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CROATIA

8 JAN - 19 FEB 1993

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DE/LB

JAN 1993

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

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UNPROFOR  
Palais des Nations

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NO. 11  
ZAGREB

UNPROFOR  
OUTGOING CODECABLE

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ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE  
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.:	DATE: 25 JAN 93
TO: GOULDING NEW YORK UNATIONS	FROM: NAMBIAR UNPROFOR ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX :
ATTN:	FILE REF. NO.: DRAFTER : TITLE :
INFO : VANCE, ICFY GENEVA	
SUBJECT: TELEPHONE CALL FROM DEFENCE MINISTER SUSAK.	

UNPROFOR-Z-92

MESSAGE

- (1) MINISTER OF DEFENCE SUSAK CALLED ME ON TELEPHONE AT 2040 HRS TODAY TO ASK ME WHAT THE SITUATION IN THE AREA OF OPERATIONS WAS; I INFORMED HIM THAT OPERATIONS HAD NOT YET CEASED.
- (2) HE REFERRED TO THE LETTER I HAD SENT TO PRESIDENT TUDJMAN AND ENQUIRED HOW THE CASUALTIES COULD HAVE OCCURRED WHEN THE CROATIAN ARMY WAS KEEPING THE FRENCH TROOPS INFORMED OF WHAT THEY (THE CROATIAN ARMY) WAS DOING. I TOLD HIM THAT EVEN IF THAT IS CORRECT, IT DOES NOT CONDONE WHAT HAD BEEN DONE. WHILE TAKING COVER BEHIND THE ASPECT OF EXCHANGE OF SHELLING, HE ACCEPTED THAT WHAT HAD HAPPENED WAS UNFORTUNATE.
- (3) I REMINDED HIM OF WHAT I HAVE BEEN INFORMING HIM ALL ALONG - THAT SUCH UNILATERAL ACTION WOULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. I ALSO INFORMED HIM THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE ASSURANCES PRESIDENT TUDJMAN AND HE HAVE BEEN GIVING SECRETARY VANCE AND US, THE REALITY ON THE GROUND WAS THAT ADMIRAL LATICA AND HIS COLLEAGUES MAINTAINED THAT CEASEFIRE WAS ONLY A PROPOSAL SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS AND NOT BINDING.

DISTRIBUTION:	
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- (4) I POINTED OUT THAT THIS WAS TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE AND THAT INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE IMPLEMENTED. HE STATED THAT BOBETKO WAS RETURNING TOMORROW AND WE COULD SET UP A MEETING ON HIS RETURN TO CLARIFY THE SITUATION.
- (5) I INFORMED HIM THAT I AM PREPARED TO MEET, BUT THE MORE IMPORTANT ASPECT WAS TO STOP THE FIGHTING.















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DESLIJAN DAILY SITREP HQ SOUTH

T2005250615

I 250600A JAN 93

FM HQ SECTOR SOUTH

TO INUD HQ UNPROFOR

INFO: GQV HQ WEST

DKM HQ EAST

FMZ HQ NORTH

BQF LOG BASE ZAGREB

ZEN/FINCOBATT

ZEN/BRITMEDBATT

ZEN/HQ BELGRADO

ZEN/LOG BASE BRAVO

PZE CANENGBATT

ZEN/FREBATT 1

ZEN/CZEBATT

ZEN/KENBATT

CKY BIN KISSELJAK

ZEN/OPS, UNMO, ECOMM, CAC, KNIN

ATTN: OPS

SUB: DAILY SITREP SECTOR SOUTH 24TH JANUARY 93

UNCLASSIFIED

MESSAGE

GENERAL SITUATION

A. GLOBALY TENWE.

B. FIGHTING CONTINUED WHOLE DAY 24 JAN 93 IN THE REGION OF ZEMUNIK AIRPORT (WJ28.81), MUBAPSTAN (WJ22.83), BUNOVANE (WJ33.89), KASIC (WJ38.88), SMILCIC (WJ40.86), NOVIGRAD (WJ44.92), MASLENICA (WJ43.96) VELESIT MOUNTAIN. THE CA CONTINUE TO GAIN INITIATIVE. AT THE TIME SERBS LOST IN MOST AREA DUE TO POOR ADMINISTRATION COMMAND AND CONTROL. THE CA ACTIONS WAS A SURPRISE TO ALL SERB FORCES IN THE AREA.

C. 1100A CA ATTACKED BADINDUB (WJ25.93), CRNO (WJ24.85) AT 1220A. AND HEAVY SHELLING CONTINUED ON DRACE, SMILCIC JACENICE (WJ46.98). CA FRONT LINE PRESUMABLY BABIJA (WJ53.00) JASENICE (WJ46.98) SMILCIC (WJ41.87) GRADINA (WJ39.75). CONFIRMATION TO FOLLOW AFTER PHYSICAL RECC

HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

D. SERBS CONTINUE TO REORGANIZE THEIR POSITIONS AND REINFORCING OTHER AREAS WITH FRESH TROOPS. STRONG POINT NOW SMILCIC, ZEMUNIK AIRPORT DRACE.

E. MANY CIVILIANS EVACUATED FROM SMOKOVIC (WJ28.86), SMILCIC MEDAK (WK40.22) AREAS. TENSION IS HIGH, CIVILIANS BLAMING UNPROFOR FOR LACK OF PROTECTION. HOSTILITIES LIKELY TO CONTINUE AS SERB LOSSES GROW HIGH. CASUALTIES ON SERB SIDE HIGH BOTH CIVILIANS SOLDIERS.

F. SUMMARY OF EVENTS CFV:

- 2 -

CZECHBATT ADR:

1) PINK ZONE 1

11) DEPLOYMENT OF SERB HEAVY WEAPONS ALONG CFL REPORTED IN OUR SIT UPDATE DATED 250210A JAN 93.

12) 241242A - 241800A JAN 93

SEVERAL MG SA FIRE ON BOTH SIDES:

A) SERB SIDE

- SEVERAL HMB FIRE IN BUNINICA (WK20.74)

- SEVERAL SA SHOTS IN (WK34.49)

B) CA SIDE



SEVERAL MG SHOTS FROM DODAC (WK19.69)  
 SEVERAL SA SHOTS FROM (WK00.70 33.33)  
 LICKI OSIK (WK24.87) RECEIVING

2/5

BURSTS FROM HQ SA FIRES.

- C) SEVERAL BLASTS REPORTED ALONG BOSNIA - UNDA BORDER IN ZELJAVA AIRPORT (WK61.66).
- D) 2 X 120MM MORTAR WITH AMMO ALL LIGHT WEPS REMOVED FROM STORAGE IN LICKI OSIK TO LINE. 60 TDF SOLDIERS REINFORCED AREAS.
- E) 2 X 81 GUNS LOCATED IN BARRACKS IN ZELJAVA (WK60.66).
- F) 50 SOLDIERS WERE REINFORCED SERB EFFORTS IN SECTOR KNIN FROM PETROVO SELO (WK36.69)

FRONT  
 LICKI OSIK

FREBATT AOR

## 2. PINK ZONE 2

IN  
 DOES

21) THE CA SEEM TO HAVE REINFORCED THEIR POSITIONS THE AREA RIENIK (WK37.27) - BILAJ (WK35.31). CA NOT SEEM TO BE PROBABLE IN THIS ZONE.

IN

SUPPORTED  
 SECTOR SOUTH

22) THE SERB FORCES HAVE REINFORCED THEIR POSITIONS THE ZONE ALONG CFL. APPROX 1 INF BATT GROUP BY TANKS ARTY IN DEFENSIVE POSTURE (SE BIT UPDATE 250210A JAN 93).

CA

23) THE VELEBIT MOUNTAIN IS QUIET BUT TENSE. SERB EXCHANGE SA FIRE IN SOME PLACES, FRONT LINE ON BOTH SIDES DIFFICULT TO DEFINE.

## 3. PINK ZONE 3

SERBS.

TO  
 COMBAT

31) CA FORCES SEEMED TO HAVE REACHED SOUTH LINE MUBASTAN - POLICNIK - SUHOVARE (INCLUDING DRACE) EXCLUDING PALJUV, GRUBIC PARTIALLY CONTROLLED BY

32) SERB FORCES HOLDING ZEMUNIK AIRPORT BY BATT (PLUS). SITUATION TOO CONFUSED. SERBS DO NOT SEEM HAVE THE ABILITY TO HOLD LONGER DUE TO LACK OF SERVICE SUPPORT (FUEL, GASOLINE, AMMO).

33) MASLENICA - CA CONTROLLING THE AREA WITH REINFORCED INF COY. NO TANKS HAVE BEEN USED BY CA. CA SUCCESS HAS BEEN DUE TO INFILTRATION. SERBS LIKELY TO COUNTER ATTACK TOWARDS THE DIRECTION OF ROVANJSKA OTER.

EINDE DEEL 1.  
 BT

NNNN

JVERVOLG DAILY SITREP SECTOR SOUTH 24 JANUARY

- 3 -

HEAVY PREPARATORY ARTY IN THE AREA. THIS IS NOT  
LIKELY TO START BEFORE FULL REINFORCEMENT ARRIVED.

KENBATT AUR

A. PINK ZONE 4

41) NO SIGNIFICANT CA ACTIVITIES.

42) SERB FULLY DEPLOYED ON CFL ON DEFENSIVE

POSTURE.

43) OTHER ACTIVITIES WERE:

240045A ONE MILICIJA IN BENKOVAČ CAMP SHOT 6 SA ROUNDS  
AT DUTCH COMME VEHICLE

241000A CA ADVANCE PAST KASIC TOWARDS SMILCIC.

241030A MILICIJA FIRE 5 MORTAR BOMB 1 ARTY RD FM  
BILJANE TOWARDS KASIC.

241245A RECEIVE INFO THAT CA HAVE CAPTURED GRNO (84.23)  
ARE ADVANCING TOWARDS ZEMUNIK.

241300A 1 TANK 3 APC SEEN MOVING TOWARDS BENKOVAČ  
TROUGH BRUSKA.

241325A - 241345A MILICIJA FIRE 8 MORTAR RDS FM BILJANE  
TO KASIC. CA RETALIATED BY 3 MORTARS RDS. 1 RD  
LANDED 100M FM KEN COY LOC AT BILJANE.

241630A MILICIJA DISMANTELE ROAD BLOCK AT KAKMA TO GET  
ACCESS OF PASSING THROUGH WITH TANKS.

241630A 1 ARTY RD LAND IN KEN COY LOC AT BILJANE.

5. PINK ZONE 5

241115A TO 241235A SEVERAL ARTY TANK RDS FROM BOTH  
SIDES IN DANIS AREA (WJ93.57).

6. PINK ZONE 6

241100A 2 SERB TANKS MOVED TO POTRAVEJE (XJ84.50)

II. CHANGES IN OPS AREA

A) SEE SECTOR SOUTH SIT UPDATE DATED 250210A JAN 93.

B) ADDITIONAL SITUATION UPDATE AS AT 250800A JAN93 TO  
FOLLOW.

C) SERBS CONTINUE TO REINFORCE OWN POSITIONS.

III. CONTINUING AFFAIRS

A) DFC SC HAD A MEETING WITH KNIN AUTHORITIES (MR  
HADZIC FRANOVIC).

B) MONITORING FIGHTING IN PINK ZONE 3.

IV. LOGISTICS

A) KARLOVAC CROSSING POINT CLOSED.

B) ALL ROADS SECTOR SOUTH PASSABLE.

C) MUBAPATAN MEDAK CROSSING POINT CLOSED FOR SECURITY  
REASONS. TENSION EXIST IN ZITNIC (WJ92.55) CROSSING

POINT.

V. ADMINISTRATION

(NTR)

VI. SOUTH SECTOR COMMANDER ASSESSMENT



GENERAL SITUATION: THE CA SIDE WAS CHARACTERIZED BY SIGNIFICANT SUCCESS RECORDED BY CA SIDE, MEANWHILE SERBS NEVER SHOW THEMSELVES IN A POSITION BUT TO DELAY THESE ATTACKS. THIS MIGHT BE DUE TO THE CHOICE OF THE CA MAIN AXIS OF ATTACK (ISLAM LATINSKI - BENKOVAC) THAT OFFER POOR OPPORTUNITIES TO CARRY OUT DEFENSIVE ACTIONS OR LACK OF ORGANISATION. DESPITE THESE SUCCESS, THE RHYTHM OF THE CA MANOEUVRE SEEMED TO BE LOW (ESPECIALLY IN MASLENICA AREA). SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS STOPPED IN OUR AREA ROUND 1800A.

