

ICFY

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

16 APR - 25 JULY 1993

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

[LANGUAGE NOT SCREENED]
CONFIDENTIAL
KM WG JUNE 2012

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES	<u>S-1835</u>
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FILE	<u>7</u>
ACC.	<u>2011/0195</u>

FD-392

BEZ-3123

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1496

FOR UNPROFOR
'93 JUL 25 13:32

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/~~IMMEDIATE~~/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/~~RESTRICTED~~/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/ONLY
BELGRADE
RO'S INITIALS

1/3

PAGE 1 of 3

OUTGOING FAX NO. LO-B/2458	DATE: 25 JULY 1993
TO: CO-CHAIRMAN OF IC FY GENEVA	FROM: COL J.P. NGURUKIE SMLO BELGRADE UNPROFOR
FAX NO.: 41-22-9170123	FAX INMARSAT: 873-1512502 OR BELGRADE: 38-11-609368
ATTN: LORD OWEN ATTN: T. OREN	FILE REF. NO.: LBS/22
INFO: CMLO, UNPROFOR HQ ZAGREB	
FAX NO.:	
INTERNAT. DISTRIBUTION:	

MESSAGE

- PLEASE FIND ATTACHED A LETTER FROM DR. RADOVAN KARADZIC, REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA FOR YOUR KIND ASSISTANCE
- KIND REGARDS.

ACTION INFO

DISTRIBUTION:	
TS	JVD MA
LO	JW WS
DL	PS BR
	SM MW
	CMCL
	SC/GA
	JPM

12

2/3

РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА
ПРЕДСЈЕДНИК РЕПУБЛИКЕ
САРАЈЕВОREPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SAKAJEVOTOR
25 12:58BELGRADE
RO'S INITIATIVES

Excellencies,

Thank you for your communication of 23 July.

While recognising that there is no substitute for a mutually-agreed political solution which balances all legitimate ethnic and religious aspirations as far as humanly possible, we wish to propose some immediate palliatives, which could be introduced within days given good will on all sides. We give irrevocable guarantees, as you requested, that we shall do everything in our power to ensure that food, water, electricity and gas reach the town of Sarajevo uninterruptedly. (The gas-main will need unblocking in Hungary; the Moslems will need to stop hindering water installations.)

We offer to make Sarajevo in effect an open city if the Moslems agree to do likewise. As for the enclaves in Eastern Bosnia, we are prepared to desist from all attacks on them provided that the armed forces within them are disarmed. If they provisionally recognise our wider sovereignty, we shall be glad to recognise their internal sovereignty. They will then be free to go about their daily lives unhindered, move in and out to work or trade, subject to normal security requirements, as indeed Moslems and Croats are doing in many parts of our Republic in spite of war and hatreds. Your Excellencies must understand that our objective is not to gain more territory, but to ensure access and security. Let territory remain in the hands of its inhabitants.

This procedure for the enclaves of Eastern Bosnia could provide a precedent for post-war coexistence between and inside the Republics, with open frontiers, even before fighting has been brought to an end. But this can come only when Alija Izetbegovic and his partners recognise that we and the Croats will not agree to a unitary Bosnia by any other name, and hence that we must negotiate a tripartite solution en gros et en detail.

I have decided, after much hesitation, to attend the Geneva talks. Let me explain my original reluctance to participate. First, as I made clear to you previously, I do not believe that the talks could conceivably lead to the political solution we all so keenly desire until the Moslem leadership accepts the consensus of the Christian majority in favour of confederation as a basis for negotiation. This is still some way off, not least because powerful forces, including some represented at your conference, are encouraging the Moslems to hold out against our tripartite peace-proposals.

3/3

But this is not the main reason for my misgivings over personal attendance. My Government is seriously concerned at the potential threat of an armed attack on my country by forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, acting as UNPROFOR but effectively under political and operational control of their own Governments and of their NATO-appointed commander in chief. We are now liable to be subjected to air attacks designed among other things to destroy our installations and cripple our ground forces, in order to make them vulnerable to an army of occupation at the service of hostile forces. The NATO aircraft which were recently moved to Italy, with their special capacity for use against land-forces, can have been sent only as preparation for such offensive action. If it is decided, on whatever grounds, that UNPROFOR members have been attacked in the course of defending putative "safe areas" (terms and related activities which have no precedents in the Geneva Convention or international law) the most modern arms of mass-destruction could be launched against us with impunity, as your Excellencies yourselves mentioned in your letter of 23 July.

It would be incumbent on me, as elected leader of my people, to be present in order to share their dangers and lead resistance to these attacks according to our traditions. We Serbs have a long history of resisting threats. If there is a price to pay, we pay it; we could not do otherwise and remain true to ourselves and our ancestors. Please let us approach a settlement with logic and compassion rather than threats and hectoring, in everyone's interest.

Nevertheless, I believe that the proposed talks should be given every chance and hence I am going to attend them. I thereby demonstrate in the most practical manner my acceptance of your Excellencies' own good faith and implicit assurance that no attacks are planned for the period of my presence in Geneva. May I take it, given your Excellencies' publicly stated desire to hold the talks until a final settlement is reached, that the question of lifting sanctions against Yugoslavia will be high on the agenda if the talks make significant progress. Since sanctions were linked to Serbia's alleged aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose conflict you now explicitly recognize as a succession struggle between indigenous Bosnian ethnies, their *raison d'être* would be removed once a settlement were in sight.

I look forward to hearing from you.

Believe me to be,
Yours sincerely,

25 July 1993

Rt.Hon.Lord Owen and Hon.T.Stoltenberg
Co-chairmen of IC FY

Dr Radovan Karadzic
President
Republic of Srpska

Radovan Karadzic

UNOG
Palais des Nations

FAX 007 389

BEZ 359

MSC 1158-71
1502 1/2

UNITED NATIONS
UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

'93 JUL 24 20:47

'93 JUL 24 21:28

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/ONLY

BELGRADE
RO'S INITIALS

PAGE 1 of 2

OUTGOING FAX NO. LO-B/24 56	DATE: 24 2100 July 1993
TO: TELCOMS GENEVA "ICFY CONFERENCE"	FROM: COL J.P. NGURUKIE for SMLO BELGRADE UNPROFOR <i>Capt Alaa</i>
FAX NO.: 41 22 9170123	FAX INMARSAT: 873-1512502 OR BELGRADE : 38-11-609368
ATTN: LORD OWEN MR. T. STOLTENBERG Co-CHAIRMAN ICFY CONFERENCE	FILE REF. NO.: LOB/22 DRAFTER: CAPT ALAA EL DIN AHMED TITLE: LDC
INFO: CMLC - UNPRO FOR ZAGRBB HQ FAX NO.:	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:	
SUBJECT: LETTER FROM REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA	

MESSAGE

- 1- PLEASE FIND ATTACHED FOR YOUR KIND ATTENTION A LETTER FROM REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA TO PASS IT TO LORD OWEN AND MR. T. STOLTENBERG.
- 2- KIND REGARDS.

ACTION	INFO
DISTRIBUTION:	
WS/TS	LO
DL/LO	KV/CPL
FW	SC/GA
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	PS
	JM

FAXIN -

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РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА
ПРЕДСЈЕДНИК РЕПУБЛИКЕ
САРАЈЕВО



REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC
SARAJEVO

Your Excellencies,

On behalf of the Republic of Srpska and its authorities, I inform you that the guarantee for gas resupply of the City of Sarajevo has been given by the Government to the UNPROFOR Command-Sector Sarajevo. The gas-supply will need to be unblocked in Hungary, while the Moslem side will have to supply electricity to the water-works for their pumps.

If these conditions are met, the City of Sarajevo will experience no further interruptions in the supply of services.

sincerely yours

Pale, 24 July, 1993.



Dr. Radovan Karadzic
President
Republic of Srpska

Radovan Karadzic

Rt.Hon.Lord Owen and Hon.T.Stoltenberg
Co-chairmen ICFY Conference

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102:1943

SALVO

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CODE RESTRICTED

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

C26-759

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE JUL 24 16:31
(UNPROFOR)OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLEMOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of 3

CODE RESTRICTED

TO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : *fu* STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Admir Thurnberg*

DATE : 24 JULY 1993

NUMBER : -----

SUBJECT : Developments in B-H

Please find attached document for your information.

CODE RESTRICTED

MOST IMMEDIATE

ACTION	INFO
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ENDALL

93 JUL 24 18:09

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations


MOST IMMEDIATE C26.759

1

HQ BH COMMAND MAIN KISELJAK 2/3

Page 1 of 2

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE/
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.	DATE: 241510B JULY 93
TO: SHANNON BOYD CHIEF, PRESS & INFO UNPROFOR, ZAGREB	FROM: HUSSEIN AL-ALFI CHIEF, PRESS & INFO BH COMMAND KISELJAK
FAX NO.: 00-38-41-170-099	FAX: 873-130-1526
ATTN:	FILE REF.NO. : DRAFTER : TITLE : RELEASING OFF.:  SIGNATURE
INFO : FAX NO.:	
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENTS IN B-H	

MESSAGE

1. UNMOs team in Macca have just reported this afternoon at 1400 HRS on the situation in the Brcko area. Their report is still unconfirmed and it is based on sources from the HQ 106 Infantry Brigade HVO. The report states that the front-line south of Brcko has changed, and the corridor has been widened by approximately 2 kilometers. The new front-line is from Lugovi to Omerbegovaca. The report further mentions that the Brod area is under Bosnian Serb control. According to that report, the Bosnian Serb forces have last night gained a total of 4 square kilometers.

UNMOs also mentioned that there is a Serb activity along the whole front-line, specially in the eastern part, that is Brod to Celici. More than one battalion of 106 Infantry Brigade HVO has been withdrawn. UNMOs state that the losses seem to be high.

If this report is confirmed, then these developments explain

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C26-759

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MOST IMMEDIATE

2

the desperate attempts by the BiH Presidency to insist on putting a halt to the Serb offensive in the Brcko area as one of the pre-conditions for their participation in the Geneva talks. On the other hand, the escalation of the offensive by the Serbs in Sarajevo, as well as in Brcko area, demonstrates their determination not to leave any winning card for the BiH Presidency to bargain with in Geneva. On the contrary, the intention of the Bosnian Serbs is to corner the Bosnian Presidency to a situation where they have no alternative but to accept the partition of BH according to the terms dictated by the Serbs themselves.

Best regards,



1993-07-21 19:40 5601

UNITED NATIONS HQS NY

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010/9

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CN2-620 CYZ-458 P1/2

'93 JUL 21 19:46

CODED CABLE
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE 3

TO: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 21 JULY 1993

NUMBER: **1427**

SUBJECT: Letter to President Izetbegovic



21 P 3:43

I agree with the draft letter. Please find attached a copy of the draft with minor editorial changes.

DISTRIBUTION:	
JW	DL
TS/WS	LO
BR	JPM
MW	JVD
CNCL	JH
MA	PS

P.2/c
CNZ-620 CYZ-456 P2/2

July 1993

Dear President Izetbegovic

I have received your letter of 19th July 1993 in which you ^{expressed} highlight your concern about recent Serb military activity in the vicinity of Igman Mountain.

pull out
The SRSG spoke with Dr Karadzic on 19th July and ^{requested} asked that military activity be ^{stopped} curtailed. *immediate*

Moreover
Additionally, as you are aware, the Co-Chairmen have appealed to all the parties to cease offensive military action throughout B-H to allow the peace process to proceed. It would greatly assist our common mission if you would ensure that forces under your control also cease offensive military action, particularly in the central and southern parts of the Republic.

The best course of action now would be that you and the other parties *commence* negotiations for peace. *without delay.*

This letter is also written on behalf of the Secretary-General and my BH Commander Lt General Briquemont.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.

