

The Seed Programme

95. In South Kasai there are two harvest seasons; the so-called 'small' harvest in June and the 'big' harvest in December. The situation which the relief programme seeks to correct arose, as has been explained, mainly from the fact that many refugees arrived too late to sow in time for a December harvest, and that those who had managed to sow saw much of their crop burnt by the invading Congolese troops. The food situation was in fact relieved slightly by the December yield which, small as it was, nevertheless came at the critical time when the relief programme was still trying to get under way. These stocks, however, could not be expected to last much more than a month. It was to avoid a recurrence of this situation and to make the refugees self-supporting as soon as possible that it was decided in January to assist them in sowing for the June crop.

96. The odds against the programme were great. First, sowing was, according to the agriculturists, to be completed by the end of the first week in February, but in early January it was not yet known where suitable seeds could be located. Secondly, it was thought that the population was so enfeebled that the clearing of land, most of it virgin in the main area, would be both very limited and superficial. Thirdly, the soil in the region was notorious for its infertility and for its lack of surface water. Fourthly, transport for distribution of seeds in the area would have to be provided at the expense of the food distribution programme, which had to be increased at the same time. Last but not least, when it became quite clear that no sizeable stocks of seed were accessible in the Congo, airlifting the seed from the neighbouring countries became a sine qua non, because by any other means they would arrive too late; and, as has been described elsewhere, this was in a period when it was very doubtful that additional airlift would be available.

97. Based on the F.A.O. nutritionist's initial report it was estimated that some 1,000 tons of beans, groundnut and maize seed would be required. This original figure was calculated on the assumption that the refugees would have used their seed reserves as food, and did not take into account what sowing the peasant refugees, with their sound instinct for survival, might already have done, despite

their losses and difficulties. The extent of the sowing done was in fact surprising. The F.A.O. team of agronomists, who joined the operation to advise on the seed programme, were able to reduce the requirement of seed to 100 metric tons of groundnuts, 200 short tons of maize and 175 metric tons of beans, a total of 457 metric tons. The groundnut seeds were purchased from Garoua in the Camerouns, the maize seeds from Salisbury in Rhodesia, and the beans from Luanda in Angola, and all were flown into Bakwanga, for the most part by the U.S.A.F., but also by ONUC's own airlift all within a period of two weeks.

98. In order to stimulate and facilitate the clearing and preparation of the maximum expanse of soil, simple agricultural tools such as hoes and bush knives were purchased by ONUC and distributed.

99. The great help given to ONUC by the F.A.O. liaison officer, Mr. Abbott, and by the members of the seed team in these hard-pressed days must be acknowledged. Without their expert advice and their willingness to help in any of the related practical supply functions, the seed programme might well have foundered.

100. In Bakwanga the F.A.O. team worked in very close collaboration with the local agricultural authorities, and highly praised the active support they were given in carrying out this programme of assistance. Together with the authorities the team worked out a distribution plan, participated personally in the distribution to main drop-off points, and later extensively supervised the distribution and the sowing of the seed.

101. The distribution and sowing having been successfully completed, an F.A.O. expert will be required to watch the further development of the harvest and to advise on experiments in the use of fertilizers, so far little known in the area, and of which donations of 150 tons in kind have been offered.

102. It is at this stage impossible to say what the yield of the crops will be. It is tentatively estimated, however, that the June harvest is unlikely to provide enough food to last the whole period of six months between the June and December harvests, so that a renewed food distribution programme may prove necessary towards the end of 1961. Moreover, a certain assistance, but how much is not yet known, will be required for the June-July sowing to ensure that the first full harvest in

December will in fact make further food distribution unnecessary. However, before that time important decisions must be taken with regard to the permanent rehabilitation of these people. It cannot, for example, be certain at this stage whether or not the refugees will wish to remain in the area which they now inhabit nor whether the authorities will make an attempt to resettle them in more fertile lands farther East.

Costs and Finance.

103. The refugee relief operation is functionally and organizationally part of the UNOC Civilian Operations, and for that reason is not administered on a separate budget. The main operational and administrative costs of the operation have up to now been charged against ONUC general funds. Two special funds have been created, however, for financing the relief operation; a Relief Operation Project, to which \$500,000 has been allocated from the U.N. Congo Fund, and the U.N. Congo Famine Relief Fund, which is the depository of contributed funds received directly by ONUC from national societies and individuals, plus moneys collected through U.N. offices. No decision has yet been taken on the apportionment of operational and administrative costs, so far financed by ONUC general funds, to the Relief Operation Project of the Congo Fund, or to the Congo Relief Fund. It has, however, been agreed in principle that such charges as amortization of vehicles, and salaries of ONUC personnel, should remain an ONUC charge, and that only such expenditures as are incurred specifically for the relief operation should be charged against relief funds.

104. Up to 28 February 1961 the funds available to the Refugee Relief Coordinator consisted of the following:

	\$	\$
UNICEF, first allocation	150,000	
UNICEF, second allocation	<u>261,000</u>	411,000
Congo Famine Relief Fund:		
- through national societies	524,020	
- through U.N. offices	68,192	
- other contributions	<u>19,638</u>	<u>611,850</u>
TOTAL:		<u>\$1,022,850</u>

105. Food, seed, medical supplies, agricultural tools and other equipment, required in the initial phase of the relief operation (i.e. in the period ending with the arrivals of donations of food in February), were purchased by ONUC to a total value of \$466,091.

106. The foreseeable need for food-stuffs to continue the relief operation in South Kasai through June 1961 (i.e. until the next harvest) is amply covered by donations received and pledged in kind. The need to purchase food-stuffs, insofar

as that need can be actually foreseen, is therefore now very limited. It is to be remembered, however, that the disruption of mining, commerce, and transportation throughout the Congo, in addition to forced migration, has caused widespread suffering and privation among the Congolese people. Once communications are re-opened, it will certainly be found that a considerable part of the population is in urgent need of relief measures to provide food and medical care. Moreover, it is unlikely that the refugees in South Kasai will be entirely self-supporting in food from the next harvest onward; and the emergency relief operation should be followed by a rehabilitation programme. It is impossible to forecast, of course, the extent to which these additional needs for relief measures may be met by further donations of food and medicines.

107. There is thus a balance of uncommitted funds in the hands of the Refugee Relief Coordinator at 28 February 1961 amounting to \$556,759. This sum is not all freely disposable, however.

108. The allocations made by UNICEF were for specific purposes, \$306,000 being earmarked for food, \$90,000 for seed, and \$15,000 for medical supplies. Purchases against these earmarked funds were made as follows:

	<u>Allocation</u>	<u>Committed</u>	<u>Balance</u>
	\$	\$	\$
Food	306,000	233,379	72,621
Seed	90,000	61,595	28,405
Medical Supplies	15,000	11,296	3,704
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL:	411,000	306,270	104,730

109. The contributed funds in the Congo Famine Relief Fund have been used as follows:

	\$	\$
Received to 28 February 1961		611,850
Committed for purchases:		
Dried Fish	120,100	
Agricultural Tools	7,029	
Hospital Equipment	13,145	
Freight Charges	13,542	
Other Supplies and Equipment	6,005	159,821
	<hr/>	<hr/>
Uncommitted Balance:		452,029
		<hr/>

110. In several countries appeals have been launched by non-governmental charitable agencies for public subscription of funds for relief work in the Congo. The total amount collected by these agencies is not known to ONUC. Some part has been transmitted in cash to ONUC for credit of the Congo Famine Relief Fund, the amounts received to 28 February 1961 being as follows:

	\$
Oxford Famine Relief Committee	490,000
Save the Children Fund, U.K.	14,000
Save the Children Fund, Australia	784
Congo Famine Relief Fund, Malta	16,158
Guatemala Red Cross	300
Int. Council of Youth Organizations, Japan	2,778
TOTAL:	<u>524,020</u>

111. Some national Red Cross Societies have purchased food and/or medical supplies out of their collections and shipped these to the Congo as donations in kind. These are included in the schedule of donated supplies annexed to this report (Annex II and III).

