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UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1002

BOX 124

FILE 6

ACC. 1992/0283

MESSAGE

PRIORITY

12 1228 B JAN 95

FROM : OPS CELL

RESTRICTED

TO : A COY

INFO : UNAMIR HQ/KIGALI ←

TAC HQ/BUTARE ←

BN HQ KIBUNGO

D COY

8108

WNG O PD MOVEMENT OF DPs AT RUNYOMBYI PD IT IS INTENDED TO MOVE A/M
DPs FROM PRESENT LOC TO KAMANA DP CAMP PD DATE AND TIMINGS ARE TO BE
FIXED LATER POSSIBLY AT BUTARE OPS CONF DATE PD METHOD OF MOV PD
METHOD OF MOV IS LIKELY TO BE BY FOOT OWING TO TPT PROBLEMS PD SY
IS TO BE PROVIDED BY GHANBATT FOR ESCORT AND AT NEW CAMP /////

DRAFTER'S NAME


APPT

TELE

MAJ AY ASSANE

OPS OFFR

NIL


RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE
WITH RANK

ALL
14/11

Seen
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Thunt
802 OPS
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TO : UNAMIR HQ , KIGALI

Ref : SEC4/002


FROM : SECTOR 4 C HQ , CYANGUGU

Date : 4 Nov 94

ATTN : G2 UNAMIR HQ , KIGALI

SUBJECT : UPDATED INFORMATION ON DP'S CAMPS IN SECTOR 4 C

PLEASE FIND ATTACHED THE UPDATED INFORMATION ON DISPLACED PERSONS
CAMPS IN THIS SECTOR.


VIB-SANZIRI

Maj

for Sect Comd

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UPDATED INFORMATION ON DISPLACED

PERSONS CAMPS

SECTOR 4 C

SL	NAME	GR	SIZE	NO OF DISPLACED PERS	SITUATION IN CAMPS	ATTITUDE
a	b	c	d	e	f	g
1	NYAGATARE TRANSIT CAMP	8124	2005sq M	2878	<p>a. DPs are in transit awaiting transport to be conveyed to their homes.</p> <p>b. UNHCR distributes food items to DPs in this camp. They are well accommodated in tents.</p> <p>c. Medical care provided by IDA</p> <p>d. Malaria is prevalent</p>	<p>a. All DPs in the camp are eager to return to their villages/towns</p> <p>b. They are awaiting transport to convey them.</p>
2.	KARANYIRO- CYIMBOGO TRANSIT CAMP	7719	400sq M	3300	<p>a. DPs are in transit awaiting transport to be conveyed to their homes</p> <p>b. They are well accommodated in tents with good drinking water and food provided by ICRC.</p> <p>c. Medical care provided by MEDUN BE MONDE</p> <p>d. Malaria is prevalent</p>	<p>a. The people are willing to go home and are therefore awaiting transport</p>

a.	b.	c	d	e	f	g
3.	MURURU CAMP	7521	600 SqM	7375	a. Accommodated in tents b. Good water and food provided by UNHCR c. Co-located with a hospital d. Malaria cases high	1. DPs not willing to go to their homes because security is not assured.
4.	NYARUSHISHI CAMP	8522	1 km Sq	7135	a. DPs live in tents. b. Food and water provided by UNHCR. c. Medication by ICRC d. Malaria cases high e. Evacuation is currently in progress by UNHCR	a. DPs are willing and cheerful to go to their homes. b. Lack of sufficient vehicles is retarding the rate of evacuation
5.	GIKUMDAYURA CAMP	9309	SCATTERED SMALL CAMPS	2900	a. Depend on water from a stream. b. No organised feeding. DPs survive on the goodwill of the local residents. c. No medical facilities available.	a. Not willing to go to their homes because security is not assured.

a	b	c	d	e	f	g
6.	NYAMASHEKE CAMP	9841	100 sqm	850	<p>a. DPs live in a school compound</p> <p>b. Fed by ICRC once a week</p> <p>c. Good drinking water from pipes.</p> <p>d. Sanitation is alright</p> <p>e. Medical care provided by Medcin San Frontiers.</p>	<p>a. Majority want to return home. Those who don't wish to go home claim, Tutsi returnees from BURUNDI have occupied their homes. Their safety they claim is not assured.</p>
7.	KIRAMBO CAMP	0444	100 sqm	3850	<p>a. DPs live in makeshift tents</p> <p>b. in a community centre.</p> <p>b. Fed by ICRC once a week</p> <p>c. Pipeborne water available</p> <p>d. Good sanitation</p> <p>e. Attend med services at KIBOGORA (CR 0343).</p>	<p>a. Most of the DPs don't want to return to their homes. Not sure of their safety.</p>
8.	GATARE	1345	—	2729	<p>a. There is no DPs camp. The DPs are living with relations in GATARE. Most of these DPs are from GISOVU Commune (CR 2952)</p>	<p>a. Fear to return home because of their safety.</p>

a	b	c	d	e	f	g
9.	GIKUNDAMVURA CAMP	9309	300 sq M	3000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Live in makeshift tents. b. No food c. No water d. No medical attention 	These are BURUNDI refugees who recently crossed into RWANDA because of the situation in that country.
10.	BUTAMBAMO CAMP	8307	80 m sq	3000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. live in tents b. Water from stand pipe and stream c. Occasionally fed by ICRC d. No medical facility 	These DPs are from the general area of BUTAMBAMO. Most of them have their houses destroyed and are therefore waiting for materials to repair their houses before moving in.

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4-

F/IN - 3712

F A X**FROM****UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES**UNAMIR
94 OCT 17 21 56

OUTGOING FAX #: UPD 043	DATE: 17 OCTOBER 1994
TO: HQ UNAMIR, KIGALI	FROM: UNAMIR PLANNING DESK, DPKO, NY
ATTN: G 3 PLANS, LTCOL A. BRIMELOW	FAX #: (212) 963 1356 TEL #: (212) 963 2794
NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE: 11	
REFERENCE:	
SUBJECT: SITUATION ON RWANDA/TANZANIA BORDER ZONE	

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED TWO UPDATES PROVIDED BY SITCEN/DPKO ON SUBJECT. THEY HAVE BEEN RECEIVED FROM A MEMBER STATE AND DO NOT REFLECT A UN OFFICIAL OPINION.

2. BEST REGARDS.

Seen
9/11
19/11

SRSG FC CAO & DIR (G3 PLANS)

DRAFTED/CLEARED BY: LTCOL LARS ANDERSSON	AUTHORIZED BY:
TO FAX #: 3-3090	

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

HQRW1017FAX

(2)

G2

G3 Plans (for review)

18.10

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REFUGEE SITUATION ON RWANDA/TANZANIA BORDER

13 OCT 94

DOC 94-5879

SUBJECT: TANZANIAN REFUGEE EMERGENCY GROWS

1. INTRODUCTION. A GRIM PICTURE WITH FEW PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT

A. OBSERVATION OF THE KAGERA REGION OF TANZANIA FROM OCTOBER 3 TO 7 REVEALED FIRST HAND EVIDENCE OF THE CHALLENGES FACING RWANDAN/BURUNDI REFUGEES AND RELIEF WORKERS. THIS FIVE-DAY TRIP ALLOWED AN OBSERVATION TEAM TO VISIT ALMOST ALL REFUGEE SITES IN THE NGARA AND KARAGWE DISTRICTS AND TO DISCUSS AT LENGTH THE REFUGEE SITUATION WITH KEY NGO AND LOCAL TANZANIAN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICIALS. THE TEAM WAS ABLE TO TRAVEL BY AIR AND ROAD EXTENSIVELY THROUGHOUT THESE TWO DISTRICTS. THIS INCLUDED GAINING GOOD AERIAL VIEWS OF MOST REFUGEE CAMPS AND THE RWANDAN SIDE OF THE BORDER. ON OCTOBER 6, THE TEAM JOINED UP WITH SENIOR PEACE OFFICERS FOR DISCUSSIONS ON THE FOOD CRISIS FACING THE CAMPS.

B. THE OVERALL FINDING WAS THAT THE REFUGEE SITUATION BECOMES GRIMMER WITH EACH PASSING DAY AS FOOD, WATER, HEALTH/SANITATION, SHELTER, FIREWOOD AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR A CONSTANTLY GROWING REFUGEE POPULATION BEGIN TO SURPASS THE ABILITY OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND HUMANITARIAN RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS (HRO) TO SATISFY THEM. THIS REPORT REITERATES THE INCREASING GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION.

2. OVERVIEW: WAGING A LOSING BATTLE AGAINST MOUNTING

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ODDS

A. BASICALLY, THERE ARE JUST TOO MANY REFUGEES (527,450 ON OCTOBER 10) IN TOO FEW PLACES, TOO CLOSE TOGETHER AND TOO CLOSE TO THE BORDER, AND THERE ARE STILL TOO MANY ARRIVING EACH DAY. IT IS DIFFICULT TO TALK OF REPATRIATION AND STABILIZING CAMP CONDITIONS UNTIL THE HEAVY INFLUX, OVER 1,000 PER DAY FOR OVER TWO MONTHS, IS STOPPED. THE UNRESOLVED ETHNIC CONFLICT IN BURUNDI AND RWANDA, THE ARRIVAL IN RWANDA OF THOUSANDS OF FOREIGN TUTSIS FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND THE PRESENCE OF A GOVERNMENT IN KIGALI BACKED BY THE TUTSI MILITARY LEAVE FEW, IF ANY, VIABLE OPTIONS OPEN FOR THE HUTU REFUGEES.

