

UNAMIR

SECURITY

21 SEPT - 11 DEC 1994

CONFIDENTIAL

EL/WG JUNE 2009

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

UNARCHIVES

SERIES 5-1062

BOX 164

FILE 4

ACC. 1998/0283

file

SMPO 28/12

UN SECRET

To : HQ MILOBS GP KIGALI

From: HQ SECTOR 3

Date: 11 DEC 94

File: SECTOR 3/OPS/2


Subject: EXPLANATION REGARDING BREACH OF SECURITY

1. Please refer to directions of CMO/DFC on the above subject received through your HQ.

2. Explanation, regarding breach of security of impending ops through transmission of classified information as unclassified in the Daily Sitrep of 10 Dec 94, is forwarded in succeeding paragraphs .

3. This HQ has undergone a total change in the command and staff structure with effect 1800 h on 10 Dec 94. While every effort was made to gather maximum information and forward the same to your HQ in time, it was not known that the message was being transmitted by voice in clear by the Canadian Signals Det due to breakdown of teletype communication. Since all sitreps had earlier been unclassified but were being transmitted by teletype the message was considered to be secure.

4. Notwithstanding the above, the undersigned takes full responsibility for the serious lapse which has undoubtedly occurred. However, it shall be ensured that such lapses do not occur in future through education of all MILOBS on matters of communication security.


SA Hasnain
Lt Col
Sector Comdr

UN SECRET

DCMO
I would like you to
speak personally to the
sector Comd & the duty officer
on the seriousness of such
lapses which could result
in a complete disaster.
As officers, we should be
conscious and mindful
of these important issues
J. H.
DFC/CMO
20/12

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MEMORANDUM

2012 FSO

11 Dec 94

DCOS OPS

SECURITY BREACH

Sir,

1. At 2245 hrs on Sat 10 Dec 94 a security breach of Op Overture occurred.

2. Msg CIP 303/001 sent fm Sect 3 HQ, Gitarama, a SITREP alleging both DP and NGO knowledge of the impending Op Overture was passed on the Force Comd Net (Channel 1).


3. The msg was incorrectly classified UNCLAS by its originator, Lt Cdr Haque, which permits its transmission on the Force Comd Net.

4. The programmed users of Channel 1 are very limited, a list is attached to this memo. The following 6 users also have channel 1:

FC
FC's Veh
FSO
FSO's Veh
Force Sig Ops
ADC to FC


5. Channel 1 is insecure and it is possible to monitor transmissions using commercially obtained frequency scanners.


6. Whilst this incident definitely constitutes a security breach, I do not believe that this specific incident seriously compromises the success of Op Overture.


IG FAVAGER
Maj
FSO
2012

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(3)
DCMO
I want this particular officer
to appear at my interview
16/12
DFC/los/cmo

(2) DFC/COS
For your information prior
to action by DCMO.

DCOS OPS
11.12



* RAD DET DEPLOYED WITH CALL SIGN

FORCE COMD NET **EFF: 5 DEC 94**

file 12/1/94

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DCMO 8/18/94
Action
sm po 19/11

To: Distribution List

From: Force Commander

Date: November 1994

Subject: Contingency Plans

- Blouignand mgn*
1. Enclosed are the HQ UNAMIR contingency plans for:
 - a. Security Alert - Op Plan NIKE;
 - b. Reinforcement - Op Plan HECTOR; and
 - c. Withdrawal and Evacuation - Op Plan JASON.
 2. Addressees are to develop outline operation/support plans for submission to G3 Plans, HQ UNAMIR, by 5 Dec 94 as follows:
 - a. Military, CIVPOL and MILOBS:
 - (1) Sector 1 - CO NICOY;
 - (2) Sector 2 - CO GHANBATT;
 - (3) Sector 3 - OCs MALAWI and MALICOY to submit plans through Sector Comd;
 - (4) Sector 4A - CO ZAMBATT;
 - (5) Sector 4B - CO FRAFBATT;
 - (6) Sector 4C - CO ETHIOBATT;
 - (7) Sector 5 - CO TUNBATT;
 - (8) Sector 6 - COs INDBATT, CANCON and AUSMED.
 - b. Staff:
 - (1) Personnel/Logistics Support - DCOS SP
 - c. Civilian:
 - (1) UNAMIR civilian staff,)
 - (2) FSA personnel;) - Special Task Officer to CAO (Mr Lombardo) to coordinate
 - (3) Brown and Root personnel.)
 - d. UN Agencies - HAC to coordinate with respective Security Officers.

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- e. NGOs - Sector Commanders (HAC to assist).
- 3. POC for enquiries is G3 Plans, HQ UNAMIR.

Distribution List

	Copy No 1
CO NICOY	2
CO GHANBATT	3
Comd Sector 3	4
OC MALAWICOY	5
OC MALICOY	6
CO ZAMBATT	7
CO FRAFBATT	8
CO ETHIOBATT	9
CO TUNBATT	10
CO INDBATT	11
CO AUSMED	12
CO CANCON	13
UNAMIR Civilian Security Officer	14
Special Task Officer to CAO	15
Security Officer UNREO	16
HAC	17
A/C Mil Obs Force	18
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5000.46 (Plans)

PART IUNAMIR SECURITY ALERT CONTINGENCY PLANOP PLAN NIKEGENERAL

1. This instruction covers the Security Alert Measures (SAMs) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan NIKE. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan NIKE are:

a. UNAMIR Reinforcement Contingency Plan - Op Plan HECTOR. Part II. It is likely that Op Plan NIKE SAMs could be activated concurrently with Op Plan HECTOR.

b. UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan - Op Plan JASON. Part III. Op Plan NIKE SAMs will be invoked if Op Plan JASON is activated.

2. Op Plan NIKE provides for the increase of UNAMIR security in the event of a deteriorating situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied locally or nationally, as the threat dictates.

3. It should be noted that the UNAMIR Rules of Engagement (ROE) levels of readiness/alert states may be applied independently or in conjunction with Op Plan NIKE.

THREAT

4. It is assessed that RGF has a developing capability to establish an insurgency threat against the BBGNU. The scale of this potential will increase with time. Current assessment is that the threat is likely to be manifest as follows:

a. Initially in Sector 4/5.

b. Concurrently in more than one border area.

c. In Kigali.

d. In the interior but not until the re-establishment of the population base in rural areas.

5. The threat to UNAMIR is likely to be:

a. A collateral threat caused by attacks on the BBGNU and RPA. Soft targets would be particularly vulnerable under these conditions.

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- b. Direct attack on UNAMIR in order to achieve political ends.

PROTECTION

6. In either case, the protection of UNAMIR personnel must be paramount. Under the current mandate UNAMIR also has a duty to protect the following:

- a. UNREO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agency personnel.
- b. NGO Personnel.
- c. Displaced Persons, Refugees and civilians in sites or populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces.
- d. Any other person under UN protection.

7. UNAMIR resources are limited. It is accepted that the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited by an increased threat. In these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be problematic. Op Plan NIKE gives guidance on the level of security to be achieved by UNAMIR under these conditions.

SECURITY ALERT MEASURES

8. Command. The responsibility for adherence to Security Alert Measures (SAMs) devolves to Sector Commanders, under the orders of HQ UNAMIR.