112. Other national Red Cross Societies have transmitted their collections to the League of Red Cross Societies. It is a general principle adopted by the Red Cross that money entrusted to the League must be disbursed by the League itself on foods and medicines only, and on transportation of such supplies. As explained above the need to purchase foods, as far as can be foreseen at the present time, is very limited, by reason of the generous donations received of food in kind. The League is, however, anxious to maximize the immediate use of the funds held in trust. To facilitate this, it was proposed to the League that it should select retroactively such food purchases made by ONUC, together with related transportation and any administrative costs, as would be acceptable under the League rules; and that these selections be charged by the League to its trust funds as constituting purchases pre-financed by the United Nations pending availability of the League funds.

113. It was agreed by the Executive Director of UNICEF that the League might, if it wished, choose from items pre-financed out of the UNICEF allocation, up to the total committed by ONUC, or \$306,270 (para. 102). To the extent that such pre-

financing was reimbursed by the League, UNICEF funds would be freed for other emergencies to be selected in consultation between UNICEF and ONUC. It was further agreed by ONUC that the League might choose to finance by reimbursement the purchase of dried fish costing \$120,100 which had been pre-financed out of the Congo Famine Relief Fund (para. 109). On 23 February 1961 ONUC turned over to the League a first schedule of receipted invoices selected by the League, in an amount of \$82,587.57.

114. The relief operation in the Congo has thus a balance of food supplies and of cash resources in hand with which to meet the emerging need to extend the relief work throughout the Congo.

Coordination of Donations

115. It is clear that in the circumstances prevailing in the Congo, coordination not only of the donations, but also of their utilization, is particularly imperative. The very spontaneity and enthusiasm of the response to the need, coming as it did from so many different quarters, defeated to some extent the attempts made from the beginning at coordination. It was as unavoidable as it is regrettable, that this should have led to a certain dissipation of effort on the part of some donors.

116. A number of organizations asked the Refugee Relief Coordinator's Office for guidance and information as to what assistance was most needed, but it was not always possible to respond to these requests as quickly as some of them would have wished.

117. This delay in providing concrete suggestions for immediate action arose out of an overriding desire to ensure that none of the generous contributions was wasted or even ill spent on supplies which were either only marginally essential or had already been donated in adequate quantities. Once the immediate foreseeable needs were covered - and the essential needs were soon amply and generously covered - the only honest advice that could be given in most cases was for donors to bide their time and wait until the situation cleared. A more detailed explanation was precluded by a total absorption in the practical problems of getting the generous supplies of food to the tens of thousands of people who were on the brink of death by starvation, and of accomplishing this in the current realities of the Congo. Some examples may help to clarify the position.

118. To many of the nations wishing to contribute to the relief programme, milk is a normal food and to several among them it is a surplus product. Nothing was more natural than for many of them to wish to contribute milk in one form or another. As a result of spontaneous donations made simultaneously from a number of countries, however, the situation arose almost immediately that milk was on the way to the Congo in quantities which far exceeded the needs of the refugee relief operation in South Kasai. It is fortunate that milk powder is relatively easy to distribute and a food which can be fitted into almost any relief programme.

Hence the surplus milk can certainly be used in the Congo, in schools, hospitals, leprosaria, maternity clinics and the like, although many such projects must await the restoration of a degree of law and order.

119. The problem is more difficult, however, when the food donated is of a kind to which the Congolese people are unaccustomed, and which is not likely, in the near future, to form part of their normal diet. Small quantities of these foods are acceptable for medical purposes but beyond that they must be considered undesirable. Some types of food offered involve risk to the health of the intended beneficiaries, as in the case of canned meat for example; to a people ignorant of the germ theory of disease, and in the sanitary and climatic conditions of the areas in which the Baluba refugees are settled, an opened and half-consumed tin of preserved meat can be a very potent source of food poisoning.

120. In a situation where the foreseeable requirements of food have all been covered by donations delivered free to the Congo, it has become difficult to accept other donations in kind which have been made subject to the payment by ONUC out of contributed funds of ocean freight to the Congo from distant ports.

121. Yet another problem arises with regard to medical supplies. Those supplies which were most urgently needed for the treatment of the refugees were naturally purchased locally from the Congo Famine Relief Fund. The provision of medical supplies and medicaments requires careful planning if costly overstocking and duplication is to be avoided and such planning requires time. Several national charities have pressed their desire to send medical supplies from their national resources. The only advice that could honestly be given to such charities was to curb their impatience. The need for their help is undoubtedly there, but the details of the precise requirements of medical supplies are still obscured by the administrative chaos in the Congo.

122. By the end of February that which at Christmas had been a surge of individual charity had become an operation in which the established international non-governmental organizations had developed a great interest. Several of them had collected public contributions and were enquiring of ONUC how they might develop programmes to meet the needs of the Congolese people.

123. Although the political tensions make forward planning at this time most difficult, there is no doubt that once the present crisis passes there will be ample need for assistance programmes of many different kinds, not only in the Bakwanga area but elsewhere in the Congo.

124. The disruption of the economic life of the Congo, with the accompanying loss of purchasing power and the non-availability of food as a result of the breakdown of internal transport, will require a great deal of assistance to repair.

125. The breakdown of the health services due to the lack of personnel, as well as a lack of finance, has provoked a recrudescence of disease. Leprosaria, for example, have had to go without the Government subvention for many months. As a result the sick cannot be fed, and many of them will disappear and thus interrupt the long process of treatment, releasing contagion once more into the general population.

126. If, then, the present conjuncture of international tensions and political developments in the Congo itself imposes a period of waiting before planning a new phase of international relief assistance, there need be no doubt in the minds of those who direct charitable organizations that the opportunity for action for the relief of suffering among the Congolese people will soon present itself on a very large scale indeed.

Staffing

127. Three schedules are attached showing the present organizational structure of the Refugee Relief Coordinator's Office in Leopoldville and that of the two field offices at Luluebourg and Bakwanga. (Annex VI, A to C)

128. It should be pointed out that this organization has only been achieved in recent weeks. It has proved difficult to fill the necessary posts permanently with suitable staff and there are at present several important vacancies which are still in the process of being filled.

Looking Towards the Future

129. Now that stocks of relief supplies have been established in the Congo and road transport is available in some quantity, it becomes possible to consider the needs of the other groups of Congolese people who may be also suffering from starvation. It must be emphasized, however, that because of the lack of security in large areas of the country, reaching the known groups is a difficult and dangerous undertaking. Efforts are being made at the present time to establish the facts and details of this problem as a preliminary to undertaking an extension of the relief programme.