## 2) ON CA SIDE

MAIN AXIS OF ATTACK REMAINED THE SAME (ISLAM LATINSKI - SMILCIC) SECONDARY ATTACKS WERE LATER PERFORMED AS FOLLOW (FROM NORTH TO SOUTH):

- MASLENICA - JADENICE (WICH WERE ONLY SEIZED ROUND 1530A)
- NOVI GRAD (FROM PAJLUV)
- MUSAPSTAN (FROM ZADAR)
- BADINDUB (FROM BIGINJE AREA)

AT THE END OF THE DAY THE LINE OF CONFRONTATION IS AS FOLLOW: ZEMUNIK AIRPORT - SMOKOVIC - SUHOVARE - NORTH OF SMILCIC - NOVI GRAD (UNCONFIRMED).

ALL MOVEMENTS REPORTED ALONG THE CFL IN PZ 4 & 5 ARE TO BE CONSIDERED SO FAR AS DECEPTION ACTIONS.

## 3) ON SERBIAN SIDE

- ZEMUNIK AIRPORT IS STILL UNDER CONTROL OF 1 BATTALION PLUS.

- SERB STRONG POINT POSITION BLOCKING CA ADVANCE REMAIN SMILCIC WHERE A FULL BATTALION IS DEPLOYED (TANK + INF). WOULD THIS POSITION BE SEIZED, THEN THE ROAD TO BENKOVAC WOULD BE ALMOST OPEN, EXCEPT IF TANK COUNTER. ATTACK WOULD BE CARRIED OUT (TANK REINFORCEMENT FROM SECTOR NORTH ARE SUPPOSED TO ARRIVE THIS NIGHT IN OUR SECTOR).

## 4) UNPROFOR POSITION

- BECAUSE OF BEING OVERRUN A LOT OF UNPROFOR OP, CP, XING POINTS WERE ABANDONED. (SEE LIST IN ADDITIONAL REPORT PARA)

- REORGANISATION IS STILL IN PROGRESS FOR UNITS EVACUATED ON CA SIDE OR WITHDRAWN ON SERBS SIDE. ALL OF THEM ARE GATHERING FOR POSSIBLE REENGAGEMENT OR REDPLOYMENT

- 1 APC COY FROM CZECHBATT HAS ALREADY BEEN DEPLOYED, AS REINFORCEMENT IN KENBATT AREA. HIS TASK IS TO MONITOR THE SITUATION BTW SMILCIC, BENKOVAC, BILJANE. SECONDARY TASK WILL CONSIST IN PROVIDING ASSISTANCE FOR EVACUATION IN CASE OF THREATS...

## 5) POSSIBLE CA SERB ACTIONS

### 51) CA SIDE:

- BEING MORE MORE CONFIDENT IN THEMSELVES THEY MIGHT START AGAIN ATTACKING ON THE SAME MAIN AXIS WITH POSSIBLE

- 3 -

SECONDARY FLANK ACTION FROM RASJANE AREA (WJ34.73) TOWARDS NADIN (WJ39.80)

- OR (AND IT WOULD BE SURPRISING) CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION ONLY ON THE SEIZED LINE.

### 52) SERB SIDE:

CARRY OUT COUNTER ATTACKS

- FROM OBROVAC AREA TOWS MASLENICA

- FROM BENKOVAC TOWS SMILCIC

## 6) GENERAL CONCLUSION

DESPITE PDT TRUDJMAN ANNOUNCEMENT IN THE MEDIA REAL OF TRUCE SEEMS TO BE FAR AWAY AND PROFITABLE NEGOCIATIONS ARE NOT POSSIBLE FOR NEAR FUTURE.

SIGNED LCL HUERNE - 500 -

## VII. ADDITIONAL REPORT

A) KENBATT POSITION IN ISLAM GRCKI (WJ36.91) EVACUATED, BILJANE CHECK POINT UNDER CONSTANT SHELLING FROM CA SIDE.

B) CZECHBATT LOCATIONS IN PINK ZONE UNPA STILL INTACT BUT REDUCED NUMBER OF TROOPS IN PINK ZONE.

C) FREBATT POSITION



9  
4  
5/5

WK74.51 - 1 SECT  
WK83.33 - 1 SECT  
WK90.14 - 2 SECT  
WK95.11 - 1 SECT  
WK48.11 - 3 SECT  
WK50.11 - 1 COY  
WJ43.98 - 1 SECT BEING EVACUATED  
WK44.01 - 3 SECT  
WJ50.87 - 1 SECT THREATEND  
WJ42.91 - 1 SECT EVACUATED  
WJ35.88 - 1 SECT UNDER CA SHELLING  
WJ32.86 - 1 SECT EVACUATED TO MORROW  
WJ27.89 - 1 SECT LIKELY TO BE SHELLLED IF SERB COUNTER  
ATTACK

WJ28.84 - 2 SECT EVACUATED TO MORROW

WJ26.83 - 1 SECT EVACUATED TO MORROW

WJ23.87 - 1 SECT EVACUATED TO MORROW

BY MOVEMENT VIA STRMICA

231740A TO 231930A 4 BUSES WITH 140 PAX CROSSED FM  
BOSNIA TO KNIN

241425A TO 241210A 6 BUSES WITH 223 PAX CROSSED FM KNIN  
TO BOSNIA

SIGNED CAPT DELOEIL DUTY OFFICER



**PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

010/12

201 East 42nd St., Suite 3108  
New York, New York 10017

Tel. (212) 986-1585  
Fax (212) 986-2011

New York, 25 January 1993

**H.E. Yoshio Hatano  
President of the Security Council  
UNITED NATIONS  
New York**

Your Excellency,

I have the honour, upon the instructions of my Government and following my letter dated 22 January 1993 [S/25145], to inform you that the limited action of the Croatian Police forces and Croatian Army units on the territory of the Republic of Croatia - within the so-called "pink zones" - aimed at securing the perimeter of the Maslenica-bridge rebuilding site, has been terminated upon completion of its goals.

The Government of Croatia deeply deplores the tragic loss of life of two members of the French battalion of UNPROFOR who were caught in the cross-fire during the said conflict, and hopes that an independent investigation will be conducted to shed light on the events that have led to their deaths. We wish to inform the members of the Security Council that the Croatian Army units have given full protection to the UNPROFOR units in the perimeter of interment, and had assisted in transferring the French battalion from this area.

The Croatian Government is gravely concerned by the seizure of heavy weapons - that were under UNPROFOR protection and within its custody - by the Serbian paramilitary units illegally operating in the UNPA-s and "pink zones" on the territory of the Republic of Croatia. We believe that this action of Serbian insurgents is undermining one of the basic pillars of the Vance Plan. The Government of Croatia for months now has been reiterating its call that the provisions of the Security Council Resolution 779 (1992) and that the "withdrawing and the disarming of all forces, including paramilitary forces" [S/RES/779, op. para. 4] in the UNPA's be carried out.



Since UNPROFOR forces have not been able to implement this request of the Security Council, this has resulted in non-implementation of the most important element of the United Nations Peace-plan: the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons. Ultimately, this has resulted in ever-expanding numbers of displaced persons in Croatia (after the total eviction of the Croatian population from these regions); in constant instability of the UNPA's and immediately adjacent regions ("pink-zones"). Limited success of the mandate of UNPROFOR and failure to proceed with the implementation of the UN Peace-plan as a whole, is constantly sending a wrong message to the insurgent authorities of the so-called "Krajina" in Knin and elsewhere, and to all of the Serbian nationalists and extremist paramilitary forces. They have expanded their occupation of the territory of the Republic of Croatia, and have constantly been fortifying their positions.

The action of Croatian authorities has been carried out within the "pink zone". We have to remind that the legal and political status of those "entities" is considerably different than those of UNPA's. In the original provisions of the UN Peace-plan, that is to be found in the Security Council Resolution 743 (1992), the "pink zones" are never mentioned, and did not exist as a concern or even consideration of the Council. However, in the Resolution 762 (1992) these vaguely defined "entities" have been added to the Peace-plan, as a temporary and provisional measure. These parts of the Croatian territory were to be returned to the authority of the Government of Croatia as soon as UNPROFOR assumes responsibility within UNPA Sectors South and North and Croatian Government issues the Amnesty Act [S/RES/762, op. para 5; S/24188, para. 16] - both of those provisions have long ago been met. Yet, UNPROFOR, due to the obstruction by the Serbian side, has not been able to act accordingly.

My Government highly appreciates all the confidence-building measures and actions undertaken by UNPROFOR and other UN officials, especially towards the opening of the communication routes on the territory of the Republic of Croatia. Unfortunately, all of these efforts have proven fruitless, as experienced in the UNPA Sector West. As provided in the provisions of the Security Council Resolution 769, UNPROFOR has been given a mandate to establish control of the international borders of the Republic of Croatia towards Serbia and towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. That has not been implemented.

Finally, I have to reiterate the view of my Government, that the legitimate authorities of one country cannot be regarded as aggressors on their own territory. The action that had been undertaken by police and military units of Croatia is in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Security Council resolutions, and did not pose a threat to the civilian population living in the "pink zone" or UNPA Sector South at any time. The action was limited in its range, and has stopped after achieving its legitimate goal, which was clearly within the framework of establishing the necessary and essential living conditions for the population of Croatia as a whole.



The Republic of Croatia deploras in the strongest possible manner the assertions stated in the letter dated 24 January 1993 by Dr. Radoje Kontic, "Vice-President of the Federal Government" of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) about "ruthless Croatian aggression /.../ against the Republic of Serbian Krajina". We would like to remind that the territory in question is within the legitimate and internationally recognized international Croatian borders, thus being an indivisible part of the Republic of Croatia. The letter manifestly demonstrates that the authorities in Belgrade lay claim to the territory of another sovereign and internationally recognized member-state of the United Nations. Therefore, if the term "aggression" is to be used, it can only apply to the militant and expansionist policy of the Belgrade authorities. We deem it necessary to reiterate that the Croatian people and their Government reserve the right to protect and defend the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia from any foreign military aggression, and are ready to use all necessary means to fulfill this task.

The immediate return of the heavy weaponry that is now in the hands of Serbian paramilitary units - thus once again posing serious threats to the stability in the region and to the civilian population of the city of Zadar and surrounding areas - to the custody of UNPROFOR, is of utmost importance. It will be one of the primary criteria of the Croatian Government when re-examining the mandate of the United Nations Peace-keeping operation upon its completion in late February 1993.

I would kindly ask for your assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the Security Council.

Accept, your Excellency, the assurances of my highest appreciation.

Ambassador Dr. Mario Nobilo  
Permanent Representative





President of the UN Security Council  
Secretary General of the United Nations  
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe  
European Community  
The Geneva Peace Conference  
Academies of Sciences and Arts

AS IS WELL KNOWN, THE FORMER YUGOSLAV PEOPLE'S ARMY (JNA), THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA AND THE REPUBLIC OF MONTENEGRO AFTER LONG PREPARATIONS HAD COMMITTED AN OPEN AGGRESSION ON SLOVENIA AND CROATIA IN 1991, AND THEN ON BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, WITH THE AIM OF PRESERVING THE BOLSHEVIK SYSTEM AND CREATING ETHNICALLY CLEAN GREATER-SERBIA. IT WAS ONLY AFTER IMMENSE HUMAN LOSS AND THE HEROIC RESISTANCE IN CROATIA THAT THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND THE CSCE WERE WILLING TO ADMIT THE TRUTH ON THIS AGGRESSION, AND RECOGNIZE THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE REPUBLICS OF SLOVENIA, CROATIA, AND BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, WITHIN THEIR INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED BORDERS. THE LEADERSHIP OF CROATIA HAD ADOPTED THE SO-CALLED VANCE PLAN, ACCORDING TO WHICH SERBIAN TERRORIST PARAMILITARY UNITS SHOULD ALREADY HAVE BEEN DISARMED, THE REMAINING JNA UNITS WITHDRAWN FROM THE CROATIAN TERRITORY, AND THE SO-CALLED PINK ZONES RESTORED UNDER FULL CROATIAN SOVEREIGNTY.

THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA HAD FULLY ADOPTED THE OBLIGATIONS RESULTING FROM THE CONFERENCE ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, INCLUDING ITS CHAPTER II, CONCERNING HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC GROUPS. BASED ON THESE INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS THE CROATIAN SABOR (PARLIAMENT) HAD ADOPTED THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS OF ETHNIC GROUPS AND MINORITIES. THE LAW ENVISAGED TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN ELEVEN COMMUNES WITH THE SERBIAN MAJORITY AND THE WIDEST CULTURAL AUTONOMY FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE SERBIAN AND OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS ON THE ENTIRE CROATIAN TERRITORY.

UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA HAD ACCEPTED THE SO-CALLED VANCE PLAN, CONCERNING THE FOUR UNPA ZONES AND THE TRUCE, YET NOT REPEAT NOT REFERRING TO THE SO-CALLED PINK ZONES. SERBIAN SIDE REPEATEDLY REFUSED NEGOTIATIONS ON THE RESTORATION OF THE PINK ZONES UNDER CROATIAN SOVEREIGNTY. WITH ITS LACK OF COOPERATION AND THE TENDENCY OF MAINTAINING THE EXISTING UNLAWFUL SITUATION IT IS ACTUALLY TRYING TO CONSOLIDATE THE SO-CALLED 'REPUBLIC OF SERBIAN KRAJINA' ON THE OCCUPIED CROATIAN TERRITORY. AFTER HAVING CAUSED A GREAT DEAL OF DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTING PHASE ONE OF THE VANCE PLAN, SERBIAN SIDE HAS THE INTENTION OF MAKING THE PLAN IMPOSSIBLE IN ITS ENTIRETY. THROUGH THIS AN UNACCEPTABLE AND UNBEARABLE SITUATION FOR CROATIA WAS CREATED. SINCE THE VITAL COMMUNICATION LINE BETWEEN THE NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN CROATIA PASSES ON THE VERY EDGE OF THE PINK ZONE, THROUGH THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MASLENICA BRIDGE, WHICH WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE FORMER JNA AND THE SERBIAN PARAMILITARY FORCES, ONE MILLION PEOPLE IN SOUTHERN CROATIA AND APPROXIMATELY TWO MILLION PEOPLE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA HAD BEEN CUT OFF FROM THE REST OF CROATIA AND EUROPE. IT WAS FOR THE SAKE OF THESE PEOPLE THAT CROATIA COULD NO LONGER TOLERATE THE SITUATION THAT HAD ALREADY LASTED FOR A YEAR AND A HALF. NO-ONE HAS THE MORAL RIGHT TO THREATEN BY THE FORCE OF ARMS THE LIVES OF THREE MILLION PEOPLE DEPENDING ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF A SINGLE BRIDGE, THAT WOULD PROVIDE THEM WITH THEIR ONLY CONNECTION TO CROATIA AND EUROPE. IN THE NAME OF HUMANENESS AND THOSE PEOPLE'S LIVES WE SEND AN APPEAL THAT THE DISPUTED COMMUNICATION LINE BE OPENED AND ITS MAINTENANCE ENSURED.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED IT BECOMES EVEN MORE CLEAR THAT TAKING ACTION TO SECURE THE BACKGROUND OF THE CONSTRUCTION SITE WAS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY, BECAUSE THE UNPROFOR, DESPITE ALL PROMISES, HAD FAILED TO DO SO.

Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts



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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

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24 93 JA 18

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MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of 2

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS NEW YORK  
INFO : VANCE, ICFY GENEVA  
FROM : NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR ZAGREB  
DATE : 24 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 86  
SUBJECT: SITUATION AROUND MASLENICA: UPDATE

*Alambil*  
*H Gen*

93 JAN 24 18:34

UNPROFOR  
Palace of Nations

1. Details of the situation as at 1500 hours today are contained in Sector South sitreps forwarded under our UNPROFOR-Z-85 a couple of hours ago. Shelling towards Zadar, which had ceased yesterday evening, recommenced around 1230 hours today, but Zadar itself has not been shelled today. The Croats had already warned that if it were to begin again, they would retaliate on Knin, Obrovac and Benkovac. For their part, the Serbs have said that if Knin is shelled, so also will Zagreb; we estimate this is within their capability. CivPol has evacuated approximately 200 women and children from Smokovic to Benkovac, and the Serbs are evacuating Medak. A French detachment at Zemunik is sheltering in foxholes and cellars because of the proximity of belligerent positions and the intensity of hostilities. Some of its positions have been hit several times by the heavy weapons of both sides. Sector South commander is looking into the evacuation possibility of this group. Sector South has described the problems of providing updated and overall pictures because of communications' and evident operational difficulties.

2. Early this morning, Goran Hadzic and Spanovic came to Sector South Headquarters and conveyed the following message to us: - that they would be ready to discuss the situation on the basis of whatever we proposed, and would accept our mediation, but would do so only when there was a ceasefire. Meanwhile, they said, they had sought military assistance from Cosic and General Panic in Belgrade. We later heard from Wilson in Geneva that Cosic had not agreed to a proposal from Panic that JA aircraft be deployed in support. Panic has been trying to reach us in Zagreb this afternoon.

DISTRIBUTION:

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3. Gaudreau is back in Knin and led talks this afternoon with Hadzic and Spanovic, together with Rob and Peterson. Spanovic emphasized his orders not to shell Zadar, but only military objectives in the vicinity. He said they urgently wanted a ceasefire but that they would not talk to the Croats until there was one. Knin understood the Croats' need to have this area and had the meeting taken place at Maslenica, as planned, something could have been worked out. We also have the representatives in Zadar whom we deployed there on Friday. They are in close touch with CA leaders. They reported at approximately 1300 hours through Knin as follows: - The CA believes that it has now attained phase 1 of its objectives, namely a security line; however, a number of Serb strongholds continue to hold out along the line. Phase 2, that of consolidation, is now beginning. They are reported to be in confident mood. As regards negotiations, they are not ready to consider even a temporary ceasefire unless the Serb side concedes three points: - the security line; the complete withdrawal of Serb troops from the area of their concern; and no new movements of Serb forces towards the CFL. However, they are seeking confirmation from Zagreb for this position at this time.

4. I was briefed this morning by two UNMOs who had spent the last 48 hours observing the situation. They said that the CA attack had been carefully prepared and was fully coordinated. They believed its objective was as stated, namely, the securing of the bridge area and the highway in the vicinity. The Serb side had been caught totally by surprise and were quite unprepared. The CA had made initial rapid inroads, and had by yesterday afternoon almost attained their objective. However, they had failed to overcome the prepared Serb defensive positions. The Serbs were now moving up much reinforcement and heavy weaponry, of which they had the preponderance, but still appeared disorganised and confused. There was general mobilisation. They expected a Serb counterattack immediately they were ready. They believed the Croats would want to talk peace as soon as possible; the Serbs, perhaps some days from now.

5. I have asked Gaudreau to ask Rob to look at our Peruca deployment to see if it would be feasible and desirable to reinforce there.

6. Gaudreau and Peterson have been tasked to visit Zadar as soon as possible to meet up with the CA local command and explore the question of an end to the hostilities. They have no mandate to conduct substantive negotiations. I have asked them to report tomorrow morning. At this time I shall consider whether the time is ripe to begin exploratory talks on the ground. **ENDALL.**

CNZ 054 CYZ 039 P1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CODED CABLE

TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, GENEVA ✓

FROM: L GOULDING, NEW YORK

DATE: 23 JANUARY 1953

NUMBER: MSC-121

**SUBJECT: Peruca Dam**

1993 Jan 23 P 12

We have taken note of disturbing contents of your UNPROFOR-Z-082. At this stage it does not seem to us that there is any useful action that could be taken at Headquarters, particularly since you have not seen evidence for these allegations. Should you receive additional information confirming the seriousness of this threat, we could make a public appeal to both sides in the name of the Secretary-General, if you judge that this might help. Please advise, when appropriate, on the wording and timing of such an appeal.

93 JAN 23 21:30

Patricia A. Williams

# 2011

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142/93  
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**MOST IMMEDIATE**  
**UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE**  
**UNPROFOR**

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

**MOST IMMEDIATE****CODE RESTRICTED**CODE RESTRICTED  
PAGES

23 93 JA 19 312

Page 1 of 2

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB *Pedric Thomsen*

DATE : 23 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-082

SUBJECT: ATTACHED LETTER FROM "RSK"

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1. We have just received (2000 hours local) the attached letter from so-called Minister of Defence Spanovic. It has reached us through Sector South.

2. Similar reports have come in during the day. We have not seen evidence for such allegations, though a concentration of Croatian Army is reported near Sinj, some kilometers to the south of Peruca. The dam is still prepared for demolition and is, obviously, highly vulnerable and extremely dangerous. Martic has also threatened to blow it.

Endall

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

UNPROFOR  
 Palace for Nations  
 93 JAN 23 19:56



Z - 082

2/2  
2/2

Translated from Serbian

RSK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
No.: 01-52-1/93  
Knin, 22.01.1993

- Gen. Satiš Nambiar  
- Sector South HQ

According to the information that we have Croatia is planning an attack against UN forces on the HEPS Peruca and the taking over of the same.

For these intentions it has planned and executed preparations of the 126 brigade and special saboteur units from Split. At the same time Croatia is planning to blow the dam up because of which it is already evacuating the population from Trilje and Omis. For this act they wish to put the blame on the Serbs.

Please inform the UN Security Council of these intentions, and please undertake URGENT MEASURES IN ORDER TO PREVENT A DISASTER.

Minister  
Colonel

Stojan Spanovic

23.01.1993

*[Handwritten signature]*



C2N-103  
C2G-048UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

'93 JAN 23 18:59

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

MOST IMMEDIATE  
23 JAN 1993 18:59

CODE RESTRICTED

Page 1 of 5

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 23 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 081

SUBJECT: CONCERNS OVER THE CONTINUED FIGHTING AROUND MASLENICA

1. Together with my senior colleagues, I am trying to assess the various implications of the still developing and widening situation caused by the extraordinary Croatian action. DFC Gaudreau came from Knin to report to me this afternoon and is returning tomorrow morning.

2. On the ground, fighting is continuing, and the Serbs are continuing to move up heavy armament. A general mobilisation is taking place in the sectors and heavy weapons are being broken out of the double lock storage depots. Crossing points are being closed or restricted, and there are reports of UNPROFOR personnel not being permitted to leave Sector East. Zadar is being shelled. My tentative impression is that the Croatian Army has found it heavy going, though they made initial quick advances due to a virtual unpreparedness on the Serb side. The danger of a more general conflagration is not utterly remote.

3. The Croatian military in Zadar have conveyed, through Sector South personnel who were sent there to liaise immediately the fighting began, their willingness to begin ceasefire talks with Knin, as well as a threat to shell it and Benkovac. The terms which they have suggested i.e. a withdrawal of Serb forces behind a line which they have previously described as their objective, with UNPROFOR controlling the vacated area, seem unlikely of acceptance. Rob and Peterson conveyed these this afternoon to Hadzic, Spanovic and Martic in Knin (expressing no view on the matter, but emphasizing that they were acting only as postmen). The Knin authorities said they were willing to talk, on certain conditions, including a full withdrawal of the Croatian forces to their previous positions, and would give their answer at 1000 hours tomorrow, Sunday.

F

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4. As you will appreciate, we have consulted extensively within headquarters on the situation, and are deeply concerned to retrieve whatever can be retrieved. A first step has been the issuance of a press statement to correct much disinformation which has been circulated locally. We did not issue yesterday, although I did a TV and some radio interviews, and I and the DCM spoke to some of the international press. The current text has already been sent to DPI in New York. There are now several major dangers. First, it is hard to see how we shall, for the foreseeable future, be able to move forward on the implementation of the Vance Plan. Everything the Serbs had alleged of Croatian intentions has, unfortunately, been vindicated, even if their own intransigence (which they of course attributed to their mistrust of the Croats) may have been, at least in part, to blame. How can we talk of disarmament of their police, return of heavy arms to storage, non-victimisation of Croats, restoration of law and order, institution of UNPROFOR border controls, etc. etc.? The second, of course, is that we are in grave danger of losing most of our credibility: - not only in terms of our effectiveness, but also in terms of our impartiality. You will have seen Zecovic's letter today to the Secretary-General complaining about what he regarded as an inadequate Security Council response. We can understand the reluctance of the Council to take other steps on the eve of the renewed Geneva Conference; though Croatia did not, apparently, hesitate. However, you will recall that in the case of a much lesser sin, over the Miljeveci plateau, there was a specific directive to the Croats in a SecCo resolution to pull the military out. We are inclined to feel that it could jeopardise the United Nations' reputation locally if the Council does not take more formal action in the present matter which, if the fires are not rapidly extinguished, could lead to a descent into general warfare. We are appalled by the irresponsibility of the Croats in this matter, although we were all too aware of the war mentality of some of their wilder spirits; despite the at times crass, uncooperative and brazen behaviour of most of the Knin group.

