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SECRETARY - GENERAL 'S TRIPS - TRIP TO UNITED KINGDOM,
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

21-22 JAN 1985

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REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
AT THE LUNCHEON TO BE HOSTED IN HIS HONOUR
BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF THAILAND

MR. FOREIGN MINISTER,
EXCELLENCIES,
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

IT IS A GREAT PLEASURE FOR ME TO BE YOUR GUEST AT THIS LUNCHEON, MR. MINISTER, AND TO ENJOY IN YET ANOTHER WAY YOUR GENEROUS HOSPITALITY. MAY I ALSO SAY THAT I AM, INDEED, TOUCHED BY YOUR KIND WORDS, WHICH ARE, OF COURSE, A GREAT ENCOURAGEMENT TO ME, PERSONALLY, BUT ALSO REFLECT THAILAND'S CONTINUING CO-OPERATION WITH THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE IMPORTANCE IT PLACES ON ITS MEMBERSHIP IN THE ORGANIZATION.

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THIS MORNING, WE WERE ABLE TO ENGAGE IN WHAT I BELIEVE WERE VALUABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS, ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES IN WHICH WE SHARE A COMMON INTEREST. MANY OF THESE ISSUES HAVE INTERNATIONAL RAMIFICATIONS AND ARE, THEREFORE, A MATTER OF CONTINUING CONCERN TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

WE HAVE JUST HAD THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A FURTHER EXCHANGE OF VIEWS AND YOU MAY BE SURE, MR. MINISTER, THAT I HAVE GREATLY BENEFITED FROM YOUR WIDE KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCE OF THE INTRICATE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THIS PART OF THE WORLD.

I WOULD LIKE TO PAY TRIBUTE TO YOU FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH WE WERE ABLE TO CONDUCT THESE DISCUSSIONS. IN THE VARIOUS EXCHANGES WE HAVE HAD, EITHER AT THE TIME OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OR ON OTHER OCCASIONS, I HAVE COME TO VALUE HIGHLY YOUR CANDOUR, OPENESS AND CONSTANT READINESS TO APPROACH THE SEARCH FOR APPROPRIATE SOLUTIONS IN A MOST POSITIVE SPIRIT. THESE ATTRIBUTES ARE A TRUE REFLECTION OF YOUR NATURE AND I LOOK FORWARD, NOW THAT THAILAND IS A MEMBER OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, TO THE DISTINGUISHED CONTRIBUTION THAT THEY WILL CERTAINLY ENABLE YOU TO MAKE TO THE WORK OF THIS IMPORTANT ORGAN OF THE UNITED NATIONS OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS.

IN NEW YORK, YOU ARE, OF COURSE, MOST ABLY REPRESENTED BY AMBASSADOR BIRABHONGSE KASEMSRI, WHO HAS BECOME A WELL-KNOWN FIGURE IN OUR ORGANIZATION. HIS UNSWEERVING COURTESY AND REMARKABLE DIPLOMATIC SKILLS HAVE EARNED HIM THE RESPECT OF ALL THOSE WHO WORK WITH HIM, AND I WISH TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS ONCE AGAIN MY APPRECIATION FOR THE CO-OPERATIVE AND VERY CORDIAL RELATIONS WHICH I AND MY COLLEAGUES IN THE SECRETARIAT HAVE DEVELOPED WITH HIM.

MR. MINISTER,

THE PRESENT SITUATION IN YOUR REGION IS A MATTER OF SERIOUS CONCERN TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT IS THIS CONCERN WHICH BRINGS ME HERE AND TO OTHER COUNTRIES IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA. MY MAIN OBJECTIVE ON THIS TRIP IS TO SEEK WAYS OF CARRYING FORWARD THE SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL AND ENDURING SETTLEMENT OF THE TENACIOUS ISSUES FACING US, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE BASIC PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE UN CHARTER. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THAILAND AND ITS ASEAN PARTNERS HAVE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE TO THIS PROCESS, IN WHICH ALL PARTIES CONCERNED MUST PLAY THEIR PART.

IT IS MY FERVENT HOPE THAT IN THIS YEAR, 1985, THE FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, NO EFFORTS WILL BE SPARED IN OUR COMMON QUEST FOR PEACE, IN THIS REGION AND ELSEWHERE.

ON THE HUMANITARIAN SIDE, I AM, OF COURSE, FULLY AWARE OF THE BURDEN IMPOSED ON THAILAND FROM THE OUTSET BY LARGE NUMBERS OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES, AND I AM GRATIFIED BY ITS CONSISTENT CO-OPERATION WITH THE UN RELIEF OPERATIONS.

MR. MINISTER,

I WISH TO THANK YOU AGAIN FOR THE SUPPORT THAILAND HAS ALWAYS EXTENDED TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND TO MY PERSONAL EFFORTS AS SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE WORLD ORGANIZATION. I LOOK FORWARD TO MY DISCUSSIONS THIS AFTERNOON WITH HIS EXCELLENCY THE PRIME MINISTER AND TO THE BANQUET WHICH HE IS KINDLY HOSTING FOR ME THIS EVENING.

I WOULD NOW LIKE TO PROPOSE A TOAST TO YOUR HEALTH, MR. MINISTER, TO OUR CONTINUING CLOSE CO-OPERATION AND TO THE WELL-BEING AND PROSPERITY OF THE PEOPLE OF THAILAND.

Antarctica

East Timor

Australia in
the Saco

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New Caledonia
Update

Briefing Note on
Thai-Lao Border

Briefing Note on
Kampuchea

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21 January 1985

Briefing Note for the Secretary-General
ON THE THAI-LAOTIAN BORDER DISPUTE

The dispute between Thailand and Laos, which began on 6 June 1984 when Thai troops occupied three border villages, continues unresolved. The incident arose when, according to Thailand, a work crew building a road near the border was harrassed by Laotian soldiers, causing Thailand to send troops to the area and take control of the villages. In their public statements, the Thai authorities have maintained that the villages are inside Thai territory but, during a meeting with the Secretary-General on 28 September, Foreign Minister Siddhi admitted in confidence that Laos seemed to have a "stronger case" and that the situation had arisen from "a misunderstanding".

The three villages, Ban May, Ban Kang and Ban Savang, cover an area of about 19 square kilometers and reportedly have a total population of 1,100 to 1,200 people. They are located in a remote, mountainous and densely vegetated area, about 200 kms to the North-West of Vientiane. For Laos, the villages are part of its Sayaboury province, while Thailand considers that they belong to its Uttaradit province.

Laos, basing its position on the Franco-Siamese border treaties of 1904 and 1907, which show the villages as Laotian, accused Thailand of "premeditated" occupation of the three villages and asserted that this "aggression" had been encouraged by China. Initially, Laos had said that no negotiations could take place until the Thai troops were "unconditionally" withdrawn from the villages, but it later agreed to send a delegation to Bangkok, where two inconclusive rounds of talks were held, from 21 to 23 July and from 6 to 15 August. The talks were apparently broken off by Thailand, when Laos rejected the Thai suggestion that a "joint technical team" be sent to survey the area and determine the exact location of the border line. Thailand, for its part, refused to accept the validity of the Franco-Siamese treaties, which it considers as "unequal" treaties, imposed by France during the colonial era.

Following suspension of the talks, Thailand decided unilaterally to send its own survey team to the area, although it later indicated that this team was unable to accomplish its task because of "acts of provocation and harassment" by Laotian troops. Laos condemned Thailand's action as an attempt to modify the border line and "legalize" its

occupation of the three villages. In a meeting with the Secretary-General on 29 August, the Laotian Ambassador, referring to press reports suggesting that Thailand might ask the UN to send a neutral survey team, stressed that his Government would object to such an initiative. He explained, in substance, that any survey of the area would create the illusion of a genuine territorial dispute, while the problem was in fact a clear-cut case of aggression by one country against another.

During September, several incidents occurred in the area, giving rise to casualties on both sides. On 2 October, hoping to defuse the situation and to avoid that the issue be used at a time when Thailand was a candidate for a seat on the Security Council, Foreign Minister Siddhi announced in the General Assembly that his Government had decided to "remove" its troops from the three villages. The following day, Laos called for an urgent meeting of the Security Council, which was convened on 9 October.

At that meeting, the Laotian Foreign Minister dismissed the announcement made by the Foreign Minister of Thailand as a "propaganda ploy". He said that, in order to prove its sincerity, Thailand should allow the situation to return to what it was before 6 June 1984. This meant that Thailand should : a) Unconditionally withdraw its troops, administration and civilian personnel from the villages; b) Allow the villagers forcibly "deported" to Thailand to return to their homes; c) Pay compensation for the damage caused by Thai troops; and d) Recognize Laotian sovereignty over the villages. The Foreign Minister of Laos also said that his Government was ready to resume negotiations with Thailand, "anywhere and at any time", in order to achieve a peaceful settlement of the problem.

