UNAMIR

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

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UNAMIR
94 APR -5 17 23

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : UNOMUR

FROM : BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE : 05 Apr 94

NUMBER : MIR-715

UNAMIR
94 APR -5 17 49

SUBJECT : **WEEKLY SITREP Nb 25, 29 Mar 94 - 04 Apr 94**

1. GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS

A. This week was relatively calm and passed without any major incident. The security situation at KIGALI is influenced by a curfew from 23.00 Hrs till 05.00 Hrs the next day. This curfew is installed by the government since the assassination of the Minister of Public Works, Mr. GATABAZI, on 23 Feb 94.

B. The formation of the Broad Based Transitional Government is still uncertain.

C. On 302200 Mar 94 the leader of the CDR youth organization (extreme Hutu) was killed during a gun fight at KIGALI. The next morning the CDR flags were hoisted half mast and there was a spontaneous demonstration by CDR supporters. Gendarmerie and UNCIVPOL held the situation under control.

Further escalation of the violence was expected but did not take place. Fear amongst the Tutsi population is limited and few Tutsi take shelter in churches and other public places during the night. The CDR flags are still hoisted half mast.

D. Sec KIGALI, UNCIVPOL and Gendarmerie conducted a first Cordon and Search operation at KACYIRO (KIGALI) on 010600 Apr 94. The operation was authorized by the Public Prosecutor and it was done in a legal manner. One rifle, some military documents and drug plants were captured. The procedures are being reviewed in order to conduct next cordon and search operation more smoothly.

2. POLITICAL

A. The political stalemate continues with the issue of the entry of the party of the Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR) into Transitional National Assembly (TNA) being the apparent remaining obstacle to the setting up of the remaining institutions. Eleven (11) of the fifteen (15) political parties legally established at the time of the signing of the Protocol on Power-sharing issued a statement expressing support for CDR's entry into the TNA.

B. The Special Representative together with the Representative of the Facilitator, the Papal Nuncio, and the Ambassadors of the observer countries to the Arusha peace process issued on 28 march a solemn declaration calling on the parties to resolve their differences.

C. The Declaration specifically endorsed the right of the CDR to be admitted in the TNA when it is established and called all political actors to refrain from bringing any new obstacle.

D. As the RPF expressed its reluctance to let the CDR enter the TNA, the aforementioned met on 29 march with a delegation of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). While not refusing the CDR the right to have one seat in the TNA as provided for in the Arusha Agreement, the RPF argued that the CDR had not followed the relevant provisions of article 61 of the Protocol on Power-sharing. The RPF further contented that the CDR had not renounced its practice of racial hatred.

E. The current Prime Minister also met with the aforementioned to register the RPF's reluctance about the CDR and CDR's refusal to issue a statement renouncing violence, as demanded by the RPF. She called on the international community to exert pressure on both the President of the Republic and the RPF to solve this new obstacle.

F. The Special Representative, who expressed his concern for the delay in the setting up of the transitional institutions, continues his mediation with all political leaders in order to find a solution to the current political impasse.

3. MILITARY

A. **FORCE HQ**

Normal staff duties were carried out. Force Comd, Maj Gen DALLAIRE, was three weeks out of station and returned in the mission area on Thursday 31 Mar 94. He was briefed on the current situation and on the main activities/incidents that occurred during his absence.

B. **UNOMUR SECTOR**

UNOMUR operational area is calm. On 311500 Mar 94 acting cmo held a meeting with NRA Army Comd, Maj Gen MUGISHA, on the issue of restrictions of UNOMUR Ptl at the UGANDA/ZAIRE border. Acting CMO agreed with the statement of the General that UNOMUR should not monitor this border because it is not forseen in the UNOMUR mandate and stated that UNOMUR is only using this area in order to reach the UGANDA/RWANDA border in that particular area. After having studied thoroughly the map the general agreed that the UNOMUR activities are in accordance with the mandate. The general agreed to impose no longer restrictions on UNOMUR movement in this regard. The second helicopter BELL-212 arrived in the UNOMUR mission area. During the period 77 patrols including 19 night patrols were carried out. Details of vehicle and personnel border crossings at GATUNA are as follows:

Location	Nb of vehicles		Nb of people	
	To RWANDA	To UGANDA	To RWANDA	To UGANDA
GATUNA	83 (1) 21 (2)	58 7 (3)	324	178
KYANIKA	/	/	/	/
LUBIRIZI	/	/	61 REFUGEES	/

(1) 13 Ton Maize, 10 Ton Beans, 7 Bags of Rice, 9 Oil Drums and 1 Lorry engine
(2) World Food Programme trucks/vehicles (WFP)
(3) ICRC

C. **DMZ SECTOR**

The situation in the DMZ area was calm. Extensive patrolling was carried out by the six UNMO teams and BYUBAT. Insufficient number of vehicles and lack of accommodation hamper the operations.

D. **KIGALI SECTOR**

Conducted 351 vehicle and 67 foot Ptl in KIGALI city in order to ensure Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA). Established daily 6 check points at different places in KWSA. Random patrols and check points saturation being monitored by Force HQ. Tunisian Coy(-) ensured the location of the RPF battalion and RPF VIPs at KIGALI city (CND compound). The private residences of the prime minister, the prime minister designate, the president of the constitutional court and five opposition ministers are being secured by Sec KIGALI until the installation of the BBTG. Operational situation of RUTBAT improved significantly since their vehicles and equipments arrived in the mission area.

E. **MILOB GROUP**

(1) **MILOB Group HQ** A total of seven escorts were conducted the past week. Milob Gp HQ co-ordinated deployment of UNMOs for the installation of BBTG which did not take place.

(2) **RPF Sector** Routine Ptl and monitoring missions were carried out. Many dignitaries attended the RPF easter celebrations at MULINDI on 03 apr 94. Discussions are still ongoing regarding the installation of a repeater in their sector.

(3) **RGF Sector** About 200 Rwandese returnees from camp KIGARAMA (B4207), when ordered to leave the camp, mounted a road block in the area and asked food from Red Cross. Also CDR flags were hoisted half mast at RUHENGERI.

(4) **South Sector** The political impasse concerns the population at BUTARE. People are apprehensive that hostilities could start again. The past week the influx of Burundese refugees increased. On 28 Mar 94 the authorities of the KIBUYE prefecture held a meeting to discuss the famine problem in that area. Sec Comd made

Recce for SRSG's visit to this region on 07 Mar 94. Refugees in GITIZI camp (C8510) threatened UNHCR personnel because they were not happy with the current food distribution system.

F. **FORCE LOG, MED AND ENGINEERS ELEMENTS**

The engineer Coy is deployed in the DMZ area at BYUMBA. Their major equipments arrived from BANGLADESH. It seems that there are many deficiencies. However the unit is checking the equipment and preparing them for use. Mine detectors also arrived. FC tasked the unit to study and to test the feasibility of mine clearance in Rwanda with this equipment. It is revealed that this equipment is partially effective and that complementary equipment is necessary. The field operations division (FOD) will be asked for appropriate action.

G. **UNAMIR FORCE STRENGTH**

UNAMIR strength is almost at its maximum which is 2,548. Current strength is 2,519. All troops are on ground and few observers are yet to arrive. Please find enclosed the weekly personnel state as of 050800 Apr 94.

H. **MEDICAL AND HEALTH STATE**

The UNAMIR field hospital is installed in King FAYCAL hospital in KIGALI. They provide medical care to UNAMIR personnel and local population. The hospital has a serious lack of supplies. About 40 UNAMIR personnel and 30 locals receive normal treatment on a weekly basis. Medical supplies are urgently required. Discussions are ongoing with ICRC/UNICEF in getting their support for delivering supplies to UNAMIR for treatment of the local population by UNAMIR field hospital. It is observed that the number of patients with malaria is on the increase. UNAMIR personnel is asked to use the preventive medicine provided by the UN.

4. <u>UNCIVPOL</u>

A. CIVPOL continues to carry out mixed patrols together with Gendarmerie.

B. <u>Incidents</u>

(1) On 291820 Mar 94 a person with major injuries was found by a UNCIVPOL Police Monitoring Team (PMT). He was attacked

by unknown bandits and brought to Kigali Hospital.

(2) 2919.25 Mar 94 a PMT heard an explosion near Gendarmerie (GdN) Brigade Remera. They went, together with GdN, on the spot and found 2 injured persons. One grenade was thrown at the "NOUVEAU MARCHE DE REMERA". The GdN suspect, that there was a INTERHAMWE meeting in progress. The 2 injured persons have been brought to Kigali Hospital by CIVPOL.

(3) On 290800 Mar 94 at KICUKIRO, one person tried to get in the house of the president of the M.R.N.D. He was arrested by a Gendarme who fired one round. The man had no ID card with him. GdN is still investigating.

(4) On 290900 Mar 94 at KIMIHURURA, a grenade was thrown in a bar by a man who was stabbed by some locals. He was the only injured person and was evacuated to the Kigali Hospital by MILOBS.

(5) On 3015.30 Hr, the PMT of KICUKIRO/GIKONDO monitored a peaceful demonstration of students of the Gikondo University, together with the commander of the GdN KICUKIRO. About 500 students demonstrated for autonomy for their university and against lack of electricity. There were also some road blocks but the situation was calm.

(6) On the 292100 Mar 94 two hand grenades exploded in the area of KIMISAGARA. A woman had major injuries out of this explosion. Investigations are still going on.

(7) On 302200 Mar 94 the leader of the CDR -youth organization was killed in a gun fight between some CDR members and the GdN, near the mosque of NYAMIRAMBO. Investigation by CIVPOL started on 31 March 94.

(8) On 310515 Mar 94 there was a fire clearance with grenades at the same place as in 2.1.6. There were several people injured. CIVPOL is investigating.

(9) On 302100 Mar 94, the bodies of two people, who were murdered with machetes, were found in the area of NYAMIRAMBO. PMT will investigate.

(10) On 302200 Mar 94, two armed persons (Tutsi) were arrested and brought to the prison of KICUKIRO. UNAMIR was asked by RPF liaison Offr to contact the GdN and to release them from prison. CIVPOL started the investigation, but it is not the task of Civpol to tell the GdN to release them.

(11) In the night of 31/01 Apr 94 there were four grenade explosions. Tree in NYIAKABANDA. The GdN does not know the exact location. There were no victims and no witnesses. The last grenade exploded near the GdN station at KICUKIRO. The

commander of the brigade was hurt. CIVPOL is still investigating this matter.

(12) On 01 Apr 94, an unidentified drunken local policeman in uniform, armed with his service gun, threatened some people in the neighborhood of REMERA. He was arrested by GdN.

(13) On the 01 Apr 94, CIVPOL was informed that there were INTERAHAMWE people preparing hand grenade attacks against the population. CIVPOL went to the place together with local GdN.

(14) In the morning of 02 Apr 94, CIVPOL was informed by KIBAT that one of their patrols found the body of a strangled man at the road junction in KICUKIRO. CIVPOL is investigating this matter.

(15) On the 031335 Apr 94, Civpol got the message from that there were troubles going on in NYAMIRAMBO (commune of BILYOGO). It was presumed that it were fights between clans. The GdN of NYAMIRAMBO was informed and went on the spot.

C. ***Miscellaneous***:

(1) During the weekly meeting between CIVPOL and staff of the GdN, on 28.03.94, in CIVPOL HQ, the insufficient co-operation in important investigations, like the murder of minister GATABAZI, were discussed. The Chief of Staff of the GdN, agreed that the co-operation between both sides was not free and open. Finally the Chief of Staff stated, that he will do his best, for the setting up of better co-ordinations in the future. CIVPOL is very doubtful on this last statement, because not only the GdN is actually involved in the investigations, but also the Minister of Defence and the Army and on the other hand, the Minister of Justice who intervenes also.

(2) On the 282145 Mar 94, CIVPOL Liaison Section received the information that the live of the Prosecutor of the Republic is in danger. He arrested the bar manager of the bar "Las Vegas" (in presence of CIVPOL officers). The arrested man is a member of the PSD Party and local leader of the INTERAHAMWE. He was arrested for prohibition and is suspected to know more about the assault on Mr. GATBAZI. The prosecutor is now receiving threats from different sides. They put him under pressure and want him to release that man. The prosecutor refuses, because the arrest is legal. He made an official request for protection which has been granted.

(3) The commander of GdN NYAMIRAMBO informed CIVPOL about the message of the RTLM. RTLM said, that the GdN of NYAMIRAMBO arrested people for more than one week for ignoring the the curfew.

(4) There was a meeting between CIVPOL and the commander of the CRCD. He was informed by the minister of defense on new orientations about the assassination of late Minister GATABAZI. The information is being checked and will be incorporated in the final investigation report.

(5) Concerning the vehicle full of ammunition (the one that had a car crash near the CND, reported as per daily sitrep 06/07 Mar 94) CIVPOL got a written permission from the Public Prosecutor to explode the Ammo. The EOD team was informed and the disposal took place on 01 Apr 94.

(6) Early in the morning of 01 Apr 94 there was a weapon search action by the GdN together with some CIVPOL teams. The operation was a succes.

D. Current Manpower

60 Police Officers. (Unchanged).

5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

The logistic environment is still difficult. Equipment arrived from UNTAC but the logistic situation remains difficult due to delays in delivery vehicles as most of them require medium to major repairs. Radios are also in short supply. Operational status from BANGLADESH contingent has somehow improved due to the arrival of their vehicles/equipment. The logistics and engineer company vehicles and equipments are being distributed. It was also brought to FOD's attention that there are no spare parts and no mechanics available for the APCs (BTR-80) provided by BANGLADESH. For the moment three BTR-80 out of eight are not operational.

6. CONCLUSION

We passed the scheduled installation date for the BBTG by more than 95 days. This situation is deteriorating significantly and all UNAMIR resources are being used to the maximum of their availability. The rhythm of activity will require a reassessment of troops to tasks in order to ensure a sustainable capability of the Force over the next month. Intense diplomatic efforts are continuing to facilitate the setting up of the BBTG. Joint Military Commission meetings are also continuing to maintain communication between the two forces (RGF and RPF). Looking ahead, UNAMIR is preparing the ground for the Disengagement, Demobilization and Integration of thr Forces.

7. REGARDS

UNAMIR

ANNEX 'A'

DATE: 5 APR 94

WEEKLY MILITARY COMPONENT PERSONNEL STATE

TIME: 0800 HRS

SL NO	COUNTRY	TROOPS										MILOBS	GRAND TOTAL
		INF BN	LOG COY	ENGR COY	MED COY	MOVCON PL	MP SEC	DMZ COY(-)	SUB TOTAL	STAFF	TOTAL		
1	AUSTRIA											15	15
2	BANGLADESH	370	200	203	50	19	11		853	30	883	54	937
3	BELGIUM	412							412	16	428		428
4	BOSTWANA											9	9
5	BRAZIL	3							3		3	10	13
6	CANADA									1	1	1	2
7	CONGO											26	26
8	EGYPT											10	10
9	FIJI											1	1
10	GHANA	798							798	19	817	24	841
11	HUNGARY											4	4
12	MALAWI											5	5
13	MALI											10	10
14	NETHERLAND											10	10
15	NIGERIA											15	15
16	POLAND											5	5
17	RUSSIA											15	15
18	SENEGAL											39	39
19	SLOVAKIA											5	5
20	TOGO											15	15
21	TUNISIA							60	60		60		60
22	URUGUAY											25	25
23	ZIMBABWE											29	29
	GRAND TOTAL	1583	200	203	50	19	11	60	2126	66	2192	327	2519

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : UNOMUR

FROM : BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE : 29 MAR 94

NUMBER :

SUBJECT : **WEEKLY SITREP Nb 24, 22 MAR 94 - 28 MAR 94**

1. **GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS**

A. The past week the situation in the mission area was calm. However still tension is observed on the increase after a fourth unsuccessful attempt to install the broad based transitional government and the transitional national assembly on 25 Mar 94. UNAMIR took necessary security and protocol arrangements for the planned swearing-in ceremonies. The ceremony did not come to a conclusion because of disagreement amongst RPF and some of the parties. All authorities including the president of the Republic, except the RPF reported for the ceremony.

B. On 241800 Mar 94 A/FC in consultation with SRSG decided to change the UNAMIR Force readiness status from yellow to red in view of the swearing-in ceremonies for the Broad Based Transitional Government and Transitional Institutions on Friday 25 Mar 94. State of alertness continues in anticipation of possible installation of BBTG on Monday 28 Mar 94. But the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) could not be installed and UNAMIR continues to pursue all efforts to unblock the situation.

C. MAIN INCIDENTS

On 221545 Mar 94, RPF Chairman escorted by 16 RPF Armed soldiers went out of the CND compound without UNAMIR armed escort. After some time the UNAMIR armed chased and caught up with the convoy. RPF is often impatient when they request for escorts. On 23 Mar 94 at about 0300 Hrs four unidentified armed miscreants attacked the chief of Kambuga Sector (A7626) and his wife. The victims sustained injuries and admitted at Kirambo Hospital. Attackers used explosives. On 232000 Mar 94 a grenade exploded at Mimuli (B2840). Out of the explosion six persons were killed and two injured. The injured pers were evacuated to the hospital at Ngarama. Investigation ongoing. During the night of 23/24 Mar 94 unknown burglars broke into a storehouse at Kigali International Airport. They removed two UN-Mail Bags and one Belgium Diplomatic Mail Bag and ripped open letters. Civpol is investigating.

D. Main events of the week for UNAMIR Military Division are: (1) On 221430 Mar 94 A/FC visited the MILOB Teams at Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. Also he visited Byubat HQ at Byumba. He received an operational briefing by DMZ Sector Comd. One Byubat Coy (+), about 200 troops, were transferred from DMZ Sec to Kigali Sec (Operation Boomerang). (2) On 221700 Mar 94 an operational briefing was conducted by the staffs of Ops Branch to the Deputy Asst Secy of the African Bureau of the US State Department, Mrs. Prudence Bushnell, and the Director of the office of Central Africa, H.E. The Ambassador Mrs. Arlene Render, Accompanied by H.E. The Ambassador of the United States Mr. David Rawson and the counselor of the US Embassy, Mrs. Joyce leader. A/FC presided over the briefing. (3) On 230800 Mar 94 Force HQ received a US Delegation led by Dy Asst Secy of the Department of Defence Responsible for humanitarian and refugee affairs, MS patricia Irvin, Lt Col Bruce Bartolain, the plans and policy Directorate Officer for the Middle East/African affairs and MS Yael Aronoff, the special Asst to the Dy Asst Secy. They were briefed on humanitarian activities and mine clearance. (4) The Defence Minister of Rwanda paid a visit to RUTBAT from 1100 Hrs to 1400 Hrs on 23 Mar 94. He was accompanied by the Chief of the RGF, Chief of the Gendarmerie and Senior Officers of the Government Forces. The Defence Minister was received by the Acting Force Commander, Kigali Sector Commander and RUTBAT Commander. (5) On 241500 Mar 94 A non-denominational service was organized for late Mr. J.P. Stevelinck, Security Officer UNAMIR, and late Ms. Shireen Causey, Secretary to the CAO. SRSG, A/FC and CAO attended. (6)

On 26 Mar 94 was the 23rd Independence Day of Bangladesh. SRSG, A/FC, RGF Representatives, RPF Representatives and other VIPs attended a ceremony organized by the Bangladesh Contingent on this occasion.

2. **POLITICAL**

A. The main political events continued to focus on efforts to install the transitional institutions. The SRSG intensified his contacts and consultations to this end with the various political leaders as well as with members of the diplomatic corps, including in particular the representative of the Facilitator and the observer states to the Rwandese peace process.

B. During the period under review, there were two unsuccessful attempts to set up the institutions, on 25 and 28 March. Both efforts failed when agreement could not be reached on the request by CDR to be included in the institutions. It is to be noted that CDR, which had previously opposed the Arusha Peace Agreement, has subsequently stated its support for that Agreement and applied for inclusion in the institutions envisaged under the Agreement.

C. On 28 March, the SRSG signed a joint statement with the representative of the Facilitator, the Ambassadors of the observer states (Belgium, France, Germany and United States, Burundi, Uganda, Zaire) and the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, in which they appealed to Rwandese political leaders to reach a compromise which, inter alia, would allow CDR to participate in the transitional institutions, and thus allow those institutions to be set up without further conditions.

D. Also during the period under review, the SRSG received at UNAMIR headquarters the Deputy United States Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs who, accompanied by the Director of the Central African Office in the State Department, was on an official visit to Rwanda.

3. **MILITARY**

A. **FORCE HQ**

Normal staff duties were carried out. On 251700 Mar 94 A/FC called for a staff meeting to debrief the UNAMIR deployment for the swearing-in ceremony and gave orders on subsequent actions to be followed in anticipation of the installation of BBTG.

B. **UNOMUR SECTOR**

The general situation in the UNOMUR area continues to be calm. There is no significant change. Election campaigns in UGANDA followed by rallies were organized. All went peacefully. The British High Commissioner in Uganda accompanied by his wife paid a courtesy visit to Mission HQ on 21 Mar 94. During the period under review total 73 patrols including 21 night patrols were carried out. The following border crossing were observed:

OPS	NO OF VEHICLE CROSSED THE BORDER		NO OF PEOPLE CROSSED THE BORDER		WITH LOAD
	TO RWANDA	TO UGANDA	TO RWANDA	TO UGANDA	
KATUNA	34(*) 44(WFP) 32(ICRC)	43	59	184	28 TONS OF MAIZE(3) 19 TONS OF BEANS

Most of the movements were of routine nature. All veh carried food and supplies. The attitude of the NRA and RPF towards UNOMUR ptl found to be normal along the border. Operational activities could not be maximized due to shortage of vehicles and Absence of helicopters.They received two (02) helicopters on 24 and 25 Mar 94. One of them went to Kigali on 27 Mar 94. Eleven (11) vehicles have arrived at Kampala and expected to reach Kabale by next week.

C. **DMZ SECTOR**

The situation in the DMZ area was calm. Extensive patrolling was carried out by the six UNMO teams and BYUBAT. The following incidents occurred: (1) On 22 Mar 94, at about 1100 hrs, BYUBAT ptl base at NGARAMA (B2628) heard 10 rounds small arms fire from the gen area of GR (B2527). Ptls confirm RGF were testing wpns on Hill-Top at GR (B2522). (2) At 1230 Hrs on 22 Mar 94, a loud explosing was heard 300M Ne of B Coy HQ at NGARAM (B2829) from the Dir of GR (B288288). Ptls and EOD sent to spot suspected fragments of device to be HE bomb. Samples of fragments collected for further investigations. (3) On 23 Mar 94, Comd of RGF Bn at NYAGATARE reported of RPF presence at WARUFU (B320517) across the DMZ line. Report was being investigated. (4) Letters received on 23 Mar 94, indicated RPF planned activities as fols:

(a) Intended to carry out a peaceful demonstration on 26 Mar 94 in protest against current political impasse by marching from CYUNGO to KINIHIRA. A protest has been sent to RPF by DMZ Sector not to carry out the planned demonstration.

(b) Deploy along ridge KINIHIRA and within CYUNGO community pending any interference by the RGF.

(c) Houses of Mr. HUSIRIKARI and KARYABWITE at KINIHIRA as well as that of Mr. ALLOY NDIMUKIHE at KABAKABWA were earmarked by RPF as grouping points.

(5) Complaints received from residents of CIABAYAGA (B3243) by team F indicates that 2 locals were molested by RGF soldiers. (6) BYUBAT EOD team DML fol at NGARAMA on 21 Mar 94:

(a) 2 x M26 HE hand grenade.

(b) 1 x M75 HE hand grenade.

(c) 1 x M40 HE hand grenade.

(d) 1 x 60MM HE Bomb.

(e) 1 x 60MM Mor Fuse.

(f) 1 x Apers.

(7) RPF representative at NGARAMA, MR. ALPHONSE meretse visited BYUBAT Coy at KINIHIRA and intimated that RPF does not intend org demonstrations on 26 Mar 94 But rather wants to hold political rallies to know the views of the public on current political issues. He was told to pass through the proper channel with such proposals. (8) Force Engr Coy provided security at NGONDORE, continued with repair works and recovered qty 25 rounds small arms ammo (7.62) from A house adjacent to the meeting place. (9) Force Engr Coy carried out road recce from BYUMBA to KAGANDU - BURENGA - KARAMA - TUMBA and KIRAMBO.

D. **KIGALI SECTOR**

Conducted 347 vehicles and 51 foot patrols in Kigali City in order to ensure Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA). Established 34 check points at different places in KWSA. Random patrols and check points saturation being monitored by Force HQ. Tunisian Coy (-) ensured the protection of the RPF battalion and

RPF VIPs at CND complex. BYUBAT GOLF provided security to the Force HQ, Kigali Sector HQ and Private residences of the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister Designate, the President of the constitutional court and five opposition ministers and the residence of SRSG, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Social Affairs and to the residence of Mr. NGULINZIRA BONIFACE and Mr. NGANGO. Kigali Sector also provided 46 UNMOs escorts and 46 armed escort during this period. Operational situation of RUTBAT improved significantly since their vehicles and equipments arrived in the mission area.

E. **MILOB GROUP**

(1) General Situation. This week was marked by the preparation for the installation of the BBTG which as usual failed to take place. The majority of the population is disappointed with this failure. The overall situation is calm. Due to the recent clashes in BURUNDI the number of refugees in the camps in the south of RWANDA is increasing. The situation is still under control of the local, UN and NGO authorities. UNMOs are monitoring closely.

(2) MILOB GP HQ. CMO met Gen KAGAME on 21 Mar 94 at MULINDI. He discussed general situation and the difficulties faced by UNMOs since the restriction on the free movement last week. Gen KAGAME assured the CMO of his co-operation and that of his troops. MILOB HQ Staff and Sector Staff conducted familiarization program with 5 newly arrived MILOBs from MALAWI.

(3) RPF SECTOR. Changes in appointments and promotions have taken place in RPF hierarchy. Lt Col JAMES has replaced Lt Col CEASER as Ops Officer in Gen HQ RPF. Lt Col CEASER assumed command of a Bn. US delegation led by the Dy Asst Secy of the Department of Defence responsible for humanitarian and refugee affairs, MS PATRICIA IRVIN met with RPF Chairman and Chairman of the RPA High Command on 231130 Mar 94. The delegation also included Lt Col BRUCE BARTOLAIN, the plans and Policy Directorate Officer for the Middle East/African Affairs and Ms YAEL ARONOFF, the special Asst to the Dy Asst Secy. The delegation also visited Milob HQ in MULINDI. Sector Comd briefed on operational and refugee situation. The RPF soldiers seemed to be disappointed on the failure to install the BBTG. On 26 Mar 94 Gen KAGAME was observed by UNMOs talking to the soldiers at NGONDORE check point probably to boost maorale.

(4) RGF SECTOR. On 23 Mar 94 refugees at camp sake D 4354 demonstrated against a catholic nun, whom they accused to be responsible for inadequate distribution of food in the camp. No casualties reported. On 23 Mar 94 a demonstration of approx 1000 locals took place in GISENYI. The demonstration was against the refugees from UGANDA and their use of the land of the Gisenyi Citizens. A similar demonstration took place on the 24 mar 94 near the post office because of the same reason. The original owners want their land back. Requested local authorities to take appropriate measures. No casualties reported.

(5) SOUTH SECTOR. On 25 Mar 94 team 705 visited refugee camps NGOZI F6990, KARAMA F7096, AKANKUBA F76099 border check point NGOZI. Team obtained information about influx of refugees from BURUNDI to RWANDA. The reason for the influx was the recent massacres in BURUNDI in which according to refugees and international news several hundred people have been killed. No major problems reported from the camps. Following VIPs arrived in refugee camp of BUGARAMA in the prefecture of CYANGUGU: Mr. LOSANZE Augustine, Mr. HAKIZIMANA DEOGRANY, BOTH POLITICAL ADVISER to the Burundese President, Debutee Mr. NDIKAMANA Nastal, the Secretary of the Assembly and the wife of the Presidents Cabinet with children.

F. **FORCE LOG, MED AND ENGINEERS ELEMENTS**

(1) The Engineer Coy is deployed in the DMZ area at BYUMBA. Their major equipments have arrived from BANGLADESH. It seems that there are still deficiencies. However the unit is checking the equipment and preparing them for use. Mine detectors also arrived. FC tasked the unit to study and to test the feasibility of mine clearance in Rwanda with this equipment. If it is revealed that this equipment is not effective the field operations division (FOD) will be asked for appropriate action.

(2) Log Coy provided security to the UNAMIR workshop and UNAMIR supply and communication warehouse. Dry, fresh and frozen food were issued to the various components of UNAMIR as usual. One section (10 drivers) carried out training on the local road and traffic system.

G. **UNAMIR FORCE STRENGTH**

UNAMIR strength is almost at its maximum which is 2,548. Current strength is 2,538. All troops are on

ground and few observers are yet to arrive. Please find enclosed the weekly personnel state as of 290800 Mar 94.

H. **MEDICAL AND HEALTH STATE**

The UNAMIR field hospital is installed in King Faycal hospital. They provide medical care to UNAMIR personnel and local population. The hospital has a serious lack of supplies. About 94 UNAMIR personnel and 56 locals receive normal treatment on a weekly basis. Problems occur with the local population in the critical periods. They have confidence in the UNAMIR field hospital and are not willing to be transferred to the governmental hospital (KIGALI Hospital) after their emergency treatment. The Kigali hospital also demonstrates no positive attitude in getting these patients. They don't answer the phone and deny sending ambulances to get the patients. solutions to this problem are being negotiated. medical supplies are urgently required. Discussions are ongoing with ICRC/UNICEF in getting their support for delivering supplies to UNAMIR for treatment of the local population by UNAMIR field hospital. It is observed that the umber of patients with malaria is on the increase. A/FC issued a memorandum to motivate the UNAMIR personnel to use the preventive medicine provided by the UN.

4. **UNCIVPOL**

A. CIVPOL carried out mixed patrols together with Gendarmerie in the various places in Kigali City.

B. Incidents

(1) On 21 Mar 94 between 1110 Hrs and 1205 Hrs there was an illegal manifestation going on workers of ELEKTROGAS, in Kigali town, because they had not been paid since long. The Gendarmerie intervened and struck the demonstration apart by the means of teargas and batons. The strikers agreed to go with the local Gendarmerie to the Pirmature, to discus their matter. The whole manifestation had no political background.

(2) There is a general mobilization of security forces in Kigali to monitor, manifestations planned by some political parties, which do not agree with the planned BBTG.

(3) On 21 Mar 94 at 0900 Hrs a journalist, IYUBAHUMPATSE Jean Baptiste, who is working for the French BBC Service, was assaulted by locals in his Gikondo residence. The reason was for an article that he had written about the political situation in RWANDA. The CIVPOL - PMT asked the Bde Comd of Kicukiro to patrol the neighborhood.

(4) The Gendarmerie of NYARUGENGE, arrested two (2) RGF soldiers who tried to sell a weapon in Kigali centre on 20 Mar 94. Weapon: Rifle R4 5,56mm Nr 784706. The rifles have been confiscated by the Gendarmerie.

(5) In the night from 22 Mar 94 to 23 Mar 94, the Gendarmerie from Nyamirambo arrested 4 people, because they were in possession of one (1) hand grenade.

(6) On 25 Mar 94 at 1800 hrs CIVPOL received message that one (1) local civilian was injured while cutting grass near a house in KICURIRO. While cutting the grass his tool must have struck a hand grenade and exploded. The man received injury.

