

DR

G3 OPERATIONS/PLANS - OPERATIONS
OPERATION HOMEWARD

18 SEPT 1994 - 11 APR 1995

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

[1 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]

[8 CONFIDENTIAL]

PH/WG JUNE 2009

UNARCHIVES

SERIES 51062

BOX 124

FILE 6

ACC. 1998/0903

Definitions

3. The following definitions apply to this Directive:

- a. "weapons" unless otherwise ordered, is defined as a firearm, grenade, spear and sword. An item such as a machete, or an axe is only to be considered a weapon if it is used in an aggressive manner against an individual.
- b. "temporary detention" is defined as the period it takes for the crowd to disperse or for the individual to be removed from the vicinity so that he can no longer interfere with the mission.
- c. "joint operations" is defined as an operation where the ~~RPA~~ and UNAMIR troops are acting together.

Power to Search DPs

4. UNAMIR has the power to search detainees who have sought protection with UNAMIR troops or are getting on trucks provided by the NGOs. It can be reasonably argued that this power derives from the fact that UNAMIR is providing security and protection to DPs and therefore soldiers must be allowed to search individuals and their possessions. If a DP refuses to be searched they are to be denied protection or access to the truck.

5. The power to search detainees is limited to searching them for the purpose of the mission. Thus UNAMIR does not have the power to search tents or DPs who may be going about their normal business in the camp unless otherwise ordered for a specific operation.

Power to Disarm DPs

6. Reference B, Annex A, paragraphs 1 and 2 stipulate that for ROE States Green and Yellow UNAMIR troops do not have the power to disarm paramilitary and civilian personnel. This Directive however does not prohibit disarming paramilitary and civilians in Rwanda where there is a need to do so for security and protection reasons. It may be argued that if a DP is under UNAMIR's care, UNAMIR has the right to disarm the person to ensure its own and other DPs protection and security.

7. If a weapon is found on a DP, that person is to be asked to surrender the weapon before boarding the truck. Failure to surrender the weapon will mean that the DP cannot board the truck. Weapons may be removed by force from DPs only if UNAMIR soldiers believe that the DP is exhibiting a hostile intent or hostile act (as defined in Reference B).

Separating DPs

8. It is permissible to separate DPs from agitators if they are gathered in a crowd and UNAMIR has a reasonable belief that the purpose of such a gathering is to stop DPs from returning to their communes. The justification for doing this is that the mission is to facilitate DPs returning to their communes and the agitators should not be allowed to interfere in this process.

Replaced see DCOS OPS Ltr.

FROM : G3 OPS *per At*
TO : NIBATT
SECTOR 1 MILOB HQ

DATE : 11 MAR 95

SUBJECT: REPORTING OF BORDER CROSSINGS

1. In order to avoid inaccuracies in figures of border crossing submitted from your sector, you are requested to limit your figures to daily crossings only (ie 24 hr period) and not for periods covering 3 to 4 days.
2. For your necessary attention and action please.

FROM: G3 OPS

3000.32 (Ops)

TO: MILOB GP HQ
TUNBATT
FRAFBATT
ETHIOBATT
ZAMBATT
GHANBATT
NICOY
MALAWI COY
MALI COY

INFO: DCOS OPS/
INDBATT

DATE: 08 FEB 95

SUBJECT: REPORTING OF BORDER CROSSINGS

1. Figures reported by the units concerning border crossings, do not tally with those submitted by other UN agencies, particularly figures of outflow of Rwandese into neighbouring countries which consistently have been reported as nil by formed troops and MILOBS.
2. Units are therefore requested to ensure that in future, figures of border crossings submitted to this HQ are accurate.
3. Acknowledge.

Thrust

Scay
H
9/2

H
10/2



OUTGOING FAX NO. _____

PAGE 1 OF 1

MOST URGENT FACSIMILE

TO: UNAMIR SECTOR 5 MILOBS COMMANDER - GISENYI, RWANDA	FROM: MGEN TOUSIGNANT FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI
ATTN: MILOB COMD OR MAJ McCOMBER	DATE: 8 Feb 95
FAX NO: 1 57 (SECTOR 5)	PHONE: 1 212 963 3092
INFO: MILOB GP HQ KIGALI INTERNAL: [REDACTED] MA/FC; UNAMIR SPOKESMAN	FAX NO: 1 212 963 3090
FAX NO: RWANDATEL 83911	DRAFTED BY: AMA/FC
SUBJECT: WORLD FOOD PROGRAM COMMENT GISENYI BORDER CROSSING	
REFERENCE: UNNY HQ DPKO SITREP 7 FEB 95	

SUBJ SITREP STATED THAT WORLD FOOD PROGRAM (WFP) PERSONNEL IN GISENYI AREA HAVE REPORTED AN INSUFFICIENT NUMBER (10 OUT OF 15) OF THEIR VEHICLES ARE BEING ALLOWED TO CROSS THE FRONTIER INTO ZAIRE TO SUSTAIN THEIR OPERATION. THIS HAS DRAWN THE FULL ATTENTION OF OUR SPOKESMAN HERE AND HIS ASSOCIATES IN NEW YORK.

REQUEST THAT YOU MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CONFIRM OR DISCREDIT THIS REPORT BY ACTIVELY SEEKING OUT INFORMATION FROM WFP AND OTHER NGOS IN YOUR AREA ABOUT THIS SUBJECT AND OTHER TRANS-BORDER MOVEMENT.

WOULD APPRECIATE RESULTS OF YOOUR SURVEY WITHIN NEXT 24 HRS SO THAT WE CAN RESPOND IN A PRO-ACTIVE MANNER.

② Ops Clk
PA
8.2

10/2

11/2

Seen
A
9/2

1

FROM: G3 OPS

3000.32 (Ops)

TO: MILOB GP HQ
TUNBATT
FRAFBATT
ETHIOBATT
ZAMBATT
GHANBATT
NICOY
MALAWI COY
MALI COY

INFO: DCOS OPS
INDBATT

DATE: 08 FEB 95

SUBJECT: REPORTING OF BORDER CROSSINGS

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2. Units are therefore requested to ensure that in future, figures of border crossings submitted to this HQ are accurate.
3. Acknowledge.

FROM : GHANBATT

TO : UNAMIR HQ


REF INFO REQUIRED REGARDING CROSSING OF REFUGEES FROM BURUNDI PD
NIL REFUGEES CROSSED TODAY PD RUTETE BORDER IS RARELY USED PD
SUBSEQUENT TO CROSSING IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO FIND RETURNEES
PD RETURNEES TALKED TO CONFIRM THAT THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS IN
CROSSING THE BORDER ANYWHERE ///1835

Copy to 93 L
as requested

~~TH~~
07/2

Thunt
06/2

3000.32



FROM: G3 OPS
TO: SECTOR 3
INFO: MALICOY

3000.34 (Ops)

FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL

DATE: 2 FEB 95.

SUBJECT: HANDING OVER OF DETAINEES

1. Ref Para 4 (c) of your sitrep dated 01 Feb 95.
2. It is for your information that any person who has been detained by you for having committed an offence, or has sought protection has to be handed to the Local Prosecutor only and not to the Gendarmerie or the RPA. The handing over of the local who had sought protection from MALICOY, to the RPA is in direct contravention to FC's Directive on Handling of Detainees.
3. You are therefore requested to forward a detailed report on the incident including the following:
 - A. Name of the individual.
 - B. Charge against the individual.
 - C. Whether Human Rights and the ICRC were present when the individual was being handed over to the RPA.
4. Your report should reach this HQ by 05 Feb 95.
5. Acknowledge.



2000-1

Distribution List

27 January 1995

Thunt
30/1

FC DIRECTIVE ON THE HANDLING OF DISPLACED PERSONS

References:

- A. UN Security Council Resolution 925 dated 8 Jun 94
- B. Section 9: Op Directive No 2 Rules of Engagement
- C. FC Directive on the Legal Jurisdiction Applicable to UNAMIR and the Rwandan Authorities Version II dated January 95

Atk
01/2

Introduction

1. This Directive outlines, from a legal perspective, the issues which soldiers need to be aware of when handling displaced persons (DPs) whether they be in DP camps or under the protection of UNAMIR troops (eg when UNAMIR is providing convoy security to the trucks returning DPs back to their communes).

Assumptions

- 2. The following assumptions are made:
 - a. While UNAMIR and the RPA may be working together in the camps, UNAMIR's mandate as stated in Reference A will still be adhered to. That Resolution states, amongst other things, that UNAMIR is to:
 - "(a) Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; and
 - (b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;"
 - b. The ROE state applicable during operations conducted in DP camps will be either Green or Yellow.

Definitions

3. The following definitions apply to this Directive:
 - a. "weapons" unless otherwise ordered, is defined as a firearm, grenade, spear and sword. An item such as a machete, or an axe is only to be considered a weapon if it is used in an aggressive manner against an individual.
 - b. "temporary detention" is defined as the period it takes for the crowd to disperse or for the individual to be removed from the vicinity so that he can no longer interfere with the mission.
 - c. "joint operations" is defined as an operation where the RPA and UNAMIR troops are acting together.

Power to Search DPs

4. UNAMIR has the power to search detainees who have sought protection with UNAMIR troops or are getting on trucks provided by the NGOs. It can be reasonably argued that this power derives from the fact that UNAMIR is providing security and protection to DPs and therefore soldiers must be allowed to search individuals and their possessions. If a DP refuses to be searched they are to be denied protection or access to the truck

5. The power to search detainees is limited to searching them for the purpose of the mission. Thus UNAMIR does not have the power to search tents or DPs who may be going about their normal business in the camp unless otherwise ordered for a specific operation by UNAMIR HQ or Sector Commanders in Accordance with Reference A.

Power to Disarm DPs

6. Reference B, Annex A, paragraphs 1 and 2 stipulate that for ROE States Green and Yellow UNAMIR troops do not have the power to disarm paramilitary and civilian personnel. This Directive however does not prohibit disarming paramilitary and civilians in Rwanda where there is a need to do so for security and protection reasons. It may be argued that if a DP is under UNAMIR's care, UNAMIR has the right to disarm the person to ensure its own and other DPs protection and security.

7. If a weapon is found on a DP, that person is to be asked to surrender the weapon before boarding the truck. Failure to surrender the weapon will mean that the DP cannot board the truck. Weapons may be removed by force from DPs only if UNAMIR soldiers believe that the DP is exhibiting a hostile intent or hostile act (as defined in Reference B).

to their communes. The justification for doing this is that the mission is to facilitate DPs returning to their communes and the agitators should not be allowed to interfere in this process.

9. In these circumstances, minimum force in accordance with the ROE may be used and a DP may be detained temporarily. Temporarily is defined as that period it takes for the crowd to disperse or for the individual to be removed from the vicinity so that he can no longer interfere with the mission

Handing Over DPs

10. DPs are to be handed over in accordance with Reference C. That Directive states, amongst other things, that Rwandan citizens are to be handed to the Office of the Prosecutor only. DPs are not to be handed to the RPA or any other local authority.

Protecting DPs

11. As stated in Resolution 925, it is UNAMIR's mandate to protect displaced persons and Rwandan citizens at risk. This means that where UNAMIR troops witness a hostile act or intent against a Rwandan citizen (including DPs) they are to take the necessary steps to ensure that they provide the person with protection (see Reference B).

Joint Operations with the RPA

12. All UNAMIR troops are reminded that they remain, for command and control purposes, under command of UNAMIR. Consequently, they are not to act on the orders of the RPA, unless such orders are for their own safety. It is for the UNAMIR soldier to determine whether an order issued by the RPA is for his safety or, the safety of someone he has been ordered to protect under the ROE.


13. UNAMIR troops are also reminded that they are to comply with ROE 5 for States Green and Yellow which prohibits intervention between warring factions (see Reference B). Thus, if two groups of armed people are fighting, UNAMIR troops cannot intervene.

14. Joint patrolling by UNAMIR troops and the RPA are not to occur. Commanders should take reasonable steps to avoid presenting the perception that UNAMIR is acting jointly with the RPA

OP Retour

15. In addition to the above orders, UNAMIR troops are to adopt the following directives for OP Retour:

- a. Joint searches of DPs getting on to NGO trucks may be conducted by UNAMIR and the RPA. However, the principles outlined in paragraphs 12 and 13 above must be adhered to. UNAMIR soldiers are also reminded that in accordance with the ROE if they witness the RPA assaulting a DP they make take reasonable steps to stop the assault.
- b. The RPA are travelling in some vehicles which are under UNAMIR protection. If these trucks are attacked, UNAMIR troops are to use minimum force to protect the occupants under their care in accordance with Reference B, notwithstanding the fact that the RPA may also be in the same vehicle.



G. C. Tousignant
Major-General
Force Commander

DISTRIBUTION LIST

Action

Lists B, C and D
HRL/UNHRFO
CSS
CCPO
STO
CSO
MCC
CTO
BMES
CCO

Information

Lists A and D



C73 c/s

Minute

From: DCOS Ops *[Signature]*

To: Lists A, B, C, D and E
HRL/UNHRFO
CSS
CCPO
STO
CSO
MCC
CTO
BMES
CCO

Date: 28 Jan 95

Subject: AMENDMENT TO FC DIR ON HANDLING OF DISPLACED PERSONS

Reference: 2000-1 dated 27 January 1995

1. Due to a reproduction error, page two of the reference should be replaced with a new page two.
2. Addressees are requested to insert the attached page in the reference.

②

cc

Pse make the
rec amendment-

[Signature]

30/1

③ Amendment
carried out.

30/1

AS.

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE UNCLAS				FILE — DOSSIER	
PAGE OF DE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE	CLASS	SPECAT CAT-SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAC/IOC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO				
	25 0900B JAN 95								
BOOK DOSSIER	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE								

UNAMIR HQ OPS
CO ZAMBATT (HAN)

SUBJECT: INFORMATION CAMPAIGN TEAMS

1. THE RESPONSE FROM THE IDPS IN CAMPS SINCE YOUR INFORMATION CAMPAIGN TEAMS STARTED OPERATING HAS BEEN TREMENDOUSLY GOOD.
2. UNREC, HAS REQUESTED THAT THE NUMBER OF CAMPAIGN TEAMS BE INCREASED.
3. PISE MAY YOU INCREASE THE NUMBER OF INFO CAMPAIGN TEAMS TO BE CONDUCTING THE SAME OPERATION //

JK CHUMBU

11185

SIGNATURE


* RPA not RGF
(replace throughout)

2000-1

Distribution List

January 1995
FC DIRECTIVE ON THE HANDLING OF DISPLACED PERSONS

References:

- A. UN Security Council Resolution 925 dated 8 Jun 94
- B. Section 9: Op Directive No 2 Rules of Engagement
- C. FC Directive on the Legal Jurisdiction Applicable to UNAMIR and the Rwandan Authorities dated

Introduction

1. This Directive outlines, from a legal perspective, the issues which soldiers need to be aware of when handling displaced persons (DPs) whether they be in DP camps or under the protection of UNAMIR troops (eg when UNAMIR is providing convoy security to the trucks returning DPs back to their communes).

