UNAMIR OPERATIONS - GENERAL 19 NOV 1993 - 23 MAY 1994

CONFIDENTIAL

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES
SERIES S-1062
BOX 62
FILE 4
ACC. 1998/0283

[redacted]

MSG

IN - OUT

MILOB
GP HQ
OPS
SPECIAL
DOCUS

Made in West Germany

SC0,2400,0,3150;IP0,10668,8128,0;

UN RESTRICTED

REORGANIZATION OF MILOB GP

MILOB GP HQ

1. CMO)
2. ADC to CMO) 3
3. DCMO)

OPS BRANCH

4. COO - 1
5. ASST OO - 1
6. HUMANITARIAN OPS - 6
7. GENERAL OPERATIONS - 6

LOG BRANCH

8. C Log O - 1
9. D Log O - 1

PERS BRANCH

10. CMPO - 1
11. DCMPO - 1

HUMANITARIAN BRANCH

12. CHIEF HUMANITARIAN OFFR- 1
13. A HUM OFFR - 2
14. HUM TEAMS - 3 X 15 (45)

LIAISON BRANCH

15. C Ln O - 1
16. A C Ln O - 1
17. RGF LIAISON - 6
18. RPF LIAISON - 6
19. SRSG LIAISON - 2
20. FC LIAISON - 2
21. AIRPORT LIAISON - 2

ESCORT TEAMS

22. TEAM A - J - 3 X 8(24)

UN MERIDIEN

23. CAMP COMDT - 1 (ZIM)
24. SY OFFR - 1
25. ADMIN/LOG - 2

S U M M A R Y

1.	MILOB GP HQ	-	21
2.	HUM BRANCH	-	48
3.	LIAISON BR	-	24
4.	ESCORTS	-	27
5.	MERIDIEN	-	4
	TOTAL	-	124

TO: FHQ

FROM: MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT: PROVISION OF ESCORT TO JOURNALISTS

1. MILOB GP HQ request FHQ policy on the above subject.

2. For your directive.

I D TIKOCA
Colonel
CMO

UN RESTRICTED

TO: FHQ

FROM: MILOB GP HQ

DATE: April 18, 1994

SUBJECT: PROVISION OF ESCORT TO JOURNALISTS

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2. For your directive.

I D TIKOCA
Colonel
CMO

UN RESTRICTED

From: MilOb Gp HQ
Ops

To: FHQ

Date: 14 Apr 94

Subject: Proposal for restructure of MilObs with a supposed strength of 100 officers

1. Please find attached a proposed reorganisation of MilObs with a supposed strength of 100 officers.

2. One MilObs Team will consist of 3 MilObs. Logistical requirement per Team will be as follows:

1 vehicle with base station
2 hand held radios
rations
helmets
flack jackets

3. The reorganisation in this 28 teams allows a flexible and efficient deployment and tasking of MilObs.

4. The teams can be organised in units of three to five teams to facilitate command and control depending on tasking. The intention of this structure is to keep MilObs as much flexible and mobile as possible in order to react on a variety of scenarios and tasks. Mobility, flexibility, communication and security will be the critical features of future MilObs operations in RWANDA.

5. The possibility of a regrouping of officers according to tasking and necessary skills (f.ex. language, computer, driving, negotiation, investigation etc.) should be possible at any time and also be considered when composing this teams.

6. As a decrease of armed UN personnel has to be expected an increase of other security measures for UN personnel should be considered. Such considerations should include.

a. Enough air evacuation on permanent stand by, both for medical and tactical evacuation

b. Improvement of medical support

Suggested Structure of MilObs for UNAMIR 2



MilOb HQ	14
28 MilOb Tms á 3 UNMOs	84
Total	**98**

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SCALING DOWN OF MILOBS STRENGTH BY 60%

COUNTRY	C/RENT STR	40%	60%	REMARKS
AUSTRIA	15	6	9	
BANGLADESH	39	13	26	
CANADA	1	1	-	
CONGO	26	10	16	
EGYPT	10	4	6	
FIJI	1	1	-	
GHANA	24	9	15	
MALAWI	5	2	3	
MALI	10	4	6	
NETHERLANDS	1	1	-	
NIGERIA	15	6	9	
POLAND	5	2	3	
RUSSIA	15	6	9	
SENEGAL	29	12	17	
TOGO	15	6	9	
URUGUAY	25	10	15	
ZIMBABWE	19	7	12	
17	250	100	150	

SC0,2400,0,3150;IP0,10668,8128,0;

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REORGANIZED MILOB GP HQ



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	TOTAL -	124

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DISTRIBUTION OF UNMOS PER PREFECTURE
FOR HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

SRL	PREFECTURE	POPULATION	UNMOS	REMARKS
1	BUTARE	645,000	21	
2	BYUMBA	762,000	21	
3	CYANGUGU	455,000	16	
4	GISENYI	717,000	15	
5	GITARAMA	795,000	16	
6	KIBUNGO	553,000	15	
7	KIBUYE	421,000	15	
8	KIGALI	1,400,000	75	
9	RUHENGERI	804,000	21	
10	GIKONGORO	442,000	15	
11	MILOB GP HQ	------	20	
	TOTAL	6,994,000	250	

* Consideration given to the physical size of the Prefecture and the road condition.

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UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(UNAMIR)

TO : **SQN LDR GEJERE** **Date : 15 Apr 94**
CAPT ADJE

FROM : **MILOB GP HQ**

SUBJECT : SUBMISSION OF RADIO INFORMATION NEWS

1. Henceforth, you are to submit the radio information news at the following timings daily:

a. 0700hrs.
b. 1200hrs.
c. 1600hrs.
d. 2000hrs.

2. Besides the above timings, you could submit any item of news considered to be of value immediately.

3. A simple format is recommended. You start with the headlines. The headlines must be quoted as monitored on the radio. Thereafter, the main items.

4. For your compliance.

INFO :
CMO

S ILIYA
Lt Col
COO

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REORGANIZED MILOB GP



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DISCUSSION BETWEEN RPF LEADERSHIP AND COL ID TIKOCA DURING THE HANDING OVER OF THE CEASE-FIRE ACCORD(FROM RWANDESE GOVT) ON 11 APR 94

1. This differs from what we said /delivered yesterday.

2. RGF should undertake the measures to protect the citizens of the country.

3. We are not doing (negotiation) anything with the government. We also do not sign anything with the government.

4. Our (RPF) proposal was:

a. Our proposal was up to the point and wanted to be in that way.

b. We can not act on what they have said just like that.

c. What ever we have said we are at the point of implementing it.

d. What ever the RGF (Govt Force) has started, there was no reason to start that after the killing of the President.

e. We don't want any foreign force to be present in this country with the plea of protecting their citizens and thereby in the process lingering their stay.

f. It is the responsibility/good judgement of the population to decide whether this present situation affects them or not. If it affects them they will go if not they will not. There is no reason to search for them and thereby linger their (foreign forces) stay.

g. We want an agreement between the UNAMIR, RPF and the Govt Force (Not the Govt) because the present leadership being refuted by the whole forces including the Presidential Guard. What we think the Presidential Guard is a kind of scapegoat.

4. The evacuation operation is agreed between 48hrs starting from the signing of the Communique. We want to have this Communique to be broadcast and in the hands of all including the member countries of the Security Council.

5. The Security Forces (Army, Gendarmerie, Police and Communal Police) and whoever is involved should act to save the human life. But their text indicates that they had been doing something to stop it (Save human life) which is not.

6. We need means to verify, thus we want the establishment of telephone link to verify and check the situation all over the country. Had they been serious they could give us some hot lines.

7. We are asking you to allow all Rwandese citizens who wants to come to Kigali. It is same for every one may be foreigner or Rwandese. Human life is same for everyone. It is precious for every one whether they are foreigners or Rwandese.

8. We have not been fighting all over the country. We talked about truce. There is no reason to have truce all over the country but only in Kigali.

9. We don't need a truce only to allow the foreigners to go to their country.

10. When asked why they want truce only in Kigali thir reply was :

a. It is for evacuation of foreigners.

b. If all the foreigners have already been evacuated then there is no need for the cease-fire.

c. We don't want to be portrayed that we are negotiating for cease-fire.

d. It is for truce. We don't know with whom we are negotiating. We only recognize RGF.

e. They have signed the paper on behalf of the Ministry of Defence but not for RGF.

f. UNAMIR, had they not been recognizing the present government would not have brought this paper to us.

10. When asked what they want UN to do in this present problem/situation, they replied:

a. UN is helping to evacuating the people/expatriates (two countries).

b. We want to give them a safe passage up to the airport.

c. We want to know the time for their coming. We don't shoot them even if they pass through our defences.

11. When asked what is the solution, they replied:

a. With the short period we want all foreign forces to leave this place.

b. French Radio has said that only 47 french people are left. These people can evacuate them in one trip. By this pretext of evacuating their people we don't want them to linger their way.

c. On the other hand Belgium has comparatively a large community here.

d. Now we can't allow 48 hours but only 24 hours because half of the time is gone.

e. Evacuation has got no bearing on the nationality.

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TO : DISTRIBUTION LIST

FROM : FORCE HQ/OPS BRANCH

SUBJECT : **UNAMIR INSTALLATIONS - RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)**

Reference : Ops Directive No 2 / 19 Nov 93.

1. **UNAMIR Installations are**

a. Whether compounds surrounded by fences or walls, containing UN personnel or UN equipment.

b. Vital grounds defended by UN troops, i. e. grounds to which UN troops will not allow any access unless to persons presenting themselves at the normal access(es) and after identity controls.

2. UNAMIR troops will adhere to following specific guidelines whilst guarding or defending the installations:

a. **Hostile Intent**. It is an action which appears to be preparatory to an aggressive action against :

(1) The UN - installation or

(2) The UN personnel guarding/defending it or

(3) Any person who has access to it or

(4) Equipment contained in it.

b. **Hostile Act**. Any aggressive action against as under paragraph 2,a. above.

c. **Authority**. The commander of the guard/defence unit is authorized to use all available weapons or means needed to respond to the threat to which the installation, the own troops, the persons authorized to accede or the stored equipments are exposed. Still, the principles of Minimum Force and collateral damage to be avoided (ref 7. e. and f) will be adhered to.

d. **Threats**.

(1) Any installation of weapon directed to the installation has to be considered as a hostile intent and will lead to preparedness to respond fire by the guarding unit.

(2) Any firing at the defending/guarding troops, authorized persons or stored equipments has to be considered as a hostile act and will lead to immediate reaction by fire and even to offensive actions in order to dislodge the threat.

(3) Hostile attitude by persons will only be reacted at, if those persons proceed towards the installation, although warning by voice have been given. Warning shots will precede fire for effect. If the installation is surrounded by fence or wall, there will be no firing for effect unless the persons actually attempt to cross or to force the barrier.

3. **Rules of Engagement**:

Rule No	State
1	B
2	B
3	D
4	A
5	B
6	B

R. A. DALLAIRE
Maj Gen
Force Copmmander

Distribution :

Action :

Internal :

Kigali Sector
DMZ Sector

Info :

SRSG
MILOB HQ
DFC/COS

SC0,2400,0,3150;IP0,10668,8128,0;

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
(UNAMIR)

TO : **FHQ** **Date :** **Apr 94**

FROM : **MILOB HQ**

SUBJECT : **MILOBS WHO CROSSED THE BORDERS INTO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES DURING THE RWANDAN CRISIS**

1. The following MILOBs were ordered to crossed the borders into neighbouring countries during the Rwandan crisis.

SRL	NAME	NATIONALITY	STATUS	REMARKS
1.	MAJ MAURICE	CONGO	UNMO	
2.	CAPT KAMPILA	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	IN BURUNDI
3.	CAPT DJATO	TOGO	UNMO	AS AT DATE
4.	CAPT CHAENGENI	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	
5.	CAPT SIBANDA	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	
6.	CAPT ALBERT	CONGO	UNMO	
7.	SQN LDR SABIR	NIGERIA	UNMO	
8.	MAJ SALAM	EGYPT	UNMO	IN TANZANIA
9.	MAJ DEKEYA	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	AS AT DATE
10.	CAPT KADANGHA	TOGO	UNMO	
11.	MAJ AZOTI	TOGO	UNMO	
12.	MAJ DRAGE	AUSTRIA	UNMO	
13	MAJ UNGAR	AUSTRIA	UNMO	BELIEVED TO TO BE IN ZAIRE
14	MAJ KODIA	CONGO	UNMO	
15	MAJ TCHEMI	TOGO	UNMO	

2. The under-listed officers crossed the border into neighbouring countries without prior authority from MILOB GP HQ:

SRL	NAME	NATIONALITY	STATUS	REMARKS
1.	SQN LDR ANIS	BANGLADESH	UNMO	IN UGANDA DATE
2.	MAJ AGGREY USHE	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	IN TANZANIA
3.	CAPT GENERO	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	AS AT DATE
4.	CAPT MUTAMBURE	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	

3. The officers listed below crossed the border into Uganda on the instructions of their home government:

SRL	NAME	NATIONALITY	STATUS	REMARKS
1.	LT COL SOSA	URUGUAY	UNMO	
2.	MAJ GRIECO	URUGUAY	UNMO	IN UGANDA
3.	CAPT FONTES	URUGUAY	UNMO	AS AT DATE
4.	CAPT MIKAK	URUGUAY	UNMO	
5.	CAPT MUNZ	URUGUAY	UNMO	

4. Submitted for your information please.

5. Best regards.

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
(UNAMIR)

TO : FHQ Date : Apr 94

FROM : MILOB HQ

SUBJECT : MILOBS WHO CROSSED THE BORDERS INTO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES DURING THE RWANDAN CRISIS

1. The following MILOBs were ordered to crossed the borders into neighbouring countries during the Rwandan crisis.

SRL	NAME	NATIONALITY	STATUS	REMARKS
1.	MAJ MAURICE	CONGO	UNMO	
2.	CAPT KAMPILA	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	1IN BURUNDI
3.	CAPT DJATO	TOGO	UNMO	AS AT DATE
4.	CAPT CHAENGENI	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	
5.	CAPT SIBANDA	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	
6.	CAPT ALBERT	CONGO	UNMO	
7.	SQN LDR SABIR	NIGERIA	UNMO	
8.	MAJ SALAM	EGYPT	UNMO	IN TANZANIA
9.	MAJ DEKEYA	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	AS AT DATE
10.	CAPT KADANGHA	TOGO	UNMO	
11.	MAJ AZOTI	TOGO	UNMO	
12.	MAJ DRAGE	AUSTRIA	UNMO	
13.	MAJ UNGAR	AUSTRIA	UNMO	BELIEVED TO TO BE IN ZAIRE
14.	MAJ NKODIA	CONGO	UNMO	
15.	MAJ TCHEMI	TOGO	UNMO	
16.	LTCDR AKPAN	NIGERIA	UNMO	
17.	CAPT SALAM	EGYPT	UNMO	
18.	MAJ RYHZKOVSKY	RUSSIA	UNMO	

2. The under-listed officers crossed the border into neighbouring countries without prior authority from MILOB GP HQ:

SRL	NAME	NATIONALITY	STATUS	REMARKS
1.	SQN LDR ANIS	BANGLADESH	UNMO	IN UGANDA DATE
2.	MAJ AGGREY USHE	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	IN TANZANIA
3.	CAPT GENERO	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	AS AT DATE
4.	CAPT MUTAMBURE	ZIMBABWE	UNMO	

3. The officers listed below crossed the border into Uganda on the instructions of their home government:

SRL	NAME	NATIONALITY	STATUS	REMARKS
1.	LT COL SOSA	URUGUAY	UNMO	
2.	MAJ GRIECO	URUGUAY	UNMO	IN UGANDA
3.	CAPT FONTES	URUGUAY	UNMO	AS AT DATE
4.	CAPT MIKAK	URUGUAY	UNMO	
5.	CAPT MUNZ	URUGUAY	UNMO	

4. Submitted for your information please.

5. Best regards.

SC0,2400,0,3150;IP0,10668,8128,0;

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(UNAMIR)

TO : **SQN LDR GEJERE** **Date :** **Apr 94**

CAPT ADJE

FROM : **MILOB GP HQ**

SUBJECT : SUBMISSION OF RADIO INFORMATION NEWS

1. Henceforth, you are to submit the radio information news at the following timings daily:

a. 0700hrs.

b. 1200hrs.

c. 1600hrs.

d. 2000hrs.