9. SAMs. UNAMIR SAMs under Op Plan NIKE will be as shown below. A detailed description of the action to be taken under each SAM is to be found in the Annexes shown:

- a. GREEN. Low level threat. Normal Activities. - See **Annex A**.
- b. YELLOW. Medium level threat. Increased security activities. - See **Annex B**. Deployment options are further sub-divided as follows:
 - (1). ALFA. Withdrawal to platoon positions.
 - (2). BRAVO. Withdrawal to company localities.
 - (3). CHARLIE. Withdrawal to battalion defended areas.
- c. RED. High Level threat. Maximum security activity. Civil evacuation if required. UNAMIR evacuation plans in readiness for immediate execution. See **Annex C**.

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10. Activation. The activation of Op Plan NIKE will be sent by HQ UNAMIR, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy, at the earliest opportunity. An activation message will include the following information:

- a. The codeword - Op Plan NIKE.
- b. The unit/Sector to which the SAM applies.
- c. The SAM to be adopted.
- d. The time by which the SAM is to be activated.
- e. The ROE readiness/alert status
- f. Brief description of the reason for Op Plan NIKE activation.
- g. Confirmation details.

11. Example. An example Op Plan NIKE activation message (sent by radio) is given below:

4C THIS IS ZERO.
A. OP PLAN NIKE.
B. ETHIOBATT SECTOR 4C.
C. YELLOW ALFA.
D. BY 241200B OCT 94.
E. ROE YELLOW
F. SIGHTINGS OF ARMED INSURGENTS IN GISAKURA AREA.
G. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW BY FAX.

12. Reaction. On receipt of the Op Plan NIKE SAM message, the receiving unit is to:

- a. Follow the action outlined in the relevant Annex to this Instruction.
- b. Liaise with neighbouring Sectors to inform them of the location of sub-units.
- c. Prepare to carry out the action at the next SAM level.

13. Delegation. The authority to raise a SAM level is delegated to Sector Commanders, if they consider that this is warranted by the threat. They do not have the authority to lower a SAM level. In the event that a Sector Commander judges that a SAM level is to be raised, he must:

- a. Inform HQ UNAMIR by the fastest possible means, giving reasons for the increase in level.
- b. Liaise with neighbouring Sector Commanders.

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- c. Provide regular advice to HQ UNAMIR on his perception of the threat.

14. Reporting. Under NIKE YELLOW and RED, units and sub-units are to make reports as follows:

- a. Any unusual activity related to the threat to be reported immediately.
- b. Specific reference to Op Plan NIKE activity is to be made as part of the SITREPs at 0600 and 1800 hrs.
- c. A weekly summary of Op Plan NIKE activities.

15. Status of MILOBs. MILOBs have special status under the UN Convention, wherein they are defined as "experts". Because they are unarmed, early consideration for their security should be given by Sector Commanders. MILOBs are to be controlled as described in Annexes A-C.

16. Status of UNCIVPOL. UNCIVPOL authority can offer some advantages over military authority, in certain circumstances. Sector Commanders are to consider requesting UNCIVPOL support to enhance their security arrangements, particularly for the following:

- a. Crowd control.
- b. Personal search.
- c. Law and order enforcement.
- d. Guarding of Key Points.
- e. Liaison with Gendarmerie.

FURTHER ACTION

17. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Sector commanders are to develop formal RRF contingency plans, which match Op Plan NIKE escalation as follows:

- a. NIKE GREEN. One section per company at 30 mins NTM.
- b. NIKE YELLOW. One section per company at 10 mins NTM.
- c. NIKE RED. One platoon per company at 10 mins NTM.

18. Sector Plans. Sector Plans for Op Plan NIKE are to be developed immediately. Sector Commanders are to submit Op Plan NIKE sub-plans to HQ UNAMIR **by 5 Dec 94**.

19. Protected Personnel. Sector Commanders are to submit initial estimates of the numbers and deployment of Protected Personnel to HQ UNAMIR by 5 Dec 94.

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20. Warning and Reporting Procedures. G3 Ops is to develop Op Plan NIKE Warning and Reporting Procedures by 5 Dec 94.
21. Test Exercise. G3 Ops is to plan to exercise Op Plan NIKE measures as a CPX, as soon as Sector plans have been cleared by DCOS Ops.
22. Administration and Logistics. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan NIKE by 5 Dec 94.
23. Review. G3 Plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan NIKE, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

PART I ANNEXES

- A. Op Plan NIKE GREEN - Normal Activities.
- B. Op Plan NIKE YELLOW - Medium Level Threat.
- C. Op Plan NIKE RED - High Level Threat.

OP PLAN NIKE GREEN - NORMAL ACTIVITIES

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
2. Reconnaissance. Carry out reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under NIKE YELLOW and RED.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
3. Protected Personnel. Establish the identity, numbers and locations of Protected Personnel within AOR, and brief them on the procedure to be followed under NIKE YELLOW and RED. This must be done discreetly in a manner which avoids alarmism.
4. MILOBs. Ensure that all MILOB personnel within the Sector are briefed on Op Plan NIKE contingencies.
5. UNCIVPOL. Consider how UNCIVPOL deployment could be utilised to enhance military security arrangements.

OP PLAN NIKE YELLOW - MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT

1. Passage of SAMs. All units and sub-units within AOR are to be informed of the change of Op Plan NIKE SAM, by the fastest possible means.
2. Normal Operations. Units and sub-units are to continue to carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
3. Reconnaissance. Carry out further reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under NIKE RED.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
4. Protected Personnel.
 - (1). Establish identity, numbers and locations of UN and NGO personnel within AOR.
 - (2). Maintain a register of these details.
 - (3). Inform those personnel of the reason for an increase in the threat and of the need to remain vigilant.
 - (4). Develop plans to marshal those personnel into UNAMIR Safe Areas.
 - (5). Inform those personnel of the action to be taken to withdraw them to UN Safe Areas.
5. Withdrawal to Safe Areas. Under Op Plan NIKE, withdrawal to Safe Areas will be ordered as required. Safe Areas are designed to provide increased protection of Protected Personnel, not to defend an area from direct attack, although they must be capable of doing so. The occupation of Safe Areas will be ordered as follows:
 - a. NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Section outposts to withdraw to platoon positions. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of section level.
 - b. NIKE YELLOW BRAVO. Platoons to withdraw to company localities. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of platoon level.

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c. NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE. Companies to withdraw to battalion defended areas. Patrolling to be carried out at minimum of platoon level. National contingents operating independently at company level, will remain in place. Sectors will not be vacated.

6. Withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas. During execution of NIKE YELLOW or RED, Protected Personnel may be withdrawn to Safe Areas, **on a voluntary basis**. UNAMIR personnel are not in a position to enforce withdrawal. Advice which can be given as a professional recommendation only. Withdrawal of these personnel should occur under the following conditions:

- a. At the request of the personnel concerned.
- b. On the advice of the Sector Commander.
- c. On orders from HQ UNAMIR.

7. Reception. Platoon, company and battalion locations must have provision for the inclusion of Protected Personnel within the relevant AOR. Arrangements should be made for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of those personnel.

8. Fixed Installations. Sector Commanders are to increase the security of fixed installations, which include communications repeater sites, under NIKE YELLOW. In practice, it may practical to co-locate platoon, company and battalion positions with fixed installation. In other cases, this may not be possible and the following minimum security is to be provided:

- a. NIKE YELLOW ALFA. Minimum of one section to augment security at fixed installations.
- b. NIKE YELLOW BRAVO AND CHARLIE. Minimum of one platoon to augment security at fixed installations.

