

OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 14 December 1960  
No : B-1680

1. My B-1561, 1562 discussed questions posed by flight of Lumumba. His subsequent recapture may have left unconsidered several policy problems which developments in Stanleyville still keep very much to the fore. These particularly concern attitude or action ONUC should take toward ANC troop movements as set out in paragraphs 5 through 11 of that cable.
2. Active character of this problem is indicated by Indonesian reports from Coquilhatville that Mobutu on 12 December moved two ANC platoons by chartered Air Congo DC-4 to Lisala on Congo River in Equateur reportedly to stop infiltration in that area from Orientale Province. On 11 December one ANC platoon was airlifted by the same aircraft from Coquilhatville to Boende.
3. Urgently request policy directive.



LEOPOLDVILLE  
14 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

B-1679    SEC GEN FROM DAYAL REFERENCE B-1678 PARA 7 FOLLOWING IS TEXT  
OF LETTER TO KASAVUBU CLN

QUOTE

(text attached)

UNQUOTE



Le 14 décembre 1960

Excellence,

J'ai l'honneur d'attirer de la manière la plus urgente votre attention, en votre qualité de Commandant suprême de l'Armée nationale congolaise (ANC), sur la situation d'une extrême gravité qui a été soudain créée à la base militaire de Kitona. Les faits, dont je présume qu'ils vous sont connus, sont les suivants.

Dans la matinée du 13 décembre, une mission composée de cinq commissaires généraux et de deux conseillers belges est arrivée par avion à Kitona, sans que les Nations Unies aient été informées de ce voyage. Après s'être entretenues, hors la présence de représentants des Nations Unies, avec le personnel supérieur du groupe d'assistance technique belge qui se trouve encore à Kitona, la mission s'est rendue à Banane. Vers quatorze heures, une unité de l'ANC de 120 hommes, complètement équipée et possédant quatre canons, s'est présentée à Kitona et a demandé à occuper la base. Cette unité était accompagnée des commissaires généraux qui s'étaient rendus à Banane en fin de matinée. Conformément à ses ordres, l'officier commandant le contingent de la Force des Nations Unies à Kitona s'est opposé à l'entrée sur la base de l'unité de l'ANC. Les officiers de cette dernière ont alors menacé d'avoir recours à la force pour pénétrer dans la base.

Le Général Kettani, Commandant suprême a.i. de la Force des Nations Unies, a immédiatement, dans l'après-midi d'hier, le 13 décembre, soulevé cette question avec votre Chef d'Etat-Major, le Colonel Mobutu. Ce dernier a indiqué qu'il n'avait pas donné d'ordre visant à occuper par la force la base de Kitona. Il a en conséquence été prié d'ordonner immédiatement le retrait des troupes de l'ANC qui étaient arrivées à la base, et il a promis qu'il le ferait.

Cependant, au lieu que la situation s'améliore, les dernières nouvelles reçues de Kitona sont extrêmement sérieuses, et révèlent soit que les ordres donnés par le Colonel Mobutu n'ont pas été exécutés, soit que les ordres que ce dernier avait promis de donner ne l'ont pas été. En effet, malgré les assurances reçues par les Nations Unies, et passant outre à l'injonction de l'officier commandant le contingent des Nations Unies à Kitona, l'ANC a finalement pénétré dans la base, et y renforcé son effectif pendant la nuit. Cet effectif

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Joseph Kasa-Vubu  
Président de la République du Congo  
Léopoldville



était estimé ce matin à plus de 200 hommes répartis dans toute la base, avec une auto blindée et une jeep armée d'une mitrailleuse, en plus du matériel qui avait été amené hier. L'ANC s'est emparée d'un nombre de véhicules du parc de voitures de la base, parmi lesquels figurent cinq camions et quatre jeeps que les Nations Unies ont décidé d'acheter au Gouvernement belge.

Vous n'êtes pas sans savoir que la question du statut des bases militaires de Kamina et de Kitona a été examinée par le Conseil de Sécurité, et a fait l'objet du troisième rapport du Secrétaire général au Conseil sur l'application des résolutions de ce dernier relatives au Congo (S/4475). Comme l'indique ce rapport, l'administration temporaire des bases par les Nations Unies doit être considérée comme une mesure provisoire au sens de l'Article 40 de la Charte, sans préjudice des droits, des prétentions ou de la position des parties intéressées. Il a été indiqué clairement qu'en s'acquittant de cette responsabilité, et jusqu'au moment où les parties intéressées se seront mises d'accord sur la disposition des bases, l'Organisation doit exercer en tant qu'administrateur de Kamina et de Kitona une autorité exclusive, afin d'assurer la sauvegarde de tous les intérêts en cause.

En conséquence, la pénétration de l'ANC dans la base de Kitona doit être considérée comme une ingérence flagrante dans le mandat d'administration de la base donné au Secrétaire général par le Conseil de Sécurité. Les conditions dans lesquelles cette ingérence a eu lieu sont telles qu'on se trouve en présence d'un véritable acte d'agression contre les Nations Unies. On ne saurait en outre laisser de se préoccuper de la coïncidence dans le temps, d'une part de la tentative de l'ANC de se saisir de la base, et d'autre part de l'arrivée à Kitona d'une mission des commissaires généraux. Si l'on songe de plus que cette mission a tenté de discuter la question de la disposition de la base directement avec le groupe d'assistance technique belge, sans en informer au préalable les Nations Unies et en tenant celles-ci à l'écart de ces discussions, il est impossible de n'en pas conclure que l'Organisation se trouve placée devant une tentative unilatérale délibérée de la part des autorités congolaises d'entraver l'exécution par les Nations Unies du mandat du Conseil de Sécurité. S'il entrait dans les intentions de ces autorités d'engager des discussions au sujet de la disposition des bases après que les Nations Unies se seront acquittées des responsabilités qui lui ont été confiées, la méthode normale eût consisté à prendre contact avec mon Quartier général. La méthode de la force n'est pas le langage qu'il convient d'employer en traitant avec les Nations Unies.

Je suis certain, Excellence, que vous apprécierez la gravité de la situation qui a été créée par l'action précipitée de vos commissaires généraux et des troupes de l'ANC. Si la Force des Nations Unies devait se trouver obligée, pour la défense de la base de Kitona et pour sa propre défense, d'avoir recours à la force, la responsabilité n'en incombera pas aux Nations Unies. Dans ces circonstances, j'ose exprimer le ferme espoir que Votre Excellence prendra immédiatement les mesures appropriées pour que les troupes de l'ANC qui ont pénétré dans la base de Kitona et y ont occupé des positions agressives se retirent sur-le-champ.

J'ai informé le Secrétaire général de ces très sérieux événements.

Veuillez agréer, Excellence, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Rajeshwar Dayal  
Représentant spécial du  
Secrétaire général



OUTGOING CLEAR

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Secgen New York  
From: Dayal Leopoldville  
Date: 14 December 1960  
No: B-1678

Your 4182. The UN Civilian Administrator of Kitona Base reported at 0930 hours that the ANC had established an armed guard at the gasoline depot and the vehicle park. The UN Moroccan Officer in charge had stopped distribution of gasoline to the base. The ANC however told the Congolese workers to refuel their trucks and return to work. In order therefore to keep away the Congolese workers from the scene, which would have added to the confusion, Headquarters ONUC have ordered that no gasoline should be issued to any vehicle today, and a holiday has been declared.

2. An ONUC Liaison Officer called on the ANC Chief of Staff, Col. Mobutu, at 1000 hours and informed him of the serious situation at Kitona Base. Col. Mobutu expressed surprise and categorically denied having issued any orders to the ANC units in the area to occupy the base. He suggested that this action had probably been carried out through local initiative, thereby placing the responsibility on the five members of the College of Commissioners and the local ANC. He said that he would be prepared to send one of his Staff Officers by air to Kitona to convey to the local ANC his orders to vacate the base immediately. This was agreed to and arrangements have been made to fly Col. Mobutu's representative with a senior UN Moroccan officer to Kitona immediately.

3. Col. Mobutu was informed of a number of vehicles, the property of the UN, having been seized by the ANC which must be returned to the UN Base Administration forthwith. He has given assurances that his representative would arrange their return.

4. At 1200 hours, the President of the College of Commissioners, Mr. Bomboko was telephoned and indicated that the action of the ANC had been provoked by rumours spread by Moroccan soldiers of the UN Force at Boma



and Matadi. Those soldiers were alleged to have told the ANC that Belgian paratroopers were about to land at Kitona and that the ANC should go there in order to defend the base. Mr. Bomboko was told that any complaint about the behaviour of members of the United Nations Force should be referred immediately to ONUC Headquarters and that his explanations could in no way justify the action taken by the ANC. In addition, it was pointed out to Mr. Bomboko that the arrival at Kitona in the morning of 13 December of the mission of Commissioners-General accompanied by two Belgian Counsellors, could hardly be reconciled with his explanations as to the causes of the development. Mr. Bomboko was asked to see to it that the Commissioners-General do not take any unilateral initiative on the matter of the disposition of Kitona Base and that he exercise immediately his good offices with the ANC in order to obtain an immediate withdrawal of their troops from Kitona Base.

5. The inherent improbability of Mr. Bomboko's allegations concerning the behaviour of UN soldiers at Boma and Matadi is evident from the fact that Kitona Base is being adequately guarded by UN troops against any possible eventuality.

6. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General has sent a letter of protest to the Chief of State in his capacity as Supreme Commander of the ANC in which he has clearly stated where the responsibility would lie in the event of any clash developing at Kitona Base.

7. Text of letter to Kasavubu is being cabled separately.



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDOVILLE  
Date : 14 December 1960  
No : B- 1677

Following letter dated Stanleyville 5 December received today.  
Naturally I am taking no action on enclosed telegram but content has  
important implications both as to moves for troop withdrawals and as  
indicating intent to establish opposition capital in Stanleyville.

Quote (text attached) UNQUOTE  
"A"

Enclosure addressed "aux pays afro-asiatiques ayant leurs  
troupes au Congo" reads as follows

Quote (text attached) Unquote  
"B"

Stanleyville, le 1<sup>er</sup> décembre 1960

Monsieur D A Y A L  
Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général,  
à LEOPOLDVILLE.-  
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Monsieur,

Vu la gravité de la situation, j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de bien vouloir transmettre par vos soins ce télégramme joint à la lettre, aux pays afro-asiatiques qui ont leurs unités au Congo sous votre responsabilité.

Comme vous devez le savoir mieux que moi l'O.N.U. au Congo, devient de plus en plus la cible des pays observateurs pour avoir été inconsciemment le par-avant de la politique et de la complicité de l'Amérique avec ses satellites du bloc occidental. Le jeu de la politique américaine est maintenant à découvert. Pour ceux-ci, la force nationaliste du Congo doit à tout prix être anéantie en semant la panique parmi la population pacifique par des arrestations et des tueries comme c'est le cas récemment à Kikwit.

Je vous invite à prendre vos responsabilités quand il est pas encore trop tard. La politique de neutralité jouée jusqu'ici par l'O.N.U., a été pour favoriser la minorité qui doit s'emparer du pouvoir pour le mettre au service des impérialistes occidentaux.

