

LEOPOLDVILLE
17 April 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNATIONS
NEWYORK

A-1002 SEC GEN FROM ABBAS

Following is text which Kasa-Vubu gave at his press conference this morning CLN

QUOTE Il est inutile de nous dissimuler que de nombreux Congolais éprouvent de la méfiance à l'égard des représentants des Nations Unies au Congo et s'inquiètent de leurs intentions.

Cette méfiance et cette inquiétude s'expliquent par plusieurs raisons. Des membres des Nations Unies ont voulu se servir de l'Organisation pour imposer leur politique personnelle au Congo. Les pays africains qui ont participé à la Conférence de Casablanca ont cru qu'il leur appartenait de prendre des décisions quant à l'avenir du Congo. D'autres Etats ont répandu le bruit qu'on voulait renverser les institutions congolaises et désarmer l'Armée nationale. Ils désiraient aussi affaiblir le Congo en le privant des techniciens dont il a besoin sans se soucier aucunement de les remplacer.

Aujourd'hui, nous voyons plus clair, et nous savons que certaines de ces craintes et de ces préventions sont sans fondement. Nous avons eu des entretiens pleins de confiance et de franchise avec des porte-parole de l'ONU qui ne font pas passer les préoccupations congolaises après celles des délégués et des fonctionnaires à New York. Nous avons pu observer le comportement des forces de police nigériennes. Nous avons constaté que ces Nigériens sont nos amis, et qu'ils sont venus ici pour nous aider. Ils savent comme nous que, si nous arrivons à résoudre nos problèmes, le Nigéria et le Congo seront deux grands pays de l'Afrique, et qu'ils resteront amis.

Nous avons aussi constaté que la Commission de Conciliation envoyée par l'ONU s'est efforcée de chercher avec nous des solutions pour aider le Congo, et non pour satisfaire les caprices de la majorité du moment qui peut surgir aux Nations Unies, sous l'effet de la propagande et de la passion politiques, et dans l'ignorance des réalités. Enfin nous avons apprécié l'appui fidèle de beaucoup de nos amis africains d'expression française.

J'ai aujourd'hui la conviction qu'avec certains éléments de l'ONU nous pouvons collaborer, et que nous avons intérêt à le faire. Nous espérons que dans quelques mois la présence des forces militaires de l'ONU au Congo ne sera plus nécessaire, pas plus que celle de services administratifs trop nombreux et parfois mal adaptés à nos besoins. Dès ce moment l'Organisation n'aura plus à nous apporter que le concours qu'elle donne, à leur demande, à d'autres pays indépendants déjà économiquement développés ou en cours de développement économique. Les dépenses de l'Organisation seront à la fois moins lourdes et plus efficaces. Entretemps, les services de l'ONU et la Commission que l'Assemblée générale enverrait au Congo, peuvent nous apporter un concours utile. Nous avons constaté que la coopération que devraient souhaiter tous les leaders congolais est rendue plus difficile par l'imprécision de décisions trop rapidement adoptées et trop vaguement formulées. Cette imprécision a pu donner à croire que l'esprit qui animait la Conférence de Tananarive était renié. Il convient à l'avenir de mieux préparer les travaux. La prochaine conférence de la table ronde ne devra être convoquée qu'après la préparation des textes tenant compte de tous les aspects politiques, constitutionnels, économiques et sociologiques de nos problèmes. La tâche la plus urgente est la préparation d'une telle conférence, et nous inviterons quelques techniciens compétents à participer à cette préparation, avec le concours éventuel de l'ONU.

Ces raisons m'ont amené, en ma qualité de Président de la République, à conclure un accord avec le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies. J'ai tenu à informer aussitôt l'opinion publique du contenu et de la portée de cet accord. Il consacre plus explicitement que ne l'ont fait les résolutions

adoptées dans le passé, la souveraineté du Congo et des prérogatives du Président de la République. Sur cette base, la République du Congo, respectueuse de ses obligations comme membre de l'Organisation des Nations Unies peut accepter la résolution du 21 février 1961, sans compromettre sa souveraineté ni ses intérêts nationaux vitaux. Un des objectifs de cet accord est de débarrasser le Congo des influences étrangères néfastes. Le Président de la République coopérera avec l'ONU pour réaliser cet objectif, compte tenu de la reconnaissance des droits souverains de la République et des pouvoirs constitutionnels qu'il détient. Il n'est donc pas question de nous imposer quoi que ce soit dans ce domaine. Seuls quitteront le pays les membres du personnel militaire et paramilitaire et les conseillers politiques, dont nous estimerons le départ nécessaire. Aucun ne sera écarté sans avoir été entendu. De plus, les Nations Unies nous aideront à recruter les techniciens dont la République aurait besoin, sans pour autant avoir le monopole d'un tel recrutement. Nous estimons, en effet, que les techniciens qui ne conviennent pas doivent être remplacés préalablement à leur congédiement. L'ONU assistera la République du Congo dans la formation des cadres administratifs et techniques par la création de bourses d'études et d'instituts spécialisés - ce concours s'étendra à la réorganisation de l'Armée nationale, sous l'autorité du Président de la République à tous les stades de cette réorganisation. J'estime en effet que si toutes les fractions de l'armée ont l'obligation de se rallier à l'autorité du Chef de l'Etat, il m'incombe de donner à cette armée tous les moyens voulus pour devenir l'instrument discipliné et efficace de la politique menée par le Chef de l'Etat et par son gouvernement.

Aucune menace ne pèse donc sur l'Armée nationale ni sur ses techniciens engagés ou rappelés sous mon autorité ou avec mon accord. Je suis prêt à couvrir de mon autorité le personnel étranger qui apporte à la République une aide utile et loyale dans toutes les parties du Congo.

J'envisage de confirmer à l'Organisation des Nations Unies mon désir de la voir coopérer efficacement à aider le Congo dans d'autres domaines. Des incidents très regrettables, nés de graves malentendus,

ont opposé des Congolais et des soldats de l'ONU à Matadi notamment. Nous avons aujourd'hui que l'ONU ne souscrit pas aux visées de certains de ses membres et que ni l'Armée nationale, ni la population, n'ont maintenant rien à redouter de ses initiatives. Les souvenirs laissés par ces incidents, et l'émotion qu'ils ont créée sont trop récents pour que je puisse autoriser dès aujourd'hui le retour des forces armées de l'ONU à Matadi, même si des engagements souscrits dans le passé rendaient ce retour théoriquement légitime. Cependant je suis préoccupé de trouver une solution satisfaisante pour l'ONU, mais qui en tout cas ménage l'émotion de nos populations.