9. MILOB Withdrawal. MILOBs are to adhere to Op Plan NIKE SAMs. Arrangements for the reception and administration of MILOB personnel are to be coordinated by Sector Commanders. MILOBs may be given military tasks in the AOR under NIKE YELLOW, provided that the following criteria are fulfilled:

- a. They are not sent to the site of a known or suspected threat.
- b. They travel as a minimum party of six in two vehicles.
- c. They have guaranteed communications.

10. Movement. Convoy movement is permitted under the following conditions:

- a. Minimum convoy is four vehicles.

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- b. Minimum protection is one section per convoy or packet.
- c. Movement off MSRs is minimized.
- d. All convoys or packets have guaranteed communications.
- e. Movement at night is minimized.

11. Administration. The following administrative actions are to be carried out:

- a. Combat Supplies. Seven days combat supplies are to be maintained at first line.
- b. Stockpiling. A further seven days combat supplies are to stockpiled at unit level.
- c. Destruction Plans. In accordance with Op Plans HECTOR and JASON.
- d. Leave. Leave is restricted to compassionate cases only.
- e. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be consumed when units are placed on NIKE YELLOW or RED.

OP PLAN NIKE RED - HIGH LEVEL THREAT

1. Passage of SAMs. All units and sub-units within AOR are to be informed of the change of Op Plan NIKE SAM, by the fastest possible means.
2. Operations. Where possible, units are to continue to carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
3. Reconnaissance. Carry out further reconnaissance of the following:
 - a. All locations identified for use under Op Plans HECTOR AND JASON.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
4. Protected Personnel.
 - a. Establish identity, numbers and locations of UN and NGO personnel within AOR, if this has not been done under NIKE YELLOW.
 - b. Maintain a register of these details.
 - c. Inform those personnel of the reason for an increase in the threat and of the need to remain vigilant.
 - d. Advise those personnel of the need to move into Safe Areas immediately.
 - e. If ordered by HQ UNAMIR, plan to escort those personnel to Kigali or a neighbouring country.
5. Withdrawal to Safe Areas. If withdrawal to battalion defended Safe Areas has not been ordered under NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE, an increase in SAM to RED automatically orders this withdrawal. National contingents operating independently at company level, will remain in place. Sectors will not be vacated.
6. Withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas. During NIKE RED, Protected Personnel may be withdrawn to Safe Areas, **on a voluntary basis**. Sector Commanders are to give those personnel strong advice to withdraw to Safe Areas immediately.
7. Reception. Safe Areas must have provision for the inclusion of the UN and NGO personnel within the relevant AOR. Arrangements should be made for the reception, accommodation, feeding and transportation of those personnel.

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8. Further Withdrawal. UN and NGO personnel may be further withdrawn, **on a voluntary basis**, as ordered by HQ UNAMIR. They may be escorted to Kigali or a neighbouring country.
9. Fixed Installations. Under NIKE RED, the minimum force required to augment security at fixed installations is one platoon. Sector Commanders are to recommend whether or not fixed installations should continue to operate in this security environment.
10. MILOB Withdrawal. MILOBs are to adhere to Op Plan NIKE SAMs. Arrangements for the reception and administration of MILOB personnel in Safe Areas are to be coordinated by Sector Commanders. MILOBs may not be given military tasks in the AOR under NIKE RED, without the specific authority of the Force Commander.
11. Movement. Convoy movement is permitted under the following conditions:
 - a. Minimum convoy is eight vehicles.
 - b. Minimum protection is two sections per convoy or packet.
 - c. No movement off MSRs.
 - d. All convoys or packets have guaranteed communications.
 - e. No movement at night.
12. Administration. The following administrative actions are to be carried out:
 - a. Combat Supplies. Seven days combat supplies are to be maintained at first line.
 - b. Stockpiling. A further seven days combat supplies are to be stockpiled at unit level.
 - c. Destruction Plans. In accordance with Op Plan HECTOR and JASON.
 - d. Leave. No leave is to be granted.
 - e. Dress. All personnel are to wear ballistic protective equipment and headgear where issued.
 - f. Alcohol. No alcohol is to be consumed when units are placed on NIKE RED.

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5000. 46 (Plans)

PART IIUNAMIR REINFORCEMENT CONTINGENCY PLANOP PLAN HECTORGENERAL

1. This instruction covers the Reinforcement Measures (RMs) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan HECTOR. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan HECTOR are:

a. UNAMIR Security Alert Contingency Plan - Op Plan NIKE. Part I. It is likely that Op Plan NIKE SAMs will be linked to Op Plan HECTOR RMs.

b. UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan - Op Plan JASON. Part III.

2. Op Plan HECTOR provides for the reinforcement of UNAMIR units and locations in the event of a deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied locally or nationally, as the threat dictates.

3. It should be noted that the ROE levels of readiness/alert states may be applied independently or in conjunction with Op Plan HECTOR.

4. Scenario. It is not possible to anticipate specific scenarios. Op Plan HECTOR seeks to generate additional formed bodies of troops to enhance the security cover provided in certain Sectors. It is expected that such reinforcement would be in a scenario in which an additional presence would improve the security situation, or provide better protection for UNAMIR personnel or those who UNAMIR has a duty to protect. In other scenarios, reinforcement would not be the appropriate response.

REINFORCEMENT MEASURES

5. Command Responsibility. The responsibility for implementation of RMs devolves to Sector Commanders, under the orders of Main HQ. The two key players are:

a. Reinforcing Sector Commander (RSC). The Sector Commander from whose Sector formed bodies of troops will be deployed to reinforce another Sector.

b. Gaining Sector Commander (GSC). The Sector Commander receiving reinforcing formed bodies of troops.

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6. Command Relationship. The delegation of command to the GSC will be coordinated by HQ UNAMIR. In principle, the GSC will assume TACON of reinforcing troops, subject to national command restrictions.
7. Requirement for Reinforcement. HQ UNAMIR will determine whether a Sector is to be reinforced on the basis of the following:
 - a. At the request of the GSC.
 - b. On evidence of a deteriorating security situation in the Sector(s) concerned.
 - c. To preempt a threat which is expected to materialize.
 - d. In response to a changing political situation.
8. Level of Reinforcement. Under Op Plan HECTOR, reinforcement up to multiple company level, by **formed platoons and companies**, can be ordered as required. Reinforcement by a complete battalion is unlikely, but can be ordered by HQ UNAMIR if required. Reinforcement of Kigali at battalion level is to be coordinated under the Force Evacuation Plan, Op Plan JASON.
9. RMs. UNAMIR RMs under Op Plan HECTOR will be as shown below. A detailed description of the action to be taken under each RM is to be found in the Annexes shown:
 - a. GREEN. Low level threat. Normal Activities. - See **Annex A**.
 - b. YELLOW. Medium level threat. - See **Annex B**. Deployment options are further sub-divided as follows:
 - (1). ALFA. Reconnaissance. Main Body at 24 hrs NTM.
 - (2). BRAVO. Deployment of Advance Party. Main Body at 12 hrs NTM.
 - (3). CHARLIE. Main Body at 6 hrs NTM.
 - c. RED. High Level threat. Deployment of Main Body. See **Annex C**.
10. Activation. The activation of a RM will be sent by HQ UNAMIR, using the fastest means possible, followed by a confirmatory hard copy, at the earliest opportunity. An activation message will include the following information:
 - a. The codeword - Op Plan HECTOR
 - b. The Reinforcing Sector(s).
 - c. The Gaining Sector(s).
 - d. The level of reinforcement.

