

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 9 May 1961
No : A-1184

Delay in answering your 3237 regretted but it has not been easy to get the facts. Following is a report by Major Monette from the Military Information Office here :

"Air Katanga Aircraft - Reg 00 - ABS - (DC 4)

Brought by an Air Brousse crew from Coquilhatville on 3 May. Time of arrival 0858Z. Captain Bonnons in charge of crew. Aircraft still located at N'Djili and guarded by two ANC soldiers. Arrived with 20 passengers. 16 civilians with open shirts and 4 soldiers. All Black. Unable to find out where original crew are but think they must still be in Coq."

We are unable to find any further information. If we do, I will cable it immediately.

OUTGOING CODE

TO: SECGEN, New York
FROM: ABBAS, Leopoldville
DATE: 9 May 1961
NO. A- 1183

Following from Gardiner.

This morning meeting was with Kasa-Vubu, Adoula, Bomboko and Mobutu. Three main questions were brought up as follows cln.

1. Regarding the disposition of the armed units whose officers were mercenaries and are being removed by the UN, how can they be brought under the President's authority query. The President will forward a letter requesting that such units be disarmed by the UN who should prevent them from dispersing lest they go underground and should assist ANC officers in contacting the men and attempting to win them over to the President. The President would like the men to be sent thereafter to centers to be examined, retrained and scattered in loyal units of ANC.
2. Regarding efforts made by the President to enforce Congolese laws prohibiting illegal carrying of arms, could the UN undertake to disarm or assist the President in disarming youth and irregular bands query. This question will also be the object of a request embodied in a letter from the President.
3. A third letter will be sent by the President asking the Secretary General what distinction is drawn between on the one hand, exercise by the President of his power to maintain law and order, and on the other hand, activities which would be regarded as of a civil war nature under the terms of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.

Regarding the rotation of the Ethiopian garrison in Coquilville the President will also send a letter expressing his wishes in the light of further discussions with General Mobutu.

At the end of the meeting we were informed that it had been decided to make an announcement in the next few days that Parliament is to be convened and that President will write to the Secretary-General requesting UN assistance in this undertaking.

Hope action en train to secure services soonest of military expert.

Agreement on all points as stated in my A-1140 and approved by your 3235.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : NARASIMHAN, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 9 May 1961
No : A-1182

I hope to complete my review of all aspects of ONUC operations by Thursday. Further contacts with Leo authorities seem unlikely since Coq conference dragging on. There are many matters which I feel should be brought to your notice urgently. Request permission leave Leo Thursday afternoon arriving New York Friday.

OUTGOING CODE

TO : SEC GEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 9 May 1961
No : A-1181

Your 3259.

I note that you have not answered point 5 in our unnumbered cable of 30 April. Kasa-Vubu raised the same problem with Gardiner in their discussions and Narasimhan is briefed on what Kasa-Vubu has said. I hope that after discussion with Narasimhan, you will send us your instructions.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 9 May 1961
No : A-1180

Ward reports the following reaction to Nyunzu :

- (A) Katangese military have orders not to get involved but to resist any attempt at disarmament.
- (B) Mercenaries. Generally 75 per cent would go if they received their pay which, in most cases, is outstanding since their recruitment.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 9 May 1961
No : A-1179

IMMEDIATE

Kamitatu sent me a letter to-day by hand of one of his friends asking for transport to Coquilhatville and for protection when he goes there. I answered saying that I would be prepared to give him a seat in the first scheduled UN plane to Coquilhatville, but I made it clear to him that in the circumstances and with our limited number of troops there, we cannot give him any protection in case he needs it.

The letter which I signed to Kamitatu has not yet gone and we are keeping it till to-morrow but the contents of it have been conveyed to Kamitatu by his friend. Kamitatu now says that he would like us to contact Adoula and/or Bomboko to ask them to meet him at the airport. Apparently he is not so much afraid of the politicians as he is of the ANC at the airport. In weighing the matter, I consider that if Kamitatu goes there and if he can persuade Gizenga to come to the meeting, some progress might be made towards reconciliation. On the other hand, if Kamitatu's fate is going to be similar to that of Tshombe, I fear that we will be exposed to quite a lot of unjustified criticism, not only by the Casablanca Powers but also by the Eastern countries. I would appreciate your advice before I sent the letter to-morrow to Kamitatu and before I approach Adoula and/or Bomboko through Poujoulat to find out if the President would like him to come and if they would meet him at the airport.

OUTGOING CODE

To : CORDIER, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDOVILLE
Date : 9 May 1961
No : A-1178

Dumontet has agreed to stay on after 21 May but he would like a definite assurance to leave the Congo not later than 29 May. He plans to leave Elisabethville on 27 May. I hope this has your concurrence and that his replacement will arrive in time to take over from him.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 9 May 1961
No : A-1177

Dumontet has been asked if UN has any objection to the return to Katanga of all six persons of Tsombe's entourage who were recently evacuated to Belgium. The question is asked in view of decisions to be taken by their families. I have not yet sent him any advice. Clearly, as far as our investigations went, and as far as the resolution goes, three of the advisers cannot be allowed to return, but if we accept and give support to the orders of the President, none of them should be allowed to return. Please send us your instructions.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLVILLE
Date : 9 May 1961
No : A-1176

Following received from Gardiner :

"Met this afternoon with President, Adoula, Bomboko and Col. Ndjoku representing Mobutu. Regarding ONUC garrison in Coquilhatville notion that we have no choice but use Ethiopians in battalion strength driven home but they still regard stationing battalion Coquilhatville as politically awkward as well as practically unnecessary and are inclined to prefer total withdrawal of ONUC troops from Equateur. They asked to consult Mobutu and tell us to-morrow. Should they decide on total withdrawal I will insist on obtaining official confirmation in writing. Question of maintenance or withdrawal civilian operations experts not mentioned.

Regarding request for military reorganization they accept sending of advisers, posting of liaison officers and organization of training courses but are anxious to carry us further to help them to conquer promptly the 'rebel' provinces.

Accepted to meet to-morrow to discuss further what Unations can do and not do beyond assistance in reorganization army and to help its unification under President's authority."

Gardiner returns this evening.

OUTGOING CODE

IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDOVILLE *S.A.*
Date : 9 May 1961
No : A-1175

Your 3286.

1. Indeed I am fully aware of your aims in North Katanga and I think that ^{my}unnumbered cable of 30 April from MacEoin and myself is our last indication that we fully understand your aims. I agree that, as you say, "due to various reasons we are short of our objectives at Nyunzu". These various reasons have been elaborated in our unnumbered cable of 30 April to which we note that you are very largely in agreement.
2. Your 3286 must have crossed with MacEoin's 2572. The report from Nyunzu raises in our minds one important question, that is why Nazruddin allowed the bulk of the mercenary platoon to walk towards the airport and ~~live~~, knowing this, he goes and surrounds and searches the houses in which they used to live. His orders to arrest the whole platoon were clear cut. The Force Commander can give a clear cut order but as he is not on the spot, the officer carrying out the operation has to use his own discretion and cope with its details which will never be known to the Force Commander. When we have an answer to this question, we will let you know.
3. If it were not for the fact that we became certain that there was an independent platoon of mercenaries in the area, we would not have ordered Nazruddin to take any action for the moment. Our policy, as indicated in unnumbered cable of 30 April, is to soft-paddle until we have built up our strength. This, I still believe, is the correct policy.

The reasons were given in cable referred to above, but I would like to repeat that our most important objective is to carry out the operation without exposing the UN troops to any loss of life, for when everybody knows our full strength it is our belief that they will not put up a fight, not only when we march towards Albertville but also in places where we have small numbers of troops like Manono and Albertville if we decide not to evacuate.