2. Besides the above timings, you could submit any item of news considered to be of value immediately.

3. A simple format is recommended. You start with the headlines. The headlines must be quoted as monitored on the radio. Thereafter, the main items.

4. For your compliance.

S ILIYA
Lt Col
COO

UN RESTRICTED

MINUTES OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE C M O AND THE RGF C O S ON THE DRAFT TRUCE DOCUMENT AT THE RGF HQ ON 10 APRIL 1994

1. After the usual formalities, Col GATSINZI, the RGF COS expressed his condolences for the death of Belgian UNAMIR soldiers and let the CMO know that he and his staff officers were ready to listen to him.

2. The CMO thanked them for the warm welcome and expressed, on behalf of the FC, his condolences for the death of H E the President, the COS and the other officers.

3. He informed them that after long discussions with the FC, the RPF was able to prepare a document requesting a 48 hour truce to enable the expatriates to be evacuated.

4. The CMO let the COS know that he is ready to wait as long as required to enable them to provide their reply to the truce document.

5. In his response, the COS assured the CMO that he cannot give an answer to this document because it was an issue discussed between the FC and the Minister of Defence. Therefore he will hand it over to him.

6. The CMO insisted again on the importance of the time. He requested from the COS a specific hour on 11 Apr 94 at which UNAMIR should expect their answer. The COS reaffirmed that he will do his best to forward it to the Minister as soon as possible and will convey the answer through the RGF liaison officer.

7. The RGF LO raised the two points the FC requested him to convey to the COS as follows:

a. The evacuation movement of the expatriates will start at 0830hrs on 11 Apr 94 with an escort from KIGALI NIGHT using the RWANDEX route to the airport.

b. RPF insisted that the massacres are still going on.

8. For the first point, the COS reaffirmed that he cannot give any reply on this matter because again this evacuation program will depend on the Minister's reply to the document.

9. As for the second point, he stated that the massacres are related to the current situation after the RPF initiated the hostilities by getting out of the CND and attacking the Presidential Guard Battalion and also after the RPF refused to accept the cease-fire initiated by UNAMIR in accordance with the Government.

10. The CMO raised the point of the freedom of movement of UNAMIR personnel throughout the whole country.

11. The COS reaffirmed that the freedom of movement of UNAMIR is guaranteed in the zones they control but they cannot guarantee that in the zones they do not control, in other words, in RPF areas.

12. Finally, the COS gave the assurance that the document will be forwarded to the Minister as soon as possible, and his reply will be conveyed to the FC through the RGF LO.

13. The meeting ended at 2328hrs (LT)

Maj Rabacca

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

(UNAMIR)

TO : **FHQ** **Date : 12 Apr 94**

FROM : **MILOB GP HQ**

SUBJECT : **RESPONSE BY GEN PAUL KAGAME TO A MESSAGE FROM UNAMIR F C**

Reference:

A. Message from FC to Gen Kagame on 121200B Apr 94.

1. Reference A requested Gen Paul Kagame, through the RPF Sector MILOB Commander, to do everything to avoid shelling/bombing/assaulting the UN Garrison in BYUMBA.

2. The MILOB Sector Comd could not see the General due to the obvious military situation. However, the Secretary of the RPF High Command presented the following text quoting the General.

3. Quote. We have done everything possible to protect UNAMIR. Up to now, we have not shelled BYUMBA despite the shelling from the enemy. We have lived up to our commitment. With reference to the routing of the convoy from NKOUMBA to KISARO, the convoy was halted by our forces because the RGF was shelling in that direction. So it was done to protect you from RGF shelling, so the convoy has now proceeded. Unquote

4. The MILOB Sector Commander contacted D 9 who indicated that the shelling of RPF was coming from positions located 5km South of BYUMBA. Accordingly, advised the FHQ to liaise with the RGF authority in order to stop the shelling.

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

(UNAMIR)

MESSAGE FROM F C TO GEN KAGAME THROUGH
RPF MILOB SECTOR COMD ON 121200B APR 94

1. I want you (RPF MILOB SEC COMD) to use all available means, to go personally to contact either Gen Kagame or the commander of the RPF force conducting operation against BYUMBA.

2. You are to tell him that, in my discussion with the Minister of Defence, he believes that BYUMBA is already in very tenuous position.

3. I prevail, as brother officer that there is no tactical advantage in shelling/bombing the area where the UN Tps are garrisoned in BYUMBA.

4. We have done everything possible to move out up to 2/3 of that UN Garrison.

5. Our transport have been delayed and it is impossible for me to clear that area before last light.

6. Support for the future of this mission and our assistance is critical on the decision on avoiding the bombing/shelling/assaulting the UN Garrison in BYUMBA.

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

(UNAMIR)

TO : FHQ Date : Apr 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : NOTICAS - MILOBS.

1. The following MILOBs both URUGUAYANS were injured on 8 Apr 94 at 0830hrs.

a. Capt TARRASCO UNID 749. Sustained injury on the finger.

b. Maj CIESLINSKAS UNID 586. Seriously injured by shrapnel on the abdomen.

2. Both are presently with RUBATT Med Centre. Request Immediate Medevac to KING FAISAL HOSPITAL.

3. FHQ is requested to transmit NOTICAS to UNNY.

MINUTES OF THE MEETING BETWEEN THE C M O AND THE RGF C O S ON THE DRAFT CEASE FIRE DOCUMENT AT THE RGF HQ ON 10 APRIL 1994

1. After the usual formalities, Col GATSINZI, the RGF COS expressed his condolences for the death of Belgian UNAMIR soldiers and let the CMO know that he and his staff officers were ready to listen to him.

2. The CMO thanked them for the warm welcome and expressed, on behalf of the FC, his condolences for the death of H E the President, the COS and the other officers.

3. He informed them that after long discussions with the FC, the RPF was able to prepare a document requesting a 48 hour truce to enable the expatriates to be evacuated.

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12. Finally, the COS gave the assurance that the document will be forwarded to the Minister as soon as possible, and his reply will be conveyed to the FC through the RGF LO.

13. The meeting ended at 2328hrs (LT)

Maj BABACAR

UN RESTRICTED

UNTED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA
(UNAMIR)

TO : CONGOLESE CONTINGENT COMMANDER **Date: 10 Apr 94**

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT: INJURIES OF CAPT NZOUNGOU EMILE

1. You are required to submit a report on the above mentioned subject to MILOB GP HQ by 17 April 1994.

2. It has been brought to my attention that the above mentioned officer had his wife in this country of which you are aware of.

3. Treat as urgent.

4. Best regards.

ID TIKOCA
Col
CMO

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA
(UNAMIR)

TO : **FHQ** **Date :** 10 **Apr 94**

FROM : **MILOB GP HQ**

SUBJECT : **NOTICAS MILOB - CAPT NZOUNGOU EMILE**

1. The above officer of Congo nationality was fired upon by the RPF at 1235hrs passed Meridian Hotel on the way to Force Headquarters. The said officer was amongst a convoy of UN vehicles but driving a civilian vehicle.

2. Injuries sustained were superficial cuts on arms and face. The officer was treated with first aid treatment at Meridian Hotel by some UNAMIR Staff, he will be sent to the hospital for further examination. This HQ will further appraise you with details of injuries sustained and the Doctor's assessment.

3. For your information and necessary action for further submission to UNNY.

4. Attached pre and medical examination report. (10/1615 Apr 94).

ID TIKOCA
Col
CMO

COPY:
CONTOLESE CONTICO

UNAMIR FIELD HOSPITAL
KIGALI, RWANDA

UNID NO : 560 RANK : CAPT

NAME : NZOUNGOU UNIT : MILOB

NATIONALITY : CONGOLESE AGE : 40 YRS

DISEASE : LACERETED INJURY FOREARM RT DATE : 10.4.94

H/O RTA at 1000 hrs on 10.4.94 (on duty)

L/E
One lacerated wound found in the forearm RT
Length - 5 cm . Depth - 1 cm . Breadth - .5 cm
No active bleeding
Small abrasions on the forehead ,

MANAGEMENT
wound cleaned , stitched dressed .
Inj T.T. ½ cc. IM stat
Tab Amoxycillin 250 mg 8 hourly
Tab Paracetamol 1+1+1

Adv
Report to remove stitches Stitch to be removed after 07 days

Recommended Rest x02 days

SIG OF MED OFFR (AJOT)

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA
(UNAMIR)

TO : **FHQ** **Date : 10 Apr 94**

FROM : **MILOB GP HQ**

SUBJECT : **NOTICAS MILOB - CAPT NZOUNGOU EMILE**

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2. Injuries sustained were superficial cuts on arms and face. The officer was treated with first aid treatment at Meridian Hotel by some UNAMIR Staff, he will be sent to the hospital for further examination. This HQ will further appraise you with details of injuries sustained and the Doctor's assessment.

3. For your information and necessary action for further submission to UNNY.

4. Attached please find medical examination report. (10/6/15 BNov94)

ID TIKOCA
Col
CMO

UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR FIELD HOSPITAL
KIGALI, RWANDA

UNID NO : 560 RANK : CAPT

NAME : NZOUNGOU UNIT : MILOB

NATIONALITY : CONGOLESE AGE : 40 YRS

DISEASE : LACERETED INJURY FOREARM RT DATE : 10.4.94

H/O RTA at 1000 hrs on 10.4.94 (on duty)

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One lacerated wound found in the forearm RT
Length - 5 cm . Depth - 1 cm . Breadth - .5 cm
No active bleeding
Small abrasions on the forehead ,

MANAGEMENT
Wound cleaned , stitched & dressed .
Inj T.T. ½ cc. IM stat
Tab Amoxycillin 250 mg 8 hourly
Tab Paracetamol 1+1+1

Adv
Report to remove stitches Stitch to be removed after 07 days

Recommended Rest x02 days

SIG OF MED OFFR (AJOT)

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH

06 Apr 94

3000.13(Ops)

See Distribution:

SUBJECT: **VISIT BY SRSG TO KIBUYE - MWENDO**

1. SRSG will visit KIBUYE and MWENDO on 07 Apr 94, together with Staff personnel and press representatives. The movement to the visited area will take place by road and by air.

2. Movement

a. By air

(1) Passengers

- SRSG
- Mr. KANE
- Security Officer
- CMO
- Lt Comdr ZOWONOO
- Maj PODEVIJN
- TV press : 4 people
- Mr. MOCTAR and assistant (Total 12)

(2) Timing

- RV at airport 061130 Hrs.
- Estimated flight time : 25 Min.
- Estimated time of arrival at KIBUYE: 1200 Hrs.
- Time of departure to MWENDO: 1255 Hrs.
- Time of arrival at MWENDO: 1320 Hrs.
- Time of departure at KIGALI: 1400 Hrs.
- Time of arrival at KIGALI: 1425 Hrs.
- Maj PODEVIJN will pick up the TV press at AMAHORO parking area at 061100 Apr 94.

b. By Road

Other press than TV will travel by road, escorted by two armed escorts from KIGALI Sector.

(1) Number of journalists: 10
(2) Transportation by 2 minibuses, provided by CTO.
(3) RV at AMAHORO Force HQ at 0700 Hrs.

UNID NO. 705 05 APRIL 1994

RANK : MAJOR

NAME : KOZLOV SERGUEI

AGE ; 35 YEARS SEX ; MALE

UNIT : KIGALI SECTOR (MILOB)

DISEASE : SEVERE FALCIPARUM MALARIA WITH HEPATITIS (MALARIC HEPATITIS)

CASE SUMMARY

UNID No. 705 Major KOZLOV SERGUEI aged 35 years, a Russian Army Officer, now working at Kigali Sector (MILOB) of UNAMIR was admitted to this field hospital at 1645 hours on 05 April 1994 with 05 days history of fever, vomiting,weakness and pain in the abdomen. The temperature is continuous in nature with mild headache and bodyache. It is not associated with chills and rigor. He is also complaining of poor appetite, vomiting and pain in the right upper abdomen for last 04 days. He is passing high coloured urine for the same duration. There is no cough or sputum, no pain in the throat, chest or pain during micturition.

The patient suffered malaria once in last month (From 12th March to 18th March 1994) and treated by Belgian doctor with tab Halfan and became symptomfree and free from malarial parasite. He is in Kigali for last 03 months and does not taking malarial chemoprophylaxis.

Clinical examination on admission revealed :

Looks very ill

Temp : 101°F Pulse : 120/min

B.P : 90/50 mmHg Dehydration : Present

Jaundice : Present(Mild). Abdomen : Liver is palpable(3 cm) tender and soft

Anaemia : Nil

Spleen is not palpable

No Neck rigidity

No Skin rash

Heart Lungs	NAD	No Neurological deficit

Blood film shows; infinite count of malarial parasite (Plasmodium falciparum), and diagnosis was made as a case of **SEVERE FALCIPARUM MALARIA WITH HEPATITIS (MALARIC HEPATITIS)**

Treatment is being started with I.V Quinine Dihydrochloride and other supportive measures. He should be evacuated immediately to Base Hospital,at Nairobi, Kenya, for better treatment and further investigation. The patient will travel by Air in lying position with 01 intensive care assistant and 01 attending physician.

CMPO/Cont. Cond. Russian Cont.

Hospital: The Nairobi Hospital.

Detail of Caserac: ETD Kigali Airport - 2315hrs, 05 APR 94

By C130.

ETA. 0045 Nairobi

More detail to be acquired from FHQ, SMO, Maj Moin

S M Hossain

S M MOTAHAR HOSSAIN
MBBS,FCPS(INT MED)
Major
Medical Specialist
UNAMIR Field Hospital
Kigali, Rwanda

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

(UNAMIR)

TO : **FHQ** Date : 04 Apr 94

FROM : **MILOB GP HQ**

SUBJECT : **MEDICAL PROGRESS REPORT ON INJURED MILOBS**

Reference :

A. Communication, Medical Duty Officer/MILOB GP HQ at 081445B Apr 94.

1. Reference A above, the two Uruguayan MILOBs, Maj CIESLINSKAS and Capt TERRASCO have undergone successful surgery and reported to be in stable condition.

2. For your information and necessary action for onward submission to UNNY.

I D TIKOCA
Col
C M O

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

(UNAMIR)

TO : FHQ

Date : 08 Apr 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : NOTICAS - MILOBS.

1. The following MILOBs both URUGUAYANS were injured on 8 Apr 94 at 0830hrs.

a. Capt TARRASCO UNID 749. Sustained injury on the finger.

b. Maj CIESLINSKAS UNID 586. Seriously injured by shrapnel on the abdomen.