General Jean Cot

His Excellency

Mr Alija Izetbegovic

President of the Presidency

Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

21-07-1993


R2931^W / 014HQ BH COMMAND SARAJEVO

Page 1 of 3

IMMEDIATE
RESTRICTED

22 July 93

182
Copy sent to
General
22 July
182

OUTGOING SERIAL NO:	DATE: 21 JUL 93
TO: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB HQ BH COMMAND KISELJAK	FROM: HQ BH COMMAND FWD SARAJEVO
FAX NO: 0038/41 270344	FAX: 871 154 6436
ATTN:	FILE REF. NO : BHCS/8607
ZAGREB: FC	DRAFTER : WG CDR B C COLE
KISELJAK: COS, CAC	TITLE : MA TO COMD
	RELEASING OFF.: WG CDR B C COLE
	SIGNATURE : 

SUBJECT: REPORT ON A MEETING WITH MR MATE BOBAN
19 JUL 93MESSAGE

Please find attached a report on a meeting between Commander BH and Mr Mate BOBAN.

MA.010

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FC

DCM/DCA

DFC

CAO

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CMO

UNITED NATIONS
PROTECTION FORCE



HEADQUARTERS
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA
COMMAND, SARAJEVO

TO: HQ UNPROFOR, ZAGREB ATTN: FORCE COMMANDER
INFO: HQ BH COMMAND, KISELJAK ATTN: COS, CAC
FROM: BH COMMANDER, SARAJEVO
DATE: 21 JUL 93
FILE: BHCS/8607

SUBJECT: REPORT ON MEETING WITH MR MATE BOBAN
19 JUL 93

1. On 19 Jul 93 I had a meeting in MEDUGORJE with Mr Mate BOBAN. The purpose of the meeting was to effect my formal introduction with him following my assumption of command. General PETKOVIC was present at the meeting also.

2. I began by informing BOBAN that my mandate required me to support the entire population of BH regardless of ethnic background. To do this I would need complete freedom of movement for UNPROFOR and UN related aid agencies, and a guarantee of safety for UN personnel. I also advised Mr BOBAN that much work was required to alleviate the suffering of the population during the coming winter. Communication with, and accessibility to, all regions of the country would therefore be essential and UNPROFOR was actively pursuing a road repair and maintenance programme to facilitate this.

3. Mr BOBAN welcomed me to the territory of HERCEG-BOSNIA and wished me success in my appointment. He then proceeded to give me a lengthy and detailed discourse on the history of the present situation and on the moral/political justification of the Croat position. He also advised that I should work as a soldier and not become involved in political matters. At this, I stressed that my position was strictly neutral and that, in my opinion, the solution to the problems in BH could only be resolved politically. However, I pointed out that I was also the senior UN representative in BH and that I must try to make sense of what was happening in all areas of the conflict if I was to succeed in my mandate.

21 JUL '93 19:16 KISELJAK BOSNIE

P.1

4. BOBAN concluded the formal element of the meeting by assuring the continuation of good relations between the Croat peoples and UNPROFOR. He also stated that his soldiers would never fire the first shot if agreement had been reached for a cease-fire. Moreover, the HVO had never obstructed UNPROFOR and would not do so in the future. This latter statement was untrue as my HQ has records of several cases when UNPROFOR movement has been obstructed by the HVO.

5. At an informal, private discussion between myself and BOBAN, immediately after the main meeting, he suggested that I broker an immediate cease-fire agreement between all the warring factions. Such an agreement, he said, would have the unqualified support of the Croat peoples and the HVO and could be a precursor to lasting peace. I undertook to do what I could.



FRANCIS BRIQUEMONT
Lt Gen, Belgian Army
Commander
BH Command

UNITED NATIONS
PROTECTION FORCE



HEADQUARTERS
BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA
COMMAND, SARAJEVO

TO: HQ UNPROFOR, ZAGREB ATTN: FORCE COMMANDER
INFO: HQ BH COMMAND, KISELJAK ATTN: COS, CAC
FROM: COMMANDER, BH COMMAND, SARAJEVO
DATE: 21 JULY 1993
FILE: BHCS/8607

SUBJECT: REPORT ON MEETING WITH GEN DELIC

1. I yesterday attended a meeting at BiH Army HQ SARAJEVO with Gen DELIC. Also present were Gen HALILOVIC, Col DIVIAK and Col SIBER. The meeting was at the request of Gen DELIC.

2. Gen DELIC began the meeting by stating that the latest Serb offensive in the area of IGMAN Mountain (15 Km SW of SARAJEVO) was a deliberate attempt to isolate SARAJEVO from the rest of the country and also to prevent BiH attendance at the forthcoming talks in GENEVA. He also said that the Serbs were using the same tactics in MAGLAI and GORAZDE. He asked for every assistance in stopping the Serb offensives so that the BOSNIAN Delegation could proceed to GENEVA.

3. I advised Gen DELIC that there had been many cease-fire agreements in the past but that all had failed. The solution lay with the Commanding Generals. If they genuinely wished to cease hostilities then it was up to them to give orders that would be carried out. Past experience showed that soldiers, of all 3 factions, did not always respect the orders of their Generals and that this was a major problem. DELIC replied that he was now very sincere and would guarantee that BiH forces would cease hostilities throughout BH within 48 hours of a cease-fire agreement. This period of time was necessary to ensure the passage of his order to the lowest formation. He admitted there could still be isolated incidents of his soldiers breaking the agreement but these would have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. I assured DELIC that we would offer every assistance and that BOBAN had already indicated his willingness for a cease-fire. The next step would be to convince Gen MLADIC of its necessity. DELIC then tried to introduce other conditions that

should be tied to a cease-fire agreement. However, he eventually accepted that a step-by-step approach was necessary and that the first objective should be to secure an unconditional cease-fire.

4. Gen DELIC then questioned the reason for the delay in implementing the Safe Area concept set out in SCR 836. I told him that the major obstacle was that the Serbs still believed that the terms of the agreements for SREBRENICA and ZEPA had still not been fulfilled by the BiH Army. Moreover, political agreement on the concept had not yet been reached. At this, DELIC confirmed that he was ready to begin negotiations with the Serbs but that they must produce competent negotiators with the authority to speak for their leadership.

5. In concluding, DELIC reconfirmed that the preconditions for BOSNIAN attendance at the next round of talks in GENEVA was a full cease-fire in BH and the reconnection of power and water supplies to SARAJEVO. He confirmed also that if agreement could be reached with MLADIC for a cessation of hostilities then he would ask President IZETBEGOVIC to make a public declaration calling for peace. He would also issue orders to his troops to stop fighting and for all prisoners to be released. His final word was that there was a genuine desire by the BOSNIANS to attend the GENEVA talks.



FRANCIS BRIQUEMONT
Lt Gen, Belgian Army
Commander
BH Command



CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR L'ANCIENNE YOUGOSLAVIE



Palais des Nations, 1211 Genève 10

Bureau des Co-Présidents

To: Mr Stoltenberg

From: John Wilson

Date: 20 July 1993

Subject: Special Report on Igman Mountain

1. Recent media reporting supports President Izetbegovic's claim that Muslim positions on Igman Mountain are under attack by Serb forces. UNPROFOR have had no presence in that area for the past ten days so are unable to confirm precise events but can confirm fighting around Igman Mountain. They are also not able to confirm Serb use of 9 helicopters.

2. It would appear that Serb forces are attacking from two directions: from the south along the Sarajevo-Trvno road; and, from the west out of Hadzici. Muslim refugees are reported to have fled towards Igman and Butmir (north of Igman but south of the airport). BH Army sources acknowledge that the attacks are ongoing but deny that their defensive lines have been broken. Comment. It would seem that the Serbs have taken advantage of events in Central and Southern Bosnia and concentrated forces for this attack. It probably has two objectives, to: cut supply routes to Gorazde and Sarajevo; and, capture Muslim artillery positions used to defend Sarajevo. Both objectives would result in added pressure on the Muslims to negotiate and contribute to the Serb aim of cleansing eastern Bosnia. Given the existing Muslim strategic situation, the Serb offensive is likely to be successful.

3. It is recommended you reply to President Izetbegovic's letter as per the attached draft.



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

To: Mr Stoltenberg/Lord Owen

From: John Wilson

Date: 19 July 1993

Subject: Special Report on Igman Mountain

1. Media have recently been reporting that Muslim positions on Igman Mountain are under attack by Serb forces. UNPROFOR have had no presence in that area for the past ten days so are unable to confirm precise events but can confirm fighting around Igman Mountain.

2. It would appear that Serb forces are attacking from two directions: from the south along the Sarajevo-Trvno road; and, from the west out of Hadzici. Muslim refugees are reported to have fled towards Igman and Butmir (north of Igman but south of the airport). BH Army sources acknowledge that the attacks are ongoing but deny that their defensive lines have been broken. Comment. It would seem that the Serbs have taken advantage of events in Central and Southern Bosnia and concentrated forces for this attack. It probably has two objectives, to: cut supply routes to Gorazde; and, capture Muslim artillery positions used to defend Sarajevo. Both objectives would result in added pressure on the Muslims to negotiate and contribute to the Serb aim of cleansing eastern Bosnia. Given the existing Muslim strategic situation, the Serb offensive is likely to be successful.

3. UNMO in Gorazde report that to the best of their knowledge the supply route to the city is still open.

OUTGOING
MOST IMMEDIATE

CZM-927 JUL 19 18:13 UNPROFOR

CZG+741

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

'93 JUL 19 18:03

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of 2

CODE RESTRICTED

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: (fa) STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 19 JULY 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 892

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC'S ATTACHED LETTER

I transmit for appropriate action copy of letter just
received from President Izetbegovic.

Endall.

** CYCY **
1993-07-19 19:08

6035473

UNPROFOR ZAGREB

011 P02

FROM: PREDSEDNIK PREDSEDNISTVA BiH PHONE NO. 1 3871664959



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

PRESIDENCY

PRESIDENT

Sarajevo, July 19, 1993

Dr Boutros Boutros Ghali,
UN Secretary GeneralSir David Hanney, President
of the Security CouncilAmbassador Viktor Jackovich, U.S.
Department of State

Gen. Cot, UNPF Force Commander

Gen. Briquemont, UNPF BN Commander

Dear Sir,

I have to inform you that again the Serbian aggressor have launched a heavy offensive towards Sarajevo safe zone, now coming from two directions: SE and SW, aiming to cut-up the city. There are signs that the Serbian forces plan the general attack on the town itself. Strong forces were also directed to the mountain Igman where there were 3 helicopter descents registered in last 2 days, which are the blunt violations of "no-fly zone".

I call you to intervene immediately and stop this new act of aggression on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Please, accept the assurances of my highest considerations.

Sincerely

Alija Izetbegovic

A. Izetbegovic



CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR L'ANCIENNE YOUGOSLAVIE



Palais des Nations, 1211 Genève 10

Bureau des Co-Présidents

TO: Stoltenberg, Zagreb; att Military Assistant

FM: *for* Stoltenberg, Geneva 

DATE: 19.7.1993

PAGE: 1 of 11

SUBJECT: Energy Problems in Bosnia

Ref telecon Karonen/Ahlquist please find attached the three messages from the Permanent Mission of Bosnia-Herzegovina regarding different energy matters. Your advice would be appreciated.



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

LO	TS
JPM	KV
DL	JVD
INA	

Permanent Mission
to
the United Nations Office
at Geneva

F A X T R A N S M I T T A L : 10 /ten/ pages, inc. cover page

To : President of the Security Council

Secretary General of the United Nations

Co-Chairmen of the ICFY, Mr. D. Owen and T. Stoltenberg

USA State Department, Mr. William C. Ramsay


Sir,

Please find attached the Informations No 67, 68 and 69 of the Ministry of Energetics and Mining of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina relating to energy supply of the City of Sarajevo, the natural gas supply of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Energy Supply of the Republic of Bosnia - Herzegovina, respectively.

Accept sir assurances of my highest consideration.

Geneva, July 18, 1993

Chargé d'affaires a.i.
minister counsellor


Mustafa Bijedic



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Government
Ministry of Energetics, Mining and Industry

Sarajevo, 16 July 1993
Information No. 67

The energy supply to the City of Sarajevo

The City of Sarajevo has been without any kind of energy and water supply for the past five weeks. The lack of energy supply means the total paralysis of all the City functions. It is obvious that the aggressor use the energy supply as a powerful means of continuing the genocide.