(7) In the night of 24 Mar 94 at 2250 Hrs a Gendarmerie patrol arrested a local police guard at Petrowanda station in NYAMIRAMBO. The guard was on duty, but was drunked. He threatened 10 persons with his kalnachnikov (AK-47). The patrol secured the gun and the police guard was given to the prefecture de KIGALI NYAMIRAMBO Gdn for investigation.

(8) On 27 Mar 94 a local boy was beaten up by unknown attackers near the CND for unknown reason. He was seriously injured and brought to the FAYSAL HOSPITAL for treatment. This matter will be handled by a CIVPOL - PMT.

C. MISCELLANEOUS

(1) CIVPOL has been informed of the increasing drug problem in and around Kigali. Most of the drugs are being distributed and consumed in "Kigali Night" and the "Club Sportive Kigali".

(2) On 25 Mar 94 at 1500 hrs a meeting was held in the office of the Public Prosecutor concerning the killing of the Minister of Public Work. From CIVPOL: Inspec KRANZL, Comm. ASSIH and Maj DELPORT were present at the meeting.The prosecutor informed CIVPOL about the new information and statements. Then CIVPOL went together with the prosecutor to the bar "LAS VEGAS" to make an investigation. As this bar is an illegal brothel the prosecutor arrested the owner on the scene. The person was brought to Kigali prison.

5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

The logistic environment is still difficult. Equipment arrived from UNTAC but the logistic situation remains difficult due to delays in deliver vehicles as most of them require repairs. Radios are also in short supply. Operational status from BANGLADESH contingent has improved due to the arrival of their vehicles/equipment. The logistics and engineer company vehicles and equipments are being distributed. There are however deficiencies. It was also brought to FOD's attention that there are no spare parts and no mechanics available for the APCs (BTR-80) provided by BANGLADESH. For the moment three BTR-80 out of eight are not operational. UNAMIR is expecting the arrival of the helicopters. On 24 and 25 Mar 94 two helicopters arrived at Kabale. Out of two, one helicopter came to Kigali on 27 Mar 94. This operational deficiency in UNAMIR and UNOMUR will be taken care of upon delivery of all helicopters.

6. CONCLUSION

We passed the scheduled installation date for the BBTG by more than 87 days. this situation is deteriorating significantly and all UNAMIR resources are being used to the maximum of their availability. The rhythm of activity will require a reassessment of troops to tasks in order to ensure a sustainment capability of the Force over the next month.

7. REGARDS

UNAMIR

ANNEX 'A'

DATE: 29 MAR 94

WEEKLY MILITARY COMPONENT PERSONNEL STATE

TIME: 0800 HRS

SL NO	COUNTRY	TROOPS										MILOBS	GRAND TOTAL
		INF BN	LOG COY	ENGR COY	MED COY	MOVCON PL	MP SEC	DMZ COY(-)	SUB TOTAL	STAFF	TOTAL		
1	AUSTRIA											15	15
2	BANGLADESH	370	200	203	50	19	11		853	29	882	59	941
3	BELGIUM	412							412	16	428		428
4	BOSTWANA											9	9
5	BRAZIL	3							3		3	10	13
6	CANADA									1	1	1	2
7	CONGO											26	26
8	EGYPT											10	10
9	FIJI											1	1
10	GHANA	798							798	19	817	24	841
11	HUNGARY											4	4
12	MALAWI											5	5
13	MALI											10	10
14	NETHERLAND											9	9
15	NIGERIA											15	15
16	POLAND											5	5
17	ROMANIA	5							5		5		5
18	RUSSIA											15	15
19	SENEGAL											49	49
20	SLOVAKIA											5	5
21	TOGO											15	15
22	TUNISIA							60	60	1	61		61
23	URUGUAY											25	25
24	ZIMBABWE											29	29
	GRAND TOTAL	1588	200	203	50	19	11	60	2131	66	2197	341	2538

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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN - 99

UNAMIR
94 MAR 29 13 49

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

A: ANNAN, NATIONS UNIES, NEW YORK
GOULDING, NATIONS UNIES, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, NATIONS UNIES, NEW YORK

DE: BOOH-BOOH, MINUAR, KIGALI

DATE: 29 MARS 1994

OBJET: EFFORTS D'INSTALLATION DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA TRANSITION

NUMERO: MUK-676

NBRE DE PAGES: 2

Après la publication officielle et la communication aux partis politiques de leur position conjointe dont copie vous a été transmise le 28 mars, le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général, le Nonce apostolique, les Ambassadeurs des pays occidentaux et les Ambassadeurs et Chargé d'affaires du Groupe africain ont rencontré ce matin le Front Patriotique Rwandais pour, une fois de plus, tenter de trouver une solution au dernier obstacle à la mise en place des institutions de la transition. Cet obstacle, comme vous le savez, est l'admission de la Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR) au sein de l'Assemblée Nationale de la transition. Le Front Patriotique Rwandais était représenté à la réunion de ce matin par son Premier Vice-Président, son Ministre de la Jeunesse dans le Gouvernement de la transition à base élargie et deux autres hauts responsables politiques.

Il a été demandé au Représentant Spécial, tout au début de la réunion, de faire une déclaration liminaire sur les négociations en cours et leur état d'avancement. Le Front Patriotique, dans sa déclaration, a maintenu sa position à savoir que les institutions de la transition devraient être mises en place sans la CDR, quitte à ce que l'Assemblée Nationale de la transition statue dans un délai raisonnable sur la demande d'admission de ce parti. Le Front Patriotique a par ailleurs estimé qu'étant donné la confusion qui règne sur la position du Président concernant les dissensions internes au sein du MDR et du PDI, il était indispensable d'obtenir de lui des garanties que le règlement préalable des problèmes au sein de ces partis ne serait pas utilisé comme condition à la mise en place des institutions de la transition.

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- CODE -

Cette réunion avec le Front Patriotique Rwandais a été suivie d'une rencontre avec le Premier Ministre du Gouvernement de la transition. Le Premier Ministre, en convoquant cette réunion, souhaitait être informé des développements politiques les plus récents suite à la publication de la position conjointe de la communauté internationale. Elle voulait également faire le point de la situation de ses contacts avec les partis politiques rwandais et le Front Patriotique. A cet effet, le Premier Ministre nous a déclaré être d'avis que les problèmes au sein du MDR et du PDI, une fois réglés, il ne resterait plus qu'à convaincre le Front Patriotique de la nécessité de permettre la participation de la CDR dans l'Assemblée Nationale de la transition. D'après le Premier Ministre, ses contacts avec le Front Patriotique Rwandais ne lui laissent aucune perspective de dénouement heureux de la question de la CDR. Etant donné cette situation, le Premier Ministre a lancé un appel à la communauté internationale afin que celle-ci poursuive ses contacts avec le Front Patriotique Rwandais et le Président de la République. Pour le Premier Ministre, toute solution pouvant conduire à la mise en place des institutions de la transition serait la bienvenue. C'est sur cette note que la réunion a pris fin, étant entendu que les négociations se poursuivront avec le Front Patriotique, le Président de la République et les responsables politiques de la CDR.

En dépit de tous ces obstacles sérieux, le Représentant Spécial estime nécessaire, avec le concours des Ambassadeurs des pays occidentaux, du Nonce apostolique, et des Ambassadeurs du Groupe africain, de poursuivre les négociations avec le Front Patriotique et le Président de la République en vue de trouver une issue heureuse à l'impasse actuelle.

UNAMIR
1994 MAR 29 14 : 02

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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN-101

UNAMIR 1994 MAR 29 17 - 01

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

A: ANNAN, NATIONS UNIES, NEW YORK
GOULDING, NATIONS UNIES, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, NATIONS UNIES, NEW YORK

DE: for BOOH-BOOH, MINUAR, KIGALI

DATE: 29 MARS 1994

OBJET: EFFORTS D'INSTALLATION DES INSTITUTIONS DE LA TRANSITION

NUMERO: MIR-650

NBRE DE PAGES: 3

Me référant à mon câble confidentiel no MIR-676 du 29 mars, je vous prie de trouver ci-joint copie de la lettre que le Président de la République rwandaise m'a adressée, suite à la déclaration conjointe que je lui ai fait parvenir au nom de la communauté internationale. Cette lettre a pour but de satisfaire l'une des conditions exigées par le Front Patriotique Rwandais, à savoir que le Président devra donner des garanties par écrit qu'il ne fera pas du règlement des problèmes au sein du MDR et du PDI un préalable à la mise en place des institutions de la transition. J'ai transmis l'engagement du Président à Mme le Premier Ministre, au Premier Ministre Désigné, au Front Patriotique et aux Représentants de la communauté internationale, en exprimant le souhait que celui-ci sera une contribution appréciable pour permettre le déblocage de l'impasse actuelle. Je considère donc qu'après cet engagement du Président, s'il y a blocage, celui-là sera de la responsabilité du Front Patriotique Rwandais.

Par ailleurs, dans le cadre de mes contacts, je compte confier à l'Ambassadeur de l'Ouganda qui doit se rendre bientôt dans son pays un message au Président ougandais pour qu'il use de son influence auprès du Front Patriotique Rwandais afin qu'une solution heureuse soit trouvée au dernier obstacle à la mise en place des institutions de la transition. A défaut d'une visite de courtoisie que je me proposais de rendre au Président de la République de l'Ouganda, le départ très prochain de l'Ambassadeur me semble être une occasion opportune de demander au Président ougandais de continuer à apporter son concours à la communauté internationale pour faciliter la mise en place des institutions de la transition au Rwanda. Cette mission de bons offices du Président ougandais est d'autant plus nécessaire qu'il jouit d'une confiance et d'une considération toutes particulières au sein du Front Patriotique Rwandais.

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UNAMIR 1994 MAR 29 17 - 0

PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE
CABINET DU PRESIDENT

Kigali, le 29 mars 1994

N° 208/01.10

RECEIVED
OFFICE OF SRSG
Date 29-3-94 - 12h00
No. 848 By PP

Réf. No :

Annexe :

Objet :

Dr Jacques-Roger BOOH-BOOH
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire
Général de l'ONU
K I G A L I.-

Monsieur le Représentant Spécial,

Le Président de la République me charge de vous informer qu'Il a bien reçu la lettre que vous Lui avez adressée le 28 mars I994, relativement à la mise en place des institutions de la transition.

Le Chef de l'Etat voudrait par la présente, vous redire ainsi qu'à la Communauté Internationale, représentée à Kigali, particulièrement par vous-même et les membres du Corps Diplomatique au nom desquels vous Lui avez transmis votre dite lettre, Sa profonde reconnaissance et celle du Peuple rwandais, pour tant d'efforts que vous ne cessez de vous imposer, pour accompagner notre pays, dans sa quête de la paix et dans sa volonté de mettre sur pied des institutions politiques stables, à même de favoriser la réconciliation nationale et la reconstruction de notre pays, après cette longue période de guerre.

Le Président de la République souhaite vous rappeler que son action politique, depuis qu'Il se trouve à la tête de l'Etat rwandais, est et reste basée sur la paix, l'unité nationale et le développement de l'ensemble du Pays.

A ce titre, Il se félicite des conclusions dégagées à l'issue de la réunion que vous avez tenue ce lundi 28 mars I994 et à laquelle ont participé le Nonce Apostolique, Doyen du Corps Diplomatique, l'Ambassadeur de la République Unie de Tanzanie, représentant du Facilitateur ainsi que les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne, de Belgique, du Burundi, des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, de France, d'Ouganda et du Zaïre, pays observateurs aux négociations de paix d'Arusha.

En conséquence, le Président de la République m'a chargé de porter à votre connaissance qu'Il partage entièrement votre avis que le FPR et tous les partis politiques, agrées au Rwanda à la date de signature du Protocole d'Accord sur le Partage du Pouvoir et qui se sont engagés à respecter l'Accord de Paix, doivent être représentés à l'Assemblée Nationale de Transition dès sa mise en place.

2/3 CRA-101

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Le Chef de l'Etat partage par ailleurs votre avis que c'est à la Commission sur l'Unité et la Réconciliation qui doit être mise en place le plus rapidement possible, qu'il revient de contrôler en tout temps, le respect par chaque force politique, des principes du Code d'Ethique Politique dont la violation est passible de la sanction d'exclusion des institutions.

Le Président de la République espère fermement que chaque parti politique et le FPR se rallieront à votre avis et feront tout, pour que la mise en place des institutions de la transition ne souffre plus d'aucune entrave de la part de qui que ce soit userait de stratagèmes, pour aboutir à l'exclusion de ces institutions, d'une quelconque force politique.

Telles sont les observations que le Chef de l'Etat m'a chargé de porter de Sa part, à votre connaissance. Il vous assure de Sa pleine disponibilité pour collaborer à la mise en place des institutions de la transition, soucieux qu'Il est de relancer le Rwanda sur la voie de la paix et du progrès pour tous ses habitants.

Veuillez agréer,Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, l'expression de ma plus haute considération.

Le Directeur de Cabinet
Enoch RUHIGIRA



3/3 CRN-101

CRN-98 3/3

28/03/1994

LISTE DES SIGNATAIRES DE LA DECLARATION DU 28 MARS 1994

Le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU	**Dr. Jacques-Roger Booh-Booh**
Le Nonce Apostolique	**Mgr. Giuseppe Bertello**
L'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis	**S.E. M. David Rawson**
L'Ambassadeur de France	**S.E. M. Jean-Michel Marlaud**
L'Ambassadeur de Belgique	**S.E. M. Johan Swinnen**
L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne	**S.E. M. Dieter Holscher**
Le Représentant du Facilitateur	**S.E. M. Saleh Tambwe**
L'Ambassadeur du Zaïre	**S.E. M. Kokule**
L'Ambassadeur d'Ouganda	**S.E. M. Ignatius B. Katetegirwe**
Le Chargé d'affaires du Burundi	**S.E. M. Severin Mfatiye**

CRN-98 2/3



1) The Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, the Apostolic Nuncio, Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, the Representative of the Facilitator and the Ambassadors of the observer countries to the Arusha peace process have met to examine the reasons which still impede the setting up of the transitional National Assembly and the broad-based transition government.

2) They solemnly appeal to the Rwandese parties to show a spirit of compromise and solve the last pending problems. They stress that a solution is urgent, considering political and financial constraints.

3) They are of the opinion, after consideration of the pertinent provisions of the protocol on power-sharing, that all political parties authorized in Rwanda at the date of signature of this protocole and the RPF should be represented at the transitional National Assembly when it is in place, under the condition that they respect the peace agreement.

It will be the task of the Commission on National Unity and Reconciliation to see that every political force respects the principles of the Code of Political Ethics, the violation of which can lead to the exclusion from the institutions, to be decided by the Supreme Court.

4) They recommend this Commission to be set up immediately after the institutions and be asked to give rapidly its preliminary conclusions on the behaviour of the political parties represented in the institutions.

5) They insist that if this principle is agreed by all concerned, no new cause for delay in the installation of the institutions should be brought up. Each political force should abstain from any attempt which might create new problems between or within political parties. A positive and constructive attitude, at this point in time, is indispensable for the smooth fonctioning of the installations ceremony for the broad-based institutions and their effective operation.



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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR 1994 MAR 28 14

CRN-98 **OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

FAX NUMBER..... **IMMEDIATE**

TO: **ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK**
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: **KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK**

FROM: **BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI**

DATE: **28 MARCH 1994**

NO OF PAGES: **3** MIR-672

UNAMIR 1994 MAR 28 14 35

SUBJECT: **EFFORTS TO INSTALL THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS**

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1. This morning, I met with the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, the Representative of the Facilitator and the Ambassadors of observer countries to the Arusha peace process to examine the political impasse that continues to prevent the installation of the transitional institutions.

2. After an examination of the reasons for impasse, we decided that at this stage, a declaration stating our views on the impasse might be helpful. We therefore agreed to issue a communiqué (which is attached) appealing to all political parties to demonstrate a spirit of compromise and urgently resolve the impasse, which basically is a disagreement between the RPF and the Government on whether or not the CDR should be represented in the Transitional National Assembly at the initial stage. We declared that in our view, all political parties that were authorized on the date of the signature of the protocol of power-sharing and the RPF should be represented in the Transitional National Assembly when it is installed.

3. We recommended further that following the setting up of the transitional institutions, the Commission on National Unity and Reconciliation, which is charged with over-seeing the observance of the code of ethics by political parties, should be immediately established so that it could pronounce itself on the behaviour of political parties represented in the transitional institutions.

4. I expect reactions to our communiqué from the political parties, and will transmit these reactions to you. Meanwhile, I am continuing to associate my ongoing efforts with those of the members of the diplomatic corps and other interested parties to ensure that the installation exercise be carried out in a bi-partisan manner.

5. I would appreciate any action the Secretary-General may wish to take in support of our Declaration and would also suggest that the Spokesman of the Secretary-General brings this Declaration to the attention of the media during his mid-day briefing.

6. Regards.

UNAMIR / CODE

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

CRN-96
MIR-663

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 25 MARCH 1994

NO OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: EFFORTS TO INSTALL THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS

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1. Following a series of intensive consultations at various levels until late in the evening yesterday, including the first ever bilateral meeting between the RPF and one of its most strident political opponents, the CDR, a meeting brokered by UNAMIR and held at UNAMIR Headquarters, we received invitations last evening from the Foreign Ministry to attend the ceremonies for the installation of transitional institutions at 0830hrs this morning, 25 March. I immediately consulted thereafter with the Acting Force Commander, Brig. Gen. Anyidoho, and it was decided that UNAMIR should, at its level, take the necessary practical measures to facilitate a smooth and peaceful installation ceremony. Our forces were put on red alert, our civilian component moved from phase 1 to phase 2 security status, and a UNAMIR convoy was dispatched to Mulindi to escort senior RPF officials to Kigali for the installation ceremonies. Furthermore, an air observation post was put in operation to enhance security in Kigali.

2. This morning, I met at 0800hrs with other members of the diplomatic corps at the residence of the Dean of the Corps, the Apostolic Pro Nuncio, and from there we proceeded to the CND complex where the installation ceremonies were scheduled to take place. Upon our arrival at the CND, we learnt that the UNAMIR convoy that had been sent last night at the RPF's request to escort its leaders from Mulindi to Kigali for the ceremonies this morning was still in Mulindi and was not sure when the leaders would be ready to travel to Kigali. It then became apparent that there were still a number of problems to be resolved before the installation could take place.

3. President Habyarimana, who had also arrived at the CND to preside over the scheduled ceremonies, told me that the key issue holding up progress was the RPF's continuing opposition to the CDR's entry into the transitional parliament even though the CDR, which had earlier rejected the Arusha Peace Agreement, had subsequently accepted the accord and fulfilled the other conditions for participation in the transitional institutions provided for under the Peace Agreement. He emphasized that the outstanding issue relating to the representation in the TNA of the "Parti Démocrate Islamique" and that pertaining to the MDR could be set aside if the RPF was prepared to lift its objection to CDR's participation in the TNA.

— C O D E —

4. At a meeting attended by Government and RPF officials at the CND building from 0900hrs to 1300hrs today, UNAMIR and other members of the Diplomatic Corps present urged the parties to try to break the impasse and put the institutions in place. The representative of the Facilitator and the Ambassadors of the observer states to the peace process (Belgium, France and United States) appealed strongly to the RPF to remove its objection to CDR's entry into the transitional parliament. The Ambassadors left the clear impression that they considered the RPF's attitude as obstructionist and also deplored the absence in Kigali of most of the members of the RPF's leadership, a situation which, in their view, often delayed the taking of decisions on important matters.

5. Consultations are continuing but it is difficult to say when the installation of the institutions will indeed take place. As the stalemate persists, I have requested the UNAMIR convoy that travelled to Mulindi last night to return immediately to Kigali with or without the RPF officials the convoy was to have escorted to Kigali for the installation ceremonies.
In view of the continuing political uncertainty and the resulting climate of tension and anxiety, our forces are constantly rehearsing the detailed contigency plans that have been prepared to deal with any emergency security situations, bearing in mind our Rules of Engagement. The specific concern we raised in our earlier correspondence is based on our fears that attacks directed at the CND during this period of political controversy would probably be in the form of spontaneous or mob action rather than a carefully planned military operation.

6. Regards.

CRN-96-
MIR-663-

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

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UNAMIR
93 MAR 23 16 04

CRN-433

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 23 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: MIR - 655

SUBJECT: **MEETINGS WITH FRENCH AND RUSSIAN AMBASSADORS**

NO OF PAGES: 2

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1. At their requests, I met separately today at UNAMIR headquarters with Ambassador Jean-Michel Marlaud of France and Ambassador Anatoli Smirnov of Russia. Both meetings dwelt to a large extent on the forthcoming Security Council consideration of the situation in Rwanda.

2. The French Ambassador indicated that, according to his country's delegation at the UN in New York, the Council would probably examine several options ranging from withdrawal of the mission to maintaining UNAMIR as it is, if the present impasse persists. He made it very clear that his Government did not support the withdrawal of UNAMIR despite the frustrations with the very limited achievements realized so far. France believed, he stressed, that the consequences of a complete withdrawal would be too costly, not only for Rwanda, but for the international community as a whole. Nevertheless, he underlined it was necessary to put pressure on Rwandese political leaders to break the stalemate and advance the peace process rapidly and substantially. The Ambassador mentioned the continuing respect of the cease-fire as an example of some of the positive elements in the peace process so far which ought not to be ignored or compromised. He indicated that his Government might lean towards a six-month extension of UNAMIR's mandate but with the requirement that the Council review the situation again within the first 90 days, an approach similar to that called for under the Council's resolution 872.

3. The Ambassador said it was his understanding that the Secretary-General's report to the Council might be ready early next week. He wanted to know UNAMIR's thoughts on the Council's forthcoming meeting and specifically which option we would prefer regarding the mission's future.

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4. I informed the Ambassador that I had, as he would expect, submitted a report to the Secretary-General on developments on the ground. Obviously, I observed, several factors would have to be taken into account when the Secretary-General made specific recommendations to the Council. Clearly, UNAMIR, and I believed the international community as a whole, was not satisfied with the present impasse. At the same time, we recognized the vital role played by UNAMIR in preventing the resumption of hostilities and aiding the parties to continue dialogue. Furthermore, as the Ambassador himself had noted, some progress had been made and the fact that the cease-fire continued to hold was not a minor achievement. I agreed with the Ambassador that the simple withdrawal of the mission might result in a situation even more dangerous than at the moment and that it would also be useful, if the Council decided to extend the mission, to include requirements, such as an early review, as a means of pressurizing Rwandese political leaders to take the necessary measures to advance the peace process in a significant way.

5. The French Ambassador also informed me that he and the ambassadors of the two other European Union members in Kigali (namely Belgium and Germany) had met yesterday morning, 22 March, with President Habyarimana and in the afternoon, with the Prime Minister Designate. They had left those meetings cautiously optimistic about the prospects for compromise which would allow the installation of the transitional institutions which they hoped could take place within the next few days. The Ambassadors had once again, during those meetings, underlined the need for peaceful dialogue to overcome present difficulties.

6. My meeting with the Russian Ambassador this afternoon was our first encounter, as he only arrived Kigali on 18 March to take up his post. In our review of developments in Rwanda, he left me with the impression that while his Government was concerned about the current stalemate, it did not appear to have taken a position yet on possible Security Council action during the forthcoming consideration of this item. He stressed in general that Russia wanted full and prompt of the Arusha Peace Agreement and UNAMIR to play its role. If there was no substantive progress, this could make the Council's deliberations difficult. He believed, nevertheless, that imposing ultimatums would not be helpful. It was important, he said, to recognize the peculiarities of the situation in Rwanda which did not lend itself to artificial approaches.

7. The continuing drama in neighbouring Burundi also came up in my discussions with the two Ambassadors who shared my preoccupation over the disturbing events in that country which we all agreed could severely complicate the situation in Rwanda. Both Ambassadors supported a global approach to the quest for peace in this sub-region, otherwise any progress registered in one country would at best be partial and fragile.

8. Regards.

According to a communiqué issued by the Presidency of the Republic on 21 March, President Habyarimana had met earlier that day with the Prime Minister Designate and had informed the latter that he had received a letter, on 20 March, from one of the two factions within the PL protesting against the Prime Minister Designate's choice of candidate for Justice Minister, a portfolio assigned to the PL under the Peace Agreement. The President had requested the Prime Minister to continue consultations with the PL with a view to reaching an acceptable agreement which, according to the President, should be based on the compromise formula reached on 27 February by which the three ministerial positions assigned to the PL should be divided in a two to one ratio between the Party's two factions, with the faction receiving one ministerial portfolio nominating candidates for the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the TNA.

According to the same communiqué, President Habyarimana believed that the list of deputies for the TNA which he had received on 20 March from the Prime Minister of the current coalition government contained a number of anomalies impeding the putting in place of the TNA. Accordingly, the President had once again called on the Prime Minister to: a) ensure that the "unjustified" obstacles to the entry of the CDR in the transitional parliament were removed; b) ensure the "true" representation of the "Parti Démocrate Islamique" (PDI) in the TNA; and c) take into account the recent court rulings on cases brought by some MDR party members seeking to be TNA deputies.

The President would be prepared, the communiqué had concluded, to preside, as of 24 March, over the ceremonies for the installation of the transitional institutions, once the above-mentioned concerns had been removed.

Para. 23 should be revised to read as follows:

Meanwhile, my Special Representative has stressed to all the parties that UNAMIR will not tolerate the importation of ammunition into Rwanda before the installation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government. He has also expressed heightened "concern about increasing reports on the distribution of weapons to civilians which constitutes a serious threat not only to public security in Kigali and elsewhere in Rwanda, but also to UNAMIR personnel.

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III. CIVILIAN POLICE

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Add after original para. 29

Since my report of 24 September 1993 to the Security Council (S/26488), the security situation in Rwanda and, especially in Kigali, the capital, has deteriorated alarmingly. While most incidents can be attributed to armed banditry, which has been growing as a result of the easy availability of weapons since the outbreak of the civil war in 1990, ethnic and politically motivated crimes, including assassinations and murders, have also been increasing.

These disturbing developments, unless contained or stopped, could lead to the creation of an environment of widespread and heightened insecurity that could hinder seriously the full and effective implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, especially within the time-frame recommended in my report of 24 September and approved by the Council in its resolution 872 (1993).

The situation is particularly worrying because the Government's "Gendarmerie Nationale" which is responsible for ensuring law and order, is severely handicapped in terms of personnel, equipment and training. Close monitoring by CIVPOL, within the framework of its mandate, of the activities of the Gendarmerie Nationale as well as the communal police to ensure that they are acting in compliance with the terms of the Peace Agreement, would therefore be vital, especially during the critical final phase of the transitional period, leading up to the elections. The visibility of United Nations civilian police monitors would help inspire and enhance confidence and promote a greater sense of security within the society which should facilitate the full and timely implementation of the Peace Agreement.

This is unacceptable

In order to be credible and effective, CIVPOL which, on the basis of the current authorized personnel strength of 60 has been able to deploy and to operate only in Kigali, should be enabled to function in other parts of Rwanda. Accordingly, an additional 45 civilian police monitors would be required for deployment along a formula of 5 monitors per province, to monitor the nine gendarmerie territorial companies responsible for the country's nine provinces. The primary tasks of these additional 45 police monitors would cover the monitoring of the activities of the gendarmerie and the police throughout the nation and, in this connection, include participation in patrols and, as appropriate, investigation of and reporting on related incidents.

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UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

FAX NUMBER..... CRN-91 MIR-639

IMMEDIATE

UNAMIR 22 18 01 MAR 94

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: for BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 22 MARCH 1994

NO OF PAGES: 3

SUBJECT: **LATEST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS**

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1. Please find attached a communiqué issued by President Habyarimana indicating his readiness as of the 24 March, to endorse the list of ministers announced by the Prime Minister Designate and to swear in deputies for the Transitional National Assembly. You would note from the communiqué that the agreement of the President to proceed with the installation of the transitional institutions is subject to the agreement of the Prime Minister Designate to review the list of ministers within the Party Liberal in conformity with a compromise reached on 27 February to that effect.

2. The President has also urged the Government to ensure that the concerns of the CDR and PDI regarding their participation in the Transitional National Assembly are resolved. Both the CDR and the PDI are political parties which are guaranteed one seat each in the Transitional Assembly. The CDR does not, however, appear in the list of deputies presented by the Prime Minister as the Party had not signed the code of political conduct by which all signatories committed themselves to the full implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

But on the end they were tied to.

3. I have been in contact with the Prime Minister-Designate, who has assured me that he was working hard to resolve the remaining problems so as to ensure the installation of the transitional institutions on Friday 25 March. The current political environment and the ongoing discussions among the political parties give me cautious hope that the transitional institutions will be installed within this week or next week. I will advise you as the situation evolves.

4. Regards.

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAIS
PRESIDENCE DE LA REPUBLIQUE
CABINET DU PRESIDENT

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COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

La Présidence de la République communique ce qui suit:

1. Le Président de la République,le Général Major HABYARIMANA Juvénal a reçu en audience ce lundi 21 mars I994,Monsieur TWAGIRAMUNGU Faustin,Premier Ministre Désigné du Gouvernement de Transition à Base Elargie.Le Premier Ministre Désigné a commenté au Chef de l'Etat,les critères qui ont abouti à la sélection des candidats ministres dont il a publié la liste sur les antennes de RADIO RWANDA,le ~~vendredi~~ I8 mars I994.

2. Le Président de la République a informé le Premier Ministre Désigné qu'Il est prêt à procéder à la nomination des ministres qui ont été choisis en concertation avec leurs partis politiques,comme le prévoit l'article 52 de l'Accord d'Arusha et à recevoir leur serment.

3. A ce titre,le Président de la République a informé le Premier Ministre Désigné qu'Il a reçu le 20 mars 1994, une lettre de protestation des responsables du Parti Libéral contre la candidature proposée pour le portefeuille de Ministre de la Justice.Le Chef de l'Etat a encouragé le Premier Ministre Désigné à poursuivre ses consultations avec le Parti Libéral, en vue de lever cette équivoque et de désigner un candidat Ministre de la Justice convenu avec les Responsables de ce Parti, notamment en respectant les compromis qui ont été atteints à l'issue de la réunion du 27 février I994 et qui consistent en la répartition des postes dévolus au Parti Libéral, dans le sens de 2 à 1 ministères à chacune des 2 tendances de ce parti,attendu que celle détenant un ministère devait présenter les candidatures à la présidence ou à la vice-présidence de l'Assemblée Nationale de Transition.

4. Le Président de la République a regretté l'attitude conflictuelle qui se dégage de l'allocution prononcée le I8 mars I994,par le Premier Ministre Désigné lors de la publication de la liste des candidats ministres du Gouvernement de Transition à Base Elargie.Le Chef de l'Etat a encouragé à nouveau le Premier Ministre Désigné à privilégier la concertation et le dialogue,en s'abstenant de pratiquer la politique du fait accompli.

