

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, McKEOWN, LEOPOLDOVILLE

From : BUNCHE, NEWYORK

Date : 17 February 1961

No : 1137

Re our 1068. Call sign for the two UN DC3s being ferried from Italy to Congo urgently needed if a delay in their departure is to be avoided.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, McKEOWN, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : BUNCHE, NEWYORK

Date : 17 February 1961

No : 1136

Our 946.

UStates has agreed to provide two H19 helicopters as requested by you. They are now ready for shipment. Presume helicopters are still needed. If so please advise within 24 hours as to how you want them transported - by air or sea - and their destination.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

TO : MR. R. DAYAL, GEN. MCKEOWN
FROM : MR. BUNCHE
DATE : 17 Feb 61
NO : 1128

Reference my 913. Meeting here with Austrian representative and ambassador Gohn fully confirmed your D-375. Gohn is satisfied on all important counts and assures that the present Austrian medical team numbering 60 can be relied upon to carry on. Reactivation of second team in vienna seems to be dead issue now. He expresses hope that if it should later become necessary to move Austrian team, authorities in new locale will be fully informed and way will be as well prepared as possible to avoid recurrence of their original experience.

cc. Mr. Dayal
cc. Gen McKee

INCOMING CLEAR

To : PRESS, ONUC LEO
From : OMNIPRESS, NEWYORK
Date : 17 February 1961
No : 1126

The following statement was read by a spokesman for Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold at United Nations Headquarters 17 February:

"In regard to the statement which Mr. Kanza is alleged to have made before students at Harvard University on 16 February to the effect that the Secretary-General of the United Nations knew about the death of Mr. Lumumba 'some weeks' before it was announced, the Secretary-General states most categorically that this allegation is completely unfounded.

All of the facts known to the Secretary-General with regard to these tragic events have been brought to the attention of the Security Council in the report of his Special Representative which reveals quite clearly that he, like the general public, learned about these events only after Katangese authorities made their announcement.

The Secretary-General wishes to express his great surprise that statements such as that attributed to Mr. Kanza should be made, without having the slightest foundation or shred of evidence."

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 17 February 1961

No : 1121

Following is text of note verbale sent by me to Belgian Permanent Representative yesterday:

"Le Secrétaire général présente ses compliments au Représentant permanent de la Belgique et, se référant à la note verbale S.292 du Représentant permanent en date du 13 février, a l'honneur de présenter les observations ci-après.

Comme le Secrétaire général a déjà eu l'honneur d'en informer le Représentant permanent, la Force des Nations Unies au Congo a pour instructions permanentes de protéger les ressortissants étrangers et d'user de ses bons offices pour faciliter l'évacuation de ceux qui souhaitent quitter le pays.

De toute évidence, les mesures précises à prendre à ces fins dépendront des circonstances propres à chaque cas et de ce que les commandants des troupes des Nations Unies jugeront sur place approprié. C'est ainsi qu'une protection a été offerte grâce à la création d'enceintes gardées militairement par les Nations Unies et à l'emploi de patrouilles des Nations Unies qui escortent des étrangers résidant à l'intérieur du pays jusqu'à des points où ils se trouvent en sûreté. D'autres mesures peuvent être prises le cas échéant dans la mesure des possibilités de la Force, y compris le redéploiement de certaines unités de la Force des Nations Unies."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Secretary General, New York
Date : 17 February 1961
No. : 1115

Reur 433, 435, 438, 440.

1. In appropriate way you should get across to Tshombe and Kalongi my very strong concern re. this matter and my firm demand for protective steps so that no harm to lives of people concerned occurs. Were the lives of the persons to be endangered or lost, I would denounce the acts to SECCO in most categoric terms.

2. Although it is now popular to regard such action of mine as those of Pontius Pilatus, you know as well as I that this is maximum we can manage. Here the battle goes on and there have never been any hands more covered with blood than mine according to those who, for reasons of their own, remember that this is Easter time. That is no argument for any specific kind of action of ours, as we should continue to stick to the guns which have been ours all through, but it certainly gives us an added, although superficial reason, to use the means we have to protect people against the lunacy of those who now seem to see themselves as the men of the future.

3. I fail to believe that information in your 440 para one can be right. You should track it down by all means, and if it is verified, how can I do anything but denounce the Kasavubu regime ?

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 17 February 1961

No : 1114

Message from Tshombe, your D-436, circulated as annex
to your report on Katanga.

Pse return to Raj's

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal and Gen. McKeown
From : Mr. Bunche, New York
Date : 17 February 1961
No. : 1113

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Reference ONUC 739 and 751 and our 819, 902/03 and 1009.

Because of pressure of time factor we must now make approach to countries concerned about rotation plan set forth in our messages indicated above although we had hoped for comments from your end beforehand. USNS BLATCHFORD departed New York 11 February with ETA Matadi 26 February. USNS ELTINGE will depart New York 20 February with ETA Matadi 7 March.

Dist.: Gen. McKeown

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 17 February 1961

No : 1112

Following received to-day from Joseph Kasa-Vubu:

"A Monsieur le Secrétaire général
United Nations New York
No 12/763/61 du 16 février 1961

A un moment où votre personne est violemment critiquée par délégations différents pays tenons à vous assurer à nouveau notre confiance et volonté gouvernement légal Congo à collaborer avec vous STOP Espérons que vos délégués sur place inspirerons plus nettement souci d'aider seul gouvernement légitime République et consacrer tous moyens dont ils disposent à épauler action de réorganisation économique administrative et militaire entreprise par ce gouvernement STOP Sommes conscients efforts faits par tous les peuples pour nous aider dans nos graves difficultés actuelles STOP Souhaitons que cette aide continue et aboutisse à résultats concrets en parfaite concordance de vues avec autorités du pays STOP Souhaitons que puissiez continuer longtemps encore action qu'avez si énergiquement commencée et que l'ensemble des pays membres a d'ailleurs ratifiée à plusieurs reprises STOP Haute considération FULLSTOP Le Président de la République Joseph Kasa-Vubu "

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal

From : Secretary General, New York

Date : 17 February 1961

No. : 1110

Tunisian delegation here has expressed its desire to keep, if possible, all Tunisian troops for the present in the Leopoldville area. They also wish, if it is compatible with ONUC operations, to keep troops as little dispersed as possible. We wish to emphasize that this is a wish rather than a categoric demand.

