

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 8 December 1960
No : 8-1634, 1635

Have taken opportunity Ahmed's visit Leopoldville to make a full assessment of position in Kamina in light of following facts.

- I. All remaining Belgians except one medical officer and one civil engineer are now scheduled to leave Kamina by end of current month.
- II. Our main operational activity at Kamina consists of maintenance of C-119, DC3 and helicopters for which about two hundred air officers and technicians are based at Kamina. Other supporting and security forces at Kamina total about nine hundred, comprising Irish Battalion, Indian composite supply platoon, Pakistani ordnance platoon, Pakistani transport platoon and small units of engineers, signals and military police.
- III. We are experiencing increasing difficulties in maintaining C-119 aircraft due lack of spare parts and believe spare part supply for this aircraft will remain continuing problem which will gradually diminish effective strength C-119 fleet. Therefore, cost of operation entire Kamina Base already excessive for present air maintenance operations would become more and more prohibitive as effective strength fleet fails. Our recommendations for C119 are:
 - a) concentrate all C119's under one national group, preferably the Italians;
 - b) arrange for C119 maintenance to be done by Italians at Pisa or wherever else best suited.

No other justifiable consideration now exists for operation of Kamina Base. Kamina is no longer considered suitable as future civilian training centre. Flying school equipment has been removed by Belgians. Students in Ecole Professionnelle are scuttling away and none now left in second and third year classes.

Congolese workers are making demands for amenities and facilities which will tend to increase Unations financial obligations. Recruitment large number French-speaking technicians needed for replacing Belgian personnel presents considerable difficulty. Ahmed has estimated that at least 66 technicians and other staff are needed urgently. He states that this number represents immediate needs only and that considerable additional staff will be required later as detailed needs are more closely examined. In any case recruitment cannot be accomplished by end of current month when all remaining Belgian personnel leave Kamina, which faces us immediately with breakdown essential services if they are continued to be run on scale required by present operations.

In the light of above considerations and present financial stringency, we have come to the conclusion that we cannot continue to justify the excessive cost of operation of Kamina Base for ONUC requirements. We believe that aircraft maintenance and transport requirements can be met at far less cost by making better use of N'Djili Airport facilities, carrying out maintenance outside Congo wherever practicable and when required, chartering commercial aircraft as already done at present.

We therefore recommend that operations at Kamina be closed as soon as possible and our functions there confined to custodial maintenance until future disposition of the Base is settled.

In suspending Kamina operations the following four questions arise:

First: discharging of surplus Congolese workers. We propose to carry out this operation with sympathy and will explore all means to assist them in their resettlement. We also propose granting them reasonable compensation plus cost of transportation for them and their dependents.

Second: Cancellation of current construction contracts. According to present estimates, penalties for cancelling all current construction contracts will amount to about 50,000 dollars which will save payment of about 125,000 dollars for work remaining to be done plus stores at site worth about 100,000 dollars.


Third: Purchase of Belgian equipment. We propose cutting down purchases to bare maintenance needs of Base and to meet essential needs of ONUC forces elsewhere in Congo. Ex-Belgian Base Commander has advised that if Unations decided to declare any significant quantities of equipment and the stores now included in Wheeler's list as surplus to its requirements, he may find it necessary to retain some Belgian technicians beyond 31 December to arrange checking, packing and shipment. We expect that such technicians remaining at Kamina can take care of removing surplus equipment and stores or making other storage arrangements.

Fourth: Minimum custodial maintenance Base installations, buildings, etc. This would need a small military force and some civilian staff for general maintenance and security and to keep in minimum operation services such as electric power, hospital, which also serve needs outside Base. All costs incurred for this purpose would be entirely on custodial account.

Would appreciate your urgent decision on above proposals.

OUTGOING CODE

To : CORDIER
From : DAYAL
Date : 8 December 1960
No. : B-1633 (Most immediate)



Your 4009. While Lumumba was still at large, Congolese authorities had placed restrictions on flying, during which period a number of Ghana flights were interrupted. We arranged with Bomboko that the Ghana flights in support of their contingents only will be given friendly treatment. We acceded to Congolese demands of early warning and their right to inspect such flights as for other international aircraft. Defence Accra was advised accordingly, in spite of which an RAF Hastings for Ghana contingent attempted to land at Leopoldville on the evening of 6 December without previous warning to us. The Congolese turned this aircraft back. We have advised Defence Accra to comply with arrangements made.

We have since received a schedule of such RAF flights and have made arrangements with the Chief of Sureté, and Brazzaville. Would like to assure you that all efforts are being made to facilitate these flights. However, Ghana should be advised to comply with arrangements made.