5. La Présidence de la République communique par ailleurs que le Chef de l'Etat a reçu le dimanche 20 mars I994,la lettre de Madame le Premier Ministre Lui transmettant la liste des députés à l'Assemblée Nationale de Transition.Le Président de la République relève qu'il existe dans cette liste, des anomalies qui entravent la mise en place de l'Assemblée Nationale de Transition.Le Chef de l'Etat demande à nouveau à

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Madame le Premier Ministre,de s'assurer que les obstacles injustifiés à l'entrée du parti C.D.R.dans l'Assemblée Nationale de Transition ont déjà été levés. Le Premier Ministre du Gouvernement de transition actuel est invité par ailleurs à s'assurer de la vraie représentation du parti P.D.I. dans l'Assemblée Nationale de Transition.

Enfin,le Président de la République rappelle à Madame le Premier Ministre que les instances judiciaires viennent de se prononcer sur certains recours en justice introduits par des candidats députés du parti M.D.R.et lui demande en conséquence de tenir en considération ces décisions judiciaires qui ont force de loi.

6. Le Président de la République est prêt à partir du jeudi 24 mars 1994,à présider les cérémonies de mise en place des institutions de la transition. Mais Il demande au Gouvernement de lever d'ici là, ces quelques obstacles qui restent. C'est là la meilleure voie pour mettre en place des institutions de transition stables, capables de s'attaquer véritablement aux défis graves auxquels le pays est confronté.

Kigali,le 21 mars 1994

Le Directeur de Cabinet
Enoch RUHIGIRA.-

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UNIX CIBDE - Code

UNITED NATIONS
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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR · MINUAR

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CRN — 89

UNAMIR
MAR 21 '94

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO:	**ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK** **GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK**
ATTENTION:	**KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK**
FROM:	**BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI**
DATE:	**21 MARCH 1994**
NUMBER:	MIR — 620 —
NO. OF PAGES:	**3**
SUBJECT:	**Meeting with United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs**

1. The United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mrs. Prudence Bushnell, accompanied by the Director of the Office for Central Africa in the Department of State, Ambassador Arlene Render, who are currently on an official mission to Rwanda, visited UNAMIR today. I attach hereto a note for the file of my meeting with them. The Deputy Force Commander, Brig. Gen. Anyidoho (Ghana), in the absence of the Force Commander, briefed the delegation on the military and security situation.

2. Regards.

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MAR 21 '94

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NOTE FOR THE FILE

SRSG's meeting with United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Mr. Prudence Bushnell and Director of the Office of Central Africa in US Department of State, Ambassador Arlene Render, at UNAMIR Headquarters, 21 March 1994, 1600hrs

The SRSG, in welcoming the distinguished visitors, said it was always a pleasure and an honour to receive United States officials at UNAMIR in view, in particular, of the key position of the United States as a permanent member of the Security Council.

He reviewed briefly the history of UNAMIR and underlined that the continuing delay in putting the transitional institutions in place greatly concerned the United Nations which had deployed important resources on the ground in Rwanda to assist the Rwandese leaders in implementing their Peace Agreement. The SRSG noted, nevertheless, that the situation was not totally hopeless. In this connection, he pointed out that the cease-fire was generally holding and noted also the announcements over the weekend of proposed ministers for the transitional government and of deputies for the transitional national assembly. He stressed that UNAMIR had played a critical role in preventing the resumption of hostilities and emphasized his view that the cost of a UNAMIR withdrawal at this stage would be too high.

Mrs. Bushnell said she followed closely the Rwanda situation and UNAMIR's role as well as related issues pertaining to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa as part of her responsibilities within the Bureau of African Affairs in the US Department of State. She commended the SRSG for his constructive and effective leadership of UNAMIR and for his cooperative relationship with the diplomatic community in Kigali. She explained that the purpose of her delegation's visit to Rwanda was to convey to Rwanda's political leaders the message that while the international community was prepared to help, they bore the primary role for ensuring peace in their country. It was therefore vital, indeed essential, for them to put the transitional institutions in place promptly.

In the course of an exchange of views on the possible impact of the situation in the subregion as a whole, the SRSG observed that recent developments in the subregion were worrying and referring specifically to the events in the neighbouring countries of Burundi and Zaire, felt they could adversely influence the Rwandese situation. He said allegations by Rwandese officials, including the President, of Ugandan military support for the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) had not been proven or substantiated by United Nations military observers on the Uganda/Rwanda border (UNOMUR). The SRSG noted, in this connection, that these UN observers were thinly spread along the long border and did not have helicopters for wider surveillance of the area by air. In reply to Mrs. Bushell's question, the SRSG attributed the lack of helicopters to bureaucratic factors, as the equipment had already been approved. They just had not arrived yet, he pointed out.

In reply to a question by Mrs. Bushnell about the security situation in Kigali, the SRSG stressed UNAMIR's concern. He said much of the trouble was the result of common banditry, with criminals taking advantage of the unsettled political climate and the resulting tensions. He emphasized that UNAMIR did not have evidence of systematic

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the security issue in Kigali, but its resources and mandate as well as the resources of the Government's gendarmerie, which was responsible for ensuring public security in Rwanda, were limited. The SRSG added that, in his view, the installation of the transitional institutions would create a helpful climate by reducing tensions and stabilizing the overall situation.

The United States Ambassador to Rwanda, who accompanied the visiting American officials, informed the SRSG that their delegation had met with President Habyarimana earlier in the day and he had said he planned to meet with the Prime Minister Designate later in the afternoon. The Americans had stressed the need for Rwandese leaders to find an acceptable compromise that would break the impasse and allow the transitional institutions to come into place.

Mrs. Bushnell and Ambassador Render stated that the Security Council's forthcoming meeting on the situation in Rwanda could be "difficult" if there was no progress towards the installation of the institutions and if violent incidents were to develop in the meantime.

After agreeing with the SRSG that conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace-making were always cheaper than war, Mrs. Bushnell said the United States will continue to support the United Nations' role in Rwanda and encouraged the SRSG and his staff to continue with their efforts to advance the peace process.

Mrs. Bushnell and Ambassador Render were accompanied by Ambassador David Rawson and Mrs. Joyce Leader, Counsellor, US Embassy Kigali.

Sammy Kum Buo
21 March 1994

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR
23 MAR 12 48

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CRN-92

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 23 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: MIR-648

SUBJECT: REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

NO OF PAGES: 4

1. Further to our MIR-596 of 18 March, I attach hereto an additional contribution containing proposed revised texts to replace original paras. 17 and 23 as well as proposed additions to the draft report covering developments since 18 March.

2. With reference to your code cable 812 of 21 March, we regret the omission, due to an oversight, and attach hereto a text justifying the need for additional civilian police officers, including a description of the tasks to be performed. You may wish to reflect the request to increase the Civilian Police Component of UNAMIR in the recommendations, if you agree with the proposal.

3. Concerning your code cable 813, we do not think this specific incident should be mentioned in the Secretary-General's report at this time, especially as efforts are underway to deal with it on the ground. However, we think it is useful to make a reference to our concern over reports of arms importation in general. Accordingly, we have proposed a revision to para. 23 of our draft report, in an effort to reflect this point.

4. Regards.

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PROPOSED REVISIONS/ADDITIONS TO DRAFT TEXT

OF FURTHER REPORT OF SECRETARY-GENERAL ON UNAMIR

Para. 17 should be revised to read as follows:

17. During separate visits to Tanzania by an RPF delegation and by President Habyarimana on 4 and 8 March respectively, the two signatories to the Peace Agreement sought the intervention of President Mwinyi, the Facilitator of the Rwandese peace process, to try to break the impasse in the implementation of the Agreement. The Facilitator responded by sending his Foreign Minister to Rwanda on 11 March to seek a solution that would allow the transitional institutions to be put in place.

After para. 17, add the following new paras.:

The Tanzanian Foreign Minister, the Honorable Joseph C. Rwegasira, left Rwanda on 18 March after intensive bilateral consultations with various Rwandese political and religious leaders as well as with members of the diplomatic corps, the representative in Rwanda of the OAU Secretary-General, and my Special Representative, Dr. Jacques-Roger Booh Booh.

Prior to his departure, the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, speaking on behalf of the Facilitator, made a statement in Kigali in which he indicated that his consultations had led him to conclude that the stumbling block to putting the transitional institutions in place revolves around the internal problems within the Parti Libéral (PL). He stressed the view that the apparent power struggle within the PL was unacceptable as it had no legal basis within the framework of the Peace Agreement. The proposed composition of the BBTG, he emphasized, was within the prerogative of the Prime Minister Designate as long as he respected the lists of ministers proposed to him during consultations with each of the political forces concerned. The Tanzanian Minister also regarded as "irrelevant and illegal, within the terms of the Peace Agreement, as well as unacceptable the rejection by the RPF of the compromise reached within the PL on a formula for sharing the Party's assigned seats in the transitional parliament. He concluded by underlining the Facilitator's view that all political leaders should strictly adhere to the terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Following the Tanzanian Foreign Minister's departure, the Prime Minister Designate, in a nationwide radio address later on the same day, 18 March, announced the proposed composition of the BBTG. The following day, 19 March, the Prime Minister of the current coalition government announced the names of deputies for the TNA.

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : UNOMUR

FROM : BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE : 22 MAR 94

NUMBER :

SUBJECT : WEEKLY SITREP Nb 23, 15 MAR 94 - 21 MAR 94

1. GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS

A. UNAMIR passed a third calm week following the assassination of the late Minister of works and national secretary of the PSD party, Mr. GATABAZI. The security situation at KIGALI is greatly influenced by a curfew being installed by the government from 22.00 Hrs till 05.00 Hrs.

B. Tension is observed to be on the increase due to the fact that the list of ministers and deputies were radio broadcasted by the Prime Minister Designate and the Prime Minister respectively. Also it was stated that the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) should swear in on Monday 21 Mar 94 the latest.

c. The following incidents are brought to your attention: (1) Since

14 Mar 94 the movement of UNAMIR personnel (UNMOs) within the RPF Sector has been restricted by RPF. Night movements are no longer allowed, vehicles are searched at RPF check-points and access to the RPF area is denied. CMO is sorting this out; **(2)** On 161740 Mar 94 a major incident took place at KINIHIRA. Unidentified individuals executed a very professional ambush on a car of the KINIHIRA tea plantation. The director, his wife and 3 other persons were killed; **(3)** Also on 16 mar 94 a Rwandan registered car met an accident at KABUGA, about 15 Km EAST of KIGALI. While investigating CIVPOL team found 45 grenades, 28 rifle grenades and 30 Kg of AK-47 and 7.62 mm ammunitions. The five passengers, all Burundese, were arrested by the Gendarmerie; **(4)** Another incident occurred on 170030 Mar 94 when a RGF position at GUSHEGU (B333492) was attacked by unidentified individuals armed with rifles. Two RGF soldiers were killed and one injured. The attackers seized five weapons; **(5)** At 191950 Mar 94 a grenade was thrown at the Chez Lando restaurant. Fortunately the grenade felt on the roof and the explosion caused only 8 human casualties with minor injuries. They all reported to the UNAMIR field hospital for treatment.

2. <u>POLITICAL</u>

A. The week under review was calm, though UNAMIR reported the death of five people murdered in a car ambush in Kinihira, 80 miles away from Kigali. UNAMIR investigations are still under way to determine those responsible for these killings.

B. The visit of the Foreign Affairs Minister of Tanzania in Kigali, as the envoy of the Faciliator gave however a new impetus to the political stalemate in the country, as he shuttled back and forth among the rwandese political parties to convince its leadership to resume dialogue in a collective open-ended meeting.

C. The Tanzanian minister involved the Special Representative and the diplomatic corps in Kigali in two unsuccessful meetings on Thrusday and Friday of political parties and the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). Both the Prime Minister-Designate and the Prime Minister attended the meetings. Twice, the MRND and the representative of the President of the Republic failed to show up at those meetings. In a statement before his departure to Dar-es Salam, the Tanzanian minister however expressed hope that the rwandese parties would soon resume talks to end the current impasse.

D. During the week under review, the Prime Minister-Designate issued the list of cabinet ministers of the Broad-Based Transitional

Government (BBTG). The Prime Minister of the current government also issued the list of deputies to the Transitional National Assembly (TNA).

E. After a meeting with the Prime Minister-Designate on Monday 21, the President of the Republic issued a communique stating his readiness as from Thursday 24 to endorse the list of ministers and to receive the oath of the deputies at a swearing-in ceremony for the Transitional National Assembly and the Broad-Based Transitional Governemnt (BBTG).

F. The President however said that the Prime Minister-Designate might wish to reconsider his list of ministers as there was no agreement with the Parti Libéral as regards the sharing out of ministerial posts in conformity with a compromise reached on 27 February 1994 to that effect.

G. The President also said that the Prime Minister of the current government should make sure that the "unjustified obstacles preventing the CDR from entering the TNA are upheld", and that the PDI had proposed the name of a bone fide representative to the TNA. Both the CDR and the PDI are political parties which are guaranteed one seat each in the TNA. The CDR does not however appear on the list of deputies presented by the Prime Minister, as this party has yet to sign the so-called code of political conduct by which all signatories commit themselves to the full implementation of the Arusha peace Agreement.

H. The Special Representative continued his efforts at promoting a dialogue among the parties. He also received this week Mrs. Prudence BUSHNELL, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the African Bureau of the US State Department of State and Mrs. Arlene RENDER, Director of the Office of Central Africa, who confirmed support of UNAMIR by the US government.

3. MILITARY

A. **FORCE HQ**

Normal staff duties were carried out. On 17 Mar 94 Acting Force Comd (A/FC) visited the location of the KINIHIRA ambush. The same day he inspected the UNAMIR field hospital in order to assess its capabilities and present difficulties. The inspection was satisfactory and the logistic problems being brought to A/FC's attention will be solved in the near future. The hospital requires additional Staff and equipment. Also a co-ordination meeting between KIGALI Sec HQ and UNCIVPOL took place. The idea of quick reaction teams composed of one

UNMO, one CIVPOL Police Officer and one or two Gendarmes was introduced. On 19 Mar 94, A/FC attended a graduation ceremony of RPF war victims at CYONDO (RPF Sector). Also this week the Belgian contingent troops (1 Para Bn) were relieved. On 20 Mar 94 A/FC and various military and civil authorities attended the take over parade between the 1 Para Bn and the 2 Para Bn (2 Cdo Bn).

B. **UNOMUR SECTOR**

The situation in the UNOMUR operational area is calm. A/CMO paid a working visit to the Britisch High Commissioner and Defense advisor at KAMPALA. Security aspects were discussed in a meeting with the Security Officer of UNDP on 18 Mar 94. During the period under review 80 Ptl were carried out, including 24 night Ptl. The following border crosings were observed:

Location	Nb of vehicles		Nb of people	
	To RWANDA	To UGANDA	To RWANDA	To UGANDA
GATUNA	72 (1) 70 (2)	47 55 (2)	465	360
KYANIKA	/	/	/	/
LUBIRIZI	/	/	9 (3)	/

(1) 12 vehicles carried food stuffs (Maize, Beans, ...)
(2) World Food Programme trucks/vehicles (WFP)
(3) With 90 cattle and some utensils

Most of the movements were routine except one which took place on 18/19 Mar 94 when a total of 212 people crossed the border to attend the graduation ceremony at CYONDO (See also Par 3. A.).

NRA Liaison Officer to UNOMUR forwarded a complaint being issued by the local NRA commander at KISORO, regarding UNOMUR presence in BUNAGANA at the UGANDA-ZAIRE border. A/CMO assured the Liaison Officer that UNOMUR is not patrolling the UGANDA-ZAIRE border but that the area EAST of BUNAGANA (mount SABINO) give access to the UGANDA-RWANDA border and that this fits in the UNOMUR mandate.

C. **DMZ SECTOR**

The situation in the DMZ area was calm. Extensive patrolling was carried out by the six UNMO teams and BYUBAT.

Insufficient number of vehicles and lack of accommodation hamper the operations. Besides the major incidents of KINIHIRA and GUSHEGU mentioned in Par. 1. the following incidents occurred in the DMZ sector: (1) ONE RPF section manned a check-point at NYANAMO (A9923) in the DMZ area. RPF claimed that the location was out of DMZ; (2) An abandoned M26 grenade exploded on RGF position 500 m of the Joint Military Committee meeting place at NGONDORE. No casualties or damages to property; (3) Thirty-five small arms Ammo was recovered from an abandoned house at NGONDORE; (4) On 19 Mar 94, armed RPF soldiers in civilian clothing were seen at MYOVE (DMZ).

D. **KIGALI SECTOR**

Conducted 322 vehicle and 46 foot Ptl in KIGALI city in order to ensure Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA). Established daily 6 check points at different places in KWSA. Random patrols and check points saturation being monitored by Force HQ. Tunisian Coy(-) ensured the location of the RPF battalion and RPF VIPs at KIGALI city (CND compound). The private residences of the prime minister, the prime minister designate, the president of the constitutional court and five opposition ministers are being secured by Sec KIGALI until the installation of the BBTG. RUTBAT conducted training on armored vehicles (BTR-60). Operational situation of RUTBAT improved significantly since their vehicles and equipments arrived in the mission area.

E. **MILOB GROUP**

(1) **MILOB Group HQ** Milob Gp received 5 military observers from URUGUAY and 5 from MALAWI. On 16 Mar 94 CMO visited RPF HQ at MULINDI for a pre-arranged meeting with the RPF chairman. However the meeting did not take place because of absence of the RPF chairman.

(2) **RPF Sector** As mentioned in Par 1. RPF imposed restrictions on movement of UNMOs in the RPF Sector. Any movement of UNMOs in the RPF sector must be accompanied by RPF military personnel. Also a 48 hours notice of any movement must be given and no movement is allowed during the night. Throughout the week MILOB reported a refusal of RPF to co-operate. MILOB teams also were denied access to RPF installations, in some cases even after prior notice. These places were the B Moble Force and the 21 Bn.

On 18 Mar 94 the RPF MILOB HQ received unconfirmed information about 150 recruits arriving in the area of the 59 Bn. Investigation ongoing.

21 Bn Comd stated on 18 Mar 94 that his troops have been withdrawn from the trianular area 1130-1433-1335 in DMZ. This withdrawal was confirmed by the MILOBS. Civilians found at grid 127352 complained that the withdrawal of RPF seriously affects their access to medical care. The team escorted the RPF medical team to/from DMZ where 16 boxes with medical equipment were withdrawn.

(3) **RGF Sector** On 16 Mar 94 at KINIGI (A5440) unidentified bandits injured a rich peasant by means of a grenade. The victim reported to the RUHENGERI hospital where he died. Gendarmerie is investigating.

(4) **South Sector** 35,000 Burundese refugees, all HUTU, who were spread over several camps have been concentrated at GAHARWA (D2948) by Rwandese authorities. On 14 Mar 94 students of the agricultural faculty at BUTARE went on strike because of problems with examination dates. The strike was called off on 19 Mar 94 and no incidents were reported.

F. **FORCE LOG, MED AND ENGINEERS ELEMENTS**

The engineer Coy is deployed in the DMZ area at BYUMBA. Their major equipments just arrived from BANGLADESH. It seems that there are many deficiencies. However the unit is checking the equipment and preparing them for use. Mine detectors also arrived. FC tasked the unit to study and to test the feasibility of mine clearance in Rwanda with this equipment. If it is revealed that this equipment is not effective the field operations division (FOD) will be asked for appropriate action.

G. **UNAMIR FORCE STRENGTH**

UNAMIR strength is almost at its maximum which is 2,548. Current strength is 2,534 All troops are on ground and few observers are yet to arrive. On 15 Mar 94 FOUR UNMOs from SENEGAL have been converted into CIVPOL. Please find enclosed the weekly personnel state as of 210800 Mar 94.

H. **MEDICAL AND HEALTH STATE**

The UNAMIR field hospital is installed in King FAYCAL hospital

in KIGALI. They provide medical care to UNAMIR personnel and local population. The hospital has a serious lack of supplies. About 40 UNAMIR personnel and 30 Locals receive normal treatment on a weekly basis. Problems occur with the local population in the critical periods. They have confidence in the UNAMIR field hospital and are not willing to be transferred to the governmental hospital (KIGALI hospital) after their emergency treatment. The KIGALI hospital also demonstrates no positive attitude in getting these patients. They don't answer the phone and deny sending ambulances to get the patients. Solutions to this problem are being negotiated. Medical supplies are urgently required. Discussions are ongoing with ICRC/UNICEF in getting their support for delivering supplies to UNAMIR for treatment of the local population by UNAMIR field hospital. A first urgent medevac has been executed to NAIROBI the week before. Unfortunately the patient, Ms. Shireen CAUSEY, secretary to the UNAMIR Chief Administrative Officer passed away on 18 Mar 94. A memorial service will be organized on Thursday 24 Mar 94. It is observed that the number of patients with malaria is on the increase. A/FC issued a memorandum to motivate the UNAMIR personnel to use the preventive medicine provided by the UN.

4. UNCIVPOL

A. CIVPOL carried out mixed patrols together with Gendarmerie in the area of KICUKIRO and GIKONDO. The patrols mainly handled road blocks being installed by local militia.

B. Incidents

(1) On 14 Mar 94 eighteen persons were arrested by the Gendarmerie of GIKONDO in KABUGA because a child had been killed in this area. They were suspected to be RPF members. CIVPOL went to the Gendarmerie and checked the identities of the arrested people. Finally they were released on 161200 Mar 94.

(2) On 15.03.94 Maj. KAMANZI M. Frank (LO) of the RPF informed CIVPOL that 11 persons are kept in prison by the GdN at RWAMAGANA. The reason is unknown. Today the persons are released and CIVPOL is still investigating.

(3) CIVPOL received a complaint from the RPF about an alleged killing of eight persons in the night of 15.02.1994 at NYAGATARE. R.P.F. accuses the "Interahamwe". Besides RPF complaints that in January and February this year several attacks took place against other people in this area. CIVPOL is

investigating in this matter and will proceed to the scene.

(4) On 16.03.1994 CIVPOL received the message that five (05) people were arrested at KABUNGA by GdN KACYIRU for illegal possession of 45 grenades of different brands (Russian, Belgium, Chinese and South African) and 28 rifle grenades (South African) together with approximate 30 kg SAA-munition 7.62 for FAL and KV and a some magazines. All stuff has been handed over to EOD. Police Monitoring Team GdN KACYIRU is monitoring the investigation of the local GdN.

(5) CIVPOL received information that on 10.03.94 one (01) person was stabbed at NYAKABANDA. At first GdN arrested four (04) persons. One of them, SEMUTWA Jean-Claude has been brought to justice. He is suspected to be a "M.D.R. Power" sympathiser. The victim was belonging to the "M.D.R. TWAGIRAMUNGU". The other three (03) arrested persons have been set free. Further investigations will be done by CIVPOL.

(6) On 17.03.1994, 21.00 hrs, a merchant was assaulted in the neighbourhood of KANOMBE by non-identified people. One of the bandits was killed in a gunfight with the military. GdN found an ID on his body, which will be verified, and twelve (12) R4 cartridges and two (02) machetes. PMT GdN KACYIRU is monitoring the case.

(7) On 17.03.94, about 16.00 hrs, BIZIMANA Jean-Marie was beaten at the KICUKIRO market by locals thinking he is a TUTSI. He was saved by a PVK policeman and a bystander.

(8) On 17.03.94, during night-time Mr. LIBERAKURO and his children were crossing the road when two (2) persons arrived on a motorcycle. They shot one of the children, who was injured. PMT CIVPOL is investigating.

(9) CIVPOL patrol informed CIVPOL HQ about a second grenade explosion in the sector of GIPOROSO in the yard of SEKIMONYO Louis. Six (6) persons were injured and were taken to the C.H.K.

(10) On 19.03.94, 22.38 hrs, CIVPOL was informed that there was a group of people surrounded by local Gendarmerie in front of the UNAMIR HQ (AMAHORO). The people were Moto-taximen who were mourning one member of their group. The person died after a long illness. The local GdN was there reminding the people about the curfew. After the first investigation there was no connection with the hand grenade explosion near the "Chez Lando" the same day.

2.2. ***Miscellaneous***:

(1) A meeting of co-operation was opened by the mayor of KICUKIRO township about tolerance between the ethnic groups.

(2) On 14 March there was a district security council meeting at Kucikiro's district in order to take efficient measures against violence and criminality. Suggestions were given to the Prosecutor.

(3) Night Patrols: Generally the situation at GIKONDO was calm. There were no roadblocks in this area and most of the inhabitants complied with the curfew. Only in the part of KARAMBO were placed three (3) roadblocks and at one of these, there were a lot of drunken and aggressive people. The GdN told the CIVPOL-Patrol that by passing the roadblock they would attack them. According to the GdN this part of GIKONDO is the most dangerous area and it is always a risk to go there.

(4) On 18.03.94, 22.05 hrs, CIVPOL received information that the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is tipped to be a member of the new government, stated that somebody wants to kill him this night. The PMT Patrol went to the place of the Minister GOINCIRA and informed the local GdN, who placed three (3) Officers in front of the house.

D. Current Manpower

55 Police Officers. On 22 Mar 94 four (4) UNMOs have been converted into CIVPOL.

5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

The logistic environment is still difficult. Equipment arrived from UNTAC but the logistic situation remains difficult due to delays in delivery vehicles as most of them require repairs. Radios are also in short supply. Operational status from BANGLADESH contingent has somehow improved due to the arrival of their vehicles/equipment. The logistics and engineer company vehicles and equipments are being distributed. It was also brought to FOD's attention that there are no spare parts and no mechanics available for the APCs (BTR-80) provided by BANGLADESH. For the moment three BTR-80 out of eight are not operational. UNAMIR is expecting the arrival of the helicopters. This operational deficiency in UNAMIR and UNOMUR will be taken care of upon delivery of the helicopters.

6. CONCLUSION

We passed the scheduled installation date for the BBTG by more than 80 days. This situation is deteriorating significantly and all UNAMIR resources are being used to the maximum of their availability. The rhythm of activity will require a reassessment of troops to tasks in order to ensure a sustainable capability of the Force over the next month. Intense diplomatic efforts are continuing to facilitate the setting up of the BBTG. Joint Military Commission meetings are also continuing to maintain communication between the two forces (RGF and RPF).

7. REGARDS

UNAMIR - MILITARY DIVISION
Weekly Personnel State

DTG: 210800 Mar 94

Ser Nb	Country	TROOPS										UNMO	Total
		Inf Bn	Log Coy	Eng Coy	Med Coy	MovCon Pl	MP Sec	TUN Coy(-)	Sub Total	Staff	Total		
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)
1	AUSTRIA											15	15
2	BANGLADESH	370	200	203	50	19	11		853	30	883	59	942
3	BELGIUM	423							423	17	440		440
4	BOTSWANA											9	9
5	BRAZIL	3							3		3	10	13
6	CANADA									1	1	1	2
7	CONGO											26	26
8	EGYPT											10	10
9	FIJI											1	1
10	GHANA	800							800	19	819	24	843
11	HUNGARY											4	4
12	MALAWI											5	5
13	MALI											10	10
14	NETHERLANDS											9	9
15	NIGERIA											15	15
16	POLAND											5	5
17	RUSSIA											15	15
18	SENEGAL											35	35
19	SLOVAKIA											5	5
20	TOGO											15	15
21	TUNISIA							60	60	1	61		61
22	URUGUAY											25	25
23	ZIMBABWE											29	29
	TOTAL	1,596	200	203	50	19	11	60	2,139	68	2,207	327	2,534

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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN-88 UNAMIR/CODE 1/8/607

OUTGOING CODE CABLE A 732

IMMEDIATE

94 MAR 20 09 42 UNAMIR

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 19 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: MIR-607

SUBJECT: **EFFORTS TO INSTALL THE TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS**

NO OF PAGES: 8

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1. As you are aware, the two signatories to the Arusha Peace Agreement recently sought the assistance of the Facilitator, H.E. President Mwinyi of Tanzania, to help break the impasse holding up the installation of the transitional institutions. President Mwinyi, consequently, sent his Foreign Minister to Rwanda on 11 March. The Minister left Rwanda yesterday, 18 March, after intensive consultations with the various political leaders as well as with members of the diplomatic corps in Kigali, the representative of the OAU Secretary-General and I. Prior to his departure, Minister Rwegasira made a statement, a copy of which is attached hereto.

2. As reflected in the Minister's attached statement, he also came to the conclusion following his consultations in Rwanda that the stumbling block to putting into place the transitional institutions evolves around the internal difficulties within the Parti Libéral (PL). While both factions within the Party have apparently agreed on a six-five formula for sharing the eleven seats assigned to them in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA), they still differ on the formula for the distribution of their assigned ministerial portfolios. Although the PL is allowed only three ministerial portfolios under the Peace Agreement, including the post of Minister of Justice, both factions of the Party are seeking two ministerial positions each, including the Justice Ministry. Hence the deadlock.

.../...

94 MAR 20 09 UNAMIR

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3. The Tanzanian Foreign Minister stressed, on behalf of the Facilitator, that the power struggle within the PL was unacceptable as it had no legal basis within the framework of the Peace Agreement. The composition of the Broad-Based Transitional Government was within the prerogative of the Prime Minister Designate as long as he respected the lists of ministers submitted during consultations with the political forces concerned. The Minister further stated that the rejection by the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) of the compromise reached within the PL on the sharing of the seats for parliament was both "irrelevant and illegal going by the Peace Agreement". The Minister emphasized overall that in the Facilitator's view all political leaders should strictly adhere to the terms of the Peace Agreement, with each political force exercising its mandate in constituting the TNA and the Prime Minister Designate exercising his prerogative in picking his cabinet.

4. Following the Tanzanian Foreign Minister's departure, the Prime Minister Designate yesterday evening addressed the nation over Radio Rwanda in the course of which he announced the proposed composition of his government (please see list attached). This evening, the Prime Minister of the current coalition government also announced the names of the deputies for the TNA. The government announced by the Prime Minister Designate includes the twenty-one ministerial portfolios provided for under the Peace Agreement. The numerical distribution among the political forces concerned is as follows:

MRND: 5 portfolios, RPF: 5 portfolios, MDR: 4 portfolios (including the post of Prime Minister), PSD: 3 portfolios, PL: 3 portfolios, PDC: 1 portfolio.

5. It is not clear if the Prime Minister Designate:

a) informed President Habyarimana in advance of the announcement of the composition of the government;

b) has the agreement of the two factions within the PL on the lists of names of ministers. In this connection, it is to be recalled that the two factions within the PL had each been seeking two of the three ministries assigned to the Party, including the Ministry of Justice. It is not clear at this point to which faction of the PL the Prime Minister Designate's choice of Justice Minister belongs.

6. In his radio address, the Prime Minister Designate indicated that consultations underway with a view to putting into place the transitional institutions should not go beyond 21 March. According to the Peace Agreement, the Prime Minister Designate shall, following his selection of candidates for the ministerial portfolios distributed among the various political forces, present them to the President of the Republic for appointment as well as to the TNA. Since the Prime Minister Designate has now announced the proposed composition of his government, it is to be expected therefore that, according to the Peace Agreement, he will submit the list of ministers to President Habyarimana. The President should normally perform the formality of appointing the ministers proposed by

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the Prime Minister Designate at the official installation ceremony of the BBTG. Similarly, the list of members of the TNA will be submitted to the President, who would preside over the first session of the TNA. Although the President should legally not interfere with the Prime Minister Designate's prerogative in selecting the members of his government or with the political forces' designation of their TNA members, this possibility cannot be ruled out completely. In that event, there could be a collision, especially if, as we now understand it, both the Prime Minister Designate and the RPF, as well as the current Prime Minister, appear determined to proceed with the installation of the BBTG and the TNA with or without the President.