B. DESPITE THE PRAISEWORTHY EFFORTS OF HRO'S A LOSING BATTLE IS BEING WAGED AGAINST MULTIPLE, INTERRELATED AND GROWING EMERGENCY SITUATIONS WITHIN THE CAMPS. FOOD IS ALREADY IN SHORT SUPPLY AND MAINTAINING THE FOOD PIPELINE DOES NOT LOOK POSSIBLE. A FATAL FOOD GAP HAS OCCURRED AND MOST CAMPS HAVE BEEN GETTING HALF-RATIONS (900 CALS PER PERSON) FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. OUT OF DESPERATION, UNHCR IS TAKING THE UNUSUAL STEP OF SPENDING UP TO DOLS 800,000 TO PROCURE FOOD LOCALLY. HOWEVER, FOOD ON HAND AND IN THE PIPELINE REPRESENTS ONLY ABOUT A 35-DAY SUPPLY. MUCH MORE FOOD WILL BE NEEDED TO KEEP UP WITH EVEN THE CURRENT REFUGEE CONSUMPTION RATE OF 10,000 MT PER MONTH. IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER OR NOT SUCH HIGH QUANTITY OF NEEDED FOOD AID CAN BE SUPPLIED ON A CONSISTENT BASIS.

C. AVAILABLE WATER IN MOST CAMPS IS LESS THAN HALF THE RECOMMENDED LEVEL OF 20 LITERS PER PERSON/DAY AND THE DIFFICULTY OF FINDING ADEQUATE

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GROUND WATER IS PRECLUDING THE OPENING OF NEW SITES. BENACO AND CHABILISSA CAMP RESIDENTS GET UNDER 5 LITERS A DAY AND OFTEN WAIT IN LINES FOR WATER MORE THAN FOUR HOURS. THE LACK OF GROUND WATER MADE UNHCR DECIDE THIS WEEK TO ABANDON EFFORTS TO COMPLETE WORK ON THE NEW OMUKIRIRO SITE. THIS IS A REAL SETBACK AND MEANS MORE OVERCROWDING IN EXISTING CAMPS IN THE KARAGWE DISTRICT AND THE POSSIBLE ISOLATION OF THESE CAMPS AS HEAVY RAINFALL MAKES ROAD ACCESS MORE DIFFICULT (THE INCREASED USE OF THE ROADS BY RELIEF VEHICLES IS ALSO ADDING TO A DECLINE IN ROAD CONDITIONS).

D. A SIMILAR WATER PROBLEM HAS STOPPED RELOCATION OF BENACOIANS TO THE ADJOINING MUSUHURA HILL SITE AND MAY ALSO PREVENT THE FULL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW, ADJOINING NYANGAGONGA HILL SITE. UNHCR IS DEVELOPING A LONGER- TERM WATER RESOURCE PLAN WHICH INVOLVES PUMPING WATER OVER SOME DISTANCE FROM THE KAGERA OR RUVUMU RIVERS. THIS WOULD TAKE NINE MONTHS TO CONSTRUCT AND THE ESTIMATED COST WOULD BE DOLS 5 MILLION. BESIDES THE COST AND COMPLEXITY OF SUCH AN UNDERTAKING, IT WOULD PROBABLY MEET WITH RESISTANCE FROM GOT OPPONENTS OF REFUGEE "PERMANENCY" IN THE REGION. MEANWHILE, THE TRANSFER OF TWO UNAMIR WATER PURIFICATION UNITS AND WATER TANKERS FROM KIGALI WOULD BE OF GREAT HELP.

E. GENERALLY, THE CRUDE MORTALITY RATE IS ABOVE THE ACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF 2 PER 10,000. THIS RATE IS EXPECTED TO GO UP AS THE RAINY SEASON PROGRESSES AND OVERCROWDING OF THE CAMPS INCREASES. THE SERIOUS LACK OF PLASTIC SHEETING FOR SHELTER WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO INCREASED MORTALITY AS THE STRAW HOVELS MANY REFUGEES LIVE IN WILL GIVE LITTLE PROTECTION

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AGAINST RAIN AND CHILLY WEATHER. PROBLEMS RELATED TO HEALTH/SANITATION, DISPOSAL OF HUMAN WASTE AND THE BURIAL IN SHALLOW GRAVES OF THE HUNDREDS OF DEAD EACH WEEK WILL ALSO MULTIPLY DURING THE OCTOBER- DECEMBER RAINY SEASON. [THE INCREASED DIFFICULTY OF COLLECTING FIREWOOD, EVEN WITH THE MAXIMUM USE OF FUEL-EFFICIENT STOVES AND ALTERNATE FUELS SUCH AS PEAT, ADDS TO REFUGEE MISERY AND WEIGHS HEAVILY AGAINST THE MAINTENANCE OF CAMPS FOR MUCH MORE TIME IN THE SAME PLACES. THE HIGH INCIDENCE OF STD'S AND THE HIV VIRUS ADDS TO THE TERRIBLE TOLL ON REFUGEES AND THE LOCAL POPULATION AS WELL. THE BABY BOOM (OVER 12,000 BIRTHS EXPECTED IN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS) THAT WILL START TO OCCUR IN THE DECEMBER-JANUARY PERIOD WILL FURTHER COMPLICATE THINGS.

F. THESE HARSH CONDITIONS SERVE TO UNDERMINE SECURITY BY INCREASING TENSIONS AND ENCOURAGING MILITANT ELEMENTS WITHIN THE CAMPS TO UNDERTAKE VIOLENT ACTS AND CONSIDER ARMED EXCURSIONS INTO RWANDA. ALSO, A MORE DESPERATE REFUGEE POPULATION IS GENERATING AN INCREASE IN ANTAGONISMS WITH THE OUTNUMBERED LOCAL INHABITANTS. IN PARTICULAR, THE LARGE, GROSSLY OVERCROWDED BENACO CAMP (CITY) WITH OVER 275,000 REFUGEES IS LIKE A TIME BOMB WAITING TO EXPLODE AT ANY MOMENT. THE EXISTENCE OF MILITARY TRAINING WITHIN THE BENACO CAMP HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. THE OVERCROWDED CONDITIONS IN BENACO AND ITS SISTER CAMP CITY, LUMASI, WHICH SHOULD HIT THIS WEEK ITS MAXIMUM POPULATION OF 100,000, INCREASE THE POTENTIAL FOR ALL SORTS OF BAD NEWS. THE SAME APPLIES TO THE VERY TENSE CHABILISSA CAMP AND THEIR DIFFICULT TO MANAGE POPULATION OF JUST OVER 81,000. EVEN IN NOT SO CROWDED, SMALL (POP. ABOUT 13,000) CAMPS LIKE LUKOLE (THE SO- CALLED BURUNDI CAMP BECAUSE THIS IS

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WHERE HUTU REFUGEES FROM BURUNDI ARE LOCATED) BAD, INEXPLICABLE THINGS CAN HAPPEN LIKE THE MASS RAID AND THEFT OF AROUND 300 TENTS WHICH WAS PERPETRATED BY AN UNKNOWN GANG DURING THE NIGHT OF OCTOBER 8 - 9. THE FRIGHTENING THING ABOUT SUCH CRIMINAL EPISODES IS THAT SO LITTLE CAN BE DONE TO STOP IT OR BRING THE GUILTY TO JUSTICE.

G. THE LIGHTLY-ARMED 50 TANZANIAN POLICEMEN IN THE REGION, OR EVEN THE ADDITIONAL, UNHCR-FUNDED 300 TANZANIAN POLICE EXPECTED BY THE END OF THE MONTH, ARE CERTAINLY NO MATCH FOR THE KIND OF MASSIVE UPHEAVAL THAT COULD OCCUR IN THE CAMPS. THERE IS NOTHING TO STOP THE THOUSANDS OF YOUNG MEN IN THE CAMPS FROM TAKING OVER AND WRECKING MAYHEM THROUGHOUT THE AREA. ALREADY THE CRIME RATE IS SKYROCKETING AND LOCAL JAILS ARE BULGING WITH THREE TIMES AS MANY PRISONERS AS THEY WERE DESIGNED TO HOLD. ALSO, WITNESS THE SEPTEMBER 29 INCIDENT WHERE THE DETAINMENT OF ONE PROMINENT HUTU PERSONAGE IN BENACO BY THE TANZANIAN POLICE LED TO THE ENGULFMENT OF THE POLICE STATION BY THOUSANDS OF YOUNG MEN WHICH GAVE THE POLICE (ADMITTEDLY, THE POLICE HANDLED THE SITUATION POORLY) NO CHOICE BUT TO RELEASE THIS REFUGEE NOTABLE. THIS VIVIDLY EXEMPLIFIES THE DANGERS ASSOCIATED WITH TRYING TO EXTRACT ANYONE ACCUSED OF PARTICIPATING IN HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS FROM THE CAMPS. IT IS ALSO WORTH NOTING THAT THE TEAM COULD NOT VISIT THE CHABILISSA CAMP IN THE KARAGWE DISTRICT ON BECAUSE OF UNREST RELATED TO FOOD SHORTAGES AND WAS SUBJECTED TO TWO BENACO SECURITY ALERTS WHILE STAYING IN NGARA. IF 50% FOOD RATIONS CAN CAUSE SUCH A DISTURBANCE IN CHABALISSA, WHAT WOULD THE ABSENCE OF ANY RATION DO? THE ANSWER TO THIS MAY BE KNOWN NEXT WEEK WHEN SOME CAMPS MAY NOT BENEFIT FROM THE