Assumptions

2. The following assumptions are made:

- a. While UNAMIR and the ~~RGF~~ may be working together in the camps, UNAMIR's mandate as stated in Reference A will still be adhered to. That Resolution states, amongst other things, that UNAMIR is to:

"(a) Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible, of secure humanitarian areas; and

(b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;"

- b. The ROE state applicable during operations conducted in DP camps will be either Green or Yellow.

② AUSMEI Legal O
Pls amend and
provide final copy for
COS → FC perusal,
approve.

cc
Pte WD DCOS ops
20/1

③ treated
DE
cc
20/1

Definitions

3. The following definitions apply to this Directive:
 - a. "weapons" unless otherwise ordered, is defined as a firearm, grenade, spear and sword. An item such as a machete, or an axe is only to be considered a weapon if it is used in an aggressive manner against an individual.
 - b. "temporary detention" is defined as the period it takes for the crowd to disperse or for the individual to be removed from the vicinity so that he can no longer interfere with the mission.
 - c. "joint operations" is defined as an operation where the RPA and UNAMIR troops are acting together.

Power to Search DPs

4. UNAMIR has the power to search detainees who have sought protection with UNAMIR troops or are getting on trucks provided by the NGOs. It can be reasonably argued that this power derives from the fact that UNAMIR is providing security and protection to DPs and therefore soldiers must be allowed to search individuals and their possessions. If a DP refuses to be searched they are to be denied protection or access to the truck.
5. The power to search detainees is limited to searching them for the purpose of the mission. Thus UNAMIR does not have the power to search tents or DPs who may be going about their normal business in the camp unless otherwise ordered for a specific operation by UNAMIR HQ or Sector Commanders in Accordance with Reference A

Power to Disarm DPs

6. Reference B, Annex A, paragraphs 1 and 2 stipulate that for ROE States Green and Yellow UNAMIR troops do not have the power to disarm paramilitary and civilian personnel. This Directive however does not prohibit disarming paramilitary and civilians in Rwanda where there is a need to do so for security and protection reasons. It may be argued that if a DP is under UNAMIR's care, UNAMIR has the right to disarm the person to ensure its own and other DPs protection and security.
7. If a weapon is found on a DP, that person is to be asked to surrender the weapon before boarding the truck. Failure to surrender the weapon will mean that the DP cannot board the truck. Weapons may be removed by force from DPs only if UNAMIR soldiers believe that the DP is exhibiting a hostile intent or hostile act (as defined in Reference B).

Separating DPs

8. It is permissible to separate DPs from agitators if they are gathered in a crowd and UNAMIR has a reasonable belief that the purpose of such a gathering is to stop DPs from returning.

9. In these circumstances, minimum force in accordance with the ROE may be used and a DP may be detained temporarily. Temporarily is defined as that period it takes for the crowd to disperse or for the individual to be removed from the vicinity so that he can no longer interfere with the mission

Handing Over DPs

10. DPs are to be handed over in accordance with Reference C. That Directive states, amongst other things, that Rwandan citizens are to be handed to the Office of the Prosecutor only. DPs are not to be handed to the RGF or any other local authority..

Protecting DPs

11. As stated in Resolution 925, it is UNAMIR's mandate to protect displaced persons and Rwandan citizens at risk. This means that where UNAMIR troops witness a hostile act or intent against a Rwandan citizen (including DPs) they are to take the necessary steps to ensure that they provide the person with protection (see Reference B).

Joint Operations with the RGF

12. All UNAMIR troops are reminded that they remain, for command and control purposes, under command of UNAMIR. Consequently, they are not to act on the orders of the RGF, unless such orders are for their own safety. It is for the UNAMIR soldier to determine whether an order issued by the RGF is for his safety or the safety of someone he has been ordered to protect under the ROE.

13. UNAMIR troops are also reminded that they are to comply with ROE 5 for States Green and Yellow which prohibits intervention between warring factions (see Reference B). Thus, if two groups of armed people are fighting, UNAMIR troops cannot intervene.

14. Joint patrolling by UNAMIR troops and the RGF are not to occur. Commanders should take reasonable steps to avoid presenting the perception that UNAMIR is acting jointly with the RGF.

OP Retour

15. In addition to the above orders, UNAMIR troops are to follow the following directives for OP Retour:

- a. Joint searches of DPs getting on to NGO trucks may be conducted by UNAMIR and the RGF. However, the principles outlined in paragraphs 12 and 13 above must be adhered to. UNAMIR soldiers are also reminded that in accordance with the ROE if they witness the RGF assaulting a DP they must take reasonable steps to stop the assault.
- b. The RGF are travelling in some vehicles which are under UNAMIR protection. If these trucks are attacked UNAMIR troops are to use minimum force to protect the occupants under their care in accordance with Reference B, notwithstanding the fact that the RGF are also in the same vehicle.

HANDLING DISPLACED PERSONS

Introduction

1. This brief outlines, from a legal perspective, the issues which soldiers need to be aware of when handling displaced persons (DPs) whether they be in DP camps or under the care of UNAMIR troops (eg when UNAMIR is providing convoy protection to the trucks returning DPs back to their communes).

Assumptions

2. The following assumptions are made:

a. While UNAMIR and the RPA may be working together in the camps, UNAMIR's mandate as stated in Resolution 925 will still be adhered to. That Resolution stated, amongst other things, that UNAMIR is to:

"(a) Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance, where feasible of, secure humanitarian areas; and

(b) Provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations;"

b. The ROE applicable during OP Retour will be either state Green or Yellow.

Weapons Defined

3. A weapon, unless otherwise ordered, is defined as a firearm, grenade, spear, sword etc. An item such as a machete, or an axe is only to be considered a weapon if it is used in an aggressive manner against an individual.

Power to Search Detainees

4. UNAMIR has the power to search detainees who have sought protection with UNAMIR troops or are getting on trucks provided by the NGOs. It is arguable that this power derives from the fact that UNAMIR is providing security and protection to DPs and therefore soldiers must be allowed to search individuals and their possessions. If a DP refuses to be searched they are to be denied protection or access to the truck.

5. This power to search detainees is limited to searching them for the purpose of the mission. Thus UNAMIR does not have the power to search tents or DPs who may be going about their normal business in the camp unless otherwise ordered for a specific operation.

③
COPZ sent
to Legal
offr Ausmed
Dre

② Legal O Ausmed
1. Looks good to me
less a few typos.
2. FC Directive might be most
appropriate format; your thoughts
Dec 4/8.1

Power to Disarm Detainees

6. OP Directive No 2, Rules of Engagement, Annex A, paragraphs 1 and 2 stipulate that for ROE States Green and Yellow UNAMIR troops do not have the power to disarm paramilitary and civilian personnel. This Directive however does not prohibit disarming paramilitary and civilians in Rwanda where there is a need to do so for security and protection reasons. It may be argued that if a DP is under UNAMIR's care, UNAMIR has the right to disarm the person to ensure its own and other DPs protection and security.

7. If a weapon is found on a DP that person is to be asked to surrender the weapon before boarding the truck. Failure to surrender the weapon will mean that the DP cannot board the truck. Weapons may be removed, by force, from DPs only if UNAMIR soldiers believe that the DP is exhibiting a hostile intent or hostile act (as defined in OP Directive No 2, ROE)

Separating DPs

8. It is permissible to separate DPs if they are gathered in a crowd and UNAMIR has a reasonable belief that the purpose of such a gathering is to stop DPs from returning to their communes. The justification for doing this is that the mission is to facilitate DPs returning to their communes and the agitators should not be allowed to interfere in this process.

9. In these circumstances reasonable force in accordance with the ROE may be used and a DP may be detained temporarily. Temporally is defined as that period it takes for the crowd to disperse or for the individual to be removed from the vicinity so that he can no longer interfere with the mission.

Handing Over DPs

10. DPs are to be handed over in accordance with the FC Directive On The Legal Jurisdiction Applicable To UNAMIR And Rwandan Authorities. That Directive states, amongst other things, that Rwandan citizens are to be handed to the Office of the Prosecutor only. DPs are not to be handed to the RPA.

Protecting DPs

11. As stated in Resolution 925, it is UNAMIR's mandate to protect displaced persons and Rwandan citizens at risk. This means that where UNAMIR troops witness a hostile act or intent being committed against the Rwandans (including DPs) they are to take the necessary steps to ensure that they accord the person with protection (see OP Directive No 2, ROE).

Joint Searches with the RPA

12. All UNAMIR troops are reminded that they remain, for command and control purposes, under UNAMIR. Consequently, they are not to act on the orders of the RPA, unless such orders are for their own safety.

13. UNAMIR troops are also reminded that they are to comply with ROE 5 for States Green and Yellow which prohibits intervention between warring factions (see OP Directive No 2, ROE). Thus if two groups of armed people are fighting UNAMIR troops cannot intervene.

14. Joint searches or activities between UNAMIR and the RPA are not to occur. If for practical reasons UNAMIR must search DPs this search is to be conducted by the UNAMIR Commander taking all reasonable steps to ensure that the DPs are separated into groups which allow the RPA and UNAMIR to conduct searches separately. Commanders should take reasonable steps to avoid people having the perception that UNAMIR is acting jointly with the RPA.

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS

3000.32(OPS)

TO: HQ SECT 3 MILOBS/GITARAMA

DATE: 9 JAN 95

SUBJECT: COORDINATION OF OP RETOUR.

REF: Your letter sector 3/ops/1 dated 1 Jan 95.

1. In your letter reference A above; you raised a number of points concerning OP RETOUR. It is requested that you liaise with Tac HQ which is the coordinating HQ for OP RETOUR, who will be able to answer the questions posed in your letter.

2. For your necessary action.


JK CHUMBU
MAJ
SO2 OPS

①
From: G3 OPS
UNAMIR HQ

File No: 3000.32 (Ops)

TO: TAC HQ
GHANBATT
ZAMBATT
1CDHSR

Date: 23 DEC 94

Subject: REPORTING OF DP MOVEMENTS

1. It has been noticed that the daily figures reported of DPs, moved out of Sector 4A by Tac HQ, GHANBATT, ZAMBATT and 1CDHSR do not tally.
2. You are requested to ensure that the figures forwarded by you in the daily SITREPS are accurate in all respects.
3. Please acknowledge receipt.

② G3 Ops UNAMIR

Noted.

ReWCAPT
ID
27 Dec 94

Thur
S02 OPS
29/12

From: UNAMIR OPS

File No: 3000.12(Ops)

To: ETHIOBATT
FRAFBATT
ZAMBATT
GHANBATT
TUNBATT
INDBATT
NICOY
SECTOR 2
SECTOR 3
FORCE PROVOST MARSHAL
COO TAC HQ
G4
FORCE ENGR
G3 PLANS
CANSIGS
AUSMED
CIVPOL
CHAO
HRFO
FSO
CLO
G3 AIR
PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFR

Infor: FC
DFC
COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
FMO
G2

Date: 22 Dec 94

Subject: OP RETOUR CO-ORD CONFERENCE

1. The above-mentioned conference is scheduled for 27 Dec 94 at 0930 hrs in the Ops Room.

2. You are accordingly requested to attend this conference.


3. Heli schedule for the conference is as below. COO Tac HQ to travel by road to this location.

- a. Kigali ETD 0630 hrs
- b. Mutara ETA 0705 ETD 0710 hrs.
- c. Kibuye ETA 0725 ETD 0730 hrs.

d. Cyangugu ETA 0755 ETD 0800 hrs.

e. Gikongoro ETA 0820 ETD 0825 hrs

4. Officers coming by heli are requested to be on time at the heli pad to prevent delays.


JK CHUMBU
Maj
SO2 Ops

From: G3 OPS
UNAMIR HQ

File No: 3000.32 (Ops)

TO: TAC HQ
GHANBATT
ZAMBATT
1CDHSR

Date: 23 DEC 94

Subject: **REPORTING OF DP MOVEMENTS**

1. It has been noticed that the daily figures reported of DPs, moved out of Sector 4A by Tac HQ, GHANBATT, ZAMBATT and 1CDHSR do not tally.
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3. Please acknowledge receipt.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

24 Nov 94


To: 1 CDHSR//OC Support Sqn


Info: D COS Ops/1 CDHSR CO

From: UNAMIR PAffO

Subject: MEDIA COVERAGE OP HOMEWARD/CALGARY HERALD

1. A journalist and photographer from the Calgary are in Rwanda until the 22 Dec 1994. Although they have not come to Rwanda to cover the CF, they nevertheless agreed to cover the Op Homeward story. As agreed with the Ops O 1 CDHSR, they will be travelling with the Op Homeward crew on Sunday 18 Dec 94.
2. It is requested that support sqn provide the following equipment to them from the 18 dec to 22 Dec 1994:
 - a. 2 x Flak vests;
 - b. 2 x Helmets;
 - c. 2 x Cots;
 - d. 2 x Sleeping bags; and
 - e. 2 x bug nets with wood poles.
3. If possible, equipment will be picked up at approx 10h00, sunday 18 Dec 1994. Thank you for your cooperation.


S. Grenier
Captain
UNAMIR PAffO
11123 or 2052(Cdn net)


19/12

cc
Pse fwd Copy to
CO 1 CDASR

PAAUZYUW UCCVVDB0004 3162031-0000--UCCVVDA.
ZNR 00000
P 142031 NOV 94
FM TACHQ BUTARE//G3 OPS//
TO UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//OPS//
BT
UNCLAS OPS 018/2

SUB: OPERATION HOMEWARD

1. FOR THE REMAINDER OF OPERATION HOMEWARD, PROPOSED
CONFIDENCE BUILDING PATROLS OF BUTARE AND GITARAMA
PREFECTURE.
ENTIRE PATROL ACTIVITY IS OF 4 DAYS STARTING
WEDNESDAY, THURSDAY, FRIDAY AND SATURDAY INCLUSIVE.
WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE CANADIAN CONVOY IS
AVAILABLE.

THEY ARE TO REPORT TO OUR LOCATION TOMORROW NIGHT
FOR THE EVENING MEETING COMMENCING AT 151830 NOV
94.

WE ALSO UNDERSTAND THAT THE CANADIANS HAVE 7 TCV'S
AND 2 AVGP'S. IT IS NOT CLEAR IF WE WILL NEED ALL 7
TCV'S HOWEVER SEND ALL 7 TCV'S AND WE WILL NEED 2
AVGP'S. PLSE ACKNOWLEDGE.