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- e. The RM to be adopted.
 - f. RV location for YELLOW ALFA.
 - g. The time at which the NTM is to be achieved.
 - h. The ROE readiness/alert status.
 - i. Brief description of the reason for Op Plan HECTOR activation.
 - j. Confirmation details.
11. Example. An example Op Plan HECTOR activation message (sent by radio) is given below:

1,2 AND 5 THIS IS ZERO.
A. OP PLAN HECTOR.
B. SECTORS 1 AND 2 TO REINFORCE SECTOR 5.
C. SECTOR 1 TWO PLATOONS.
D. SECTOR 2 ONE COMPANY.
E. YELLOW ALFA.
F. RV SECTOR 5 HQ AT 240800B OCT 94.
G. RM TO BE ACHIEVED BY 241200B OCT 94.
H. ROE GREEN
I. AUGMENT SECURITY IN RUHRENGERI AND NDIZA AREAS.
J. CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW BY FAX.

12. Reaction. On receipt of an Op Plan HECTOR message, addressees are to:
- a. Carry out the action described in the relevant Annex.
 - b. Liaise with neighbouring Sectors to inform them of the location of sub-units when RMs are in place.
 - c. Prepare to carry out the action at the next RM level.
13. Safe Area Contingency Positions. Sector Commanders are to carry out reconnaissance of contingency positions for deployment of reinforcing units. In principle, it is to be expected that reinforcing units would be withdrawn under NIKE RED. If the tactical situation prevents this, they will need to remain in the Gaining Sector. As a precaution, contingency reconnaissance should be carried out as follows:
- a. Within each company Safe Area, under Op Plan NIKE, one platoon position.
 - b. Within each battalion Safe Area, under Op Plan NIKE, one company position.

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14. Summary of NTM Timings. Op Plan HECTOR.

RM	RECCE PARTY	ADVANCE PARTY	MAIN BODY
GREEN	6 hrs	12 hrs	48 hrs
YELLOW ALFA	Move	6 hrs	24 hrs
YELLOW BRAVO	-	Move	12 hrs
YELLOW CHARLIE	-	-	6 hrs
RED	-	-	Move

15. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Sector Commanders are to maintain RRF readiness as described under Op Plan NIKE.

FURTHER ACTION

16. Sector Plans. Sector Plans for Op Plan HECTOR are to be developed immediately. Sector Commanders are to submit Op Plan HECTOR plans to HQ UNAMIR by 5 Dec 94.

17. Test Exercise. G3 Ops is to plan to exercise Op Plan HECTOR measures as a CPX, as soon as Sector plans have been cleared by DCOS Ops.

18. Communications. FSO is to highlight communications issues concerned with Op Plan HECTOR by 5 Dec 94. Consideration should be given to:

- a. CNR compatibility.
- b. Frequency harmonisation.
- c. CEOI planning.

19. Logistic Planning. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan HECTOR by 5 Dec 94.

20. Review. G3 Plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan HECTOR, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

Part II Annexes:

- A. Op Plan HECTOR GREEN - Normal Activities
- B. Op Plan HECTOR YELLOW - Medium Level Threat
- C. Op Plan HECTOR RED - High Level Threat

OP PLAN HECTOR GREEN - NORMAL ACTIVITIES

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order.
2. Reconnaissance. Identify:
 - a. Possible locations for use under HECTOR YELLOW and RED, at platoon and company level.
 - b. Routes to all locations including alternatives.
3. Administration of Reinforcing Troops. Make contingency plans to administer one three platoon company consisting of the following:
 - a. 120 personnel.
 - (1). Recce Party - 5.
 - (2). Advance Party - 10.
 - (3). Main Body - 105.
 - b. 10 vehicles.
4. Preparation of Own Troops. Prepare to deploy formed bodies of troops to another Sector. Battalion Sectors should initially plan on preparing one company; Company Sectors should initially plan on preparing one platoon, as follows:
 - a. Notice to Move (NTM).
 - (1). Recce Party at 6 hrs NTM.
 - (2). Advance Party at 12 hrs NTM.
 - (3). Main Body at 48 hrs NTM.
 - b. Equipment. Fully equipped and scaled for 7 days operations.
 - c. Combat Supplies. Self contained for 3 days.

OP PLAN HECTOR YELLOW - MEDIUM LEVEL THREAT

1. Tasks. Carry out normal tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
2. Reconnaissance. If reinforcement is being planned, carry out detailed reconnaissance of locations earmarked for reinforcement under HECTOR RED, including routes.
3. Preparation for Reinforcement. If ordered to prepare to reinforce another Sector, reduce NTM to:
 - a. HECTOR YELLOW ALFA.
 - (1). Recce Party - Move immediately.
 - (2). Advance Party - 6 hrs.
 - (3). Main Body - 24 hrs.
 - b. HECTOR YELLOW BRAVO.
 - (1). Advance Party - Move immediately.
 - (2). Main Body - 12 hrs.
 - c. HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE. Main Body at 6 hrs NTM.
4. Reception Arrangements. If reinforcement of the Sector is planned:
 - a. Issue verbal orders on arrival of the Recce Party.
 - b. Appoint an LO to coordinate reception arrangements.
 - c. Provide guides, movement control and signing as required.
 - d. Coordinate C2 including communications electronic instructions.
 - e. Prepare accommodation, if available, taking into account the tactical situation.
 - f. Coordinate administrative support.

ANNEX C TO
5000.46 (PLANS)
PART II TO
DATED OCT 94

OP PLAN HECTOR RED - HIGH LEVEL THREAT

1. Tasks. Carry out tasks as described in current HQ UNAMIR Op Order, where possible.
2. Deployment on Reinforcement. If ordered to reinforce another Sector, deploy the Main Body immediately.
3. Reception Arrangements. If receiving reinforcements:
 - a. Issue confirmatory orders.
 - b. Coordinate C2 arrangements.
 - c. Arrange administrative support as required.

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5000. 46 (Plans)

PART III**UNAMIR WITHDRAWAL AND EVACUATION CONTINGENCY PLAN****OP PLAN JASON****GENERAL**

1. This instruction covers the UNAMIR Withdrawal and Evacuation Contingency Plan (WECP) to be adopted by all UNAMIR and associated units in the UNAMIR AO. It is codenamed Op Plan JASON. Those Instructions which must be read in conjunction with Op Plan JASON are:

- a. UNAMIR Security Alert Contingency Plan - Op Plan NIKE. Part I. Raising of Op Plan NIKE SAMs will inevitably precede implementation of Op Plan JASON.
- b. UNAMIR Reinforcement Contingency Plan - Op Plan HECTOR. Part II.

2. Op Plan JASON provides for the withdrawal and evacuation of UNAMIR and associated personnel in the event of a seriously deteriorating security situation in Rwanda. It is designed to be flexible and responsive in a changing security environment, and to be applied on a national basis.