7. Bearing that possibility in mind, we would have a number of concerns for which we would like your guidance, including in particular the following:

we must reconsider our inform what we will to do and seek then (UNHQ) con-cerned.

a) since the installation ceremonies would most likely take place at the CND complex where the RPF battalion for which we are providing security, is housed, what should UNAMIR's reaction be if there is a violent confrontation relating to the installation?

b) should the Government and RPF, the two signatories to the Peace Agreement, decide to proceed with the installation ceremonies even if President Habyarimana objects, what should UNAMIR's position be if we are invited to attend and requested to provide security for participants at such ceremonies?

c) as you are aware, under the Peace Agreement, the President of the Republic shall preside over the first session of the transitional parliament unless he is unable to do so, in which case, the President of the constitutional court shall preside. It is not clear whether the President of the Republic's refusal would constitute an inability to preside within the framework of the Agreement. If not, would it be legal for the President of the constitutional court to preside in place of the President of the Republic?

8. Members of the international community in Kigali, including the diplomatic corps and representatives of international and intergovernmental organizations plan to meet on Monday, 21 March, to assess the situation and consider possible reactions to the latest developments. It may also be advisable for the Secretariat at headquarters to request the Ambassador of Rwanda at the UN to convey to the President Habyarimana our view that, in light of the latest political developments, there is a necessity for him to ensure the prompt and peaceful installation of the transitional institutions. Meanwhile, in our continuing consultations with the various political leaders, we are stressing the need for a peaceful and smooth installation ceremony. In this connection, I today appealed to President Habyarimana, through one of his close political associates, to meet with the Prime Minister Designate to ensure that the arrangements for the installation and the event itself proceed in a non-confrontational climate.

9. As usual, we shall keep you informed of relevant developments and look forward to receiving your earliest possible reactions to our concerns above.

9. Regards.

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LIST OF MINISTERS ANNOUNCED FOR THE BROAD-BASED TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

1. **Mouvement Républicain National pour la Démocratie et le Développement (MRND)**

Augustin Bizimana	Ministry of Defence
Ferdinand Nahimana	Ministry of Higher Education, Scientific Research and Culture
Prosper Mugiraneza	Ministry of Public Service
André Ntagerura	Ministry of Planning
Mrs. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko	Ministry of Family Affairs and Promotion of the Status of Women

2. **Front Patriotique Rwandais (FPR)**

Pasteur Bizimungu	Ministry of Interior and Communal Development
Mrs. Kayumba Immaculée	Ministry of Transport and Communications
Seth Sendashonga	Ministry of Youth and Associative Movement
Jacques Bihozagara	Vice Prime Minister
Dr. Joseph Karemeva	Ministry of Health]

3. **Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR)**

Dismas Nsengiyaremye	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation
Boniface Ngulinzira	Ministry of Information
Mrs. Agathe Uwilingiyimana	Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education

4. **Parti Social Démocrate (PSD)**

Augustin Iyamuremye	Ministry of Public Works and Energy
Frédéric Nzamurambiho	Ministry of Agriculture
Marc Rugenera	Ministry of Finance

5. **Parti Libéral (PL)**

Justin Mugenzi	Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Cottage Industry
Aloys Niyoyita	Ministry of Justice
Landoald Ndasingwa	Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs

6. **Parti Démocrate Chrétien (PDC)**

Nayinzira Jean-Népo	Ministry of Environment and Tourism

CRN-8X — CODE —

5/X/607

STATEMENT BY HON. JOSEPH C. RWEGASIRA, TANZANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE FACILITATOR ON 18.03.94 IN KIGALI AT THE END OF HIS VISIT TO RWANDA.

On 4th March, a delegation of the RPF came to see the Facilitator to say that there were problems in the Implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, and sought the intervention of the Facilitator to resolve and allow for the set up of the Transitional Institutions. Similarly on 8th March the President of the Republic of Rwanda also came to Dar es Salaam to see the Facilitator and said that they were facing problems and therefore implementation of the Peace agreement had stalled. He also sought the intervention of the Facilitator.

The Facilitator had heard from various other sources that indeed there were problems, but had refrained from any intervention because as we all know supervision of the implementation of the Peace Agreement was placed under the United Nations. However,upon request by the two signatories of the Peace Agreement, the Facilitator felt under moral responsibility and legitimacy to try and help. It is for this reason ,the Facilitator saw the need to dispatch me to Kigali to see how we can jointly solve the problems and have the Institutions put into place.

I thought the best way to go about my assignment was to consult as largely as possible, first bilaterally or separately and if necessary collectively. In this context, since my arrival, I engaged in separate consultations. I have had very exhaustive consultations with all parties called upon to implement the Arusha Peace Agreement, even to the extent of consulting with what is now commonly known here as tendencies.

More specifically, I met the president of the Republic twice,
I met the current prime Minister twice,
I met the RPF Leadership at Mulindi,
I met the Prime Minister Designate twice,
I met the leadership of other political forces including MRND,

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MDR, PSD,PDC and both "tendencies" of PL.

I also had occasion to meet some members of the international Community and the leadership of the Catholic and protestant Churches in Rwanda.

Let me point out that, the second round of consultations were basically held to seek agreement and consensus on the opportunity of holding a collective consultations of the above.

If I were to make a rundown of my report to the Facilitator at this juncture, I would say the above consultations were very useful, frank and sincere. I learnt many aspects the Facilitator was not aware of in so much detail. I received explanations and reasons for certain positions and even managed to get useful suggestions on how we should proceed.

I am extremely grateful to the President of the Republic Government leaders, political forces. the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General,the OAU Representative in Rwanda, members of the Diplomatic Corps without forgetting the entire people of Rwanda; for the unreserved support they have extended to me. It is out of these consultations and contributions that I thought a collective consultation of all political forces to enable me to complete my assignment was necessary. Unfortunately this latter part of consultation has not succeeded because three parties did not take part in the meeting for the purpose, namely MRND, Mugenzi tendency of the PL and the representative of the Presidency.

Now allow me to briefly, share with you how the current problem is perceived according to the above consultations. It is a shared opinion of all with whom I consulted that the only remaining stumbling block to the putting into place of the Transitional Institutions evolves on the difficulties within the PL party. Earlier there was a problem with the list of deputies but later on a compromise was reached to share the 11 deputies on a 6/5 formula between Mr. Ndasingwa and Mr. Mugenzi "Tendencies" respectively. During my consultations with the leadership of the two tendencies they both repeated to me that their agreement on this sharing formula still holds. It is true, however, that both Mugenzi and

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Ndasingwa demand two ministerial portfolios to go with the formula and both of them want of necessity the Justice portfolio. It is the strong opinion of the Facilitator that such linkage has no legal basis and, therefore, not acceptable. This is exactly what I told the leadership of the two tendencies. Moreover, according to the provisions of the Peace Agreement this amounts to encroachment on the prerogatives of the Prime Minister Designate.

Connected to this Problem, is RPF rejection of the sharing formula under the contention that it was arrived at under duress during the meeting of 27th February,1994. The RPF contends that they have moral authority to question compromise reached following alleged intimidation and coercion; especially when the compromise was reached at the meeting of 25th and 27th February whereat they did not take part, as opposed to the different compromise reached at the earlier meeting of 18th February in which they participated. The RPF also believes that the linkage with the cabinet has a background which must be considered.

It is the opinion of the Facilitator that not only that the linkage is irrelevant and illegal going by the Peace Agreement, but also finds the RPF contention not acceptable especially when the leadership of the PL party insist they have reached compromise amicably for the interest of their party, and early setting up of the Institutions despite earlier positions to the contrary.

Allow me also to emphasise that the opinion of the Facilitator is based on the belief that all players should strictly adhere to the mandate prescribed to him/her by different articles of the Peace Agreement. Ie. each political force exercise their mandate in constituting the National Assembly and the Prime Minister Designate exercise his prerogative in picking up his cabinet as long as he respects the lists given to him during consultation with the Political forces.

As I mentioned earlier the Facilitator is aware of various meetings and consultations held at various levels to try and bring about a speedy installation of the Transitional Institutions. These meetings were held within the spirit of negotiating a

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political compromise to the difficulties facing some political forces.

I wish to point out that noble and well meaning as these meetings might have been, there is no doubt however that they took place outside the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement. This also includes the consultations I am making now as representative of the Facilitator. May be we need to take stock and if we come to the conclusion that the spirit is not there or rather not sufficient , we may wish to come to an end to this politicking and negotiations outside the Peace Agreement and therefore strictly adhere to the Arusha Peace Agreement which as we all know is now the Fundamental law of the Republic of Rwanda. Let us give Peace a chance by giving implementation of the Peace Agreement a chance.

Let me not tire you further as we are all conversant with the situation and problems facing implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

THANK YOU ALL FOR LISTENING TO ME SO ATTENTIVELY.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : UNOMUR

FROM : BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE : 15 MAR 94

NUMBER :

SUBJECT : **WEEKLY SITREP Nb 22, 08 MAR 94 - 14 MAR 94**

1. GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS

A. UNAMIR passed a second calm week following the assassination of the late Minister of works and national secretary of the PSD party, Mr. GATABAZI. The security situation is influenced by a curfew installed by the government from 22.00 Hrs till 05.00 Hrs and which is still effective. On 122340 Mar 94 there was a firing/grenade accident at GITARAMA (40 Km SOUTH-WEST of KIGALI). Two unknown persons entered the residence of the former prime minister and vice-president of the MDR party, Dr. Diamas NDSENYAREMGE, and threatened him. He took shelter in the sleeping room and could barricade it. Finally the aggressors took a radio and when leaving the compound they threw a grenade into the empty living room. Fortunately there were no casualties. CIVPOL and

local gendarmerie are investigating the case.

B. The Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) is not yet installed and UNAMIR continues to pursue all efforts to unblock the situation.

C. Main events of the week for UNAMIR Military Division are: (1) On 081200 Mar 94 Force Comd (FC) and KIGALI Sector Comd witnessed a demonstration of the Bangladesh Force Reserve Company mounted on BTR-80. Breakthrough of a road block and extraction of VIPs from a critical situation being demonstrated; (2) On 090930 Mar 94 FC chaired a Joint Military Commission (JMC) meeting at NGONDORE. (3) The same day DFC/COS visited SOUTH Sector HQ at BUTARE and the refugee camps SAGA I and II in that area; (4) On 10 Mar 94, FC left the mission area and will be out of station till 28 Mar 94. The Deputy FC and Chief of Staff, Brig Gen ANYIDOHO from GHANA is the acting FC; (5) On 101040 Mar 94 a Belgian helicopter crashed 2 Km NORTH of KIGALI. Fortunately the pilot and the passengers had minor injuries. Investigation ongoing; (6) On 101900 Mar 94 the Belgian Minister of Defense, Mr. L. DELCROIX, arrived in the mission area for a three days visit to RWANDA and UNAMIR. He was accompanied by ten parliamentarians and 40 journalists; (7) Mrs. Shireen CAUSEY, secretary to the Chief Administrative Officer, having malaria with serious complications was evacuated to NAIROBI (KENYA) by Belgian aircraft C-130; (8) On 12 Mar 94, a medal parade was organized for the Belgian battalion (KIBAT) being relieved soon..

2. <u>POLITICAL</u>

A. During the period under review, attention remained focussed on ongoing efforts to break the persistent political impasse holding up progress on the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement starting, in particular, with the installation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly.

B. Visits were undertaken by President Habyarimana to Kampala (Uganda) and Dar-Es-Salam (Tanzania) to discuss with those leaders modalities for resolving the political impasse that is preventing the installation of the transitional institutions. Following these visits, the Foreign Minister of Tanzania arrived in Kigali over the week-end for further discussions with Rwandese political leaders including RPF officials. The Minister held discussions with the SRSG on 15 March.

C. The SRSG, along with the Tanzanian Ambassador in Kigali, representing the Facilitator, met with President Habyarimana on 11 March. The Belgium Defence Minister, Mr. Leo Delcroix, who

was also visiting Kigali, had discussions with the President, urging him to promptly find a solution to the political impasse.

D. A group of members of the diplomatic corps in Kigali, including also the representative of the OAU Secretary-General and a UNAMIR political adviser, visited Mulindi on 9 March, for discussions with RPF officials.

3. MILITARY

A. **FORCE HQ**

Normal staff duties were carried out. Besides the activities mentioned under Par. 1.c. Force HQ Staff worked out the UNAMIR withdrawal plan. The plan was reviewed by the Sectors. and is for the time being distributed.

B. **UNOMUR SECTOR** The general situation in the UNOMUR area continues to be calm. There is no significant change. Election campaigns followed by rallies were organized. All went peacefully. Staff briefing was organized for the Dutch UNMOs that arrived in the mission area. The French ambassador to UGANDA paid a courtesy visit to UNOMUR. The planned Ptl were carried out. During the period under review UNOMUR conducted 32 day Ptl, 20 night Ptl and 4 boat Ptl. A more cooperative attitude of the NRA was observed. The following border crossings were observed:

CP	VEHICLES		PERSONS	
	To RWANDA	To UGANDA	To RWANDA	To UGANDA
GATUNA	36 (1) 26 (2)	48 24 (2)	59	84
KYANIKA	0	0	0	0
LUBIRIZI	0	0	0	0
BIGAGA	0	0	0	0
KAFUNZO	0	0	0	0

(1) Six Vehicles with food and one with fuel
(2) World Food Programme trucks

Most of the movements were of routine nature. All Veh carried food and supplies. The attitude of the NRA and RPF towards UNOMUR Ptl found to be normal along the border. Operational activities could not be maximized due to shortage of vehicles and ABSENCE of helicopters. Eleven vehicles which are supposed to be received are not yet delivered.

C. **DMZ SECTOR**

The situation in the DMZ area was calm. Extensive patrolling was carried out by the six UNMO teams and BYUBAT. The following incidents occurred: (1) Seven rounds of firing were heard at 111935 Mar 94 at 700 meter SOUTH-WEST of the DMZ Sec HQ. The rounds were fired by RGF personnel at BYUMBA; (2) Un undetermined number of displaced persons returned to RPF controlled area at KAGOGO; (3) On 04 Mar 94, four RPF soldiers carried out psyops in island area of lake BULERA near KAGOGO. Locals were assured of RPF being harmless; (4) On 08 Mar 94, BYUBAT Ptl spotted RPF personnel at KIDAHO (7148) and RWAHOMBO (). One RPF Sec at grid A754478 and about one company at SOZI (7548); (5) Two persons, suspected to be thieves, were beaten to death by locals on 051530 Mar 94; (6) RPF deployment was observed by BYUBAT at check-point CYENKWANSI, BUFUNDA and GAKOMA; (7) Five grenades were thrown into a house at GATETE (9016). Investigation ongoing.
The operations are hampered due to insufficient number of vehicles, shortage of communication equipment and non availability of accommodations.

D. **KIGALI SECTOR**

Conducted 323 vehicle and 40 foot Ptl in KIGALI city in order to ensure Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA). Established daily 6 check points at different places in KWSA. Random patrols and check points saturation being monitored by Force HQ. Tunisian Coy(-) ensured the location of the RPF battalion and RPF VIPs at KIGALI city (CND compound). The private residences of the prime minister, the prime minister designate, the president of the constitutional court and five opposition ministers are being secured by Sec KIGALI until the installation of the BBTG. RUTBAT conducted training on armored vehicles (BTR-60). Operational situation of RUTBAT improved significantly since their vehicles and equipments arrived in the mission area and are being checked and distributed.

E. **MILOB GROUP**

(1) **MILOB Group HQ** At the weekly CMO conference it was stressed that the vehicles are to be considered as critical stores of UNAMIR. The necessity to drive carefully was emphasized. In order to immediately recognize any movement or re deployment of troops, UNAMIR has increased patrolling and monitoring in all Sectors. For the

moment there is one UNMO team per RPF battalion. So far no movement of troops was observed, however both factions seem to be more active and alert than before. Two escorts for RPF VIPs and UNAMIR communication personnel were carried out.

(2) **RPF Sector** The RPF MILOB Sector intensified patrolling and liaison with RPF within OAR. RPF seems to be more vigilant but no unusual movement or preparations could be observed. No major incident was reported throughout the week. On 07 Mar the 59 Bn Comd addressed 200 RPF Officers/Troops on the football field of BUTARO. On 10 Mar another meeting was held and attended by 500 RPF Officers/Troops. About 1,000 returnees, escorted by RPF, repaired the BUTARO-BAKARAGATA road on 10 Mar 94.

(3) **RGF Sector** The situation at RUHENGERI is calm. On 11 Mar 94, a meeting was held between the prefect of GISENYI, the RGF Milob Sec Comd and local Gendarmerie on the issue of general security in the GISENYI area.

(4) **South Sector** The situation was calm at BUTARE throughout the week. Also at CYANGUGU. Conducted patrolling of the refugee camps of KANAGE and SAGA 1 & 2.

F. **FORCE LOG, MED AND ENGINEERS ELEMENTS**

The engineer Coy is deployed in the DMZ area at BYUMBA. Their major equipments just arrived from BANGLADESH. It seems that there are many deficiencies. However the unit is checking the equipment and preparing it for use. Mine detectors also arrived. FC tasked the unit to study and to test the feasibility of mine clearance in Rwanda with this equipment. If it is revealed that this equipment is useless the field operations division (FOD) will be asked for appropriate action.

G. **UNAMIR FORCE STRENGTH**

UNAMIR strength is almost at its maximum which is 2,548. Current strength is 2,506 All troops are on ground and few observers are yet to arrive. Please find enclosed the weekly personnel state as of 140800 Mar 94.

H. **MEDICAL AND HEALTH STATE**

The UNAMIR field hospital is installed in King FAYCAL hospital. They provide medical care to UNAMIR personnel and local

population. The hospital has a serious lack of supplies. About 40 UNAMIR personnel and 30 Locals receive normal treatment on a weekly basis. Problems occur with the local population in the critical periods. They have confidence in the UNAMIR field hospital and are not willing to be transferred to the governmental hospital (KIGALI hospital) after their emergency treatment. The KIGALI hospital also demonstrates no positive attitude in getting these patients. They don't answer the phone and deny sending ambulances to get the patients. Solutions to this problem are being negotiated. Medical supplies are urgently required. Discussions are ongoing with ICRC/UNICEF in getting their support for delivering supplies to UNAMIR for treatment of the local population by UNAMIR field hospital. A first urgent medevac has been executed to NAIROBI. Few co-ordination problems occurred and the SOP will be adapted.

4. UNCIVPOL

A. The mixed patrols (CIVPOL/Gendarmerie) are continued for increasing the security situation of the population of KIGALI. The situation has improved but there are still serious incidents.

B. Incidents

(1) In the night of 07 Mar 94 the population of NYARRAMA, area KICUKIRU/GIKONDO injured a young man of 18 years called TOUMWINE James because they thought that he was a RPF rebel. The Police Monitoring Team (PMT) asked Gendarmerie GIKONDO why they did not bring him to the hospital. The answer was that you have to pay first before getting help from the hospital. Subsequently the victim was brought to the UNAMIR field hospital where he was treated.

(2) On 091620 Mar 94, CIVPOL got information that a grenade was found in the area of KARURUMA. CIVPOL informed the EOD team and went together to the location. There was one grenade, M 26 made in South Africa, in the bushes behind some houses. The EOD team took the unsafe and dangerous grenade and destroyed it.

(3) On 09 Mar 94 Mr. ASSOUMANI Kissigui from the NYAKABANDA residence, arrived at the Gendarmerie station of NYAMIRAMBO and stated that he was beaten by a Gendarmerie patrol team. He had a major injury on his head. CIVPOL is investigating together with Gendarmerie.

(4) On 11 Mar 94 KICUKIRO Gendarmerie was informed, that an RGF officer, Lt MUTABAZI Etienne, Officer S1 OPS at RUHENGERI, was attacked at the GIKONDO area by a crowd of about 50 people. The officer wanted to arrest Mr. BIRUSHYA Boniface, member of the CDR party and boutique owner at GIKONDO, because he was suspected, to be involved in a theft affair. The officer was escorted to his residence by the Gendarmerie.

(5) On 11 mar 94 at KICUKIRO the body of a young man was discovered near the stadium, in front of DON BOSCO School. That person has not been identified. CIVPOL is investigating together with Gendarmerie Brigade of KICUKIRO.

(6) On 120215 Mar 94, there was a grenade explosion in the area of FAYCAL Hospital. No establishments were made by CIVPOL and there were no complaints in this case.

C. Accidents

(1) The night patrol in sector GIKONDO had an accident on 072300 Mar 94. UNAMIR vehicle 417, Nissan pick-up, had a collision with a road block and was damaged in the front.

(2) On 081830 Mar 94, the UNAMIR vehicle 1242 of the KICUKIRO CIVPOL patrol team was hit by a Rwandese private vehicle at the left rear fender. The accident happened in the area of KICUKIRO near Boulevard of the African Union. Nobody was injured. The Military Police (MP) is investigating the case.

D. Current Manpower

52 Police officers. On 08 Mar 94 three (3) police officers from BANGLADESH arrived at the CIVPOL HQ.

5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

The logistic environment is still difficult. Equipment arrived from UNTAC but the logistic situation remains difficult due to delays in getting vehicles issued because most of them require repairs. Radios are also in short supply. Vehicles and radios are still significantly deficient to the requirement. Operational status from BANGLADESH contingent has somehow improved due to the arrival of their vehicles/equipment. The logistics and engineer company vehicles

and equipments are being distributed. Also was brought to FOD's attention that there are no spare parts and no mechanics available for the APCs (BTR-80) provided by BANGLADESH. For the moment three BTR-80 out of eight are not operational. UNAMIR is also very repeat very dissatisfied with all matters relating to helicopters. This operational deficiency in both UNOMUR and UNAMIR is most disconcerting.

6. CONCLUSION

We passed the scheduled installation date for the BBTG by more than 72 days. This situation is deteriorating significantly and all UNAMIR resources are being used to the maximum of their availability. The rhythm of activity will require a reassessment of troops to tasks in order to ensure a sustainment capability of the Force over the next month.

7. REGARDS

Weekly
Personnel
Plate

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

94 MAR -8 15 06

CRN 78

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : UNOMUR / ZEA

FROM : BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE : 08 MAR 94

NUMBER : MIR 506

SUBJECT : **WEEKLY SITREP Nb 21, 01 MAR 94 - 07 MAR 94**

1. GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS

A. The situation calmed down. Curfew was installed by the government from 22.00 Hrs till 05.00 Hrs. A major incident happened on 06 Mar 94 when a civilian car loaded with 80 Kg SAA explosives and 100 grenades was involved in an accident. The driver bought the ammunition at NYAMIRAMBO (KIGALI). The origin and destination could not yet be determined. See Par 4. B. (4) for further details. Gendarmerie and CIVPOL investigating the case.

B. The Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) is not yet installed and UNAMIR continues to pursue all efforts to unblock the situation.

C. Main events of the week for UNAMIR Military Division are: **(1)**

In order to meet the increasing demands for security and UNAMIR presence at KIGALI it was decided to re deploy one Company (+) from DMZ to Kigali Sector; **(2)** On 01 Mar 94 FC met the President of the Republic and the Chiefs of Staff from RGF and Gendarmerie. FC stated that the risks of flare ups in KIGALI had to be the prime concern and that resources must go there; **(3)** UNAMIR received Mr. W. KUNATH from German press and Mrs. D. ASLAMOVA from Russian press (Pravda); **(4)** FC conducted an aerial Recce in the North-West of the country to see the disposition of the RPF. Significant concentration of troops was observed and also they were more alert. Defensive positions in a number of places were improved and no tangible sign of any movement was detected.

2. POLITICAL

A. During the period under review, UNAMIR again focussed its political activities on efforts to unblock the impasse holding up the installation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly.

B. The SRSG visited Mulindi on 1 March for discussions with the FPR leadership, in particular with its chairman Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe. During the meeting, the SRSG sought to ascertain the FPR's perspectives on recent political developments in the country and to examine its views on the proposed formulas agreed on 27 February by the five political parties represented in the Government aimed at resolving the internal problems within the PL and MDR. It is to be noted that on 28 February, the FPR had issued a press release in which it rejected the proposed solutions. The SRSG urged the FPR to continue to pursue dialogue with the other political forces in order to reach an acceptable compromise which would enable the installation of the transitional institutions to take place at the earliest opportunity. He stressed the need for a peaceful approach and to avert the resumption of war.

C. On 2 March, the SRSG met with the Ambassadors of Belgium, France, Germany and the United States to review and assess the overall situation in Rwanda and to consider what could be done to overcome persistent obstacles and to help advance the peace process. The need to prevent the resumption of hostilities and to encourage continuing dialogue among the various political forces was underlined in the course of the meeting. The Ambassadors, whose countries constitute the main aid donors to Rwanda and three of which (Belgium, France and the United States) are among

the observers to the peace process, reaffirmed their support for the SRSG's efforts to break the stalemate and move the process forward.

D. The SRSG continued his consultations on 3 March with a meeting with President Habyarimana and on 4 March, with a meeting with the Prime Minister Designate. He also had discussions in Kigali with other Rwandese political leaders during the period, including the Director of the President's Cabinet as well as the First Vice-President of RPF.

E. On 7 March, President Habyariman paid a one-day official working visit to Uganda during which he met with President Museveni. In a communiqué issued at the end of the visit, the two leaders pointed out that they had held fruitful discussions on matters of a bilateral and regional nature. The two Heads of State expressed appreciation to the United Nations for its assistance in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement and renewed their call on the international community to continue to lend both moral and material assistance to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement. President Museveni on his part reiterated his commitment to assist where possible.

3. MILITARY

A. **FORCE HQ**

Normal staff duties were carried out. Besides the activities mentioned under Par. 1.c. Force HQ Staff worked out the UNAMIR withdrawal plan. The plan is for the moment being reviewed by the Sectors. A final version will be available at the end of this week. On 01 Mar 94, FC met the president of the Republic. Deputy FC and KIGALI Sec Comd were in attendance as was the Minister of Defense and the Chiefs of Staff of RGF and Gendarmerie. Several clarifications and concerns were brought out and explained. The movement of troops from DMZ was a concern and they hoped it will be only temporary. FC insisted that the risks of flare ups had to be the prime concern and that resources must go there. Support to and with the Gendarmerie was critical and we must continue to help each other. The same day FC went to MULINDI to meet RPF Comd, Maj Gen KAGAME. The cease-fire violations were discussed in detail. He agreed initially to resolve this immediately. He stated that discipline was getting more difficult as he is having problems sustaining the army due to the absence of BBTG organized logistics. He answered very directly that should he ever consider offensive operations through the DMZ, UNAMIR

would be advised before as he does not want to injure UN personnel. He was calm, very confident but impatient with the political situation. On 02 Mar 94, FC met RPF vice-chairman at CND compound (KIGALI). Discussions were on the day long meeting he had with the prime minister and the parties. The vice-chairman was calm, interested in the proposals that were made that day and ready to bring these points to MULINDI, but still very skeptical about the President's maneuverings. The split of the PL Deputies/Ministers was still most bothersome to him. On 06 Mar 94, FC visited RPF Chairman and RPF Army Comd at MULINDI. Chairman was very hard line and not particularly disposed for discussions on the political situation. He said he was surprised we were discussing anything other than the 18 Feb 94 entente. Maj Gen KAGAME was serene and reaffirmed his impatience in the political situation and his concerns about food and discipline problems. Also he stated that the impasse needed a bit more time to permit some of the political elements to fall into place.

B. **UNOMUR SECTOR**

The situation inside UNOMUR area is calm. On order from FC the patrolling activity was intensified in order to detect any vehicle movement during the night. No abnormal traffic was observed. ACMO went to KAMPALA and paid a working/courtesy visit to the ambassadors of EGYPT, FRANCE, KENYA, NIGERIA, RWANDA, TANZANIA, UK, USA, the Chief of Staff of NRA and the UNDP representative. Also the Deputy Force Commander of BOTSWANA Defense Force visited UNOMUR on 04 and 05 Mar 94. On the personnel side, the UNMOs from ZIMBABWE were relieved. Also the Dutch UNMOs are going to be relieved soon. A total of 55 patrols, including 14 night patrols were conducted. There was no significant movement except World Food Programmme and Red Cross convoys. Most of the movements were of routine nature carrying food stuffs/supplies. NRA and RPF were found extra alert along the border. Operational activities coulds not be maximized due to shortage of vehicles and absence of helicopters. UNOMUR still expects 11 vehicles from UNOSOM. A guideline for collection and analyses of information was circulated to all UNMOs. Hopefully this will improve the quality of the sitrep's and reports.

C. **DMZ SECTOR**

The situation in the DMZ area was calm the past week. Several incidental shots were observed. They are definitely an

indication of tense and alertness on both sides. The DMZ Sec is now fully operational. UNAMIR is present in the whole DMZ. Extensive patrolling was carried out.

D. **KIGALI SECTOR**

Conducted 306 vehicle and 51 foot Ptl in KIGALI city in order to ensure Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA). Established daily 3 check points at different places in KWSA. Random patrols and check points saturation being monitored by Force HQ. Tunisian Coy(-) ensured the location of the RPF battalion and RPF VIPs at KIGALI city (CND compound). The private residences of the prime minister, the prime minister designate, the president of the constitutional court and five opposition ministers are being secured by Sec KIGALI until the installation of the BBTG. RUTBAT conducted training on armored vehicles (BTR-60). Operational situation of RUTBAT improved significantly since their vehicles and equipments arrived in the mission area and are being checked and distributed.

E. **MILOB GROUP**

(1) **MILOB Group HQ** An additional seven UNMO teams have been deployed the past week. In order to immediately recognize any movement or re deployment of troops, UNAMIR has increased patrolling and monitoring in all Sectors. For the moment there is one UNMO team per RPF battalion. So far no movement of troops was observed, however both factions seem to be more active and alert than before. The unstable security situation resulting in the assassination of two prominent politicians (the minister of public works (PSD) and the CDR president) last week has normalized. The Tutsi population in the CYANGUGU area, the native area of the CDR president, that was threatened because of the situation returned to their houses. MILOB Gp HQ conducted 14 escorts for RPF and various NGOs.

(2) **RPF Sector** The RPF MILOB Sector intensified patrolling and liaison with RPF within OAR. RPF seems to be more vigilant but no unusual movement or preparations could be observed. No major incident was reported throughout the week.

(3) **RGF Sector** The population at RUHENGERI is getting anxious due to the delay of installation of the BBTG. On 03 Mar 94 the team reported that RGF is maintaining and re-inforcing positions in the RUHENGERI Sector. Young men

are recruited to dig trenches.

(4) **South Sector** The situation was calm at BUTARE throughout the week. Also at CYANGUGU. Conducted patrolling of the refugee camps of KANAGE and SAGA 1 & 2. It was observed that several hundreds of refugees returned to BURUNDI the past week.

F. **FORCE LOG, MED AND ENGINEERS ELEMENTS**

The engineer Coy is deployed in the DMZ area at BYUMBA. Their major equipments just arrived from BANGLADESH. It seems that there are many deficiences. However the unit is checking the equipment and preparing it for use. Mine detectors also arrived. FC tasked the unit to study and to test the faisability of mine clearance in Rwanda with this equipment. If it is revealed that this equipment is useless the field operations division (FOD) will be tasked for appropriate action.