4. This has been our policy for sometime now, but if you would like us to start an operation with the 480 Malaysians who, for the moment, will never have the support of the Ethiopians who are in the process of being rotated or the support of the Indians who are just beginning to be moved from Kamina, please say so. I can understand your anxiety about the Gendarmerie being with us in the same place without any action being taken on our part. But is this not the case in Elisabethville, Manono and Albertville to talk only of North Katanga?

5. We are agreed that Iyassu should be in command of the troops in Katanga but we are waiting the build-up of the Indians at Kabalo and Nyunzu before he takes up his position there.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN ONLY - NO DISTRIBUTION

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

H.A.

Date : 9 May 1961

No : A-1174

It is nine weeks to-day since I left Addis Ababa. As I anticipated, long absences of the Executive Secretary and his deputy are very seriously affecting the work of a newly established Secretariat. A letter to me dated 21 April from Rossen attaching a memo on the office of the Executive Secretary, which I sent to de Seynes, and further news indicated that there has been serious deterioration. It is precisely because of the dangers of these long absences that I, in spite of sickness late 1959 and early 1960, allowed myself only twelve days leave since I joined on first October 1958.

I would advise that delaying my return to Addis Ababa will not only cripple the Secretariat of the Commission, but will also be against my personal wish.

May I therefore beg of you to permit me to return to Addis by 15 or at the latest by 20 May?

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: Secretary-General

FROM: Narasimhan *N.A.*

DATE: 8 May 1961

No.: **A-1173**

I presented your letter on Port Franqui on behalf of Abbas to President Kasa-Vubu at meeting I had this morning. Present were Bomboko, Adoula and Mobutu. Adoula was reasonable in his approach and he asked me to inform you that the President, Government and General Staff deplored the regrettable events at Port Franqui, all the more since these events have taken place at a time when Congolese authorities have swung round to full co-operation with United Nations. He promised that exemplary action will be taken as soon as responsibility is established and the delay was due to their absence in Coq.

He also wanted to have copy of UN report.

I replied that I was not sure if the UN report was in a form which could be made available to them immediately but undertook to have a précis prepared and sent to them.

Kasa-Vubu stated that he was conscious of need to take speedy action but added that the punishment to be meted must fit the crime. I was taken aback by Kasa-Vubu's complacency and told him that Port Franqui is a serious matter and that world public opinion has been profoundly shocked. It is not an isolated local incident in regard to which they can take their own time to establish the facts and hence there was necessity for speedy action.

Bomboko then began a long account of how in the past one-sided reports had been rushed by the Special Representative to the Secretary-General and been made available to General Assembly and Security Council without their having a chance to

present their side. Mobutu stated that his Chief of Staff, Kiembe, had made an investigation and that his report indicated that the Provincial Minister of the Interior from Luluabourg arrived at Port Franqui accompanied by a group of Ghanian soldiers. The ANC presented him with a guard of honour at the airport. The Minister dismissed them saying "I do not need you. I have got the Ghanian soldiers". This incident was reported to the ANC officer in charge who issued instructions that the Minister should be arrested. It was because the Ghanians protected the Minister from arrest that the whole incident took place. Mobutu said that he felt entitled to ask whether the Ghanians had the right to accompany a Provincial Minister in his plane and subsequently to prevent his arrest. Was their action authorized by the Force Commander etc.

I replied that when a press report of a serious incident like Port Franqui was received, the Secretary-General was bound to be asked anxious questions by the diplomatic representatives of the countries which had suffered casualties and he had naturally to call for a report from the Special Representative. This could not await the further examination of the other side of the case.

Adoula replied to this that a question of principle was involved here, that each had a right to know what the other side had reported. He felt that the Congo was being made to appear as a "murder story" and the press was feeding this kind of news. It was for this reason that the versions of both sides had to be considered and examined before any action could be taken.

Gardiner advised them that without assuming responsibility they should at least express regret for the tragedy because human lives had been lost. Even this suggestion did not seem to appeal to them. I left the discussion saying that the Secretary-General expected an immediate reply to his letter to the President.

Before leaving Coq, I told Kasa-Vubu and Bomboko that if they wanted me to

come again to discuss any matter I would be glad to do so, and they said they would be glad to see me again at any time either in Coq or Leo. I made this provision in case I received further instructions from you on the basis of my reports which would make it necessary for me to see them again.

I remember our parting discussion when you said that no doubt words of wisdom would be exchanged across the wires. So far I have gained many impressions but not much wisdom. I intend to carry on with my study of the problem at this end and I might conceivably shorten my stay by a day or two depending upon further report from Gardiner on his return to Leo.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: Secretary-General only

FROM: Narasimhan

DATE: 8 May 1961

No.: A-1172

H. A.

I have just returned from a two-day visit to Coq. I got your instructions before my first meeting with Bomboko last night. This lasted nearly three hours. We discussed the following problems:

1. Port Franqui.
2. Replacement of present Ethiopian contingent in Coq by full battalion.
3. Organizational note.

This morning I again had three hours with President Kasa-Vubu, Bomboko, Adoula and Mobutu. I was accompanied by Gardiner, Martin and Poujalat. I started the discussion with the organizational note. I handed over to them a French translation of the approved text. It was obvious to me that they fully realized the implications of the note. After a long discussion, Bomboko made the following statement and I quote from my notes:

"What is the object of this note? Is it not to say that the Secretary-General can appoint anybody he likes as Special Representative? The United Nations is no doubt an institution but the human agency is important at all levels including the level of the Special Representative. Already a campaign has been launched against us that we have sold the Congo to the United Nations. The Eastern European countries are trying to discredit the Secretary-General himself on the Congo operations and they would like to see the Unations effort here fail. There are European countries who would like to see the Congo Balkanized. For

all these reasons we have to co-operate to make the UN operations in the Congo a success and for this purpose the personality of the Special Representative and our confidence in him are very important. Success or failure depends entirely upon him. We do not agree with the note because it seeks to minimize the role of the Special Representative. We do not accept such a role of reduced importance for him. The Special Representative must be someone in whom we have confidence. We do not claim the right to say to the Secretary-General "appoint X or Y as Special Representative". The Secretary-General is free to appoint anyone he approves of as Special Representative but if he loses our confidence we have the right to say so and he has then to be replaced. The implementation of the agreement of 17 April is the most important task ahead of us. The successful implementation of this agreement requires that we should have confidence in the Special Representative of the Secretary-General."

I saw no point in continuing this discussion further because it had already lasted about 1½ hours. I shall give you full details of the discussion orally. I promised to convey Bomboko's views to you as their tenor and intent are obvious.

I also discussed Port Franqui on which a separate cable is being sent. Regarding the Ethiopian contingent, I had no time to discuss this matter and decided to leave it to Gardiner to discuss it as our case has been presented in writing by Abbas to President Kasa-Vubu.

I have left Gardiner and Martin behind and they will cable me if they see any point in my returning to Coq to have further discussions with Kasa-Vubu and Bomboko. The Coq Conference is being prolonged indefinitely and it is my guess that it may last through the week.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 8 May 1961
No : A- 1171

M.A.

Your 3258.

With reference to para. 2, I regret that I did not mention to you that after his meeting with Vice-President Kibwe I sent the following to Dumontet on 6 May :

"Your secret ELLEO-328 reached me in the absence of MacEoin in Luluabourg. While I am pleased to note that you stated clearly our unwielding position on mercenaries, you should forthwith tell Kibwe, without making any reference to orders, that our position is that not only we demand the withdrawal of mercenaries from Nyunzu but our firm position is that these mercenaries should be handed to us for repatriation in accordance with resolution of 21 February which now they say they will accept. This is our firm policy not only with regard to mercenaries in Nyunzu but mercenaries anywhere in Katanga. If you are specifically asked whether or not an order was issued to UN troops at Nyunzu to act, your answer should be that UN orders to their forces are not subject to disclosure to anybody."