Je ne veux ici jeter la pierre sur votre personne qui n'est venu au Congo qu'en dernière minute quand tout était déjà consommé. Mais je veux simplement attirer votre attention sur un échec éventuel de l'O.N.U. au Congo dont les conséquences négatives et les fausses accusations seraient capitalièrement aggravées par votre innocence, actuellement Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général. Vous connaissez suffisamment l'habileté des Occidentaux dans cette matière.

Je crois fermement que vous m'aideriez cette fois-ci pour sauver le Congo et vous demande de dépêcher vos forces pour défendre le peuple de la région de Kikwit contre les expéditions punitives de MOBUTU.

Vous remerciant anticipativement, veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Représentant Spécial, l'assurance de ma considération très distinguée.-

VICE-PRÉMIER MINISTRE  
de la République du Congo

Antoine MIZENGA



TELEGRAMME

aux pays afro-asiatiques ayant leurs troupes  
au Congo.

11  
DEVANT SITUATION GRAVE CREEE PAR COMPLICITÉ ACCIDENTAUX  
DONT ETAS UNIS AMERIQUE EN TETE SE SERVAT DES NATIONS UNIES AU  
CONGO POUR CAMOUFLER LEUR POLITIQUE STOP LANCE VIBRANT APEL VOS  
PAYS POUR EVACUATION URGENTE VOS FORCES CONGO STOP AINSI MANOEUVRES  
OCCIDENTAUX A DECOUVRENT RENCONTRERONT CE QUI LES ATTEND STOP  
TOUT RETARD VOUS APPORTEZ CETTE SOLUTION FAIT SOMBRER CONGO ET  
AFRIQUE STOP. PENCHEZ VOUS SERIEUSEMENT SUR CE PROBLEME ET RESERVEZ  
CONGO SOLUTION SALUTAIRE DANS BREF DELAI STOP PEUPLE CONGOLAIS  
MALGRE SON MORAL BON EST IMPUISSANT DEVANT FORCE MILITAIRE DES  
IMPERIALISTES SOUS ETIQUETTE MOBUTU STOP DEMANDE A VOS EXCELLENCES  
VOS DIPLOMATES PUISSENT VENIR EN DIRECT RESIDER STANLEYVILLE  
POUR QUE TRAITIONS ENSEMBLE PROBLEME CONGO STOP INSISTE SUR URGENCE  
STOP TRES HAUTE CONSIDERATION FULSTOP.

VICE-PREMIER MINISTRE  
de la République du Congo

Antoine GIZENGA.-



To: Secgen New York  
From: Dayal Leopoldville  
Date: 14 December 1960  
No: B-1676

The sudden grave developments at Kitona are a clear act of aggression on the part of the Commissioners and the ANC against us. I have asked Kettani immediately to send the Moroccan company from Boma to the base to surround the ANC who have assumed aggressive positions there. He however prefers to alert them while negotiations take place here. Meanwhile, Berthiaume has been sent to remind Mobutu of his promise to Kettani yesterday which has not been kept; on the contrary, the ANC have been reinforced during the night. In our negotiations here I feel that we would be operating from a position of strength if our military posture at Kitona is strengthened.

2. The whole affair smacks of a conspiracy between the Congolese authorities and the Belgians as it is significant that two Belgian counsellors accompanied the Commissioners to the base yesterday. While the Belgian head of the technical mission at Kitona has been expressing surprise and dismay at the developments, he obviously had little hesitation in handing over the keys.

3. The stores at Kitona base are valuable to Mobutu for his threatened build up of the ANC as there is a large number of vehicles, plenty of gasoline and a large store of ammunition. When Mobutu bragged the other day that he has plenty of arms for the 3000 ANC whom he proposes to recruit, he obviously had Kitona in mind. I am told that there is not much in the way of arms in Kitona in which context the arrival of a large Belgian transport at Brazzaville yesterday assumes an ominous significance. Knecht has gone to Brazzaville this morning to track our stolen vehicles and I have asked him to make enquiries about the cargo of the Belgian plane.



4. We cannot possibly afford to be thrown out by force from Kitona as it would completely undermine our military position and the Belgians, who have engineered this aggressive venture, would at the same time charge us with failure to carry out our responsibility for the care and maintenance of the base. The situation may even build up to some kind of a clash in Leo and I have asked that all our troops be alerted. While we shall bend to the utmost to avoid a clash here or in Kitona, should however, we be forced into one, the ANC should be taught a lesson once and for all which will make them desist in future from raising their hand against the UN troops.

5. I hope I have your agreement with this line of approach as it is essential to restore the shattered respect for the UN force among the lawless elements here. I am addressing a strong letter to Kasavubu as Supreme Commander asking for his intercession and placing the responsibility, should any clash develop, where it belongs.

6. Berthiaume reports that Mobutu puts the blame on the Commissioners and he has promised to send his liaison officer with a Moroccan officer to Kitona immediately.



INDICATE  
PRIORITY

S V C Service	FFFFF Routine	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS
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OUTGOING CODE

N R

Address(es)

(TEXT &amp; SIGNATURE)

insert prefix &amp; / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

TO: BUNCHE

FROM: DAYAL

DATE: 14 DECEMBER 1960

NUMBER B-1675 STOP IN VIEW PROPOSALS IN OUR B-1634  
CMA SUGGEST MOVEMENT OF ITALIAN HOSPITAL TEAM BE  
DELAYED UNTIL REQUIREMENTS HAVE BEEN REASSESSED IN  
LIGHT OF DECISIONS YOU WILL FINALLY TAKE STOP

cc: Brackenbury  
Col. Kapoor

I. N. 5990 — 200.000 — 7/60

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : Brackenbury

Authorized :

Date : 14.Dec.60.



INDICATE  
PRIORITY

S V C Service	FFFFF Routine	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS
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Address(es)

UNATIONS NEWYORK

*Handwritten:*  
14/12

(TEXT &amp; SIGNATURE)

insert prefix &amp; / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

B - 1674 FOR BUNCHE FROM DAYAL STOP REFERENCE YOUR  
4157 STOP UNLESS A MAJOR POLICY DECISION CAN BE MADE  
ON ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR C 119 MAINTENANCE WE  
MUST CONSIDER OUTSTANDING REQUESTS FOR PERSONNEL STILL  
VALID STOP IF YOU ARE ABLE TO ARRANGE FOR C 119 MAINTENANCE  
OUTSIDE CONGO AS PROPOSED OUR B-1634 THEN WE COULD CLEARLY  
REDUCE OUR PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS STOP WE ARE NOW STUDYING  
THE POSSIBILITY OF MAINTAINING THE DC-3'S AT NDJILI INSTEAD  
OF KAMINA STOP AS SOON AS WE RECEIVE YOUR DECISION  
REGARDING C 119'S WE WILL PREPARE A REVISED STATEMENT  
OF OUR PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS FOR AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE  
AFTER TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL FACTORS KNOWN TO US STOP

cc: The Air Commander  
Brackenbury

I. N. 5990 — 200.000 - 7/60

T. O. R.

BY:

*Handwritten signature:* CM

Drafted by : Brackenbury

Authorized :

T. O. D.

Date : 14 Dec. 60.



CLEAR

To : SECGEN  
From : DAYAL  
Date : 13 December 1960  
No. : B-1672

MOST IMMEDIATE

*h.f. Lubben*  
*Boys*

1. A very serious situation has developed today at the former Belgian military base of Kitona, on the basis of two first reports.

2. At 1020 hours local time, the United Nations civilian administrator of the Kitona Base reported that a mission composed of five commissioners-general of the Congolese College of Commissioners, accompanied by two Belgian counsellors, had unexpectedly arrived at the base by chartered plane. Headquarters of ONUC had not been informed of the College's intention to despatch such a mission.

3. After its arrival, the mission went into a meeting with senior members of the Belgian technical mission which is still at the base (see document S/4557, paragraph 105). No United Nations officials were invited to participate in this meeting. The senior Belgian official later declared that the Commissioners-General had come to him to discuss the disposition of the base; but he had answered that he could give them no information as they had no official credentials from their government. The mission later in the morning proceeded to Banana with transportation provided by the United Nations base administration.

4. At 1400 hours an ANC unit of 120 men in 4 trucks and 6 jeeps, supported by a battery of 4 guns, arrived at Kitona Base accompanied by the Commissioners-General. It was learnt that this unit had moved from Matadi to Banana in the morning. The Moroccan officer-in-charge of the United Nations contingent at the base denied the ANC entry into the base. A discussion ensued, during which it was proposed from the Congolese side that ANC and United Nations soldiers take up joint guard duties throughout the base. The excuse given for this suggestion was that the Belgians were to leave the next day, and that Belgian paratroopers would land at the base at any moment. The United Nations officer-in-charge having refused to accede to the Congolese proposal, the ANC commander declared that he had orders to take over the base, and that he would use force to do so if necessary. Four of the commissioners advised him against doing so, whereupon they were arrested by the ANC on the ground that they were in league with the Belgians. The Commissioner for Defence, however, supported the ANC's contention that they should use force to occupy the base. The United Nations officer-



in-charge warned that any attempt at using force to enter the base would be resisted by force according to the principle of self-defence. The situation as last reported was that United Nations and ANC troops were facing each other at the gate of the base, and that the situation was very tense. Meanwhile, the four arrested Commissioners were released through United Nations intervention, and the Commissioners' mission was reported to be on its way back to Leopoldville.

5. In the afternoon, the senior member of the Belgian technical mission reported that the ANC officers had seized the keys of the vehicles and offices still used by Belgians. The circumstances under which such a seizure, as opposed to a handing-over, of the keys would have been possible, have not yet been established.

6. The question of the status of the former military bases of Kamina and Kitona was dealt with by the Security Council at its 887th meeting, and was the object of the third report of the Secretary-General to the Council on the implementation of its resolutions on the Congo (S/4475). As stated therein, the temporary administration of the bases by the United Nations is to be regarded as a provisional measure within the meaning of Article 40 of the Charter, without prejudice to the rights and claims of the parties concerned. In the fulfilment of this responsibility, it has been made clear that the United Nations must exercise exclusive authority as administrator, as not to do so would impair the impartiality of the Organization, which in this case acts as caretaker for all legitimate interests involved in accordance with recognized principles of law.

7. The attempted action of the ANC reported above must thus be considered as a flagrant interference with the mandate given to the Secretary-General by the Security Council in respect of Kitona Base, an interference which took place in conditions which lend to it the nature of a deliberate attempt at committing an act of aggression against the United Nations. Moreover, one must view with the greatest concern the coincidence in timing of the ANC attempt at seizing the base with the arrival at Kitona of a mission of the Commissioners-General. If, furthermore, the mission tried to enter into negotiations about the disposition of the base directly with the remaining Belgian technical mission, without prior notice to, nor participation of, the United Nations, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the United Nations is being faced with a ~~unilateral~~ unilateral attempt on the part of the Congolese authorities to frustrate the execution of the mandate of the Security Council.

8. General Kettani, the Acting Commander of the United Nations Force, has immediately taken up this matter with the ANC Chief of Staff, Colonel Mobutu, and has demanded that the ANC desist



immediately from its attempt to occupy the Kitona Base by force. Colonel Mobutu has indicated that he would issue orders to the ANC/base commander - whom he has apparently already designated - that the troops be withdrawn from Kitona.

