troops means that the lives of UN personnel are placed at serious risk.
- c. The threat can more easily be met by a more compact force structure.
- d. The Force mission requires a presence at minimal deployment.
- e. Final evacuation under JASON RED is a likely possibility.

14. Personnel. Under JASON YELLOW CHARLIE, force strength will be reduced to the minimum consistent with the maintenance of a UN presence. The following will be evacuated:

- a. All remaining Protected Personnel.
- b. Those UNAMIR civilian personnel whose presence is not required for the maintenance of a Force presence.
- c. Those UNAMIR military personnel not required to provide a Force presence. This will involve a large number of administrative and support personnel, as well as those formed units not detailed off as Security Force.

15. Equipment. The following equipment will be evacuated:

- a. Important stores.
- b. Essential stores of formed units ordered to withdraw at this stage.
- c. The bulk of the vehicle fleet less those vehicles required in order to maintain a Force presence and Security Force.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

16. Means of Evacuation. The means of evacuation employed will depend on available airlift, priority equipment requirements and land route security. In principle, evacuation will be achieved

by:

- a. Air. Protected Personnel, UNAMIR civilian personnel and administrative and support personnel.
- b. Land. Formed units and sub-units, driving fleet vehicles in convoy, less those to be evacuated by air.

17. Security Force. The composition of the Security Force required to protect the UNAMIR presence will be determined by the threat. Its primary task will be to provide security for remaining UN installations and KIA, up to the point at which the air evacuation under JASON RED is completed. It is likely to consist of:

- a. HQ UNAMIR core operations personnel.
- b. A battalion (-) of wheeled/tracked APC-mounted infantry.
- c. Integral engineer support.
- d. Remaining Air Operations Staff.
- e. Second Line transport resources.

18. Destruction. When JASON YELLOW CHARLIE is ordered, the following equipment will be destroyed:

- a. All Non-Essential equipment, including that left by units evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.
- b. Important equipment which cannot be evacuated within remaining air/vehicle lift availability. The bulk of important equipment should have been evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.

OP PLAN JASON RED

GENERAL

1. JASON RED is the executive order to evacuate Rwanda. It involves:
 - a. The safe evacuation of the UN presence in Rwanda.
 - b. The evacuation of the Security Force.
2. JASON RED will be ordered by the FC when the following criteria have been fulfilled:
 - a. The UN presence in Rwanda no longer serves a military or political purpose.
 - b. The safety of those remaining UN personnel is in serious doubt.
 - c. The security situation in Rwanda is likely to deteriorate to a greater extent.

METHOD

3. Execution. JASON RED will be conducted as a 2 phase operation as follows:
 - a. Phase 1. Evacuation of remaining UN presence via KIA.
 - b. Phase 2. Evacuation by road of the Security Force.
4. Phase 1. Phase 1 will consist of the following elements:
 - a. Reduction of KP responsibility by Security Force to a minimum.
 - b. Centralisation of UN personnel in one location.
 - c. Provision of transitional security at KIA for final evacuation flights.
 - d. Route recce for land evacuation route.
 - e. Escort of remaining UN personnel to KIA by Security Force.
 - f. Evacuation of UN presence less Security Force.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

5. Phase 2. Phase 2 will consist of the following.
 - a. Centralisation of Security Force.
 - b. Despatch of recce elements including engineer support.
 - c. Clearing of route if required.
 - d. Route security.
 - e. Road move to neighbouring country.
6. Command. The Force will be commanded by the FC until his departure. HQ UNAMIR core operations staff will continue to exercise command after his departure.
7. Liaison. Liaison for the execution of JASON RED will be effected with the local authorities. UNAMIR remains responsible for the safe evacuation of UN and Protected Personnel.
8. Communications. Security Force CNR will provide the main means of communication during JASON RED. FSO is to plan to provide out-of-country communications for use by Security Force during Phase 2.
9. Logistics. The Security Force is to be self-contained for 7 days.
10. Destruction Policy. Remaining Important and Non-Essential stores and equipment not destroyed or evacuated under JASON YELLOW will be destroyed by the Security Force before evacuation.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

ASSESSMENT OF THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ELEMENTS
FROM DP CAMPS AT KIBEHO AND NDAGO

For: MGEN G.C. Tousignant

By: LTCOL A.D. Brimelow

Date: 26 November 1994

Ref: Z 723, Sheet 40 Butare, Ed 1, 1:50 000

AIM

1. To clear criminal elements from Kibeho and Ndago Displaced Persons Camps with the following limitations:

- a. The operation must be completed as soon as possible;
- b. Surprise must be maintained;
- c. RPA participation is required;
- d. Tasks which require RPA contact with DPs must be minimised;
- e. The risk of casualties is to be minimised; and
- f. NGO cooperation is required.

FACTORS

Relative Strengths

2. Opposition. The estimated populations of Kibeho and Ndago are 40 000 and 20 000 respectively. The number of dwellings approximates 10 - 15 000. The strength of the criminal element is unknown:

- a. Criminals and extremists in both camps are suspected of being armed;
- b. Armed resistance is likely;
- c. Suspects are likely to attempt to escape;
- d. A number of the criminal element is known to the RPA;
- e. The general mood of the camp inhabitants is one of apprehension and insecurity.

3. Own Troops.

- a. UNAMIR presently consists of six battalions and three independent companies;

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN CONFIDENTIAL

2

- b. Two battalions are not yet fully deployed;
- c. One of the remaining four battalions is conducting rotation which will not be completed until 30 Nov;
- d. The sector in which the objective camps are located is occupied by GHANBATT (the rotating unit) and ZAMBATT (deployment not complete);
- e. ZAMBATT is the most self sufficient unit in terms of transport;
- e. The RPA have indicated the availability of a battalion sized force to cooperate in the conduct of the operation;
- ① f. The use of UNAMIR troops from other sectors will degrade security in the sectors from which they are drawn;
- i. The use of a significant portion of a single unit, other than GHANBATT or ZAMBATT, would degrade security to an unacceptable level;
- j. Three of the contingents are French speakers.