The Thai Ambassador confirmed to the Council that his Government had decided to "redeploy" its troops "away" from the three villages. He pointed out that, without military protection, it was not possible for Thai civilian personnel to remain in the area because of possible harassment by Laotian forces. He also stated that no villagers had been "taken away or held by Thailand". He therefore felt that Laos should not object to the establishment of the joint technical team proposed earlier by Thailand. If Laos still rejected this idea, Thailand would be ready to ask the Secretary-General to dispatch to the area a "fact-finding mission, with the assistance of Laotian and Thai technical experts, for an on-site survey". Thailand would accept the findings of the joint technical team or fact-finding mission. Moreover, should these findings prove inconclusive, Thailand would be prepared to resort to an "impartial, independent technical expert or group of experts", acceptable to both sides. Finally, Thailand would be prepared to resume negotiations with Laos "on the basis of those findings".

In a letter dated 17 October, the Thai Ambassador formally informed the Secretary-General that the removal of Thailand's "military and administrative presence" in the three villages had been completed four days earlier. He stressed that the population of the villages had crossed into Thailand "voluntarily" and that Bangkok would be willing to facilitate their return to Laos, if they so wished. He added that these various facts could be verified by the proposed UN fact-finding mission or "any other mutually-agreeable mechanism". In a private conversation with Rafeeuddin Ahmed, the Permanent Secretary of the Thai Foreign Ministry added that the proposed verification process could also include an "assessment" of the alleged damages suffered by the villagers. He appeared reluctant, however, to commit Thailand to a resumption of negotiations, saying the question of "timing" had to be kept open.

These ideas were conveyed to the Ambassador of Laos on 19 October, but he rejected them, pointing out that Thailand's apparent flexibility, on the eve of the Security Council elections, was a purely tactical, if not deceitful, move. He maintained that Thailand had not withdrawn its troops from the three villages and that it was in fact "reinforcing" its military presence in the area.

On 27 October, in a statement issued by its Foreign Ministry, Laos conceded that the Thai troops had been "constrained to withdraw" from the three villages, that the Laotian local authorities were "once more administering the villages", and that "some" of the inhabitants had returned. Thai troops, however, were "still occupying a position" in Lao territory, in a "valley South of Ban May". The statement insisted on a "complete" withdrawal by Thailand and reiterated the other Laotian conditions for a settlement. It stressed, at the same time, the readiness of Laos to send a delegation to Bangkok, to resume negotiations "as soon as possible".

A few days later, Thailand denied any military presence in Laotian territory and said that this could be ascertained by "any neutral third party". The withdrawal of Thailand from the three border villages was indirectly confirmed by a Vietnamese press release, dated 29 November 1984. This press release pointed out that a group of foreign journalists from socialist countries had visited the "hamlets formerly occupied by Thailand".

In early December, Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi rejected the Laotian call for renewed talks, saying that any such talks had to be preceded by the creation of "a good atmosphere". He called on Laos to stop its propaganda campaign against Thailand and challenged Vientiane to accept a visit to the three villages by a "representative of the UN Secretary-General to determine the truth". He also rejected the Laotian claims for compensation, saying that both sides had "equally suffered casualties", and stated that Thailand would arrange for the repatriation of those villagers who wished it. Foreign Minister Siddhi is also reported as having stated that negotiations with Laos should encompass other problems between the two countries, including the question of a number of "small islands in the Mekong River", which forms part of the border between the two countries.

On 10 December, Thailand claimed that ICRC representatives had visited the people from the three villages who had crossed into Thailand. In his letter, the Thai Ambassador said the ICRC had "conducted interviews" with those people, who had confirmed that they had fled to Thailand "voluntarily". The ICRC has indicated, however, that the only purpose of its visit was to determine whether the villagers needed any relief assistance. It has pointed out that there had been no "interviews" and has expressed regret, in private, about this "political exploitation" of its involvement.

In a letter addressed to the Secretary-General on 21 December, Laos stated once again that Thai troops, while no longer in the three villages, continued to "occupy nine hilltops about 300 to 500 metres inside Lao territory", from which they dominated the area and carried out shelling. Laos revealed that, in a message sent to Thai Foreign Minister Siddhi on 24 November, Acting Foreign Minister Kamphay Boupha had proposed the resumption of negotiations in Bangkok, on 10 December. Laos expressed regret that Thailand had not reciprocated this "good will gesture" and concluded that the inflexible position adopted by Bangkok was an indication of its intention to re-occupy the three villages.

On 5 January 1985, a spokesman of the Laotian Foreign Ministry said that Thailand had launched two attacks near Ban May, about "600 metres" inside Laos. He stressed that Laos wished to reserve its right to self-defence, but repeated the call for the resumption of talks at Bangkok.

The Communiqué of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers' Conference, dated 18 January, reiterates full support for Laos and mentions the usual Laotian conditions for a settlement of the problem. Curiously, however, it calls for an "immediate" withdrawal of Thailand's troops "from the three Lao hamlets" and overlooks the fact that this withdrawal has been repeatedly acknowledged by Laos.

In his discussions with the two parties, the Secretary-General might wish to :

- 1) Urge Laos to tone down its polemical attacks against Thailand and call on the latter to consider returning to the negotiating table. Over the past few months, Laos has conducted a strong propaganda campaign against Thailand, focusing on General Arthit Kamlang-Ek, the Supreme Commander of the Thai armed forces. Bangkok, for its part, has made it clear that these polemics stood in the way of resumed talks.

- 2) Explore the possibility of involving the UNHCR in the voluntary repatriation of the people from the three villages who are still in Thailand. The introduction of a neutral third party would help to determine their wishes in a manner acceptable to both sides.

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Update

Briefing No.

Briefing Note on
Kampuchea

US/MIAs

South

18 January 1985

BRIEFING NOTES FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ON THE QUESTION OF KAMPUCHEA

1. Viet Nam's current position

Over the past year, Viet Nam has stressed its desire for a dialogue with the ASEAN countries. Without making any fundamental concessions, the Vietnamese authorities have gone further than in the past to show that such a dialogue would effectively focus on the question of Kampuchea.

During a visit to Australia in March 1984, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Co Thach agreed that a "partial solution" to the question of peace and stability in Southeast Asia should be based on a discussion of the following steps :

- (a) Withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea;
- (b) Elimination of Pol Pot and his associates as a political and military force and creation of a safety zone on both sides of the Thai/Kampuchean border;
- (c) Security of the Sino/Vietnamese, Sino/Laotian and Thai/Laotian borders;
- (d) A process of self-determination by free elections, excluding Pol Pot and his associates; and,
- (e) International supervision and guarantees of all aspects of the foregoing.

At the time, Australian Foreign Minister Hayden had expressed the view that this "five-point formulation" was an indication of Viet Nam's willingness to discuss Kampuchea as a "priority issue".

Two months later, Rafeeuddin Ahmed visited Hanoi. He met with Mr. Co Thach on 17 May and pointed out, inter alia, that ASEAN could not reasonably be expected to discuss the security of the Sino/Vietnamese and Sino/Laotian borders with Viet Nam. He urged that these extraneous issues be excluded from an eventual dialogue with ASEAN. Mr. Co Thach agreed.

The Vietnamese Foreign Minister indicated that he was also prepared to drop his proposal for the creation of a "safety zone on both sides of the Thai/Kampuchean border", as it had been rejected repeatedly by Thailand. He said he would only insist on the adoption of "security measures" along that border. Mr. Co Thach's basic message was that Viet Nam would be ready to undertake a total withdrawal from Kampuchea, if satisfactory arrangements on the elimination of "Pol Pot and his accomplices" could be worked out. In the past, "total" withdrawal had always been linked to a more elusive concept, the cessation of the Chinese "threat". During his meeting with Mr. Ahmed, however, Mr. Co Thach made no reference to the Chinese threat.

The five-point formulation adopted in Canberra was thus converted into the following "four-point agenda", which Mr. Co Thach said could form the basis for initial talks with ASEAN :

- (a) Elimination of Pol Pot and his accomplices and adoption of security measures along the Thai-Kampuchean border;
- (b) Withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea;
- (c) Self-determination by free elections, excluding Pol Pot and his accomplices; and,
- (d) International supervision and guarantees for all aspects of the foregoing.

The merit of this agenda is, of course, that it clearly focusses on the Kampuchean issue, even if Mr. Co Thach made it clear that a comprehensive settlement was, in the last analysis, contingent upon a broader regional arrangement, including China.