130. When law and order is restored in the Congo, the chaos caused by the dislocation of administration, widespread insecurity, and disruption of the economy, will leave many groups of the population in need of relief measures to help them repair normal economy. The major need in that phase would be for "pump priming" in the various elements of the national economy rather than for a gratuitous distribution of food, since the economy is predominantly agricultural and largely self-sufficient in food. The relief operation in this phase would, therefore, develop into the administration of first aid repair to the total economy, and thus would merge into the preliminary phase of a long-range recovery programme.

ANNEX IU. N. Congo Famine Relief Operation

PURCHASES BY ONUC

Financed from UNICEF Allocations and from

U. N. Congo Famine Relief Fund

1 December 1960 to 28 February 1961

Commodity	Quantity metric tons	Country of Purchase	Cost \$	Total by Commodity \$
Maize flour	1,000	Rep. of Congo	97,000	
	636	Rhodesia	52,965	
	92	Uganda	6,038	
	200	Rep. of Congo	<u>20,000</u>	169,003
Rice	-	-	-	-
Dried Fish	100	U. South Africa	32,340	
	50	Uganda	16,987	
	300	Angola	90,000	
	100	Senegal	<u>30,100</u>	169,427
Milk	-	-	-	-
Palmoil	96	Rep. of Congo	<u>15,049</u>	15,049
Seeds - Maize	182	Rhodesia	13,162	
- Beans	175	Angola	25,933	
-Groundnuts	100	Cameroon	<u>22,500</u>	61,595
Medical Supplies	-	Rep. of Congo	<u>11,296</u>	11,296
Agricultural Tools	-	Rep. of Congo	<u>7,029</u>	7,029
Hospital Equipment	-	Rep. of Congo	<u>13,145</u>	13,145
Other Supplies and Equipment	-	Rep. of Congo	<u>6,005</u>	6,005
Freight Charges	-	-	<u>13,542</u>	<u>13,542</u>
TOTAL				<u>\$466,091</u>

U.N. Congo Famine Relief Operation

DONATIONS OF FOOD IN KIND RECEIVED

to 28 February 1961

(metric tons)

Commodity	Donating Country	Quantity Donated	Total Received by Commodity
Maize Flour	Rep. of Congo	15	
	United States	<u>2,064</u>	2,079
Rice	U.A.R.	140	
	Belgium	37	
	Portugal	24	
	United States	<u>1,515</u>	1,716
Dried Fish	Germany	50	
	Portugal	10	
	Norway	<u>135</u>	195
Milk Whole Milk Powder	Canada	1	
	Denmark	72	
	Netherlands	2	
	Norway	7	
	Switzerland	<u>6</u>	
		88	
Skim Milk Powder	United States	<u>708</u>	796
Palmoil	United Kingdom	<u>200</u>	200
Various Foods	Belgium	18	
	(CPRA)	31	
	Ghana	4	
	Netherlands	4	
	Norway	3	
	Portugal	<u>14</u>	74

ANNEX III

U. N. Congo Famine Relief OperationDONATIONS OF FOOD IN KIND
PLEDGED BUT NOT YET RECEIVED

as at 28 February 1961

(metric tons)

Commodity	Donating Country	In Transit to Congo	For Future Shipment	Total Pledged but not yet Received
Maize flour	United States	1,339	6,598	7,937
		1,339	6,598	7,937
Rice	China	100	-	100
	Netherlands	100	900	1,000
	Norway	10	-	10
	Pakistan	-	100	100
	Sierra Leone	-	100	100
	Spain	-	100	100
	United States	1,034	1,434	8,466
	Vietnam	-	100	100
		1,599	8,632	10,231
Dried Fish	(CPRA)	100	-	100
	Denmark	50	-	50
	Finland	25	-	25
	Iceland	-	17	17
	League Red Cross	500	1,100	1,600
	Netherlands	20	-	20
	Norway	429	-	429
	Sweden	307	-	307
		1,431	1,117	2,548

Commodity	Donating Country	In Transit to Congo	For Future Shipment	Total Pledged but not yet Received
Milk (powder & condensed)	Finland	20	-	20
	Germany	234	-	234
	Netherlands	480	-	480
	Norway	13	-	13
	Switzerland	45	-	45
	Union South Africa	39	-	39
	United States	375	1,193	1,568
		1,206	1,193	2,399
Palm Oil		-	-	-
Various Foods	Denmark	10	-	10
	Morocco	-	18	18
	Norway	10	-	10
	Switzerland	2	-	2
	United States	5	-	5
		27	18	45

Annex IV

U.N. Congo Famine Relief Operation

STOCKS OF FOOD IN THE CONGO

as at 28 February 1961

Commodity	In Transit Matadi - Lulua- bourg	Leo'ville W'house	Leo'ville Airfield	Port Francqui	Lulua- bourg	Kamina	Bakwanga	Total Stocks Congo
Maize Flour	1,670	-	-	-	960	298	155	3,083
Rice	1,535	-	9	-	-	-	48	1,592
Dried Fish	50	-	2	-	-	-	108	160
Milk (powder and conden- sed)	383	180	-	-	212	-	81	856
Palmoil	-	-	-	200	-	-	-	200
Seeds	-	-	7	-	-	-	11	18
Various Foods	10	26	9	-	-	-	11	56
TOTALS:	3,648	206	27	200	1,172	298	414	5,965

ANNEX V

U. N. Congo Famine Relief Operation


TOTAL FOOD SUPPLY

(metric tons)

as at 28 February 1961

Commodity	Purchases			Donations				Total Supply
	Red'd	In Transit to Congo	Total	Rec'd	In Transit to Congo	For Future Shipmt	Total	
Maize								
Flour	1,929	-	1,929	2,079	1,339	6,598	10,016	11,945
Rice	-	-	-	1,716	1,599	8,632	11,947	11,947
Dried Fish	150	400	550	195	1,431	1,117	2,743	3,293
Milk								
(pdr & cond)	-	-	-	796	1,206	1,193	3,195	3,195
Palmoil	96	-	96	200	-	-	200	296
Seeds	457	-	457	-	-	-	-	457
Various Foods	-	-	-	74	27	18	119	119

ORGANIZATION AND STAFF
as at 28 February 1961



ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING

as at 28 February 1961CHIEF REFUGEE RELIEF COORDINATORCOORDINATOR LULUABOURG

(vacant)

SUPPLY OFFICER

(R. Gavard)

MILITARY TRANSPORT UNITASSISTANT

(L. Vieira)

TRANSPORT OFFICER

(vacant)

WAREHOUSE OFFICER

(Moutier)

SUPPLY ACCOUNTANT

(vacant)

ASST. TRANSPORT OFFICER

(F. Henriques)

DESPATCHERS

(vacant)

SECRETARY

(vacant)

MECHANIC

(Monteiro)

BAKWANGA

ANNEX VI-C

ORGANIZATION AND STAFF

as at 28 February 1961

CHIEF REFUGEE RELIEF COORDINATOR

COORDINATOR BAKWANGA

(X. Caballero)

DEPUTY COORDINATOR
AND STORES OFFICER

(vacant)

GENERAL ASSISTANT

(vacant)

TRANSPORT OFFICER

(F. Guinde)

ASST. TRANSPORT OFFICER

(A. Mendes)

MECHANIC

(Campmas)