4. Deductions

- a. The nature of the task requires a cordon and search type of operation;
- b. RPA contact with the bulk of the population should be avoided, therefore participation in the cordon element would be prudent;
- c. RPA liaison will be required to identify suspects;
- d. A holding/screening facility will be required for detainees;
- e. The requirement to achieve surprise will require deployment, from a relatively remote assembly area, under cover of darkness and will probably prevent full scale rehearsals;
- f. The use of obscurants by day, illumination by night and APCs early in the operation would probably cause panic among the DPs, therefore, a dawn H Hr and subsequent introduction of APCs (if necessary) would probably be necessary;
- g. The likelihood of casualties might require the forward deployment of medical support.
- h. Establishment of a composite force will be necessary if the operation is to be mounted before the GHANBATT rotation/ZAMBATT deployment is complete;
- ① x i. The establishment of a composite force may result in the requirement for disparate national clearances, which could delay the operation and compromise security.
- ② j. Contributions to a composite force should be limited to company level to reduce the complexity of command and control. Likely contributors are:
 - (1) FRAFBATT - one company ;
 - (2) TUNBATT - two companies;

UN CONFIDENTIAL

3

- ④ k. ¹⁰⁰ ~~Maximum~~ ^{INBATT} force available on a composite basis is seven companies;

- m. Since GHANBATT and ZAMBATT both occupy positions in relatively close proximity to the objective, either of these units presents the practical alternative if the most cohesive force possible is to be utilised;

- ## Ground

6. Approaches There are four principal approach routes as shown on the attached trace:

- ### (1) Advantages

- (a) Relatively narrow frontage (approx 800 metres);
- (b) Dominates high ground throughout the operation;
- (c) Relatively secure flanks;
- (d) Good going for mounted and dismounted operations;
- (e) High speed approach;
- (f) Well defined axis facilitates ease of control; and
- (g) Clears the largest camp first.

UN CONFIDENTIAL

(2) Disadvantages

- (a) Depth of objective will reduce the element of surprise;
- (b) No concealment and cover is sparse;

b. Approach B

(1) Advantages:

- (a) Multiple objectives can be approached simultaneously;
- (b) Well defined, multiple axes to the Northern end of the objective.

(2) Disadvantages:

- (a) Large frontage (15 Km) cannot be covered in a single phase;
- (b) Linear configuration of objective would necessitate flank security;
- (c) Difficult to control;
- (d) High ground not dominated early in the operation;
- (e) Difficult approach; and
- (f) No concealment and cover is sparse.

c. Approach C

(1) Advantages:

- (a) Relatively narrow frontage (approx 800 metres);
- (b) Dominates high ground throughout the operation;
- (c) Relatively secure flanks;
- (d) Good going for mounted and dismounted operations;
- (e) High speed approach;
- (f) Well defined axis facilitates ease of control; and
- (g) Blocks most likely escape route to the south early.

(2) Disadvantages:

- (a) Depth of objective will reduce the element of surprise;
- (b) No concealment and cover is sparse;
- (c) Long approach march; and
- (d) Fails to clear the most heavily populated camp early in the operation.

d. Approach D

(1) Advantages:

- (a) Multiple objectives can be approached simultaneously; and
- (b) Two well defined axes to the northern end of the objective.

(2) Disadvantages:

- (a) Longest approach;
- (b) Two single routes only to the northern end of the objective; poor access for vehicles elsewhere;
- (c) Insecure flanks;
- (d) Approach is dominated by high ground; and
- (e) Difficult to control.

8. Deductions All approaches offer a range of useable assembly areas and FUPs and would require the use of multiple phases. Approaches A and C provide for the most manageable frontages and ease of control however leapfrog of sub units would be necessary to access assigned objectives. Approaches B and D present the capacity to access multiple objectives simultaneously, however the going is generally poor, coordination would be difficult for an unrehearsed force and the size of the objective would require the force to reorient for subsequent phases.

- a. Approaches A and B are the most direct;
- b. Approaches A and C facilitate the most positive control;
- c. Approach B facilitates the opportunity to present the most impact early in the operation.
- d. Approach D is discounted due to poor access, going, control requirements and the need to maintain security.

Time and Space

9. The operation is to be mounted as soon as possible to deter the RPA from taking unilateral action, however, the desired effect (to provide incentive to DPs to return to their homes) should complement Op TAHA. Considerations are as follows:

- (10) a. Outline planning - 5 days (D-11);
- b. Consultation with RPA - 1 day (D-6);
- c. Battle procedure - 5 days (D-5);
- d. Conduct (approach A):
 - (1) Preliminary move - 1 day (D-1);
 - (2) Move to FUP/cutoff positions - H-6;

- (3) Time in FUP - 2 hrs;
- (4) Advance from LD to objective - H+20;
- (5) Clearance of objective (restricted to daylight hours) - 5 days.

e. Approach C would require more time to conduct a move to the FUP with the attendant risk to the element of surprise. Clearance of the objective would be marginally faster in the first phase; subsequent phases would take the same amount of time. Approaches A and B are the most direct.

12. Deductions The earliest practical D Day is 8 Dec 94. The earliest completion date is 13 Dec 94. Any significant delay to this timeframe might prompt the RPA to take unilateral action to forcibly clear the camps.

Assessment of Tasks

11. The Camp complex presents approximately 15 search objectives and up to 10 escape routes. The task / troop requirement is assessed as follows:

a. Secure FUP (approaches A and C) - one company;

b. Secure FUP (approach B) - four platoons;

13. c. Clear each objective - one company;

d. Reserve - one platoon;

14. e. Flank security (approaches A and C) - two sections;

14. f. Flank security (approach B) - four sections;

g. Cordon/cutoff - minimum of 10 platoons;

h. Holding/screening facility security - one platoon;

i. Command and control element;

(1) A Tac HQ;

(2) Helicopter support;

(3) Signals detachment.

j. Transport - battalion lift plus second line element;

l. Medical support element;

j. Liaison - MILOB detachment;

k. CIVPOL detachment;

l. Interpreter element;

m. BBGNU law enforcement representation;

n. UN representatives;

3 x pls 3

4 x pls 4

13 x 15 x 3 pls = 45

1 x pl 1

10 x pls 10

1 x pl 1

64 pls

less 16 pls RPA

= 54 pls

= 18 coyts

= 4 1/2 bns.

- (1) UNREO;
- (2) Human rights;
- (3) ICRC.

o. NGO representatives.

12. Deductions The assembly of a seven company force (plus a RPA battalion) would create the need for a command and control capability which is beyond the resources of UNAMIR. The maximum practical UNAMIR force is four rifle companies plus organic and second line support. Regardless, multiple phases will be required to successfully complete the task.

Summary of Deductions

13. Principal deductions are as follows:

- a. A cordon and search operation is required;
- b. Cooperation by the RPA to provide the cordon, liaison with protection parties, advice and linguists will minimise the likelihood of casualties to and apprehension among DPs;
- c. An operation mounted at dawn is most likely to achieve the desired element of surprise;
- d. The establishment of a composite force would minimise security degradation in each sector;
- e. The utilisation of GHANBATT or ZAMBATT will provide a measure of unity of command, minimise the logistic burden and facilitate the maintenance of security;
- f. The utilisation of GHANBATT or ZAMBATT is not feasible before 5 Dec or on deployment of the remainder of ZAMBATT, whichever is the earlier;
- g. The composition of the force and the potential complexity of the command and control arrangements imply the establishment of a Tac HQ;
- h. Approach A is the most practical in terms of control, coordination and supportability;
- i. The requirement for a multi phased operation and the associated battle procedure presents 8 Dec as an indicative D Day.