5. In short, the prospects are bleak at this time if we do not see an end to the hostilities and a return to the status quo ante. We shall do our best at this end, but feel it necessary to bring our medium- and longer-term concerns to your attention, for the most effective action which can be taken. As of tonight, we have a situation of considerable gravity on our hands.

ENDALL



2-081 3/5

PRESS STATEMENT

Issued by Shannon Boyd, Acting Chief, Press and Information,  
UNPROFOR, on behalf of the Mission

1. At 1500 hours today, Saturday 23 January, the situation in the area of Croatian incursions into the UNPA and Pink Zones is, that fighting continues, with the Croatian Army still seeking to advance, despite assurances given by President Tudjman and Defence Minister Susak that they had ordered a ceasefire as of Friday afternoon. UNPROFOR confirms that Zadar is now being shelled and that mobilisation in the area is widespread. There are no reports at this time of UNPROFOR casualties.
2. The UNPA and Pink Zones were established, with the agreement of all concerned, by Security Council Resolutions 743 of 21 February 1992 and 762 of 30 June 1992.
3. Croatia's unilateral military action has been condemned by the Security Council, by the Secretary-General, and by UNPROFOR. The Force Commander, Lt. General Satish Nambiar, at an urgent meeting requested by him with President Tudjman at 13.30 on 22 January, called on the Croatian Government to halt its offensive and to withdraw to the positions which it had previously occupied. UNPROFOR, in accordance with the directions of the Security Council, is seeking, by all means available to it, to contain and defuse the situation.
4. UNPROFOR deeply deplores this unilateral resort to force and resulting hostilities in an area in which peace had been established for more than a year. It profoundly regrets the bloodshed which they have caused.
5. In view especially of a number of misleading statements attributable to various sources, UNPROFOR wishes to place on public record the sequence of events preceding Croatia's unilateral military action and the consequent tragic events.
6. It should first be said, that allegations and allusions in certain media to the effect that UNPROFOR had prior notice of the Croatian action and, even, that it had somehow given it prior approval, are wholly devoid of truth. The background and sequence of events are as follows: -
7. The Croatian armed incursion into the UNPA and Pink Zones has been stated to have the objective of securing the area of Maslenica bridge, which formerly carried vital traffic from northern to southern Dalmatia. The question of reconstruction of the bridge has been under discussion in joint machinery presided over by UNPROFOR, and established by Resolution 762, in common with numerous other issues of joint concern to Croatia and the Serb local authorities. These include Peruca Dam, Obrovac power station



and reservoir, water supplies on both sides of the confrontation line, the reopening of roads and railways, the restoration of power supplies and the repair of power lines, as well as many other issues of economic and social concern in and around the Pink Zones. A pre-requisite for these discussions has been the restoration on each side of minimal confidence in the good faith of the other party to the discussions. The most recent of such discussions, involving UNPROFOR and experts on both sides, took place at Zitnic on 19 January. Due to the painstaking and patient work which was taking place, major progress had become a strong possibility, provided that both sides, at a political level, took certain decisions to cooperate.

8. To this end, during the past five weeks, UNPROFOR had held many rounds of bilateral talks at senior levels of the Croatian Government with, in particular, Ministers Milas, Susak and Mudrinic; and, on the Serb side, in Belgrade and Knin, with Col. Spanovic, Mr. Martic and Mr. Bjegovic, with a view to establishing such political agreement for a possible breakthrough in regard to these various steps towards a normalization of the situation.

9. The last such bilateral meetings took place at Knin on Monday 18 January and in Zagreb on 19 January. At these meetings, UNPROFOR sought to finalise arrangements for a high-level meeting between both sides, under the chairmanship of the Force Commander, at which a number of these issues would be discussed and, hopefully, resolved. The process of intensive bilateral preparations had finally led to an agreement to meet, at Maslenica, on Thursday, 21 January, between high level delegations. The first item on the agenda was the reconstruction of the Maslenica Bridge. It was followed by Peruca dam and Obrovac power station. Substantive bilateral preparations on these various issues had also been conducted by UNPROFOR, and each party was fully informed regarding the situation. Various "packages" had been discussed of action to be taken, under UNPROFOR supervision and control, to restore a variety of important facilities, on an agreed basis, so that the lives of the people in the various affected areas could begin to return to normal after the earlier tragic hostilities. As a result of these consultations, UNPROFOR felt that the proposed high level talks had a reasonable chance of success.

10. At the last moment i.e. late in the evening on 20 January, the Serb side asked for a postponement of the meeting from 21 until 22 January so that they could study the final agenda and make necessary preparations. Upon this being conveyed to the Croatian Government, Vice Prime Minister Milas said that a meeting on 22 January would be impossible. He offered, however, to meet on 23 January. Before this offer could be conveyed, the news came of Croatia's unilateral resort to force. UNPROFOR had expressed its concern, in clear language, to the Serb side over the last-minute postponement.



11. Meanwhile, during the past two weeks, UNPROFOR had observed substantial military movements on the Croatian side of the ceasefire line, and a heightening of tension in certain areas, accompanied by an increase in ceasefire violations, and attempts to infiltrate arms into the Croatian side of Sector West. On 18 January the Force Commander wrote to General Bobetko, Chief of Staff, Croatian Army, on these matters, and on other recent aspects of Croatian Army activities, calling on him to exercise maximum restraint. Also on that date, the Knin authorities met with Deputy Chief of Mission Thornberry, and conveyed to him their detailed concerns on the subject. The DCM raised them at a meeting with Croatian Vice Prime Minister Milas the following day at which time he also handed over copy of the Force Commander's letter.

12. In view, especially, of this background, UNPROFOR is deeply troubled by the return to hostilities, with all the tragic suffering brought about by war. The cause has been stated to be the question of Maslenica Bridge which, though of great importance to Croatia, was literally on the eve of potentially fruitful negotiations. It is also baffled by a decision to choose unilateral resort to force, rather than peaceful negotiations in accordance with an agreed peace plan and ongoing discussions within its framework. Months of patient confidence-building and consultations had preceded Friday's incursion.

13. Despite the setback, UNPROFOR will continue to devote its resources to the process of peaceful settlement of the outstanding issues. Meanwhile, the Force Commander has prioritised that the Mission should use every effort to contain the damage which has now been done. UNPROFOR is convinced that the way forward must be found by negotiations, and not through a return to the grim and tragic path to a renewal of general hostilities in the area. A ceasefire and return to former positions must be achieved as soon as possible.

ENDALL



CZV 099

CZC 075

136/93.

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**MOST IMMEDIATE**OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Page 1 of 1

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 7x 1200 LT AS **MOST IMMEDIATE**  
INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
DATE: 23 <sup>JANUARY</sup> DECEMBER 1993  
NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-77

*Handwritten signature*  
Hr Gen

SUBJECT: CROATIAN OFFENSIVE

Reference your MISC-116 of 22 January 1993.

We would like to point out that operations by the Croatian Army units are not restricted to the pink zones but also within the UNPAs, in the opstine of Gracac, Obrovac and possibly Benkovac.

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CZN-098.

CZ9-073.

135/93

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OUTGOING CODE CABLEMOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of 4.

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -OK.

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 23 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR 2- 76*Handwritten signature*  
*Mr Gen*DISTRIBUTION:

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SUBJECT: SITUATION IN SECTOR SOUTH

1. At 1830 hrs yesterday evening, after I had sent the attached letter to President Tudjman, I received a call from Defence Minister Susak to inform me that instructions had been issued to Croatian Army units to cease operations.

2. There was a lull during the night, but as of 0800 hours this morning, Croatian Army units have resumed operations in area East and North East of Zadar. I have written to General Bobatko (in the absence of President Tudjman and Defence Minister Susak at Geneva) to ask his units to cease operations (copy of the letter attached).

3. In the meanwhile, the Serbs in the UNPAs have apparently declared a "state of war", have ordered general mobilisation, and in many cases, broken into storage areas and taken out some heavy weaponry. We are doing what we can to limit the scope of these activities and restore stability. A copy of a cable I received from Sector South on a meeting held at Knin is attached. My Deputy Force Commander is at Knin and meeting the authorities there at 1000 hours.



CZN-098 CZQ-073.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

2/4

22 January 1993

*Your Excellency,*

Secretary Vance informs me you have given him an assurance that you would issue orders to the Croatian Army to cease hostilities with immediate effect. However, the reports I have received from Sector South indicate that the Croatian Army continues with its operations.

May I request you to please issue appropriate instructions immediately in order to enable us to stabilise the situation.

*With warm regards  
Yours sincerely,*

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Satish Nambiar".

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander  
UNPROFOR

His Excellency  
President Franjo Tudjman  
Republic of Croatia  
Zagreb

*Maslenica*



C2N-098

C2G-073

P.2

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

3/4

23 January 1993

*My dear General,*

In response to the letter I had addressed to President Tudjman yesterday evening, Defence Minister Susak had conveyed to me at about 1830 hours that instructions had been issued to the Croatian Army units to cease operations.

Regrettably, whereas there appears to have been a lull during the night, I have just been informed that the Croatian Army units have resumed offensive operations in the area this morning. I ask you to please take immediate action to cease all operations to enable us to prevent the spread of the conflict.

I have informed Secretary Vance in Geneva and am now informing the Secretary General in New York of these latest developments.

*With warm regards,**Yours sincerely,*

Lt Gen Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander  
UNPROFOR

General Janko Bobetko  
Chief of Staff  
Croatian Army  
Croatian Army Headquarters  
Zagreb



803

CZN-098.

C29-073.

R3957 4/4

*Two copies*  
*TVL6*

UNPROFOR Page 1 of 1 Pages  
SECTOR SOUTH

VBDNR <i>T. J. J.</i>			
TVA <i>0625</i>	TVZ	CONCEN ID <i>53HQ 001</i>	CONCEN ID
for concen use only			

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE  
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO. :	DATE/TIME: <i>230625</i> JAN 93
TO: HQ UNPROFOR	FROM: HQ SECTOR SOUTH
FAX NO. :	FAX:
ATTN: FC	FILE REF. NO. : DRAFTER : CAPT GAROLI TITLE : DO 2 RELEASING OFF. : <i>Mr Dobbe</i> SIGNATURE : <i>[Signature]</i>
INFO : FAX NO. :	
SUBJECT: RESULT OF THE MEETING WITH 'RSK' AUTHORITIES	

MESSAGE

1. PRESENT IN THE MEETING WERE SECTOR COMD, CAC , MR. BORIS MARTINOVIC (LEGAL ADVISOR OF 'RSK') AND MR SPANOVIC.
2. IN THE MEETING THE 'RSK' AUTHORITIES INDICATED THAT THEY HAVE DECLARED A STATE OF WAR DUE TO THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
  - A. MOVEMENT OF TROOPS IN EUROPE WHICH 'RSK' CLAIMED THEY HAD ALREADY KNOWN CONCENTRETING IN AREAS OF ITALY, GREECE, HUNGARY AND AUSTRIA.
  - B. THE EARLY MORNING ATTACK BY CROATIAN ARMY IN AREAS OF ISLAM LATINSKI (2692), SUHOVARE (3189), ISLAM GROCKI (3790), PODGRADINA (3892), KASIC (3888) AND AN AMBUSH AND SHELLING AT MALI ALAN (5003), ROVANJSKA (4401) AND ZEMUNIK AIRPORT (2881).
  - C. ACCORDING TO MR. KARADZIC WHO GAVE SOME INFORMATION THROUGH THE NATIONAL RADIO THAT JNA (YUGOSLAVIAN NATIONAL ARMY) WILL ASSIST THE SERES OF SERBIAN KRAJINA IN THIS ISSUE. THEY REQUESTED THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO HAVE MEETING IF THE WORLD IS NOT SEEING THEIR PROBLEM, IT SHOULD BE KNOWN THAT GENERAL MOBILIZATION IS BEING CONDUCTED AND ALL 'RSK' AND ALL OTHER GOVERNMENTS ARE OBLIGED TO THIS ORDER. NOTE THAT THEY STATED THAT THIS HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH UNPROFOR.