As the result of the initiative of Mr Bernard Kouchner, the former minister of the health and humanitarian affairs of the Government of the Republic of France, on July 12th 1993 it has been agreed that:

- (1) the representatives of the Bosnian Government will ensure electric energy supply at the level of 2 MW for the Ilidža settlement, a part of the occupied territory of the City of Sarajevo, and 2.0 MW for the main City water wells, located in Bačevo, currently under the aggressor control, in order to ensure the water supply to only few settlements in the besieged part of the City;
- (2) the aggressor will normalize the natural gas supply of the besieged part of the City;
- (3) the reparation of the damaged electrical lines will be organized in next two days under UNPROFOR protection, in order to ensure for the besieged part of the City minimal quantities of the electric energy (2-3 MW) from the Kakanj thermo power plant which is under the legal authorities control.

The Bosnian Government representatives realized the agreed obligations immediately.

With explanation that some technical problems exists, the aggressor realized the natural gas supply on July 15th 1993., 10 a.m. In the afternoon hours, on the same day, the UNPROFOR representatives informed the legal authorities that the part of the City natural gas ring has been damaged, and that accordingly it was necessary to interrupt the natural gas supply of the whole City

again to repair the damaged part of the ring. Even if the mentioned technical problems had existed, in the both cases, it was possible to ensure the natural gas supply of the besieged part of the City along with the reparation of the damaged elements of the City natural gas ring.

Regardless of the fact that five days have passed since the agreement was reached, the besieged part of the City is still without electricity supply.

The City is without natural gas supply since June 15th 1993, 6 p.m., even though at the moment, according to the information, the technical problems on the City gas network have been resolved.

From July 13th 1993, some parts of the City have had the minimal water supply (at the underground level) with few interruptions.

According to the presented facts, one can learn that there is no readiness on the aggressor side to implement the reached agreement. Therefore, the legal authorities, as well as all other influential persons involved in solving the tragic situation in the City, must undertake new and efficient measures.

MINISTER

R. Mahmutćehajić, Sc.D.

Co.

UNHCR, Zagreb and Sarajevo

USA State Department, Mr William C. Ramsay

UN, Boutros Ghali

President of the Security Council

Lord Owen, Thorvald Stoltenberg and Reginal Bartolomew

Lt.Gen. Briquemont

USA Ambassador in RB-H

(via the RB-H Missions in New York and Geneva)



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Government
Ministry of Energetics, Mining and Industry

Sarajevo, July 17th 1993

INFORMATION No. 68

The natural Gas Supply of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The key information regarding the consumption of the natural gas on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is as follows:

1. The cities of Zvornik, Sarajevo, Visoko and Zenica are the key consumers of the natural gas in the Republic.
2. The official importer of the natural gas from the Russian Federation to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is Energopetrol Sarajevo.
3. Since the beginning of the aggression against the Republic the aggressor has interrupted on several occasions the natural gas supply to all the consumers on the territories of the Republic that are under the control of legal authorities. The aggressor blocked completely the delivery of the natural gas supply to Zenica and Visoko on October 31st. 1992, and, on June 28th. 1993 that of the city of Sarajevo. Currently, no one on the territories controlled by the legal authorities can use natural gas.
4. It is particularly important to note that the citizens of Sarajevo, after blocking of the natural gas, have been left with no other source of energy. Since the beginning of the aggression against the Republic the coal, firewood and liquid gas supply of the city have been completely blocked, while the electricity supply was occasionally at the level of 3% of the minimal humanitarian needs. The average quantities of diesel fuel delivered monthly to the City could meet the only per day consumer needs of the City.
5. After the interruption of the natural gas supply of Zenica, Visoko and Sarajevo, the consumers in Serbia and some parts of the occupied territories of the Republic have had unobstructed natural gas supply despite the fact that the delivered gas was exclusively meant for the consumers on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Serbia and the Serbian aggressor used 90-95%, at average, of the total of the amounts of natural gas delivered for the needs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has been an act of permanent non-observance of the UN resolutions.

6. After the aggressor has stopped, with no technological or technical reasons, the natural gas supply to the consumers on the territory of the city of Sarajevo, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has sent a request to the Republic of Hungary to stop the natural gas delivery to the consumers in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina via Serbian territory. According to the information of the Hungarian company for oil and natural gas supply, MOL, dated July 16th. 1993. the mentioned request was realized on July 14th. 1993 at midnight.

According to the presented facts we suggest the following:

1. The Serbian aggressor should give guarantees for unimpeded natural gas supply to all the consumers in the Republic (Zvornik, Sarajevo, Zenica, Visoko), after which the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will send a request to the Government of the Republic of Hungary for the re-establishment of the natural gas delivery.
2. UNPROFOR should provide for the security of the key pipeline installations from the entering point to the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Karakaj near Zvornik), block stations (see the Attachments) and main measuring and regulating sub-stations in Sarajevo (Velešići and Butila).
3. Operational management of the natural gas infrastructure and using of the natural gas in the Republic should be entrusted to the mixed working group under the UNPROFOR protection, in order to ensure, on a permanent basis, the conditions of the implementation of the guarantees as specified by the first item of the suggested measures.


Since the natural gas supply does not solve minimal existential needs of all the population of the Republic, the City of Sarajevo in particular, it would be indispensable to establish immediately, with the UNPROFOR and UNHCR assistance, the rationalized strategy of supply with other sources of energy (electric power, oil derivatives, coal, fire wood and liquid gas).

 MINISTER

Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, Sc.D.

Co.
UNHCR, Zagreb and Sarajevo
USA State Department, Mr William C. Ramsay
UN, Boutros Ghali
President of the Security Council
Lord Owen, Thorvald Stoltenberg and Reginald Bartolomew
Lt.Gen. Briquemont
USA Ambassador in RB-H
(via the RB-H Missions in New York and Geneva)

TUZLA



THE NATURAL GAS SUPPLY SYSTEM OF BOSNIA - HERZEGOVINA

LEGEND

- CONSTRUCTED PIPELINE
- CONSTRUCTED REDUCTION SUBSTATIONS
- PLANNED CONNECTIONS TO THE MAIN PIPELINE
- PLANNED REDUCTION SUBSTATIONS
- BLOCK STATION



Sarajevo, 17 July 1993

Information No. 69

Energy supply in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The extremely difficult situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been mainly the result of the shortage of all kinds of energy supply to consumers. Therefore, the Ministry of Energetics, Mining and Industry proposes the establishing of energy supply to all the consumers in the Republic, based on the following principles:

1. In order to establish the energy supply to all the population of the Republic, meeting the minimum of their humanitarian needs, it is necessary that UNPROFOR and UNHCR provide immediately a new working mechanisms and also to engage in their teams experienced experts in the field of energy supply.
2. To establish immediate supply of all kinds of energy on the territory of the Republic, where the current state of energy infrastructure allows the same.
3. To provide each citizen of the Republic with equal energy equivalent.
4. UNPROFOR should ensure land corridors for unimpeded delivery of spare parts, necessary equipment elements, raw materials and distribution of fuels to all parts of the Republic.
5. UNPROFOR should ensure repairs of energy supply infrastructure, indispensable for the supply of the population of the Republic, which would meet their humanitarian needs.
6. To establish a Mixed Coordinating Body with the purpose of managing overall energy resources supply by equal usage of the available production capacities, and also to control the level of energy consumption on the individual territories of the Republic. UNPROFOR and UNHCR representatives should be included in the above mentioned Coordinating Body.

The key indicators to supply of the individual energy resources and the proposal of the measures to be taken immediately are mentioned hereafter. Detailed data are available in the series of Informations issued by the Ministry of Energetics, Mining and Industry.

1. Electricity energy

a. Current state

1. Since the beginning of the aggression against the Republic, the electricity supply to all the territories of the Republic has been reduced generally below the level of the minimal humanitarian needs, unless it has been completely cut off.

The electricity supply to the city of Sarajevo has been at the level 2-3 MW for the last three months, which meets only 5% of emergency needs of the city. The electricity supply was completely cut off on 21 June 1993.

Following the Agreement signed on 12 July 1993, the electricity supply to the temporary occupied territories of the City has been restored at the level of 4 MW. The agreement on the restoration of electricity supply to the besieged part of the city has never been realized due to the aggressor's will, and for that reason the city has no water or electricity supply.

b. Proposed measures

1. To restore the electricity supply to all the consumers in the Republic, where technically feasible.

2. To place the key structures of the electricity supply net under UNPROFOR control.

3. To create the equal conditions in respect to electricity supply to all parts of the Republic.

4. The electricity will be distributed, regardless of its source, on the basis of a unique criteria (number of inhabitants), and UNPROFOR will control the energy flows from power plants.

5. UNPROFOR and UNHCR need the assistance in the process of delivering the indispensable raw materials and spare parts for power plants and mines.

2. Oil derivatives

a. Current state

1. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina provided for minimal quantities of oil derivatives for humanitarian purposes of the population of the Republic.
2. The delivery of oil has been limited due to the fact that roads are being blocked either by HVO or Serbian aggressor forces.

b. Proposed measures

1. UNPROFOR and UNHCR shall provide necessary quantities of oil derivatives for all parts of the Republic, whereas the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina will try to provide sufficient quantities of oil derivatives for non-occupied regions and to place them at the disposal of UNHCR, that is to organize the transport to final consumers.
2. Oil will be distributed according to the number of inhabitants in the individual regions of the Republic.

3. Natural gas

a. Current state

1. The aggressor has cut off natural gas supply to all the consumers on the territories of the Republic, under the control of the legal authorities.
2. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has addressed the Government of the Republic of Hungary with the request to stop natural gas delivery over the territory of Serbia to consumers in the Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina.

b. Proposed measures

1. The Serbian aggressor is to give guarantees for unimpeded natural gas supply to all consumers in the Republic, which would be followed by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina request addressed to the Government of the Republic of Hungary to restore the delivery of natural gas.
2. It has been suggested that UNPROFOR provide protection of the crucial structures of the natural gas pipeline, including the entrance of the pipeline in the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Karakaj near Zvornik), block stations of gas pipeline (refer to the attachment) and main city gas stations for measuring and regulation in Sarajevo (Velešići and Butla).

3. It is necessary to entrust the mixed working group under the UNPROFOR protection with the operational managing of gas infrastructure and with the consumption of natural gas, in order to provide conditions for the implementation of the guarantees as specified by the first item of the suggested measures.

4. Coal and fire wood

a. Current state

1. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has ensured sufficient capacities for providing urgent quantities of coal and fire wood.
2. The Serbian aggressor has been preventing the transport of coal and fire wood.

b. Proposed measures

1. UNPROFOR and UNHCR have to ensure corridors for unimpeded delivery of coal and fire wood to the jeopardized regions of the Republic. For example, it is necessary to provide for the city of Sarajevo delivery of at least 50.000 t of coal and 20.000 m³ of fire wood.

5. Technical gas

The situation regarding the technical gas supply corresponds with the above described situation regarding coal and fire wood. Therefore, we ask for the same measures to be applied.

MINISTER

Rusmir Mahmutćehajić, Sc. D.

Co.
UNHCR, Zagreb and Sarajevo
USA State Department, Mr William C. Ramsay
UN, Boutros Ghali
President of the Security Council
Lord Owen, Thorvald Stoltenberg and Reginal Bartolomeu
Lt. Gen. Briquasart
USA Ambassador in RB-H
(via the RB-H Missions in New York and Geneva)

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Palais des Nations

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TO: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 16 JULY 1993

NUMBER: 1405

SUBJECT: Letter from Dr. Radovan Karadzic

Attached for your information please find a letter from
Radovan Karadzic addressed to the Secretary-General.

from ZCCO

CNZ-611 CYZ-445 P2/2

*Mr Arman
ac Mr Gouling
Mr Eliasson
CG/AS*

РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА

ПРЕДСЕДНИК РЕПУБЛИКЕ


САРАЈЕВО



REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC

SARAJEVO



Pale, 15 July 1993.