COURSES OF ACTION

Opposition

14. Course A Armed resistance.

- a. Likely reaction by some individuals but coordinated resistance is unlikely.
- b. The effect of this would be to create panic amongst the DPs and increase the possibility of collateral damage.

15. Course B Escape.

- a. Most likely reaction.
- b. This course of action would have little effect on the aim of the operation.

16. Deductions:

- a. The most probable course is Course B, however, suspects might choose to fight once escape routes are blocked.
- b. UNAMIR troops should prevent escape if the likelihood of violence is low, otherwise escapees should be left to the cordon.
- c. UNAMIR should respond to engagement strictly in the terms of the ROE.

19 Own Courses
17. Course I Assign a formed unit to advance on a single axis (Approach A) to conduct a search of Kibeho and Ndaga DP Camps with an RPA battalion providing the cordon element.

- a. Advantages:
 - (1) Unity of command is inherent;
 - (2) The logistic overhead is minimised;
 - (3) The maintenance of physical and operational security is enhanced; and
 - (4) Control and coordination is simplified.
- b. Disadvantages:
 - (1) The earliest time that a unit will be available to conduct the operation is 5 Dec. Time for preparation is, therefore reduced.
 - (2) Advance on a single axis will reduce momentum; and
 - (3) An element of surprise will be lost on depth objectives.

18. Course II Assign a composite force to advance on a single axis (Approach A) to conduct a search of Kibeho and Ndaga DP Camps with an RPA battalion providing the cordon element.

- a. Advantages:
 - (1) Participation by a variety of countries is consistent with the spirit of the UN ethos;
 - (2) Participation by a French speaking nation would enhance community relations;
 - (3) Maximum presence would be maintained in all sectors.

b. Disadvantages:

- (1) Unity of command is not easily achieved;
- (2) Administrative overhead is increased;
- (3) Disparate communication equipment could frustrate command and control.

19. Course III Assign the RPA to conduct the search with UNAMIR providing the cordon.

a. Advantages:

- (1) Casualties to UNAMIR will be minimised;
- (2) Does not compromise UN impartiality;
- (3) Adheres to the current peacekeeping (vice peacemaking) concept of operations.

b. Disadvantages:

- (1) The presence of the RPA in force may cause panic amongst the DPs unless an intense information campaign preceeds th operation;
- (2) Influence over RPA activities will be marginalised;
- (3) Potential adverse effect on Op TAHA.

COMMANDER'S GUIDANCE

20. Guidance on the following issues is requested:

(20)

a. Confirmation of your requirement to mount the operation in view of the potential adverse effect on Op TAHA, the UNAMIR mandate/concept of operations and the risk to UNAMIR troops;

(21)

b. Troops to task:

- (1) Size; and
- (2) Composition.

c. Command and control arrangements;

d. Timing;

(22)

e. Delineate specific tasks and roles:

- (1) RPA;
- (2) CIVPOL; and

(3) NGO
(4) Rv Rsg

f. ROE limitations

UN RESTRICTED

TO: UNAMIR WELFARE OFFICER

GH1/027/A

INFO: DFC/COS ✓


FROM: GHANBATT HQ

DATE: 2 NOV 94

SUBJECT: GHANBATT MAILS

1. Your attention is hereby drawn to the rather deteriorating situation concerning receipt and delivery of mails for Ghanbatt.
2. For some time now the Unit has always had to send its representative to Nairobi to liaise with the UNEP representative responsible for receiving mails for UNAMIR, before troops can receive their mails.
3. It is believed that it is the responsibility of the Force Welfare Office to coordinate the activities of the UNEP representative in Nairobi concerning the receipt of mails, to negate the necessity for individual follow-ups by Units.
4. Apart from the fact that sending Ghanbatt personnel to Nairobi to locate and collect mails is a strain on the Unit's human resources, it is also terribly taxing on our meagre finances.
5. It is requested that efforts be made to correct this state of affairs, as it is affecting the morale of troops and creating inconveniences for the Unit.
7. Accept for your necessary action, please.

⑤ Welfare Officer
Take note of the
contents and see to
correct them. If you
are having any difficulties,
I would like to know.
J. J.
DFC/COS
02/11


R ADWINI
Capt
for Commanding Officer

A3
58
5/11/94

UN RESTRICTED



UNAMIR - MINUAR

TO: FORCE HQ

REF: PLANS 32/94

FROM: MILOBS GP HQ

DATE: 28 OCT 94

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

Reference: A. MULINDI Analysis 1/94 dated 16 Jun 94.

INTRODUCTION

1. The referred to analysis was almost a duplicate of the outcome of the situation after the defeat of the RWAND Government Forces and the installation of the Broad Base Government of National Unity.

2. This paper is intended to scrutinize the situation from the introduction of the Government of National Unity until to date and outline observations which might influence the decision making process at higher levels.

3. It is advised that the reader should go through the reference if this paper has to make contributing sense to participants in this Mission.

BRIEF BACKGROUND

4. The fall of the Habyarimana Government was witnessed on 18 Jul 94 when the victor, Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) installed their Government. On this victorious date they (RPF) swore to pursue a Reconciliation programme and above all, they called their Government a Broad Based Government of National Unity. Since there was nobody to integrate with, the RPF Government's war machinery was converted to Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) meaning that RPF had total dominance in this organ and thus ensuring total protection of their depleted ethnically based subjects, once an area of controversy having noticed what took place after Apr 6 if a ceasefire had been brokered.

5. Events that followed shall be discussed in detail below.

AIM

6. To give the reader a likely future analysis of RWANDA to assist in decision making.

MA/ADC
Take your time
in going through
this as come
up with some
figs
26/10
DFC/W

9
26/10

SCOPE

7. The analysis shall be covered out as follows:
 - a. General.
 - b. Banditry Activities in UNAMIR SECTORS.
 - c. RPA Activities.
 - d. Political Scenario.
 - e. Population State.
 - f. Observations.
 - g. Conclusion.

GENERAL

8. Immediately after the introduction of the new Government (BBGNU), the situation became relatively calm except for tension mostly with regard to the involvement of the French in the conflict.

9. The withdrawal of the FRENCH from RWANDA left fears of a mass exodus into ZAIRE. This was contained by UNAMIR efforts which is only recognised by senior RPA officials in high echelons whilst the low level command elements treat this with reservations.