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INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLOVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 17 February 1961

No : 1094

Following three excerpts from Belgian intervention this afternoon in Secco will interest you:

"Le Gouvernement belge estime que la sécurité et la paix internationales seraient gravement compromises si la situation actuelle dans la République du Congo devait se prolonger. Dans deux provinces, des bandes rebelles se sont placées en état de révolte ouverte contre le Président de la République, seul chef légal de l'Armée. Non seulement elles mettent ainsi en péril l'unité et l'intégrité du territoire, mais elles font régner un état permanent d'insécurité pour les populations congolaises et pour les étrangers établis au Congo. Les pillages, les sévices, les arrestations arbitraires, les brutalités et les atrocités se succèdent, allant jusqu'au meurtre, sans que les forces de l'Organisation soient en mesure d'y mettre fin ou même simplement de s'y opposer avec efficacité. Les interventions tardives ou l'absence d'intervention des troupes de l'ONUC sont vraisemblablement dues dans certains cas au défaut d'ordres des services de l'ONUC à Léopoldville, voire à des ordres donnés en sens contraire. Je suis chargé d'insister encore une fois et en particulier sur le sort fait à un peloton de huit soldats belges, dont un sergent et un caporal, qui a franchi par erreur la frontière du Congo sur un camion qui, dans la nuit, s'est, sur le territoire ruandais, détaché de la colonne automobile et s'est égaré. Il a été capturé sans offrir de résistance. Les circonstances de l'événement sont claires et incontestées. Leur qualification politique ne l'est pas moins. Ces hommes, s'ils étaient des prisonniers de guerre,

devraient être protégés par les conventions de Genève. Mais ils ne sont pas prisonniers de guerre, puisqu'il n'y a pas belligérance. Ce sont des hommes égarés qui doivent être rendus sans délai. Voilà pourquoi le Gouvernement belge multiplie les démarches pour leur libération. C'est littéralement tous les jours qu'il intervient. Il lui paraît incroyable de constater que du côté de l'ONU aucun résultat n'a pu être obtenu. Non seulement ces hommes n'ont pas été libérés, mais on ne sait même pas avec certitude s'ils sont convenablement traités. C'est par d'autres sources, particulièrement grâce au Consul général d'une puissance amie, que la Belgique a pu obtenir les premières nouvelles. Je demande s'il est tolérable que, dans une ville où se trouve une garnison de l'ONU, huit hommes indubitablement innocents restent en prison contrairement à toutes les règles du droit internationale, sans même recevoir aucun réconfort moral ou matériel de notre Organisation. Mais que devient le prestige de celle-ci si elle ne parvient pas à faire respecter ces règles les plus élémentaires du droit là où elle se trouve en force? Le Gouvernement belge demande formellement au Secrétaire général qu'il soit mis fin à ces abus et que les troupes mises à sa disposition interviennent sans retard pour faire respecter l'idéal de notre Organisation, le droit international et la morale. Si l'ONUC restait passive devant de pareils agissements, notre Organisation, qui a précisément pour devoir de veiller au respect des libertés fondamentales, avouerait son impuissance à la face du monde. Le Gouvernement belge estime que pour l'honneur de notre Organisation, il convient qu'elle s'oppose à ces mesures odieuses et que les étrangers qui désirent quitter le territoire, par exemple, ou se trouvent dans l'obligation de le faire, puissent le faire sans entraves. L'impuissance de l'ONUC devant cette situation risque d'entraîner les conséquences les plus graves, non seulement pour le Congo, mais pour les Nations Unies et pour la paix. Si en raison de ces sévices, et constatant l'absence de protection, ces

étrangers étaient contraints d'évacuer ces territoires, le chaos économique s'ajouterait à l'instabilité politique et l'action de l'ONU en serait rendue définitivement impossible. Déjà, le processus est en cours : c'est la fermeture des entreprises et les pertes de salaire, la misère et la famine qui menacent des populations entières. Je ferai grâce au Conseil de la liste des sociétés importantes, des entreprises économiques de toute espèce - entreprises industrielles, minières, agricoles ou de transports - qui ont été obligées de fermer leurs portes ces derniers temps. Qu'on ne vienne pas accuser ces étrangers de manoeuvres politiques et tenter de justifier l'inaction par le souci de non-ingérence dans les affaires intérieures. J'ai déjà démontré pourquoi. La crainte d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures ne peut être une justification à l'inaction de l'ONU. Cette Organisation a le devoir essentiel, comme ses contingents, d'assurer les conditions élémentaires d'une vie civilisée au Congo et de faire respecter les droits vitaux des étrangers. La Belgique, pour sa part, a le droit strict et le devoir d'exiger que les nationaux - comme tous les étrangers, d'ailleurs - jouissent au Congo de la protection active des forces de l'Organisation."

INCOMING CODE

To: Dayal
From: Cordier
No.: 1086
Date: 16 Febr. 1961.

MK 9B 1/2
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Reference our 686

Swedish Mission informs today, 15 February, that 9 swedish Missionaries now in Lemera can only be evacuated with the assistance of the UN. The UN is therefore requested to assist in facilitating the evacuation as soon as possible.

Kiva

last item of
Further to my BU 127 and para 2 of BU 119

See Para 1 of BU 161

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 15 February 1961

No : 1069

Following is text of note verbale sent by me to the Belgian Permanent Representative to-day:

"Le Secrétaire général des Nations Unies présente ses compliments etc. et a l'honneur de présenter les observations suivantes au sujet de la note verbale S.288 du Représentant permanent, datée du 12 février 1961.

Le Secrétaire général n'a cessé d'examiner la question des huit soldats belges détenus, et a obtenu de Stanleyville des renseignements selon lesquels, à une date récente, ceux-ci étaient raisonnablement bien traités et étaient maintenus dans des conditions convenables.