The Indochinese Foreign Ministers conference, held in Vientiane on 2 July 1984, reiterated the call for talks with the ASEAN countries and stated that a dialogue should be initiated "immediately". The conference pointed out that this dialogue should be based on both the ASEAN appeal of 21 September 1983 and the Indochinese Foreign Minister's communiqué of 29 January 1984.

The ASEAN appeal proposes a settlement comprising three essential elements : A phased withdrawal of Vietnamese troops "on a territorial basis", self-determination through internationally-supervised elections in which all Kampucheans would participate and national reconciliation involving all the Kampuchean factions. The Vientiane communiqué of 29 January 1984 is a document of a more general character. It deals, inter alia, with Sino/Vietnamese and American/Vietnamese relations. It also suggests that, "pending a global solution of the problems of Southeast Asia", the Indochinese and ASEAN countries should negotiate a

"framework agreement" on principles governing relations between them. It refers to the Kampuchean problem only to accuse Thailand and other ASEAN countries of seeking to impose an "absurd solution", based on the "unilateral" withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the return of Pol Pot.

While the Indochinese communiqué of 2 July 1984 formally conceded, for the first time, that the ASEAN appeal would be acceptable as a basis for talks with ASEAN, the request that the Vientiane communiqué of 29 January be considered on an equal footing represented an apparent regression from the four-point agenda which Mr. Co Thach had privately accepted during his meeting of 17 May with Mr. Ahmed. Moreover, in a letter addressed to the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement, dated 1 September 1984, Mr. Co Thach once again linked the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops to the cessation of the Chinese "threat", although this linkage had been conspicuously absent from the meeting of 17 May.

During the recent session of the General Assembly, Mr. Ahmed met with Mr. Co Thach on 10 October and expressed his surprise at the apparent discrepancy between Viet Nam's public stand and Mr. Co Thach's private statements of the previous May. The Foreign Minister explained, in substance, that his position had not changed but that, in its public statements, Viet Nam could not avoid perfunctory references to the Indochinese joint communiqués and to the Chinese threat. The following day, on 11 October, Mr. Co Thach formally confirmed to the Secretary-General that Viet Nam would be ready to enter into talks with ASEAN, on the basis of the four-point agenda worked out with Mr. Ahmed. He added that these talks should constitute the "first phase" of a global settlement of the problems of the region.

Subsequently, on 16 November, the General Assembly considered the question of peace, stability and co-operation in South-East Asia. During the debate, Vietnamese Ambassador Hoang Bich Son stressed that his country was "prepared to engage in negotiations with the ASEAN countries". He pointed out, in this regard, that "three areas of consensus and of differences" had emerged. He explained that Viet Nam and ASEAN agreed on : (a) The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces "without permitting the return of the Pol Pot clique"; (b) Respect for the right of self-determination of the Kampuchean people; and, (c) The need for international guarantees and supervision. On the other hand, the Ambassador said, there were differences over the "method to eliminate Pol Pot and his associates" and how the right of self-determination should be exercised. He added that the modalities for international guarantees and supervision also required "further discussion".

It should also be noted that, in his statement before the General Assembly, the Vietnamese Ambassador conceded, for the first time, that there was an "international aspect" to the "Kampuchean issue". He did not elaborate, however, on the implications of this apparent concession.

The 10th Indochinese Foreign Ministers' Conference has just been held in Ho Chi Minh City, on 17 and 18 January 1985. The final communiqué of the Conference re-affirms that the Kampuchean situation is "irreversible". At the same time, it stresses the "ardent aspiration" of the Indochinese countries to peace and reiterates their "willingness to enter into negotiations with the parties concerned" to achieve an early solution based on the following elements :

- a) The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea, paired with the exclusion of the genocidal Pol Pot clique;
- b) Respect for the Kampuchean people's right to self-determination, first and foremost the right to come back to a life free from threat of genocide;
- c) The holding by the Kampuchean people of free general elections with the presence of foreign observers;
- d) Building South-East Asia into a zone of peace and stability wherein States with different social systems can live in peaceful coexistence, without allowing their respective territories to be used against other countries;
- e) Respect by all external States of the national rights of South-East Asian countries; and
- f) The establishment of an international form of guarantee and supervision for the implementation of the agreements.

These elements are not inconsistent with the "four-point agenda" discussed privately with Mr. Co Thach. Moreover, the two additional points, relating to peaceful coexistence between States with different social systems and to the respect of the national rights of the countries of the region, only reiterate generally accepted principles.

However, instead of calling for a dialogue with the ASEAN "group", as Viet Nam had done consistently during the past year, the communiqué places the emphasis on the promotion of "bilateral" relations between the countries of the region. This change of approach is justified by a reference to the recent evolution of ASEAN's own position on the matter.

The communiqué also recalls Viet Nam's proposal for an "international conference". It is pointed out that this conference will be attended by the countries of the region, as well as other countries that are "directly concerned or have already contributed" to the search for peace and stability in South-East Asia. Viet Nam had previously said it would accept a limited, 1954 Geneva-type, international Conference. The present formulation, however, appears to allow for more flexibility in the membership of the Conference. The idea of a limited international conference had been explored by Rafeeuddin Ahmed during his first trip to the region in 1982 and had been received positively by the ASEAN countries, as a possible alternative to the UN-sponsored ICK which Viet Nam has always rejected.

2. ASEAN's current position

During the last five years, the ASEAN countries have taken the lead in mobilizing the international community against the Vietnamese presence in Kampuchea and in elaborating proposals for a negotiated settlement of the problem. After pressing for an International Conference on Kampuchea (ICK) which was convened in July 1981, they encouraged the establishment, in 1982, of the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK). The following year, they issued their 21 September Appeal, which sets out the main elements for a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem and calls for consultations with Viet Nam on "initial steps" towards such a settlement.

The beginning of 1984 was marked by a number of Indonesian initiatives. By the month of May, however, ASEAN seemed to have developed a sense of helplessness about its capacity to influence the situation and it began to show doubts about the policy of active involvement it had pursued so far.

In February, General L. B. Murdani, Commander-in-Chief of the Indonesian armed forces, paid an official visit to Viet Nam. Later that month, an Indonesian/Vietnamese academic seminar on regional peace and security issues, including Kampuchea, was held in Hanoi. In the course of this informal seminar, the Indonesian side expressed the view that the main Khmer Rouge leaders should specifically be excluded from general elections in Kampuchea, as well as from an eventual process of national reconciliation.

Subsequently, Vietnamese Foreign Minister Co Thach was invited to visit Jakarta from 11 to 13 March, on his way to Canberra. During his visit, Mr. Co Thach reportedly rejected out of hand President Suharto's proposals for a multinational peace-keeping force with Vietnamese participation and for the establishment of a government of national reconciliation in Kampuchea. Although Mr. Co Thach later claimed that he had not rejected President Suharto's ideas, but rather his contention that "the Pol Pot criminals" should be allowed to participate in general elections in Kampuchea, the Indonesian authorities concluded that Viet Nam remained adamant. Their disappointment was compounded by Mr. Co Thach's subsequent visit to Australia from 14 to 19 March, where the "five-point formulation" announced by Foreign Minister Hayden created the impression that, after deliberately spurning Indonesia, the Vietnamese had taken a somewhat softer line in Canberra.

Moreover, a few days after Mr. Co Thach's return from Australia, Viet Nam launched its annual dry season offensive along the Thai-Kampuchean border. The ASEAN countries interpreted this as further evidence of Hanoi's lack of sincerity. They consequently decided to put their diplomatic efforts in abeyance and to adopt a stiffer attitude. In a joint communiqué issued on 8 May 1984, the ASEAN countries stressed that the "trust and confidence" they had attempted to forge with Viet Nam had been undermined.

This disillusionment became even more evident during the 17th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, held in Jakarta on 9 and 10 July 1984. The two strongly worded communiqués issued on that occasion dismissed the third annual "partial withdrawal" announced by Viet Nam at the end of June as another "rotation of troops". They denounced Viet Nam's "attempts to impose a military solution" of the Kampuchean problem and asserted that "at least half a million Vietnamese settlers" were engaged in a process of "colonization" in Kampuchea. They expressed ASEAN's "deep disappointment" with the Indochinese communiqué of 2 July 1984 and rejected Viet Nam's proposal for an immediate dialogue as a "propaganda ploy" which offered "nothing positive". In conclusion, they stressed that it "should now be clear to all that the onus rests with Viet Nam to respond in good faith" to the international efforts aimed at achieving a comprehensive political settlement of the Kampuchean problem.