10. The deployment of RPA into the once FRENCH Protected area left the population guessing and this was increased by RPA action towards the population.

11. Normality almost took shape, however this is continuously hampered by the deteriorating situation throughout the country.

Comment

12. It is important to note that UNAMIR functions are executed by those deployed on the ground. Negative attitudes by RPA in lower echelons affects the efficiency of UNAMIR due to direct impulses subjected to deployed UNAMIR personnel. There is need for UNAMIR HQ to advise the BBGNU to disseminate information to improve relations between the two organisations. Dissemination here means up to rank and file of RPA and other interested Government Agencies.

BANDITRY ACTIVITIES BY SECTORS.

13. Sector 1. Sector 1 has been affected by mine incidents in the BYUMBA Prefecture. Of concern is the report by Amnesty International on the purported massacres in AKAGERA National Park.

14. Sector 2. There has been reports of fresh bodies flowing in the AKAGERA River. In addition to this, an RPA vehicle is said to have been ambushed in this Sector. There was also a massive destruction of houses in KIBUNGO.

15. Sector 3. This Sector has witnessed many atrocities mostly

blamed on the militia which is said to be still in the area. Surprisingly, UNAMIR movements to carry out investigations are delayed by RPA restrictions leaving a lot of unanswered questions.

16. Sector 4A. Though a supervised repatriation programme was going as per plan, the number of displaced people in camps is increasing. The contributory factor being the atrocities being committed to some who opted to go home. Cases of extortion have also been reported.

17. Sector 4B. Night abductions are rife in this Sector. Quite a number of people have been reported missing.

18. Sector 4C. Atrocities and attacks are increasing in this Sector. There is a likelihood of cross-border raids. The BURUNDI RESISTANCE MOVEMENT used to stay in BUGARAMA.

19. Sector 5. New graves have been reported in Sector 5. It is difficult to rule out atrocities.

20. Sector 6. This Sector is witnessing atrocities and abductions. Also of recent, UNAMIR property has been targeted to fulfil other people's interests. A senior Government Official absconded.

Comment

21. Movement restrictions imposed on UNAMIR personnel in some Sectors under the pretext of security is not convincing. Such restrictions are the result of such reports as given by AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL and UNHCR. It is important that the BBGNU reconsider this subject if they want guaranteed support from the International community. If the situation continues, then there is no doubt that some sort of hidden agenda is in place and most likely a revenge war is taking shape, thus if it has not already taken shape.

22. The situation is deteriorating at an alarming rate. It seems that the ousted Government left some stay behind parties, and the BBGNU on the other hand are carrying out clandestine operations. The atrocities taking place leave not a single doubt that both parties are to blame.

23. Extortion is a sign of poverty. In Africa, if a leader does not have money to pay salaries or allowances, then he must have a dynamic political programme, well convincing, to enable his followers both militants and civilians to abide by the law. BBGNU seem to lack both hence extortion will soon be a slogan in RWANDA. The International Community has an important role here, to support this country financially, to enable them pay salaries.

24. The RWANDESE populace is subjected to all forms of harassment. Their knowledge of rights is limited. RWANDA does not have a police force in place and the military is found abusing their authority throughout the world. It is important and of a priority to establish the local rural police force for

UN RESTRICTED

the protection of the people from the military and any other would be violators of their rights. The establishment of the Police Force must be supported by the introduction of the judicial system. The international community should assist in the prosecution of this programme.

25. The concept of RECONCILIATION pronounced by the BBGNU is a very complex process. This concept is not being pursued as previously pronounced. Arrests and abductions have been rife in the hands of the authorities. Strides for a monitored AMNESTY should be put in place if RECONCILIATION in RWANDA must have a meaning. It must be noted that RECONCILIATION means :

- a. Burying the hatchet.
- b. Forgetting the past.
- c. Forgiving.
- d. Accepting co-existence.
- e. Introducing a new Government Order.

26. The BURUNDI RESISTANCE MOVEMENT mentioned earlier, is suspected to have withdrawn to ZAIRE together with the Government Forces. There is a likelihood of them opening a safe passage for the ousted army in south west of RWANDA to carry out low intensity operations. Already there are indication of some low level banditry activities particularly along the border between RWANDA and BURUNDI.

RWANDA PATRIOTIC ARMY (RPA) ACTIVITIES

27. The RPA before and during the prosecution of the war appeared a well organised insurgent movement. Currently however, there is a lot of mixed opinions about them. It is necessary to classify their actions as follows :

a. Positive Actions. In order to cleanse the weaponry at the disposal of many people which was attributed by the ousted Government, the RPA are executing positive and deterrence operations throughout the country. The operations are in the form of cordon and searches, road blocks, sweeps and mass mobilisation, intended to win their hearts and minds.

b. Negative Action. While progressive operations were underway, bad things also accompanied them. Seizure of private property and looting by RPA or RPA directed became an outcry throughout the country. Abduction and harassment of civilians was being reported on daily basis. RPA became uncooperative to UNAMIR and uncalled for restrictions became the order of the day.

Comment

28. The positive actions were a clear sign of the desire for security and stability. Mass mobilisation was an indication of RPA's quest for political support. However the negative actions seem to overshadow all these efforts. RPA is a strong organisation but is lacking as from the past, a comprehensive popular political guidance. A clear, well spelt political

UN RESTRICTED

programme forms the nucleus of every country's defence policy. The military must not overshadow the politicians unless this country is once again driving towards a dictatorship administration.

POPULATION STATE

29. The above paragraph explains how the RPA are to some extent a threat to their own people. Lack of guaranteed^{security} coupled with abuse of popular rights of the populace leaves the people reserved since they do not know who will be the next target. Fear is prevalent in almost every eye. People still want to remain in displaced people's camps internally and in refugee camps externally. In Sector 5 some people still want to go to ZAIRE but are denied that right. Not much is going on in the fields with regard to food production. Most of the returnees from the refugee camps are refugees of age. They have been outside RWANDA for some years and are quite optimistic about their security because they were liberated by RPF. The yesterday refugee still remains and is not keen to return just like those still in displaced people's camps. Fear and lack of security still exists.

