



To: The DSG

#1 PRIORITY

Please find attached, for your approval, a draft of the Secretary-General's first report on Mali since the adoption of resolution 2100 (2013) establishing MINUSMA. The report, which is due for publication tomorrow, focuses on political and security developments, as well as the humanitarian, human rights and development situation. It also discusses the transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA and highlights some of the challenges associated with the establishment of the Mission.

07/06/13

On the political process, the report notes that progress has been made towards the implementation of the transitional Government's roadmap for the transition. It also highlights the challenges inherent in the presidential elections planned for 28 July and warns against the risk of heightened tensions if the results are not accepted by major stakeholders. The report cautions that MINUSMA's capacity to support the elections, including assistance with security and logistics, will be limited given that the Mission is in the early stages of its deployment.

In its assessment of the security situation, the report notes that although major combat operations have been completed, the use of asymmetric tactics by extremist groups has been on the rise in Mali and the sub-region. It also points out that while the attacks in Mali have to date targeted the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF) and AFISMA, UN personnel could be at risk in the future. Concern is also expressed over the recent increase in intra-communal violence in the north and renewed fighting

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United Nations



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Cabinet du Secrétaire général

between the MDSF and secular Tuareg rebels in and around the town of Anefis.

In the **observations** section, the Secretary-General calls on the parties concerned to **stop fighting immediately** and refrain from any action that could jeopardize ongoing efforts by the **ECOWAS mediation** to broker a political settlement between Bamako and groups in the North.

The report has been reviewed by PU. A track-changed version is attached indicating the changes to be made. The report was received on 5 June and is scheduled to issue today.

AR

Political Unit
7 June 2013

C.S. - we strengthened the language on elections in para 79.

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MINUSMA: RPT of the SG
To the SC

Seen in ODSG by: *ER*

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Note to Mr. Eliasson

MINUSMA: Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council

1. Please find attached the draft report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which was prepared in consultation with MINUSMA, the United Nations Country Team in Mali, and the members of the Mali Inter-Agency Task Force.
2. The report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), and covers the period from 27 March to 3 June. It focuses on political and security developments, the status of the extension of state authority, the humanitarian situation, the human rights situation and protection of civilians, as well as development issues. It also discusses the establishment of MINUSMA, support to the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), and the planning for transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA.
3. The report recounts strides made in the political process and includes updates on the priority political elements, including the implementation of the transitional Government's roadmap for the transition, the electoral process, and relevant information on the progress, promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law. In particular, it gives a detailed update on the mediation process between the transitional authorities in Bamako and armed groups in the north, in particular regarding the situation in Kidal. The report highlights the challenges inherent in the presidential elections planned for 28 July and 11 August for the first and second round, respectively, and clearly identifies the risk of further aggravated tensions if the results are not accepted by major stakeholders. The report also cautions that MINUSMA's capacity to support the elections, including with the security and logistic needs, will be limited due to its early stages of deployment.
4. Regarding the security situation, the report notes that, while the major combat operations have largely been completed, the use of asymmetric tactics has been on the rise both in Mali and the subregion, including the large-scale attacks on 23 May in Niger. The attacks in Mali to date have targeted the Malian Defence and Security forces and AFISMA personnel but, as the report states, United Nations personnel could be at risk in the future. Furthermore, the report documents a worrying trend in increased intra-communal violence in the north, including violent incidents between Arab and Tuareg communities.
5. The report describes the status of AFISMA's deployment and highlights the challenges inherent in the transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA on 1 July, should the Council so decide. In particular, it stresses the need to bring the capabilities of AFISMA troops on the ground up to United Nations standards, both through bilateral assistance and through the Trust Fund in support of AFISMA, and underscores the critical need for deploying enablers as soon as possible, without which MINUSMA's broader deployment may be jeopardized.
6. The report's observations section calls on all Malian stakeholders to engage in

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
constructive dialogue, including on issues related to the upcoming elections. It recalls the new geopolitical context and associated threats that operating in Mali poses to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, while clarifying the nature of MINUSMA's mandate and its limitations. It further calls on the support of the Member States and the broader international community, while underscoring the importance to address the regional dimension of the Malian crises and the corresponding need for region-wide solutions.

7. We would be grateful if you could obtain the Secretary-General's approval of the report at his earliest convenience. The report is due to be submitted to the Security Council by 7 June 2013, as requested by the Security Council resolution 2100 (2013).



Jeffrey Feltman

4 June 2013



Hervé Ladsous

4 June 2013

cc: Ms. Clark
Ms. Haq
Mr. Prodi

June 7, 2013

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Draft Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Mali

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 2100 (2013) of 25 April 2013, by which the Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), subsuming the United Nations Office in Mali (UNOM), with MINUSMA assuming responsibility for the implementation of UNOM's mandated tasks.

2. In resolution 2100 (2013), the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed on the situation in Mali, the implementation of the mandate of MINUSMA, and to provide a report to the Council within 45 days of the resolution's adoption, specifically on the security situation and the political process and to include updates on the priority political elements including the implementation of the transitional road map, the electoral process, and relevant information on the progress, promotion and protection of human rights and international humanitarian law. In addition, I was asked to provide a review of the troop level, force generation and deployment of all MINUSMA's constituent elements. The present report contains the requested updates as well as major developments in Mali since the issuance of my report of 26 March 2013 (S/2013/189).

II. Update on major developments

A. Political Developments

3. During the reporting period, there were a number of developments related to the dialogue and reconciliation process, the situation in Kidal and the mobilization of national and international stakeholders in the run-up to the holding of presidential and national legislative elections. They represent moderate progress in efforts to restore Mali's constitutional order and territorial integrity. However, the country continues to face overlapping political, security and humanitarian challenges, which pose threats to the population and social cohesion. Social polarization, inter-communal tensions and

antagonism between political actors remain high and could escalate into further conflict if unresolved.

Dialogue and Reconciliation

4. In an important step, interim President Dioncounda Traoré appointed the President and two Vice-Presidents of the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission on 30 March. On 10 April, 30 members of the Commission were appointed by presidential decree, and on 25 April, all its members officially took office. While many viewed this as a positive development in order to move the dialogue and reconciliation process forward, some have criticized the Commission for a perceived lack of transparency in the selection of its membership and insufficient inclusion of religious, community and traditional leaders. The United Nations is providing technical and logistical support to the Commission.