During the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, as well as during his previous trip to the region in May 1984, Mr. Ahmed discussed with the Foreign Ministers concerned the "four-point agenda" worked out with Mr. Co Thach. He advised the ASEAN countries to seek direct confirmation of this agenda from Mr. Co Thach and suggested that they might also wish to present counter-proposals, with a view to defining a mutually-acceptable text.

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers acknowledged that the four-point agenda did represent a useful clarification of Viet Nam's position. They expressed the view, however, that Viet Nam's linkage of a withdrawal from Kampuchea to the elimination of "Pol Pot and his accomplices" was only a "tactical" change, aimed primarily at breaking up the CGDK. They reiterated that they did not wish to see Pol Pot return to power, but considered that the best way to "eliminate" the Khmer Rouge was to allow them to take part in free general elections under international supervision. Above all, they made it clear that they remained unconvinced of Viet Nam's readiness to engage in meaningful negotiations on Kampuchea.

Hence, during the last session of the General Assembly, while Mr. Co Thach stressed that conditions for a dialogue were "ripe", the ASEAN countries raised the stakes by responding that the question of Kampuchea was not a problem between them and Viet Nam, but one between Viet Nam and the Kampuchean people. They pointed out that, while they were still willing to "assist" in the search for a solution to the conflict, Viet Nam should prove its sincerity by seeking direct negotiations with the Coalition Government of Prince Sihanouk.

In the past, the ASEAN countries had always stressed their readiness to discuss a solution of the Kampuchean problem with Viet Nam. Their present attitude of apparent disengagement seems to be a result of the negative atmosphere that has prevailed since May 1984. However, it probably does not amount, at least for the time being, to a fundamental change of approach.

It should be noted, in this context, that during a meeting in New York last October, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar and Vietnamese Foreign Minister Co Thach agreed to exchange visits in 1985. Dr. Mochtar is tentatively scheduled to visit Hanoi from 22 to 25 January and Mr. Co Thach is expected to travel to Jakarta later in the year. Dr. Mochtar's visit to Hanoi will be the first by an ASEAN Foreign Minister in the last five years. Although Malaysia is the current Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, Indonesia has been authorized to act as an informal "interlocutor" with Viet Nam.

3. Sihanouk and the Phnom Penh régime

Last October, Prince Sihanouk revealed that France had tried to arrange secret contacts between himself and representatives of Hanoi and Phnom Penh. He pointed out that, as a result of a quiet French initiative, the Vietnamese Government and the Heng Samrin régime had agreed to send emissaries to Paris for separate encounters with him, in November.

The Prince said he had told the French authorities that as a "man of dialogue", he was willing to "talk to anybody". He had reportedly explained that, while he was not ready for negotiations, he would not object to an "exchange of views between adversaries". Following the positive reactions of Hanoi and Phnom Penh to the sounding undertaken by France, Prince Sihanouk said he had felt compelled, "in good conscience", to appraise his coalition partners and China of the proposed encounters. Son Sann reportedly agreed that contacts would be useful. However, the Khmer Rouge and China expressed strong opposition, pointing out that this initiative would only play into the hands of Viet Nam, which was trying to "break up" the coalition. As a result, Prince Sihanouk decided to cancel the meetings.

The French Permanent Mission in New York has confirmed that Paris has been trying to facilitate contacts between Sihanouk and "the other side". The Mission has indicated that the "private" visit which Mr. Hun Sen, Foreign Minister of the Phnom Penh régime, paid to Paris, from 23 November to 3 December 1984, was the result of an informal "invitation" by Mr. Régis Debray, a counsellor to President Mitterrand. It had been hoped that a meeting with Prince Sihanouk could be arranged on that occasion, but the "constraints" imposed on him by his participation in a coalition government had prevented it.

On his arrival in Beijing, on 3 January 1985, the Prince stated that he would not have "any contacts" with the Heng Samrin régime until the withdrawal of the Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea. He also indicated that he had rejected an "offer" by Foreign Minister Hun Sen to meet with him in February.

Mr. Hun Sen was named Prime Minister on 14 January, following the recent death of his predecessor in Moscow. He will however keep the foreign affairs portfolio. At the end of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers Conference in Ho Chi Minh City, on 18 January, he reportedly declared that Phnom Penh would be prepared to hold talks with the factions of Sihanouk and Son Sann, if they dissociated themselves from Pol Pot. He pointed out that, if they joined the Phnom Penh régime in "eliminating" Pol Pot, they would be able to play "a certain role" in Kampuchea.

This is the clearest indication so far of Phnom Penh's willingness to consider a reconciliation with the two non-communist factions. There can be little doubt that this approach is encouraged, if not inspired, by Viet Nam since the communiqué of the Ho Chi Minh City Conference praises the "policy of national unity" pursued by Phnom Penh. Mr. Hun Sen's statement, however, is likely to be denounced by the Khmer Rouge and China as further evidence of Viet Nam's attempts to split the Coalition Government of Prince Sihanouk.

4. The Military Situation

Ampil, the Headquarters of the KPNLF forces, and the last major encampment of that faction in the Thai-Kampuchean border area, fell to Vietnamese forces on 8 January 1985. The assault began the previous day, on the sixth anniversary of the establishment of the Heng Samrin régime in Phnom Penh. Observers report that Viet Nam threw into the battle for Ampil more of its resources than it had ever used against the resistance. More than 4,000 Vietnamese and Heng Samrin soldiers are believed to have taken part in the battle, backed by Soviet-made T-54 tanks, against the 5,000 resistance fighters defending Ampil. With the fall of Ampil, Viet Nam has managed to take over seven of the KPNLF camps, leaving only a small one, mainly inhabited by civilians.

Viet Nam began its annual dry-season offensive on the resistance camps along the Thai-Kampuchean border much earlier than in previous years. In contrast to the 1983-84 dry season, when serious fighting did not occur until 25 March, this time, Viet Nam launched its first attacks on 18 November, capturing Nong Chan, a major KPNLF camp. There followed, in late November and December, the seizure of four smaller camps - Baksei, Nam Yuen, Sokh Sann and O'Bok. The largest KPNLF camp, Nong Samet, was overrun on 25 December. The civilian population of these camps was evacuated to temporary sites in Thailand, either before the attacks or as they began. As a result, there have reportedly been few civilian casualties. Some 130,000 civilian Kampucheans have crossed the border into Thailand since last November. Moreover, a large number of the 80,000 people who had sought refuge in Thailand, following last year's dry season, have not been able to return to their camps, because of the continuing tension along the border.

In previous years, the Vietnamese forces had retreated from the camps, after their seizure. Their tactics, however, seem to have changed. There has been some speculation that they may now try to remain in position in or near the camps. Observers believe that Hanoi hopes to "bottle up" the resistance forces at the border and thus, be able to prevent or, at least, to curtail drastically any further infiltration deep inside Kampuchea.

The KPNLF camps have been the prime target during the present offensive, although some Khmer Rouge bases have also been hit. Sihanouk's stronghold at Tatum has not so far been attacked. The Sihanoukist forces had also been spared last year. This concentration of attacks on the KPNLF has been seen as an attempt to destroy the myth that the non-communist factions can represent a credible military and political alternative to the Khmer Rouge or the Heng Samrin régime. The futility, in Hanoi's view, of this ASEAN basic strategy would thus be exposed. In any event, Viet Nam seems to have gained a military and psychological victory over the Coalition, while still maintaining the option of eventually winning over Prince Sihanouk to its side.

The intensity of the Vietnamese offensive this season has led to a greater number of direct clashes with Thailand, which has accused Hanoi of several limited incursions into its territory. These clashes have caused some casualties on both sides, but only Thailand has reported its losses. In the most recent incident, a Thai military plane, apparently helping to dislodge Vietnamese soldiers in Thai territory, was shot down by Vietnamese anti-aircraft fire. Viet Nam has, as in the past, denied any violation of Thai territory and reiterated that these charges are another of Thailand's "slanderous" contentions, aimed at hiding its support for the resistance forces.

On 9 January 1985, ASEAN issued a statement deploring the escalation of fighting and Viet Nam's "recurrent intrusions" into Thai territory. ASEAN stated that these actions reveal once again Viet Nam's disregard for international opinion and its "single-minded pursuit of a military solution" to the Kampuchean problem. The statement adds that Hanoi's attitude belies its protestations of peaceful intentions and its desire for a negotiated settlement of the problem. It is likely that the ASEAN countries will take a similar line during the Secretary-General's visit to the region.