PROTECTION

3. Under the current mandate, UNAMIR has a duty to protect the following:

- a. UNREO, UNHCR, UNCIVPOL and other UN agency personnel.
- b. NGO Personnel.
- c. Displaced Persons, Refugees and civilians in sites or populations under the protection of UNAMIR forces.
- d. Any other person under UN protection.

4. UNAMIR resources are limited. It is accepted that the provision of security and humanitarian assistance, under the UNAMIR mission, may have to be limited by an increased threat. In these circumstances, the extension of protection to all those listed above may be problematic. Op Plan JASON gives guidance on the level of security to be achieved by UNAMIR under these conditions.

PRINCIPLES OF EVACUATION

5. An Evacuation will be the Last Resort. Before it is ordered, UNAMIR will seek to continue the mission, whilst retaining security by:
- Increasing Security Alert Measures (SAMs). Op Plan NIKE.
 - Reinforcing threatened Sector(s). Op Plan HECTOR.
 - Withdrawing to Kigali, from where evacuated Sectors can be re-occupied, if there is a decrease in the threat.
 - Evacuating Kigali at the end of the withdrawal process.
6. UNAMIR will Present Strong and Coherent Resolve. An evacuation will only be ordered where there is no alternative. Even when non-essential personnel have been withdrawn or evacuated, a high security core of troops will provide a presence until evacuated.
7. Protected Civilians will be Evacuated First. They will be offered early withdrawal to Safe Areas, escorted to Kigali and advised to leave when the security situation makes their presence no longer tenable.
8. Equipment will not be Abandoned. Where possible, only equipment of low value will be left in Rwanda.
9. Kigali International Airport will be the Primary Means of Evacuation.
10. Final Evacuation Phase will be Conducted by Road.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

11. A possible sequence of events for the implementation of Op Plan JASON is given below:

SER	EVENT	RESPONSE
1	Insurgent threat increases in Sector(s).	Security Alert Measures increased under Op Plan NIKE.
2	Greater presence required to ensure security in Sector(s).	Op Plan HECTOR invoked to threatened Sector(s).
3	Situation worsens in threatened Sector(s).	Protected Personnel withdrawn to Kigali.
4	Increase in threat in other Sectors.	Non-essential personnel withdrawn to Kigali. Op Plan HECTOR invoked if troops available.

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5	Threat increases in all Sectors.	Op Plan HECTOR concentrated on Kigali Sector.
6	Kigali comes under direct threat.	Op Plan JASON activated. Protected Personnel advised to leave.
7	Insurgency in Kigali worsens.	Non-essential personnel evacuated.
8	Situation deteriorates.	Destruction plans prepared Some operational personnel evacuated.
9	Government loses control.	Bulk of operational personnel evacuated by air/road. Destruction plans invoked.
10	Order to evacuate given.	Remainder of available personnel leave by air. Security Force leaves by road.

12. Alternative Scenarios. A number of other scenarios could invoke Op Plan JASON. In the main, however, a progressive deterioration, leading to a total collapse of security would be required before the full plan would be implemented.

13. Degree of Evacuation. Op Plan JASON may be only partially executed. A stabilisation of the security situation would limit the degree of evacuation. Similarly, the process of evacuation could be reversed if the situation were to improve.

STAGES OF EVACUATION

14. JASON GREEN. During JASON GREEN, normal operations will continue. Preparation for further stages will be carried out. Major changes to the security environment will include:

- a. Op Plan NIKE SAMs may be raised.
- b. Op Plan HECTOR RMs may be activated to increase presence in threatened Sector(s).
- c. For full details, see **Annex A.**

15. JASON YELLOW. Under JASON YELLOW, the WECF will be stage, as described in **Annex B**, as follows:

- a. JASON YELLOW ALFA. Orders for withdrawal to Kigali.
- b. JASON YELLOW BRAVO. Protected and Non-Essential personnel evacuated.

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c. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Bulk of personnel evacuated by air/road.

16. JASON RED. Kigali/Rwanda evacuated by air. Security Force leaves by road. See Annex C.

RESPONSIBILITIES

17. Overall Responsibility for WECP. Chief Security and Area Security Coordinator for Rwanda is responsible for the coordination of the UNAMIR WECP.

18. Military Aspects of WECP. G3 Plans is responsible for the planning of military aspects of Op Plan JASON within HQ UNAMIR. Within UNAMIR, military responsibility for the WECP devolves to:

- a. Sector Commanders to coordinate withdrawal of their Sectors to Kigali.
- b. Sector Commander Sector 6 (Kigali) for the reception of units withdrawn to Kigali prior to evacuation.
- c. G3 Ops for the coordination of deployment of units.
- c. DFC/COS for the coordination of evacuation of Kigali, devolved as follows:
 - (1). Security and Protection - DCOS Ops.
 - (2). Transport, Movement, Sustainment and Destruction - DCOS Sp.
- d. Contingent/unit/sub-unit Commanders for the coordination of contingent plans to conform with UNAMIR plans and national requirements.

19. Protected Personnel. Those organisations representing personnel protected by UNAMIR are responsible for briefing their personnel on the HQ UNAMIR WECP and for ensuring that their own instructions conform to the overall plan. These include:

- a. UN agencies.
- b. UN Aid agencies.
- c. NGOs.
- d. Contractors.

20. Destruction Plans. UNAMIR equipment will not be permitted to fall into the hands of an aggressor, unless there is no way to prevent this. **Sector Commanders and HQ Staff branches are to prepare lists of equipment which meet the criteria below.** In principle, all usable UNAMIR stores and equipment will be evacuated. The following categories of stores and equipment are to be used:

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- a. Essential. Those stores and equipment without which the Force cannot evacuate in good order. This category includes all weapons, vehicles, fighting equipment scales and combat supplies for 7 days. It may also include critical information which will enable the Force to resume operations in Rwanda with minimum loss of efficiency.
- b. Important. Those stores and equipment which are high value, and whose loss would involve difficulty in fulfilling the mission, or considerable expense to the UN. These include alternative communications equipment, computers, medical stores, support equipment scales and remaining combat supplies.
- c. Non-Essential. Those stores and equipment which are difficult to evacuate and whose loss does not incur considerable expense to the UN. These include defence stores, office and accommodation stores, and land line already in place.

FURTHER ACTION

- 21. Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). G3 Ops is to develop a RRF plan for Op Plan HECTOR, taking into account RRF procedures adopted under Op Plan NIKE and the RRF to be provided by Comd Sector 6 during JASON YELLOW. See Annex B para 5.
- 22. Reception Plan. Commander Sector 6 is to develop a reception plan, in line with deployment under JASON YELLOW, as detailed by G3 Plans.
- 23. Protected Personnel. Parent Organisations of Protected Personnel are to develop their own evacuation plans, using Op Plan JASON as the template. These should be submitted ASP. UNREO is to ensure that the Parent Organisations of Protected Personnel are briefed on the security requirements of UNAMIR and that they submit, **by 5 Dec 94**:
 - a. Lists of all personnel in country.
 - b. Lists of vehicles, with stores and passenger capacity.
 - c. Location of assets.
 - d. Priority for evacuation.
 - e. Any call on evacuation resources which might be of use to UNAMIR.
- 24. Military Evacuation. Sector Commanders, Contingent Commanders and HQ UNAMIR staff branches are to submit outline lists of personnel and equipment to be evacuated by 5 Dec 94, to include:
 - a. Non-Essential Personnel.
 - b. Essential and Important Stores by tonnage and category.
 - c. Integral lift capability for personnel and stores.