5. There have been significant developments regarding the situation in Kidal. The *Movement National pour la Liberation de l'Azawad* (MNLA) and the newly-established Tuareg High Council for the Azawad have expressed willingness to engage in dialogue with the transitional Government to begin negotiations on the basis of respect for Mali's territorial integrity, sovereignty and secularism. Together with the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the European Union, the United Nations has continued to actively engage the transitional Government and groups in the north, in particular the MNLA, with a view to facilitating direct talks that would pave the way for the conduct of presidential and legislative elections nationwide and substantive dialogue after the polls.

6. The Acting Head of Mission visited Kidal and Tessalit from 29 to 31 March, and Kidal again on 25 April, where he engaged local representatives, including a council of elders, civil society, *Mouvement Islamique de l'Azawad* (MIA) and MNLA, on the prevailing situation and a possible way forward for dialogue. The interlocutors stressed the need to peacefully resolve the situation in Kidal and to address the root causes of the problems in the northern regions, which in their view resulted from governance issues.

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7. My Special Representative for West Africa has worked closely with the Acting Head of MINUSMA to facilitate the launch of dialogue between the Malian authorities and armed groups in the northern regions. He travelled to Bamako from 30 April to 2 May where meetings were held together with the Special Representative of the Chairman of the African Union Commission for Mali and the Sahel and Head of AFISMA, Mr. Pierre Buyoya, and the Special Representative of the President of the ECOWAS Commission for Mali, Mr. Aboudou Toure Cheaka, and the Acting Head of MINUSMA, with the interim President and the Prime Minister of Mali, who both confirmed the intent of the Malian authorities to engage in dialogue with the armed groups in the northern regions. They also undertook a joint visit to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, for consultations with the ECOWAS mediator, President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso, on the way forward. Subsequently, on 10 May, the Acting Head of MINUSMA, the Head of AFISMA and the European Union Special Envoy for the Sahel, Michel Reveyrand de Menthon, met MNLA representatives in Ouagadougou.

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8. These rounds of discussion with the Malian authorities and representatives of the groups in the north yielded encouraging results. The parties expressed commitment to initiate dialogue as soon as possible and stressed the need to find a mutually-acceptable and sustainable solution to the problems of the north. Interim President Traoré endorsed a preparatory phase in the dialogue to reach agreement that the principles of territorial integrity, non-application of Sharia law and disarmament would govern the participation of the armed groups in the national dialogue and reconciliation process. The MNLA requested international guarantees to ensure a meaningful post-electoral dialogue on the future status of the north and on the implementation of any future agreement.

9. Subsequently, the transitional Government and the MNLA endorsed the seven-step facilitation plan developed by the United Nations in close coordination with the African Union, ECOWAS and the European Union. The aim of the facilitation plan is for the parties to reach agreement on a framework that would pave the way for nationwide elections, including in Kidal, create conditions conducive for the deployment of MINUSMA, and outline the post-electoral framework for dialogue.

10. On 16 May, interim President Traoré appointed Mr. Tiébilé Dramé as his adviser on the situation in the northern regions and mandated him to coordinate national, regional and international efforts towards addressing the recurring instability in the north including through finding a negotiated solution involving the armed groups and militias. In this context, from 26 to 30 May, he met with representatives from the High Council for the Azawad (HCA) in Niamey, Niger, as well as the Arab Movement for the Azawad (MAA) and an Alliance of Arab Communities in Nouakchott, Mauritania. He subsequently reported that the parties expressed willingness to discuss a framework agreement that would pave the way for the holding of elections nationwide and subsequent substantive discussions with elected officials on the problems facing the northern regions.

11. On 3 June, the ECOWAS Mediation Team convened a meeting of the international community in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, to discuss preparations for direct talks between the transitional Government of Mali and armed groups in the northern regions. The meeting was chaired by the Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso, Mr. Djibril Bassole. Mr. Dramé, on behalf of the transitional Government, and a joint MNLA and HCA delegation noted a commitment to dialogue and to the holding of the presidential elections as scheduled. (see paragraph 12) The joint MNLA and HCA delegation reaffirmed its commitment to territorial integrity, sovereignty and secularism of the Malian state. Participants raised concern about the growing tensions on the ground and called on all sides to desist from acts of provocation that could negatively impact on the ongoing mediation efforts. A team comprising the ECOWAS Mediation Team, African Union and United Nations was established to finalize the draft framework agreement to be presented to the parties on 7 June before the start of direct talks.

Elections

12. On 27 May, interim President Traoré announced new dates for the elections. The first round of the presidential election is scheduled for 28 July, with a possible second round on 11 August. The legislative elections are to be held in September. On 20 May, the National Assembly adopted the revised Electoral Law that was

subsequently promulgated on 22 May. The revised law provides for the use of biometric voter registration aimed at enhancing the transparency and credibility of the polls

13. Preparations for the elections are underway. However, several challenges remain. These include the situation in areas under the control of the MNLA; the management of the voting for IDPs and refugees; and the inclusion in the voters' register of up to 400,000 young people who reached voting age after the establishment of the civil registry. The civil registry currently includes some 6.9 million prospective voters. Most of the electoral materials distributed to the northern regions for polls to be held in 2012 were destroyed in the conflict and need to be replaced. Finally, the security conditions throughout the country need to be conducive for the holding of the polls.

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14. The proposed financial requirement for the presidential and legislative elections is \$128 million of which the transitional Government has pledged approximately \$50 million. The remaining \$78 million are being mobilized through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - administered Basket Fund. As of 27 May, the European Union, Luxembourg, Sweden, Canada and UNDP had provided \$35 million to the Basket Fund, leaving a funding gap of approximately \$43 million.

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15. MINUSMA has continued to support efforts to create an environment conducive to the conduct of free, fair, transparent and inclusive presidential and legislative elections, including providing technical assistance to the Malian authorities. To this end, MINUSMA is assisting Government efforts aimed at building political consensus around outstanding electoral issues. There are ongoing discussions between the transitional Government, political actors, including presidential candidates and civil society, on the signing of an electoral code of conduct. MINUSMA will use all available resources to support the elections, including assistance with the security and logistic needs. However, the Mission will be unable to provide the level of support that it could otherwise provide in later stages of deployment.

16. With the support of UN Women, the Ministry of Women's Affairs held an event on 30 April, with the participation of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Territorial Administration and Decentralization, that launched the transitional Government's National Strategy for the participation and representation of women in elections. The strategy was updated to include certain provisions of Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, including a recommendation that a 30 per cent quota for participation of women candidates be included in the electoral law. Currently, only 10 per cent of parliamentarians are women. However, this provision was not included in the amendments to the draft Electoral Law that was presented to the parliament.