BT
#0004

Received 11-14-1994 20:50:49

A1357LBY497REULB
D I.. BC-RWANDA-TANZANIA 11-18 0329
BC-RWANDA-TANZANIA

MORE THAN 20,000 RWANDAN REFUGEES IN TRAINING
DAR ES SALAAM, NOV 18 (REUTER) - MORE THAN 20,000 RWANDAN YOUTHS
ARE UNDERGOING MILITARY TRAINING AT NIGHT AT A REFUGEE CAMP IN
NORTHWEST TANZANIA, A SECURITY OFFICIAL SAID ON FRIDAY.
NGARA DISTRICT COMMISSIONER BRIGADIER SYLVESTER AGGREY HEMED TOLD
REUTERS THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT WAS AWARE OF THE SITUATION BUT THERE
WAS LITTLE THEY COULD DO TO CONTAIN THE PROBLEM.
HE SAID THE MORE THAN 20,000 RWANDAN YOUTHS, AGED BETWEEN 15 AND
25, WERE TRAINING AT KASULO REFUGEE CAMP UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS AND
WERE BELIEVED TO BE HUTU INTERAHAMWE MILITIAMEN.
THE INTERAHAMWE (THOSE WHO ATTACK TOGETHER) WERE RESPONSIBLE WITH
HUTU TROOPS FOR THE MASSACRE OF UP TO A MILLION MEMBERS OF RWANDA'S
TUTSI MINORITY AND THEIR HUTU ALLIES BETWEEN APRIL AND JULY.
HEMED SAID THE ONLY WAY OUT TO END THE PROBLEM WAS TO LOWER THE
NUMBER OF REFUGEES IN THE CAMPS. THERE ARE MORE THAN 500,000 RWANDAN
REFUGEES IN TANZANIA AND AID OFFICIALS COMPLAIN MILITIAMEN, TROOPS AND
FORMER HUTU OFFICIALS RUN THE CAMPS.
HEMED SAID LOWERING THE NUMBERS OF REFUGEES IN EACH CAMP SO THEY
COULD BE SECURED WAS A TEDIOUS AND EXPENSIVE VENTURE BUT IF THE
SITUATION WORSENER TANZANIAN AUTHORITIES WOULD BE FORCED TO DO SO.
HE SAID INTERNATIONAL AID AGENCY WORKERS WERE CONCERNED AND SOME
HAD THREATENED TO WITHDRAW UNLESS SOMETHING WAS DONE.
AID AGENCIES HAVE THREATENED TO PULL OUT OF REFUGEE CAMPS AROUND
THE EASTERN ZAIREAN TOWN OF GOMA UNLESS THE UNITED NATIONS SENDS IN A
POLICE CONTINGENT OR RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE TO END A REIGN OF TERROR
BY FORMER OFFICIALS AND THEIR HENCHMEN.
THE FRENCH MEDICAL AID AGENCY MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES (DOCTORS
WITHOUT BORDERS) PULLED ITS WORKERS OUT OF CAMPS AROUND THE EASTERN
ZAIREAN TOWN OF BUKAVU LAST WEEK IN PROTEST AGAINST INSECURITY.
HUTU OFFICIALS AND SOLDIERS IN THE CAMPS HAVE THREATENED TO LAUNCH
A GUERRILLA WAR IN RWANDA TO TOPPLE THE TUTSI-DOMINATED RWANDA
PATRIOTIC FRONT WHICH WON A THREE-MONTH CIVIL WAR IN JULY.
REUTER REUT13:33 11-18

② ADC to FC

These Reuter extracts will be send
to us daily from now on. Does
FC wish to get a copy?

[Signature]
DCOS ops
19.11

A1108LBY421REULB
R F.. BC-RWANDA-BELGIUM 11-18 0307
BC-RWANDA-BELGIUM

BELGIUM WANTS CONFERENCE ON AFRICAN REFUGEE PROBLEM

BRUSSELS, NOV 18 (REUTER) - BELGIUM CALLED ON FRIDAY FOR AN URGENT CONFERENCE TO DISCUSS THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN CENTRAL AFRICA AND OFFERED HELP TO END INSTABILITY IN THE REGION.

"WE ARE EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT'S HAPPENING IN CENTRAL AFRICA AND ESPECIALLY IN AND AROUND RWANDA," FOREIGN MINISTER FRANK VANDENBROUCKE TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE AFTER THE WEEKLY CABINET MEETING.

"A LOT OF PEOPLE THERE BELIEVE WE'RE HEADING STRAIGHT TOWARDS A NEW EXPLOSION OF VIOLENCE AND THAT THIS IS JUST A MATTER OF MONTHS OR EVEN LESS. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY... SHOULD MAKE A JOINT EFFORT TO PREVENT A NEW EXPLOSION," HE SAID.

UP TO ONE MILLION PEOPLE ARE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN MASSACRED SINCE APRIL 6 IN RWANDA WHEN PRESIDENT JUVENAL HABYARIMANA DIED IN AN ATTACK ON HIS AIRCRAFT ALONG WITH THE LEADER OF BURUNDI. BOTH COUNTRIES ARE FORMER BELGIAN PROTECTORATES

SEVERAL MILLION RWANDANS HAVE POURED INTO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES TO ESCAPE THE BLOODSHED AT HOME.

"BELGIUM WISHES TO PRESENT TO ITS INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS, AND THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED, A FRAMEWORK WHICH WILL SERVE FOR A COORDINATED APPROACH OF THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES," VANDENBROUCKE SAID IN A STATEMENT APPROVED BY BELGIUM'S CABINET.

"BELGIUM IS IN FAVOUR OF A SWIFT MEETING OF A REGIONAL REFUGEES CONFERENCE, AS PROPOSED BY THE BURUNDIAN AUTHORITIES," THE STATEMENT SAID.

A BELGIAN MISSION, HEADED BY JOHAN SWINNEN -- DIPLOMATIC ADVISER OF BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER JEAN-LUC DEHAENE AND FORMER BELGIAN AMBASSADOR TO RWANDA -- WILL BE SENT TO RWANDA, BURUNDI AND TO THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) TO FURTHER EXPLAIN THE BELGIAN PLAN.

BELGIUM URGED THE NEW RWANDAN GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT A POLICY OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND SAID THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD ALSO SUPPORT STABILITY IN BURUNDI, WHICH HAS THE SAME ETHNIC MIX AS RWANDA.

REUTER REUT11:54 11-18

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A0990LBY377REULB

R I.. BC-RWANDA-TRIBUNAL

11-18 0575

BC-RWANDA-TRIBUNAL

FAST JUSTICE FOR RWANDA WAR CRIMINALS - PROSECUTOR

BY SARA HENLEY

THE HAGUE, NOV 18 (REUTER) - THE U.N.'S CHIEF WAR CRIMES PROSECUTOR SAID ON FRIDAY HE BELIEVED IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO DELIVER QUICK JUSTICE TO THOSE RWANDAN LEADERS RESPONSIBLE FOR GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY.

"MY IMPRESSION IS THAT IN RWANDA ONE COULD BE ABLE TO GO IN WITH A FAIRLY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT INVESTIGATIVE TEAM AND GO FOR THE JUGULAR -- GO FOR THE TOP LEADERSHIP AND NOBODY ELSE, GET OUT INDICTMENTS QUICKLY AND GET TRIALS ON QUICKLY," JUDGE RICHARD GOLDSTONE TOLD REPORTERS.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN JUDGE, BROUGHT TO THE HAGUE IN AUGUST TO PROSECUTE SUSPECTED WAR CRIMINALS FROM THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, WAS ALSO LAST WEEK MADE CHIEF PROSECUTOR OF THE UNITED NATIONS' RWANDAN WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL SET UP BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

ALTHOUGH HE TOLD A MEETING OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS THAT IT WAS TOO EARLY TO PUT A DATE ON THE RWANDAN TRIBUNAL'S FIRST LIKELY INDICTMENTS, GOLDSTONE SAID HIS TASK IN RWANDA LOOKED MUCH EASIER THAN IN YUGOSLAVIA BECAUSE THE WAR THERE IS OVER.

"WE WILL IMMEDIATELY BE ABLE TO INVESTIGATE TOP LEADERSHIP BECAUSE IT'S KNOWN WHO THEY ARE; THERE ARE 8,000 PEOPLE IN PRISON AT THE MOMENT IN RWANDA. MANY OTHER PEOPLE PRESUMABLY ARE OBTAINABLE IN NEIGHBOURING STATES," GOLDSTONE SAID.

"HAVING TRIED THE TOP LEADERSHIP THAT WOULD BE THE END OF THE WORK AND THE END OF THE TRIBUNAL. I THINK RWANDA COULD BE A MUCH SHORTER EXERCISE THAN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA."

THE RWANDA TRIBUNAL IS MEANT TO TRY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MASSACRE OF AROUND ONE MILLION MAINLY MINORITY TUTSIS BETWEEN APRIL AND JULY, A GENOCIDE WIDELY BLAMED ON THE FORMER HUTU-LED GOVERNMENT.

WHERE IT WILL BE SITED HAS YET TO BE DECIDED, BUT GOLDSTONE SAID IT WOULD PROBABLY BE IN AFRICA, PERHAPS NAIROBI.

THE RWANDA TRIBUNAL WILL HAVE 11 JUDGES AND SHARE THE APPEALS JUDGES ALREADY SERVING ON THE YUGOSLAV WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL HERE.

GOLDSTONE DENIED HIS DUAL FUNCTION AS PROSECUTOR FOR BOTH TRIBUNALS WOULD STRETCH HIS TIME AND CURB THE EFFICIENCY OF THE COURTS, SAYING HIS ROLE WAS MAINLY POLITICAL -- TO ENSURE THE SAME STANDARDS ARE USED FOR BOTH COURTS AND FOR EVERY SUSPECT.

BOTH TRIBUNALS WERE ESTABLISHED UNDER MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF THE U.N. CHARTER, SO MEMBER COUNTRIES ARE OBLIGED TO OBEY COURT ORDERS TO HAND OVER SUSPECTS AND COOPERATE IN OTHER WAYS.

BUT SUSPECTS FROM THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA ARE LIKELY MORE EASILY TO EVADE TRIAL BY HIDING UNDER THE CONFUSION OF WAR OR IN AREAS THE U.N. HAS NOT RECOGNISED AS STATES.

NONETHELESS, GOLDSTONE REITERATED A COMMITMENT TO PROSECUTE THOSE AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL ALSO IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, IF ENOUGH EVIDENCE CAN BE FOUND AGAINST THEM.

"WE WILL NOT REFRAIN FROM INDICTING ANYBODY BECAUSE OF THE POSITION HE OR SHE HOLDS," HE SAID. "IT'S NOT OUR JOB."

ONE KEY APPROACH THE YUGOSLAV TRIBUNAL'S PROSECUTOR CAN USE WILL BE SIMPLY TO TARGET GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS WHERE ATROCITIES ARE KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN COMMITTED BETWEEN PARTICULAR DATES, HE SAID.

"I'VE NO DOUBT THAT YOU CAN DRAW...THE CONCLUSION THAT THESE THINGS DON'T HAPPEN SPONTANEOUSLY," HE SAID. "THERE'S OBVIOUSLY A GUIDING HAND WHICH LED TO THIS. ONE CAN PROVE THAT IN A NUMBER OF WAYS;

"A USEFUL WAY OF ESTABLISHING ETHNIC CLEANSING IS BY LOOKING AT TELEPHONE BOOKS. IF YOU COMPARE THE TELEPHONE BOOKS FOR 1990 AND 1994 YOU SEE CERTAIN PEOPLE ARE NO LONGER THERE. THAT SORT OF OBJECTIVE EVIDENCE CAN ESTABLISH THERE WAS A GUIDING HAND," HE SAID.

REUTER REUT11:11 11-18

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A0935LBY357REULB

R I.. BC-UN-RWANDA 11-18 0252

BC-UN-RWANDA

UN AGENCY SAYS RWANDANS GOING HUNGRY IN ZAIRE

ROME, NOV 18 (REUTERS) - THE U.N. WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP) SAID ON FRIDAY A GROWING NUMBER OF RWANDAN CHILDREN WERE GOING HUNGRY IN ZAIRE'S REFUGEE CAMPS BECAUSE FOOD DISTRIBUTION WAS CONTROLLED BY CORRUPT RWANDAN LEADERS.

THE ROME-BASED AGENCY SAID IN A STATEMENT THAT THE SITUATION WAS ESPECIALLY BAD IN THE MUGUNGA CAMP IN GOMA ON ZAIRE'S BORDER WITH RWANDA, HOME TO 200,000 REFUGEES.

"THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF FIVE WHO WERE SUFFERING FROM SEVERE MALNUTRITION HAS MORE THAN DOUBLED FROM AUGUST TO 8.3 PERCENT," THE STATEMENT SAID.

"MORE THAN 30 PERCENT OF THE POPULATION OF THE CAMP ARE NOT RECEIVING FULL RATIONS. THOSE ESPECIALLY AFFECTED ARE THE ELDERLY, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES HEADED BY WOMEN."

THE WFP, WHICH DELIVERS AN AVERAGE OF 20,000 TONNES OF FOOD TO ZAIRE EVERY MONTH FOR THE REFUGEES, BLAMED THE RISE IN MALNUTRITION ON THOSE WHO DISTRIBUTE THE RATIONS.

"THE MORE VULNERABLE GROUPS DO NOT RECEIVE ENOUGH FOOD BECAUSE OF CORRUPTION AND FOOD LEAKAGES AT THE DISTRIBUTION LEVEL."

"AT CAMPS, RELIEF FOOD IS DELIVERED TO VILLAGE HEADS, ELDERS AND OFFICIALS OF THE OLD RWANDAN HIERARCHY WHO KEEP THE CONTROL OF THE FOOD DISTRIBUTION," THE STATEMENT SAID.

THE FOOD ORGANISATION SAID FOOD SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED "BASED ON A FAMILY/HOUSEHOLD LEVEL."

THE FORMER RWANDAN HUTU ADMINISTRATION WAS OUSTED BY THE TUTSI-DOMINATED RWANDA PATRIOTIC FRONT (RPF) AFTER HUTU MILITIA AND TROOPS HAD MASSACRED HUNDREDS OF THOUSANDS OF TUTSIS BETWEEN APRIL AND JULY.

REUTER REUT10:42 11-18

Col Arp

Page 1

A1423LBY082REULB

R I.. BC-RWANDA-UN 11-21 0508

BC-RWANDA-UN

UN FORCE URGED FOR RWANDA REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE

BY ANTHONY GOODMAN

UNITED NATIONS, NOV 21 (REUTER) - SECRETARY-GENERAL BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI ON MONDAY RECOMMENDED SETTING UP A U.N. FORCE OF 3,000 TO 5,000 TROOPS TO PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CAMPS IN ZAIRE WHERE MORE THAN A MILLION RWANDAN REFUGEES ARE AT THE MERCY OF ARMED FOLLOWERS OF RWANDA'S OUSTED GOVERNMENT AND PREVENTED FROM RETURNING HOME.