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UN RESTRICTED**USUAL WEEKLY DISTRIBUTION OF FOOD.**

H. THINGS ARE SOMEWHAT MORE TENSE IN THE KARAGWE DISTRICT AS MOST OF THE LOCAL INHABITANTS TRACE THEIR ANCESTRAL ORIGINS TO TUTSI FORBEARERS AND THE RPF IS REPORTED TO BE ACTIVELY WORKING ON THE RWANDA SIDE TO SEAL THE BORDER IN THIS MARSHLAND/BOG AREA. THE LONG- TERM PRESENCE OF SO MANY REFUGEES IN THIS AREA DEFINITELY REPRESENTS A DESTABILIZING ELEMENT. ALSO, MOST OF THE NEARLY 19,000 SO-CALLED TANZANIAN TUTSIS WHO HAVE CROSSED OVER INTO RWANDA IN THE LAST FEW MONTHS ORIGINATE FROM THIS AREA. MOST OF THESE "TUTSIS" WERE BORN IN TANZANIA AND HAVE NEVER SEEN RWANDA. IT IS OBVIOUS TO LOCAL TANZANIAN AUTHORITIES THAT THESE PEOPLE ARE MOSTLY GOING TO RWANDA AS THE RESULT OF A "TUTSI- RETURN" PROMOTION CAMPAIGN DIRECTED BY TUTSI LEADERS WITHIN RWANDA AND THE PROMISE OF LAND, HOUSES, ETC. THE PROBABLE OCCUPATION OF LAND AND HOUSES LEFT BY FLEEING HUTU REFUGEES BY THESE NEW, ENGLISH-SPEAKING TUTSI ARRIVALS IS VERY UNNERVING TO THE REFUGEE POPULATION AND MAKES REPATRIATION AND THE AVOIDANCE OF RENEWED ARMED CONFLICT MORE DIFFICULT.

3. CONCLUSION: CHANCES FOR PREVENTING A "PERMANENT" REFUGEE CRISIS AND MORE CHAOS ARE GROWING SLIMMER.

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SECURITY IN CAMPS ON THE RWANDA/TANZANIA BORDER

14 OCT 94

DOC 94-5884

1. SUMMARY. SECURITY IN THE CAMPS CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS FRAGILE. NGO'S ARE DISSATISFIED WITH THE "QUALITY OF POLICE PROTECTION." GOT IS RELUCTANT TO SEND MORE POLICE OR TO APPROVE ADDITIONAL CAMP SITES. AS CONDITIONS STAND NOW, INTERVIEWS BY HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATORS WOULD BE AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS UNDERTAKING. COMMUNE LEADERS OPPOSE DECONGESTION OF THE CAMPS, FEARING THE POLICE WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SEIZE "THE ENEMIES OF THE RPF."

2. CAMP ENVIRONMENT IS A TINDER BOX. OVERCROWDING AND A LACK OF ADEQUATE FOOD AND WATER CONTRIBUTE TO AN ALREADY FRUSTRATED REFUGEE POPULATION, CREATING A VOLATILE MIX WHICH COULD EXPLODE AT THE SLIGHTEST PROVOCATION. NGO WORKERS SAY: "THESE REFUGEES HAVE BEEN TRAUMATIZED IN RWANDA AND ARE ON A VERY SHORT FUSE." "THEY HAVE BEEN ON REDUCED FOOD RATIONS FOR ~~THREE WEEKS AND PROSPECTS FOR NEXT WEEK ARE EVEN~~ WORSE." "THE SITUATION IS CRITICAL." "I HAVE WORKED IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN MANY COUNTRIES, BUT HERE THEY ARE MORE TENSE AND HOSTILE TO NGO WORKERS." "WITH THE IMMEDIATE ONSET OF THE RAINS, MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WILL SKYROCKET."

3. CAMP SECURITY

A. RELATIONS. RELATIONS BETWEEN REFUGEES AND THE FEW TANZANIAN POLICE ARE POOR. REFUGEES SAY THE

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POLICE ARE SYMPATHETIC WITH THE RPF. THE POLICE LACK TRAINING IN CROWD CONTROL, AND WHEN THEY MEET WITH COMMUNE LEADERS ONLY INFLAME THE SITUATION. THE UNHCR LEADER SEEMS TO HAVE A GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CAMP LEADERS. DURING A MEETING WITH THE KAGERA REGIONAL COMMISSIONER, A HEATED EXCHANGE BETWEEN UNHCR AND THE REGIONAL POLICE COMMISSIONER OSTENSIBLY OVER THE PROVISION OF BEDDING FOR THE ADDITIONAL PROMISED 300 POLICE. AN OBVIOUS LACK OF TRUST BETWEEN UNHCR AND THE POLICE LEAVES THE NGO WORKERS WITHOUT CONFIDENCE OF POLICE SUPPORT IF A VIOLENT ERUPTION OCCURS.

B. POLICE CAPABILITIES. THE POLICE AT BENACO AND CHABALISSA, THE BIGGEST CAMPS, WOULD BE UNABLE TO QUELL A SERIOUS RIOT. RIOTS WHICH HAVE ALREADY OCCURRED WERE CONTAINED BY THE COMMUNE LEADERS IN CONSULTATION WITH UNHCR OFFICIALS. THE MILITIA PRESENCE IS BECOMING MORE APPARENT. WHILE NGO WORKERS HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED THEY WERE CONDUCTING "MILITARY-TYPE" MEETINGS OR DRILLS AT NIGHT IN THE CAMPS, ONE DAY AT NOON A GROUP OF ABOUT 60 YOUNG MEN JOGGED IN FORMATION THROUGH BENACO WITH RAISED FISTS SHOUTING SLOGANS. LIKE SO MANY THINGS THAT HAPPEN IN THE CAMPS, THIS INCIDENT BY ITSELF LACKS SIGNIFICANCE BUT WHEN TAKEN WITH OTHER INCIDENTS IT CAUSES US THOSE ON THE OUTSIDE TO FEAR FOR THE SAFETY OF THE NGO'S AND TANZANIANS NEAR THE CAMPS. WHEN THE REGIONAL COMMISSIONER (RC) WAS ASKED IF TANZANIAN MILITARY UNITS WERE AVAILABLE TO HELP IN CASE OF A MAJOR RIOT, HE SAID THEY ARE IN BUKOBA (EIGHT HOURS AWAY) BUT WAS VAGUE AND NOT COMFORTABLE DISCUSSING THE MILITARY AND ADMITTED THAT THEY COULD NOT CONTROL THE BORDER WITH RWANDA AND DID NOT KNOW WHO CROSSED THE BORDER DURING THE DAY OR EVEN THE NIGHT.

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THERE APPEAR TO BE ONLY A FEW TANZANIAN SOLDIERS IN THE BORDER AREA.

C. THE DANGERS

(1) THE TANZANIAN POLICE WOULD BE ABLE TO PROTECT UN HUMAN RIGHTS INVESTIGATORS SEEKING TO INTERVIEW IN THE CAMPS. THE REFUGEES WOULD KNOW WHY THEY WERE THERE AND THEIR LEADERSHIP WOULD INTIMIDATE EVERYONE NOT TO COOPERATE IN ANY WAY. ANY REFUGEE WHO CONSENTS TO AN INTERVIEW WITH A UN INVESTIGATING TEAM WOULD BE KILLED THAT NIGHT.

(2) IT WOULD SEEM IMPOSSIBLE TO CONSIDER REMOVING A SELECTED GROUP OF SUSPECTS FOR INTERROGATION OR DETENTION AND TRIAL. WHILE AN ARMED UN FORCE MIGHT TRY IT, MANY WOULD DIE IN THE EFFORT. COMMUNE LEADERS WILL NOT MOVE TO SMALLER CAMPS AWAY FROM THE BORDER IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE OVERCROWDING AND IMPROVE SANITATION AND THE AVAILABILITY OF WATER, BECAUSE THEY FEAR THE TANZANIAN POLICE, ACTING IN CONCERT WITH THE RPF, WOULD SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ARREST "SOME OF US" AND TURN THOSE ARRESTED OVER TO THE RPF FOR EXECUTION. THEIR DEFENSE STRATEGY SEEMS TO BE THAT THEIR STRENGTH IN NUMBERS. IF THEY WERE MOVED IN LARGE GROUPS OF SAY 25,000, THEN MAYBE THEY WOULD GO. ON REPATRIATION, THE REFUGEES STATE THAT THEY WOULD RATHER STARVE THAN RETURN TO RWANDA UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITIONS.