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International and regional developments

17. On 19 April, the African Union, ECOWAS and the United Nations co-chaired the fourth meeting of the Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali in Bamako. The meeting provided an opportunity for the Malian authorities, the region and the wider international community to review progress made on the implementation of the transitional roadmap since the Group's previous meeting in Brussels on 5 February and to outline the way forward. Participants reiterated their firm conviction that any solution to the multidimensional crisis in Mali should be owned by the Malians and based on the simultaneous pursuit of both the political and military tracks.

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B. Security Situation

18. The security situation in northern Mali remained complex and volatile. Major combat operations by the Malian Defense and Security Forces (MDSF), AFISMA and French Operational Serval have largely ceased. The MDSF, AFISMA and Operation Serval have regained control over most major population centers in the north of the country. The reporting period was marked by clashes between the MNLA and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), as well as fighting between other Tuareg and Arab armed elements. The MNLA progressively reasserted control over the region of Kidal. However, the MDSF retook control of Anefis and advanced towards Kidal town.

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19. It will be recalled that MUJAO, Ansar Eddine and AQIM suffered heavy casualties and their operational capabilities were severely diminished as a result of the operations conducted by the MDSF, AFISMA and Operation Serval. Consequently, the groups fragmented and their elements blended into the local population, fled to neighboring countries or joined existing groups. The reporting period was marked by the creation of new groups including the Mouvement Islamique de l'Azawad (MIA), Haut Conseil de l'Azawad (HCA) and Mouvement Arabe pour l'Azawad (MAA). The first two groups are comprised mainly of elements allegedly from the MNLA and Ansar Eddine with the MIA subsequently merging in the HCA. The MAA is comprised primarily of Arab elements.

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20. During the reporting period, there were increased clashes between the MNLA and armed extremist groups, including the former allies in the 2012 offensive. At least five clashes between the MNLA and MUJAO took place in Anefis (120 km southwest of Kidal) and Menaka, resulting in at least ten casualties. The MNLA wrested control of Anefis, reinforcing its presence in the area and also further north into Tessalit, Menaka and other locations. Clashes also took place between the *Mouvement des Arabes pour l'Azawad* (MAA) and the MNLA, including in Ber. On 24 April, nine people were killed during clashes between the MNLA and Arab elements near Intaf. Also of concern are the reports of increasing tensions between Tuareg and Arab communities.

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21. During the reporting period, the MDSF redeployed some 1,200 troops in Gao and 650 troops in Timbuktu. On 6 May, an additional 250 MDSF troops were deployed to Menaka. The MDSF also indicated that a number of troops deployed in Gao were preparing to move northwards. Announcements by the transitional authorities and corresponding movements by the MDSF towards Kidal contributed to raising tensions in the region and amongst Tuareg communities raising fears in the north about a possible return to armed conflict. On 5 June, the MDSF launched an offensive and took control of the town of Anefis (115km from Kidal town) from the MNLA. This advance was reportedly triggered by arrests and expulsions of dark-skinned (non-Tuareg) inhabitants of Kidal by the MNLA. The MNLA stated that of the 180 persons it had arrested, 20 had been detained for "espionage" for the Malian

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Deleted: , On 6 May, 250 MDSF troops were deployed to Menaka increasing the force strength to 900. The MDSF has indicated that a number of troops deployed in Gao are being preparing to move northwards. These developments raised

authorities while the others, as non-residents, would be deported to a “demarcation line,” beyond Douentza. In the ensuing fighting on 5 June, the deaths of several MNLA elements were reported and the MNLA retreated to the north.. As of 6 June, the MDSF was reportedly consolidating 35km south of Kidal town.

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22. During the period under review, Operation Serval and AFISMA operations were completed in the Adrar des Ifoghas mountains but continued around major population centers. French forces redeployed from the Kidal region to focus on operations, together with the MDSF and AFISMA, against extremist armed groups along the Niger river area near the Mauritanian border, the Gao area, along the Asongo axis, and in the area of Lake Faguibine (south of Timbuktu). No major clashes occurred, but significant quantities of weapons, ammunition and explosives were captured, and facilities for producing improvised explosive devices were uncovered. From 8 to 18 April, targeted joint operations were conducted against MUJAO elements in the Gao region. More than 13 tons of weapons and ammunition were discovered.

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23. AFISMA continued to gradually assume operational responsibilities for several areas in northern Mali as Operation Serval began to draw down, as announced by French Foreign Minister, Laurent Fabius, in Bamako on 5 April. As of 30 May the strength of AFISMA stood at 6,085 with personnel deployed in the towns and regions of Timbuktu, Gao as well as Menaka, along the border with Burkina Faso in the area of Douentza and along the border with Mauritania in the area of Diabaly. The AFISMA contingent, previously based in Kidal town, redeployed to Aguelhok and Tessalit in early May. Operation Serval continued to maintain a company there. As of 29 May, the strength of the French forces stood at 4,000 troops focusing on ongoing operations.

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24. The extremist armed groups have been weakened by the Malian, AFISMA, and French operations, and their ability to launch large-scale operations degraded. They have lost the tactical advantage and much of the safe haven they had access to for years in northern Mali. However, these groups are increasingly resorting to asymmetric tactics, including suicide bombings. MUJAO and other extremist groups have carried out a number of suicide attacks throughout the north. On 30 March, a

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suicide bomber struck a MDSF checkpoint in Timbuktu, followed a few hours later by an insurgent attack on the city. On 12 April, a suicide bomber detonated his explosive device in a marketplace in Kidal city, killing four AFISMA Chadian soldiers and injuring another three. On 4 May, a complex attack involving a vehicle laden with explosives, small arms fire by the passengers in the vehicle, and a motorcyclist wearing a suicide vest targeted an MDSF convoy north of Gao, killing two MDSF soldiers. On 10 May, another Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (SVBIED) attack took place at the entrance of the AFISMA camp of the Niger contingent in Menaka. The same day, three suicide bombers targeted a MDSF checkpoint in Gossi (154 km southwest of Gao), wounding two soldiers.

25. On 23 May at dawn, two simultaneous bomb attacks were carried out in the northern towns of Agadez and Arlit in Niger. In Agadez, the military training camp was attacked by nine suicide bombers divided into three groups in a well-coordinated attack consisting of a VBIED, direct fire with assault rifles and individual explosive belts. As a result, 24 soldiers were killed and 16 others sustained critical injuries. In Arlit, a VBIED exploded at the entrance of the Somair uranium mine and processing facility outside the city. A civilian was killed and 14 suffered critical injuries. These two suicide attacks were claimed by MUJAO.