Kitona



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 13 December 1960  
No : B-1671

This morning we again contacted Bomboko about the continued obstruction to our movements by the order to OTRACO. Bomboko, after expressing simulated surprise that his orders had not been obeyed, said he would again speak to Nendaka. He then launched into various irrelevancies including an exposition of the intricacies of administration, UNOC's insistence on this matter in contrast to dilatoriness to secure Songolo's release, its colonialist methods in trying to exercise pressure, ad nauseum. They try to throttle us and when we struggle to escape the noose, we are charged with all kinds of misdemeanours.

2. Later Timberlake telephoned to say that he had spoken to Bomboko who assured him that the restrictions were being lifted and that I would receive a letter from him in confirmation. As six hours have elapsed and nothing has happened, I am sending another protest to Kasa-Vubu.

3. The three Western Ambassadors were informed about the Stanleyville situation, and I made it clear that there was no room for complacency as the situation could erupt again. They emphasized that the withdrawal of the Europeans would mean great economic loss to the province and to the individuals themselves. I told them that the question of security of the personnel was of primary importance and if the local authorities could not assure it, it was for the envoys to take whatever decision they considered appropriate. It would of course be impossible for us to watch over the foreigners indefinitely. I left them in no doubt as to the point at which our responsibility ceases and theirs begins. Their consular representatives are due back this evening and they have the intention of sending one representative at a time to watch the situation, to which I have agreed.



4. They expressed much anxiety about the redeployment of our troops and I had to tell them that we could not afford to be hopelessly outnumbered and out-gunned in Stanleyville.

5. I have just spoken to the Indonesian Battalion Commander from Coquilhatville who tells me that the Provincial President has been openly saying that he has no need for the UN troops or technicians. His Vice-President went to Brussels recently to get Belgians in large numbers who are shortly expected. In view of the open hostility to the UN troops and technical and civilian personnel in Coquilhatville, we have to consider anxiously the question of their withdrawal. The Indonesian Colonel is convinced that if the troops withdraw, the civilian staff could not possibly continue. Our intention was to replace the Indonesians, who are badly wanted in Leopoldville to enable us to hold our own against the ANC here, by the UAR troops but we are told that their arrival in Coquilhatville would be opposed.

6. In view of the disquieting news of the possible withdrawal of so many contingents, totalling almost 6000 men, we may have to abandon Equateur province altogether which is the domain of Mobutu-Bomboko. They have been busy making defence arrangements along the Orientale border.

7. There is some information that Mobutu has declared that he will recruit some 3000 troops for whom he claims he has ample arms.


8. Gizenga's telegram to the President of Secco regarding the shifting of the capital from Leo to Stanleyville is ominous and presages the setting up of the "legitimate government" there. The missions which have been expelled from here will no doubt flock to their new haven to stoke the fires of the incipient civil war.

9. I am separately reporting on the attempt which was made by the Commissioners-General to spring a surprise on us by forcibly seizing the Kitona base. This is a clear act of attempted aggression and I hope that an open clash between the Moroccans and the ANC does not develop. I shall address a strong letter of protest to Kasa-Vubu.



OUTGOING CODE

To : Secgen  
From : Dayal  
Date ; 13 December 1960  
No. : B-1670



Kettani met Mobutu this afternoon as previously arranged. Mobutu said that he wanted to take over Kitona Base and asked for UN assistance in converting it into a pilot and parachute school. Kettani explained that this would be very expensive and would require a good deal of time before it could start. Kettani advised that it was more essential for the ANC to train its officers, without which it could make little progress. Mobutu replied that he intended to open an officers' and warrant officers' academy at Coquilhatville, where he proposed to train 25 of each cadre at a time. He asked for 5 or 6 UN officers to provide technical assistance. Kettani agreed to consider this request.

Kettani impressed on Mobutu that it was up to the Congolese authorities to ask for UN assistance. He also added that it was essential to agree on a policy of military technical assistance to the ANC, and once finalized both the Congolese authorities and the UN should adhere to it. This led to a discussion on the present lack of accord between Congolese authorities and the UN, which prevented a regular flow of UN assistance. Mobutu said that he had already arranged to meet President Kasa-Vubu to discuss this very subject and he would telephone Kettani the results of the discussion.



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MOST IMMEDIATE

Address(es)

~~SECRET~~ UNATIONS NEWYORKMOST IMMEDIATE

(TEXT &amp; SIGNATURE)

insert prefix &amp; / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

B-1669

SECGEN FROM DAYAL THIS MORNING 46 JEEPS FOR COQUILHATVILLE CMA  
LULUABOURG CMA STANLEYVILLE AND LISALA CMA ONE MINIBUS FOR  
COQUILHATVILLE AND ONE DISMANTLED CRANE FOR KAMINA WERE TO BE  
LOADED FOR DESPATCH BY OTRACO RIVER BARGES STOP ONUC MOVEMENT  
CONTROL ORGANIZATION RECEIVED A WRITTEN CONFIRMATION FROM  
MR E BOUKOU CMA CHIEF OF HARBOUR CMA OTRACO LEOPOLDVILLE CMA  
THAT HE HAD NOT RECEIVED ANY INSTRUCTIONS RESCINDING THE BAN  
IMPOSED ON THE MOVEMENT OF UN STRATEGIC MATERIAL AND VEHICLES  
BY OTRACO CMA WHICH HAD BEEN IMPOSED ON 2 DECEMBER BY MR NENDAKA  
CMA COMMISSAIRE DE SURETE STOP THIS WAS LATER CONFIRMED BY MR  
ZANGA CMA DIRECTEUR EXPLOITATION OTRACO LEOPOLDVILLE STOP  
ALREADY ~~XXX~~ 18 VEHICLES OF GHANA POLICE WHICH WERE UNDER DESPATCH  
ON 9 DECEMBER BY TRAIN FROM LEOPOLDVILLE TO MATADI HAVE BEEN  
REFUSED TRANSPORTATION STOP FURTHERMORE ONLY ONE TRANSHIPMENT  
OF TWO RAIL ~~XXX~~ WAGONS FROM MATADI TO LEOPOLDVILLE HAS BEEN  
PERMITTED WHICH ONLY CONTAINS PERSONAL EFFECTS AND SUPPLIES

I. N. 5990 — 200.000 - 7/60

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by : Rikhye

Authorized : Dayal

Date : 13.12.1960



LEOPOLDVILLE  
13 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

B-1668      SEC GEN FROM DAYAL      FOLLOWING MESSAGE WAS JUST HANDED  
TO IYASSU BY CHEF DE CABINET OF QUOTE PRIME MINISTER MR PATRICE  
LUMUMBA UNQUOTE MESSAGE READS CLN TELEGRAMME PRESIDENT ASSEMBLEE  
GENERALE ONU    PRESIDENT CONSEIL SECURITE SECRETAIRE GENERAL ONU NEW  
YORK    VOUS INFORMONS A DATER 12 DECEMBRE 1960 17 HEURES LOCALES EN  
VERTU PLEINS POUVOIRS ACCORDES 13 SEPTEMBRE 1960 PAR PARLEMENT  
GOUVERNEMENT AVOIR DECIDE INSTALLER PROVISoireMENT CAPITALE REPUBLIQUE  
DU CONGO A STANLEYVILLE STOP    POUR LE CONSEIL DES MINISTRES LE VICE  
PRESIDENT A GIZENGA STOP END



OUTGOING CODE

To : Secgen  
From : Dayal  
Date : 12 December 1960  
No. : B-1667

Since von Horn's luncheon for Bomboko and Mobutu, where Kettani took the opportunity of telling them some home truths, Kettani has had another talk with Mobutu. After Mobutu's return from Coquilhatville, discussions will continue in regard to the future training of the ANC. Kettani informs us that he advised Bomboko and Mobutu at the luncheon meeting that in view of the disinterest shown by the ANC in receiving further training he could not possibly continue to retain a large number of instructors idle when they were badly needed in Morocco. Furthermore, as the Congolese had organized a Ministry of Defence and the ANC a General Staff (with the assistance of the Belgians), Kettani proposed to return home such Moroccans as had been earmarked for this purpose. He also said that, having imparted basic training to the para-commandos, there was no further need for Moroccan assistance. Therefore he intended to return all instructors except those required to organize the proposed Officers' Military Academy at Luluabourg.

Kettani further states that many of his officers and men have become disheartened due to the attitude of the ANC; therefore the unwilling amongst the instructors earmarked for the Officers' Academy are also being returned to Morocco. He emphasized to Bomboko and Mobutu that while he was always available to give advice or assistance to the Congolese, he was not going to take the initiative unless there was a specific request. Kettani definitely had the impression that the Congolese wanted UN assistance, but only on their own terms.

Kettani has informed us in writing that the Moroccan contingent will serve for six months and is therefore due for rotation on or about 15 January. Their three-and-a-half battalions will be replaced by only one infantry battalion. When told that this would have an adverse effect on ONUC's ability to carry out its law and order mandate, he first pointed out the security needs of Morocco, but later came out with the truth that Morocco, except for a token participation of one battalion, did not wish to make a larger contribution to ONUC in view of the present political situation in the ~~Congo~~ Congo. He said that Moroccans



were not wanted by the present Congolese authorities, and the Congolese people have told the Moroccans to go home, not only here in Leopoldville, but also at Thysville and Matadi. While he appreciates the adverse effect of the departure of the bulk of his contingent without relief, he said that the presence of UN troops is only supporting the present Congolese régime and its supporters who no longer welcome ONUC. While the Moroccans did not wish to desert altogether the UN effort in the Congo, they were not willing to support the present set-up in the Congo at great sacrifice to their own country.

Kettani is unhappy over developments in Orientale Province and expressed dissatisfaction with ONUC's obvious efforts to protect the European population there in contrast to our more neutral attitude towards disturbances amongst the Congolese. Kettani was told that Europeans were foreign nationals and therefore deserved special treatment, whereas UN had to be careful to avoid taking sides when incidents were confined to the ~~Congolese~~ Congolese only. He generally accepted this, but said that his officers and men failed to understand the tremendous effort made by ONUC to save Belgian lives when these were the same nationals who were undermining the total UN effort in the Congo. This view has equally been expressed by members of many contingents to our operational staff this morning, and indicates the surge of feeling against Belgian policies which have resulted in the present situation in the Congo. Officers and men are giving their lives and many are being wounded in saving Belgians in Katanga. With determined effort many Belgians who form the majority group of Europeans in Orientale are being protected now. On the other hand, it is the Belgians who are supporting Bomboko, Mobutu, etc., in all the anti-UN activities which are sabotaging the very roots of our efforts. This development amongst the rank and file of the force cannot be easily overlooked.

The Indonesian Commander is in Leopoldville and reports that he has completed his task in Coquilhatville. The Indonesians feel that they are no longer wanted and have been more or less told by the Provincial authorities that law and order can be maintained by their own security forces. The local authorities are very perturbed over the planned relief of the Indonesians by the UAR troops, and they have gone so far as to say that they would rather have no UN troops there at all than the UAR. The Provincial authorities remain on non-speaking terms with Van der Goot, bringing our civilian operations virtually to a standstill. The only people who still want the UN troops to remain in Coquilhatville are the Belgians.