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25. Communications. FSO is to develop an outline Force Communications Plan to support Op Plan JASON by 5 Dec 94.
26. Logistic Planning. DCOS Sp is to provide detailed comment on the feasibility of the administrative and logistic constraints on Op Plan JASON when initial civilian and military evacuation lists have been submitted.
27. Review. G3 plans is to conduct a monthly review of Op Plan JASON, revise the plan as required and coordinate the revision of supporting plans.

OP PLAN JASON GREEN

GENERAL

1. When JASON GREEN is in force, normal operations may continue, where the threat permits. This state is the opportunity for all preparatory action to be carried out, in the event that a higher Op Plan JASON state is ordered. Time utilised efficiently in planning Op Plan JASON activation during this period will pay dividends.
2. Op Plan NIKE. Op Plan NIKE may operate independently of Op Plan JASON. It provides for the raising of Security Alert Measures (SAMs), on a Sector or national basis as required. It is unlikely that Op Plan JASON would be activated unless the security situation had already warranted a SAM increase to NIKE YELLOW CHARLIE or NIKE RED. The withdrawal of Protected Personnel to Safe Areas can be expected before Op Plan JASON states are increased. Their evacuation from threatened Sector(s) under Op Plan JASON would follow naturally from this situation.
3. Op Plan HECTOR. Op Plan HECTOR may also operate independently of Op Plan JASON. As the UN intends to present a robust resolve in the face of an increased threat, it is likely that Op Plan HECTOR escalation to HECTOR YELLOW CHARLIE or HECTOR RED would be invoked before Op Plan JASON activation. The reinforcement of Kigali is a process which follows naturally from the reinforcement of other threatened Sector(s).

OUTLYING SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

4. Preparation. Sector Commanders of outlying Sectors (ie not Kigali, Sector 6), have specific command responsibilities under Op Plan JASON. These include:
 - a. Preparation of Sector units and sub-units for Op Plan JASON activation.
 - b. Briefing of all personnel.
 - c. Contingency planning.
 - d. Subsidiary Plans:
 - (1). Communications Plan.
 - (2). Logistic Plan.
 - (3). Movement Plan.
 - (4). Destruction Plan.

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5. Military Information. Sector Commanders are responsible for the provision of up to date military information, where the tactical situation allows the deployment of troops, specifically in the following key areas:

- a. Insurgent activity.
- b. Developing threat.
- c. Route information, between locations and to/from Kigali.

6. Protected Personnel. UN, NGO and other Protected Personnel are to be considered when planning Op Plan JASON contingencies. Sector Commanders **are to plan to**:

a. Ensure that OP Plan NIKE SAMs are promulgated to all Protected Personnel and that they are:

- (1). Listed and registered.
- (2). Briefed on the developing threat situation.
- (3). Encouraged to withdraw to Safe Areas, as the threat evolves.
- (4). Administered within Safe Areas if necessary.

b. Provide up to date information to Main HQ on Protected Personnel, if deployed to Safe Areas, to include:

- (1). Names & Parent Organisation.
- (2). Locations.
- (3). Medical Condition.
- (4). Available transport.
- (5). Stores and Equipment.
- (6). Capability for self-sufficiency.
- (7). Intentions.

c. Brief Protected Personnel on the means by which their parent organisation is planning to evacuate them. If Motorola communications are intact, this may not be required.

d. Escort Protected Personnel to Kigali for further evacuation to another country, if ordered to do so.

KIGALI SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES

7. Sector Command. Sector Commander Sector 6 Kigali, has specific responsibilities for the development of OP Plan JASON plans. He is responsible for coordinating the reception as ordered by HQ UNAMIR, within Sector 6 of the following:

- a. Those units, sub-units and contingents currently deployed in Sector 6.
- b. Those units and sub-units redeployed to reinforce Sector 6 under Op Plan HECTOR.
- c. Those units and sub-units redeployed to Sector 6 under Op Plan JASON.
- d. Protected Personnel occupying Safe Areas under Op Plan NIKE.
- e. Protected Personnel still occupying work locations in Kigali City.

8. Kigali International Airport (KIA). KIA is central to the UNAMIR WECP. The retention of security in the area of KIA is critical to the continued maintenance of the Force and of the evacuation of UNAMIR personnel, equipment and stores. G3 Plans is to plan to deploy elements of the Force under Op Plan JASON, to guard KIA as follows:

- a. Airport buildings including Control Tower.
- b. Marshalling apron work areas.
- c. Perimeter.
- d. Flight paths which could be threatened by low-level air defence systems.

9. Key Points (KPs). The protection of KPs will be essential to the implementation of Op Plan JASON. A full list of KPs, to be guarded by elements of the Force is to be evolved by G3 Plans, in discussion with other UN and NGO representatives. The number of KPs will be the minimum consistent with the threat and the maintenance of the Force. It is likely to include:

- a. Amahoro Hotel.
- b. Amahoro Stadium Complex including 500 Man Camp.
- c. Third Line Supply Compound.
- d. Wksps.
- e. Kigali City Hospital (AUSMED).
- e. UNDP Building.

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10. Contingency Planning. G3 Plans is to plan the deployment of all Force units within Sector 6 under JASON YELLOW ALFA. These plans are to include:

- a. Deployment areas for all units and sub-units, reced to platoon level.
- b. Requirement for defence stores.
- c. Development of RRF plans.
- d. Accommodation requirements.
- e. Administrative arrangements including the delivery of water.

11. Communications. FSO is to develop a communications plan for the use of Sector 6 units deployed under JASON YELLOW and RED.

LOGISTIC PLANNING

12. General. Preliminary logistic planning by DCOS Sp for the activation of Op Plan JASON YELLOW and RED should commence immediately. Information is required to predict the sustainment requirements for the Force deployed into Sector 6. Consideration should be given to providing raw data from which operational options can be developed. Some issues are:

- a. The number of personnel to be evacuated during JASON YELLOW and RED.
- b. The means by which evacuation can be achieved.
- c. The impact on Op Plan JASON caused by a closure of KIA.
- d. Practical guidance for comparison of Force sustainment/structure requirements, when the Force is deployed to Kigali.
- e. Minimum stocks required based on 14 days without resupply.
- f. Accommodation options.

OP PLAN JASON YELLOW

GENERAL

1. JASON YELLOW is the trigger for the UNAMIR WECP to commence. It stages the withdrawal and evacuation process between JASON GREEN, the planning phase, and JASON RED, the final evacuation of Kigali and Rwanda.
2. JASON YELLOW is staged as follows:
 - a. JASON YELLOW ALFA. Outlying Sectors withdrawn to Kigali.
 - b. JASON YELLOW BRAVO. Evacuation of Protected and non-essential personnel.
 - c. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE. Evacuation of bulk of UNAMIR personnel.