OUTGOING CODE

To : BUNCHE, NEWYORK
From : DAYAL, VON HORN, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 8 December 1960
No : B-1632

Your 4008.

UN Liaison Officer nominated for Goma and introduced to local USAF representative, Col. Felstadt, who is satisfied with arrangements. Due to situation at Stanleyville, cannot yet advise despatch of Austrian medical team. Iyassu proceeding there to-morrow and have asked him to recommend when Austrians may arrive at Stanleyville.

LEOPOLDVILLE
8 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS
NEWYORK

B-1630 SECEN FROM DAYAL FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF TWO LETTERS
FROM PRESIDENT KASAVUBU RECEIVED SEVEN DECEMBER AT 2205 HOURS CLN

QUOTE

(A)

UNQUOTE

QUOTE

(B)

UNQUOTE

7 décembre 1960.

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Votre message du 7 décembre m'apporte les réactions du Comité Consultatif pour l'Opération des Nations-Unies au Congo. Vous avez bien voulu me faire part du regret et du désappointement des membres du Comité; vous n'ignoriez cependant pas, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, que si aucune communication n'avait été reçue du Congo, c'était pour la bonne raison que voulant rendre un dernier hommage au lieutenant-colonel KOKOLO, j'ai été retenu loin de Léopoldville jusqu'à ce matin. Vos représentants au Congo ont été dûment avertis de cet état de choses et il leur a été spécifié, de façon précise, qu'une réponse vous serait remise certainement aujourd'hui, ce qui a été fait.

Vous comprendrez je suppose, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, que j'ai été fort surpris, à la lecture de votre message de ce jour, en voyant qu'aucune référence n'avait été faite à cet empêchement à vous répondre avant une date déterminée. J'en ai conçu un ressentiment d'autant plus vif que la Commission de Conciliation a décidé d'envoyer d'office un certain nombre de membres à Léopoldville, dès le 13 décembre. Or, vous savez, à partir du 12 décembre, se tient à Brazzaville une Conférence importante des Chefs d'Etat d'Afrique d'expression française, à laquelle prendra part une importante délégation de la République du Congo.

Il me sera donc impossible de recevoir ni ce jour-là, ni les jours qui suivent, les membres de la Commission et je vous demande formellement en conséquence qu'ils veuillent bien différer leur arrivée à Léopoldville.

Ma lettre du 6 décembre vous demandait de bien vouloir préciser quelques points particuliers avant la venue de la Commission. Il serait en effet dommage que faute de ces précisions, tout le travail de la Commission soit entaché d'un malentendu fondamental qui ne rende ultérieurement ses conclusions peu utilisables. Je suis persuadé, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, que vous partagerez mon souci d'oeuvrer dans la clarté et c'est pourquoi je vous saurais infiniment gré de mettre convenablement au point ces questions préalables avant d'envisager une nouvelle date pour la venue à

Léopoldville de la Commission de Conciliation.

Je saisis cette occasion pour vous renouveler,
Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, les assurances de ma très
haute considération.

LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO,

J. KASA-VUBU,

LE COMMISSAIRE GENERAL AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES,

J. BOMBOKO,

A Monsieur le Secrétaire Général
de l'Organisation des Nations-Unies
s/c du Représentant Spécial au Congo
Léopoldville.

7 décembre 1960.

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

J'ai lu avec la plus grande attention vos messages des 3 et 5 décembre qui me sont parvenus ce matin à mon retour du Mayumbe.

Je m'étonne un peu de l'importance attachée à l'arrestation de Monsieur LUMUMBA par un certain nombre de délégations afro-asiatiques et est-européennes; En effet, Monsieur LUMUMBA est sous le coup d'un mandat d'amener depuis le mois de septembre dernier pour toute une série de raisons qui ont été abondamment justifiées et si son arrestation n'a pu être exécutée à ce moment c'est parce que les troupes des Nations-Unies, agissant arbitrairement à nos yeux, l'ont empêchée. Vous n'ignorez pas Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, que Monsieur LUMUMBA s'est rendu coupable d'infractions dont le caractère flagrant et grave ne vous aura pas échappé :

1. Usurpation de fonctions publiques (article 123 Code Pénal)
2. Attentats à la liberté individuelle, avec tortures corporelles (article 67 Code Pénal)
3. Atteintes à la sûreté de l'Etat (article 186 Code Pénal)
4. Organisation de bandes hostiles dans le but de porter la dévastation, le massacre ou le pillage (article 193 à 197 Code Pénal)
5. Incitation de militaires à commettre infractions (article 202 Code Pénal).