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26. Indications of potential unrest and insecurity were also observed in southern Mali. On 28 April, seven alleged MUJAO elements who had been arrested in March by Malian security forces in Bamako, and eight alleged armed group members who had been transferred from Timbuktu to Bamako were detained at the gendarmerie camp in the capital. On 27 April, members of pro-government militias (Ganda Iso and Ganda Koy) were arrested in Sevare. Meanwhile, on 6 April, a policeman was killed and a Malian soldier wounded when a joint military-gendarmerie force attempted to end clashes between police officers in Bamako, reportedly due to disagreements between pro-junta and other officers over perceived unfairness in promotions. 16 police officers were arrested and a large quantity of weapons seized during the incident.

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27. It is assessed that armed elements in Mali maintain the capacity to recover with auxiliary support networks and recruitment structures reportedly still in place.

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There have also been reports that Al-Queda in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM) has intensified activities in the Tamesna region near the border with Niger and Algeria, while armed extremist group training camps have been found east of Timbuktu.

28. Weapons-related stockpile management remains an urgent issue to be addressed, in Mali as well as in its neighbouring countries. A recent report by the Conflict Armament Research and the Small Arms Survey identified weaponry used by non-state armed groups in Mali that can likely be attributed to former Libyan military arsenals, including 106 mm recoilless rifles and NR-160 rockets and weapons such as BM-21 multiple-launch rocket systems, 9M22M rockets, and UB-32 rocket launchers. The report also indicated that armed groups had captured some of the materiel from the Malian Armed Forces.

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29. The United Nations Mine Action Service has continued to coordinate the deployment of explosive ordnance disposal teams to priority contaminated areas in central Mali and has been further engaged in building the capacity of the MSDF to mitigate explosive threats. Risk awareness sessions on explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices have also been conducted for AFISMA and United Nations personnel.

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C. Extension of State authority

30. The transitional Government continued progressively to strengthen its presence in the northern regions, particularly Gao and Timbuktu. State control is being gradually restored in most major northern towns. The Governor and prefets have returned to the Gao region. In Timbuktu region, however, the Governor and prefets have only returned to the town of Timbuktu due to continued insecurity in the rural areas. Some basic administrative services have been re-established, although many key administrative buildings remain unusable due to damage sustained during the conflict. Meanwhile, the MNLA has retained control of Kidal town, and extended its influence through most of Kidal region and south to the Menaka area.

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31. The Malian gendarmerie, national police and national guard have been gradually resuming law and order functions in northern Mali. As of mid-May, 78

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police officers had re-deployed to Timbuktu and 80 to Gao. Meanwhile, gendarmerie officers continued to redeploy to the north, including 108 to Gao, eight to Douentza, 105 to Menaka, five to Ténenkou, and eight to Youwarou and 112 in Timbuktu region. Thirty-three national guards have redeployed each to Douentza, Ténenkou, and Youwarou, while 100 returned to Gao. However, justice and corrections institutions are still not functioning in the north, as return of personnel has been hampered by security concerns. Logistical challenges, including lack of vehicles, communication equipment and premises, have also undermined the operational effectiveness of the security institutions.

32. The United Nations has been closely coordinating its planning and assessments regarding the broader security and rule of law sectors with the European Union. On 22 April, the European Union Foreign Affairs Council concluded that the European Union would be ready to consider an additional engagement in Mali with a focus on security and rule of law to help the Malian authorities combat terrorism and organized crime.

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33. The European Training Mission in Mali (EUTM) reached a strength of 540 military personnel by the end of May. In May, the EUTM worked closely with OCHA, MINUSMA, as well as other United Nations partners, in developing and delivering a course on international humanitarian law and the protection of civilians. On 2 April, EUTM started the training of the first of four Malian Armed Forces' battalions comprising 650 soldiers, which is expected to be completed by June. In cooperation with UN Women, MINUSMA is training the MDSF on the protection of women and children in situations of conflict.

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34. As of 28 May, the Trust Fund in support of Peace and Security in Mali, which is to provide support to the Malian defence and security sectors, had received some \$7 million in confirmed pledges. MINUSMA has been coordinating with the transitional Government to determine a list of prioritized materiel requirements that could be provided using existing United Nations contracts. The United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy will be complied with in providing support from the Trust Fund.

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D. Human rights situation

35. The human rights situation in Mali remains of grave concern with continued reports of abuses and it is exacerbated by insecurity in the north of the country. MINUSMA has continued to receive allegations of serious human rights violations in the north, including summary executions, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, and destruction and looting of private property. These allegations implicate elements of the MDSF, and also armed groups, including the MNLA, MUJAO and the MAA. As highlighted in my previous report, the crisis had severely impacted the delivery of basic services throughout the country, which impedes the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.

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36. The interference by the Malian authorities in the exercise of civil and political rights, including freedoms of assembly and expression, remained an issue as evidenced by the illegal arrest and arbitrary detention of Mr. Boukary Daou, the chief editor of Le Républicain newspaper in March. He was charged with inciting revolt and spreading false rumours after allegedly publishing an open letter by Malian soldiers on the situation within the MDSF and disclosing Captain Amadou Sanogo's entitlements. The arrest suggested pro-junta elements' continued interference in the functioning of the country's institutions and politics. On 30 April, the case against Mr. Daou was dropped. Meanwhile, the extension of the state of emergency until 6 June, put into question the exercise of civil liberties as it allows for exceptional derogations from due process.

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37. Reports of retaliatory violence committed by the MDSF against members of the Tuareg and Arab communities have decreased. However, in Timbuktu, the risk to these communities remained significant in the light of persistent perceptions of their association with armed extremist groups. Most members of the Arab and Tuareg communities in Timbuktu region have not returned, fearing retaliation by the MDSF and the local population. Local authorities have attempted to provide humanitarian assistance to remaining Arab and Tuareg families who have refrained from leaving their homes due to security concerns. Eight Arabs and one Songhai, who had reportedly been arrested by the MDSF in the Abarajou neighborhood of Timbuktu on 14 February, remain unaccounted for.

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38. MINUSMA has continued to visit alleged members of armed groups arrested in the north and transferred to Bamako to monitor the legal proceedings and assess conditions. According to judicial authorities, as of 31 May, some 400 individuals were detained in connection with the conflict in the north. On 29 March, judicial authorities released 27 of the detainees for lack of evidence.

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39. During interviews conducted by MINUSMA during the reporting period in Mali and in refugee camps in Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger, refugees and displaced persons have repeatedly raised the issue of past conflicts and ensuing impunity. Malian refugees in Niger and Mauritania have cited the security situation and the lack of adequate basic services as their major concerns in considering return. They are aware of the reconciliation process, but have expressed reservations over the lack of refugee representation in the Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission.