Je désire terminer cet exposé de mes décisions concernant la coopération entre la République du Congo et l'ONU par un très sérieux avertissement. Aucun doute ne peut subsister quant à nos intentions de coopérer étroitement et loyalement avec ceux qui viennent à nous en amis, qui cherchent à nous comprendre, et à nous aider. Mais aux autres, je dois dire très fermement: "Restez où vous êtes, ou retournez d'où vous êtes venus. Vous ne pouvez compter sur aucun concours, ni de ma part, ni de celle des mes ministres. Nos portes, et celles de nos amis, vous resteront fermées. Votre présence au Congo ne pourrait que compromettre une coopération qui se développe très heureusement sans vous". Je sais que cet avertissement sera entendu et compris de ceux qui m'écoutent au Congo. Mais si d'autres veulent y rester sourds, qu'ils portent la responsabilité de leur aberration intolérable et de toutes les conséquences que cette aberration pourrait entraîner. UNQUOTE

OUTGOING CODE

To : SEC GEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 17 April 1961
No : A-1001

M.A.

Further to my 997-998, I just heard that Kasa-Vubu and
Bomboke will see me to-morrow morning at 1000 hours.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE *M.A.*

Date : 17 April 1961

No : A- 999, 1000

Chief Communications Officer Brinkman has been approached by Belgian Chief Technical Adviser, Direction des Télécommunications, Ministère des Communications, Georges Novgorodsky, and a second Belgian Technical Adviser who arrived recently, with what they called "a minor problem". On visiting transmitters this morning, Chief Communications Officer was informed that a decision had been taken to withdraw from Unations use the two transmitters utilized by ONUC on New York and Geneva circuits as they were allegedly now required for Congolese communications purposes. No reply was given when Brinkman asked the hour or date on which this withdrawal would become effective. He is satisfied that no valid technical reason exists for this action. Approximately fifty transmitters are in working order at the transmitting centre, Leopoldville, and some of these are not presently utilized.

2. Withdrawal of facilities follows long period of continuous pressure for Unations to cease utilizing the two main transmitters which ensure direct communication with New York and Geneva. This pressure is of course in contradiction with original agreement reached between Bunche and Congolese authorities for untrammelled Unations communications but, as you know, ONUC has made continuous efforts to obtain land on which to install our own equipment which we have already in Leopoldville, which would have enabled us to operate these circuits under complete control of Unations personnel and without making demands upon Congolese transmitter. Authorities here have deliberately prevented this installation by delaying decision on lease of land but last week finally communicated refusal to assign to Unations either of the two plots under negotiation.

3. It is relevant to point out that many of the Congolese transmitters at the Leopoldville centre were put into operation by UN personnel after events in July 1960, part of this equipment having been wilfully sabotaged at the time of withdrawal of Belgian technicians.

4. It is noteworthy that Unations Chief Communications Officer was informed of intended withdrawal of transmitters by these two Belgian advisers, no Congolese officials being present during the conversations. This action follows recent return from Brussels of Novgorodsky whose hostile attitude towards UN technical assistance has caused numerous previous incidents, all fully reported to Nwokedi/Gardiner delegation. In particular, Novgorodsky opposed all Unations telecommunications activities except purely maintenance work and was instrumental in arranging for Congolese Director of Telecommunications to deny access to installations to Quijano-Caballero, ITU Senior Representative. During Novgorodsky's recent three weeks absence, relations between Unations and Congolese telecommunications authorities improved considerably with no suggestion of any difficulties regarding utilization of Congolese telecommunication facilities by Unations in accordance with Bunche agreement. Firm request was also made during Novgorodsky's absence for substantial technical assistance which had previously been impeded. Refusal of land followed by announced withdrawal of Congolese facilities appears clearly identifiable with Novgorodsky's return and withdrawal is a particularly glaring example of political intervention by Belgian advisers devoid of any solid technical justification.

5. Latest action represents furthest point so far reached in a consistent campaign by Belgian political advisers to prevent establishment of normal relations between Unations mission and Congolese authorities as well as a deliberate attempt to dislocate essential communications of ONUC.

6. Under these circumstances we propose, subject to your concurrence, to take immediate measures to establish an alternative reliable communication link under complete control of Unations between Leopoldville, New York and Geneva, without asking any authority from Congolese Government. Article XVI of Annex 6 of Agreement between Unations and ITU reserving Unations same

rights as members of Union may be considered relevant in this connection. We thus propose to set up the two transmitters in our own possession in an area controlled by Unations troops near enough to Royal building to permit necessary radio link thus avoiding land lines which might be subject to sabotage.

7. We also consider it essential that in conformity with 21 February resolution appropriate action be taken to secure the expulsion from the Congo of the so-called Chief Technical Adviser to the Direction des Télécommunications, Georges Novgorodsky, whose advice to Congolese has been consistently political in character and directed against the technical assistance activities and vital communications facilities of Unations.

8. Nwokedi and Gardiner concur with the above.

9. Please advise if you concur with the course of action, particularly the contents of para 6.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLVILLE
Date : 17 April 1961
No : A-997, 998

Timberlake and Scott came to see me first thing this morning. We talked about the status agreement in general and about your memorandum on Matadi. We also talked about the situation in Katanga and about reconciliation. As far as the temporary arrangement about Matadi is concerned, neither of them received any further instructions and they maintain their previous stand which I communicated to you in a cable which I dictated in their presence. On this matter, Timberlake received no instructions whatsoever, but Scott has received instructions to help us over the status agreement but not on the temporary solution on Matadi. They both think that I should not press Kasa-Vubu for an immediate answer to the last memorandum which I handed to him because, they say, we should let him finish the agreement with Gardiner and Nwokedi.

On the question of Katanga they see our difficulties but they argue Tshombe's case and they say, particularly Scott, that we should negotiate with Tshombe because, if we force a solution, we will be left with serious administrative problems. Scott says, for instance, that if Tshombe is not allowed to have police in North Katanga, the whole system of administration will not work. I did nothing more than telling him about our difficulties and never mentioned any plans on our part, apart from saying to them that we will be failing in our duty if we allow troop movements to continue in North Katanga, which might very easily lead to clashes with the tribes and what is remaining of the Jeunesse and the ANC from the north.

The only matter on which we had complete accord is reconciliation. They tell me that for months they have been working on this and I told them that now is a much more opportune time to double their efforts. They agreed with me and it was in this connection that they told me about the cables which Kasa-Vubu has been sending to Tshombe. I told them that they could tell Kasa-Vubu and his Ministers that I would be prepared to help them to meet in the same way that I helped Kamitatu to meet Gizenga, that is by providing transport and, if necessary, protection. I told them that my thinking would be to give them facilities to meet in Kamina if they make a request. I stressed to the two Ambassadors that although this is my line of thinking, neither they nor myself should mention the possibility of Kamina as a meeting place before I get your approval. So all they will say will be that I would give favourable consideration to any request from them to facilitate a meeting. Please cable me most immediately if you agree to my allowing them to meet in Kamina.