IN A REPORT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, HE SAID THIS WOULD BE MORE REALISTIC THAN A 10,000- TO 12,000-MEMBER ENFORCEMENT OPERATION, EITHER UNDER U.N. COMMAND OR BY A U.N.-AUTHORISED MULTINATIONAL FORCE, TO SEPARATE FOLLOWERS OF THE FORMER REGIME FROM THE OTHER REFUGEES.

RWANDA'S FORMER HUTU-LED GOVERNMENT, OVERTHROWN IN JULY, IS WIDELY HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GENOCIDE OF BETWEEN 500,000 AND A MILLION MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY TUTSI TRIBE AND OF HUTU OPPONENTS.

BOUTROS-GHALI SAID IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH SECURITY IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS INCREMENTALLY, AREA BY AREA, BECAUSE OF THE IMMENSITY OF THE TASK.

HE SAID THE U.N. REFUGEE AGENCY ESTIMATED THERE WERE 850,000 REFUGEES IN THE GOMA AREA OF NORTH KIVU AND ABOUT 370,000 IN SOUTH KIVU, AROUND BUKAVU AND UVIRA.

"THE CAMPS, WHICH SPRAWL OVER MILES (KM) ARE OVERCROWDED, CHAOTIC AND INCREASINGLY INSECURE," BOUTROS-GHALI SAID.

"THE FORMER RWANDESE POLITICAL LEADERS, RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES SOLDIERS AND MILITIA CONTROL THE CAMPS, THOUGH THE DEGREE OF CONTROL VARIES FROM AREA TO AREA.

"THEY ARE DETERMINED TO ENSURE BY FORCE, IF NECESSARY, THAT THE REFUGEES DO NOT REPATRIATE TO RWANDA...IT IS BELIEVED THAT THESE ELEMENTS MAY BE PREPARING FOR AN ARMED INVASION OF RWANDA AND THAT THEY MAY BE STOCKPILING AND SELLING FOOD DISTRIBUTED BY RELIEF AGENCIES IN PREPARATION FOR SUCH AN INVASION."

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL SAID THAT, DEPENDING ON THE SITUATION IN THE CAMPS AND THE RATE OF REPATRIATION, A FORCE OF 3,000 WOULD TAKE 24 TO 30 MONTHS TO COMPLETE A SECURITY OPERATION IN THE BIGGEST CAMPS, NORTH OF LAKE KIVU.

WITH AN ADDITIONAL 2,000 TROOPS TO CONDUCT A PARALLEL OPERATION IN CAMPS IN THE AREA SOUTH OF LAKE KIVU, WHERE CONDITIONS WERE marginally BETTER, THE OPERATION COULD BE COMPLETED ABOUT 10 MONTHS SOONER.

BOUTROS-GHALI SAID THE FORMER RWANDAN LEADERS, TROOPS AND MILITIA HAD "MADE EVIDENT THEIR OPPOSITION TO EITHER THEIR REMOVAL FROM GOMA AND BUKAVU OR THEIR SEPARATION FROM THE REFUGEE POPULATION PRIOR TO AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT."

REFERRING TO THE MORE AMBITIOUS OPTION INVOLVING 10,000 TO 12,000 TROOPS OPERATING UNDER THE CHAPTER VII ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS OF THE U.N. CHARTER, HE RECALLED HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO OBTAIN TROOPS FOR THE PRESENT 4,300-STRONG U.N. FORCE IN RWANDA -- STILL BELOW ITS AUTHORISED STRENGTH OF 5,500.

THE UNITED NATIONS COULD NOT BE SURE OF QUICKLY OBTAINING THE PERSONNEL FOR SUCH A LARGE NEW FORCE, HE SAID.

ALTHOUGH THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT, ALTERNATIVELY, AUTHORISE A U.N. MEMBER STATE OR A GROUP OF MEMBERS TO CONDUCT THE OPERATION, HE DID NOT SAY WHICH COUNTRY OR COUNTRIES MIGHT BE WILLING TO TAKE ON THE TASK.

REUTER REUT14:38 11-21

Photocopy fwd
to G2, CLO and
FSC for their
info.

Red
C (GFI)

G3 Plans	26/11
G3 Ops	27/11
G2	
CLO	
FSC	
FTI	

Dec 20/11

FROM: UNAMIR HQ OPS

File No: 3000.26(Ops)

TO: SECTOR 3

INFO: SECTOR 5

DATE: 27 DEC 94

SUBJECT: SITUATION OF IDPS

1. Attached hereto, please find a self explanatory letter written by six representatives of 700 persons of the Hutu ethnic group who fled from Gitarama, due to acts of violence committed by Tutsis and RPA soldiers.

2. You are requested to investigate the allegations contained in the letter. It is also requested that Human Rights team should be involved in the conduct of the investigation. Details of investigation should be submitted to this HQ.

2. Submitted for your necessary action.

KABALI, 22 December 1994

To : Major General G.C. Toussignant
UNAMIR Force Commander

From : Major Colonel Toumia Abdelaziz
Commander of Tunisia Contingent in Rwanda

Subject: Situation of Displaced Persons

Attached: Handwritten complaint

I have the honor to inform you that a group of 14 persons reported three times to the site of Nemba Company respectively on 6, 13, and 20 December 1994.

The delegation represents 700 persons of the Hutu ethnic group who fled from Gitarama due to acts of violence committed against them by Tutsis and RPA soldiers. At present they are roaming the place of Mataba (71/10). They gather during the day and disperse in the forest at night for fear of being pursued by RPA.

With respect to such a situation, the persons requested the following:

- 1- they want to be assembled in a protected camp.
- 2- necessary assistance in food and medicines.
- 3- election of the bourgmasters by the population or their appointment by the Government Council.

MILOBS and Human Rights based in Gisenyi were informed of this problem in time.

(TRANSLATION)

Prefecture of Gitarama

Security situation as regards human rights.

Throughout the whole prefecture, the Hutus are equated with INTERAHAMWE. As a result, they are tortured by Tutsis and RPA. They are beaten with pestles and clubs and they have their eyes put out. All this is done to them while the arms are tied behind the back. The atrocities are committed in broad day light and at night as well. The outstanding example is the Commune of Mugina.

The teacher Sezikeye Andrew is in detention because he was falsely accused of having participated in the massacres while, at the time, he had had a motorcycle accident. He was abducted from his class, after they had tied his arms in front of his pupils. The following day, they came to look for Ignatius Rwagakinga, his fellow teacher. But, happily enough, he managed to escape. He is presently in a hiding place. Both teachers belong to the School of Kivumu in Commune Mugina. It was on 14 November 1994.

The following others are held in the commune prison: Sezikeye Andrew, Sezikeye Emmanuel, Habimana Pascal alias Rusheru, former RPF Hutu councillor. The latter's wife had fled to Zaire. When she returned home, her husband was imprisoned as a punishment for having welcomed an INTERAHAMWE.

Ntihabose Wellars alias Sinderibuye, Sebasaza, Biziyayaremye died in the commune prison killed by Ntaganira Wellars, the Chief of Commune and RPA soldiers assigned to the commune. All this is done with the complicity of a certain Karenzi P. Claver, a teacher belonging to the Hutu ethnic group but dominated by his wife who is a Tutsi and Rudasingwa J.D. alias Rujed, RPF vet for the commune. Both men are supported by the bourgmaster, Munyantarama Valens, Nteziryayo Evariste, Nsengiyumva and his son Silas, Buhigiro Denys, Karambizi, Bashyitsi J.B., Gatabazi Frédéric, Sebazungu Théoneste, Nteziryayo Evariste, former councillor in the Government currently in Zaire.

Just like in all communes of the prefecture, UNAMIR people come and visit the prisons; they count the prisoners and go back home. But as soon as they leave the place, the prisoners are killed and immediately replaced by fresh ones.

Below is a list of Batutsi who accompany RPA while hunting persons of the Hutu ethnic group: (at least 2 names per commune)

Commune of Mugina

Karenzi P.C., Hutu dominated by his wife Tutsi; Rudasingwa J.D.; Kigage; Muligande; Mukiga; Sebahutu Vincent, councillor of Ngoma Sector.

Commune of Taba

Abegayire Védaste (councillor); Muyombana Gonzalve.

Commune Rutobwe

Karwera Joseph; Rutabana Assouman.

Commune Ntongwe
Nyilinkindi, councillor of Rutabo Sector; Butera and Bukeye.

Commune of Nyabikenke
Bagaza (councillor); Gashugi

Commune of Nyamabuye
Ruhunga Albert; Hakizimana Abias

In the commune of Mugina there is a plan of eliminating all intellectual Hutus and those who were not born in that commune (immigrants). With the help of Karenzi and his sister Nyirabihogo, a concubine to Nkusi, RPA soldier, other RPA soldiers captured Domina, Ngezahogukora's wife, and raped her. Afterwards, they put her eyes out and threw her body in Umukunguli river. The said Karenzi has got 3 sons, 4 brothers-in-law and a junior brother in RPA. He relies on this support to ill-treat innocent Hutus.

In view of this situation, Hutu people move day-in day-out and leave their homes. Their cows and property are taken over by Tutsis and RPA soldiers. For reference, you may see the farm of Cyeru in Commune Mugina, prefecture of Gitarama. They say that Hutu people have to raise goats, sheep, and pigs and not cows who belong to Tutsis. We wish that

- the soldiers who move around among the population be taken back to their barracks at the prefecture;
- the bourgmasters be elected by the population or appointed by the Government Council since those appointed by RPF are at the origin of cases of revenge.

Have signed: Mutarambirwa
Twagirumwami Joseph
Mukamana Chantal
Mukeshimana Solina
Rwabakika Isaac
Niyibizi Samuel

Representatives of refugees from Gitarama in
Ruhengeri.

REPORT on the 30 November NGENDA TASK FORCE MEETING

DRAFT

The meeting was held at the office of the Sous-Prefet of Kanazi in Nyamata from 10h00 to 11h30 on Wednesday 30 November 1994.

Attendees:

Ms. Hyacinthe Mukantabana/Bourgmestre of Kanzenze
Mr. Canisius Gasarabwe/Bourgmestre of Gashora
Mr. Innocent Rulinda/Bourgmestre of Ngenda
Ms. M.Claire Rubasingwa/Sous-Prefecture de Kanazi
Mr. Jamiah Rubagumya/Secrétaire à la Préfecture
Mr. Emmanuel Bizumuremyi/WORLD VISION Nyamata
Ms. Adrienne Paul/WORLD VISION Nyamata
Ms. Jean-Marie Nyabyenda/ZOA/MEDAIR
Mr. Faustin Habihana/ZOA/MEDAIR
Mr. Jean Higiro/ZOA/MEDAIR
Mr. Gerrit Noordam/ZOA/MEDAIR
Ms. Cristina Pizzi/CUAMM Nyamata
Mr. Enrico Frontini/CUAMM Nyamata/Rilima
Mr. Casimir Karasira/CUAMM Nyamata
Mr. Marco Barone/Coopération Italienne
Mr. Giorgio Benaglia/Coopération Italienne
Ms. Anne Smith/CRS
Ms. Anne Malone/REFUGEE TRUST
Ms. Helene Moeneback/OXFAM-QUEBEC
Mr. Michel Lefebvre/OXFAM-QUEBEC
Mr. Abbe Jean-Pierre Kaberamanzi/CARITAS-RWANDA
Mr. Nicolas de Torrente/MEDICINS SANS FRONTIERES
Ms. Voutar/MEDICINS SANS FRONTIERES
Mr. Alain Sigg/Human Rights
Mr. Francesco Del Re/WFP
Ms. Marie-Jose Torres/UNHCR
Ms. Hillary Musonera/UNICEF
Mr. Gilbert Nkusi/UNICEF
Mr. Jean-Luc Stalon
Mr. Marc Seinet/ICRC KIVOVU
Mr. Laurent Fellay/ICRC KIVOVU
Mr. Kevin Thelin/PRODEVA-ASF
Mr. Job Kuseh/MILOB RILIMA
Mr. Eugen Ntambara/21st Battalion - KIBUNGO
Ms. Margaux van de Fliert/UNREO

The meeting was conducted in French.

*Signed and checked
by J. Fellay, N. de Torrente
2 B.*

5/12

ATTENDANCE

ICRC, MSF and OXFAM-QUEBEC attended the meeting for the first time in response to growing health and reconstruction needs in the Bugasera area.

RPA Ltnt. Ntatambara, Security Commander in Kibungo, joined the meeting halfway through.

The Bourgmestre of Gashora was not able to attend the meeting, but arrived shortly after.

EQUILIBRE was advised by the Ministry of Rehabilitation not to enter the area pending a decision on permission to start rebuilding of houses.

Local Authorities

The Bourgmestre of Kanzenze stated that there was an ongoing large influx of returnees. 49 families have come in by the official way (IOM/HCR transport) in the last week. Many people have come to the centre of Kanzenze commune. Half of these have already resettled on the hills (2/3 families per house). 49 people have been transported back by UNHCR. 30 of these have gone to the hills to reclaim their property. 19 people are still at the commune without a house nor food.

In the process of reclaiming their property, IDP returnees have ousted old caseload refugees occupying their houses.

Old caseload refugees from (1959/'60) have no place to go since many houses have been destroyed. They stay at the commune offices. Sharing a house between 2/3 families does not cause a problem. The number of people arriving by far exceeds the number of houses available. Rebuilding of houses has become an urgent requirement. In response to the question whether all people whose houses have been destroyed were also killed, the Bourgmestre replied that many people had escaped. Quite a large number of these people are now coming back.

The availability of land was discussed. Apparently there is quite some land available. This land is, however, not always suitable for cultivation.

The Bourgmestre of Ngenda stated 80.000 people (the entire population) need food aid, of which 60.000 people urgently. He stated there was no housing problem.

After the meeting, the Bourgmestre of Gashora also mentioned rapidly rising food and housing needs in Gashora commune.

Food

In general there is an increasing shortage of food due to growing population numbers.

This shortage is also the result of people who have come in from across the Burundi border or from other areas, harvested and consequently left the area leaving the land bare for new returnees.

WFP is in the process of assessing food needs.

ICRC has come to Bugasera area to carry out an evaluation with regard to food and medical needs and a relief programme.

Water

UNICEF reported it had brought in a water specialist to Bugasera.

The water pump in Ngenda has been repaired.

PRODEVA stated they were carrying out a water evaluation study.

For the time being, some problems remain; problems that, however, existed already before the war.

Security

The security situation has deteriorated. It was reported that 3 to 4 families (16 IDPs) were killed in Ngenda on Saturday 26 November. The victims are said to be relatives of Interahamwe killers.

A local staff member from WORLD VISION has been beaten up and robbed at a road block.

Children threw stones at busses with IDP returnees.

Food, shelter, and protection/monitoring needs are rapidly rising as a consequence of increased IDP return combined with the already extensive presence of old caseload refugees.