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDOVILLE  
Date : 12 December 1960  
No : B-1666

1. The easing of Stanleyville situation seems to have increased the complacency of the threatened persons and their Consular and diplomatic representatives. There seems to be a tendency to take Manzikala's broadcast at its face value and not to evacuate even women and children. While it is for their own nationals to decide whether to stay or go, I have asked our people in Stanleyville to inform the Consular representatives that any such decision would be entirely on their own responsibility and if any difficulties develop later, the fault will not be ours. I have also explained this to Charpentier who entirely agrees. On the return of the Consular mission to-morrow, we will explain our position in a press release.
2. The Council debate, at which basic questions concerning this operation were raised, has had curious reactions here. Those who had been criticising and harassing us are unanimous in their view that the UN must not go. The western missions have seen a demonstration of our usefulness at Stanleyville. The exercise of brinkmanship gave a close-up view to its practitioners of the perilous chasm from which they have recoiled with horror.
3. The Congo News Agency, in a sharp departure from its usual attitude, has spoken of the "great role" of the UN troops in maintaining peace in key regions such as North Katanga, Orientale and Kasai which would become "breeding grounds of terrorism and civil war if the UN troops are withdrawn". The News Agency further speaks of the existence of many reasons for "the normalization of relations between the UN and the present Congolese authorities".



4. Another interesting development is a recent meeting between Sendwe and Kasa-Vubu - Bomboko at the latter's invitation. Incensed over the treatment of Tshombe as Chief of State during the recent Brazzaville festivities and his honouring by the Belgian King, Kasa-Vubu suggested a second Sendwe visit to North Katanga assisted by some of Mobutu's men. Sendwe declined the offer and said that he would only go under UN auspices. Kasa-Vubu is further reported to have said that he would not attend the conference of African Chiefs of State if Tshombe were treated as one.

5. The Belgians are playing a double game in backing up both Tshombe and Kasa-Vubu etc., and they are beginning to be found out. If they were ultimately to make their choice which could well be in favour of Tshombe, their position in Leopoldville would be unenviable. That could bring about a rapid transformation of the political situation, turning it full cycle.

6. There is some evidence that Mobutu's intention of constituting the Commissioners into a Provisional Government has not been welcomed by Ileo and his friends and there was a report that Kasa-Vubu supported his fellow-lodger, Ileo. It should be recalled that Ileo told me that he hoped to form his Cabinet soon and was hopeful of parliamentary support (probably as a result of the buying over of dissidents).

7. We are investigating into a report that stolen UN cars have appeared for sale in Brazzaville.



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen New York  
From: Dayal Leopoldville  
Date: 11 December 1960  
No: B-1664

I have spoken to Von Horn and feel that the most appropriate press release would be as follows:

Quote. General Von Horn, who has been continuously in command of the United Nations troops in the Congo from the start of the operation, is proceeding on a month's leave for rest and recuperation. During his three years in the United Nations, he has had practically no leave. General Kettani will be Acting Commander during General Von Horn's absence. Unquote.

The release will be made here at 1530 hours Leopoldville time.

2. The Stanleyville situation has been held in check, thanks to the efforts of Iyassu, etc. The Consular representatives, who have gone under UN auspices, have not had any untoward experience which one hopes will receive due appreciation. They however, made the mistake of allowing themselves to be taken by the local authorities to a conference without first being briefed by our people. As a result, they were treated to rough talk which somewhat unnerved them but the situation was retrieved by Iyassu's subsequent talk with Gizenga. The Consular representatives have reported their impressions to their principals; they plan to return on December 13. I hope they will not be lulled into a false sense of security into delaying evacuation of the Europeans as the situation remains extremely uncertain.

3. Another reason for the Mobutu-Bomboko trip to Coquilhatville is provided by the infiltrations from Orientale which have taken place at various points of Equateur province. There is also much concern among the local authorities and Belgians at the substitution of Indonesian by UAR troops. I agree with Von Horn that we should go ahead with this



move, hoping that the UAR battalion is not suddenly pulled away from the Congo. District Commissioner Salamu of Stanleyville is reported to have gone to Cairo. I hope this will not lead to a Lebanese type of situation being promoted.

4. We await the arrival of the Bureau of the Conciliation Commission. I hear however that Kasavubu and Mobutu will be in Brazzaville from December 15 onwards for the conference of African Chiefs of State.

5. As things are calmer in Leo, we have reduced, though not eliminated, our personal security arrangements.



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK

IMMEDIATE

From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE

Date : 11 December 1960

No : B-1663

Following cable dated 10 December 2015Z received from  
Stanleyville:

QUOTE

(text attached)

UNQUOTE



INCOMING CODE

To : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
From : IYASSU and KELLY, STANLEYVILLE  
Date : 10 December 1960 (2015Z)  
No : CIV 45

1. Diplomatic mission arrived 1530 hours local was greeted by Lundula, Ateta, Chef de Cabinet of Manzikala, and UN. They were whisked through entry formalities and into Sabena guest house. There was no opportunity for UN briefing on situation before Lundula and colleagues sat down with them for a meeting which we avoided attending. Thereafter they were taken to Manzikala. Sogba, Provincial Telecommunications Minister, also attended meeting by chance. Afterwards Mission came to UN to tell us on results meeting with Manzikala and Sogba.
2. They told us the meeting had been ominous. Sogba had exhibited xenophobia, extremest vocabulary regarding "imperialist capitalistic" etc. powers and threatened all Europeans (except Greeks, in answer to question put by Greek Consul). The ultimatum had been only postponed and would be reintroduced when "they" saw fit. Although Manzikala had been more reasonable and had not withdrawn his statement broadcast to-day, he had failed to stem his colleague. The Mission returned most disheartened. They felt they could not rely on the promises of the Orientale administration. Since UN could not guarantee individual protection of Europeans all over the province, they felt that evacuation might have to be considered. This could mean tremendous personal loss to individuals and collapse of the economy. Some of the representatives, particularly the French, felt that the Heads of Mission should be called from Leopoldville.
3. While we were discussing with the Mission, reports of arrests of Europeans in Bunia came in, which we did not announce to the meeting.
4. When the Mission left we went to see Gizenga. Salumu seems to have gone, some say to the UAR. Gizenga was all sweetness and reasonableness.



Our estimate is that he feels the cause of Lumumba and Stanleyville are in great danger and that he cannot afford to make an enemy of the UN. In any case he agreed to all our requests. In particular he stated that foreigners who did not work against the Congo were welcome and would not be intimidated. The ultimatum would not be reintroduced, he would look into the report of arrests in Bunia and would take action to cancel them if they had taken place, finally he gave his word that the 100 Belgians still under UN protection in a building at Stanleyville could go home without risk.

5. We are seeing the diplomatic (consular) representatives again to-morrow. We feel the danger to the foreign population is at least postponed. However any significant change in the fortunes of the Stanleyville clique could raise the danger again very seriously.

6. Situation in Stanleyville to-night completely calm. No arrests have been reported, no trace of unusual activity by police or army. Reinforced patrolling by Ethiopian Brigade continuing.



OUTGOING CODE

To : BUNCHE, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 10 December 1960  
No : B-1661

Reference 4090 from Fieldserv. I had spoken to you about strengthening our OPI and had further discussed the matter with Foote and Gordon. As a more senior man was unavailable, I suggested Faure who would have relieved the unrelenting pressure of press conferences, UN publications, radio programmes, liaison with press etc. and would have helped in expanding OPI activities in provinces as well as publication of news sheet in Lingala etc. With all our activities in the military and technical assistance fields going unrecognised, it is essential to beat our tom-tom more vigorously, so as not to lose our case by default. I request your good offices in securing Faure's services; he was quite willing to come.



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen New York  
From: Dayal Leopoldville  
Date: 10 December 1960  
No: B-1660

The news from Stanleyville, which has been repeated to you as soon as received, has fortunately relieved our immediate anxieties, the threat having been lifted. Eight Consular representatives departed this morning to examine the cases of their nationals and to arrange for their disposition in consultation and cooperation with UN representatives. This would help to reduce our responsibilities in regard to individual cases, with the UN providing general security. Iyassu and Kelly express concern over arrival of the group, but in view of urgency of matter and to allay the anxiety of the Embassies here, we concurred with the proposal. I hope that most of the Europeans could be evacuated since there is no knowing how the situation might develop when there is so much irresponsibility and violence in the air. The detailed measures which we have taken in Stanleyville after much anxious thought have had an immediate effect which I hope will not be lost upon our various critics.

2. Kivu province is restless although it has, comparatively speaking, been the most peaceful so far. In Kasai, the Ghana Brigade are doing a good job, but we are now faced there with the tremendous problem of refugee relief.

3. Mobutu and Bomboko have gone to Coquilhatville this morning and we are trying to ascertain the precise purpose of their sudden visit. There is a struggle between the Provincial President, some of his Ministers and leading members of the ANC. These dissensions must be awkward for the Mobutu-Bomboko group who wish to use Equateur as a base for action against Orientale province. Mobutu made an announcement three days ago that he intends to recruit some ANC from the Bakongo tribe, no doubt for action against Orientale. I do not know how seriously to take this declaration which, if carried out,



would only make confusion worse confounded and give the ANC a deeper tribal colour thereby intensifying internal conflict. The unannounced visit of Mobutu etc., may also have been undertaken to have a closer view of the Orientale situation from a safe vantage point. The replacement of the Indonesians by the UAR troops in Coquilhatville — although one does not know how long they will be in the Congo — is worrying the Europeans and the provincial administration, who are trying to create difficulties about accommodation etc., which are being resisted.

4. In North Katanga the ding-dong struggle between the Balubakats and the Gendarmerie goes on with UN troops busily introducing order wherever they are. On the whole, the situation there is under control.

5. Last night, the Malayans gave a largely attended dinner and dance party at which Mobutu and his wife were among the guests. We all had friendly exchanges with them, although Mobutu seemed somewhat preoccupied.

6. There is no fresh excitement in Leo which prepares for its weekend. But for the sixth floor there will be little relief from its vigil.



LEOPOLDVILLE  
10 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

IMMEDIATE

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

B-1659    SECEN FROM DAYAL    FOLLOWING CABLE DATED 10 DECEMBER 1445Z  
RECEIVED FROM BRZAK STANLEYVILLE CLN

QUOTE

(text attached)

UNQUOTE



UNCLAS 101445Z CIV 45 FROM BRZAK FOR DAVAL

MINISTRALA PROVINCIAL PRIME MINISTER ISSUED TODAY THIS PRESS COMMUNIQUE  
LE CONSEIL DES MINISTRES DU GOUVERNEMENT DE LA PROVINCE ORIENTALE TIEND  
A PORTER A LA CONNAISSANCE DU PUBLIC CE QUI SUIIT

1 LE GOUVERNEMENT ET L'ARMEE NATIONALE SONT DECIDES A ASSURER LA  
SECURITE DE TOUTES LES PERSONNES SE TROUVANT SUR LE TERRITOIRE DE  
LA PROVINCE, QUOI QU IL ARRIVE. ILS PRIENT PLUS PARTICULIEREMENT  
LES ETRANGERS, EUROPEENS ET CONGOLAIS DE SE RASSURER ENTIEREMENT.  
LE GOUVERNEMENT ET L'ARMEE NATIONALE PRIENT PLUS PARTICULIEREMENT  
LES TECHNICIENS ETRANGERS DE POURSUIVRE LEUR TRAVAIL SOUS SA

PROTECTION. L'ORDRE PUBLIC ET LA PROTECTION DES BIENS ET DES  
PERSONNES SERONT DESORMAIS ASSURES.

