

Country Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant  
East Timor (West New Guinea) - Sec.-Gen Notes to Chef de Cabinet

03/01/1962 - 18/05/1962

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SECRET

3 January 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet  
From: The Secretary-General

Ambassador Charles Yost of the U.S. Mission saw me yesterday afternoon (2 January 1962) and informed me that he had received a message from Washington to the effect that both the Governments of the Netherlands and of Indonesia had agreed to negotiate on the problem of West Irian under my auspices. Ambassador Yost remarked that his Government would be very happy if I could give favorable consideration to this demarche from the two Governments. I told him that I shall send for the representatives of both countries and sound out their views, and assured him that I would give very close consideration to this request.

Minister Lopian, chargé of the Indonesian Mission here, saw me this morning and conveyed to me a message received by him from his Government yesterday. The message in effect was a re-iteration of what Ambassador Yost told me on the previous day. I informed Mr. Lopian that I would immediately contact the Netherlands Mission and that I would inform him of my reaction tomorrow (4 January ).

Mr. Polderman, chargé of the Netherlands Mission, saw me this afternoon and conveyed to me a similar message from his Government. He reaffirmed newspaper reports that his Government would not attach any prior conditions for the purpose of negotiations under my auspices.

I informed both delegates that I felt highly honoured at the trust and confidence imposed on me by their respective Governments, but without committing my active participation in this negotiation I would like to initiate exploratory talks with the two parties to enable me to formulate my own position before the actual negotiations take place. I informed them of my line of thinking which is as follows:

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a) The two Governments should not set any prior conditions for the purpose of discussions under my auspices;

b) I propose to hold exploratory talks with each party before I commence with the negotiations contemplated;

c) I will try my best to be present at the bi-lateral negotiations, but in view of the fact that I will certainly be engaged in other important activities, I would like to depute a personal representative in case my presence is not possible;

d) Before the actual exploratory talks commence I would like to request the two Governments to make a simultaneous public announcement to the effect that they would not set any prior conditions for the purpose of negotiations. If desired, I would prepare a short draft of this announcement for their approval.

This afternoon Ambassador Stevenson of the U.S. Mission rang me up from Washington, conveying his best wishes for the success of the projected negotiations, expressing his personal wish that I should consider the request of the two Governments favorably if I considered that there is a pretty good chance of achieving positive results.

SECRET

5 January 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 3 January 1962.

Minister Lopian, chargé d'affaires of the Indonesian Mission here, saw me yesterday morning and I showed him the draft of the proposed statement meant to be released simultaneously in Djakarta, The Hague and New York. As already discussed with you, the projected statement contained the sentence: "The negotiations will be undertaken without any prior conditions being set by either Government".

I also suggested to him that if his Government were agreeable to it, I would like to release it at 4 pm today EST.

Mr. Lopian reacted to my suggestion negatively, and informed me that he was sure that his Government would not agree to enter into negotiations with the Netherlands representatives without any prior conditions. When I asked him if the transmission of my draft to his Government would embarrass Djakarta, he said that he was quite definite that his Government would be embarrassed. In the circumstances I told him not to take any action on this draft.

Mr. Folderman, chargé d'affaires of the Netherlands Mission, saw me on the same day and I showed him the draft. He assured me that he was definite that his Government would agree to its release at the specified time, but I informed him of the Indonesian reaction and asked him not to take any action on this draft for the moment. In the course of our conversation I brought to his attention Resolution A/L.367/Rev.1, tabled on

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27 November 1961 by India and other delegations at the plenary session of the General Assembly, and I asked him whether the operative paragraph 1) of that resolution could serve as a basis for negotiations, of course substituting me for the President of the General Assembly. He told me that he would convey this to his Government and that he would let me know the result as early as possible.

He saw me again this morning and informed me that so far he had not received any reply from The Hague, but he transmitted to me the following information:

a) If any negotiations take place on the basis of my first formulation, the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington (Amb. van Royen) will represent the Netherlands in these talks.

b) The Netherlands Government would like to convey its thanks to me for the efforts I have been making with a view to bringing together the two parties concerned, and it still considered that my first formulation is the most appropriate basis for negotiations.

c) Ambassador Schürmann, Permanent Representative to the U.N., is arriving in New York on Saturday afternoon (tomorrow), and he will no doubt have more detailed information regarding his Government's attitude towards the problem.