Comment

30. The BBGNU wants every RWANDESE back home. What RPA are doing on the ground raises negative impulses. Fear is a sign of lack of security. According to the RWANDESE civilian population, war is eminent, so why go to the fields? If any economic developments and social stability are to be realised strides must be made to harness this prospect. Confidence building operations must be introduced. Positive steps towards peace must be considered and accepted. Not everybody masterminded the genocide, not everybody was a killer hence RECONCILIATION can work. From history the term MAJORITY has a lot to do with political decisions and RWANDA cannot be an exception. Infact if the majority is not invited peacefully within the governing framework, war automatically become the last resort. In simple; RGF withdrew as an Army and the RWANDA Government withdrew as a government. Though they might be disorganised, it needs one to understand the reasons for withdrawal. The most important being to reorganise. It does not necessarily mean that they will win that war, but might or might cause again uncalled for death, injuries, refugees and a continued state of instability. This can be avoided if peaceful means can be put in place. It must be remembered that the world has too many sympathisers hence some dictators have been in power for ages. Positive decisions which can make a leader unpopular for a short term but have long term solutions, are the prospect for peace in RWANDA. Military actions must be politically directed with clear aims and the aims must be democratic, and only can you win a positive answer/reaction.

POLITICAL SCENARIO

31. As already mentioned it is difficult to outline RPF political objectives. The same objectives are supposed to influence the Government's political agenda. It is a known factor

that in a country where tension exist, the military has an upper hand. However, this must not down play the political role of the politicians.

32. It is strange that a young Government which is under the scrutiny of the International Community and already getting mammoth support from the same suffers the plague of a Minister absconding. Is this a signature of an inhouse brawl? This raises many speculations.

33. Prefecture Administrators have been deployed in all prefectures. It is strange that the Prefecture Administrator is to execute all tasks without the aid of staff. Some are not even seen in their areas of work. There is virtually no joint effort between them and UNAMIR. This supported by the lack of a Judiciary system leave the populace and the International Community wondering.

34. NGOs provide most essential commodities. BBGNU does not posses the machinery to move and distribute such commodities. They lack own commodities to distribute hence are trying to portray a picture of providing to the community what NGO's are providing. This they are doing without the provisions.

35. The BBGNU has made strides in the field of education, a move welcomed by the International Community. In some sectors fear still remains prevalent and parents are still not keen to release their children to go to school.

COMMENTS

36. Any political programme need financial backing. RWANDA is a poor country which generates her funds from tea. The tea fields have been ruined by the war and are currently lacking professional staff to mann both the fields and the factories. Infact professional and technical staff is a nightmare in RWANDA. The International Community must consider sending expatriates to help putting this country back^{to} her feet.

37. Expatriates need money and the same Community should make strides in this field.

38. The drive by the Government to put themselves on same footing contributes to luring support from the Community. The basic requirement to convince the Community is an outline of the Government's political objectives, the Government's National economical programme and Government human rights policies. If this is publicly announced, the community is also interested to monitor the execution.

39. It is most advisable that the Community is not impressed by military built ups. Preparation for war and fighting diverts essential resources meant to support development to war needs. A country keen to go for war must have resources at her disposal to support that war not banking on the International Community.

40. Absconding by any minister at present discourages unity. The

UN RESTRICTED

Minister's move was a blow on RPF and a morale booster for the ousted Government. This is likely going to buy the ousted Government some support from sympathisers and discredit RPF Government to the International Community. RPF's unity policy must be clear not only on paper but on execution.

OBSERVATIONS

41. Rehabilitation of the Genocide Error. The genocide was carried out and this is a fact. Investigations are underway to uproot the perpetrators. On the inauguration of the BBGNU, RPF outlined that they will follow a reconciliation process on their endeavour to rebuilt RWANDA. They clearly stated that they were not intending to repeat the same refugee tragedy, every RWANDESE was to come home. What was lacking in this Reconciliation statement was how they intend to prosecute the reconciliation. Until todate nothing positive has been initiated, less meetings with neighbouring Governments for the purpose of initiating pressure for refugees to flock home. If the RPF Government is serious about Reconciliation, their Government policies must be tailored to accommodate this noble idea. Reconciliation should have been programmed and the process understood by both players. It is suggested that if Reconciliation is to be effected then a demarcation line must be put in place for an Amnesty by divisions and a time table set. The International Community must be empowered to supervise the programme. The division can be as outlined below:

a. Population Grouping by Degree of Involvement.

(1) Group 1. Group 1 are those who planned and masterminded the genocide. They can never be forgiven and shall be tried by authorised courts of law.

(2) Group 2. Group 2 are those who executed the order to kill. In this group there are two considerations.

(a) Prepared Killing Machinery. These are the militias and soldiers who participated in the actual killings. The constitution of every country places these persons on a position of trust with regard to the protection of civilians which they violated. They must face trial.

(b) Civilian Participants. These are civilians induced into the killings. They can be covered by the Amnesty. This group include soldiers who did not kill but failed to protect the civilians.

(3) Group 3. This group encompasses ordinary civilians and members of families from participating parents. They must be covered by the amnesty.

b. Time Table. The program can be considered to start anytime, however, due to the prevailing situation, it might be ideal to start the Amnesty after the completion of the current investigations. This might reduce confusion on the

authorities action on the ground and the peace process under way.

Government Programmes.

42. The policy of the Government of RWANDA is obviously one detected by the past experience. The state machinery infrastructure need to be revised to seal any loop holes that gives total power to individuals or a group with a similar purpose. It is from this policy that a political programme is drawn. Note that the target of the political programme is the RWANDESE POPULACE and the International Community at large. Examples of items to include on the political programme are as follows:

a. The internal populace's commitment on the political front and on the economical sphere.

b. The system of reception of those displaced or in refugee camps. This includes their reception, resettlement and rehabilitation. The issues that affect the International community are mostly of a moral obligation. The International community must realise that no Government Programme can be initiated unless there is a financial input to it. This shall in turn allow the politicians to make promises, reassure their people and win the confidence of the people.

UNAMIR OPERATIONS

43. The goal of UNAMIR is to see/witness a free RWANDA, peaceful and committed to the needs of her population. This goal is a culmination of many UN Mandates, all within the interests of Peace. The UN needs to work in a free environment to enable it serve as a deterrent as well as an efficient eye of the International community. The BBGNU must realise this important task and accord the UN her correct status. It is appreciated that even Radio RWANDA should highlight some of the good work done by UNAMIR towards the Rwandese populace who are craving for more UN support for their survival.

CONCLUSION

44. It is important to note that there is still a likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities in RWANDA. The only path for peace are negotiations and positive political programmes. Reconciliation does not work where hidden agendas exist. Reconciliation requires support and does not work in isolation of other mechanisms. It is also appreciated that the Government of RWANDA should avoid the past historical error, thus following the footsteps of a dictatorship hence should consider Democracy as a possible solution to their long standing conflict.

UN RESTRICTED

MMAJ *MMAJ* N/5
M MASANGANISE

Lt Col

S PLANS/TRG O

Note: This document has been compiled from the information obtained from the situation report from Sectors, Interviews with the locals and other officials playing an important role in RWANDA. Attached to this document is the Analysis 1/94.