JASON YELLOW ALFA - WITHDRAWAL PHASE

3. Outlying Sector Command Responsibilities. On the receipt of a JASON YELLOW ALFA message, outlying Sector Commanders are to:
 - a. Marshall units and sub-units in Safe Areas.
 - b. Marshall Protected Personnel into Safe Areas.
 - c. Prepare orders for a road move to Kigali, utilising routes reced under JASON GREEN.
 - d. Be prepared to receive detailed reception coordinating instructions from HQ UNAMIR, including timings.
 - e. Prepare Non-Essential stores for destruction.
 - f. Carry out route clearance and security.
 - g. Before departure, destroy Non-Essential stores.
 - i. Move to Kigali.
4. Sector 6 Commander Responsibilities. On receipt of JASON YELLOW ALFA message, Sector 6 Commander is to prepare reception arrangements for units withdrawing to Kigali as follows:

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- a. Escort convoys from release points within Sector 6 to deployment areas.
- b. Provide guides down to platoon level.
- c. Provide security to units which are occupying their deployment areas, until local defence has been established.
- d. Allocate two platoons to act as RRF at 5 mins NTM during occupation of deployment areas.
- e. Escort Protected Personnel to parent organisations, if the security situation permits.

5. Deployment Coordination. G3 Ops/G3 Plans will coordinate the deployment of units within Sector 6. This will involve:

- a. Identification of deployment areas.
- b. Coordination between units.
- c. Arrival procedures.
- d. Issue of defence stores.
- e. Key Point isolation and guarding procedures.
- f. Development of Map/Locator list for Sector 6.
- g. Control of movement.
- h. Security procedures and ROE.
- i. RRF allocation.
- j. Administrative arrangements.

6. Arrival Procedures. On arrival in Sector 6, units and sub-units will deploy to designated areas. Immediate actions on arrival are:

- a. Establish perimeter defence of designated area(s).
- b. Coordinate return of Protected Personnel to parent organisation with Commander Sector 6, if the security situation permits.
- c. Allocate RRF for local defence and take over responsibilities from Commander Sector 6.

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- d. List non-essential personnel and manifest for evacuation under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.
- e. Identify Important stores for evacuation.
- f. Identify Non-Essential stores for destruction.

JASON YELLOW BRAVO - PRELIMINARY EVACUATION

7. **General.** JASON YELLOW BRAVO will be ordered if the situation deteriorates to the point that:

- a. The presence of a full complement of UNAMIR personnel in Kigali places an unmanageable burden on the logistic structure necessary to sustain it.
- b. A large number of personnel cannot be properly employed due to security restrictions on their tasks.
- c. Protected Personnel could be placed in direct danger.
- d. Further evacuation seems likely.

8. **Personnel.** Personnel to be evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO are:

- a. The bulk of Protected Personnel, less those required as a minimum presence on the ground by their parent organisations.
- b. UNAMIR civilian personnel whose work in the security environment is no longer deemed essential.
- c. UNAMIR military personnel whose role cannot be carried out in the current security environment.
- d. Formed UNAMIR units no longer required to enhance the security of Kigali.

9. **Equipment.** It is not intended to evacuate equipment under JASON YELLOW BRAVO except for:

- a. High value equipment which would be particularly difficult to evacuate in an increased threat scenario.
- b. Essential equipment of any formed unit which is ordered to evacuate at this stage.

10. **Personal Baggage.** Personnel evacuated during Op Plan JASON will be restricted to minimum personal baggage. Commanders should issue instructions for personnel to carry:

- a. Personal Weapon.

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- b. Equipment up to 30 kg in weight.
- c. Personal documents including passport.

11. Means of Evacuation. At this stage the primary means of evacuation will be by air. Evacuation by road will be carried out by any formed unit which is ordered to evacuate at this time.

12. Destruction. Destruction will not be authorised for Non-Essential stores left by any formed unit which withdraws at this time.

JASON YELLOW CHARLIE - MAIN EVACUATION

13. General. JASON YELLOW CHARLIE will be ordered if the security situation deteriorates to the extent that:

- a. The Force can no longer be easily sustained.
- b. The presence of a large body of troops means that the lives of UN personnel are placed at serious risk.
- c. The threat can more easily be met by a more compact force structure.
- d. The Force mission requires a presence at minimal deployment.
- e. Final evacuation under JASON RED is a likely possibility.

14. Personnel. Under JASON YELLOW CHARLIE, force strength will be reduced to the minimum consistent with the maintenance of a UN presence. The following will be evacuated:

- a. All remaining Protected Personnel.
- b. Those UNAMIR civilian personnel whose presence is not required for the maintenance of a Force presence.
- c. Those UNAMIR military personnel not required to provide a Force presence. This will involve a large number of administrative and support personnel, as well as those formed units not detailed off as Security Force.

15. Equipment. The following equipment will be evacuated:

- a. Important stores.
- b. Essential stores of formed units ordered to withdraw at this stage.
- c. The bulk of the vehicle fleet less those vehicles required in order to maintain a Force presence and Security Force.

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16. Means of Evacuation. The means of evacuation employed will depend on available airlift, priority equipment requirements and land route security. In principle, evacuation will be achieved by:

- a. Air. Protected Personnel, UNAMIR civilian personnel and administrative and support personnel.
- b. Land. Formed units and sub-units, driving fleet vehicles in convoy, less those to be evacuated by air.

17. Security Force. The composition of the Security Force required to protect the UNAMIR presence will be determined by the threat. Its primary task will be to provide security for remaining UN installations and KIA, up to the point at which the air evacuation under JASON RED is completed. It is likely to consist of:

- a. HQ UNAMIR core operations personnel.
- b. A battalion (-) of wheeled/tracked APC-mounted infantry.
- c. Integral engineer support.
- d. Remaining Air Operations Staff.
- e. Second Line transport resources.

18. Destruction. When JASON YELLOW CHARLIE is ordered, the following equipment will be destroyed:

- a. All Non-Essential equipment, including that left by units evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.
- b. Important equipment which cannot be evacuated within remaining air/vehicle lift availability. The bulk of important equipment should have been evacuated under JASON YELLOW BRAVO.

OP PLAN JASON RED

GENERAL

1. JASON RED is the executive order to evacuate Rwanda. It involves:
 - a. The safe evacuation of the UN presence in Rwanda.
 - b. The evacuation of the Security Force.
2. JASON RED will be ordered by the FC when the following criteria have been fulfilled:
 - a. The UN presence in Rwanda no longer serves a military or political purpose.
 - b. The safety of those remaining UN personnel is in serious doubt.
 - c. The security situation in Rwanda is likely to deteriorate to a greater extent.

METHOD

3. Execution. JASON RED will be conducted as a 2 phase operation as follows:
 - a. Phase 1. Evacuation of remaining UN presence via KIA.
 - b. Phase 2. Evacuation by road of the Security Force.
4. Phase 1. Phase 1 will consist of the following elements:
 - a. Reduction of KP responsibility by Security Force to a minimum.
 - b. Centralisation of UN personnel in one location.
 - c. Provision of transitional security at KIA for final evacuation flights.
 - d. Route recce for land evacuation route.
 - e. Escort of remaining UN personnel to KIA by Security Force.
 - f. Evacuation of UN presence less Security Force.