I received a cable this morning from Dumontet to say that when he met Munongo at his house Sunday afternoon, he took advantage of that meeting to explain to him our position as stated in the cable quoted above. Dumontet said, "Munongo was rather conciliatory and said they were going to take care of mercenaries but 'please, he said, give us time'."

New subject. Dumontet reports that while he was with Munongo, the latter was informed by telephone about Bomboko's broadcast in which he said that Tshombe will be prosecuted on various charges. On hearing this Munongo exploded against Bomboko and his supporters, particularly the Belgians, and said that he could not hold the tribal chiefs who want to act against Leo anymore. It did not take Dumontet long to calm him down and in the end he again suggested that he would contact Gizenga and get his agreement if the UN could arrange to make the Congolese leaders, including Tshombe, meet in a safe place under UN protection.

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OUTGOING CODE

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7.A.

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USE DOUBLE SPACING.

~~MMY~~ .A-117Q. FROM ABBAS MACEOIN TO SECGEN STOP INTERROGATION OF
SEVEN MERCENARIES WHO SURRENDERED TO UN FORCES AT NYUNZU ON SIX MAY
AND OF ONE WHO SURRENDERED AT ELISABETHVILLE ON FOURTH MAY HAS BEEN
COMPLETED STOP MERCENARIES WERE BROUGHT TO LEOPOLDVILLE ON SEVEN MAY
EVENING STOP DETAINEES ARE NAMELY ONE STOP PETER WARREN HITEN DONNOLLY
DOCTOR OF MEDICINE BORN TWELVE OCTOBER 1930 ROBERTS HEIGHTS SOUTH
AFRICA NATIONALITY SOUTH AFRICAN HOME ADDRESS 4 PRINSLOO STREET
LADYBRAND ORANGE FREE STATE STOP TWO STOP GEORGE ELEFThERIADIS BORN
TWENTYTHREE JANUARY 1936 ATHENS GREECE STOP ADDRESS KAVALAS AND
PERGAMOU STREET 76 CMA EGALEO ATHENS GREECE NATIONALITY GREEK
EMIGRATED RHODESIA 1957 STOP THREE STOP IAN MANSLEY BORN ELEVEN
JANUARY 1941 GLASGOW SCOTLAND NATIONALITY BRITISH HOME ADDRESS 104
BERKELEY STREET GLASGOW C3 STOP FOUR STOP LEON JOHANNES GROBLER
BORN 26 MAY 1942 BENONI TRANSVAAL NATIONALITY SOUTH AFRICAN HOME
ADDRESS 100 VAN DYK MINE PO VAN DYK VIA BOKSBURGH TRANSVAAL STOP FIVE
STOP LOUIS BROCKLEBANK BORN TENTH MAY 1917 FLORIDA SOUTH AFRICA
NATIONALITY SOUTH AFRICAN HOME ADDRESS 33 DAVENPORT AVENUE GLENWOOD
DURBAN NATAL SOUTH AFRICA STOP SIX HERMANUS BENJAMIN DEWITT BORN
21 FEBRUARY 1936 JERMISTON SOUTH AFRICA NATIONALITY SOUTH AFRICAN
HOME ADDRESS 15 PARK AVENUE YEOLIVE SOUTHERN RHODESIA STOP SEVEN
NICOS VONDITSIANOS BORN 15 FEBRUARY 1938 LARNACA CYPRUS ~~HOME ADDRESS~~
CLAIMS BRITISH AND GREEK NATIONALITY HOME ADDRESS ORMIDIHA LARNACA
CYPRUS STOP EIGHT STOP ROY VICTOR BARTLETT BORN THIRTEENTH JUNE 1933
LONDON ENGLAND NATIONALITY BRITISH EMIGRATED TO SOUTH AFRICA 1959

.../2

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY :

Drafted by :

Authorized :

Date :

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USE DOUBLE SPACING.

- 2 -

HOME ADDRESS 24 ALPINE HEIGHTS GRAFTON ROAD YEOVIL JOHANNESBURG
STOP THE LASTNAMED SURRENDERED AT ELISABETHVILLE FULLER REPORT
FOLLOWING STOP AND END

Imp. Sarfati 10385

T. O. R.

T. O. D.

BY :

Drafted by : Maj Fleming
Authorized : Col Egge
Date : 8 May 61

OUTGOING CODE

PRIORITY

To : SECGEN, NEW YORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 8 May 1961
No. : A- 1169

M.A.

Reference your 3230.

1. We are sending you en clair two separate cables giving a summary of the information obtained during the interrogation of Henry and Antoine, respectively. In addition, we have received on these two gentlemen from Dumontet the information quoted below which is not included in the interrogation report as we are not sure whether by making this information public we would not compromise Dumontet's sources.

" Jean-Pierre Antoine : Agent of Sûreté intérieure. Close adviser of Katangese Chef of Sûreté. Played a nasty role in recent interrogation of Jean Flad (see our OPS 71 of 20 April). Formerly at Coquilhatville came here 6-9 months ago. Anti-UN. I would recommend strict action against him.

Henry : Former Agent of Sûreté extérieure that is to say attached to Service of protection of Tshombe. Counterpart of Antoine in Sûreté extérieure. No information immediately available on his exact role. Nobody seems to know him. "

2. The interrogation of Antoine was carried out by Knecht who, as a former police official, feels that Antoine had a much more important role to play than would be indicated by his relatively low rank.

3. The following report was submitted by Dumontet on 20 April concerning the arrest of Mr. Flad:

"Flad saw a police car just behind with a Belgian police officer. The officer called him by name, using a loud-speaker and ordered him to open his car completely and get out. They searched the car very thoroughly, but found nothing. Then Mr. Flad had to drive his car at gun point to main police HQ and later on he was brought to Katangese Sûreté Service d'immigration. The interrogation was conducted by Chief 1G officer (African) and also Belgian

officer of police (his name thought to be Antoine). Main accusations and questions as follows: Mr. Flad was accused of being a spy for the French security police. Questions were placed about UN locations, strength and armaments at Kamina Base. Number of Swedish soldiers in Eville, why so many arms, grenades, etc., at HQ. If any arms depot in Swedish camp, defence measures, armament of Swedish BN, etc. Had he heard rumours of any disturbances planned for 20-21 April then asked what he know about Mr. Dumontet, Col. Kjellgren and about their discussions with Tshombe and Munongo. He was asked for his papers, not only ONU ID card, but also Congolese ID. Examining his papers they saw a movement order. He told them it was for Kamina. He noticed they had enlarged photocopy of his ID card taken when he was arrested on 4 April in connection with the riots against UN.

Treatment - Arriving at HQ they started to beat and slap him taking care, however, not to hit his face. He was thrown to the ground. Later he was detained at immigration Dept. together with fifteen other prisoners (probably political) in a very small room (enough to sit up but not to lie down). The other prisoners were also beaten up. In the morning he was stripped of his clothes and forced to clean the room twice. He was released directly by Minister Munongo on personal intervention of Mr. Dumontet who made strong representation to the Minister and requested his immediate release. "

OUTGOING CLEAR

LEOPOLDVILLE

7 Mai 1961

UNATIONS

NEW YORK

A- 1168 SECGEN FROM ABBAS

Summary of information given by Mr. Jean-Pierre Antoine during the interrogation on 28 and 29 April:

1. Mr. Antoine was born on 15 October 1929 in Brussels, Belgium, and had Belgian nationality since birth. After completing his studies at the "Ecole Coloniale" in Belgium and serving as trainee in the Belgian "Surete Nationale", he was transferred in 1957 to Leopoldville and assigned the post of "Sous-Commissaire principal a la Surete Nationale". He left in June 1960 for Belgium to take his "long leave". In September 1960, he returned to Elisabethville at the request of the Belgian Ministry of African Affairs to serve in the "Surete Nationale Interieure" of the Katanga Government in the same position and at the same salary as he had before leaving Leopoldville. He agreed at first to serve in Katanga for a three-month period and later accepted an extension of his appointment there for one more year. He retained his previous Belgian Civil Service registration number but was not sure whether he could continue in the Belgian Civil Service if he returns to Belgium. He did not sign any contract with the Katanga Government. His base pay is 125,000 Katanga Francs payable in Katanga and 62,500 Belgian francs payable in Belgium;

in addition, he receives various allowances including a "danger allowance" of 200 Katanga francs daily.