2 LE GOUVERNEMENT PROVINCIAL DENIE FORMELLEMENT QU'IL ENTRE DANS  
SES INTENTIONS D'IMPOSER AUX ENTREPRISES UNE AFRICANISATION FORCEE  
DES CADRES, QUI NE SERAIT PAS EN RAPPORT AVEC LES NECESSITES DE  
L'ECONOMIE ET LA RENTABILITE DE CES ENTREPRISES. LE GOUVERNEMENT  
CONNAIT VIVEMENT QUE CES ENTREPRISES POURSUIVENT LIBREMENT LA  
POLITIQUE D'AFRICANISATION QU'ELLES AVAIENT ENTAMEE AUPARAVANT DE  
MANIERE A CE QUE LE PLUS GRAND NOMBRE DE CONGOLAIS CAPABLES PUISSENT  
OCCUPER LE PLUS RAPIDEMENT POSSIBLE, DES POSTES DE RESPONSABILITES  
DANS LE SECTEUR PRIVE.

3 LE GOUVERNEMENT DENIE FORMELLEMENT QUE DES MESURES AIENT ETE PRISES  
EN CE QUI CONCERNE LES TRANSFERTS BANCAIRES. SEULES LES AUTORITES  
COMPETENTES ONT LE POUVOIR DE PRENDRE DE TELLES MESURES.

ENFIN, LE GOUVERNEMENT PROVINCIAL ET L'ARMEE NATIONALE ASSURENT TOUTS  
LES HABITANTS LOYAUX ET DE BONNE VOLONTE DE SON CONCOURS POUR RETABLIR  
L'ORDRE ET LA PAIX.

VIVE LA PROVINCE ORIENTALE

BT

CIV 101445Z 45 1 2 3

10/1510Z 550 000

100/11/20002



LEOPOLDVILLE  
10 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

IMMEDIATE

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

B-1658 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL REFERENCE MY B-1657 BARA EIGHT FOLLOWING IS  
TEXT OF LETTER SENT TO PRESIDENT KASAVUBU ON 10 DECEMBER CLN

QUOTE

(text attached)

UNQUOTE



Le 10 décembre 1960

Monsieur le Président,

J'ai l'honneur d'attirer votre attention sur la copie ci-jointe d'un ordre adressé le 2 décembre 1960 à l'OTRACO et à l'Agence maritime internationale par l'Administrateur en chef de la Sûreté, ordre restreignant le transport du matériel et des véhicules stratégiques ou militaires de la Force des Nations Unies au Congo.

Il est évident que la publication d'un tel ordre représente une ingérence dans l'exercice par la Force de ses fonctions essentielles au Congo. Je n'ai pas besoin de souligner que cet ordre constitue également une violation flagrante de l'Accord du 27 juillet 1960, signé par M. Bunche et par M. Bomboko, garantissant la liberté de mouvement à l'intérieur du pays pour la Force, et qu'il contrevient de même aux Articles 25 et 49 de la Charte des Nations Unies.

A la suite d'interventions réitérées faites au cours des derniers jours auprès de M. Bomboko et de M. Nendaka, nous avons été informés oralement que l'exécution de cet ordre avait été suspendue pour le moment, et que nous pouvions maintenant procéder aux expéditions pour lesquelles le chargement n'avait pas été effectué à la date prévue. Je suis persuadé que vous accorderiez qu'une indication indirecte de ce genre n'offre pas les assurances nécessaires que le fonctionnement de la Force dans son aspect essentiel ne sera plus l'objet d'aucune obstruction. Je dois donc vous demander d'une manière urgente de confirmer l'annulation formelle de l'ordre en question, et que de fermes directives soient données aux autorités intéressées pour que ne se renouvellent pas de semblables tentatives de harcèlement et d'obstruction de nos opérations; il est en effet essentiel qu'il n'y ait pas d'ingérence dans nos lignes de ravitaillement, tant militaires que civiles.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération.

Rajeshwar Dayal  
Représentant spécial du  
Secrétaire général

Son Excellence  
Monsieur Joseph Kasa-Vubu  
Président de la République du Congo  
Léopoldville



LEOPOLDVILLE  
10 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

IMMEDIATE

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

B-1657      SEC GEN FROM DAYAL

1.            Reference your 4104. Following is report of our difficulties with the Congolese authorities concerning our freedom of transport.
2.            On 2 December the Chief of Sûreté Nationale, Mr. Ndeka, issued orders prohibiting transport of UN strategic or military material, and particularly vehicles belonging to the UN Force, without his prior authorization. These orders were received by the Agence maritime internationale in Matadi and by OTRACO in Leopoldville and therefore affected shipping as well as river, rail and road transport. A copy of the order is reproduced below. [Reference my clear cable No. 1645 for insertion.]
3.            The Chief of Civilian Operations thereupon made representations to Mr. Bomboko, the President of the College of Commissioners, who said that he would examine the situation and communicate his decision later the same day.
4.            As the promised reply was not forthcoming, the following day an ONUC representative met Mr. Ndeka, who questioned the principle of ONUC freedom of movement in the Congo; at the end of the discussion, he offered to consider changing his order into one requesting the transport companies to hold in abeyance such ONUC shipments as would interfere with shipments by or for the Congolese authorities, pending discussion and arrangement with ONUC authorities. In view of the urgency and importance of the matter, however, Mr. Bomboko was again approached and told that unless prompt remedial action was taken, ONUC would be compelled to consider urgent measures to prevent this calculated attempt to paralyse its movements. Mr. Bomboko objected to what he called intimidation, but finally promised a reply after further consultations with the officials concerned.
5.            On 9 December Mr. Bomboko informed ONUC that it was free again to ship its stores and supplies for the time being. The latter restriction,



he explained, was motivated by statements to the press on 8 December which, in his view, prejudiced the issue, since he already had the question under examination.

6. It should be pointed out that the order of the Chief of Sûreté Nationale was arbitrarily adopted and communicated to OTRACO and Agence maritime internationale without any prior reference to ONUC nor were any reasons given for its issuance. It is clear that such an unjustified and provocative action constituted an open attempt to strangle ONUC's operation and was in violation of agreements entered into between ONUC and the Congolese Government.

7. As late as December 8 or 9, a declaration was apparently made by a Congolese Security Officer to the Agence France Presse, containing mischievous and totally unfounded allegations, which sought to justify the illegal restrictions. In his statement to the news agency, the Congolese Security Officer is reported to have said that the order of Mr. Ndeka was aimed "more particularly at certain members of ONUC who were shipping arms under cover of the United Nations to certain areas of the Congo, in particular to Stanleyville"; it was also hinted that air transport might be similarly controlled in the near future.

8. On 9 December, OTRACO informed ONUC Movement Control Officers that they would now be prepared to accept ONUC's next shipment but no indication has been given regarding the categorical withdrawal of the order. The Special Representative has sent to the Chief of State a letter requesting urgently formal cancellation of the order issued by the Chief of the Sûreté Nationale as this order constituted a flagrant violation of the Agreement of 27 July 1960 signed by Dr. Bunche and Mr. Bomboko, guaranteeing ONUC's freedom of movement in the Congo, and further contradicted Articles 25 and 49 of the United Nations Charter.



OUTGOING CODE

TO : Secgen, Newyork  
FROM : Dayal, Leopoldville  
DATE : 10 December 1960  
NO. : B- 1656

Your 4126.

1. In paragraphs 75 to 80 of my second progress report, the General Assembly and the Security Council have been informed of the events which led to the establishment in late October of two neutral zones in North Katanga under the exclusive protection of the UN Force.
2. In keeping with the principles of the Charter and with the specific terms of the mandate of the UN operation in the Congo, the UN Force has consistently endeavoured to carry out its special responsibilities in the neutral zones through methods of conciliation and through all peaceful means at its disposal. The UN Force has kept in constant contact with the local Balubakat leaders and has attempted to secure wherever reasonable and possible, the satisfaction of their legitimate grievances. As a further step towards the pacification of the region and in spite of the political risks involved, in early November the UN made arrangements for a visit to three towns situated in the neutral zones (Bukama, Manono and Kabalo) of Mr. Jason Sendwe, the President of the Cartel Katangais, and of another two recognized Cartel leaders, Senator Remy Mwamba and Deputy Ambroise Muhunga. The visitors had an opportunity to meet practically all the principal local leaders in the area and sought their assistance in the task of restoring peace. For a while, the mission seemed to have produced the results that had been envisaged.
3. Three facts, however, militated against the success of the UN efforts:



(a) The extreme state of tension reigning in North Katanga, as a result of the sharp political differences existing between the Cartel Katangais and the authorities in power in Katanga.

(b) The refusal to concede the rights claimed by the Cartel as an opposition party; and

(c) The continued application by the Katangese Gendarmerie of violent repressive methods in Baluba areas adjacent to the netural zones.

4. In fact, the hostility of certain uncontrolled segments of the Baluba population was regrettably extended to the UN Force itself. On 8 November, an armed band of Balubakat youths ambushed and massacred at Niemba a patrol of the Irish contingent which was making a routine tour of inspection of the area. A few weeks later, on 2 December, a large group of armed Balubakat attacked the Moroccan contingent stationed at Luena when the latter interposed itself to protect the non-Baluba civilian population of that town from being massacred.

5. In order to dissuade the Balubakat youths from making similar attempts in the future, the UN Force was obliged to place under UN custody ten of the participants at the Niemba ambush and fifty of the men who had been actively engaged in the killings at Luena.

6. It should be recalled, however, that the mandate assigned to ONUC by the Security Council is to render military assistance to the Congolese Government. ONUC itself has no governmental authority nor can it establish courts or otherwise exercise any form of criminal jurisdiction over the Congolese population. While ONUC troops may defend themselves against attack, ONUC cannot punish criminal acts committed against its personnel but must rely on such governmental authority as is functioning in a given area.

7. Before placing these persons under the jurisdiction of the governmental



authority existing in the Katanga region, the Katangese authorities were requested by the UN formally to guarantee that the detainees would be judged under due process of law and not by a military court or under emergency legislation. The authorities were also asked to authorize the presence of UN observers throughout the trial.

8. The requested guarantees have been formally given by the Procureur général of the province of Katanga.



LEOPOLDVILLE  
10 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

IMMEDIATE

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

B-1655 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL FOLLOWING CABLE DATED 10 DECEMBER 1015Z  
RECEIVED FROM BRZAK CLN QUOTE SITUATION STANLEYVILLE CALM AND DEFINITELY  
NOT CORRESPONDING TO REPORTS SUCH AS THIS MORNING ON THE RADIO BRAZZAVILLE  
STOP ULTIMATUM WILL NOT BE CARRIED OUT AND AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THAT  
EFFECT WILL BE MADE ON RADIO STANLEYVILLE AT 1030Z BY MANZIKALA STOP  
UNQUOTE



INDICATE  
PRIORITY

S V C Service	FFFFF Routine	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS
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Priorite Nations traffic  
is strictly limited.