The MILOB from Rilima reported an incident from last week where an IDP convoy - 613 people in 11 vehicles and 1 military vehicle were all searched. There were 9 roadblocks. He pointed out that a convoy of IDP returnees should not be held up by RPA screenings because of the time factor; the IDPs had to go back to Kigali because of the late hour. He stressed the importance of better UNAMIR/RPA coordination.

The RPA Security Commander from Kibungo was asked to give a security brief. He stated Interahamwe was active in the area. He also said a propaganda campaign was ongoing directed against RPA soldiers. The blame for killings was put on the RPA. He did however admit to incidental cases of revenge killings. He claimed there was a centre in Kibungo where suspects were held under RPA-protection.

CONCLUSIONS

- 1) The situation in Kanazi-area has deteriorated rapidly within one week. Housing, food and security needs have become more stringent.
- 2) The large influx of returnees is creating conflicts arising a.o. out of disputes over property.
- 3) The increasing food and shelter needs as a direct result from increasing returnee flows requires an immediate response. It is believed that Open Relief Centres would be the best solution to address needs in terms of food, shelter and protection. The UNHCR Protection Officer and the Human Rights Officer are examining the best location for such centres in consultation with local authorities.
- 4) The 16 people killed last week point to a growing sense of insecurity and hostility towards IDP-returnees. An increased and permanent UNAMIR presence in Kanazi - especially Ngenda - is suggested.
- 5) There is a clear need for more coordination between UNAMIR/RPA to improve on IDP return procedures, especially with regard to avoiding lengthy RPA screenings during transport.
- 6) Bugasera area should be identified as a priority zone for the IDP-Operation, this would entail improving the reception structures for IDP return as soon as possible.

01 01 29 NOV 94 00 00 UUUU

UNAMIR PAFF

UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS//

TAC HQ BUTARE//DUTY OFFICER/OPI OP HOMEWARD//

INFO : UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//DCOS OPS/MILOB HQ//

UNCLAS UNAMIR PAFF 015

SUBJ: LOUD HAILERS USE IN CAMPS

REF: CONVERSATION OPI OP HOMEWARD/ CAPT GRENIER 29 NOV 94

1. AS DISCUSSED AT REF, 10 LOUD HAILERS WILL BE SENT TO YOUR LOCATION BY HELICOPTER SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE IN BUTARE AT APPROX 09H30 30 NOV 1994. PLSE HAVE TRSP AVAIL TO RELEASE HEL ASAP. 10 BOXES OF APPROX 2 CUBIC FEET/5 LBS EACH. PLSE SEND ME A MSG CONFIRMING RECEIPT OF EQUIPMENT WITH CONTACT OF WHO IS TO CONTROL THE ITEMS WHILE IN BUTARE.

2. FOR THE MOMENT IT IS REQUESTED THAT THESE LOUD HAILERS NOT BE USED. WE HAVE NOT YET ESTABLISHED WHAT THE EFFECT THIS PUBLIC INFORMATION MEANS WILL HAVE ON THE DPS. FOR THE MOMENT THIS EQUIPMENT IS SIMPLY PRE-POSITIONED IN BUTARE FOR USE AT A LATER DATE. EXERCISE STRICT CONTROL OF THESE ITEMS.

3. PLSE ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS MSG TO THIS HQ ASAP.


S. GRENIER CAPT, UNAMIR PAFF, 11123/2052

32

PAAUZYUW UCCVVDG0112 3311417-UUUU--UCCVVDA.

ZNR UUUUU

P 271400Z NOV 94

FM SECTOR 4C/CYANGUGU//ETHIOBATT//

TO UNAMIR HQ/KIGALI

BT

UNCLAS ETHIOBATT 06/03/118

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

1. UNHCR/CYANGUGU INFORMED US THAT THEY RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM UNHCR/KIGALI NOT TO TRANSPORT DP'S TO KIBUYE. REASON NOT KNOWN.

2. WE REQUEST YOU TO SEND US A DETAIL INFORMATION REGARDING THIS FROM UNHCR/KIGALI.

BT

#0112

Received 11-27-1994 14:33:55

Thunt
CBOPS2
28/11

UNHCR - Kigali contacted and refused that they did not send such order and advised that they should confirm with the prefect in the area.

JS
DO

3000.32

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

①


To: DCOS Ops

From: HAC

Date: 11 Nov 1994

Subject: IOM REPORT

1. The attached report was forwarded to HAC by the head of IOM for Rwanda.
2. For your consideration and action as necessary.



D.J. MacNeil
Maj
A/CHAO

② G3 Ops

FAX to G3 Ops in Tac HQ
for corrective action.


DCOS ops
12-11

Actioned

~~Mount~~ SO2 OPS

12/10

Report on the IDPs movement from Chanika camp to Kigali of the 07/11/94.

This morning exercise was supposed to be a joint operation between IOM, UNHCR and UNAMIR, to evacuate No. 786 IDPs from the Chianika camp to Kibungo with overnight in Kigali. The agreement was :

- departure scheduled from Butare at 06.30 (IOM trucks);
- meeting point at Gikongoro at 07.30 (UNAMIR escorts and HCR for registration).
- confirmation by UNHCR personnel of the registered people;
- loading and departure to destination.

Today' s situation in Chanika camp has been:

- IOM arrived in Gikongoro with a fleet of No. 9 trucks at 07.15, no escort was present at the meeting point and the UNHCR field assistants showed up on time and escorted the convoy to Chanika camp.
- It took more than one hour to load two trucks, total 90 people.
- Two MILOBS finally showed up at 8:30, and escorted at 9:00 the first two trucks to Kisi.
- At 09:30 three Zambian officers arrived and were informed by us on the need for additional soldiers due to increase in agitators around the loading site; at this point, the three officers left the site to look for help, leaving us in the middle of a potentially explosive situation.
- At 10:00 four officers (Zambia) finally arrived, by then, the agitators in the crowd had started to act in a provocative manner and they continued to do so towards UNAMIR. According to the OIM and HCR staff present, the UNAMIR people answered back, imitating the gesture of "cutting throat". The crowd immediately took advantage of the situation and started to shout, saying that the IDPs who had already been loaded in the third truck were going to be killed after their departure. At this point, the situation went out of control and the UNAMIR soldiers were completely overwhelmed and started backtracking towards their cars while the IDPs, excited by the crowd, got down from the third truck. The crowd at this point had become violent and threatening. The convoy had to leave in a hurry with people throwing stones to the departing convoy.

This incident showed that the non French speaking UNAMIR officers had not been briefed, had no team leader and were not in sufficient number.

There is also a strong need for at least one UNHCR supervisor during the loading operation.

On the basis of what above, I suggest that tomorrow's scheduled movements of IDPs in Chanika should be canceled for obvious reasons; the life of IOM and HCR staff is continuously threatened and they do not benefit of any protection.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE MOVEMENTS :

- UNAMIR escorts should be on site at least 30 minutes before departure, in larger number, properly briefed and with a French speaking leader in order to maintain the crowd at least 10 meters away from loading zone.
- the same applies to UNHCR registration staff who should be on the spot at least 45 minutes before loading. Registration must be done before the IOM trucks arrive to load the IDPs, divided in trucks loads, ready to be loaded. There should be at least one supervisor to the field assistants in order to expedite the registration and later the loading process.
- IOM must send in one or two trucks at a time to avoid congestion and difficulty in crowd control in the loading zone.

Thank you for your attention.

Davide Terzi
IOM coordinator
Butare 07 Nov. 94



MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAG				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER	
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE	CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAG/ICG	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
OF DE	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO				
BOOK DOSSIER	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE								

FROM — DE *DA*

TO — A *UNAMIR HQ.*

*CN4 ENROUTE TO THIS LOC WITH 154 DISPIAKED
PER ETA. 1730 hrs.*

Del

18/4

DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION

DRAFTER — RÉDACTEUR			SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES <i>Passed to D.O 1500 cpl [Signature]</i>
NAME — NOM	OFFICE — BUREAU	TEL — TEL	
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR			
NAME — NOM	OFFICE — BUREAU	TEL — TEL	
SIGNATURE			SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE

01 01

10 NOV 94 00 00 UUUU

UNAMIR PAFF

UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//MILITARY PUBLIC AFFAIRS//

TAC HQ BUTARE//OPI OP HOMEWARD//

INFO UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//FC/DCOS OPS/G-3 OPS/G-3 PLANS//

UNCLAS UNAMIR PAFF 001

SUBJ: PUBLIC INFO CAMPAIGN IN SUPPORT OF OP HOMEWARD

REFS: A. UNHCR INFO MEETING 9 NOV 94

B. MEETING CAPT GRENIER/OPI UN RADIO STATION 10 NOV 94

IN SUPPORT OF OP HOMEWARD, I PROPOSED THIS MORNING AT REF B, THAT COVERAGE OF THE DP RETURN PROCESS BY A JOURNALIST FROM UN RADIO MIGHT HELP COMPLETE THE INFORMATION LOOP TO AND FROM CAMPS IN SECTOR 4.

2. THE AIM IS ALLOW AND ASSIST A UN RADIO JOURNALIST TO FOLLOW A FAMILY DURING THEIR JOURNEY HOME WITH OP HOMEWARD. HE WILL THEN PRODUCE A DOCUMENTARY AND AIR IT ON UN RADIO WHICH WILL BEGIN TEST BROADCAST ON SAT 12 NOV 94.


3. THE PROPOSED ITINERARY FOR THIS COVERAGE IS AS FOLLOWS: I WOULD DEPART KIGALI WITH ONE MILITARY CAMERAMAN AND ONE UN RADIO JOURNALIST AT 08H00 TUESDAY 14 NOV. WOULD ARRIVE BUTARE AT 08H30 AND PICK UP OPI OP HOMEWARD AND CONFIRM WHAT CAMP IS BEING MOVED. BRIEFING IN BUTARE NOT REQUIRED. FLY TO CAMP AND ARRIVE AT APPROX 09H00. REMAIN ON THE GROUND 60 MINUTES MILITARY CAMERAMAN TO FILM OPERATIONS. UN RADIO JOURNALIST REMAINS WITH CONVOY/DP'S WHILE OPI, CAPT GRENIER AND MIL CAMERAMAN RETURN TO BUTARE AND KIGALI. AT APPROX 16H00, HELICOPTER PICK UP OF UN RADIO JOURNALIST EITHER IN BUTARE OR OTHER LOCATION AS SPECIFIED BY TAC HQ DEPENDING ON SITUATION.

4. THIS INITIATIVE IS IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF OP HOMEWARD AND AIMS AT OBJECTIVELY REPORTING THE FACTS DURING THE RETURN TRIP OF DPS. THIS IS A TRIAL RUN. WILL ASSESS THE EFFECTIVENESS AND REPORT WILL BE PROVIDED. THIS WILL BE THE FIRST OF MANY STEPS UNDERTAKEN BY MIL PUB AFFAIRS TO DIRECTLY ASSIST THE HOMEWARD EFFORT.

G3 AIR

For your action please

10/11


S. GRENIER CAPT, UNAMIR PAFF, 11123/2052

Som
A
12/10

PAAUZYUW UCCVVDDB0001 3100713-UUUU--UCCVVD A UCCVVD D UCCVVD E UCCVVD G.
ZNR UUUUU

P 060713 NOV 94

FM TACHQ BUTARE

TO UCCVVD A//UNIMIR HQ KIGALI//CANCON//

UCCVVD E//~~SECTOR 4A HQ KIBUKO~~//ZAMBATT/GHANBATT/MILOB HQ//

UCCVVD D//SECTOR 3 HQ GITARAMA//MILOB HQ//

INFO UCCVVD A//UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//OPS/G3 PLANS//

UCCVVD G//SECTOR 4C HQ//ETHIOBATT//

UCCVVD B//TACHQ BUTARE//MILOBS//ZEN

BT

UNCLAS OPS 220

SUBJ: OP HOMEWARD - MONDAY 7 NOV 94

1. SIT: AT MEETING 052000 NOV 94, UNHCR IDENTIFIED MUKO(3840), CYANIKA(5629) AND KIBEHO(5007) AS CAMPS TO BE ACTIONED ON 7 NOV 94. ZAMBATT IS PROVIDING 6 TRUCKS AND CANSIGS 5 TRUCKS WITH COMD AND CONTROL ELEMENT.

2. IOM: IN COORDINATION WITH IOM, MOVE DISPLACED PEOPLE FROM DESIGNATED CAMPS TO HOME COMMUNES.

3. CONCEPT OF OP:

PAGE 2 UCCVVDDB0001 UNCLAS

A. CANSIGS: MOVE 140 PEOPLE FROM KIBEHO TO BUTARE WHERE THEY WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO IOM VEHICLES FOR MOVE TO KIGALI THEN KIBUNGO ON TUE 8 NOV 94.

B. ZAMBATT:

(1) MOVE 200 PEOPLE FROM MUKO TO GITARAMA WHERE THEY WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO IOM VEHICLES FOR MOVE TO KIGALI THEN NGENDA COMMUNE ON TUE 8 NOV 94; AND

(2) PROVIDE SECURITY SECTION UNDER OPCON OF PACKET COMD/MILOB TO ASSIST WITH LOADING AT MUKO AND CYANIKA SHOULD DISRUPTIVE ELEMENTS ATTEMPT TO INTERFER;

C. IOM: IN ADDITION TO TASKS AT 3 A AND B ABOVE, MOVE 780 PEOPLE FROM CYANIKA TO KIGALI THEN TO KIBUNGO ON TUE 8 NOV 94.

D. MILOBS:

(1) 4A TO PROVIDE TEAMS TO MUKO AND CYANIKA FOR COMD AND CONTROL DURING LOADING, MOVEMENT AND PASSAGE THROUGH CHECKPOINTS;

(2) 3A TO ACCOMPANY CANSIGS TO KIBEHO FOR

PAGE 3 UCCVVDDB0001 UNCLAS

ASSISTANCE IN ORGANIZING LOADING, MOVEMENT AND PASSAGE THROUGH CHECKPOINTS.

E. GHANBATT: TO PROVIDE SECURITY SECTION UNDER OPCON PACKET COMD TO ASSIST WITH LOADING AT KIBEHO SHOULD DISRUPTIVE ELEMENTS ATTEMPT TO INTERFER


4. ORDERS: TO BE ISSUED AT TAC HQ BUTARE AT 062000 NOV 94. 5. ADM:

(1) ZAMBATT VEHICLES TO REMAIN IN THEIR PRESENT LOCATION (KARAMA 5631) AND MOVE DIRECTLY TO MUKO FOR ETA 070800 NOV 94.

(2) TRANSPORT VEHICLES TO CARRY JERRY CAN OF POTABLE WATER FOR CONSUMPTION BY DISPLACED PEOPLE DURING MOVE.