2. In his post as "Sous-Commissaire principal a la Surete nationale (Surete interieure)" in Katanga, his functions are primarily to collect political information of interest for the maintenance of State security. He claimed that, "en principe", it is not his function to make arrests, but only to provide information. Any arrest carried out by his office had to be sanctioned by the Minister of Interior, Mr. Munongo. He is one of fifteen Belgian officials and fifteen Katangese performing similar functions of political police under the direction of the "Chef de la Surete", Mr. Pierre Pandukufwa. He claimed at first that he was only concerned with the Immigration Service, but in later conversations admitted that, together with another Belgian called Louwagie, he often advised Mr. Pandukufwa on political personalities in Katanga and carried out confidential investigations in political matters. He denied being a political adviser, claiming that he is only a subordinate official who has been in no direct contact with Mr. Tshombe or members of his Government.

3. Mr. Antoine denied having taken any initiative in preparing the anti-UN demonstrations in Elisabethville on 4 April or in the subsequent arrest of UN staff member Jean Flad. He claimed that he became involved in the demonstrations at the request of Mr. Tshombe and that his intention was to restore calm. As regards the Flad affair, Antoine stated that he was only concerned with Flad's safety and that Mr. Flad himself

came to thank him after he was released. He claimed that in interior political matters of Katanga, Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Munongo acted independently of their foreign advisers and took full responsibility for their actions.

4. As regards his role in Mr. Tshombe's delegation to the Coquilhatville conference, Mr. Antoine stated that he was taken along because he knew the region and spoke the local language. He denied having participated in the preparatory work for the conference or in the political discussions which took place at the conference. He admitted having been involved in Mr. Tshombe's attempt to ingratiate himself with the local population at Coquilhatville by distributing cigarettes, etc., and to have selected the places which Mr. Tshombe should visit on his tour through the city.

5. When questioned about the events of February 1961, Mr. Antoine denied any knowledge of the circumstances of the transfer and death of Mr. Lumumba and would not give any information other than that the investigation of Mr. Lumumba's death was carried out by a Mr. Allard who made a reconstitution of the events in the presence of a Belgian Captain named Glatt. Mr. Antoine denied the information according to which he had planned the arrest of General Iassu when the latter came to Katanga to obtain information on Mr. Lumumba's whereabouts.

6. Mr. Antoine behaved correctly during the interrogation but it was apparent that he was withholding information and

he gave his answers only with some reluctance. He did not have in his possession any documents or personal papers other than his passport and itendity cards.

OUTGOING CLEAR

LEOPOLDVILLE

7 May 1961

UNATIONS

NEW YORK

A- 1167 SECGEN FROM ABBAS

Summary of information given by Mr. Roger Marcel Henry during his interrogation on 28 and 29 April:

1. Mr. Henry stated that he was born on 17 December 1919 in Marcinelle, Province Henaut, Belgium and had Belgian nationality since birth. In 1941, he obtained a job as a constable (Police Communale) and in 1943 he entered Government service as a member of the "Police Judiciaire", entrusted with criminal investigations. In July 1950 he was transferred to the Ministry of Colonial Affairs and sent to Leopoldville where he served as an official of the "Departement de la Surete". As a result of the disturbances which followed the transfer of sovereignty, he was evacuated on 9 July 1960 to Belgium where he remained on a "leave with pay" status at the disposal of the Ministry of African Affairs. About September 1960, he requested to be permitted to return to Leopoldville but received no reply from the Ministry. In November 1960, he was informed by that Ministry that he would be sent to Elisabethville at the request of the Katanga Government. He was introduced to an official of the Katanga Delegation in Brussels, but apart from that all the arrangements for his transfer to Elisabethville, including his travel orders, were made by the Ministry of African Affairs in

Brussels; he remained in Belgian civil service status and continued to carry his previous civil service registration number.

2. Mr. Henry departed from Brussels for Elisabethville on 19 November 1960, leaving his family in Belgium. In Elisabethville he was assigned the post of "Chef de Bureau du Service de la Presidence" at an annual salary of 168,000 Katanga Francs net payable in Katanga, and 84,000 Belgian Francs payable in Belgium. He did not sign any contract with the Katanga Government concerning his services.

3. When questioned about the type of work performed in his position as Bureau Chief of the Service de la Presidence, Mr. Henry stated that his duties were primarily of an information character; he described them as "Service de Renseignements". He was entrusted with collection of information on matters of interest to the Katanga Government from external sources, such as foreign newspapers or reports from foreign representatives or agents of the Katanga Government. (Information given in the interrogation of other persons under UN custody indicated that Mr. Henry was primarily responsible for matters affecting the "Surete Exterieur" of Katanga.) Mr. Henry claimed that he only reviewed and culled information sources and that he was only concerned with the selection and presentation of information. He disclaimed having acted as a political adviser to Mr. Tshombe; to have added to the presentation of information any advice as to action to be taken; or to have been in personal contact with

Mr. Tshombe or other members of the Katanga Government. His reports were channelled to Mr. Tshombe through the Chef du Service de la Presidence, Mr. Renner, and in his absence through Mr. Royers. In any event, according to Mr. Henry, the papers prepared by the Service de la Presidence served only as a basis of information on which the political advisers, such as Mr. Belina - Podgaetsky and Mr. Thyssen, made their suggestions to Mr. Tshombe.

4. As regards his functions in Mr. Tshombe's delegation at Coquilhatville, Mr. Henry stated that he was taken along to make the delegation seem more important and that he did not have any work to do. In subsequent conversations, he conceded however that, if the participation of Katanga in the Conference had continued, his duties would have included maintaining liaison with Elisabethville and furnishing information of interest to Mr. Tshombe.

5. Mr. Henry stated that from 9 February to 23 March 1961 he was hospitalized with an intestinal infection, and could therefore give no information on events relating to Mr. Lumumba's transfer to Katanga and subsequent death. The period of his sickness also included the time during which the Tananarive Conference was held.

6. Mr. Henry had no papers in his possession which would in any way support or contradict the statements which he had made. He was co-operative but very cautious during

his interrogation and did not volunteer any information apart from answering questions and stating reasons for which, in his opinion, he should not be considered as falling into the category of political advisers.

LEOPOLDVILLE
7 May 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS
NEWYORK

A-1166 SEC GEN FROM ABBAS Following is text of pamphlet alleged to have been ferried over from Brazzaville and distributed in Leo and other places CLN

QUOTE Justin Bomboko a pris le pouvoir à Coquilhatville avec l'aide de certains de ses frères Mongos, avec l'aide des militaires de Coquilhatville complices des gens de Stanleyville, et avec l'aide de l'ONU.

Justin Bomboko a fait prisonnier le Président Tshombe parce que celui-ci voyait clair dans son jeu et qu'il avait dénoncé l'accord de Bomboko avec l'ONU.

Bomboko a fait un accord avec l'ONU pour mettre le Congo sous tutelle de l'ONU pour que les Onusiens réoccupent Matadi et que l'ONU désarme tous les militaires qui ne sont pas pour Bomboko : les Bakongos, les Balubas et ceux du Katanga. En échange l'ONU va aider Bomboko contre ses adversaires contre le Président Tshombe pour aider Bomboko à devenir Président de la République unitaire du Congo.