Kasa-Vubu asked all the Ambassadors to meet him this morning and he announced to them the agreement reached with Nwokedi and Gardiner. Since they left Kasa-Vubu about half an hour ago, I had a talk on the telephone with Scott and had a few minutes with the German Ambassador who came to see me at my request to announce to him your decision to release the German crew and their plane. Both Ambassadors were very pleased at the agreement reached and they think that the way is beginning to be paved for closer co-operation with the United Nations. After Kasa-Vubu's meeting with the Ambassadors, he started a press conference which is still on and about which I will report later.

I have requested to see Kasa-Vubu to-day to talk to him about Katanga, Matadi and reconciliation, but no time has yet been fixed for me. I am sure Bomboko will be with him but after seeing them, I will make a point of seeing Adoula and Ileo.

There is quite a lot of talk, which appears to have sense in it, that Kasa-Vubu's Ministers are now split. There are some who are for co-operation with United Nations and there are others, led, I presume, by Delvaux, who are against co-operation, but obviously the side which is for co-operation with us is winning. The agreement with Nwokedi and Gardiner and the cables to Tshombe go to substantiate this.

OUTGOING CLEAR

LEOPOLDVILLE
17 April, 1961

mu

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

A- 996

SECGEN from NWOKEDI

Agreement initialled President's residence this morning in presence of ILEO, BOMBOKO, ADOULA and KASONGO. We noticed on arrival that diplomats and press had been invited for press conference. BOMBOKO later explained that they were anxious to avoid any misrepresentation or incitement of public against the agreement. There seems to be some apprehension that agreement will intensify ~~the~~ split in Cabinet between pro-UN and pro-Tshombe groups. We were not repeat not present at, or involved in, press conference which took place after initialling and our departure.

OUTGOING CLEAR

LEOPOLDVILLE
17 April, 1961

ju

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

A- *995* SECGEN from NWOKEDI

Your 2626

1. Respectfully submit that it would be most embarrassing to inform Congolese authorities that text has been communicated to special negotiator in Brussels for comments. Twice in the course of discussions last week they expressed strong protest against what they regarded as an attempt to undermine their authority and administration by withdrawing Belgian personnel ^{*behind their back*} ~~without their approval~~. We believe we succeeded in correcting their misconception in explaining Sahbani's role, but it would be difficult to revert to matter at final meeting today. We therefore propose to say that text will be subject to any comments you may wish to make after discussion with us in New York.
2. Your paragraph four is noted.
3. We intend to emplane for Brussels at one o'clock tomorrow, April 18, arriving Brussels eight a.m. Grateful advise Sahbani to meet us at airport for discussion as we shall continue journey to New York via London same day. Expect arrive New York via PANAM flight No. 1 at 7:40 p.m. local time.

OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

N.A.

Date : 17 April 1961

No : A- 994

I have had a long meeting with Scott and Timberlake on which I am reporting separately. They both told me that President Kasa-Vubu has in the last few days sent three cables to Tshombe and they promised to let me have copies of all three. Both of them sent me a copy of the same cable despatched on 14 April which gives me a great measure of encouragement. I will cable you the texts of the other two cables when I receive them. Following is the text of cable dated 14 April signed by Kasa-Vubu and Adoula who, I understand, from the two Ambassadors, is now Minister of Defence as well as of Minister of the Interior:

"Devant aggravation situation Nord Katanga vous rappelle instamment les termes mon télégramme du 4 avril par lequel vous demandais cesser opérations militaires en région Baluba - esprit conférence Tananarive être s'abstenir recourir à la force pour régler problèmes en suspens et employer uniquement moyens pacifiques - or depuis toujours votre seul souci est obtenir victoire militaire sans essayer négociation - ne pouvons que déplorer maintien cette attitude surtout après Tananarive dont vous compromettez ainsi résultats par votre action unilatérale et belliqueuse STOP Il m'est impossible d'approuver votre politique - aussi vous demande fermement mettre un terme effusions sang et opérations guerre contre populations frères - cohabitation harmonieuse toutes populations ex-Congo belge ne peut provenir asservissement de certaines par les armes et la violence - c'est donc intérêt pays tout entier qui est en cause et vous adjure en tenir compte STOP Sur un autre plan attire votre très sérieuse attention sur mécontentement croissant ONU et opinion internationale

devant vos tendances persistantes à vous dérober à toute coopération internationale - vos ennemis ne manquent pas de présenter votre attitude comme dictée par intérêts étrangers à Afrique et ainsi opinion mondiale et grande partie opinion africaine adopte hostilité croissante et méfiance à l'égard non seulement dirigeants katangais mais aussi autres dirigeants ex-Congo belge - je ne puis accepter que ce discrédit s'étende à l'ensemble du Congo - il est indispensable que vous vous absteniez toute initiative unilatérale et non concertée en matière de relations avec ONU et étrangers STOP Loi fondamentale ainsi que résolutions Tananarive donnent d'ailleurs uniquement compétence à pouvoir central en cette matière STOP Estime essentiel dans période que nous traversons maintenir ces dispositions Loi fondamentale jusqu'au moment où modification structures deviendra effective STOP En raison urgence et importance primordiale questions évoquées ci-dessus je vous demande réponse urgente et suggère que nous procédions à consultations avant que n'empire situation actuelle qui me paraît très grave pour Katanga et peut-être lourde conséquence pour ensemble Congo "

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 16 April 1961
No : A-993

N.A.

Following received last night from Dumontet:

"Certain uneasiness reported among Katangese Government. This is arising from wish of Katangese Assembly to install a Prime Minister. Tshombe's reaction was unfavourable since it would take a good deal of his power. Munongo, on the contrary, feels he has fair wind since he would be most likely choice. Kibwe would have been another possible choice for Prime Minister but Munongo has privately threaten to release proof of graft in the purchase of four Fougas in which Kibwe would have been directly implicated."

OUTGOING CODE

Most immediate

M.

TO : SECGEN, NEWYORK
FROM : ABBAS, LEO
DATE : 16 April 1961
NO. : A-992

G.A.

From Nwokedi-Gardiner Delegation. Substance of observations in your 2597 was communicated to Congolese Authorities who have today submitted following counter-proposals for discussion at to-morrow's meeting.