Enfin, l'organisation de l'expédition militaire contre la province du Sud-Kasaï a été qualifiée par Vous même de crime de génocide, dans un rapport du mois de septembre au Conseil de Sécurité.

La conscience nationale congolaise s'est révoltée contre de tels agissements; le pays dans son ensemble a éprouvé un réel soulagement quand j'eus décidé de révoquer Monsieur LUMUMBA de ses fonctions - 29 parlementaires de son parti se sont publiquement désolidarisés de lui et c'est aussi pourquoi le Parquet, sur base de toutes les infractions relevées plus haut, a lancé un mandat d'amener contre lui.

Aujourd'hui, l'armée nationale congolaise a pu mettre fin à une équipée de Monsieur LUMUMBA à travers le Kwilu et le Kasai; cette équipée n'avait qu'un seul but : ébranler l'autorité des institutions établies, rejoindre ses partisans à Stanleyville et y installer un gouvernement séparé dont l'action, sans lui, se précise déjà : arrestations et expulsions d'Européens, séquestration d'adversaires politiques avec tortures et sévices graves, suppression de toute liberté individuelle et toutes les grandes libertés publiques. Les représentants de l'ONUC à Stanleyville assistent, semble-t-il, impuissants à cette nouvelle flambée de terrorisme; comme elle a laissé faire Monsieur GIZENGA venu, sans titre aucun, prendre le pouvoir sur place et commander les actes répréhensibles dont ont été victimes des centaines de compatriotes. Vous ne pouvez ignorer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, qu'au nombre de ces victimes figure Monsieur SONGOLO, Ministre des Communications, Messieurs les Sénateurs FELE et FATAKI et d'autres parlementaires provinciaux et nationaux. De nombreux chefs coutumiers ont été fouettés à sang, des centaines de notables et de personnalités de la province n'ont dû leur salut qu'à la fuite. Vos représentants sur place ont dû nous avertir de tous ces manquements graves aux lois et principes qui régissent un pays civilisé, vous n'aurez pas manqué non plus d'en aviser les délégations afro-asiatiques et est-européennes, dont les réactions, hélas, sont bien lentes à se dessiner.

Bien au contraire, alors que toute l'attention de notre peuple meurtri dans sa chair, se porte sur Stanleyville et sa population traquée et réduite au silence, alors que nous suivons avec angoisse le déroulement des événements dans cette région, c'est à ce moment qu'une certaine opinion mondiale, soigneusement préparée, s'agite au sujet du sort d'un homme, dont toute l'activité est à l'origine du drame que nous vivons. Or cet homme est prisonnier et non séquestré, écroué régulièrement en vertu d'un mandat d'amener dont votre représentant a reconnu la parfaite validité, placé sous la surveillance de forces de l'ordre dont la discipline quoiqu'en dise le rapport de Monsieur DAYAL, se rétablit de jour en jour; cet homme a pu être visité par deux médecins qui concluent à un état de santé satisfaisant. Que veulent donc en plus les délégations qui se sont adressées à vous? Faut-il que nous recherchions à notre tour quel est le traitement des membres de l'opposition au Ghana, quel sort a été réservé au Général Néguib en Egypte et que nous rappelions les victimes de l'insurrection hongroise?

Vous pouvez être certain, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, que notre pays n'a pas adhéré en vain à la Charte des Nations-Unies; nous en connaissons les obligations et nous nous sommes engagés à les respecter intégralement. Toute l'organisation du pays, que nous travaillons d'arrache-pied à remettre en ordre, est basée d'ailleurs sur ces principes et si nous n'avions pas eu toute la magistrature démantelée, en grande partie, sous l'action de Monsieur LUMUMBA lui-même et des tribunaux d'exception qu'il organisa, il ne serait pas difficile au pouvoir judiciaire aujourd'hui de mener le procès, suivant les règles en vigueur dans tous les pays civilisés. Ce sera toutefois notre principal souci de demain.

Mais l'opinion publique du pays est extrêmement sensibilisée à toutes les interventions venues du dehors, dont l'aspect partisan et outrageusement unilatéral l'a vivement émue.

Je partage, comme vous, le souci que le dernier épisode de l'affaire LUMUMBA puisse se dérouler dans la sérénité complète, en dehors des passions et des interventions intempestives. Puis-je vous demander dès lors, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, d'user de votre grande influence auprès des délégations qui sont venues vous faire part de leurs sentiments, pour leur demander de cesser toute campagne, toute agitation, toute intervention en faveur de Monsieur LUMUMBA : le caractère intempestif de ces démarches et les réactions importantes qu'elles éveilleront sûrement dans l'opinion, ne feront que rendre très difficile le déroulement correct du procès.