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40. To address human rights concerns, the transitional Government has established units to monitor operations by MDSF personnel deployed primarily in the main northern cities. The transitional Government has also launched investigations of alleged human rights violations committed by MDSF elements. MINUSMA has supported these efforts by training 650 MDSF personnel on international human rights, and humanitarian and refugee law. MINUSMA has also briefed AFISMA contingents on the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

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E. Protection of Civilians, Child Protection and Conflict Related Sexual Violence

41. The United Nations has initiated a protection of civilians risk assessment to inform Mission planning on the implementation of the protection of civilians mandate. Mechanisms are also being developed to mitigate the risks faced by civilians as the Mission implements its mandate in conjunction with the MDSF.

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42. The conflict in Mali has been characterized by numerous reports and incidents of grave violations against children. These included recruitment and use of children as child soldiers, sexual violence, killings, maiming and attacks on schools and hospitals. The presence of children in self-defence militias continued to be reported. The

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transitional Government and the United Nations have finalized a draft Protocole d'Accord on the handover of children associated with armed forces or groups.

43. Since the launch of Operation Serval in January, the only allegations of conflict-related sexual violence have been from Kidal, which MINUSMA has been unable to confirm. Rape committed during the occupation of the north continued to have repercussions as births resulting from the rapes have led to abandonment. Institutions receiving abandoned children have reached full capacity. The family code adopted in November 2011 forbids the adoption of abandoned Malian children and orphans by foreigners.

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F. Humanitarian situation

44. At least 3.4 million Malians are food-insecure or suffer from malnutrition, 1.4 million require immediate assistance, including 568,000 people in the north who remain particularly vulnerable as a result of the conflict. Humanitarian activities in northern Mali are being carried out where possible, in spite of ongoing military operations, the proliferation of landmines and unexploded ordnance, banditry and violent incidents such as suicide attacks in and around the main urban areas.

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45. As of 27 May, over 475,000 people had been forced out of their homes by the conflict in the north and sought shelter in central or southern Mali, or in neighbouring countries. Most of the 301,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) live with family or friends, under very precarious conditions, depending for survival on humanitarian aid and the solidarity of host communities that had already been under considerable strain before the conflict started. During the first quarter of 2013, some 14,400 IDPs returned to their homes in the north, while 23,500 people fled to the south.

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46. Food security remains a major challenge, as all three northern regions have been affected by a food crisis with at least one in five households facing a severe food shortage. In Tessalit and Abeibara districts, in the Kidal region, the situation has reached emergency levels. By June, food insecurity is predicted to reach emergency levels in 11 of the 13 administrative units in the north, while the start of the rainy season in the same period will hinder the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

47. Some schools reopened during the reporting period in Gao and Timbuktu regions, with 461 out of 1,079, or 42 per cent. of schools operating. Close to 100,000 students and 2,345 teachers have returned to the classrooms. However, no schools are functioning in the Kidal region and more than 100,000 children still have no access to education in the north. Access to health care remains very limited in the north, mostly due to the reluctance of healthcare staff to return, while measles and cholera outbreaks have been reported in Gao and Assongo districts, respectively. The distribution of non food items and the rehabilitation of infrastructure have been carried out in Kidal, Mopti and Ségou. In conjunction with the Malian authorities and non-governmental organisations, UNICEF launched a SMART nutrition survey in Gao on 30 April. This is the first survey in conflict-affected areas of northern Mali since 2011 and it will be vital in determining needs and priorities for nutrition interventions.

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48. As of 29 May, the Consolidated Appeal Process for Mali for 2013 was only 29 per cent funded, having raised \$120 million out of the required \$410 million. Additional resources are urgently needed in order to address the basic needs of millions of Malians who currently depend on humanitarian assistance for their survival.

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G. Development Situation

49. The political and security crisis has had a serious impact on the country's economic and social development. The suspension of official development assistance, with the exception of humanitarian aid, resulted in the freezing of many investment projects, and drastically reduced resources and budget allocations, especially for the basic social sectors. Gross Domestic Product growth reached a recession level of 1.2 per cent in late 2012, reflecting the effects of shocks to the economy during the year. The recession of 2012 resulted in an increase of vulnerability among households and a rise in the incidence of poverty to 43.6 per cent.

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50. On 15 May, the European Union, France and Mali co-chaired an International Donors Conference on Mali in Brussels titled 'Together for a New Mali,' which was attended by 108 delegations. The conference was held to garner support for the

Sustainable Recovery Plan for Mali, building on existing documents such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy and the Priority Action Plan, which UNDP supported. €3.25 billion was pledged, including by the European Union, who pledged €520 million, and bilaterally by France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. The funds will be used to rebuild Government institutions and the military, repair damaged infrastructure, organize presidential elections, support dialogue with groups in the north and stimulate the economy.

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51. Following several missions to the north, United Nations agencies have decided to re-establish an active presence in the northern region. A limited number of staff would be redeployed to Timbuktu, where a United Nations office is being established. The integrated UN presence in Mali will work closely with the World Bank, and there have been initial discussions on priority areas of cooperation at the headquarters level and in Bamako.

III. Establishment of MINUSMA

A. MINUSMA deployment

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52. Pursuant to Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), MINUSMA was established on 25 April. MINUSMA subsumed UNOM with immediate effect and assumed responsibility for the implementation of its tasks as mandated in resolution 2085 (2012). As of that date, Mr. David Gressly, former Head of UNOM, assumed the responsibilities of Acting Head of MINUSMA.

53. On 17 May, I appointed Mr. Albert Gerard Koenders of the Netherlands as my Special Representative for Mali and Head of MINUSMA. Mr. Koenders, who has served as my Special Representative for Côte d'Ivoire and Head of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) since October 2011, assumed his responsibilities in Mali and for MINUSMA on 4 June.

54. Further to paragraph 33 of Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), the United Nations and the transitional authorities of Mali are close to finalizing a status of forces agreement with regard to MINUSMA, along with two supplemental

arrangements relating to support to AFISMA and to the handover of detainees by MINUSMA to the transitional authorities of Mali. Discussions are also underway with the Government of France on arrangements for the implementation of paragraph 18 of resolution 2100 (2013), wherein the Security Council authorized the French troops, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means, from the commencement of the activities of MINUSMA until the end of MINUSMA's mandate, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General.

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55. Building upon the staff and structure of UNOM, the Secretariat, in coordination with MINUSMA, has accelerated the deployment of staff to the Mission in Bamako and key logistics and security personnel to the major northern population centers to facilitate future deployments. This deployment is contingent upon a number of factors, including safety and security considerations and enabling capabilities. The deployment of additional personnel is guided by the following three principles: a) ensuring a seamless transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA by 1 July; b) ensuring that no security vacuum emerges and that gains made so far are not eroded; and c) ensuring that urgent mandated tasks can be performed, in particular in relation to the political process.