*FC*  
*DCM*  
*DFC*  
*COS*  
*COO*  
*CBHOPS*  
*CAD*  
*CMD*



FAX OUT-558

9/12

010/12

**UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE**

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

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Page 1 of 2  
MOST IMMEDIATE 22 93 JA 18

(UNCLASSIFIED)

UN RESTRICTED

UN CONFIDENTIAL

CRYPTO ONLY

OUTGOING FAX NO.:	DATE: 22 January 1993, 17:54
TO: VANCE UNATIONS GENEVA	FROM: BGEN S.T. HARDERS/COS UNPROFOR ZAGREB
FAX NO.:	FAX NO.:
ATTN.: BGEN J. WILSON	FILE REF. NO.: (COS) DRAFTER: MAJ VIDENKJAER, MA/COS
INFO:	
FAX NO:	
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN SECTOR SOUTH.	
INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: FC, DFC, DCA, COS, COO, CBHOPS	

**MESSAGE:**

1. PLEASE FIND ATTACHED THE TIMETABLE SHOWING THE EVENTS IN SECTOR SOUTH AS REQUESTED FROM YOU.

2. REGARDS.

DISTRIBUTION:

JW only

93 JAN 22 17:52

UNPROFOR  
Palais des Nations

MSE 157/1



1/21/93

DTG (DD-MN-YY)	SOURCE	REPORT	ACTION	REMARKS
		5 KM FROM CPT.		
221320 JAN 93	OPS-SS	1) DZBT BILJANE (WJ 3884) SKILLING FROM BOTH SIDES 2) CA NOR DEPLOYED CLOSE TO OUR OF SK22 (WJ 3492) 3) CA TANKS AND INFANTRY MOVING FROM ISLAM LATINSKI TO KASIC (WJ 3828) 4) AMBUSH FROM CA TO SENG SIDE ON THE ROAD BETWEEN ROK (WE 5213) AND HALLI ALAN (WE 5205). TWENTY PERS KILLED (OR WOUNDED). UN DELIVERED MEDICAL CARE TO WOUNDED PERS IN FRENCH BAT.		
221545 JAN 93	OPS-SS	MILICIJA TANKS HEARD MOVING FROM KWIN TO DRNIS.		
221625 JAN 93	OPS-SS	PRINCIPAL AXIS OF ATTACK ISLAM LATINSKI TOWARDS SMILCIC (WJ 4184): FRONT LINE IN KASIC. CA INFANTRY MOVEMENT BY TRUCKS TOWARDS MUSAPSTAN (WJ 2286) WHERE THEY STOPPED CA INFILTRATION AT NOVAKESKA (WK 4400) NEAR UN CP.		
221705 JAN 93	OPS-SS	PHONECALL CONFIRMED OF 221545 JAN 93: AT 1600 HRS 8 TANKS 3 APCs 3 155 ARTY FROM MILICIJA COMING FROM KWIN TO DRNIS AREA.		

22/01 '93 19:32

0041 170 199

UNPROFOR ZAGREB

041 170 199

01002

*E/but - 558 R2/2*

131/93

010/12

CZN 095

CZG 070

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

22 93 JA 18

55 Z

MOST IMMEDIATE - FLASH

Page 1 of 1

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 7x 1839 LT p-5.

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 22 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-73 *laubil*

SUBJECT: RE MY UNPROFOR-Z-72 *lr g* (MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN)

The last word in the second line of paragraph 6 of the above cable should, of course, be "disagreement", not "agreement".

Endall

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93 JAN 22 17:47

 UNICEF  
 Palais des Nations



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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

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Page 1 of 7

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -TX 1630LT P.S.  
INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG  
FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB  
DATE : 22 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-72  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRESIDENT TUDJMAN  
REF. : MY UNPROFOR-Z-69 AND 71 OF TODAY

*Handwritten signature*

*Handwritten initials*

93 JUN 22 17:40

UNOS Telecom Unit  
Palace of Nations

1. I met with Tudjman for 20 minutes to discuss the morning's events and their possible implications. I had Thornberry, Gaudreau and Campose; he, Radic, Susak, and two senior military personnel.
2. I asked that their military action be halted and that they withdraw to their previous positions. UNPROFOR would have to stabilise the situation as best it could.
3. Tudjman said that he had personally authorised action by their military and police personnel to provide necessary protection for the reconstruction of Maslenica bridge. This was the sole object of the operation which of course included securing the adjacent area around Zemunik. Once completed, their forces would remain in this area. Any withdrawal was out of the question. He said that he had emphasised the Croatian need for the bridge to be available in a letter to the Secretary-General of 9 December and that he had personally discussed it with the Secretary-General who had, he said, indicated that their request was fully justified. He had also discussed it with Co-Chairmen Vance and Owen on 2 and 4 January, and with them again on 12 January. They had told him they had discussed it in Belgrade and that Cosic and Milosevic had also agreed with their objective. He stated that, on 20 January, he had discussed it once again with Mr. Vance and Lord Owen. He had informed them about the delays in the talks which Milas and Thornberry were trying to hold with the Serbs, and that these delays could no longer be tolerated. He stated:- "They said we should not tolerate those delays any longer."



C2N 094

C2G 069

3/7

- 2 -

3. I said we fully understand their frustration. But it was my view that unilateral action would be totally counterproductive. I said we must do all we could, now, to limit the damage that was being done, and that I would inform the Secretary-General of his position.

4. Tudjman said that he appreciated UNPROFOR's position on this. His actions, he said, were also aimed at showing the Krajina Serbs that agreements must be made. They were parallel to what was occurring in BH, and would help to show the Serb extremists that their occupation of Croatia could not be allowed to continue any longer. He had directed that the peace-keeping operation in the area should be fully safeguarded, and that local agreements should be made with UNPROFOR to avoid casualties.

5. I emphasised that this action could have widespread repercussions. Heavy weapons were already being moved out by the Serbs. Tudjman said that we must warn them not to do that. If they reacted, Croatia would expand their actions. They had no present intention of moving in the Drnis and Lika areas. Their movements there were precautionary only. He wanted to reiterate, that Mr. Vance and Lord Owen had told him that there had now been enough delays.

6. We pointed out that we had been working extremely hard to bring both sides to the table. Finally, there had been agreement only on the date. Croatia had demanded 21 January, the Serbs had said 22; last night Milas had said 23 January. We feared the far-reaching implications of this action in regard to the many other areas where cooperation would be required. What would the chance now be of any such cooperation in the near future? We shared the exasperation with the Serb delay on Wednesday night (which we had communicated to Milas during the Tudjman/Co-Chairmen meeting). But it had been a question of a day.

(SEE UNPROF. 2.73)

7. Tudjman said they had been patient long enough, in BH, with the Serbs in the Krajina, in Croatian-Serbian relations. The time had come, now that various leaders had agreed on the need for normalisation and to move forward, to make the Serb extremists in the Krajina fully aware of the realities. In this, he expected UNPROFOR to perform its tasks. Otherwise, Croatia would implement unilaterally, as with Maslenica. Meanwhile, it remained fully available to discuss all other matters.

8. Susak said this was a matter of principle for them. Maslenica was too important to discuss along with the other matters which were on the Serb-Croat agenda. (On departure, he told Thornberry that they were fully willing to meet in Maslenica tomorrow to discuss the remainder of the agenda ...)



..... 9. After the meeting, I sent DFC Gaudreau to Knin to oversee the situation on my behalf. One matter of concern is that some of the Knin authorities have been trying to say that we were party to this unilateral action, and there are reports of angry crowds outside UNPROFOR locations. We are looking into these. Meanwhile, I am drawing attention to my letter to Bobetko of 18 January (attached), which Thornberry also brought to Milas' attention on 19 January. We are dealing with these allegations, which are troublesome for the future of UNPROFOR and, indeed, stability in the region, and I shall emphasise this in my responses to the press. I am also attaching copy of my letter sent to Spanovic and Martic yesterday.

..... 10. I attach copy of protest just received from RSK.

Endall

\*\* CYCY \*\*

1993-01-22 15:35 5615

YUGOSLAVIA

037 P03

CEN 074

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

18 January 1993

*My Dear General,*

1. I am writing this letter to seek your intervention with regard to certain reports I am receiving from our sectors which indicate an increased level of activity by your forces along the UNPA and "pink zone" boundaries. Some examples of these are:-

(a) Increased patrolling and cease-fire violations by Croatian forces in the general areas of Zadar, Sibenik, Tinja, Skradin, Zemunik, Drnis and Gospic. Reinforcement of your forces in these areas and preparation of combat positions along the cease-fire line are also being reported. There are also reports of construction of an airstrip at Lucici.

(b) An attempt by six trucks of the Croatian Army, loaded with arms, ammunition and other warlike materials, to enter Sector West through our checkpoint at Sovarnica Brook on 10 January 1993. Two of these trucks were stopped by our personnel while the remaining four drove away. One of the drivers mentioned that the arms and ammunition were being carried to Pakrac. There are also reports of build-up of your forces in the Kutina area, West of the sector boundary.

(c) A number of tanks and other heavy weapons observed in areas bordering Sector East, at Krndija, Gorjani and Dakovo, in contravention of the withdrawal agreements.

2. You would appreciate that such activities have resulted in increased tension in the area.

3. May I seek your cooperation in ensuring that your forces respect the cease-fire and withdrawal agreements and that they do not undertake any actions which could heighten tension and lead to further deterioration of the situation.

*With warm regards,**Yours sincerely,*

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander

General Janko Bobetko  
Chief of Staff  
Croatian Army  
Croatian Army Headquarters  
Zagreb



C2N 094

C2G 069

5/7

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

21 January 1993

*My dear Colonel Spanovic,*

Recent developments in the Sectors and statements made by some of your colleagues and subordinates, give us cause for concern. We have repeatedly informed you that all of us are fully committed to the implementation of the Vance Plan and other Security Council resolutions pertaining to the UNPAs.

2. Regrettably, we have not received the complete degree of co-operation required to enable us to execute our mission effectively; but we continue to try our best. Our understanding is that you and your people accept the need for continued deployment of UNPROFOR, so that peace is maintained, and a political resolution of the problem reached. If that be so, it is essential that you support our activities, and enable us to progress in the implementation of the Plan, so that our credibility is not affected, and the International Community represented by the Security Council, endorses continued deployment of UNPROFOR. We must have something to show to your people and others, that our deployment is in fact necessary and useful. It is therefore very much in your interests that we move forward on the issues that Mr. Thornberry has been discussing with you. To illustrate the point I am making, I must inform you that the cancellation of today's meeting has severely affected UNPROFOR's credibility, and has caused me and my colleagues to doubt your seriousness and genuineness.

3. I am also aware of various moves being initiated in the UNPAs on the grounds of a developing military threat. You should know that we are monitoring all such activity on your side, as well as the Croatian Army side, in order to ensure that the situation does not get out of hand. In this again, we require your full co-operation. I find it quite unacceptable that your militia and others continue to impose restrictions on our freedom of movement and activity at times.

4. There are also apparently various rumours circulating, and veiled threats being made, of possible actions against UNPROFOR personnel and units in case a No-Fly Zone enforcement resolution is passed by the Security Council. You and your people must understand that UNPROFOR is not associated with any such moves. We will continue to fulfill our mission, but that will very much depend on you. It is for you and your colleagues to ensure that none of our units or personnel, are subjected to any harm or abuse. I regret to state that some of the observations now being made will only do more damage to your cause than be of any help.

Colonel Stojan Spanovic  
Knin

CZV094

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- 2 -

5. Finally, I wish to once again emphasize that my colleagues and I in UNPROFOR are fully committed to our task, and will do everything we can to make the Plan work. But we need your complete and genuine co-operation and assistance, which sadly we have found somewhat lacking to date.

6. I look forward to a more rewarding and satisfying interaction between us.

*With warm regards,*

*Yours sincerely,*

*Satish*

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander



C2N 094

C2G 069

Translated from Serbian

RSK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
MINISTRY OF INTERN. AFFAIRS  
Str. Pov. No. 81-1  
Knin, 22.01.1993.

UNPROFOR HQ  
Gen. Satish Nambiar

Aggression on the RSK, protest.-

The Croatian armed forces have started on 22.01.1993 at 7,05 h, with the support of strong artillery fire and tanks an aggression on the RSK in the directions of Starigrad - Obrovac and Zadar - Benkovac.

The Croatian armed forces, after strong artillery preparation, in 08,00 h started a general attack in those directions.

In all the towns of South Dalmatia air attack alarms have been given. In the directions from Sibenik and Split to Drnis and Knin mobilization has been undertaken and grouping of the 113, 141 and 142 ZNG brigades. In the Sinj - Vrlika direction the 126 ZNG brigade has been mobilized.

The Croatian artillery has taken positions in Pakovo Selo and is in full alert to begin the shelling of Drnis and Knin.

We demand measures to be undertaken for preventing and condemning the aggression of the RC on the RSK.

