

UNAMIR

G3 OPERATIONS PLANS - STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES (SOP)

[1 OCT 1993-31 DEC 1995]

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UNAMIR FORCE SOPs

PART THREE

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To 1000.1 (FC)

Dated 13 December 1993

WRITING PLAN FOR UNAMIR FORCE SOPs

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PART 3 - OPERATIONS

SECTION 1 - CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. The concept of operations for UNAMIR was created by the Reconnaissance Mission to Rwanda (17 Aug-3 Sep 93) and was articulated in the Secretary-Generals report to the Security Council of 25 September 1993. The concept of operations was approved by the Security Council in Resolution 872 of 5 October 1993. ~~THEY~~ REAFFIRMED WITH RESOLUTION 918 ON 17 MAY 1994.

2. The concept of operations for UNAMIR is:

- a. To monitor the current cease-fire arrangements through verification and control of the current DMZ by the integration of elements of the NMOG II forces under command of a UN led Force HQ in Kigali. The UNOMUR forces will also come under command of the HQ and maintain their monitoring tasks on the Uganda/Rwanda border.
- b. To establish a Kigali Weapons Secure Area, with the agreement and support of the parties, in and around the city of Kigali through the deployment of formed UN troops and observers.
- c. To provide protection for the movement and installation of the RPF VIPs and an RPF Battalion in Kigali so that the Broad Based Transitional Government may be installed.
- d. To be prepared to employ formed UN troops for security of UN property and personnel anywhere in Rwanda, until relieved by the new Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie.
- e. To conduct and assist in mine clearance operations. UN areas and areas of interest will be cleared by the UN. The UN will conduct mine awareness and clearance training and provide mine clearance equipment to both parties to clear their respective zones.
- f. To monitor the cease-fire arrangements through verification and control of the disengagement of the parties to a new and expanded DMZ and the concentration, disarmament and demobilization/reintegration of troops of both parties and the Gendarmerie in accordance with the Arusha Peace Agreement of 4 August 1993. This is to be achieved by the deployment of formed UN troops and observers in the DMZ, the Assembly Points, the Cantonment Points and the Integrated Training Centers.
- g. To monitor the continued integration of the Rwandese Defence Forces, the Gendarmerie and the process of transition of the Rwandese Broad Based Transitional

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Government through verification and control throughout the country by UN troops and observers.

- h. To monitor the civilian security situation by assisting the Gendarmerie in the recovery of illegal weapons and monitoring the activities of the Gendarmerie and the Communal Police.
- j. To be prepared to employ formed UN troops to provide escort and protection for humanitarian activities until relieved by the new Rwandese Defence Forces and Gendarmerie.
- k. To monitor and verify the withdrawal of foreign troops in accordance with the Arusha Peace Agreement.
- L. To monitor the return of refugees and displaced persons to ensure it is carried out in a safe and orderly manner.
- M. ADD To this list what Resolution 918 included.

SECTION 2 - OUTLINE PLAN

I. The UNAMIR mandate will be conducted over a 22 month period (from 5 October 1993) in four phases:

- a. Phase One. Phase one will commence on the day (5 October 1993) on which the Security Council adopts the enabling resolution and would end on D-Day, the day on which the Broad-Based Transitional Government is installed in Kigali. The objective of this phase is to establish the essential conditions needed to permit the *secure installation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government. The necessary command and control, service support, infrastructure and equipment will be deployed to permit sustained operations. This phase would see elements of the NMOG II and UNOMUR observers continuing their respective mandates in the DMZ and on the Uganda/Rwanda border, but under command of UNAMIR. By the end of Phase One 1428 military personnel would be deployed, of whom 1217 would be staff officers and troops and 211 would be military observers.
- b. Phase Two. Phase Two will commence on D Day and last until D Day+90 or when the process of disengagement, demobilization and integration of the Forces and Gendarmerie begins. This phase would see the continued build up of the Mission to its peak strength. The expanded NMOG II and UNOMUR would be fully integrated as entities into the mission and would continue to discharge their mandates. The major activities during this phase would be to monitor the disengagement of forces to a new expanded DMZ, continued monitoring of the Uganda-Rwanda border and ensuring that all preparations for the disengagement, demobilization and integration process are in place. By the end of this phase 2548 personnel, of

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whom 2217 would be staff officers and formed troops and 331 would be military observers.

- c. Phase Three. Phase Three would commence on D Day +90 or when the disengagement, demobilization and integration process begins, and would last until d Day +360, or when the process is completed. During this phase, the Mission would establish, supervise and monitor the new DMZ with a second infantry battalion and would continue to monitor the Uganda\Rwanda border. It would establish approximately 26 assembly\cantonment points and 4 integrated training centers, monitor the movement of large bodies of military personnel in and through the DMZ and assist in maintaining general security in the country. Security would also continue to be provided in Kigali. By the end of this phase, the strength of the Mission would be in the process of reduction to approximately 1240 all ranks.
- d. Phase Four. Phase Four would commence on D Day+360, or when the disengagement, demobilization and integration process is completed. This phase would last about 10 months. It would see the further reduction of the Mission's strength to the minimum level needed to assist in ensuring the secure atmosphere required in the final stages of the transitional period leading up to the elections. During this phase, the monitoring of the DMZ and of the Uganda\Rwanda border would cease. The residual strength of the Mission would amount to approximately 930 military personnel, of whom 850* would be staff officers and formed troops and 80 would be military observers.

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When 2217 would be staff officers and formed troops and 221 would be military observers.

Phase Three. Phase three would commence on D Day + 30 or when the disengagement, demobilization and integration process begins, and would last until D Day + 360, or when the process is completed. During this phase, the Mission would establish, supervise and monitor the new DMS with a second Infantry Battalion and would continue to monitor the Uganda/Rwanda border. It would establish approximately 34 assembly/contingent points and 4 integrated training centers, monitor the movement of large bodies of military personnel in and through the DMS and assist in maintaining general security in the country. Security would also continue to be provided in Kigali. By the end of this phase, the strength of the Mission would be in the process of reduction to approximately 1200 all ranks.

Phase Four. Phase four would commence on D Day + 360, or when the disengagement, demobilization and integration process is completed. This phase would last about 10 months. It would see the further reduction of the Mission's strength to the minimum level needed to assist in ensuring the secure atmosphere required in the final stages of the transitional period leading up to the elections. During this phase, the monitoring of the DMS and of the Uganda/Rwanda border would cease. The residual strength of the Mission would amount to approximately 900 military personnel, of whom 650 would be staff officers and formed troops and 250 would be military observers.

This is a history
of Rwandan conflict.
It is necessary
to attach new
concept based only
on the latest
Resolution of the
Security Council.

Section 3 - Duties and ResponsibilitiesORGANIZATION OF OPERATIONS BRANCHGeneral

- a. The Staff duties of Ops Branch are to provide for and develop the plans, policies and directives to operationally carry out the command responsibilities of UNAMIR. In this regard its principal responsibilities include:

- Communication and Control of operational matters;
- UNAMIR operational planning;
- Supervision of the conduct of operations and selective training;
- Collection of military and other information valuable to UNAMIR mission and evaluation of military information;
- Operational tasking.

- b. The organization chart of Operations Branch is attached in Annex E to part 2. The Branch consists of seven cells as follows:

- Current Operations cell
- Military Information cell
- Air operations cell
- Signals cell
- Training cell
- Movement control cell
- Liaison cell

ENGR CELL
(MINE CLEARANCE
COORDINATION
CELL)

Chief Operations Officer (COO)

The COO is normally a Colonel and is the head of the Operations Branch. His overall duties and responsibilities are contained in Par 4. of part 2. Also he is the principal assistant to the Force Commander in matters pertaining to organization, planning, training, operations and military information.

Deputy Chief Operations Officer (DCOO)

The DCOO is normally a Lieutenant-Colonel. As COO he is acting COO (A/COO) when the latter takes over all responsibilities of COO. He is responsible for co-ordination of Ops Branch.

mine clearance
situation

- Co-ordination of Ops briefings;
- Co-ordination of Ops Conferences;
- Supervision of the work of Ops branch personnel;
- Maintaining liaison with Plans Branch concerning operational matters;
- Supervision of all major exercises and Ops;
- Review of the Ops Chapters in the SOP;
- Preparation of Ops Branch leave plan;
- Supervision and guidance of the use of Ops Branch vehicles.

Basically is designated from a permanent group of officers for that aim only, FDO is responsible for:

- reception, registration, processing and further distribution of all msgs.
- conveyance all msgs intentionally received for this aim to all concerned, and registration them.
- co-ordination of information flow.
- management of allotted channel on the FM Radio. (F-0)

4. The Current Operations cell

The Current Operations Cell contains three cells as follows:

- Senior Duty cell;
- Force Ops Room;
- Force Duty Cell.

a. Senior Duty Offr (SDO)

The SDO is normally a major and he is the head of the Current Operations Cell. He supervises the UNAMIR Ops Room activities and the Force Duty Cell. He is responsible for the efficient running of the Ops Center on a Day/Night basis and is especially responsible for:

- Maintenance of the Ops situation map;
- Supervision of filing system including all classified papers;
- Distribution of messages to officers concerned;
- Briefing about the current Ops;
- Submission of Daily Situation Reports (SITREPS) to United Nations Situation Center, New York - daily at 12.00 Hrs local the latest;
- Submission of Weekly SITREPS to United Nations Situation Center, New York - on TUESDAY at 18.00 Hrs the latest;
- Preparation of special cable on incidents (SINCREPS) of immediate importance;
- Receiving/handling INCREPS, SHOOTREPS, ...;
- Receiving medevac requests and supervising the execution of the medevac operation;
- Efficient controlling of the channels 7 and 1 on motorola;
- Ensuring that rostering of Duty Officers is completed;
- Maintaining of statistics and graphs
- To co-ordinate the escort requests in the absence of the Liaison Offr.

c. Force Duty Offr (FDO)

5. Military Information Cell The Military Information cell is normally headed by a Major, the Military Information Officer (MIO). He is responsible for military information functions listed below and in his detailed job description. He advises and assists other staff officers on all military information phases of the functional areas for which they are responsible. Specifically, he has coordinating staff responsibility for the production of military information, use of military information and any training for military information. He is especially responsible for:

- Recommending the acquiring of essential elements of information.

- Preparing plans, orders, requests for surveillance, reconnaissance and other military information gathering activities.
 - Supervising and co-ordinating the UNAMIR military information collecting activities.
 - Processing data into useful information which includes recording, integrating, correlating, evaluating and interpreting information.
 - Disseminating military information in the form of estimates, summaries and annexes, periodic reports, analyses of the area of operation, studies and situation maps.
 - Estimating how the characteristics of the area of operations and weather will affect the contingent and other element forces.
 - Estimating forces in presence, capabilities and vulnerabilities and courses of action they are likely to pursue.
- Preparing information estimates, annexes, reports, summaries, briefing and studies.
 Preparing and disseminating special reports of statistical nature and reports covering defined periods and operations relative to the forces.
 Conduct of any training in the military information area as may be required.
 Maintenance of information on villages and population movements.
~~Demands and issues of maps and updating FC's and DFC's Ops maps.~~

To be canceled:

"Demands and issues of maps and..."

6. Air operations cell The Air Staff is headed by the CASO who is normally a Major. As a military cell head, he is responsible to the COO for the operational efficiency of the air personnel. The air staff works in close co-operation with UNAMIR Ops Branch. The responsibility of the air staff, the use of supporting helicopters and all other matters concerning air operations are covered in Part 5.

* 7. Signals cell The Military Signals Officer (MSO) is normally a Major. He works under direct supervision of the COO for all operational matters. The responsibility of the Military Signals Officer, the use of communication equipment and all matters concerning communications are covered in Part 7.

8. Training cell Headed by the Military Training Officer. Planning, coordinating and monitoring of training activities of UNAMIR military personnel is the task of this cell.

9. Movement control cell Headed by the Chief Movement Control Officer. The MOV CON Platoon is under operational control of this cell.

10. Liaison cell Headed by the Chief Liaison Officer. He is responsible to maintain liaison with the RGF and RPF forces as well as with all UN and other agencies on matters of UNAMIR operational interest. All matters related to escort duties to move to DMZ and RPF held areas will be coordinated through this cell.

SECTION 4 - OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR ESTABLISHMENT
OF KIGALI WEAPON SECURE AREA

GENERAL

1. In light of the Arusha Peace Agreement of August 1993 and UN Resolution 872 dated 5 October 1993, the establishment of a Weapon Secure Area in and around Kigali is a requirement.
2. The aim of establishing this area is threefold: a) to ensure a smooth and peaceful formation of a Broad-Based Transitional Government in Rwanda; b) to provide security to the international expatriate community and to the general population of Kigali; and c) to control the movement and employment of military components of the RGF (Rwandese Government Forces), the RPF (Rwandese Patriotic Front), and any other armed elements in and around Kigali.
3. KIGALI Weapons Secure Area shall be established in Phase 1 of the UNAMIR operation and will be maintained throughout Phases 2 and 3.

Responsibility

4. The Sector commander of the KIGALI sector is responsible for establishing the KIGALI Weapon Secure Area in close coordination with the Gendarmerie and local police.
5. The Infantry Battalions and UN Military Observers of the KIGALI Sector will be responsible for manning and monitoring the Weapon Secure Area.

Area of Operation

6. (See Annex A ^{PART I})

Definitions Related to Establishment and Enforcement of Weapon Secure Area

7. Weapon. Any object which can be used to cause physical damage, harm, or deterrence to an individual is a weapon. It includes heavy weapons like artillery pieces, tanks, rockets, missiles, etc., as well as light weapons like fire arms, knives, swords, bayonets, spears, batons, clubs, etc.
8. Secure Area. An area where movement and employment of troops/force or weapon of any party is controlled and regulated by UNAMIR forces. Enforcement of security for UNAMIR military and civilian components is also a requisite of such a secured area.
9. Check Points. Manned points used as means to control movement and to check vehicles and pedestrians in order to

enforce control measures, orders, and regulations. These may be static or mobile.

- a. Static Check Points. Troops are permanently located at fixed points. These will normally be on important road junctions such as entrances or exits to a controlled area, etc. A static check point is manned on a 24 hours a day, and 7 days a week basis. They must have both radio and line communication with the base or battalion HQ.
- b. Mobile Check Points. Static check points may not be enough to cover an area of operation. In such circumstances, mobile check points are necessary. They will have a minimum section strength of 10 men with two UN vehicles. They are established at varying times and places and at irregular intervals. They must have radio communication with the next level of authority.

10 Road block. A static or mobile check point which closes the road for vehicle movement is called a road block. A road block must have signs reading "Road Block" in English, French, and the local language, and be clearly visible at a distance from the vehicle.

11 Search. Search operation is a cause of harassment and inconvenience to the populace. This operation therefore has to be short, methodical, and accurate, together with correct behavior of the soldiers carrying out the search. The following principles are to be employed during the search operation:

- a. Due care must be taken to avoid damage to the vehicle or property being searched.
- b. Coffins carrying funeral convoys should not be searched. A follow-up action will take place as required.
- c. All unauthorized arms, ammunition, and explosives found are to be confiscated and receipt given to individuals carrying them. These individuals shall be turned over to the proper authorities. Weapons will be seized by UNAMIR.
- d. Vehicle Search. Each time a vehicle is searched, the search party must systematically search the trunk, engine compartment, the driver's/passenger's cabin, the under carriage, etc. The suspicious vehicle must be thoroughly searched.
- e. Personal Search. If the situation warrants, the Sector Commander may authorize personal search. It must be carried out in a dignified manner taking care not to cause any public embarrassment to the

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individual. Women will only be searched with metal scanners and will NOT be physically searched. In cases of very suspicious circumstances, women may be utilized to search women.

- f. Area Search. Area search shall be done only in conjunction with a cordon operation. During an area search, the local populace should be segregated. A house or a shop shall be searched in the presence of the owner.

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12. Cordon. UNAMIR may have to carry out a cordon operation to search for weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Prior permission from UNAMIR HQ is needed to carry out cordon and search operations. Liaison with gendarmerie and local police (Annex D) shall be done to cordon an area. Cordon must be done with sufficient troops and reserve.

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13. Patrolling. Patrolling will form an essential part of Weapon Secure Area operation. This will be done both by the Infantry Battalion and UN military observers.

- a. Type of patrols. The following are types of patrol depending on terrain and intensity of operation:

- 1) Foot patrol
- 2) Vehicle/APC mounted patrol
- 3) Air patrol
- 4) River/lake patrol

- b. Aim of Patrolling

- 1) To confirm, verify, or supervise an incident, agreement, or a cease fire violation.
- 2) To obtain information about terrain, topography, etc.
- 3) To supervise and inspect weapons, ammunition, and explosive stores/dumps/ware houses of forces.
- 4) To locate and confiscate arms, ammunition, explosives etc.
- 5) To indicate UN presence.
- 6) To provide protection for parties or populace.
- 7) To prevent infiltration of armed elements into controlled area/zone.

- c. Strength. In no instance should a foot patrol be less than a section (8 to 10 Men), a vehicle patrol less than two vehicles, and a river/lake patrol less than two suitable boats/vessels.

- d. Security. Contrary to conventional patrols, security

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of UN patrol lies in prior information to both parties through the LOs. However, the following aspects need consideration:

- 1) DO NOT undertake patrolling in suspected mined areas.
- 2) Ensure that UN signs or marks, in the form of UN flags, white-painted UN- marked equipments, and UN headgear, are clearly visible during patrolling.

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Escorts. In UNAMIR, escorts will be of two types:

- a. UN Military Observer Escort. This will be an unarmed escort composed of military observers. In case of any suspicion of danger, this escort shall be augmented by armed escorts from infantry battalions. Unarmed escorts shall normally be provided to important persons of the two parties, UN agencies, foreign missions, and visiting VIPs.
- b. Armed Escorts. Armed escorts shall be composed of infantry soldiers. They shall be provided to UN convoys, body of troops, or to a VIP as a mark of honor, and for security reasons.
- c. Authority of Detailing Escorts. Force HQ upon recommendation from Sector HQ, shall have the sole authority to detail escorts. The Chief Liaison Officer is the coordinating staff for detailing escorts.

Pre-conditions For the Enforcement Plan

15

The enforcement plan of KIGALI Weapon Secure Area shall depend on the fulfillment of the following conditions:

- a. The Government of Rwanda must provide to UNAMIR their detailed man power, weapons, (including artillery/mortar/air-defence systems), ammunition states, and the disposition/location of all formations, units, and establishments within the limits of the Weapon Secure Area. Local parade state must be readily available.
- b. The RPF must provide UNAMIR with their detailed man power and weapons, as well as ammunition states of the battalion to be installed in KIGALI. They also must forward the leave, turn over, etc. of the battalion.
- c. All movement of formed units/bodies of troops,

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weapons, ammunition, and military aircraft/helicopters of the two parties will fall under the scrutiny and control of UNAMIR, from the day the enforcement measures are activated. See Annex C.