G. **UNAMIR FORCE STRENGTH**

UNAMIR strength is almost at its maximum which is 2,548. Current strength is 2,522 All troops are on ground and few observers are missing. Please find enclosed the weekly personnel state as of 080800 Mar 94.

H. **MEDICAL AND HEALTH STATE**

The UNAMIR field hospital is installed in King FAYCAL hospital. They provide medical care to UNAMIR personnel and local population. The hospital has a serious lack of supplies. About 40 UNAMIR personnel and 30 Locals receive normal treatment on a weekly basis. Problems occur with the local population in the critical periods. They have confidence in the UNAMIR field hospital and are not willing to be transferred to the governmental hospital (KIGALI hospital) after their emergency treatment. The KIGALI hospital also demonstrates no positive attitude in getting these patients. They don't answer the phone and deny sending ambulances to get the patients. Solutions to this problem are being negotiated. Medical supplies are urgently required. Discussions are ongoing with ICRC/UNICEF in getting their support for delivering supplies to UNAMIR for treatment of the local population by UNAMIR field hospital.

4. <u>UNCIVPOL</u>

A. The number of incidents decreased due to the curfew installed

by the Government. CIVPOL together with gendarmerie and police conducts since the beginning of this week preventive patrolling. A certain success is already observed. These combined teams will become confidence building when RPF can be added to the patrolling team (as observer). Discussions are ongoing on this issue.

B. Incidents: (1) On 030500 Mar 94, MRND and CDR followers gathered and attacked a house at KIMIHURURA. It is reported that two persons have been killed. CIVPOL is investigating if there were political reasons or banditry; (2) On 030630 Mar 94, five persons were injured whilst a grenade exploded. They were brought to the UNAMIR field hospital for treatment. Two persons were reported having major injuries; (3) On 061330 Mar 94 a civilian vehicle numbered 78473 mat an accident 100 meters SOUTH of the CND compound. The driver sustained minor injuries. Whilst recovering the vehicle following ammunition was found: 80 Kg of SAA, 28 SAA chargers, 100 grenades type F-1 (Russian) and 100 detonators type F-1. UNMO team witnessed the accident. The ammunition/explosives were brought to camp KANOMBE by UNAMIR EOD team. The driver got treatment at KIGALI hospital and was arrested by the gendarmerie of REMERA. The name of the driver is Mr. NIYONGABE. He spent the week-end at KIGALI and asked an unknown person for buying grenades and explosives. He bought the ammo on 05 Mar 94 at NYAMIRAMBO (KIGALI). Gendarmerie and Civpol investigating the matter.

C. Current strength of UNCIVPOL: 49 Police Officers (Unchanged)

5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

The logistic environment is still difficult. Equipment arrived from UNTAC but the logistic situation remains difficult due to delays in getting vehicles and radios issued. Vehicles and radios are still significantly deficient to the requirement. Operational status from BANGLADESH contingent has improved due to the arrival of their vehicles/equipment. The logistics and engineer company vehicles and equipments are being distributed. But there is still no word on the deficiencies of this equipment. UNAMIR is also very repeat very dissatisfied with all matters relating to helicopters. This operational deficiency in both UNOMUR and UNAMIR is most disconcerting.

6. CONCLUSION

We passed the scheduled installation date for the BBTG by more than 65 days. This situation is deteriorating significantly and all UNAMIR resources are being used to the maximum of their

availability. The rhythm of activity will require a reassessment of troops to tasks in order to ensure a sustainment capability of the Force over the next month.

7. REGARDS

UNAMIR - MILITARY DIVISION
Weekly Personnel State

DTG: 080800 Mar 94

Ser Nb	Country	TROOPS										UNMO	Total
		Inf Bn	Log Coy	Eng Coy	Med Coy	MovCon Pl	MP Sec	TUN Coy(-)	Sub Total	Staff	Total		
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)
1	AUSTRIA											15	15
2	BANGLADESH	370	200	203	50	20	11		854	30	884	59	943
3	BELGIUM	406							406	15	421		421
4	BOTSWANA											9	9
5	BRAZIL	3							3		3	10	13
6	CANADA									1	1	1	2
7	CONGO											26	26
8	EGYPT											10	10
9	FIJI											1	1
10	GHANA	800							800	19	819	24	843
11	HUNGARY											4	4
12	MALI											10	10
13	NETHERLANDS											10	10
14	NIGERIA											15	15
15	POLAND											5	5
16	RUSSIA											15	15
17	SENEGAL											39	39
18	SLOVAKIA											5	5
19	TOGO											15	15
20	TUNISIA							60	60	1	61		61
21	URUGUAY											20	20
22	ZIMBABWE											30	30
	TOTAL	1,579	200	203	50	20	11	60	2,123	66	2,189	323	2,512

9/9

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR
1994 MAR -8 14 19

CRN-77 1/t

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO:	ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO:	KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM:	BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE:	8 MARCH 1994
SUBJECT:	JOINT COMMUNIQUE
NUMBER:	MIR-501
NO OF PAGES:	5

1. Please find attached for your information, a joint communiqué issued by Presidents Habyarimana and Museveni following a one day visit to Uganda made by President Habyarimana on 7 March.

2. This visit takes place at a critical juncture as the institutional impasse persists in Rwanda, scenes of massacres are reported in Burundi and legislative elections are due to be held this month in Uganda.

3. It is too early to assess the impact of this visit on the evolution of the political situation in Rwanda. It is known, however, that President Museveni has a broad audience within the RPF, which seems to be ignoring the political compromise reached by the Head of State and the five parties of the current coalition government.

4. A meeting is being held today in Mulindi by the Western Ambassadors, the Representative of the Facilitator (Tanzania), the Representative of the OAU and a Representative of UNAMIR with RPF leadership in order to convince the RPF to renounce the logic of war and involve itself more positively with the other political forces in the negotiations now underway.

Regards.

2/5

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

His Excellency Juvenal Habyarimana, President of the Republic of Rwanda paid a one day official working visit to Uganda on 7th March 1994.

1. During his stay in Uganda President Habyarimana held cordial and fruitful discussions with President Yoweri Museveni on matters of bilateral and regional nature. The two Presidents were accompanied by their respective Ministers and other dignitaries. President Habyarimana briefed President Museveni on the current political situation in Rwanda.
   President Museveni commended President Habyarimana and through him the entire people of Rwanda for the efforts made so far in implementing the Peace Agreement between the Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Patriotic Front signed on 4th August 1993 at Arusha, Tanzania.

2. President Museveni expressed the hope that the deadlock which has delayed the installation of the Transitional government would be overcome soon so that the long awaited era of peace, national reconciliation and economic development for the people of Rwanda and stability in the sub-region could begin.

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

3. The two Heads of State expressed appreciation to the United Nations for its role in overseeing the implementation of the Peace Accord and renewed their call to the international community to lend both moral and material assistance to facilitate the implementation of the Peace Agreement. On his part, President Museveni reiterated his commitment to assist where possible.

4. The two Heads of State reviewed relations between their two countries, since their last meeting in September 1993. In this regard they renewed their commitment to enhancing cooperation in all fields of human endeavour. They noted that the traffic within the Northern Corridor is still badly affected by the situation in Rwanda, and that this has adversely affected the economies of the countries of the sub-region. They called for the re-opening of the transit route as soon as possible.

5. The two Presidents discussed the Rwandese refugee problem and confirmed their commitment to resolve the matter once and for all.

THE REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

In this connection President Habyarimana briefed President Museveni on the difficulty faced in the return of Rwandese refugees in the North of the country. The two Presidents agreed to set up a Joint Technical Commission to work out modalities for the orderly return of refugees.

6. The two Presidents also recommended the convening of a Regional Summit to find a global solution to the problem of refugees in the region.

7. Regarding KBO, the two leaders reviewed progress made in the implementation of its projects and programmes. They reaffirmed their commitment to the objectives of KBO as a useful forum for regional cooperation and called for its strengthening.

At the end of the visit President Juvenal Habyarimana expressed his heartfelt appreciation to President Museveni, the Government and the people of Uganda for the warm reception and hospitality accorded to him and his delegation during their stay in Uganda.

Done in ENTEBBE ..... this .....day of .....1994 in two originals in English and French Languages both texts being equally authentic.

H.E. YOWERI KAGUTA MUSEVENI
PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF UGANDA

H.E. JUVENAL HABYARIMANA
PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

1/10

CRN 76

UNAMIR

94 MAR -8 13 55

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE: 8 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: MIR 500

SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FOR DETERRENT OPERATIONS

REFERENCE: CODE CABLE DPKO\UNAMIR DATED 16 FEBRUARY 1994

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1. IN THE REFERENCE GUIDANCE WAS PROVIDED FROM UNNY TO UNAMIR ON THE CONDUCT OF DETERRENT OPERATIONS.

2. ATTACHED IS THE OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE FC UNAMIR HAS ISSUED TO GUIDE THE INTERNAL SECURITY OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY UNAMIR IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR DIRECTION.

3. THE DETERRENT OPERATIONS SUCH AS ARMS RECOVERY WILL BE INITIATED WHEN POLITICAL IMPERATIVES ARE MET AND ALSO WHEN ALL COORDINATION AND INITIATIVES BETWEEN UNCIVPOL AND THE GENDARMERIE ARE FINALIZED. WE HOPE TO HAVE THIS SITUATION CLARIFIED IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE.

4. FORWARDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND REVIEW.

5. REGARDS.

2/10

UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR

1000.01 (FC)
Force HQ
Amahoro, Kigali

1 March 1994

To: Distribution List

From: Force Commander

Subject: OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE NO 9

Reference:
A. UN Peacekeepers Handbook dated 1984
B. Operational Directive No 2 (Interim) dated 19 November 1993.
C. Security Council Resolution 872 dated 5 October 1993

GENERAL

1. Due to the deteriorating security situation and due to the anticipated increasing requirement during the demobilization process to support a reduced Gendarmerie capability in aid to the civil power operations to maintain law and order, it will continue to be necessary under our peacekeeping and circumstance mandate for UNAMIR formed units, primarily Infantry units, to conduct aid to the civil power operations. The most intense and extreme of these operations is crowd control operations.

AIM

2. The aim of this operational directive is to define the concept of operations for UNAMIR personnel engaged in aid to the civil power operations under its current UN mandate.

THREAT

3. The threat that may develop, for which UNAMIR in general and Infantry Units in particular, may confront can be divided into three categories:

a. Peaceful Demonstrations. Characterized by a protest by a number of civilians in regards to an alleged injustice. These demonstrations will be non-violent in nature but could change to violence due to instigators or over-reaction by the security forces.

b. Violent Demonstrations. Characterized by a mob or crowd which is acting in a manner which is contrary to law and order with violent manifestations. These demonstrations

will have as their primary goal the injury of persons, the theft or destruction of public or private property and\or the disruption of normal routine.

c. Threats or Threatening Actions. Members of the government or civil population may be threatened or even assaulted. They may call for assistance from UNAMIR. These threats or actions may require a response from UNAMIR.

TASK

4. The mission of UNAMIR forces, specifically infantry elements, will be to support the civil authorities, namely the Gendarmerie in the maintenance of law and order. The Gendarmerie must at all times be the lead element in any confrontation with peaceful or violent demonstrations and in responding to calls for assistance except in the DMZ sector where UNAMIR forces are the responsible security organization.

5. UNAMIR forces will only act in close support, behind the Gendarmerie, unless the Gendarmerie cannot or will not intervene. In this isolated case, UNAMIR forces will only defend life and UN property or installations in accordance with the Rules of Engagement as outlined in reference B. UNAMIR forces will also intervene on the order of the Force or Sector Commander to save VIP lives or to prevent crimes against humanity as described in Reference B

6. In all other instances it must be emphasized that UNAMIR will only, in accordance with its mandate, act in support of the civil authorities such as the Prefect of Kigali, the police and the Gendarmerie. Requests for support must be submitted in writing. In short, the UNAMIR elements will conduct their mission in close support of the Gendarmerie.

CONDUCT OF PEACEFUL DEMONSTRATION CROWD CONTROL

7. A peaceful demonstration will be controlled by the Gendarmerie with monitoring by UNAMIR. The legal authority for UNAMIR to assist in operations to conduct peaceful demonstration crowd control are contained in paragraphs 3 a and h of Reference C. This monitoring will be conducted in the following manner:

a. Warning of the demonstration will be received or reported to Force Headquarters. Force Headquarters must receive a written request from the appropriate civil authority such as the Prefect of Kigali for support. If UN lives or property could be in danger if the demonstration became violent UNAMIR will operate unilaterally or preferably in coordination with the gendarmerie.

b. Force HQ will direct the increased and appropriate level of readiness for the Force and the affected Sector.

Force HQ will also notify UNCIVPOL so that their activity, under the command of the PC and his operations section, can be coordinated with UNAMIR military personnel in regards to the demonstration. Force HQ will also notify the appropriate Sector Headquarters to liaise with the Gendarmerie and to provide one UNMO team to monitor the Gendarmerie at the demonstration and forward periodic sitreps of the situation (NOTE: the UNMO team should remain behind the Gendarmerie, out of contact with the demonstration but in the best position of observation).

c. Force HQ will liaise with the UNCIVPOL to ensure a UNCIVPOL monitoring team also liaises with the Gendarmerie and with the UNMO team. The lead team will be the UNCIVPOL team.

d. Force HQ may task the appropriate Sector Headquarters to provide a to be determined sized infantry unit to act as a reserve should the demonstration become violent and if UN lives or property (including the CND) could be in danger. In the DMZ, this will have to be done as the responsibility to intervene rests with UNAMIR.

e. Force HQ may increase the alert status of the Force Reserve. In the case of UNMO Sectors, the Force Reserve will be alerted to provide the Infantry force, on order, to the Sector Headquarters.

f. Force Headquarters will disseminate information on the demonstration to all divisions of UNAMIR and to UN agencies so that the area can be avoided.

g. Sector Headquarters will provide periodic sitreps on the demonstration which will be disseminated by Force HQ.

h. Upon completion of the demonstration a report will be submitted to Force HQ Attn:COO within 24 hours.

CONDUCT OF VIOLENT DEMONSTRATION CROWD CONTROL

8. A violent demonstration must be confronted by the Gendarmerie. UNAMIRs MISSION IN REGARDS TO THESE OPERATIONS IS FOR OUR PERSONNEL TO TAKEOVER THE FOLLOWING TASKS GUARDING VITAL POINTS, ESCORTING VIPs, CHECKPOINTS, PATROLS, TRAFFIC OF JUNCTION CONTROL ETC. IN OTHER WORDS WE WILL RELIEVE GENDARMERIE PERSONNEL FROM THEIR ROUTINE DUTIES SO THAT THEY WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL TO CONDUCT ANTI-DEMONSTRATION DUTIES. The gendarmerie is specially trained and equipped with crowd control equipment. They are also the primary agency for the maintenance of law and order.

9. UNAMIR forces are not trained nor equipped for crowd control operations. UNAMIR is not in Rwanda to replace but to support the civil authorities, namely, the Gendarmerie in the performance of

its responsibilities. The legal authority for UNAMIR to assist in aid to the civil power operations is contained in paragraph 3 a of Reference C which states UNAMIR will "contribute to the security of the city of Kigali inter alia within a weapons-secure area established by the parties in and around the city". The aid to the civil power tasks UNAMIR will perform in Kigali and in the remainder of the country, except the DMZ, are listed in paragraph 8. However, as the Force Reserve based on a company from RUTBAT must be capable to respond to situations, anywhere in the country including the DMZ. The Force Reserve must also be trained and prepared to conduct violent demonstration crowd control but for employment in the DMZ only.

10. Violent demonstration crowd control will only be conducted if such occurrences happen in the DMZ as there is no other authority to deal with them and as it is in our mandate to provide security in that area. Violent demonstrations against the CND or against a UN installation, anywhere other than the DMZ, will be treated as attacks on a Vital Point, in which case UNAMIR "Rules of Engagement" and Sector\Unit operational procedures will be applied.

11. Violent Crowd Control Procedures. Violent demonstration crowd control in the DMZ will be conducted in the following manner:

a. Warning of the demonstration and its likely or actual violent nature will be received or reported to Force Headquarters.

b. Force HQ will direct the increased and appropriate level of readiness for the Force and the affected Sector. It will also notify UNCIVPOL so that their activity, under the command of the PC and his operations section, can be coordinated with UNAMIR military personnel in regards to the demonstration.

c. The Sector Commander will designate a UNAMIR Commander as demonstration commander (most likely the CO of an Infantry Battalion). All UNAMIR military forces involved in the crowd control operation will be placed under his command. He should establish a Joint Headquarters with the gendarmerie demonstration commander. The UNCIVPOL will maintain their own liaison contact with the UNAMIR Demonstration Commander and the Gendarmerie Commander. The UNAMIR Demonstration Commander will establish direct personal contact with the Gendarmerie Demonstration Commander and review the role of the UNAMIR military forces and prepare a joint plan with him. They should remain together for the duration of the operation. They should each have direct communications with their immediate superior.

d. The to be determined sized infantry force will be alerted, dressed and equipped, briefed and transported to a debussing point. The debussing point should be well to

the rear of the Gendarmerie and the demonstration but within site of the demonstrators. A large, disciplined, well-organized and overwhelming military force, dismounting from APCs in view of the crowd, will have a desired intimidating effect and will effectively demonstrate the solidarity between the Gendarmerie and UNAMIR for the maintenance of law and order.

e. UNAMIR Demonstration Forces will be formed into four groups:

(1) Command Group. Consisting of the Commander, his second in command, a signaller, a photographer\recorder\diarist, a megaphone man with a translator, two banner men and a runner.

(2) A Formed Sub-Unit. Consisting of a platoon or company depending on the plan.

(3) A Support Group. A tailored group possibly consisting of transport drivers, medical assistants Press Information Officers etc. The support group should be under the command and control of a designated subordinate commander with direct access and communications with the UNAMIR Demonstration Commander.

(4) Reserve. A designated reserve should be maintained throughout the operation to react to unforeseen developments.

f. A formed sub-unit will be formed in line to the rear of the gendarmerie line at an interval to be determined by the nature of the ground. A line marked by minetape or concertina wire should be placed forward of the UNAMIR and to the rear of the gendarmerie line, at a grenade throwing distance from the forward UNAMIR line. Command Group will form up as designated by the Commander to the rear of the formed sub-unit. The commander and his signaller, runner and photographer\recorder\diarist may be forward with the Gendarmerie Commander. The reserve will be formed up to the rear of the command group. The support group will be positioned for local security well to the rear of the reserve.

g. The commander will ensure the photographer\recorder\diarist maintains a time diary of all actions, decisions, conversations etc. Photographs will be taken as required. A running recording of the incident will be made to include verbal decisions, verbal descriptions and conversations. Periodic SITREPs will be forwarded to Sector Headquarters. Continual liaison will be maintained with the Gendarmerie Commander.

h. The Gendarmerie, with their training, experience and equipment will confront the crowd and attempt to disperse it. UNAMIR forces will remain in close support.

i. Should the Gendarmerie be overwhelmed or be forced to fall back, the Gendarmerie Commander will order the withdrawal of his forces to the rear of the UNAMIR line and formally request UNAMIR support while he reorganizes\reinforces his men.

j. If the demonstrators advance a verbal warning in French and Kinyarwanda will be issued by megaphone " You are in violation of the Kigali Weapons Secure Area Agreement and are ordered to disperse peacefully". The verbal warning should be reinforced by the unveiling of a banner with the warning written in bold letters in both languages.

k. Should the demonstrators continue to advance and if the distance permits the warning should be repeated.

l. Should the demonstrators continue to advance a final verbal warning in French and Kinyarwanda will be issued by megaphone "You are ordered to disperse peacefully or we will fire". This warning should be reinforced by the turning of the banner with the warning written in bold letter in both languages. This warning must be followed by an order for the sub-unit to aim their weapons.

m. Should the crowd continue to advance or cross the designated line, the Commander by megaphone will issue a fire control order designating a specific firer by number to fire a warning shot. The warning shot will be fired at a safe area to ensure no collateral injury from ricochet or fall of shot in accordance with Reference B. If the warning shot is ignored and the crowd continues to advance towards or threaten the UNAMIR force, the commander will, by megaphone, issue a fire control order designating a specific firer by number to aim at the centre of mass of a specified individual (preferably an identified ringleader). The commander will issue the order to fire. A single aimed shot will be fired and all soldiers will cock their weapons to confuse the crowd as to who fired the shot. A delay should then be allowed and the warning in para 91 should be repeated.

n. The procedure in para 9m should be repeated as many times as it takes to ensure the dispersal of the crowd. Once the crowd commences dispersing the Gendarmerie will return to their former position and commence pursuit to prevent reformation of the demonstration. UNAMIR forces will remain in close support until the demonstration is declared ended by a joint decision of the Gendarmerie and UNAMIR demonstration commander.

o. It must be emphasized that at no time will indiscriminate, volley or automatic fire be initiated by UNAMIR forces.

p. Should any member(s) of a violent demonstration produce small arms or grenades he is to be immediately engaged by a fire control order with a single aimed shot from a designated firer. These weapons are to be viewed as an immediate threat to the life of UN personnel. Other weapons like machetes, rocks, sticks are to be viewed as an imminent threat to UN personnel and the engagement of those persons will follow the sequence outlined above.

q. As soon as it is safe and feasible to do so, wounded demonstrators will be administered first aid and turned over to the Gendarmerie. UN casualties will be evacuated by UNAMIR medical personnel as soon as the casualty takes place. Evidence will be compiled and taken. UNAMIR forces will be redeployed on order based on the situation.

r. A complete written report, supported by photographs, recordings, the diary and statements is to be completed and forwarded through the chain of command to Force HQ as soon as possible after the incident.

CONDUCT OF CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE

12. During any civil disruption or terror campaign, UNAMIR will be burdened with many calls for assistance. Response to all calls is impossible. They must be screened into the following categories:

a. Calls for Assistance from VIPs. Calls for assistance from VIPs will be passed to the Sector and\or Force Commander who will decide on the UNAMIR response. VIPs are political, diplomatic or UN civilian leaders (Note: RPF Liaison Officers also fall into this category) whose death or injury could impair the peace process. As any delay could result in the death or injury of the VIP, the appropriate sector headquarters will dispatch an armed patrol to investigate, report and secure the area of the VIP, pending a decision by the chain of command.

b. Calls for Assistance from UN Military\Civilian Personnel. Should UN military (ie UNMO) or UN civilian (including UN organizations like UNHCR) call for assistance they will be directed to call the UN Resident Security Representative (for non-UNAMIR UN civilian staff) or the UNAMIR Security Officer (for UNAMIR civilian staff) or the Chief Military Observer who will screen their situation and recommend action to the Force HQ duty officer. The duty officer will assess the recommendation and pass direction to the appropriate Sector

Headquarters, who will action the direction given. This may include any of the following actions in recommended order or priority:

(1) requesting UNCIVPOL to contact the Gendarmerie and monitor their response.

(2) dispatching an UNMO team to the scene to extract the civilian to a safe-haven (ie hotel).

(3) dispatching an armed patrol to the scene to extract the civilian to a safe-haven (ie. hotel).

c. Calls for Assistance from Civilians. Calls for assistance from civilians will be directed to Force Headquarters Duty Officer to the UNCIVPOL Duty Officer to the Gendarmerie as a first step for investigation and action. Should the Gendarmerie refuse to respond an assessment of the threat will be made by the duty officer as to whether or not life is immediately in danger or injury or death. If life is not in danger the appropriate sector headquarters will be tasked with sending an UNMO team to investigate when and only when possible given personnel availability and other taskings. If there is an immediate threat to life the appropriate sector headquarters will be tasked with sending an UNMO team to secure the individual(s) and take them to a safe haven (ie church, gendarmerie station etc). In either case the gendarmerie will be informed of the action, the UNAMIR reaction and informed it is there responsibility to respond to these calls.

CONCLUSION

13. While these directives are not universal in application to every single possible situation, they are tried and proven methods which will legally and morally protect UNAMIR in the performance of its mandate in these situations. I expect it to be applied to the situation by commanders exercising good judgement, initiative and common sense. Sector Commanders are to ensure this directive is given the widest possible dissemination and that training is conducted in this technique as soon as it can be organized. Sector Commanders are to ensure that training both in command posts and by troops under their command is conducted as soon as possible given the present security situation. This training is to take top priority after operational commitments and is not to be delayed by excuses of lack of stores, time etc.

14. Given the present and anticipated situation, I consider these operations to be our most urgent priority. We must ensure our men our prepared to deal with them in a legal and credible manner.

10/10

R. A. Dallaire
Brigadier-General
Force Commander

DISTRIBUTION LIST

UNAMIR Force HQ Standard Distribution List A

MIO 913

UNAMIR
1994 MAR -7 15 161

KMF 249

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 7 MARCH 1994

TO: ASRAR\UNOMUR\KABALE	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO:MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE MISC 196 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 011-250-84275
SUBJECT:INFORMATION FROM SOURCE IN GISENYI	
ATTN: COL AZRAR	ROOM NO.2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE:	

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS OBTAINED BY AN UNMO TEAM IN GISENYI FROM AN UNCONFIRMED SOURCE:

A. ON 1 AND 2 MARCH 1994, AT BARARE, UGANDA A MEETING OF NRA OFFICERS WAS CONVENED PERTAINING TO SUPPORTING THE RPF IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS SPECIFICALLY IN THE BYUMBA AND RUHENGERI AREAS.

B. THE RPF HAS REQUESTED THE NRA TO PROVIDE WEAPONS.

C. AT THE PORT OF GOMA IN ZAIRE IT WAS REPORTED THAT SOME FOUR TONS OF WEAPONS WERE TO BE TRANSPORTED TO THE RPF THROUGH UGANDA. THE TUTSI COMMUNITY 70 KM NORTH WEST OF GISENYI IN ZAIRE WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR TRANSFERRING THE WEAPONS FROM ZAIRE TO UGANDA.

D. VERY HIGH RANKING ZAIREAN MILITARY OFFICIALS WITH HIGH LEVEL CONTACTS IN THE ZAIREAN GOVERNMENT ARE REPORTED TO BE INVOLVED IN ARMS SMUGGLING FROM ZAIRE THROUGH UGANDA TO THE RPF.

2. THIS UNCONFIRMED AND VERY SKETCHY INFORMATION IS BEING FORWARDED TO ALERT YOU THAT UNOMUR CAN EXPECT THE POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR INCREASE IN THE MOVEMENT OF MUNITIONS FROM UGANDA TO THE RPF IN THE NEAR TERM.

3. UNOMUR WILL INTENSIFY ITS OPERATIONS WITH INCREASED VIGILANCE AT BORDER CROSSINGS AND BY INCREASED PATROLLING.

4. THESE ARE VERY TENSE TIMES. WE ARE OPERATING UNDER A TIME CONSTRAINT. EVERY DAY MEANS ONE MORE DAY FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF

A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. ROLE OF UNOMUR IS ESSENTIAL IN MAINTAINING STABILITY ON THE NORTHERN FRONT IN DISRUPTING AND DELAYING RPF PREPARATIONS FOR A RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES IS CRITICAL TO SUCCESS OF BOTH MISSIONS.

5. GOOD LUCK AND REGARDS.

cc: Gen Dallaire

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

1/3

UNAMIR
1994 MAR -7 13 28

CRN 75

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: HISHAM OMAYAD, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 7 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: MIR 492

SUBJECT: BRIEFING NOTE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

NO OF PAGES: 3

As requested in your FAX of 4 March, please find attached hereto our contribution on the current situation in Rwanda.

.../...

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

THE SITUATION IN RWANDA

The situation in Rwanda remains worrying as the impasse on the installation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly continues. The hopes raised initially by the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement last August have dimmed somewhat as practical implementation of the Agreement has stalled.

The recent upsurge of violence, especially in the capital, Kigali, in the course of which the Minister of Public Works and Energy, Mr. Félicien Gatabazi, was murdered, can be attributed in part to the mounting political and public tensions associated with the deadlocked peace process and, in particular, the continued failure to install the Broad-Based Transitional Government and the Transitional National Assembly provided for in the Peace Agreement. The absence of these institutions, which were expected to have been put in place by the end of last December, has meant that Rwanda is being governed by a caretaker Government that lacks the political legitimacy to enter into long-term commitments, especially those required to deal with the country's worsening socio-economic and humanitarian conditions, or to implement the various phases of the Peace Agreement. The public as a whole has become more anxious and concerned, with the vast majority of Rwandese refugees and internally displaced persons selecting to remain in various humanitarian settlements and camps rather than to reintegrate just yet into the society's mainstream.

The United Nations which, on its part, has taken the necessary measures, in particular with the deployment of UNAMIR, to assist the Rwandese parties concerned in the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, has emphasized on several occasions its preoccupation over the continuing impasse and called for the prompt installation of the transitional institutions. In a Presidential statement on 17 February, the Security Council reaffirmed that continued support for UNAMIR will depend on the full and prompt implementation by the parties, of the Peace Agreement. The Secretary-General and his Representative have continued to urge the Rwandese parties concerned to proceed with the implementation of their Agreement and have reminded them that the mandate of the United Nations operation in their country, as decided by the Security Council, is to assist them in carrying out the provisions of the Agreement they signed in Arusha. As it is not the role of the United Nations to micro-manage the peace process in Rwanda, the Organization's continued role can be relevant, indeed possible, only if the parties concerned, in particular the signatories to the Peace Agreement, demonstrate the necessary political will to fulfil their responsibilities by implementing the Agreement.

.../...

The main reasons for the delay in the installation of the transitional institutions can be traced in general to a continuing jockeying for position between the signatories to the Peace Agreement as they both seek to consolidate their political positions. The Secretary-General and his Special Representative have called on both sides, most recently on 1 March when the Secretary-General received a Special Envoy from President Habyarimana, to reach an early compromise in the interest of the Nation as a whole.

Significantly, the cease-fire is, in general, holding. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General has urged all parties concerned to continue to seek dialogue to resolve remaining problems and to desist from any actions that might heighten mutual suspicions. We believe that the various political leaders are fully aware of the negative consequences for their country if the present impasse is not removed as soon as possible. Some progress has recently been reported in ongoing efforts to resolve the internal problems within two political parties, the Parti Libéral (PL) and the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), since those problems have been seen as the two main specific obstacles to an agreement on the installation of the transitional institutions. A formula for the resolution of the internal problems of these two parties was agreed upon on 27 February by the main political forces, except RPF, which has expressed initial disagreement with the proposed solution. Efforts are on the way to bridge the differences and to arrive at a compromise that will allow the installation of the transitional institutions at the earliest opportunity.

The situation in Rwanda is complex. The problems are multi-dimensional and of long-standing. The Arusha Peace Agreement was an important step towards the building of an enduring edifice of peace and national reconciliation. The implementation of this Agreement is vital for the attainment of this objective. While the international community can continue to play an important role by supporting and assisting the peace process, the primary responsibility for its realisation remains with the parties directly concerned.

1/3

UNAMIR

CNR 48 CRN-74 1 94 MAR -7 13 01

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 7 MARCH 1994

TO: ANNAN\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO:MOST IMMEDIATE CODE CABLE INMARSAT: MIR 491	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT:RESUPPLY OF AMMUNITION FOR GOVERNMENT ARMY	
ATTN: MGEN BARIL	ROOM NO.2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE:3	

1. ON 21 JAN 94 AS WAS REPORTED TO YOU IN OUR DAILY SITREP AN AIRPLANE CONTAINING MORTAR AMMUNITION WAS IMPOUNDED BY UNAMIR AT THE KIGALI AIRPORT. THE RGF STATED THE AMMUNITION WAS ORDERED PRIOR TO THE PEACE AGREEMENT. WHEN DEMANDED BY UNAMIR THEY HAVE STILL NOT PRODUCED ANY DOCUMENTATION TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS POSITION. THE AMMUNITION REMAINS IN OUR POSSESSION.