The Serb nation will be forced, if these measures are not undertaken, to execute a mobilization and defend the RSK.

Minister of Defence  
Col. Stojan Spanovic

Minister of Internal Affairs  
Milan Martić

22.01.1993

UNPROFOR

CNZ-051

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CYZ-037

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'93 JAN 22 19:53

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: *for* GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *Kanishan Ho*

DATE: 22 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER: MISC-116

SUBJECT: Croatian Offensive

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1. At informal consultations of SecCo today, SecGen spoke along lines of attached statement. Representatives of France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom urged that a statement be issued deploring this offensive, while the Ambassador of Venezuela argued that it would be unfair to condemn this violation when the Serbs were guilty of far worse in the region. The US agreed with both views and expressed support for a general statement to the press by the President.

2. In consultation with the Secretariat, the President made the following informal remarks to the assembled media at the end of the meeting: "The members of the Security Council deplore the Croatian Army offensive that took place today in the Pink Zones. They urge the Croatian authorities to withdraw their forces to positions occupied before this offensive, and strongly support the efforts of the Force Commander of UNPROFOR to defuse the situation. They equally deplore violations by all sides of the United Nations peace-keeping Plan, and appeal to all parties to cooperate fully with the peace process in the region led by the Co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. They demand that all parties adhere faithfully to all relevant Security Council resolutions. The



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P2/4

members of the Council call on all parties to undertake no action that could jeopardize the peace process, and to cooperate fully with the Co-Chairmen in their current efforts."

3. Please let us have copies of any press statements issued at your end (Zagreb and Geneva).

**Statement by the Secretary-General to informal  
consultations of the Security Council on the events in Croatia of  
22 January 1993**

Since early this morning UNPROFOR has been receiving reports of Croatian Army attacks in the "pink zone", in the area of Maslenica bridge, north-east of Zadar and in the Drnis area. These reports have been confirmed by UNPROFOR's troops on the ground and by UN military observers. One UNPROFOR checkpoint is in an area overrun by Croatian Army forces, though there are no reports of any UNPROFOR casualties. In reaction, the local Serb forces have been reinforcing their positions and appear to have broken into several storage depots which had held heavy weaponry under joint UNPROFOR-Serb control.

The Force Commander of UNPROFOR, Lt.-Gen. Satish Nambiar, sought an urgent meeting with the President of Croatia, Mr Franjo Tudjman. The meeting took place at 1330 hours (local time). Gen Nambiar conveyed my concern at these developments and called on the President to stop the Croatian military offensive and to withdraw his forces. President Tudjman responded that the military action had been undertaken for the limited purpose of providing security for the construction of a bridge at Maslenica. His forces would not withdraw from the Maslenica bridge area but had no intention of extending operations to other areas.

The co-Chairmen of the International Conference on the former Yugoslavia (ICFY), Mr Cyrus Vance and Lord Owen, have also



CNZ-051 P4/4

appealed to President Tudjman to withdraw his forces.

CYZ-037

I deplore this unilateral military action by the Croatian authorities, which is a setback to the efforts being undertaken by UNPROFOR under the terms of Security Council resolution 762 to achieve a peaceful transfer of control in the "pink zones". UNPROFOR is taking all steps in its power to prevent the situation from escalating. In addition to reiterating his demand that the Croatian Army withdraw to positions held before the recent offensive, the Force Commander has called upon the local Serb authorities to exercise restraint and not to embark upon a cycle of action and retaliation which could have calamitous consequences. He has sent the Deputy Force Commander of UNPROFOR, Major-General Gaudreau, to the area to review the situation and issue the necessary directives to UNPROFOR personnel there.

ST/at 22.1.93

C2N: 93  
C2B: 69

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

22 93 JA 13 567

MOST IMMEDIATE - FLASH

Page 1 of 2

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 22 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-71

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON CROATIAN MILITARY ADVANCE INTO PINK ZONES

REF. : MY UNPROFOR-Z-069 OF TODAY

..... We have been monitoring Croatian radio and TV and by noon our time the attached had been the only information released locally.. The Serbs in Knin have called in our people and told them that if there is no ceasefire and withdrawal by 1300 hours they will begin shelling Zadar and Zagreb. Tudjman has indicated he will see us at 1330 hours and I shall report thereafter. UNMOs have told us that RSK forces have begun withdrawing their weaponry from storage.

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CEN:93 P2/2

Croatian TV News Program at Noon 12:00, Friday, 22 January 1993

=====

Item 1

In his talks with Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorwald Stoltenberg, President Tudman was said to have discussed (among other things) the mandate of UNPROFOR in Croatia, and the beginning of works on the establishment of a pontoon bridge at Maslenica and preparations for the construction of a permanent bridge -- with the knowledge of Secretary General Boutros Ghali and the UNPROFOR officials.

Item 2

The news anchorman stressed that the item had been a repeat of a morning announcement:

"This morning the Croatian police has started implementing security measures in the area of Maslenicko Zdrilo, in order to protect the construction workers and equipment at the site of the future pontoon bridge from possible Chetnik provocation."

=====

Note: The above news items have been interpreted to the best of this analyst's ability. The actual text may have differed to a small -- and almost certainly unimportant -- extent from the above interpretation, as the news program was not recorded, but noted and interpreted live off the air. (Bruno Ogorelec)

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UNOG Forewarning Unit

Palais des Nations  
UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

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CZG-066

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MOST IMMEDIATE - FLASH

Page 1 of 2

TO : THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
UNATIONS, NEW YORK *→ 24*

INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG

FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB

DATE : 22 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- *69*SUBJECT: CROATIAN MILITARY ADVANCE INTO PINK ZONES

## DISTRIBUTION:

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1. Sector South has been informing us since early this morning of shelling by the Croatian Army at Maslenica and in the area of Zemunik airport, together with ground advances supported by artillery. It also appears that preparations are being made in the Drnis area and at Vitlebit mountain in the Lika area for further military action by the Croats. According to Spanovic, so-called "Defence Minister" in Knin, a number of villages have been taken, and at least one UN checkpoint overrun. He has told us that many refugees are already in flight. He anticipates possible attacks in Knin, including by air. He insisted that his side has not yet used tanks or artillery, all of which are (nominally at least) in UN controlled storage. Spanovic has conveyed to us that we should inform UNPROFOR in the other sectors, because he may have to withdraw units from them to strengthen their position in Krajina. He has asked that the Security Council be urgently informed of these events. I should add, that the authorities in Knin have requested a meeting with our civil affairs personnel, and that the COS Sector South and a civil affairs officer are attempting to reach Zadar to see the Croatian authorities there.

2. Meanwhile, I have asked for an immediate appointment with President Tudjman, and will request the cessation of military action on the Croatian side.

3. The final trigger for this action will probably be stated by the Croats to be the failure of the Serb side to agree to a meeting yesterday regarding Maslenica. In fact, the Serbs had agreed to hold the meeting today. Two cables yesterday to Goulding provide



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- 2 -

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CZG-066

background to the matter. The Croats have been exasperated by Serb delays, and have been threatening for some time to take unilateral action, which we have been trying to head off by pushing the Serbs in Knin to negotiate. Indeed, we had developed some qualified hope that we were making progress.

4. We have no reports of casualties to UNPROFOR personnel at this time. Should the Serbs seek to remove arms from storage, we shall attempt to do our duty but, given our limited resources, and the likely fury of the Serbs over what they will probably argue is a treacherous attack, we do not foresee that we shall be universally successful in the matter.

5. I shall keep you fully informed through Goulding's office in respect of this unilateral resort to force by Croatia.

Endall

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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
(UNPROFOR)

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OUTGOING CRYPTO CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

CZN-089  
CZG-064

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS NEW YORK  
INFO : VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM : NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR ZAGREB  
DATE : 21 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-067  
SUBJECT : Croatian Government/Knin Meeting  
Scheduled for 21 January

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1. As Abdul-Aziz told Tharoor yesterday evening, this meeting, which we had laboured to establish, did not take place today. The Knin Serbs, late on its eve, said they were not yet ready, and asked for a postponement to tomorrow (22 January). Milas, when so informed by Abdul-Aziz, became rather emotional and said he could not attend tomorrow. Neither side has been faultless on this matter: indeed, were we to be frank, we could recite a lengthy and tedious account of ineptitude, disorganisation and disingenuousness which, even by recent local standards, might have been impressive.

2. Nevertheless, we are determined to spare no effort to get the two sides to the table, and have consequently sent the attached communications today, and will follow up. If there is a public slanging match - and it will be interesting to see if there is - we shall remain studiously neutral, for neither has clean hands, however virtuously they may present themselves. The basic problem remains, we believe, that the Croats tend to relapse into unilateral postures and patterns of thought, which are very counterproductive; and the Krajina Serbs (who are in a political mess and state of confusion because of Geneva progress



and a perhaps altered Belgrade position) feel increasingly isolated and cannot yet figure out how to play their hand. Meanwhile, both armed forces enjoy provoking and annoying one another, and the CA is not concealing its position-strengthening along the CFL.

3. We should appreciate whatever diplomatic pressures can be applied to both to make them more accommodating.

ENDALL

No. of pages : 6

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

OUTGOING FAX

MOST IMMEDIATE

3/6

CZN-089  
CZS-064

To : Mr. Ivan Milas  
Vice-President  
of the Government of the Republic of Croatia  
and President of the  
Government's Commission for UNPROFOR  
Fax no.: 452-002

From : Cedric Thornberry  
Deputy Chief of Mission  
Fax no.: 170-199

Date : 21 January 1993

Subject: Proposed Meeting at Plitvice Motel, Maslenica

*Dear Mr. Milas,*

When Mr. Abdul-Aziz called you yesterday evening, he said that, at the end of a long day of discussion between UNPROFOR representatives in Knin and the local authorities there, the latter had asked for a postponement of the proposed meeting for 24 hours. This, they said, was necessitated by its potential importance, and the significance of the agenda. As I am sure you will appreciate, not only you, but we ourselves, were most disappointed by this, arrangements having been made. Our acting Civil Affairs Coordinator is today, on my instructions, calling on their senior officials to convey my views on the situation. At the same time, frankness also requires me to say that our arrangements had not been fully facilitated by your reluctance to provide details of your proposed travel to Maslenica, as requested in my letter of 17 January to you. As Dr. Baletic will be able to confirm, our desire to ensure the fullest possible security for Croatian delegations, and to minimise their discomfort during final stages of the journey, necessitates quite complex security arrangements by UNPROFOR, and thus twenty-four hours' notice for effective coordination, liaison and crossing arrangements, including full escort by our military.

Mr. Abdul-Aziz conveyed to me your inability to meet tomorrow at Maslenica, as the Serb side had proposed. May I therefore request that, as a matter of urgency, you advise me of another date - and, should you see fit, any alternative location - for this



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CLG-064

meeting. The Force Commander and I feel strongly that we should neglect no opportunity to advance effective cooperation in resolving outstanding issues, especially when so much preparation has gone into the matter. As during the past week while we have sought to establish this meeting, we ourselves are ready to reschedule all our arrangements in order to implement a matter of such priority importance. I am sure that you, too, share this sense of urgency, and I should be glad to call upon you, at your convenience, to finalise outstanding details of a substantive and logistical nature.

With my best personal regards.

Sincerely,

Cedric [Signature]

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CZG 052

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UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

18 January 1993

*My Dear General,*

1. I am writing this letter to seek your intervention with regard to certain reports I am receiving from our sectors which indicate an increased level of activity by your forces along the UNPA and "pink zone" boundaries. Some examples of these are:-

(a) Increased patrolling and cease-fire violations by Croatian forces in the general areas of Zadar, Sibenik, Tinj, Skradin, Zemunik, Drnis and Gospic. Reinforcement of your forces in these areas and preparation of combat positions along the cease-fire line are also being reported. There are also reports of construction of an airstrip at Lucici.

(b) An attempt by six trucks of the Croatian Army, loaded with arms, ammunition and other warlike materials, to enter Sector West through our checkpoint at Sovarnica Brook on 10 January 1993. Two of these trucks were stopped by our personnel while the remaining four drove away. One of the drivers mentioned that the arms and ammunition were being carried to Pakrac. There are also reports of build-up of your forces in the Kutina area, West of the sector boundary.

(c) A number of tanks and other heavy weapons observed in areas bordering Sector East, at Krndija, Gorjani and Dakovo, in contravention of the withdrawal agreements.

2. You would appreciate that such activities have resulted in increased tension in the area.

3. May I seek your cooperation in ensuring that your forces respect the cease-fire and withdrawal agreements and that they do not undertake any actions which could heighten tension and lead to further deterioration of the situation.