- d. Weapon and ammunition stores/dumps of the two parties within the Weapon Secure Area shall be scrutinised, verified, and inspected from time to time if and when deemed necessary by UNAMIR. See Annex C.

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16. After the UN Infantry Battalions are deployed in the Kigali area, the following control measures will have to be adhered to by both the RGF and the RPF political/military leaders:

- a. Government forces should withdraw from all defensive positions, static check points, pickets, and guards within town and move back to barracks, except for some key points which will continue to be militarily secured. The key points and authorized forces are found in Annex B.
- b. UNAMIR, in collaboration with the Broad Based Transitional Government, will establish the modalities of work of public and private security organizations in order to improve the security of the Kigali Weapons Secure Area.
- c. Ammunition of heavy weapons/armaments like artillery guns, tanks, missile/rocket systems, armed helicopters, etc. shall be segregated from their weapon systems and kept in the stores/dumps inside secured areas/cantonments under the responsibility of the parties and surveyed by UNAMIR.
- d. There will be no movement of formed units or contingents of more than a section strength (10 men) of any of the two parties out of the barracks or designated locations without prior permission from HQ UNAMIR, except for the Presidential Guard which is allowed to move with three sections of ten men for presidential escorts, for the Prime Minister and the Chairman of the RPF who allowed to move with two sections each and for the guards at the points of Annex B. This includes the movement of units who are to enter the Weapons Secure Area.
- e. Both parties shall be allowed to escort their political leaders. For purposes of assisting UNAMIR in establishing the KWSA, military personalities will continue to be escorted within the limits established by UNAMIR until the BBTG makes the appropriate decisions with the Army Command High Council and the Command Council of the National

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Gendarmerie for their security. Escort shall be of maximum section strength (10 men) and shall have rifle/sub machine gun each with 60 rounds of ammunition.

The following level of leadership will be authorized to have escorts:

- 1) The President - the Presidential escort shall be provided by a maximum of three sections (10 men per section).
 - 2) On occasions where the President must attend large gatherings, the detailed deployment of armed personnel will be discussed and coordinated by the UNAMIR Command. This procedure is also applicable to the Chairman of the RPF.
 - 3) The Prime Minister and the Chairman of the RPF will have an escort of a maximum of two sections of 10 men per section.
 - 4) The Speaker of the National Assembly, the President of the Supreme Court, the Cabinet Ministers of the Government and other very important personalities whose names and titles shall be furnished to UNAMIR.
 - 5) Other very important personalities of the RPF, whose names and titles will be furnished to UNAMIR.
- f. All forces' escorts shall be monitored by UN military observers and if required, escorted by UNAMIR troops.
- g. The two parties may keep guards in the work and residence area of VIPs, and in their HQs for close security reasons. Such guards shall be of maximum ten men strength, be located in the perimeter boundary, and shall not possess offensive weapon systems like tanks, artillery pieces, missile/rockets, and armed helicopters.
- h. All forces shall be allowed to carry out their usual training/exercise inside their barrack areas and bivouacs, less deployment training/exercise of artillery, mortars, air defence and tanks/APC. Forces shall be allowed to perform their routine administrative activities inside the cantonments/designated boundaries.

Modus Operandi

- 17
1. The UNAMIR military component, i.e., the infantry

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battalion and the military observers, in coordination with the UNAMIR civilian police should at all times ensure that pre-conditions set out in the forgoing paragraphs are implemented and adhered to.

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11. To establish KIGALI Weapons Secure Area and to enforce control measures, both infantry battalions and military observers of the KIGALI sector should carry out the following operations:

- a. Establishment of Check Points. Both mobile and static check points should be established on all major road junctions and entry and exit points of the area. Static check points must be established in the entry/exit points of barracks of both RGF and RPF forces' locations with sufficient strength. All movements in and out of RGF and RPF will be checked.
- b. Road Blocks. In conjunction with check points, road blocks should also be established, especially during night.
- c. Search. Search operations should be carried out in all mobile and static check points. They should be done at irregular intervals of time.
- d. Patrolling. Elaborate patrol programs should be prepared by both infantry battalion and military observers to cover all major roads, tracks, operationally important barracks, installations, RPF and RGF locations, air field, etc. Military observers should always be accompanied by armed escorts while patrolling at night.
- e. Cordon. This will be carried out in coordination with the Gendarmerie and local police, and on specific information related to discovery of weapons, ammunition, and explosives. Cordon operation should be avoided at night.

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12. UN military observers shall constantly monitor, observe, investigate, and report the following:

- a. RGF deployments and any changes to their already existing deployed troops/weapons systems including ammunition within the KWSA boundaries.
- b. RGF and RPF movements into and out of their respective locations.
- c. Deployment and re-deployment, if any, of major weapon systems like field and anti-aircraft guns, tanks/APCs, and armed helicopters, etc. of the two parties.

- d. Civil disorder and disturbances, assembly of mob, political party meetings and rallies, etc. in conjunction with UN civilian police.
- e. Political murder, intimidation, and harassment which affects the operation of UNAMIR.

Conclusion

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20. The establishment of the KIGALI Weapon Secure Area is vital to the success of the UNAMIR operation. This, in effect, is the first major phase of the peace process in Rwanda. Success of this phase of operation depends on elaborate and in-depth planning and bold execution of various control measures by the infantry battalion and the military observers group of the KIGALI sector.

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21. The degree and intensity of imposing control measures, restrictions on movement, deployment, re-deployment of RGF and RPF forces will ultimately rest on the cooperation between UNAMIR military components deployed on the ground, and the RGF and the RPF. Utmost caution must be exercised, and absolute neutrality should be maintained in handling both the opposing parties, so that neither of the parties feels deprived or betrayed.

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22. The operational procedures for the establishment of the Kigali Weapons Secure Area will be put into effect as of 1600 hrs, 24 Decembre 1993. It is anticipated that once the Broad Based Transitional Government, as well as the High Command of the Army and the National Gendarmerie, are operational that this document will be subject to review with UNAMIR in order to align the document with any organizational changes within the Government and its transitional institutions.

23. List of Annexes

This is
also history
for
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and not for
us

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**AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA AND THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC
FRONT ON THE RETURN AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF
THE WAR DISPLACED PERSONS IN THEIR PROPERTY
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEMILITARISED ZONE**

The Government of the Republic of Rwanda hereinafter called the "Government" on the one hand, and the Rwandese Patriotic Front hereinafter called in initials "RPF" on the other, agree on the following :

**CHAPTER I : FIELD OF APPLICATION OF THIS AGREEMENT AND
DEFINITION OF THE DEMILITARISED ZONE**

Article 1 :

This Agreement governs the return and the resettlement of the war displaced persons in their property and the administration of the Demilitarized Zone, pending the conclusion and implementation of a Peace Agreement between the Government and the RPF.

Article 2 :

The Demilitarized Zone means that part of the territory of the Republic of Rwanda between the RPF positions before 08 February 1993 and the Rwandese Government Forces positions on 17th March 1993 as identified and mapped by NMOG and confirmed by both parties.

**CHAPTER II : STRUCTURES AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DEMILITARIZED
ZONE**

Article 3 :

The Administrative entities which are partly or completely in the Demilitarized Zone are: the cell, the sector the commune and the Sup-Prefecture.

The Socio-economic activities in the field of Education, Health, Justice, Youth, Commerce, Agriculture and Animal Husbandry which are at the level of the above-mentioned administrative structures shall be maintained.

Article 4 :

Any incomplete administrative entity within the Demilitarized Zone shall fall under the direct authority of the Sub-Prefet of Kirambo or Kinihira as the case may be.

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X CHAPTER III : PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEMILITARIZED ZONE

Article 5 :

The Socio-economic services shall remain under the direct responsibility of the Government. However, NMOG shall be informed of any movement of exit or entry by the persons employed by those services.

Article 6 :

The leaders of the commune, sector and cell in the Demilitarized Zone shall be elected through universal suffrage by any Rwandese citizen fulfilling the conditions defined in the guidelines on special elections in the Demilitarized Zone appearing in Annex A of this Agreement.

Article 7 :

The Broad-Based Transitional Government shall decide on the expiry or continuation of the mandate of the cell leaders, counsellors of sectors and bourgmestres of the communes to be elected in the accordance with this Agreement.

Article 8 :

The Sub-Prefets of Kinihira Sub-Prefecture in Byumba Prefecture and of Kirambo Sub-Prefecture in Ruhengeri Prefecture shall be appointed. To this effect, the Government proposed six candidates to RPF out of whom two were selected and are to be appointed by the Government.

Article 9 :

The incumbent Prefets of Byumba and Ruhengeri at the date of signing of this Agreement, shall not be allowed to enter the Demilitarized Zone, nor to exercise their authority there.

Article 10 :

The Sub-Prefets of Kinihira in Byumba Prefecture and Kirambo in Ruhengeri Prefecture shall cover the whole Demilitarized Zone in those Prefectures. The Sub-Prefets shall be directly accountable to the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communal Development and shall inform the RPF accordingly through its representatives on the Commission mentioned in Article 15.

Article 11 :

Political activities are authorized in the Demilitarized Zone. However the NMOG may take restrictive measures to those activities in order to preserve the security of the people.

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Article 12 :

In each Sub-Prefecture of the Demilitarized Zone, a commission responsible for the follow up of the implementation of this Agreement shall be constituted. It shall be composed of six permanent members, all of them being civilians, three representatives of the RPF and three representatives of the Government.

This commission shall supervise :

- the implementation of this Agreement,
- the distribution of humanitarian aid,
- Security-related activities in the Demilitarised Zone.

Article 13 :

The members of the Commission for the follow up of the implementation of the Agreement and a representative of NMOG are part of the Sub-Prefecture security council in addition to the usual members, except the Intelligence Officer. The security council is convened by the Sub-Prefect on his initiative or at request of the representatives of the RPF, those of the Government or those of NMOG. The meeting shall be held once in two weeks. However, the members of the security council may decide to reduce the frequency to at least one mandatory meeting per month, depending on the matters to be discussed.

The members of the Commission may attend meetings of the Commune Council after informing the concerned Bourgmestre.

Article 14 :

The follow up Commission shall work under the instructions of the Sub-Prefet from whom it gets assignments. However, it may take its own initiatives and inform the Sub-Prefect and NMOG accordingly. The commission shall start work after the elections when all the local authorities have taken up office. The Government shall be responsible for the subsistence allowance of the members of the Commission, provide supporting personnel (such as typists and drivers) and necessary materials.

Article 15 :

The Commission for the follow up of the implementation of this Agreement together with the Commission charged with resettlement, preparation and supervision of elections (CRE) shall live with the members of the NMOG team. The latter is entrusted with the security of the members of the two Commissions.

CHAPTER IV : MODALITIES OF ELECTIONSArticle 16 :

Elections of cell leaders, sector counsellors and commune Bourgmestres will be held in

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the following communes : Kinigi, Nkumba, Kidaho, Cyeru, and Nyamugali in Ruhengeri Prefecture, as well as the communes of Cyungo, Bwisige, and Tumba in Byumba Prefecture. The cells or sectors fully situated in the demilitarized Zone which are at the same time part of the communes not mentioned in the preceding paragraph will only elect the cell leaders or the sector counsellors.

Article 17 :

Cell leaders and sector counsellors shall be elected by direct suffrage by show of hand. An electoral college composed of cell leaders and sector counsellors will elect the Bourgmestre through indirect suffrage by secret ballot, in writing, on the basis of free candidature.

Article 18 :

No one shall be permitted to concurrently hold the offices of cell leader, sector counsellor or Bourgmestre. When a person is elected at a higher level, he will be replaced at the lower level by the candidate who followed him immediately in votes. In case of equal votes or failure to get a replacement, new elections shall be organized.

Article 19 :

Elections at cell level shall start one week after the end of the exercise of return of the war-displaced people to the Demilitarized Zone. They will be followed by elections at the sector and commune level respectively as provided for in the Elections Timetable, Annex A of this Agreement.

Article 20 :

The elections shall be supervised by a commission made up of civilian representatives from the Government and the RPF and members of the NMOG.

This commission shall also be responsible for the resettlement of the displaced. It shall be composed of 10 representatives of the RPF, 10 representatives of the Government and some members of the NMOG. Its mandate shall end with the entry into service of Bourgmestres.

CHAPTER V : SECURITY IN THE DEMILITARISED ZONE

Article 21 :

Security in the Demilitarised Zone shall be ensured by the enlarged NMOG, if possible, with the financial and experts support of the United Nations Organization.

There shall be a Communal Police Force of five to ten people. This Police Force shall carry no firearms whatsoever and will be charged with keeping law and order in the commune. Members of this Police Force must be honest citizens. However, NMOG may advise and assist where deemed necessary.

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Article 22 :

Each party shall have to show to the NMOG all the places where it laid mines and where it demined. In order to allow for verification, sketches or maps shall be drawn and submitted to the NMOG within seven days from the date of signing of this Agreement.

Article 23 :

No person shall be allowed to possess or carry firearms in the Demilitarised Zone except NMOG staff.

CHAPTER VI : PROCEDURE OF RESETTLEMENT**Article 24 :**

The return of the displaced persons shall be done commune by commune and shall officially start after the signing of this Agreement.

Article 25 :

The Rwanda Government will identify vulnerable groups such as the old, the sick, children, pregnant women and the handicapped and provide transportation.

Article 26 :

The exercise of returning the war displaced persons to the Demilitarised Zone will last for a period of one month from the date of signing of this Agreement.

Article 27 :

The administrative authorities shall, mainly through public meetings and media, sensitise the people to return to their properties and live in harmony in the Demilitarised Zone.

The said authorities will make an effort to create a climate of cordial understanding between the individuals who will return to the Demilitarised Zone and those who had remained there.

In particular, the Chairmain of the RPF and the Government Prime Minister will explain through the media accessible to the majority of the Rwandese people, the modalities of resettlement.

CHAPTER VII : ACCESSIBILITY TO THE DEMILITARISED ZONE**Article 28 :**

The local administration of the Demilitarised Zone in conjunction with NMOG will organise the supply routes in its territory considering local realities.

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Article 29 :

Military personnel from both sides shall not be allowed into the Demilitarised Zone, except on authorisation of the NMOG.

Article 30 :

Any Government or RPF official wishing to visit the Demilitarised Zone shall be required to obtain NMOG authorisation.

CHAPTER VIII : HUMANITARIAN AID**Article 31 :**

Humanitarian aid shall be distributed by humanitarian organisations with the support of the administration. The humanitarian organisations shall utilise the existing roads and tracts for access in the Demilitarised Zone. The NMOG shall ensure security and give information on the security condition of the roads. Distribution points shall be chosen among parishes, commune offices, health centres and any other easily accessible place offering enough space and security. The humanitarian organisations shall establish and control their stores in the Demilitarised Zone.

Article 32 :

Humanitarian organisations are hereby authorised to start dispensing aid and medical care to the inhabitants of the Demilitarised Zone.

Article 33 :

The Government is hereby authorised to start socio-economic activities in the Demilitarised Zone.

Article 34 :

All distribution personnel that have been known to divert relief aid shall not be permitted to work in the Demilitarised Zone. The ICRC's position on each individual shall be final in this matter.

CHAPTER IX : FINAL CLAUSES**Article 35 :**

For purposes of planning and carrying out their activities in the Demilitarised Zone, the Government and humanitarian organisations may utilize the recommendations of the reconnaissance teams, appearing in Annex B of this Agreement.



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Article 36 :


Upon the installation of the Broad Based Transitional Government, this particular Administration set up by this Agreement in the Demilitarised Zone shall automatically come to an end and this zone shall fall under the normal system of administration for similar entities, applicable in the rest of the country.

Article 37 :

The two parties request the Secretary General of the OAU to include in the present mandate of the NMOG, the maintenance of security in the Demilitarised Zone.


Done at KINIHIRA, this 30th day of May 1993
In French and English

For the Government of the
Republic of Rwanda




Dr. James GASANA
Minister of Defence

For the Rwandese
Patriotic Front




Tito RUTAREMARA
Member of the Executive
Committee and Chief
Coordinator of the RPF

For The Facilitator



H.E. Dorah N. J. MBEZI
Ambassador of the United
Republic of Tanzania
to Rwanda

For the Secretary General
of the OAU



Major General
EKUNDAYO OPALEYE
Commander of the Neutral
Military Observer Group

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5. The Liaison Officer pointed out that after the installation of the BBTG, the authority of regional and local officials will also include the RPF zone. Does the RPF see the matter in the same way? UNAMIR Force Commander replied that national administration will be done from Kigali.
6. The Liaison Officer further pointed out that the security component should be given priority. The Army Chief of Staff proposed that UNAMIR determine other assembly points in RPF zone, considering:
 - a. the uncertainty of the current situation.
 - b. the context of DMZ violation by RPF.

For this reason, it was impossible to pursue discussions on the disengagement process.

CONCLUSIONS

- a. Thus, Chief of Staff's conclusions were:
 - That the choice of assembly points should be based on the current DMZ in which UNAMIR will deploy forces.
 - That heavy weapons should be put in cantonment points.
 - That it was not possible to establish assembly points in the DMZ.
- b. UNAMIR will present the results of the discussions during a meeting of the Joint Military Commission.

Section 6- ~~GUIDELINE ON THE DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS~~

INTRODUCTION

1. Disengagement process starts just after the date on which the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) is installed in Kigali and followed by the demobilization process. As per Arusha Peace Agreement dated 4 August 1993, UNAMIR personnel will be fully committed during this period.

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2. The aim of this paper is to provide necessary instructions, modus operandi and other administrative arrangements for Disengagement process.

SCOPE

3. This paper describes the tasks, responsibilities of concerned people and sequence of actions to be followed during disengagement process.

GENERAL INFORMATION

4. DISENGAGEMENT Just after the installation of the BBTG, the preparation of the disengagement process starts. With this process, both parties leave their present defensive locations and move to assembly points. A total of 28 assembly points will be selected to execute the disengagement process.

5. DEMOBILIZATION. A total of 35,000 personnel will be demobilized in phases after two months of training in their Assembly points.

DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS

6. ORDER FOR DISENGAGEMENT. After the installation of the BBTG, the National Army High Command Council will issue necessary orders in consultation with UNAMIR FC.

7. PREPARATION FOR DISENGAGEMENT. Working Group of JMC on Operations will sit with both parties and prepare modus operandi of disengagement. During that meeting, details of operations order should be prepared by both parties separately.

8. SEQUENCE OF ACTIONS.

a. Option 1

- 1) Issue warning order.
- 2) Marking of mine fields.
- 3) Movement of supporting arms to cantonment points.
- 4) Movement of administrative group to assembly points.
- 5) Movement of main body to assembly points.

b. Option 2.

- 1) Issue warning order.
- 2) Movement of 10%, including administrative groups - first day of disengagement.