Bomboko suit un plan secret de ses amis de l'ONU et des communistes pour devenir Président et former un gouvernement avec Sendwe, Kamitatu et Gizenga. Bomboko trompe le Président Kasa-Vubu car il doit le chasser avant le 30 juin 1961.

Bomboko veut établir un état unitaire avec des provinces commandées par ses amis : Sendwe au Katanga, Kamitatu à la province de Léopoldville et Njoku à la province de l'Equateur. Bomboko a dit qu'il n'y aurait plus d'Etat du Sud-Kasai et qu'il ferait arrêter Kalondji et désarmer la gendarmerie du Sud-Kasai. Bomboko a dit qu'il n'y aurait pas d'Etat Mukongo et qu'il ~~n'y aurait pas d'Etat~~ ferait arrêter le Gouvernement Mukongo comme Kamitatu a fait arrêter les Chefs Bayanzis.

Les militaires mutinés de Coquilhatville, complices de Stanleyville, font semblant d'obéir à Mobutu mais ils reçoivent leurs ordres par radio Stanleyville. Déjà ils avaient attaqué le Président Kasa-Vubu lorsqu'il était venu à Coquilhatville l'autre fois, maintenant ils veulent tuer le Président Tshombe pour venger Lumumba.

Kalondji et Moenda n'ont plus rien à dire à Coquilhatville, ils sont menacés par les soldats s'ils ne votent pas oui à tout ce que commande Bomboko.

Bomboko trompe Iléo; il lui fait croire qu'il est toujours Premier Ministre mais d'après les plans des communistes c'est Bomboko qui doit devenir Président et mettre Iléo en prison.

Bomboko a fait alliance avec les gens de l'ONU; il leur a donné la permission d'aller désarmer les soldats de l'ANC dans le Kasai et qu'ils avaient chassé les Lumumbistes de Luluabourg. Les soldats ghanéens, les amis et Bomboko et assassins du Colonel Kokolo ont voulu aller désarmer les militaires de l'ANC mais ceux-ci se sont bien défendus.

Demain quand les Onusiens viendront pour attaquer Matadi avec l'accord de Bomboko, les soldats de l'ANC les empêcheront de passer.

Le peuple congolais ne veut pas de tutelle de l'ONU même si cela doit aider Bomboko à devenir Président de l'Etat unitaire. Le peuple veut la confédération. Ils veulent la liberté de Tshombe, le défenseur des Congolais contre l'ONU.

Bomboko trompe Bolikango, il lui laisse croire qu'il deviendra Chef de l'Etat après qu'il aura chassé S.E. Kasa-Vubu. Mais c'est un mensonge pour avoir Bolikango avec lui. D'après les plans de Bomboko, Bolikango ne doit avoir aucune place. Au contraire les Ministres Bangels dans l'Equateur doivent être remplacés par des Mongos. Eketebi doit être remplacé par Djoku.

Mais tous les Mongos ne vont pas avoir de place car Bomboko a aussi décidé de mettre en prison son rival Bolya car celui-ci lui fait concurrence chez les Mongos.

Tous les Congolais, les Bakongos, les Balubas, les Bangelas et tous les autres doivent s'unir contre le coup d'état de Bomboko. Ils doivent protester contre la conférence de Coquilhatville. Ils doivent protester contre l'accord avec les crapules de l'ONU. Ils doivent protester contre l'arrestation du Président Tshombe. Ils doivent protester contre le désarmement des gendarmes sud-kasaiens et les militaires de l'ANC qui sont contre Bomboko. Ils doivent protester contre les accords secrets entre Bomboko, Sendwe et Gizenga. A bas le dictateur unitariste Bomboko! Vive la Confédération! UNQUOTE

LEOPOLOVILLE
7 MAY 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS
NEWYORK

A-1165 SEC GEN FROM ABBAS Following received from E'ville :

"Munongo gave to-day a press conference particularly interesting in view of circumstances. It contains 4 parts :

(1) Munongo explains that people of North Katanga are not opposed to Government. He backs his assertion by offering a referendum under UN control in which population would be able to say whether it is for or against Katangese government.

(2) Munongo states that Katanga is always prepared to talk with rest of Congo in search of pacific and African solution of Congolese problem if Tshombe and Kimbe can come back.

(3) Munongo explains why Katangese proclaimed independence in July 1960. He says Katanga was simply forced to do so in order to save the riches of the country from peril of anarchy which was threatening rest of Congo. But Munongo adds that Tshombe was always prepared to talk with moderates as shown by his initiative of Tananarive Conference. This third article is interesting not only by contents but also by time which is quite different from previous statements on subject of independence of Katanga.

(4) Munongo charges Bomboko and left wing of Belgian socialist party have tried to wipe out in Coquilhatville the results of Tananarive and to force at gunpoint a solution that suits them. Then Munongo warns UN not to support Bomboko policy. He concludes by saying Tshombe represents moderates of Katanga Government and it would be folly to condemn him and whole of Katangese to a fight to the finish."

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

N.A.

Date : 7 May 1961

No : A-1164

With reference to the leakage of MacEoin's orders to which I referred to in my 1161, Ward answers as follows :

"Nyunzu is in direct wireless communication with E'ville over Gendarmerie network and incidents were reported over this net. Nazruddin fully aware of this."

Of course, I am not satisfied with this reply. First of all, how did the Gendarmerie come to know about the orders if they were not told by somebody? Secondly, how can Ward be ^{sure} ~~emphatic~~ that the incidents were reported by the Gendarmerie? In any case, we can only be patient and wait for Ward's replacement during the next week.

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLOVILLE H.A.

Date : 7 May 1961

No : A- 1162, 1163

Your 3246.

With regard to Nyunzu mercenaries the die is cast as the following from Ward indicates :

"1. Just returned from Nyunzu. Brief report on to-day's operation. Early this morning road blocks established on roads out of Nyunzu. At 0815 Nazruddin saw Commander of Gendarmerie and explained his mission. By this time UNO troops were in position covering all living quarters which cover a large area. By 1130 AM total of 7 mercenaries had been arrested and at urgent request of Nazruddin I had arrived. We ordered cordon to close in and buildings to be searched. No more were found. Patrols with armoured cars immediately dispatched on all roads out. No transport had been allowed to leave Nyunzu.

2. Albertville fairly tense and much gendarmerie activity. Considerable increase in Katangese strength.

3. Am meeting Nazruddin and Furney to-morrow."

I have always been guided by your firmness as far as the capture of mercenaries is concerned. Para. 2 of your 2924 is but one of your indications of a firm stand. In fact it was us who advised a go-slow policy until we have built up our strength. My unnumbered of 30 April gives our general line. In this cable we informed you that there had been no repeat no separate group of mercenaries in the Gendarmerie force at Nyunzu but they were integrated with the company as a whole. When MacEoin was informed later that the Gendarmerie forces did comprise a separate platoon of mercenaries, he gave his orders that they should be arrested. He gave full advice to Nazruddin to negotiate with them

and to explain so that they surrender peacefully. Later, when ^{we} ~~they~~ learnt that most of them were of British nationality, Major Furney, the Malayan Liaison Officer here, who is Irish by nationality and who is seconded to the Malayan Force from the British Army, advised that a diplomat from the British Embassy should be asked to go and negotiate the surrender of the mercenaries with them. I was very strongly opposed to this suggestion because I strongly believe that diplomatic assistance as far as the mercenaries are concerned should be given either by the British Embassy here in Leo or by the Consulate in E'ville with the politicians who, if they accept the British diplomat's advice, can issue instructions to Crèvecoeur or to any other senior officer to make the mercenaries surrender or withdraw to E'ville for evacuation. I consider that if any diplomat goes to Nyunzu to negotiate, he will inevitably enter into discussions with our officers who receive their orders from the Force Commander, and if there is the slightest disagreement between the British diplomat and the officers commanding the UN troops and if we decide taking any action which is against the advice of the diplomat or which is not palatable to him or to his Government, we will be blamed and criticized for what we considered to be the right action to carry out your instructions which are very firm as far as the implementation of the resolution is concerned. I still strongly feel and advise that no meddling of diplomats, British or otherwise, should be allowed in the field, and if they are really genuine and sincere in their efforts to withdraw the mercenaries, they should act with Kasa-Vubu, Tshombe, Munongo or whoever they may discuss matters with because it is these politicians who can give orders for the withdrawal of the mercenaries. Kibwe's and Munongo's promises of yesterday to Dumontet are good examples of this.