N R

CLEAR

Address(es)

UNATIONS NEW YORK

(TEXT & SIGNATURE)

insert prefix & / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

B-1654

FOR SEC GEN FROM DAYAL X SEVEN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES VISITING STANLEYVILLE  
TODAY ARRIVING 1345 LOCAL TIME TO STUDY SITUATION AND SEE HOW THEY CAN HELP

*ju.*

I. N. 5990 — 200.000 - 7/60

T. O. R.

BY :

T. O. D.

Drafted by :  
Authorized : F.C. Nwoke  
Date : 10 Dec.



OUTGOING CODE

*Ime*  
*Ad*  
*9/12*

To: Secgen New York  
From: Dayal Leopoldville  
Date; 9 December 1960  
No: B- 1653

The refugee situation in Kasai is so grave that it demands immediate action. Brun is just back after a preliminary assessment of the needs of the 250,000 or so Baluba refugees who are dying at the rate of 200 daily. He describes conditions of starving and disease as truly appalling. The area is barren and inhospitable and along with immediate relief, the question of finding agricultural land nearby is of importance if present sowing season is not to be missed. I have discussed the matter with Linner and others, and a detailed statement on the situation will follow which you might wish to publish. The urgent steps we are taking to tackle this gigantic problem will show to our critics what we are capable of despite our manifold difficulties. It should also help to expose the empty oratory in the Security Council, and what is more, reveal the callous indifference of the Congolese authorities to a human problem of such tragic proportions. I would request most urgent and sympathetic consideration of our detailed proposals which will follow.

2. Regarding the OTRACO affair, Bomboko has agreed to our next shipment moving out and we have sent the goods to the docks. Temporary relief seems to have been secured, perhaps as a result of the publicity received, although Bomboko displayed considerable peevishness over it. By way of illustration of the twisted mentality of the Congolese security people, they informed AFP that the restrictions were imposed to prevent illegal shipments of arms by "certain UN members" to Stanleyville, and it was hinted that similar restrictions may be applied to air



transport. The need for vigilance therefore continues.

3. According to the "Courrier d'Afrique" the Kasavubu-Mobutu plan is to set up a Provisional Government (of the Commissioners) in early January, then to convene a Round Table Conference which would split up the Provinces (Kasavubu wants fourteen) after which the federal government would be set up. The Abako chief has strongly criticised Tshombe for insisting on independence while at the same time talking of federation or confederation.

4. Timberlake, trying to be helpful (the Senators' visit has considerably chastened him), informed me that he has recommended that up to six C-130s be transferred to UN. This information may be worth following up. Charpentier said that his Government has some DC3's at Brazzaville, which they might be prepared to let us have, if approached.

5. Moroccan Brigade have been informed by the Government that they will be recalled about January 15 and replaced by a single battalion. This is serious news, if correct.

6. The Malaysians held a very successful and impressive parade this morning.



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen New York  
From: Dayal Leopoldville  
Date: 9 December 1960  
No: B- 1652

*hmc  
pd  
9/12*

Your 4073, 4074.

We have transmitted to you latest situation reports regarding Stanleyville, and have directed Brzak to lodge protest to provincial authorities as desired. As Songolo etc., have already been inspected by Red Cross some time ago, we have added the word "again" before "permitted" in your paragraph (f).

2. I have kept western envoys who have expressed much concern over Stanleyville situation, closely informed, and have just had meeting with Ambassadors of US, UK, France and Italy. I informed them of latest situation, of Iyassu's visit, of our determination to do everything possible to protect Europeans by concentrating them in school building under UN guard, by providing escorts from outlying places to Stanleyville. I felt that responsibility for the further movements of the refugees should rest with the diplomatic and consular representatives, who after ascertaining their views, should arrange charter air service, preferably to Usumbura, necessary UN protection being provided at airport for safe evacuation. They all concurred with the arrangements and expressed appreciation for our efforts. Consular representatives of five or six countries will be proceeding to Stanleyville in a day or two to work out arrangements with our representatives; I have promised to afford them full protection.


3. The breakdown of the Europeans in Orientale is as follows: 500 Greeks, 50 Italians, 25 Americans, 25 French, 18 UK, 300 Cypriots, 80 British passport holders, rest



Belgians.

4. It is reported that Gizenga himself, or his emissaries are trying to rally elements in Kivu and Equateur. In Kivu at an ANC meeting, the proportion of those voting for Lumumba was 500 against 200.

5. The <sup>3rd</sup>~~1st~~ Group of ANC (posted in Orientale and some 7000 strong) have addressed telegram to Kasavubu etc., demanding release of Lumumba under threat of causing bloodshed in Leopoldville.





LEOPOLDVILLE  
9 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

IMMEDIATE

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

B-1651 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL FOLLOWING IS COPY RECEIVED AFTERNOON  
9 DECEMBER OF TELEGRAM ADDRESSED TO YOU CLN QUOTE

"MONSIEUR LE SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE ONU  
NEWYORK

Résumés agences de presse attribuent à Votre Excellence  
déclaration qu'elle aurait faite au Conseil de sécurité  
et suivant laquelle République Congo serait sous régime  
inconstitutionnel qui n'a pu s'établir qu'avec aide  
étranger. Nous étonnons beaucoup pareille déclaration et  
sommes convaincus qu'il s'agit d'un malentendu. En effet  
aurions peine à croire que Votre Excellence ait fait sans  
l'étayer d'aucune preuve allégation aussi grave que dénuée  
de tout fondement et de nature à compromettre redressement  
actuel du pays. Très haute considération.

PRESIDENT REPUBLIQUE CONGO, Joseph KASA-VUBU

Le Commissaire GENERAL AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES,  
Justin BOMBOKO" UNQUOTE



LEOPOLDVILLE  
9 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

B-1650 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL YOUR 4073/74 FOLLOWING IS REPORT ASKED FOR CLN

1. This is a report on the serious situation which has developed during recent days in Stanleyville, following several days of mounting tension as a reaction to the departure from Leopoldville of Mr. Lumumba and his ensuing arrest. The following information is based upon a series of messages received from our civilian and military representatives in Stanleyville.
2. On the morning of 8 December, Mr. Bernard Salumu, District Commissioner of Stanleyville, issued a declaration stating that if Mr. Lumumba were not liberated within 48 hours, he would arrest all Belgians in the Orientale Province and he even threatened to kill some of them. The same morning, a leading article in the local newspaper "Uhuru" demanded the expulsion of all Belgians from the Congo.
3. Later in the day, the Acting Prime Minister of Orientale Province, Mr. Manzikala, gave a press conference in Stanleyville in which he issued an ultimatum stating that if Mr. Lumumba was not released within 24 hours, all Belgians in the Orientale Province would be arrested. Mr. Salumu, who was present at the press conference, specified that the arrests would extend to the entire European population. The ultimatum was also broadcast by the Stanleyville radio station.
4. The threat to arrest all Belgians if Mr. Lumumba and his political associates, who are presently detained, were not released within 48 hours, was repeated at a meeting held during the afternoon between representatives of the Provincial Government and United Nations officials. It was added that the Congolese would then be allowed to steal and pillage Belgian property. The Provincial representatives requested the United Nations to intercede in Leopoldville for the immediate release of Mr. Lumumba, and warned that if this release could not be effected, the United Nations should refrain from intervening for the prevention of the threatened arrests, otherwise there would be a clash between UN and local troops. Mr. Salumu, who participated in the meeting, also stated that all European civilian personnel of the United Nations would be requested to leave the Congo.



5. The arrest of a number of Belgians, both in Stanleyville and in Aru, was reported during the day. One of them at least was reported to have been severely beaten by gendarmes. The extreme nervousness among the European population was heightened by the fact that no Belgian was able to receive authorization to leave the Orientale Province, on the ground that all Belgians would be kept as hostages until such time as Mr. Lumumba is released.

6. As the news spread that arrests were already taking place in Stanleyville, a number of Europeans started to seek refuge in the United Nations Headquarters building. In the face of this situation, the United Nations officials made immediate plans to take over a school building accommodating five hundred persons and to place this building under the protection of the United Nations Force. ONUC Headquarters in Leopoldville immediately approved of the arrangement, and confirmed to the Commander of the Force in Stanleyville their instructions to provide full protection to the European population with all means that may be required in the circumstances. General Iyassu, Chief of Staff of the ONUC Force, and two senior civilian officials of ONUC, left Leopoldville for Stanleyville by air at 0700 hours on the morning of 9 December.

7. The number of Europeans in Stanleyville is about 800-1000 and an equal number is believed to reside in the rest of Orientale Province. For security reasons, the Europeans living in outlying areas may prefer to concentrate at one place; wherever possible, UN escorts will be provided for their safe conduct to Stanleyville. In consultation with the diplomatic missions concerned, and with their co-operation, arrangements for the evacuation by air of those wishing to leave are being made.

8. The United Nations representative in Stanleyville has to-day delivered to the provincial authorities a formal note of protest, sent by me on behalf of the Secretary-General, concerning the situation.

BRACKET The text may be inserted here; French text separately cabled to you. UNBRACKET



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen New York  
From: Dayal Leopoldville  
Date: 9 December 1960  
No: B-1649

Reference your 3977.

U.S., U.K. and other envoys have seen me about Stanleyville situation and I have acquainted them with facts as reported to us. As we have already reported, there has been great disorder in the city. In spite of efforts by ANC and Gendarmes to weaken our position at the airport, we have managed to retain control. UN troops, their officers and our civilian officials are doing their best in the midst of a confused and dangerous situation to protect the European population and to bring about some measure of calm. We have not been able to get any information about the airport incident mentioned to you presumably in view of the general confusion.

2. Individual members of the Gendarmerie, it is learnt, have been trying to seize cars in default of payment of something like 500 Congolese francs. The cars stolen by Gendarmerie belonged previously to Europeans or Congolese. No UN cars have been stolen.

3. We have just had a message that Iyassu and party have reached Stanleyville. UN troops doubled their patrolling last night which had a reassuring effect. Some Europeans are reported to be under arrest in the Gendarmerie camp and consequently tenseness continues since the ultimatum is due to expire at 2000 hours tonight. When Iyassu sees the Acting President, Gizenga and Salamu, efforts will first be made to secure the cancellation of the ultimatum and then to reach understandings regarding the problem of the European population.



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLVILLE  
Date : 9 December 1960  
No : B-1648

Following cable dated 8 December 2000Z received from Stanleyville:

QUOTE

( text attached)

UNQUOTE



FM ONUC STAN 082000Z

TO. ONUC LEO

S E C R E T

CIV 41 FROM BRZAK FOR DAYAL INSPITE OF ALL THREATS EXPRESSED TODAY BY SALUMU WHICH INCLUDED CLOSING OF AIRPORT FOR UN, KILLING SOME BELGIANS AND ARRESTED PARLIAMENTARIANS AS REPRISAL FOR REPORTED DEATH OKITO, FORCING ALL WHITE UN PERSONNEL INCLUDING CANADIAN SIGNALS OUT OF CONGO ETC AM CONVINCED THAT THIS IDEA IS SUPPORTED ONLY BY HANDFUL OF MEN LIKE SALUMU AND THAT REST OF POPULATION INCLUDING MANZIKALA AND PROV GOVERNMENT WHOSE ATTITUDE YOU KNOW FROM MY CIV  
BRACKET OUR B-1611 UNBRACKET  
35 WERE JUST NOT COURAGEOUS ENOUGH TO OPPOSE.