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- 3) Movement of 30% - third day.
- 4) Movement of 30% - fifth day.
- 5) Movement of 30% - seventh day.

c. Option 3

- 1) Issue warning order.
- 2) Movement of administrative group to assembly points.
- 3) Movement of non essentials to assembly points.
- 4) Movement of main body to assembly points.
- 5) Movement of supporting weapons from assembly points to cantonment point.

9. DIAGRAM OF DISENGAGEMENT PROCESS

The Diagram of Disengagement Process is attached to this document as Annex 6.

10. CONTROL MEASURES

The following control measures must be ensured during the disengagement process.

a. Checkpoint. It is an easily recognizable place where routes from Units/sub-units converge and through which units/sub-units must move on their way to the meeting point. Here troops will not halt but the commander will be required to report after the whole of his unit/sub-unit has passed through.

b. Meeting points. This point will be selected 300/400 yards back of the defended locality. Every unit/sub-unit will assemble there. The commander of the unit/sub-unit will count their men, then give an OK report to UNMOs present.

c. Embussing point. Normally one embussing point will be established for one battalion and it may be located at the bn. meeting point or behind any suitable place. While selecting embussing point it must be ensured that enough space is available for the vehicles to turn about. In case companies are spread out, may have to establish more than one embussing point for a battalion.

11. TIME SCHEDULE FOR DISENGAGEMENT.

The time schedule for the disengagement process is attached

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to this paper as Annex - ¹⁻²~~B~~. For the smooth functioning of this process, an early warning order should be given to both parties so that each party gets enough time for marking existing mine fields, filling up trenches and can take preparation for their backward move.

12. DISENGAGING UNIT/SUB-UNIT COMMANDER MUST KNOW:

For a smooth and organized disengagement, a commander must know the following:

- a. Where he has to go.
- b. The time when he will begin thin out.
- c. The time by which he will have to leave present location.
- d. Route to bn meeting point.
- e. Route to bn embussing point.
- f. Time by which he has to report to bn meeting point.
- g. A warning against rumours.
- h. A warning against leaving anything behind.
- j. Information regarding security arrangements made for disengaging soldiers by UNAMIR, otherwise he will remain in panic till the completion of the process.

13. COMPOSITION OF ADMINISTRATIVE WORKING GROUP

Administrative working group should be earmarked before the beginning of the process. Those persons should be sent ahead to main body to their respective assembly points. Necessary briefing should be given to them regarding their job in the assembly points. They are responsible for:

- a. Allotment of accommodation.
- b. Security plan for the assembly point.
- c. Arrangement for water.
- d. Establishment of cookhouse and latrines.
- e. Provide arrangement for kote/magazine.

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- f. Place for dumping non essential goods.
- g. Responsible for all stores.
- h. This group should be always under an officer of RGF/RPF.

RESPONSIBILITIES.

14. UNMOs are mainly responsible to provide security to the disengaging forces. Their tasks will be as follows:

- a. Brief commander on ground on what is the requirement of UNAMIR and get their strengths of troops.
- b. Pass back all information regarding progress, development, problems if any to higher HQ.
- c. Accompany the disengaging forces.
- d. Ensure mine fields are marked and trenches are filled up.
- e. Ensure escort while moving from embussing points to assembly/cantonment points.
- f. Always try to keep a RGF/RPF wireless set during the process.
- g. Check back if all troops have arrived in battalion meeting points/RV.
- h. Keep contact with UNMOs who are responsible for the disengagement of counterpart.
- j. Ensure both parties start disengagement process simultaneously.

15. UNAMIR ESCORT PARTY.

These parties will be tasked to provide security during movement of troops to cantonment points and assembly points. Their tasks are as follows:

- a. Should not allow anyone to get down from the vehicle when at halt in between embussing and Assembly points.
- b. Escort the whole convoy by two vehicles, one in front and the other at the back, hosting UN Flag.

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- c. Keep contact with present UNMOs representative.
- d. Maintain convoy speed.
- e. Keep your eyes and ears open to such abnormality if anything noticed, inform UNMOs present.

ASSEMBLY POINTS

16. COMMAND OF THE ASSEMBLY POINTS

Each Assembly point shall be under a Military Commander appointed by the party concerned. The Military Commander shall be answerable to the Command to which he is accountable and to the Army Command High Council. The Military Commander shall liaise the Command to which he is accountable and the UNAMIR Forces.

17. SECURITY OF THE ASSEMBLY POINTS

The security of the Assembly points shall be jointly ensured by the contingents amounting to 10% of the total strength of those points and whose minimal size should be one hundred and twenty (120) men, and by members of the UNAMIR Forces. The personnel of those contingents shall carry individual weapons only, and shall restrict their movements within the Assembly points. Additional security measures to be taken in each Assembly point shall be decided by mutual agreement between the Commander of the Assembly point and the UNAMIR Force.

18. GUARD OF ARMS, AMMUNITION AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN THE ASSEMBLY POINTS

Once the troops arrive in the Assembly points, each party shall undertake identification of its troops and make an inventory of armaments and ammunition. The ACHC and UNAMIR Force shall cross-check the inventory of arms and ammunition as well as the identification of servicemen. No one will be allowed to bring their personal weapons from magazines located in their Assembly area except on duty or training. Programmes for such training should be forwarded to ACHC and UNAMIR HQ.

CANTONMENT POINTS

19. A total of 2 Cantonment points each one will be selected for the two parties.

20. DEFINITION OF HEAVY WEAPONS

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All weapons shall be considered as heavy weapons except pistols, UZZI sub-machine guns, sub-machine guns, rifles, light machine-guns (6.25 mm), medium machine-guns (7.62 mm) and general-purpose machine guns (7.62 mm). Armoured vehicles such as personnel carriers, tanks, etc. helicopters and other military aircrafts belong to the category of heavy weapons.

21. SECURITY OF CANTONMENT POINTS

One platoon each will be detailed by UNAMIR for the protection of the cantonment point. Some members of the respective parties shall, however, be authorized by the UNAMIR to visit Cantonment points for the purpose of servicing the heavy weapons. It is suggested to keep liaison officers in each Cantonment point from concerned party.

22. SYSTEM OF COLLECTION OF HEAVY WEAPONS

Persons responsible for this purpose must request senior most present with the troops for detail planning cleaning of heavy weapons. After cleaning, it is better to go for long term preservation which will reduce the handling of heavy weapons for maintenance. UNAMIR representative will prepare 5 received vouchers for each heavy weapons. Distribution of those copies as under:

- a. One copy will remain with the store-keeper.
- b. One copy to the individual depositing the weapon.
- c. One copy to Army High Command Council.
- d. One copy to Operational Branch, UNAMIR HQ.
- e. One copy to Plans Section, UNAMIR HQ.

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~~PART 1 OPERATIONS~~

SECTION 1 OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

General

D.1. ~~General~~. This section describes the operational methods of ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL to fulfill its mission as given in the mandate. It should be read in conjunction with ^{PART} Volume 1 of this SOP. ~~Operations Directives (Annex 1.1) give more detail instructions in different operational methods.~~ This section is organized as follows:

- A. - UN INSTALLATIONS
- B. - SAFE HAVENS
- C. - Positions and observations posts;
- D. - Operation of UNAMIR checkpoints;
- E. - Patrolling;
- F. - ESCORTING of Road Convoy;
- G. - Arms, ammunitions and explosives;
- H. - UNAMIR UNIFIL search operations;
- I. - Procedures for dealing with ^{R&F RPF} IDF/DEF ground operations and incursions;
- J. - ^{ESCOPT} Readiness status;
- K. - Use of Battalion Mobile Reserve (BMR) and Force Mobile Reserve (FMR);
- L. - Complaints
- M. - Guidelines for specific tactical operations; and
- N. - ^{Voluntary Disarmament} Operational inspections and investigations.

POSITIONS AND OBSERVATION POSTS

1) In fulfilling their mission, ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL soldiers can be deployed in:

- Positions;

a.

UN INSTALLATIONSAIM

- 1) The aim of this SOP is to define status of UN Installations and clarify access to them.

GENERAL

- 2) UN Installations. All UNAMIR military and civilian camps, structures and equipment, deployed on Rwandese territory, belonging to the mission and necessary to fulfill its mandate.

- 3) The UN Installations will be guarded by UNAMIR assigned elements.

- 4) Access to these areas is restricted and access is conditioned by the following regulations.

- 5) Access to UN Installation. Access to UN Installations is possible on condition that person is entitled to do so.

- 6) Persons authorized to enter into UN areas.

a) - All UNAMIR members (military and civilian pers) with ID cards issued by UNAMIR Chief Security Offr office in FHQ;

b) - UNAMIR local staff, which has got UNAMIR ID cards;

c) - VIPs and other guests invited by at least UNAMIR chiefs of branches in their company; and

For security reasons it is imperative that all other visitors must be asked whether they carry weapons with themselves, if yes it must be deposited in specially prepared place and noted on the permit. Carrying weapons during a visit is strictly forbidden.

d) - Other persons ready to substantiate duty aim of their visit at UN Installation after confirmation by the interested person from UNAMIR side.

e) - All visits are possible in UNAMIR official working hrs namely between 8.00 am and 5.00 hrs pm, from Monday to Saturday, with exception of official holidays given in separate administrative instruction, after receiving of a special written permission.

- 7) Permit's issuing procedure. Detailed procedure for issue of ID cards is described in SOP Part 9, Military Personnel, section 5.

- 8) Visitor's cards/one time use permits must be issued by Duty Clerk directly by the main entrance to the HQ building as far as important UN Installations are concerned.

necessary basis for the continuation of discussions regarding a ceasefire.

DFC

He stated that the suffering of the population must stop and that goodwill must be shown by both parties.

LCol Rwigambe

He indicated that a ceasefire is impossible unless the massacres stop.

Gen Gatsinzi

The RAF agree that there should be an international enquiry into the massacres in both zones. Can the RPA deny that massacres also took place in their areas? The RAF admits that a few members of the army may have taken part, but certainly not the majority.

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The ceasefire is not an end by itself. Instead of the signature of a ceasefire document, we should look for the reasons that caused the massacres.

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The RAF is firm in its commitment to stop massacres, but they must have the availability of their troops to do this.

DFC

The DFC recommended a lunch break. The meeting reconvened at 1530. He reemphasized the importance of the document and requested both parties to analyze this document. Concepts and modalities could be discussed later.

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He indicated the FAR's commitment to the process.

Col Mugambage

He once again indicated that the pre-conditions must be met before any further discussions can take place.

Col Rwabalinda

He underlined that the evacuation process is on going but that there is a need to accelerate the process. Massacres and propaganda should be the concern of both parties. He believes that mechanisms should be put in place to relieve the tension. UNAMIR and RPA should contribute towards finding these mechanisms.

Gen Gatsinzi

He indicated that he would take these pre-conditions to his high command for their action. The army is concerned and committed to stopping the killings. They will contact the RTLM and other radio to work towards decreasing the tensions in the country.

DFC

He reminded all present of the FAR's last statement, indicating their commitment to stop the massacres and to stop the propaganda on the radio.

9) Chief Security Officer should be OPI for coordination of all security regulations in FHQ.

10) In a case of minor UN Installation this is only UNAMIR unit Comd/Section Manager/Guard responsibility to comply the above mentioned rules.

11) The following principles are in force;

a) - All visitors must be written in a special register with their personal data:

(1) - First and second name, both home and employment place address, aim of the visit and a name of: the UNAMIR member (if possible)/branch/section/cell to be contacted with; and

(2) - Next must be given special visitor's card, which should be fixed in visible place on clothes (eg. in FHQ) or one time use permits in case of less important UN Installations; or

(3) - One time use permit for entry into UN Installation.

Rules of Engagement

12) Instructions for all Members of the UNAMIR Military Component Authorized to Carry Arms and Ammunition Regarding Opening Fire in Rwanda.

a) 1) Your immediate commander will order any change in the states of weapon readiness. While your commander will normally issue the order to open fire, you have the right to use appropriate force to protect yourself and those it is your duty to protect. Whenever possible a warning should be given before opening fire.

b) 2) You must only use the MINIMUM FORCE necessary. MINIMUM FORCE involves the following sequential actions:

- (1) a. open display of weapons.
- (2) b. verbal warning.
- (3) c. barring access to the point being protected.
- (4) d. physical restraint.
- (5) e. pointing weapons, and
- (6) f. firing weapons.

c) 3) If you have to fire, you must account for all rounds expended in an after action report submitted to your immediate commander.

d) 4) You are to avoid the use of force, if it is

4)

Reprise de la séance à 12h20.

DfC

- Confirme à nouveau sur l'information du colonel Nyon (COO) la reprise des évacuations au stade Kanyahoro - Ntelle collines et J. famille. A la suite de cela le DfC propose que les deux délégations retiennent leur ordre du jour.

Col Frank

- Revient à nouveau sur le terme engagement à cause des expériences passées. Chaque accord finalisé avec l'autre partie n'empêche pas des projets de massacres contre la minorité, d'où notre insistance à cet engagement qui doit tenir du cœur. Tout un programme de massacres, de génocide a été orchestré. Le peuple sait maintenant que l'armée Rwandaise a entraîné et armé les Interhamwe et une partie de cette délégation des FAR en fait partie. Cette délégation a les moyens d'arrêter ces massacres de même que la RTLN et le gouvernement qui incitent les populations à s'entretuer.
- Il faut que les évacuations continuent que la RTLN s'arrête et que le gouvernement cesse ces propagandes de massacres.
- Ce sont là les bases, nos préconditions pour la poursuite de nos discussions.

Lt Col. Andrew

- Ajoute les remarques qui suivent: Les FAR sont responsables des tueries et tout le peuple sait que le gouvernement peut arrêter les massacres. Une bonne volonté est demandée pour libérer les personnes en otage. Le gouvernement ^{demande} un cessez-le-feu alors que la RTLN et la radio officielle continuent à mener une propagande et des distributions d'armes aux civils. Il précise que le quartier de Nyamirambo est menacé de massacres. Il est illogique selon lui de demander un cessez-le-feu alors que les massacres continuent. Il faut des critères de base pour démontrer l'engagement des Forces Armées Rwandaises. Que ceux qui exécutent ces propagandes s'arrêtent et que les Forces Armées prennent la responsabilité pour permettre la poursuite des discussions.

Gal. GASHINZI

- La plupart des observations relevées par le FAR ont incluses dans le document projet de cessez-le-feu. Il faut nous engager dans cette voie pour faire cesser les massacres.

possible to do so, and your conduct must cause the least possible concern, fear or danger to the local population.

Warnings.

- 2) ~~(b)~~ **WARNINGS BEFORE FIRING.** Whenever possible a warning should be given before firing. The warning should be given in a loud clear voice in English or Kinyarwanda or in French:

STOP-HANDS UP/HAGARARA AMABOKO HEJORU/ARRETE LES MAINS EN L'AIR

(pause)

STOP OR I WILL SHOOT/HAGARARA CYANGWA NDAKURASA/A TIRE

- 3) ~~(b)~~ **FIRE AFTER WARNING.** After warning you may fire on a person only if:

- a. you believe the person is about to attack you or any person it is your duty to protect; **AND**
- b. the person is carrying a dangerous weapon (eg. firearm, improvised firing device or machete); **AND**
- c. the person refuses to stop when called to do so; **AND**
- d. you believe there is no other way of stopping the person.

- 4) ~~(b)~~ **FIRE WITHOUT WARNING.** You may fire without warning on a person:

- (1) who has used or is using a firearm or other offensive weapon against you, your unit or persons it is your duty to protect; **OR**
- (2) who is carrying what you believe to be a dangerous weapon **AND** who is clearly about to use it **AND** you believe that there is no other way to protect yourself or the persons it is your duty to protect.
- (3) retaliation is prohibited, and all wounded should be given first aid.

UN Installation and Refugee Camps:

- 13 ~~(b)~~ A Guard of UN Installation is authorized to use armed force against armed persons in cases described in above instruction for opening fire and also:

- a) ~~(b)~~ in self-defence;
- b) ~~(b)~~ against an attempt to disarm UNAMIR personnel;
- c) ~~(b)~~ when other UN personnel or other lives are in

3.9. Chief Security Officer should be OPI for coordination of all security regulations in FHQ.

3.10. In a case of minor UN Installation this is only UNAMIR unit Comd/Section Manager/Guard responsibility to comply the above mentioned rules.

3.11. The following principles are in force;

a.- All visitors must be written in a special register with their personal data:

(1)- First and second name, both home and employment place address, aim of the visit and a name of: the UNAMIR member (if possible)/branch/section/cell to be contacted with; and

(2)- Next must be given special visitor's card, which should be fixed in visible place on clothes (eg. in FHQ) or one time use permits in case of less important UN Installations; or

(3)- One time use permit for entry into UN Installation.

Rules of Engagement

3.12 .Instructions for all Members of the UNAMIR Military Component Authorized to Carry Arms and Ammunition Regarding Opening Fire in Rwanda.

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(2) You must only use the **MINIMUM FORCE** necessary. **MINIMUM FORCE** involves the following sequential actions:

a. open display of weapons.

b. verbal warning.

c. barring access to the point being protected.

d. physical restraint.

e. pointing weapons, and

f. firing weapons.

(3) If you have to fire, you must account for all rounds expended and submit a report, submitted

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PROTOCOLE D'ENTENTE POUR LA CREATION
D'UNE ZONE D'ACCORD DE FACILITES
A L'AEROPORT INTERNATIONAL DE KIGALI

Situation Général

1. Dans le cadre de l'accord d'Arusha et de la Résolution 872 des Nations Unies (1993) en date du 5 octobre 1993, le Secrétaire général, par message codé 1115 du 13 avril 1994, a établi comme condition à la présence de la Force des Nations Unies au Rwanda, le besoin d'établir une zone d'accord de facilités sous le contrôle des Nations Unies autour de l'aéroport international de Kigali.
2. L'objectif de la création de cette zone d'accord de facilités est d'assurer une utilisation pacifique et sans encombre de l'aéroport par la MINUAR et les agences internationales humanitaires. Ceci permettra aux Nations Unies d'aider l'assistance humanitaire et de ravitailler la MINUAR. En outre, l'exclusion de toute présence des forces sur et autour du site, permettra d'éviter les tirs/bombardements sur l'aéroport.
3. Cette zone d'accord de facilités sera établie et maintenue par la MINUAR aussi longtemps qu'il le sera nécessaire, selon les accords mutuels.

Responsabilité

4. Le commandant du secteur Kigali est chargé de la création de cette zone d'accord de facilités.

5. Les activités sur et autour de l'aéroport de cette accord de facilités seront surveillées par le BYUBAT, la compagnie de génie de la Force et les observateurs militaires du secteur Kigali.

- a. Organisation. L'organisation du bataillon BYUBAT la défense d'une zone neutre à l'aéroport international de Kigali se compose:

- 1) Trois compagnies d'infanterie de 5 officiers et 102 hommes. Ils sont équipés de 14 X M113 montés d'une mitrailleuse lourde cal .50mm.
- 2) Un peloton de Mortier de 50 hommes équipés avec 4 mortiers de 81 mm.