I told him that in the absence of any reaction from his Government towards my second formulation I need not see the Indonesian chargé d'affaires for the time being.

Ambassador Yost of the U.S. Mission again saw me today and asked me if there was any further development regarding my soundings with the two delegations. He told me that Washington was very much interested in these exploratory talks. I informed him of the developments and I promised to keep him apprised of further developments as his Government is keenly interested in bringing about negotiations between the two parties..

SECRET

11 January 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

Subject: Continuation of my note of 5 January 1962

On the basis of my discussions with the representatives of the Netherlands and Indonesia I discussed with Amb. C.S. Jha of India, on 8 January, and explored the possibilities of Prime Minister Nehru coming into the picture in some way or other. I asked Amb. Jha if he considered that his Prime Minister would be agreeable to offer his good offices by asking President Sukarno if the latter still maintains his position towards the Indian draft resolution, A/1.367/Rev.1), which was originally sponsored by India and supported by Indonesia, but which was not adopted by the General Assembly. I also suggested to Amb. Jha that since India was the original sponsor of that resolution and because of the fact that P.M. Nehru is held in very high esteem by President Sukarno, the idea of P.M. Nehru getting involved in the negotiations should be considered. Amb. Jha, however, maintained that his Prime Minister would be very reluctant to get involved in such a manner at this stage particularly because of the emotional climate prevailing in Indonesia and in the light of the latest statements made by President Sukarno. He, however, told me that if I want him to convey any message to his Prime Minister, he would be only too glad to comply with my wish. I informed him that it was not my intention to convey any particular request to his Prime Minister since my intention was just to get his reactions to my idea.

On the same day Mr. Edward Heath, Lord Privy Seal of the British Government, saw me in connection with another matter and he seized the opportunity to touch on certain news reports regarding my discussions with both the representatives of the Netherlands and of Indonesia. I gave him a brief resume of the discussions, without of course mentioning my references to P.M. Nehru, and Mr. Heath asked me to continue with my efforts to bring the two parties together. He also mentioned his belief that the Indonesian position had definitely hardened after the rejection of the Indian draft resolution in the General Assembly.

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On 9 January Amb. Yost of the U.S. Mission informed me that he had received a message from Washington to the effect that the Netherlands Government was ready to reconsider its position on the formulation set forth in the Indian draft resolution which the Netherlands had rejected, and Amb. Yost suggested that I might seek to confirm this from the Netherlands delegation here. Amb. Yost also confided to me that the information was informally conveyed to the State Department by the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington, Mr. van Royen.

On 10 January I sent for Amb. Schürmann of the Netherlands and asked him if the information conveyed to me by Amb. Yost was true. He told me that he had to refer this to his Government and promised to see me again on the next day when he hoped he would have received specific instructions.

Today Amb. Schürmann saw me and confirmed the information I received from Amb. Yost. To avoid criticism in his own country and for other apparent reasons, Amb. Schürmann suggested that the text of the announcement should be slightly different from the actual text of the relevant paragraph of the Indian resolution. He confided to me that his Government would be agreeable to undertake negotiations with the Government of Indonesia on the basis of the following announcement:

"The Government of Indonesia and the Netherlands have agreed to undertake negotiations without delay with a view to reaching an agreement on the future status of Netherlands New Guinea/West Irian in conformity with the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, under the auspices of the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations.

"Both Governments have requested the Acting Secretary-General to make his services available in these negotiations.

"The Acting Secretary-General has agreed to lend his services to these negotiations which will take place under his auspices and in his presence, or in the presence of one of his deputies."

SECRET

22 January 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet  
From: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 11 January 1962

On 12 January I sent for Ambassador Wirjopranoto of Indonesia and asked him if his Government would be agreeable to the new formulation. He told me that in view of the Indonesian Government's press statement released in New York on 9 January, this new formulation would not be acceptable to his Government. The latest position of the Indonesian Government towards the problem is stated in that communiqué as follows:

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"In view of the past experiences, there must be prior guarantees of success before Indonesia can once again meet the Dutch at the negotiating table. Indonesia is still prepared to negotiate with the Dutch, but only if the latter recognize that the basis of such negotiations will be the transfer of administration over West Irian to Indonesia. This is indispensable to guarantee that negotiations will succeed in attaining a fruitful solution in line with the freedom and independence of the whole of Indonesia and the solemn proclamation of the United Nations on 'the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations'."