1. In preamble delete quote à moins que ces dernières ne soient contraires à l'esprit de la Charte ou ne portent atteinte à la souveraineté de la République" unquote, and between the words quote Congo unquote and quote est unquote include quote dont la souveraineté ne saurait en aucun cas être mise en doute unquote. The proposed addition may appear superfluous but the Congolese insist on their inclusion.
2. In paragraph (2) delete the words quote uniquement d'aider le Président de la République à se débarrasser unquote and insert after quote février unquote quote obtenir l'élimination unquote and add quote A cet effet, le Président de la République recevra toute l'assistance de l'ONU unquote. (This is an attempt to meet the desire to redress the balance).
3. Second sentence of paragraph (3) should now read quote Pour mettre en oeuvre ce qui précède et compte tenu du Congo unquote Ends.

Will welcome reaction soonest.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SEGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 16 April 1961
No : A-990

The German crew who are detained by us here are very anxious to know when they and their plane could be released. I will appreciate your immediate further instructions.

I have some fear that even if we release this crew and allow them to return in their plane, the Congolese authorities at the airport may get hold of them and detain them for interrogation. I would like your advice in such a contingency.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGON, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 16 April 1961 *H.A.*
No : A- 988, 989

I received this morning following report from Ahmed on the supply situation in Katanga:

"We have just now received advice from our office in Elisabethville that the Katangese authorities have issued strict orders to all local dealers not to supply United Nations 'with any commodity whatsoever'. Since a good deal of procurement of food supplies for ONUC forces in Katanga used to be done by us locally this restriction has created a serious supply situation. We are therefore taking action to make emergency procurements in Northern Rhodesia and to airlift supplies from there to E'ville.

2. As you are aware, access to the Kamina Base by rail and road has been blocked by the Katangese authorities. As a result fresh supplies which used to be procured in the neighboring areas of the Kamina Base can no longer be obtained. It is feared that the situation in Albertville, Manono and Kabelo is about the same though definite information has not yet been received from these places.

3. The action of the Katangese authorities to severely restrict the supply of aviation gas to ONUC in Katanga has already been reported to you. I have asked Dumontet to negotiate for the relaxation of this restriction but have not yet received any reply.

4. For Kamina, aviation gas was normally purchased in Leopoldville and transported by Otraco barges up to Port Francqui and from there by BCK railway to Kamina. OTRACO are now refusing to take any cargo from Leo to Port Francqui alleging that the docks are congested and since the BCK railway from Luluabourg to points in Katanga is reported to be running irregularly this method of transport to Kamina is no longer feasible.

5. In the above circumstances, we have to rely almost entirely upon the United Nations air fleet and such other charter service as can be obtained for carrying essential supplies to support our forces in Katanga. However this will tie up a great deal of our air fleet in supply functions and will seriously affect our ability to deal with other air transport requirements. In any case it seems highly undesirable for us to incur excessive costs on air transport of supplies to support our troops for no other reason than to fight the economic blockade imposed upon us by the Katangese authorities. I suggest a solution of this problem be sought through negotiations to be taken up at a high level with the Katanga authorities."

The cable which was sent to Ahmed from E'ville informed him that procurement officer Khalil has already left for Salisbury. His plan is to buy supplies and rail them to Ndola on the border between South Katanga and Northern Rhodesia. From there the supplies will be air lifted to E'ville.

On questioning Ahmed about the supply situation to-day in E'ville, he tells me that a week ago he had information that the supplies were enough for three weeks. This means that as of to-day they should have two weeks supply of basic food items.

OTRACO's action seems to be a retaliation to our refusing to receive supplies from them coming from Matadi to Leo and our refusal to give them the manifests to enable them to handle our supplies for us at Matadi itself. I will see what I can do with the authorities here about supplies to Kamina. Ahmed also tells me that several items of basic supplies for the Indians in Kamina, such as flour, onions, garlic, were not brought by the Indian Brigade from India and must be supplied from here. We are investigating the possibility of air lifting these supplies from Dar-es-Salaam even if it causes the slowing down of the troop and equipment arrivals.

Rikhye will recall that MacEoin has spoken about this problem when they had their telex conversation but, at the time, we were not definitely faced with this serious situation.

I have not yet heard from Dumontet about the result of the démarche which I asked him to make to Tshombe and which I relayed to you in my 984,985,986. The only information I have from Dumontet is a cable received last night in which he informed me that Tignee, Chef de Cabinet to Munongo, had informed him that Tshombe had decided to send back all South African mercenaries due to arrive on the 16th and to cancel the arrival of 20th April.

MacEoin's view about the whole problem of Katanga is that we must, as soon as the Indian Brigade is assembled in Kamina, take over Manono and the other places now occupied by Tshombe, disarm his gendarmerie, and lift the ban on supplying UN forces, by force if necessary. MacEoin also is of the strong opinion that we should remove the mercenaries and the Belgians from the gendarmerie, and also remove all the political advisers. He firmly believes that unless we take such drastic measures in Katanga, our position is going to be made very difficult, not only there but also in other places.

MacEoin considers that if we do not act as quickly as possible, we will give Tshombe a golden opportunity quickly to strengthen his gendarmerie by importation of arms, mercenaries and training of more Katangese troops.

We understand that Tshombe sent yesterday three emissaries to meet Kasa-Vubu. Of course, we do not know for certain what the purpose of the mission is. But Gardiner tells me that Khiari has some information that one of the purposes of this mission is to warn Kasa-Vubu that unless he is helped to deal with the UN in Katanga, he will lose the battle and after that the UN forces will turn on Kasa-Vubu himself. I will certainly keep Kasa-Vubu informed about the situation in Katanga and do all I can to win his support for our operation there, not only by giving us his official support but also by exercising all the pressure that he can on OTRACO.

Please send us your most immediate reactions.

LEOPOLDVILLE
15 April 1961

OUTGOING CLEAR

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNATIONS
NEWYORK

A-987 YOUR 2606 Following is repeat of our A-841 of 30 MARCH CLN

QUOTE SecGen from Abbas and MacEoin Your 2168. This is a
report on the events in the military field UNQUOTE

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 15 April 1961
No : A-984, 985, 986

H.A.

Munongo, one of Tshombe's ministers, was sent at Tshombe's request with Tignee to meet Ward in Albertville to discuss with him the situation in North Katanga. As soon as we heard this information, we instructed Ward to listen to what Munongo had to say but not to make any commitments. Munongo visited Albertville and came with Ward to Kabalo where they had another discussion. At Kabalo Munongo asked Ward to ask us to do the following:

- (a) UNO to control airfield at Kabalo
- (b) Katanga Government allowed to send school teachers
- (c) Katanga Government to be allowed to send shopkeepers
- (d) Railway to be reopened so that economy can flow
- (e) Customary Chiefs and administrators to be flown in.