CLERK/TYPIST

ASST. STORES OFFICER

(vacant)

DIST. OFFICER

(J. Capestrani)

STORAGE OFFICER

(W. Koopman)

LAKE MUKAMBA

DISTRIBUTION OFFICER

(vacant)

FINANCE/ADMIN OFFICER

(J. Carbonel)

ADMIN. ASSISTANT

(vacant)

SECRETARIES

(Mrs. L. Gufler)

(Miss K. Murphy)

ACCTG. CLERK/TYPIST

(vacant)

Annex VII

MEDICAL SERVICES IN SOUTH KASAI

Situation in early December 1960

Location of Hospital	Beds	Patients Approx.	Dispensaries depending from Hospital	Mater-nities depending from Hospital	Total Personnel Employed at Hospital and Dispensaries		
					Assistants Medicaux	Graduate nurses	Auxiliary nurses
BAKWANGA	35	60	4	0	1	5	14
KATANDA	100	250	12	0	1	5	37
MIABI	150	1000	15	1	2	15	61
TSHILENGE	30	60	23	0	1	6	44
GANDAJIKA	230	500	10	0	2	9	36
MWENE DITU	34	?	1	1	2	7	4
6	579	1870	64	2	9	47	196

C/SOC 500

Conf. 12/62

20 February

2

Mr. R. Gardiner, Officer-in-Charge, ONUC, LEOPOLVILLE

C. A. Gaviola, Chief of Civil Mission, ONUC, BUKAVU

Aid to Ruanda Refugees

9

This morning President Miruho received the Joint Mission of the Haut Commissariat and League of Red Cross Society accompanied by Dr. Nicolas and myself, in presence of the Minister of Public Works and later of Vice-President Moley. After discussing all possible problems of resettlement based on the Government and Mr. Temnomeroff's plans, President Miruho said emphatically that this was the last time he received a delegation and wanted no more reports. That if definite and positive action was not taken within two months, he would be compelled to send the refugees back to Ruanda, no matter the consequences. That immediately after Independence he received the refugees with open arms and gave three million francs for their aid. That the Government cannot any longer cope with the problem and has said so countless times.

In lengthy meetings with the representatives of the Norwegian and Swedish Missions plans were traced for immediate action. It is to be hoped that this time plans and promises will be acted upon.

We are trying to have a Mercedes truck in good condition to place it at the disposal of both Missions so as to start removing from Sange the refugees in better condition. The rainy season is starting and conditions will become still worse in that low region. President Miruho signed at the meeting an authorization for their resettlement in Lemulenge, not far from Sange but situated at a higher level.

This morning three military trucks with milk and medicines were sent with an MSF patrol. In spite of assurances given yesterday to me by a Lieutenant at Shangugu (the Commander was impossible to find) and a letter of the Prefet authorizing the transit on the paved road through Ruanda, clearance was not given, until 10 a.m. this morning after they had already left on the hazardous road on the Congo side.

The Members of the Joint Mission will travel to Goma tomorrow to study the resettlement of the refugees in North Kivu in the region of Bihwe, for which authorization was also granted by President Miruho today.

cc: Mr. Khiary ✓
Mr. Tooby

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

SECRET/05/62

BUKAVU

30 January 1962

To : GENERAL S. MAC EGIN, FORCE COMMANDER - ONUC - HQ - LEOPOLDVILLE

From: C.A. GAVIOLA, Chief Civilian Officer - ONUC - BUKAVU

-copy : MR KHIARY - MR H.S. AHMED

Subject : Report on Usumbura incident

With reference to my BUKA/19, I enclose a declaration signed by Mr. Ludvigsen, Head of the Norwegian Mission in Bukavu, and a copy of a telegram sent to you by Mr. Harnett as well as his report on the situation of the refugees at Sange, which might explain the reaction at the lack of cooperation received from an official at Usumbura.

CAG/jc

A qui de droit,

Je viens d'apprendre que la visite que nous venons de faire, Mr. Harnett, le capitaine Richard Pellerin et moi au Service de l'Information ONUC Usumbura doit avoir été mal comprise par le représentant ONUC Usumbura. Selon ce que l'on m'a dit le capitaine Pellerin a été accusé d'avoir médit certaines personnalités au service de l'ONUC à Bukavu, entre autres un employé de nationalité wégyptienne.

Vu que j'ai assisté à l'entretien entre le capitaine Richard Pellerin et l'employé en question à Usumbura je dois dire que je n'ai pas ainsi compris ce qu'a dit le capitaine. A mon avis il n'a pas dans ce qu'il a dit accusé qui que ce soit au service de l'ONUC.

Il va de soi que nous sommes très reconnaissants pour le service de l'ONU au Congo, mais j'ai été bien étonné de constater que, malgré les événements tragiques que nous venons de voir parmi les réfugiés ruandais, et au sujet desquels nous aurions voulu donner un rapport, notre visite a plutôt été reçue avec négligence. Nous avions cru rencontrer plus de compréhension pour le cas de réfugiés ruandais de la part d'un employé au service de l'ONU justement au Ruanda-Urundi.

Bukavu, le 26 janvier 1962

M.
M. Ludvigsen
B.P. 1247 Bukavu

COPIE/jc

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Address(es)

FM : HARNETT WHO BUKAVU

TO : ONUC LEOPOLVILLE

(TEXT & SIGNATURE)

insert prefix & / or number as required

USE DOUBLE SPACING.

FROM HARNETT FOR GEN MCEIN INFO AHMED GAVIOLA INFO LOPEZ-NOGUEROL INFO COMO CANADIAN CONTINGENT. VISITED SANGE AREA WITH NORWEGIAN AND SWEDISH MISSIONARIES ACCOMPANIED BY CAPT PELLERIN CANADIAN MEDICAL OFFICER WHO WISHED TO SEE PERSONALLY THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF RUANDA REFUGEES OF WHOM MANY HUNDREDS DEAD IN PAST TWO MONTHS. UNABLE TO TRANSPORT URGENTLY NEEDED FOODSTUFFS DUE TO BELGIAN REFUSAL OF TRANSIT VIA ONUC MILITARY CONVOY. ALTERNATIVE CONGO ROUTE UNUSABLE. AFTER SANGE VISIT CONTINUED TO USUMBURA TO PURCHASE DIRED MILK FOR REFUGEE INFANTS. VISITED UN OPI TO REQUEST INFORMATION AS TO MEANS OF CHANGING BELGIAN ATTITUDE IN VIEW OF LIFE OR DEATH URGENCY. THE GENTLEMAN TO WHOM NORWEGIAN MISSIONARY AND I SPOKE WAS DISCOURTIOUS AND SAID HE WAS VERY BUSY AND SUGGESTED WE GET CHIEF OF MISSION TO ACT. WE AGREED THAT WAS CORRECT, BUT THOUGHT OUR BUSINESS IN USUMBURA GAVE EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK INFOR.ATION AND POSSIBLE ON THE SPOT HELP. ONLY THEN WHEN WE HAD FAILED, CAPT PELLERIN INTERVENED WITH THE REMARK "BBAEL TOWER" AS QUOTED. THE OFFICIAL IN A MOST HIGH-HANDED MANNER DEMANDED HIS NAME WHICH HE RIGHTLY REFUSED TO GIVE. IF THE GENTLEMAN CONCERNED HAD WITNESSED THE THRONG OF HALF STARVED REFUGEES SEEKING MEDICAL AID WHOM WE HAD JUST LEFT HE MIGHT UNDERSTAND OUR DISMAY AT HIS OFF-HAND MANNER. HE WOULD BE BETTER EMPLOYED IN ATTEMPTING ACTIVE HELP THAN SENDING ABUSIVE AND DISTORTED MESSAGES IN ALL DIRECTIONS

C. 81471

T.O.R.