Since he felt very strongly that even the transmission of my request would embarrass Djakarta, I did not press him any further. Ambassador Wirjopranoto assured me, however, that his Government would enter into negotiations with the Government of the Netherlands if there was some indication of the latter's sincere intention to comply with the previous agreements, particularly the agreement reached on 22 June 1949 on the holding of a round-table conference. He informed me that at that particular meeting an agreement was reached to discuss ways and means of transferring real, complete and unconditional sovereignty of West Irian to Indonesia in accordance with the principles of the Renville agreement. I asked him if a copy of that agreement could be made available to me, and he promised to send it to me.

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Ambassador Yost of the U.S. Mission saw me on 15 January and exchanged views on the latest developments regarding West Irian. On that day I sent cables to the President of the Republic of Indonesia and to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, expressing my deep concern of the news of an incident involving a clash between Dutch and Indonesian naval vessels near the West Irian coast. In the same messages I reiterated my appeal of 19 December to both Governments to seek a peaceful solution of the problem. The appeals were made on the basis of news reports which I received on that morning.

On 16 January Ambassador Stevenson of the U.S. Mission informed me that an Indonesian mass landing off West Irian was imminent according to the information received by the State Department, and he asked me if I would be agreeable to sending further appeals to both Governments to avoid precipitate action. I informed him of my messages sent on the previous day and that I was awaiting replies from both Governments. I considered that no further action on my part was called for at that stage.

On 17 January Ambassador Stevenson saw me again and conveyed to me an oral request from the Secretary of State to take very prompt action in view of the very serious psychological climate prevailing in Indonesia as the result of the sinking of two Indonesian naval boats by Dutch naval units. I told him that my information was to the effect that President Sukarno would for the time being restrict his activities to retaliatory measures only, and that he would not launch a full-scale attack on West Irian. In any case, I assured him that I would make a further appeal to the two Governments to depute their permanent representatives in New York to discuss with me the possibilities of a peaceful settlement of the whole question in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. On the same day I received a reply from the ~~permanent~~ Prime Minister of the Netherlands to my appeal of 15 January, assuring me that the Netherlands Government would refrain from any precipitate action in that area. In the same message he repeated a suggestion made by the Netherlands Government to Mr. Dag Hammarskjöld to send one or more observers or personal representatives to Netherlands New Guinea.

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On 18 January Ambassador Stevenson discussed with me the advisability of my personal visits to both the Netherlands and Indonesia. I told him that for the moment it would not be necessary or advisable.

On 19 January, at my luncheon with President Kennedy and Ambassador Stevenson, the question of West Irian was also discussed along with other problems. Among the formulas likely to contribute to the success of a solution of the problem, the question of trusteeship of the territory was also mentioned. In the light of my discussions with the permanent representatives of the two countries on 17 January, I expressed my feeling that this idea should be pursued and that I would explore the possibilities of such an approach with the two delegates as soon as possible.

On the same day I sounded both delegates regarding their attitudes towards the idea of formulating an approach involving a trusteeship system for the area. The Indonesian representative, as his first reaction, indicated to me that things had gone too far for the Indonesian Government to consider a solution of the problem within the framework of a trusteeship system, even if Indonesia were asked by the General Assembly to serve as the trustee. However, after <sup>the</sup> transfer of administration of West Irian to Indonesia, his Government would be agreeable to determine the will of the people of West Irian through established processes of self-determination. He told me that if the Netherlands Government were agreeable to transfer the administration of West Irian to Indonesia, as a gesture of conciliation, the Indonesian Government would be prepared to make a similar gesture by promising some measure, after five years, whereby the people of West Irian would be given free choice regarding their future status.

The Netherlands representative did not have any immediate reaction to the idea of a trusteeship system for West Irian, but he stressed the fact that the crux of the problem is the guarantee of a genuine self-determination by the people of West Irian at a certain stage. He, however, promised to transmit to his Government the substance of our conversation and assured me that he would convey to me his Government's reply as soon as it was received.