Bien que l'Organisation des Nations Unies ait dans ce cas, comme dans d'autres cas de détention, cherché à obtenir la libération des intéressés, les efforts déployés par ses représentants en faveur des huit soldats se sont heurtés à la position adoptée par les autorités congolaises, à savoir que ces hommes auraient pénétré illégalement sur le territoire de la République du Congo; ces autorités n'ont pas semblé jusqu'ici disposées à accepter l'opinion que le passage de la frontière ait été purement accidentel.

Les représentants de l'ONU sur place continueront à insister pour qu'une enquête immédiate sur les circonstances de l'affaire soit faite par les autorités congolaises et que ces hommes soient rapidement relâchés. L'ONU insistera aussi pour que les détenus soient traités conformément à la loi et aux principes humanitaires et exercera ses

bons offices en vue de prévoir leur évacuation lorsque cela sera possible.

Compte tenu de ses attributions dans le cadre du mandat des Nations Unies, le Secrétaire général ne peut envisager de prendre des mesures qui comportent l'usage de la force, comme le suggère le Gouvernement belge, pour assurer par contrainte la protection effective, la libération et l'évacuation du territoire congolais des huit soldats en question."

I N C O M I N G C O D E C A B L E

To : Ambassador R. Dayal and General Kettani
From : Secretary-General
No. : 1067
Date : 15 February 1961.

Re 401. J'ai envoye reponse a la ~~letter~~ lettre de Kettani du 9 Fevrier par le dernier courrier, entre autres acceptant le temps de depart qu'il trouve indique. En vue de la communication recu de ~~Kettani~~ Kettani de Rabat, je donne mon accord au desir de Kettani de mettre fin a son contrat pour departu avec les troupes Marocaines vendredi 17 Fevrier. Poertant, je dois ajouter que, en vue du developpement politique, je ne peux pas exclure un changement de plan du gouvernement du maroc qui pourrait mener a une autre decision du gouvernement en ce qui concerne le depart de Kettani. Cette reserve n'influence pas l'accord donne et ainsi il peut faire ses plans sur la base des indications deja donnees du gouvernement. J'espere que Kettani va recevoir ma lettre avant son depart comme j'y exprime mes vues et mes remerciements sincerés dont je voudrais qu'il prenne connaissance avant son depart. Si la lettre arrivait trop tard, je lui envoie l'expression de mes sentiments les plus amicaux et pleins de gratitude.

Distribution : Ambassador Dayal
General Kettani

I N C O M I N G C O D E C A B L E

To : Ambassador R. Dayal
From : Secretary-General
No. : 1066
Date : 15 February 1961.

Your D-393. I am in absolute agreement with the operational directive and we have at present no amendments to suggest.

Re para 3 I do not regard a letter to Kasa-Vubu at this moment as timely. It appears to me that in view of overall situation here letter may be dispatched at a somewhat later date.

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LINNER, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 15 February 1961

No : 1065

Following communication has been transmitted to-day by Yugoslav Mission. We should like to have your early comments on it. It might be well for this proposal to be given most sympathetic response; thus you should try to find workable formula avoiding dangerous precedent:

"The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to inform the Secretary-General of the following: The Prime Minister of Kivu Province, Mr. Kashamura, has addressed to the President of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia an urgent request for the following personnel:

- i. Four engineers for a thermic power station; two (2) telecommunications engineers; three (3) economists; several doctors and agricultural experts - engineers of agronomy;
- ii. one or two (1, 2) experts to help with the export of tea, coffee, quinine, etc., waiting there ready for export.

The Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia considers that this is a request of a social and humanitarian nature, and is ready to grant Mr. Kashamura's request. Accordingly, the Yugoslav Government has the intention to send the aid asked by Mr. Kashamura by plane, via Stanleyville and/or Bukavu.

Bringing the above to the attention of the Secretary-General, the Government of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia has the honour to ask for the necessary co-operation on his part, so that the dispatch of the mentioned aid might proceed in an orderly manner and, at the same time, in accordance with the Yugoslav Government's considered opinion that the assistance to the Republic of the Congo should be given in agreement with the United Nations."

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 15 February 1961

No : 1064

Will you kindly arrange for urgent transmission of following cable to Mrs. Lumumba from Dr. Kwame Nkrumah:

"For Mrs. Lumumba

The cruel murder of your beloved husband and our dear brother and comrade in the struggle for liberation of the African continent, has come not only as a personal shock to me but also as a tragedy which the Government and people of Ghana and the rest of the African continent cannot easily forget. The Government and people of Ghana join me in sending you our deepest condolence for a loss which does not only rob you and your children of a husband and father but deprives the whole of Africa of the counsel of one of its noblest sons of our age. I loved Patrice both as a person and as a politician with both a vision and a message for Africa and you and I as well as all patriotic sons of Africa shall miss him dearly. In this terrible hour I urge you to be consoled by the fact that your dear husband died in a just and noble cause. His memory shall not be dulled by passage of years nor shall time extinguish the flame he has kindled in the hearts of many. Africa shall always remember him as one of its greatest sons who laid down his life that Africa might be free. May God bless his soul.

Dr. Kwame Nkrumah"

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDOVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 15 January 1961

No : 1063

USSR has introduced following resolution in Secco:

"USSR draft resolution

"The Security Council,

Regarding the murder of the Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba, and of the outstanding statesmen of the Republic, Okito and Mpolo, as an international crime incompatible with the United Nations Charter and as a flagrant violation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples adopted at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly,

Decisively condemns the actions of Belgium which led to this crime;

Deems essential that the sanctions provided under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter should be applied to Belgium as to an aggressor which, by its actions, has created a threat to international peace and requires of the States Members of the United Nations the immediate implementation of these sanctions;

Deems it obligatory for the command of the troops that are in the Congo pursuant to the decision of the Security Council, immediately to arrest Tshombe and Mobutu, for purposes of court trial; to disarm all the military units and gendarmerie under their command; and to ensure the immediate disarmament and removal outside Congolese territory of all Belgian troops and all Belgian personnel;