3. TANZANIA VERSUS ZAIRE. THE IN TANZANIA CANNOT BE CONSIDERED IN ISOLATION, BUT THERE ARE SOME DIFFERENT FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WHEN SEEKING SOLUTIONS ON A REGIONAL BASIS. THE OBVIOUS DIFFERENCE WOULD BE THE RELATIVELY WEAK PRESENCE IN TANZANIA OF THE FORMER

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FAR, APPROXIMATELY 10,000 ACCORDING TO THE GOT, A FIGURE CONSIDERED MUCH TOO HIGH BY THE U.N. IT SEEMS THAT COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE REFUGEES IN ZAIRE AND TANZANIA IS EXTENSIVE. NGO'S BELIEVE THAT 15-20 HUTU MILITIA HAVE BEEN COMING FROM ZAIRE TO BENACO EACH WEEK FOR A MONTH TO RECEIVE OR CONDUCT MILITARY TRAINING/PLANNING. THEY ARE NOT SURE IF THE ONES WHO COME ARE THE SAME, I.E., THEY ARE GOING BACK AND FORTH, OR IF THE FLOW IS ONE WAY ONLY. IT IS CERTAIN THAT REFUGEE LEADERS IN EACH CAMP ARE AWARE OF EVENTS IN THE OTHER.

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FROM : SECTOR 3 HQ


TO : FORCE HQ (OPS)✓
FORCE HQ (HAC)✓

INFO : MILOB GP HQ
: TAC HQ
: MILOB TEAM BUTARE

SUBJECT: REPORT ON MONITORING OF LIVING CONDITION OF RETURNEES.


1. Attached herewith is a report on an ongoing MILOB monitoring operation in the commune of BUTARE.
2. Specific information will very soon be provided to enable you initiate action on road bridges repairs.
3. Rest of issues are respectfully repered to you for appropriate action please.
4. Many thanks.

Dated: 28 Oct 94
Returned 2/11
Adh 3.11
Thanks 2/PA.


S HAIDER
MAJ
For Sector Comd

② G3 Plans 3

1. Monitoring exercise seems like a worthwhile venture for Milobs in coop with UNHCR and HAC. this has implications for Op R and perhaps an Op O/Frag O/Instr to CMO.


Dec 8 1994
31.10

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INTERIM REPORT ON MILOB MONITORING EXERCISE OF CONDITION OF
RETURNEES - MUYIRA COMMUNE

Introduction

1. In fulfillment of part of MILOB tasks, to assist displaced persons in returning to and settling down in their homes, the team in Butare embarked on an exercise to monitor conditions of returnees in their homes. The exercise started on 12 October 1994 in cooperation with the UNHCR who however withdrew after the first day. The exercise started with the Muyira Commune in Butare Prefecture and is intended to cover all the communes. The MILOB Team is also using the exercise to confirm ^{whether} ~~whether~~ returnees are actually going back to the DPC, and if so, at what rate.

2. The monitoring exercise in Muyira Commune lasted four days during which the MILOBs interviewed the locals. The interview took the form of asking the people how the security situation in their homes was, what their most serious problems were ie. health, food, clothing, housing, farming etc. At the ~~end~~ of the first phase of the exercise, many things were brought to the fore.

Aim

3. The aim of this report is to give a brief account of the MILOB monitoring exercise of returnees in Muyira Commune and make recommendations.

Conduct of Exercise

4. The exercise started 12 October 1994 with MILOB using the list of returnees as registered by UNHCR in the DPC during Op Homeward. The team visited the homes of returnees, checking their living conditions and also cross-checking the returnees families against the lists. At the end of the first day out of 17 families registered for Muyira Secteur, 14 families were located. Three families that could not be located were said to be generally around. The exercise thereafter continued in Mukoma, Nyamiyaga and Munyinya Secteurs. Due to the large area to be covered and limitation in time, the exercise had to be reviewed after the first day. Random sampling is now done, rather than check family by family. The last Secteur, Munyinya was checked 20 October 1994, after which the exercise will continue in other communes.

5. Many problems were reported by the locals, the most acute which is common in all the Secteurs, being that of lack of hoes. As many as 4000 families require hoes to enable them to cultivate the land. Those that have hoes now are people who did not leave their

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homes and those who returned early enough to loot from other homes. The fear now is that if these hoes are not distributed in time people would be forced to eat the seeds given them. During the exercise, it was also discovered that the local staff of the NGOs responsible for distribution of cooking oil sold them to the locals rather than give them freely. A few people confessed to buying the cartons at 2000 FRW per carton of six gallons. A computation carried out by the MILOB Team and the Bourgemestre, showed that about 109 cartons of cooking oil, out of the stock brought for distribution could not be accounted for. Other problems identified include lack of medicines, food and building materials since many homes were destroyed.

6. It was also observed during the course of the exercise that contrary to general reports and impressions held, not very many people have returned to the DPCs or the refugee camps. Most of those who returned to the DPC are the early returnees, ie those who returned to their homes in late July and early August. In Munyina Secteur, the people reported that many of the early returnees were harassed by the Tutsis while some were killed. These prompted some to run back to the DPC and refugee camps thereby spreading the story of reprisals. This has generally stopped as many neighbours now live in peace.

Findings

7. The following findings were made:

- a. Local NGOs staff sell cooking oil instead of distributing it free;
- b. The people are hardly cultivating the land due to lack of hoes;
- c. About 4000 hoes will be required for the commune;
- d. Many people have no shelter and are therefore living in overcrowded homes where they are sheltered by friends and relatives;
- e. MSF and ICRC, during their food distribution refused to give to the new returnees who were not registered during the registration exercise conducted in September;
- f. Medical centres located at Nyamiyaga (SQ8440) and Busoro (SQ) are not adequate;

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- g. Some families still have relatives in the DPCs and refugees camps and would therefore want them brought back. Many families have been displaced and do not therefore know the whereabouts of their kin;
- h. Contrary to general belief, not very many returnees have fled back to the DPCs. Those that have fled are people who were caught up in the reprisals of July and August by the Tutsis. This has generally stopped; and
- i. The condition of most earth roads are bad. Many will be rendered impassable in the near future. Many wooden bridges also require repairs.

Conclusion


8. The monitoring exercise has enabled the team to identify many problems of the locals which were hitherto unknown. Cooking oil meant to be given out to the locals free is now being sold by the local staff of the NGOs. Many locals cannot cultivate the land due to lack of hoes, thereby negating the objective of bringing people home to cultivate the land. Rural roads and bridges if not repaired will soon cut off many rural areas from the urban centres, thereby encouraging rural - urban migration.

Recommendation

9. It is recommended that:
- a. Monitoring exercise be encouraged in other areas with large numbers of returnees;
 - b. The allegation of sale of cooking oil be investigated by the NGOs concerned and those found responsible dismissed;
 - c. The present system of distribution of relief materials be reviewed. That is, hoes and seeds be issued out together so that people with seeds but without hoes are not tempted to eat the seeds;
 - d. Appropriate NGOs and UN agencies be encouraged to assist locals with building materials to enable them to rebuild their destroyed homes; and

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- e. Government be advised to encourage locals to repair their roads/bridges in view of lack of resources by the Government, otherwise, many rural areas will be cut-off from urban centres.



E. Essien
Major
Senior Team Leader
Butare

2 | October 1994

4/4

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To: Force Headquarters

Info: MILOB HQ

From: MILOB Sector 5

SPECIAL REPORT ON MASSACRE ON 31 OCT 94 OF VILLAGERS
IN RWERERE AND RUBAVU COMMUNES IN SECTOR 5

GENERAL

1. During the night of 30/31 October 1994, unidentified persons armed with grenades and fire arms infiltrated from across the Rwandan border with Zaire and killed the members of three families in three separate attacks in dwellings close to the border.

2. First news of the incidents was received from the RPA LO attached to MILOB Sector 5 at about 1030hrs 31 Oct 94. A visit was made to the scenes by Sector Comd accompanied by Sector Ops Offr, RPA LO, Info Offr and OC of the RPA Coy deployed in the area.

FINDINGS

3. Details about the places of the incidents and casualty states are given below.

4. RUTAGARA 189204. This is located in Secteur KINYANZOVU in Commune RWERERE. 19 bodies were found in one out of a group of four huts. The victims were made up of 2 men, 4 women and 13 children. They must have been rounded-up into one hut and sprayed with bullets. Grenades also seem to have been used. The head of the family was a community leader by name ALPHONSE KYANGANZARA.

5. RUTAGARA 186201. The place is located in Secteur BYAHI in Commune RUBAVU. 10 dead bodies were found in an isolated house close to the inter-commune boundary. These were made up of 1 man, 1 woman and 8 children. Grenades and fire arms appeared to have been used in the massacre. Head of family was KINYOOTE.

6. RUTAGARA 183191. 7 dead bodies were found in an isolated house close to the Zairean border. These were also made up of 1 man, 1 woman and 5 children. It appeared that only fire arms were used in this attack. Head of family was NTAKAZARUMARA J.

7. The attacks all took place at about 0300hrs on 31 October 1994.

8. All three places were isolated and surrounded by banana

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② FC

1. Special report as req.
2. HRFO is continuing to investigate.

DCO
2.11

CC

copy sent FC
date.

3000.32 (wps)

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plantations. They were all within 100-150m of the Zairean Border.