As an alternative to sending a diplomat, MacEoin and I agreed to send Major Furney to help Nazruddin in negotiating with the mercenaries because we considered that as an Irishman and as an officer in the British Army, his co-operation with Nazruddin would be a great help. When we decided on this, we asked Nazruddin to delay his action for 24 hours pending the arrival of Major Furney at Nyunzu. Communications being slow and

ineffective, most unsatisfactory for such operations, and breakdowns in airplanes being what it is, Nazruddin did not receive the message in time and Major Furney did not take off yesterday morning as planned. But even if he did, he would have arrived too late for the capture of mercenaries. He left at 0530 hours this morning.

I would like your clear instructions on this matter for the future. Do we use our discretion in getting hold of these mercenaries, or are we to allow diplomats who may be as many as the nationalities of the mercenaries in the Katangese army to go and negotiate and if they fail, we hold our horses and cable you and wait for instructions? I submit that this procedure, if it is to be followed, will delay the evacuation of mercenaries. If we are to follow with British mercenaries the same procedure which you suggested in your 3246 with the ^{Belgian}~~British~~ mercenaries who, I consider, have a much stronger case to serve with the Katangese gendarmerie than the British or the South-Africans, the clearing of mercenaries will be a long and a tedious operation.

Latest information indicates that of the seven mercenaries captured, six are believed to be South-Africans including one Lieutenant (medical), and one Englishman.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 6 May 1961
No : A-1161

I regret to inform you that instructions which MacEoin sent to Ward about the capture of the mercenaries at Nyunzu leaked out. Dumontet sent me two cables this morning. In the first one, he tells me that Vice-President Kibwe informed him that a message was received from Nyunzu to the effect that Albertville forces had received instructions to arrest mercenaries in Nyunzu. Kibwe promised to withdraw the mercenaries from Nyunzu. In the second cable he informs me that he had a tête-à-tête luncheon with Munongo at his residence and he was informed that an order was sent in the morning for mercenaries of Nyunzu to be withdrawn.

On receipt of the first cable I sent a most immediate message to Ward asking him to investigate the leakage and to let me know immediately.

MacEoin returns from Luluabourg to-night and I will discuss with him the steps to be taken to prevent such leakages in future.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SEC GEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLOVILLE
Date : 6 May 1961
No : A-1159, 1160

Further to my A-1137 and reur 3207, I am sending the following
with Narasimhan to Kasa-Vubu to-morrow morning CLN

QUOTE

.....

UNQUOTE

I asked Narasimhan to explain verbally to Kasa-Vubu that if he
does not agree to our stationing a battalion in Coquilhatville, we will
be forced to withdraw all the civilian technical assistance experts from
Equateur.

Le 6 mai 1961

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que, suivant la règle normale de rotation des unités des Nations Unies, les contingents de la Brigade éthiopienne qui sont actuellement stationnés à Stanleyville, Kabalo et Coquilhatville vont être rapatriés en Ethiopie. Ces contingents seront remplacés simultanément par une autre brigade éthiopienne.

Vous n'ignorez certes pas, Monsieur le Président, que les soldats éthiopiens stationnés à Coquilhatville, dont le nombre n'est que de 270, ont éprouvé récemment de grandes difficultés. Tous les efforts qui ont été accomplis par les officiers pour établir et maintenir des liens d'amitié et de collaboration avec les Congolais ont été, jusque tout dernièrement, voués à l'échec. La tension a parfois été telle que le Commandant des forces des Nations Unies et moi-même avons craint une attaque de l'ANC contre ces soldats. Il est même arrivé une fois que des mitrailleuses aient été braquées contre les Ethiopiens par des soldats de l'ANC, à une distance de trois mètres, pour la simple raison que le bruit s'était répandu qu'une troupe de comédiens de Malaisie allait arriver par un avion de l'ONU - l'ANC avait craint que cet avion n'amène des renforts militaires. Pendant plusieurs semaines, l'ONU s'est vu refuser l'utilisation du terrain d'aviation et n'a pu ainsi ni envoyer des renforts à ce contingent limité de soldats éthiopiens, ni leur envoyer des vivres.

Mais les militaires n'ont pas été les seuls à rencontrer des difficultés. Les membres du personnel civil de l'ONU qui se rendent à Coquilhatville pour apporter à la province une aide technique dans les domaines scolaire, médical et autres, sont soumis à la fouille des bagages et n'ont jamais été accueillis avec la courtoisie qui leur est due, bien qu'ils fussent porteurs de pièces d'identité établissant

Son Excellence
Monsieur Joseph Kasa-Vubu
Président de la République du Congo

leur qualité de fonctionnaires de l'ONU. A plusieurs reprises, on a même empêché ces techniciens de se rendre à leur travail.

Je me suis rendu auprès de M. Adoula et lui ai fait connaître la manière dont le personnel militaire et civil de l'ONU est traité à Coquilhatville. Je lui ai demandé d'intervenir en sa qualité de Ministre de l'Intérieur. La tension a quelque peu diminué pendant un jour ou deux, mais la situation a de nouveau beaucoup empiré après cela. Par la suite, j'ai fait part de mes préoccupations à MM. Bomboko et Bolikango. Les Généraux MacFoin et Iyessu ont fait des démarches analogues auprès du Général Mobutu. Mais ce n'est qu'au cours des quelque derniers quinze jours que la situation a commencé à s'améliorer. Je constate avec plaisir qu'après le discours tenu il y a deux ou trois jours par le Général Mobutu, les relations ne sont pas devenues seulement plus satisfaisantes mais aussi plus amicales.

Vous reconnaîtrez certainement, Monsieur le Président, que les unités éthiopiennes ont rendu d'excellents services en Equateur, dans la Province Orientale et dans le Kivu et ont couronné leur action par la façon brillante dont elles ont, à Kabalo, désarmé et arrêté le premier groupe important de mercenaires du Katanga. Ces unités ont également apporté une contribution importante au maintien de la paix dans le Nord-Katanga en tenant et en défendant Kabalo contre les assauts de la gendarmerie commandée par des officiers étrangers.

Le récent incident de Port Francqui, incident tragique et lamentable, au cours duquel un nombre limité de soldats de l'ONU ont été sans raison valable désarmés et arrêtés, et certains d'entre eux assassinés, nous a enseigné une leçon que nous n'oublierons plus. Un grand nombre de soldats ghanéens sont encore portés disparus et, plus de dix jours après l'incident, nous avons des raisons de croire qu'ils ont perdu la vie.

A la suite de cet incident, et afin de protéger les soldats de l'ONU qui viennent ici pour servir le Congo, le Commandement des forces des Nations Unies a décidé qu'il ne permettra plus l'envoi dans les provinces de petites garnisons, qui risqueraient d'être, sans provocation, désarmées et leurs hommes tués.