Your Excellency,

I wish to inform your Excellency of Government of the Republic of Srpska's position on two issues of current importance.

1. The Government resolutely opposes the proposed deployment of further Moslem forces to this country as projected recently by the Islamabad Conference of Islamic Countries.

2. In light of the increasing deterioration in the humanitarian situation throughout the former B&H, the Government of the Republic of Srpska wishes to inform your Excellency that we should be happy to place all our territory at your disposal for the secure passage of humanitarian aid from any point to any destination. The armed forces of the Republic of Srpska would provide escorts at request.

With highest respect,

Dr Radovan Karadzic
President
Republic of Srpska

Radovan Karadzic

Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali
Secretary-General
United Nations Organization



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

FAX

TO: Force Commander,
UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

FAX: 38 41 176 709

FOR INFO: Mr Eide, SRSG'S Office
DCA'S Office

DATE: 13 July 1993

FROM: John Wilson
ICFY, GENEVA

FAX: 917 0079

PAGE 1 OF 3

SUBJECT: Letter from Mr. Alija Izetbegovic to the Co-Chairmen

Please find attached a copy of the above letter.



REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Permanent Mission
to
the United Nations Office
at Geneva

F A X T R A N S M I T T A L

To: -International Conference on Former Yugoslavia,
Co-Chairmen, Mr.D.Owen and T.Stoltenberg
-UN Secretary General, Mr.B.B.Ghali
-President of the Council of Minister of the EC,
Minister Petersen
-USA Secretary of State, Mr.Christopher

Sir,

Please find attached a letter of the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Alija Izetbegovic relating to the conditions for continued talks on halting the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and searching for peaceful solution. Accept sir assurances of my highest consideration.

Geneva, July 12, 1993

Chargé d'affaires
minister counsellor

Mustafa Bijedic
Mustafa Bijedic

Via : Secretariat of the ICFY

Mission of the Rep.of Bosnia-Herzegovina, New York

Mission of the European Communities, Geneva

Mission of the USA, Geneva

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REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
PRESIDENCY
PRESIDENT

Sarajevo, July 12 1993

Dear Sir,

The Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, Lord David Owen and Mr Thorwald Stoltenberg have requested my presence at the following round of talks on halting the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is to take place in Geneva.

I am ready to meet this request, but, in my opinion, it is at the same time indispensable that:

- all the attacks aimed at occupying new territories be stopped, and
- that food, electricity, water, and natural gas supplies no longer be used as methods of blackmail and waging war not only against Sarajevo but other towns in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well.

If you find these conditions reasonable, please endorse them and do everything in your power to have them respected. I would like to convince you that the mentioned conditions will be fully respected on our behalf.

I believe that the moment for putting an end to the war in Bosnia has come, for what, Sir, we need your support and assistance.

Please, accept the assurance of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,
Alija Izetbegović
Alija Izetbegović



INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

Office of the Co-Chairmen



010/9 ✓

FAX

PAGE 1 OF 3

TO: Ambassador R Bartholomew FAX NO: 1-202-647 6040
FROM: *TBR* Thorvald Stoltenberg TEL NO: (41-22) 917 1200
DATE: 6 July 1993
SUBJECT: THE CURRENT SITUATION IN B-H

Please find attached the background paper referred to in my cable of 5 July.

THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Introduction

In Bosnia and Herzegovina there is currently not only widespread fighting but the humanitarian operations of international organizations are obstructed or sabotaged for military purposes, while the personnel of UNPROFOR, UNHCR and other organizations are increasingly targeted deliberately by members of the armed forces. While all of this is going on the support of the international community for humanitarian operations is dwindling, with a wide gap between the needs for humanitarian operations and the sums actually received. There is therefore a serious challenge of role and of means affecting the United Nations and other organizations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The following facts vividly bring out the situation on the ground.

A. The Humanitarian situation

- UNHCR has funds for humanitarian operations for only a few more weeks.
- The winter of 1992-93 was mild in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The chances are very high that the coming winter will be more severe, taking into account the usual kind of winter in the country. The problem facing UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations now is that they can hardly meet the needs of this summer, much less the needs of the coming winter. Since there is no sign of abatement of the conflict it must be assumed that there will be a continued need for humanitarian relief in the winter. How to meet this need is difficult to foresee.
- There is clear evidence of the deliberate targeting of humanitarian personnel.
- Aid convoys are deliberately blocked as part of the military strategies of all three sides. Humanitarian relief is diverted for military purposes.
- UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations are unable to operate in some parts of the country.

B. The peacekeeping situation

The focus of the military conflict has shifted from a relatively localized Serbian-Muslim confrontation in the east to a wide-ranging Croat-Muslim confrontation in the centre. This phase of the conflict has disrupted UNHCR and commercial traffic to the point where food has become scarce in the area. Refugee populations are swelling. Humanitarian agencies advise that many civilians, having exhausted their savings and food stocks over the last winter are destitute.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina UNPROFOR has been given the tasks of protecting humanitarian convoys and protecting the designated safe areas. With the deployment of United Nations Military Observers to Gorazde UNPROFOR has a presence in each of the safe areas that enables it to monitor the situation. However, the stark realities are that there is little prospect for implementing the safe areas policy before new resources arrive and that the civilian population will face devastating hardship next winter unless UNPROFOR focuses on efforts to restore utilities and humanitarian relief deliveries.

At the same time, there is concrete evidence that members of UNPROFOR are becoming the targets of deliberate attacks with a resulting rise in the casualty rates. UNPROFOR has now lost 49 persons in the former Yugoslavia and has had 536 persons wounded. The casualty rate has significantly increased recently.

UNPROFOR's resources and equipment are badly strained. UNPROFOR has an urgent need for more troops and for:

- armoured vehicles
- medical evacuation capabilities
- night vision and other surveillance equipment
- signals equipment
- communications equipment.

To: Lord Owen

From: Graham Messervy-Whiting

Date: 6 July 1993

Subject: Area Percentages

The current Serb-Croat proposal results in the following percentages (my note of 23 June):

Bosnian Serbs 56.5%

Bosnian Muslims 26.8%

Bosnian Croats 16.7%

My recommendation is that we should aim to push this proposal towards a 'yardstick' which should be in the order of:

Serbs 52%

Muslims 31%

Croats 17%

One way in which this could be done is shown on the attached trace.

Main points compared with our original thoughts of 18 June (Serbs 51%, Muslims 36%, Croats 13%) are:

The Muslims would have to have a minimum of the '4 opstinas' in the Bihac pocket and a substantial 'neck' leading to Eastern Bosnia to get their percentage up and the Serbs' percentage down.

The Croats would have to have the sizeable slice of the Posavina and some additional territory in Central Bosnia, as shown on the trace, in order for the Muslims to have the eastern half of the Mostar opstina and thus deeper access towards the sea in the south.

The additional Croat territory in Central Bosnia could include the balance of Prozor (62.3% Croat) and Bugojno (34% Croat, 44.5% Muslim) opstinas, bridging through to the Novi Travnik (39.6% Croat) and Vitez (45.7% Croat) opstinas. The bulge into Stolac opstina is probably not realistically achievable.

Such a 'yardstick' would accord more closely with the current situation on the ground and result in:

Serbs 51.9%

Muslims 31.2%

Croats 16.9%

Draft

010/9

30 June 1993

THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Introduction

The role of the United Nations under the Charter is to promote the peaceful settlement of disputes and, in situations where the parties have resorted to the use of force, to persuade them to return to the search for peaceful settlement through negotiations, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and other means specified in article 33 of the Charter. In the event that parties to a conflict are determined to fight one another and to settle matters on the battlefield it becomes difficult for the United Nations to play its role. In Bosnia and Herzegovina there is currently not only insistence on the resort to force but the humanitarian operations of international organisations are obstructed or sabotaged for military purposes while the personnel of UNPROFOR, UNHCR and other organisations are increasingly targeted deliberately by members of the armed forces. While all of this is going on the support of the international community for humanitarian operations is dwindling with a wide gap between the amounts governments pledge for humanitarian operations and the sums actually received. There is thus at hand a serious crisis of role and of means insofar as the United Nations and other organisations are involved in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I. The Humanitarian Situation

The following facts bring out the situation on the ground vividly.

- UNHCR has funds for humanitarian operations for only two more weeks.
- Governments pledge \$..... for humanitarian relief for the period to Of this, \$.... was delivered.
- The winter of 1992-93 was mild in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It must be assumed that the coming winter will be more severe, taking into account the usual kind of winter in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The problem facing UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations now is that they can hardly meet the needs of this summer, much less the needs of the coming winter. Since there is no sign of abatement of the conflict it must be assumed that there will be a need for humanitarian relief in the winter.
- There is clear evidence of the deliberate targeting of humanitarian personnel.
- Aid convoys are deliberately blocked as part of the military strategies of all three sides.
- UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations are unable to operate in some parts of the country.

II. The Peacekeeping Situation

The focus of the military conflict has shifted for a relatively localised Serbian-Bosnian confrontation in the east to a wide-ranging Croat-Bosnian confrontation in the center. This phase of the conflict, has disrupted UNHCR and commercial traffic to the point where food has become scarce in the area. Refugee populations are swelling. Humanitarian agencies advise that many civilians having exhausted their savings and food stocks over the last winter are destitute. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, UNPROFOR has been given the task of protecting humanitarian convoys and protecting the designated safe areas.

With the deployment of UNMO's to Gorazde, UNPROFOR has a presence in each of the Safe Areas that enable it to monitor the situation. However the stark realities are that there is little prospect for implementing the Safe Areas over the next weeks before new resources arrive and that the civilian population will face devastating hardship next winter unless UNPROFOR focuses as its first priority on efforts to restore utilities and humanitarian relief deliveries.

At the same time, there is solid evidence that members of UNPROFOR are becoming the targets of deliberate attacks with a resulting rise in the casualty rates. UNPROFOR has now lost 49 persons in the former Yugoslavia.

UNPROFOR's resources and equipment are also badly strained. UNPROFOR has an urgent need to ...

III. The Search for Peace

The implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan would have required the deployment of a large implementation force. There is no evidence to-date that Governments are willing to put such a force on the ground.

Efforts to pursue the progressive implementation of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan in the Croat and Muslim areas were being conducted by the Co-Chairman of the ICFY when the outbreak of fighting between the Muslims and the Croats made such a strategy impossible.

The only options thus left were to await the outcome of the military clashes or to try still to persuade the combattants to come to the negotiating table. The Co-Chairmen of the ICFY organized meetings in Genthod, Switzerland among Presidents, Izetbegovic, Milosevic, Tudjman and Bulatovic from 15-16 June. Presidents Milosevic, Tudjman and Bulatovic returned to Genthod for further talks on 23 June. The Co-Chairmen of the ICFY also arranged for the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to hold several meetings in Geneva to join in the search for peace.

In the course of these meetings of leaders arranged by the Co-Chairmen of the ICFY, the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs have

Av-5
Medevac
capability
signals
surveillance
eggs
X

FCIF
urgent time
no
no
no

suggested some revision of the Vance-Owen Constitutional Principles, Military Agreement and Agreement on Interim Arrangements with the main change being the structuring of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has not yet adopted a position on them.


With regard to the allocation of territories among the proposed three internal republics, the Croats and the Serbs have not yet put forward formal proposals. They have indicated that this issue should be worked out in direct negotiations among the three parties.

The Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina met in Sarajevo on 29 June and (reportedly) decided to establish a three-member working group to develop a position for the Presidency in the negotiations, with a view to meeting the Co-Chairmen by 6 July. When the Presidency adopts a position it will be possible to ascertain whether the three parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina are destined for discussions with a view to the achievement of a negotiated settlement or for further conflict, with devastating consequences for the innocent civilian population. As historic choice thus faces the Bosnian parties : the path of peace or the path of war.