2. ON FRIDAY 4 MARCH 1994 THE RGF INFORMED UNAMIR SEVERAL MAJOR SHIPMENTS OF AMMUNITION WOULD BEGIN ARRIVING 7 MARCH 1994. THE LIST OF THE AMMUNITION IS ATTACHED AND IS A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT. IT IS DEFINITELY MORE THAN IS REQUIRED FOR ANY CURRENT REQUIREMENT.

3. AT A MEETING ON 5 MARCH 1994 THE G3 AND G4 OF THE RGF COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY DOCUMENTATION AS YET TO SUPPORT THE CLAIM THE AMMUNITION HAD BEEN ORDERED BEFORE THE PEACE AGREEMENT.

4. RGF HAD BEEN INFORMED AFTER FIRST INCIDENT IN JAN NOT TO ORDER OR SHIP ANY AMMUNITION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF UNAMIR. IN OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE PEACE AGREEMENT AMMUNITION RESUPPLY IS NOT REQUIRED AS BOTH PARTIES WILL BE INTEGRATING THEIR ARMIES SHORTLY AND THE BBTG AND ONLY THE BBTG SHOULD DECIDE ON WHAT AMMUNITION WILL BE PURCHASED AND RESUPPLIED.

5. FURTHER THE RGF HAS BEEN TOLD THAT IF THE AMMUNITION ARRIVES AT KIGALI AIRPORT IT WILL NOT BE OFFLOADED BUT THE PLANE WILL BE RETURNED TO ITS POINT OF EMBARKATION. WE CANNOT IMPOUND THIS AMOUNT (80 TONS) OF AMMUNITION AS WE DO NOT HAVE THE PROPER AND SAFE FACILITIES FOR ITS STORAGE AND AS ITS PRESENCE IN KIGALI WOULD MAKE IT A TARGET OF THE RGF SHOULD HOSTILITIES RESUME. WE

WOULD THEN BE CAUGHT IN A POSITION OF GIVING IT TO THE RGF OR DEFENDING IT FROM THE RGF. FC HAS DIRECTED THE PLANE IS TO BE RETURNED TO ITS POINT OF EMBARKATION AND A PROTEST WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE RGF.

6. DUE TO THE SENSE OF INSECURITY AND UNCERTAINTY PREVALENT IN RWANDA ANY AMMUNITION RESUPPLY AT THIS TIME WOULD BECOME AN EXPLOSIVE ISSUE WITH THE PARTIES. AS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IS THE STATED DESIRE OF BOTH PARTIES THERE IS NO NEED FOR AMMUNITION RESUPPLY UNTIL THE INSTALLATION AND SUBSEQUENT DECISION OF THE BBTG.

7. REGARDS.

ANNEXE A ML N° 0616 /06.1.9 du 03 MARS 1994

TRES SECRET

LISTE DU MATERIEL SOLDE DE NOS COMMANDES ATTENDU INCESSAMMENT

A. Solde du contrat N° 01/92 du 30 Mars 92 d'avec MINADEF-EGYPTIEN

1. Bombes 120 mm HE	700
2. Bombes 82 mm HE	1.000
3. OBUS 122 mm	500
4. Cartouches 12,7	200.000
5. Cartouches 7,62 X 39	1.350.000
6. Cartouches 7,62 X 51	920.000
7. Grenades à main	8.000

B. Solde de la commande du 01 Mai 93 chez MIL-TEC CORPORATION LTD

1. Cartouches 5,56 mm	1.000.000
2. Cartouches 7,62 mm LOOSE	177.640
4. Cartouches 7,62 mm LINKED	417.220
5. Cartouches 12,7 mm sur maillon	250.000
6. Bombes Mor 60 mm	7.500

C. Solde du contrat N° 01/93 du 03 Mars 93 d'avec DYL-INVEST LTD

1. Bombes Mor 60 mm	5.000
2. Cartouches 7,62 X 39	250.000
3. OBUS 122 mm D30	300
4. Grenades lacrymogènes	2.000
5. Détonateur pyrotechnique	1.000
6. Détonateur éléctrique	500
7. TNT en paquets	1.000
8. Pistolet 9 mm	100
9. Cartouches 9 mm	10.000

N.B: Cette livraison du point "C" devrait nous être expédiée au courant de la semaine du 28 Février au 05 Mars 1994.

Ministère de la Défense Nationale

cc: Gen. Dallaire
CRN-73
1/5

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR
1994 MAR -4 11 45

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

A: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DE: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

INFO: KITANNI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 4 MARS 1994

OBJET: ENTRETIEN AVEC LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE

NUMERO: MIR 480

NO DE PAGES: 5

VEUILLEZ TROUVER CI-JOINT COPIE DE LA LETTRE QUE J'AI ADRESSEE A SON EXCELLENCE M. LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL DES NATIONS UNIES.

Secours
Sector office file
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UNAMIR
1994 MAR -4 12 01

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

P4/4 (2/5)

CRN 072

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

A: S.E. MONSIEUR BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI
SECRETAIRE GENERAL DES NATIONS UNIES, NEW YORK

DE: BOOH-BOOH, RSSG, MINUAR, KIGALI

DATE: 3 MARS 1994

OBJET ENTRETIEN AVEC LE PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE

NUMERO: MIR 0470

NOMBRE DE PAGES: 4

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CONFIDENTIEL

Kigali, le 3 mars 1994

A Son Excellence, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali,

Excellence, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général,

J'ai été reçu, sur sa demande, par le Président de la République, Son Excellence M. Juvénal Habyarimana. Cette rencontre fait suite aux entretiens que vous avez eus avec son Envoyé Spécial et à la réunion tenue au Siège de la MINUAR entre le Premier Vice-Président du Front Patriotique Rwandais et le Directeur de Cabinet du Président de la République. L'objet de notre réunion était donc de faire le point de la situation et de voir ensemble si des progrès notables étaient accomplis qui permettent la mise en place des institutions de la transition.

1. Pour ce qui est de la réunion entre le Vice-Président du Front Patriotique et le Directeur de Cabinet du Président de la République, elle a permis de clarifier les suspicions du Front Patriotique nées des réunions tenues le 25 et le 27 février entre le Président de la République et les cinq partis politiques membres de la coalition gouvernementale actuelle. Il a été entendu que cette réunion n'était pas dirigée contre le Front Patriotique mais qu'elle entrait plutôt dans le cadre de la mise en oeuvre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha, de l'appel lancé par le Président du Conseil de sécurité et par vous-même, pour débloquer l'impasse actuelle.

A l'issue de cette rencontre, les deux parties se sont entretenues avec le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général qui les a assurées de l'appui continu de la communauté internationale et des Nations Unies dès que les institutions de la transition seront mises en place. Le Représentant Spécial les a également assurées de son concours personnel pour que l'exécution de l'Accord d'Arusha se fasse dans la transparence et dans le respect mutuel. Les deux parties, en quittant le Représentant Spécial, ont donné des assurances qu'elles ne ménageront aucun effort pour poursuivre le dialogue et trouver une solution qui permette la mise en place des institutions de la transition dans les meilleurs délais.

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L'ambiance qui a prévalu et les promesses tenues par le Front Patriotique constituent une évolution positive par rapport à la position qu'il avait adoptée à l'issue de la réunion entre le Président de la République et les partis politiques de la coalition du gouvernement de la transition. Il était en effet apparu que le Front Patriotique avait décidé de rompre tout dialogue avec le Président de la République et avec certains partis politiques de la coalition gouvernementale actuelle qu'il accusait d'avoir cédé sous la pression et les menaces du Président de la République.

2. Pour ce qui est de la réunion que j'ai tenue avec le Président de la République, elle a porté sur les résultats de l'entretien entre son Envoyé Spécial et vous-même et sur le climat politique qui prévaut dans le pays, suite à la décision du Front Patriotique de suspendre le dialogue avec le gouvernement de la transition. Le Président m'a fait part de vos inquiétudes concernant le retard considérable constaté dans la mise en place des institutions de la transition et de la recrudescence de la violence dans le pays. Il m'a assuré qu'il a été très sensible à votre message et qu'il s'emploiera à tout mettre en oeuvre pour qu'une solution équitable soit trouvée à l'impasse politique actuelle.

A cet égard, il m'a fait part du développement positif au sein du Parti Libéral dont la faction Tutsi venait de soumettre au Premier Ministre Désigné la liste de ses députés à l'Assemblée de la transition. Il m'a également indiqué que des consultations étaient en cours au sein du Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) et qu'il avait bon espoir qu'une solution raisonnable serait trouvée entre le Premier Ministre Désigné, président de ce parti et la faction dissidente. Cette évolution positive constatée suite à l'appel du Conseil de sécurité et aux conseils bénéfiques du Secrétaire Général le rend optimiste quant à une solution rapide de l'impasse actuelle.

3. Le Président de la République m'a fait part des ses inquiétudes au sujet de l'introduction d'armes au Rwanda à partir de la frontière avec l'Ouganda. J'avais déjà informé le Siège des accusations portées par le Président de la République contre le Front Patriotique Rwandais à ce sujet. Il m'a également indiqué que le Chef d'Etat Major de l'armée rwandaise a fait rapport au Général Dallaire au sujet des mouvements de troupes du Front Patriotique à l'intérieur de la zone démilitarisée et dans certains endroits du pays. Cette situation, m'a-t-il dit, n'est pas de nature à créer un climat de confiance et d'entente entre les parties à l'Accord d'Arusha. Il a donc souhaité recevoir des informations crédibles de la MINUAR pour rassurer la population et éviter une méfiance préjudiciable à la mise en place des institutions de la transition. Le Président a estimé qu'un climat de confiance et de respect mutuel est indispensable entre les parties à l'Accord d'Arusha si celles-ci veulent mener à bien les responsabilités qui leur sont confiées pendant la période de la transition.

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A ces appréhensions, j'ai répondu que les Nations Unies ont mené leur enquête concernant la livraison d'armes au Front Patriotique Rwandais par l'Ouganda et qu'aucune preuve tangible n'a corroboré ces accusations. J'ai par ailleurs dit au Président de la République que la MINUAR fera de son mieux pour créer entre les parties à l'Accord d'Arusha un climat de confiance et de respect mutuel, du reste indispensable pour la mise en place des institutions de la transition et la poursuite des responsabilités de ces parties pendant la période de la transition.

4. Je pense, à l'issue de l'entretien que j'ai eu avec le Président de la République, que le langage transparent et ferme que vous avez tenu à son Envoyé Spécial et le message non moins ferme du Président du Conseil de sécurité ont permis d'assouplir les positions des uns et des autres et de favoriser le dialogue qui, nous espérons, aboutira très bientôt à la mise en place des insitutions de la transition. Mon voyage à Mulindi, à un moment où la rupture semblait être consommée entre les parties à l'Accord d'Arusha, a permis de convaincre le Front Patriotique que les intérêts supérieurs du peuple rwandais exigeaient la reprise des négociations et la recherche d'une solution qui privilégie la coopération, l'entente et le respect mutuel. J'ai été particulièrement sensible à la réponse positive apportée par le Front Patriotique à mon appel.

J'ai donc bon espoir, après mes entretiens avec le Président de la République et avec le Front Patriotique, et surtout suite à l'évolution positive au sein du Parti Libéral que les institutions de la transition ne tarderont pas à être mises en place. Encore une fois, c'est pour moi, pour vous-même et pour toute la communauté internationale, faire un pari sur le sérieux et le sens des responsabilités de la classe politique rwandaise.

Je vous prie d'agréer, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, l'expression de ma très haute considération.

Dr. Jacques-Roger BOOH-BOOH
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général

Son Excellence, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies
New York

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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN 071

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: BARIL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: DALLAIRE, FC, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE: 3 MARCH 1994

NUMBER: MIR 0469

SUBJECT: **WITHDRAWAL OF PATROLS ON NIGHT OF 22 FEB 94**

REFERENCE: TELECOM BOOH-BOOH/ANNAN ON 2 MAR 94

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1. During discussions at reference, the point was raised regarding the withdrawal of our troops from the streets of Kigali on the night of 22 February 94. The SRSG indicated that I would provide you with details of this affair.

2. Since 24 Dec 93, our forces in the KWSA have been conducting daily and nightly patrols in accordance with our operational plans and to the limits of our equipment resources. As of 1 Mar 94, after consultations with your staff in DPKO, we have ordered a reinforcement of the KWSA by troops previously dedicated to the DMZ monitoring tasks (total of 200 soldiers moving to Kigali). These extra troops will perform static guard duties at vital points and VIPs, as they have no mobility (Ghanaian ship to arrive only at mid-month in Dar Es Alam), and thus relieve those soldiers of RUTBAT and KIBAT who can, through their mobility, permit us to double our patrol and check point capabilities.

3. On the night in question, we had no less than 400 troops already fully engaged in patrol, escort and VIP/vital point

guards. Replacements were being manoeuvred in place to relieve those who had been on extended high alert state due to the road blocks, dangerous crowds, killings, grenade attacks, and assassinations. We had also imposed special security arrangements called operation LONG DUE for the installation ceremonies of the BBTG.

4. At approximately 1850 hours that night, we received a reliable tip that the terror campaign in the KWSA, was to be escalated to a new level by specifically targeting UNAMIR forces. The SRSG having already been warned by the President that his life was in danger, the FC ordered UNAMIR forces to "Red Alert" status (see attached format) for the KWSA only. Those forces committed to escort and VIP/vital point guards were to continue to conduct their operations (be they UNMOs or formed troops). We even reinforced certain points and we increased our surveillance and monitoring of these tasks.

5. FC however did order that all mobile patrols in the KWSA were to be cancelled as the Gendarmerie (who are present with each patrol) were less and less available to join us. Just as importantly, the FC's assessment of the risks to effectiveness of those patrols (foot and mounted in soft-skinned light vehicles) going in those volatile, darkened streets with the forwarned threat of an attack on UNAMIR forces having been stated, and on the Belgian contingent in particular (whose area of responsibility is very much in the heat of the action of Kigali), mitigated against these tasks. We still had over 300 troops deployed out of their garrison in Kigali alone that night.

6. This alert status and special instructions were done for one night only as the threat was not borne out even on our escorts, and as such we resumed all our previous tasks, and are now even reinforcing them. It is hoped that these points of clarification provide you with the required information.

7. The FC is most disturbed by the fact that this is the second such occasion where information on the performance or on the decisions by local commanders are taken up with you and your staff without any consultation between those informing you and ourselves on the ground. The first such incident was a fight in a bar that was totally blown out of proportions by misinformation to your HQ. FC feels it is essential for good working relationships here that before the highest levels in DPKO get involved, we be given the opportunity to fully clarify the situation in the theater. Furthermore, FC considers it only normal and proper that these sources of misinformation be made known to him so that more care can be given in ensuring that they get the appropriate answers, right here in Kigali.

8. Regards.

Hand delivered today in sealed envelope. not sent over the wire.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 2 MARCH 1994

TO: AZRAR\UNOMUR\KABALE	FROM: DALLAIRE\UANMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO: 256-486-23816 INMARSAT:	FAX NO: 250-84273
SUBJECT:SECURITY OF INFORMATION AND PERSONNEL	
ATTN: COL AZRAR (EYES ONLY)	ROOM NO. EXT: 3721
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE:2	

1. THE RPF AND SPECIFICALLY ITS MILITARY LEADER HAVE WARNED UNAMIR THAT THE INFORMANT THAT UNOMUR HAS BEEN USING SINCE LAST SEPTEMBER IS AN AGENT OF THE RWANDESE EMBASSY IN KAMPALA. THIS INFORMATION IS CONSIDERED SIGNIFICANT AND EXTREMELY CONFIDENTIAL. THE RPF STATE THEY WILL SHORTLY PROVIDE THE FC WITH PROOF OF THIS ALLEGATION.

2. IN ADDITION THE RPF STATES THAT UNOMUR HAS BEEN INFILTRATED OR MEMBERS OF THE MISSION HAVE MORE THAN LIKELY BEEN SUBVERTED. AGAIN PROOF WILL BE PROVIDED SHORTLY.

3. YOU ARE DIRECTED TO SUPERFICIALLY TREAT THE INFORMANT AS YOU HAVE IN THE PAST. HOWEVER, YOU ARE TO EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION WHEN DEALING WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL. IN ADDITION, ALL INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM HIM IS TO BE CONSIDERED JAUNDICED AND SUSPECT. ANY INFORMATION HE PROVIDES MUST BE VERIFIED BY DIRECT OBSERVATION OR EVIDENCE BY A TOTALLY RELIABLE UN ASSET. DO NOT UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES PROVIDE THIS INDIVIDUAL WITH ANY REPEAT ANY INFORMATION ON UNOMUR OR UNAMIR.

4. YOU ARE TO INCREASE SECURITY OF INFORMATION WITHIN THE MISSION. EMPHASIZE UNDER ANOTHER REASON SECURITY WITHIN THE MISSION BY ALL UN PERSONNEL. APPOINT A TOTALLY RELIABLE UNMO AS MISSION SECURITY OFFICER AND HAVE HIM CONDUCT A THOROUGH SECURITY SURVEY AND INITIATE ANY RECOMMENDATIONS YOU FEEL WILL ENHANCE SECURITY OF INFORMATION AND PERSONNEL WITHIN YOUR MISSION. INVESTIGATE AND REPORT ANY SUSPICIONS WHICH ARISE FROM THE INFORMANT OR FROM ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION IN THE MISSION.

ARISE FROM THE INFORMANT OR FROM ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL OR ACTION IN THE MISSION.

6. ENSURE YOU EXERCISE EXTREME CAUTION WHEN TRANSMITTING ANY INFORMATION ON THIS DELICATE SUBJECT.

7. I DEPEND ON YOU AND I AM FULLY CONFIDENT IN YOUR EXCELLENT JUDGEMENT IN THIS MATTER TO ENSURE THAT TIMELY, VERIFIED AND ACCURATE INFORMATION IS FORWARDED TO THIS HQ AND THAT YOU ENSURE THE SECURITY OF INFORMATION AND PERSONNEL IN UNOMUR.

8. HIGHEST REGARDS AND GOOD LUCK.

cc = Gen Dallaire

UNITED NATIONS — NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA — MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

1994 MAR -2 15 52

CRN-70 1/3

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO:	ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO:	KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM:	BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE:	2 MARCH 1994
NUMBER:	MIR-465
SUBJECT:	MEETING WITH AMBASSADORS OF BELGIUM, FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES ON 2 MARCH 1994
NO OF PAGES:	3

UNAMIR 1994 MAR -2 16 00

1. Following my meeting with Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe, the FPR President, in Mulindi yesterday (as covered in our MIR-451 of 1 March), I met today with the Ambassadors to Rwanda of Belgium, France, Germany and the United States to review and assess the overall situation and to consider what might be done to overcome persistent obstacles and to help advance the peace process. Gen. Dallaire, who had also travelled to Mulindi yesterday afternoon, after my return to Kigali, reviewed his meeting with Gen. Kagame, the FPR Chief of staff, as well as his recent discussions with President Habyarimana and other senior Government officials.

2. From the outset, I stated, as reflected in our MIR-451 of 1 March, that my discussions with the FPR President as well as the contents of the FPR's communiqué of 28 February, a copy of which was also forwarded to you with our MIR-451, had left me seriously concerned. I stressed the need for urgent measures to be taken to preempt and avert the resumption of war. I recalled and reaffirmed the peaceful approach supported by the United Nations and outlined the various efforts undertaken by the Organization, including the personal interventions of the Secretary-General, to try to advance the peace process. I reiterated the Security Council's concern over the continuing impasse and its call for the full and effective implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, beginning with the prompt installation of the transitional institutions.

.../...

CRN-70 2/3

3. Gen. Dallaire and I referred to the FPR's insistence, firstly that the Arusha accords had established a power equilibrium between FPR and the Government and, secondly, that FPR would not accept any attempt to reopen a discussion on the Arusha Agreement or to distort or undermine in any way the power-sharing principle and formula reflected in that Agreement. It was our view that although there was no concrete evidence of preparations for war or for major military operations by either side, the FPR's increasingly bellicose language and its rejection of the compromise solutions for PL and MDR problems proposed at the meeting of the governing coalition of political parties on 25 and 27 February, appeared to indicate that the FPR leadership was prepared and may even have already decided to resort to the military option to defend whatever position or interests it may feel it had lost politically through the proposed compromise. In this connection, I recalled a statement by the FPR President during our meeting yesterday, that in the FPR's view, President Habyarimana had already resumed the war through recent incidents, including the ambushing of an FPR/UNAMIR military escort on 22 February during which one FPR soldier had died, and that the FPR was prepared to retaliate. Gen. Dallaire also recalled, in this regard, a statement by Gen. Kagame that UNAMIR would be given advance notice of any planned FPR military operation.

4. During our review of recent political developments, there was a general feeling that President Habyarimana appeared to have gained the upperhand in the context of current political alignments. In the French Ambassador's view, the President had outmanoeuvred the FPR, and this development in itself did not constitute a violation of the Arusha Peace Agreement as the FPR, alleging that the President had used intimidations, threats and other sinister tactics in his dealings with the various political parties and leaders, had claimed. The French and Belgian Ambassadors observed, furthermore, that President Habyarimana had, following the appeals of the international community, acted in an effort to find a compromise solution that would remove the impasse hindering the installation of the BBTG and TNA. It was therefore difficult to understand, the French Ambassador said, why the FPR, which moreover had stood against interference in the internal affairs of political parties, should now be rejecting the compromise formulas reached on 27 February for solving the PL's and MDR's problems. I expressed the view that the level of mutual mistrust between the FPR and President Habyarimana appeared to be so deep that the FPR may tend automatically to suspect any initiative by or associated with the President.

5. In response to a question by the Ambassador of the United States, Gen. Dallaire discounted suggestions that the recent killings in Kigali may have been ethnically motivated, and directed against the Tutsi minority. Noting Gen. Dallaire's response, the French Ambassador said it was important for such information to be made available widely so as to prevent the FPR from using reports or claims of an anti-Tutsi massacre as a pretext for resuming the war.

.../...

CRN-70 3/3

6. Warning that serious incidents could be initiated deliberately by either Government of FPR partisans to provoke or incite a major FPR military operation in retaliation, Gen. Dallaire stressed the importance of such preventive and confidence-building measures as the resumption of high-level contacts between officials of the FPR and Government, including their military representatives. Gen. Dallaire expressed his concern over the proliferation of false and misleading information about the two-sides' military intentions or activity. He stressed, for example, that recent Government reports of the large-scale movement of FPR military equipment and personnel from Uganda into Rwanda were unfounded.

7. The Ambassador of the United States indicated that he planned to visit the FPR leadership in Mulindi. In response to his request for ideas and other points he may wish to raise with the FPR President, I emphasized the importance for the FPR to soften its rhetoric and to play the "political game" rather than opting for a military approach. The four ambassadors also called upon the FPR to return to dialogue with the other political leaders. In this connection, the Belgian Ambassador pointed out that he had met earlier in the day with representatives of Rwanda's civil society, including church leaders, and they had all urged the international community to put pressure on the FPR. The French Ambassador, on his part, stressed that it was unacceptable for the FPR to threaten to resume war whenever it suffered a political loss. All participants agreed that pressure should be maintained on the various political actors, including President Habyarimana, the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister Designate and the FPR. To this end, the Ambassadors of Belgium, France and Germany indicated that they, as representatives of the European Union, would initiate contacts with the authorities concerned as soon as possible.

8. I also informed the Ambassadors of my meeting on 25 February with the UK Ambassador to Rwanda, who is based in Kampala (Uganda). The Ambassador had promised to convey to President Museveni my concern about the continuing impasse and my wish for his intervention to facilitate progress. I indicated that the Ambassador had informed us of his meeting with President Museveni on 28 February in the course of which the President had expressed his preoccupation with the Rwandese impasse and had stressed his view that the Arusha Peace Agreement fully covered the interests of the FPR. In this connection, Gen. Dallaire and I noted reports yesterday, 1 March, which are so far unconfirmed, that President Museveni had met yesterday with an FPR delegation. The fact that Mr. Patrick Mazimhaka, the FPR First Vice President who was among FPR civilian officials who left Kigali last week-end for the FPR headquarters in Mulindi, today returned to Kigali, may signal the readiness of FPR, perhaps under pressure, to resume dialogue; on the other hand, it could simply be fortuitous. We shall follow these developments and keep you informed.

9. Regards.

cc: Gen Callum

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
UNAMIR
UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN-69 1/5

94 MAR -1 16 22 OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
JONAH, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 1 MARCH 1994

SUBJECT: Report of the meeting of the SRSG with the RPF in Mulindi on 1.3.94

MIR-451

UNAMIR 94 MAR -1 16 28

1. Following the all party consensus of 27 February 1994, on the modalities of resolving the impasse on the installation of the transitional institutions, I requested a meeting with the RPF leadership to ascertain their reaction to the consensus and to offer them my good offices in promoting dialogue among the political forces to resolve the impasse.

2. I went to Mulindi and met with the RPF leadership (both civilian and military) on 1 March 1994. I stressed to them the Secretary General's personal concerns and those of the international community about the undue delay in the installation of the transitional institutions and urged them to seriously consider the current consensus. I appealed to them to reconsider their seemingly uncompromising position as reflected in their communiqué of 28 February 1994 (copy attached).

3. They said they were strongly opposed to the so called consensus because it had emerged as a result of manipulation by President Habyarimana and his use of violence to terrorize and even kill RPF supporters, including important political leaders. They insisted that the President had imposed the consensus on the political parties so that he could continue to exercise his dictatorial powers and unravel the Arusha Peace Agreement. This was unacceptable to the RPF because the Arusha Peace Agreement calls for democratization and equilibrium not dictatorship. They also expressed serious concern about the famine in the refugee and displaced persons camps which has caused many deaths. They called for UNAMIR's immediate intervention.

4. Major General Kagame, head of the military wing of the RPF said that the country was now in a state of war since the President had violated the ceasefire agreement by terrorizing and killing innocent civilians who are thought to be RPF supporters. He cited instances of the violence perpetrated by the President's supporters including the ambushing of UNAMIR patrols and the killing of RPF soldiers as well as the assassination of a prominent political leader. He said UNAMIR cannot remain silent or passive in such a climate and had to use force against the perpetrators of violence.

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5. I explained that our mission was a peace-keeping one which was mandated to assist the peace process and not to engage in war with any faction or party. We were not a tribunal to apportion blame but would continue to assist the peace process in accordance with our mandate. I appealed again to the RPF to seriously consider the political option and come up with their proposal to break the deadlock if the latest consensus remains unacceptable to them. I stressed that the delay in installing the institutions has socio-economic and humanitarian consequences which should be unacceptable to any Rwandese leader who gives priority to the national interest. I promised to hold discussions with the relevant agencies regarding the situation in the refugees and displaced persons camps so that immediate remedies could be found to alleviate the conditions in the camps.

6. I left the meeting very pessimistic about the present state of mind of the RPF leadership. They appeared to be seriously considering the war option which I very strongly tried to dissuade them from pursuing. I am however still hopeful that reason will prevail and the party leadership will seriously reconsider their position and continue finding a peaceful solution to the impasse.

7. The Force Commander has left Kigali this afternoon to meet with Major General Kagame in Mulindi. We shall report on the meeting upon the Force Commander's return.

8. Regards.

CRN 69 3/5

COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE

Il y a déjà plus de deux mois que les préalables (le déploiement effectif des troupes de la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda d'une part et le départ des troupes françaises d'autre part) sont réunis et que les Institutions de transition prévues par l'Accord de Paix d'Arusha auraient dû être mises en place. Pour ce faire, les personnalités du FPR appelées à participer dans ces institutions avaient ragagné la capitale le 28 Décembre 1993 par un convoi, de Mulindi vers Kigali, auquel le peuple rwandais a réservé un accueil chalereux et enthousiaste.

Depuis ce jour-là cependant, le Président Habyarimana s'est livré à des manoeuvres visant à ne permettre la mise en place des institutions que le jour où il aurait réussi à modifier, en sa faveur, l'équilibre des forces prévu dans l'Accord de Paix d'Arusha. C'est ainsi que le 5 Janvier 1994, le jour de prestation de serment par le Président de la République et par l'Assemblée Nationale de Transition (ANT), sa garde républicaine a usé de la violence pour barrer l'accès aux députés du Parti Libéral agréés par la Cour Constitutionnelle, parce que le Président de la République voulait favoriser la prestation de serment par des députés figurant sur une liste de son choix. Depuis cette tentative avortée, le recours à la violence n'a guère cessé.

Le problème des dissensions au sein des partis PL et MDR, avancé par le Président Habyarimana pour entraver la mise en place des institutions, a fait l'objet d'un examen approfondi le 8 janvier 1994 lors d'une réunion entre lui et le FPR, en présence du Premier Ministre du gouvernement actuel et des représentants du Facilitateur des négociations de paix d'Arusha, des Secrétaires Généraux de l'ONU et de l'OUA. Il avait alors été établi que le problème invoqué du désaccord, au sein de ces partis, sur les listes des députés devant les représenter à l'ANT n'était pas réel et que, en conclusion, le Président devait dès le lendemain, 9 janvier 1994, annoncer au FPR, aux instances concernées et au public en général la date retenue pour la mise en place des institutions. Il était également convenu que la question du choix des ministres serait laissée au Premier Ministre désigné du gouvernement de transition à base élargie, conformément à l'Accord de Paix d'Arusha.

Au lieu de procéder comme convenu, le Président Habyarimana avait amené les diplomates accrédités à Kigali à s'impliquer dans la recherce de solutions à ce problème artificiellement créé, mais ces diplomates ne tardaient pas non plus à s'apercevoir que ce problème servait de paravent pour d'autres desseins ayant trait à la dénaturation de l'Accord de Paix d'Arusha. A chaque fois que les décisions relatives à la mise en place des institutions devaient être prises, la violence et le terrorisme des milices Interahamwe, du parti MRND du Président, et Impuzamugambi du parti extrémiste ethnisant CDR se déchainaient sur les habitants de Kigali. Le Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général de l'ONU, le Dr. J.R. BOOH BOOH,

devait également s'impliquer dans la recherche d'un dénouement à ce blocage en présidant notamment, les 7 et 8 février 1994, des réunions où le MRND et le Président de la République lui-même étaient représentés. Pourtant, seuls le Président de la République et son parti ont refusé les conclusions de ces rencontres. Par la suite, des réunions des partis, tenues les 16 et 18 février 1994, avaient permis de fixer au 22 février 1994 la date de mise en place des institutions.

En réaction à cette décision à laquelle lui-même et son parti avaient été pleinement associés, le Président de la République et son parti lâchaient les milices Interahamwe, Impuzamugambi et des éléments dissidents du MDR dits MDR POWER qui, le 20 février 1994, attaquaient des adhérents qui se rendaient à un rallye politique autorisé par l'autorité et où l'orateur principal était M. Twagiramungu Faustin, Président du MDR et Premier Ministre désigné du Gouvernement de transition à base élargie. Le lendemain encore, en date du 21 février 1994, les mêmes milices bouclaient les routes de Kigali, gardaient prisonniers dans le building les fonctionnaires du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et volaient des documents officiels à la Cour constitutionnelle.