On Sunday 21 January, I understand from you that both the U.S. Government and the Netherlands Government sought a clarification from you by telephone whether the idea of trusteeship and self-determination after five years of trusteeship was my proposal. Needless to say, it was certainly not my proposal, but one of the ideas which I had in mind at this stage of exploratory talks.

23 January 1962

The Indonesian representatives <sup>say</sup> ~~insist~~ that negotiations can take place only to discuss the following items:

1. transfer of the administration of West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia, and
2. the internal self-determination of the people in West Irian, after a certain specified period.

SECRET

23 January 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 22 January 1962

The Netherlands representative saw me in the afternoon of 22 January and informed me that his Government is not in favour of the idea of a trusteeship system for Netherlands New Guinea with Indonesia as trustee. His Government still feels that a transfer of the administration of the area to the U.N., as proposed by the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands at the 16th regular session of the General Assembly, would be the most feasible. Amb. Schürmann clarified this proposal by stipulating that the U.N. might even appoint Indonesians to certain key administrative posts to replace the existing Netherlands officials. A parallel would be the U.N. role in Libya and Somalia before the attainment of independence. When I asked him if his Government's reaction of the idea of trusteeship is absolute, he replied in the affirmative.

I then discussed with him the advisability of my making an appeal to the Government of the Netherlands with a view to effecting the release of the 35 Indonesians rescued by the Dutch naval boats in the recent clash off Netherlands New Guinea. I explained to him that my motive was purely humanitarian and that, if the Government of the Netherlands could respond to my request favorably, it might ease tensions and demonstrate to the whole world that the Netherlands was ~~with~~ all out for a peaceful solution of the problem. Amb. Schürmann assured me that he would convey my intention to his Government and let me know as soon as he received a reply. Until then I was not to make any appeal to the Government of the Netherlands.

On the same day the representative of Indonesia, accompanied by Mr. Tjondronegoro of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, <sup>saw me. Mr. Tjondronegoro/</sup> said that he was sent by President Sukarno to see me and to explain to me the attitude of the Indonesian Government towards the problem. He made it clear that in view of the very high emotional climate in Indonesia as a result of the sinking

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of the two Indonesian naval boats, President Sukarno had decided on taking appropriate retaliatory measures against the Netherlands armed forces in West Irian, but with due regard to my attempts at bringing the two parties together, action had been withheld for the time being. He also told me that, according to a very reliable source of information, the majority of the members of the Netherlands Government decided last week to negotiate with the Indonesian Government on the modalities of the transfer of administration of West Irian to Indonesia. However, he went on, for obvious reasons, the Netherlands Government had decided not to divulge this decision at this stage. I questioned him about the reliability of this source, and he stressed that the source was unimpeachable.

He brought from President Sukarno the following formula, which alone could be the basis of negotiations between the two parties. President Sukarno feels very strongly, according to him, that negotiations can take place only to discuss the following items:

1. transfer of the administration of West Irian to the Republic of Indonesia, and
2. the internal self-determination of the people in West Irian, after a certain specified period.

Mr. Tjondronegoro also informed me that, if the Netherlands Government agreed to this formulation as a basis for discussion, ~~that~~ a public announcement to that effect must be made by the two Governments before discussions actually take place.

The Indonesian representatives also rejected the idea of trusteeship with Indonesia as administering authority. They explained to me that an 'internationalisation' of this administration has always been opposed by their Government.

They also stressed the urgency of the problem and they requested me to try to get a reaction of the Netherlands to their formulation as early as possible.



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SECRET

25 January 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

SUBJECT: Continuation of my note of 23 January 1962

The Netherlands representative saw me in the morning of 24 January and he informed me that he had not received any reply from his Government regarding my contemplated request regarding the release of the Indonesian crew.

I then showed him the Indonesian formula which was presented to me by the Indonesian representatives as a basis for negotiations. His first reaction was that the Netherlands Government would not be agreeable to enter into negotiations with the Indonesian representatives on the basis of the Indonesian formula, but he promised to transmit the same to The Hague and let me know of the reply as soon as he received it. Ambassador Schürmann reiterated the position of his Government that the crux of the problem is the genuine and effective implementation of the right of the people of West Irian for self-determination.