2. Both are presently with RUBATT Med Centre. Request Immediate Medevac to KING FAISAL HOSPITAL.

3. FHQ is requested to transmit NOTICAS to UNNY.

REPORT ON HIJACKING OF MILOBS VEHICLE
NO. 1024 BY LOCAL MILITIA AT REMERA

1. At around 1900hrs, two MILOBs vehicles 1024 and 1041 proceeded to Remera area to up-lift two Zimbabwean MILOB officers who were stranded in a house in the area. On reaching the gate of the house, a large mob of armed militia looking drunk and agitated ordered me (Maj C Hokoyo, UNID No.720) to surrender the vehicle which I was driving for, according to them, security duties.

2. As most of them were known to me, I pleaded with them in Swahili to grant me safe passage as we had come to collect our property from the house, and promised them that as soon as I dropped the luggage I would return with the vehicle. After almost convincing the gang, one very drunk militia who appeared to be the head of the group ordered me out of the vehicle and immediately took to the driver's seat.

3. Another militia, well known to me, pulled out a grenade, armed it, and ordered the former out of the vehicle. There was a scuffle for a moment as the former resisted after which the latter gave up and the vehicle was driven away. We returned to Force HQ in the other vehicle and reported the incident to the CMO and the duty officer.

Date 7 APRIL 94.

C HOKOYO
Maj.

From - MILOBS HQ

UN RESTRICTED

TO - FHQ

Date - 07 2000 hrs Apr

SITREP FROM RPF SECTOR HQ -MULINDI

PERIOD : 071930B APR 94.

PERIOD COVERED: 071700B-071900B APR 94.

1. CALM BUT TENSE WITH INCREASED ACTIVITY OF STAFF OFFRS AND TROOPS INSIDE MULINDI BASE.

2. AT 1700HRS GEN KAGAMI WITH PROTECTION PARTY OF PLATOON PLUS STR MOVED OUT OF MULINDI. SUSPECTED MOVING TO A STEP UP HQ.

3. AT 1730HRS A SNR LADY OFFR MOVED OUT WITH CHILD OF GEN KAGAMI IN A BENZ CAR. WE SUSPECT MOVING TO UGANDA.

4. AT 1830HRS 3 X MINI BUSES FULL OF FEMALE CIVILIANS AND CHILDREN OF RPF HQ PERS MOVED OUT. SUSPECTED ALSO BEING EVAC TO UGANDA.

5. AT 1905HRS, A PICK-UP TRUCK LOADED WITH SEVERAL DRUMS OF FUEL MOVED OUT OF MULINDI. SUSPECTED TO REFUEL TASK VEHS.

RECEIVED AT 1940HRS.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR
Force HQ
Ops Branch

3000.6(FSO)/Ops

30 Mar 94

See Distr :

RADIO COMM FOR ESCORT MISSIONS TO AND FROM MULINDI

1. Enclosed, pl find a report on subj matter. All concerned agencies involved are to comply with instructions in the report.

2. Submitted for your information and necessary action pl.

3. Regards.

FUAD M M ALI
Sqn Ldr
Force Sig Offr

Distr:

Action:

External:

Kigali Sector HQ
MILOB Gp HQ
DMZ Sector HQ
BYUBAT
Engrs Coy

Internal:

Action:

Liaison Offr

Info:

FC's Office
DFC, Office

UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

RADIO COMM FOR ESCORT MISSION TO AND FROM MULINDI

1. **Observation**. On 23 Mar 94 a recce was carried out by Force Sig Offr to select a channel for radio comm for escort mission to and from MULINDI. The main purpose is to have smooth comm all through the mission. The fol observations were noted:

a. There was comm with Duty Offr of Force HQ and the convey in Ch-7 upto KM 48(from KIGAKI to MULINDI). There were distortion but readable when the convey was moving through the valleys. In Ch-11, convey was also in contact with C-0. The convey could also contact K-0 in Ch-8 loud and clear with little distortion in valleys. In Ch-10, the convey had good contact with F-0 and D-0

b. At KM 58 (BIWSEGE) convey comm with K-0 was distorted in Ch-8. F-0 was also distorted in Ch-7.

c. At RUKOMO junction,(KM 59) the convey had no contact with C-0 in Ch-11. There was contact with F-0 in Ch-7 but noisy and distorted. Convey had good contact with K-0 in Ch-8 as well as with D-0 in CH-10.

d. At KM 60 no contact with C-0 in Ch-11, and F-0 was distorted in CH-7. But good comm with F-0 and D-0 in Ch-10.

e. Subsequent KMs there were no contact with C-0 and F-0 in Ch-11 and Ch-7 respectively. But good contact with F-0 in Ch-10 upto KM-84 (MULINDI). From MULINDI RPF Sector HQ there was good comm with C-0 and D-0 in Ch-11 and Ch-10 respectively.

2. **Recommendation**. It is recommended that when an escort mission is carried out to and from MULINDI, all concerned stations must switch on to Ch-10. Escort control agency must inform DMZ Ops Room and seek permission to use their net for the mission. They must also inform DMZ Ops Room when the mission is complete. The comm between front and rear conveys can be carried in simplex mode by switching to Ch-4. This is to be followed to keep transmission in Ch-10 to bear minimum. All escorts and UNMO involved in the escort missions must be briefed clearly so that no confusion arises in comm. This recommendation is to be implemented to over come the existing comm problem in escort mission. **DMZ Ops Room/Comd Post will act as Net Control of Ch-10 for all escort missions.**

MILOB GP HQ
KIGALI

6 Apr 94

MILOB

See Distribution

GENERAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS
FOR HIS EXCELLENCY DR J R BOOH BOOH'S VISIT TO
KIBUYE PREFECTURE ON THU 7 APR 94

Reference :

A. FHQ Letter dated 1 Apr 94.

INTRODUCTION

1. His Excellency, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) in Rwanda, would pay a working visit to Kibuye Prefecture on 7 Apr 94.

2. Wide spread famine resulting from drought and heavy rains has been reported from the Region. Despite relief efforts by voluntary organisations such as CARITAS and Religious bodies the situation requires more attention in form of aid. The visit would therefore, afford him the opportunity to assess the situation on the ground.

3. In preparation of His Excellency's visit, reference A asked the military observer group to conduct a recce and coordinate the areas to be visited. The result of the recce has since been conveyed to the FHQ.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to lay down adequate instructions for the smooth conduct of he SRSG's visit.

5. Programme of visit. The visit will take place between 1100hrs and 1400hrs 7 Apr 94. The detailed programme is in Annex A.

6. Members of the Entourage. His Excellency would be accompanied by a number of military personnel, humanitarian and Government Agencies. They will include the following:

a. Members of the Press.

b. Internal Affairs Personnel.

c. Social Affairs Personnel.

7. Areas to be visited. The main areas to be visited are Children's Hospital in KIBUYE and drought affected areas in MWENDO.

8. Mode of Journey. The Special Representative and a few others would travel by a helicopter. The remaining members of the entourage will travel by road.

SECURITY INSTRUCTIONS

9. The Comd Southern MILOB Group will undertake the following tasks:

a. Deploy MILOBs to all the areas to be visited. Specifically, MILOBs will be deployed at KIBUYE and MWENDO throughout the period of visit.

b. Clearly mark the HELIPADS at BUTARE and MWENDO (4559) by 6 Apr 94. Send 6 figure grid reference of the Helipads to MILOB HQ immediately.

c. Liaise with the armed escorts on arrival from KIGALI.

d. Coordinate the security requirements with the local Security Agents and those of UNAMIR.

e. Monitor activities of the visit including the security situation.

f. Report information on continuous basis to the MILOB HQ.

g. Maintain a reserve of at least one team of 4 Observers for possible reinforcement.

h. Submit a detailed report on conclusion of the visit to MILOB HQ.

ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS

10. Dress. Working hour dress/fatigue will be worn.

11. Vehicles. Each team will deploy with vehicles and communication requirement. Considering the POL problems especially in the South, all vehicles will begin operations with full tanks. It is further advised that extra fuel be carried in Jerricans.

12. Feeding/water. MILOBs will deploy with 48 hours self-sufficient in ration.

13. Timings. In addition to the timings in Annex A, MILOBs will deploy in all positions by 1000hrs on 7 Apr 94. There will however be no move before first light same day.

CONCLUSION

13. In summary, no instructions can be exhaustive, commanders and observers will use their good judgement to address any unforseen problem on the spot. All should endeavour to make the visit hitch-free.

S ILIYA
Lt Col
for CMO

Annex:
A. Programme of His Excellency's visit to KIBUYE Prefecture, 7 Apr 94.

Distribution:
External:
Action:
Comd Southern Sector
Information:
FHQ
DFC
Office of the SRSG
RPF MILOB Sect
RGF MILOB Sect
Sector MILOB Coord, DMZ
Sector MILOB Coord,Kigali

ANNEX A TO
MILOB LTR DATED
6 APR 94

PROGRAMME OF HIS EXCELLENCY THE SRSG'S VISIT
KIBUYE PREFECTURE ON 7 APR 94

SRL	TIMINGS(HRS	EVENT	PLACE	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1.	1200 -1210	H E and entourage arrive KIBUYE.	KIBUYE	Received by the Prefect, Officials and Comd MILOB Southern Sector.
2.	1210 -1225	Presentation on famine and security sit by Prefect.	KIBUYE	
3.	1225 -1240	Remarks by SRSG.		
4.	1240 -1255	Visit to Children affected by famine.	KIBUYE Hospital	
5.	1255 -1320	Depart for MWENDO.		
6.	1320 -1330	Arrival and Reception by Burgmaster of Commune.	MWENDO	Received by Burg-master and MILOB Team.
7.	1330 -1400	Visit to drought affected area.		
8.	1400	Depart for Kigali.		

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(U N A M I R)

TO : FC, UNAMIR Date : Apr 94

FROM: CMO, MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT: **UNMO'S OPERATION AT NIGHT**

Reference:

A. Discussion FC/CMO dated 25/26 April 94.

B. Mandate UNAMIR

C. Humanitarian Assistance Mandate for UNAMIR.

D. Proposed SOP for MILOBS.

1. First and foremost the Military Observers primarily role is to observe and report to the Force Commander on activities of the warring factions after a cease-fire is officially reached.

2. Usually, the Mil Obs are restricted to daylight activities only BUT in special cases depending on the Force Commander of a mission or a Chief Military Observer in a Military Observer mission, he may task Mil Obs to conduct night patrols and observation, in line with the mission's concept of operation.

3. Since the outbreak of hostilities hence breaking of the Cease-fire on the 6 April 1994, Mil Obs had been executing all tasks given to them without question.

FC was appraised with the concern of MILOBs on the Mandate of UNAMIR by CMO and the FC informed CMO that the Security Council has included an addendum to the Mandate for UNAMIR and that is to provide assistance in the evacuation of expatriates out of Rwanda. This information was delivered to all MILOBs which was reassuring as this would cover, hopefully, compensation for life lost or injury sustained which may lead to disability or lost of career.

4. It is important to understand that most of these third world countries that are active participants in the observer missions of UN do not have insurance facilities from their countries to cover for them whilst serving in war zones. The observers from such countries are quite conscious of this fact. The guidelines to MILOBs has this compensation facility available. But the crux of it is that, has to be technically proved that he is legally operating under the Mandate of that mission. It is unfortunate that in some cases officers lost their lives or being disabled without compensation because of certain legal technicalities.

5. As your subordinate commander and CMO, I would always carry out orders as I am disciplined and honoured to do so and may be ask questions later if necessary. This as you know, I always do to my best and I will continue to do so. During last night's meeting, I raised the question of night operations of MILOBs to you may be at a wrong moment but all I am seeking is a security assessment or provision of some security elements to be able to conduct mission given to MILOBs safely and certainly there was no intention to avoid MILOBs conducting duties anytime in the day or night as and when ordered by the Force Commander.

6. If at all I feel that the security of the MILOBs are at a certain great risk in my own assessment, my duty as a subordinate commander in a peacekeeping operation is to seek consultation and appraised my concern to you.

Notwithstanding, your directives and orders will always be executed to the fullest; no doubt about that.

7. As for the night operations for the MILOBs, I request that some degree of security be assured by both parties and Force Headquarters in order to facilitate their operations.

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From: MilOb Gp HQ
Ops

To: FHQ

Date: 14 Apr 94

Subject: Proposal for restructure of MilObs with a supposed strength of 100 officers

1. Please find attached a proposed reorganisation of MilObs with a supposed strength of 100 officers.

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1 vehicle with base station
2 hand held radios
rations
helmets
flack jackets

3. The reorganisation in this 28 teams allows a flexible and efficient deployment and tasking of MilObs.

4. The teams can be organised in units of three to five teams to facilitate command and control depending on tasking. The intention of this structure is to keep MilObs as much flexible and mobile as possible in order to react on a variety of scenarios and tasks. Mobility, flexibility, communication and security will be the critical features of future MilObs operations in RWANDA.

5. The possibility of a regrouping of officers according to tasking and necessary skills (f.ex. language, computer, driving, negotiation, investigation etc.) should be possible at any time and also be considered when composing this teams.

6. As a decrease of armed UN personnel has to be expected an increase of other security measures for UN personnel should be considered. Such considerations should include.

a. Enough air evacuation on permanent stand by, both for medical and tactical evacuation

b. Improvement of medical support

Suggested Structure of MilObs for UNAMIR 2



MilOb HQ	14
28 MilOb Tms á 3 UNMOs	84
Total	**98**

SC0,2400,0,3150;IP0,10668,8128,0;

UN RESTRICTED

SCALING DOWN OF MILOBS STRENGTH BY 60%

COUNTRY	C/RENT STR	40%	60%	REMARKS
AUSTRIA	15	6	9	
BANGLADESH	39	13	26	
CANADA	1	~~1~~	~~1~~	
CONGO	26	10	16	
EGYPT	10	4	6	
FIJI	1	~~1~~	~~1~~	
GHANA	24	9	15	
MALAWI	5	2	3	
MALI	10	4	6	
NETHERLANDS	1	~~1~~	~~1~~	
NIGERIA	15	6	9	
POLAND	5	2	3	
RUSSIA	15	6	9	
SENEGAL	29	12	17	
TOGO	15	6	9	
URUGUAY	25	10	15	
ZIMBABWE	19	7	12	
17	250	100	150	

Comp Comdt:

1. Pse info all Contingent Comds / submit names of Offrs who are to stay and continue the mission. Meet at 1300hrs.
2. The numbers of Offrs to be retained in each contingent is listed above (60% column)

UN RESTRICTED

3. We need hardworking and determined offrs to be left behind to continue mission.

SD
CMO

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(UNAMIR)

TO : FHQ **Date: Apr 94**

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : COOPERATION WITH O A U IN RWANDA

Reference:

A. FAX No. OPS/ ADM - 372 dated 14 April 1994.

1. The deployment of troops supervised by OAU in the early stage of the Rwandese conflict facilitated to a great extent the deployment of the UN Peace Keeping force in Rwanda. This cooperation affected positively:

a. The conduct of the UN reconnaissance mission in the field.

b. The production of immediate and accurate information on terrain, troops, population, attitude and logistics.

2. This cooperation was translated into facts in the field of logistics and administrative as follows:

a. Logistics. The logistics support of the OAU Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in Rwanda was fully financed by donor countries; France, Germany, Belgium, USA and Nigeria. A logistics cell manned by three officers was in charge of executing the contracts signed with local shops by the Force structure through a civilian finance officer appointed by OAU. The logistics cell was also in charge of allocation and accountability of resources.

b. Feeding. Centralised through a contract with a local Hotel (HOTEL MERIDIEN) which assigned light teams in different sectors.

c. Clothing. No clothing was equipment was issued. Observers geared with their own equipment from home.

d. Accommodation. Provided by local government through a contract with landlords.

e. Transport. The mission was endowed with 47 vehicles donated by countries as follows:

(1) Germany - 16 Jeeps fitted with radios.