T.O.D.

BY :

Drafted by : T. HARNETT

Authorized : 25 JANUARY 1962

Date :

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO

UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM January 1962

A : Dr. A. Bellerive Senior Consultant and WHO Representative ONUC HQ Leopoldville

De : T. Harnett, Sanitarian W H O - ONUC BUKAVU

Report on Sange

Info: Mr. F. Tooby

Info: Dr. Nicolas

Sange is an area on the Ruzizi plain about fifty kilometres from Uvira. It has about five thousand Ruanda refugees, dispersed among the local population, to whom the Swedish and Norwegian Missions are making distributions of food, and give medical aid within the limits of the means at their disposal. On Wednesday 17th Jan 62 they informed me that the Chief of the refugees had stated that seven hundred of his people had died in the previous month. Though we felt this figure was greatly exaggerated I said it required immediate investigation, and having informed the Chief of Mission, the Acting PHA, Dr. Froewys and I arrived in the village next day. We were satisfied that a critical situation existed and next day informed the Congolese Director of Medical Services who was most cooperative giving us an excellent supply of various medicines, and promising to send a team of "infirmières" and "gardes sanitaires". Dr. Froewys and I departed immediately with the medical supplies, arriving at Sange (Friday 19th) to find the two Swedish nurses busily treating a throng of men, women and children. Apart from the numerous cases of dysentery and malaria it was evident that there was general malnutrition. The Swedish Mission offered to buy six tons of foodstuffs on Monday 22nd if I could provide ONUC Military Transport to deliver for a mass distribution at Sange on Tuesday 23rd at 11 a.m. This, I undertook to do, knowing the Malayan Command had readily assisted me on many previous occasions. On Monday we arranged the details for a convoy of two trucks, two landrovers, and two armoured scout-cars. Here we came up against the shocking refusal of the Belgians to allow us pass through that portion of the road that went through Ruanda. Next morning we set out at 7 a.m. via the Nya Ngewi escarpments, and after a journey full of danger for the heavy vehicles we arrived at Sange at 11 a.m. The nurses were just completing the examination of a large number of patients, and the Congolese team were doing excellent work at another point. I went to them, and asked what they had found. They told me they had examined eight hundred the previous day, and when I asked how many were ill the answer was "almost all". Actually among the eight hundred they had identified 203 cases of a wide variety of parasitic diseases.

During my first visit I had asked the Chief to give me as accurate as possible a list of the number of deaths, and now he handed me a signed statement that since the month of November, December and January there were 238 deaths - 58 men, 78 women and 102 children. He told me his figures were gathered in the surrounding area, but that these were more remote parts that he and his helpers had not yet penetrated. More than a thousand refugees had gathered to collect food for their families, and the Malayan troops under the command of Captain Campbell did fine work marshalling these to the distribution points.

ctd.

Before leaving, the nurses asked if I could take back to hospital in Bukavu twenty cases in need of special treatment, but fearing that the hospital might be unable to accommodate such a number without prior notice I asked that the five most serious cases be selected. These I delivered to the hospital later that evening.

Before leaving it was agreed that we would make another distribution the second next day, Thursday 25th, pulling back about twenty kilometers to Luberizi. Unfortunately on the way back so many hazards were more clearly seen that I decided with great regret that I could not request a convoy for this route which is deteriorating rapidly as a result of the rains, and neglect. However, I went to Luberizi on the morning of the 25th in the car of Mr. Ludvigsen of the Norwegian Mission, and again found these two wonderful Swedish ladies busily dispensing medicine to hundreds of refugees. (If there is a U.N. medal I know of no one more worthy to receive it). They accepted the disappointment of no transport with charity.

The position at the time of writing (Friday 26th) is that a radical solution to the question of transit via Ruanda-Urundi must be found urgently. To accept the alternative of using commercial transport is to squander funds badly needed for the purchase of food, to accept unreliability, and to shutoff ONUC military Personnel from participation in the noblest and most satisfying work in the Congo Operation.



ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

SECRET /06/62

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

BUKAVU

30 January 1962196.....

A : MONSIEUR M. KHIARY, Chef des Opérations Civiles - ONUC - HQ - LEOPOLDVILLE

De : C.A. GAVIOLA, Chef de la Mission Civile de l'ONUC pour la province du
Kivu-Maniéma - BUKAVU

Objet : Situation des réfugiés au Kivu

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to be 'Gaviola', is written over the subject line and extends to the right.

A la suite de l'incident d'Usumbura, j'ai demandé à M. Harnett son rapport sur la situation des réfugiés à Sange, qui confirme que l'office pour les réfugiés à Genève n'a pas encore pris d'action décisive pour remédier à cette situation vraiment angoissante nonobstant que son Délégué Spécial a visité le Kivu récemment et s'est bien rendu compte de la magnitude du problème.

Ci-joint copie du rapport sur l'incident d'Usumbura.

CAG/jc

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

To: Mr. Gaviola

BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC, LEOPOLDVILLE

Bukavu

30th Jan. 1962

Dear Sir,

I should like to refer to various aspects of the Refugee problem in Kivu, and to offer some suggestions based on experience in the field.

First of all, no organization exists here to deal with a situation full of tragic potentialities. My own position as a member of the WHO Team has become untenable due to the opposition of the Public Health Adviser to my participation in this work. He holds that the sole responsibility rests with the Refugee Relief Office. But witnessing the misery of these poor people, their helplessness, and state of malnutrition that renders them vulnerable to every infection, I cannot but believe this a narrow interpretation of our function. On the other hand

2

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
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UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7218
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC. LEOPOLDVILLE

it would appear that while somebody is trying to stave off disaster, notably the Missions, the Refugee Relief Office is quite willing to shirk its own responsibility, offering only token assistance. The result then is that classic situation where an overlapping function has the effect of nothing at all being done. In the meantime the refugees die in earnest.

Reliable sources estimate the exodus of refugees from Ruanda-Urundi at 75,000. Some have gone to Uganda and Tanganyika, and the Missions, principally Swedish and Norwegian, care for 40,000. These are dispersed inside the Congo from Mvira to Masisi. I have already reported on the deplorable condition of the centres at Loma, but in fact the death and disease I anticipated there has hit Sange first.



BOITE POSTALE 7248
LEOPOLDVILLE
REPUBLIQUE DU CONGO
CABLE : ONUC, LEOPOLDVILLE

I cannot see an end to this problem for many years, especially with Ruanda-Urundi's own uncertain future. But Charitable Organizations cannot continue indefinitely to find the means to carry on catering for such numbers. A controlled, and not over-ambitious programme of resettlement should be initiated so as to in time eradicate the problem, or reduce it to manageable proportions. The Norwegian Mission have discussed such a project with me so as to make a beginning, and put to the best possible use the recent gift from the Oxford Famine Relief Committee. A little co-operation from the Congolese Government, and ONUC is all that is needed to get it under way, and it could serve as a pilot scheme for many more.