Directs that the "United Nations Operations" in the Congo shall be discontinued within one month, and all foreign troops withdrawn from there so as to enable the Congolese people to decide its own internal affairs;

Deems it essential to dismiss D. Hammarskjold from the post of Secretary-General of the United Nations as a participant in and organizer of the violences committed against the leading statesmen of the Republic of the Congo."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

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TO : MR. DAYAL
FROM : SECRETARYGENERAL
DATE : 15 Feb 61
NO : 1061

Reference D-402. Making immediate approaches toward meeting aircraft needs as set forth in your para 7. However, must recall to your attention our message on previous lack of success attending strenuous efforts to acquire C/130s. Would be helpful also if aircraft needs in para 7 could be equated to additional personnel needs. //

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 14 February 1961

No : 1046

Following is text of USSR Government statement in connection with Lumumba's murder dated 14 February 1961:

"The telegraph has brought tragic news: the outstanding leader of the national liberation movement in Africa, national hero of the Congo, Head of Government of the independent Republic of the Congo Patrice Lumumba and his companions in arms, President of the Senate Joseph Okito and Minister of Defense Maurice Mpolo have perished at the hands of hirelings of the colonialists and the hatchetmen of the puppet Tshombe.

Together with the Congolese people and all the freedomloving peoples of the world the Soviet people bow their heads before the memory of the courageous sons of the Congolese people who firmly and consistently defended the freedom and independence of their motherland.

In connection with the bloody assassination of statesmen of independent Congo, the Soviet Government considers it its duty to state the following:

The murder of Prime Minister Lumumba, President of the Senate Okito and Minister Mpolo is an international crime the entire responsibility for which is borne by the colonialists, and above all Belgian colonialists. The whole world knows that the Congolese province of Katanga, where Patrice Lumumba, Joseph Okito and Maurice Mpolo were taken to be done away with, has in effect been reoccupied by Belgium and is governed from Brussels with Belgian money, with the help of Belgian arms and hundreds of Belgian officers and non-coms which form the backbone of Tshombe's armed gangs.

In their hatred of the cause of Congo's national liberation, the colonialists went as far as to organize the brutal murder of the legitimate leaders of the Congolese state. In full view of the world they are trampling underfoot all standards of international law and morals, mock the resolutions and the Charter of the United Nations, throw a challenge to all freedomloving peoples of the world.

Of course, Belgian colonialists would have never dared to do all this had not they felt the support of their allies, of a whole coalition of colonial powers which from the very outset prodded the Belgians onto the path of adventures in the Congo and which likewise will not escape grave responsibility for the committed crime.

Who does not realize that the governments of the Big Western Powers have blocked all proposals, all steps aimed at curbing the aggression against the Congo and protecting the rights of the legitimate Government and Parliament of the Congo? Who does not know that a word from the governments of these countries to their placeman Hammarskjold would have been enough for the events in the Congo to develop differently and the life of the national hero of the Congolese people to be saved? The crime was prepared methodically, step by step, and it was sanctioned in fact in no other place but the capitals of the states which bear the responsibility for the criminal aggression unleashed against the Republic of the Congo.

This grave crime of the colonialists cannot be left unpunished. The hirelings who spilled the blood of Patrice Lumumba and his associates must be severely punished. The peoples will call the Belgian Government to account for its part in this foul crime. The murderers and the organizers of the crime will be branded by the contempt and wrath of all the peoples of the world. And on the soil of Africa, the murderers, by their actions, have merely sown new seeds of inextinguishable hatred which will burn in the hearts of more than one generation of Africans.

The tragic death of Patrice Lumumba and his associates lays bare with fresh force the disgraceful role played in Congolese affairs by the United Nations Secretary General Hammarskjold and the subordinated to his command of the troops sent to the Congo in the name of the United Nations. From the very first day of the realization of the so-called "United Nations Operation in the Congo", Hammarskjold acted in the interests of Congo's enemies - Belgian and other colonialists. Hammarskjold's entire policy towards the legitimate government of Patrice Lumumba - and it was at the request of that government that the United Nations troops were sent to the Congo - from beginning to end was a policy of foul betrayal of the interests of the Congolese people, of the principles of the United Nations, of elementary standards of decency and honour. Under the false mask of impartiality, the United Nations Secretary-General helped the colonialists to dismember and disorganize the Congolese state, to put weapons into the hands of foreign mercenaries and executioners.

It was clear from the discussion of this question in the United Nations that the colonialists had entered into a foul collusion with Hammarskjold, and, as a result, the latter was deliberately temporizing with measures in defence of the legitimate government and parliament of the Congo. When the Prime Minister and other members of the government and parliament of the Congo were seized by mercenaries of the Belgian colonialists, thrown into a dungeon and subjected to inhuman torture, when it was clear to all the world that their life was in danger, Hammarskjold would not move a finger to save the lawfully elected leaders of the Congolese people. It was clear to all that in the prepared assassination of the Prime Minister of the Congo Hammarskjold had been assigned the role of the executor of the will of the colonialists holding the United Nations flag.

The murder of Patrice Lumumba and his associates in a Katanga prison was the culmination of Hammarskjold's criminal actions. It is clear to all upright people on earth that the blood of Patrice Lumumba is on the hands of this servant of the colonialists, and nothing can wash it away. The states which hold dear the authority of the United Nations and its future cannot put up with a situation where this Organization is represented in the international arena by a miserable lackey of the colonialists. His actions put the stigma on the entire United Nations Organisation. This man not only cannot be trusted in the least but, what is more, deserves only the scorn of all honest people. Hammarskjold is not fit for the high post of United Nations Secretary-General, and his continued tenure of this position is intolerable.

The Congolese people are continuing their struggle for freedom, for the restoration of the independence of the Congo Republic. The blood of Patrice Lumumba will become the banner of this struggle, and it can be said with confidence, will awaken to life fresh forces of the national liberation movement in the Congo and in all Africa.

The Prime Minister of the Congo has perished but the legitimate government of the Congo Republic headed by his deputy Antoine Gizenga continues to discharge its functions. Having its seat in the temporary capital of the Republic Stanleyville, it exercises now control almost over a half of the territory of the Congo and enjoys nationwide support. Belgian interventionists and their henchmen started a military campaign against the stronghold of Congo's independence - Stanleyville. They are preparing fresh bloody crimes against the Congolese people.