6. ACKNOWLEDGE.

DO NOT STAPLE, CREASE, FOLD OR MUDGE — NE PAS BROCHER, FROISSER OU MACULER

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER			
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP (GROUPE DATE — HEURE)			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE		CLASS	SPECAT CAT-SPEC	LMF L-DIFF	CAT/CIC IAC/IGC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR	
	DATE DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO						
OF DE	312055	OCT	94								
BOOK DOSSIER	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE										
<p>3</p> <p>milob GP HQ Kigali Force HQ (DCOS) operations Kigali DTG 312055 OCT 94</p> <p>Subj Details of Border Crossing</p> <p>For inflow and outflow at Burundi Border could not be obtained because the senior authorities were not present and soldiers refused to release the figures. Subject Sector Commander will talk to liaison officer (RPA) Tomorrow 1 Nov 94. This is common problem at Border post.</p> <p>G2 G3 Ops FYI  DCOS Ops I.H</p>											
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION											
DRAFTER — REDACTEUR						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES					
NAME — NOM OFFICE — BUREAU TEL — TEL											
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR						RX on Motorola 312055 CPL McISAAC					
NAME — NOM OFFICE — BUREAU TEL — TEL											
SIGNATURE						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE					

PAAUZYUW UCCVVDB0001 2881017-UUUU--UCCVVDA.

ZNR 5UUO.

P#81017 O@T 94

FM UCCVVDB/TACHQ BUTARE

TO UCCVVDA/UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//OPS/GS PLANS//
UCCVVDA/MILOBHQ KIGALI

BT

UNCLAS OPS 116

SUBJ: OP HOMEWARD - DESTINATION SITUATION

1. THIS HQ ADVISED THAT GASHORA COMMUNE (SECTOR 2A)

AND SECTOR 2B ARE SECURE FOR RETURN OF DISPLACED

PEOPLE. UNHCR THIS LOC BELIEVES HOWEVER ~~THAT~~ PEOPLE CANNOT RETURN DIRECTLY TO THE
→ ARE PLACED INTO TRANSIT CAMPS, POSSIBLY RUN BY THE HOMES, BUT RATHER 2
GOVERNMENT.

2. REQUEST MILOB QUERY AND ADVISE IF PEOPLE CAN BE
MOVED DIRECTLY INTO HOMES OR WILL THEY BE PLACED ON
TRANSIT CAMPS IF WE MOVE THEM FROM CAMP IN SECTOR

4A.1

3. REQUEST RESPONSE SOONEST AS ANSWER EFFECTS
PLANNING FOR OP HOMEWARD MOVEMENTS. REQUIRE HARD
COPY RESPONSE IN ADDITION TO ANY VERBAL CONFIRMATION

Sean
Thrust
802
20/10

Sean
H
18/10

PAAUZYUW UCCVVDB0001 2881017-UUUU--UCCVVDA.
ZNR 5UUO.

P# 17 OCT 94

FM UCCVVDB/TACHQ BUTARE
TO UCCVVDA/UNAMIR HQ KIGALI//OPS/G3 PLANS//
UCCVVDA/MILOBHQ KIGALI

BT

UNCLAS OPS 116

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4A.I

3. REQUEST RESPONSE SOONEST AS ANSWER EFFECTS
PLANNING FOR OP HOMEWARD MOVEMENTS. REQUIRE HARD
COPY RESPONSE IN ADDITION TO ANY VERBAL CONFIRMATION

cc
Pse send copies to
MILOB

19/10

THAT PEOPLE CANNOT RETURN DIRECTLY TO THEIRS
HOMES, BUT RATHER

**FACSIMILE COVER PAGE
UNAMIR TACTICAL HQ
BUTARE, RWANDA**

FM: UNAMIR TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS BUTARE, RWANDA PH: 00 871 383 02 0026 00 873 383 02 0026	TO: UNAMIR HQ // G3 Ops //
FAX: ATLANTIC: 00 871 383 02 0026 INDIAN: 00 873 383 02 0026	FAX:
INFO:	
NO OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER PAGE: 4	
OP Homeward.	
Sent [Signature] 18/11	

MONDAY 17 OCT 94

CAMP: NDAGO

LOCATION: 5102

REGISTRATION: UNHCR IC: ~~MAWA~~ - NA

MILOB: CRM 4

DESTINATION: NGENDA - 468

MEDICAL SCREENING: TBA ~~CoAL~~

MARSHALLING/START POINT: ~~ON CAL~~

AT 0800 HOURS

SURVIVAL PACK: ISSUED IN KIGALI ~~OR BUTARE~~

ROUTE INFORMATION:

LEG 1

AGENCY: BRITCON - 16C CR ~~CoAL~~ VEHICLES: 4T NUMBER: 14

ETD: 0900

ROUTE: NDAGO - KIBEHO - BUTARE / KIGALI ETT: 8.5 HOURS

CRITICAL POINTS: KIBEHO CHECKPOINT

RPA REP: CONFIRMED

MILOB: CBM 9

WAY STATION: KIGALI ~~OR BUTARE~~

LEG 2 18 OCT

START POINT: KIGALI ~~OR BUTARE~~

ETD: 0800

ROUTE: TO BE ISSUED

AGENCY: BRITCON

VEHICLES:

ADMINISTRATION:

ENROUTE MEDICAL EMERGENCIES: AUS MED BUTARE THRU OA

MALI MED GITARAMA THRU OA

WATER POINT: JERRY CANS ON TRUCKS

COMMUNICATIONS:

HANDHELD RADIO - CHANNEL 13 - TACHQ - OA

BRITCON - 15

MILOB GIKONGORO - CRO

MALAWI - MAO

MILOB BUTARE - CBO

AGENCY + FIRST NAME

HAC BUTARE - MAMA PAPA 4

MILITARY VHF: 40.25 MHZ

SECURITY: NIL

PATROLS: NIL

MONDAY 17 OCT 94

CAMP: CYANIKA

LOCATION: 5530

REGISTRATION: UNHCR IC: *Paul*

MILOB: CRM 2

DESTINATION: GASHORA - ~~300~~ PEOPLE *500*

MEDICAL SCREENING: UNHCR *Trocane*

MARSHALLING/START POINT:

AT 0800 HOURS

SURVIVAL PACK: ISSUED AT BUTARE

ROUTE INFORMATION:

LEG 1

AGENCY: IOM VEHICLES: TRUCKS NUMBER: 40

ETD: 0900 HOURS

ROUTE: CYANIKA - GIKONGORO - BUTARE

ETT: 1 HR

CRITICAL POINTS: KIZI CHECKPOINT

RPA REP: CONFIRMED

MILOB: CBM/O

WAY STATION: BUTARE

LEG 2 18 OCT 94

START POINT: BUTARE

ETD: 0800 HOURS

ROUTE: BUTARE - KIGALI - DESTINATION

AGENCY: IOM VEHICLES: TRUCKS

ETT: 6 HOURS

ADMINISTRATION:

ENROUTE MEDICAL EMERGENCIES: AUS MED BUTARE THRU OA

MALI MED GITARAMA THRU OA

WATER POINT: JERRY CANS ON VEHICLES

COMMUNICATIONS:

HANDHELD RADIO - CHANNEL 13 - TACHQ - OA

BRITCON - 15

MILOB GIKONGORO - CRO

MALAWI - MAO

MILOB BUTARE - CBO

AGENCY + FIRST NAME

HAC BUTARE - MAMA PAPA 4

MILITARY VHF: 40.25 MHZ

SECURITY: NIL

PATROLS: NIL

MONDAY 17 OCT 94

CAMP: KADUHA

LOCATION: 4732

REGISTRATION: UNHCR IC: NATASHA, OR MASTI

MILOB: CRM 1

DESTINATION: GASHORA - 523 NGAONA - 523

MEDICAL SCREENING: UNDER

MARSHALLING/START POINT: Dist Pt at church AT 0800 HOURS

SURVIVAL PACK: ISSUED AT KIGALI

ROUTE INFORMATION:

LEG 1

AGENCY: BRITCON - 16D Cpl MARTIN VEHICLES: 4T NUMBER: 16

ETD: 0800 HOURS

ROUTE: KADUHA - GITARAMA - KIGALI

ETT: 4.5 HOURS

CRITICAL POINTS: CHECKPOINT GR 5550

RPA REP: ?

MILOB: CBM ?

WAY STATION: KIGALI

LEG 2 18 OCT 94

START POINT: KIGALI

ETD: 0800 HOURS

ROUTE: TO BE ISSUED - Joe Fergus.

AGENCY: BRITCON

VEHICLES:

ADMINISTRATION:

ENROUTE MEDICAL EMERGENCIES: AUS MED BUTARE THRU OA
MALI MED GITARAMA THRU OA

WATER POINT: JERRY CANS ON VEHICLES

COMMUNICATIONS:

HANDHELD RADIO - CHANNEL 13 - TACHQ - OA

BRITCON - 15

MILOB GIKONGORO - CRO

MALAWI - MAO

MILOB BUTARE - CBO

AGENCY + FIRST NAME

HAC BUTARE - MAMA PAPA 4

MILITARY VHF: 40.25 MHZ

SECURITY: NIL.

PATROLS: NIL.

PAAUZYUW UCCVVDH0151 2901503-UUUU--UCCVVDA UCCVVDF UCCVVDF

ZNR UUUUU

P 171503Z OCT 94

FM SECTOR 5 GISENYI

TO UNHQ KIGALI//COO/C LOG O//

INFO UCCVVDF/SECTOR 4B KIBUYE//SECTOR COMD//

UCCVVDF/SECTOR 4B KIBUYE//MILOB HQ//

ZEN/BRITCON

ZEN/CO TUNBAT

ZEN/OC REAR PARTY 2 FD AMB NKIMURA

BT

UNCLAS DSIG

SUBJ: TRANSPORT OF RETURNEES GISENYI-KIBUYE AREA 19 OCT 94

REF: CONFIDENTIAL MOVE 001 151103Z OCT 94

MOVO

REFS: A. 1:50000 OP LANCE SERIES:SHEETS GISENYI,MURUNDA

KIBUYE, RUHENGIERI, NGORORERO, BIRAMBO

TIME ZONE ALL TIMES LOCAL

1. SITUATION.225 RETURNEES TO RWANDA HAVE BEEN AUTH BY RWANDA GOVT TO MOVE FROM GISENYI UNHCR TRANSIT CAMP TO THEIR FORMER ~~HOUSES IN~~ TE COMVUNES OF GISHYITA 2063 AND RWAMATAMU 1856 SOUTH OF KIBUYE.
2. MISSION. TO TN RETURNEES FROM GISENYI TO KIBUYE AREA ON 19 OCT

G3 Ops
FYI
18-10

94.

3. EXECUTION

- A. GEN OUTLINE. MOV WILL BE CONDUCTED IN 3 PH AS FOLS:
- (1) PH 1 - MOVE OF BRITCON TCV X 10 TO PARK AREA AT FORMER LOC OF 2 FD AMB;
 - (2) PH 2 - TN OF RETURNEES FROM GISENYI TRANSIT CAMP TO GISHYITA AND RWAMATAMU. BRITCON TO HRBR IN LOCAL AREA; AND
 - (3) PH 3 - RTN OF BRITCON TCV TO KIGALI
- B. GROUPING. MILOB SEC 5 WILL ESCORT GISENYI - RUTSIRO SECTOR 4B WILL ESCORT RUTSIRO - GISHYITA/RWAMATAMU.
- C. AVG SPEEDS 30 KPH
- D. DENSITY. CONVOY WILL CONSIST OF SINGLE PACKET
- E. HALTS. CONVOY LDR WILL CONDUCT SHORT HALT AT TWO HR INTERVALS.
- F. ROUTES
- (1) ROUTE A (PH 1/2: GISENYI - RUBAVU 2213 - KIVUMU 2303 GISHYITA/RWAMTAMU.
 - (2) ROUTE B (PH 3): HQ UNAMIR TO CONFIRM AND COORD AS REQD WITH SECTORS.
- G. CRITICAL POINTS.

PAGE 3 UCCVVDH0151 UNCLAS

(1) HARBOUR NI 18 OCT 94	NKUMIRA 3118(FORMER LOC 2 FD AMB)
(2) SP	GISENYI TRANSIT CAMP 225135
(3) HANDOVER TO 4B ESCORT	RUTSIRO 3183
(4) RP GISHYITA	GISHYITA 2063
(5) RP RWAMATAMU	RWAMATAMU 1656
(6) HABOUR NI 19 OCT 94	LOC TBC BY COMD SEC 4B

H. ROUTES TO SP. FROM PH-1 HRBOUR DIRECT. MILOB ESCORT/UNHCR
REPS WILL BE IN LOC AT UPLOADING POINT.

J. TIMINGS

(1) BRITCON ARRV AT HRBR LOC	NLT 181700 HRS 94
(2)UPLOAD RETURNEES AT GISENYI TRANSIT CAMP	190700 HRS 94
(3)ROS _o SP	NLT 190800 HRS 94
(4)ARRV RUTSIRO	ETA 191300 HRS 94
(5)ARRV KIBUYE	ETA 191500 HRS 94
(6)ARRV GISHYITA/RWAMATAMU	ETA 191600 HRS 94
(7)BRITCON RTN TO KIGALI	20 OCT 94

4. ~~CEYAN~~ SERVICE SUPPORT

- A. REC. BRITCON TO PROVIDE TOW BAR WITH CONVOY. ALL
PROCEDURES IAW BRITCON/UNAMIR SOP.
- B. R AND Q BRITCON TO BE SELF SUFFICIENT FOR RATS AND ACCN

PAGE 4 UCCVVDH0151 UNCLAS
THROUGHOUT.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

A. CONVOY COMD MILOB ESCORT LDR IS DESIGNATED CONVOY COMD.

B. LN INSTR

(1) MILOB SEC 5 OFFR WILL BV WITH SHIPCOM IN HARBOR LOC
181700 HRS 84.

(2) HANDOVER OF CONVOY ESCORT FROM SEC 4 TO SEC 5 WILL
BE AT BUTSIBO 3183

(3) UGND SEC 48 TO ADVISE ALL SHIPCOMS OF THE
SECTOR ASAS. ALSO ADVISE ALL SHIPCOMS OF THE
MCS 34.