To: Lord Owen/Mr Stoltenberg

(Copy to: List A internal)

From: Graham Messervy-Whiting



Date: 29 June 1993

Subject: ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN BiH

Extract from HQ BHC's most recent assessment of the current military situation in BiH are reproduced below.

a. Northern Bosnia. There is no change to our assessment. The BRCKO/POSAVINA corridor continues to be the point of main effort. The BSA will probably mount subsidiary operations elsewhere [eg East of DOBOJ ; GRACANICA; GRADACAC; CELIC; SAPNA] to tie down BiH/HVO potential reinforcement forces. Despite the inter-ethnic conflict in Central Bosnia, there are only minor indications of similar animosities developing in N Bosnia. However, the feeling of isolation and the frustrations and difficulties that arise from it continue. This has been exacerbated by the treatment meted out by the HVO to the "Convoy of Joy".

b. Eastern Bosnia. The BiH will continue to harass the BSA around SREBRENICA. Serb restraint could soon snap over blatant BiH use of ZEPA as a rest and staging area. The BSA will maintain pressure on GORAZDE until they have reduced it to a state of impotence. They will probably then move more forces up to the BRCKO/POSAVINA Corridor. They may also move forces up to either the SAPNA/RASTOSNICA thumb, or to the OLOVO/VARES area.

c. Central Bosnia. The BiH have gained the initiative and will attempt to press home their advantage. They will probably attempt to gain more territory, and encircle/entrap the Croat community within the general area contained within a line VITEZ-G.VAKUF-JABLANICA-KONJIC-TARCIN-KISELJAK-VITEZ in order to use them as bargaining levers to force the Croats in Southern Bosnia to allow unhindered commercial traffic to and from Central and N Bosnia, and the coast. Concurrently, and to the same end, they will attempt to secure the key traffic routes JABLANICA-PROZOR (including junction point at PROZOR), and JABLANICA-TARCIN. The BSA and HVO cooperation will increasingly frustrate the BiH by forcing them to maintain sufficient troops on the frontline to counter BSA offensives, while also trying to protect the Muslim communities and their defensive lines around ZENICA. The BSA objectives may now become more ambitious given the increased support from the HVO in some areas and the consequent reduction in the strength of opposition. This is likely to result in pressure in the VARES-OLOVO area to separate the TUZLA Pocket, increased pressure on the weakened defences near TURBE and TRAVNIK, and pressure on VISOKO-BREZA to secure the road going N to VARES.

d. Southern Bosnia. The HVO will probably become more hostile towards the Muslims in Southern Bosnia, UNPROFOR convoys, and all Humanitarian convoys destined for Muslim areas in Central and Northern Bosnia. The BiH will become more aggressive because of the isolation of the Muslim community. The HVO will go on trying to maintain their superior position in MOSTAR (by pushing the BiH to the E side of the NERETVA river; although last week the HVO lost some ground on the W side of the BOULEVARD). Further north, they are trying to divide the BiH forces in the JABLANICA-KONJIC area by attacking the BOKSEVICA HEIGHTS (YJ 2344) and linking with the HVO KOSTAJNICA pocket (YJ 2544). As stated last week, the BiH may now be working to a strategic plan. We still assess that the initial aim in Southern Bosnia will be to take control of the TARCIN-KONJIC-JABLANICA-PROZOR-GORNJI VAKUF area, and take control of the roads from D.DREZNICA to JABLANICA-PROZOR and from JABLANICA to KONJIC-TARCIN: in order to complement the BiH Central Bosnia plan, and to force the Croats to allow traffic to the MOSTAR Muslim community. It is assessed that this plan will be accomplished by VI CORPS, recently formed up by the BiH in this area.

Pani
for info.
Jovan

SUMMARY

1. RECENT OVERT SIGHTINGS, ALREADY REPORTED UP UNPROFOR CHANNELS FROM BRITISH SOURCES IN BOSNIA, CONFIRMING HV PRESENCE IN SUPPORT OF BOSNIAN CROAT FORCES (HVO). BRITISH FORCES (BRITFOR) CONTENT THAT THESE SIGHTINGS MAY BE DISSEMINATED WIDELY.

DETAIL

2. 7 MAY 93 - A UK LIAISON OFFICER HAD A CONVERSATION WITH AN HV SOLDIER, WHO COMMENTED THAT HIS UNIT WAS GIVEN THE SPECIAL TASK OF ASSAULTING A POSITION IN THE SLATINA AREA (3 KMS NORTH-WEST OF JABLANICA), WHICH THE HVO HAD FAILED TO TAKE.

3. 28 MAY 93 - THE BRITISH BATTALION (BRITBAT) REPORTED THE SIGHTING OF A VEHICLE BEARING "DUBROVNIK TIGERS" (HV) INSIGNIA ON THE PROZOR TO JABLANICA ROAD.

4. 18 JUNE 93 - BRITBAT REPORTED THE SIGHTING OF A LARGE NUMBER OF HV TROOPS, TOGETHER WITH A NUMBER OF HVO AND HOS (BOSNIAN CROAT IRREGULAR) TROOPS, IN PROZOR.

5. 18 JUNE 93 - A UK LIAISON OFFICER REPORTED THE SIGHTING OF A NUMBER OF VILIBUS SPECIAL FORCES TROOPS (HV FROM THE ZADAR AREA) MOVING TOWARDS PROZOR.

6. BRITFOR COMMENT THAT THE PRESENCE OF HV TROOPS NORMALLY INDICATES AN AREA OF IMPORTANT HVO EFFORT AND, BY INFERENCE, A STRATEGIC POINT OF EFFORT FOR THE CROATIAN GOVERNMENT. HV FORCES ARE USED TO BOLSTER HARD-PRESSED AND POORLY TRAINED HVO UNITS WHO ARE HAVING PROBLEMS ACHIEVING AN OBJECTIVE. A GOOD EXAMPLE IS THE CURRENT OPERATION TO THE NORTH EAST OF JABLANICA, WHERE THE BIH FORCES APPEAR TO BE PUTTING UP A ROBUST STAND AND THE HVO HAVE CONSISTENTLY FAILED TO TAKE THE VITAL GROUND IN THE AREA TO THE EAST OF THE TOWN.

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

20/9
CNZ 558 CYZ 386 P 1/4

'93 JUN 29 -2 :40

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB FOR WAHLGREN
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
DATE: 28 JUNE 1993
NUMBER: MSC-1280
SUBJECT: Serb Roadblocks near Sarajevo

[Handwritten signature]
CODED CABLE

1. Please find enclosed two self-explanatory letters on the above subject, one from the office of the Presidency of the Republic and one from ABC News.
2. I should be grateful for your comments on the overall issue as well as suggested draft replies.

DISTRIBUTION:	
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JUN 29 1993
P 10:31

FAX-IN

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P 2/4

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REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND HAITI GOVINA

PRESIDENCY

PRESIDENCY

Sarajevo, June 26, 1993

28-06

~~Mr. Annan~~

cc Mr. Gonzales

AS

ST/PS/RN

81x.

As you may know in October 1992 on the road to the airport of Sarajevo the Serbian aggressor established the heavy reinforced control point, thus violating the Airport Agreement, changing the regime of movement and endangering the security of transport.

This road is frequently used for the transport of Bosnian presidential delegations and the control point is the constant threat to their lives. In tolerating this situation by UNPROFOR, on the same spot Bosnian Vice Prime Minister was killed by aggressor's soldiers right inside the UN armed personnel carrier (APC).

We urgently request the removal of that control point and taking full control over the road by UN forces, thus fulfilling the Airport Agreements, or the change of route to the airport through Dobrinja settlement.

In expectation of your immediate reaction, please accept our deepest considerations.

Office of the President

Malik Shalji
Advocate

Advise

CONFERENCE CENTRE
QUARTERS

1993 Jul 26 1 P 6:56

ZAGREB
RO'S INITIALS

RO'S INITIALS

93 JUN 26 15 29

UNESCO
COMMUNICATIONS

S1



ABC News 47 West 66 Street New York NY 10023 (212) 456 4006

Robert J. Murphy
Senior Vice President

28/6 11:20 am
KA

Mr. Kofi Annan
Under Secretary General
Office of Peace Keeping Operations
Room S-2627A
United Nations
New York, NY 10017

Accd.: ST, PS, RK, I
To solve the problem of
Serbia Roadblock" as he
requests, UNPROFOR must
first assure its own
freedom of movement.

Dear Sir:

I would like to bring to your attention the serious problems that our ABC News team in Sarajevo is experiencing with the new Serbian roadblock just outside Sarajevo airport.

Our team, including correspondent, Jim Laurie, and producer, Robin Weiner, was stopped and thoroughly searched by Serb militia at 15:45 on June 21st, just after they had arrived from Split. Their notebooks and files were carefully examined, one videotape (which was being delivered on behalf of ABC, Australia, to the office of President Izetbegovic) was confiscated, and all Serbo-Croat language newspapers were taken away.

On June 23rd, at 15:20, our team experienced another incident at the same Serbian roadblock. Our sound technician, David Hands, (UNPROFOR ID #1477) was enroute to the airport when he was stopped by the Serbs and asked for the papers to our armoured car (a rented Opel Senator). When David was unable to produce documents to their satisfaction, the Serbs accused him of stealing the car and threatened to confiscate it. When David protested, he was told he could keep the car, but he must return to Sarajevo. He was not permitted to proceed to the airport.

ABC News regards these types of examinations, harassment and confiscation, threatened or actual, as unacceptable. We also understand we are not the only broadcast journalists to have had problems at the Serb airport road checkpoint.

CNZ 558 CYZ 386 P 4/4

As accredited journalists with UNPROFOR, we would like to request that UNPROFOR take immediate action to solve the problem of this Serbian roadblock.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Slobodan Milosevic', written over a large, stylized circular flourish.

June 25, 1993

CZG-668 CZN-849 **OUTGOING** UNPROFOR COMMUNICATIONS
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OUTGOING CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVA

INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
STOLTENBERG, ZAGREBFROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Wahlgren*

DATE: 27 JUNE 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 824

SUBJECT: AGREEMENT FOR PEACE IN BIH

REF: YOUR MSC 06137

INTERNAL: FC, DFC, DCN, COS, ACOS O/I, ACOS P/L, COO, COPO, FE, CAO.

1. FURTHER TO MY Z-797 23 JUN 93, I ENCLOSE MY PROPOSAL FOR THE AMENDMENTS TO ANNEX IV TO SG REPORT S/25479 26 MAR 93.
2. YOU WILL NOTICE THAT THE APPENDIX ON THE "DRAFT AGREEMENT FOR DEMILITARIZATION OF SARAJEVO" HAS BEEN REMOVED. AT PRESENT WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF DRAWING UP A DETAILED DOCUMENT FOR SIGNING WITHIN THE MMWG ON THE 6TH OF JULY.
3. THE SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS WILL NOT CHANGE THE ESSENTIALS OF THE EARLIER DOCUMENT, BUT MAY IMPROVE THE CLARITY THEREOF.
4. REGARDS.

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit
 Palais des Nations

2/17

ANNEX IV (*)Agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina

THE UNDERSIGNED

Welcoming the invitation of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia to participate in Talks for the restoration of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Taking account of the constructive atmosphere of the peace talks held in Geneva from 2 to 5 January and the assistance of the Force Commander of the United Nations Protection Force, Lieutenant-General Satish-Nambiar,

Keeping in mind the principles of the International Conference and the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, in particular resolutions 752 (1.992) and 787 (1.992) pertaining to withdrawal of all outside forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Wishing to bring the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to an end without further delay and to re-establish peace throughout the country.