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PART 3: OPERATIONS

mortal danger;

d) (4) when attempts are made to infiltrate UNAMIR premises or to destroy or them;

e) (5) in defence of UNAMIR premises being under immediate attack;

f) (6) when attempts are made with the use of armed force to penetrate UN premises or cut off UN force and;

g) (7) when attempts are made to compel UNAMIR pers by armed force to withdraw from a position they were ordered to occupy by their superiors;

1A)

3.12. Both samples: of a register and a visitor's card/permit are included as enclosures.

ANNEX 5

4. Le commandant du secteur Kigali est chargé de la création de cette zone d'accord de facilités.

5. Les activités sur et autour de l'aéroport de cette accord de facilités seront surveillées par le BYUBAT. La compagnie de génie de la force et les observateurs militaires du secteur Kigali.

a. Organisation. L'organisation du bataillon BYUBAT pour la défense d'une zone neutre à l'aéroport international de Kigali se compose:

- 1) Trois compagnies d'infanterie de 50 effectifs et 102 hommes. Ils sont équipés de 14 X M103 montés d'une mitrailleuse lourde cal. 50mm.
- 2) Un peloton de mortier de 50 hommes équipés avec 4 mortiers de 81 mm.

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Section Refugee Camps (RC)

15) ~~15~~. The aim of this SOP is to clarify goals and mode of refugees/displaced persons protection by UNAMIR for long undefined time.

16) ~~16~~. Basically RCs are set up to physically secure refugees/displaced persons and provide them all primary means necessary to life, for indefinable long time and offer the reliable information regarding refugees/displaced persons registered in the RC.

GENERAL

17) ~~17~~. Refugee Camps are civilian structures provisionally adapted for concentration and protection of refugees/displaced persons with max. possible provision with primary means necessary to life in such places as:

a)- Stadia;

b)- Other recreation sports edifices;

c)- Uninhabited open grounds, on suburbs of towns, with well developed local roads net, naturally enclosed by eg. hill slope, forest etc. with access to a source of water such as a river, a lake, and which offers good conditions as a shelter with possibility to lodge significant number of refugees;

d)- Hotels;

e)- Dormitories;

f)- Blocks of apartments and;

g)- Schools;

18) ~~18~~. Qty of RCs depends on public security in a particular areas in sectors.

19) ~~19~~. One can differentiate the following types of RCs:

a)- arranged spontaneously (ad hoc) by refugees/displaced persons on their marching routes, seeking a safe place for resting, or

b)- specially prepared structures, very often set up by Humanitarian Relief Agencies with collaboration with local authority.

20) ~~20~~. In the first case RCs are perhaps hardly well prepared for its function because there are no suitable facilities such as sources of drinkable water, lavatories or well organized food distribution points, and also various simplest kitchen utensils stores for further distribution, but there no doubts that these places are apparently enough safe to survive.

Col Mugambage He mentioned again the term commitment because of past experience. He said that every agreement finalized so far had ended in massacres being conducted against minorities, therefore the commitment must come from the heart. Massacres and genocide were orchestrated programs. The world knows that the Rwandese army trained and armed the Interhamwe and that there were also members of the army who were involved in those massacres. This delegation has all the means to stop these massacres and to stop RTLM from inciting the population to violence. It is a must that the evacuation process continue, that the RTLM stop and that the Government stops propaganda about massacres. These are the basis of the preconditions for continuing the discussion regarding a ceasefire.

LCol Rwigambe He emphasized that the RAF are responsible for killing and the world knows that they can stop the massacres. As a sign of good will it is required that they let the displaced persons held behind the lines against their will be released. The government asks for a ceasefire when RTLM and the official radio continue to use propaganda to incite violence and at the same time they distribute weapons to civilians. He indicated that the Nyamirambo is threatened by massacres. It is illogical to ask for ceasefire when there are still massacres continuing. It is a basic requirement to stop these massacres to demonstrate the commitment of the RAF to a ceasefire. Those who use propaganda must stop and the armed forces must take on these responsibilities to permit the discussions to continue.

Gen Gatsinzi He indicated that the observations raised by the RPF are contained in the ceasefire document. The inability of the RAF to stop the massacres is because all of their troops are engaged in the fighting. The propaganda problem is included in the ceasefire document, but also the RPA radio uses propaganda to incite violence. Therefore, we should return to the document at hand. If there is an implementation of the ceasefire there will be a decrease in the suffering of the population and it allow the RAF to restore law and order.

Col Mugambage He confirmed that they are open to negotiations but not with their eyes closed. It is true that all the key points are in the document but, we want basic conditions such as the transfers of displaced persons, the RTLM radio to stop inciting violence by use of propaganda. These points constitute the

21)

~~21~~. The second option is much better for refugees in view of more advantageous structure of such object used as the RC.

22)

~~22~~. Places of this type are usually selected by Humanitarian Relief Agencies with help of local authorities and are proficiently prepared to offer security, adequate to the location in terrain, access to source of fresh water, food, lavatories, primary kitchen utensils, and other services such as clothing, bedding, and medical care as well.

23)

~~23~~. The RC has got its own organization with following cells: management, reception (for refugee registration purposes), logistic (for estimation of needs, temporary storage and gradual, further distribution of food), and medical.

24)

~~24~~. After comparison of these two options it is obvious that all units engaged in establishment of RCs rather should legalize existing camps and concentrate maximum their force to improve infrastructure of ad hoc set up RCs than try to move people to RC better organized, increasing their suffering quite unintentionally.

25)

RESPONSIBILITY

~~25~~. Sector Comds are responsible for participation in RC establishment, with collaboration with OPS and HAC, maintenance and RC's protection as well.

26)

SECURITY

~~26~~. This is clear that RCs are carefully selected to grant security as much as possible, nevertheless any cases of harassment and lawlessness can not be excluded, therefore these places must be recognized by UNAMIR forces as objects for special protection.

27)

~~27~~. Security of RCs is Sector Comd's responsibility who must set up a Guard with the strength adequate to the local public security situation and size of the camp and undertake other necessary precautionary measures.

necessary basis for the continuation of discussions regarding a ceasefire.

DFC

He stated that the suffering of the population must stop and that goodwill must be shown by both parties.

LCol Rwigambe

He indicated that a ceasefire is impossible unless the massacres stop.

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The RAF agree that there should be an international enquiry into the massacres in both zones. Can the RPA deny that massacres also took place in their areas? The RAF admits that a few members of the army may have taken part, but certainly not the majority.

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DFC

He reminded all present of the FAR's last statement, indicating their commitment to stop the massacres and to stop the propaganda on the radio.

Section - SAFE HAVENS

AIM

1) The aim of this SOP is to clarify goals and mode of Refugees/Displaced Persons protection by UNAMIR units for temporary period of time:

- (a)- To provide a shelter for all Refugees/Displaced Persons oppressed racially including:
- (b)- Physical protection against both any attempts of harassment and mainly threat of killing.
- (c)- To provide other needs necessary for life such as feeding and medical care during the all period of time when Refugees/Displaced Persons stay at the Safe Havens.

GENERAL

2) Safe Havens are specially selected places in UNAMIR Area of Operation (AO) such as :

- (a)- Hotels;
- (b)- Dormitories;
- (c)- Schools and;
- (d)- Other blocks of apartments, which can be used as flats.

3) Edifices serving as a temporary accn for bigger number of Refugees/Displaced Persons which are to be repatriated or transported to a Refugee Camp, provided that absolute security is granted for these people in such place.

4) Number of Safe Havens depends on current needs (how many people require to be secured) of Sectors.

5) Particular groups of Displaced Persons can stay at the Safe Haven not longer than necessary for further arrangements to be carried out by UNAMIR HAC without causing disturbances in smoothness of people rotation.

RESPONSIBILITY

6) Sector Comds in their AOs are responsible for both selection possibly the best places suitable for Safe Havens set up and their maintenance, including particularly their protection.

7) The place should be chosen after final consultation with OPS and HAC.

SECURITY

MINUTES OF THE CEASEFIRE MEETING
BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES
OF THE RAF AND THE RPA.
30 MAY 1994

Present

UNAMIR: Brig Gen Anyidoho, Col Moen, Mr. Dessande, LCol Austdal,
Maj Diagne, Capt Turgeon, Mr. Mactar Gueye.
RAF: Brig Gen Gatsinzi, Col Hakizimana, Lt Col Setako, Lt Col
Rwabalinda, Maj Gakara.
RPA: Col Mugambage, Lt Col Rwigambe, Maj Kamanzi, Capt Kazura.

PURPOSE OF THE MEETING

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the draft ceasefire presented by UNAMIR.

On the 30th of May, 1994 at Force HQ, UNAMIR hosted a meeting between the delegations of the RAF and the RPF, under the chairmanship of the Deputy Force Commander of UNAMIR.

DFC After greeting both delegations, the DFC informed everyone of the purpose of the meeting was to discuss a draft ceasefire document that was the result of the visit of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General, Mr. Riza. He indicated the manner in which the meeting would be conducted and asked each side if they had received the documents. He then invited each side to make comment.

Col Mugambage After thanking UNAMIR for their efforts to bring both sides together in an effort to find a solution to the conflict. He indicated that a commitment by the two parties to resolve the conflict must be defined today. As an example of this lack of commitment, he gave as an example the transfers of the refugees. After starting out well, the transfers stopped, he asked for an explanation of why this happened before continuing the discussion.

DFC He indicated that he would make comments on this subject later and asked the other party if they had any comments to make.

Gen Gatsinzi He thanked UNAMIR for hosting this meeting and assured everyone of his delegations' commitment to

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8) This is a basic condition which must be satisfied before selection of any Safety Haven.

9) Sectors Comds are scheduled to be tasked for setting up an adequate protection of such place by :

- (a)- Maintenance of both radio and land line comms with sector's HQ.
- (b)- Appointment of LO who should have not limited access to above mentioned comms means on a permanent basis.
- (c)- Guarding the place using the strength of a guard adequately to intensiveness of danger.
- (d)- Both concertina and barbed wire should be used as a fence around the place.

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~~PART 1 OPERATIONS~~~~SECTION 6 OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY~~

(General)

0.1. ~~General~~. This section describes the operational methods of ~~UNICEF~~ ^{UNAMIR} to fulfill its mission as given in the mandate. It should be read in conjunction with Volume 1 of this SOP. ~~Operations Directives (Annex 1.1)~~ ^{PART} give more detail instructions in different operational methods. This section is organized as follows:

- ~~1~~ - ON INSTALLATIONS
- ~~2~~ - SAFE HAVENS
- ~~3~~ - Positions and observations posts;
- ~~4~~ - Operation of ~~UNAMIR~~ checkpoints;
- ~~5~~ - Patrolling;
- ~~6~~ - ~~ESCORING~~ ^{ESCORTING} OF ROAD CONVOY,
- ~~7~~ - Arms, ammunitions and explosives;
- ~~8~~ - ~~UNAMIR~~ ^{UNAMIR} search operations;
- ~~9~~ - Procedures for dealing with ~~IOF/DEF~~ ^{RGF RPF} ground operations and incursions;
- ~~10~~ - ~~ESCOR~~ ^{ESCOR} status;
- ~~11~~ - Use of Battalion Mobile Reserve (BMR) and Force Mobile Reserve (FMR);
- ~~12~~ - Guidelines for specific tactical operations; and
- ~~13~~ - Operational inspections and investigations.

C ~~2~~ POSITIONS AND OBSERVATION POSTS

~~2.1~~ ^{UNAMIR} In fulfilling their mission, ~~UNICEF~~ ^{UNAMIR} soldiers can be deployed in:

- Positions;

- Observation posts;
- Checkpoints; and
- Temporary positions.

.2) Positions. A position is a tactically sited location permanently occupied by armed military members of ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL, from where they carry out various operational tasks such as checkpoints, roadblocks, observation and patrols. Each position has an area of responsibility.

.3) Observation Post. An OP is a permanently occupied position from where the military members carry out their observation and reporting mission. An ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL OP must also have the capability for patrolling and reacting to the observed threat.

.4) Checkpoint. A checkpoint is a position on the road used as means of controlling traffic, in order to enforce control measures. The main task of ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL checkpoint is to prevent the infiltration of arms and to block armed incursions into ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL AO.

.5) Temporary posns/OPs/CHP. Temporary positions are occupied for a limited period of time for observation or traffic control duties. Normally they are manned for only limited hours.

.6) Marking and protection. All positions must be well lineated, distinctively marked and provided protection for

the occupants. Detailed instructions ^{will be} ~~are~~ given ^{by} ~~in~~ Operations Directives ^{ABOUT} ~~as follows~~:

- ~~OP DIR 306~~ - Security of posts and personnel;
- ~~OP DIR 311~~ - Procedure for initiating new redeployment projects; and
- ~~OP DIR 315~~ - Standardization of positions, checkpoints, OPs and other field fortifications in the area of operations.

.7.) Positions/OPs/CHPs should:

- Be protected by a protective wall made of earth mound, gabions and T-walls;
- Be surrounded by illuminated perimeter fence protected with barbed wire and/or concertina wires;
- Be painted white with black UN-markings on each side, visible from air and illuminated in the time of darkness;
- Have United Nations flag prominently placed at all times of the day and illuminated in the time of darkness;
- Have shelters capable of protecting all personnel from fire of small arms, LMG, HMG and shrapnels of ~~avy~~ ^{avy} arms;
- Have line and radio communication to next higher HQ;
- Have specific written orders;
- Have specified minimum strength; and
- Have specified area of responsibility.

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.8.) See Annex 6.1 for position layouts and Annex 6.2 for checkpoint layout.

^{UNAMIR}
OPERATION OF ~~UNIFIL~~ CHECKPOINTS

.1) General. The following section outlines all aspects of checkpoint (CHP) operations. Guidelines for soldiers behaviour at CHPs are outlined in Annex 6.8. The following paragraphs should be read in conjunction with respective Operations Directives and are divided to cover:

- Permanent Checkpoints
- Mobile/^{improvised} ~~Snap~~ Checkpoints (~~OPS Directive 101~~)
- Searches at and Security of Checkpoints (~~OPS Directive 105~~)
- Procedures for Dealing with Armed Elements and ~~IDF/DEF~~ ^{RGF RPF} at Categories 'A', 'B', and 'C' Checkpoints.

NO NEED TO
HAVE CHPS A, B, C

^{UNAMIR}
.2) Permanent Checkpoints. Permanent CHPs inside the UNIFIL AO will fall into one of three categories depending on their location and mission: The category of each ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL CHP is published in the monthly ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL Deployment Details.

- Category 'A': Category 'A' CHPs are defined as CHPs inside the North-western Area. The mission of these CHPs is to:
 - Conduct searches of vehicles with the minimum disruption of traffic unless the operational situation dictates otherwise;

3-40 -

To up DATE

- Prevent the movement or deployment of explosives and long range weapons in the ~~North-western Area~~;
- Observe and report on any activities that may affect the operational situation in the ~~UNAMIR~~ ^{UNAMIR} AO;
- Be prepared to serve as a blocking position.
- Category 'B': Category 'B' CHPs are defined as all CHPs on roads leading into the Central Area. The mission of these CHPs is to:
 - Search all vehicles entering the Central Area to prevent the movement of all weapons, explosives and ammunition. (Unless suspicious, vehicles leaving the Central Area need not be searched). Suspicious trucks carrying heavy loads that cannot be thoroughly searched should be followed to their destination and the unloading will be supervised by ~~UNAMIR~~ ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL personnel;
 - Be prepared to serve as a blocking position in case of an incursion by a large force. See sub-section 6.7;
 - Close the road at the CHP between 2200 hours LT and 0400 hours LT and during summer time between 0001 hours LT and 0400 hours LT. Only allow vehicles to pass after the personnel have gotten out of the vehicle and it has been searched;

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- Observe and report on all activities that may impact on the operational situation in ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL AO.
- Category 'C': Category 'C' CHP are defined as CHP inside the ~~Central Area~~. The mission of these CHP is to:
 - Conduct searches of vehicles inside the ~~Central Area~~ in accordance with the operational situation without causing unnecessary delays of traffic or harassment of the population;
 - Prevent weapons, ammunition and explosives being moved inside the ~~Central Area~~;
 - Be prepared to serve as a blocking force (see sub-section 6.7 below);
 - Close the road at the CHP between 2200 hours LT and 0400 hours LT and during summer time between 0001 hours and 0400 hours LT. Only allow vehicles to pass after the personnel have gotten out of the vehicle and it has been searched.

3) ^{UNAMIR} Carrying of arms by non-UNIFIL personnel - special guidelines. Notwithstanding the instructions outlined in sub-section 6.8, some weapons are allowed to be carried in the AO by non-^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL personnel. The following seeks to give guidance to units on weapons which may be carried by individuals in this category:

- ^{RWANDERESE}
- Lebanese Army and Gendarmerie. As legitimate organs of the ^{RWANDERESE} ~~Lebanese~~ Government, ^{RWANDERESE} ~~Lebanese~~ Army and Gendarmerie are allowed to carry personal weapons in the AO.

Bows
and
arrows,
spears

- Hunting weapons/pistols. Weapons used in hunting such as air rifles, shotguns, ^{RWANDERESE} ~~and~~ knives ^{AND MACHETTES ARE} ~~are~~ allowed to be carried by ^{RWANDERESE} ~~Lebanese~~ civilians in the AO as are pistols.

- Local village security. Inside villages certain named individuals designated by local community leaders and with the approval of the battalion commanders, may be allowed to carry personal weapons when employed in police type duties. These weapons may not be brought out of the specific village in which they are deployed. BATT will monitor the functioning of these individuals and ensure that their number does not exceed that necessary for the performance of internal security tasks.
- Designated liaison personnel. Designated liaison personnel with an ID card issued by the Minister of State may travel through ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ CHP with maximum of four armed escorts carrying rifles or sub-machine guns. Only if he is carrying such ID card, will a person or his escort be permitted to

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UNAMIR

pass through ~~UNIFIL~~ CHP whilst armed. Instructions as issued by Liaison Branch will be strictly adhered to. A record of passage of individuals/cards will be kept. The possession of an ID card does not exempt the vehicle from search.

4) Notwithstanding the above, these procedures may be temporarily waived but only when precleared by Liaison Branch and confirmed by ~~UNIFIL~~ ^{UNAMIR} OPS (e.g. for funerals, internal problems etc.).

5) Points of clarification

- Personal weapons. Personal weapons as referred to in this chapter are defined as pistols, rifles, sub-machine guns. They are NOT LMGs, HMGs, RPGs, LAWs, Ack-Ack guns or other heavy calibre weapons.

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- Non-UNIFIL CHPs. The only groups of armed men allowed in the AO are those mentioned in paragraph 6.2.2. above. ^{UNAMIR} CHPs established by any group other than ~~UNIFIL~~ are unauthorized. BATTs will use their best efforts to ensure that such CHPs are peacefully dismantled.