9. RPA units in the area heard the noise of the attacks and moved in, but in each case it was too late, as the assailants acted rather swiftly. In the case of the incident at RUTAGARA 186201 noise of the withdrawing assailants shuffling through the near-by banana groves was heard towards the Zairean frontier.

GENERAL COMMENTS

10. The attacks appear to have been a well planned operation by one source with three well known objectives to hit or reach simultaneously. This can be inferred from the time of attack in each location and the efficiency and speed with which the mission was accomplished.

11. The victims were ordinary farmers who may not have had any other place to live to feel secure. The choice of targets therefore seems to have been dictated by their easy accessibility. It is also possible that the hamlets were already known to some members of the murder squads who perhaps lived in the area before the April-July 1994 war.

12. The attacks are the first of their kind in Sector 5 or at least known to MILOB Sector 5. They could be a prelude to what is yet to come unless appropriate measures are adopted to ensure these isolated hamlets are well protected.



M AUSTDAL
LT COL
SECTOR COMD

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OAACZYUW UCCVVDH0143 2881103-CCGC--UCCVVDA.

ZNY CCCCC

①

O 151103Z OCT 94

FM SECTOR 5 GISENYI//MAJ MCCOMBER//

TO UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//COQ//C LOG O//

INFO BRITCON//CHAO//

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOVE 001

SUBJ: MOVEMENT OF RETURNEES ~~FROM~~ GISENYI TO SECTOR 4B

1. THERE IS A REQUIREMENT TO MOVE 225 RETURNEES FROM THEIR PRESENT TRANSIT AREA AT INYEMERAMIHIGO NEAR GISENYI TO THEIR HOMES AT GISHYITA 2063 AND RWAMATAMU 1856 SOUTH OF KIBUYE.

2. THE PROGRAMME IS KNOWN TO THE PREFECTURES OF BOTH GISENYI AND THE RECEIVING AREA AND IT IS PROPOSED TO EFFECT THE MOVEMENT ON WEDNESDAY 19 OCT 94.

3. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT 10 X TCV'S (5 TON), PREFERABLY WITH SEATS, WILL BE REQUIRED TO UNDERTAKE THE TASK.

4. A POSSIBLE ROUTE FOR THE CONVOY WOULD B GISENYI-RUBAVU 2213-KIVUMU 2303-KAYOVE 2792-RUTSIRO 3183-KIBUYE-GISHYITA-RWAMATAMU. THE PORTION BETWEEN KAYOVE AND RUTSIRO IS NOT SO GOOD AND MIGHT CAUSE SOME PROBLEMS FOR THE CONVOY.

5. AN ALTERNATE ROUTE COULD BE GISENYI-JABA 4421-KABAYA 4807-GORORERO 5995-BULINGA 6779-GITARAMA-KIBUYE-GISHYITA-RWAMATAMU(THIS ROUTE IS VERY LONG BUT MAY BE A BETTER ALTERNATIVE. YOUR ADVICE IS NEEDED ON THIS.

6. IT IS REQUESTED THAT 10 X TCV'S BE DETAILED TO REPORT AT HQ SEC 5 ON TUESDAY 18 OCT TO UNDERTAKE THE TASK THE NEXT DAY, 19 OCT. ADVICE IS ALSO NEEDED ON THE CHOICE OF ROUTE.

7. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP AS 48 HRS ADVANCE NOTICE TO UNHR IS REQ FOR COORDINATION.

BT

#0143

③

DCOS ops

50, 10 trucks earmarked for the lift on 19 Oct. Vols will be reporting to Sector 5 tomorrow

② G3 Ops

1. Coord with G3 Plans 3, G4 and Tac HQ. Incl Britcon if regr.
2. Keep HAC informed re decisions.

Received 10-15-1994 11:34:49

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To: Distribution List

From: Col H. Osae-Addae, COO, TAC HQ Butare

Date: 29 September 1994

Subject: OPERATION HOMEWARD

References: A. Estimate prepared by LCol P Desnoyers dated 16 September 1994
B. Fragmentary Order to Operation Order No. 18 Op Homeward dated 18 September 1994

Background

1. On 16 September, LCol Desnoyers, newly appointed as Deputy Chief HAC created reference A to take advantage of a temporary surplus of UNAMIR vehs. The intent was to use these vehicles to assist NGO's in the return of IDP's to their homes before the rains render the camps difficult/impossible to support. The stated aim was "to propose a military option to assist relief agencies" in the relocation of IDP's. HQ UNAMIR adopted this proposal and issued reference B two days later. LCol Desnoyers called and chaired a meeting of NGO's and UN agencies at TAC HQ Butare on 29 September at which it was obvious that the civilian attendees had no prior knowledge of the initiative. At subsequent working meetings at TAC HQ it was obvious that the same individuals/agencies were both suspicious and unclear about what was perceived as a military solution foisted on them by UNAMIR: much laborious and repetitive explanation was required to reinforce the concept that UNAMIR was merely to help facilitate their actions. Further, it was obvious that they could not make themselves ready at the speed envisaged in the original estimate.

2. Preliminary meetings were held on 20 and 21 September and working/coordination conferences on 23, 24, and 25 September. Op Homeward began 26 September. Coordination meetings are held at TAC HQ every night except Fridays. They are meant to include all NGO's and UN agencies as well as RPA and Prefecture reps and of course TAC HQ which includes Brit MovCon.

Aim

3. To examine Op Homeward to identify lessons learned and recommend a way ahead.

Factors

4. The factors considered at reference A will be re-assessed in light of practical experience as follows:

1/6

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2605 OPS
This is the report I spoke about. See my annotation. This report was not copied to me and I don't know why. Please read the whole report and let us have your views. Meanwhile I think we should refrain the HQ at Butare whilst we contemplate a re-org and re-assign meet.
HJH
10-10-94
DFC/W

See reference A
3000.32 (1994)

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a. Will to Return Home:

- (1) Security. The perception of safety is as important as the reality. Rumours of RPA retribution and, at the least, RPA harshness, abound. They come from various sources but share the common feature that they are easier to start than to stop. From the outset TAC HQ has vigorously pursued rumours and dubious/incomplete reports of all natures from all sources but TAC HQ's resources are not equal to the task. The lack of a massive, high-level counter-propaganda campaign is crippling, at best. Further, the NGO's and agencies will have no part of any such campaigns and resist so strongly that it may reasonably be argued that their lack of active support for relocation is perceived by the Rwandese as tacit support of the stay-put attitude. Since UNAMIR assists relief agencies and since the agencies control, in one way or another, the movement, the perception of safety as portrayed by the agencies outweighs the reality;
- (2) Humanitarian Assistance Dependency. The view from TAC HQ is that the IDP's are already dependent on the relief effort. More to the point, as long as a lack of safety is perceived, the indignity of a refugee camp is the lesser of two evils. It is noteworthy that if the rainy season will reduce/curtail the relief effort to some camps, it will at the same time reduce security within those camps by reducing the hours and randomness of observation by both UNAMIR and the relief agencies. It is argued by some that this is part of the RPA hidden agenda;
- (3) Propaganda. Discussed above; and
- (4) Deduction. The IDP's presently lack the will to return home as they perceive themselves better off where they are. This situation must deteriorate with the onset of the rains by which time the task of relocation/support will be more difficult and resources less plentiful. The desire to return home must be injected now if the status quo is to be avoided.

b. Health Conditions. Medical screenings are not always done and are usually cursory at best. They should be considered desirable not mandatory;

c. RPA Verifications. The RPA steadfastly refuse to conduct screenings in camps. To date they have been somewhat intransigent about improving their system to increase throughput. Cooperation is improving in some areas but high-level pressure must be applied to gain full cooperation and maximum efficiency in the verification process. As a start, direction from the RPA Chief LO that the local LO attend all coordination conferences and be available 7/24 (assignment of assistants?), would be most useful;

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- The prefects
commit.
- d. Final Destinations. Attendance of the receiving Prefects at coordination conferences is sporadic. Further, their ability to project themselves into the receiving commune/sector either personally or through their subordinates is either lacking or not being pursued aggressively. Prefects must place more emphasis on and effort into the positive reception of returnees: this must include positive control of the RPA garrison;
- e. Road Conditions. The assumption made by LCol Desnoyers remains valid. However, see staging;
- f. UNHCR/IOM Staging. We have avoided overnight staging where possible. As 90% of the population live away from urban centers, so they also live well off surfaced roads. This means that military-type vehicles are required for both ends of a trip although not necessarily in the middle. Overnighting, therefore, reduces available lift and should be avoided. We have developed alternate methods of providing the essential start-up ingredients;
- g. Mass Population Effect. No impact yet observed as relocation effort is in the hands of relief agencies who will not be seen to encourage return;
- h. Location of Camps. Although most are in Sector 4 as stated, the estimated population is questioned for several reasons. Airborne/satellite sensing devices should be employed to accurately identify the dimensions of the problem including internal migration on a regular and frequent basis;
- Which are they?
- i. Available UNHCR/IOM Resources. Assumption correct but not necessarily pertinent. See Staging; and
- j. Available UNAMIR Resources. Assumption was optimistic. A more reasonable assumption is 30-50 vehicles.
- from what source:

Other Factors

5. Other factors worthy of consideration are:

- a. Will to Walk. Considered by LCol Desnoyers under Mass Population Effect as the willingness to walk home once the migration had started. This view is not shared by TAC HQ. The Rwandese walked for their lives and, given the degree of support available in the camps, will probably not walk home unless forced to;
- b. Reception on Return. One aspect overlooked is the return of refugees from previous conflicts. They now live in the homes of the current IDP's and bear a grudge;

- c. RPA Hidden Agenda. The RPA are intransigent to an almost inexplicable degree. Assurances given at national level in Kigali are not translated into action on the ground. One argument advanced is that the RPA are as well-behaved as they are because they know their turn is coming when the rains isolate the camps from prying eyes. This is perhaps reinforced by an often-stated RPA point of view (local) that those in Sector 4 probably have something to hide. The status quo in Sector 4 can thus be perceived as a target of opportunity. While this hypothesis is not necessarily supported, its' potential implication are too great to be overlooked; and
- d. Appropriate Agencies. The initial meeting and the subsequent coordination conference included the agencies from Butare area. It became clear later that the Gikongoro area reps of those agencies must also be included in the operation as they are almost separate entities and communications between different offices of the same agency is not what we are accustomed to in the Army. Including them in the coordination Conferences however is cumbersome and problematic. For the time-being it is sufficient that the Butare rep coordinates with the Gikongoro rep after a TAC HQ conference but this is potentially a weak link. Care must be taken to ensure coordination between different Sector reps of agencies is effected.