I then asked him if his Government would be agreeable to negotiate with the Indonesian representatives only to discuss the agenda, and not the substance of the problem, in my presence. He promised to transmit this request to his Government.

Ambassador Schürmann expressed distress at the rigidity of the Indonesian position, but he made it clear that this was his own reaction and that it did not necessarily reflected the views of his Government. I also mentioned to him that the Indonesian representatives had confided to me that they had private information to the effect that the majority of the members of the Netherlands Government was in favour of discussing the ways and means of the transfer of administration of Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia, but for obvious reasons they would not like to make this public. Amb. Schürmann denied any knowledge of this, but he was sure that the information was absolutely without foundation.

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Amb. Sukardjo and Mr. Tjondronegoro of Indonesia saw me in the afternoon of the same day. I informed them that their formula for negotiations had been transmitted to the Netherlands representative who promised to seek his Government's instructions, and I also indicated to them that Amb. Schürmann did not consider that his Government would be agreeable to this formula. I reiterated the Netherlands viewpoint that the crux of the problem was a genuine and effective implementation of the right of self-determination of the people of West Irian within a specific period.

I also asked them if the Indonesian Government would be agreeable to negotiate with the Netherlands representative in my presence just to discuss the agenda, and not to go into the substance of the problem. The Indonesian delegates expressed doubts about their Government agreeing to this, since it would give the impression that the two delegations had entered into negotiations without any prior agreement on the substance.

I then suggested the advisability of the two delegations getting together privately, not in my presence, just to discuss the agenda. They assured me that they would communicate this request to their Government.

Today (25 January) Sir Patrick Dean saw me, and said that H.M. Government was very much interested in the progress of the private exploratory talks undertaken by me with the two delegations. I gave him a brief resumé of the negotiations, and he handed over to me the formulation which, his Government considers, would be of some help in my endeavours to bring the two parties together. The British formula is reproduced below:

"The Government of Netherlands enters talks with objective of settling West New Guinea dispute and on clear understanding that this will require establishing conditions which will enable Government of Netherlands to terminate its administration over territory.

"The Government of Indonesia enters talks with objective of settling West Irian dispute and on clear understanding that this will require establishing conditions assuring free choice (free expression of will) of Papuan people within five years."

SECRET

29 January 1962

To: C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 25 January 1962

Amb. Schurmann saw me today and informed me that the Netherlands Government agrees to enter into negotiations with the Indonesian representatives in my presence to discuss the agenda only, if not the substance of the problem. This was in confirmation of his first reaction indicated to me at our last meeting on 24 January.

I informed him that the Indonesian representatives were not too willing to enter into negotiations even to discuss the agenda if there was no indication of the Netherlands Government's willingness to include in the agenda the discussion of the transfer of administration of Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia. I also informed him that the Indonesian representatives had been suggested to get in touch with the Netherlands representatives privately, not in my presence, just to discuss the agenda. Amb. Schurmann informed me that no such approach had been made by the Indonesian representatives, and even if such an approach were made he still considered that his Government would prefer that negotiations should be conducted in my presence. I then handed over to him a copy of the British formula mentioned in my note of 25 January. He considered that it should serve as a basis for discussion, but suggested that this formula should not be presented to the Indonesian representatives, as their outright rejection would put us in another difficult situation. He suggested that attempts should be made for negotiations in my presence just to discuss the agenda, preferably outside the U.N. building, in order not to attract public attention which the Indonesian representatives feared. He further suggested that if such negotiations take place, I should come out with my own formula similar to the British one as a basis for discussion. I assured him that I would continue to endeavour my utmost to bring the two parties together as early as possible. He suggested that since there are two Indonesian representatives in New York, he would like to have his colleague from Washington also here if negotiations come through. He suggested early next week as the most appropriate time.

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He also informed me that he had received a reply from his Government to my earlier query regarding the advisability of my sending an appeal to the Netherlands Government to release the Indonesian crew now being held in Netherlands New Guinea. He said that his Government would welcome such an appeal. I told him that my appeal would be sent out today. The same was communicated to him this afternoon.