The colonialists are bent on drowning in blood the national freedom of the Congo. To prevent this from happening is a matter of honour for the peoples of Africa and all the world. It is essential to render allout assistance and support to the national government of the Congo in Stanleyville.

Expressing the will of the Soviet people who are deeply incensed by the heinous assassination of the national hero of the Congo Patrice Lumumba and his companions, the Soviet Government demands:

- I. The United Nations must resolutely condemn the actions of Belgium which resulted in the murder of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, of the Chairman of the Senate and the Defense Minister of the Congo Republic as an international crime incompatible with the United Nations Charter and constituting a crying violation of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples adopted at the XV session of the United Nations General Assembly. In conformity with its Charter it must apply appropriate sanctions to the aggressor.
- II. The colonialists placemen Tshombe and Mobutu must be arrested forthwith by troops which are posted in the Congo in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council and put on trial. All military units and gendarmerie of Tshombe and Mobutu must be disarmed at once. Likewise all Belgian troops in the Congo and the entire Belgian personnel must be immediately disarmed and removed from the Congo.
- III. Within a month's time the so-called United Nations Operation in the Congo must be called off and all foreign troops must be withdrawn from the Congo so as to enable the Congolese people themselves to settle their internal affairs.
- IV. Dag Hammarskjold must be dismissed from the office of Secretary-General as an accomplice and organizer of the murder of leading statesmen of the Congo Republic, who has stained the name of the United Nations. For its part, the Soviet Government will not maintain any relations with Hammarskjold and will not recognize him as an official of the United Nations.

V. As it is known, the legitimate Government of the Congo led by acting Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga has appealed to all countries requesting assistance to save the Congo Republic. The Soviet Government considers that the rendering of such assistance is the sacred duty of all freedomloving states. For its part, together with other states friendly to the Congo Republic, it is ready to render all possible assistance and support to the Congolese people and its legitimate government."

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 14 February 1961

No : 1038

Following is text of note verbale sent by me to-day to
Belgian Permanent Representative:

"Le Secrétaire général etc.

Les Nations Unies continuent de prendre toutes les mesures en leur pouvoir pour aider à maintenir l'ordre public, pour prévenir les arrestations arbitraires et les mauvais traitements à l'encontre des personnes et pour obtenir la mise en liberté des personnes injustement détenues. L'ONU a également offert protection, dans des enceintes spéciales, aux ressortissants étrangers qui l'ont demandée et a usé de ses bons offices pour assurer leur évacuation. Ces mesures, s'inscrivant dans le cadre du mandat donné par le Conseil de Sécurité, ont été prises en coopération avec les autorités congolaises et non en vue de les supplanter; elles ont été appliquées, en outre, à toutes les personnes sans distinction de nationalité. Il ne pouvait de toute évidence y avoir de traitement spécial au profit des Belges, si ce n'est dans la mesure où leur évacuation, comme celle d'autres étrangers, a été facilitée chaque fois qu'elle a été demandée.

En ce qui concerne l'opinion du Gouvernement belge selon laquelle il y aurait lieu de renforcer les contingents de l'ONU dans la province Orientale et dans la province de Kivu et de prendre d'autres arrangements spéciaux en vue de l'évacuation des ressortissants belges, le Secrétaire général est tenu de faire observer qu'il faudrait pour le faire des forces dépassant de loin celles dont dispose actuellement l'ONUC, de sorte qu'il serait matériellement extrêmement difficile de donner

pleinement satisfaction aux demandes du Gouvernement belge. Mais d'autre part, on envisage actuellement d'urgence un redéploiement possible des troupes en fonction des exigences qui se manifestent, et les besoins de la province Orientale et de la province de Kivu seront pleinement pris en considération.

Des observations analogues s'appliquent à la demande d'envoi d'avions de l'ONU à Shabunda, Kalima, Kasongo, Punia, Kindu etc. Parmi les avions de transport, hélicoptères et avions légers dont dispose l'ONUC, un DC-3, deux hélicoptères et un autre appareil ont récemment été endommagés par des coups de feu tirés du sol et les avions disponibles suffisent à peine aux besoins de l'opération des Nations Unies.

Toutefois, les représentants des Nations Unies au Congo ont fait savoir au Secrétaire général que les opérations d'évacuation dans la province Orientale et la province de Kivu se sont jusqu'ici déroulées d'une manière relativement encourageante eu égard aux événements politiques, et que toutes les mesures possibles sont prises, en coopération avec les autorités congolaises, pour que ces opérations se poursuivent sans entraves."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

M. Bahini el
N 142

TO : MR. LINNER MACFARQUHAR
FROM : MR. CORDIER
DATE : 14 Feb 61
NO : 1037

Re surplus foods, we are informed through mission that US embassy Leopoldville learns from local commercial sources that stocks of wheat flour in Congo are running low and might be depleted by 10 March. If this is true 1500 tons of wheat flour could be shipped per USNS Eltinge which is due to leave New York on 20 Feb ETA Matadi 7 march. Please confirm.

We are meeting with US officials on 14 Feb regarding surplus food programme. US officials say that in transfer offer there will be provision stating that 75% of proceeds of sales of first shipment of wheat should be earmarked for wages. We assume that this is a fair estimate of ratio of wages in relation to total costs of public works projects selected in past. Please confirm.