C'est pourquoi, Monsieur le Président, nous avons l'intention, lorsque les compagnies éthiopiennes seront rapatriées, de remplacer les soldats éthiopiens de Coquilhatville par un bataillon de 700 hommes environ. Nous croyons qu'une garnison importante de l'ONU à Coquilhatville sera en mesure non seulement de se défendre contre l'attaque d'éléments irresponsables - attaques que vous désapprouvez certainement, Monsieur le Président - mais encore d'apporter à votre gouvernement une aide efficace en vue de maintenir l'ordre.

J'espère que vous approuverez cette mesure. Au cas où vous ne l'approuveriez pas, votre refus confirmera, je le crains, le Conseil de sécurité dans l'opinion que l'accord du 27 juillet 1960 n'est pas respecté. De plus, le Commandant des forces de l'ONU sera alors obligé de ne pas envoyer du tout de soldats à Coquilhatville. Cela pourrait signifier que les autorités de la province ne seraient plus en mesure, si des événements graves venaient à se produire, de demander l'aide de l'ONU en vue du maintien de l'ordre.

Je vous serai très reconnaissant, Monsieur le Président, de donner immédiatement une réponse à cette lettre. Cette réponse, vous voudrez bien la donner, de préférence, à M. Narasimhan, Sous-Secrétaire aux Affaires politiques, qui a bien voulu se charger de vous remettre ma lettre. La raison pour laquelle je vous demande une réponse rapide est que la rotation des unités éthiopiennes doit commencer le 8 mai.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Mekki Abbas
Représentant spécial p.i.
du Secrétaire général

mu
45.

Outgoing Code Cable

To: ~~Field Service~~ SECGEN, NEWYORK

From: Mekki Abbas

Date: 6 May 1961

No. : A-1158 ~~OMM~~

1. Since sending you my cable A-1107 Ahmed has made further review of procurement and supply position of rations for ONUC and has today reported as follows:

2. For Items listed under sub-para (b) of which stocks were previously reported to last for the month of May only the position has now improved and except for eggs and potatoes, we are now covered for all other items for the month of June as well. In making these estimates we take into account supplies which have been brought down by OTRACO from Matadi up to 26 April which we are at present in the process of taking over. Arrangements have already been made to obtain regular supplies of potatoes and eggs through local contractor and we do not anticipate any problem in the meeting our requirements for these items.

3. As regards items listed under sub-para (c) of which stocks in hand as of 1 May were not sufficient to cover requirements for the month of May, the position is again today much better as may be noted from following details:

ATTA : Sufficient supply has now been airlifted to cover requirements for the month of May and June.

TEA : Air shipment from Goma has now begun.

SPAGHETTI and MACCARONI- We expect to take over from OTRACO sufficient supply to last for month of May and June.

ONIONS - Supplies have now arrived and arrangements for regular delivery by local agents have been made for the future.

.../...

page 2

FRESH VEGETABLES - Regular shipments are now being received.

YAMS - Airlifting from Accra is under reference to Field Service.

BUTTER GHEE - The position remains the same as previously reported.

nu
Drafted: S. Habib Ahmed

M.A.
Authorized : Mekki Abbas

Date : 6 May 1961

copy: Force Commander

Chief Logistics Officer

Senior Supply and Transport Officer

Mr. R. Bernard, Chief Procurement Officer

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 6 May 1961
No : A-1157

Further to my A-1146.

The Nigerian police officers and the Canadian Signals officer returned to-day from Coquilhatville having secured agreement on all points I raised in my letter to Kasa-Vubu. The next step is that an ANC officer, a certain Major Engila, will accompany Canadian Signals officers as early as possible next week to Matadi where they will examine the damage done to the equipment and make arrangements for the necessary repairs.

The dispatch of the 100 Nigerian police and Procurement officers will have to be delayed pending the repair and installation of the telecommunications equipment. Bearing in mind the attack on the Sudanese in Matadi and the lesson of Port Francqui, I feel very strongly that we should not send the Nigerian police there before the communication system is fixed. In fact, Commissioner of Police Edet said to me that he would never agree to the Nigerians going before this is done. He asked me if the Nigerian Prime Minister has been kept informed and has given his approval for the Nigerian police to go, because Edet is afraid that after hearing the news of Port Francqui the Prime Minister might not agree to the dispatch of the Nigerian police to Matadi. I assured him that you would be keeping the Nigerian Permanent Delegation fully informed and they would, in their turn, keep their Prime Minister fully in the picture.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 6 May 1961
No : A-1156

Have received information from E'ville that mercenary
Bartlett who sought our protection will be transferred to Leo under
guard of two military police with schedule flight on Sunday, 7 May.
We will follow the usual procedure and keep you informed.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 6 May 1961
No : A-1155

Information received from Poujoulat indicates that request for military experts has been signed by President and handed to him. Text is identical with draft sent to you in my A-1134.

Poujoulat also informs that he has seen draft letter by President to Belgian Government asking them to co-operate with him in getting rid of the mercenaries, political advisers, military and para-military personnel.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 6 May 1961
No : A-1154

Your secret unnumbered of 6 May and further to my A-1141.

I hope that our action is not causing you any inconvenience. After my 1141 was dispatched, I received a cable from Poujoulat saying, "Bomboko told me Nendaka has with him expulsion orders for all six Belgians who came with Tshombe and he will contact you requesting assistance in hastening their repatriation." Whatever may be said by Belgian authorities against our action, I think that we have acted in the best interests of the six people repatriated because I now feel certain that if we did not repatriate them, the authorities here would have got hold of them.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 6 May 1961
No : A-1153

Following from Narasimhan:

Since it appeared likely that Coq Conference would be prolonged indefinitely Abbas sent cable to Poujoulat asking whether Narasimhan should come to Coq with your personal message to President Kasa-Vubu. Poujoulat advised after consulting Bomboko that Conference was likely to continue until Wednesday and Bomboko therefore advised that I visit Coq to-morrow along with Gardiner. I propose to go to Coq to-morrow with Gardiner and also Martin who has postponed his departure by one week at my request. I shall send you a further message on return meanwhile grateful indication your programme and especially whether you are likely to be in Rome 9 and 10.

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SEGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 6 May 1961
No : A-1152

The Brazzaville authorities are putting an embargo on all communications by air and by ferry between Brazzaville and Leo. Flight Information Centre in Brazzaville informed UN Operation Centre here at 0600 hours this morning that no UN aircraft would be allowed to land in Brazzaville until further notice. We are finding difficulty in bringing over some UN personnel who arrived to-day in Brazzaville. UN has two DC3 and 2 DC4 and one C46 aeroplanes in Brazzaville. The planes were sent to Brazzaville for servicing by Air France. These may not be allowed to be returned to Leo.

This embargo may also have its impact on supplies which come from Pointe Noire to Brazzaville. Ahmed tells me that we have no supplies as of to-day in Congo (Brazzaville) but he expects a ship carrying UN supplies to arrive at Pointe Noire on 10 May.

I have contacted Charpentier to use his good offices to allow UN supplies, personnel, and aeroplanes to be permitted to pass through. He promised me to ^{do his best.} ~~use his good offices~~. Naturally, most immediate approach from you to Brazzaville authorities is essential. I am sending in clear stand made by President Youlou at a press conference yesterday.

LEOPOLDVILLE
6 MAY 1961

OUTGOING CDEAR

UNATIONS
NEWYORK

M.A.