C. ALL SHIPCOMS WILL BE ADVISED OF THE

BT

40151

SEC 1900 HRS 84

1547

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER	
PAGE	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE	CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	DWT L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAG/ICG	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO				
OF DE	171925B OCT 94								
BOOK DOSSIER	MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE								
<p>FROM — DE SECTOR 4B MILOB HQ</p> <p>TO — A UNAMIR HQ/COMD BRITCON/ INFO SECT 5 MILOB HQ</p> <p>SUBJ: USE OF BRITCON TRUCKS TO CONVEY DISPLACED PEOPLE TO KIGALI</p> <p>1. THIS SECTOR WOULD LIKE TO UTILIZE THE 10 TRUCKS THAT ARE BRINGING DISPLACED PERS. FROM GISENYI TO KIBUYE ON 19 OCT 94 TO CONVEY ABOUT 250 DISPLACED PERS. RUGABANO GR 42660 CAMP WISHING TO PROCEED TO GITARAMA AND KIGALI.</p> <p>2. YOUR COOPERATION AND QUICK RESPONSE WOULD BE MUCH APPRECIATED.</p>									
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION									
DRAFTER — REDACTEUR					SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES				
NAME — NOM OFFICE — BUREAU TEL — TEL									
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR									
NAME — NOM OFFICE — BUREAU TEL — TEL									
SIGNATURE									
					SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER		
PAGE 1 OF 2	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE		CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAC/ICC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR
	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO	UNCLAS				OPS 108
152215B OCT 94 P										
MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE										

FROM — DE TACHQ BUTARE
UNAMIR HQ KIGALI/OPS/DFC/HAC/G3 PLANS
MILOB HQ KIGALI

SUBJ: OP HOMEWARD

I. OP HOMEWARD (WEEK 17-21) FORECASTED AND
FINAL PLANNING UNDERWAY:

OP HOMEWARD FORECAST
A. MON/TUES 17/18 OCT 1250 PERS
BREAKDOWN AS FOLS:

NDGO 470

KADUHA 500

CYANIKA 300

USING BRITCON AND IOM VEHICLES.

ALL PERS TO SPEND NIGHT IN KIGALI PRIOR
TO DELIVERY TO:

B. NGENDA COMMUNE BREAKDOWN AS FOLS:

RUTONDE 180

BULENGE 291

SHYARA 29

GAKOMEYE 130

RUHAHA 10.

KAVUMU 35

NYTARUGENGE 60

KARERA 15

GAKOMBA 4.

ce
Fr AMLOB pse
AK/w

DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION

3500.32 (OPS)
R 17

DRAFTER — RÉDACTEUR			SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPÉCIALES
NAME — NOM	OFFICE — BUREAU	TEL — TÉL.	
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR			
NAME — NOM	OFFICE — BUREAU	TEL — TÉL.	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE
SIGNATURE			

MESSAGE FORM FORMULE DE MESSAGE				SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE				FILE — DOSSIER			
PAGE 2 OF 2	DATE — TIME GROUP GROUPE DATE — HEURE			PRECEDENCE PRIORITE		CLASS	SPECAT CAT SPEC	LMF L DIFF	CAI/CIC IAG/ICC	ORIGINATOR'S NUMBER NUMERO DE L'EXPEDITEUR	
	DATE — TIME DATE — HEURE	MONTH MOIS	YEAR ANNEE	ACTION	INFO					OPS 108	
BOOK DOSSIER		MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS — INSTRUCTIONS D'ACHEMINEMENT DU MESSAGE									
<p>FROM — DE</p> <p>TO — A</p> <p>C. GASHORA COMMUNE BREAKDOWN AS FOLLOWS:</p> <p>MWENDO 120</p> <p>RILIMA 190</p> <p>RWERU 64.</p> <p>2. TASK FOR UNAMIR/MILOB TO EXECUTE PRIOR TO 17/18 OCT</p> <p>A. PREFECTURE, COMMUNE AND VILLAGE LEADERS MUST BE NOTIFIED OF ANTICIPATED ARRIVALS FOR TUES 18 OCT.</p> <p>B. LIAISON MUST BE MADE TO WAIVE PHYSICAL SEARCH OF PERS AT CHECKPOINT IMMEDIATELY WEST OF KIGALI. THIS SEARCH PROLONGS TRAVEL. RECOMMEND RPA LIAISON OFFER YOUR HQ ATTEND CHECKPOINT.</p> <p>C. KIGALI WEIGH STATION TO BE ADVISED OF NUMBER OF PERS TO BE EXPECTED ON NIGHT 17 OCT AND WED 19 OCT. FURTHERMORE SITUATION REGARDING ISSUE OF SUBSISTENCE PACKAGES BY KIGALI WEIGH STATION MUST BE RESOLVED AS WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF ISSUING FROM BUTARE UNLESS THE PEOPLE SPEND NIGHT IN BUTARE.</p> <p>3. ACK THAT TASK IN PARA 2 WILL BE EXECUTED MUST BE GIVEN NLT 161200 OCT 94.</p>											
DISTRIBUTION — DIFFUSION											
DRAFTER — REDACTEUR						SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS — DIRECTIVES SPECIALES					
NAME — NOM OFFICE — BUREAU TEL — TEL											
RELEASING OFFICER — L'OFFICIER APPROBATEUR											
NAME — NOM OFFICE — BUREAU TEL — TEL											
SIGNATURE						SECURITY CLASSIFICATION — COTE DE SECURITE					

12/10 '94 07:30

00873 383 020028

TAC HQ BUTARE

001

FACSIMILE COVER PAGE
UNAMIR TACTICAL HQ
BUTARE, RWANDA

FM: UNAMIR TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS BUTARE, RWANDA PH: 00 871 383 02 0026 00 873 383 02 0026	TO: UNAMIR HQ // C3 ops LCol APAGAW-YELA
FAX: ATLANTIC: 00 871 383 02 0026 INDIAN: 00 873 383 02 0026	FAX:
INFO:	
NO. OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER PAGE: 2	
OP Homenard Daily Move Plan	

chief clerk

Px put on
op Homenard file

12/10 '94 07:31

000873 383 020028

TAC HQ BUTARE

002

WEDNESDAY 12 OCT 94

From: BUTARE WAY STATION

REGISTRATION: UNICR IC: MILOB: CRM
DESTINATION: KIGALI OR NGENDA - 266
MEDICAL SCREENING:
MARSHALLING/START POINT: BUTARE WAY STATION AT 0800 hrs
SURVIVAL PACK: ISSUED AT BUTARE

ROUTE INFORMATION: LEG 1
AGENCY: BRITCON - 15B CPL RICHIE VEHICLES: 4T
NUMBER: 10 ETD: 0900 hrs

ROUTE: BUTARE - GITARAMA - KIGALI - NGENDA

CRITICAL POINTS: CHECKPOINT KIGALI RPA:
MILOB:

WAY STATION:

TIMINGS: ETD BUTARE 0900
ETA KIGALI 1215
ETD KIGALI 1300
ETA NGENDA COMMUNE 1600
ETA KIGALI 2000

ADMINISTRATION:

ENROUTE MEDICAL EMERGENCIES: AUS MED BUTARE THRU OA
MALAWI MED GITARAMA THRU OA

WATER POINT: JERRY CANS ON VEHICLES

COMMUNICATIONS:

HANDHELD RADIO - CHANNEL 13 - TACHQ - OA
BRITCON - 15
AGENCY + FIRST NAME

MILITARY VHF: 40.25 MHZ

SECURITY: NIL

FOLLOW-UP:

Note: UNICR will transport 311 to NGENDA on WED 12 OCT
THIS IS PART OF PEOPLE MOVED BY BRITCON ON THU 11 OCT

TAC#009 Butare

THURSDAY 13 OCT 94

CAMP: CYANIKA
LOCATION: 5630
REGISTRATION: UNHCR IC: MASTI MILOB: CRM
DESTINATION: KIGALI OVERNIGHT THEN NGENDA
MEDICAL SCREENING:
MARSHALLING/START POINT: CYANIKA AT 0800 AND 0900 HRS
SURVIVAL PACK: ISSUED AT KIGALI

ROUTE INFORMATION: LEG 1
AGENCY: BRITCON - 15C CPL ORWIN 15B CPL RICHIE

VEHICLES: 4T NUMBER:10+10 500 DP'S ETD: 0900 AND 1000

ROUTE: BUTARE - KIZI - GITARAMA - KIGALI - NGENDA

CRITICAL POINTS: CHECKPOINT KIZI RPA:
MILOB:

WAY STATION: KIGALI UNHCR

TIMINGS: ETD CYANIKA 0900 + 1000
ETA KIZI 0930 + 1030
ETA BUTARE 1200 + 1300
ETD KIGALI 1530 + 1630

Note 33 to be delivered
to BUTARE WAY STATION
FOR MOVEMENT TO MUYILA.

ADMINISTRATION:
ENROUTE MEDICAL EMERGENCIES: AUS MED BUTARE THRU OA
MALAWI MED GITARAMA THRU OA

WATER POINT: JERRY CANS ON VEHICLES

COMMUNICATIONS:
HANDHELD RADIO - CHANNEL 13 - TACHQ - OA
BRITCON - 15
AGENCY + FIRST NAME

MILITARY VHF: 40.25 MHZ
SECURITY: NIL
FOLLOW-UP:

Note: Lift Fri 14 Oct will be KIGALI TO DESTINATION

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000.1.2 (G3 PLANS)

To: DCOS Ops

From: G3 Plans 3

if G3 Plans
Tac HQ
HAC
BRITCON
Information Consultant

See

17/12

Date: 7 Oct 94

Subject: OP HOMEWARD - COMMENTS

Reference: Tac HQ Op HOMEWARD report dated 29 Sep 94.

GENERAL

1. You asked for comment on Ref A and Op HOMEWARD.
2. The paper reflects accurately the dynamics of Op HOMEWARD and the difficulties which Tac HQ staff have addressed and largely overcome. As an exercise in military C2 and in giving a clear demonstration to NGOs of UNAMIR's commitment, Op HOMEWARD was highly successful, under the circumstances.

COMMENTS

m. While the aim quoted was to assist the relief agencies in the relocation of DPs, the overarching point of the operation was to encourage many others to walk home. Despite the obstacles, discussed below, it is now clear that the chances of a strategic effect developing from a low-level tactical aim, is little more than wishful thinking. To generate the type of result desired, high-level direction and the coordination of assets at national-strategic level would be required. While it is accepted that there will never be "Unity of Command", much greater coordination of resources, backed by wholehearted UN commitment, will be needed before any real impact can be anticipated. This is a blunt lesson.

4. Timing. The timing of Op HOMEWARD was dictated by the availability of transport, which generated the offer of support to the UNHCR and the NGOs. In retrospect, the timing could not have been more inappropriate. The operation began the week after the rainy season was expected - that it arrived late merely provided a short period in which some progress could be made. It now seems that few people would wish to move home so close to the start of the rainy season. Crop planting is less effective now; the comfort of the camps contrasts sharply with the (many) uncertainties of returning home - this must be a major consideration before the long rainy season.

5. Other Constraints. Other constraints on the success of the operation as originally envisaged were:

a. Staging. Slow RPA clearance procedures, in most areas, coupled with our own constraints on operating at night meant that staging was required, even for relatively short moves. This effectively caused a one day move on occasions to extend to two days, halving the lift capacity. There are two points of interest:

(1). The RPA are clearly not universally supportive of the operation. Their contribution is at best desultory. This lack of commitment is inconsistent, with the UN effort.

(2). The "Concern" Way Station at Butare is inadequate for the task. Either the capacity should be increased or an alternative opened by another NGO. This constraint (coupled to RPA intransigence) can drive the capacity of the whole operation. If a larger operation is ever to succeed, the highest resource priority must be allocated by NGOs to these "bottlenecks".

b. Commodity Distribution. NGO concerns that inadequate reception arrangements were in place limited the number of personnel that UNHCR was prepared to sponsor. That NGOs must shift their emphasis from the camps to the home communes in order to provide reception arrangements - seeds and tools, food, water and medical supplies, is self evident. Equally, it is clear that they have no intention of doing so - it is much easier to service a centralised camp, than to administer an agrarian commune. Changing the NGO perception of this problem has to become a major UN priority, or the UNHCR will never sanction plans to move large numbers of people, by vehicle or on foot.

c. Efficiency. The total system can only sustain a limited throughput. Limitations on UNHCR registration, convoy capacity, RPA checkpoint procedures, and reception arrangements, within daylight and/or staging limitations will inevitably reduce efficiency. Nevertheless, to accomplish even the limited success so far, has been a major achievement.

6. Cooperation. Op HOMEWARD has demonstrated to the civilian agencies the advantages of flexible military C2. That progress has been made here is of immense significance, and to retain the trust of these organisations, a wider plan needs to be developed as soon as possible. We should use the current rainy season to plan a larger operation between December and March.

7. Information Operations. By far the most important lesson arising out of Op HOMEWARD is the control of information. We must foster a proper understanding of the communication mechanisms at work in Rwanda's Oral Society. The development of an

information strategy is the most pressing need, and the support of UNHCR and UNREO will be critical for success. There is universal agreement on this point within UNAMIR and we must capitalise on what we have learnt thus far.

8. Conclusion. Op HOMEWARD, although of limited success, has been very useful. It has provided evidence to the NGOs of UNAMIR's capability to coordinate complex projects. More important, it has demonstrated several areas in which improvements must be made if subsequent operations are to succeed. In summary these are:

- a. Central strategic direction is required if DP repatriation is to be achieved on a large scale.
- b. We should use the rainy season to plan a major effort in the New Year.
- c. Throughput is dependant on the efficiency of certain bottlenecks, which must be improved.
- d. NGO perceptions on their role in the repatriation plan must be changed. Op HOMEWARD has gone some way to developing a relationship in which this point could be driven home.
- e. Understanding and utilising the characteristics of the Oral Society, through information operations is the key to further progress.



T A P MULLARKEY
Maj
G3 Plans 3



UNAMIR - MINUAR

File No 5000. (33 PLANS)

To: Tac HQ

From: G3 Plans 3

Info: G3 Ops

Date: 4 Oct 94

Subject: MOVEMENT OF GITARAMA DPs

1. Attached please find a minute from Sector 3 HQ reference movement of DPs in the Gitarama Prefecture.
2. Please action as appropriate under coordination arrangements for Op HOMEWARD.

T A P MULLARKEY
Maj
G3 Plans 3

Seen
4/10

3000.9 (10)

3000.32 (OPR)

R.2

MEMORANDUM

①

TO : FHQ HAC
MILOB GP HQ (OPS)
FROM : HQ SEC 3
INFO : FHQ(G3)
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP

DATE: 21 SEP 94

REF : SEC3/HUM/1

SUBJECT : DESTINATIONS/NEEDS OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN GITARAMA

1. Attached as Annex A is a table showing the ultimate destinations of displaced persons now located in KABGAYI.
2. It is please requested that arrangements be made to provide the items listed in the remarks column for 1300 displaced persons.
3. Please note that the number of displaced persons shown does not include children.
4. It is also to be noted that these people want to be camped in new sites in or nearer their commune centres as their houses were destroyed during the war.
5. MALAWICOY transport will be sufficient to conduct the movement.
6. The early identification of potential camp sites by Sector Commanders (this week) will be most appreciated.
7. The early provision of items listed in (1) of column (e) of Annex A through HAC effort will be most welcome.