(2) Belgium - 10 Minerva Jeeps.

(3) Nigeria - 2 Sedan (Peugeot 504 and Land Rover)

(4) Rwanda - 19 vehicles.

f. Maintenance. Performed by civilian shops contracted by OAU.

g. Fuel. Allocated on 15 days basis through the logistics cell in form of fuel tickets provided by local fuel company (PETRORWANDA) contracted by OAU.

h. Drivers. Government drivers assigned with vehicles to the mission, contracted and paid by OAU.

i. Health. Provided by local government and by OAU in case of evacuation out of the mission area.

j. Administrative Matters

(1) Leave. No leave or CTO granted during the mission.

(2) Working Hours. 24 hours per day.

(3 Insurance. Insurance fee of USD 100.00 in case of disability injury or death. One case of death occurred.

(4) Per Diem. Because of the central feeding system and free accommodation by local government, USD 20.00 per day was granted to observers.

k. Deficiencies

(1) The centralised feeding hampered the mission to a great extent. The mobility of observers was not guaranteed and the differences in feeding customs adversely affected the morale of observers.

(2) Lack of equipment (flak jacket, berets) was detrimental to the uniformity of observers.

(3) Observers faced lot of problems of accommodation when travelling out of their area of operation which hampered their mobility to a great extent.

(4) Health care was non existent at the early stages of the mission. All medical cases were to be treated in Kigali, thus the personnel strength was severely reduced. Afterwards, medical assistants were assigned to each zone (1 x assistant per zone) without any means to carry out medical job on site.

(5) Lowering of the per diem (3/4 used to contract commodities and feeding) was inconsistent with the mobility mission observers had to perform. One of the consequences was that no long distance patrol could be performed in remote areas of the DMZ.

(6) The contract maintenance system through local shops for all the maintenance ladder was severely detrimental to the mission, thus brought the serviceability rate as low as 40 - 50%, thwarting patrols, investigation and deployment of observers and units on the ground.

(7) The lack of tactical vehicles (16 tactical vehicles out of 47) and the poor maintenance put lot of strain on the mission.

(8) The allocation of fuel tickets was a nonsense because of the lack of fuel stations in the area of operation. Vehicles had to be driven all the way down to KIGALI (80 Km) to be filled up.

(9) Despite all these shortfalls the mission was fully accomplished by observers by guts and sweat. Nevertheless, it should have been very difficult if the mission has to last any longer.

(10) The best compromise would be a regional mission conducted with the level of assets of a UN peacekeeping type without the administrative burden that characterizes UN peacekeeping operations.

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

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

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UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(U N A M I R)

TO: FHQ **Date: Apr 94**

FROM: MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT: REPORT ON THE INITIAL INSPECTION OF VACATED UNAMIR POSITIONS BY RPF SECTOR MILOBS HQ PERSONNEL ON 24 APRIL 1994

found

1.A team of RPF Sector UNMOs inspected Force Engineer Company, DMZ Sector HQ and BYUBATT vacated locations today 24 Apr 94. It was realized that all doors, containers and cabinets were forced opened and everything vandalized. The team could not take inventory of all items because of possible booby traps. A reasonable quantity of ammunition of all types were found in two containers.

2. Generator was taken away from its location. Two Bulldozers and one TCV were found on the compound. Three refrigerators and two Deep Freezers were found with one freezer motor removed. Two Deep Freezer Containers were forced opened and emptied. It is suspected that freezer container motors were removed and taken away. All Medical stores left behind were destroyed. A number of chairs were found in officers living accommodation. RPF soldiers were found wearing Bangladesh Military uniforms and the RPF Battalion Commander apologized for his men taking away a lot of Bangladesh uniforms from BYUMBA.

3. It is requested that an engineer team should be despatched to clear this location (BYUMBA) of possible booby traps for prompt evacuation of UN Property left in BYUMBA.

[illegible].

I D TIKOCA
Col
C M O

UN RESTRICTED

1000.5/HQ COMDT/G
28 April 1994

To: See Distribution

From: Camp Comdt

Subject: UNAMIR HQ ALARM SCHEME

1. In view of the possibility of shells falling on this HQ, it is decided to adopt an alarm scheme to ensure that all personnel take appropriate action in case of such an event.

2. Please find below action to be taken by personnel who may find themselves in various locations during attacks.

a. Personnel in offices and corridors. Move to reception and remain there until all clear sign is given.

b. Personnel Outside Building. Dash to the nearest firing position or move into the reception and remain there until all clear sign is given.

c. Personnel in Opsroom. Move to reception via the cafeteria with comm gear to monitor situation and give necessary direction.

d. Sentries. Remain or move into firing positions with overhead protection and observe.

3. The first practice of the alarm scheme will take place at 231700 B APR 94. Shelling on the camp will be simulated by several long whistle blasts. The end of the exercise will be marked by several short whistle blasts. (1)

4. Further details of the alarm scheme will be posted at vantage points in due course for all to read.

5. Addressees are requested to bring the contents of this letter to the notice of all under command.

A ANNAN
Maj
Camp Comdt

Distribution:

Action:	Information:
MILOB GP HQ	
Ops Branch	FC
Pers Branch	DFC
Plans Section	CAO
Log Branch	
Humanitarian Section	
Def Pl	

Note

(1) In the absence of a suitable whistle a NISSAN pick-up horn will be used instead.

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISSTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

TO FORCE COMMANDER

FROM; DTY FORCE COMMANDER
HEAD OF TECHNICAL MISSION TO BURUNDI.

DATE; 23 MAY 94.

SUBJ; REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL MISSION TO BURUNDI

REF;
A; FAX No; KMF 976 DATED 16 May 94.

1. In the execution of instruction given at Ref A above, a UNAMIR Technical team was sent for a technical mission to Burundi from 18 - 20 May 94. The team comprised of the following;
   a. Brig Gen H K Aniyidoho, DFC/COS [Ghana], Head of Mission,
   b. Colonel I D Tikoca, CMO, [Fiji], Member,
   c. Major Babarcar Ndiaye, [Senegal] Member.

2. The aim of this paper is to report on the following issues;
   a. Mission and the execution of the mission,
   b. Set out the outcome of the mission,
   c. Recommendation of the Technical Team.

3. Mission and Execution.

   a. Mission The Technical Team left for Bujumbura without a mission or clear directive of the tasks it has to conduct.
   b. Execution The DFC/COS, head of the mission and the CMO departed for Nairobi from Kigali on the afternoon of the 17 May 1994. The team was met by the DCMO and Maj Babakar at the Nairobi International Airport who had arranged for the necessary transportion and hotel for the overnight stay at Nairobi.
   The team departed for Bujumbura from Nairobi on the 18 May 94 at 1120 hrs LT and arrived 18 May 94, 1240 hrs LT. On anticipating that there may be communication breakdown at the airport in Bujumbura the milobs at Nairobi airport were tasked to return immediately to Gigiri and to contact the SRSG in Burundi of the team's arrival.
   On the team's arrival at Bujumbura Airport it was found that there was no one waiting for the team. The team arranged through the immigration police for contact with the SRSG and to make necessary arrangement for clearence to enter Burundi even though there was no arrangement done for entry visas into Burundi. The team was thankfull for the reception and hospitality rendered by the Burundi authority in accommodating the team at the VIP lounge and after one hour the team was picked up by a Major of the

Burundi Airforce and who was requested by the SRSG to pick the team up and to be taken to the Hotel Source du Nil, where we were told that the SRSG was attending a conference for peace at the same hotel. It was also told to us by the Hotel Management that the SRSG has his office and his room in the same hotel. The team was not able to meet with the SRSG as he was one of the pricipal player of the this conference, so the head of the mission decided for the team to rest that afternoon and to await further instruction from the SRSG when he would be available.

c. Meeting with the SRSG At 1600hrs of the same afternoon Col Tikoca went to see the office of the SRSG where he was informed that the team was invited to the closing session of the National dialogue for peace in Burundi at 1630 hrs and to also attend a cocktail party to mark the closing of the three days peace dialogue which was jointly organised by the Scandinavian Organisation of Africa studies and the SRSG of Burundi. This conference was officially closed by the Interim President of Burundi. During a break of this meeting that the SRSG was able to meet with the team and expressed his concern that he was not at all informed of our arrival but it was relayed to him rather late at 1100 hrs that morning, he apologised of the delay at the airport and futher informed the team to meet with him at 1000 hrs, 19 May 94.

d. Formal Meeting with SRSG. At 1000hrs, 19 May 1994 the team met the SRSG of Burundi, Mr AHMEDOU OULD ABAALAH at his office and the following were discussed;

[1] The SRSG once again welcomed the team and expressed his apology for the reception at the airport despite not being informed 24 hours before as previously agreed. The SRSG expressed his disappointment of the team's arrival without 24 hours notice that he had repeatedly requested in his previous correspondences he sent to UNNY and UNAMIR. He also mentioned that due to the sensitivity of the issues in Burundi he had requested that the team must be refered to as his guests and he would like that their names names, nationality and passport details be faxed to him before they are send to Burundi instead he received a fax message from Milob Gp HQ at Nairobi warning him of the arrival of the team after it had already departed Nairobi.

[2] Concerning UN military presence, the SRSG stated clearly that he strongly recommend that UN military personnel should not be send to Burundi because the Army of Burundi is not ready to accept it as the Burundi problem is more a political one rather then

military. He however stated that he had convinced the Burundese authorities to facilitate UN humanitarian operations in allowing use of their facilities.

[3] Finally he stated that if UN has to send troops to Burundi then he strongly recommending that it should not come from UNAMIR.

e. Informal Discussion with Burundees Officials [Mil & Civ]

[1] All those officials that we were able to talk with expressed their concern that the Burundi issue is a political one and will be solved politically and hence there is no need of a regional or international military presence in Burundi.

[2] A professor, Dr Mpawenayo Prosper, of the Burundi University stated during the meeting that Burundi is not involve in a civil war but is a victim of socio -political terrorism. He further stated that among other reasons, the non existance of military front and space and the lack of agreement between both parties for a neutral force do not facilitate the deployment of a neutral force.[A copy of address is attached].

f Meeting with the OAU Observer Mission Commander.

[1] The Observer mission strength is 30, from Tunsia, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. He stated that the mission is without military equiptments, no vehicles, no communication eqpts, and are not allowed to dress in their military attire but only in civilian clothes.

[2] The mission does not have any mission neither any clear directive whatsoever on what tasks for them to conduct but were told just to show OAU Military presence. At presence they are not allowed to be in military uniform and have not been deployed since arrival.

[3] Finally he stated that their mandate will expire on the 17 June 94 and through his discussion with some Government's official they have relayed to them that the mandate may not be renewed.

g. The Conference of National Dialogue in Burundi. This conference was organised at the Hotel Source du Nil from the 15-18 May 94, by the office of the SRSG and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. The Objective of the conference was to provide a forum for frank discussion on crucial issues facing the Burundi Society. The issues were as follows;

[1] restoration of confidence, stability and democracy,
[2] national and sub-region concerns on security matters,
[3] reconciliation and cohabitation,

[4] protection of human rights, of minorities and national unity, and
[5] roles of civil society and international community in Burundi.

e. This conference was officially opened by the Prime Minister of Burundi and was closed by the Interim President at 1800 hours on the 18 May 1994. The three days conference was extensively covered by the local and overseas television live for the population consumption.

Observation of the Technical Team

4. The following physicall observations were made in the capital Bujumbura during the team's visit;

a. The capital is populated mainly by the Tutsi's.
b. The army are deployed at stategic points such as at the airport, major cross roads in town, key points and around the Presidents residence.
c. Army and Gendermerie officers are seen mainly with armed guards.
d. With a population of approximately six million and being a small country the population seen at Bujumbura is suspiciously scarce.
e. The population is still apprehensive. People do not move at night due to insecurity.

Recommendations and Conclusion.

5. The team with almost no guidance as to what it has to conduct in Burundi carried out its movement still to Burundi with the anticipation that the mission and tasks would be provided for by the SRSG at Burundi. After deliberations with the SRSG it was revealed that the teams arrival had raised suspicion and querries from the Government's official, and could even jeopadised the extensive effort already put in place by the SRSG's office which was begining to be appreciated by the public. It was also raised that the representative of OAU in this conference was asked to live on the second day by a demonstration group numbering more than 20000, as the OAU rep was insisting in an intreview with the news media to send an OAU force of 1000 to Burundi, he was escorted out of the country.

6. The following are recommended;

a. UNation is not advised to send military personnel to Burundi.

b. If situation permits that a UN military presence is required than it is strongly recommended that, that force must not be from UNAMIR nor must it come under its command,

c. However, UNAMIR and "that force" in Burundi should be

constantly in contact for obvious reasons.

d. All future proposals or discussions involving Burundi must be coordinated in detail and approached with caution ALWAYS as the situation is so sensative that any laxity from any part would see the Rwanda crisis repeating itself in Burundi.

e. Any further mission of the same must ONLY be carried out once consences of approval is granted for by the necessary bodies of Burundi through the advise of the SRSG to Burundi, and

f. THE MANDATE and MISSION is CLEARLY DEFINED.

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISSTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

TO FORCE COMMANDER

FROM; DTY FORCE COMMANDER
HEAD OF TECHNICAL MISSION TO BURUNDI.

DATE; 23 MAY 94.

SUBJ; REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL MISSION TO BURUNDI

REF;
A; FAX No; KMF 976 DATED 16 May 94.

1. In the execution of instruction given at Ref A above, a UNAMIR Technical team was sent for a technical mission to Burundi from 18 - 20 May 94. The team comprised of the following;
   a. Brig Gen H K Aniyidoho, DFC/COS [Ghana], Head of Mission,
   b. Colonel I D Tikoca, CMO, [Fiji], Member,
   c. Major Babarcar Ndiaye, [Senegal] Member.

2. The aim of this paper is to report on the following issues;
   a. Mission and the execution of the mission,
   b. Set out the outcome of the mission,
   c. Recommendation of the Technical Team.

3. Mission and Execution.

   a. Mission The Technical Team left for Bujumbura without a mission or clear directive of the tasks it has to conduct.
   b. Execution The DFC/COS, head of the mission and the CMO departed for Nairobi from Kigali on the afternoon of the 17 May 1994. The team was met by the DCMO and Maj Babakar at the Nairobi International Airport who had arranged for the necessary transportion and hotel for the overnight stay at Nairobi.
   The team departed for Bujumbura from Nairobi on the 18 May 94 at 1120 hrs LT and arrived 18 May 94, 1240 hrs LT. On anticipating that there may be communication breakdown at the airport in Bujumbura the milobs at Nairobi airport were tasked to return immediately to Gigiri and to contact the SRSG in Burundi of the team's arrival.
   On the team's arrival at Bujumbura Airport it was found that there was no one waiting for the team. The team arranged through the immigration police for contact with the SRSG and to make necessary arrangement for clearence to enter Burundi even though there was no arrangement done for entry visas into Burundi. The team was thankfull for the reception and hospitality rendered by the Burundi authority in accommodating the team at the VIP lounge and after one hour the team was picked up by a Major of the

Burundi Airforce and who was requested by the SRSG to pick the team up and to be taken to the Hotel Source du Nil, where we were told that the SRSG was attending a conference for peace at the same hotel. It was also told to us by the Hotel Management that the SRSG has his office and his room in the same hotel. The team was not able to meet with the SRSG as he was one of the pricipal player of the this conference, so the head of the mission decided for the team to rest that afternoon and to await further instruction from the SRSG when he would be available.

c. Meeting with the SRSG At 1600hrs of the same afternoon Col Tikoca went to see the office of the SRSG where he was informed that the team was invited to the closing session of the National dialogue for peace in Burundi at 1630 hrs and to also attend a cocktail party to mark the closing of the three days peace dialogue which was jointly organised by the Scandinavian Organisation of Africa studies and the SRSG of Burundi. This conference was officially closed by the Interim President of Burundi. During a break of this meeting that the SRSG was able to meet with the team and expressed his concern that he was not at all informed of our arrival but it was relayed to him rather late at 1100 hrs that morning, he apologised of the delay at the airport and futher informed the team to meet with him at 1000 hrs, 19 May 94.