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5. Phase 2. Phase 2 will consist of the following.
 - a. Centralisation of Security Force.
 - b. Despatch of recce elements including engineer support.
 - c. Clearing of route if required.
 - d. Route security.
 - e. Road move to neighbouring country.
6. Command. The Force will be commanded by the FC until his departure. HQ UNAMIR core operations staff will continue to exercise command after his departure.
7. Liaison. Liaison for the execution of JASON RED will be effected with the local authorities. UNAMIR remains responsible for the safe evacuation of UN and Protected Personnel.
8. Communications. Security Force CNR will provide the main means of communication during JASON RED. FSO is to plan to provide out-of-country communications for use by Security Force during Phase 2.
9. Logistics. The Security Force is to be self-contained for 7 days.
10. Destruction Policy. Remaining Important and Non-Essential stores and equipment not destroyed or evacuated under JASON YELLOW will be destroyed by the Security Force before evacuation.



MILOB GP HQ

TO : DFC/COS/CMO

Date: 25 Oct 94

FROM : MILOB GP HQ

Ref : DOPKN/O2/94

INFO : SECTOR 6
RPA LIAISON OFFICER, MILOB GP HQ

SUBJECT : INCIDENT REPORT-UNAUTHORIZED ENTRY INTO PRIVATE
PROPERTY AND THREATS BY RPA SOLDIERS

1. We wish to bring to your notice two incidents in Kigali sector which happened on 17th and 20th October 1994. Copies of statements attached.

a. Incident No. 1. On 17 Oct 94 at about 1130hrs, an unarmed RPA soldier entered the residence of some Bangladeshi MILOBs with the intention of using the wash room. The houseboy declined to allow the soldier the use of the toilet facility on the grounds that it was not a public toilet. An argument then ensued and while the two were exchanging words, Maj Mohammed Rahman, one of the MILOBs residing in the house arrived. His attempt to mediate was not accepted by the RPA soldier who became furious and remarked "so what, if you are a Major serving with UNAMIR? Do you know my rank? Do not interfere in the problem. I am a regular soldier in the Rwandese Army. We can enter any place at anytime".

b. Incident No. 2. On 20 Oct 94 at 1700hrs, MAJ L Likwasi went to pick Maj Maligwa from his residence for duty at Kigali Sector Ops Room. Whilst the former was waiting for the main gate to be opened, an RPA soldier on a motor-cycle pulled up and asked why the officer had blocked the road. When Maj Likwasi replied that he was waiting for the gate to be opened, the RPA soldier remarked "Don't you know that I can get this vehicle?" When questioned on his statement the RPA soldier confirmed that he could do that.

2. From the two incidents narrated and the previous incident of hijacking that took place on the 15 Oct 94, It is believed that some indisciplined RPA soldiers are likely to be involved in violent clashes with UN personnel based on their perception of being above the law.

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3. It is requested that the RPA High Command educate their troops on the rights of UN personnel serving in Rwanda and the need to be courteous when dealing with all UN personnel.



A UDDIN MOEEN
Col
DCMO

UN RESTRICTED

INCIDENT REPORT

1. We, six Bangladeshi HILOBs have been residing in a rented house just near the Kigali main market in the following address:

House owner: Mr. Solomon

Avenue de Commerçants

BP - 299

Kigali.

2. On 17 October 94 at about 1130 hours I entered our house in civis and found that one RPA soldier (in uniform without arms) is in quarrel with the nephew of the house owner (aged about 18 years). From their agitated conversation I made out that the RPA soldier entered the house to use the toilet without informing anybody. The young man (nephew of house owner) asked the RPA soldier that he ^(RPA soldier) should have taken permission to use the toilet since it was in the private premises and rented by UNAMIR and UNICEF personnels. The RPA soldier got annoyed and was threatening the young man and he was about to beat the young man. To stop further escalation of the situation I identified myself and told the RPA soldier "Friend, forget it, please use the toilet and go. This is a very simple matter, why to make unnecessary quarrel?" Listening my request to my utter disappointment, the RPA soldier got furious and remarked "so what you are a ~~boy~~ from UNAMIR? Do you know my rank? Don't interfere me. I am a regular soldier of the Rwandese Army, we can enter anytime any place". Seeing his attitude I quietly withdrew and pushed the young man out to break up the heated threatening of the RPA soldier. At that time another Rwandese in civis entered the house and the soldier had few words with him. Then they went out

shouting something (in Rwanda) either abusing or threatening (assumed).

3. The arrogant behaviour of the LRA soldier to me when my approach was most friendly and reasonable is quite disheartening. This attitude of the LRA soldier may lead to interpret many things including their changing attitude towards NGOs of ~~unwilling~~ UNAPIR and disregard to public rights.

4. Submitted ~~for~~ as felt necessary please.

19-10-64
Haji Mohammad Ali v. Rahman
MILOB
ID NO H. 1603

TO SECTOR HEADQUARTERS

KM 3
SECTOR 6
KIGALI

20 October 1994

INCIDENT REPORT: AT MAJOR MALIGWA'S HOME

1. I went to pick the above officer to bring to Sector HQ for duties at 1700 hrs. I parked the vehicle outside waiting for somebody to open the Gate when an RPA soldier on a motor bike came from behind and asked me why I always block the road. I told him that I don't usually block the road, as he put it and that I was just waiting for somebody to open the gate for me. At this point he said, "Don't you know that I can get this vehicle". I asked him whether he could really do that, then he confirmed and said yes. After I picked the Duty Officer, the chap also turned and rode away.
2. I feel there is more to it than just mere display of indiscipline. If positive action is not to be taken we may lose these vehicles we use or scuffles with MICBS will start.
3. Finally I would conclude by amplifying how insecure we are in front of such uncontrolled individuals.

G. L. LIKWASI
Major
KM 3
UND-M 2176

UN RESTRICTED

TO : ALL SECTORS

Date : 11 Sep 94

FROM : Plans/Trg Cell

Ref : 13/94 Plans

INFO : DCMO
SOO
SLOGO
SMPO
FHQ

SUBJECT : MILOB SECURITY MEASURES IN ALL SECTORS

Reference : UNAMIR HQ Memo dated 29 Aug 94.

1. The prevailing situation currently demands MILOBs to expand their deployment. The question of resources to support such a programme is always failing our intentions.

2. There is a possibility of the situation deteriorating. From this basis, a tentative withdrawal plan as outline below shall serve as a guideline for MILOBs to implement. The plan shall be executed in three phases as follows:

a. Phase 1. Phase 1 shall cater for MILOBs deployed as independent teams or MILOB teams collocated with armed troops. The following withdrawal procedure shall be adopted:

(1) Independent MILOB Teams.

a. Withdraw to nearest armed troops.

b. If there are no armed troops, withdraw to MILOB Sector Hq.

(2) MILOB Teams Collocated with Armed Troops. Withdraw with armed troops to next higher troop Hq.

b. Phase 2. Phase 2 shall be considered if the situation continues to deteriorate. Independent MILOB Sectors shall be affected. Action to be taken is as follows:

(1) Withdraw to nearest armed troops Hq.

(2) Withdraw to MILOB GP Hq. This is only applicable to those Sector Hqs where armed troops

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are not deployed.

c. Phase 3. If the situation continues to deteriorate then Phase 3 shall be adopted. Force Hq shall issue a withdrawal instructions to a selected area.

3. Attention of all MILOBs is drawn on the need to:

- a. Recover all essential stores and equipment.
- b. Identification of transport requirements.
- c. Additional support requirements.

4. MILOBs are expected to continue executing task at each level of withdrawal as seen fit by the CMO.

M Masanganise

M MASANGANISE
Lt Col
for CMO