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initially under

US officials also imply conditions to be established for further shipments. As matter of policy it might be better for us to indicate manner in which we propose counterpart funds will be used, especially the precise ways in which they would help the population and general economy. Your views this matter would be appreciated. After meeting referred to will convey to you thinking of US officials with respect to conditions before committing ourselves.

cc Mr. Bayal ✓
Mr. Linner
Mr. Macfarquhar

Pls return to the

INCOMING CODE CABLE

*may k
p1 examine
14/2*

TO : MR. DAYAL & GEN. MCKEOWN
FROM : SECRETARYGENERAL
DATE : 14 Feb 61
NO : 1036

*Done. Ambassador informed.
No action for the time being.
15/2*

Reference ONUC 744. Understand reasons for position taken in para 2 this message, but assume you will readily appreciate reasons both stronger and sounder against following course you suggest.

cc. Mr. Dayal & Gen Mckeown

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 14 February 1961

No : 1033

Following is text of note verbale dated 9 February received from Belgian Permanent Representative:

"Le Représentant permanent de la Belgique présente ses compliments à Monsieur le Secrétaire général et, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, a l'honneur de lui signaler la situation suivante:

Le Fonds Social du Kivu, dont le siège administratif est à Bruxelles, vient de recevoir des nouvelles alarmantes au sujet de son complexe hospitalier, en l'occurrence l'hôpital R Elisabeth de Walungu (Kivu) qui est placé sous la direction d'un ordre religieux, les Dames Chanoinesses du Saint-Sépulcre. Le médecin directeur de cet hôpital, le Docteur G. Mertens, a été sérieusement malmené par des Congolais et les deux autres médecins du Centre font l'objet de menaces constantes.

En bref, cette institution de bienfaisance voit son travail humanitaire sérieusement entravé.

Le Représentant permanent de la Belgique serait reconnaissant à Monsieur le Secrétaire général de vouloir bien signaler cette situation à ses représentants à Kivu afin que soient prises les mesures qui s'imposent en vue de la protection du personnel tant européen que congolais de ce complexe hospitalier."

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLVILLE

From : SECGEN, NEWYORK

Date : 13 February 1961

No : 1016

Could we get soonest from Berendsen official French text of investigation commission report on Lumumba's escape which you sent in D-381 on basis of monitored Katanga radio broadcast.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal, Gen. McKeown
From : Mr. Bunche, New York
Date : 13 February 1961
No. : 1017

Reference D-357. Thanks for helpful answers to our queries. However, we have serious doubts about the advisability from political angle of having Lt. Commander Burns and his staff wearing U.N. insignia with their U.S. uniforms. No are we happy about reference to a "permanent" staff for Burns, as we assumed in my 936 his assignment would be temporary, that is, for duration of sealift operation only.

Note: underlined word subject to correction if necessary.

Dist. Gen. McKeown

2. return to 14/2

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INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK

Date : 13 February 1961

No : 1015

Following is text of my statement at Secco meeting this morning:

"After the circulation of the report regarding Mr. Lumumba, document S/4688, the Secretariat has this morning received information from Elisabethville of a most serious and tragic nature, the substance of which is already well known to the members. In view of this new information, I would propose that the aforementioned report, document S/4688, be added to the agenda.

Limiting myself to one immediate observation regarding the steps now called for from the United Nations, I would express the view that the matter is of such a character and significance as to render necessary a full and impartial investigation. The representatives of the United Nations, in the first place, General Iyassu, have still not been received by Mr. Tshombe. I have instructed the General to stay until either he is received and can proceed with his task, with the necessary assistance from the authorities, or until he receives new instructions in the light of the position of this Council. I feel that an international investigation in an appropriate form is indicated.

The importance of recent tragic events is such that I shall for a moment leave aside the so-called offensive of the Katanga Gendarmerie against civilian population of the Baluba tribes, covered in another report this morning. However, I wish to reserve my right to revert later in an appropriate context to this question, which merits the most urgent attention of the Council, as well as to the question of measures that may have to be taken by the United Nations in order to counter to the limits of its possibilities the various serious developments which may be released by yesterday's events."

INCOMING CLEAR

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDOVILLE
From : SECGEN, NEWYORK
Date : 13 February 1961
No : 1014

Report on Lumumba was issued this morning as Secco document under symbol S/4688. It is essentially identical with the text submitted by you. The following alterations however have been made:

(A) In paragraph 8 we have replaced your "the texts of these three communications are appended as annexes I, II, III etc." by "the texts of those three communications have been transmitted to the Security Council in S/4637 A, B and C."

(B) At the end of the para your text "Tshombe's message is appended as Annex IV" we have substituted "Tshombe's message has been transmitted to the Security Council in document S/4637 Add.1."

(C) Your para 16 has been rephrased as follows: "Immediately on learning of the Katanga radio announcement on 10 February 1961 the Secretary-General instructed the ONUC representative in Elisabethville to use all his resources in order to track down the stories concerning the event of his reported escape for the purpose of reporting to the Security Council. The ONUC representative was requested to take all possible steps for the protection of Mr. Lumumba in case his escape from detention should prove correct and also to advise the Secretary-General what efforts had been made by UN personnel to see Mr. Lumumba. Before receipt of these instructions the ONUC representative in Elisabethville presented to Mr. Tshombe a note verbale in which he emphasized the importance of according humane treatment to the fugitives if they should be recaptured. Upon instructions etc." Consequently we have appended to the document as Annex I the statement of 10 February by Mr. Munongo and as Annex II the note verbale of 12 February from the ONUC representative in Elisabethville addressed to Mr. Tshombe.

S/4691 To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE
From : SEC GEN, NEWYORK
Date : 13 February 1961
No : 1013

(Provisional text)
S/4691

REPORT ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTHERN KATANGA
FROM THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL
ON 13 FEBRUARY 1961

I wish to report a serious civil war situation which has already developed in the Katanga Province with evidence of similar impending developments in other parts of the country as well.

(2) The authorities in Katanga have for some months past been engaged in building up their forces; they have been purchasing planes capable of small aerial raids, obtaining arms and ammunition as well as military trucks and vehicles. As a result of internal and external recruiting campaigns, the Katanga authorities have now at their disposal a force estimated at some 5,000 men, which is well equipped and strengthened by non-Congolese officers and sub-officers now estimated to be some 400 strong.

(3) In recent weeks, and in particular on 11 February 1961, Mr. Tshombe has made statements in which he has referred to the United Nations as the greatest enemy. These threats have been accompanied by demands for the withdrawal of United Nations Moroccan troops stationed in Katanga Province.