A-1151 SEC GEN FROM ABBAS Following is from monitoring of Radio
Brazzaville CLN

QUOTE Yesterday at a press conference, Abbé Fulbert Youlou, President of the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) has made a stand on the measures taken by the Government of the ex-Belgian Congo following his intervention in favour of President Tshombe. Following are the main points of President Youlou's declarations:

SUBQUOTE Helicopters and UN planes have been flying low all day (5 May) over our capital. All river traffic between our two capitals has been forbidden on the Congo since this morning. Armed patrols are circulating on the river. If press agency dispatches are to be believed, these surprisingly ridiculous measures constitute a reply to the appeal which I launched in protest against the arbitrary arrest of the Chief of State of Katanga, and to preach peace and reconciliation, as well as to reaffirm that my country intends to remain a place of refuge. Only one explanation can be made of the measures taken in Leopoldville. The planes and helicopters are either attempting to intimidate us, or to observe imaginary concentrations of invasion forces. Armed troops claim to be preventing an unthinkable landing. What irresponsible authorities, which cannot be African, have taken such measures? What obscure interests are attempting to sow panic and to create an irreparable situation between Congolese? The only thing we can do is obviously to wait peacefully for these grotesque measures to be abandoned then probably disavowed by their instigators. Unfortunately, our fellow citizens who go over every day to the other river bank cannot return to their homes. Our boats and our planes risk to be progressively blocked in foreign territory. We must therefore take the practical steps required by the situation. As from 5 May, all river and air traffic between Brazzaville and the ex-Belgian Congo is forbidden. Traffic will be reestablished as soon as the measures taken by our neighbours are withdrawn. It should not be necessary to reassure the

Congolese on the banks as to my Government's wish for peace. I believe however, in order to put an end to false rumours, that I should reassert the fact that we have no ill intentions towards any African, even towards those whose policies we disapprove. We have never contemplated and never shall contemplate, any action against our brothers. Today, like yesterday, we are fervent partisans of the reconciliation of all Congolese. UNSUBQUOTE

In a message to President Youlou, the Government of Katanga thanked him for his noble and generous gesture in favour of President Tshombe's liberation. UNQUOTE

I am sending comments separately.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLVILLE

M.A.

Date : 6 May 1961

No : A-1150

Gizenga gave Tickner the following message to be forwarded to you:

"Secrétaire général de l'ONU à New York

Rpt Président de la Commission de mise en application de la résolution du 21 février c/o ONU Léopoldville.

No. 225/CAB/VPM Le Conseil des Ministres réuni sous la présidence du Vice Premier Ministre A. Gizenga insiste sur l'application de la résolution du 21 février. Fait connaître au Secrétaire général que les résolutions prises hors du Parlement soit à Tananarive soit à Coquilhatville par quelques leaders congolais irresponsables quel que soit leur sens ne peuvent engagés l'avenir du Congo. Le Conseil demande avec insistance l'ouverture du Parlement le seul organe souverain capable de résoudre la crise congolaise. Vous rappelle cependant l'Arrêté présidentiel numéro un mettant Kasa-Vubu dans l'impossibilité d'assumer ses fonctions de Chef de l'Etat. Le Conseil précise que Kasa-Vubu préside la Conférence comme grand leader de l'Abako dont les résolutions ne sont valables que pour ce parti. Le Président du Conseil A. Gizenga. Antoine Gizenga, Président du Conseil. Stanleyville, le 4 mai 1961."

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEW YORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 5 May 1961
No. : A- 1149

M.A.

Reference your 3204. Belina-Podgaetsky's Titre de Voyage No, 26927 contains following information:

- a) Issued at Brussels on 17 August 1960 by Provincial Government of Brabant (Bureau des Passeports) for Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Trade (Belina states he received document in Elisabethville by mail).
- b) Résidence actuelle: rue de Escavée in Braine-l'Alleud in Brabant, Belgium.
- c) Cover of document carries reference to Convention of 28 July 1951.
- d) Holder is entitled, according to document, to return to Belgium during the period up to 17 August 1962.

Reference UN-HCR certificate No. 60063. Place of issue: Brussels. Date of issue: 11 August 1960. Certificate does not specify domicile but gives place of birth as Somain (France).

Reference certificate of matriculation. Issued by Government of Belgian Congo at Elisabethville on 23 September 1954 (Belina states that this was a new card issued in conformity with changed regulations and that original card issued on his first arrival in Elisabethville in June 1953 was returned to authorities). Domicile stated as Braine-l'Alleud (Brabant) same as described in Titre de Voyage as résidence actuelle.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 5 May 1961
No : A-1147, 1148

Following received from Poujoulat in Coquilhatville :

"Bomboko held press conference at 1500Z also attended by Kasa-Vubu. He read message sent Secgen by Katangese ministers and refuted it by saying that primo Kasa-Vubu had never been and was not President of Confederation and that accords of Tananarive were not mandatory but accords of principles only subject at all times to revision. He reaffirmed that sole representative of Congo was Kasa-Vubu who could correspond with Secgen on all political and other matters affecting this country. He spoke of agreement 17 April indicating satisfaction that UN was here only as technical assistance recognizing full sovereignty of Republic's rights and of President's position as uncontested Chief of State. Also indicated that Tshombe had been treated with utmost respect when he arrived Coq being even greeted by ANC 20th Battalion formerly in Katanga from which it was chased by Tshombe himself. It was only after he tried to sabotage conference that Government decided to take known measure.

New subject. President was pleased at both your CV-78 and 79, Bomboko has been requested by Kasa-Vubu to write immediately to Belgian Government and I will send you copy if I can obtain one.

New subject. Dissension here still prevailing and President is to try and resolve inimitiés. Obviously Bomboko does not have yet sufficient strong grounds for having some of the leaders arrested and he is hiding his time.

New subject. President wishes to know reactions Secgen to note verbale handed to Gardiner re evacuation of Belgian conseillers. Bomboko indicated that if Secgen after receipt this note still did not consider

that Droulans, Pirard and Mikdolajczak fell under terms para A-2 he would take appropriate measures to have them immediately expelled from Leo.

New subject. Bomboko gave me copy of cable addressed to Adoula by Nendaka ref 05/406 dated 3 May and I promised him that only yourselves and Secgen would see it and that it will not be used for any purpose nor publicized since Bomboko intends to use this information to pressure Belgian Government into withdrawing completely from Katanga QUOTE quelques suggestions à faire à Bomboko suivant dossier reconstitué que je vous apporte demain. Responsabilité Belgique dans crise congolaise devient évidente. Bomboko doit exiger à Spaak dans l'immédiat et avant reprise relations avec Belgique conditions sine qua non suivantes :

Primo) fermeture tous bureaux représentations katangaises en Belgique

Secundo) régularisation par Gouvernement central situation boursiers et stagiaires katangais

Tertio) fournir liste personnel nationalité belge au Katanga en vue effectuer triage, mutation et démobilisation générale tous militaires et officiers belges

Quarto) retrait délégation katangaise Marché commun

Quinto) revision comptes fiscaux et douaniers depuis l'Indépendance et notamment provoquer restitution

Sexto) justification, répartition dividende portefeuilles Etat du Comité spécial du Katanga et autres participations dans d'autres organismes situés en province katangaise. Signed Nendaka, Administrateur en Chef de la Sûreté UNQUOTE Bomboko indicated that for some time now they had established a dossier with various documents they had found in Leo establishing beyond doubt direct participation Belgian Government into affairs of Republic. Finally Abbe Youlou has wired President requesting release Tshombe and Bomboko has been requested to express President's regrets since unable accede this request. Bomboko also tells me that UK delegate approached Secgen with same request and that he intends to write UK delegate in similar terms as for Youlou. Bomboko expressed desire to meet again with Gardiner towards end of week here to discuss details aide memoire I sent you re my P 32, is this possible. "

CV-78 is my unnumbered cable of 3 May. CV-79 is my A-1142.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLVILLE
Date : 5 May 1961
No : A-1146

I sent the following, which is self-explanatory, to President
Kasa-Vubu with officers who went by plane to Coquilhatville this afternoon:

QUOTE

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UNQUOTE