Vous voudrez bien estimer, avec moi et avec l'ensemble du pays, qu'il s'agit là d'une affaire intérieure. Que tous ceux qui ont le souci de Monsieur LUMUMBA veuillent bien également s'en convaincre et ne pas rendre trop difficile la tâche de ceux qui, dans ce pays, veulent restaurer le règne de la justice et du respect des droits de l'homme.

Je ne doute pas que vous voudrez bien vous ranger à ces arguments et d'avance je vous en sais infiniment gré.

Veillez agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO,

J. KASA-VUBU,

LE COMMISSAIRE GENERAL AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES,

J. BOMBOKO,

A Monsieur le Secrétaire Général
de l'Organisation des Nations-Unies
s/c du Représentant Spécial au Congo.
Léopoldville.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN NEWYORK
From : DAYAL LEDPOLDVILLE
Date : 7 DECEMBER 1960
No. B- 1629

Your 3972. Our military report as follows: It is difficult to report with exactitude the number of Congolese officer trainees in Belgium at present. We are however certain that 37 out of 40 intended for training in the UK are now in Belgium. Before their arrival, there were either nine or eighteen already under training in Belgium. Thereafter Mobutu made a press statement that he had arranged to send another 90. However we are unable to obtain any confirmation.

Your 3970, Para 2. 1) We have given further consideration to our relative strengths and feel that our recommendation to increase our fire-power is justified. We cannot of course enter into an arms race, as UN resolutions disallow military aid to the Congo except through us, but at the same time we must avoid putting our troops to unnecessary risks or leave our force with unequal fire-power. We gather that besides Ethiopia, the UAR, Sweden and Ireland, none of the other serving contingents have any tanks in their armies. Ethiopian armour is committed to the defence of their Somaliland frontier. Sweden and Ireland have a few tanks which probably will not be available. The UAR has them in adequate numbers and could perhaps supply a self-contained squadron if adequate guarantees could be given them in regard to the security of their frontiers with Israel.

2) New sources could be Israel, which has an identical problem to the UAR, India or Pakistan, but there is serious political objection to the first-named.

3) The type of tank required should be air-portable in USAF aircraft and should be equipped with an armament which can dispose of the existing Congolese armoured vehicles as well as provide fire support to our infantry element.

4) A number of our infantry battalions in the Congo are without their heavy support weapons companies, i.e., Ethiopian battalions do not have any machine-guns or heavy mortars, the Malayan battalion has left behind all heavy support weapons, including tank-destroying rocket-launchers, and Sudan battalion is without its machine-guns and mortars. We recommend that the heavy support weapons companies should join their parent units as soon as possible, as without these we shall continue to

be mostly armed with rifles and bayonets and light automatic weapons.

5) While we do not wish to take an alarmist view about the future tactical employment of the UN troops in the Congo, it is considered essential that UN troops having once been attacked by the ANC should be so equipped that at least they should be able to defend themselves adequately should they again be attacked.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 7 December 1960
No : B-1628

1. Senators Church, McGee and Moss accompanied by Edward Kennedy are here on a visit and I had a long talk with them yesterday. They came to visit our Headquarters this morning for a conference at which Von Horn, Linner, Rikhye and Nwokedi were also present. There was a full discussion on the various aspects of this operation, the Senators' enquiries centring on the question of the use of UN troops in various situations, both actual and hypothetical, and the question of Belgian influx. We are giving a dinner tonight for the Senators and Kennedy.

2. Scott called later and I emphasized that the situation which certain countries had desired had now been created in the Congo. Today all signs indicated a drift towards disintegration and civil war. Attempts are being made to hem in the UN operations from all sides with the various embassies looking on as bystanders. I mentioned the complaint of our technical consultants regarding the honouring of Kokolo, who perpetrated the Kasai massacres and was responsible for the shedding of UN blood, while not a word had been said in appreciation of the sacrifice of the Tunisians. In this connection, I told Scott very firmly about his Counsellor, Gaydon's attitude and behaviour. Scott was very much on the defensive and I drove the points home, with what results, remains to be seen.