(4) Although the United Nations established in the middle of October, in agreement with the Katanga authorities, a neutral zone in Northern Katanga with a view to its pacification, this agreement has been unilaterally abrogated by them on the grounds that ANC units owing allegiance to non-Katanga authorities had penetrated into Northern Katanga, north of the neutralized zone, although this was through areas held by the Katanga gendarmerie. The United Nations has not accepted this abrogation. It should be noted also that since October the United Nations has continued its effort to pacify Northern Katanga with the assistance of local leaders and has persistently tried to bring about political pacts between the Baluba leaders and the Katanga authorities. In spite of these continued negotiations, the Katanga authorities have now embarked on an offensive military action against the population of Northern Katanga. On the morning of 11 February, a force of 300 to 400 Katangese gendarmerie with automatic

weapons, in 60 trucks under command of Colonel Crèvecoeur, attacked the village of Mukulekulu, between Lubudi and Luena. The number of casualties is still unknown. The village has been completely burnt and the inhabitants have fled. After the operation, the gendarmerie continued towards Luena, burning all villages en route. Another column of some 300 gendarmerie are proceeding from Kabondo Dianda to the same area. There are reported to be at least 2,000 gendarmerie in the area of Lupudibukama and they have declared an area of ten kilometers on each side of the railway to be a military zone under gendarmerie occupation. The majority of the Baluba in the area have been forced to flee into the bush.

(5) The Katangese authorities issued a statement on the military operations on 11 February, which is annexed hereto.

"Facing the incapacity more and more flagrant of the UN forces to establish order and to stop the continuous incursions of Baluba rebels in the region of Mukula-Kulu and Luena, the Katanga Government decided to take over again the initiative and its freedom of action. The latest attempts made by UNO to obtain an agreement with the Baluba leaders to re-establish the railroad traffic having failed, the Government has given the order to the Katanga forces to start moving. The armed forces of Katanga consequently have started a vast operation of disconnecting main routes and railroad from Lubudi to Luena. In this last locality, as we know, our troops are encircled and subjected to fire by arms having become most accurate since several months. A task group of Katanga forces composed of elements of 4 battalions comprising troops of mobile infantry, mobile groups with armoured jeeps, a detachment of combat specialists of communications troops, logistic units and transport and a rear base have been positioned in Lubudi. A great concentrated action has started on February 10th in the evening by the occupation of the bridge situated on the north Kalulu. The Katanga forces have then attacked the rebel concentration in the morning of 11th February 1961, liberating the route of Mukula-Kulu and dispersing the enemy elements which took flight in disorder leaving several wounded behind. Numerous arms and ammunition have been recovered, notably grenades. Finding only but a weak resistance the Katanga troops took over Mukula-Kulu by the end of morning. Now, the occupation and the cleaning up of the surroundings of Mukula-Kulu is continuing with success. The operation has been led with a maximum of efficiency and speed. This conveys the exemplary discipline shown by all the Katanga troops during the action. The morale of all the participants is excellent and has contributed greatly to the success. The Katanga forces have received extremely efficient aerial assistance by helicopters and light observation planes. In spite of unfavourable wheather their efficiency has been remarkably revealed

for the aerial observation as for the evacuation of the wounded. The rear base assured in a perfect way the supply of troops of food and ammunitions. No doubt that final success will crown the efforts of the valiant soldiers of the Katanga forces."

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal

MOST IMMEDIATE

From : Secretary General, New York

Date : 13 February 1961

No. : 1012

(Second part of 1011)

English text as follows:

"From the reports received I learn that Mr. Tshombe, although he is informed about the character of your mission and my request for his cooperation in an investigation by the U.N. of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Lumumba's alleged escape, has refused to receive you. As very rightly pointed out in the note presented by Berendsen to Tshombe on 11 January, such a refusal cannot but lead international opinion to the most unfavorable conclusions. Naturally, in the circumstances, it cannot be considered that the fate of Lumumba, and those kept with him in detention in Katanga, is a domestic affair in the sense of the U.N. Charter. It must be well known to the authorities in Katanga and in the Congo in general that the repercussions of the treatment of Lumumba are of the gravest international significance.

With this background, I consider it my duty as Secretary General to request you to insist on a discussion with Tshombe and on the providing of the facilities for which we have asked through Berendsen. What has happened so far, including the note from Berendsen and the refusal by Tshombe to receive you, has been brought to the attention of the SECCO. The same would of course be the case with the reaction to this renewed demarche from me through you. I wish you to remain in E'ville, even in case of a continued refusal, until the SECCO has had time to consider the situation and you have been informed about the result. I also wish you to provide Tshombe with a copy of this letter.

I wish to inform you that the so-called offensive of the Katanga

/gendarmerie against the.....

No. 1012 - 13 February 1961

gendarmerie against the Baluba tribes has also been brought to the attention of the SECCO together with the note from the special representative to Tshombe regarding this matter. Needless to say, I fully endorse the reaction of the special representative. No interpretation of the mandate of the U.N. force can permit it to be a passive witness of military measures against a civilian population which, in the circumstances, has characteristics of genocide. It is obviously the party taking the initiative in such measures which will have to bear the full consequences both for ensuing risks for lives and as regards the political reaction which would be unavoidable were the U.N. force to be attacked while engaged in the fulfillment of its clear mandate from the SECCO. I am sure that, if and when you meet Tshombe, you will not fail to impress on him the extreme seriousness of this situation and its significance to the efforts to restore satisfactory conditions in and around Katanga as well as in the Congo in general.

Yours sincerely,

D. H. "

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal
From : Secretary General, New York
Date : 13 February 1961
No. : 1011

MOST IMMEDIATE

If you are agreed, please transmit following urgently to Yassou in E'ville:

"Cher General Yassou,

J'apprends par les rapports que je recois que M. Tshombe, bien qu'il ait ete informe du caractere de votre mission et de ma demande pour sa cooperation dans une enquete menee par les Nations Unies sur les circonstances qui ont entoure la pretendue evasion de M. Lumumba, a refuse de vous recevoir. Ainsi qu'il etait mentionne tres judicieusement dans la note presentee par Berendsen a Tshombe le 11 Janvier, un tel refus ne peut que conduire l'opinion internationale aux conclusions les plus defavorables. Il est bien evident que dans les circonstances presentes le sort de Lumumba et de ceux qui partageaient sa detention au Katanga ne saurait etre considere comme une affaire interieure dans le sens de la charte des Nations Unies. Il convient que les autorites du Katanga et du Congo en General sachent bien que les repercussions des traitements subis par Lumumba prennent une signification internationale extremement grave.