6) Communication. The CHP will be equipped with an adequate communication system to ensure continuous voice contact with the next higher HQ. Ideally, each site will be

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and also spears
and bows with
arrows.

equipped with both land line and radio. However, the minimum requirement is the capability to report on the company/platoon net.

25) .7) Blocking positions. All Category 'A', 'B' and 'C' CHPs should be prepared to act as blocking positions in case of an incursion by a heavily armed superior force into the General Area (see sub-section ~~5.23~~^{below} and paragraphs ~~5.23~~^{above} and 5.24) and ~~5.23~~^{above}). In this case, CHP commanders should:

- Attempt to delay the incursion by all means possible (i.e. lay in obstacles and vehicles to block the road;
- Immediately notify higher HQ;
- Await further instructions.

Blocking positions
"A", "B" and "C"
to be ~~at~~
corrected.

Mobile Checkpoints

.8) General. The increase in the road network and the improvement in navigable tracks throughout the AO poses problems for ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIT II~~. The use of mobile CHPs is seen as an adequate temporary solution. Each BATT will plan for and operate mobile CHPs each day to augment permanent CHPs and to enhance the control over the area. These CHPs will consist of no less than four soldiers and will cover the many side roads within the AO. Ensure that the location and times of these CHPs are varied and do not become predictable. They will be in radio contact with the major CHP so that they can easily relieve them of pressure when the traffic is heavy. Signs reading "Mobile Checkpoint" written in ~~Arabic~~ and French

3-4A

~~3-4A~~ 1

KINYARWANDA

English will always be clearly displayed in the area of the vehicle. It is stressed that mobile CHPs are not patrols showing a ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ presence. They are separate operations with a definite CHP mission. They can of course be combined with patrolling, depending on the area they are deployed.

9.) Each battalion will pursue a vigorous CHP policy in its AO ensuring that they cover tracks and lesser routes as well as new roads which do not have permanent CHPs.

10.) Mobile CHPs should be coordinated by battalions Ops. Depending on the allocation of armoured vehicles within the unit, each individual Coy could undertake such activity in their own area but it is more likely that a single element (i.e. Recce Coy) be tasked with the mission for the whole AO. This is a prerogative of the unit.

11.) Battalion Ops will maintain a separate mobile CHP register and brief/debrief the CHP before and after each mission. For suggested layout of the Mobile Checkpoint Register see Annex B, ~~OPS Directive 101~~. The main features are covered in paragraph 12, ~~OPS Directive 101~~.

12.) Mobile CHPs can be either Category A, B, or C, depending on where they are deployed but it would be normal to follow a Category B policy as they cover areas not normally checked, where they may be a high level of potential infiltration of weapons and a low traffic density.

3-A5

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Category
A, B, and C
to be canceled

13) Strength and equipment. This is a unit responsibility but ideally the strength of the CHP should be at least a section and two armoured vehicles. Personal weapons and the vehicle should supply the necessary defensive potential. The vehicles should provide protection. Ancillary equipment such as signposts, wire barriers, mobile vehicle stops, etc. should be carried in the vehicles.

14) Method of operation. The mobile CHP/patrol should leave base after briefing by the unit ops officer. The briefing should include:

- Routes out and back. These should be varied constantly to avoid interdiction or planned attack;
- The number of CHPs required, the position of deployment and the average time in place;
- Instructions on communications, report lines, etc.;
- Special instructions.

15) The patrol then leaves base and sets up its first CHP. In choosing a CHP location, the following criteria should be applied. It will not be possible to ensure that all criteria are available on the ground but nevertheless, the following provides a set of guiding principles:

- CHPs should be established at varying times and for irregular periods of time.
- Good communications. This is an essential element. An excellent site with poor communica-

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~~3~~

~~Page 12 of 49~~

tions is in fact not a site at all. Communications are necessary to:

- Maintain contact with controlling station (normally battalion Ops);
- To call on BMR as back-up;
- To allow the CHP to be redeployed should a particular problem arise elsewhere.
- CHPs should not be visible to approaching vehicles from a long way off to avoid them taking alternative routes. CHPs should, however, be sited so that they give some early warning to approaching vehicles and so avoid accidents. Proper use of terrain features is a necessary requirement.
- If possible, the CHP should be sited on an incline which will slow down traffic.
- CHP locations should be different each time a specific route is given. Routes should not be specific to given days. Routes in a given area should be varied if possible.
- Once a CHP has been in position for the planned period of time it should redeploy to its next location and so, until it arrives back at base for debrief.

16/ Security of CHPs. All CHPs should provide adequate security for personnel. The nature of the mission requires some soldiers to be dismounted in order to check/search vehicles. These soldiers must be given the same protection

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~~3-47~~

UN RESTRICTED

as they would get on a permanent CHP. This security is provided by:

- The proper deployment of the CHP in order to give it a tactical advantage over the vehicle to be checked;
- Use of makeshift barriers;
- Use of armoured vehicle to block the road;
- Use of main armament of armoured vehicle to cover troops involved in checking and searching;
- In some cases, where terrain and strength of patrol allow, a dismounted covering group could occupy a suitable position to give additional cover to the whole CHP.

6.17) Pre-recce and preparation. The implementation of this policy will require pre-recce by the units and sub-units concerned before a battalion plan can be drawn up. Consultation with local leaders may also prove beneficial before putting this policy into effect.

Searches at and security of checkpoints

6.18) General. Each commanding officer is responsible for the security of his CHPs and ensuring that the personnel conducting searches are thoroughly briefed and trained to enable them to perform their tasks efficiently and diplomatically. Methodical and accurately conducted searches are some of the most important means to perform UNAMIR UNIFIL tasks, together with correct behaviour of the soldiers manning the

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CHPs. It shows ~~UNTEL~~ effectiveness to both groupings and the local population.

19/ Searches at CHPs. The following principles should be employed:

- Due care must be taken to avoid damage to vehicles and property;
- All unauthorized arms, ammunition and explosives found are to be confiscated but small arms can be retrieved when owners eventually leave the AO. If not retrieved within 24 hours, they should be sent to BN HQ. (Other arms see sub-section ~~5.1~~);
- Small vehicles normally require only one searcher, however this will be increased to two or more for large vehicles such as trucks and buses;
- At a minimum, each time a vehicle is searched, the sentry will systematically check the trunk, the engine compartment and the under-carriage. Suspicious vehicles must be thoroughly searched;
- why? Coffins in funeral convoys should not be searched;
- Personal searches. At the discretion of the battalion commander, personal searches may be authorized if the situation warrants it. In any case, personal searches will be conducted in a dignified manner taking care not to publicly embarrass or humiliate the individual being searched. Women will only be searched with metal scanners and will not be physically searched.

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- Flexibility. Each CHP will increase the number of personnel conducting vehicle searches during periods of heavy traffic. This will eliminate as much inconvenience to the local population as possible, consistent with the operational situation at the time;
- Special discretion should be shown towards ~~Sheikhs~~. They could be recognized by the black or white turbans and clothes in the same colours. The ~~Sheikhs~~ wearing a black turban are the most important.
- Officials of the ^{RWADDESL} ~~Lebanese~~ Government (recognized or identified by ID- card) should not be searched, i.e. personnel from the ^{RWADDESL} ~~Lebanese~~ Army, Gendarmerie and ^{RWADDESL} ~~Lebanese~~ Internal Security Forces.
- Beasts of burden (^{cow} ~~donkeys~~, etc.) should be searched.
- The same procedures as mentioned above will be used when mobile CHPs are established.

.20) Security of CHPs. All categories of CHPs must be constructed or deployed in such a way as to ensure the security of soldiers carrying out searches and to protect troops. ~~Suggested layout for checkpoints are given in Annex D to OPS Directive 105.~~

.21) In static CHPs, care will be taken during construction and/or improvement to provide control of

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approaching vehicles, search bays, speed breakers and good secure positions for covering troops. Each sentry conducting a search will be covered by another sentry. The search area should also be covered by a sentry inside the position. How to behave in a case of a forced entry or in other situations where force might be used, see Section 5 - "Use of Force". For security at mobile CHPs, see paragraph 1.15/above.

1.22) Procedures for searching suspicious vehicles. All occupants will be asked to get out of the vehicles and stand or sit at least five meters clear from the vehicle; the driver of the vehicle will be asked if there are any arms, ammunitions or explosives in the vehicle. He will accompany the searcher. ~~Procedures for searches are given in Annex B to OPS Directive 105.~~

1.23) Procedures for sentries manning CHPs at night. For security reasons all Category 'B' and 'C' CHPs will be closed at night between 2200 hours LT and 0400 hours and during the summer time between 0001 hours LT and 0400 hours LT. Obstacles will be placed across the road at the CHP to prevent vehicles from breaking through the CHP especially in emergencies and preplanned operations. The checkpoint has to be manned in the time of night restrictions and ready to be opened in case of emergencies. ~~Procedures are outlined in Annex C to OPS Directive 105.~~

Categories should be
canceled along
with hours.

To be canceled : IDF/ DFF AT
CATEGORIES "A" "B" and "C"

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PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH ARMED ELEMENTS OR IDF/DFF
AT CATEGORIES 'A', 'B' AND 'C' CHECKPOINTS

.24.) Armed Elements at Category 'A' Checkpoints. UNAMIR
personnel at Category 'A' CHPs will: UNIFIL

- Deny the entry of long range weapons and explosives into the ~~North-western~~ Area.
- Conduct random searches of vehicles entering and in the ~~North-western~~ Area.
- Confiscate long range weapons, ammunition and explosives being transported inside the ~~North-western~~ Area (i.e. tanks, APCs, artillery, mortars, HMGs, RPGs, rockets and rocket launchers).
- Observe and report on any activities that may affect the operational situation in the UNIFIL AO.
- Inform personnel that they are prohibited from entering UNIFIL AO if they are transporting long range weapons.
- If they insist on free passage with weapons:
 - Attempt to negotiate;
 - Tell them that they may enter the AO without the long range weapons;
 - Alert higher HQ.
- If these efforts fail:
 - Issue a verbal warning to the armed elements;
 - Provide a show of force with all personnel in position;
 - Begin to lay in obstacles.

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UN RESTRICTED

- If these fail and armed personnel attempt to break through the position:
 - Fire a warning shot above the vehicle and personnel;
 - Fire a warning shot near the vehicle or personnel;
 - Fire at the vehicle to prevent it from moving;
 - Report incident to higher headquarters.

RGF RPF

25) Armed Elements or ~~RAF/DEF~~ at Category 'B'

Checkpoints. ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ personnel at Category 'B' CHPs will:

- Deny entry of all armed elements and prevent movement of all weapons, ammunition and explosives into the ~~Central~~ Area unless approved by prior agreement with ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ HQ.
- Search all vehicles entering the ~~Central~~ Area. (Unless suspicious, vehicles leaving the ~~Central~~ Area need not be searched).
- Prevent weapons, explosives or ammunition entering the ~~Central~~ Area.
- Close the road at checkpoints between 2200 hours and 0400 hours daily and during summer time between 0001 hours LT and 0400 hours LT.
- Be prepared to follow and report to higher HQ suspicious trucks that cannot be thoroughly searched and supervise the unloading.
- Inform personnel that they are prohibited from entering the ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ AO unless they are on access list (prior agreement).

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NO TIME
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RGE RPF

- If armed elements or ~~IDF/DPF~~ insist on free passage with weapons:
 - Attempt to negotiate;
 - Tell them they are able to enter AO without weapons;
 - Alert higher HQ.
 - If these efforts fail:
 - Issue a verbal warning;
 - Provide a show of force with all personnel on position;
 - Block the road with all means available (obstacles, vehicles, etc.).
- If these fail and armed elements attempt to break through the position, continue as 6.3.24 above.

RGE RPF

- .26) Armed elements or ~~IDF/DPF~~ at Category 'C'
- Checkpoints. ~~UNIFIL~~ ^{UNAMIR} personnel at Category 'C' CHPs will:
- Prevent movement of all weapons, ammunition and explosives into the ~~Central~~ Area unless approved by prior agreement with ~~UNIFIL~~ ^{UNAMIR} HQ.
 - Randomly search vehicles moving through CHP in the ~~Central~~ Area.
 - Confiscate all weapons, explosives or ammunition discovered in the ~~Central~~ Area.
 - Close the road at checkpoints between 2200 hours and 0400 hours daily and during summer time between 0000 hours LT and 0400 hours LT.
 - Report to BN HQ suspicious trucks that cannot be thoroughly searched and supervise the unloading.

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~~3-54~~
UN RESTRICTED

No category C
an hrs

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- Inform personnel they are prohibited from carrying or transporting weapons unless they are on access list (prior agreement) ^{RGF RPF}
- If armed elements or ~~RF/RF~~ ^{UNAMIR} insist on free passage with weapons continue as per paragraph ~~(2.24)~~ ^(2.24)

6.4. PATROLLING

6.4.1. Patrolling is an essential military response to many of the operational problems faced by ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~. The large area of operations cannot be covered only by observation posts and checkpoints and ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ presence should be seen in the most remote and isolated areas of the AO. The planning and conducting of patrolling in their respective areas of ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ operations is the responsibility of unit commanders. ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ Operations has however over-riding responsibility in the following areas:

- Coordination between the patrolling programmes of various units;
- Standardization of planning and reporting procedures;
- Advice and guidance on patrolling principles; and
- Tasking of patrolling in specific areas and times.

When considered necessary the coordination takes place in weekly patrolling conferences arranged by ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ OPS. Detailed instructions on patrolling are given in Operations Directive ~~103~~.

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Section - Patrolling

AIM

0.1) The aim of this SOP is to clarify goals and mode of patrolling by UNAMIR units/UNMOs in AO :

- a)- To cover areas not catered by existing OPs and CHPs;
- b)- To gain information of various parties and their activities in the AO;
- c)- To indicate UNAMIR presence to the local population;
- d)- To provide a physical link between adjoining but isolated posts;
- e)- Carry out mobile "snap" checkpoint on roads and tracks not covered by permanent positions;
- f)- Insert "blocking patrols" along possible infiltration lanes;
- g)- Carry out observation from isolated temporary OPs;
- h)- Provide protection for parties and local population.

GENERAL

0.2) Patrolling is an essential military response to many of the operational problems faced by UNAMIR.

0.3) The large area of operations can not be covered only by observation posts and checkpoints and UNAMIR presence should be seen in the most remote and isolated areas of the AO.

0.4) The planning and conducting of patrolling in their respective areas of operations is the responsibility of unit coms.

0.5) UNAMIR OPS has however over-riding responsibility in the following areas:

- a)- Coordination between the patrolling programs of various units;
- b)- Standardization of planning and reporting procedures;
- c)- Advice and guidance on patrolling principles; and
- d)- Tasking of patrolling in specific areas and times.

0.6) When considered necessary the coordination takes place in weekly patrolling conferences arranged by UNAMIR OPS.

0.7) Types of patrols. The patrols undertaken by UNAMIR units include:

- a)- Foot patrols;

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15.4.3 In all cases these persons or groups will be kept separate from the general population to ensure the safety of those found with weapons and to ensure the safety of the general population of unarmed displaced persons.

PREPARATION

15.5 It is expected that all individuals or groups ready to hand-over their weapons will likely approach UNAMIR Installations or to other locations where UNAMIR troop presence is visible such as at Checkpoints, and Road Blocks.

15.6 It is imperative, therefore, that all UNAMIR commanders responsible for the security of their assigned compounds and all team leaders appointed to man checkpoints or roadblocks ~~must~~ be prepared to conduct this operation. The following prior preparation is required:

15.6.1 To find an appropriate area that can be guarded. It should be separated from the general population of displaced persons as far as possible and out of sight;

15.6.2 To select and train individuals in the procedures regarding the handover of weapons;

15.6.3 To have all necessary forms for handover available, (Annex A and Annex B); and ~~XC~~.

15.6.4 To have reserve forces on stand-by for emergencies or if help is required to guard the compound.

SECURITY

15.7 For security reasons, it is imperative to be vigilant and to take appropriate precautionary measures, in proportion to the number of people still armed in the vicinity of the UN Installation. Individuals or groups still waiting to be disarmed must be under observation for all times.

PROCEDURE

15.8 Make Contact with Group Leader. It is important to come into contact with a leader/comm of individuals to be disarmed. He should be used to keep the group waiting to be disarmed, informed regarding the necessary procedures to be followed and to keep them under control throughout the procedure. If a leader cannot be identified, at least one soldier must be designated to keep the group informed and to maintain order.

→ 4 Maintain at
Lists of people handed
over.
- Make it an Annex,

b)- Mobile patrols; and

c)- Mobile checkpoint patrols.

8) Patrolling should be conducted by day and night, both in city area and outside of city area.

9) In both of mentioned cases rules of operations are the same but the graduation of difficulties is different.

10) Patrolling in the city is more dangerous in view of concentration of elements which are reluctant to political and military situation stabilization.

11) It will require patrols to be strengthened to fulfill all tasks smoothly and their total number and operational recurrence should be also bigger.

12) The type of patrol used should be decided after detailed reconnaissance, carried out before.

13) Foot patrols. The minimum strength of a foot patrol should be one section.

14) When patrolling the area of responsibility in close vicinity of own position the strength can be smaller.

15) Guiding principles for planning are:

a)- Patrol paths to be based on existing mine cleared tracks;

b)- High visibility measures to be taken in areas where considered necessary;

c)- Radio contact with control HQ;

d)- Reporting procedures of the progress to be utilized;

e)- Tactical formation to be used; and

f)- Reinforcement plan by controlling HQ.

16) Foot patrols by night are authorized only in areas where they can be safely conducted.

17) "Blocking positions" of infiltration may be an integral part of such patrols.

18) Mobile patrols. The guiding principles are the same as those laid down for foot patrols.

19) The minimum strength should consist of two vehicles.

20) Armored or soft skinned vehicles can be used.

21) All vehicles must fly the United Nations flag, which should be illuminated by night.

22) Units whose AOs are very sensitive are restricted to night

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15.9 Conduct Disarmament Outside the UNAMIR Installation. If it is possible, the disarmament process must be carried out outside of the UNAMIR Installation;

15.10 Reception. An appropriate number of reception points must be set up. The number of reception points will depend on how many people are waiting. Such reception points must be well organized in order to maintain high efficiency. At least three soldiers should be appointed to one reception point;

15.11 Displaced Persons. The main body of the still armed group must stay sufficiently far away from the UNAMIR Installation (the necessary orders should be given by comd/leader of the group);

15.12 Approach. All individuals must approach the reception point by one by one. The soldiers responsible for registry must write in all the necessary information on the **CONFISCATION FORM** (Annex A). An official **RECEIPT** must then be given to the individual who has given up his weapon (Annex B). After completion of the registration and handover of the weapon, the individual must be escorted to the guarded area. He must not be allowed to rejoin the other armed individuals or the unarmed displaced persons; and

15.12.1 Completed Annex A. The completed confiscation forms will be delivered to UNAMIR Force HQ (Humanitarian Cell).

15.13 Weapons. The soldier responsible for checking weapons must inspect the weapon carefully, removing the magazine and clearing the chamber. The soldier will then give the weapon data to be registered. Finally, the weapon is to be secured in a guarded location. Weapons, ammunition, grenades etc. must be stored separately.