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56. A flexible approach to mission support has been adopted. The overriding consideration is for the security and safety of United Nations personnel and assets. A phased and prioritized approach will be taken based on security conditions and the level of enabling capabilities deployed. The principles of the Global Field Support Strategy will be applied including operating with a light mission footprint supported by a back office, which will be established in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, for transactional activities.

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57. As of 30 May, MINUSMA comprised of 95 international staff including two* military officers, three police officers from the United Nations Standing Police Capacity, 57 substantive, 38 mission support staff and six national staff. During the start-up phase, in addition to personnel from the Standing Police Capacity, up to ten United Nations police officers will be deployed to support the establishment of the police component. Furthermore, specialists from the Justice and Corrections Standing

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Deleted: <#>All mission components will be co-located and where necessary, supplies of main commodities will be stored in situ in order to prevent any interruption in supply lines. An environmental management approach will be taken aiming to minimize the impact on resources, environment, communities and cultural sites.¶
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Capacity have been deployed. The Secretariat has also established planning support teams at United Nations Headquarters in New York and in MINUSMA.

58. Current plans are to establish the military headquarters during June and progressively deploy additional units as they can be generated for operations commencing from 1 July. Priority is being given to the deployment of enabling units on or before 1 July to support the transition from AFISMA and the transition of units already deployed. The deployment of engineer units, EOD companies, Level II Hospitals, transport companies and Headquarters protection companies are currently being negotiated for deployment. In addition, the bulk of the units deployed in AFISMA are expected to be transitioned on 1 July. The remaining units will be deployed as soon as Memoranda of Understanding are negotiated.

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59. Current timelines for the deployment of military force enablers indicate that most will arrive and be operational in Mali towards the end of 2013. In addition, current assessments of commercial contractors capable of performing large-scale construction projects in northern Mali indicate limited availability. Consequently, it is expected that MINUSMA will face significant challenges in developing operational bases in Gao and Timbuktu during the remainder of 2013. The capacity of MINUSMA to operate out of those locations during that period will therefore be limited.

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<#>In addition to MINUSMA's civilian Headquarters in Bamako, MINUSMA is prioritizing the establishment of the Force Headquarters, as well as two regional and Force Sector Headquarters in Gao and Timbuktu. These will serve as the main bases of deployment of MINUSMA military, police and civilian personnel in northern Mali in the start-up phase. The Mission's ability to establish a secure and capable operational presence in Gao and Timbuktu during the first phase of deployment will be heavily dependent on the deployment of force enablers, such as logistics, engineering and transport units, as well as the availability of commercial contractors that can provide construction and related camp services in these locations. ¶

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60. In addition to MINUSMA's civilian Headquarters in Bamako, MINUSMA is prioritizing the establishment of the Force Headquarters, as well as two regional offices and Force Sector Headquarters in Gao and Timbuktu. These will serve as the main bases of deployment of MINUSMA military, police and civilian personnel in northern Mali in the start-up phase. The Mission's ability to establish a secure and capable operational presence in Gao and Timbuktu, as well as Kidal where in the first phase an antenna office will be established, during the first phase of deployment will be heavily dependent on the deployment of force enablers, such as logistics, engineering and transport units, as well as the availability of commercial contractors that can provide construction and related camp services in these locations. Teams of experts have conducted field surveys in the logistics, engineering, aviation, communications, supplies and medical areas. The preparation for deployment and

design of Mission camps and infrastructure is ongoing. The strategic lift of materiel is being organised, including the early establishment of the Mission's communications and information technology infrastructure.

61. A small Communication and Public Information team is on the ground working on several key elements of the transition to and establishment of MINUSMA. Its activities include: (a) public outreach to raise awareness and explain MINUSMA's mandate (b) support to elections-related communication as well as to the Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation; and (c) liaison with AFISMA to plan outreach activities in preparation for the transition of AFISMA to MINUSMA.

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62. A small integrated security section has been established under the leadership of a Chief Security Adviser, in order to assess the security of United Nations personnel and premises during the transition while continuing to support current United Nations operations. Specific threat assessments and Security Risk Assessments are being completed to determine the feasibility of further civilian deployments in the areas of Timbuktu, Gao, Mopti and Kidal. My Special Representative is the Designated Official for security in Mali.

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63. Draft concepts of operation have been prepared for the Mission's military, police, civilian and security components. The MINUSMA force will establish a secure environment for the extension of state authority and civilian security and make space for stabilisation activities in northern Mali; deter and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements; and enable the Malian transitional authorities to undertake their national responsibilities. It will focus on information-led operations, in support of the MDSF or unilaterally, to protect the population, United Nations personnel, facilities and equipment. The MINUSMA force will secure and maintain a presence in the key population centres, and maintain freedom of movement along the connecting lines of communication.

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B. Support to AFISMA

64. AFISMA troops and police continue to play an important role in coordination with the MDSF and French forces in stabilizing the security situation in the north. As

at 29 May, AFISMA had 6,085 troops, including 92 staff officers, and 18 individual police personnel, and one full police unit comprising 140 officers, deployed in Bamako. The advance team of another formed police unit, comprising 72 officers, is deployed in Sevare. This represents 87 per cent of the total forces pledged by various troop- and police-contributing countries to AFISMA.

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65. MINUSMA continued to support AFISMA by providing planning support, establishing coordination mechanisms, and identifying priority needs. Furthermore, UNOM and MINUSMA continued to develop key documents for AFISMA, including military and police operational directives, guidelines for the protection of civilians, rules of engagement and a code of conduct.

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66. AFISMA contingents received logistical support from the main logistics base in Bamako, a logistics node in Niamey in Niger, and three forward logistics bases in Sevare, Gao and Timbuktu. A private company contracted by the United States supplied the forward most units in Gao and Timbuktu. This company will also provide training to AFISMA. However, logistics remain a significant challenge due to inadequate infrastructure, poor communication, electricity shortages. In addition, bilateral and multilateral donors have provided funding and reimbursements for operations, critical life-support (rations, water and fuel), logistical support for strategic and in-theatre movements, direct materiel support and the training of enabling units.

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C. The transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA,

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67. The Secretariat, with the support of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UNOAU) has deepened its engagement with the African Union and ECOWAS regarding the transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA. On 8 and 9 May, a multidisciplinary United Nations team met their African Union and ECOWAS counterparts at the African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa to review transitional arrangements in the areas of military, police, training and mission support. These include the conduct of a joint planning session and subsequent establishment of a joint AFISMA – MINUSMA mechanism in Bamako to help oversee the transition.