*With warm regards,**Yours sincerely,*

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander

General Janko Bobetko  
Chief of Staff  
Croatian Army  
Croatian Army Headquarters  
Zagreb

UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
Palais des Nations

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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

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CZG-048

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: (for) NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Pedric Henderson*  
DATE: 17 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER: UNPROFOR-043  
SUBJECT: PROPOSED CROATIAN GOVERNMENT/SERB KNIN AUTHORITIES MEETING

To update you on our attempts to get agreement on the various outstanding economic matters, we attach for your information copy of our letter of today's date to Milas. The Croats had insisted on 20 January; the Serbs on 28 January. We hope the Croats will accept 21st, and that both sides will negotiate in good faith. (It is important that the Croats send their A-team.) Some of the Croats still seem attached to the idea of unilateral action, which they seem to think we ought to be supporting, and there are various indicators showing related preparations. Tensions are way up.

ENDALL

Circ. FC DCM DFC CMO COS

*Anger Santana Boyd*  
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BELGRADE

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CZV-065  
CZG-048

17 January 1993

Dear Mr. Milas,

Meeting with Serb Authorities at Maslenica

1. Further to the discussions we had on 13 January, together with Ministers Susak and Mudrinic, and your subsequent message, we have obtained the agreement of the Knin authorities to meet at Plitvice Motel, Maslenica, on 21 January. Despite our endeavours, it proved impossible for them to advance their initially-suggested date to 20 January, as suggested by yourselves.

2. I hope this date will be agreeable to you. If so, we shall initiate practical arrangements. UNPROFOR representatives would plan to travel (weather permitting) by helicopter directly to Maslenica. We should be glad to help to facilitate your travel arrangements, should you find this of assistance. We would propose that the meeting begin at 1100 hours, and we shall be glad to offer a working lunch to the participants and their assistants.

3. UNPROFOR will be represented on 21 January by the Force Commander and myself. We shall be assisted by Ms. J. Peterson, Civil Affairs Coordinator in Sector South; Mr. C. Echard, also of Sector South; Mr. M. Abdul Aziz, Senior Political Officer at headquarters; and by Lt. Col. P. Campose, Military Assistant to the Force Commander.

4. The Knin authorities have informed us that they will be represented by Col. S. Spanovic, Mr. M. Martic, and Mr. Djegovic. They will be assisted by Mr. Martinovic and Mr. Starevic.

5. We very much hope that your representation will likewise be such that it is in a position to reach definitive agreements on the matters at hand, as the Force Commander is convinced that decisions must be taken without delay with work on various matters being begun within days. We believe that there is sufficient common interest to enable this to happen.

/ . . .

Mr. Ivan Milas  
Deputy Prime Minister of the Government  
of the Republic of Croatia  
President, Government Commission for UNPROFOR  
Zagreb


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CZG-048

6. I shall have a preliminary meeting on 18 January in Knin with the authorities there, and will then hope to meet with yourself and other colleagues on 19 January to finalise the agenda, and to learn the names of your delegation. However, as you know, much preliminary discussion has already taken place, notably in my discussions with Mr. Susak and Mr. Mudrinic at Defence Headquarters on 10 December, and with the Knin group in Belgrade on 14 December, on subjects which are familiar to all of us.

7. My assistant will be in touch with your office tomorrow to set up an appointment for 19 January.

With my best personal regards.

Yours sincerely,



Cedric Thornberry  
Deputy Chief of Mission



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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

17 93 JAN 15 14Z

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93 JAN 17 15:58

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 17 JANUARY 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-038

SUBJECT: INCIDENT WITH CROATIAN ARMY NEAR PAKRAC

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On 10 January, at approx. 2300 hours, a CA truck with uniformed personnel, and carrying military materials, sought to enter Sector West. Shortly after, five more such vehicles arrived. The first was stopped: the other four fled rapidly towards Bjelovar (outside the UNPA). One of the two remaining vehicles attempted to force its way through the checkpoint but was halted by Argbatt troops. A third vehicle was also stopped, apparently driven by the chief of the convoy. All three vehicles halted by Argbatt carried weapons and military materials and were driven by armed personnel. Several of the CA personnel threatened the Argbatt troops. According to the report, which is attached, a drunken CA soldier said that the weaponry was for the Pakrac area. The following day, two letters were received from the Croatian army requesting the release of their vehicles and their cargo. They were said to have taken a wrong turning in the darkness and fog, having been destined for Osijek. Sector West is unable to accept the explanation. The convoy was 75 kilometres from the Osijek road when stopped; a member said they were headed for Pakrac; and their conduct, when stopped by Argbatt, was not consistent with innocent navigational error. We have raised the matter with the Croatian Government (Milas), asking for an enquiry.

ENDALL



## SPECIAL REPORT

## SUBJECT

Confiscation of military materials.

## SITUATION

## a. Facts

On 10th Jan 93, about 2300 Hrs, a truck tried to enter at UNPA by C.P.WA3 (SOVARNICA BROOK) with uniformed personnel and transporting military materials.

While our personnel was discussing with the croatian, about to control the truck, four transportation trucks more and a tank truck were arrived at the place.

The personnel of those trucks (all of them weaponed and wearing military uniforms - said our personnel they were CROARMY's soldiers and threatening our personnel with AK 47 they tried to go across the Check Point.

Personnel of E COY stopped the first and second truck but the others four vehicles run away direction to BJELOVAR. Into the mentioned trucks were found war materials.

One of the trucks (TAM 130-T-11- Plate No. 3G 669-366) tried to run away rushing over the people of Check Point but it was stopped aimed by weapons of our personnel.

Also a lorry (painted dark red) was stopped. It was been driving by the convoy's chief. From this vehicle were confiscated weapons, ammunition and military equipment.

A drunk croatian soldier told our personnel that the destination point of this material would be PARRAC and its surrounding areas.

## b. Croatian personnel involved

- MARTIN CETA R237313-JMB6 0504 95530232/371 V.P. 3002
- ALOS ARJAVEJ R537407-JMB6 0206 947350192/658 V.P. 3002
- NENAD RAFAJIC R537347-JMB6 1001955330022/0555 V.P. 3002
- DAMIR MARTINKO R537555-
- 30/40 CROARMY SOLDIERS WITH RUN AWAY AFTER THREATEN OUR PERSONNEL WITH THEIR WEAPONS.



## Vehicles involved

- TRUCK TAM 150-1-11 - Plate No. ZB 630 86W.
- TRUCK MB 1213 - Plate No. ZB 637-CV.
- A lorry painted dark red without plates.

## Material which was confiscated

See Annex 1

## GENERAL ASSESMENT

According with the quantity and type of confiscated materials, we can deduce that the mentioned materials could be employed in order to equip a force at level of a reinforced infantry COY.

## POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENT

For the above stated we can deduce that such a confiscation would be a hard strike for the intents to reequip the demobilized personnel existing at PAKRAC area.

For this reason, it wouldn't be set aside a possible action from croatian radicalized groups, against personnel and ARGBAT's materials, in first place, or against the rest of UNPROFOR elements.



SERIAL CONFISCATED AT CREATION TRUCKS WHICH WERE STOPPED  
 A BROOD CHECK POINT WAS 110158 JAN 42

CONFISCATED ITEMS	QUANTITY	REMARKS
TRUCK No. 1		
HAND GRENADE RM91	318	
HAND GRENADE RM91	88	Different kind.
82MM PROJECTIL	10	
MORTAR PROJECTIL 82MM	120	green box
MORTAR PROJECTIL 82MM	100	green box
AMMUNITION 5.56MM	2	boxes of 1440 E/one
AMMUNITION 7.62MM x 39MM	6	boxes of 1400 E/one
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE-EJECT- ABLE	80	
EQUIPMENT FOR EXTENSION OF FIELD CABLE SYSTEM	1	
FIELD TELEPHONE	3	
MORTARS CAL 82MM	4	complete
RIFLE GRENADE	56	
AIMING APPARATUS FOR MOR- TAR OF 82MM	3	with box
HOOK FOR BELT TO HUNG FIELD	3	
KNIFE	3	
HAMMER 2 1/2 lbs	1	
SMALL HAMMER	1	
TRUCK No. 2		
PROJECTIL M82 PL	54	gray box
PROJECTIL M60-MORTARS	27	
PROJECTIL M 82	4	boxes x 10 E/one (green)
PROJECTIL M 82	5	boxes x 5 E/one (green)
ANTIPERSONNEL MINE	24	
PROJECTIL 82MM	9	boxes x 3 E/one
PROJECTIL 82MM	1	box x 6
AMMUNITION 7.62 mm x 39 mm	57	boxes
AMMUNITION 7.92 mm	23	boxes (two were open)
AMMUNITION 7.9 mm	32	boxes
CAMOUFLAGE NET	1	
ITEMS CONFISCATED AT A PARTICULAR VEHICLE		
AK 47 No. 8899-8	1	
M70 AB2	1	
ZASTAVA YUGOSLAV No. 85966	1	
HELMET	3	
MAGAZINES AK47	4	
SIGNAL PISTOL No(s) D29809 and D29824	2	
MACHINEGUN MAGAZINES	2	
MAGAZINES OF M70 AB 29 MM	4	
UNIFORM (SHIRT)	3	
(PANT)	1	
SHORT BLADE	2	
AIMING GLE FOR MORTAR	1	No. 0491

Page 1 of 1

SECRET



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UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

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Page 1 of 3

TO : GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK 1930 4/7  
INFO : VANCE, ICFY, UNOG  
FROM : NAMBIAR, ZAGREB *Cedric Thornberry*  
DATE : 15 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z- 27  
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN THE PINK ZONES/SECTOR SOUTH

- .....
1. UNMO HQ Sector South's Weekly Sitrep to 14 January concludes with the Commander's Assessment, and this we attach for your information.
  2. During a working lunch today with Secretary Vance and Lord Owen, prior to their meeting with Presidents Tudjman and Izetbegovic, Thornberry and Gaudreau mentioned the development of tensions in this area. It appeared that Croatia may indeed be preparing against various eventualities in this region.
  3. In the context of our continuing pressure on the Knin authorities to attend a meeting at a very senior level with those of Croatia (our UNPROFOR-Z-20 of 13 January refers) on 20 January, the Serbs allege a recent major increase in so-called propaganda, disinformation and incitement emanating from the Croatian side in this region. This is, say the Serbs, making it all the more difficult for them to get their act together in a timely and constructive manner. A report on this was also shown to the Co-Chairmen.
  4. For your information.

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#### 7. COMMANDERS ASSESSMENT:

i) There is considerable evidence to suggest that the CA are increasing military activity, perhaps in preparation for an offensive against UN troops. Perhaps the CA side has got wind of a possible UN withdrawal from the UNPAs, in the event of military intervention in BiH, and considers it an opportunity too good to miss. Certainly considerable military preparations are underway, notably:-

a. The construction/improvement of roads leading to the ceasefire lines, particularly in the Zadar and Sibenik areas

b. The construction of new bunkers and trenches, and reinforcement of some positions. Again notable in the Zadar and Sibenik areas.

c. The construction of an airstrip close to the confrontation line in the Sibenik area

d. Relocation of the HQs of two battalions to areas better suited for command and control of their subordinate companies

e. Greater difficulties provided to UN for visiting certain CA positions, namely Velebit mountain

f. Removal from command of Comd 6 Guards Brigade from Gospic in favour of his deputy, who is reported to be a far better soldier

g. Mass panic buying of petrol in the Sinj area reported today, despite there being no price increases imminent

h. TDF have reported that they think the CA are about to launch an offensive, and have asked UN agencies to investigate this suspicion

i. CA have closed crossing at Umljanovic and want to close Pakovo Selo, both in the Drnis area

All these factors combined seem to indicate an awareness on the Croatian side that a critical time is approaching. If an opportunity to retake lost territory arises, the CA is not going to allow itself to be caught unprepared

ii) The area of Kricke has become a flashpoint over the past week. CFV are reported almost every hour, and constant UNMO patrolling does not seem to have eased the situation at all. In this location the CA positions overlook the TDF positions, and the distance separating the sides is short. Tension is sky-high and RHQ and K2 patrol the area on a daily basis at the moment. Civilians are happy to see the UNMOs but say that the CFV start again almost immediately they leave. They are almost always started by the CA. Liaison officers have been approached on the matter, but just shrug it off with some excuse like 'we cannot control our men all the time'. It is possible that the CA is trying to generate an area of high tension for their own reasons. They are succeeding, as all attempts to cool the area down are failing at the moment.

iii) The mountain of Gola Pljesvica has been used recently to fire heavy weapons onto the Bihać salient, in contravention of the Vance plan. It is believed that the guilty persons were White Eagles, hardliners, who do not seem to care about the tense international political situation. The Bosnians in Bihać filed a



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strong protest, both with the UNMOs in Bihac and K6.

iv) The Geneva talks, and the possibility that Karadzic may sign the Owen/Vance plan for Bosnia, have heightened tension in the UNPA in general, and in Knin in particular. The local people feel that if he signs, he is selling out the people of Krajina, as the plan effectively cuts the corridor from Serbia. If he does sign, it would be considered that the UN put too much pressure on Karadzic, and effectively forced him into a corner. The UN would therefore bear the blame for the problems in RSK. This demonstrates the ever increasing anti-UN feeling in Knin, and the incident in which the UNHCR official was dragged from his car. It must be considered certain that incidents such as these will increase.