Conclusions

6. It is concluded that:

- a. Op Homeward, while disappointing to date, is probably the best available option albeit in a modified form. It enjoys the advantage of being in place so that relief agencies don't have to be reconvinced;
- b. current UNAMIR capability will achieve at best a limited result;
- c. the agencies and NGO's must either positively support Op Homeward and BBGNU resources employed to a much greater degree for best results;
- ✓ d. more UNAMIR resources should be dedicated to counter-propaganda;
- e. rumour quashing must receive higher priority;
- who will? f. the RPA must be compelled to effect closer liaison with TAC HQ;
- will take time g. local civil authorities must be more closely integrated;
- h. overnighting should be avoided; and
- j. the number of IDP's must be more accurately identified.

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Options

7. There appear to be three options:

- a. maintain status quo. Op Homeward will, at best, achieve extremely limited results;
- b. cancel Op Homeward. While this would avoid a very heavy resource bill for minimum return this option is unconscionable; or
- c. adopt a more vigorous approach to Op Homeward.

Recommendation

8. It is recommended that Op Homeward continue (Option C) with the following modifications:

- a. the relief agencies or the BBGNU be coopted to pursue a vigorous relocation propaganda campaign;
- b. every effort be made to maximize transport resources, perhaps employing RPA vehicles;
- c. counter-propaganda be emphasized to include rumour quashing as a high priority;
- d. the RPA and local civil authorities be directed by their central command to participate fully;
- e. the number of IDP's be more accurately identified using airborne sensors; and
- f. TAC HQ continue to conduct Op Homeward focused on Sector 4 and incorporate the other refinements mentioned above.

H. Osae-Addae
Col
Comd TAC HQ

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Distribution List

Action

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HAC

Information

DCOS Ops

DCOS Sp

G3 Plans

G4 Log

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ANNEX A TO
TAC HQ
OP HOMEWARD DATED
29 SEPT 94

RPA ATTITUDES AND COOPERATION IN OP HOMEWARD

1. The first organizational meeting for OP HOMEWARD on 20 Sep 94 was well attended by the RPA and the civil authorities; the Prefects for Gikongoro and Butare were present as were the Sous-Prefect and the RPA LO to TACHQ. Arriving late for the meeting were two representatives from the Ministries of Rehabilitation and of the Interior. Unfortunately these officials did not get a chance to address the meeting regarding the Government's position towards OP HOMEWARD. Nonetheless Capt Zegara, the Prefect for Gikongoro assured the meeting that the Government fully supported the operation although lacking the resources to take a major part. He emphasized however that security measures would not be compromised for the sake of speed in moving people.
2. Following the meeting, the representatives from Kigali spoke with the Prefects but it is not known what was discussed nor whether their discussion carried on after leaving the OP HOMEWARD meeting.
3. A second organizational meeting was held on the evening of 21 Sep 94 where again the RPA and civil authorities from the previous meeting were in attendance. The position of the government was again reiterated and their concern emphasized that action had to be taken to return people to their homes as soon as possible. At all times it was stressed that the operation was a cooperative venture between UNAMIR, the NGO and the Government of Rwanda.
4. The first coordination conference was held on 23 Sep with the Sous-Prefect for Butare and the RPA LO in attendance. It was identified that the Kizi checkpoint would become a bottle neck to the operation unless additional personnel were assigned to the search of baggage and registration of individuals. The RPA LO in addition to saying that he would be present at the checkpoint also agreed to provide additional personnel and it was suggested to him that two searchers and one register be assigned to each truck load of people arriving at Kizi so as to minimize delay. It was forecast that the convoy packets would likely be 10 vehicles in size however no specific numbers of vehicles could be determined at this point and thus the actual number of people necessary to man Kizi checkpoint could not be given. This detail would only have been available at the Sunday night, 25 Sep, conference.
5. The problem with the physical layout/separation of the security check and registration points was identified and an offer was made by an NGO group to set up a mass processing site at Kizi to handle large numbers of people quickly and with security. It appeared that the RPA LO would not entertain any suggestion of

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changing the layout of the checkpoint nor any explanation of what was envisioned. Consequently, he rejected the offer of resources to process people. Several subsequent attempts by both the military and NGO to explain what was being offered were rejected as was an offer to recce Kizi checkpoint on Saturday afternoon 24 Sep. The reason given for not wanting to recce Kizi checkpoint is that the RPA LO knew what the site looked like.

6. There was no representation at the 24 Sep coordination conference by either the civil authority or the RPA LO; although the LO was at TACHQ several hours before the meeting for 30-40 minutes and did not advise that he would be absent from that night's meeting nor the one scheduled for the following evening.

7. The coordination meeting on 25 Sep 94 was the final coordinating meeting for the lift scheduled on Monday 26 Sep. It was a critical meeting as all tasks were finalized and/or confirmed except those of the RPA at Kizi checkpoint. The only representation from the civil authority was the Sous-Prefect who could not comment upon the manning of Kizi.

8. The operation commenced at 0800 hrs, Monday, 26 Sep and the RPA LO was not available nor was Kizi checkpoint manned with sufficient people to handle the volume of transported persons envisioned. The lift went faster than expected and the first truck arrived at about 0900 and there was only one person searching baggage and one person at the registration point. Attempts to find that RPA LO, Prefect or a responsible individual at RPA Brigade Headquarters (the Commander or a Duty Officer) proved unsuccessful. The LO eventually appeared at about 1030 hrs saying that he had come from Kigali. He was surprised that there was a problem as personnel had been detailed for the checkpoint. Eventually the personnel were found and the problem resolved. It was fortunate though that only half the displaced persons registered for the move in fact showed up for the vehicles.

9. The atmosphere in the following three nightly meetings slowly degenerated between the RPA/civil authority and the NGOs because of a divergence in attitudes regarding the perceived security situation in Sector 3 and who OP HOMEWARD was serving; the people of Rwanda as typified by the displaced people or the Government of Rwanda. This was a situation which had not existed previously as the reluctance of people to return was not known. No senior member of the civil authority was present hence the RPA dominated what was largely a civil affairs matter. The RPA maintained that the NGOs were responsible for spreading rumors/not supporting the legal authority of the Rwanda government including straying beyond their (NGO) mandate if they question people on their state of well being and/or report any suspicions to UNAMIR. The NGOs countered that the RPA were insensitive to the rights of individuals and being purposely difficult to work with.

10. As a result of the friction between the RPA and NGOs, the Prefect Security officer and Maj Wilson (suspected of being the

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Brigade Information Officer) attended the last coordination meeting for the first week's task of OP HOMEWARD. Maj Wilson requested a meeting with the UNAMIR staff following the conference and in a purely military audience confided that the RPA consider the NGOs as a subversive element and asked that UNAMIR be cognizant of hidden agendas on the part of the NGOs. This meeting was also used to air some outstanding local grievances on the part of UNAMIR forces from TACHQ and MILOB sector 4A:

- a. the availability of the RPA LOs at TACHQ and Gikongoro was discussed in that their attendance was irregular and that they had conflicting priorities. A suggestion was made for the RPA to assign more LOs to each location so that there would be someone available whenever they were needed.
- b. the denial of access to non-military facilities and restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNAMIR troops. It was explained that such actions hamper the ability for UNAMIR to gather evidence to refute rumors and in fact add to the problem the RPA are experiencing with distrust by the populous.
- c. the unwillingness of civil authorities to visit camps in Sector 4A so as to appease the inhabitants request for information on what the government is doing and what the people can expect if they return home.
- d. the lack of direct face to face communications between senior RPA officers and senior UNAMIR officers to resolve problems rather than passing messages among intermediaries.

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ANNEX B TO
TAC HQ
OP HOMEWARD DATED
29 SEPT 94

PSYOPS ASPECTS OF OP HOMEWARD - RECOMMENDED TACTICS

ASSUMPTIONS

- * That a large proportion of IDP's believe that they are guilty of a crime committed during the recent war. They are currently unaware of the scope of the RPA's intentions to apply the process of law to those returning to their home locations.
- * That the IDP's are better provided with food, shelter, water, health care and security in the refugee camps than in their home locations.