China was slow to react to the Vietnamese offensive along the Thai-Kampuchean border, as it was expecting the visit, in December, of First Deputy Prime Minister Arkhipov, the highest-ranking Soviet official to visit Beijing in 15 years. On 28 December, however, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman "strongly condemned" the attack on Nong Samet camp. After the fall of Ampil, on 8 January, China condemned the Vietnamese offensive as "criminal", calling on Hanoi to end its "atrocities" in Kampuchea and accusing it of threatening Thailand's security. US diplomatic sources have speculated that some kind of reaction from China should be expected, although it may come with some delay. The Vietnamese dry season offensives have usually been accompanied or followed by renewed tension along the Sino-Vietnamese border. According to press reports, armed incidents have in fact occurred in the past few days.

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BACKGROUND FOR THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ON THE ISSUE OF US SERVICEMEN MISSING IN ACTION IN INDO-CHINA
(MIA's)

During 1984, the question of the American servicemen listed as missing in action in Indo-China showed some movement, albeit uneven. It will be recalled that late in 1982, the Governments of the United States and Viet Nam had agreed in principle to four annual visits to Hanoi by US experts. It was also agreed that the US would receive Vietnamese experts at the Joint Casualty Resolution Centre (JCRC) in Hawaii to train them in the identification of human remains. Three visits to Hanoi took place between December 1982 and June 1983 but, one planned for September 1983 was cancelled, following remarks by US Secretary of State Schultz, qualifying as "cruel and heartless" Viet Nam's failure to co-operate more willingly in accounting for the approximately 2,500 servicemen missing in action since the end of the Indo-China war.

On 29 January 1984, the communiqué of the Indochinese Foreign Ministers' Conference, held at Vientiane, expressed the willingness of Viet Nam, Laos and the Phnom Penh régime to provide information on the MIA's, "in a humanitarian spirit" and as a way of showing "understanding towards the American people". US Assistant Secretary of Defence Richard Armitage subsequently visited Hanoi in February, where Foreign Minister Co Thach gave a "clear commitment" to move more rapidly in the search for MIA's. Additional information was reportedly provided on that occasion and the US delegation appeared satisfied that progress could be achieved on this issue.

However, a visit scheduled for April was once again cancelled by Hanoi, avowedly for "technical reasons". Observers interpreted this as Hanoi's reaction to President Reagan's official visit to China during that month. This did not however affect the visit by members of Viet Nam Veterans of America (VVA), a non-governmental organization, who spent two weeks in Hanoi and Phnom Penh during April and met with Messrs. Co Thach and Hun Sen, respectively. Foreign Minister Co Thach reportedly asked the VVA to visit every three months to maintain a link with the US. The Reagan administration opposes this idea, but has said it will not take steps to hinder VVA's efforts so long as that organization does not attempt to negotiate on behalf of the US Government.

More concrete progress was achieved, in July, when Viet Nam decided to hand over to a visiting team of US experts the remains of eight MIA's, thus bringing to 96 the total number of American servicemen accounted for since the end of the war. During the same month, the US and Laos reached an official agreement to begin investigations at a site in Pakse, Southern Laos, where a US plane had crashed in 1972. Later, while in New York for the General Assembly Session, Foreign Minister Co Thach held a meeting with US officials and another visit of US experts to Hanoi took place from 22 to 25 October 1984.

President Reagan has consistently stated that the MIA issue should be considered as one "of highest national priority". To underscore its concern in this regard, the US administration has pointed out that, even if Viet Nam were to withdraw from Kampuchea, the American people would not tolerate a normalization of relations with Viet Nam until the latter demonstrates greater co-operation in resolving this problem.

Washington maintains that the progress achieved so far is not satisfactory. It also continues to suggest, from time to time, that some American servicemen may still be alive. However, Viet Nam denies it categorically, and former Secretary of State Haig, as well as Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, have admitted that no persuasive evidence of this exists.

At the request of the US Permanent Mission in New York, Rafeeuddin Ahmed discussed the MIA issue during his 1982 and 1983 visits to Laos and Viet Nam. The two governments, while expressing their willingness to search for the remains of American servicemen, expressed a certain bitterness at the US Government's failure to keep its promise of assistance for their economic reconstruction, following the end of the war. Hanoi and Vientiane admitted, however, that it would not be proper to link this humanitarian issue to the provision of aid, or to the other issues standing in the way of improved relations with the United States.

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Overview of the Pacific region

The Pacific Ocean occupies a third of the earth's surface and is bordered by three continents with disparate histories. It contains more islands than the rest of the earth's seas together and reflects a diversity of political, social and economic systems commensurate with its size. Politically and economically, the importance of the region is now fast emerging, spearheaded by the arrival of Japan as a major industrial force, the quest for new markets and sources of raw materials, and the tendency of super-power rivalries to be played out on new fields.

Headed by Japan, several Far Eastern States are making increasing inroads on world markets. The ASEAN states, with abundant supplies of labour and raw materials as well as aggressive programmes of capital investments, are rapidly modernizing their industrial sectors, while China, by opening its doors to the West, looms large both as a potential market and as a source of raw materials.

Australia and New Zealand, in contrast, are potentially in danger of a relative economic decline. Australia is encountering difficulties in re-orienting its industrial output to be competitive in the increasingly innovative region, while New Zealand remains primarily agricultural.

The small island States by and large remain relatively undeveloped and impoverished, faced with a paucity of exploitable resources and a growing demand for manufactured goods which together result in chronic trade deficits. One of the main problems facing the region is to determine how these States can avoid becoming progressively more dependent on foreign aid and develop viable economies of their own.

In the post-Vietnam War era, the Pacific and Indian Oceans have assumed heightened importance as a backdrop for super-power military rivalry. The United States has erected a forward deployment network stretching from Japan to the Persian Gulf, with Japan and the Philippines providing sites for major air and naval installations in the Pacific sector. Although the United States has no permanent bases in Australia or New Zealand, it considers their participation in combined military exercises and surveillance and reconnaissance operations as essential to its Pacific defense strategy. There has been a corresponding increase of the Soviet military presence in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, highlighted by recent reports of submarine, surface ship and bomber aircraft deployments from Vietnam.

The perception of intensified super-power military competition creates a dilemma for many Pacific States which must balance the value they place on the United States security shield against their fear of militarization and nuclearization of their part of the world. Their ambivalence on the issue is evident in the South Pacific Forum, where consensus on the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the region has been conditional on the proviso that all security arrangements, including those involving port visits by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels, be left to the sole discretion of individual States.

The Pacific States also share a broader concern over the climatic and biological effects on the region of a possible nuclear war. They have therefore been active in promoting a nuclear test-ban treaty, arms control negotiations between the super-powers and nuclear disarmament in general.

The Pacific island States generally have democratic institutions and a Western orientation. Those States which were colonized by the United Kingdom have almost all remained within the Commonwealth upon independence; several other States, whether fully independent or internally self-governing, have retained ties with Australia and New Zealand. Both France and the United States, which still have a number of territories in the area, wield considerable influence politically as well as economically. Because of historic and economic links, it is unlikely that the essentially pro-Western, pro-democratic orientation of the States of the region will shift significantly in the foreseeable future.

With the exception of Vanuatu and now New Caledonia, the Pacific has experienced no major political convulsions in recent times. Most States have so far coped peacefully with problems caused by ethnic diversity and the transition to independence.

The Latin American States on the Pacific Rim share a common concern with the other Pacific countries based on the preservation of marine resources. Like the Pacific island States, they vigorously and continuously protest the nuclear tests conducted by France in Mururoa, Polynesia.

Among the most striking phenomena in the Pacific is the migration of inhabitants from the smaller and more remote islands to metropolitan countries. Over the past 20 years, 98,000 migrants have gone to the United States, 86,000 to New Zealand, 21,000 to Australia and 16,000 to Canada. As a result, in the cases of Niue and Tokelau, for instance, the expatriate communities in New Zealand are larger than the population at home.

The major cause of migration away from the smaller States is the lack of paid employment. Although islanders can survive on subsistence agriculture, opportunities in the commercial sector are totally inadequate to the demand, leading to an outflow of would-be wage earners. While many migrants initially send home cash remittances thereby bolstering the islands' revenues considerably, they have proven to be an unreliable source of income. Islanders who decide to remain permanently in a metropolitan country often relax ties with their families with the passage of time and discontinue the practice of sending money back.

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Additional Material to be included in
the Brief of the Secretary-General on Australia

Antarctica

Australia has had a long association with Antarctica beginning with early expeditions and continuing up to the present with an active scientific program. Its importance to Australia derives from its geographical proximity, the history of Australian involvement there and Australian administration of the "Australian Antarctic Territory" where Australia maintains three permanent bases (at Casey, Davis and Mawson as well as one on Macquarie Island).

Australia was one of the original 12 signatories, in 1959, of the Antarctic Treaty the main purpose of which was to provide for the continuing conduct of peaceful scientific research in the area (south of 60 degrees latitude). The Treaty also bans all military activities there as well as nuclear explosions of the dumping of nuclear wastes and puts all existing claims into abeyance (Australia claims over one half the area).