I am sorry to add to your many burdens, but hope you will gain the interest of the proper authority.
Yours faithfully,
T. Harneith.

Le 9 février 1962

Cher Monsieur Gaviola,

1. La lettre du Président Miruho à l'Ambassadeur d'Amérique lui a été transmise le 8.2.62.
2. J'ai retransmis une copie de celle que vous m'avez envoyée avec le commentaire ci-joint au Premier Ministre. Le commentaire vous est communiqué à vous seulement et ne doit pas être communiqué au Président Miruho.
3. Je pense que vous serez d'accord avec moi qu'il n'appartient pas aux gouvernements provinciaux de prendre par sa propre initiative sans grand danger pour l'avenir du Congo.
4. Le Représentant du Haut Commissaire aux Réfugiés et une commission formée de représentants des organisations philanthropiques visiteront le Kivu la semaine prochaine pour trouver une solution au problème des réfugiés. Je vous prierai de les assister et les aider dans leur mission.
5. Le problème du Ruanda Burundi est actuellement en étude aux Nations Unies qui sont informées de tous les détails. J'espère que les mesures adéquates seront prises en temps opportun.
6. J'ai demandé à M. Ahmed de vous répondre séparément sur le problème des transports par avion ONUC.
7. Si ma suggestion au Premier Ministre concernant la formation de la police présente un certain intérêt pour le gouvernement provincial je vous prierai de m'en informer.

Sincèrement,

M. Khiary
Chef des Opérations civiles
de l'ONU au Congo

Monsieur C.A. Gaviola
Représentant civil de l'ONUC
BUKAVU, Kivu

le 9 février 1962

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M. Khiary
Chef des Opérations civiles
de l'ONU au Congo

Monsieur C.A. Gaviola
Représentant civil de l'ONUC
BUKAVU, Kivu

ORGANISATION DES NATIONS UNIES
AU CONGO



UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION
IN THE CONGO

BOITE POSTALE 7248
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CABLE : ONUC LEOPOLDVILLE

INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L

.....6 février.....196.....2

Cher Monsieur Khiary,

Le Président J. MIRUHO m'a prié de faire suivre la lettre ci-jointe à l'Ambassadeur des Etats Unis à Léopoldville dont je vous envoie une copie.

Je suis d'accord que la question de sécurité est à la base de tous redressements possibles économiques.

J'ajoute aussi une photocopie de la lettre que m'adresse le Directeur de l'A.E.P.Ki. concernant les transports aériens de l'ONU, sujet que nous avons discuté lors de notre dernier entretien.

Je crois que le Chef de la Mission Civile devrait être autorisé à donner un Lift à bord de l'avion DC3, avec base à Bukavu, dans certains cas exceptionnels sans consulter le Commandant des Forces à Léopoldville, car en général l'autorisation est accordée, mais arrive trop tard.

Nous avons comme exemple le cas du Frère BOSCO qui s'occupe incessement du problème des réfugiés aussi bien à Goma comme au Sud du Kivu, et qui n'a pas souvent le moyen de se déplacer entre Goma et Bukavu.

Veuillez agréer, cher Monsieur Khiary, l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

C.A. Gaviola
Chef de la Mission Civile ONUC
pour le Kivu-Maniema

M. M. KHIARY
Senior Consultant
Public Administration
ONUC HQ
LEOPOLDVILLE

le 9 février 1962

Cher Monsieur Gaviola,

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Sincèrement,

M. Khiary
Chef des Opérations civiles
de l'ONU au Congo

Monsieur C.A. Gaviola
Représentant civil de l'ONUC
BUKAVU, Kivu

CIV.OPS/027/62

le 8 février 1962

A Son Excellence le Premier Ministre de la
République du Congo

De M. Khiary, Chef des Opérations civiles
de l'ONU au Congo

Objet : Demande d'assistance militaire directe
adressée par le Président du Kivu à
l'Ambassade d'Amérique

Monsieur le Premier Ministre,

Notre représentant au Kivu m'a transmis pour information une
requête du Président Mirho à l'Ambassadeur d'Amérique au Congo
dont copie ci-jointe. L'originale de cette requête vous a été
adressée directement en date du 3 février.

Les motifs qui ont poussé le Président provincial à discuter
avec un ambassadeur étranger accrédité auprès du Gouvernement Central
des problèmes aussi importants que ceux du maintien de l'ordre et le
rétablissement de la sécurité sont certes légitimes. En effet le
désordre qui règne dans la Province du Kivu pousse le Président Mirho
à chercher partout une solution rapide pour lui permettre de restaurer
son autorité et de relancer l'économie de la Province. Cependant, il
me semble que le moyen choisi manque d'orthodoxie et de légalité.

Si le Gouvernement Central permettait à chaque province de s'adres-
ser directement à l'étranger, qu'advierait alors de l'unité du Congo ?
Si chaque province pouvait se ravitailler en armes selon ses besoins,
quelles garanties aurait le Gouvernement Central pour maintenir un
contrôle et une certaine suprématie sur le plan de la force ?

Je suis persuadé que vous partagez ces appréhensions et que vous
donnerez aux présidents provinciaux les directives à suivre pour l'ob-
tention de l'assistance étrangère.

Les Opérations civiles sont à votre disposition pour envoyer d'extrême urgence des instructeurs en matière de formation de police dans la Province du Kivu.

Si le gouvernement américain était désireux d'apporter une aide au Congo en la matière, un programme pourrait être arrêté par le Gouvernement Central et soumis à S.E. l'Ambassadeur des Etats-Unis.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Premier Ministre, l'expression de mes sentiments les plus respectueux.

M. KHIARY
Chef des Opérations civiles
de l'ONU au Congo

ROUTING SLIP

TO

M. Khiaary

APPROVAL	NOTE AND RETURN
SEE ME, PLEASE	YOUR COMMENTS
YOUR SIGNATURE	YOUR INFORMATION
NOTE AND FILE	FOR ACTION

*Ci-joint un résumé de
l'aide-mémoire de Gaviola.*

*L'annexe A est un rapport
des Officiers de l'Intelligence
Maurice sur des actes de violence
dans le Rwanda-Urundi du
22 sept 1961 au 13 janv. 1962
concernant principalement les
Tutsi.*

FROM

2

Résumé

Aide-mémoire de Gaviola au Dr. Linnér en date du 6 février 1962.

Objet: Problèmes ayant trait à l'Indépendance du Ruanda et du Burundi

Craintes qu'une fois l'indépendance accordée la situation devienne ~~chaotique~~ chaotique et mène à des actes de violence contre les européens et entre les Ruandais et les Burundais. Mesures ont été déjà prises par certaines autorités étrangères pour évacuer leurs ressortissants.

Insiste sur le fait que ces deux régions sont très différentes ^{l'une de l'autre} et ne sont nullement une seule et unique entité.

^{Cite} ~~Rapporte~~ le flot des réfugiés du Ruanda-Urundi vers le Kivu depuis 1959 et de nouveau ^{un autre flot} depuis les dernières élections du mois de septembre; sont au nombre de plus de 50 mille, peut-être de 75 à 80 mille.

Loue travail des missions Suédoise et Norvégienne, mais taux de mortalité des réfugiés est dans les centaines. Visites des experts et des représentants de l'Office du Haut Commissaire du Secours aux réfugiés n'ont été suivies ~~mais~~ d'aucun résultat pratique.