Le sommet de l'horreur devait être atteint dans la soirée de ce 21 février 1994 lorsque des tueurs à la solde du Président Habyarimana assassinaient M. GATABAZI Félicien, Ministre des Travaux Publics, de l'Energie et de l'Eau et Secrétaire Général du Parti d'opposition PSD. La mise en place des institutions prévue pour le 22 février 1994 était ainsi rendue impossible, mais le Président Habyarimana l'annonçait pour le lendemain, le 23 février 1994. Cela n'a pas empêché aux troupes gouvernementales de tendre, pour la soirée du 22 février 1994, une embuscade visant à décimer les personnalités du FPR qui, ce soir-là, devaient quitter Mulindi pour regagner Kigali, en vue de l'installation des institutions de transition fixée au 23 février 1994 par le Président Habyarimana. Par divine providence, le départ de ces dirigeants avait été reporté de justesse lorsqu'il s'était avéré que cette cérémonie décidée unilatéralement et dénoncée par les partis d'opposition n'aurait pas lieu. Mais l'embuscade devait être exécutée comme prévu et l'escorte composée de militaires du FPR et de la MINUAR qui rentrait à Kigali fût prise dans un assaut qui coûta la vie à un de nos militaires, fît un blessé parmi nos militaires et un autre blessé parmi les militaires de la MINUAR.

Du fait que le Président Habyarimana avait annoncé, le 22 février 1994, la mise en place des institutions tout en s'arrogeant le droit de décider, à la place des partis politiques parties à l'entente du 18 février 1994, des listes des personnalités qui les représenteraient dans les institutions, ces décisions autocratiques prises en dehors de toute référence à l'Accord de paix d'Arusha et des procédures convenues lors des réunions précitées étaient rejettées par les partis politiques qui, effectivement, boycottèrent la cérémonie du 23 février 1994. Ce jour-là, les horreurs redoublaient dans Kigali et ailleurs dans le pays, en même temps que le Président Habyarimana convoquait pour le 25

février 1994 une réunion des partis politiques qui forment l'actuel gouvernement de coalition et sont appelés à participer, avec le FPR, aux institutions de la nouvelle transition issue de l'Accord de Paix d'Arusha. C'est à la faveur de la réunion convoquée dans ce climat de terreur que, le 27 février 1994, les diregeants de ces partis ont accepté les décisions qu'ils rejettaient le 23 février 1994.

Dès lors qu'il est clair que le Président Habyarimana a recourru au terrorisme et à l'intimidation, avec l'assassinat de l'un des leaders de l'opposition et les massacres pérpétrés pendant toute la semaine qui vient de s'écouler, pour faire fléchir les dirigeants de ces partis politiques, le FPR récuse les conclusions et les soi-disant compromis obtenus par le Président Habtyarimana dans ces conditions. Ces compromis sont d'autant plus inacceptables qu'ils s'inscrivent dans une logique contraire à l'esprit de l'Accord de Paix d'Arusha, qui a pour finalité des réformens profondes des structures et du fonctionnement de l'Etat rwandais, de manière à éradiquer les pratiques dictatoriales que le Président Habyarimana veut sauvegarder par le biais de la manipulation des partis pour leur imposer des éléments à sa dévotion comme représentants au sein des institutions.

Le FPR condamne encore une fois les actes barbares pérpétrés par les milices à la solde du Président Habyarimana et annonce qu'il ne participera pas à un Gouvernement mis en place sur la base des compromis obtenus par la terreur. Pour les députés à l'ANT, le FPR n'acceptera d'autres listes que celles agréées par la Cour Constitutionnelle en date du 4 janvier 1994.

De même, le FPR exige que le Premier Ministre désigné du Gouvernement de transition à base élargie soit rétabli dans son droit de choisir les ministres devant composer son équipe gouvernementale, comme il l'avait prévu pour le 5 février 1994 avant que le processus d'intimidation croissante exercée par le Président Habyarimana ne soit déclenché. Le FPR ne peut pas non plus accepter qu'un quelconque rôle dans la mise en place des institutions ou dans le choix des personnalités devant en faire partie soit confié à des personnages comme MUGENZI Justin qui déclarent ne pas adhérer à l'Accord d'Arusha. En effet, ceux-là ne manqueront pas d'entraver l'exécution des dispositions de l'Accord de paix et de chercher à bloquer le fonctionnement normal des institutions.

Le FPR met en garde le Président Habyarimana et ses adeptes des partis MRND et CDR qui continuent à porter atteinte à la vie et à la tranquillité des Rwandais, tout en les prévenant qu'il ne saurait plus y assister les bras croisés. De même, nous dénonçons, encore une fois, la distribution continuelle des armes à feu aux populations civiles auxquelles nous faisons appel pour qu'elles s'en débarassent.

Fait à Mulindi, le 28 février 1994

Col. Alexis KANYARENGWE
Président du FPR

cc: Gen. Dallaire

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MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR
94 MAR -1 15 34

CRN-68
KMF225

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
94 MAR -1 16 09

IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
: JONAH, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : UNOMUR

FROM : BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA

DATE : 01 MAR 94

NUMBER : MIR-450 MISC 165

SUBJECT : **WEEKLY SITREP Nb 20, 22 FEB 94 - 28 FEB 94**

1. GENERAL SITUATION AND HIGHLIGHTS

A. The situation was observed to be explosive. The first half of this week was marked by; (1) the assassination by unidentified individuals of Mr. GATABAZI, minister of public works and national secretary of the PSD party., in his residence on 212245 Feb 94; (2) the assassination of Mr. BUCYANA, prominent opposition leader and national president of the CDR, at a road block near BUTARE on 231200 Feb 94; (3) numerous riots, road blocks. All these incidents may have been initiated by the announcement of the installation of the Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) on 22 Feb 94. The confrontation between supporters of political parties often deteriorated into purely criminal acts. The trouble spots were KIGALI, BUTARE and CYANGUGU. A number of road blocks were erected in these locations. In KIGALI area a road block was the location of an ambush during which a Uruguayan

UNMO was lightly injured by a hand grenade explosion and a RPF soldier was mortally wounded. A board of inquiry was set up to investigate the incident. In the second half of the week the situation calmed down. Groups of demonstrators were frequently observed. In addition a number of threatened persons took shelter in more secure places, particularly churches with support from the Red Cross coordinated by UNAMIR.

B. The BBTG is not yet installed. UNAMIR continues to pursue all efforts to unblock the situation. Despite the explosive situation a new attempt for swearing-in ceremonies was announced for 23 Feb 94 and did not occur.

C. Main events of the week for UNAMIR Military Division are: **(1)** All UNAMIR forces were committed on Monday 22 Feb 94 for the announced swearing-in ceremonies that day; **(2)** An ambush of the UNAMIR escorted convoy occured on 22 Feb **(3)** The assassination of Mr. BUCYANA on 231200 Feb 94; **(4)** The funeral of late minister GATABAZI at BUTARE; **(5)** Artillery shelling was heard and observed by UNOMUR on 24 Feb 94 at about 400 m from the RPF check point at KASHEKYE **(6)** 85 young men between 16 and 26 years old crossed the Ugandan/Rwandan border at GATUNA on 270900 Feb 94. It is assumed that these are RPF reinforcements; **(7)** All RPF VIPs located at KIGALI left for MULINDI on 28 Feb 94 in order to attend a RPF meeting. They took luggage with them and it is not clear whether they will come back to KIGALI; **(8)** Ghanaian battalion (BYUBAT) is now 100 % on ground. Troops arrived from GHANA on Tuesday 23 Feb 94 and Saturday 26 Feb 94.

2. <u>POLITICAL</u>

A. Following the upsurge in violent incidents and the heightened political tension ignited by the politically motivated murders of Mr. Felicien Gatabazi, Minister of Public Works and Secretary-General of PSD, on 21 February, and Mr. Martin Buchyana, President of CDR, on 22 February, the security situation improved somewhat during the period under review, as efforts to break the political stalemate that have hindered the installation of the transitional institutions, continued.

B. During an unsuccessful attempt to install the institutions at a ceremony on 23 February which was boycotted by the FPR, PSD, PL and MDR as well as by the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister Designate, President Habyarimana appealed for national reconciliation and harmony and against ethnic and political

discord. He also announced that he would convene, on 25 February, a meeting of political parties represented in the Government, in a continuing search for solutions to the country's political crisis.

C. The meeting called and presided over by the President was held on 25 and 27 February and was attended by representatives of MNRD, MDR, PSD, PL and PDC, as well as by the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister Designate. It was agreed, inter alia, that pending the installation of the BBTG, the current Government headed by Prime Minister Mrs Agathe Uwilingiyimana, would continue to manage the country's affairs. With the exception of Mr. Landouald Ndasingwa who expressed "serious" reservations on the proposals regarding the PL, participants also agreed on proposed solutions to the problems within the PL and MDR, as a way of facilitating the installation of the transitional institutions.

D. Meanwhile, the SRSG, who met with President Habyarimana on 23 February, also met with an FPR delegation on 25 February and with the Director of President Habyarimana's Cabinet on 28 February, in continuation of his efforts to advance the peace process. On 1 March, the SRSG travelled to Mulindi for a meeting with the FPR President, Col. Alexis Kanyarengwe, in an effort, inter alia, to ascertain FPR's perspectives on and reactions to recent political developments. The SRSG also met with and maintained close contacts with members of the diplomatic corps, the representative of the Facilitator and the representative of the OAU.

E. On 28 February, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was scheduled to meet at United Nations Headquarters in New York with a special envoy sent by President Habyarimana, Mr. Andre Ntagerura, Rwanda's Minister of Transport and Communications.

3. MILITARY

A. **FORCE HQ**

Normal staff duties were carried out. Force Comd efforts in having a meeting with RPF Comd, Maj Gen KAGAME, on the issue of DMZ violations (RPF positions in DMZ) have been ignored several times. A formal protest in this regard has been lodged and efforts to have this meeting will be continued. Actual climate is not in favor of the establishment of demobilization, demilitarization and integration plans because of difficulties in getting the parties together and also because of non-availability of the Army High Command Council to be installed together with the BBTG. A Staff check was organized

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in order to appraise possible missions for BYUBAT (DMZ) within KIGALI sector. Operational order on this issue is being prepared.

B. **UNOMUR SECTOR**

The general situation in UNOMUR operational is calm. The incoming CMO, Col ASRARUL HAQUE from BANGLADESH, arrived on 23 Feb 94. He made operational visits to the areas and was installed officialy by Force Comd on 26 Feb 94. During the reported period UNOMUR conducted 38 day patrols and 14 night patrols. The flow of refugees from UGANDA into RWANDA decreased. Monitoring activities in this domain will be continued. Communication are improving due to fresh receipt of walkie talkies. All teams and Staffs are in possession of walkie talkie. One UNOMUR vehicle was involved in an accident with a World Food Programme truck. The vehicle was severely damaged but nobody was injured.

C. **DMZ SECTOR**

The situation in the DMZ area was calm the past week. On Monday 20 Feb 94 DMZ Comd met the RPF Comd on the issue of RPF troops being present in the DMZ area. It was stated that all RPF troops found in DMZ were blatant cease fire violations and that they must be withdrawn over the next 48 Hrs. The violations were denied by RPF and there is no progress on this subject. BYUBAT (Ghana) is now 100 % on ground and is deployed at BYUMBA (BN(-)), KINIHIRA (A Coy), NGARAMA (B Coy) and NKUMBA (C Coy). Orders are being prepared to move a maximum of two Coy(-) to KIGALI for security and sentry tasks since KIGALI has become the most insecure location in the country. Conducted routine Ptl and escort duties.

D. **KIGALI SECTOR**

Conducted 218 vehicle and 52 foot Ptl in KIGALI city in order to ensure Kigali Weapon Secure Area (KWSA). Established daily 3 check points at different places in KWSA. Random patrols and check points saturation being monitored by Force HQ. Tunisian Coy(-) ensured the location of the RPF battalion and RPF VIPs at KIGALI city (CND compound). The private residences of the prime minister, the prime minister designate, the president of the constitutional court and five opposition ministers are being secured by Sec KIGALI untill the installation of the BBTG. RUTBAT conducted training on armored vehicles (BTR-60). Operational situation of RUTBAT improved significantly since their vehicles and equipments arrived in the

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mission area and are being checked and distributed.

E. **MILOB GROUP**

(1) **MILOB Group HQ** Conducted 10 escorts for different international organizations (UNHCR, ICRC, ...). Provided escort for the funeral of the late minister GATABAZI on 24 Feb 94. Conducted investigation on an incident that happened on 260800 Feb 94. As reported by RGF, a group of RGF soldiers were ambushed by RPF while fetching fresh water. The fire fight resulted in ONE RPF killed, TWO RGF seriously wounded, TWO RGF lightly injured and ONE RGF missing. The incident took place at MUTARA (B3352) close to a bridge known as RURUNGE bridge. The investigation revealed that there was a shooting incident at this location at the mentioned date. The alleged RPF killed person was in civilian clothes. RPF denies any involvement in this case. The identification of the killed person was not possible. The locals were reluctant to assist in identification and the counselor of the commune did not show up. The body was not claimed by anybody. Local women stated that the victim was 20 years old and that he married 3 months ago. Investigation still ongoing.

(2) **RPF Sector** Team participated in the investigation mentioned in Par. (1) above. About 4,000 refugees are on their way to the RPF sector. For the moment there are about 14,500 refugees spread out as follows:

Camp NDAGO (7987)	4,072
Camp KABONA (8041)	3,010
Camp MUSANA (8445)	2,745
Camp BUKARANGATA (8542)	4,143
Camp BULIBA (8539)	495

(3) **RGF Sector** **(a)** Two hand grenade attacks occurred in the night of 24/25 Feb 94 at GISENYI. In one a 16 year old girl had major injuries. One house was owned by a Tutsi, the other house owner was married with a Tutsi woman; **(b)** At dawn of 27 Feb 94 small arms fire was heard at the Rwandan/Zairian border. No further details could be made available. In the same night two hand grenade explosions occurred in the market of GISENYI town. No casualties were reported.

(4) **South Sector** **(a)** After the killing of the Minister of Public works who was a citizen of BUTARE the enraged crowd

killed the president of the CDR on 221200 Feb 94; **(b)** On 24 Feb 94 the funeral of the late Minister took place at BUTARE. No incidents occurred. In the following days gendarmerie and RGF conducted extensive patrolling in the area and the situation calmed down. **(c)** In the night 24/25 Feb 94 at CYANGUGU, the hometown of the late CDR president, sixteen houses were burned down, and at least two persons have been killed. All victims were Tutsi. Approximately 200 refugees resulting from this riots took shelter in the parish at CYANGUGU.

F. **FORCE LOG, MED AND ENGINEERS ELEMENTS**

Engineer Coy is now deployed in the DMZ area at BYUMBA. All Log, Med and Engineer personnel are available in the area but the units are not operational due to non availability of operational equipment. Vehicles and containers are arriving from BANGLADESH but it seems that there are many deficiencies.

G. **UNAMIR FORCE STRENGTH**

All Ghanaian troops are now on ground. 250 Troops arrived on Tuesday 22 Feb 94 and Saturday 26 Feb 94. Please find enclosed the weekly personnel state as of 280800 Feb 94.

H. **MEDICAL AND HEALTH STATE**

The UNAMIR field hospital is installed in King FAYCAL hospital. They provide medical care to UNAMIR personnel and local population. The hospital has a serious lack of supplies. About 40 UNAMIR personnel and 30 Locals receive normal treatment on a weekly basis. Problems occur with the local population in the critical periods. They have confidence in the UNAMIR field hospital and are not willing to be transferred to the governmental hospital (KIGALI hospital) after their emergency treatment. The KIGALI hospital also demonstrates no positive attitude in getting these patients. They don't answer the phone and deny sending ambulances to get the patients. Solutions to this problem are being negotiated. Medical supplies are urgently required.

4. <u>UNCIVPOL</u>

A. Due to the security situation the government installed a curfew at KIGALI city from 19.00 Hrs till 05.00 Hrs the next day.

B. CIVPOL investigated: (1) The killing of minister GATABAZI. The

minister and one of the accompanying gendarmes were killed by unknown persons. A second gendarme had major injuries. A meeting was held at the office of the prosecutor at KIGALI. Informations was exchanged between Gendarmerie, CIVPOL and Prosecutor. Investigation ongoing; (2) On 24 Feb 94 eleven persons were arrested by the Gendarmerie of NYARURENGE because of demonstrations before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Investigation ongoing; (3) On 22 Feb 94 about ten Tutsi were killed in the living area of Mr. BUCYANA, late president of CDR party; (4) Five to six families from GIKONDO area (KIGALI) were escorted by Gendarmerie and CIVPOL to a church where they took shelter. They left their houses because of insecurity.

C. Accidents: NTR.

D. Current strength of UNCIVPOL: 49 Police Officers (Unchanged)

5. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

The logistic environment is still difficult. Equipment arrived from UNTAC but the logistic situation remains difficult due to delays in getting vehicles and radios issued. Operational status from BANGLADESH contingent has improved due to the arrival of their vehicles/equipment. The logistics and engineer company vehicles and equipments are being distributed. But there is still no word on the deficiencies of this equipment.

6. CONCLUSION

We passed the scheduled installation date for the BBTG by more than 57 days. This situation is deteriorating significantly and all UNAMIR resources are being used to the maximum of their availability. The rhythm of activity will require a reassessment of troops to tasks in order to ensure a sustainment capability of the Force.

7. REGARDS

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UNAMIR - MILITARY DIVISION
Weekly Personnel State

DTG: 280800 Feb 94

Ser Nb	Country	TROOPS										UNMO	Total
		Inf Bn	Log Coy	Eng Coy	Med Coy	MovCon Pl	MP Sec	DMZ Coy(-)	Sub Total	Staff	Total		
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)	(j)	(k)	(l)	(m)	(n)
1	ARGENTINA												
2	AUSTRIA											15	15
3	BANGLADESH	370	200	203	50	20	11		854	27	881	51	933
4	BELGIUM	406							406	15	421		421
5	BOTSWANA											9	9
6	BRASILIA	3							3		3	10	13
7	CANADA									1	1	1	2
8	CONGO											25	25
9	EGYPT											10	10
10	FIJI											1	1
11	GHANA	800							800	19	819	24	843
12	HUNGARY											4	4
13	MALI											10	10
14	NETHERLANDS											10	10
15	NIGERIA											15	15
16	POLAND											5	5
17	RUSSIA											15	15
18	SENEGAL											39	39
19	SLOVAKIA											5	5
20	TANZANIA												
21	TOGO											15	15
22	TUNISIA							60	60	1	61		61
23	URUGUAY											20	20
24	ZIMBABWE											29	29
	TOTAL	1.579	200	203	50	20	11	60	2.133	63	2.186	314	2.500

READING FILE

FOR PERUSAL OF SECTOR COMDS/BRANCH HEADS

Date of document: 1 MARCH 1994

Subject: WEEKLY SITREP No 20 - 22-28 FEB 94

File Ref.: Code cable CRN-68 (MIR-450) du SRSG à NY.

Ser	Appt	Date	Initials
1.	DFC		
2.	Kigali Sect Comd	08/03	
3.	DMZ Sect Comd		
4.	CMO	10/3	
5.	COO		
6.	DCOO		
7.	CMPO	8/3	
8.	CPlans	M/3	
9.	CLogO		
10.	MA	29/3/94.	
11.	HQ Comd	14/3	
12.	CAO		
13.	PC/UNCIVPOL	7.3.94	

CRN-67 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 1 MARCH 1994

TO: ANNAN\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO:MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE INMARSAT: MIR-444	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT:REQUEST FOR DIRECTION IN RELATION TO ASSISTING IN THE PLANNING OF THE EVACUATION OF THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY IN RWANDA	
ATTN: MGEN BARIL	ROOM NO.2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 1	

1. AT THE PRESENT TIME UNAMIR IS CONDUCTING COORDINATION AND PREPARING A PLAN ONLY FOR THE EVACUATION OF UN CIVILIAN STAFF AND THEIR DEPENDANTS. THE QUESTION HAS ARISEN SHOULD WE VERY DISCREETLY PARTICIPATE IN THE PREPARATION OF THE PLAN FOR THE EVACUATION OF THE GREATER EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY.

2. PRIOR TO THE UNAMIR MANDATE THE FRENCH BATTALION WAS IN KIGALI PRIMARILY TO GUARANTEE THE SECURITY AND PLAN AND IF NECESSARY CONDUCT THE EVACUATION OF THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY. ONCE UNAMIR ARRIVED IN KIGALI THE SECURITY GUARANTEE OF ITS PRESENCE PERMITTED THE FRENCH BATTALION TO DEPART.

3. THE QUESTION UNAMIR REQUESTS DIRECTION ON IS WHAT IS OUR MANDATE IN RELATION TO PROVIDING SECURITY TO AND ASSISTING IN THE PLANNING AND POSSIBLE EXECUTION OF THE EVACUATION OF THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY?

4. THIS IS AN URGENT REQUEST AS DUE TO THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION IN KIGALI IN THE PAST WEEK AND THE TENSE ATMOSPHERE IN THE ABSENCE OF THE BBTG WE ARE BEGINNING TO BE INFORMALLY APPROACHED BY VARIOUS PERSONS AND AGENCIES REQUESTING OUR PARTICIPATION IN THE PLANNING PROCESS FOR THE EVACUATION OF THE EXPATRIATE COMMUNITY.

5. PLEASE PROVIDE DIRECTION ASAP.

6. REGARDS.

cc: Gen. Dallaire

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

1994 FEB 28 17 31

CRN 66 1/5

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
JONAH, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 28 FEBRUARY 1994

NUMBER: MIR-441

SUBJECT: EFFORTS TO BREAK THE IMPASSE ON INSTALLATION OF TRANSITIONAL INSTITUTIONS

NO OF PAGES: 5

1994 FEB 28 17 37
UNAMIR

1. As I informed you in our MIR-409 of 24 February, President Habyarimana convened on 25 February, a meeting of the five political parties represented in the current Rwandese Government, namely the MRND, MDR, PSD, PDC and PL. As agreed at that meeting, the participations met again yesterday, 27 February, and at the conclusion of their discussions, issued a communiqué, a copy of which was given to me today by the Director of President Habyarimana's Cabinet with whom I met this afternoon (please see attached). The current Prime Minister as well as the Prime Minister Designate, also participated in the two meetings. As the Director of Cabinet told me, all the participants agreed on the contents of the communiqué, except Mr. Landouald Ndasingwa who, as explained in para. 3 below, had reservations on some of the conclusions reached. I was also informed that representatives of the MDR who had participated in the meeting did not sign the communiqué because it contained a reference to Mr. Faustin Twagiramungu, the Prime Minister Designate, as President of the Party. As you are aware, the MDR is currently divided into two factions, with one faction made of members of the Political Bureau, objecting to Mr. Twagiramungu's continuation as President of the Party.

.../...

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2/5

2. According to the communiqué, a solution appears to have been found to one of the two main problems impeding the installation of the transitional institutions. As reflected in the communiqué's first conclusion, the problem within the MDR appears to have been resolved along the lines indicated in our MIR-404 of 23 February, as follows:

- All the 11 deputies appearing in the list of 5 January 1994, will be sworn in while the case of the 4 deputies in the list being contested would continue through the judicial process.

- concerning ministerial positions, members of the Political Bureau of the MDR would submit a list of two ministers to the Prime Minister Designate who, on his part, would have the right to designate one minister (for a total of three ministers for the MDR).

3. The second point in the conclusions of the communiqué seem to indicate that consensus has still not been reached on the problem of the Parti Libéral (PL), as it appears that one of the two factions of the PL, namely the so-called "Lando" faction (referring to Mr. Landouald Ndasingwa, Minister of Social Affairs), reportedly expressed "serious" reservations on the following formula apparently supported by the other faction, namely the so-called "Mugenzi" faction (referring to Mr. Justin Mugenzi, Minister of Trade):

- the "Mugenzi" faction would designate 5 parliamentarians and two ministers;

- the "Lando" faction would designate 6 parliamentarians, including a candidate for the post of speaker of the transitional parliament, and one minister.

4. The proposed solution for the PL is also the same formula reflected in our MI-404 of 23 February, which was opposed then by the RPF (and which I understand it still opposes). As I informed you at that time, President Habyarimana had told me on 23 February that the above proposals had been agreed to at a Cabinet meeting held in the evening of 22 February. He had been irritated, he emphasized to me, when some participants in that Cabinet meeting had later appeared, on 23 February, to distance themselves from the proposed solutions, which the FPR had also opposed as an attempt by the President to impose his own lists on the MDR and PL.

.../...

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5. What the communiqué seems to show is that an important evolution has taken place in the alignments of the various political parties between 23 and 27 February. With Mr. Landouald Ndasingwa apparently more isolated than previously, it could be said that his faction, generally regarded as allied to the FPR, has suffered in favour of the "Mugenzi" faction which is widely seen as allied to President Habyarimana and the MRND. The pressure could now shift from the President to Mr. Ndasingwa as well as the FPR to make the necessary compromises in order to allow the transitional institutions to be put in place. This pressure might include the "moral" influence of the church since, as you are aware, the proposed solution for the PL problem had earlier been advanced by the council of bishops.

6. We understand that some of the civilian officials of the FPR who have been residing in the CND building in Kigali where the FPR battalion is based, left for the FPR headquarters in Mulindi over the week-end. We do not know if or when they will return to Kigali or what may be the purpose of their trip. It is conceivable that the FPR leadership in Mulindi would be carrying out a review of recent political developments as well as an assessment of the implications for the FPR of such developments. The FPR's decision on whether or not to support the installation of the transitional institutions on the basis of the proposed solutions mentioned above could probably be influenced in part by Rwandese public opinion as well as pressure by the international community. If the present alignment of political forces holds, it could be difficult for the FPR and Mr. Landouald Ndasingwa to resist for too long without suffering serious political consequences.

7. In my continuing efforts to advance the peace process, I have requested a meeting with the FPR leadership in Mulindi to ascertain its perspectives on, and its reactions to the recent political developments. Meanwhile, we continue to follow developments closely and will keep you informed.

8. Regards.

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COMMUNIQUE.

Le Président de la République, le Général-Major HABYARIMANA Juvénal, a dirigé, le 25 et le 27 février 1994, une réunion regroupant les partis politiques qui participent au Gouvernement actuel de transition, à savoir le MRND, le MDR, le PSD, le PDC et le PL.

Le Premier Ministre, Madame Agathe UWILINGIYIMANA, ainsi que le Premier Ministre désigné, Monsieur TWAGIRAMUNGU Faustin, ont participé aux deux réunions.

Les deux réunions se sont penchées sur le problème du fonctionnement du Gouvernement actuel, dirigé par Madame Agathe UWILINGIYIMANA, ainsi que sur les entraves à la poursuite de la mise en place des Institutions de la Transition.

Concernant le fonctionnement du Gouvernement actuel, il a été entendu que, aussi longtemps que le Gouvernement de Transition à Base Elargie n'aura pas été mis en place, le Gouvernement actuel doit continuer à fonctionner, notamment à travers les réunions du Conseil des Ministres, pour s'attaquer aux défis auxquels le pays est confronté, spécialement les problèmes relatifs à la sécurité et la question de mise en place des institutions de transition.

Quant aux entraves à la poursuite de la mise en place des Institutions de la Transition, la réunion du 27 février a abouti aux conclusions suivantes pour aider à dégager des approches permettant aux partis MDR et PL d'entrer dans ces institutions:

1. Concernant le parti MDR, la liste des Députés est celle arrêtée le 5 janvier 1994, sous réserve des cas pendants en justice et de la suite qui y sera réservée. Pour ce qui est des Ministres, les délégués du Bureau Politique du MDR auront droit à deux Ministères sur une liste qu'ils vont présenter au Premier Ministre désigné; tandis que celle du

Premier Ministre Désigné, Monsieur TWAGIRAMUNGU Faustin, aura droit à un Ministère.

2. Quant au parti PL, la tendance MUGENZI désignera cinq Députés dans ses rangs, celle de NDASINGWA en choisira six. Pour les Ministres, la tendance MUGENZI en aura deux, celle de NDASINGWA aura un Ministre et donnera le candidat au poste de Président du Bureau de l'Assemblée Nationale de Transition. Monsieur NDASINGWA Landouald a émis de très sérieuses réserves sur cette proposition, notamment sur la répartition des ministères.

3. La tendance non satisfaite par les compromis ci-dessus tirera les leçons des conclusions dégagées et prendra ses responsabilités.

4. Les listes définitives des Députés seront transmises au Président de la République et au Premier Ministre au plus tard le 28 février 1994 à 19H00, par les deux tendances.

5. Le Premier Ministre Désigné présentera la liste des candidats Ministres au Président de la République au plus tard le 1er mars 1994 à 12H00.

6. La mise en place des Institutions de la Transition aura lieu à une date qui sera fixée de commun accord avec le Front Patriotique Rwandais.

Fait à Kigali, le 27 février 1994.

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UNAMIR
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UNAMIR
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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

DATE: 27 FEBRUARY 1994

TO: ANNAN\DPKO\UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAIRE\UNAMIR\KIGALI
FAX NO:MOST IMMEDIATE-CODE CABLE INMARSAT: MIR-437	FAX NO: 011-250-84273
SUBJECT:REINFORCEMENT OF THE KWSA	
ATTN: MGEN BARIL	ROOM NO.2052
TOTAL NUMBER OF TRANSMITTED PAGES INCLUDING THIS ONE: 5	

1. DUE TO THE PRESENT INCREASING DETERIORATION IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN KIGALI AND DUE TO THE INTENSITY OF SECURITY OPERATIONS WITH EVER INCREASING MANPOWER DEMANDS IT HAS BECOME NECESSARY TO TEMPORARILY REDEPLOY SOME ELEMENTS OF THE GHANA BATTALION (BYUBAT) FROM THE DMZ TO KIGALI (KWSA). THIS TEMPORARY REDEPLOYMENT WILL GIVE US A SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ADVANTAGE IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AND MAY PROVIDE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ADVANTAGES AT THE PRESENT TIME.

2. THERE HAS BEEN AND WILL LIKELY CONTINUE TO BE INCREASED DEMANDS FOR STATIC POINT SECURITY AND ESCORTS. DUE TO INCREASED TERRORISM INCIDENTS LIKE THE ASSASSINATION OF THE MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS ON MON 21 FEBRUARY AND A POSSIBLE INCREASE IN DIRECT ATTACKS ON UNAMIR LIKE THE AMBUSH OF THE CONVOY OF RPF ON TUES 22 FEBRUARY, THE REQUIREMENT TO PROTECT THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP, UNAMIR PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS AND THE RPF IN THE CND COMPLEX WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE EXCESSIVE DEMANDS OF THE PRESENT FORCE IN KIGALI. SOME HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES ARE ALSO INITIATING REQUESTS OF UNAMIR TO PROVIDE SECURITY AT THEIR DEPOT AND DISTRIBUTION FACILITIES AND OF THEIR CONVOYS. THESE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES OF THE INCREASE IN OUR TASKS HAVE RESULTED IN UNAMIR LARGELY BEING PLACED IN A STATIC DEFENSIVE POSTURE IN KIGALI. IT HAS ALSO SERIOUSLY DEGRADED OUR ABILITY TO MEET SWIFTLY AND IN SUFFICIENT STRENGTH TO MEET EMERGENCY CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE AND TO EFFECTIVELY REACT TO UNFORESEEN SITUATIONS. IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR MANDATE WE MUST PROTECT UN PERSONNEL, UN PROPERTY AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THEREFORE THESE TASKS CANNOT BE REDUCED. IN CONCLUSION WE ARE RAPIDLY DEPLETING AND EXHAUSTING OUR RESOURCES IN KIGALI AND MAY IN THE NEAR FUTURE BE UNABLE TO SECURE THE KWSA.