STRATEGY

- * Any PSYOPS effort must be coordinated at the highest level.
- * PSYOPS will not be effective unless it is seen as clear Government policy with the support and involvement of UNAMIR.
- * NGO support of a PSYOPS campaign is fundamental to it's success. They need to be convinced that the concept is sound in terms of the Government's commitment to the provision of both a secure environment for returnees and a legal process which is open to public scrutiny.
- * The sources of current anti RPA propaganda need to be identified.
- * The RPA must be persuaded that there is a need for the investigation of both actual incidents and rumours of same. Subsequent dissemination of the findings of these investigations is necessary.
- * NGO effort be redirected to regional centers to facilitate the transition from refugee camps to home locations.

METHODOLOGY

- * Monitoring of radio transmissions carrying anti RPA/Government propaganda.

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- * Jamming of illegal transmitters.
- * Radio broadcasts of government policy including:
 - a. Method of resolution of house and land ownership disputes;
 - b. explanation of Government's intentions regarding prosecution of alleged criminals; and
 - c. continuing support of NGOs and presence of UNAMIR forces in home locations.
- * Leaflet campaigns supplementing radio broadcasts.
- * Use of transportable loud speaker systems to disseminate information and detail of Op Homeward timings, destination, reception arrangements, etc.
- * A concerted effort by UNAMIR and other UN agencies to investigate reports of any incidents which suggest subversive activity, anti-government action, RPA activity which falls outside stated Government policy and any other incidents which impact on the security situation. Freedom of movement for UNAMIR forces and the candid passage of information between the RPA and UNAMIR are critical to this aspect of operations.
- * Use of both radio and transportable loud speaker system to provide results of investigations into both illegal radio broadcast and specific rumours effecting individual camps or areas.
- * Ensure that NGO presence in rural areas is coordinated to provide adequate coverage for returned persons.

B-2/2

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To: Distribution List

From: Col H. Osae-Addae, COO, TAC HQ Butare

Date: 29 September 1994

Subject: OPERATION HOMEWARD

References: A. Estimate prepared by LCol P Desnoyers dated 16 September 1994
B. Fragmentary Order to Operation Order No. 18 Op Homeward dated 18 September 1994

Background

1. On 16 September, LCol Desnoyers, newly appointed as Deputy Chief HAC created reference A to take advantage of a temporary surplus of UNAMIR vehs. The intent was to use these vehicles to assist NGO's in the return of IDP's to their homes before the rains render the camps difficult/impossible to support. The stated aim was "to propose a military option to assist relief agencies" in the relocation of IDP's. HQ UNAMIR adopted this proposal and issued reference B two days later. LCol Desnoyers called and chaired a meeting of NGO's and UN agencies at TAC HQ Butare on 29 September at which it was obvious that the civilian attendees had no prior knowledge of the initiative. At subsequent working meetings at TAC HQ it was obvious that the same individuals/agencies were both suspicious and unclear about what was perceived as a military solution foisted on them by UNAMIR: much laborious and repetitive explanation was required to reinforce the concept that UNAMIR was merely to help facilitate their actions. Further, it was obvious that they could not make themselves ready at the speed envisaged in the original estimate.

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Aim

3. To examine Op Homeward to identify lessons learned and recommend a way ahead.

Factors

4. The factors considered at reference A will be re-assessed in light of practical experience as follows:

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② Desnoyers
This is the report I spoke about. See my annotations. This report was not copied to me and I don't know why. Please read the whole report and let us have your views. Meanwhile I think we should refrain the HQ at Butare whilst we contemplate a re-org and re-assigment.
JG
10-10-94
DF/WS

3000.32(0725)
R-6

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a. Will to Return Home:

- (1) Security. The perception of safety is as important as the reality. Rumours of RPA retribution and, at the least, RPA harshness, abound. They come from various sources but share the common feature that they are easier to start than to stop. From the outset TAC HQ has vigorously pursued rumours and dubious/incomplete reports of all natures from all sources but TAC HQ's resources are not equal to the task. The lack of a massive, high-level counter-propaganda campaign is crippling, at best. Further, the NGO's and agencies will have no part of any such campaigns and resist so strongly that it may reasonably be argued that their lack of active support for relocation is perceived by the Rwandese as tacit support of the stay-put attitude. Since UNAMIR assists relief agencies and since the agencies control, in one way or another, the movement, the perception of safety as portrayed by the agencies outweighs the reality;
- (2) Humanitarian Assistance Dependency. The view from TAC HQ is that the IDP's are already dependent on the relief effort. More to the point, as long as a lack of safety is perceived, the indignity of a refugee camp is the lesser of two evils. It is noteworthy that if the rainy season will reduce/curtail the relief effort to some camps, it will at the same time reduce security within those camps by reducing the hours and randomness of observation by both UNAMIR and the relief agencies. It is argued by some that this is part of the RPA hidden agenda;
- (3) Propaganda. Discussed above; and
- (4) Deduction. The IDP's presently lack the will to return home as they perceive themselves better off where they are. This situation must deteriorate with the onset of the rains by which time the task of relocation/support will be more difficult and resources less plentiful. The desire to return home must be injected now if the status quo is to be avoided.

b. Health Conditions. Medical screenings are not always done and are usually cursory at best. They should be considered desirable not mandatory;

c. RPA Verifications. The RPA steadfastly refuse to conduct screenings in camps. To date they have been somewhat intransigent about improving their system to increase throughput. Cooperation is improving in some areas but high-level pressure must be applied to gain full cooperation and maximum efficiency in the verification process. As a start, direction from the RPA Chief LO that the local LO attend all coordination conferences and be available 7/24 (assignment of assistants?), would be most useful;

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- The prefects commit.
- d. Final Destinations. Attendance of the receiving Prefects at coordination conferences is sporadic. Further, their ability to project themselves into the receiving commune/sector either personally or through their subordinates is either lacking or not being pursued aggressively. Prefects must place more emphasis on and effort into the positive reception of returnees: this must include positive control of the RPA garrison;
- e. Road Conditions. The assumption made by LCol Desnoyers remains valid. However, see staging;
- f. UNHCR/IOM Staging. We have avoided overnight staging where possible. As 90% of the population live away from urban centers, so they also live well off surfaced roads. This means that military-type vehicles are required for both ends of a trip although not necessarily in the middle. Overnighting, therefore, reduces available lift and should be avoided. We have developed alternate methods of providing the essential start-up ingredients;
- g. Mass Population Effect. No impact yet observed as relocation effort is in the hands of relief agencies who will not be seen to encourage return;
- h. Location of Camps. Although most are in Sector 4 as stated, the estimated population is questioned for several reasons. Airborne/satellite sensing devices should be employed to accurately identify the dimensions of the problem including internal migration on a regular and frequent basis;
- Which are they?
- i. Available UNHCR/IOM Resources. Assumption correct but not necessarily pertinent. See Staging; and
- j. Available UNAMIR Resources. Assumption was optimistic. A more reasonable assumption is 30-50 vehicles.
- from what source?

Other Factors

5. Other factors worthy of consideration are:

- a. Will to Walk. Considered by LCol Desnoyers under Mass Population Effect as the willingness to walk home once the migration had started. This view is not shared by TAC HQ. The Rwandese walked for their lives and, given the degree of support available in the camps, will probably not walk home unless forced to;
- b. Reception on Return. One aspect overlooked is the return of refugees from previous conflicts. They now live in the homes of the current IDP's and bear a grudge;

- c. RPA Hidden Agenda. The RPA are intransigent to an almost inexplicable degree. Assurances given at national level in Kigali are not translated into action on the ground. One argument advanced is that the RPA are as well-behaved as they are because they know their turn is coming when the rains isolate the camps from prying eyes. This is perhaps reinforced by an often-stated RPA point of view (local) that those in Sector 4 probably have something to hide. The status quo in Sector 4 can thus be perceived as a target of opportunity. While this hypothesis is not necessarily supported, its' potential implication are too great to be overlooked; and
- d. Appropriate Agencies. The initial meeting and the subsequent coordination conference included the agencies from Butare area. It became clear later that the Gikongoro area reps of those agencies must also be included in the operation as they are almost separate entities and communications between different offices of the same agency is not what we are accustomed to in the Army. Including them in the coordination Conferences however is cumbersome and problematic. For the time-being it is sufficient that the Butare rep coordinates with the Gikongoro rep after a TAC HQ conference but this is potentially a weak link. Care must be taken to ensure coordination between different Sector reps of agencies is effected.

Conclusions

6. It is concluded that:

- a. Op Homeward, while disappointing to date, is probably the best available option albeit in a modified form. It enjoys the advantage of being in place so that relief agencies don't have to be reconvinced;
- b. current UNAMIR capability will achieve at best a limited result;
- c. the agencies and NGO's must either positively support Op Homeward and BBGNU resources employed to a much greater degree for best results;
- ✓ d. more UNAMIR resources should be dedicated to counter-propaganda;
- e. rumour quashing must receive higher priority;
- who will? f. the RPA must be compelled to effect closer liaison with TAC HQ;
- will take time g. local civil authorities must be more closely integrated;
- h. overnighting should be avoided; and
- j. the number of IDP's must be more accurately identified.