Ward and Brzak proceeded from Kabalo to Leo where MacEoin, Iyassu and myself had long discussions with them. They return to Albertville to-morrow. I feel that the explanations about our mandate and policies which we made to Ward have had a very good effect on him and I hope that when he returns he will carry out our policies with conviction.

I considered with MacEoin seriously the question of sending him again to Tshombe, but we all came to the conclusion that if MacEoin goes again to Tshombe, Tshombe, in spite of the fact that he has had his nose rubbed in Kabalo, might think that we are running after him. I therefore despatched the following cable, to which all agreed, to Dumontet:

"With reference to the discussions which you had with Tshombe lately about the whole situation in North Katanga, and with reference to the discussions which Munongo and his advisers had with Ward and Brzak in Albertville and Kabalo, I want you to make it crystal clear to Tshombe that we insist on the following:

- (1) That all troop movements in Katanga by Mr. Tshombe must be halted, otherwise under Security Council resolution of 21 February 1961 the UN Force must carry out its obligations to halt all troop movements, using force if necessary.
- (2) That the UN must, under the agreement signed with the Congolese Government on 27 July 1960, have full freedom of movement of UN personnel, both civilian and military, as a basic condition for the purpose of the UN mandate. Any interference or restriction of this freedom cannot be tolerated. Such interference includes the blocking of airfields to UN, as is happening now at Manono and Albertville.
- (3) He must stop forthwith the appointment of mercenaries and the importation of arms and other war equipment.
- (4) UN troops must be accorded the normal facilities in the matter of being supplied with light, water, merchandise, bank facilities, etc.
- (5) Broadcasts, demonstrations, and other measures aimed at inflaming the population and inciting them to acts of violence against UN personnel will likewise be regarded as an attempt to oppose the UN in the implementation of its mandate.

There are now troops which we know are in places where their presence is bound to cause a breach of peace such as, and this is only one example, the gendarmerie who are now on the outskirts of Kabalo. These troops must return to where they originally came from, otherwise the UN will be forced to disarm them.

With regard to the suggestions made by Mr. Munongo to Brig. Ward, you must refer to my cable EV-175 of 8 April in which I said the following:

'Please also impress on Tshombe that his argument that these gendarmerie are moving to various places in North Katanga in order to make life return to normal does not impress us. He can be assured that in all the places where the UN is stationing troops, every assistance, even protection, will be given to people who want to reopen mines, schools, etc. Please make this very clear to him.'

Therefore, in allowing the return of merchants, medical personnel, school teachers, establishment of normal local administration, the reopening and exploitation of the railway, and the opening of postal and telegraphic communications, we are not striking a bargain with them, because a week before Munongo saw Ward, I have given the assurance, as you see from my cable to Mr. Tshombe, that we will allow these people to return and, if necessary, give them protection.

You must refer to your clear cable ELLEO-224 of 17 March and remind Tshombe of the full contents of his letter which you communicated to me and in which he pleaded with us, when he heard that we were considering withdrawing our troops from Kabalo, not to do so. He said in his letter that the consequences of our withdrawal would be very serious because the great amount of merchandise, rolling stock, locomotives, tugs, etc. which were there would be destroyed and looted by the rebels. From that time until now we never waited for anybody to come and negotiate with us to protect property and lives and to open schools and hospitals. This is our duty and it will continue to be so, and please refer to my cable EV-155 in which I asked you to inform Tshombe that for the time being we were not considering withdrawing the troops. Please also remind Tshombe of a letter N° FDP/AM/F.261/D.9436 dated 17 March in which the Representative General of F.E.C. pleaded with us not to withdraw our troops from Kabalo. This being the case, nobody must think by any stretch of the imagination that we are giving this protection to that area as a bargain for anything. I repeat it is our duty and we will continue to do it.

Please hand a copy of this cable in French to Mr. Tshombe. ”

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

To: Sec-Gen, New York
From: Abbas, Mac Eoin
Date: 15 Apr 61
No: A-983

We have received reports today to the effect that Katangese Gendarmerie have occupied Niemba and are likely to occupy Nyunzu soon. We have ordered a motorised company to move from Kabalo towards Nyunzu with the object if possible of securing Nyunzu and the airfield there. If this is not possible ~~xx~~ due to its being previously occupied by Gendarmerie in strength, this company will occupy a position to the west of Nyunzu and as close as possible to it to prevent any movement of Gendarmerie westwards from Nyunzu towards Kabalo. It may be necessary to reinforce this company depending on the information we receive on the progress of the operation.

91. A'
15/4

ful
~~11/4~~
15/4

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 15 April 1961
No : A- 982

M.A.

I have not heard anything yet from Kasa-Vubu about Matadi. Nor have Timberlake and Scott come to see me. I telephoned Timberlake this evening and he said that he had not received any further instructions from his Government, similar to the instructions received by Scott. They are dining together to-night and I will be contacting them shortly to fix an appointment with them so that I can brief them. I will do this even if Timberlake does not receive his instructions, because I feel that in any case he should be fully informed. I shall take the opportunity of discussing the Matadi question with them to drive home to them, as you say, with due discretion, the contents of your 2593.

OUTGOING CODE

TO: SECGEN, NEWYORK

FROM: ABBAS, LEO

DATE: 15 April 1961

No.: A-980, 981

Jm.

M.A.

From Nwokedi-Gardiner Delegation. Your 2597. The attitude not only of Kasa-Vubu and Bomboko but of Adoula and other political leaders should be seen against background of their condemnation of the resolution of 21 February and open declaration that they would not be associated with it. One can see a reversal of policy and repudiation of decisions taken at Tananarive in the proposals submitted by the Leo authorities. Their willingness to break with Tshombe, apart from their own calculated interest, presage an attempt to trust and co-operate with the UN. The new policy and people who sponsor it are already under attack typified by Delvaux's recent press conference. The insistence on respect for sovereignty of Congo is calculated to allay the fears of those who have been led to believe that resolution of 21 February infringes sovereignty and also to convince Congolese public that they are not selling out or submitting to UN domination.

This is the background to their continued insistence on taking the initiative themselves in implementing the Security Council resolution with the UN only giving assistance. They have made it clear that they cannot afford to tolerate any attempt on the part of UN to reverse the position even in respect of parts of the resolution where the initiative rests primarily with UN. In our judgement, the successful implementation of an agreement binding the Congolese Authorities "to act with the assistance of the UN" will depend ^{largely} on the degree of personal understanding between the two parties charged with such responsibility.

After today's meeting, the text of the Agreement is now as follows:

"En sa qualité de Membre des Nations Unies, la République du Congo est tenue de respecter la Charte de l'Organisation et de mettre en oeuvre les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité, à moins que ces dernières ne soient contraires à l'esprit de la Charte ou ne portent atteinte à la souveraineté de la République.