3. Mobutu has been very talkative and self-confident. He has threatened to divert the waters of the Nile if the UAR should send any assistance to Orientale province. It is believed that he has had some differences with Kasa-Vubu and Ileo regarding the continuance of the Commissioners-General after 31 December. It may be that a compromise will develop in the form of a governmental team drawn from Ileo's Cabinet and

the Commissioners. Mobutu thought that the approval of the Presidential delegation's credentials had been helpful but the S.G. "s'est fourré le doigt dans l'oeil". He personally received the eleven Congolese officers at Brazzaville on their return from their jaunt to the USA and other countries.

4. We hope your talk with Senator Kennedy was useful.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SEC GEN, NEWYORK
From : DAYAL, LEDPOLOVILLE
Date : 7 December 1960
No : B-1627

1. Iyassu is just back after a stop over in Stanleyville where he met Gizenga and Lundula. They said that the UN troops should withdraw from the province as they had made an appeal to certain countries for aid which has been promised. Iyassu is of the opinion that it is a question of time before the secession of Orientale is declared. Mobutu has sent a company of paracommandos to Coquilhatville from where they will march to the Orientale border. A clash occurred between his troops and those of Gizenga etc., at the border in which one of Mobutu's men was killed. This pattern is likely to intensify. Iyassu has gathered the impression that Gizenga is by no means all in all there. But if Lumumba had somehow reached there, the whole situation would have taken a dramatic turn. This coincides with our information that it is Salamu, the District Commissioner who seems to be the boss.
2. Brzak has had a difficult time in Stanleyville and we had been considering his replacement. As Iyassu will soon be going there, the change-over could now take place. Caballero seems the best possible choice.
3. Van der Goot in Coquilhatville is also badly in need of a change which we are considering. Now that instead of the usual pressures, Tshomba has changed his tactics against UN - with motives suspicious but unknown - this might be the time to replace Berendsen by Duran. These changes will be spaced out.

OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEW YORK
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
DATE : 7 December 1960
NO. : B- 1626

1. Tshombe's relations with Kasa-Vubu continue to be precarious and may have even taken a turn for the worse. It is, I think, significant that Bolele, at his press conference yesterday (on which I reported in my B-1617) allotted as much time to his customary attacks against the UN as to his denunciations of Tshombe and his "Belgian supporters".
2. If the policies of Kasa-Vubu's and Tshombe's advisers may be at variance, the "advisers" behind Tshombe and Kalonji have never failed to follow a consistent line. A recent example of the identity of their interests and aims are the negotiations which took place last week between the Katangese and the South Kasai authorities which have resulted in an agreement calling for annual trade exchanges between the two "states" amounting to three hundred million francs in each direction.
3. In addition, the press has reported that Tshombe will attend the conference of heads of state of the French-speaking countries of Africa at which the problem of Katanga will be discussed, and Kalonji is said to have left Bakwanga for a tour of West Africa which may well include an appearance at the conference. Such a methodically combined action in the political and economic fields cannot but consolidate the de facto situation of the two "presidents" and lay the ground for their eventual de jure recognition.

LEOPOLDVILLE
7 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS
NEWYORK

B-1625 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL/LINNER REOUR 2889 RE CRITICAL SITUATION
REFUGEES IN SOUTH KASAI STOP UPON RECEIPT OF YOUR 3838 CMA WE HAVE
IMMEDIATELY ORDERED DRIED FISH CMA MAIZE FLOUR AND PALM OIL IN CONGO AND
IN NEIGHBOURHOOD COUNTRIES STOP HOWEVER CMA TRANSPORT OF THESE FOODS BY
SURFACE WILL TAKE CONSIDERABLE TIME AND WILL BE DELAYED BY GENERAL
DETERIORATION OF TRANSPORT SERVICES INSIDE CONGO STOP IN VIEW OF RECENT
EVENTS CMA TRANSPORTS BY RAIL AND BY RIVER ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY
DIFFICULT AND ARE ENCOUNTERING CONSIDERABLE DELAYS STOP AS YOU ARE AWARE
CMA ONUC AIR OPERATIONS CANNOT UNDERTAKE SUCH AIRLIFT STOP TO COPE WITH
THIS EMERGENCY SITUATION CMA WE SUGGEST TO APPROACH US GOVERNMENT TO PLACE
AT OUR DISPOSAL EITHER THE SEVEN CCC 124 OR THE SIX CCC 130 AIRCRAFTS
INVOLVED IN THE AIRLIFT OF THE AUSTRIAN MEDICAL TEAM STOP THESE AIRCRAFTS
ARE DUE IN CONGO AS OF 9 DECEMBER PAREN REFER TO ADMIN REPORT 98/21 UNPAREN
STOP THESE AIRCRAFTS WOULD BE USED FOR THE TRANSPORT OF FOODS FOR REFUGEES
FROM LEOPOLDVILLE AND NEIGHBOURHOOD COUNTRIES TO LULUABOURG PAREN WHERE
LANDING IS POSSIBLE UNPAREN FROM THERE FOODS WILL BE TRANSPORTED BY RAIL
AND BY ROAD UNDER MILITARY ESCORT STOP QUANTITIES TO CARRY ARE 1000 TONS
OF MAIZE FLOUR CMA 100 TONS DRIED FISH CMA 90 TONS OF PALM OIL AND 400 TONS
OF VARIOUS FOODS STOP ABOVE QUANTITIES WILL COVER BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR
100,000 REFUGEES FOR ONE MONTH STOP PLEASE ADVISE