Distribution:

External:

Action:

FC

CPLANS/TRG O (FHQ)

Internal:

Action:

CMO

DCMO

UN RESTRICTED

ANNEX E
TO BRIEF ON RWANDA

ANALYSIS 1/94
ref File C:\WP51\doc\AGO001.DOC

16 JUNE 1994

ANALYSIS OF RWANDA SITUATION FOR FC

BACKGROUND

1. This analysis does not need to highlight the ARUSHA AGREEMENT but shall refer to it on certain occasions.
2. Events that took place from the introduction of the Cease Fire until the death of the late President of RWANDA are familiar.
3. The aftermath of the death of the President is familiar.
4. UNAMIR actions after the incident are also known.

INTRODUCTION

5. this paper is based on the analysis on RPF current operations and likely future intentions.
6. In addition recommendations of future UN deployment are highlighted.

SCOPE

7. The analysis will be covered under the following headings.
 - a. Aim of this paper.
 - b. RPF operational Objectives.
 - c. Threat to RPF.
 - d. How RPF can achieve their Aim.
 - e. Logistic support of RPF.
 - f. Recruitment/Trg of RPF Cadres.
 - g. RPF politics.
 - h. UN deployment.
 - i. Likely future RWANDA.
 - j. Best possible Course.
 - k. Plan.

AIM

8. To give the Force Commander a broad observation of the likely outcome of the RWANDA crisis.

RPF OPERATIONAL OBJECTIVES

9. Before outlining RPF objectives it is important to highlight RPF aim to cross the DMZ after the death of the President on night 06 April 1994. RPF clearly indicated that their operation was to stop killings of RWANDESE.
10. To achieve this aim RPF longterm and shortterm Objectives were outlined as follows:
 - a. To conduct a rescue operation of any would be survivors.

UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

- b. To reduce RWANDA GOVERNMENT FORCES military capabilities.
- c. To establish RPF military presents within areas occupied by their own supporters (To include those who had formed a coalition for election purposes).
- d. To pave way for coexistence of the future RWANDA.

THREAT TO RPF

- 11. Resistance by RGF has frustrated RPF's objectives to some extent in their endeavour to rescue their people. The withdrawal strategy of RGF without sustaining heavy losses poses a formidable threat to RPF short and long term plans.
- 12. The continuous existence of the Militias allegedly perpetrating the massacres, poses a threat to the security and stability of RWANDA.
- 13. The inability of the Government to honour Agreements eg: ARUSHA AGREEMENT leaves RPF without trust.
- 14. The total overthrow of the RGF is likely to lead to an upsurge of an insurgency against an RPF dominated Government.
- 15. By virtue of population imbalance (HUTU/TUTSI), there is a likelihood of mass uprisings against the minority of the RPF dominated Government.
- 16. The likelihood of external forces intervention cannot be ruled out.

HOW RPF CAN ACHIEVE THEIR AIM

- 17. Shortterm Solution. So far RPF has been advocating for a short term solution. Thus:
 - a. Rapid advance in overwhelming strengths and capturing ground mostly occupied by their people.
 - b. The likely prospect of establishing Assembly Areas in areas captured after the brokering of a ceasefire.
- 18. Longterm Solution. It is anticipated that as a longterm Solution, if RPF manages to reduce the RGF's military capability, might result in RPF considering the following:
 - a. Majority representation in the future Army of RWANDA for the protection of their people.
 - b. Establishment of a Government guided by the principle of reconciliation.
 - c. A political programme designed to restore confidence in refugees, convincing them to comeback into RWANDA.

COMMENT

- 19. The resistance offered by RGF limits RPF's objective of rapid advance to protect their people, hence continued fighting and slim chances of implementing a lasting ceasefire.
- 20. Without reducing RGF's military capability, RPF feels that there is an imbalance of power hence suspect repetition of events is likely.
- 21. Continued military pressure by RPF on RGF creates fear and lack of trust. This is to lead to RGF, the Government and its supporters refuse the concept of coexistence.
- 22. RPF do not have an immediate solution on the killings allegedly perpetrated by the Militias since they operate behind RGF lines. A neutral force behind RGF lines might stabilise the situation, creating confidence in the RPF side.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF RPF

UN RESTRICTED

23. It will be incomplete to conclude this analysis without looking at how RPF sustains themselves in the field. In the history of armed struggles, no movement survives without a spring board. The question is who is RPF's springboard?

24. Indicators. The indicators are that since the beginning of this current conflict, heavy trucks loaded with uncovered war materials and vehicle spare parts, have been observed more often in and out of MULINDI HQ. The possibility of secret routes in and out of the springboard cannot be ruled out.

RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

25. Ground captured by RPF demand forces to hold it. Losses incurred in battle require replacement. The sources for RPF recruitment are the Refugee Camps and Displaced Peoples Camps. Movement of military going age youth has been observed, however, destinations could not be established.

26. This does not rule out that the possibility of military training is in existence. Many youth are now seen manning check points.

RPF POLITICS

27. Within RPF controlled areas, civilians administrative infrastructures are been established at every displaced peoples camps. Extensive political campaign based on democracy, abiding by the principle of reconciliation is being undertaken. It has been noticed that among the targeted recipient, some regard the idea with reservations. They seem not support the RPF cause.

28. It must be noted that the population balance in these camps under RPF are TUTSI dominated, resulting in different sentiments with regard to the situation in RWANDA.

29. Restrictions by RPF on direct participation by UNAMIR in support of Humanitarian Aid indicates a likelihood of using Humanitarian Aid for political gains. However this is a short-term aspect since movement from point A to B of displaced persons is now rife because of scarcity of food supplies in camps.

30. On the International Community Forum RPF are making good scores. They are extensively using the press to highlight their cause as well as attract support from various sectors of the community.

COMMENT

31. It is difficult to ascertain whether the suspected recruitment is voluntary or under desperation judging by the situation in RWANDA.

32. It must be noted that the refugee scholarships afforded RWANDESE refugees has enabled them to secure some wealth of some sort. The need for these refugees to come back to RWANDA commits them to sacrifice all their wealth to support RPF. This does not rule out other external sources of support.

33. UN Mission need to be explained to both warring parties to enable them understand the need to accept it.

UN DEPLOYMENT

34. The past and current deployment of MILOBS by the HQ including proposed deployment is suitable for mission success. This part of the analysis is only to share some suggestions on the proposed deployment of MILOBS hence might influence the deployment

UN RESTRICTED

of ARMED CONTINGENTS.