PARA AM SURE THAT AT FIRST SHOW OF FORCE SALUMUS WHOLE SCHEME WILL COLLAPSE. UN MILITARY COMMANDER CONSIDERED TODAY SETTING UP ROADBLOCKS SO AS TO MAKE IMPOSSIBLE FOR GENDARMERIE TO TAKE NUMBERS OF HOSTAGES TO MILITARY CAMPS FROM WHERE THE LIBERATION WOULD BE COSTLY. PLEASE INFORM IF YOU AGREE TO THESE ROADBLOCKS AND KINDLY CONFIRM WHAT ALL MEANS INCLUDING USE OF ARMS CAN BE USED TO SAFEGUARD CONTROL TOWER ON AIRFIELD AND SAFE LANDING OF GENERALS AIRPLANE.

PARA CURFEW WAS IMPOSED ON STANLEYVILLE BY LOCAL AUTHORITIES AT 8 PM LOCAL AND REFUGEES RETURNED TO THEIR HOMES AS ULTIMATUM BROADCAST BY LOCAL RADIO GAVE DELAY UNTIL TOMORROW NIGHT. AT PRESENT TOWN IS REPORTED QUIET

2079/RL/082250Z DEC 60



LEOPOLDVILLE  
9 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

B-1647 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL

Hereafter French text of note being delivered in Stanleyville STOP  
Only change to be made in English text is addition of word QUOTE again  
UNQUOTE after word QUOTE permitted UNQUOTE in paragraph FFF concerning Red  
Cross STOP Text follows CLN QUOTE

Au nom du Secrétaire général agissant sous mandat du Conseil de  
sécurité des Nations Unies, je suis chargé d'appeler d'urgence votre attention  
sur ce qui suit: (A) Le Secrétaire général proteste énergiquement contre les  
menaces de représailles dirigées contre des personnes qui devraient jouir de  
la protection normalement donnée à tous les résidents du pays. (B) Le  
Secrétaire général proteste en outre contre la manière impérative dont les  
Nations Unies ont été informées des représailles qu'on se propose d'exercer si  
M. Lumumba n'était pas libéré. (C) Le Secrétaire général attire l'attention  
des autorités sur le fait que la libération de M. Lumumba est une question  
qui ne relève pas, à l'heure actuelle, du mandat ou de la compétence de  
l'ONU, que cette question est en train d'être examinée par le Conseil de  
sécurité, que l'autorité de celui-ci doit être respectée et qu'aucune pression  
ne peut être exercée sur lui en anticipation de l'attitude qu'il pourra  
vouloir adopter ou autrement mettant en cause son autorité. (D) Les  
intentions dont l'ONU a été informée et qui motivent la présente protestation  
seront portées à l'attention du Conseil de sécurité. (E) Conformément à son  
mandat tel qu'il a été défini par le Conseil de sécurité, la Force des Nations  
Unies résistera à tout acte de violence envers les personnes demandant  
protection aux Nations Unies. Les instructions nécessaires à cet effet ont  
été communiquées aux unités de la Force des Nations Unies à présent à  
Stanleyville. (F) Le Secrétaire général juge nécessaire à cette occasion  
d'appeler une fois de plus et d'urgence l'attention des autorités sur la



détention prolongée de M. Songolo et de plusieurs autres parlementaires, en insistant pour que ces personnes soient traitées en pleine conformité avec les principes généraux du droit. Il réitère sa demande que les Nations Unies soient autorisées à rendre de nouveau visite aux personnes détenues pour se rendre compte de la manière dont elles sont traitées, par l'intermédiaire de représentants de la Croix Rouge; l'attitude des autorités à l'égard de M. Lumumba est de toute évidence sérieusement compromise par le refus des autorités d'accéder aux demandes concernant les personnes dont il est question ci-dessus. UNQUOTE



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen New York  
From: Dayal Leopoldville  
Date: 9 December 1960  
No: B-1646

Further to my 1644. Latest information is that discussion in progress among Commissioners regarding OTRACO affair which might indicate some softening. I have asked our Command that supplies for transport should be gathered under guard at docks for shipment. That will show that we mean business. Meanwhile, my proposed letter to President will be held up pending your comments and further developments here.



INDICATE  
PRIORITY

S V C Service	FFFFF Routine	SSSSS Priority	PRIORITE NATIONS
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Priorité Nations traffic  
is strictly limited.

N R

Address (es)

UNATIONS

NEWYORK

(TEXT &amp; SIGNATURE)

insert prefix &amp; / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

B- 1645 For Secgen from Dayal. Text of order given Otraco on 5 December referred to in several my cables since then was as follows quote Otraco A partir de ce jour tout matériel stratégique ou militaire et notamment des véhicules appartenant aux forces de l'ONU ne peuvent être embarqué au bord de navire qu'après avoir reçu préalable de mes services stop exception est faite pour les produits pharmaceutiques et les vivres stop copie confirmation suit fullstop Administrateur en Chef de la Sûreté Nendaka unquote

*J. McDiarmid*

Alga 5664 - 180.000 - 10/60

T. O. R.

BY: Room 632, Tel: 189

Drafted by: J. McDiarmid

T. O. D.

Authorized:

Date: 9.12.60



OUTGOING CODE

MOST IMMEDIATE

To: Secgen New York  
From: Dayal Leopoldville  
Date: 9 December 1960  
No: B-1644

Your 4076.

Difficulties with OTRACO were promptly reported in my 1599-1600 paragraph 4 and thereafter situation reported in my B-1615 paragraph 9, B-1622 paragraph 3 and B-1640-41 paragraph 9.

2. The latest position is that Bomboko yesterday, after being repeatedly pressed, said that the matter was under consideration and he resented the suggestion that it was being reported to you for possible reference to the Security Council.

3. As no satisfaction has been received, I would request your urgent concurrence for despatch of the following letter to Kasavubu.

Quote. I have the honour to invite your attention to the enclosed copy of an order issued to OTRACO by the Administrateur en chef de la Sûreté restricting the transport of the strategic or military material and vehicles of the United Nations Force in the Congo.

This order represents an interference in the fulfilment by the Force of its essential functions in the Congo, and the immediate effect has been to prevent the shipment of essential material as to which arrangements must be made with OTRACO by today, Friday 9 December 1960. I need not point out that the order also represents a flagrant violation of the Agreement of 27 July 1960, signed by Dr. Bunche and Mr. Bomboko, guaranteeing la liberté de mouvement à l'intérieur du pays pour la Force,



and that it is likewise in contradiction of Articles 25 and 49 of the United Nations Charter.

As representations made to Mr. Bomboko and to Mr. Nendeka have not brought about a rescission of the order, I must urgently bring the matter to your notice for immediation action. You will appreciate the urgency of the cancellation of the order so as to obviate the necessity of my referring it to the Secretary-General for the attention of the Security Council now in session.  
Unquote.

4. We have not seen the statement attributed to Rikhye but I am informed that he did speak of our difficulties in reply to a specific question put to him by a correspondent.



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 8 December 1960  
No : B-1642

Following cable dated 8 December 1600 hours received  
from Ethiopian Brigade Stanleyville:

QUOTE

(text attached)

UNQUOTE



INCOMING CODE

PRIORITY

SECRET

To : ONUC LEO

From : ETHIOPIAN BDE STAN

Date : 8 December 1960 1600Z

SECRET OPS94 for OPS and Mr DAYAL

A meeting was held this p.m. with Provincial Government authorities in which UN were advised that if Mr. Lumumba and his political affiliates who are presently under arrest were not released within 48 hours, that the local authorities will arrest all Belgians and that the Congolese civilians will be permitted to steal and pillage Belgian property. Provincial authorities requested UN to intercede with ONUC Leo to effect release of Mr. Lumumba before wholesale arrests of Belgians is effected. Should Lumumba not be released within specified time authorities advised that UN do not intervene during the arrests, because they would be forced to clash with local troops. Authorities also advised that all UN European civilians will be required to leave the Congo. This was stated by the District Commissioner Mr. Salomu. Of the 48 PNP and 8 Belgians arrested yesterday, 21 PNP and 6 Belgians were released. The UN Bde Commander is still meeting with local authorities to ensure the safety of the European civilians. Situation in Orientale Province is very tense.

082000Z DEC 60



OUTGOING CODE

To: Secgen New York  
From: Dayal, Leopoldville  
Date: 8 December 1960  
No: B- 1640, 1641

We read your inspiring speech to the Security Council with the greatest admiration. Unless minds are entirely closed and narrow interests have obfuscated the great world issues at stake, your solemn warning should be heeded.

2. In my analyses, my primary purpose was to deal with the difficulties of ONUC's operations in the light of the present situation and future prospects. I had not of course entered into the realm of the great international political issues. While the countries represented in the UN would practically without exception ask for the operation to continue; the great among them, as well as several of the lesser, are doing everything to undermine its prestige and wreck its functioning.

3. If the operation were, for whatever reason, to be forced out of the Congo, the certain consequences would be immediate and uninhibited civil war degenerating into tribal conflict fought with knives, bows and arrows in the trackless jungles and wastes of the country which could go on for years. It would also mean the complete disintegration of whatever fabric of national unity still remains. The fissiparous tendencies unleashed would result in the complete disruption of the country into tribal and ethnic fragments. The Belgian population would be the first to flee and the economic life of the country would be totally paralysed. The rest of the world would of course not stand aside amidst this chaos, as the different factions would appeal to various sides for help which would be readily forthcoming in one guise or another. A confused Spanish civil war situation would prevail with fighting going on all over the prostrate body of the Congo in pursuit of nebulous and conflicting aims. The explosion in the Congo would certainly not be confined to



its artificial boundaries but would spark off conflicts in the inflammable territories surrounding this heart-land of Africa. That of course would not be the end of the story and there would be a grave danger of the conflict assuming world-wide dimensions.

4. The Security Council or the Assembly would, I am convinced, never agree to the withdrawal of the operation, and in its enfeebled state, with the withdrawal of military units and relentless criticism from various quarters for differing reasons, it would be still less in a position to deal with the ever-darkening situation. It may thus find itself in the position of a hostage, powerless to act in a situation far beyond its capabilities, and yet saddled with grave responsibilities.

5. The developments in Stanleyville are getting more and more perilous. I am separately reporting on the latest information received from there. If the massacre of Europeans, which is threatened, were to take place, there would be immediate danger of Belgian military intervention from Usumbura where, it is reported by a Sudanese Colonel who passed through there yesterday, the Belgians have considerable military and air force at the airfield. We would then have a repetition in much graver form of the situation which arose early in July.

6. The clouds of civil war are getting darker and as I reported yesterday, Gizenga and Salamu have appealed for and have been promised, foreign aid. The ANC backed by the Belgians is in an aggressive mood and is already reaching out to the borders of Orientale where forays are taking place.