LEOPOLDVILLE
7 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNATIONS
NEWYORK

B-1624 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL FOLLOWING LETTER DATED 6 DECEMBER
RECEIVED 1515 HOURS TODAY QUOTE (text attached) UNQUOTE

6 décembre 1960.

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général
de l'Organisation des Nations-Unies
à NEW YORK.

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Rentré au Congo le dimanche 27 novembre, j'ai pris les premiers contacts nécessaires pour préparer utilement la venue au Congo d'une Commission de Conciliation des Nations-Unies. Il ne m'a pas été possible de me consacrer entièrement à cette mission; vous aurez appris en effet que, déjouant l'attention des gardes que l'ONUC lui avait accordés pour sa protection, M. LUMUMBA s'est échappé dans la soirée du 27 novembre et est parvenu à gagner le Kasai, à la suite d'une équipée en voiture qui a provoqué dans le pays une nouvelle tension bien inutile.

Une correspondance séparée en date de ce jour vous entretient plus particulièrement de la question, je vous demanderais de bien vouloir vous y référer.

L'arrestation de Monsieur LUMUMBA va permettre désormais au pays de consacrer toute son attention à la tâche de la reconstruction. Cependant il me paraît inopportun de précipiter l'arrivée de la Commission de Conciliation; une arrivée précipitée ne permettra pas, je le crains, d'utiliser à bon escient ses bons offices. Il est en effet indispensable que le travail soit préparé et que l'itinéraire de la Commission soit jalonné dans les chefs-lieux de provinces, de rencontres avec les notabilités locales, les chefs politiques et les membres des différentes assemblées élues. Cette tâche demandera un certain délai et je ne vois pas, compte tenu de la prochaine réunion à Brazzaville des Chefs d'Etat d'Afrique d'expression française, qu'il soit possible à la Commission de faire du bon travail avant le 26 décembre prochain.

Au préalable, je serais heureux que soient parfaitement mises au point à votre intervention, les questions suivantes :

1. Les pays participants à cette Commission.
2. Le caractère du travail qu'accomplira cette Commission pendant son séjour au Congo.

.....

3. L'élimination des risques résultant, pour le Pays, d'attitudes déplacées de délégués de pays avec lesquels le Congo a dû suspendre ses relations diplomatiques.

4. L'intervention éventuelle du Congo dans les frais de voyage et de séjour des membres de la Commission.

Il m'agréerait, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, que vous puissiez me donner une réponse précise sur ces différents points, dans un délai assez court, de façon que je puisse faire examiner attentivement tous les aspects de la venue de cette Commission avant de vous marquer un accord formel sur la date de son arrivée.

Je saisis cette occasion de vous renouveler, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO,

Joseph KASA-VUBU.

LE COMMISSAIRE GENERAL AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES

Justin BOMBOKO.

LEOPOLOVILLE
7 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS
NEWYORK

8-1623 SECGEN FROM DAYAL FOLLOWING RECEIVED AT 1400 HOURS

QUOTE

(text attached)

UNQUOTE

Léopoldville le 6 décembre 1960.

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général
de l'Organisation des Nations-Unies
à NEW YORK.

Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

Ma lettre de ce jour vous entretient incidemment du problème causé au pays par la fuite de Monsieur LUMUMBA et par la responsabilité de l'ONUC dans les difficultés qui s'en sont suivies.

Je me permets de vous rappeler à ce sujet toutes les notes et télégrammes de protestation qui vous ont été adressés lorsque les responsables locaux de l'ONUC eurent décidé d'accorder une protection telle à M. LUMUMBA qu'elle équivalait à le soustraire aux poursuites légalement entamées contre lui par le pouvoir judiciaire. Toutes ces démarches se sont révélées vaines. L'attitude de l'Organisation internationale, dans cette affaire, n'a pas été empreinte du souci de comprendre le point de vue des autorités congolaises, elle a produit dans tout le pays une rancœur très vive à l'égard des responsables de l'ONU, rancœur dont les manifestations regrettables des 22 et 23 novembre dernier furent les plus significatives et les plus graves.