Desiring to work out arrangements for bringing about compliance with a cessation of hostilities and for monitoring it so as to ensure that it is effective and lasting,

Hereby agree on the following:

1. Measures for the achievement of an unconditional cessation of hostilities throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, as set out in Annex I to the present agreement;
2. Measures for the restoration of infrastructure in Bosnia and Herzegovina as set out in Annex II to the present agreement;
3. Measures on the opening of routes as set out in Annex III to the present Agreement;
4. Arrangements on the separation of forces as set out in Annex IV to the present agreement;
5. Measures for the demilitarization of Sarajevo, as set out in Annex V to the present agreement;
6. Measures for the monitoring of the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina as set out in Annex VI to the present agreement;

(*): Previously reproduced in S/25403, Annex III

3/17

7. Return of forces to designated provinces, as set out in Annex VII to the present agreement.

A. IZETBEGOVIC

R. KARADZIC

M. BOBAN

Witnessed by:

C. VANCE

D. OWEN

Geneva, 30th day of January 1993

4/17

(Annex I)Cessation of hostilities

BROAD PRINCIPLES

All parties agree to support the broad principles required to support a cessation of hostilities. These broad principles will be translated into concrete action through additional discussion within the Mixed Military Working Group. Several of the principles will be dealt with on a stand-alone basis, although they remain an integral part of the overall framework of the cessation of hostilities.

The broad principles are:

A cease-fire must be put in place and remain effective. This is to be implemented 7 days from midnight (New York time - EST) of the day on which the Security Council endorses this plan.

Monitoring and control measures are to be put in place to ensure compliance and should include as a minimum:

- Establishment of joint commissions, including:
 - representatives with executive authority from the warring parties in the area
 - communications to appropriate commandbody, to be provided by warring parties
 - a senior commission in Sarajevo, for Army HQ level
 - a number of regional joint commissions
- Links between Commanders in conflict areas (hot lines)
- Provision of United Nations Protection Force/European Community Monitoring Mission liaison and monitors;
- Establishment of joint crisis management teams;
- Guaranteed freedom of movement for the United Nations Protection Force and monitoring agencies.

Execution of all agreed action of the warring parties, as specified below, will come into effect on D+7 to ensure full compliance with the cease fire.

The restoration of infrastructure will proceed on a priority basis as decided by the Infrastructure Management Group in conjunction with all parties. Annex II.

Routes supporting the general freedom of movement of people, commerce and humanitarian aid are to be opened.

5/17

Annex III

The separation of forces is to be achieved progressively, and is to include monitoring of infantry and heavy weapons on both sides of confrontation lines. Annex IV.

6/17

(Annex II)Restoration of infrastructure

All parties agree that denial or use of civil utilities as a weapon of war is unacceptable and all affirm their commitment to the full restoration of the civil infrastructure across Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular, Sarajevo, for all civilians irrespective of ethnic origins.

The provision of humanitarian aid can not be linked in any way with the military steps in the cessation of hostilities. Restoration of infrastructure is humanitarian in nature but is strictly dependent on the willingness of all three parties to support it.

It includes where applicable:

- Power grids
- Power stations and related coal mines
- Bridges
- Gas
- Telecommunications
- Railway lines
- Routes
- Water supply

Guarantees of security will be requested and must be provided. The restoration of power/water/heat will be fully supported by the warring parties.

Assistance will be provided through all the appropriate agencies, including UN and civilian expertise. However, within Bosnia Hercegovina the IMG and the joint committee in SARAJEVO, with representatives of all sides, is to identify the priorities and define needs according to local resources and aid agencies resources. The works will be executed in conjunction with civilian authorities and relevant local agencies. To this end, vital installations will be identified in conjunction with the IMG.

- Access will be guaranteed after local arrangements are made.
- Forces will be withdrawn from sites consistent with security.
- Local forces will provide, as agreed in joint committee, liaison with the repair teams.
- Civil agencies/workers will be assisted.

Parties will work to re-establish infrastructure, including railways/power grids/water supplies, across borders with neighbouring republics.

7/17

Respect for infrastructure facilities must be developed and they must remain free from attack or use as defensive positions.

All parties agree to develop a common instruction for passage down chains of command to demonstrate an equal endorsement of support and to allow free access for reconnaissance, workers and expert teams.

8/17

(Annex III)Opening of routes

The opening of routes is directly related to the political issue which concerns the freedom of movement of all people in the context of constitutional principles. It is equally applicable to the besieged areas of Sarajevo, Gorazde, Zepa and Srebrenica, as well as all other areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is to be achieved through:

- Security guarantees by all parties to ensure non-interference and protection of personnel and material using the routes.
- Non-interference on the route.
- Checkpoints, patrols, and monitoring by United Nations Protection Force/European Community Monitoring Mission, as appropriate.
- Supervised control measures.
- Freedom of passage of humanitarian aid.
- Absolute freedom of movement of United Nations forces.

The concept of blue routes for Sarajevo is attached. This format is applicable for the establishment of all other similar types of routes within Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additional routes will have to be negotiated in the Mixed Military Working Group.

Special attention will be required to provide the constituencies with access to a sea port on the Adriatic Coast, a guaranteed corridor to the BIHAC province and linkage of the besieged areas within Eastern Bosnia.

9/17

AppendixSarajevo "blue routes" concept

The parties have decided to establish three free passage routes with mutually agreed measures to guarantee and ensure safe passage for freedom of movement of civilians, commercial goods and humanitarian aid to and from Sarajevo.

These routes are:

- Sarajevo-Zenica-Sarajevo;
- Sarajevo-Mostar-Sarajevo;
- Sarajevo-Zvornik-Sarajevo.

Outline for blue routes1. Execution1.1 Prerequisites

The following prerequisites are to be required:

- 1.1.1 Cessation of hostilities
- 1.1.2 Complete freedom of movement for United Nations Protection Force forces on the three blue routes.

1.2 Use of the blue routes1.2.1 Timings

Routes will be open during daylight hours for convoys. United Nations Protection Force forces will use the routes 24 hours each day.

1.2.2 Access for civilians

All civilians, regardless of sex, age, or ethnic origin, and without weapons or ammunition, will be allowed to use the routes. Private and commercial vehicles will also be permitted on each route subject to inspection outlined in paragraph 1.5.1 below.

10/17

1.2.3 Access for humanitarian aid

All international and local humanitarian aid agencies will be allowed to use the routes. Humanitarian aid includes, but is not limited to, food, water, medical supplies and fuel.

1.2.4 Access for commercial goods

Normal commerce will be progressively restored to and from Sarajevo.

1.3 Establishment of routes

1.3.1 Sarajevo-Zenica-Sarajevo

This route incorporates Sarajevo-Rajlovac-Ilijas-Visoko-Zenica.

1.3.2 Sarajevo-Mostar-Sarajevo

This route incorporates Sarajevo-Ilidza-Hadzici-Tarcin-Jablanica-Mostar.

1.3.3 Sarajevo-Zvornik-Sarajevo

This route incorporates Sarajevo-Bentbasa-Mokro-Sokolac-Vlasenica-Zvornik.

1.4 Checkpoints

Checkpoints will be established and manned by United Nations Protection Force forces at the entrance and exit of each route and when crossing the boundaries of the constituent units. Each United Nations Protection Force checkpoint will be located near or with the checkpoint of the force controlling the territory involved consistent with the security requirements of the factions. No side will be permitted to erect a new checkpoint.

1.5 Control measures

1.5.1 Inspection procedures

a. Inspections will be conducted by United Nations Protection Force forces. Each side is permitted to monitor the events in close coordination with the United Nations Protection Force.

11/17

b. War-related material, weapons or ammunition are forbidden. If found, the items will be confiscated and subsequently destroyed under control of the United Nations Protection Force and the parties.

c. Humanitarian aid convoys may be subjected to inspections.

d. Checkpoints will be activated only during daylight hours as a safety measure for civilians and convoys.

1.5.2 Convoys security

a. In principle the freedom of movement will enable the movement of convoys. Security will therefore be provided as area security.

Only in case of emergency or where required, specific convoys will be escorted.

b. Each convoy will be escorted with the appropriate United Nations Protection Force vehicles.

c. Convoys and escorts will take priority over military activities.

d. The Army controlling the territory involved may provide civilian police as an additional means of security.

1.5.3 Patrols

a. United Nations Protection Force forces will monitor/patrol the blue routes as necessary.

b. Patrols will consist of at least two vehicles suitably equipped and will contain an appropriate communications net.

c. All United Nations Protection Force patrols will be permitted to cross all checkpoints.

1.6 Implementation

1.6.1 Suggested timeframe

D-7 - Security Council endorses the plan

D+1 - Inspection procedures agreed

12/17

D+7 - Erecting checkpoints

D+7 - Routes cleared of all obstacles
by three parties

D+15 - Reconnoitre by the United Nations
Protection Force

Opening of blue routes for civilians
and humanitarian aid as soon as
possible. However this depends fully
on the conditions of the route and
availability of resources to repair
damage.

13/17

(Annex IV)

Separation of forces

The parties agree that the separation of forces is an element of the overall cessation of hostilities. An agreement will be based on the steps and control measures and sequence of events outlined below. Separation of forces and withdrawal of heavy weapons are linked.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

- Security Council endorses the plan - initiates all follow-on actions (D-7). The 7 days permit passage of information:
- Cessation of hostilities to be fully effective D-Day, to include:
 - Temporary freezing of the military situation, on the existing lines pending agreement on redeployment of forces behind the demarcation lines of their respective constituencies.
 - No forward deployment or offensive action.
 - No move of additional forces, explosives or weapons forward will be permitted. Rotation on an individual basis is acceptable.
- Declaration of forces. This is to take place on D-4 and should include:
 - Numbers and locations of all heavy weapons
 - Detailed documentation of minefields
 - Location of frontlines (traces)
 - Defensive works and positions
- Establish and mark confrontation lines (CFL)
 - Agree areas of separation in which no forces are allowed. These may be small initially but will be enlarged progressively in consultation within the Mixed Military Working Group.
 - Abandon defensive works on confrontation lines and progressively within areas of separation.
 - Patrol areas of separation.
- Withdrawal of heavy weapons on time schedule as agreed by regional joint commissions

14/17

- of calibre 12.7 mm and above
- locations to be determined based on suitability for monitoring and in principle on effective ranges of weapon systems.
- Ammunition will be stored and monitored separately.
- Infantry is to be withdrawn to barracks locations as available and monitored.
- All such withdrawals will be supervised by the United Nations Protection Force and subsequently monitored at the designed locations by the United Nations Protection Force in order to prevent use or deployment.
- After completion of the withdrawal of heavy weapons and separation of forces, designated parties of all warring factions will return to within the demarcation zone and start clearing all minefields they have laid.
- Security and monitoring of the area of separation requires absolute freedom of movement for UNPROFOR, including the use of observation helicopters.
- Details of implementation, disputes, clarifications and breaches of the cessation of hostilities will be dealt with by the appropriate Joint Commission or Mixed Military Working Group.

15/17

(Annex V)

Establishment of Sarajevo as a Safe Area

The establishment of Sarajevo as a safe area is based on one requirement: an effective cessation of hostilities.

The other elements are:

- Establishment of control on a designated line
- Restoration of civil utilities
- Land routes and freedom of movement
- Separation of forces along lines of confrontation.

Control measures include:

- Patrol and monitoring of the demarcation line
- Checkpoints at major crossings until confidence is restored
- Mixed patrols in the areas of separation.

A military/civil joint commission as previously proposed should oversee the implementation of the accord.

A draft document for the establishment of Sarajevo as a safe area will be prepared for signature by the high level Mixed Military Working Group.

16/17

(Annex VI)Monitoring of borders

Pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolution 787 (1992), paragraph 5, to prevent interference from outside the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the United Nations Protection Force/European Community Monitoring Mission will monitor borders with neighbouring republics, as well as between the constituent units. This annex also takes note of Security Council Resolution 838 (1993).

Principles

United Nations Protection Force/European Community Monitoring Mission forces will monitor crossings to prevent weapons, ammunition, military personnel or irregular forces from entering the country.

Borders between the constituent units and with adjoining republics will be monitored.