Australia opposes the move in the General Assembly by several countries, for the United Nations to assume control of the area. Australia considers that the existing system has made Antarctica "a region of unparalleled peaceful co-operation in the interests of mankind" and that "new international arrangements would inevitably be divisive and ultimately ineffective".

Antarctica: Treaty Support Reaffirmed

In a statement issued on 1 December, on the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty, Foreign Minister Hayden reiterated Australia's strong support for the Treaty. He stressed the importance of the provisions in the treaty which ensured Antarctica's status of demilitarization and freedom from nuclear weapons. He highlighted its value as the first major disarmament treaty binding the superpowers and subsequently all nuclear weapon states. As international interest and involvement in Antarctica grew, the Treaty would continue to gain in strength and evolve to meet the needs of the next twenty five years, Mr. Hayden said.

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Briefing Note for the Secretary-General

THE QUESTION OF EAST TIMOR

1. Substantive talks between Indonesia and Portugal

In accordance with the agreement reached between Foreign Minister Mochtar of Indonesia and Foreign Minister Gama of Portugal at their "chance encounter" on 1 October 1984, substantive talks on the question of East Timor were held in New York from 12-16 November 1984 and 7-9 January 1985. As agreed, the agenda called for consideration of humanitarian issues first, beginning with the question of the repatriation of the former civil servants of Portugal. It was felt that this approach would encourage the building of mutual trust and open the way for discussion of a broader range of issues, leading eventually to a comprehensive settlement of the problem.

Both sides agreed that the first two rounds of talks went well. Information was exchanged on the question of the repatriation of the former Portuguese civil servants, culminating in the presentation by Indonesia to Portugal of a list of names of individuals who might be eligible for repatriation. Both sides have also reaffirmed their commitment to the "common goal" of achieving a comprehensive and internationally-acceptable solution. The third round of talks is scheduled for mid-March 1985, when discussion of religious and cultural aspects of the situation in East Timor will begin and consideration of the repatriation of former civil servants will continue.

Once the various humanitarian issues have been covered successfully, it is hoped that Indonesia will come forward with a formula for a comprehensive settlement which, while preserving its fundamental interests, will be sufficiently credible to Portugal and the rest of the international community. Rafeeuiddin Ahmed has made it clear to the Indonesian side that the ball is in its court. Jakarta's willingness to seek an internationally-acceptable solution implies that it will take the action necessary to achieve that goal.

Indonesia is aware that such action must provide a credible confirmation of the wishes and interests of the people of East Timor and appropriate guarantees or safeguards for the preservation of their cultural and religious identity. The fulfilment of these fundamental requirements should be preceded by a tangible improvement of the humanitarian situation in the territory, as this will help to create the political climate conducive to a definitive solution of the problem, in the framework of the UN.

Portugal realizes that this is the only realistic approach. Lisbon is aware that it should not press Indonesia for specific "concessions" but rather allow it to come up with its own ideas on the ways and means to achieve the common goal of an internationally-acceptable solution.

2. The situation in the territory

In recent months, foreign diplomats have visited East Timor on two separate occasions. From 23-27 October 1984, an official of the US Embassy in Jakarta and the US State Department desk officer for East Timor visited six districts outside Dili. From 26-30 November, East Timor was visited by the Ambassador of New Zealand in Jakarta and the deputies from the Canadian and British embassies. This group was able to travel to various parts of the territory, including the eastern portion which had, until then, been considered unsafe.

With respect to the food situation, the US team reported that, in general, it appeared "satisfactory". The New Zealand Ambassador concurred with this view, noting that there seemed to be surpluses in some provinces and confirming that the main problem was apparently one of distribution. The Canadian official reported that there had been "no sign" of malnutrition but that he had been told there were problems in the Iliomar area (in the east).

With regard to the economic situation, observers agree that East Timor is receiving the highest per capita allocation of funds from the central Government and has the highest number of doctors per capita. However, it remains the Indonesian province with the lowest per capita income. The US team reported that construction was very evident in most of the districts it visited. They confirmed that the administering authorities were stressing economic development, education, transportation and agriculture. The Canadian official felt that, on balance, the development projects were "well conceived and well executed" and that an effort was being made to take into account the territory's "social and cultural heritage".

With regard to the religious situation in the territory, the US team reported that the membership of the Catholic Church has tripled over the past ten years, to its present level of 400,000 members. The apostolic administration of the diocese of East Timor is within the direct purview of the Vatican and is not integrated into the Indonesian bishopry. Jakarta has not, so far, insisted on such integration, apparently as a way of showing its understanding for the Vatican's sensibilities on the question of East Timor. The Papal Nuncio in Jakarta has indicated that there is no religious persecution in East Timor and that the clergy there only encountered difficulties when it expressed sympathy for FRETILIN. There are also reports that some of the older members of the clergy have not readily accepted the fact that the Church has been deprived of the administrative role it used to play when Portugal was in charge of the territory.

With regard to the military situation, Indonesian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief L. B. Moerdani, in an exclusive interview with Reuters on 17 December 1984, reported that there were more than 7,000 Indonesian troops in the territory. He estimated the FRETILIN forces to number between 500 and 700 armed men and said the FRETILIN sympathizers numbered between 3,000 and 5,000 people. General Moerdani also admitted that "clashes still occur occasionally".

The foreign visitors, on the other hand, did not report having seen any inordinate concentrations of military forces. The New Zealand Ambassador reported that there were generally no signs of security problems during his visit to the territory. He had been told that FRETILIN had begun resorting to reprisals against Timorese villagers and their property. These reprisals have been interpreted as acts of "desperation". The New Zealand Ambassador concluded that, although the military operations undertaken by the Indonesian authorities in the wake of the incident of 8 August 1983 had not been a success, in the long run FRETILIN obviously "could not win". He felt that a continuing improvement of the conditions of life in the territory will convince many of the FRETILIN supporters to assimilate into the population within a few years. The report of the Canadian official indicated that this was also evidently the view of the Indonesians, although Governor Carrascalao admitted that a small number of FRETILIN "die-hards" would probably never surrender.

Regarding the question of human rights, a precise appraisal of the situation remains difficult. The New Zealand Ambassador reported that, as a result of a lower level of military activity in the area, abuses by Indonesian forces had decreased. Prisoners were being brought to trial before the courts and provided with legal assistance. Reportedly, there have been acquittals in some cases. However, it has not been possible to verify this, as foreign observers have not been allowed to attend the trials. Amnesty International continues to be concerned over reports of torture, "disappearances and extra-judicial killings of the combatants" by Indonesian forces.

3. Activities of the ICRC

Following an agreement reached with the Indonesian authorities in December 1983, the ICRC carried out three series of visits to East Timor detention centres this year (out of the four originally planned). The third round of visits took place in September/October, when the ICRC was granted access, for the first time, to Los Palos, Baucau and Viqueque, in the eastern portion of the territory. There did not appear to be any serious problems regarding conditions of detention at these centres. However, at the Komarca Prison, in Dili, a number of prisoners were suffering from malnutrition and conditions of detention remained generally below normal standards, particularly with regard to medical assistance.

The ICRC is still in the process of discussing arrangements for the fourth series of visits to East Timorese detention centres. It has been agreed that the fourth round would be postponed until February or March 1985, and that, in the meantime, the ICRC would carry out a "follow-up" visit to the Komarca Prison, which took place in December.

The ICRC relief assistance programme to East Timor has been suspended since July 1983. Indonesia maintains that the situation is under control and that such assistance is no longer needed. Permission to allow the ICRC freedom of movement throughout the territory for the purpose of making an assessment of the eventual requirements has, therefore, been refused. However, the ICRC relief assistance to Atauro Island has continued without interruption. The displaced persons on Atauro were visited by the New Zealand Ambassador during his stay in the territory. He reported that a large number of them had already been returned to the main island. It is expected that the remainder will be returned by mid-1985. The ICRC has indicated that the number of displaced persons on Atauro Island now stands at 1,300, after reaching a peak of some 4,000 in 1982. It would like to have access to these people in their respective places of relocation on the main island, but permission has not, so far, been granted. In 1984, the ICRC also pursued its family reunion/repatriation programmes to Australia and Portugal under satisfactory conditions.