3. ALREADY THE MINISTER OF DEFENCE, AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE GENDARMERIE, HAS ASKED FOR PERMISSION TO REDEPLOY MORE GENDARMERIE FORCES IN THE KWSA, AND\OR USE MILITARY POLICE TO RELIEVE GENDARMERIE ASSETS FROM SEVERAL VITAL POINT STATIC GUARDS. HIS CONCERN IS THAT THE GENDARMERIE IN THE KWSA IS BURNING OUT AND THAT HE DOES NOT HAVE THE RESERVES TO SUSTAIN THIS LEVEL OF OPERATIONS. HE IS BEING FORCED TO USE HIS TWO RIOT-CONTROL COMPANIES IN MORE DEMANDING TASKS THAN USUALLY CALLED FOR AND AS SUCH IS WEAKENING HIS RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR MORE SERIOUS INTERVENTIONS. HE IS ALSO USING TOO MUCH FORCE FOR CERTAIN LESS DEMANDING TASKS. WE HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THIS WITH THE RPF AND HAVE PRODUCED A FINAL DRAFT OF A KWSA RULES ADDENDUM TO ASSIST THE GENDARMERIE.

4. ON THE POLITICAL FRONT THE PRESIDENT AND HIS SUPPORTERS APPEAR TO BELIEVE UNAMIR FORCES IN THE DMZ ARE THERE TO DEFEND THE DMZ FROM AN RPF ATTACK. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANDATE, OUR RESPONSIBILITY IS TO MONITOR THE DMZ AND REPORT ON CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS. THIS HAS BEEN EXPLAINED ~~TO THE~~ DIRECTLY TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE FC AND WILL SHORTLY BE EXPLAINED TO THE PUBLIC THROUGH THE LOCAL MEDIA. A FACTION SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT WITH APPROXIMATELY 1000 UN TROOPS IN THE DMZ, UNAMIR CAN AND WILL BLOCK THE RPF, THUS POSSIBLE LEAVING THEM FREE TO CONTINUE THE PRESENT DELAY IN THE FORMATION OF THE BBTG. IN ADDITION, TERRORISTS CONTINUE THEIR CAMPAIGN IN KIGALI AND APPEAR TO BELIEVE THEY CAN ESCALATE THESE ACTIVITIES WITH IMMUNITY. IT IS MOST NOTICEABLE THAT THESE TERROR TACTICS ARE CONTROLLED BY SOMEONE AS LAST WEEK IT WAS VERY ACTIVE AND HOSTILE IN KIGALI AND THIS WEEK IT APPEARS TO BE AT AN EASY CALM. THIS FACTION IS ALSO EXPLOITING THE RESULTANT FEAR AND INTIMIDATION OF THE POPULACE BY THIS TERROR AND FEAR CAMPAIGN WITH ACCUSATIONS THAT THE RPF AND THEIR SUPPORTERS ARE RESPONSIBLE. THE RESTRICTED GENDARMERIE FORCES IN KIGALI (DUE TO THE RULES OF THE KWSA) ARE STRETCHED THIN AND ARE EXHAUSTED. THEY HAVE LARGELY BEEN UNABLE OR UNWILLING WITHOUT POLITICAL SUPPORT TO AGGRESSIVELY CONTAIN THE ELEMENTS OF THE TERRORIST CAMPAIGN IN KIGALI. THESE FORCES CANNOT BE REINFORCED WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT OF THE RPF, WHICH IS UNLIKELY AS THE RPF FEAR THE GOVERNMENT WILL USE THIS EXCUSE TO REINFORCE GENDARMERIE FORCES TO CONTAIN THEM IN THE CND AND NOT TO SUPPRESS THE TERRORIST CAMPAIGN.

5. FOR THEIR PART THE RPF FEEL PINNED DOWN AND ENCIRCLED BY THE UN WITH UNOMUR IN THE NORTH, AN ACTIVE OBSERVER SECTOR WITHIN THEIR AREA, A SUBSTANTIAL UN FORCE IN THE DMZ, AND SECURITY ENCIRCLEMENT IN THE CND COMPOUND IN KIGALI. THEY BELIEVE AND HAVE INCREASINGLY STATED THEY BELIEVE THE UN IS PLAYING INTO THE PRESIDENTS PLAN OF DELAY AND EVENTUALLY IGNORE OR SCRAP THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT. THE PRESENT TERRORIST CAMPAIGN IN PART APPEARS TO BE AIMED AT THEIR SUPPORTERS IN KIGALI AND POSSIBLY (UNCONFIRMED) MEMBERS OF THEIR ETHNIC GROUP. THEY ARE INCREASINGLY SHOWING SIGNS OF FRUSTRATION WITH THE APPARENT IMPOTENCE OF UNAMIR TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCY CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE AND TO ASSIST IN STOPPING OR CONTAINING THE TERRORIST CAMPAIGN. THEIR REACTION IS CORRECT IN VIEW OF UNAMIR AND GENDARMERIE

STRETCHED RESOURCES IN A DEFENSIVE AND STATIC POSTURE WHICH MAKE US UNABLE TO RESPOND SWIFTLY FOR EMERGENCY CALLS FOR ASSISTANCE AND UNABLE TO ASSIST THE EXHAUSTED GENDARMERIE IN CONTAINING THE TERRORIST CAMPAIGN.
WE ARE INCREASINGLY BEING VIEWED BY THE RPF AS PART OF THE PROBLEM AND NOT AS PART OF THE SOLUTION. THEIR FRUSTRATION WITH UNAMIRs CAPABILITY SHORTAGES AND THE RESULTANT DELAYS IN REACTION ARE INCREASING ON A DAILY BASIS.

6. IN CONCLUSION UNAMIR FORCES IN KIGALI ARE STRETCHED. WE HAVE LOST THE INITIATIVE AND ARE RAPIDLY LOSING ANY CAPABILITY TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCY SITUATIONS. UNAMIR IS ALSO LOSING CREDIBILITY WITH THE RPF, AND THE POPULATION IN GENERAL, TO ASSIST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF SECURITY IN THE KWSA. UNAMIR FORCES IN KIGALI NEED REINFORCEMENT IF THEY ARE TO RECOVER THE INITIATIVE, MAINTAIN CURRENT AND FULLY RESPOND TO NEW GUARD AND ESCORT TASKS, REGAIN A RESERVE RAPID REACTION CAPABILITY, STOP OR AT LEAST ASSIST IN CONTAINING THE TERRORIST CAMPAIGN, REASSURE THE RPF AND CONTINUE TO OBTAIN THEIR SUPPORT AND TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE OTHER FACTIONS AND THE TERRORISTS THAT UNAMIR IS NOT A SHIELD FOR THE DELAYING, POSTURING, AND NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT. WE MUST TAKE A PASSIVE MILITARY ACTION WHICH WILL SHOCK THESE NEGATIVE ELEMENTS INTO FIRSTLY CONTAINING THE TERRORIST CAMPAIGN AND SECONDLY TO PROD THEM INTO ESTABLISHING THE BBTG AND COMPLYING WITH THE ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT.

7. A PASSIVE MILITARY OPTION DOES EXIST WHICH SATISFIES ALL THE DEMANDS OF THE PRESENT SECURITY SITUATION IN KIGALI: IT IS BY REINFORCING THE KWSA WITH SOME ELEMENTS OF BYUBAT PRESENTLY DEPLOYING WITH CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT AND JOY FROM THE PEOPLE IN THE DMZ. IT IS PROPOSED THAT TWO COMPANIES, A SMALL COMMAND GROUP AND A SMALL LOGISTICS COMPONENT BE MOVED IMMEDIATELY TO KIGALI. THIS REINFORCING ELEMENT WOULD BE TEMPORARILY ACCOMMODATED AND SUPPORTED IN KIGALI. IT WOULD TAKE OVER ALL OF THE STATIC GUARD TASKS AS IT DOES NOT AT PRESENT HAVE ANY VEHICLE MOBILITY. ESCORTS WOULD REMAIN WITH THE KIBAT AND RUTBAT. THIS WOULD FREE UP TO TWO COMPANIES OF MOBILE, KIGALI EXPERIENCED TROOPS FOR INCREASED PATROL, CHECKPOINT AND REACTION TASKS. THIS REINFORCEMENT WOULD ALSO PERMIT UNAMIR TO RESPOND IN A TIMELY AND EFFECTIVE MANNER TO EVER-INCREASING REQUESTS FOR GUARDS, ESCORTS AND REACTION FORCES. THIS PLAN WOULD SEE A VIABLE REINFORCEMENT IN KWSA AND WILL ASSIST THE EXHAUSTED GENDARMERIE IN CONTAINING THE TERRORIST CAMPAIGN.

8. THIS PLAN WOULD ALSO SHOCK THE NEGATIVE ELEMENTS INTO REALISING THAT THE CURRENT FORCES IN THE DMZ ARE NOT THERE ONLY FOR THAT TASK,NOR ARE THEY THERE TO DEFEND THE DMZ. THEY WILL IN EFFECT BE FORCED TO "LOOK OVER SHOULDERS" TO THE NORTH WHERE THE RPF COULD BE COMING FROM AND THIS MAY PROD TO UNDERSTAND THAT UNAMIR IS NOT THEIR SHIELD FOR DELAYING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BBTG. IT WILL ALSO ASSIST IN SUPPRESSING THE TERROR CAMPAIGN WHICH IS WORKING TO THEIR ADVANTAGE IN KIGALI. THIS ONE\TWO

COMBINATION OF A MILITARY MOVE WITH A POLITICAL REACTION MAY HELP THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BBTG.

9. THIS PLAN WILL STILL SEE THE RETENTION OF A SUBSTANTIAL FORCE IN THE DMZ OF AN INFANTRY BATTALION(-), AN ENGINEER COMPANY AND 36 MILITARY OBSERVERS UNDER A FULLY OPERATIONAL SECTOR HEADQUARTERS. THE DMZ HAS BEEN MONITORED FOR THE PAST YEAR BY LESS THAN 100 PERSONNEL. WE WILL STILL MAINTAIN MANY TIMES THAT NUMBER IN THE DMZ. CONSIDERING THAT WE ARE STILL IN PHASE ONE (AWAITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BBTG) AND THAT THE DMZ STRENGTH WAS NOT OPERATIONALLY REQUIRED UNTIL THE START OF PHASE THREE(IE TO MONITOR AND PROVIDE SECURITY IN AN EXPANDED DMZ OR BUFFER ZONE TO BE NEGOTIATED AND THEN IMPLEMENTED BY THE END OF PHASE TWO) WE CANNOT BE ACCUSED OF DESERTING THE DMZ AS WE WILL STILL HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL FORCE WHICH SHOULD BE ABLE TO HANDLE THE PRESENT SITUATION IN THE DMZ. BUT THE PRECEDENT WILL BE MADE. IF WE NEED HELP IN KIGALI TO ESTABLISH A SECURE ENVIRONMENT FOR ESTABLISHING THE BBTG WE WILL DEPLETE THE DMZ TO ACQUIRE THAT REINFORCEMENT. IT MAY BE SEEN BY THE NEGATIVE ELEMENTS AS OPENING THE DOOR TO THE RPF TO PUNCH THROUGH THE DMZ. THAT CONCERN IS EXACTLY WHAT WE WANT THESE PEOPLE TO BELIEVE AND TO HAVE THEM RETHINK THEIR PRESENT TERROR\DELAYING OPERATIONS.

10. THIS REDEPLOYMENT OF AN ELEMENT OF THE GHANA BATTALION WILL BE A TEMPORARY MEASURE UNTIL THE SITUATION STABILIZES IN KIGALI OR UNTIL THE BBTG IS ESTABLISHED. IT WILL THEN BE REDEPLOYED TO THE DMZ TO COMMENCE ITS CRITICAL MONITORING AND SECURITY PHASE TWO AND THREE TASKINGS. THE GHANA BATTALION WAS CONTRIBUTED TO UNAMIR UNDER NO DEPLOYMENT RESTRICTIONS. IT CAN IN FACT BE EMPLOYED ANYWHERE IN RWANDA. AT PRESENT AN ELEMENT OF THAT BATTALION, UNDER NATIONAL COMMAND, IS URGENTLY REQUIRED IN KIGALI IF WE ARE TO EFFECTIVELY AND SUCCESSFULLY SUCCEED IN PROVIDING ASSISTANCE IN SECURING THE CITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR MANDATE.

11. A WARNING ORDER FOR THIS OPERATION (OP BOOMERANG) HAS BEEN ISSUED TO ALLOW RECONNAISSANCE, LOGISTICS AND OTHER CONCURRENT ACTIVITIES TO TAKE PLACE. THE DEPLOYMENT WILL BE CONDUCTED AND THE REINFORCEMENTS OPERATIONAL WITHIN 72 HOURS OF OUR DECISION TO MOVE. NO MOVE IS PLANNED BEFORE 0800 HOURS ON 1 MARCH 1994.

12. THE URGENCY OF THIS OPERATION CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED. THE PRESENT SERIOUS INCREASE IN TERRORIST ACTIONS COMBINED WITH THE SERIOUS DECREASE IN GENDARMERIE AND UNAMIR REACTION CAPABILITY COULD LEAD TO AN END TO THE PEACE PROCESS. IF WE ARE TO SALVAGE OUR CREDIBILITY AND SUCCEED IN THIS MISSION WE MUST REGAIN THE INITIATIVE BY REINFORCING KIGALI IMMEDIATELY WITH AVAILABLE IN-THEATRE AND AVAILABLE FORCES AND THUS HOPEFULLY PROD THE RELUCTANT PARTY INTO SERIOUSLY NEGOTIATING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BBTG.

13. THIS PROPOSED MILITARY OPERATION, COUPLED WITH THE STRONG POSITIONS EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. AND BELGIAN AMBASSADORS, THAT THEY WILL NOT BE IN A POSITION TO RECOGNISE ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT EXCEPT THE CONSTITUTIONAL BBTG, SHOULD BRING SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS

TO ENDING THE POLITICAL IMPASSE.

cc : Gen Dallaire

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA — NATIONS UNIES MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 64

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
94 FEB 28 10:56
ONLY

A: M. AIME, NATIONS UNIES, NEW YORK
BUREAU DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL

DE: BOOH-BOOH, SRSG, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 28 FEVRIER 1994

NUMERO: MIR ~~434~~ 435

OBJET: COMPLEMENT D'INFORMATION POUR LA VISITE DE L'ENVOYE SPECIAL DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE DU RWANDA

NBRE DE PAGES: 2

Suite à notre câble MIR-434 du 27 février 1994, nous souhaitons vous apporter le complément d'information ci-dessous:

1. Sous la présidence du Général-Major Juvénal Habyarimana, une réunion de tous les partis politiques, à l'exception du Front Patriotique Rwandais, s'est tenue hier toute la journée et s'est poursuivie une partie de la nuit. Les résultats de ces délibérations se présentent comme suit.

2. Pour le Parti Libéral: il a été proposé d'attribuer six postes de députés à la faction Tutsi et cinq postes à la faction Hutu. Concernant le Gouvernement, deux postes seraient alloués à la faction Hutu et un poste à la faction Tutsi. Ce règlement est sujet à une proposition attribuant à la faction Tutsi la possibilité de proposer un candidat à la présidence de l'Assembléee ou à son bureau. Il est à noter cependant que le Représentant de la faction Tutsi a émis des réserves sur cette proposition.

3. En ce qui concerne le Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR), la liste des députés du 5 janvier 1994 présentée par le président de son parti et Premier Ministre Désigné sera maintenue. Il reste entendu que les instances judiciaires resteront saisies des dissensions de ce parti et que leurs décisions serviront de solution définitive à la divergence entre le Premier Ministre Désigné et la faction dissidente de son parti.

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4. La date de la mise en place des institutions de la transition n'a toujours pas été fixée car le Gouvernement rwandais doit préalablement prendre contact avec le Front Patriotique pour lui faire part des résultats de la réunion d'hier.

5. Nous sommes informés que la direction politique du FPR a quitté la capitale pour rejoindre Mulindi. Seuls son bataillon et quelques chefs militaires sont restés à Kigali. Leur première réaction serait défavorable au compromis concernant le Parti Libéral.

6. Observations:

Il est à noter que la proposition concernant le Parti Libéral est celle qui a été soumise par les Evêques et Pasteurs rwandais. Celle-ci avait reçue notre encouragement. Mais nous craignons que la réserve faite par la tendance Tutsi du Parti Libéral ne remette en question ce délicat compromis. Le Secrétaire Général pourrait insister sur la nécessité de mettre en place les institutions de la transition, étant entendu que le Parti Libéral y prendra sa place dès qu'il aura trouvé une solution à ses dissensions internes. Il ne s'agirait donc pas d'une exclusion mais plutôt d'une mesure provisoire de suspension de la participation du Parti Libéral.

cc : Gén. Dallaire

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR

UNAMIR - MINUAR

1994 FEB 26 07 02

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN-62 1/2

1994 FEB 26 07 09 UNAMIR

TO:	ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK JONAH, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO:	KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM:	BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE:	25 FEBRUARY 1994
SUBJECT:	Current Situation

MIR-418

1. I wish to refer to our (Jonah/Booh-Booh) telephone conversation of yesterday in which Mr. Jonah informed me that the Secretary-General had phoned President Habyarimana to stress again his personal concerns over the undue delay in installing the transitional institutions. I am extremely happy that the Secretary-General has continued to exert pressure on the President because it is evident to most people in Rwanda that the President is the principle figure who could influence or bring about the immediate installation of the remaining transitional institutions.

2. Prior to my telephone conversation with Mr. Jonah, I had received a phone call from the President who told me about his telephone conversation with the Secretary-General. He indicated that he would send a personal emissary to the Secretary-General who would convey a detailed account of the political/security situation in the country and his own efforts in resolving the present political impasse. He accused President Museveni of Uganda of continuing to actively support the RPF and cited an instance of 2 vehicles (mercedes benz) entering Rwanda from Uganda. He also accused the RPF troops from the RPF battalion in Kigali of going into the City at night and terrorizing the citizens.

3. On the question of security he informed me that my personal safety was in danger and that increased security measures should be taken for my protection. I was both surprised and alarmed by this warning because when I met the President two days ago, he did not draw my attention to the threat. However, I am taking the warning seriously since it is conceivable that the President's supporters (with or without his knowledge and consent) might carry out a terrorist act against my person or other UNAMIR personnel and then blame the act on RPF or factions opposed to the President and his Party or vice versa. In this connection, I wish to suggest that when the President's emissary arrives in New York, he/she must be told in no uncertain terms that the Government is responsible for the security of all UNAMIR personnel and that the international community expects the government to take that responsibility very seriously and act accordingly. Meanwhile, I have requested a thorough review of security arrangements for UNAMIR and all other UN personnel in Rwanda. We would also like to be advised soonest as to the type of security measures that should be taken for the SRSG whose personal safety appears to be in danger as evidenced by the warning provided by the Head of State.

CRN-62

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4. Regarding the President's concerns over President Museveni's support of the RPF and the RPF troop movement in Kigali, I informed the President that our reports indicate that the Uganda/Rwanda border is calm without any noticeable troop movement from either side. The RPF troops the President referred to had gone to town to relieve another RPF convoy that was being prevented from proceeding to the CND compound and had returned immediately thereafter. I promised to look into the President's allegation regarding the question of ammunition entering Rwanda from Uganda which has not been reported to us by any of our sources.

5. Having spoken over and over again to all the parties and shades of opinion in Rwanda, I am convinced that the only option that would allow the immediate installation of the institutions is the consensus of February 10, which called for installing the institutions without the PL, with the understanding that the PL could join the institutions after resolving the differences within its party. This consensus was accepted by all the political parties and the RPF except MRND which had reservations about the date agreed upon for the installation of the institutions. We however learnt that the MRND subsequently removed its reservations and called for the political parties to take note of their concerns on the role of political parties during the period of transition.

6. At this morning's meeting with the RPF which was requested by the RPF, I was informed by the RPF's First Vice President that President Habyarimana has plans to replace the current coalition government headed by Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana. They considered such a move as irrelevant and unacceptable because it is against the Arusha Peace Agreement. Before the conclusion of our meeting the Force Commander and I drew the attention of RPF to the presence of their troops in the DMZ which was a clear violation of the ceasefire agreement. The RPF delegation promised to bring this to the attention of the relevant authorities in their organization.

7. This afternoon, the US Ambassador phoned and confirmed the President's intention to replace Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana's Government and is circulating two lists of new cabinet ministers. He said he has warned the Director of the president's cabinet that if the President proceeded with such a plan, the new government will not be recognized by the US and the US might even suspend all economic assistance to Rwanda because it cannot endorse unconstitutional acts. He advised the President to discuss the situation with the SRSG before publicising his plans. The Belgian Ambassador also called me to advise me of the President's plans and indicated that Ambassadors of the European Union in Kigali would reject such a move if acted upon by the President.

8. Please advise us urgently as to how UNAMIR should react if the President replaces the present transitional (coalition) government by another government which is not a broad based transitional government as stipulated in the Arusha Peace Accord.

9. The overall situation in the country and especially in Kigali is calm though tense. The public and private sectors have resumed normal activities. UNAMIR as well as other UN organizations in the country are on phase two of the security plan.

10. Thanks for your UNAMIR 566 of 24 February whose contents we have noted.

11. Regards.

cc : Gen. Dallaire

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR

1 94 FEB 26 07 00

LRN-61 1/3

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IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
JONAH, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 25 FEBRUARY 1994

NUMBER: MIR-417

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

NO OF PAGES: 3

UNAMIR 1 94 FEB 26 07 09

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1. I met this afternoon at UNAMIR Headquarters with Mr. Edward Clay, the UK Ambassador (High Commissioner) in Kampala (Uganda), who is also accredited to Rwanda and presented his credentials to President Habyarimana earlier today.

2. The Ambassador stated, from the outset, that he was very concerned about the seemingly deteriorating situation in Rwanda, especially the security aspects, and had sought the meeting to exchange views with me on the current status and prospects for the peace process as a whole and on possible ways and means to improve the disturbing security situation, in particular. In this connection, he asked me what his Government could do to help and, after recalling that President Habyarimana had accused the Ugandan Government of aiding the FPR militarily, asked me also what ideas or suggestions he might take back to the authorities in Kampala.

3. In welcoming the Ambassador, I underlined the influential position of the United Kingdom as a Permanent Member of the Security Council and a member of the European Union, and expressed our appreciation for its support, within those organs, of UNAMIR in particular and of the Rwandese peace process as a whole. I

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emphasized, especially in response to the Ambassador's question as to what the UK could do to help, that it could use its position to influence the parties concerned to compromise in order to allow the concrete implementation of the Peace Agreement.

4. I reviewed recent developments in Rwanda and stressed that although the atmosphere, at least in Kigali, appeared calmer today, the overall political and security remained troubling and volatile and the situation could easily degenerate again, especially if the current political impasse persisted. Noting reports of growing Government deficits, I expressed serious concern about the worsening socio-economic situation and in particular about the impact that the Government's inability to pay the salaries of its workers, including members of the security forces, could have on the already precarious security climate in Kigali and throughout the country, especially as criminal elements were increasingly taking advantage of present difficulties in order to carry out acts of banditry. Rwanda's problems were daunting, I observed, and it was vital therefore for the authorities and leaders concerned to show the necessary political will firstly to install the transitional government and parliament which would thus allow attention to be focussed on addressing the country's very real and critical challenges.

5. Ambassador Clay stressed his Government's view that the Arusha Peace Agreement remains the best instrument for peace in Rwanda and urged its full and effective implementation beginning, as soon as possible, with the installation of the transitional institutions. He shared our concern that all parties involved in the process should show restraint and refrain from the use or threat of use of force, including the threat to resume the war.

6. In the course of our exchange of views on the reasons for the current impasse and the obstacles that had impeded concrete progress so far, especially with regard to the installation of the transitional institutions, the Ambassador was sceptical about the impact of the so-called Ugandan factor and specifically the claims by President Habyarimana that Ugandan support had emboldened the FPR and made it less co-operative in the peace process. While acknowledging that President Museveni knew the FPR leadership well and may even continue to sympathize with the Front's aspirations to participate in the management of Rwanda's affairs, the Ambassador did not believe however that President Museveni's Government was engaged in any large-scale support, militarily or otherwise, for the FPR, and noted, in this connection, that UNOMUR had so far not

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reported any significant movement of military supplies or personnel from Uganda into Rwanda. The Ambassador however was not sure who might be supplying the FPR or how military equipment reached FPR forces inside Rwanda.

7. Ambassador Clay nevertheless recognized that President Museveni might be in a position to contribute to the Rwandese peace process. He therefore shared our view that it might be useful if President Museveni intervened, as he had recently done in Burundi, to try to break the impasse.

8. In response to Ambassador Clay's question if I had met with President Museveni, I replied that I had not but that I planned to visit the neighbouring countries, including Uganda, at an opportune moment.

9. Regards.

cc Gal Dallaire

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

1994 FEB 24 17 561

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
JONAH, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: BOOH-BOOH, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 24 FEBRUARY 1994

NUMBER: MIR-409

SUBJECT: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN RWANDA

NO OF PAGES: 4

UNAMIR 1994 FEB 24 18

1. Further to our MIR-404 of 23 February on the above subject, I would like to inform you that Kigali awoke this morning to a much improved security situation and a calmer overall atmosphere. Most road-blocks have disappeared, there appears to be freer movement of civilians on the streets and more stores are open today than in the past two days. Nevertheless, the general political and security situation remains troubling. The United Nations community is still operating under the phase 2 security status and the curfew imposed by the Government in Kigali and Butare is still in effect. We are pursuing intensive consultations at various levels with both Government and FPR officials with a view, in particular, to the earliest possible installation of the transitional government and the transitional parliament.

2. President Habyarimana's appeal yesterday afternoon for tolerance and national harmony and against ethnic and regional polarization, was replayed over the National Radio yesterday evening and, conceivably, could have contributed to the improved situation and calm noticed today. We are constantly urging the various political leaders, especially at such critical and volatile moments when passions and tensions are high, to preach restraint and national reconciliation, in particular to their respective supporters.

.../...

3. The President has called another meeting of political parties for Friday 25 February but this has been characterized by the Prime Minister Designate as another ploy by the President to give the impression of wanting to install the transitional institutions, when in actual fact, he is the principle figure behind the impasse. The RPF issued a statement attributing their boycott of the President's meeting of 23 February, to the President's intention of impossing an unacceptable list of deputies on the Nation.

4. The funeral took place in Butare today of the Minister of Public Works and Energy, Mr. Félicien Gatabazi, who was murdered on Monday night, 21 February. Senior Government officials, including the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister Designate, as well as representatives of the FPR and other political parties were present. A detachment of UNAMIR forces was part of the security escort and the Force Commander, Brig. Gen. Dallaire, officially represented the Mission at the funeral and conveyed, on behalf of the Secretary-General, United Nations condolences to the bereaved family. We are grateful for the copies you sent to us yesterday of the statement by the Secretary-General condemning Mr. Gatabazi's murder. We have today reissued the statement here as a press release (please see attached). We have also informally brought it to the attention of some Government officials, in particular those involved in the investigation of the killing. We will keep you informed of progress in the investigation and relevant related developments.

5. Reports, especially through the international media, have been circulating, in particular last evening and today, that much of the violence of the past two days may have been ethnically motivated and directed against the Tutsi minority. According to these reports, upwards of about seventy Tutsis may have been killed during this period. ?

6. In view of Rwanda's long and tragic history of ethnic conflict, the possibility of ethnically motivated incidents is a constant threat, especially during moments of tension, fear and confusion. However, we do not have conclusive or compelling evidence that the events of the past two days were either ethnically motivated or provoked ethnic consequences or reactions. From what is known, the two political leaders killed were both Hutus, one (Minister Gatabazi) was a southerner and the other (Mr. Buchyana), a northerner. Also, while Mr. Buchyana and the party he led, the CDR, were widely regarded as hardline Hutu nationalists, Mr. Gatabazi and his PSD party were seen as moderates who reached out to all Rwandese without regard to ethnic or regional background. Indeed, the PSD has been viewed as an ally or potential ally of the FPR which has been characterized, especially by its Hutu critics, such as the CDR, as a Tutsi-dominated party.

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7. Even on a "normal" day, it is difficult to know the exact number of deaths in Kigali and/or the causes of death. The official source for such information is the National Gendarmerie with which we, especially our CIVPOL component, maintain close working relations. The Gendarmerie does not as yet have conclusive figures on the number of people killed over the past two days or the causes of death. From our own observations, including the results of patrols carried out by our military and police contingents, we are not in a position to corroborate reports of a major increase in ethnically motivated incidents or murders in Kigali. However, from what we have been able to gather, at least twenty five people died and about a hundred may have been wounded as a result of the incidents of the past two days. We also gather that several other people died but were buried by their relatives and were not taken to the mortuary and consequently not part of the statistics. We are following this aspect with particular attention because of the potentially explosive impact that the resurgence of Hutu/Tutsi ethnic violence could have not only on the Rwandese situation but also in neighbouring Burundi.

7. With regard to the UNAMIR military observer who was wounded on 22 February, as reported in para. 4 of our MIR-404 of 23 February, we are pleased to inform you that he sustained only minor injuries and did not require hospitalization. His name is Capt. Cooper, a national of Uruguay.

8. Regards.

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COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE NO 19/94

LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL DES NATIONS UNIES CONDAMNE LE MEURTRE DU MINISTRE RWANDAIS DES TRAVAUX PUBLICS

Il demande aux parties concernées de mettre en oeuvre sans délai l'Accord de Paix d'Arusha

Kigali, (BIEP), le 23 février 1994

Le Porte-Parole du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies a fait hier à New York la déclaration suivante, au nom de M. Boutros Boutros-Ghali:

Le Secrétaire Général a appris avec consternation l'assassinat, le 21 février 1994, à Kigali, du Ministre des Travaux Publics et de l'Energie du Rwanda, Félicien Gatabazi. Le Secrétaire Général condamne énergiquement le meurtre du Ministre qui risque de compliquer les efforts en cours pour établir au Rwanda un gouvernement de transition à base élargie. Il attend des détails supplémentaires sur cet incident de son Représentant Spécial au Rwanda.

Le Secrétaire Général demande instamment aux autorités de déployer leurs efforts afin d'appréhender et de livrer à la justice au plus tôt les auteurs de cet acte méprisable. Il invite les parties concernées à faire preuve du maximum de retenue et à redoubler d'efforts pour mettre en oeuvre, sans délai, l'Accord de Paix d'Arusha. (END)

Bureau d'Information, d'Education et de Presse (BIEP), MINUAR
Kigali, Rwanda: Tél: 8-4278/79/80/81/82/83/84/85
Poste: 1484
Téléfax: 8-4275