La République du Congo accepte la résolution du 21 février 1961 compte tenu de ce:

- 1) que les Nations Unies réaffirment leur respect de la souveraineté de la République du Congo dans l'application de la résolution;
- 2) que le but des paragraphes A-2 et B-2 de la résolution du 21 février est uniquement d'aider le Président de la République à se débarrasser de toutes les influences étrangères néfastes;
- 3) que les Nations Unies accordent leur assistance au Président de la République pour que tous les fonctionnaires étrangers civils, militaires, paramilitaires, mercenaires et conseillers politiques qui n'ont pas été engagés ou rappelés sous l'autorité du Président de la République soient renvoyés du Congo dans les plus brefs délais. Compte tenu de la reconnaissance des droits souverains de la République et des pouvoirs constitutionnels qu'il détient, le Président de la République réexaminera les engagements du personnel étranger, civil, militaire et paramilitaire faits sous son autorité et prendra les décisions nécessaires compatibles avec les intérêts de la République du Congo;
- 4) que les Nations Unies accordent au Président de la République toute assistance pour:
 - a) recruter les techniciens dont la République du Congo aurait besoin, sans pour cela assurer aux Nations Unies le monopole de ce recrutement,
 - b) former les cadres administratifs et techniques par l'octroi de bourses d'études et la création d'instituts spécialisés.

La République du Congo reconnaît la nécessité de réorganiser l'Armée Nationale, étant entendu que cette réorganisation sera faite sous l'autorité du Président de la République, avec l'assistance des Nations Unies et sur la base des propositions formulées par le Chef de l'Etat dans sa lettre du 5 mars au Secrétaire général des Nations Unies.

L'application détaillée de l'accord de base ci-dessus fera l'objet, dans chaque cas, d'une étude approfondie de la part du Président de la République du Congo et de l'Organisation des Nations Unies."

On the receipt of your 2597, final meeting with Kasa-Vubu has been cancelled and we hope to meet Congolese Authorities on Monday to discuss the substance of your observations. It would be helpful if amended text could reach us before next week's meetings. Supporters of Delegation are disappointed but we hope to rally them round for new effort next week.

There is genuine desire to come to terms and the proposals made to us are not in line with Belgian attempts to secure a tripartite meeting. Kasa-Vubu and his supporters are anxious to avoid creating panic in the civil service and driving their Belgian aids into the Congolese underground to sabotage their efforts. This should be taken into consideration in re-drafting point three, last sentence. We have kept door open because failure would bring Delveaux type and Belgian consultants who have been kept out of our talks on the scene. They would certainly be more aggressive and unscrupulous.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 15 April 1961
No : A- 978, 979

I relayed your clear cable 2467 to Fitzgeralds and asked him to send me promptly information on the cable together with his comments. His report is as follows:

"Following report on events in Kivu Maniema since 1 January prepared with Msgr. Van Steene Archbishop Bukavu, Msgr. Cleirf Bishop Kindu and Rector Jesuit College Bukavu.

1. Kivu Maniema province comprises five catholic dioceses, Bukavu Goma and Beni in East, and Kindu and Kasongo in west of province.
2. Events in Bukavu diocese. After arrest of Provincial President 25 December and arrival of Kashamura from Stan 4 January, anti religious propaganda began. On about 11 January Kashamura ordered arrest and expulsion of nun in Bukavu Hospital and religious social worker. Some days later Congolese priest arrested and imprisoned for criticizing new authorities in private letter which was censored. Shortly afterwards two priests expelled. 16 February youth movement attacked missions Bukavu, murdered Father Devos, wounded another priest and attempted murder others. Missions sacked and burnt and all missionaries taken under ANC protection and later lodged Jesuit college inside ONUC lines.
3. Events in Kasongo diocese. In July 1960 landing of Belgian paratroops at Kasongo blamed on missionaries. All missionaries evacuated (three words garbled) never returned. Missionaries returned Kasongo after two weeks when ONUC forces in Kasongo. No further events until Lumumba's death announced 14 February. All missionaries in Kasongo and neighbourhood arrested and brought to Kasongo prison. Badly beaten. One nun fractured skull and another nun age 75 broken arm. Several nuns stripped naked by

Congolese soldiers. Priests also badly beaten. French priest from Wamaza brought Kasongo and badly beaten. All held in prison for several days then released and held in house arrest in Mission. On 14 March Balubakat terrorists arrived Kasongo. Missionaries again beaten including Vicar General Kasongo Msgr. Kalumbwa. After three days missionaries permitted withdraw to Kindu under ONUC protection. Missionaries from Moyo brought Pangi 14 February and beaten. Superior collapsed in coma for long period. These missionaries later evacuated. Early March three nurses with religious vows molested in Kalole, and one was raped twice in Kalole catholic church. On 4 April Brother Goffinet of Wamaza who took refuge in Kalole was ordered by Chef de Poste Wamaza to return his personal belongings or else be arrested.

4. Events in Kindu diocese. Father Nibelle SJ, on visit to his brother in Kampene near Kindu, badly beaten on 14 February with lay mining workers. Late February nuns at Lubutu, North of Kindu, forced to dance naked and one sister raped.

5. There are principal anti catholic events in Kivu Maniema. In almost all cases protests sent to local authorities by ONUC but without response.

6. Present position. A. Kasongo diocese. 5 missions abandoned, 2 with Congolese Abbés only and 7 in South Kivu around Fizi still occupied since no trouble in South Kivu. B. Bukavu diocese. Local population favourable to missionaries but present provincial government and Stanleyville government are anti religious. All missions occupied and only 7 priests and 10 sisters evacuated from diocese leaving about 100 still there.

C. Kindu diocese. Many priests and nuns evacuated but no definite figures available. D. Goma and Beni dioceses. No anti religious movement in these dioceses and problems there are lack of food and transport but not of security.

7. Future prospects. Kasongo and Kindu dioceses unsuitable for return of European sisters for indefinite period. Other three dioceses calm but situation in Bukavu depends upon attitude Kivu provincial government which currently is strongly anti religious."

OUTGOING CLEAR

LEOPOLDVILLE
14 April 1961

UNATIONS
NEW YORK

M.A.

A- 977, SEC GEN from ABBAS

Your 2442.

1. The following report covers the events which have occurred in Katanga since February 29, 1961 with respect to the civil war situation in that Province of the Republic of the Congo. The occupation of Manono on 30 March by Mr. Tshombe's forces, under the over-all command of Colonel Crèvecoeur, was obviously an important step in the northward drive to Kabalo and to other parts of Baluba-controlled territory in North Katanga, a drive planned by Mr. Tshombe as indicated to the ONUC representative in Elisabethville as early as March 22nd (vide para. 3 of A-841 of March 30).