35. KIGALI SECTOR. KIGALI SECTOR was a hot spot before the death of the President. Tasks for the MILOBS were so great affecting the fluent flow of information to the Sector HQ, planing and accountability of MILOBS within the Sector. The Sector was seriously absorbed in routine work resulting in the failure to identify indicators as reflected after the crash of the Presidential plane, while some of the Sector's Staff were in their houses in KIGALI on various occasions were MILOBS mobilised from various Sectors to assist KIGALI SECTOR. It is anticipated that in the event of a ceasefire being established most displaced persons shall move to their homes. The same political parties of yesterday shall come into play. A Government of some sort shall be established. Violence shall not be ruled out. With this in mind, KIGALI SECTOR shall remain a hot spot.

36. ARMED CONTINGENTS. The Situation in RWANDA is explosive hence you cannot isolate MILOBS from armed personnel. As portrayed by RPF Aim and elements affecting the attainment of that Aim, humanitarian security guarantee remains blink.

COMMENT

37. The problems foreseen in KIGALI require KIGALI SECTOR to remain an independent Sector without any affiliation to any areas.

38. The need to divide KIGALI into Subsectors is recommended.

39. Though MILOBS and Armed Forces tasks differ, it is more ideal to collocate the two on deployment for the purpose of assuring safety of MILOBS. This principle will also ease the withdrawal plan if the situation become untenable.

40. Judging by RPF's Aim of prosecuting this war the insertion of Armed elements into hostile territory after an agreement with the control authority might calm down the situation.

LIKELY FUTURE RWANDA

41. Future RWANDA is likely to fall in any of the following type of Governments:

a. Courses Open.

- | | | |
|-----|------------------|---|
| (1) | <u>Course 1.</u> | A BROAD BASED GOVERNMENT. |
| (2) | <u>Course 2.</u> | A MILITARY GOVERNMENT. |
| (3) | <u>Course 3.</u> | PARTITIONING RWANDA AND DECLARE SEPARATE STATES |

COMMENT

42. The RPF military objectives and political programme tend to favour course 1 above. If a comparison is made between the operations in KIGALI and operations EAST and SOUTH of KIGALI one would realise that not much efforts are undertaken in KIGALI. The writer's opinion is that if RPF takes KIGALI this would mark the fall of both RGF and the GOVERNMENT. Based on ethnical analysis, the fall of the HUTUS. The best strategy then for RPF is to dominate ground occupied by their people, leading to Course 1 above. However note must be made that MT KIGALI dominates KIGALI, strategically it is unsound for RPF not to capture it. The consequence of taking it might also be a defeat for RGF hence a defeat for the GOVERNMENT.

43. If RGF are defeated the likelihood is Course 2 above. Though the principle of reconciliation is quite obvious, there is limited trust among RPF ranks which might lead to

UN RESTRICTED

changes on the leadership factor. Infact to be more precise, the CHAIRMAN won't be more useful to the organisation. Note must be taken that his role is very important in Course 1.

44. Course 3 is a very complicated issue. Most TUTSI survivors are now in RPF controlled areas. They also form the majority in the said areas. Course three might only be taken if anyother or all other means fail.

MILITARY OPTIONS FOR FUTURE RWANDA

45. For the purpose of this analysis it is ideal to look into what type of GOVERNMENT FORCES are likely to be created for the future RWANDA in order to analyse the most likely type of GOVERNMENT to be created after the establishment of a ceasefire.

46. The RPF believe that some of the principles in the ARUSHA AGREEMENT are no longer applicable. By assessing the events that took place after the Presidents death, there is a likelihood that RPF will resist military cuts as per the agreement. Pursuing their objective of reducing RGF military capabilities is an indication of a likelihood for military dominance.

47. As two other options are available to RPF. They might accept cuts per the ARUSHA AGREEMENT or opt for a balanced cut. Due to lack of trust the options are likely to be met with stiff resistance since these would limit their capability to protect their people.

48. The final option is having separate RPF and RGF standing Armies as independent balanced formations. This might work but to ensure maximum security to their people would require changing habitation areas to areas protected by their own soldiers. A State of continued instability will prevail and might influence Course 3.

BEST POSSIBLE COURSE / LIKELY

49. The most likely type of GOVERNMENT for RWANDA is likely to be influenced by the following:

- a. Lack of trust.
- b. Insecurity.
- c. Population Balance.
- d. Co existence.
- e. Balance in military Strength.

50. Judging by the weight of facts, it is likely that RPF shall opt for a BROAD BASED GOVERNMENT supported by an RPF dominated ARMY.

PLAN

51. It is important to note all the facts in this paper. This paragraph only highlights that there is a likelihood of a delay on achieving a ceasefire until a military imbalance has been realised.

UN RESTRICTED

mmgsa - masangise

J MASANGANISE
Lt Col
Sector Commander

DISTRIBUTION
CMO
FC

NOTE: The analysis has been made out from facts obtained from RPF elements and a physical study on the ground.

UN RESTRICTED

DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER

SECRET

MA
let it all happen
disarmament
20/10
DFC/601

UNAMIR/NICOY/7408.9/G

Copy No. 19 of 38
HQ NICOY
UNAMIR
BYUMBA CAMP
BYUMBA

See Distribution

19 Oct 94

NICOY CONTINGENCY PLAN

INTRODUCTION

1. The Military and political situation in Rwanda is generally calm. However, the RPA has continuously displayed negative attitude towards UNAMIR personnel. This has greatly hampered UNAMIR activities. In Sector one where NICOY is based, the RPA has not only refused the contingent to carry out some of its assigned tasks, but has turned down requests for assistance and mutual cooperation. This attitude of RPA has not in anyway dampened the resolve of the contingent to fulfil its mandate under the auspices of UNAMIR general plan.

2. However the present situation has necessitated the need to work out a contingency plan in anticipation of any adverse situation that may arise. This plan is based on the current situation in Rwanda, the UN mandate and the Contingent National plan. The NICOY deployment was also taken in consideration in marshalling out this plan.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to enumerate actions to be taken as a contingency to any adverse situation that may arise in the mission area.

WARNING ORDER

Stage 1

4. On receipt of any adverse report, warning order for move would be sent to units within three days, on the Codeword DAMISA. At this stage, troops must identify non-essential equipments that may hinder their movement for destruction. Only essential items should be retained for move. The troops should be very portable.

1 of 5

SECRET

20/10
G-8

SECRET

Stage 2

5. If the situation does not improve on the second day, the stage 2 of the state of rediness for move on the codeword BAREWA shall commence. At this stage the troops should eliminate all non - essential eqpt and be ready to move. All security items that cannot be carried must be destroyed. Any equipments or items that may offer an advantage to the adverse party must be destroyed.