Gardant ceci en memoire, je considere comme de mon devoir en tant que Secretaire General de vous demander d'insister en vue d'obtenir une entrevue avec Tshombe ainsi que les facilites que nous avons deja sollicitees par l'intermediaire de Berendsen. L'evolution de la situation, y compris la note de Berendsen et le refus de Tshombe de vous recevoir, a ete portee a la connaissance du Conseil de Securite. Il en sera de meme bien entendu du resultat de cette nouvelle demarche que je tente par votre intermediaire. Je souhaite que vous restiez a E'ville, meme au cas ou le refus serait maintenu, jusqu'a ce que le Conseil de

/Securite aie eu le temps....

*ONUC chose
falling from Saigon
for Yassou*

No. 1011 - 13 February 1961

Securite aie eu le temps d'examiner la situation et que vous ayez pu etre informe du resultat. Je desire egalement que vous remettiez a Tshombe une copie de cette lettre.

Je tiens a porter a votre connaissance que la soi-disant offensive de la gendarmerie Katangaise contre les tribus Baluba a ete aussi rapportee au Conseil de Securite qui a en connaissance egalement de la note du representant special a Tshombe a ce sujet. Bien entendu j'approuve entierement la maniere dont le representant special a reagi. Aucune interpretation du mandat de la force des Nations Unies ne peut permettre de demeurer un temoin passif devant des mesures militaires entreprises contre une population civile dans des circonstances qui presentent les caracteristiques du genocide.

Il est evident que ceux qui prennent l'initiative de telles mesures devront supporter toutes les consequences a la fois d'avoir mis des vies en danger et sur le plan politique d'encourir une reprobation qui serait inevitable si jamais les forces des Nations Unies se trouvaient attaquées alors qu'engagees dans l'accomplissement de leur mandat tel qu'il a ete clairement etabli par le Conseil de Securite.

Je suis convaincu que lorsque, comme je l'espere, vous rencontrerez Tshombe vous ne manquerez pas de lui faire ressortir le caractere extremement serieux de cette situation et la portee qu'elle peut avoir sur les efforts entrepris en vue de restaurer des conditions satisfaisantes tant au Katanga / meme, qu'autour de cette province et qu'au Congo en general."

Note: This message will be in two parts.

INCOMING CODE CABLE

To : Mr. R. Dayal

MOST IMMEDIATE

From : Secretary General, New York

Date : 13 February 1961

No. : 1010

Reur D-364.

1. Part of reaction is reflected in draft letter to Yassou.

2. I am going to stage the long-planned approach to Tshombe in short initial statement in SECCO tomorrow, combining Tshombe's attitude on our investigation with the Katanga "offensive", the arms import, the Mercenaries, the uncooperative attitude on reconciliation and other similar indications of the Katanga line, with its obvious outside support. It is unavoidable that comments from my side on present situation in this way get concentrated around Tshombe's case. The risk with this approach is dual: one, it may be overshadowed by storm around Lumumba, while, on other hand, it may create a state of extreme tension between U.N. and Tshombe. But I think we will have to go straight on now in interest of U.N. itself, and therefore have to face these risks.

3. On question of various military moves, we have following comments, which I hope are sufficient as background for your approaches to Ileo, Kalonji and Gizenga, which I think necessarily should follow that to Tshombe. (Your para 6). We do not necessarily accept theory that Katanga moves, in spite of their undoubtedly Belgian background, are coordinated with moves by Kalonji and Mobutu. In saying this, we do of course not exclude that we are facing a concerted military action -- which certainly has not been worked out by Congolese brains -- but for the moment we feel that we can concentrate on Katanga offensive as the most immediate question even if that were to be true. The possibility of a combined operation is recognised as significant enough for us to speak to various delegations here with appropriate warnings.

4. We do not hesitate to regard Katanga attack on Balubas as

/having sufficiently.....

No. 1010 - 13 February 1961

having sufficiently strong elements of genocide for us to be entitled to act forcefully in protection of civilian population. Historically, politically or ethically Katanga has no excuse for its action in an alleged U.N. failure to establish order through peaceful means, while on other hand politically and ethically we have no excuse for standing passive in face of stamping-out operation simply because this operation is said to be part of a settlement of Tshombe quarrel with Lumumba groups. We feel that you and command are in order if instruction is given that troops should intervene in protection of civilian population against attacks by organised military force threatening villages and people in the way which we now witness. Thus, we endorse key phrase in your para 2 stating that you have asked troops to "prevent burning of villages and killing of civilians, with force if necessary." Mutatis mutandis, the same would apply to renewed attacks by Kalonji forces. (7)

5. Although both these situations have strong elements of civil war, they are, as you say and as I have stated above, different from clashes between Mobutu and Gizenga forces. Tentatively, I would say, even as regards such clashes, that efforts at pacification through interposition seem to be indicated, especially in view of probable attitude of population and also because the soldiers on neither side may be too keen on fighting. I have in fact said to key delegations here that, although I stick to opinion that we cannot become third party in civil war operations between organised forces, I feel that our first duty would be to try to impose cease-fire, leading on to armistice under control of U.N. troops. This of course presupposes that there is not too much energy, drive and support on either one of the two sides. It may be significant that French Ambassador has asked me if I would have objections against proposal for cease-fire and armistice coming from Leo (obviously, he had in mind that French-Belgian pressure might be exercised on Kasavubu with a view to avoid development involving most serious risk for Belgian /nationals in Stanleyville.....

No. 1010 - 13 February 1961

nationals in Stanleyville; as I believe some parties on that side may still dream about possibility of "a military solution", this is the only reason which I could guess might prompt them to an otherwise somewhat unexpected support for our efforts).