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[2] Concerning UN military presence, the SRSG stated clearly that he strongly recommend that UN military personnel should not be send to Burundi

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c. Army and Gendermerie officers are seen mainly with armed guards.

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3/3

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : LT COL PAUL MOIGNY (CONGO NATIONAL SENIOR) Date : 17 Jul 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ Ref : MILOB/6464.1/OPS

SUBJECT : DELIVERY OF PISTOLS

Reference :

A. Misc No 1123,Outgoing Fax No. 1160 dated 16 July 1994.

1. This headquarters is forwarding quantity 24 Pistols Makarov with quantity 25 Magazines to you.

2. You would recall that the pistols were recovered at the height of hostilities in Rwanda. Consequently, in the melee, one pistol and 3 magazines could not be found. Efforts are being made to locate the items. You would be informed accordingly.

3. Once more, UNAMIR wishes to place on record the high sense of dedication and hard work your contingent exhibited throughout its tour of duty with UNAMIR. Wishing you all the best.

4. Please acknowledge receipt.

I D TIKOCA
Colonel
CMO

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ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : LT COL PAUL MOIGNY Date : Jul 94

(CONGO NATIONAL SENIOR)

FROM : MILOB GP HQ Ref : MILOB/6464.1/OPS

SUBJECT : **DELIVERY OF PISTOLS**

Reference :

A. Misc No 1123,Outgoing Fax No. 1160 dated 16 July 1994.

1. This headquarters is forwarding quantity 24 Pistols Makarov with quantity 45 Magazines to you.

2. You would recall that the pistols were recovered at the height of hostilities in Rwanda. Consequently, in the melee, one pistol and 3 magazines could not be found. Efforts are being made to locate the items. You would be informed accordingly.

3. Once more, UNAMIR wishes to place on record the high sense of dedication and hard work your contingent exhibited throughout its tour of duty with UNAMIR. Wishing you all the best.

4. Please acknowledge receipt.

I D TIKOCA
Colonel
CMO

COPY:

Chief of Staff) Please, you may wish to note
Congolese Armed Forces) Paragraph 2.
Brazaville)

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MEMORANDUM

5000.1 (C Plans)

20 Jul 94

Distribution List

SECURITY TASKS FOR UNAMIR INFRASTRUCTURE - KIGALI

Ref: Infrastructure Recce 17 Jul 94.(enclosed)

1. Enclosed you will find the areas that require security. The duties are divided between Kigali Sector MILOB and Ghanbat.

2. Any questions can be directed to the undersigned.

3. All security tasks are to be started forthwith.

AM Austdal
Lcol
C Plans

Distribution List

Action	Info
Kigali Sector MILOB	COO
Ghanbat	MILOB GP HQ

Copy Bleebo — Read & file.

SJO

Read

SECURITY PROVIDED BY GHANBAT.

SECURITY PROVIDED BY MILOBS

Annex 1 TO
Status of Infrastructure Acquisition
Dated .....July 1994

INFRASTRUCTURE RECCE-KIGALI AREA:

REF: Z922 KIGALI CITY MAP

1. The table outlined below is self-explanatory:

AREA	DESCRIPTION	USE	OWNERSHIP	REMARKS
1	Amahoro Stadium Complex	Force HQ and Signal Sqn	Govt	Continue to occupy facility
2	Centre Christos	Ghanbatt HQ and HQ Coy	Catholic/ Jesuit Order	To be occupied wef 17 July 1994. Owners to be contacted to establish terms of occupancy
3	Chez Lando	Potential future use as accommodation	Private	To be reassessed to determine feasibility of repairs and occupancy
4	Hotel Meridien	Admin and Movement Staff quarters	Private	Continue occupation. Further discussions with Proprietors & RPF to establish terms of occupancy
5	Former Belgian Bn HQ	Ghanbatt A Coy HQ and Pl location	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994
6	Former Kigali Sector HQ	Ghanbatt A Coy Pl Location	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994

7	Faycal Hospital	MSF, RPF and Pl of Ghanbatt	Govt	Continue to occupy facility
8	Former CIVPOL HQ	CIVPOL HQ and MILOB HQ PATROL	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994
9	KABUGA Hotel	Ghanbatt B Coy loc	Private	Reoccupy section formerly used wef 17 July 1994. Office block will be retained by RPF
10	Military Academy	Ghanbatt C Coy location	Govt	To be occupied wef 17 July 1994. Arrangement to be reassessed after 6 months
11	Hotel Diplomat	Civilian Staff	Private	To be occupied wef 17 July 1994. Further discussions with Proprietors & RPF to establish terms of occupancy
12	KIA Terminal building and warehouse	Logistic and movement control cell	Govt	Continue occupation and usage
13	Military Training Area PATROL ONLY.	Ghanbatt dry trg. Area for Heli. Camp under tents for 500 pers.	Govt	Lo RPF to contact High Command before commitment
14	KIGALI Hospital	AUSTRALIAN Contingent	Govt	To be occupied wef 17 July 1994
15	Gendarmerie	MP Coy,Heli Wing	Govt	Being occupied by RPF troops
16	IVECO	UNAMIR Maintenance facility	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994
17	RWANDEX	UNAMIR Sup Depot	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994

18	Old Bangladesh Log Base - Industrial Area	UNAMIR Log Base	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994
19	Hotel Mille Collines	Accn for Civilian Staff and NGO's	Private	To be occupied after discussions with Proprietors & RPF to establish terms of occupancy
20	Village URUGWIRO	Military Staff	Govt	Reserved for usage of Rwandan Govt Officials. To be persued by SRSG
21	UNDP Building	NGO's, UNAMIR HAC & RPA Humanitarian LO's	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994
22	UNICEF Building	UNICEF	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994
23	Effets Scolaire	Depot and quarters		Reserved for Rwandan Govt Educational unit usage
24	Printing Company Near Stadium	QM for HQ Sig Sqn	Private	No longer required
25	Belgian Cooperative Village	Civilian and Military Staff Officers/ NGOs Quarters. FC/DFC & SRSG accommodation	Govt	UNAMIR to contact Belgian Authority for property documents
26	Trafipro - WFP Compound	Offices for Civilians and Staff Officers	Private	UNAMIR and RPF to contact WFP to confirm continued usage of facility
27	Old SRSG's House	MILOB GP HQ and CIVPOL HQ PATROL	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994
28	Old UNAMIR Garage	UNAMIR Maintenance Facility PATROL	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994

29	GITARAMA	Bn HQ and Log Coy		To be confirmed after recce
30	BUTARE	Coy Location		To be confirmed after recce
31	BYUMBA Old Sector HQ	Sector HQ		To be confirmed after recce
32	Byumba School	Engr Coy		Reserved for Rwandan Govt Educational unit usage
33	BUGESERA	Coy Location		To be confirmed after recce
34	KIBONGO	Coy Location		To be confirmed after recce
35	Former MILOB GP HQ	MILOB Sector 2 HQ and CIVPOL Sector HQ	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994
36	KHADDAFI crossing -open site	Camp site for UNAMIR personnel	Govt	To be confirmed after recce
37	Former UNAMIR Stores (Movie Theatre) REMERA	Warehouse for QM-HQ Sig Sqn PATROL	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994
38	BYUMBA Stadium	UNAMIR Engr Coy	Govt	To be confirmed after recce
39	Former Communication Workshop	Communication unit	Private	Reoccupy wef 17 July 1994

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

MILOB GROUP HEADQUARTERS

TO; See Distribution List

INFO; SOO

FROM; CMO

DATE;

SUBJ; ESTABLISHMENT OF KIGALI MILOB SECTOR HEADQUARTERS

Ref; A. FC's directive on 29 May 94.

B. UN Resolution 918 [1994]

C. OPORD 11 dated

General.

1. Reference B above decides to expand UNAMIR mandate under resolution 912 [1994] to include the following responsibilities within the limits of the resorces available to it;

a. to contribute to the security and the protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas,

b. to provide security and support for the distribution of the relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations.

c. authorises in this context an expansion of the UNAMIR force level up to 5,500 troops.

d. requests the SecGen, as recommended in his report, and as a first phase, immediately to redeploy to Rwanda the UNAMIR military observers currently in Nairobi and to bring up to full strengh their elements of the mechanised infantry battalion currently in Rwanda.

Mission.

3. You are to redeploy 50 military observers in Kigali by Thursday 021000B Jun 94.

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Execution and General Outline.

4. Phase 1;

a. Deploy HQ element and four teams to Kigali by 311000BMay94.

b. Establish Kigali Sector HQ by 311200B May 94.

c. Monitor on a 24 hours basis the Red Cross and Sainte Famille campus both situated at Kiyovu.

5. Phase 3;

a. Deploy the remaining teams to Kigali by 021000B Jun 94.

b. Be prepared to carry out tasks within your area of responsibility.

Administration and Logistic

6. The organigram and the list of personnel in your Sector are attached as annexes A and B respectively in this instruction.

7. The Sector HQ will be situated on the ground floor of the Homohoro Stadium and all members of the sector will be accomodated on the third floor of the same stadium. Furnitures for both office and accomodation are in place.

8. All logistic requirements attached as annex C of this report will be available for issue on 01 May 94 at the Homohoro Stadium.

Command and Sigs

9. Lieutenant Colonel Mustafizur Rahm is appointed Kigali Sector Senior UNMO and is responsible to the command and control of all military observers in his sector.

10. The signal instruction is attached as annex D of this instruction.

I.D. TIKOCA
COLONEL
Chief Military Observer

ANNEX A TO
MILOB HQ LTR
31-May-94

KIGALI MILOB SECTOR

APPOINTMENTS

SER NO	TEAM	UNID	RANK	NAME	NATIONALITY	LOCATION	PRESENT LOCATION	APPT	CALL SIGN
1	SEC HQ	626	LT COL	MUSTAFIZUR RAHMAN	BANGLADESH	KENYA	KIGALI	SSMO	CK 9
2	SEC HQ	551	MAJ	AVOUKOU E	CONGO	R-KIGALI	KIGALI	2IC / OO	CK 8
3	SEC HQ	513	CAPT	MBAYE M	SENEGAL	R-KIGALI	KIGALI	PERS/LOG OFFR	CK 1
4	SEC HQ	709	MAJ	PETROUNDOVSKI A	RUSSIA	KENYA	KIGALI	DUTY OFFR - 1	CK 0
5	SEC HQ	608	CAPT	BOIMAH A	GHANA	KENYA	KIGALI	DUTY OFFR - 2	CK 0
6	TEAM-1	594	CAPT	HANZL MANFRED	AUSTRIA	KENYA	KIGALI	T/LDR	KM 1
7	TEAM-1	624	CAPT	BERTHE A	MALI	R-KIGALI	KIGALI	UNMO	
8	TEAM-1	563	CAPT	MALICK	SENEGAL	R-KIGALI	KIGALI	UNMO	
9	TEAM-2	569	MAJ	MD MOBARAK HOSSAIN	BANGLADESH	KENYA	KIGALI	T/LDR	KM 2
10	TEAM-2	656	CAPT	APEDO K E	TOGO	R-KIGALI	KIGALI	UNMO	
11	TEAM-2	679	MAJ	SA RAHMAN	EGYPT	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
12	TEAM-3	515	MAJ	GOKABA J P	CONGO	KENYA	NAIROBI	T/LDR	KM 3
13	TEAM-3	600	MAJ	ADUSEI A	GHANA	R-KIGALI	KIGALI	UNMO	
14	TEAM-3	703	CAPT	WEISSENBOCK E	AUSTRIA	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
15	TEAM-4	675	MAJ	M-GAFFAR	EGYPT	KENYA	KIGALI	T/LDR	KM 4
16	TEAM-4	641	MAJ	LINARES E	URUGUAY	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
17	TEAM-4	568	MAJ	SUFI H Z RAHMAN	BANGLADESH	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
18	TEAM-5	601	MAJ	AWADEY PERRY	GHANA	KENYA	KIGALI	T/LDR	KM 5
19	TEAM-5	691	MAJ	TANVIR MAJUMDER	BANGLADESH	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
20	TEAM-5	534	CAPT	MALONDA G	CONGO	R-KIGALI	NAIROBI	UNMO	
21	TEAM-6	717	MAJ	RYSHKOWSKI A	RUSSIA	KENYA	KIGALI	T/LDR	KM 6
22	TEAM-6	598	MAJ	AGYEKUM-YAMOAH S	GHANA	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
23	TEAM-6	579	CAPT	FELICI R T	URUGUAY	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
24	TEAM-7	566	MAJ	DIOP M	SENEGAL	R-KIGALI	NAIROBI	T/LDR	KM 7
25	TEAM-7	639	MAJ	COSTA G	URUGUAY	KENYA	NAIROBI	UNMO	
26	TEAM-7	724	CAPT	MALIGWA D	ZIMBABWE	R-KIGALI	KIGALI	UNMO	
27	TEAM-8	589	MAJ	SOSA M J	URUGUAY	KENYA	KIGALI	T/LDR	KM 8
28	TEAM-8	632	MAJ	AHSANUR RAHMAN	BANGLADESH	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
29	TEAM-8	524	CAPT	ARIS O	SENEGAL	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
30	TEAM-9	729	MAJ	USHE A	ZIMBABWE	KENYA	KIGALI	T/LDR	KM 9
31	TEAM-9	645	MAJ	TCHEMI-TCHEMBI A	TOGO	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
32	TEAM-9	605	CAPT	KWEKU HENRY	GHANA	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
33	TEAM-10	647	LT CDR	AZOTI D	TOGO	KENYA	KIGALI	T/LDR	KM 10
34	TEAM-10	660	MAJ	BROSSA F B	NIGERIA	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
35	TEAM-10	751	MAJ	CURBELO G	URUGUAY	KENYA	NAIROBI	UNMO	
36	TEAM-11	620	MAJ	DIARRA D	MALI	R-KIGALI	KIGALI	T/LDR	KM 11
37	TEAM-11	706	CAPT	IVANOV O	RUSSIA	KENYA	NAIROBI	UNMO	
38	TEAM-11	652	CAPT	KADANGHA E A	TOGO	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
39	TEAM-12	630	MAJ	HAIDER SIDDIQUE	BANGLADESH	KENYA	KIGALI	T/LDR	KM 12
40	TEAM-12	676	MAJ	S NOUR S	EGYPT	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
41	TEAM-12	555	CAPT	ENGOBO A	CONGO	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
42	TEAM-13	659	MAJ	MOFOBI B T	NIGERIA	KENYA	KIGALI	T/LDR	KM 13
43	TEAM-13	638	LT CDR	SHAMSUL ALAM	BANGLADESH	KENYA	NAIROBI	UNMO	
44	TEAM-13	565	CAPT	DIOP M	SENEGAL	R-KIGALI	NAIROBI	UNMO	
45	TEAM-14	708	MAJ	ANTONOV S	RUSSIA	KENYA	NAIROBI	T/LDR	KM 14
46	TEAM-14	537	MAJ	ANKABI HENRY	CONGO	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
47	TEAM-14	576	CAPT	PEREYRA R L	URUGUAY	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
48	TEAM-15	543	MAJ	DOMBY B	CONGO	KENYA	NAIROBI	T/LDR	KM 15
49	TEAM-15	718	MAJ	KRAVTCHENKO I	RUSSIA	KENYA	KIGALI	UNMO	
50	TEAM-15	733	CAPT	NDLOVU L	ZIMBABWE	R-KIGALI	KIGALI	UNMO	

ABBREVIATIONS USED

1 SSMO - SECTOR SENIOR MILITARY OBSERVER
2 OO - OPERATIONS OFFICER
3 LDR - LEADER (OF THE TEAM)
4 CK - CHARLIE KILO
5 KM - KILO MIKE
6 LOGO - LOGISTICS OFFICER

ANNEX C TO
MILOB HQ LTR
31 MAY' 94

LOG REQUIREMENTS FOR KIGALI SECTOR

SRL	ITEMS	SECTOR HQ	TEAMS	TOTAL	REMARKS
1.	VEHICLES	3	15	18	
2.	BASE STN	1	-	1	
3.	W/ TALKIE	3	15	18	
4.	COMPUTERS	1	-	1	
5.	FAX	1	-	1	
6.	B/CHARGER	1	-	1	
7.	SPARE/BTY	3	15	18	
8.	GENERATORS	1(1.5KVA)	-	1	
9.	FRIDGE	1	-	1	
10.	FREEZER	1	-	1	

** Water , MRE , Fuel will be drawn from Kigali as per normal logistics procedure.

ANNEX D TO
MILOB GP HQ LTR
30 MAY'94

SIGNAL INSTRUCTION

1. **General.** In view of the changed UNAMIR mandate a new MILOB Hq to be set up in Kigali to be known as Kigali MILOB Sector. The sector will consist of 15 MILOB teams besides the sector HQ staff.The teams under the sector are going to carry out all the task assigned to them under the changed mandate.To accomplish their task they will require a smooth and unhindered radio communication net and a simple and clear instruction.