United Nations Protection Force actions to observe, monitor and report will be facilitated by the authorities of the constituencies and the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

17/17

(Annex VII)

Return of forces to designated provinces

To enable the process of return to normality and as a direct result follow-on from the cessation of hostilities and the separation of forces, a return of forces to designated provinces will be conducted. This can start as part of the withdrawal of heavy weapons but it is hard to fix a definite date for the completion of this process. We should however aim to achieve the return of forces within 60 days.

This stage will be coordinated with an agreed demobilization of forces in being.

The United Nations Protection Force/European Community Monitoring Mission will monitor the withdrawal of these forces in conjunction with national and provincial authorities.

The Mixed Military Working Group would be the technical negotiating agency.

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UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

P.15

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'93 JUN 26 10:06

MOST IMMEDIATE

ZAGREB
RO'S INITIALS

TO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA
STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

FROM: WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Wahlgren*

DATE: 26 June 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR

CODED CABLE

SUBJECT: REPORT ON MEETINGS OF CO BH COMMAND

Attached, please find a copy of the report by
Lieutenant General Morillon on his meetings with Dr. Ganic and Gen
Mladic on 24 and 25 June 1993 for your information.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION; FC

UNOG Telecom. Unit
Palais des Nations

'93 JUN 26 10:25

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C2G-662 P2/S

Mr. Matthews

1. Met Dr GANIC to inform him of impending changes in the command and line structure of UNPROFOR, measure his response to deployment of additional troops into BH, and determine his priorities. I addressed the rationale for the changes in the command structure in view of the anticipated increase in the number of troops in BH, with its concomitant increase in the number of participating nations. I also indicated that I would be meeting with MLADIC the following day.
2. I emphasised the urgency of persuading villagers in SREBRENICA, ZEPA, GORAZDE and to a lesser extent, BIHAC, to return to their homes by 1 Aug 93 in order to prepare for the coming winter. I also gave an overview of the increase of French troops in Sector Sarajevo, the redeployment of current assets and the possibility of troops from BANGLADESH, PAKISTAN and TUNISIA.

26 JUN

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P.4

C2G-662 P315

3. GANIC expressed satisfaction with the prospect that the incoming troops would be better armed and equipped to fulfil the mandate. He saw BiH priorities in the following order:

- a. Establishment of Safe Zones;
- b. Establishment of Safe Corridors, i.e. MOSTAR Road; and
- c. The survival of SARAJEVO.

4. GANIC was pressed for time and we agreed to meet the following day, 25 Jun 93, to further explore prospects for the future.

25 JUNE 1993 - MEETING WITH MLADIC

5. Met MLADIC who was in a buoyant and receptive mood as I described the impending changes in UNPROFOR, including my departure in a few weeks time. Although he accepted the rationale for the changes, he expressed dismay at the seemingly precipitate nature of the changes.

6. I shared my prognosis of the evolving situation in the Presidency as resulting in:

- a. Radicalisation, with IZETBEGOVIC retaining power, supported by extremists but pretty well limited to SARAJEVO; or
- b. A victory by ABDIC and the moderates, who would enjoy greater popular support, not only in SARAJEVO but in North, West and Central BOSNIA.

7. MLADIC acknowledged that hindsight of a year later now tells him that he did not fully appreciate the depth of the crisis and that the civil war could have been prevented. He returned continuously to the theme of dominance of the BALKANS by the Vatican, German economic power and Islam, likening potential confrontation to the crusades. He acknowledged that so far the Muslims are less guilty than the Croats but that they have paid a disproportionately high price. He expressed disappointment that ABDIC refused to meet him last year, but in view of the struggle in the Presidency, MLADIC expressed a willingness to give ABDIC a 'second chance', providing he is sincere, honest and negotiates in good faith. He allowed that ABDIC will need early success to consolidate his base. He expressed contempt for those who contributed to the violent breakup of YUGOSLAVIA by their inaction and lack of resolve.

8. MLADIC went on to express his appreciation to

UNPROFOR and expressed regret for the casualties sustained thus far. I reiterated my earlier statement that I could not place UN troops at continued risk if there was no desire for peace by all three parties. I also offered my good office for a discreet meeting between MLADIC and ABDIC.

CZG-662

P4/S

9. I emphasised the urgency of allowing/helping refugees to return home to repair their homes before the onset of winter and that the movement should be completed by early August.

10. I sought his reaction to the redeployment of current assets in BH Command and the possibility of Bangladesh, Pakistan and Tunisia contributing troops. MLADIC supported the idea of UN troops in RAJLOVAC, CANBAT2 in TUZLA, FREBAT3 with TUNBAT in BIHAC, BRITBAT and BANGBAT in Central Bosnia, RUSSBAT and UKRBAT in Eastern Bosnia but was not enamoured with Pakistani troops coming into BH. He also suggested YUG troops in Southern Bosnia in SPABAT area between BSA and HVO. He acknowledged that details would have to be worked out at future meetings and that he would reflect at length on the question of the return of Muslim refugees to their homes in Eastern Bosnia.

11. MLADIC expressed scepticism that he would ever get UNHCR to pay for road maintenance. He further stated that air drops are expensive and should stop since humanitarian aid can get in by road. Moreover, he expressed support for affecting repairs to power plants and utilities before the onset of winter.

12. To the question of adding a political/civil dimension to MMWG, MLADIC agreed that participation should be by 'experts' and not at Ministerial level.

13. Concerning theft of UNPROFOR vehicles and firing on UN personnel MLADIC promised to investigate.

14. Concerning BiH representative DIVJAK at the MMWG, MLADIC acknowledged DIVJAK's extended family included many Serbs and that he would guarantee safe passage for DIVJAK and family out of SARAJEVO.

15. Meeting lasted two and one half hours. I indicated that I would bring my successor to introduce him and if propitious, the new FC, Gen Jean Cot.

25 JUNE 1993 - MEETING WITH DR GANIC

16. I gave GANIC a summary of my meeting with MLADIC. In addition to reiterating his priorities as stated the previous day, GANIC went on to say that he is a modern, European, moderate Muslim with no desire to be the new leader. He acknowledged that the current conflict cannot be solved militarily, but that a better balance

of power i.e. arming Muslims would inspire more compromise by the other two parties.

CZG-662

17. To the question of utilities repair GANIC suggested formation of a joint commission to oversee repairs, reporting directly to UNPROFOR.

PS/S

18. To the question of allowing people to leave SARAJEVO to re-unite with their families, GANIC agreed it would be possible if UNPROFOR could guarantee survival of SARAJEVO.

19. To GANIC's expression of concern over the fundamental changes in UNPROFOR command and line structure I assured him that the evolution will occur with sufficient senior staff remaining, who have the corporate memory to provide continuity. To the question of ABDIC as a contender for leadership GANIC stated that ABDIC is a good businessman, able to strike balance with the Croats and Serbs, but made a mistake by leaving SARAJEVO and trapping himself in BIHAC.

20. Meeting lasted one and one half hours with assurances that we would remain in close touch.

21. Meeting with PETKOVIC scheduled for 27 Jun 93. Will report separately at the conclusion of the meeting, as well as on any other developments when I and the personalities involved have had the opportunity to reflect further on peripheral issues discussed at the margins of the meetings as well as on recent announcements by UNNY.

CODE RESTRICTED

OUTGOING

CZK 828 MOST IMMEDIATE

CZG 647 Palais des Nations

CZK 57

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS'93 JUN 24 12:15
MOST IMMEDIATE

'93 JUN 24 11:51

TO : STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB
STOLTENBERG/OWEN, ICFY, GENEVAZAGREB
RO'S INITIALSINFO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
HQ B-H COMD FWD, COMD
HQ B-H COMD MAIN, COSFROM : WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Wahlgren*

DATE : 24 June 93

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 803

SUBJECT : FOCUS OF OPERATIONS IN B-H OVER COMING MONTHS

The aim of this cable is to recommend a principle course of action and a renewed emphasis on humanitarian relief in Bosnia-Herzegovina by UN agencies and UNPROFOR, as this humanitarian relief remains the primary mission of UNPROFOR in B-H. We still remain prepared to facilitate and exploit to the extent possible any developments for Safe Areas, however, major changes in the politico-military situation since the passage of SCR 836 give scant grounds for well founded optimism in the next weeks, and it will take until October to build up most of Bosnia-Herzegovina Command in order to implement the Safe Area agreements. Therefore, my intention is now to concentrate on activities and issues where we can do the most good with our current resources. The stark realities are that there is little prospect for implementing the Safe Areas over the next weeks before the new resources arrive, and that the civilian population will face devastating hardship next winter unless we now focus as first priority on a package of diplomatic, military, engineering, and logistical efforts to restore utilities and humanitarian relief deliveries.

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With our ongoing responsibilities, and the resources available even after augmentation, we cannot force ourselves into intended Safe Areas or deter effectively aggression against them or along our lines of communication, once arrived. We must therefore accept that negotiated agreements, coupled with an effective cease fire, is the best option to implement and sustain Safe Areas. The best we thus can do is to maintain sufficient presence, to monitor the situation with a view to at any opportunity reacting in greater strength to any more positive developments. With the deployment of UNMOs to Gorazde, we have a presence in each of the Safe Areas that meets the requirement to monitor the situation while conserving forces for the essential task of restoring and sustaining humanitarian delivery through southern and central Bosnia-Herzegovina, to the benefit of the established Safe Areas.

A close examination of our options for further implementation of Safe Areas has determined that largely because of the greatly deteriorated security situation in central Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are no resources available before the arrival of additional battalions. One Ukrainian company could be possibly deployed in Gorazde, but this must then occur before unit rotation in early July. This action will have some complications - first some time is required to enhance the unit's readiness; secondly, the military situation around Gorazde has not stabilized, and thirdly, we have clear indications that Serb authorities will use precedents (dissatisfactions with Srebrenica and Zepa) to insist on a tightly controlled full demilitarization of Gorazde. As this insistence cannot be accommodated within Resolution 836, raising at this time the implementation of Gorazde as a Safe Area should be through negotiations with both Bosnian and Serb authorities.

Beyond the immediate practical limitations on our ability to proceed further with Safe Areas, our probability of success is further and perhaps decisively constrained by the far-reaching politico-military changes that have occurred since SCR 836. The details of which we have not been informed. At the same time, the focus on military conflict has shifted from a relatively localized and one-sided Serbian-Bosnian confrontation in the east, to a wide-ranging Croatian-Bosnian confrontation in the centre in which government forces, are taking initiative and are achieving some success. This phase of the conflict,

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which appears to be far from over, has disrupted UNHCR and commercial traffic to the point where food has become scarce north of the line Gornj Vakuf-Jablanica-Konjic. Croatian roadblocks have closed the main supply route near Konjic, and deliveries on secondary routes from the west are low and frequently interrupted by fighting. Refugee populations are swelling. The ECMM and other agencies advise that many civilians, having exhausted their savings and food stocks over the last winter are destitute. UNHCR stock levels inside B-H are down to a few days, and utilities may soon shut down due to lack of fuel or interrupted transmission lines.

With winter coming, we must now focus on building stocks and restoring utilities. This will require a range of complex, coordinated, multi-level negotiations, coupled with a re-examination of UNPROFOR operational deployments and procedures. If we succeed in reopening the main Mostar-Konjic-Zenica road through a combination of diplomatic pressure and local negotiation, I am also convinced that it will take all our current military flexibility to improve route surveillance, stabilize outbreaks of fighting, repair bridges, utilities and road surfaces, and remove any new road blocks or obstacles that may be emplaced by any of the warring parties. To this end, the impending addition of an air support capability will be useful in signalling the seriousness of our intent. Success in opening the main supply route, coupled with attempts to send more convoys through Serbian areas, will reopen central Bosnia-Herzegovina to high volume UNHCR traffic. The central route is also essential to restoring commercial traffic, which in the overall scheme is the most critical contributor to the delivery of goods and the economic survival of the region.