^{Mentionne} ~~Parle de~~ la visite du Dr. Bellerive au camp de Senge près de Uvira.

Mentionne opposition et inimitié entre République du Ruanda et Royaume de Burundi. Déjà la discrimination et la violence ont éclaté contre les Ruandais à Usumbura.

Les Forces spéciales Malaises craignent qu'une guerre civile ne suive l'indépendance. Suggère au cas où la tutelle serait retirée à la Belgique, de remplacer les Belges, avant leur départ, par ONURU; mais nécessité d'avoir une force militaire ONU supérieure à la force militaire Belge actuelle qui n'arrive pas à éviter les meurtres, les pillages et les incendies. Suggère que la Commission d'enquête sur mort Hammarskjöld se rende au Ruanda-Urundi pour faire enquête sur situation avant que l'ONU prenne décision finale sur indépendance.

CONF/9/62

6 February 1962

To: Dr. Sture Linnér, Officer-in-Charge, ONUC, LEOPOLVILLE

From: C. A. Gaviola, Chief of Civil Mission, ONUC, BUKAVU

Subject: Problems connected with Independence of Ruanda and Burundi

The U.S. Vice-Consuls David Doyle and Walter Clarke were sent by their Government to Bukavu on February 1/2 to study local security conditions since they fear that the day Ruanda and Burundi obtain full independence and the Belgian troops are withdrawn, a chaotic situation, worse than the one of the Republic of the Congo as known in 1960, may develop. Planning ahead, they contemplate the eventuality that all U.S. citizens, which number about 200 (most of them missionaries) may have to be evacuated to Kivu Province.

Equal fear has been expressed by the French Consul, Monsieur Robert Massé, in a recent visit to Bukavu.

According to them, the total number of Europeans in both Ruanda and Burundi is approximately 3,000.

But the protection of the Europeans does not, in this case, constitute the main problem. The greatest fear is for mass murders and persecution among the Ruandese and Burundese themselves, since they are divided by centuries-long hatred and rivalries.

Already Lt. Colonel L.F. Nixon, in his report of 17 May 1961 (Conf 392/61 of 6 June 1961) said that "the result of a sudden withdrawal of the Belgian administration would be disastrous. Civil war is certain ..."

There is no purpose in discussing the proposals 1. to 5. of the PROJETS DE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTES PAR LA QUATRIEME COMMISSION (COMMISSION DE TUTELLE) DE L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DE L'ONU (Résolution 1419 (XIV)) as posterior facts have demonstrated them to be just wishful thinking. There is no historical fundation to consider Ruanda-Urundi as an entity. It has been only for administrative reasons that the former Colonial Powers regarded them as a unit. Each one of them have an independent King "Mwami" but even the administrative rules of each were quite different.

According to the report (A/4994) of the Commission for Ruanda-Urundi created on 20 December 1960, all parties concerned have at last understood that the fact is that Ruanda and Burundi have always been separated and they have developed in a different way. Only the representatives of Ghana and Guinea pronounced themselves in favour of the independence of Ruanda-Urundi on condition that it remained unified.

Even under Belgian Tutelle, since the events of November 1959, thousands of people, if they escaped from being murdered, are obliged to seek refuge abroad, are having their plantations destroyed, their houses burned and their cattle stolen or wantonly killed. (Annex A).

It is the Province of Kivu which has received the most impact and the stream of refugees has constantly increased since 1959, receiving a considerable new flow after the elections of last September, when the minority Watutsi was vengefully persecuted and retaliated by forming terrorist bands which, resenting to having been left at the unmercy of the Bahutus, sought their victims indiscriminately among the Europeans.

The amount of refugees actually in Kivu exceeds the number of 50.000 and some estimates place it at 75 - 80.000. The Swedish and Norwegian Missions alone are taking care of about 40.000 but many thousands more have crossed the uncontrolled frontier and made their way into the interior. The "Mission pour l'Installation des Peuples Indigènes" at Goma and the Trappist Fathers at Lake Mokotos are also doing excellent work for the resettlement of refugees.

There have been visits by experts (Annex B) and representatives of the High Commissioner for Refugee Relief, the last one by Mr. Temnomeroff in early December 1961, but the practical results have been nil (Annexes C, D, E and F). If it were not for the selfless and devoted work of the Swedish and Norwegian Missions - just a handful of people feeding and nursing tens of thousands of them - the death-rate would be appalling.

Dr. Bellerive, W.H.O.'s Chief Representative in the Congo, is visiting today a refugee camp at Sange, near Uvira, where two Swedish nurses are miraculously obtaining ^{that} the death-rate stays in the hundreds and not in the thousands (Annexes G and H).

The new autonomy granted on January 1 to the Republic of Ruanda and Kingdom of Burundi means, to all practical ends, a definitive recognition of the existence of two separate and different States. This still limited autonomy has sufficed to show signs of discrimination and even enmity among both States. At Usumbura, for example, the Administration counted with the collaboration of all 14 University Graduates. Now there are only 7. One was murdered, the others dismissed or voluntarily exiled. Ruandese students are beaten or denied equal opportunity of education. There is also discrimination in the granting of administrative jobs. The Director of the "Association des Entreprises Privées du Kivu", Mr. J. de Mot, has just returned from a trip to Usumbura and his impressions are the following: "On y retrouve tous les signes de la désagrégation congolaise, sauf la présence des troupes belges, qui empêche les désordres graves (mais ne peut éviter les incidents) : détérioration économique, départ des fonctionnaires (surtout depuis le rappel de M. Harroy) incurie et incompétence des gouvernants".

The Malayan Special Forces (Conf.392/61) fear that once full independence is granted, civil war may be inevitable and they might be called to reestablish order. Their numbers are entirely insufficient for that purpose.

Deshalb, if Belgium is allowed to relinquish the Tutelle, it should be replaced beforehand by an ONURU. But the fact should be taken into account that internecine hatreds are deeper and more violently expressed than in the Congo and that the experienced Belgian Administration, counting with the support of 1.500 able soldiers, has not been able to prevent murder, arson and pillage. The UN would need a far greater force and hope only to avert further deterioration of the present situation. The presence in the Congo of the UN Commission investigating the Hammarskjold air-crash, could be utilised to form a fact-finding commission about the situation in Ruanda-Urundi, before a final decision is taken by the UN General Assembly.

Otherwise, all members of the Assembly should fully realize that they might be contributing to the massacre or slow-death of thousands of innocent Africans they may think they are trying, by their vote, to liberate.

Before anything else, the UN has the moral, urgent, duty to find the means of helping to live and find a future for the tens of thousands of refugees already agonizing and causing great trouble in other neighbouring countries, but principally in Kivu, which has already a problem of its own with thousands upon thousands of unemployed.

Full independence to Ruanda and Burundi would only mean slaughter and chaos and immensely aggravate the present problems the UN already faces in Kivu. Courage is needed to prevent further disasters, as the cure, like in the Congo, may be costlier or simply come too late.