2. **Aim.** The aim of this instruction is to spell out the of signal communication for Kigali MILOB Sector.

3. **Means for Communication.** In the present circumstances only radio communication will be the primary means of communication to and from the teams and with other HQs. For this following radio sets will be used:

a. Motorola Spectra - for base station.

b. Motorola Radio-Gp 300 - for HQ staffs and the team members.

4. **Channel to be used.** For all communication between the teams and MILOB HQ channel 14 to be used.

5. **Call Signs.** Following will be the call signs to be used by Kigali Sector:

a. **HQ.** HQ call signs will be prefixed by CK. The various call signs for the HQ will be as under:

(1) Sector Comd- CK 9

(2) Dy sector Comd / SOO- CK 3

(3) Sector pers / Log officer- CK 1

(4) Ops Room- CK 0

b. **Teams.** All call signs for MILOB teams under the sector will be prefixed by KM. The call signs will be distributed as per the team serial numbers of the teams.

6. **Net Diagram.** A net diagram showing various call signs is att with this instruction.

UN RESTRICTED

/asbotisation

UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MILOB GP HQ

TO : MILOB SECTOR 5 Date: 07 Aug 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ Ref: 6464.0/OPS

SUBJECT : **MOLESTATION OF MEMBERS OF ICRC**

1. Reference your previous SITREP on mentioned subject, notwithstanding RPA investigation, you are to conduct an independent investigation into the molestation and robbing of members of the ICRC.

2. Forward report as soon as investigations are completed.

3. Treat as urgent.

milob offrs at c/s 5 not aware of this situation.

I D TIKOCA
Col
C M O

UN RESTRICTED

msg sent by Maj Olam
181833 AUG 94

UN RESTRICTED

MISSION NATIONS UNIES D'ASSISSTANCE POUR RWANDA

(MINUAR)

KIGALI le 26 Avril, 1994

A Monsieur le Major Géneral BIZIMUNGU AUGUSTIN
Chef d' Etat Major des Forces Armees Rwandaises.

Mon General,

La MINUAR desire augmenter ses moyens de communication avec les Forces Armees Rwandaises et le Gouvernement Interimaire heberge a GITARAMA. A cet effet, nos equipes d'observateurs militaires seront chargees d'etre presentes soit au siege du Gouvernement soit aupres du MINADEF dans le Camp Militaire de GITARAMA.

A cet egard, nous vous demanderions de bien vouloir assurer la securite de nos equipes pendant leur deplacement aller-retour chaque jour de l'Etat Major de la MINUAR a GITARAMA et durant l'execution de leurs missions a GITARAMA.

Nous voudrions egalement installer de facon permanente les equipes d'observateurs a vocation Humanitaire a GITARAMA. Pour cela, nous sollicitons vos conseils et approbation sur ce point. Nous demeurons convaincus et confiants que la securite et la protection de nos observateurs seront garanties.

Dans l'attente de votre reponse, je vous prie de croire, Mon General, a l'expression de ma consideration distinguee.

M. Gen Dallaire

Ampliation : MINADEF

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(U N A M I R)

26 April 1994

Mr Chief of Staff

During our meeting in ARUSHA on 24 April 1994, the Special Rep of the UN Secretary General, the OAU Secretary General and the Tanzanian Prime Minister representing the Facilitator prepared the draft Cease-fire Agreement attached herewith; they requested me to bring it to your attention.

The purpose of this document is to facilitate the signing of a Cease-fire Agreement between the Rwandese Patriotic Front and the Rwandese Armed Forces. The merit of document is that it raises again the points both parties concorded which are retained from the viewpoints of both sides.

In regard to the role that UNAMIR must play in the implementation and the verification of the Cease-fire Agreement, all efforts will be made, taking into account the last decisions of the Security Council Resolution 912 dated 21 April 1994 and thus the very reduced means of UNAMIR. Some talks need to be held on this matter between UNAMIR and both parties.

Therefore, I wish to receive as soon as possible your remarks in order that the concerned parties and UNAMIR could quickly meet and eventually discuss if a Cease-fire Agreement can be implemented as quickly as possible. The Force Commander will be charge of reviewing the military aspects of our proposals with your representatives.

Please accept, Mr Chief of Staff, the expression of my high consideration.

Signed by

Dr Jacques Roger BOOH-BOOH

Special Rep of the UN Sec General

General Augustin BIZIMUNGU
Chief of Staff of the Rwandese Armed Forces
Kigali, Rwanda

UN RESTRICTED

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(U N A M I R)

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Special Rep of the UN Sec General

General Augustin BIZIMUNGU
Chief of Staff of the Rwandese Armed Forces
Kigali, Rwanda

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(U N A M I R)

DRAFT

CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE RWANDESE ARMED FORCES AND THOSE OF THE RWANDESE PATRIOTIC FRONT

The representatives of the Rwandese Armed Forces and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front,

Deeply concerned about the massacres and the senseless violence committed since the death of the President Juvenal HABYARIMANA, on 6 April 1994 in a plane crash that occurred in suspected circumstances,

Deeply concerned again about the subsequent resumption of hostilities between the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Front forces,

Reaffirming their commitment to the ARUSHA PEACE AGREEMENT signed in ARUSHA on 4 August 1993,

Mindful of the fact that an immediate cease-fire will

a. contribute to stop the killings;

b. facilitate the discussions on the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

have agreed, on this day of..... 1994, on the following:

1. The representatives of the Rwandese Armed Forces and the Rwandese Patriotic Front Forces agreed to restore an immediate cease-fire.

2. An immediate cease-fire is restored and will be in effect from the ..... 1994.

3. The cease-fire will be preceded by a truce, that is to say cessation of hostilities; this truce will be in effect at 00 Hour on the ..... 1994.

4. The practical modalities of the cease-fire will be defined by the joint military commission composed of the commanders of the Rwandese Armed Forces and those of the Rwandese Patriotic Front under the auspices of UNAMIR.

5. Once implemented, the cease-fire, is monitored and verified by UNAMIR.

6. Upon implementation of the cease-fire, both parties should take all measures to put an end to the violence within 96 Hours and continue to control the violence in their respective held areas.

7. Both parties reiterate their commitment to the ARUSHA Peace Process and agree to hold immediate talks on the implementation of the ARUSHA Peace Agreement within seven (7) days.

8. Both parties agree to put into place an International Commission of Inquiry to investigate the killings and massacres, which occurred before and after the death of President HABYARIMANA as well as the circumstances leading to his death.

CMO
Let us get this translated immediately for FC's use in the negotiation process
19/4 DFC/COS.

DRAFT
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
FOR
ESTABLISHMENT OF UN NEUTRAL TERRITORY AT KIA

General

1. In light of Arusha Peace Agreement and UN Resolution 872 (1993) dated 05 Oct 93, there is a requirement of establishing a UN neutral territory area in and around KIGALI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT (KIA).

2. The aim of establishing UN neutral area at KIA is to ensure smooth and peaceful use of KIA by the UNAMIR and international humanitarian agencies. This will allow UN to assist in the humanaitarian aid and to bring UNAMIR supplies. It will also ensure no forces on or near the site and thus will avoid cross fire/shelling at KIA.

3. KIA UN neutral territory shall be established by UNAMIR and will be maintained as long as it is required and that according to mutually agreed milestones.

Responsibility

4. Kigali Sector Commander is designated for establishing KIA UN neutral Territory (KIA UNNT).

5. BYUBAT, Force Engr Coy and UN Military Observers of KIGALI Sector will monitor all activities in and around KIA.

Area of Operation

6. KIA UNNT is shown on the sketch as Anx 'A'. The important landmarks demarcating the boundary are:

a. North: Road from REMERA - RWIMBOGO upto NYARUGUNGA.

b. South: Road from REMERA - KANOMBE GAKONI upto road bend.

c. East: NYARUGUNGA.

D. West:. REMERA.

7. The actual boundary shall be physically reconnoitred and demarcated by the BYUBAT Battalion Commander.

Definition Related to Establishment and Enforcement of KIA UNNT

8. **Weapon**. Any lethal object which can be used to cause physical damage/harm or deterrence to an individual is a weapon.

It includes fire arm (including artillery and mortars), knife, sword, bayonet, spear, baton, clubs etc.

9. **Secure Area**. An area where movement and employment of force/troops or weapon of any faction is controlled and regulated by UNAMIR forces. Enforcement of security for UNAMIR military and civilian component is also a requisite qualification of such a secured area.

10. **Check Points**. A manned point used as a means of controlling movement and checking vehicle and pedestrians in order to enforce control measures, orders and regulations. These may be static or mobile.

a. **Static Check Points**. Troops are permanently located at fixed points. These will be normally on important road junctions, at entrances/exists of KIA and around airfield. A static check point is manned 24 hours a day and 7 days a week basis. It must have both radio and line communication with the base/battalion HQ.

b. **Mobile Check Points**. Static Check Points may not be enough to cover an area of operation. In such circumstances, mobile check points are necessary. It will have minimum of a section strength (10 men) with two UN vehicles. It is established at varying time and place and at irregular interval. It must have radio communication with base/battalion HQ.

c. **Reserve Force**. One coy of BYUBAT to be kept ready near terminal building to cater for any unforseen.

11. **Road Block**. A static or mobile check point which closes the road for vehicle movement is called a road block. A road block must have signs regarding "Road Block" in english and local language and be clearly visible from a distance from the vehicle. No vehicles, arms and personnel of both the forces will be allowed to enter KIA UNNT.

12. **Search**. Search operation is a cause of harassment. This operation, therefore, have to be short, methodical and accurate together with correct behaviour of the soldiers carrying out search. Following principle should be employed during search operation:

a. Due care must be taken to avoid damage to vehicle or property being searched.

b. All unauthorized arms, ammunition and explosives found are to be confiscated and receipt given to individual.

c. **Personal Search**. If the situation warrants, the battalion commander may authorize personal search of local

civilian working at KIA. It must be carried out in dignified manner taking care not to cause any public embarrassment to the individual.

13. **Area of Defence**. BYUBAT will take up area defence in and around terminal building and air-field to ensure air flow and road movement. It will also counter any air threat. Details to be worked by BYUBAT Battalion Comd.

14. **Patrolling**. Patrolling will form an essential part of KIA UNNT operation. This will be done both by infantry battalion and UN military services.

a. **Type of Patrols**. There may be following types of patrols depending on the terrain and intensity of operation:

(1) Foot patrol.

(2) Vehicle/APC mounted patrol.

(3) Air patrol (whenever possible)

b. **Aim of Patrolling**

(1) To confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or truce violation.

(2) To locate and confiscate arms, ammunition and explosives etc.

(3) To indicate UN presence.

(4) To provide protection to own forces in defence.

(5) To prevent infiltration of un-wanted elements into controlled area/zone.

c. **Strength**. In no case a foot patrol be less than a section (10 men) and a vehicle patrol be less than two vehicles.

d. **Security**. Contrary to conventional patrols, security of UN patrols lies prior information about faction or parties through the LOs. However, following aspects needs consideration:

(1) Patrol routes should be free from cross firing and hostile shelling.

(2) Ensure that UN signs/marks in the form of UN flag, white painted UN marked equipment and UN headgear are clearly visible during patrolling.

15. **Escort**. UNAMIR escort will be of two types:

a. **UN Military Observer Escort**. These will be unarmed escorts composed of military observers. In case of any suspicion of danger these escorts shall be augmented by armed escorts from infantry battalion. Unarmed escorts will be provided to important persons of UN agencies and expatriates.

b. **Armed Escorts**. Armed escorts will be composed of infantry soldiers. It shall be provided to UN convoys, body of troops or to UN personnel.

c. **Authority of Detailing Escorts**. Force HQ shall have the sole authority to detail escorts. COO/Chief Liaison Officer/Senior Duty Officer is the coordinating staff for detailing escorts.

Pre-condition for Enforcement Plan

16. The enforcement plan of KIA UNNT will depend on fulfilment of following conditions:

a. RGF and Gendarmerie must withdraw their troops and direct fire weapons entirely from 500 meters around the KIA. No indirect system should be closer than 1000 meters of the KIA. The area is shown on the sketch.

b. RGF and RPF must stop shelling and firing in KIA UNNT.

c. RGF and RPF must not use force to break through the KIA UNNT.

d. RGF and RPF should provide their detailed deployment around KIA.

e. Use of KIA by either of factional forces must be cleared from all three RGF, RPF and UNAMIR.

f. Local civilians working at KIA must be allowed by both the forces to come to KIA for work.

g. Daily monitoring is to be done by constant presence of UNAMIR, RGF and RPF LOs.

17. After the UN infantry battalion reinforced have been deployed in KIA area, following control measures will have to be adhered to by both RGF and RPF political/military leaders:

a. Government forces withdraw from all static check points, piquet and guards within KIA. The process of withdrawal of RGF to start within two hours from tri-lateral decision.

b. All forces of both the factions should stop their patrolling activities in the KIA UNNT.

c. There will be no movement of formed units/contingents of any factional forces within 500 meters from outskirts of KIA UNNT.

d. **The Air Defence (AD) system**. Attached at Anx 'B'

Modus Operendi

18. UNAMIR military component i.e.. infantry battalion reinforced and the military observers should at all time ensure that pre-conditions set out in the fore-going paragraphs are implements/adhered to.

19. To establish KIA UNNT and to enforce control measures, both infantry battalion and military observers of Kigali Sector should carry out following operations:

a. **Establishment of Check Points**. Both mobile and static check points should be established on all major road junctions, entry and exit points of KIA. Static check points must be established in the entry and exit points of KIA with sufficient strength.

b. **Road blocks**. In conjunction with check points, road blocks will also be erected, specially during night.

c. **Search**. Search operation should be carried out in all mobile and static check points. It shall be done at irregular interval of time.

d. **Patrolling**. Elaborate patrol programme shall be prepared both by infantry and military observers to cover terminal building and air-field. Military observers shall always be accompanied by armed escorts while patrolling at night.

e. **Rules of Engagement**. Attached at Anx 'C'.