BK GBORGLAH
Lt Col
Sec Comd

Annex:

A. Destination/Needs of Displaced Persons in KABGAYI.

② G3 Plans 2/3

1. FYI and FNA
2. Pls pass copy to Tac HQ



Col
DCOS ops
3-10

DESTINATIONS/NEEDS OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN KABGAYI

SRL	PREFECTURE /COMMUNE	GRID	NUMBER	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
	<u>GITARAMA</u> <u>PREFECTURE</u>			
1.	NYAMABUYE	7571	23	Plastic sheeting, farming implements, food, seeds and transport to be provided.
2.	MUSHUBATI	6871	40	
3.	BURINGA	6476	66	
4.	RUTOBWE	7681	6	
5.	MASANGO	6154	46	
6.	MURAMA	6749	2	
7.	MUGINA	9367	9	
8.	NTONGWE	8956	2	
9.	MUKINGI	7061	4	
10.	TAMBWE	7653	12	
			TOTAL: 210) MILOB HQ(OPS) to) please task) Sector Comds to) recce and) identify) suitable areas) for location of) new camps for) these displaced) persons.
	<u>GIKONGORO</u> <u>PREFECTURE</u>			
11.	MUKO	3841	24	
12.	MUSANGE	5347	6	
			TOTAL: 30	
	<u>BUTARE</u> <u>PREFECTURE</u>			
13.	NYABISINDU	6939	6	
14.	MUYIRA	8640	12	
15.	NGOMA	7113	2	
			TOTAL: 20	
	<u>KIBUYE</u> <u>PREFECTURE</u>			
16.	GISHITA	2062	270	
17.	GISOVU	2952	80	
18.	RWAMATAMU	1556	30	
19.	GITESI	2871	150	
20.	MABANZA	3373	15	
21.	BWAKIRA	4962	10	
22.	KIVUMU	2358	7	
			TOTAL: 562	
			<u>GRAND</u> <u>TOTAL: 822</u>	

1390

HQ BRITCON
AMAHORO STADIUM
KIGALI

See Distribution

30 Sep 94

OP HOMEWARD

MOVEMENT OF DISPLACED PERSONS FROM SECTOR 4

1. The problems associated with the movement of DPs from sector 4 are well documented but there are several points which should be actioned if the plan is to succeed. This letter is written to amplify BRITCON observations which have been passed to this HQ from our med assets within sector 4.

2. At a meeting in GIKONGURU on 29 Sep 94, the NGOs present requested that UNAMIR confirm or deny the rumours of human rights violations by the RPA. Without an authoritative answer, the NGOs working within the DPs camps stated that there were not prepared to assist in OP HOMEWARD. Representatives from ICRC and UNHCR stated that it was not their responsibility to persuade DPs to return home; a point which is closely linked to the subject of reassurance about human rights violations.

3. It is suggested that a joint operation with UNAMIR and the NGOs be established which is coordinated with the RPA to reassure these Dps. It is suggested that:

a. UNAMIR should brief the NGOs on the facts concerning human rights violations.

b. Satisfied returnees be identified to visit camps and confirm conditions.

c. Community leaders be allowed to recce their home communes.

d. Initiate a psychological operations campaign to counter the RGF radio broadcasts from ZAIRE and BURUNDI.

e. Confirm the government's position regarding the DP problem and attempt to involve the RPA as part of the overall plan. This should include reassuring speeches within the camps and better treatment of the returnees at the registration points. It is also suggested that the RPA policy of burning out the DPs is sending the wrong message.

4. If OP HOMEWARD is to be resumed, then it should be noted that attempts to move DPs on market days or food distribution days will result in a poor response. It is suggested that the

1

(2)

OVERK

Pse forward a copy to
TAC HQ and RPA
L-O

CH

G3 GPS
11/10

3500.32 (GPS)
12/16

plan ties together the issue of food distribution and the transportation of DPs to their home communes. It is hoped that these points are useful so that OP HOMEWARD can be successfully resumed.



A J DUNCAN
Capt
for COMBRITCON

Distr:

External:

Action:

HQ UNAMIR - HAC
G3 OPS
G3 PLANS

Internal:

Info:

21C
23 PFA

FM: DCOS OPS

De Felt

TO: ETHIOBATT

SUBJECT: TRANSPORTATION OF REFUGEES/ DISPLACED PERSONS FROM
SECTOR 4C

1. IN VIEW OF THE INCREASING NUMBER OF REFUGEES/ DISPLACED PERSONS WISHING TO BE TRANSPORTED FROM YOUR SECTOR TO THEIR AREAS OF ORIGIN, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO TRANSPORT SUCH PERSONS USING YOUR OWN RESOURCES WHEN NECESSARY.
2. FOR YOUR NECESSARY ACTION.

*See
A*

3000.15 (072)

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.1 (PLANS)

01 02 241200B SEP 94 RR RR UUUU

016

HQ UNAMIR

TAC HQ

ZAMBATT

INFO BRITCON

CANCON

UNCLAS 016

SUBJ: ALLOCATION OF ZAMBATT VEHs TO OP HOMEWARD

1. UNHCR SCHEDULING HAS HIGHLIGHTED SHORTFALL IN VEHs AVAILABLE FOR OP HOMEWARD. ZAMBATT HAS AGREED TO PROVIDE FIRST LINE SP PENDING ARRIVAL OF ZAMBATT CONTINGENT. THESE VEHs WILL AUGMENT 13 VEHs AVAILABLE FROM BRITCON.

2. REQUIREMENT IS NOW AS FOLLOWS:

A. 18 TROOP CARRYING VEHs.

B. ONE OFFR, ONE SNCO AND DRIVERS FOR ALL VEHs.

C. SELF CONTAINED FOR RATS AND WATER FOR 5 DAYS.

D. ALL VEHs TO HAVE ONE FULL WATER JERRICAN FOR REFUGEE USE DURING TASK.

E. REPORT TO CAPT MUIR (MOVCON) AT TAC HQ BUTARE BY 251800B SEP 94.

3000.15 (0730)
R-1

UNCLASSIFIED

02

UUUU

016

F. ACCOMMODATION WILL BE ON VEHS.

G. RELEASE EXPECTED 291600B SEP 94.

3. OUTCOME OF OPERATION 26-29 SEP WILL DETERMINE REQUESTS FOR FURTHER TASKINGS.

4. EARLY ARRIVAL OF ZAMBATT CONTINGENT MAY ENTAIL WITHDRAWAL OF SUPPORT DURING OP HOMEWARD.

DFC
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
G4 TPT
G3 PLANS

MAJ T A P MULLARKEY
G3 PLANS 3

LT COL A D BRIMELOW
G3 PLANS



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

5000.15 (PLANS)

01 02 221030Z SEP 94 RR RR UUUU

014

HQ UNAMIR

TAC HQ

BRITCON

CANCON

ETHIOBATT

FRAFBATT

GHANBATT

MALAWICOY

ZAMBATT

IN CO AUSMED

UNCLAS 014

SUBJ:VEH ALLOCATION FOR OP HOMEWARD.

REF:3000.15 (PLANS) DATED 18 SEP 84.

1. AVAILABILITY OF TPT TO SUPPORT OP HOMEWARD NOW REQUIRES DETAILED PLANNING. LESS TPT MAY NOW BE AVAILABLE THAN WAS ORIGINALLY ENVISAGED. TAC HQ IS TO CARRY OUT THE FOLLOWING ACTION:

A ESTABLISH VEH TO TASK REQUIREMENT IN CONCERT WITH UN AGENCIES AND AGOS.

B PREPARE SUP, MAINT AND RECOVERY PLANS, REQUESTING ADDITIONAL

UNCLASSIFIED

Seen
4/12
3000.32 (93)

02

UUUU

014

SP FROM HQ UNAMIR G4 AS REQUIRED.

C. COORDINATE THOSE ASSETS AVAILABLE.

2. IT IS EXPECTED THAT THE FOLLOWING TPT WILL BE AVAILABLE:

A. BRITCON - 13 VEHS.

B. BROWN AND ROOT - 8 VEHS.

C. CANCON - 5 VEHS FROM FIRST LINE.

3. FURTHER FIRST LINE ASSETS MAY BE AVAILABLE FOR LIMITED PERIODS.

ZAMBATT, ETHIOBATT, GHANBATT, TUNBATT AND FRAFBATT ARE ASKED TO PASS DETAILS OF FIRST LINE AVAILABILITY TO SUPPORT OP HOMEWARD DURING WEEK 26-29 SEP 94 TO TAC HQ FOR COORDINATION.

DFC/COS
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP
G4 TPT
HAC
G3 PLANS

MAJ T A P MULLARKEY
G3 PLANS 3

LT COL AD BRIMELOW
G3 PLANS



UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM

TO : FHQ HAC
MILOB GP HQ (OPS)
FROM : HQ SEC 3
INFO : FHQ(G3)
DCOS OPS
DCOS SP

DATE: 21 SEP 94
REF : SEC3/HUM/1

SUBJECT : DESTINATIONS/NEEDS OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN GITARAMA

1. Attached as Annex A is a table showing the ultimate destinations of displaced persons now located in KABGAYI.
2. It is please requested that arrangements be made to provide the items listed in the remarks column for 1300 displaced persons.
3. Please note that the number of displaced persons shown does not include children.
4. It is also to be noted that these people want to be camped in new sites in or nearer their commune centres as their houses were destroyed during the war.
5. MALAWICOY transport will be sufficient to conduct the movement.
6. The early identification of potential camp sites by Sector Commanders (this week) will be most appreciated.
7. The early provision of items listed in (1) of column (e) of Annex A through HAC effort will be most welcome.



BK GBORGLAH
Lt Col
Sec Comd

Annex:

- A. Destination/Needs of Displaced Persons in KABGAYI.

HAC

528,
Original copy
sent to HAC.

nh, 21.9.94.

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21-1

DESTINATIONS/NEEDS OF DISPLACED PERSONS IN KABGAYI

SRL	PREFECTURE /COMMUNE	GRID	NUMBER	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
	<u>GITARAMA PREFECTURE</u>			
1.	NYAMABUYE	7571	23	Plastic sheeting, farming implements, food, seeds and transport to be provided.
2.	MUSHUBATI	6871	40	
3.	BURINGA	6476	66	
4.	RUTOBWE	7681	6	
5.	MASANGO	6154	46	
6.	MURAMA	6749	2	
7.	MUGINA	9367	9	
8.	NTONGWE	8956	2	
9.	MUKINGI	7061	4	
10.	TAMBWE	7653	12	
			TOTAL: 210	
	<u>GIKONGORO PREFECTURE</u>			
11.	MUKO	3841	24) MILOB HQ(OPS) to) please task) Sector Comds to) recce and) identify) suitable areas) for location of) new camps for) these displaced) persons.
12.	MUSANGE	5347	6	
			TOTAL: 30	
	<u>BUTARE PREFECTURE</u>			
13.	NYABISINDU	6939	6	
14.	MUYIRA	8640	12	
15.	NGOMA	7113	2	
			TOTAL: 20	
	<u>KIBUYE PREFECTURE</u>			
16.	GISHITA	2062	270	
17.	GISOVU	2952	80	
18.	RWAMATAMU	1556	30	
19.	GITESI	2871	150	
20.	MABANZA	3373	15	
21.	BWAKIRA	4962	10	
22.	KIVUMU	2358	7	
			TOTAL: 562	
			<u>GRAND TOTAL: 822</u>	

18 Sep 94

18.9

3000.15 (Plans)

FRAGMENTARY ORDER TO OPERATION ORDER NO 18 - OP HOMEWARD

References:

- A. 3000.15 (Ops) dated 31 Aug 94. (Op Order No 18).
- B. 3000.15 (Ops) dated 31 Aug 94. (FCs Directive on Transportation of Refugees/Displaced Persons).

SITUATION.

- 1. General. As given in Reference A.
- 2. Specific. UNAMIR remains committed to assisting in the relocation of refugees and displaced persons throughout the AOR. The occupants of some camps in Sector 4A have demonstrated a clear desire to return home to the BUTARE and GITARAMA Prefectures. UNAMIR currently has considerable transport assets available to support such an operation. Op HOMEWARD coordinates UNAMIR support for a movement plan scheduled to begin before the wet season.

MISSION

- 3. To assist in the transportation of refugees from Sector 4A to the BUTARE and GITARAMA Prefectures.

EXECUTION

- 4. General Outline. UNAMIR will provide support as follows:
 - a. HAC Coordination for the move.
 - b. C2 facilities at Tac HQ.
 - c. Movement Control.
 - d. Transport resources.
 - e. MILOB support.
- 5. Tasks.
 - a. HAC.
 - (1). Coordinate NGO requests for transport.
 - (2). Screen refugees/displaced persons in concert with RPA before loading on vehicles.
 - (3). Establish final destinations of refugees/displaced persons and allocate transport

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R-1

accordingly.

(4). Liaise with RPA for movement through RPA checkpoints in accordance with Reference B.

(5). Establish route planning information and pass to Movement Control.

b. Tac HQ.

(1). Coordinate UNAMIR resources.

(2). Command Op HOMEWARD.

(3). Provide C2 facilities at Butare.

c. BRITCON.

(1). Provide Movement Control Organisation.

(2). Execute movement plan as directed by Tac HQ.

(3). Coordinate UNAMIR transport resources in support of Op HOMEWARD.

(4). Provide BRITCON transport resources as available.

d. ZAMBATT. Provide transport resources as requested by Movement Control.

e. MILOB Comds Sectors 3, 4A and 4B.

(1). Liaise with RPA commanders as arranged by HAC.

(2). Provide escorts to all convoys.

(3). Clear and supervise checkpoint procedures.

(4). Establish communications links from Convoys to Movement Control at Tac HQ.

(2). Liaise with local Prefectures to establish reception arrangements for refugees/displaced persons.

f. G4. Augment transport resource requirements for Op HOMEWARD.


6. Coordinating Instructions.

a. Coordination Meeting. Action addressees are to send a suitable representative to attend a coordination meeting, chaired by HAC at Tac HQ on Tue 20 Sep 94, at 1000 hrs.

Timings. Not known at this stage. Op HOMEWARD should commence before the wet season begins.

7. Command and Signal. Op HOMEWARD will be commanded by the COO at Tac HQ. C2 will be effected as follows:

- a. HAC to provide direction and civil liaison function.
- b. CO BRITCON to provide OIC Movement Control, to be co-located with COO at Tac HQ.
- c. MILOB HQ to control RPA liaison and UNMO escort requirements. During Op HOMEWARD, authority is granted to cross Sector boundaries.



G C TOUSIGNANT
Maj Gen
Force Comd

Distribution:

External

Action:

Tac HQ
MILOB HQ
BRITCON
ZAMBATT

Information:

GHANBATT
ETHIOBATT
FRAFBATT
MALAWICOY

Internal:

Action:

HAC
G4

Information:

FC
DFC/COS
DCOS Ops
DCOS Sp
G3 Plans