In conclusion, I see little prospect for concentrating our limited resources for further implementation of the Safe Area concept in the coming weeks in view of the ongoing military operations of the parties. At the same time, there is little benefit to Safe Areas if the people in them cannot be fed. The current situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is such that the mere insistence on freedom of movement, even complemented with air power, will not restore deliveries. The problems on the supply routes must be managed now by both diplomatic and military means if we are to avoid catastrophe this winter. I will make a start with the resources I have to concentrate on this essential objective. To that

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end, I have directed Bosnia-Herzegovina Command to commence detailed planning, while at the same time continuing to prepare for the reception of additional forces that can be used if necessary to ensure supply routes remain open, or to execute new cease fire and confidence building tasks that might arise from ongoing discussions in Geneva or elsewhere.

Confirmation of your support in my approach is solicited. A new UNPROFOR priority must be made when the promised resources are deployed and the new political approach is clarified.

UNOG Telecomm. Unit
Palais des Nations

CNZ-549 (CY2-377) P1/1

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'93 JUN 24 17:07

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB FOR WAHLGREN
STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 24 JUNE 1993

NUMBER: 1220

SUBJECT: Focus of operations in B-R

Reyr UNPROFOR Z-803, we agree fully with your recommended approach. We will attempt to enlighten concerned Member States here about the considerations within which you are acting.

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1993 JUN 24 P 1:02

Palais des Nations

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR
COMMUNICATIONS

'93 JUN 23 17:42 UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE
(UNPROFOR)

'93 JUN 23 17:13

C25-642

CRYPTO CABLE

ZAGREB

MOST IMMEDIATE INITIALS /so

Page 1 of

TO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : WAHLGREN, UNPROFOR ZAGREB

Wahlgren

DATE : 23 JUNE 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-

SUBJECT: LETTERS FROM BOBAN

Attached please find, for your attention, two self-explanatory letter.

ENDALL

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UNPROFOR



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CENTRAL & SOUTHERN BH -

VBPMR 282
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MOST IMMEDIATE/RESTRICTED

OUTGOING FAX N°	DATE: WEDNESDAY, 23 JUNE 93 1640B
TO: VICTOR ANDREEV, CAC, HQ BH COMMAND, KISELJAK	FM: ALBERT BENABOU, CIVAFF CENTRAL & SOUTHERN BH, MOSTAR
FAX N°:	FAX N°:
ATTN: YOLANDA AUGER, DDCA, HQ, ZAGREB. ED JOSEPH, CIVAFF, BH COMMAND, KISELJAK.	FILE REF N°: DRAFTER : ZANA DRAGICEVIC RELEASING OFF: SIGNATURE
INFO: FAX N°:	
SUBJECT: MR. BOBAN - CORRESPONDENCE.	

DEAR VICTOR, SHALOM!

PLEASE, FIND ATTACHED MR. BOBAN'S CORRESPONDENCE ADDRESSED TO:

- A. CO-CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
MR. THORVALD STOLTENBERG AND LORD DAVID OWEN. (A. - 3 PAGES)
- B. ICYF CO-CHAIRMAN LORD DAVID OWEN. (B. - 3 PAGES)

C. GENERAL PHILIPPE MORILLON, UNPROFOR COMMANDER FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,
SARAJEVO. (C. - 2 PAGES)

PLEASE, FORWARD TO THE CONCERNED PARTIES; THE CORRESPONDENCE HAS BEEN PROVIDED
TO US BY MR. BOBAN FOR PERSONAL INFORMATION AND TRANSMISSION.

AFTER MEETING WITH OFFICIALS FROM GRUDE TONIGHT, WE WILL SEND A REPORT CLARIFYING
ISSUES MENTIONED IN THE LETTERS.

.....
P.S. WITH OPTIMISM LET US QUOTE DANIEL WEBSTER - "JUSTICE IS A LIGAMENT WHICH HOLDS
CIVILIZED BEINGS AND CIVILIZED NATIONS TOGETHER".

BEST REGARDS AND WARM SHALOM,
ABA

DCM/DDCA
123/13/93



AGT. CANARIAS
SALIDA
N° 17/6
FECH 2.3 JUN. 1993

REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA U BOSNI I HERCEGOVINI

Ured Predsjedništva

Ref.: 0049/93

Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia
Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg and Lord David Owen

Mostar, 22 June 1993

Dear Co-Chairmen,

In view of continued Muslim aggression against Croat areas and civilians in Bosnia and Herzegovina, allow me to inform the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia about the Croat position that places importance to finding a political solution to this long-lasting crisis.

The policy position of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been and remains precise and unmistakable. As an independent and internationally recognized state and subject of international law, Bosnia and Herzegovina must and can be organized only as a union of three constituent peoples with the same rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina and the right to themselves in it. The internal organization can only be defined through the complete and just satisfaction of the political will of all three peoples. We view the international borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina as unquestionable and inviolable, while the internal administrative borders must and can be a subject for political talks. In this sense, from the very beginning and over the last twenty months, the full participation of the Croat delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina peace talks under the esteemed patronage of the United Nations and European Community was very constructive and attained recognition from influential international factors.

During our delegation's constructive efforts toward reaching an acceptable political solution to the crisis, we did not meet the support of the other two factors to this conflict. I would like to remind you that the Croat party was the first to sign the Vance-Owen peace plan, regarding the plan as one from a number of possible models of the political organization of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result of the ineffectiveness on the part of the international community from implementing the plan it supported and the obstruction of the other two parties in BiH from openly accepting the plan, the Croat party decided to continue peace talks based on new proposals presented by relevant international factors including the Secretary General of the United Nations.

(A)

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P4/8

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Ref.: 0049/93 letter to the Co-Chairmen

These proposals focus toward the constituting of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state union of three peoples and their territorial-political entities. At the Geneva peace talks, the Croat party will present their views of the fundamental principles constituting this union. Based upon your advice and the conclusions of the 16 June meeting in Geneva, the highest political representatives of the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into discussions to present their views to the highest political representatives of the Muslim and Serb peoples. During these discussions, a high level of accord was reached, a high level of readiness on all three parties to stop the war was buttressed and the beginning of a real and effective process toward a political solution to the crisis was expressed.

Naturally, major obstacles still exist on this path. Recently, a part of the political leadership of the Muslim people openly expressed the lack of a will to find a peaceful solution to the crisis and aspire to utilize war and aggression as a response to repeated calls of peace and cooperation. Mr. Alija Izetbegovic, President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and whose mandate expired 20 December 1992, is the leader of this faction of the Muslim political leadership. The Croat people and political leadership hold Mr. Alija Izetbegovic most responsible for the continuation of war and aggression against the Croat people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The major Croat policy interest is peace and freedom for all the peoples and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are at the threshold of attaining this goal. Co-Chairmen, I call upon you to utilize your influence and facilitate the immediate and unconditional meeting of all three parties at the negotiating table on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the only way to halt the horrible tragedy which has brought cataclysmic effects to all three peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Co-Chairmen, in regards to this communique, the Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina and their political leadership remain at your assistance.

Sincerely yours,

President



Mate Boban

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REPUBLIKA BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA
HRVATSKA ZAJEDNICA I HERCEGOVINA



Ured Predsjedništva -

Mostar, 22. lipnja 1993.

ref. br. 0049/93

contact: g. Vladislav Pogarcic, tel. 088/662-384
058/364-731

PRIOPCENJE

Predsjednik HZ HB g. Mate Boban uputio je danas pisma Glavnom Tajniku Ujedinjenih Naroda, B. B. Ghalliu, Predsjedniku USA, g. W. J. Clinton, Predsjedniku Vijeća sigurnosti UN, Nj. E. Don Juan A. Yanez - Barnuevu, Predsjedniku Vijeća ministara vanjskih poslova EZ, Nj. E. Niels Helveg Petersen, Supredsjedatelji IC FY, g. T. Stolttenbergu i lordu D. Owenu, u povodu teške situacije hrvatskog pučanstva u Bosni i Hercegovini i povodom novih hrvatskih inicijativa za mirno razrješavanje Krize. Molimo objavite pismo u cijelosti.

B
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C26-642 PG/8



Ured Predsjednika

Ref.:0051/93

ICFY CO-CHAIRMAN
LORD DAVID OWEN
GENEVA

Mostar, 22 June 1993

Dear Lord Owen,

In regard to your 20 June interview on the TV program "The World at One" with Richard Dimbleby and statement that "...the Muslims must be guaranteed an outlet to the sea, and it is possible that they are given Mostar", allow me to inform your Lordship of certain basic observations that refute your statement.

As a center and gravitational sphere throughout the past and up to the present, Mostar remains an indisputable basis of the geographic, historical, administrative and political province of Herzegovina. In addition, the importance of Mostar spread to the neighboring provinces of Bosnia and Dalmatia.

Contemporary Mostar is the major center in the gravitational sphere of south and southwest Bosnia and Herzegovina. It lags Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Tuzla and Zenica in population as a city (63,427) and municipality (110,377). But, based upon economic involvement in the surrounding area and communication, education-schooling, manpower, cultural and other development resources, Mostar is the only urban center in Herzegovina. Herzegovina is mainly settled by Croats who can satisfy their modern day needs (railroads, airport, university, radio, television, postal service, museums, theaters, sophisticated health care, publishing houses, etc.) in Mostar. The other two peoples have a greater number of such centers. The Serbs have Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Trebinje while the Muslims have Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica and Bihac.

The Croat majority within the nationally heterogeneous city of Mostar proper is indisputable for the last one hundred years. In regard to the functions and depending on the model of administrative and political arrangement, the Croat majority in the Mostar proper gravitational area changed from: 40.2% in 1985, 41.9% (1910), 63.4% (1948) and 61.8% (1953).

After the 1930's, an active policy of the social-economic and political destruction of Croats in BiH was initiated generally, producing negative results, - especially in the administrative and territorial rearrangement of districts. Thus, the removal of Croat settlements (e.g., Ljuti Dolac and others) and addition of Muslim settlements (e.g., D. and G. Dreznica, a settlement in Podvelez) administratively changed the national basis of the city of Mostar and simultaneously stimulated the migration of Serbs and Muslims from other areas. Based on this policy the two-thirds Croat majority decreased in Mostar to today's 33.5% which still represents a relative Croat majority. According to the last census, Muslims constitute less than one-third and the Serbs one-fifth of the population of the city municipality of Mostar. In addition, the Serbs fully acknowledge Mostar as a Croat city. There are no definite and published 1991 census figures of the Croat, Muslim and Serb population in Mostar.

Based upon final and published 1981 census population figures, the Croat majority municipality of Mostar encompassed 56 settlements out of which 25 were Croat majority, 18 with a Muslim majority and 11 with a Serb majority. The inner old city center had an insignificant Muslim majority while the surrounding city proper area had a Croat majority (41.2%). If the real gravitational settlements (which were previously a part of its administrative framework) were incorporated into Mostar, and the unnatural settlements excluded, then the Croat majority in this center, namely the city municipality, would be absolute (over 50%).

Taking into account the facts that, based upon the number of Croats in the municipality and city, Mostar is concurrently the largest Croat municipality and city in Bosnia and Herzegovina and home of 9.9% of urban Croats and 4.9% of the total number of Croats in BiH, Mostar is the only main city of the Croats in BiH.

In any type of state organization of BiH in context of the inalienable right of all the peoples in it to self-determination, each people must have their political, economic and cultural center which determine relevant infrastructural substance. In the fundamental designation of the territorial organization according to the Vance-Owen plan, the Muslims have those centers, as has already been mentioned, in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zenica, Doboj and Bihać, while the Serbs only have Banja Luka and the Croats only have Mostar. Therefore, your statement about Mostar being a Muslim city is an absurd that we believe was made by chance or under pressure. Also, all relevant means of allocating the rights of the three constituent peoples in Bosnia and Herzegovina run counter to your statement that "...the Muslims must be guaranteed an outlet to the sea". We remind that you are a witness to the rational and argued requests of the fundamental rights of the Croat people in BiH and our very high level of cooperation in finding a just solution to the conflicts in BiH with you personally and with domestic and international subjects.

With the belief that your statement was a mistake, not an intent, we await future cooperation with you at the highest level considering arguments and constructiveness. Express my deepest regards,

President



Mate Boban