PROCEDURE FOR THE HANDOVER OF PRISONERS

15.14 Faction Claiming Prisoner. The faction claiming the prisoner must provide in writing the following assurances:

15.14.1 That Protocol One, Part III of the **GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR** will be followed;

15.14.2 They will provide the location at which the prisoner of war will be held; and

15.14.3 Permit the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to monitor the Prisoner of War camp.

15.15 UNAMIR Responsibilities. UNAMIR Force HQ (Humanitarian

- 22
23. Units whose AOs are very sensitive are restricted to night patrolling by armored vehs only.
- 23
24. Mobile checkpoint patrols. The road network through the AO poses problems for UNAMIR.
- 24
25. The use of mobile CHPs patrols is seen as an adequate temporary solution.
- 25
26. Each Bn will plan for and operate mobile CHPs patrols each day to augment permanent CHPs and to enhance the control over the area.
- 26
27. These CHPs patrols will consist of no less than four soldiers and will cover the many sides roads within the AO.
- 27
28. Ensure that the location and times of these CHPs patrols are varied and do not become predictable.
- 28
29. They will be in radio contact with their HQ.
- 29
30. Signs reading written in Kinyarwanda ("BARIYERI"), in French ("POSTE DE CONTROLE") and in English ("CHECK POINT") will always be clearly displayed in the area of the vehicle.
- 30
31. It is stressed that mobile CHPs are not patrols showing UNAMIR presence.
- 31
32. They are separate operations with a definite CHP mission.
- 32
33. They can of course be combined with patrolling, depending on the area they are deployed.
- 33
34. OPS Bn will maintain a separate mobile CHP patrols register and brief/debrief the CHP patrols before and after each mission.
- 34
35. Strength and equipment. This is a unit responsibility but ideally the strength of the mobile CHP patrol should be at least a section and two armored vehs.
- 35
36. Personal wpns and the veh should supply the necessary defensive potential.
- 36
37. The vehs should provide protection.
- 37
38. Ancillary equipment such as signposts, wire barriers mobile veh stops, etc. should be carried in the vehs.
- 38
39. Method of operation. The mobile CHP patrol should leave base after briefing by the unit OPS Offr.
- 39
40. The briefing should include:
- a)- Routes out and back.
 - b)- These should be varied constantly to avoid interdiction or planned attack;
 - c)- The number of mobile CHP patrols required, the position of deployment and the average time in place;

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Cell) will ensure that the following actions take place:

15.15.1 Ensure that an armed ^{guard} escort is provided during the handover; *Ensure that a current list of prisoners is compiled* ✓

15.15.2 Ensure that a representative from the ICRC is present during the handover;

15.15.3 Ensure that, if available, there is media coverage to cover the handover;

15.15.4 Ensure that the ICRC receives a copy of the **CONFISCATION FORM** (Annex A); and *a copy of the list of prisoners* ✓

15.15.5 Arrange a location for the handover that is agreeable to both UNAMIR and the faction claiming the prisoner.

d)- Instruction on comms, report lines, etc.;

e)- Special instructions.

⁴⁰ 41) The patrol then leaves base and sets up its first CHP.

⁴¹ 42) In choosing a CHP location, the following criteria should be applied.

⁴² 43) It will not be possible to ensure that all criteria are available on the ground but nevertheless, the following provides a set of guiding principles:

a)- CHPs should be established at varying times and for irregular periods of time;

b)- Good comms. This is an essential element. An excellent site with poor comms is in fact not a site at all.

c)- Comms are necessary to:

(1)- Maintain contact with controlling station (normally Bn OPS);

(2)- To call on Bn Mobile Reserve (BMR) as back-up;

(3)- To allow the CHP to be redeployed should a particular problem arise elsewhere;

d)- CHPs should not be visible to approaching vehs from a long way off to avoid them taking alternative routes;

e)- CHPs should, however, be seated so that they give some early warning to approaching vehs and so avoid accidents;

⁴³ 44) Proper use of terrain features is a necessary requirement.

a)- If possible, the CHP should be seated on an incline which will slow down traffic.

b)- CHP location should be different, each time a specific route is given.

c)- Routes should not be specific to given days.

d)- Routes in a given area should be varied if possible.

e)- Once CHP has been in position for the planned period of time it should redeploy to its next location and so, until it arrives back at base for debrief.

⁴⁴ 45) PATROL BRIEFING AND DEBRIEFING FORM is contained in annex

⁴⁵ 46) Security of CHPs. All CHPs should provide adequate security for pers.

⁴⁶ 47) The nature of the mission requires some soldiers to be dismounted in order to check/search vehs.

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ANNEX A

CONFISCATION FORM

1. CHP: _____ DTG: _____ (B) _____
2. Wpn by type and Ser No _____
3. Magazines: _____
4. Ammo/Expl: _____
5. Other items: _____
6. Other info: _____
- a. Name _____
- b. Faction _____
- c. Village _____
- d. Veh License No. _____
7. Map Reference (if found) _____
8. Individual taking name (print) _____

Signature _____

Copies: 2 copies forwarded with wpns to UNAMIR Force HQ

⁴⁷ 48) These soldiers must be given the same protection as they would get on a permanent CHP.

⁴⁸ 49) This security is provided by:

- a)- The proper deployment of the CHP in order to give it a tactical advantage over the veh to be checked;
- b)- Use the makeshift barriers;
- c)- Use of armored veh to block the road;
- d)- Use of main armament of armored veh to cover troops involved in checking and searching;
- e)- In some cases, where terrain and strength of patrol allow, a dismounted covering group could occupy a suitable position to give additional cover to the whole CHP.

⁴⁹ 50) Searches at and security of checkpoints. Each Commanding Officer (CO) is responsible for the security of his CHPs and ensuring that pers conducting searches are thoroughly briefed and trained to enable them to perform their tasks efficiently and diplomatically.

⁵⁰ 51) Methodical and accurately conducted searches are some of the most important means to perform UNAMIR tasks, together with correct behavior of the soldiers manning the CHPs.

⁵¹ 52) Searches at CHPs. The following principles should be employed:

- a)- Due care must be taken to avoid damage of vehs and property;
- b)- All unauthorized arms, ammo and expl found are confiscated but small arms can be retrieved when owners eventually leave the AO.

If not retrieved within 24 hrs, they should be sent to Bn HQ. CONFISCATION FORM is contained in annex ^G.

- c)- Small vehs normally require only one searcher, however this will be increased to two or more for large vehs such as trucks and buses;
- d)- At a minimum, each time a veh is searched, the sentry will systematically check the trunk, the engine compartment and the under-carriage.
- e)- Suspicious vehs must be thoroughly searched;
- f)- Coffins in funeral convoys should not be searched;

⁵² 53) Personal searches. At the discretion of the Bn Comd, personal searches may be authorized if the situation warrants it.

⁵³ 54) In any case, personal searches will be conducted in a

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ANNEX B

OFFICIAL RECEIPT

Date: _____

Place: _____

Name: _____

Weapon Serial No. _____

Type: _____

Ammunition: _____

Quantity _____

Type _____

Other Items Found: _____

Signature of OIC _____

dignified manner taking care not to publicly embarrass or humiliate the individual being searched.

⁵⁴
55) Woman will only be searched with metal detectors and will not be physically searched.

⁵⁵
56) Flexibility. Each CHP will increase the number of personnel conducting veh searches during periods of heavy traffic.

⁵⁶
57) This will eliminate as much inconvenience to the local population as possible, consistent with the operational situation at the time.

⁵⁷
58) Security of CHPs. All categories of CHPs must be constructed or deployed in such a way as to ensure the security of soldiers carrying out searches and to protect troops.

⁵⁸
59. Procedures for searching suspicious vehs. All pers will be asked to get out of the vehs and stand or sit at least five meters clear from the veh; the driver of the veh will be asked if there are any arms, ammo or expl in the veh.

⁵⁹
60) He will accompany the searcher.

⁶⁰
61) Procedures for sentries manning CHPs at night. Obstacles will be placed across the road at the CHP to prevent vehs from breaking through the CHP especially in emergencies and preplanned operations.

⁶¹
62) The CHP has to be manned in the time of night restrictions and ready to be opened in case of emergencies.

⁶²
63) Armed elements at CHPs. UNAMIR pers at CHPs will:

a)- Deny the entry of long range wpns and expl into the AO;

b)- Conduct random searches of vehs entering and in AO;

c)- Confiscate long range wpns, wpns ammo and expl being transported inside the AO;

d)- Observe and report on any activities that may affect the operational situation in the UNAMIR AO;

e)- Inform pers that they are prohibited from entering UNAMIR AO if they are transporting long range wpns;

f)- If they insist on free passage with wpns:

(1)- Attempt to negotiate;

(2)- Tell them that they may enter the AO without the long range wpns;

(3)- Alert higher HQ;

g)- If these efforts fail;

(1)- Issue a verbal warning to the armed elements;

h)- Provide a show of force with all pers in position;

ndicated

that UNAMIR would produce a

Declaration of Commitment which will elaborate the points raised here today and forwarded for their review. If both parties agree, it would then be signed. The next meeting was agreed to be held at 1000 hrs 2 June, 1994 at Unamir HQ.

Secretary

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(1)- Begin to lay in obstacles;

j. - If these fail and armed pers attempt through position:

(1)- Fire a warning shot near the veh or pers;

(2)- Fire at the veh to prevent it from moving;

(3)- Report incident to higher HQ.

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

5000.1 (C Plans)

STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE
FOR UNAMIR-~~A~~ CONVOY ESCORT

PART I - INTRODUCTION

1. The conflict in Rwanda has been devastating to the country and in particular to the innocent civilians who have been displaced due to the fighting. The situation is such that the leadership of both opposing forces has called upon UNAMIR to concentrate its efforts on ensuring that humanitarian relief is provided to these displaced persons and that they may be safely transported to areas in the country where they wish to go.
2. Escort duties will form an essential element of UNAMIR operation in all phases. This standing operating procedure (SOP) is aimed at providing detail guide lines to all UNAMIR Military component, civilian staff and non UNAMIR UN agencies about mission, task and duties of escorts and responsibilities of various HQs/staff in relation to escort duties.
3. To meet this request UNAMIR troops must be prepared to protect the transport of humanitarian aid, as well as the transport of displaced persons, and to use force if necessary to accomplish humanitarian assistance tasks.
4. The method that UNAMIR will use to accomplish these tasks will be based on the concept of the military armed escort. This part of UNAMIR SOP is therefore established to standardize drills and procedures to enable units to carry out armed escorts in the shortest possible time and with minimum orders.
5. SOP on escort duties contains following major topics:-
 - a. Persons entitled to UNAMIR escorts.
 - b. Areas where escorts are needed.
 - c. Types of escort.
 - d. Escort demand procedures.
 - e. Escorting responsibility.
 - f. UNAMIR escort schedule.
 - g. Tasks and responsibilities of escort teams.

PART II - DEFINITIONS

6. Opposing Forces. These may be defined as armed elements within the Rwandan Government Forces and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. They refer to troops from both of these organizations which, as a rule, conduct operations based on clear direction from the leadership of both forces.

7. Militias. This element refers to armed irregular troops which may or may not be directed by the leadership described in paragraph 6.
8. INTERAHAMWE. This element refers to militias of a specific political organization who may or may not be directed by the leadership described in paragraph 6. With regards to the Rwandan conflict, these elements may very well be armed.
9. Bandits. This element involves armed civilians responding to no fixed authority who are using the conflict for their own profit/gains.
10. UNMO. An unarmed military member of UNAMIR responsible for monitoring military activities of the opposing forces.
11. Displaced Persons. This term refers to Rwandese citizens who have been pushed out of their homes due to the fighting and are either in displaced persons camps or in hiding. These persons are considered to be in danger if they are within areas controlled by the opposing forces and are not supportive of that forces' objectives.
12. Refugees. This term refers to persons from other countries who have sought refuge inside the borders of Rwanda.
13. Foreign Nationals. This term refers to citizens of other countries who are within the borders of Rwanda.
14. Humanitarian Assistance. This term refers to provision of the basic necessities specifically dedicated to easing the suffering of displaced persons. These needs include health, food, water and security. This includes cargo provided by the ICRC, UN agencies and Non Governmental Organizations (NGO). It also includes all personnel employed by these agencies.
15. Convoy. For the purposes of UNAMIR a convoy refers to a planned road movement of goods or persons under the armed protection of UNAMIR troops.
16. Roadblock. A roadblock is any obstruction deliberately put on a route with the specific purpose of stopping a UNAMIR convoy. It is considered a hostile act endangering the mission of UNAMIR and the lives of all persons involved with the convoy.
17. Self Defence. Action to protect self or more personnel when faced with an instant and overwhelming need leaving no choice of means and no time for deliberations.
18. Hostile Intent. Hostile intent is an actions which appears to be preparatory to an aggressive action against personnel or equipment of peace keeping forces and or property under their responsibility.
19. Hostile Act. A hostile act any aggressive action against personnel or equipment of peace keeping force and or property under their responsibility. When deciding on appropriate reaction

by peace keeping forces, it has to be kept in mind that the use of armed forces is only permitted in the presence of an attack or imminent attack.

PERSONS ENTITLED TO ESCORT

20. Escorts will be provided to following categories of persons depending on the areas they visit and on the threat/security situation:-

a. UNAMIR Personnel

- (1) UNAMIR VIPs to include the SRSG, FC and CAO.
- (2) UNAMIR Staff Officers.

b. RGA and RPA Officials

- (1) The President the Prime Minister and the members of the cabinet of Broad Based Transitional Govt (BBTG) after it's establishment.
- (2) Chief of Army and Chief of Gendarmerie of RPA and RGA.
- (3) Chairman of the RPA and senior members of the central committee of RPA.
- (4) Body of armed troops of RGA and RPA.

c. UN Agencies and Members of the Diplomatic Corps. UN Agency officials and members of the diplomatic corps involved in the various stages of UNAMIR operations or in the peace process.

d. UNAMIR Visitors. Foreign dignitaries UN NY officials making an official visit in UNAMIR area of operation.

e. Humanitarian Aid Convoys. Such convoys will be escorted from UGANDA to KIGALI only.

f. Pressmen. International press officials, TV journalists etc.

- * 21. HQ UNAMIR may review this list from time to time and include or exclude personnel entitled to escort, depending on the mission commitments and security threat.

AREAS WHERE ESCORTS ARE NEEDED

22. KIGALI Area. All categories of persons/convoys mentioned in paragraph 20.

23. Movement from KIGALI to RGA and RPA Held Areas and Back. All categories of personnel/convoys mentioned in paragraph 20.

24. Movement from GATUNA Border/MULINDI to KIGALI. Movement of humanitarian aid convoys from GATUNA will be escorted.

TYPES AND STRENGTH OF ESCORTS

25. UNMO Escort. Unarmed UNMOs will provide UNMO Escorts. Each UNMO Escort team will consist of 2 UNMOs with one 4x4 transport. Two escorts will mean 4 UNMOs in 4x4 transports.

26. Armed Escort. Escort from UNAMIR formed contingents will be known as Armed Escort. One escort will consist of 2 transports with roughly half a section to one section (depending on the security situation) with personal weapons and authorized ammunition.

27. RPA and RGA Escort. Escorts provided by the RGA for movement/protection of their officials will be termed as RGA Escort. Escorts provided by the RPA for movement/protection of their officials will be called RPA Escort. The strength of such escorts will be:-

a. Restrictions on RGA and RPA Escorts. The RGA and RPA escorts will have the following restrictions on their movements:-

(1) Not allowed to move into the security perimeter of UNAMIR armed contingents/cordons/defensive positions.

(2) Not allowed to enter into any UNAMIR office premises.

(3) Not allowed to enter into either of the joint meeting sites with weapon. Escorts will be guided to rest areas where they will keep their weapons under a sentry of their own parties.

CONVOY OPERATIONS

28. Convoy tasking. A convoy tasking will not normally be conducted by a force smaller than a mechanized company. This company will be assisted by elements of the opposing forces as well as UNMOs. Reinforcement from additional elements may be employed depending on the threat.

29. Convoy composition. The following basic principles will be adhered to when conducting a convoy:

- a. no more than 100 displaced persons will be moved at one time and the convoy will not exceed six cargo carrying vehicles;
- b. as a rule there will be one APC with an infantry section between every two cargo carrying vehicles;
- c. armed elements of the Opposing Forces will assist with the protection of the convoy as it moves through areas under their control;
- d. UNAMIR troops will travel in the vehicles carrying displaced persons to provide local protection; and
- e. a reserve must be established to react to the unexpected.

UNAMIR ESCORT DEMAND PROCEDURE

30. UNAMIR Personnel. All Branches/Hqs requiring escorts will place their demands to Ops Section, HQ UNAMIR at least 48 hours in advance in writing as per format given in annex A to this SOP.

31. Non UNAMIR Personnel. Non UNAMIR personnel entitled to escort and entitled to visit to areas in paragraph 22, 23 and 24 at least 72 hours in advance stating following:-

- a. Organization/Agency asking for escort.
- b. Destination.
- c. Purpose.
- d. Details of Persons and Vehicles to be escorted.
 - (1) Number of persons.
 - (2) Number of vehicles. State the type of load when it is carrying humanitarian relief.
- e. Date and Time of Departure.
- f. Date and Time of Return.
- g. Any other information relevant to the escort.

32. Staff Procedure. Following staff procedure shall be observed in various Hqs for detailing escorts.

- a. Stage 1. Ops Section (Chief Liaison Officer) HQ

UNAMIR will receive requests for escorts from all UNAMIR and non UNAMIR agencies as mentioned in paragraph 30 and 31 (either directly or through the Liaison Cell or through the FC).

b. Stage 2. Ops Section (Chief Liaison Officer) HQ UNAMIR will take FC's clearance and task either of the following Hqs for detailing escorts:-

(1) To MILOB HQ for UNMO escorts for movement from KIGALI into RGA and RPA held areas.

(2) To MILOB HQ for UNMO escort for movement of RPA officials from RPA held areas to other locations, for movement of RGA officials from RGA held areas to other locations and for humanitarian relief convoys from GATUNA border to KIGALI.

(3) To KIGALI sector for armed escort for movement from KIGALI to other areas as and when security situation demand.

ESCORTING RESPONSIBILITY

33. UNMO Escort.

a. MILOB HQ is responsible to detail escorts for movement from KIGALI into RGA and RPA held areas. All escort will originate from HQ UNAMIR.

b. MILOB HQ is responsible to provide escorts for movement of RPA personnel from RPA held areas to other locations, for movement of RGA personnel from RGA held areas to other locations and to persons/convoys coming from UGANDA (GATUNA border) to KIGALI.

c. KIGALI Sector is responsible to provide escorts to all personnel mentioned in paragraph 20.b within KIGALI.