Amb. Sukardjo and Mr. Tjondronegoro saw me this afternoon and asked me if there was further development. I told them that I was under the impression that, on the basis of our discussion of 24 January, they would try to establish private contacts with the Netherlands representatives, and that was the reason why I did not send for them earlier. They told me that they were not enthusiastic about establishing private contacts with the Netherlands representatives even to discuss the agenda if there was no prospect of any reference to the transfer of administration to Indonesia. They said that so far the Netherlands Government has no intention of discussing the modalities of a transfer since the Netherlands spokesmen were still talking about the termination of their administration and some form of internationalisation of the administration as the next stage. They reiterated the Indonesian position that they could not enter into negotiations with the Netherlands without some kind of understanding, if not explicit, that the Netherlands Government would be prepared to discuss the transfer of administration to Indonesia after some interim arrangements have been made to facilitate such transfer. I told them that there was no prospect of the Netherlands Government making such a commitment before the negotiations started, and suggested that this should be brought up in the informal and private negotiations which I have suggested. I requested them to seek instructions from Djakarta regarding the need to enter into informal and private negotiations in my presence just to discuss the agenda, some time early next week. They promised to transmit my request to Djakarta, but maintained their original position that without any indication on the part of the Netherlands that the agenda would include the transfer of administration to Djakarta after some kind of an interim arrangement without involving the U.N., their Government would not be agreeable to the course suggested.

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Then they handed over to me a document entitled "The Indonesian-Netherlands Reconciliation Committee", which, they said, was published at The Hague in November 1961, signed by 171 prominent citizens of the Netherlands. They claim that the proposals contained in that document went much further than that held by the Netherlands Government at present. They requested me to study this document and suggested that I might find some appropriate basis for private and informal negotiations.

Mr. Tjondronegoro insisted that the time element is very important and expressed his suspicion that the Netherlands Government was playing for time. He also told me that he had been receiving queries from Djakarta asking for any progress in our exploratory talks and that he had to report back that there had been no progress. I told him not to be pessimistic since everyone should be extremely patient to achieve positive results in such negotiations.

I also informed them of my decision to appeal to the Government of the Netherlands to release the Indonesian crew now held in custody in Netherlands New Guinea. I also informed them that this appeal would be made late in the afternoon. Strangely enough there was no reaction from either of them.



SECRET

3 February 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan,  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 29 January 1962

Amb. Schurmann saw me at 3 p.m. on 30 January and handed over to me the reply from the P.M. of the Netherlands to my appeal of the previous day, expressing the readiness of the Netherlands Government to release the Indonesian prisoners through the intermediary of the United Nations. I informed him that I had in mind the TAB Resident Representative in Djakarta to serve as my representative for the purpose. Amb. Schurmann was not agreeable to this idea, and he suggested that a UN official of a higher status should be considered for such an assignment. He also said that the assignment of the UN ResRep in Djakarta would imply some form of recognition of a link between Djakarta and Netherlands New Guinea. I told him that I would give further consideration to this question.

On the same evening I sent for Amb. Sukardjo and informed him that the Netherlands Government had responded very favorably to my appeal, but he strongly objected to the idea of UN involvement in such an undertaking. He suggested that the proposed intermediary should be outside the UN and should not represent the UN. When I explained to him that it was I who had suggested to the Netherlands Government that a UN representative should make the necessary arrangements in West Irian, he expressed surprise at my initiative on these lines. When I told him that it was my original idea to send our TAB representative in Djakarta to West Irian, he seemed to favour this idea, but I did not pursue the matter further since the Netherlands representative was not agreeable to it earlier. As a compromise I told the Indonesian representative that I would request the ICRC to designate an official to act on my behalf and make on the spot arrangements for the evacuation of the prisoners, he said he would transmit this information to Djakarta.

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It was agreed that copies of my appeal to the Netherlands Prime Minister and his reply were to be released simultaneously in New York and The Hague at 12 am EST on 31 January, but in view of the Indonesian reaction I decided to defer public release until the next day. I understand ~~from~~ that you contacted Amb. Schurmann on the same night and requested him to delay the release by 24 hours.

Amb. Schurmann saw me at noon on 31st January, and I explained to him the circumstances leading to the postponement of the proposed release of letters. He told me that he had communicated your request the previous night to The Hague, but he was not sure whether his message would get there in time. In his opinion, although The Hague might get his message in time, he was not sure if the Netherlands authorities in Netherlands New Guinea would get it in time. He was favorable to the idea of asking the ICRC to designate an official who could act on my behalf. I immediately sent a cable to the President of the ICRC through Spinelli.