Cette attitude de l'ONU, qui n'a pas voulu modifier son point de vue au sujet de la protection de M. LUMUMBA, entraîne aujourd'hui inéluctablement sa responsabilité dans les conséquences de son évasion.

En empêchant en effet, sous des prétextes absolument sans aucune base juridique, l'arrestation de M. LUMUMBA, l'ONUC ne pouvait pas, comme elle le déclare actuellement, se désintéresser de son maintien sous surveillance, sans quoi, son action ne peut être taxée que d'unilatérale et partielle : il est inadmissible en effet qu'elle entrave l'action de la justice et qu'elle permette en même temps à un inculpé protégé par elle, de continuer une activité néfaste et subversive. Aujourd'hui, avec l'arrestation de M. LUMUMBA au Kasai, se clôt définitivement, je l'espère, un chapitre où le rôle des Nations-Unies n'a certainement pas contribué à ramener l'ordre et la tranquillité sur le territoire de la République. J'ose croire que dorénavant une plus juste conception du rôle des Nations-Unies dans le maintien de l'ordre au Congo n'aboutira plus à des situations de ce genre et qu'il sera mis fin de façon absolue

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à un régime des protections abusives.


Ce n'est que de cette façon, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, qu'il sera possible de mettre au point une collaboration féconde et efficace entre l'ONUC et les autorités congolaises, collaboration dont chacun espère les plus heureuses conséquences.

Je saisis cette occasion de vous renouveler, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO,

Joseph KASA-VUBU.

LE COMMISSAIRE GENERAL
AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES


Justin BOMBOKO.

OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen New York
From: Dayal Leopoldville
Date: 7 December 1960
No: B- 1622

Bomboko this morning promised President's replies regarding Conciliation Commission and your other letters this afternoon. Instead, another letter of complaint regarding old episode concerning Lumumba's arrest received which is being separately cabled. Kasavubu returned last night.

2. Bomboko also promised information by tomorrow regarding interrupted UN radio programmes.
3. Regarding river transport Bomboko says he has given corrective instructions and it remains to be seen what these are and what their effect.
4. No reactions yet from Kasavubu regarding withdrawal UN guard, but Kamitatu and Kasongo are frantic with fear.

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Secgen, New York
From: Dayal, Leopoldville
Date: 6 December 1960
No: B-1618-1619-1620

I continue my thoughts on the future of this Operation in the light of unfolding events and possible developments. When the operation was launched, its primary purpose was to enable the withdrawal of the intervening Belgian forces and to assist the young and untried Republic in shouldering its unfamiliar responsibilities. After the Belgian military withdrawal, the operation could have been a clear-cut technical assistance one, our military forces assisting the administration by way of aid to the local civil or military power. The unanimous vote in the Security Council was perhaps accorded on the basis of the above or similar assumptions.

2. But, immediately after the commencement of the operation, sharp internal political differences developed, with the government in power frequently acting in a manner repugnant to UN principles. Towards the UN, differences developed largely as a result of attempts to distort to factional advantage or deliberately to misunderstand, the UN's functions. The situation came to a head over the problem of Katanga which set the then Government on a reckless course against the UN. Unilateral aid from certain countries came in at or about this stage and the Congo found itself catapulted in the middle of the cold war with the two major Powers pulling in opposite directions. For a time, at any rate, the Western group gave its support to the UN operation until the opposing group was pushed out, which brought about sharp realignments.

3. Our attempt to keep the scales even, at this stage came up against the opposition of our former supporters. The advent of the Commissioners was the signal for the return of the Belgians with the connivance, willing or unwilling, of more powerful supporters.

4. For a month or so, the situation was held down by deflating the exaggerated pretensions of the contenders for political power and the ANC. But events in New York which coincided, whether by accident or design, with the Ghana Embassy episode, blew off the lid.

5. What are now the perspectives? If the trend to military dictatorship of which you speak continues, the difficulties facing the UN operation will progressively increase. The stark fact is that the final repository of power behind the facade of the President and the College is the ANC. The character of the ANC has not changed since my Second Report and is not likely to change basically in the foreseeable future. It should not be forgotten that it is the same ANC which committed the atrocities in early July and this force is now drunk with the heady wine of political power.