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68. The bulk of AFISMA military and police elements will transition to MINUSMA under the unified command of the MINUSMA Force Commander and Police Commissioner. This includes six infantry battalions, one reserve unit and enablers, as well as two formed police units. A number of military staff officers and individual police officers will also be transferred from the current AFISMA military and police headquarters. All AFISMA personnel will be subject to United Nations assessment, pre-deployment training and vetting procedures, including the Organization's human rights vetting policy, to ensure they meet force requirements and have the necessary skills to implement the Mission's mandate.

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69. The United Nations, in coordination with the African Union, ECOWAS and AFISMA, is conducting pre-deployment visits and in-theatre inspections of the formed units' contingent-owned equipment and self-sustainment capabilities in preparation for their planned transition as MINUSMA units and ensuing negotiations on Memoranda of Understanding. Initial assessments indicate that the current AFISMA force does not include enabling units required for MINUSMA's operations. To meet the identified military enabling requirements for MINUSMA, additional units will be required including for engineering, logistics and medical contingents. Likewise, in-theatre military tactical airlift and multi-use aviation capability, including ground support, will need to be generated, deployed and developed. Military aviation capabilities will be essential for the deployment of the force, for its logistics re-supply, and for operations, including CASEVAC and MEDEVAC. However, as of 3 June, Member States had made only limited military aviation pledges. A lack of sufficient military aviation assets would have a significant negative impact on MINUSMA's deployment and the development of its operational capability.

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70. The full operational capability to implement the mandate will be gradually developed during the remainder of 2013. Deployed AFISMA units have been given a grace period of four months to reach the required United Nations standards through either national or bilateral assistance or support from the Trust Fund in Support of AFISMA. Critical gaps remain for attack and utility helicopters, as well as for information units.

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71. A significant effort will be required to address the gaps in AFISMA's military contingents' and formed police units' equipment and self-sustainment capacities and bring them up to United Nations standards. These shortfalls are being addressed by bilateral and multilateral donors, as well as the Trust Fund in Support of AFISMA, based upon a prioritized list of needs conveyed by the African Union, and AFISMA Headquarters. The Trust Fund has received \$35 million in confirmed pledges of which \$6 million are earmarked for humanitarian mine action activities. These will be implemented by the United Nations civilian presence in Mali, in coordination with, but outside the command of AFISMA's military component.

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72. AFISMA's requirements have been identified, coordinated and prioritized in conjunction with the African Union, ECOWAS and AFISMA Headquarters. The first delivery of equipment from available Strategic Deployment Stocks via airlift commenced on 30 May 2013. The main delivery by sealift is under preparation. The support provided through the Trust Fund for AFISMA, while important, will not by itself meet the capability gaps. Considerable efforts will be required of the troop and police contributing countries and other donors for the deployment of requisite military equipment and training. The provision of all support through the Trust Fund will be carried out in compliance with the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.

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73. Police-contributing countries have officially confirmed pledges of four formed police units for MINUSMA in addition to the unit already on the ground and the three units committed for AFISMA. During the initial phase, formed police units and individual police officers will be considered for deployment to Bamako, Gao and Timbuktu and, later to Kidal and Mopti. It is important that Member States support the Mission by providing officers with the required skill sets and linguistic capacities, particularly women officers.

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74. AFISMA deployment locations are broadly aligned with planned United Nations locations, but some adjustments will be required as MINUSMA deploys. However, United Nations support will be phased-in, firstly through the development of major operational bases in Gao and Timbuktu, from which other locations in the north, including the planned Antenna in Kidal, will draw their support. Other

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MINUSMA deployment locations in the north would be supported in the first phase only with land acquisition and well drilling. Additional support services will be provided at a later stage as the logistics support plan is implemented, including by drawing upon military enablers such as explosive and ordnance disposal engineers, construction, combat engineers, transport, aviation and medical units when they become available. It is critical that such capabilities deploy as quickly as possible to enable the timely development of the Mission's operational capability.

75. At the joint planning meeting in Addis Ababa, the African Union and ECOWAS indicated their commitment to maintain their political presence in Mali. They suggested the possible co-location with MINUSMA outside Bamako of some of their personnel including the African Union and ECOWAS human rights observers and police personnel, as well as military observers, following the transition of AFISMA to MINUSMA. They have engaged the United Nations on possible areas of support in terms of strategic and operational level communication, in-theatre movement, accommodation, medical care and security for their personnel in the country after the transition to MINUSMA. The United Nations will work closely with the African Union and ECOWAS after the transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA to consolidate and ensure the sustainability of ongoing mediation efforts and the broader political processes in Mali.

IV. Observations

76. Little more than a year ago, Mali's democratic process was derailed. Less than six months ago, its sovereignty and territorial integrity were seriously challenged by armed groups that had seized control of over half of its territory. The mobilization of the international community, in particular France, the African Union and ECOWAS, averted a major catastrophe in Mali and the region.

77. The situation in Mali has improved since the beginning of the year. I welcome the progress made towards the implementation of the transitional Government's roadmap for the transition, which should lead to the full restoration of constitutional order and Mali's territorial integrity. Peace and stability countrywide can only be achieved through dialogue. Grievances cannot be addressed through violence, as the

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- United Nations locations, but some adjustments will be required as MINUSMA deploys. However, United Nations support will be phased in first to Gao and Timbuktu from which other locations in the north will be supported. Locations in the north would be supported in the first phase with land acquisition and well drilling. Additional support services will be provided as the logistics support plan is implemented, including by drawing upon military enablers such as explosive and ordnance disposal engineers, construction, combat engineers, transport, aviation and medical units. It is critical that such capabilities deploy as quickly as possible to enable the timely ... [1]
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experience in the north over the past months illustrates. I welcome the commitment of the transitional Government and armed groups, in particular the Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad, to hold direct talks as soon as possible and encourage all stakeholders to support the mediation efforts undertaken by the ECOWAS mediator in collaboration with the United Nations, African Union and European Union. I encourage all stakeholders to work towards a timely interim agreement paving the way for the holding of elections nationwide, which would set the stage for substantive discussions with elected authorities thereafter. The fighting between the Malian Government forces and the MNLA in and around Anefis is deeply troubling and must stop immediately. The parties should refrain from any actions that might jeopardise the political process. In accordance with Security Council resolution 2100 (2013), the United Nations stands ready to coordinate efforts of the international community in order to support, in close coordination with the African Union and ECOWAS, all aspects of the transitional roadmap.