20. UN military observers shall constantly monitor, observe, investigate and report about:

a: RGF deployment and any changes to their already existing deployed troops/weapon systems in and around KIA UNNT.

b. Deployment and re-deployment (if any) of major weapon systems like field and anti-aircraft guns, tanks/APCs and armed helicopters etc of all factions in and around KIA.

21. **Public Relation/Media Coverage**. Positive public relation

and correct media coverage is a major factor in the over all success of establishment and control of KIA UNNT. All concerned should state the facts to the media/press on the establishment of this very positive gesture by both sides as the importance of this national strategic target and its becoming a UN neutral territory will give hope to so many who needs this assistance so desperately.

Conclusion

22. Establishment of KIA UNNT is vital to the success of UNAMIR operation in the neutral humanitarian and peace keeping tasks depends on cooperation, transperncy, good communication.

23. The degree and intensity of imposing control measures, restrictions will ultimately rest on cooperation between UNAMIR military components deployed on ground and the factional armies. Utmost caution must be exercised and absolute neutrality should be maintained in handling both the opposing factions, so that no parties feel deprived or betrayed.

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(U N A M I R)

26 April 1994

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Kigali, Rwanda

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(U N A M I R)

DRAFT

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UNITED NATIONS ASSISSTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

TO FORCE COMMANDER

FROM; DTY FORCE COMMANDER
HEAD OF TECHNICAL MISSION TO BURUNDI.

DATE; 23 MAY 94.

SUBJ; REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL MISSION TO BURUNDI

REF;

A; FAX No; KMF 976 DATED 16 May 94.

1. In the execution of instruction given at Ref A above, a UNAMIR Technical team was sent for a technical mission to Burundi from 18 - 20 May 94. The team comprised of the following;

a. Brig Gen H K Aniyidoho, DFC/COS [Ghana], Head of Mission,
b. Colonel I D Tikoca, CMO, [Fiji], Member,
c. Major Babarcar Ndiaye, [Senegal] Member.

2. The aim of this paper is to report on the following issues;

a. Mission and the execution of the mission,
b. Set out the outcome of the mission,
c. Recommendation of the Technical Team.

3. Mission and Execution.

a. Mission The Technical Team left for Bujumbura without a mission or clear directive of the tasks it has to conduct.

b. Execution The DFC/COS, head of the mission and the CMO departed for Nairobi from Kigali on the afternoon of the 17 May 1994. The team was met by the DCMO and Maj Babakar at the Nairobi International Airport who had arranged for the necessary transportion and hotel for the overnight stay at Nairobi.

The team departed for Bujumbura from Nairobi on the 18 May 94 at 1120 hrs LT and arrived 18 May 94, 1240 hrs LT. On anticipating that there may be communication breakdown at the airport in Bujumbura the milobs at Nairobi airport were tasked to return immediately to Gigiri and to contact the SRSG in Burundi of the team's arrival.

On the team's arrival at Bujumbura Airport it was found that there was no one waiting for the team. The team arranged through the immigration police for contact with the SRSG and to make necessary arrangement for clearence to enter Burundi even though there was no arrangement done for entry visas into Burundi. The team was thankfull for the reception and hospitality rendered by the Burundi authority in accommodating the team at the VIP lounge and after one hour the team was picked up by a Major of the Burundi Airforce and who was requested by the SRSG to

pick the team up and to be taken to the Hotel Source du Nil, where we were told that the SRSG was attending a conference for peace at the same hotel. It was also told to us by the Hotel Management that the SRSG has his office and his room in the same hotel. The team was not able to meet with the SRSG as he was one of the pricipal player of the this conference, so the head of the mission decided for the team to rest that afternoon and to await further instruction from the SRSG when he would be available.

c. Brief Meeting with the SRSG At 1600hrs of the same afternoon Col Tikoca went to see the office of the SRSG where he was informed that the team was invited to the closing session of the National dialogue for peace in Burundi at 1630 hrs and to also attend a cocktail party to mark the closing of the three days peace dialogue which was jointly organised by the Scandinavian ~~Organisation~~ Institute of African studies and the SRSG of Burundi. This conference was officially closed by the Interim President of Burundi. During a break of this meeting that the SRSG was able to meet with the team and expressed his concern that he was not at all informed of our arrival but it was relayed to him rather late at 1100 hrs that morning, he apologised of the delay at the airport and futher informed the team to meet with him at 1000 hrs, 19 May 94.

d. Formal Meeting with SRSG. At 1000hrs, 19 May 1994 the team met the SRSG of Burundi, Mr AHMEDOU OULD ABAALAH at his office and the following were discussed;

[1] The SRSG once again welcomed the team and expressed his apology for the reception at the airport despite not being informed 24 hours before as previously agreed. The SRSG expressed his disappointment of the team's arrival without 24 hours notice that he had repeatedly requested in his previous correspondences he sent to UNNY and UNAMIR. He also mentioned that due to the sensitivity of the issues in Burundi he had requested that the team must be refered to as his guests and he would like that their names names, nationality and passport details be faxed to him before they are send to Burundi instead he received a fax message from Milob Gp HQ at Nairobi warning him of the arrival of the team after it had already departed Nairobi.

[2] Concerning UN military presence, the SRSG stated clearly that he strongly recommend that UN military personnel should not be send to Burundi because the Army of Burundi is not ready to accept it as the Burundi problem is more a political one rather then military. He however stated that he had convinced the Burundese authorities to facilitate UN

humanitarian operations in allowing use of their facilities.

[3] Finally he stated that if UN has to send troops to Burundi then he strongly recommending that it should not come from UNAMIR.

e. Informal Discussion with Burundees Officials [Mil & Civ]

[1] All those officials that we were able to talk with expressed their concern that the Burundi issue is a political one and will be solved politically and hence there is no need of a regional or international military presence in Burundi.

[2] A professor, Dr Mpawenayo Prosper, of the Burundi University stated during the meeting that Burundi is not involve in a civil war but is a victim of socio -political terrorism. He further stated that among other reasons, the non existance of military front and space and the lack of agreement between both parties for a neutral force do not facilitate the deployment of a neutral force.[A copy of address is attached].

f Meeting with the OAU Observer Mission Commander.

[1] The Observer mission strength is 30, from Tunsia, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. He stated that the mission is without military equiptments, no vehicles, no communication eqpts,

and are not allowed to dress in their military attire but only in civilian clothes.

[2] The mission does not have any mission neither any clear directive whatsoever on what tasks for them to conduct but were told just to show OAU Military presence. At presence they are not allowed to be in military uniform and have not been deployed since arrival.

[3] Finally he stated that their mandate will expire on the 17 June 94 and through his discussion with some Government's official they have relayed to them that the mandate may not be renewed.

g. The Conference of National Dialogue in Burundi. This conference was organised at the Hotel Source du Nil from the 15-18 May 94, by the office of the SRSG and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. The Objective of the conference was to provide a forum for frank discussion on crucial issues facing the Burundi Society. The issues were as follows;

[1] restoration of confidence, stability and democracy,
[2] national and sub-region concerns on security matters,
[3] reconciliation and cohabitation,
[4] protection of human rights, of minorities and national unity, and

[5] roles of civil society and international community in Burundi.

e. This conference was officially opened by the Prime Minister of Burundi and was closed by the Interim President at 1800 hours on the 18 May 1994. The three days conference was extensively covered by the local and overseas television live for the population consumption.

Observation of the Technical Team

4. The following physicall observations were made in the capital Bujumbura during the team's visit;

a. The capital is populated mainly by the Tutsi's.

b. The army are deployed at stategic points such as at the airport, major cross roads in town, key points and around the Presidents residence.

c. Army and Gendermerie officers are seen mainly with armed guards.

d. With a population of approximately six million and being a small country the population seen at Bujumbura is suspiciously scarce.

e. The population is still apprehensive. People do not move at night due to insecurity.

Recommendations and Conclusion.

5. The team with almost no guidance as to what it has to conduct in Burundi carried out its movement still to Burundi with the anticipation that the mission and tasks would be provided for by the SRSG at Burundi. After deliberations with the SRSG it was revealed that the teams arrival had raised suspicion and querries from the Government's official, and could even jeopadised the extensive effort already put in place by the SRSG's office which was begining to be appreciated by the public. It was also raised that the representative of OAU in this conference was asked to live on the second day by a demonstration group numbering more than 20000, as the OAU rep was insisting in an intreview with the news media to send an OAU force of 1000 to Burundi, he was escorted out of the country.

6. The following are recommended;

a. UNation is not advised to send military personnel to Burundi.

b. If situation permits that a UN military presence is required than it is strongly recommended that, that force must not be from UNAMIR nor must it come under its command.

c. However, UNAMIR and "that force" in Burundi should be constantly in contact for obvious reasons.

d. All future proposals or discussions involving Burundi

must be coordinated in detail and approached with caution ALWAYS as the situation is so sensative that any laxity from any part would see the Rwanda crisis repeating itself in Burundi.

e. Any further mission of the same must ONLY be carried out once consences of approval is granted for by the necessary bodies of Burundi through the advise of the SRSG to Burundi, and

f. THE MANDATE and MISSION is CLEARLY DEFINED.

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA

TO: FORCE COMMANDER

FROM: DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER

DATE: 23 MAY 1994

SUBJECT: **REPORT ON THE TECHNICAL MISSION TO BURUNDI 18-20 MAY 94**

REFERENCE:

A. Fax No. KMF 976 dated 16 May 94.

INTRODUCTION

1. A UN technical team was sent to Burundi for a technical mission from 18-20 May 94 as directed at reference A above. The composition of the team are as follows:

a. Brig Gen HK ANYIDOHO, DFC/COS UNAMIR - Team Leader.

b. Colonel ID TIKOCA, CMO - Member.

c. Major BABAKAR NDIYE, MMOB - Member.

AIM

2. The aim of this paper is to report on the following issues:

a. Mission and ~~Execution of the team~~.

b. Set out the outcome of the mission.

c. Conclusions and Recommendations.

MISSION AND EXECUTION

3. **Mission.** The technical team left for Bujumbura without a mission or clear directive of its task.

4. **Execution.**

a. **Arrival in Nairobi - Kenya.** The team headed by DFC/COS and CMO left for Nairobi from Kigali on the afternoon 17 May 94 and the team was met by the DCMO and Major Babakar at Nairobi International Airport who had arranged for the necessary transportation and accommodation for the over night stay at Nairobi.

b. **Departure for Bujumbura.** The team departed for

Bujumbura from Nairobi at 181120 May 94 and arrived at Bujumbura at 181240 May 94 (local time). On the team's arrival at Bujumbura Airport it was found that there was ~~none~~ no one waiting for the team since there was no information about the visit, ~~It appears to be the communications break down at the airport~~. The team had been awaiting at the airport for a long time and made an arrangement through the immigration police for contact with the SRSG requesting him to make necessary clearance for the team to enter Burundi without ~~even there was no arrangement done for entry visas into Burundi~~ a prearranged entry visa. After one hour the team was picked up by a Major of Burundi Air Force who was requested by the SRSG MR. OULD-ABDALLAH. The Major took the team to the hotel SOURCE DU NIL, where we were told that the SRSG was attending a conference for peace at the same hotel. The team was not able to meet the SRSG as he was one the principal player of the conference, so the team leader decided for the team to rest in the afternoon awaiting further instructions from the SRSG when he would be available.

c. **A Dialogue on Burundi.** ~~At~~ 1600 hrs same afternoon Col Tikoca went to see the office of the SRSG where he was informed that the team was invited to the closing session of the national dialogue for peace in Burundi at 1630 hrs which was jointly organized by the Scandinavian organization of Africa studies and the SRSG of Burundi. The conference was officially closed by the interim President of Burundi. During the break of this conference the SRSG ~~could~~ meet with the team and expressed his concerned that he was not at all informed of our arrival but it was relayed to him rather late. He apologized for the delay at the airport and further informed the team to meet him at 191000 May 94.

d. **Formal Meeting with MR. OULD-ABDALLAH, SRSG-BURUNDI.** At 191000 May 94 the team met the SRSG of Burundi, Mr AHMEDUO OULD ABDALLAH at his office and the following were discussed:

(1) The SRSG once again welcomed the team and expressed his apology for the reception at the airport despite not being informed 24 hours before as previously agreed. The SRSG expressed his disappointment of the team's arrival without 24 hours notice that he had repeatedly requested in his previous correspondences he sent to UNNY and UNAMIR. He also mentioned that due to the sensitivity of the issues in Burundi he had requested that the team must be refered to as his guests and he would like that their names, nationality and passport details be faxed to him before they are send to Burundi instead he received a fax message from Milob Gp HQ at Nairobi warning him of the arrival of the team after it had

already departed Nairobi.

(2) Concerning UN military presence, the SRSG stated clearly that he strongly recommend that UN military personnel should not be send to Burundi because the Army of Burundi is not ready to accept it, as the Burundi problem is more a political one rather than military. He however stated that he had convinced the Burundese authorities to facilitate UN humanitarian operations in allowing use of their facilities which would be advantageous to them financially.

(3) Finally he stated that if UN has to send troops to Burundi then he strongly recommend that it should not come from UNAMIR as it appears to be a low rating performance. Indeed Burundese refer to the situation in Rwanda as a lesson for them. The last organization they want to deal with is any form of military force. The team leader specifically asked the SRSG on using Bujumbura airport as a staging ground for UNAMIR II and he replied that the authorities may only accept such UN flights if there is cease fire in Rwanda.

e. **Informal Discussion with Burundese Officials (Mil & Civ).**

(1) The officials expressed their concerns to the team that the Burundi issue is political and to be solved politically and hence there is no need of a regional or international military presence in Burundi.

(2) Dr Mpawenayo Prosper, a professor of Burundi University stated during the meeting that Burundi is not involved in a civil war but it is a victim of socio-political terrorism. He further stated that among other reasons, the non existence of military front and space and lack of agreement between both parties for a neutral force do not facilitate the deployment of ~~a neutral force~~ an international force. (a copy of address is attached).

f. **Meeting with OAU OBSERVER MISSION IN BURUNDI.**

(1) The strength of the Mission is 30, from Tunsia, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The commander of the mission stated that the mission is without military equipments, no vehicles, no communication equipments and are not allowed to dress in their military attire but only in civilian clothes. The day the members of this mission arrived in Burundi, they were detained at the airport under some sort of arrest/restriction for five hours and they have not been deployed since arrival.

(2) Finally he said that their mandate will expire on 17 june 94 and the government may not allow to renew the mission.

g. **Conference of National Dialogue in Burundi.** (15-18 May 94) The conference was organized at the Hotel Source du Nil from 15-18 May 94, by the office of the SRSG and the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies. The objectives of the conference was to provide a forum for open discussion on crucial issues facing the Burundi society. The three days conferences was extensively covered by the local and overseas television, live, for the population consumption. The issues ~~was~~ were as follows :

(1) Restoration of confidence, stability and democracy.

(2) National and sub-regional concerns on security matters.

(3) Reconciliation and cohabitation.

(4) Protection of human rights of minorities and national unity, and

(5) Roles of civil society and international community in Burundi.