Manono

2. The Katangese gendarmes built up their positions at Piana and Djobo over the last week of March. On March 27 and 28 ONUC patrols reported that among the forces moved up to Piana was one platoon composed almost entirely of white soldiers and that all the jeeps were officered by white officers. By March 29 it was estimated that between ten and twelve companies of Katangese gendarmes had been concentrated in these areas including one company of white soldiers. As the road leading from Piana to Manono had been cut by the ANC/Jeunesse at several places, the ONUC detachment at Piana had earlier been withdrawn to Manono to prevent their being cut off completely, and joined the ONUC troops already at Manono in patrolling the approaches to the town.

3. On March 30, however, an undetermined number of Katangese gendarmes arrived on the eastern outskirts of Manono at approximately 1430 hours and engaged in fighting with the ANC/Jeunesse who soon retreated. At 1650 hours a patrol of white soldiers went through the outskirts of Manono in the direction of the air field, which fell under the complete control of gendarmes at approximately 1700 hours, by which time any organized resistance by ANC/Jeunesse had ceased. During the night of 30/31 March, only occasional bursts of automatic fire and sounds from stray bullets were heard.

4. By April 2nd, the strength of Mr. Tshombe's forces in Manono was estimated at 800 men, six armoured cars including four 3-ton cars mounted with 37 mm. guns, ^{and} ~~with~~ at least one field gun and further reinforcements by road and air were expected.
5. In the absence of reliable information, no definite figures are possible, but it is known that four or five gendarmes and seven ANC were killed; no information is available on Jeunesse casualties. Five Balubakats, including one woman, died in a village which was set on fire.
6. In the surrounding areas, some chiefs appealed to their people to return to work and there was some response to such appeals. In Manono, the gendarmes stated that their purpose was to protect the inhabitants from violence and disorder on the part of the Jeunesse. In Leopoldville, on the other hand, Mr. Sendwe, the President of the Balubakat, publicly protested against the passiveness of ONUC in the face of the "aggressions" of Mr. Tshombe's troops, whom he charged with acts of open warfare against Baluba men, women and children.
7. The general situation in Manono as of April 14 is quiet. The gendarmes are still in control of the air field where no ONUC planes are allowed to land.

Kabalo

8. At 1030 hours on 7 April, a DC-3 landed at Kabalo with 30 white soldiers (2 officers and 28 other ranks) on board. They were disarmed and taken into custody by the ONUC troops holding the airport. At 1310 hours a barge approached the port of Kabalo and was fired upon by Balubas. The gendarmes on the barge replied with mortars and machine guns, killing, as far as is known, one Baluba and wounding another. An ONUC (Ethiopian) patrol, which was despatched to the scene was ambushed by gendarmes, and one officer and two soldiers were seriously injured and one was later found to be missing.
9. On the following morning another ONUC (Ethiopian) patrol proceeded to search for the missing soldier and again came under fire from the Katangese gendarmes. In the ensuing clash, two ONUC soldiers were killed and four seriously wounded. Three injured Katangese gendarmes, two of them of European origin, were taken into ONUC custody and subsequently evacuated to Albertville in an ONUC plane, after having been given first aid by ONUC troops. The missing ONUC soldier was eventually brought to the ONUC camp by Balubas. The barge itself was sunk when its boiler exploded, presumably as a result of the Ethiopians returning fire. The number of casualties is not known.

10. At Kitule, 35 kms north of Kabalo, a train approaching Kabalo from Kongolo with Katangese gendarmes on board was attacked by Balubas on April 7. A clash ensued in the course of which seven Balubas are reported to have been killed and three wounded; some gendarmes were also killed but the exact figure is not known. On April 8, a Katangese aircraft flew around Kabalo and dropped several bombs on an outlying village ~~wiek~~ which was thus set on fire. In the evening, the Balubas engaged in heavy fighting with the gendarmes, approximately 10 kms south of Kabalo. The casualties sustained by either side during this engagement are not known.

11. During these events a number of Baluba villages east of Kabalo were reportedly burned by Conakats, and several Balubas killed.

12. On 11 April, a gendarmerie helicopter landed near the UN area and fired at some fishermen, wounding one. It was also reported that five gendarmes, who had escaped during the incidents of April 7/8, had been killed by Balubas. Gendarmes in the area south of Kabalo are harassing the Balubas and some women were reportedly shot at on their way to fetch water. Two gendarmes, one of them wounded, found by Balubas, were brought and given in charge to ONUC troops. On interrogation, they stated that the barge which had been sunk during the clashes of April 7/8 had carried 150 Congolese and four white gendarmerie, in addition to a crew of eleven. In Kabalo itself, some 3500 Balubas sought and obtained ONUC protection but it is now reported that the large majority of them have returned to their homes, leaving about 500 refugees as of April 14. Five kilometers north of Kabalo however, the gendarmes have been preventing villagers from going to their farms.

13. Katangese gendarmes are known to be pursuing military operations in other localities inhabited by Balubas but the vastness of the area in question and the lack of troops has prevented the ONUC Command in North Katanga from sending patrols except in the immediate vicinity of Kabalo, and therefore it is not possible to report more comprehensively on the civil war situation. Also, the authorities in Elisabethville are known to continue their imports of foreign personnel and to receive arms from abroad, as evidenced by the story of the aircraft intercepted in Leopoldville (cf. separate report on that incident).

14. Additional ONUC troops, consisting of one Company of Ethiopians and 400 Malaysians, were airlifted into Kabalo by April 10, and ONUC forces, thus reinforced, are now in firm control of the airfield and the railway station.

Elisabethville

15. Following the occupation of Manono by Katangese forces and their reported intention to move northwards to Kabalo, the Indian contingent was despatched from Leopoldville to Kamina on April 2. Consequent on this, serious incidents occurred at Elisabethville involving ONUC troops and Katangese gendarmes and Katangese mobs.

16. During the night of 3/4 April it was observed that the gendarmes for the third consecutive night had blocked the runway at the airport. They were asked by the ONUC Commander to clear the runway by 0100 hours. On their failure to do so the ONUC (Swedish) troops proceeded to remove the obstructions and to take full control of the airport; in the process, 28 gendarmes stationed at the airport were disarmed and later transported to their Headquarters in the morning where the arms were also returned.

17. On 4 April, gendarmerie reinforcements attempted to converge on the airfield but a road block was erected by ONUC troops. About noon Mr. Tshombe and ONUC officials met and agreed on joint control of the airfield. In the afternoon, however, Mr. Tshombe addressed a mass meeting at which he made^a violent anti-ONUC speech, following which he led a hostile crowd estimated at between 10,000 and 15,000 people towards the airport. This crowd, which included Belgians, men and women, was armed with machettes, stones, knives, spears, rifles and machine guns. At the airport, the demonstrators destroyed telephone cables, damaged glass windows and UN vehicles and tore the UN flag. ONUC troops, despite obvious provocation, abstained from opening fire and the crowd was subsequently dispersed by the Katangese police.