4. Concluding observations

The ICRC has stressed that freedom of access to and movement within the main island of East Timor is "essential" to the continuation of its various activities. This problem is one which the Secretary-General and Rafeeuddin Ahmed have raised at regular intervals in their contacts with Indonesian officials, both in New York and in Jakarta. Access to the territory should be facilitated not only to the ICRC but also to other outside observers, including foreign journalists. The recent visits to East Timor by foreign diplomats were a welcome development but their findings remain basically confidential. It has been pointed out to the Indonesian authorities that opening up the territory to independent observers, and especially to the press, is in their interest, as it is ultimately the only way for them to convince the international community that security conditions and the human rights situation in the territory have actually improved.

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**SUMMARY OF PROPOSAL BY AUSTRALIA FOR STRENGTHENING
THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IN MAINTAINING
PEACE AND SECURITY**

On 4 January 1985, Foreign Minister Hayden announced that during its 1985-86 term in the Security Council, Australia would pursue initiatives aimed at making the Council more effective in containing and preventing international conflict.

Its efforts would be concentrated in three main areas:

Role of the Secretary-General in dealing with world disputes

- Australia acknowledges the constructive role Mr. Perez de Cuellar has played in dealing with major disputes on the basis of a mandate from the Security Council. It also notes his use of powers assigned him under Article 99 of the Charter.
- It will seek greater involvement of the Secretary-General in disputes, whether or not they have been formally brought to the attention of the Council.
- It will discourage resolutions in the Council which are intended only to score political points and with no expectation of being implemented.

Collective security provisions of the United Nations Charter

- Australia will press in the Security Council for realistic actions designed to implement in some form the collective security provisions of the Charter.
- To this end it will propose that the Council authorize the appointment of military advisers from a representative range of countries to assist the Secretary-General in monitoring hostilities and dealing with international conflict.
- It will also seek membership in a General Assembly committee to be established on the initiative of Sierra Leone to review the collective security provisions.

Procedural reform

- Australia will support proposals aimed at creating a more conducive climate for the effective negotiation of disputes, including:

- * Increased use of informal private sessions of the Council. This would permit it and the Secretary-General to engage in quiet diplomacy.
- * Periodic sessions of the Council for conducting a general review of the international situation.
- * Greater and more co-ordinated use of the Secretariat for gathering information and providing good offices, observers or peacekeeping facilities.

Australia is aware of the fact that these reforms require the concurrence of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

The Government looks forward to discussing these proposals with the Secretary-General during his visit to Canberra in February 1985.

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Update on New Caledonia

President Mitterand, on his return to Paris after a twelve-hour visit to New Caledonia, has extended the state of emergency declared on 12 January and has stated that "France intends to maintain its role and strategic presence in that part of the world". At the same time, he has continued to insist on the essential principles of the Pisani plan, but without precluding the possibility of modifying some aspects of it.

In Noumea, while the President was met with large demonstrations by the European settlers, no untoward incident took place. He met leaders of both sides. The opposing leaders emerged from their discussions with Mr. Mitterand with relatively moderate statements. Mr. Ukeiwe, President of the Territorial Assembly who represents the anti-independence settlers said he was pleased by the attention that the President paid to his arguments. Mr. Tjibaou, the leader of FLNKS termed his discussions as "useful".

Despite the continuing tensions between the two communities, Mr. Mitterand has succeeded with his visit in turning their attention to the need to talk about the future. Both Mr. Ukeiwe and Mr. Tjibaou are expected to visit Paris to continue discussions with the President. While the anti-independence RPCR continues to oppose the Pisani plan, it intends henceforth to concentrate its attention on swaying French political circles and public opinion to its side through weekly visits to France by its leaders until the July referendum. FLNKS leaders are also devoting attention to the need to influence French political parties and Mr. Tjibaou is seeking meetings with French political leaders.

On 21 January, Mr. Tjibaou was received by Foreign Minister Bill Hayden of Australia. In a statement after the meeting, Mr. Hayden said they had discussed the situation in the Territory following the French proposals announced by High Commissioner Pisani for an act of self-determination in July and independence in association with France on 1 January next year.

Mr. Hayden said the plan outlined by Mr. Pisani appeared to meet the fundamental wishes of the Kanak people regarding land and independence, at the same time providing guarantees to the non-Kanak population of New Caledonia. The plan was a sensible mechanism in the circumstances to bring about a peaceful transfer of power. As such, it could form a reasonable basis for peaceful discussions aimed at resolving the unique and complex constitutional issues faced in the Territory.

Mr. Hayden noted the commitment of President Mitterand to the Pisani proposals, including independence, and welcomed the President's direct involvement in finding an approach acceptable to the people of New Caledonia.

He reaffirmed that Australia strongly supported the principle of self-determination and would like to see New Caledonia join the community of independent South Pacific countries as soon as was realistically possible. Australia hoped that the transition to an independent multi-racial New Caledonia could be achieved in accordance with the timetable outlined by Mr. Pisani.

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Background information on the Trust Territory
of the Pacific Islands

The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Micronesia), is the last remaining United Nations Trust Territory. It is also the only territory designated as a strategic area, under article 82 of the Charter.

Since 1969, the United States has been engaged in negotiations with the four Micronesian entities, namely, Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Palau and Marshall Islands, to determine their future political status.

In 1975, Northern Mariana Islands signed a Covenant to establish a commonwealth in political union with the United States (a status somewhat akin to Puerto Rico). The Covenant will however become effective only upon the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement for the whole Territory. In the interim, Northern Marianas function under a United States Secretarial Order which separates them from the rest of the Trust Territory for administrative purposes.

In 1982, the United States completed negotiations on a compact of free association separately with the other three entities. The compact was submitted for approval of the people through plebiscites held in these entities during 1983. These plebiscites were observed by United Nations visiting missions appointed by the Trusteeship Council.

In the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands, the results of the plebiscites were clearly in favour of the compact of free association. For these two entities the compact has since been transmitted to the United States Congress for its approval.

In Palau, 61.4 per cent of the voters expressed approval for the compact. However, a related agreement under which the United States would have the right to introduce and store radioactive, chemical and biological substances in Palau, failed to obtain the 75 per cent of the votes required for its approval under the Palau Constitution. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Palau ruled that the compact was therefore not approved.

Consequently, Palau and the United States held further negotiations with a view to reconciling the provisions of the compact with the Palau Constitution. This was achieved on 23 May 1984 when both sides initialled a revised compact. The Palau authorities conducted a plebiscite on the new compact on 4 September 1984 but it again failed to obtain the 75 per cent majority support required for approval. This plebiscite was not observed by the United Nations.

A general election held in Palau on 30 November 1984 resulted in the re-election of the incumbent President and Vice-President who in the past have supported the compact. Pro-compact Palauans were also elected to the Senate and to the House of Delegates and those in the Senate who had campaigned against the Compact have been defeated. The chances of the document being approved by the people of Palau in a new plebiscite have therefore considerably improved. Thereafter, the document would have to be approved by the United States Congress.

Under the terms of the compact, each of the three entities will be self-governing and will have the right to conduct their foreign affairs. The United States will have full authority and responsibility for the security and defence of the Trust Territory. Furthermore, in all of the four entities the United States would have rights to facilities and land for defence use for periods varying from 15 to 50 years in return for substantial payments to the governments of these entities. In addition all the agreements have an exclusionary clause which would ensure that no other power could enter into any defence or security arrangements with any of the entities.

As regards the termination of the Trusteeship agreement the United States has stated in the Trusteeship Council that it will seek termination simultaneously for all parts of the Trust Territory. The United States has also reaffirmed its intention to take up, at the appropriate time, the matter of the termination of the Trusteeship Agreement with the Trusteeship Council the Security Council.

As the negotiations between the United States and the various Micronesian entities have neared completion, the Soviet Union has become increasingly critical of the United States policy and actions in the Trust Territory. It has accused the United States of fragmenting the Territory and of plans for the strategic and military use of some of its islands. As a result, the sessions of the Trusteeship Council have become more and more contentious. But in the Council, the United States has a clear majority as it enjoys the support of France and the United Kingdom and China does not participate in the Trusteeship Council.

As regards the views of the countries of the Pacific region, they believe that the wishes of Micronesians are paramount and that it is up to them to determine their future political status through their freely expressed wishes. It may be noted that in this connexion, Papua New Guinea and Fiji, which are not members of the Trusteeship Council, accepted the Councils' invitation to participate in its visiting missions that observed the plebiscites on the compact of free association in Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands.

Australia and New Zealand are also supportive of the United States policies and actions in the Trust Territory and have made no critical pronouncements in this regard.