Amb. Yost of the U.S. Mission saw me in the afternoon and informed me that President Kennedy was very much interested in the exploratory talks now being held here, and I explained to him the latest developments. He informed me that the Netherlands Ambassador in Washington was leaving that night for The Hague for urgent consultations.

On February 1st I received a cable from the President of the ICRC informing me that he would designate an official of the ICRC to act on my behalf for the repatriation of the Indonesian prisoners. Copies of my letters to the Netherlands P.M. and his reply together with the summaries of my cable to ICRC and their answer to me were released to the press on 1st February (SG/1128).

After the release Amb. Sukardjo saw me and informed me that his Government would take a very strong objection at the use of the word "repatriation" as it would imply the sending of the prisoners from one country to another, while, in fact, the two areas are part of one country. I explained to him that there was no other word in the English language to describe such an activity.

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Amb. Schurmann saw me on 2 February and handed over to me a note on a meeting between the Indonesian Ambassador to Moscow and the Netherlands Ambassador to London on 30 January in London. He also informed me that the Indonesian Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Malik, came to London to meet the Netherlands Ambassador to London, and there were high expectations that the visit would be significant. However, from this note, which he handed over to me, it was clear that there was no special significance to it except that the two representatives met and exchanged views for the first time. He also confirmed the news conveyed to me earlier by Amb. Yost that the Netherlands ambassador in Washington had left for The Hague for consultations and that he would be back in New York next Thursday (8 February). He also suggested that if I could come up with some formula as a basis for negotiation, he and his colleague (Amb. van Royen) could get together with the two Indonesian representatives in my presence on that day. A copy of the note handed over to me by Amb. Schurmann is appended herewith.

13 February 1962

SECRET

TO: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

FROM: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 3 February 1962

Ambassador Sukardjo of Indonesia saw me on 5 February and informed me that his colleague, Amb. Tjondronegoro, had left for London on the previous day to establish informal contacts with the Netherlands officials with a view to obtaining some agreed basis for negotiations. He also informed me that Amb. Tjondronegoro would proceed to Bonn in the Federal Republic of Germany to make similar contacts with the Netherlands officials. When I asked him when he would come back to New York, he told me that he had no idea. He indicated to me that, if no progress was made in these informal soundings, Amb. Tjondronegoro might return to Djakarta and report to his Foreign Minister.

On 7 February Amb. Schurmann of the Netherlands saw me and delivered a note on the meeting between Amb. Malik and Amb. Bentinck in London. A copy of this note has already been sent to you. The most significant part of this note, it seems to me, is the reported statement of Amb. Malik to the effect that he was the only Indonesian to have the authority to contact the Netherlands representative, and that Ambassadors Sukardjo and Tjondronegoro did not have such an authority. The substance of this note is more or less on the same lines as the substance of my exploratory talks here, since the Indonesian representative insisted on a discussion of the transfer of administration of the area in dispute to Indonesia before formal negotiations take place.

Amb. Schurmann also informed me that his colleague in Washington, Amb. van Royen, would be back in the U.S. that afternoon and that he would meet him at the airport during his brief stop-over on his way to Washington. He promised to see me again if there is any new element regarding the program<sup>problem</sup> after he had seen Amb. van Royen. Until now there was no further word from Amb. Schurmann, and it is apparent that there is no further development.

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On 12 February Amb. Sukardjo asked me if I had any further news from the Netherlands representative. I told him that there was none except that some progress had been made regarding the return of Indonesian prisoners from West Irian to Indonesia under the good offices of the ICRC. I also informed him that you are looking into the matter regarding the modalities of the return of Indonesian prisoners.

Today (13 February) Amb. Yost of the U.S. Mission saw me and asked me if there was any progress in my efforts to bring the two parties together. I informed him that there was no further development except certain news agency reports emanating from Bonn.

SECRET

6 March 1962

To: Mr. C.V. Narasimhan  
Chef de Cabinet

From: The Secretary-General

Continuation of my note of 13 February 1962

Ambassadors van Royen and Schumann saw me on Wednesday, 28 February, and conveyed to me the following information.