34. Armed Escorts. Requirement of Armed Escort will depend on the level and type of threat. HQ UNAMIR (Ops Section) will decide when, where and who will need armed escort except for the following:-

a. UNAMIR Armed Escort will be provided with any armed contingents of RPA and RGA within KIGALI. KIGALI Sector HQ is responsible for it.

b. For movement of the SRSG and the FC to RGA and RPA held areas. Strength will be decided by the Personal Staff. Escort will be provided by KIGALI sector.

TASKS/RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNAMIR ESCORT

35. UNMO Escort. MILOB HQ will be responsible to issue mission and tasks to the UNMO escorts. UNMO escorts however must

ensure following:-

- a. All instructions contained in this SOP are strictly followed.
- b. UNMO teams must have UN ID card and UN head gear. UN flag must be properly hoisted in the vehicle.
- c. UNMO teams should halt at all check points manned by both parties military or gendarmerie and give their identity as well as identity of persons they are escorting. Escort will move only when permitted by the person of the check point.

36. Armed Escort. Sector HQ detailing armed escort will issue mission and tasks. Detailed briefing to be done to the Escort Commander on:-

- a. Mission.
- b. Destination.
- c. Persons/Convoy to be escorted.
- d. Time out and expected time in.
- e. Rules of engagement.
- f. Dress and UN Identifications. Escort must be in position of UN ID cards, must wear UN head gears, vehicles must have visible UN Markings and should have UN flag.
- g. Conduct. Escort should stop at all check points manned by RPA and RPA military or Gendarmerie, give their identity as well as the identity of persons they are escorting. Escorts will move only when permitted by the persons of the check point.

37. Responsibilities of the convoy commander. The commander of the sub-unit tasked with the convoy will be the convoy commander. He is responsible to ensure that the following preparations are completed:

- a. The convoy commander is to be briefed on the security situation from the escort commander.
- b. Exchange information, discuss convoy movement and confirm the route.
- c. Prior to departure, agree convoy procedures whilst under escort including speed, spacing, position of the UNAMIR Vehicles within the convoy, communication and action to be taken in the event of coming under hostile action (this information must be relayed to all driver in the convoy). In the event of injury to a driver which result in the vehicle stopping, it is the responsibility of the escort commander to render assistance.

- d. ensure all vehicles are prepared for the convoy;
- e. thoroughly brief all troops and conduct a rehearsal if possible;
- f. conduct a reconnaissance of the embarkation point and if possible the route over which the convoy will pass; and
- g. conduct a net check with all vehicles prior to the commencement of the operation;

38. Duties of the convoy commander. In addition to completing preparations the convoy commander is responsible for the following during the conduct of the convoy:

- a. maintain convoy discipline throughout the convoy;
- b. advise the control station of the progress of the convoy; and
- c. ensure that all vehicles remain with the convoy.

39. Preparation of vehicles. The convoy will be based on cargo carrying vehicles protected by APCs and the vehicles are to be prepared as follows:

- a. APC. APCs are to be prepared as follows:
 - (1) one roll of concertina wire will be carried on the trim vane to be used to protect and control Embarkation/Disembarkation points or Neutral Areas;
 - (2) strips of barbed wire along the sides of the APC to dissuade persons from climbing on vehicles;
 - (3) verification of all levels and track;
 - (4) sufficient fuel to make the journey; and
 - (5) a first aid kit.

- b. Cargo Carrying Vehicles. Trucks are to be prepared as follows:
- (1) one roll of concertina in bonnet area to be used to protect and control Embarkation/Disembarkation points or Neutral Areas;
 - (2) side windows down with wire protection over windows and cargo bay against stones and/or grenades;
 - (3) sandbags against sides of cargo area to protect passengers;
 - (4) verification of all levels;
 - (5) sufficient fuel to make the journey; and
 - (6) a first aid kit.

40. Convoy deployment. The convoy will deploy as follows:
- a. Opposing Force Advance Group. This force will work in cooperation with the convoy commander. They deploy forward of the convoy to ensure ~~that~~ blocks are open and to deploy troops to ~~keep~~ blocks open as the convoy passes through.
 - b. Outriders/Scouts. This force will be based on two APCs each carrying a section of infantry men. They will move behind the Advance Group ahead of the convoy main body. On encountering any threat to the convoy, they will provide advance warning to the convoy commander and deploy to fire positions to engage the threat with their main armament.
 - c. Convoy commander's APC. The convoy commander will be the Officer Commanding the sub-unit conducting the convoy. He will be accompanied in his APC by a UNMO capable of speaking the language of the Opposing Force. This vehicle would also contain the company commander's headquarters troops as close protection.
 - d. Convoy Packet. A convoy packet consists of an APC and two cargo carrying vehicles. It is organized as follows:
 - (1) Protection Group. This consists of an APC with a section of infantrymen, and
 - (2) Convoy Vehicles. Two vehicles carrying humanitarian goods or displaced persons. Each vehicle will also have two infantrymen providing close protection in the cargo area and one infantryman covering forward.

convoy

e. Ambulance. An ambulance will travel with the convoy and will deploy forward to assist casualties once the danger area is passed. Every effort must be made to keep casualties with the convoy. The ambulance must remain with the convoy. If available helicopters will be dedicated to evacuate casualties.

f. Rear Guard/Reserve. This force will be based on a minimum of two sections mounted in APCs. They will be responsible for covering the rear of the convoy. They will be prepared to move forward on order to assist the convoy should it experience difficulty.

g. Opposing Force Follow Up. This force will work in cooperation with the convoy commander. They will deploy to the rear of the reserve. They will confirm for the Opposing Force the end of the convoy, close roadblocks and retrieve elements deployed by the Opposing Force Advance Party.

h. Helicopter. Helicopters will maintain surveillance/overwatch along the convoy route if available. In addition, helicopters will be used for Medevac.

DIAGRAMME DEPICTING A COMPANY SIZED CONVOY OPERATION

41. Actions of troops in a convoy operation. The following actions are to be carried out by troops involved in convoy operations:

- a. APCs will cover arcs as indicated in the diagramme.
- b. Troops manning heavy machine guns/main armaments will traverse within their assigned arc. They will aim the armament at anyone on the route carrying anti armour weapons. If deployed against a threat they will take up positions which take maximum advantage of their heavy machine guns/main armament.
- c. Sections mounted in APCs will be visible and will cover to the sides of the convoy. They will aim against anyone threatening the convoy en route.
- d. One member of each vehicle will be designated to watch ahead for unexploded ordnance on the road and for dangerous conditions.
- e. When moving through towns one member of the vehicle will be tasked with covering second story windows.
- f. troops mounted in the cargo area of trucks will cover to the rear and prevent hostile forces from gaining access.
- g. A spare vehicle will move with the convoy to effect a transfer of displaced persons in the event of a breakdown.
- h. In the case of a disabled vehicle blocking the route it will be pushed aside by a follow on vehicle.
- i. No vehicle is to overtake another vehicle in the convoy without the authority of the convoy commander.
- j. At no time should the convoy stop unless ordered by the commander or in an emergency.
- k. The normal rules of engagement will apply throughout the operation.

42. COUNTER ACTIONS IN THE EVENT OF HOSTILE ACTIONS. UNAMIR is operating in a war zone and should always be alert to the fact that hostile actions could be directed at them at any time and anywhere, hostile actions is divided into two categories:

- a. Direct Fire. Which would normally be fired from small arms (SA).
- b. Indirect Fire. Which would normally be confined to mortar or artillery fire of varying calibre.

Direct fire.

43. This would normally be SA fire aimed at or near the convoy (including crossfire between factions). The safety procedures are as follows:

- a. While moving, increase speed to leave the area but attempt to maintain spacing between vehicles.
- b. If possible, never stop when under fire. You will become an easier target and endanger not only your own life but that of others in the convoy.
- c. While mobile if the convoy caught under direct aimed fire (fire for effect) use Rules of Engagement and extricate from the spot as quick as possible. Remember in such occasions never stop the convoy and engage in the peach battle.
- d. Under no circumstances vehicle should be separated from the convoy. Even if it happens try to get out from the spot and go to a safe area. After the hostility regroup and resume the journey.
- e. In case of harassment the escort has to provide maximum security/protection to the personnel on the convoy and avoid escalation. If require turn around and reorganize on a safe spot.
- f. APCs are designed as mobile shelters from convoy drivers is incorrect. Most incidents that occur on route require driver to move out of the danger area at best speed, rather than stopping and running form cover. Drivers caught in a disabled vehicle should automatically seek cover under the vehicles and await for escort APC moving towards their location to pick them up, if the risk of indirect fire is high convoy should stop at all until the threat had reduced.
- g. If the vehicle stop due to some mechanical fault immediately get out of the vehicle and take cover. After the hostility recover the vehicle if possible.
- h. If stationery take cover but remember that if instructed to abandon vehicle, take cover. In escorting vehicles if possible, always leave vehicles with engine

running. Get out of the area as soon as it is safe to do so. Radio silence should be imposed with only essential radio traffic being transmitted.

i. When out of danger area, apply first aid if necessary and assess the damage. The convoy leader is then to report by the best means to the UNAMIR Ops Room.

j. If required, carryout casualty evacuation from the danger area when it is safe to do so.

k. When ordered to leave a hostile area, leave the injured until it is safe to return to the area and re-establish the convoy.

l. After end of hostilities assess the damage ASP and report to the escort commander.

m. When accompanied by an UNAMIR escort always follow the instruction of the escort commander.

INDIRECT FIRE

44. Generally this is the fire from mortar or artillery. Even stopped its sensitivities you should always be looking for cover. The safety procedures for the type of hostile actions are the same as that for direct fire. However the killing area in terms of shrapnel for mortar and artillery projectiles (depending on the impact zone) can be large when taking cover move well away from the impact zone and look for hard cover if possible.

45. Contentions Points.

a. G3 Ops will coordinate and provide directions to the convoy when necessary. However the response to many situations will be done by the unit who will be in the best position to coordinate and act in the fastest possible time.

b. Security and safety is for most in everyone's mind. The unit controlling a specific AOR is in the best position to determine the security requirement at any given time and as such will be responsible to determine the escort requirement. The escort procedures shown more detail in Annex A.

c. Is responsible further security and protection of the convoy and will recommend the convoy commander on all matters concerning the security procedures for the convoy. He will ensure adequate communications and briefings are established whenever providing a direct escort. As the escort commander is in the best position to react to hostile threats. The escort commander will assume command of the convoy when a direct escort is provided.

d. Single vehicle travelling on route is a great risk to the safety. It is strongly advised that all vehicles should travel in pairs, permission to travel with a convoy must

be granted by the convoy leader.

SUMMARY

46. This SOP is a guide line to all UNAMIR and non UNAMIR organizations/Hqs/Staff on the procedure of placing demands for and tasking/detailing escorts.

47. All concerned are reminded that escort duty is one of the duties/tasks of UNAMIR. There are many other priority missions and those will always take precedence over escort duties. HQ UNAMIR and all its subordinate Hqs should always try to accommodate as many requests as is feasible from the operational and security point of view.

6.8.8) ^{UNAMIR} Action by ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL OPS. Upon receipt of a request for assistance from the MFR, ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL OPS will:

- Advise the FC (or DFC) of the situation including requests for FMR assistance from units;
- Advise the FC (or DFC) on a developing situation which may require FMR intervention but where FMR assistance has not been requested by unit concerned;
- Alert the FMR;
- Alert CO ~~SWEDLOG~~ to place the Engineer Combat Support Team on a given state of readiness;
- If necessary, alert CASO to have two helicopters placed on standby;
- Request Liaison Branch to have the relevant Field Liaison Team ready to assist;
- Advise all units that the FMR is to be committed;
- Upon receipt of FC's or DFC's approval, issue a full Force Commitment Order to the CO of the FMR;
- Alert BATT 120mm mortar platoons to standby if necessary.

6.8.9) ^{UNAMIR} Support elements. Support will be given to FMR by Combat Engineer Support, Liaison Branch and other units in ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL as per ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL Fire Support Plan.

- Combat Engineer Support. ~~CO SWEDLOG~~ is tasked to provide FMR, on request, with an Engineer Combat Support Team, to ensure FMR freedom of movement. The composition and tasks of the Combat Engineer Support is outlined in OPS Directive 107.

m. ~~1~~ USE OF BATTALION MOBILE RESERVES,
FORCE MOBILE RESERVE, AND COMBAT ENGINEER SUPPORT

~~1~~ 1) Background. ~~UNITED~~ Concept of Operations is contained in Section 2 of this Part. It states, inter alia, that:

"Concept of Operations is therefore based on exercising strong control where it is needed most, and using its mobility for quick intervention whenever a problem arises that exceeds the capability of the personnel on the spot."

Mobile quick intervention is to be achieved by use of Battalion Mobile Reserves and Force Mobile Reserve (FMR). In normal situations where an incident is developing at a given location (e.g. CHP) within a BATT AO, the initial response is at the discretion of the BATT commander utilizing the BMR as back-up to Coy reserves. Should a developing situation warrant a higher profile response, the BATT commander is authorized to request the intervention of the FMR in his AO.

~~1~~ 2) Concept. The deployment of BMRs and FMR will follow the normal principle of escalatory deployment.

Battalion Mobile Reserve

~~1~~ 3) By their very nature and title BMRs are for use within their own BATT AO. Notwithstanding the above, it may, in very exceptional circumstances, be decided by ~~UNITED~~ HQ to commit a BMR in the AP of an adjoining BATT. It is

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- It is emphasized that should a BMR be committed across unit boundaries, both the BMR and its host unit must have the ability to speak together on radio in the common operational language - English.

Force Mobile Reserve

4.5) General. The FMR is a fully integrated multinational Force under the command of a senior officer appointed by the FC. As a reinforced company capable of operating as mechanized infantry, it is to be treated as a separate unit of UNAMIR. UNAMIR OPS is authorized to increase the status of alert of FMR in response to a developing situation or a request from a unit for support, but FMR will only deploy upon direction from the FC.

4.6) Volume 2 Part 3 Section 4 and OPS Directive 107 outline the mission, execution and tasks of the FMR.

4.7) Request for FMR support. A request for assistance from the FMR will be made to UNAMIR OPS. The request procedures are outlined in Annex A to OPS Directive 107. Unit Commanders will:

- Provide assistance and a situation update to the FMR when they enter your AO;
- Be prepared to provide mortar fire support to the FMR if necessary.

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emphasized that committal of a BMR in a neighbouring BATT AO is an absolute exception.

8.4) In the case where a BMR is deployed in an adjoining BATT AO, certain basic principles must be adhered to (see Use of BMRs and FMR -OPS Directive 102):

- The BATT supplying the BMR must immediately reconstitute a reserve from within its own resources;
- The status of command of the BMR committed will be under command of the BATT in whose AO the BMR is being deployed;
- When a BMR is deployed in another AO the host BATT will invariably be given operational guidance/ instructions for the use of the BMR coming under command.
- Before a BMR can be committed in another BATT AO, certain basic requirements must be provided by host BATT. These are:
 - A liaison officer from the host BATT will meet the arriving BMR at a given time and RV (normally at the the inter-battalion boundary);
 - The liaison officer will brief the BMR commander on the operational situation including the operations guidance from ^{UNAMIR} UNITEC HQ;
 - Other essential details such as radio frequencies, call signs etc., will be given to BMR commander.

- Liaison Support. When committed to the AO of a BATT, FMR will receive liaison support from the field liaison team attached to the relevant AO. The BATT is responsible for fixing and RV between field liaison team and CO FMR. The field liaison team will come under the command of FMR.
- Fire support. CO FMR will request the use of 120mm mortar support fire from ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNFICIL~~ OPS, if necessary, and in accordance with the ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNFICIL~~ Fire Support Plan.

~~6.10.~~ Reporting. Through any FMR operation, CO FMR will submit to ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNFICIL~~ OPS an operations readiness report at 0400Z daily. The report will cover:

- FMR
- Engineer support team
- Field liaison team

6.10. GUIDELINES FOR SPECIFIC TACTICAL OPERATIONS

- 6.10.1. General: The purpose of this sub-section is to:
- Improve co-ordination during special operations;
 - Make very quick reaction possible;
 - Avoid misunderstanding
 - Improve reporting and ordering systems.

6.10.2. The relevant paragraphs of this SOP and the relevant Operations Directives should be read in conjunction with this sub-section. Commanding officers will make their own procedures and training programmes based on these guidelines.

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- Preparation and testing of equipment, vehicles and communications

Patrol execution

- Maintenance of radio contact;
- Reporting of progress;
- Reporting of observations;
- Execution of special tasks (OPs, CHPs).

Debrief

- Verbal to controlling officer;
- Written report to controlling HQ.

ARMS AMMUNITION AND EXPLOSIVES

1.1) General. This sub-section outlines the procedures for handling munitions confiscated, found or voluntarily handed-in. Sub-sections 1.5 and 1.4 should be read in conjunction with this sub-section.

1.2) Responsibility. The following have responsibility for receipt and storage of arms and ammunition not immediately returned to the original owner by the BATTs or the MP.

BYUBATT LOG Branch

- BATT HQ

BYUBATT LOG Branch MP
FRENCH LOG has overall responsibility for receipt and storage of all arms and ammunition not returned to the original owner by the BATTs of MP.

INSTEAD BYUBATT
USE GHANBATT

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to be canceled: ① ②

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3.3) Disposal. Weapons and ammunition will be disposed of as follows:

- Long range weapons voluntarily surrendered at CHPs leading into the North-western Area will be forwarded as soon as possible to the MP Detachment in Tyre Barracks and handed over to the Lebanese Army with assistance of Liaison Branch.
- Unauthorized rifles or sub-machine guns voluntarily surrendered or confiscated at ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ CHPs covering roads into the Central Area may be returned to the individuals when they are leaving the Central Area. If not claimed, arms and ammunitions will be forwarded to the BATT HQ within 24 hours.
- Unauthorized weapons voluntarily surrendered or confiscated at CHPs inside the Central Area will be forwarded to the BATT HQ within 24 hours. (BATT commanders are responsible for the return of weapons to the individual). Weapons not claimed by individuals after one week will be forwarded to the MP Detachment in Tyre Barracks for disposal.
- Weapons voluntarily surrendered by the OFF. These weapons may be returned to OFF personnel when they leave the AO. If unclaimed, weapons will be forwarded to the BATT HQ within 24 hours. Units will notify ACOS LIAISON to arrange for return of weapons to the ~~OFF~~ Liaison Officer.
- Explosives and dangerous ammunition. Small quantities of explosives and dangerous ammunition

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instead of
Batt experts
EOD team

↓

either found, voluntarily handed-in or confiscated should be destroyed soonest by BATT experts.

- Large quantities of arms ammunition or explosives. BATTs will request guidance from ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIT~~ IL OPS in the event of seizure or discovery of large quantities of munitions.