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78. I welcome the start of the work of the Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation. It is a strong signal of commitment by the Government and people of Mali to begin addressing the deep-rooted problems that have afflicted all communities in the country for many years. In order to achieve genuine reconciliation, the Commission will need to be as inclusive as possible in its quest for dialogue including by consulting religious, community and traditional leaders, and through the use of both traditional and institutional dispute resolution mechanisms. The dialogue process should consist of multiple tracks, including between and amongst communities and between the Government and the population.

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79. As preparations for the elections intensify, I am encouraged by the determination of the Malian people to hold the polls as soon as conditions permit. I salute their commitment to establish elected institutions mandated to address serious and pressing security, social, economic, humanitarian and development challenges. At the same time, I am concerned by a number of technical and political challenges, as highlighted above, including the worrying situation in Kidal, which has not yet allowed for the deployment of electoral officials and needs to be resolved. Elections in the present circumstances will have inevitable shortcomings. However, I believe that Malians will accept the outcome, if they feel that it genuinely represents their

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collective will. It would be important for the Malian authorities to carefully consider whether the timetable they have adopted allows sufficient time to ensure that the elections actually contribute to enhancing stability and promoting national reconciliation.

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80. ~~I~~ ^{the} I encourage stakeholders to reach consensus on outstanding legal and procedural questions, such as voting arrangements for refugees and IDPs, and issues associated with ~~voter~~ ^{the} register. All possible steps should be taken to ensure that free, fair, transparent and inclusive elections are held throughout the country, including the northern regions. The international community must continue and strengthen its support to the ongoing dialogue on arrangements for nationwide elections – including the redeployment of state electoral officials, security arrangements and confidence building measures – as well as efforts to forge consensus among stakeholders on the modalities for the conduct of the elections. It is also essential that political leaders make a clear commitment to act peacefully and responsibly, accept the outcome of the polls and work together in the wake of the elections for a stronger and more united Mali. MINUSMA will provide technical, logistic and security support within the limits of its capacity and the constraints posed by the fact that the Mission is in the early stages of its deployment.

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81. Major combat operations by the Malian Defence and Security Forces, AFISMA and Operation Serval have largely ceased since armed groups were pushed out of the Adras des Ifoghas area and the cities of Timbuktu, Gao, Kidal and Mopti earlier this year. The increasing presence in the north of the three Forces has helped stabilize the situation and significantly hamper the movement and actions of armed groups. The security situation on the ground remains nonetheless fluid, with sporadic clashes between armed groups and continued asymmetric attacks across the three regions of the north. Furthermore, the advance of the MDSF northwards towards Kidal and the fatal clashes with MNLA elements on 5 June have exacerbated tensions and increased the volatility of the situation in the region. While the operational capabilities of the armed groups have been reduced, attacks in recent months in Mali and the sub-region have shown that they retain the capability to pose a significant threat. The Malian Defence and Security Forces and AFISMA have been targeted. United Nations troops and other United Nations personnel may well face a similar

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risk. This would warrant mitigation measures that may, at times, affect MINUSMA's ability to carry out aspects of its mandate across Malian territory. Other factors of instability, including criminality and inter-communal violence, will also need to be urgently addressed by the Malian authorities with international support and due respect for human rights.

82. I remain concerned about the human rights situation. Allegations of violations and abuses continue to be reported and need to be addressed by all parties. I commend the solidarity of the population in general for providing shelter to IDPs during the conflict. However, I am deeply concerned about the plight of IDPs and refugees in camps inside and outside Mali. The majority of refugees want to return home, however fear of reprisals prevents them from doing so. Substantial stabilization operations will be required to create a secure environment that is essential to encourage such returns. In this regard, I urge the authorities to adhere strictly to human rights principles as the institutions complete their re-deployment to the north and note that long-term reconciliation will not be possible without the promotion and defence of the human rights of all communities in the north.

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83. MINUSMA's mandate presents complex challenges. The United Nations is deploying a peacekeeping operation in a new geopolitical context with threats not previously encountered in a United Nations peacekeeping environment. MINUSMA has a mandate to use all necessary means to protect the population and deter and take active steps to prevent the return of armed elements to the key population centres.

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This does not include peace enforcement or counter-terrorism responsibilities, which will be assumed by French forces. However, the protection of the population in MINUSMA's areas of deployment and within existing capabilities would be an immediate priority for the Mission.

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84. There remain many challenges to a smooth transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA. The initial focus will be on maintaining a seamless continuity between the two operations to preserve the security gains made so far and avoid creating any security vacuums. An initial transition period of six months will see the build up of additional military capacities and the concomitant extension of the Mission's operations. The logistics supply chain is a key challenge in light of the large size of

the area of operations as well as the generally poor state of Mali's infrastructure. Climatic conditions further compound the challenge, especially the impending rainy season. In other locations, access will be restricted due to the threat of asymmetric attacks and mitigating measures will need to be put in place. The generation of logistical enablers will be an initial priority to enable and the establishment and sustainment of the Mission in northern Mali. However, not all of these capabilities will be immediately available at the beginning of the transition from AFISMA to MINUSMA. The deployment of mission components will therefore be phased as security conditions improve and infrastructure is established.

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85. Given these challenges, I ask for the support of all Member States in deploying MINUSMA. It will require the efforts of all stakeholders – first and foremost the Malians themselves, but also the continued support of the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union, and the broader international community.

86. The situation in Mali has far-reaching regional and international repercussions. While focusing our collective efforts on stabilizing the situation nationally, it is important to remain mindful of the danger posed by armed elements moving to neighbouring countries to carry out terrorist attacks and engage in criminal activities. The attacks in Niger on 23 May underscore this threat. As such, it is vital to develop and build upon existing regional approaches to addressing security, governance and humanitarian challenges, which are transnational in nature. To this end, I am finalizing the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel and look forward to the support of Member States for its implementation. In the meantime, MINUSMA will need time to build up its capacity. Patience, concerted support and significant investment will be required by the international community to protect the gains made so far, strengthen stability in Mali and guard against a widening of the conflict in the surrounding region.

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87. I would like to conclude by expressing my appreciation to Mr. Joao Honwana, who served as head of UNOM in January and February and Mr. David Gressley, who served as Head of UNOM and acting Head of MINUSMA until the deployment of my Special Representative for Mali on 4 June. My appreciation also goes to the AFISMA leadership and the troop and police contributing countries as well as bilateral partners,

regional and multilateral organizations, in particular the African Union, ECOWAS, the European Union, the United Nations country team and non-governmental organizations for their work in support of the people of Mali.