Mr. Robert Kennedy, Attorney-General of the United States, brought from President Sukarno a message to the Prime Minister of the Netherlands to the effect that he was prepared to depute an Indonesian diplomat to negotiate with a Netherlands diplomat to determine the agenda for formal discussions in the presence of a third person. President Sukarno maintained that for obvious reasons these discussions should be absolutely secret and that the third person should preferably be a representative of the United States Government. The reason given was that if I were to act as the third person it would be hardly possible to keep the discussions secret as the visit of the two Government representatives to the United Nations Secretariat could not be kept away from the press, and since any such discussions involving my presence could not conceivably take place outside the United Nations Secretariat.

The two Ambassadors informed me that the Netherlands Government would prefer to have me as the third person, even for the discussion of the agenda, and they asked me for my views. I told them that I would be perfectly happy to see the discussions take place in the presence of any third party, provided the two Governments concerned agreed on him, and I ventured the suggestion that a representative of the United States Government would be ideal for that purpose.

They then informed me that President Sukarno, according to Mr. Robert Kennedy, would be perfectly willing to have the discussions

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take place in my presence when the agenda is agreed to. The Netherlands Government likewise would be very happy to have the benefit of my good offices once the preliminary discussions on the agenda are completed. I assured them that I would be very happy to offer my good offices at any stage of the negotiations.

The two Ambassadors then informed me that Mr. Luns, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, would be flying to Washington on Friday (2 March) to have further discussions with the Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, and President Kennedy.

Today, (6 March) Ambassador Schurmann saw me again and informed me that Foreign Minister Luns had several discussions with the Secretary of State and President Kennedy, and that he was informed by them that the United States Ambassador in Djakarta, Mr. Jones, had reported to the State Department that for the purpose of preliminary discussions on the agenda President Sukarno would prefer to have a prominent American, not necessarily connected with the State Department, to act as the third party during the discussions. Ambassador Jones, in his report to Washington, had suggested that a president of a well-known university would meet with President Sukarno's requirements. Mr. Luns was also informed that Washington would be in contact with Djakarta on this point and that the Netherlands Government would be informed of any concrete proposal as soon as possible. It was also agreed between the two Governments concerned that Ambassador Malik, Indonesian Ambassador in Moscow, would represent his country in the negotiations and that Ambassadors van Royen and Schurmann would represent the Netherlands. He also informed me that the preliminary discussions would take place in New York, possibly this week. He also assured me that he would keep me posted with further developments.

SECRET

18 May 1962

TO: The Chef de Cabinet

FROM: The Secretary-General

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Ambassador Schurmann of the Netherlands saw me today and handed over to me the attached note from the Prime Minister of the Netherlands with a request that a copy of the same be transmitted to the Permanent Representative of Indonesia. Mr. Schurmann emphasized two points of the letter, namely, I. requesting me to remind Indonesia of her primary obligations under the provisions of the U.N. Charter to refrain from all aggressive actions, and II. reiterating his Government's former request to me to send some impartial observers to the territory in order that they may take note of the actual situation prevailing there and to prevent, if possible, further aggression.

I assured Mr. Schurmann that I would transmit a copy of the Prime Minister's letter to the Indonesian Representative and that I would stress the two points emphasized by him.

Mr. Schurmann further informed me that his Prime Minister proposed to make a statement in the Netherlands Parliament on Monday afternoon and he requested me for another meeting on Monday morning to acquaint himself with any reaction that the Indonesian Representative might convey to me. He also informed me that his Government had requested me to distribute this letter as a Security Council document on Tuesday morning, 22 May.

I told him to come and see me at 11.30 a.m. on Monday.

This afternoon I sent for Ambassador Sukardjo of Indonesia and transmitted to him a copy of this letter and conveyed to him the two points stressed by the Netherlands Representative. Mr. Sukardjo informed me that he had so far not received any reply from Djakarta regarding the request of the Netherlands Government about my sending some observers to the territory. His personal reaction was completely negative and he

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informed me that his Government would not agree to the stationing of outside observers in the territory under dispute. I also informed him of the proposed statement to be made by the Netherlands Prime Minister on Monday afternoon and the request by the Government of the Netherlands to distribute this letter as a Security Council document on Tuesday morning. I further requested him to inform me of any further developments by 10.30 a.m. on Monday so that I may be able to transmit that information to the Representative of the Netherlands.