6. All indications point to an increase in the power and self-confidence of the ANC which is most resentful of the presence of the UN Force which represents a challenge to its absolute supremacy. The only way in which we could have exercised some control over the ANC was by means of the training programme; this, as our experts have pointed out, is no longer possible. Therefore in a situation where two armies with difference and generally conflicting motivations stand face to face, conflicts are bound to develop. For example, the situation at Ndjili airport, which the ANC seem determined to take over and which we are equally determined to resist, could precipitate such a conflict.

7. If Mobutu constitutes the College into a provisional government, a serious constitutional position would be reached. While there would be no difference in the basic structure since it would amount only to a change in name without any sanctions either in legality or in ascertainable popular support, the pretensions would increase. Supposing, furthermore, the so-called provisional government were to declare itself aligned with a certain military grouping at which Mobutu has more than once hinted, what then would be UNOC's position or that of the contingents from non-aligned countries serving under it?

8. The inescapable fact today is that while UN financial aid is welcomed, also certain types of technicians where Belgians are not available or forthcoming, the rest of the operation, particularly the military branch, is not wanted here. This is the view not only of the present Congolese authorities but also of their Western supporters. Von Horn's categoric opinion is that if we were to ask the opinion of the Congolese authorities regarding the continuance of the UN military operation, the reply would be a categorical negative.

9. If, for the sake of argument, the UN troops were to withdraw either as a result of an open demand or of pressures or of open clashes, the next question is whether the civilian operations could continue. It is evident that whatever law and order prevails here is still largely due to the presence and activities of the UN troops. And were the ANC to be free to rampage at will, it is Linner's view, with which we all agree, that the continuance of the civilian operations would be rendered impossible.

10. The curious position therefore is that while the Congolese authorities want some form of technical and mostly financial assistance to continue, they do not want

the UN troops. The Belgians on the other hand, would wish the UN troops to continue but they resent UN technical assistance. It may be that with plenty of Belgian advisers around Mobutu and among the ANC, the Belgians are trying to guard against the contingency of UN troops pulling out. But they should not forget that what the ANC did in July it could do again. Mobutu and the Commissioners are strongly pro-Belgian because of their background, affiliations and advisers, and many of the Commissioners also have Belgian mistresses. But the principal political leaders including Kasa-Vubu and Tshombe, are basically anti-Belgian and the mood of the country is xenophobic. The Belgians are therefore building on very dangerous hypotheses.

11. From the above, it will be evident that if the present trend should continue, the UN operations would become increasingly difficult since open co-operation with the Commissioners or their provisional government would expose us to serious political criticism from various quarters. It would also result in the serious danger of various national contingents pulling out, and what is more, clashes with the ANC would be inevitable since there appears to be no common basis on which co-operation would be possible.

12. We cannot altogether abandon hope of some kind of a political solution being found within the framework of some form of legality. The concept of the Conciliation Commission is still there, although there are numerous impediments in its path, those contrived by Kasa-Vubu as well as those of its own making. If the Commission is unable to come or if it returns empty-handed, the present trends will be accelerated, with the consequences to this operation earlier described.

13. Another question is whether this operation could

somehow dig in at some intermediate position, by drastic reduction of the military component while continuing with the technical and financial aid. The political objections would however, still be there, besides the inherent conflict between the aims of the UN operation and those of the authorities for the time being, in power. The prospect may therefore well be that once the operation gives ground at any point, its position will be undermined along the whole front.

14. There seems to be one remaining possibility. If the Great Powers who are in their different ways, opposing or undermining the UN operation, could be persuaded to take heed of the dangers and of the damage to the UN itself were this operation to grind to a halt, and not to force each its own political solution, but to leave it to the UN to continue its patient work of attempting to build up some form of national unity, then the operation could perhaps proceed. But since extreme and irrevocable steps have already been taken by these Powers, it may be too much to expect the Western group to exercise the degree of self-denial which would be required, or the Eastern group to abandon its frustrated ambitions in the area.

15. In the last resort therefore the position could perhaps be adopted that the UNOC's main task under the mandate was accomplished when the Belgian forces withdrew and the country was saved from instant collapse, leaving the responsibility of maintaining the country's shaky independence to the Congolese themselves with the assistance of supposed friends of their own choosing. In other words, we would have to consider anxiously the advisability of assuming or declining the new responsibilities to which the developing situation has given rise. The turning point will be reached when the fate of the Conciliation Commission comes to be known. Then will be the time for a final decision.

16. These are random thoughts intended to stimulate our mutual thinking on basic issues, and I may add to them as new ideas develop.