OUTCOME/OBSERVATIONS OF THE TECHNICAL TEAM

5. The following physical observations were made in the capital Bujumbura during the team's visit :

a. The capital is populated mainly by the Tutsi's.

b. The army are deployed at strategic points such as at the airport, major cross roads in the town, key points and around the President's residence.

c. Army and Gendermerie officers are seen mainly with armed guards.

d. With a population of approximately six million and being a small country the population seen at Bujumbura is suspiciously scarce.

e. The population is still apprehensive. Very limited movement ~~People do not move~~ at night due to insecurity.

6. The team with almost no guidance as to what it had to conduct in Burundi, carried out it's movement with the

anticipation that the mission and tasks would be provided for by the SRSG at Burundi. After deliberations with the SRSG it was revealed that the teams arrived had raised suspicion and queries from the Government~~s~~ officials and could even jeopardise the extensive effort already put in place by the SRSG's office which was beginning to be appreciated by the public. It was also raised that the representative of OAU in this conference was asked to leave on the second day by a demonstration group numbering more than 20000, as the OAU rep was insisting at an interview with the news media to send an OAU force of 1000 to Burundi, he was escorted out of the country and was replaced.

CONCLUSION

7. The mission of the Technical team to Burundi appeared to be unproductive and not well arranged with the following findings:

a. The arrangement and preparation of the team was not well thought of.

b. The SRSG in Burundi does not opine the need for such a team at Burundi now.

c. The Burundese obviously resent the presence of any form of international force in solving their political problems in Burundi.

RECOMMENDATIONS

8. The followings are recommended by the team :

a. UNITED NATIONS is not advised to send military personnel to Burundi.

b. If situation permits that a UN military presence is required in Burundi than it is strongly recommended that, that force must not be from UNAMIR nor must it come under its command.

c. However, UNAMIR and "that force" in Burundi should be constantly in contact for obvious reasons.

d. All future proposals or discussions involving Burundi must be coordinated in detail and approached with caution always as the situation is so sensitive that any ~~lacking~~ levity from ~~any part~~ anyones part would see the Rwanda crisis repeating itself in Burundi.

e. Any further mission of the same must only be carried out once concences of approval is granted for by the necessary bodies of Burundi through the advise of the SRSG to Burundi, and ~~the mandate and mission is clearly defined~~.

f. the mandate and mission of the technical ~~mission~~ team is clearly defined.

SRSG (PC)

CNR 213 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

UNAMIR 04 50 1 MAY 1994

FEB MAY -5 PM 05

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 6 May 1994

NUMBER: 1495

1. Reuters today reported that the RPF signed a ceasefire agreement Thursday in Zaire underwhich talks between the RGF and RPF would being 48 hours after the ceasefire had come into effect at midnight on Sunday (2200 GMT on Sunday). Reuters reported that these talks would take place in the presence of the heads of state of Zaire, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania at a mutually agreed venue and that the agreement also called on the United Nations to monitor the ceasefire.

2. We would appreciate your urgently sending us a copy of this document. We would also be grateful if you would send to us the text of the ceasefire agreement signed by the RGF in Arusha earlier this week.

Right CAG

Thanks and regards

SRSG (FC)

CNR - 197 P1/2

UNAMIR

1994 MAY -5 03 55

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: BOOH BOOH/DALLAIRE, UNAMIR, KIGALI

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 4 May 1994

NUMBER: 1426

SUBJECT: **Sitrep No. 030/94**

Please refer to our 1411 of 3 May 1994.

1. For your information please find attached Ould Abdallah's reply to our request for details on the OAU Observer Mission.

2. Note the new satellite phone and fax numbers for Burundi:

Phone: 871-151-3361

Fax: 871-151-3362

Regards.

(2) A/CHD Please see me

CNR - 197 P2/2

OUTGOING FAX

DATE: 4.5.94 Ref BU/SRSG/0171

TO: MR. KOFFI ANNAN USG/DPKO UN HQ NY	FROM: A. OULD ABDALLAH SRSG BUJUMBURA
FAX No: 1-212-963-92 22	FAX No: (257) 21 28 68 (office) TEL No: (257) 21 28 67 (office) (257) 22 52 22 (hotel)
	CC. Da Costa, luiz.
SUBJECT: REF. YOUR FAX MSF 3013-04	No OF PAGES: 1

1. In reference to your fax No MSF 3013-04 dated 4 May 1994, I would like to bring to your attention the following:

   a) Concerning OAU Observer Mission to Burundi (MIOB), total military officers agreed on between the organization and Government of Burundi is forty-seven (47). Presently thirty-one (31) are in town: Burkina (10), Cameroon (1), Mali (10), Niger (5) and Tunisia (5 including military Commander of the Mission). Sixteen officers (47-31 to come from Niger and Cameroon) are still expected. Mr. Hany Abdel-Aziz is liaising with them.

   b) From early agreement (February 1994), the forty-seven officers will be posted as follows: 5 at Army Headquarters in the capital; and 7 in each of Burundi 6 military camps (regions). In addition to this military component, the civilian component is composed of nine (9) officials, four (4) of them are presently on home leave.

2. Concerning our needs in vehicles, three (3) will suffice; one or two to be 4 x 4 preferably equipped with radio.

3. I expect the three guests this coming Friday 6 May or on Monday 9 May 1994. Please ~~give~~ us twenty four hours notice of day, time of arrival and flight number or special plane identification.

DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF ORGANIZATON OF MILOBS

1. MILOB GP HQ
   - a. CMO - 1
   - b. ADC - 1
   - c. DCMO - 1
   - Total 3

2. OPS BR
   - a. COO - 1
   - b. DCOO - 1
   - c. DOs - 5
   - d. Hum OPs - 2
   - Total 9

3. LOG BR
   - a. CLOGO - 1
   - b. Log Officer - 1
   - Total 2

4. PERS BR
   - a. CMPO - 1
   - b. Asst Pers - 1
   - Total 2

5. LIAISON BR
   - a. Chief LO - 1
   - b. Asst LO - 1
   - Total 2

6. RGF
   - 2 x Teams = 6

7. RPF
   - 2 x Teams = 4

8. Air Tfc Ctrl -3

9. AIRPORT - 2

10. RRT
    - 3 X Teams = 9

12. GRAND TOTALS = 42

DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF SECTORS/PREFECTURE

SECTOR	SECT HQ	TEAMS	TOTAL/PERS	PREFT.
1 (BUTARE) (KIGONGORO) (CYANGUGU)	5	12 X Teams	36	3
2 (GITARAMA) (KIBUYE)	5	10 x Teams	30	2
3 (GISENYI) (RUHENGERI)	5	10 x Teams	30	2
4 (BYUMBA)	5	8 x Teams	24	1
5 (KIGALI CITY)	5	7 x Teams	21	1
6 (KIGALI PRE)	5	12 x Teams*	37	1
7 (KIBUNGO)	5	6 x Teams	18	1
TOTALS	35	65 X TEAMS	196	1 1
GRAND TOTALS		35 + 196 = 231		

* 1 X Team to be made up of 2 UNMOs.

SUMMARY OF MILOBS

1.	F H Q	-	47
2.	MILOB GP HQ	-	42
3.	SECTORS	-	231
	TOTALS	-	320

SC0,2400,0,3150;IP0,10668,8128,0;

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(UNAMIR)

TO : **FHQ** **Date : 17 Apr 94**

FROM : **C M O** Ntuxca, COL.

SUBJECT : **REPATRIATION OF SON LDR A GAJERE (NIGERIA) ON COMPASSIONATE GROUNDS**

1. Attached please find completed ANNEX A to UNAMIR SOPs by above mentioned officer requesting for compassionate leave.

2. It is regrettable that the officer lost his father on the 7 Apr 94. But due to the tense and precarious situation then, the officer was advised to delay his return to Nigeria until the conditions improved.

3. Consequently, it is considered that he can now visit Nigeria to perform the final funeral rites of his dearest late father.

4. He is therefore,requesting for fourteen (14) days compassionate leave.

5. Above for your information and kind approval.

6. Best regards.

(1) CMO

When I visited the Airport today, this was the officer I met in charge of the control tower. Will his absence adversely affect our ability and capability to function at the airport?

18/4
DFC/COS

UN RESTRICTED

(2) Sir, His absence will not affect the ops as there are additional 3 controllers. Pray your approval

DCOS MAJ WOTSS 18/4

(3) ~~Repatr~~ COO: Pse speak.

18/4/94

CMO

ANNEX A TO
UNAMIR SOPS
PART SECTION 4

UNAMIR REPATRIATION FORM

To : FC

Date: 12 APRIL 1994

Through: CPers

From: CMO, MILOB HQ
(Sector/Sec/Unit Comd)

SUBJECT: REPATRIATION

1. It is recommended SQN LDR A A GAJERE

that DOB 20/6/55 NATIONALITY NIGERIA STATUS MILOB SECTION RGF SECTOR

DOA in UNAMIR 9 JAN 94 Length of Service 365 days

be repatriated from service on 20-APRIL 94 To his home country.

(address): HQ NIGERIAN AIR FORCE,
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, LAGOS

2. The above recommendation is based on the following reasons:

~~Medical~~/~~Disciplinary~~/Compassionate/~~Other Ground~~/~~End of Tour~~ Duty

3. Detail description :(If other than end of tour of duty)
ON THE DEATH OF HIS FATHER ON
07 APRIL 1994, TO ALLOW OFFICER PERFORM
FUNERAL IN LINE WITH LOCAL CUSTOMS.

Signature

Date 17 APRIL 94

Rank Col

Name I D TIKOCA

4. Medical Officer's Recommendation: RECOMMENDED/NOT RECOMMENDED
(only for repatriation on medical grounds)
specialist'sAdvice:

Signature: Date:

Rank: Name:

5. CPers Recommendation : The case is recommended/~~not recommended~~ for approval.

Recommended on ~~NATIONAL~~/UN EXPENSE.

Signature: _____ Date 17/4

Name: MD JAHANGIR ALAM CHOUDHURY Rank LT COL

6. Recommendation of DFC/COS: Repatriation at UN expense APPROVED /NOT APPROVED.

Signature: _____ Date _____

Name: _____ Rank _____

7. Recommendation of CAO: Repatriation at UN expense APPROVED/ NOT APPROVED.

If approved the limit of expense is : _____

Signature _____ Date _____

Name: _____ Rank _____

8. APPROVED BY FC: The case is APPROVED/NOT APPROVED.

R e m a r k s :

_____

_____

_____

Signature _____ Date _____

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(U N A M I R)

TO : FHQ Date: Apr 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : REPORT ON THE SITUATION IN RGF SECTOR SINCE 6 APR 94

GENERAL SITUATION

1. The RGF Sector was generally calm before the 6 April 1994. The morale of the Military and the Gendarmerie was high since they were paid and issued with new uniforms.

2. The news of the death of the late President of Rwanda and others on the 7 April 1994 was received with shock. Panic broke out immediately among the populace in GISENYI while RUHENGERI population's reaction was gradual.

BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND ORDER

3. On the 7 April 1994, the break of dawn saw the breakdown of law and order in the areas of GISENYI. Road blocks were erected by the Military, Gendarmerie and the militia of the political parties of MRND armed with sticks and matchets. This breakdown of law and order spread into other towns and villages. However, RUHENGERI was calm with the Gendarmerie patrolling the streets.

4. The situation gradually degenerated into conditions of genocide. Where killings were reported most was in GISENYI areas and a few in RUHENGERI.

FACTIONAL MILITARY ACTIVITIES

5. RGF. The Military and Gendarmerie in RUHENGERI areas were preoccupied with the building up of their defence and the movement of war materials forward from the 7 Apr 94. However, the number of roadblocks leading out of the town were increased. In GISENYI areas, the Military and Gendarmerie mounted roadblocks on most streets of the town. In both RUHENGERI and GISENYI areas, the Military cooperated in providing security to UNMO Teams but looked on while the militia commit atrocities. On 8 Apr 94, the RGF at RUHENGERI denied UNMO patrols entry into the DMZ.

6. RPF. Movement of the RPF into the DMZ was reported on 8 Apr 94 by refugees fleeing into RUHENGERI. This was confirmed by UNMO patrols on 9 Apr 94.

7. Hostilities. Hostilities began on 10 Apr 94 in KINIGI areas East of RUHENGERI. There were exchanges of artillery/mortar, MG and small arms fire between RPF and RGF. On 14 Apr 94, RPF withdrew from KINIGI and NKUMBA areas to KIDAHO. Their places were occupied by RGF.

OWN ACTIVITIES

9. Patrols were restricted to within the teams' townships and liaison with military commanders. These were to maintain liaison with the commanders and the confidence of the civil population in the UNMOs.

10. On 7 Apr 94, the life of Maj Unger was threatened at GISENYI Meridien Hotel. His hand-held radio and an amount of eight hundred dollars (USD 800.00) were taken away.

11. On 8 Apr 94, patrols were conducted into the DMZ for safe areas. The RGF Sector and UNMO Teams at RUHENGERI moved to NKUMBA Camp.

12. On 11 Apr 94, the UN Military Police Team of RGF Sector withdrew into Uganda with one sick UNMO (Sqn Ldr Aris) of RPF Sector.

13. On 12 Apr 94, the RGF Sector was put under the command of the DMZ Sector Commander.

14. On 13 Apr 94, 5 Uruguay UNMOs withdrew from the mission area into Uganda,

15. On 15 Apr 94, UNMO Team G 601 from GISENYI joined the RGF Sector HQ at NKUMBA.

16. On 17 Apr 94, the RGF Sector moved into Kigali.

BORDER ACTIVITIES

17. The borders of Zaire and Uganda were closed on the 7 April 1994. The Zaire border officials at NGOMA refused UNMO Teams entry into Zaire. However, the Uganda border officials at CYANIKA allowed UNMO Teams passage when required.

LOGISTICS

18. RGF Sector HQ computer was left at UNOMUR UNMOs at CYANIKA for safe keeping.

DISTRIBUTION OF UNMOS PER PREFECTURE
FOR HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

SRL	PREFECTURE	POPULATION	UNMOS	REMARKS
1	BUTARE	645,000	21	7 TEAMS
2	BYUMBA	762,000	21	7 TEAMS
3	CYANGUGU	455,000	16	5 TEAMS
4	GISENYI	717,000	15	5 TEAMS
5	GITARAMA	795,000	16	5 TEAMS
6	KIBUNGO	553,000	15	5 TEAMS
7	KIBUYE	421,000	15	5 TEAMS
8	KIGALI	1,400,000	75	25 TEAMS
9	RUHENGERI	804,000	21	7 TEAMS
10	GIKONGORO	442,000	15	5 TEAMS
11	MILOB GP HQ	------	20	
	TOTAL	6,994 000	250	76 TEAMS

* Consideration given to the physical size of the Prefecture and the road condition.

* Each Team consists of 3 Observers.

UN RESTRICTED

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

(U N A M I R)

TO : FHQ Date: 26 Apr 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : REPATRIATION OF BURUNDI REFUGEES

1. Fourteen (14) Burundi nationals comprising 9 adults and 5 children evacuated from Kigali to BYUMBA are desirous of returning to their country.

2. Authority is being requested to process them through UNOMUR.

3. Submitted for your perusal and necessary action please.

DISTRIBUTION OF UNMOS PER PREFECTURE
FOR HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

SRL	PREFECTURE	POPULATION	UNMOS	REMARKS
1	BUTARE	645,000	21	7 TEAMS
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4	GISENYI	717,000	15	5 TEAMS
5	GITARAMA	795,000	16	5 TEAMS
6	KIBUNGO	553,000	15	5 TEAMS
7	KIBUYE	421,000	15	5 TEAMS
8	KIGALI	1,400,000	75	25 TEAMS
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11	MILOB GP HQ	------	20	
	TOTAL	6,994 000	250	76 TEAMS

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