East Timor
Australia in
New Caledonia

Briefing Notes
PM of Australia

Indonesia-
Papua New Guinea

Talking Points
PM of New Zealand

Talking Points for the Secretary-General
for his meeting with the Prime Minister of Australia

In your discussions with Prime Minister Hawke of Australia, you may

- express your appreciation for Australia's consistent material, moral and political support for the United Nations and its goals, its role in peace-keeping operations and its generous contributions to United Nations development programmes and activities;
- welcome Australia's return to the Security Council and express your support for Prime Minister Hawke's stated intention to work towards strengthening the United Nations peace machinery.
- in this context, indicate your keen interest in seeing how Australia intended to give shape to its ideas in the three areas which Prime Minister Hawke had identified, namely,
 - i) increased involvement by the Secretary-General in dealing with disputes whether or not they have been brought formally to the attention of the Security Council;
 - ii) actions to implement the collective security provisions of the Charter, for instance, by the Council authorization of the appointment of military advisers to help the Secretary-General deal with international conflicts;
 - iii) creation of a climate in the Security Council more conducive to negotiations, for instance, by holding more informal and private meetings.
- express your readiness to work closely with Australia and other members of the Council on this question which is of critical importance for the future of the United Nations and for international peace and security;

- express your recognition for Australia's role in the decolonization process especially in relation to territories for which it has had direct responsibilities as administering power, namely, Papua New Guinea, Nauru and Cocos (Keeling) Islands, congratulate Prime Minister Hawke, in particular, for the conduct of the act of self-determination last year in the Cocos, and express the hope that Australia will continue to maintain its interest in this important area despite the completion of its direct role in decolonization; (Australia has withdrawn from the Special Committee of 24 this year, but continues to be a member of the Council for Namibia).
- express your appreciation for the efforts made by Prime Minister Hawke's government to promote a peaceful solution to the situation in Kampuchea and inquire about Australia's views regarding developments in the region.
- express your admiration for Australia's active participation in discussions on disarmament and nuclear arms control issues and its important initiatives in these areas
- express your understanding and sympathy for the Australian proposal to establish a nuclear free-zone in the South Pacific and its views on nuclear testing in the Pacific and inquire about the most recent developments in this regard.

Antarctica

East Timor

Malaysia

New Caledonia

Briefing Note
Thai-Lao Border

Indonesia-
Papua New Guinea

Talking Points
PM of New Zealand

Briefing Note for the Secretary-GeneralON RELATIONS BETWEEN INDONESIA AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Relations between Indonesia and Papua New Guinea have been marked by problems along their common border. In 1983, Papua New Guinea discovered that a road being built by Indonesia along the border, had crossed into its territory. During the early part of 1984, two incidents, involving air space and territorial violations, brought formal protests by Papua New Guinea to Indonesia and caused tensions between them to increase. Allegations were also made by Papua New Guinea of incursions into its territory by Indonesian troops, in pursuit of members of the Free Papua Movement (OPM), a rebel separatist movement in Irian Jaya seeking independence from Indonesia.

These problems were exacerbated by the influx into Papua New Guinea of border crossers from Irian Jaya, whose number rose from several hundred early in 1984, to some 9,000 by August, following reports of fighting between Indonesian troops and OPM. Some of these are believed to have fled because they feared reprisals from the Indonesian armed forces, while others may have been driven by rumours and by OPM incitements rather than by real threats to their safety. The Papuan authorities have taken the position that the bulk of the border-crossers should be repatriated, on the understanding that Indonesia should provide assurances for their safe return. They however feel that some 200-300 OPM sympathizers can be considered as "political refugees" and should be allowed either to remain in Papua New Guinea or be resettled in third countries. Papua New Guinea does not recognize or support OPM, but there is a strong sympathy among its population for the Irianese, with whom close ethnic ties exist.

During August, contact at Ministerial level was held between the two countries and an agreement on the repatriation of the border crossers reached, to be implemented starting on 17 September. In the interim, however, reports of the death by malnutrition and starvation of some 90 border crossers were made public. Appeals for relief assistance by Papua New Guinea led UNHCR to pledge \$US 875,000 to feed the border crossers, as funds previously provided by the Indonesian Government for this purpose had run out.

The agreement on repatriation was not implemented as hoped on 17 September. In a meeting with Rafeeuddin Ahmed during the General Assembly, Foreign Minister Namaliu of Papua New Guinea explained that Jakarta had requested changes in the agreement, after the military authorities had apparently objected to a provision implying that Indonesia would reduce its military activities in Irian Jaya. Assurances in this regard had been given in a separate letter by Foreign Minister Mochtar, who did not wish them spelled out in the formal agreement.

Foreign Minister Namaliu also said it was expected that, after conclusion of the agreement, an Indonesian verification team would interview the border crossers, and give them assurances that they would not suffer retaliatory action on their return. Rafeeuddin Ahmed suggested that the participation of UNHCR in the repatriation process might facilitate the solution of the problem, as it would take it out of its bilateral context. Foreign Minister Namaliu said the involvement of UNHCR had been considered, but Foreign Minister Mochtar had objected to it on the grounds that it would "internationalize" the problem.

In his statement of 1 October before the General Assembly, Foreign Minister Namaliu, provided a detailed account of the various difficulties which have adversely affected his country's relations with Indonesia over the past few years. In its right of reply, Indonesia expressed its strong displeasure, pointing out that this dramatisation was not warranted since most of the difficulties had been overcome. Despite this polemical exchange, the agreement on the repatriation of the border crossers was finally signed a few days later in New York, and Foreign Minister Mochtar announced on his return to Jakarta that a verification team would leave shortly for the camps to process the returnees. On the same occasion, Foreign Minister Mochtar said that Indonesia and Papua New Guinea would soon be holding talks aimed at the renewal of the 1979 border agreement between the two countries. A new border agreement was in fact signed during a subsequent visit by Foreign Minister Mochtar to Port Moresby, from 27 to 29 October.

On 3 November, following its arrival in Papua New Guinea, a seven-member Indonesian verification team was attacked at Black Water camp, near Vaimo, by some 900 border crossers. Indonesia made a strong protest to Papua New Guinea and said that the team would not proceed with its task until assurances for its safety were received. Papua New Guinea subsequently moved troops into the border villages, and all outstations along the border were reportedly put on the alert.

During a meeting with Foreign Minister Mochtar on 19 November, Rafeeuddin Ahmed reiterated the view that the participation of UNHCR in the repatriation process would help to defuse the situation. Mr. Mochtar promised to consider this suggestion and, on 13 December, Ambassador Alatas reported that his Government had agreed to a UNHCR role. This was subsequently confirmed by Ambassador Lohia of Papua New Guinea who pointed out that some of the border crossers had already voluntarily returned to Irian Jaya.

In his discussions with Foreign Minister Mochtar, the Secretary-General may wish to express his appreciation for Indonesia's acceptance of the involvement of UNHCR, which will no doubt help to resolve this problem quietly, in a manner acceptable to both sides. The UNHCR has been informed by both countries that its role should be that of an "observer". It is currently trying to ascertain the parameters of that role and has indicated that it may ask for assistance from the United Nations in this regard.

The Secretary-General may also care to express the hope that Indonesia will continue to approach its relations with Papua New Guinea, and any differences which may arise, with the moderation and magnanimity which the international community generally expects the more influential countries to show vis-à-vis their smaller and weaker neighbours.

Briefing Note on
Thai-Lao Border

Briefing Note on
Vietnam

Talking Points
PM of New Zealand

Talking points for the Secretary-General's meeting
with the Prime Minister of New Zealand

In your talks with Prime Minister Lange of New Zealand you may:

- express your admiration for the forthright and outspoken support he had extended to the United Nations and its efforts to promote equity and justice in international relations which was exemplified by his visit to New York and address to the General Assembly shortly after he became Prime Minister. This, was consistent with the positive role that New Zealand had always played in the United Nations. In this context, you may express the confidence that should the circumstances require, you could rely on New Zealand's co-operation and help in United Nations peace-keeping operations.
- express your appreciation for the excellent co-operation that New Zealand had always extended to the United Nations regarding territories under its administration in the past as well as regarding Tokelau and discuss New Zealand's intentions on the future of Tokelau.
- acknowledge the strong stand that New Zealand has taken on nuclear disarmament, particularly its strong support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and its role as a non-nuclear country, in promoting agreements on such vital subjects as the establishment of a nuclear free zone in the South Pacific, measures to avoid nuclear war, the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and the prevention of an arms race.
- express your appreciation for New Zealand's contribution to development programmes of the United Nations particularly its contribution to the United Nations Development Programme.

(It is understood that Prime Minister Lange would inform the Secretary-General of his country's candidacy for the UNDP Governing Council. There is a tradition for New Zealand to rotate on the Council with Australia).

21 January 1985

Additional Information on New Zealand-United States Relations

The United States has requested New Zealand to permit a ship to visit its port. There is no indication whether or not the ship would be nuclear-powered. New Zealand is reported to have replied that a decision on the request would be made within some weeks.