Stage 3

6. Codeword ZAKI Signals the commencement of stage 3. Once this is given, troops are expected to withdraw through carefully disignated routes. The sub unit commanders must ensure that the withdrawal routes are secured and safe for troops passage.

REINFORCEMENT PLAN

7. If any particular unit is adversely affected, effort would be made to reinforce the unit with own troops or the closest UNAMIR unit. But if the adverse situation engulfs the whole UNAMIR troops and reinforcement could not be feasible due to the contingent deployment which presently is not mutually supporting, the engaged pl should immediately withdraw to the closest UN location by all means.

WITHDRAWAL PLAN

8. Any unit that is engaged with any opposition or if faced with serious armed conflict shall withdraw from such location on the Codeword ZAKI. Troops should follow the enumerated route thus:

- You will withdraw without the use of the force through Uganda.*
- a. Byumba. All troops in Byumba shall withdraw through the road RUKOMO - GATUNA - UGANDA. If the route is blocked, the troops shall withdraw through the road KABALI - KIVUYE - UGANDA or road CYUNBA - UGANDA.
 - b. Nyagatare. Troops in Nyagatare should move through the high avenue of approach road GABIBO - NAGITUMBA - UGANDA or alternatively through a cross country route road BWENBASHA - UGANDA.
 - c. MURAMBI. The troops in Murambi should move to KIGALI through road MURAMBI - GAHINI - KIGALI.
 - d. GATUNA. Troops in Gatuna should cross through the Rwanda - Uganda border into Uganda.

SECRET

9. This contingency plan is subject to change if immediate air request or assistance for evacuation is provided either by UN or own Government. In that case, all troops must concentrate in present location in Byumba for evacuation.

COMMENTS

10. This withdrawal plan is subject to the nature of the opposing forces and further directives given by Nigeria government. For instance, a threat from RPA may reverse the whole withdrawal plan. In such situation, the whole troops may withdraw to Kigali for possible air evacuation in conjunction with other UNAMIR troops. This plan is based on the assumption that countries SW of Rwanda are hostile to RPA.

11. If there is immediate threat from RGF and Interahamwe, then all troops under command shall withdraw as per the plan in paragraph 7. i.e troops in Nyagatare and Gatuna must adhere to the withdrawal plan while troops in Murambi would withdraw through road GABIRO - NGITUMBA - UGANDA or road GABIRO - NYAGATARE - BWEHASHA - UGANDA.

12. All movement must be controlled and maximum security maintained for quick reaction. All subunit commanders should recon these routes and get acquainted with them for unforeseen circumstances.

LIAISON

13. On successful withdrawal of troops into Uganda or Kigali as the case may be, the subunit commanders should liaise immediately with the most senior Nigerian Military officer on the ground or the representative of the Nigerian Ambassador or officials of Nigerian High Commission. Immediate sitrep through the fastest communication must be established with the nearest Nigerian Embassy or High Commission for onward transmission to DA Ops Lagos and Nigerian Defence Attachee in New York.


CONCLUSION

14. This contingent plan is designed in anticipation of any adverse situation against UNAMIR. The subunit commander should be conversant with sequence of action already memorised.

SECRET

The reinforcement plan is dependent on the involvement of other UNAMIR troops, therefore various subunit commanders should have close liason with neighbouring UNAMIR troops.

15. The withdrawal plan has been simplified for easy execution, and made flexible to counter any threat from the conterding forces. Various telephone number of all Nigerian Embassies and High Commission closest to the withdrawal routes must be known. It is imperative that this contingency plan be kept secret and strictly adhered to whenever the situation arises.



LA ADEOYE
Lt Col
Contingent Commander

Distribution:

External:

Information:

Copy No

HQ MILOB Gp	1
Sector 2	2
Sector 3	3
Sector 4A	4
Sector 4B	5
Sector 4C	6
Sector 5	7
AUSMED	8
BRITCON	9
CANCON	10
ETHIOBATT	11
FRAFBATT	12
GHANBATT	13
MALAWI COY	14
TUNBATT	15

SECRET

	Copy No
DHQ OPs	16
AHQ DAOPs	17
MA/FC	18
DFC/COS	19 △
C Ops	20
G3 Plan	21
Internal:	
Action:	
1 Mech P1	22
2 Mech P1	23
3 Mech P1	24
Recce P1	25
S & T P1	26
Fd Engr P1	27
Sig P1	28
Information:	
NICOY Wksp	29
NICOY Int	30
MIR	31
APRD	32
MP	33
Chap/Imam	34
Comd's File	35
File	36
Spare	37 - 38

CARRIAGE OF WEAPONS

11. MILOBS. Under Article VI of the UN Convention, defined in Reference B, MILOBS are described as "experts". They do not carry weapons and further policy, described below, on the Carriage of Weapons, does not apply to them.

12. Principle. As UNAMIR military personnel are on duty at all times, and as they have been issued with weapons for their own protection, or the protection of those whom they have a duty to protect, the principle to be applied is that UNAMIR military personnel will carry weapons at all times. Current ROE and Security Alert Measures (to be issued) will further dictate the readiness of UNAMIR personnel. This policy does not apply to medical and religious personnel. The protection of those personnel will be as directed by the Contingent Commander/Commanding Officer.

13. Exceptions. The occasions on which military UNAMIR personnel do not carry weapons are as follows:

- a. When consuming alcohol.
- b. When in civilian clothes.
- c. When leaving Rwanda - see Other Countries (below).

Seen
19/10
DFC/COS

14. Consumption of Alcohol & Carriage of Weapons. UNAMIR personnel are not to consume alcohol when carrying weapons. Alcohol may only be consumed in the following circumstances:

- a. In a unit location or Mess which is guarded by armed guard(s).
- b. In a private residence.
- c. In a public place, (such as a bar, hotel or restaurant) at which personal protection must be provided - see Personal Protection (below).

15. Personal Protection. UNAMIR military personnel must receive Personal Protection whenever they attend a social function, at which they consume alcohol. On other occasions, they will be armed and in uniform, and able to protect themselves. Personal Protection, which must include the provision of communications (eg Motorola), during the period of the social function will be exercised as follows:

- a. In a unit location or Mess, where it will be provided by armed guard(s). This
- b. En route to/from a private residence. While personnel are visiting a private residence, their security is considered to be at a higher level than in a public place.
- c. En route to/from **and in** a public place.
- d. When carrying out organised sports or PT outside an area which is under guard.

16. Level of Personal Protection. Commanding Officers/Contingent Commanders are to determine the level of Personal Protection afforded. Communications must be provided throughout these activities. Some examples of the minimum level of protection required