I beg you to forward copy of this report to the Fourth Commission of the General Assembly, as a modest contribution to their enlightenment about the real issues at stake in Ruanda-Urundi and the impact any decision will have also on the province.

cc: Mr. Khiary

REPORTS FROM MALAYAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS22 Sept 61

Belgian authority in Kisenyi has received orders to end registration in Kisenyi area. Watutsis refugees believed that registration would be opened until 23 Sept. Watutsi refugees on seeing Belgian Paracommandos fled into neutral zone. Some were badly cut up by barbed wire. Local ANC Officers appeared at the frontier and informed Malayan Special Forces that if any shot was heard in the direction of Kisenyi, they would attack Kisenyi without any warning.

27 Sept 61

About 2000 Watutsi refugees marched to the frontier post demonstrating with banners. Some of banners read "Belgian are thieves murderers and come from the poorest country in Europe". Crowd with banners "Enough blood has already been shed. Hail Kigali". Later crowd was peaceful and made no attempt to cross frontier.

24 Dec 61

It is also said that in Ruanda territory three nights ago a murder in which seven people were killed was done by Watutusi who are taking refuge in the Congo. Three of the murderers are believed to be in Bukavu. Efforts are being made to arrest them.

Following this, the Ruanda authorities fear that similar terrorism may be committed by this gang of forty, approximately.

26 Dec 61

Rumour says ANC Paracommandos ex Bukavu killed 3 civilian with knives in bush along frontier. They were caught smuggling.

The movement of armed Watutsi terrorists has caused a certain amount of fear among the European population of Kisenyi.

27 Dec 61

3 Africans suspected to be Watutsis shot and wounded Mr. DAUBLIN of Kiningi 12 km. North of Ruengeri. The attackers left him with six 9mm bullets in his body and a broken arm. They left with Mr. DAUBLIN's blue Peugeot 403 Station Wagon for Kigali. Before reaching Kigali at Rutonga they stopped a Belgian family and killed all the three occupants. In Kigali they killed two Africans. They then went to Giterama and killed two more Africans, one of them was identified as an MP of local Ruanda Government.

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27 Dec 61 (con't)

The Belgian authorities believed that the murderers entered Ruanda territory from area of Rumangano. Blue Peugeot 403 Rux 8361 reported to be abandoned in Bukavu. Names of the suspects NUMA André, MPAMBARA Alex.

2 Jan 62

Ruanda authorities think that the armed Watutsis will strike again in a weeks time.

10 Jan 62

Ruanda/Kisenyi authorities taking steps to tighten border movements with the purpose of stopping arms smuggling by Watutsis.

13 Jan 62

Armed Watutsis are now terrorising in area of Kagera National Park. Some Belgian farmers here have been killed or wounded. It is said that these terrorists intend to kill all Belgian families in Ruanda.

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CAG/JP

PRO. MONSIEUR A. EL AKEL, Représentant Spécial, FISE
MONSIEUR T. WOODWARD, Délégué du HCNUR
28 Janvier 1967
MONSIEUR M. LIEBER-COMMAN, Assistant Pédagogique National
MONSIEUR I. R. BARRAZ, Institut National du Bâtiment
et des Travaux Publics
MONSIEUR F. GAGEL, Chef de Mission, ONU
MONSIEUR I. GODE, Chef de Mission, ONU
MONSIEUR R. BOUJOUVIC, Chef de Mission, ONU
MONSIEUR R. HAKEL, Chef de Mission, ONU
MONSIEUR C. TEBER, Chef de Mission, ONU
MONSIEUR S. ANDERSEN, Représentant Résident Adjoint
MONSIEUR A. SARRAHN, Représentant Résident Adjoint (Adm)
MONSIEUR I. LORENZO, Représentant Résident
MONSIEUR M. BATTAYE, Service du Haut Commissariat
B. R. GORDON TAILL, Représentant Résident
MONSIEUR L. MONT-UBALDIN, Conseil National
OBJET : Réunion conjointe des Missions des Nations Unies
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MONSIEUR M. E. LARCHEY, Conseil National

C/500 500

le 24 janvier

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A: Monsieur S. Linner, Chargé de Mission
DE: M. Khiary, Chef des Opérations Civiles
SUJET: Transport des réfugiés du camp d'Elisabethville à une autre destination

Monsieur Gussing propose le transfert hors d'Elisabethville de quelques familles ayant des parents dans une autre région du Congo. Le chiffre total ne dépassera pas 2.000 personnes ce qui est insignifiant par rapport à 50.000 qui forment toujours la population du camp. Je continue à penser que le transfert de quelques personnes, les cas humanitaires exceptés, ne solutionne pas le problème des réfugiés d'Elisabethville. La solution doit être recherchée dans une pression plus grande exercée sur Tshombe pour le retour des réfugiés dans leurs cités.

Je suggère de nouveau que les entretiens soient entrepris immédiatement pour le retour:

- 1° des réfugiés provenant de la cité Lumbashi
- 2° de ceux de la cité BCK,

toutes deux bien entourées de grillages et sous la protection actuellement des Forces des Nations Unies. Le retour de ces premiers contingents et la sécurité qu'on s'efforcera de faire régner dans ces deux cités encourageront peut-être d'autres réfugiés à suivre leur exemple ainsi que les autorités katangaises et les Nations Unies de poursuivre dans cette voie.

Je vous rappelle pour mémoire toutes les difficultés que nous avons rencontrées avec les quelques familles dont nous avons accepté le rapatriement d'Elisabethville à L'éopoldville.

Destinataire: Dr. Stré Linner

Origine: N. G. Gussing.

Objet: Transport des réfugiés du Camp d'Elisabethville

Comme il est dit dans mon mémorandum du 17 janvier, notre Office a reçu des centaines de lettres de réfugiés du camp et des membres de leur famille, qui attendent dans d'autres régions du Congo, demandant la réunion de la famille en dehors du camp.

Veuillez trouver ci-joint une liste contenant une partie de ces demandes. Abstraction ^{faite} des deux dernières demandes, toutes les autres contenues dans la liste viennent de membres des familles vivant dans le camp qui attendent d'être réunis avec le "chef de famille" qui, lui, se trouve à Léopoldville. Si vous êtes d'accord, pour des raisons politique ou toute autre, je recommanderais instamment que nous nous n'arrêtions pas en chemin et essayions de sortir les réfugiés du camp. Selon moi, tout transfert hors du camp nous est avantageux et *exerce une bonne influence* ^{sur} les autres réfugiés. En cas d'accord de votre part, je vous saurais gré de me faire savoir vos directives touchant la marche à suivre.

Comme vous pouvez le noter dans la liste, les réfugiés du camp ne savent pas exactement l'adresse des "chefs de famille", beaucoup d'entre eux auraient été transportés par l'ONUC d'Elisabethville à Léopoldville.

Nous recevons également beaucoup de lettres de personnes et d'organisations de Léopoldville, Luluabourg, Albertville, Bakwanga, etc. demandant de les aider à transporter les membres de leurs familles, des étudiants, des employés, du camp des réfugiés à ces endroits. Il serait utile aussi que nous ayons une marche à suivre pour ces cas.

Comme il est indiqué au No.17 de la liste, vous avez déjà autorisé, le 23 novembre 1961, le transport de la femme de Sylvain Luseke à Léopoldville (cependant elle semble ~~n'~~ être pas seule dans le camp, - je me renseigne à ce sujet). Il y a d'autres cas similaires, mais comme aucun transport ne semble être autorisé pour le moment, je suis à me demander si les autorisations ~~ne~~ accordées avant les hostilités de décembre sont encore valables.