18. On the same day at 1530 hours a convoy of four ONUC cars following a Katangese police truck from the airfield to the town found itself in a street jammed with hostile demonstrators. The cars were attacked and considerable damage done to them before gendarmes arrived on the scene to rescue the ONUC personnel, five of whom were wounded.

19. On 5 April, ONUC reinforcements were flown into Elisabethville where Mr. Tshombe had issued strict orders to stores, shops, business concerns, restaurants, places of entertainment, etc., to have no dealings whatsoever with ONUC. As of 14 April these orders were still in force, except for a ban on all banking facilities for ONUC personnel imposed on 11 April and lifted on 13 April.

Kamina

20. Consequent to the occupation of Manono by Katangese gendarmes, one battalion of ONUC (Indian) troops was flown to Kamina Base and arrived there without incident. This has given rise to severe verbal attacks of ONUC by Mr. Tshombe and there are reports that the population is being constantly told that the arrival of Indian troops prefaces an "invasion" of Kamina by Indians. The orders issued in Elisabethville by Mr. Tshombe against co-operation with ONUC civil or military personnel have been similarly applied in Kamina district. Railway and telephone communications between Kamina Base and Kamina Ville have been cut. An attempt by Kamina Ville authorities to organize a demonstration against ONUC similar to that in Elisabethville has failed to materialize. On 11 April a deliberate low-level reconnaissance of Kamina Base and its installations was carried out by a Katangese aircraft. Instructions have been given to ONUC forces at the Base and representations have been made to Mr. Tshombe with a view to preventing the repetition of such overflights.

Albertville

21. No clashes have occurred in Albertville but ONUC forces in that city are denied their freedom of movement as the airfield is not open to ONUC aircraft. An economic boycott of ONUC personnel continues in Albertville.

OUTGOING CODE

TO : SECGEN, NEWYORK

FROM : ABBAS, LEO

DATE : 14 April 1961

No. : A-976

From Nwokedi-Gardiner Delegation. Draft text forwarded under No.A-969 formed the basis of a two and a half hours discussion with Kasa-Vubu, Ile0, Bomboko, Adoula and Kasongo. Following amendments were agreed:

1) Preamble now reads "As a Member of the United Nations, the Republic of the Congo is under an obligation to respect the Charter of the Organization and to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council unless the latter are contrary to the spirit of the Charter or constitute an infringement on the sovereignty of the Republic. Therefore the Republic of the Congo accepts the resolution of 21 February 1961 and takes note of the fact:"

2) New paragraph 1 reads : "That the United Nations reaffirms its respect for the sovereignty of the Republic of Congo in the implementation of the resolution";

3) Congolese Authorities accepted the rest with the exception of second sentence of paragraph 2 beginning with "taking into account" and ending with "resolution". We insisted on the inclusion of this paragraph and Ministers asked for time to give it further consideration. Meeting has been arranged for 15 April to discuss this paragraph. Grateful any instructions.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE

N.A.

Date : 14 April 1961

No : A-975

Tickher reports that a Yugoslav journalist who was working in Stanleyville has told him that he had been designated Yugoslav Chargé d'affaires but he had not formally taken up his duties. He has dropped his press activities.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 14 April 1961
No : A-974

S.A.

Following received to-day from Dumontet:

"Katangese authorities are reported to have assigned
6,000,000 Deutscher marks for purchase of Heinkel 28 which is an
old type German bomber."

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 14 April 1961
No : A-973

M.A.

Kamitatu came to see me yesterday to ask me for help about the lifting of the blockade which Leo and Equateur authorities have enforced against Orientale and also to ask if the UN could help them by sending medical and other supplies to Stanleyville. As my time was short yesterday I could not discuss the problem with him sufficiently, so he came again this evening. The information that he and we have now is that it is quite likely that the blockade will be lifted to-morrow. Kamitatu tells me that the agreement was signed by Ileo, Adoula and Dericoyard and it is only waiting now for the signature of Bomboko.

He volunteered information about the progress of their political discussions and he said that the Belgians are working hard to torpedo any agreement. He also said that the first part of Delvaux's note to the pressmen yesterday was aimed at torpedoing the agreement, but he said the efforts continue. They are looking for a neutral country at which delegations from Leo and Orientale can meet. Ethiopia was chosen as the first country to be approached and Kamitatu said that a request has already been sent. He asked me if the UN could use its good offices to prevent people like the Belgians from sabotaging the agreement. I told him about our stand as far as political discussions between Congolese politicians are concerned. We can give them assistance in transport and protection if all the parties concerned make written requests to us, but we can never enter into discussions about matters of substance and we can never act as go-betweens.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK
From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDVILLE
Date : 14 April 1961
No : A-972

H.A.

I had no reply to-day from Kasa-Vubu about the memorandum which I handed to him yesterday. Maybe it is a good thing he is delaying the answer because I had a telephone call from Scott this afternoon informing me that he had instructions to exert further pressure on Kasa-Vubu. Scott was also told that similar instructions were being issued to Timberlake. If they can see Kasa-Vubu to-morrow, their visits may be of help if they really show him even apparent conviction about the strength of our arguments. When Scott spoke to me, I asked him to ring up Timberlake and to come with him for a meeting with me this evening, but they have not yet turned up. It is now half past seven and both of them have their dinner engagements, so I may not see them till to-morrow morning.

OUTGOING CODE

To : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

From : ABBAS, LEOPOLDOVILLE

M.A.

Date : 14 April 1961

No : A-971

I am most grateful to Dayal for his letter of 11 April and for his kind words. Since no date has been set for his departure from New York and since he does not say how long he will stay in Geneva I feel strongly that I should bring my family to join me for the rest of my stay. We have had so much separation in the last two and half years that my children hardly know me. "Thou hast a duty towards thyself and thou hast a duty towards thy wife and children." Holy Koran. Will appreciate your urgent approval.

me
14/4

Outgoing Code

To: SecGen
From: Abbas
Date: 14 April 61
No.: A-970

M.A.

A-967

Reference my cable/concerning operations of Unations bank accounts in Katanga. Base Administrator at Kamina has so far been unable to contact bank in Kaminaville owing to blockade imposed by local authorities on exit from Base. However as bank account at Elisabethville is now in normal operation currency requirements for Kamina can be obtained from Elisabethville

cc: Mr. M. Leckie
Mr. C. Brackenbury