4.) Documenting procedures. Receipt of all confiscated arms and ammunition will be recorded in triplicate on proforma at Annex 3. This proforma will assist BATT in compiling the Weekly Summary of Confiscated Weapons Munitions (See Annex N) for the purpose of reissue.

5.) Reissue. Arms and ammunitions will be reissued as follows:

- Within seven days. The BATT is responsible to register and store confiscated munitions throughout the week until reissue occurs. The reissue will be conducted by the BATT to those who are present to claim weapons. Weapons not claimed after seven days will be forwarded to the MP Detachment ~~in Tyre Barracks~~ for storage.
- After seven days BATTs will complete the Weekly Summary of Confiscated Munitions form - Annex 3 - in preparation for delivery to the MP Detachment at Tyre Barracks. The MP will store the munitions.
- The MP will return weapons (against a receipt) to individuals from 0700-1130 LT every Friday

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Para 5" to be
canceled

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morning at ~~Base Barracks~~ and will conduct a serial number inventory of all munitions received, issued and on hand later than 1730 each Friday.

6.6.) Ordinance disposal. Procedures for dealing with war debris, improvised explosive devices (IED) and other missiles, e.g. ~~primed katyushas~~ are outlined in Section 7 - Security.

H → h ~~UNAMIR~~ SEARCH OPERATIONS

6.1.) General. From time to time ~~UNIFIL~~ ^{UNAMIR} may have to undertake search operations in the AO. The following paragraphs provide guidelines for the conduct of such operations.

- 6.2.) Search will be conducted as follows:
- In unpopulated areas (e.g. ~~wadis~~ ^{UNAMIR}, open countryside, caves etc.), ~~UNIFIL~~ ^{UNAMIR} may conduct the complete operation;
 - In populated areas (e.g. villages, houses etc.) the actual search will normally be conducted by authorized ^{Rwandese} ~~Lebanese~~ authorities with ~~UNIFIL~~ ^{UNAMIR} in a support role.

6.3.) Authority for searches. Search operations will only be conducted when serious circumstances exist. This is particularly true when the searching of occupied dwellings is

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planned. In normal circumstances prior clearance from ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNITIL~~ HQ must be sought before search operations can be conducted. In emergency situations the authority may rest with the BATT commander.

4.4) Command and control. Command and control of large scale search operations will be vested in a Tactical HQ deployed from ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNITIL~~ HQ. This will always be the case where more than one unit/element is deployed. In emergency situations where one unit is involved the unit concerned will provide the command and control.

4.5) Guidelines. These guidelines are produced with a large scale operation in mind. The principles are relevant also to smaller scale operations. The guidelines are relevant to search operations in unoccupied and occupied locations except that in the latter the search party will normally come from authorized ^{IRWANDUSE} ~~Lebanese~~ authorities.

4.6) Escalation. A large scale operation will comprise the following elements:

- Outer cordon. An outer cordon will be deployed on roads and tracks leading to the search area. The outer cordon's tasks will be to stop AEs escaping from the search area or from going into the search area from outside. The outer cordon will normally be provided by mobile elements who will operate mobile CHPs although existing ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNITIL~~

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positions can also be used if suitably located. Checkpoints operated along the outer cordon line will normally be Category 'B'.

- Inner cordon. A tight inner cordon will be deployed around the area to be searched, tasked with stopping all movement into and out of the search area. The inner cordon line will normally be dismantled in a ground holding role.

- Search parties. Search parties will be either from ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL or ^{RWANDESE} ~~Lebanese~~ authorities or a combination of both.

They will be accompanied by their own security party. ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ dog teams may be used but will never be deployed within occupied houses as it is an affront to Moslem tradition to have a dog inside a house.

- Specialist elements. Depending on the circumstances, other specialist elements may be deployed (e.g. mine clearing teams etc.).

5.6.7)
UNAMIR
UNIFIL

Additional guidelines. During the search phase, personnel will:

- Be thorough but polite and firm;
- Not destroy or damage property;
- Photograph any confiscated arms, ammunition or explosives;

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- Dispose of ammunition, firearms and explosives to Unit HQ/^{UNAMIR}~~UNTEF~~ HQ;
- Should damage be caused by ^{UNAMIR}~~UNTEF~~ personnel, it should be repaired as soon as possible (preferably before departure from the area);
- Be reasonable.

8.8) Command control will be exercised and further details clarified by:

- Prior OPORD
- Prior FRAGORDS
- FRAGORDS by radio during operation

8.9) Liaison. Particularly where the search involves inhabited areas a liaison phase will be necessary. This will take place once cordons are in place but before the search proper begins. Liaison operation will be used to inform the local inhabitants about the reason for the search. Throughout the search operation they will remain in contact with the local inhabitants and receive any complaints after the operation is ended. Liaison personnel can be drawn from the following elements or a combination of elements;

- Local leadership, ~~Militias~~, etc.
- Authorized personnel
- Field liaison teams
- Unit interpreters
- Liaison Branch officers
- Military Police

6.10) Reports. On completion of the operation a full report should be submitted to ^{UNAMIR}~~UNIFIL~~ OPS. The following should, at least, be included:

- Why search operation was carried out;
- Where search operation was carried out;
- When search operation was carried out;
- ^{UNAMIR}~~UNIFIL~~ troops involved and their deployment;
- Liaison elements involved and their deployment;
- Resistance encountered during search (including incidents away from search area, e.g. at outer cordon etc.);
- Local population reaction to search.
- The results of the search operation

RGF RPF

PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH ~~IDF/DFF~~
GROUND OPERATIONS AND INCURSIONS

6.1) This sub-section deals with the following:

- RGF RPF
- Procedures for Dealing with ~~IDF/DFF~~ Ground Operations (see OPS Directive 103)
 - Procedures for dealing with major incursions (see OPS Directive 104)

Units will adopt the procedures in the event of ^{RGF RPF}~~IDF/DFF~~ ground operations against the villages in the units' AO.

NOTE: This sub-section makes reference throughout to ^{RGF RPF}~~IDF/DFF~~ operations, however, this DOES NOT preclude such operations by other forces.

2.2) Types of operations. The type of ground operations envisaged include:

- Punishment patrols involving harassment of villages, destruction of houses etc.;
- Search operations.

2.3) The principles are those of:

- Preplanning;
- Early warning;
- Quick reaction into target village;
- Defusion of situation by negotiation, show of force, moral persuasion (e.g. photography, notes, etc.);
- Escalation of ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ response from local to company to battalion level and use of FMR;
- Thorough reporting after event for political protest at ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ HQ and United Nations, New York level, if necessary.

2.4) Assessment and forward planning. A good assessment of villages in the AO should ensure good forward planning. Guidelines are set out below:

- 222-
- Possible villages for search operations: This could be identified by carefully assessing a village's resistance activities in the recent past or by the known presence of AEs in the village. By carefully assessing this, it will become obvious which villages are most at risk.

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- Possible entries and routes: When likely target villages are identified, possible entries and routes should then be considered in preparation of a warning system utilizing successive OPs/CHPs/positions etc.
- Assuring ^{UNAMIR} UNFIL presence: Once targets are identified, adjacent ^{UNAMIR} UNFIL positions are tasked to establish a ^{UNAMIR} UNFIL presence in the initial stages. Entries to villages may not always be through existing ^{UNAMIR} UNFIL positions. Some target villages may not even have ^{UNAMIR} UNFIL presence. In these cases troops must be deployed quickly to the threatened area.
- Convoy identification: Good reporting of Convoy composition can determine the convoy mission and post commanders on the ground should be aware of this. Search operations convoys normally have the following:

- Tanks - provide the main fire power
- APC - carrying troops
- MG truck - normally two trucks mounted with four MGs each to provide mobile fire power.
- Civilian car - possibly carrying GSS personnel
- Ambulance - first aid treatment, etc.
- Light jeeps - at least two, with one mounted with a loudspeaker.
- Trucks - carrying additional equipment;
- Bulldozers - for demolishing houses.

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Convoy identifi-
cation to be
canceled -
it's useless

6.5) For assessment and forward planning, it would be ideal for units directly involved with areas under ^{Rwandese} Israeli control to have a SOP using the above as a guideline. It should be noted that a good assessment of the area would ensure ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL presence in the village before the arrival of the invading force.

^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL action during ^{RGF RPF} IDF/DFP ground operations

6.6) ^{UNAMIR} General. The size of UNIFIL reaction force to any such operation will depend on the size of the force involved in the ground operation. The principles, however, are the same whether the ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL reaction force is drawn from platoon, company or battalion backed up with FMR. The principles for action at the various levels are contained in Annex 6.6.

6.7) ^{UNAMIR} Immediate action. The initial UNIFIL reaction once ^{RGF RPF} IDF/DFP are seen approaching a village is to get a ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL presence into the village as quickly as possible. Ideally ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL troops should be in the village ^{RGF RPF} before IDF/DFP arrive even though they may be completely outnumbered by the ^{RGF RPF} IDF/DFP. This avoids the situation where ^{UNAMIR} IDF/DFP get into the village first, place a cordon and deny UNIFIL access.

6.8) ^{UNAMIR} Reporting. Reporting should then start through Coy/BATT HQ to UNIFIL OPS. Periodic reports should continue to be sent building up the information on the operation. Such reports should be directed towards building up a complete picture of the ongoing operation and should answer such questions as:

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- Timings
- Village
- Strength/composition of ^{RGF RPF} IDF/DEF forces
- Routes taken into the village by ^{RGF RPF} IDF/DEF force
- ^{RGF RPF} IDF/DEF activity
- ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL action

This information will be updated and other additional information passed as the operation develops.

6.9) Escalation. Based on strength, composition and action of ^{RGF RPF} IDF/DEF, there will be a controlled escalation of ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL presence with the arrival of Coy, BATT reinforcements and FMR, if committed.

6.10) Liaison. Negotiations with commander of ^{RGF RPF} IDF/DEF will be started by ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL commander in the village. Negotiation by ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL will be taken up by the senior officer on the spot as reinforcements arrive.

6.11) Follow-up. ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL action in the village should be:

- To monitor and report on the ongoing incident;
- Continue negotiations;
- Dispatch patrols to follow ^{RGF RPF} IDF/DEF parties operating inside the village;
- Take notes/photographs openly to bring moral pressure to bear on ^{RGF RPF} IDF/DEF;
- Intervene or attempt to intervene if property is being destroyed;
- Render humanitarian assistance to villagers by offering aid, protection etc.

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6.12) Special instructions. Should ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ personnel arrive at village after cordon is placed and ^{RGF RPF} ~~IDF/DFE~~ deny them entry, ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ should try to enter village by another route. Failing this they should start negotiations to gain access to village and to deploy troops to locations from where they can monitor ^{RGF RPF} ~~IDF/DFE~~ activity and take action.

PROCEDURES FOR DEALING WITH MAJOR INCURSION ATTEMPTS

6.13) General. ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ will oppose any attempt at an incursion into the AO. ^{UNAMIR} ~~UNIFIL~~ will attempt to delay, by all means possible, incursions by large organized groups to give time to deploy reserves, establish blocking positions and stop the incursion consistent with the rules governing the use of force.

6.14) The following guidelines and procedures apply and should be adhered to consistent with the type of incursion.

6.15) Action at point of entry

- Immediately report the situation to higher HQ;
- Attempt to delay the incursion force;
- Block the route with obstacles and vehicles;
- Attempt to negotiate with the commander of the incursion force;
- If these efforts fail, warn the incursion force; deploy all available force and wait for instructions from higher HQ.

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6.16. Action at Company/Battalion level

- Report the situation to ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL OPS;
- Send reinforcements (especially APCs);
- Man blocking positions in depth on the projected route;
- Surround the incursion force;
- Keep ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL OPS informed.

6.17. Action by UNIFIL HQ OPS Branch

- Alert the FMR immediately;
- Alert the 120mm mortar platoons;
- Deploy the FMR (if the BATT's assets are not likely to be sufficient to stop the incursion);
- Deploy the 120mm mortar platoons;
- Notify Liaison Branch who will protest the incursion to the appropriate authorities.

6.18. Blocking position. To enable ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL HQ to co-ordinate possible action between units, task FMR etc., it will be necessary for units to submit to this HQ an overlay of existing planned blocking positions in depth. Subsequent adjustments to blocking positions is to be notified to ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL OPS by fastest means. (See also sub-section 6.9 - blocking).

Action by battalions in case of retaliatory firing/incursions after a serious incident

6.19. In case of serious incidents (like RS8s or attacks against ^{RGF} / ^{RPF} compounds) in ICA or in ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL AO there is a

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strong possibility of retaliatory shelling and firing into the villages inside ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL AO, often in an indiscriminate manner. This has resulted in deaths and injuries to innocent civilians and in big material losses to the villages. While retaliation is part of the normal pattern in such incidents and it is often difficult to assess how, when, where and for how long the retaliation will be carried out, it is nevertheless essential that this assessment will be done on each occasion. The retaliatory firing is often accompanied by ground operations (i.e. search operations, ambush patrols). It is of the utmost importance that ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL troops are seen to be actively taking care of the protection of local population and to put all their effort to restrict the damage caused by retaliatory actions.

8.20) When COs and the staff are making assessment of the situation after a serious incident, it is imperative that they include in the assessment:

- The likely retaliatory actions;
- The most probable areas where the retaliation is going to take place; and
- What action is required from the unit in order to minimize the effect of such retaliation on the civilian population inside ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL area of deployment. This action could be for example:
 - Closing the roads leading into certain areas for ^{UNAMIR} UNIFIL traffic and warning civilians not to travel roads likely to be exposed to retaliatory firing;

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- Observation must be maintained from protected positions while non-essential personnel are in shelters;
- Dead ground adjacent to the ICA should be observed from mobile patrols in APCs;
- A reserve of sufficient strength should be kept in immediate stand by to demonstrate a show of force and prevent incursions;
- Mobile patrols in APCs should be sent to the villages which are assessed to be threatened by retaliatory actions;
- The medical teams and ambulances should be put on stand-by to give assistance to the injured persons if needed.
- The protection for local population inside UNIFIL positions should be given if requested.

6.21) In making the assessment as outlined in paragraph 6.20 above, information from local sources as to the origin of the incident or where it was planned would provide a valuable indication as to where the retaliatory fire might be directed and from where such fire might come.

6.8. READINESS STATUS

6.8.1. General. As a result of the uncertain situation inside UNIFIL AO with continuing rapid changes and IDF/DEF and AEs activities, it is extremely important for UNIFIL to have a uniform alert system. This will enable units and

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to be
cancelled

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~~SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
~~Operations Branch~~
~~Kigali~~
~~11 February 1994~~

~~Ref. : 3000/2/0ps~~

~~See Distribution~~

L => J.

~~SUBJECT:~~ STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR ESCORTS OF RPF PERSONNEL FROM AND TO RPF SECTOR

1) This SOP aims to avoid further problems at the check-points on the road from KIGALI to MULINDI, especially at the road-block in the place called NGONDORE (074201) and RUKOMO (114202).

2) PROCEDURE

REQUEST

by RPF

a) Request:

- (1) Basically, all requests should be addressed to HQ/Ops Branch 72 hours in advance.
- (2) Exceptionally, requests can be accepted only 24 hours in advance.
- (3) Requests that are addressed with shorter delay than 24 hours will be refused, unless if the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman or RPF Btl Comd and any VIP in emmergent situations have to be escorted. Even those VIPs have to realize that it might be impossible to take appropriate measures if the request arrives late. Thus the departure time could be delayed.
- (4) Request form to be used by RPF, Annex 1.

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- (5) RPF Liaison Officers should go to GHQS in accordance with Para 2.a (2).

TASKING

by CLO

b) Tasking

- (1) UNAMIR Ops Branch/CLO responds to requests by issuing Tasks Forms (Annex f).
- (2) Task Forms are addressed to:
 - (a) Kigali Sector if an armed escort is required.
 - (b) Milob HQ in order to task an UNMO team.
 - (c) RGF Ln Offr, who:
 - Contacts the RGF Army Staff in order to inform him of the passing convoy.
 - returns the form to the CLO with his stamp, signature and acknowledgement of receipt of information.

INFORMING

by CLO

c) Informing

- (1) CLO contacts DMZ and informs this HQ of the foreseen movement and the time on which the convoy will pass at the NGONDORE and RUKOMO check-points
- (2) DMZ HQ contacts the RGF Sector Commander in order to make sure that all his check-points on KIGALI - GATUNA road are informed to avoid disturbances on the check-points.
- (3) DMZ HQ contacts CLO to confirm receipt of information by RGF Sector Commander.
- (4) DMZ HQ informs UNAMIR check-point personnel at NGONDORE and RUKOMO.

EXECUTION

by UNMO
KIBAT

d) Execution

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- (1) UNMO team leader reports to CLO in order to get:
 - (a) Three or six copies of the convoy registration form (Annex 6).
 - Three copies if RPF personnel is only to be escorted to or from MULINDI.
 - Six copies if there is RPF personnel to be escorted as well on the way up as on the way down.
 - (b) Task form signed by RGF LO. On this form, the CLO will confirm by writing that the RGF Sector Commander at BYUMBA is informed of the passing convoy.
- (2) If RPF personnel are to be escorted from MULINDI TO KIGALI:

UNMO and armed escort meet at FHQ and leave at least two hours before scheduled departure time from MULINDI.
- (3) If RPF personnel are to be escorted from KIGALI to MULINDI:

UNMO and armed escort meet at CND at least thirty minutes before scheduled time of departure.

CONTROL

by UNMO

e) Control

- (1) The escort leader is responsible to formally take note of:
 - (a) All civilian and military personnel who are part of the convoy to be moved.
 - (b) To count the total number of military guards or others in uniform.
 - (c) To count the numbers and types of weapons being moved.
 - (d) To account for the vehicles that are part of the convoy (type and licence number).
 - (e) To ascertain the contents of any of the supplies being moved.
- (2) Documentation

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- (a) The above information is to be recorded on paper in three copies for each convoy.
- (b) The copies are to be provided:
 - One to the UNAMIR NGONDORE check-point, which will conduct an ocular check on the convoy going through DMZ.
 - One to the UNMO security team at either the CND or to the RPF MILOB HQ at Mulindi on arrival.
 - The original list will be held at the place of departure of the convoy (UNMO CND or MILOB Mulindi).

MONITORING

by MILOB

f) Monitoring

Cross-checking of the above list will be conducted by the LOS of both parties from MILOB HQ under the supervision of MILOB HQ Staff on a weekly basis.

SECURITY

by ALL

g) Security

Only if this process is strictly followed will a convoy or escort of any personnel or material be permitted to move from/to CND and Mulindi without taking security risks.

NO ESCORT / CONVOY WILL BE ALLOWED TO DEPART without satisfying the required conditions. It is expected that all parties concerned would cooperate to facilitate movement within the area of operation.

Henry K. AMULDOHO
Brigadier General
Force Commander a.i.

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