7. Charpentier has just been to see me in a state of great anxiety. His analysis of the situation differed little from my own and he spoke of the imminent threat of civil war, developing into tribal conflict. If Lumumba gets out, a prospect which, in his view, is not beyond the realm of possibility because of the peculiar system of African relationships, and in view of Bombozo's somewhat equivocal position, the danger of bloodshed would increase. He was very worried about Abbe Youlou's sinister policies which are aimed at breaking up the Congo since the



Abbe did not wish to see a large and unified state next door. Charpentier regretted the folly of the Belgians who are persevering in their obstinacy. By encouraging Tshombe who has been decorated by their King, they are alienating Kasavubu.

8. We are particularly concerned about the announced withdrawal of Ceylon and UAR contingents as this might set in motion a chain reaction. Our regrouping will be of some help in meeting the first impact but we may be forced to pull out of Equateur and Kivu provinces, retaining only some units for control of the airports of Coquilhatville, Kindu and Goma. If Ghana were to follow suit, Kasai would be left wide open and the tribal conflict there would flare up anew spreading to the surrounding areas and rendering our position in North Katanga extremely difficult to hold. The withdrawal of the Yugoslavs will have a damaging effect on our already crippled air force.

9. Meanwhile, we are trying by every means possible to prevent the stifling of our movements as a result of the denial to us of the waterways by order of the Commissioners. If we do not get any satisfaction by tomorrow, I propose addressing a strong letter to Kasavubu pointing to his obligations under the agreement with UNOC and informing him that the matter will be reported to you for reference to the Security Council. Von Horn has sent a reminder today to Mobutu referring to his earlier letter which remains unreplied, regarding the maltreatment of our personnel and the theft of our vehicles of which only about half have been returned, many in damaged condition.

10. We had extended talks last evening with the Senators and Edward Kennedy and told them frankly about the crisis which had been reached and of the responsibility of the member States to support the operation not only materially but also politically and morally. We believe that some impression was created on the minds of the Democratic Senators who expressed the view that the operation must succeed. At a press conference this morning, they promised total support to the UN effort. I do not know if the Security Council is fully aware of our growing difficulties and the perilous state of affairs in the Congo and whether there is any disposition to strengthen the mandate and <sup>only</sup> the capability in



all fields of this operation to meet it. If your speech did not convince them, what will, short of a conflagration here?

Post script. Major Pongo, the captor of Lumumba, has sent a reminder today to your representative, of Count Bernadotte's fate!



OUTGOING CODE

*Imme.*  
*John H. Kelly*  
8  
XII

TO : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
FROM : DAYAL, LEOPOLOVILLE  
DATE : 8 December 1960  
NO. : B- 1639

Further my B-1637 on position Stanleyville.

1. Early this morning Salamu issued a declaration stating that if Lumumba is not liberated within 48 hours he will arrest all Belgians in Orientale and will kill some of them. He is alleged to have said that Europeans will not be allowed to leave Stanleyville but will be held as hostages until Lumumba is released. Stanleyville Lumumba newspaper Uhuru today demanded expulsion all Belgians from the Congo.
2. Later today Manzikala and Salumu gave press conference in presence of Brzak and UN Brigade Commander. Manzikala issued an ultimatum stating that if Lumumba is not released within 24 hours all Belgians in Orientale will be arrested. Salumu added that arrests would extend to entire white population.
3. Brzak reports that arrests began immediately, and many Europeans are already seeking refuge at UN HQ. We have instructed Brzak to give Europeans collective protection in a local school building. German Consular Agent Stanleyville already contemplating evacuation of all 40 German citizens in Orientale. Iyassu, Kelly and Caballero flying Stanleyville tomorrow with full instructions. The immediate responsibility is to protect the lives and safety of the European population and to arrange for their concentration in a secure place with adequate UN protection. As they will be regarded as hostages, it may be necessary to arrange for their evacuation preferably to Usumbura since



Stanleyville authorities would probably object to Leopoldville, which would also be undesirable for other reasons. Total European population of Stanleyville is about 800-1000, eighty percent being Belgians. In the rest of the province there is probably an equal number, mostly Belgians.



LEOPOLDVILLE  
8 December 1960

OUTGOING CLEAR

UNATIONS  
NEWYORK

B-1638 SEC GEN FROM DAYAL

At press conference given by Bomboko last night (7 December) following points emerged:

On the Conciliation Commission Bomboko stated that the Congolese Government was not in principle opposed to arrival of the Commission which was coming to help Congolese to solve their problems. Nevertheless, already in New York, Mr. Kasa-Vubu had made it known to SecGen that the Commission was in any event not to arrive before 26 December. Therefore before the Commission got underway the Congolese authorities were requesting clarification of the four following points. (1) What were the participating countries. (2) Following on this the Congolese Government were insisting as an absolute condition that there would be no member of the Commission from a country with which the Congo had severed its diplomatic relations. (3) What exactly were the terms of reference of the Commission, its powers and its limitations. (4) To what extent would the Congo be involved financially in the expenses incurred by the Commission.

Bomboko declared that Lumumba's arrest had been legally carried out. Lumumba had been caught redhanded in a plot against the security of the State and the Loi fondamentale provided that in cases of flagrante delicto parliamentary immunity from arrest did not obtain. Bomboko accused Unations of protecting individuals who had been carrying out illegal acts such as Gizenga who was exercising illegal control in Stanleyville. Bomboko added that Songolo and other parliamentarians had been arrested and maltreated in Stanleyville without anyone protesting. "This is the sort of duplicity which the Congolese cannot allow" he said. Lumumba was being well treated and the Congolese authorities would allow a Swiss doctor from the Red Cross to visit him on condition that the same doctor was allowed to visit the persons in Stanleyville. Lumumba would stand trial but not before "the



innocent people in Stanleyville had been freed".

Towards the end of the conference Bomboko rejected the USSR demands that Unations should disarm the ANC. "There will be no disarming; and our soldiers will never be disarmed" he declared.

Finally Bomboko announced that two days ago Kasa-Vubu had signed a "loi d'exception" which put into effect certain exceptional measures for the Province Orientale such as the establishment of martial law and the setting up of military tribunals.



OUTGOING CODE

To : SECGEN, NEWYORK  
From : DAYAL, LEOPOLDVILLE  
Date : 8 December 1960  
No : B- 1637

1. Following is report on present situation in Orientale Province.
2. Provincial Government is moderately MNC-L, but intimidated by fanaticism of ANC 16th Gendarmerie battalion incited by extremist politicians. Gizenga, Vice-Prime Minister in Lumumba Government, came to Orientale and secured position of considerable authority in province. Salumu, District Commissioner of Stanleyville is fanatical Lumumbist and violently xenophobic and appears to be the real boss. General Lundula, appointed ANC Commander in Chief by Lumumba on 8 July, and dismissed by Kasa-Vubu on 14 September, recently arrived in Stanleyville and incited ANC to greater extremism.
3. ANC 5th Infantry battalion opposed to Gendarmerie but passive. On 17 November 5th battalion crossed river in Stanleyville and forced Gizenga to seek UN protection until Gendarmerie re-asserted itself.
4. After events of 27 November, Stanleyville quiet, but this quiet due to fear of ANC. Lumumba politicians, supported by Gendarmerie battalion, expected Lumumba arrive Stanleyville. It is believed Lumumba had intended install new Government in Stanleyville and break off with Leopoldville. Since the failure of Lumumba plans and his arrest, leading clique fears invasion by Mobutu, and are attempting to seal off Province from rest of Congo.
5. Louis Lumumba, Acting Provincial President lacked much support and has been supplanted by Manzikala. However, judging by Manzikala's reply of 5 December to UN protest concerning 27 November events he is obviously unable to control events. It is also clear that Salumu, Gizenga, and Lundulu, use Gendarmerie Battalion to intimidate Provincial Government. While population is largely pro-Lumumba, it is perhaps not in full agreement with fanatical political leadership.



6. Economic situation of Province paralysed by these irresponsible armed bands. Provincial Government realises the plight of Province but is powerless and takes view that UN is responsible for maintaining law and order.

7. Latest news within Province is that all seven imprisoned Europeans are released, four of them sent to Usumbura. ANC Stanleyville clashed with civilians wounding four. Gendarmerie, expecting hostile arrivals by air, surrounded Stanleyville Airport. In Bunia, MNC party members arrested PNP members, nine of whom requested UN protection. In Arua, Gendarmerie and police arrested 48 PNP members and 8 Belgians. UN secured release of the 8 Belgians.

8. On frontier with Equateur Province much activity has resulted in Bumba area consequent to Stanleyville attempt to seal off Province. At Bunduki, Mobutu ANC arrested 2 Gendarmes and 5 police from Stanleyville. Stanleyville ANC raided in platoon strength and carried off their own men plus seven of Mobutu's ANC. District Commissioner Buta now reports one battalion Mobutu ANC has crossed frontier into Orientale and requests UN to prevent their advance. This report probably exaggerated. Mobutu has sent up from Leopoldville only 50 ANC reinforcements to his existing garrison. However, anticipating trouble, all Europeans and many Congolese have evacuated the area. Government has requisitioned all planes Gemena.

9. We have asked Brzak for full report on your 3977.



OUTGOING CODE

S E C R E T

To: Secgen  
From: Dayal Linner  
Date: 8 December 1960  
Number: B- 1636

ND  
8/12

1. One of our experts, Mr. Vittorio Bolis, has recently submitted a report on his findings on the mining activities, resources and problems in the Kasai and Kivu provinces. It is a highly interesting report, not so much because of the information it contains on the latent possibilities of the extractive industries in the two provinces, but because of the light it throws on the maze of irregular fiscal dealings and evasions of the Forminière, the Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo aux Grands Lacs Africains (CFL), the Chemin de Fer du Bas-Congo et du Katanga (BCK) and of other subsidiaries of the Empain group and of the Société Générale. I can well imagine the delight with which the report would be read in certain countries.

2. My reaction, of course, was not one of pleasure but of extreme surprise. It is one thing to suspect the existence of abnormalities and another to be overwhelmingly faced by them. The report shows, inter alia, the following:

(a) The fifty to sixty million francs of taxes that should be annually paid to the Congolese Government by the mining companies of Kivu under the existing mining law are not repeat not being paid. In fact, no contribution has ever been made by the mining companies to the treasury since 1902. Instead, the companies pay substantial royalties to the CFL, to which all mining rights in the Kivu had been



surrendered in that year by the then Free Independent State of the Congo in exchange for the CFL's offer to build its present railway system with its own funds.

(b) Under article 90 of the basic mining law, all concessions, or parts thereof, which have not been exploited for over a period of three years must revert to the Government except in cases of force majeure. Although vast tracts of the CFL concession, believed to contain important bodies of ores, have never been exploited, the company has been allowed by the Government to retain them under the escape clause mentioned above.

(c) As stated to Mr. Bolis by the management of the Forminière and by the Kalonji authorities, the taxes on the profits of the Bakwanga mines (estimated at 550 million) are being paid to the "Autonomous State of South Kasai" and not to the Central Government or to the Government of the Kasai province.

(d) The books of the Belgian companies operating in the Congo are not audited by independent accountants.

3. In view of the foregoing, it is no wonder that the Commissariat des Mines in Leopoldville has recently sent a cable to its local representatives instructing them not to supply any mining information to anyone, including UN officials. A copy of the cable was shown to Mr. Bolis.

4. I am asking Linner to have his fiscal advisors check on the