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Options

7. There appear to be three options:

- a. maintain status quo. Op Homeward will, at best, achieve extremely limited results;
- b. cancel Op Homeward. While this would avoid a very heavy resource bill for minimum return this option is unconscionable; or
- c. adopt a more vigorous approach to Op Homeward.

Recommendation

8. It is recommended that Op Homeward continue (Option C) with the following modifications:

- a. the relief agencies or the BBGNU be coopted to pursue a vigorous relocation propaganda campaign;
- b. every effort be made to maximize transport resources, perhaps employing RPA vehicles;
- c. counter-propaganda be emphasized to include rumour quashing as a high priority;
- d. the RPA and local civil authorities be directed by their central command to participate fully;
- e. the number of IDP's be more accurately identified using airborne sensors; and
- f. TAC HQ continue to conduct Op Homeward focused on Sector 4 and incorporate the other refinements mentioned above.

H. Osae-Addae
Col
Comd TAC HQ

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Distribution List

Action

FC

HAC

Information

DCOS Ops

DCOS Sp

G3 Plans

G4 Log

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ANNEX A TO
TAC HQ
OP HOMEWARD DATED
29 SEPT 94

RPA ATTITUDES AND COOPERATION IN OP HOMEWARD

1. The first organizational meeting for OP HOMEWARD on 20 Sep 94 was well attended by the RPA and the civil authorities; the Prefects for Gikongoro and Butare were present as were the Sous-Prefect and the RPA LO to TACHQ. Arriving late for the meeting were two representatives from the Ministries of Rehabilitation and of the Interior. Unfortunately these officials did not get a chance to address the meeting regarding the Government's position towards OP HOMEWARD. Nonetheless Capt Zegara, the Prefect for Gikongoro assured the meeting that the Government fully supported the operation although lacking the resources to take a major part. He emphasized however that security measures would not be compromised for the sake of speed in moving people.
2. Following the meeting, the representatives from Kigali spoke with the Prefects but it is not known what was discussed nor whether their discussion carried on after leaving the OP HOMEWARD meeting.
3. A second organizational meeting was held on the evening of 21 Sep 94 where again the RPA and civil authorities from the previous meeting were in attendance. The position of the government was again reiterated and their concern emphasized that action had to be taken to return people to their homes as soon as possible. At all times it was stressed that the operation was a cooperative venture between UNAMIR, the NGO and the Government of Rwanda.
4. The first coordination conference was held on 23 Sep with the Sous-Prefect for Butare and the RPA LO in attendance. It was identified that the Kizi checkpoint would become a bottle neck to the operation unless additional personnel were assigned to the search of baggage and registration of individuals. The RPA LO in addition to saying that he would be present at the checkpoint also agreed to provide additional personnel and it was suggested to him that two searchers and one register be assigned to each truck load of people arriving at Kizi so as to minimize delay. It was forecast that the convoy packets would likely be 10 vehicles in size however no specific numbers of vehicles could be determined at this point and thus the actual number of people necessary to man Kizi checkpoint could not be given. This detail would only have been available at the Sunday night, 25 Sep, conference.
5. The problem with the physical layout/separation of the security check and registration points was identified and an offer was made by an NGO group to set up a mass processing site at Kizi to handle large numbers of people quickly and with security. It appeared that the RPA LO would not entertain any suggestion of

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changing the layout of the checkpoint nor any explanation of what was envisioned. Consequently, he rejected the offer of resources to process people. Several subsequent attempts by both the military and NGO to explain what was being offered were rejected as was an offer to recce Kizi checkpoint on Saturday afternoon 24 Sep. The reason given for not wanting to recce Kizi checkpoint is that the RPA LO knew what the site looked like.

6. There was no representation at the 24 Sep coordination conference by either the civil authority or the RPA LO; although the LO was at TACHQ several hours before the meeting for 30-40 minutes and did not advise that he would be absent from that night's meeting nor the one scheduled for the following evening.

7. The coordination meeting on 25 Sep 94 was the final coordinating meeting for the lift scheduled on Monday 26 Sep. It was a critical meeting as all tasks were finalized and/or confirmed except those of the RPA at Kizi checkpoint. The only representation from the civil authority was the Sous-Prefect who could not comment upon the manning of Kizi.

8. The operation commenced at 0800 hrs, Monday, 26 Sep and the RPA LO was not available nor was Kizi checkpoint manned with sufficient people to handle the volume of transported persons envisioned. The lift went faster than expected and the first truck arrived at about 0900 and there was only one person searching baggage and one person at the registration point. Attempts to find that RPA LO, Prefect or a responsible individual at RPA Brigade Headquarters (the Commander or a Duty Officer) proved unsuccessful. The LO eventually appeared at about 1030 hrs saying that he had come from Kigali. He was surprised that there was a problem as personnel had been detailed for the checkpoint. Eventually the personnel were found and the problem resolved. It was fortunate though that only half the displaced persons registered for the move in fact showed up for the vehicles.

9. The atmosphere in the following three nightly meetings slowly degenerated between the RPA/civil authority and the NGOs because of a divergence in attitudes regarding the perceived security situation in Sector 3 and who OP HOMEWARD was serving; the people of Rwanda as typified by the displaced people or the Government of Rwanda. This was a situation which had not existed previously as the reluctance of people to return was not known. No senior member of the civil authority was present hence the RPA dominated what was largely a civil affairs matter. The RPA maintained that the NGOs were responsible for spreading rumors/not supporting the legal authority of the Rwanda government including straying beyond their (NGO) mandate if they question people on their state of well being and/or report any suspicions to UNAMIR. The NGOs countered that the RPA were insensitive to the rights of individuals and being purposely difficult to work with.

10. As a result of the friction between the RPA and NGOs, the Prefect Security officer and Maj Wilson (suspected of being the

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Brigade Information Officer) attended the last coordination meeting for the first week's task of OP HOMEWARD. Maj Wilson requested a meeting with the UNAMIR staff following the conference and in a purely military audience confided that the RPA consider the NGOs as a subversive element and asked that UNAMIR be cognizant of hidden agendas on the part of the NGOs. This meeting was also used to air some outstanding local grievances on the part of UNAMIR forces from TACHQ and MILOB sector 4A:

- a. the availability of the RPA LOs at TACHQ and Gikongoro was discussed in that their attendance was irregular and that they had conflicting priorities. A suggestion was made for the RPA to assign more LOs to each location so that there would be someone available whenever they were needed.
- b. the denial of access to non-military facilities and restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNAMIR troops. It was explained that such actions hamper the ability for UNAMIR to gather evidence to refute rumors and in fact add to the problem the RPA are experiencing with distrust by the populous.
- c. the unwillingness of civil authorities to visit camps in Sector 4A so as to appease the inhabitants request for information on what the government is doing and what the people can expect if they return home.
- d. the lack of direct face to face communications between senior RPA officers and senior UNAMIR officers to resolve problems rather than passing messages among intermediaries.

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ANNEX B TO
TAC HQ
OP HOMEWARD DATED
29 SEPT 94

PSYOPS ASPECTS OF OP HOMEWARD - RECOMMENDED TACTICS

ASSUMPTIONS

- * That a large proportion of IDP's believe that they are guilty of a crime committed during the recent war. They are currently unaware of the scope of the RPA's intentions to apply the process of law to those returning to their home locations.
- * That the IDP's are better provided with food, shelter, water, health care and security in the refugee camps than in their home locations.

STRATEGY

- * Any PSYOPS effort must be coordinated at the highest level.
- * PSYOPS will not be effective unless it is seen as clear Government policy with the support and involvement of UNAMIR.
- * NGO support of a PSYOPS campaign is fundamental to it's success. They need to be convinced that the concept is sound in terms of the Government's commitment to the provision of both a secure environment for returnees and a legal process which is open to public scrutiny.
- * The sources of current anti RPA propaganda need to be identified.
- * The RPA must be persuaded that there is a need for the investigation of both actual incidents and rumours of same. Subsequent dissemination of the findings of these investigations is necessary.
- * NGO effort be redirected to regional centers to facilitate the transition from refugee camps to home locations.

METHODOLOGY

- * Monitoring of radio transmissions carrying anti RPA/Government propaganda.

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- * Jamming of illegal transmitters.
- * Radio broadcasts of government policy including:
 - a. Method of resolution of house and land ownership disputes;
 - b. explanation of Government's intentions regarding prosecution of alleged criminals; and
 - c. continuing support of NGOs and presence of UNAMIR forces in home locations.
- * Leaflet campaigns supplementing radio broadcasts.
- * Use of transportable loud speaker systems to disseminate information and detail of Op Homeward timings, destination, reception arrangements, etc.
- * A concerted effort by UNAMIR and other UN agencies to investigate reports of any incidents which suggest subversive activity, anti-government action, RPA activity which falls outside stated Government policy and any other incidents which impact on the security situation. Freedom of movement for UNAMIR forces and the candid passage of information between the RPA and UNAMIR are critical to this aspect of operations.
- * Use of both radio and transportable loud speaker system to provide results of investigations into both illegal radio broadcast and specific rumours effecting individual camps or areas.
- * Ensure that NGO presence in rural areas is coordinated to provide adequate coverage for returned persons.

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