**Nash Gray**  
GRAY MN  
Major Royal Marines  
For SMO

UNPROFOR - HO ZAGREB

TO: FC, DFC, COS

FROM: Marina Coblentz, Office of DFC

DATE: 15 January 1993

SUBJECT: Draft translation of document relating alleged CA aggression on B&H (including sources for supply of arms) genocide/ethnic cleansing of Serbs by CA and TD B&H, number of Serb prisoners and forced prostitution of Serbian women

=====

Please note:

HVO\*: Hrvatska Vojna Odbrana = Croatian Military Defense

SDA\*\*: Stranka Demokratske Akcije = Party for Democratic Action

MUP\*\*\*: Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova = Ministry for Internal Affairs

merzaluk\*\*\*\*: probably a word of Turkish origin (meaning unknown)

\*\*\*\*\* OA: Opstina Assembly (SO = Skupstina Opstina) ,

\*\*\*\*\* occasionally the grammar in the document is sometimes unclear, as in this sentence.

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Please also note:

A similar report was submitted to UNPROFOR in August 1992. Some of the information in that earlier report is similar (but not strictly identical) to the information in the attached report. New information is also provided in this latest report.



MOST CHARACTERISTIC EXAMPLES OF MASSACRES OF SERBS BY UNITS OF ARMED FORMATIONS UNDER THE COMMAND OF ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC

- In villages on the territory of opstina Bos. Brod and Derventa, particularly in the villages of Sjekovac and Kostres, the islamic butcher Alija Selimagic in one day killed approximately 120 children of Serbian nationality. On 04/04/1992, in front of 200 Serbs, Alija has cut off the head of Milan Mitric with a bayonet. With Alija at its head, a group of muslim extremists has killed the entire families of Zoric, Ivic, Misic, Simic, Miletic and Vidic, among which were the four year old Sladjana, the ten year old Anica and the thirteen year old Milanka.

- On 01/05/1992 in front of the Christian Orthodox church in Konjic Djuro Magazin, seventy years old, was killed. M. Comaga, the neighbour, committed the murder. The family of Djuro and Vlasta Golubovic from Konjic and their two juvenile children Peter, 7 years old and Pavle, 5 years old, was killed in the most loathsome way.

- During May-September 1992, Azim Delalic has in function of manager of the concentration camp for Serbs in Gabeli near Konjic put into effect and ordered killings, tortures, rapes and battery of the prisoners. Thus Nedjo Milosevic, 60 years old, Simo Jovanovic and Bosko Samoukovic from the village of Idbar near Celebic, after beatings with a rifle but and various agricultural tools received heavy bodily injuries, after which they died. Delalic has in the cited camp in a cruel manner massacred the brothers Vasa and Veselj Djordjic, 22 and 24 years old. In addition, Delalic ordered the Serbian men be beaten on their genitals and head in a way that provokes strong suffering and lasting psychological and physical impairment.

- Edin Bahtic from Sarajevo, former football player from "Zeljeznicar" football club, has formed in June 1992 a special unit of armed forces of former B&H which carried out genocide on the citizens of Serbian nationality in Sarajevo. Thus, under his order in July 1992 in a cruel way 14 Serbs were killed and thrown in the Miljaca river. The killings were performed by hits with sharp objects on the head, while being bent across the wall near the Miljaca.

- A number of atrocities on citizens of Serb nationality were performed by the Jusuf Prazina brothers, called Juka and Alija. On 16 May 1992, during the attack on Pofalice in Sarajevo they have arrested the juvenile child of the Gegovic family. At that occasion, they have killed Eleza Bozidara, bed-ridden, and his wife, they killed Mladena Bratic, they massacred Buha Radovan, Ranka Sojica, both civilians, and so killed approximately 200 civilians of Serbian nationality. Alija Prazina murdered Milan Removica, born in 1905, and his wife Stoja, born in 1913 in the



courtyard of their house on 15/06/1992 in the village of Renovica, opstina Pale.

- Ismet Bajramovic, called "Celo" has as the director of the Central prison in Sarajevo executed and ordered that Serb prisoners be killed, tortured, raped and in other ways molested. And as the director of the "Viktor Bubanj" barracks in Sarajevo in June 1992, as well as later, took civilian inhabitants of Serbian nationality, especially women and children, to the barracks and in that prison personally molested them. As the director of the prison, he enabled the guards and soldiers to mostly come at night into the prison facilities, rape the women and young girls, while mistreating, injuring and killing innocents.

- Enes Durak from Sarajevo organized a group of 30 Muslim extremists which he personally lead in intercepting the bus which was transporting individuals who were going to the funeral of a killed Serbian combatant in Srednje. At that occasion, Slavica Djukanovic from Hadzici was killed, while Zorka Markovic, Gordan Markovic, Vlatka Markovic and Marica Markovic were all heavily wounded.

- On 17/12/1992 armed muslim forces from the direction of Srebrenica attacked the Serbian villages of: Bjelovac, Sikiric and Zalazje on the territory of Bratinac opstina and at that occasion they killed and massacred 48 people, while heavily and lightly wounding 72.

- In the attack by muslim armed forces on the Serbian village around Foce and especially on the village of Josanica on 21/12/1992 48 Civilian women, children and elderly were killed while the entire families of Blagojevic, Visnjic and Jevdic were killed. They first killed them and then the massacred them. At that occasion all Serbian villages (10) on that territory were also burned. It was confirmed through identification that the following individuals were killed: Slavisa Ikonc, Zarko Muminovic, Miroslav Blagojevic, Tomo Visnjic, Rade Visnjic, Goja Stojanovic, Nikola Stojanovic, Radomir Blagojevic, Milja and Mile Jegdic, Vlatko Jegdic, Miroslav Davidovic, Dragomir Blagojevic, Miladin Visnjic, Jela Visnjic, Milja Stevanovic, Miroslav Ivanovic, Danilo kulic, Vinka Kulic, Novak Micevic, Lazar Blagojevic, Pero Kulic and Vukadin Visnjic.



UNITS OF ARMED FORCES OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA WHICH ARE NOW CARRYING OUT COMBAT ACTIVITIES ON THE TERRITORY OF FORMER B&H

1. On the Orasje theatre of operations:

- the 1st CA brigade whose Commander is Col Marijan Marekovic, Zagreb
- the 2nd Croatian National Guard CA brigade, the Commander is Col Drago Matanovic, Duga Resa
- the 153rd CA brigade, the Commander is Damir Gorseta, Velika Gorica (22/12/1992 the 111th CA brigade whose Commander is Col Frano Primorac was replaced)

2. On the Hercegovinian theatre of operations:

- the 4th Croatian National Guard CA brigade, Col Mirko Sundov, Commander
- the 103rd CA brigade
- the 114th CA brigade, Col Ante Catlak, Commander
- the 115th CA brigade, Col Ivan Skoro, Commander
- the 116th CA brigade, Nedeljko Obradovic, Commander
- the 102nd CA brigade, Col Tomsic, Commander
- the 145th CA brigade
- the 156th CA brigade, Col Ante Urcic, Commander
- the 163rd CA brigade, from Dubrovnik, Col Veselko Gabricevic, Commander

3. On the territory of Samac:

- the 3rd Croatian National Guard CA brigade
- the 122nd CA brigade

CURRENTLY ENGAGED: 15 CA brigades  
ALTOGETHER 30.000 persons subject to military conscription

In addition to the cited units, the following CA units participated in combat activities on the territory of former B&H:

- the "Bruno Basic" regiment, Ciro Grubisic, Commander;
- the independent CA brigade "Kralj Tomislav", Mate Sarlija, called "Daidza", Commander
- the 128th brigade formed in Teslica, carried out combat activities in Hercegovina, Joko Djipalo, Commander;
- the 203rd brigade, formed in Vukovar, carried out combat activities in Hercegovina
- the 4th independent "Zrinjski" unit of around 1,000 men of the CA (formed of hirelings from the French Foreign Legion, trained in Kumrovac, carried out combat activities in Hercegovina).
- the CA helicopter squadron, actively supported the CA and performed delivery of weapons, ammunition and other military equipment in the Cazin Krajina, at the airport in the village of Coralici near Zacina.

#### CONCLUSION:

From the above cited it is clear that on the territory of the Republic of Srpska, currently 15 CA brigades are carrying out combat activities, while from the beginning of the war up to now in various way combat activities have been carried out by 36 complete brigades of the CA, 1 independent regiment, 6 independent units of around 1,000 men, 1 engineering battalion, 1 mixed detachment marine-landing infantry and 1 helicopter squadron, equal to approximately 65.000 soldiers.



Information on the aggression of the Republic of Croatia on the Republic of Srpska and genocide on Serbs on the territory of former Bosnia and Hercegovina.

The aggression of the Republic of Croatia on the Republic of Srpska is indisputable, and daily regular units of the CA are transferring on the territory of the Republic of Srpska. Units of the CA which have participated and are currently actively participating in battles against the Army of the Republic of Srpska on the territory of former Bosnia and Hercegovina are the following:

- the "Bruno Busic" regiment is located in the area of Posusje, Ciro Grubisic is its Commander;
- the 2nd independent CA unit of around 1,000 men is located in the area of Hutovo (Hercegovina), it is brought there from the territory of Arzana;
- the independent CA "Kralj Tomislav" brigade is located in the area of Mostar, Mate Sarlija, called Daidza, is its Commander;
- the 1st CA brigade (the elite CA unit, intended for offensive activity, is formed in Zagreb, its composition is professional) is currently located in the larger area of the village of Zaplanik and Uskople - toward Trebinje;
- two units of around 1,000 men from the 4th CA brigade (brigade formed in Split) are located in the vicinity of Mostar;
- the 128th CA brigade, formed in Gospic, is currently carrying out combat activities in Hercegovina, Joko Djipalo is the brigade Commander and Camic is the replacement;
- part of the 203rd CA brigade, formed in Vukovar, is now performed combat activities in Hercegovina, prior to which it was at the Kupres theatre of operations;
- the independent CA unit of around 1,000 men, formed in Zadar, located in the area of Siroki Brijeg - Citluk;
- the independent CA unit of around 1,000 men, formed in Trogir, is located in the area of Neum - Metkovic;
- the 11th CA brigade, formed in Brinje, located in Hercegovina, Frano Primorac is its Commander;
- the 116th CA brigade, formed in Metkovic, is currently carrying out combat activities around Mostar;
- the 118th CA brigade, formed in Gospic, currently located in Hercegovina;

- the 156th CA brigade, formed in Makarska, currently located in the area of Ploce;
- the 120th CA brigade, formed in Sisak, Vlado Hodalj, Commander, now in Hercegovina;
- the 112th CA brigade, formed in Zadar, Marko Culina, Commander, now in Hercegovina;
- the 4th artillery regiment, formed in Karlovac, supports the CA activities from the territory of Slavonski Brod (Republic of Croatia), Izidor Cesnjaj, Commander;
- the 1st medical brigade formed and located at the Zagreb fair, the CA units supply parts of the medical brigade on the larger territory of Bosanski Brod;
- the mixed detachment of the marine-landing infantry, formed in Peljesac, Col Ante Bilic, Commander, carries out combat activities from Dubrovnik toward Trebinje;
- the 33rd engineering battalion, formed in Precko near Zagreb, LCol Simic, Commander, participated in the building of village crossings for the needs of the CA at Bosanski Brod, at the villages of Gornji Svilaj and Orasje;
- the 159th CA brigade, Frane Saric, Commander, is carrying out combat activities in the direction of Stolac - Trebinje; formed in Sibenik;
- the 110th CA brigade, formed in Karlovac, Davor Perusic, Commander, is carrying out combat activities in the larger area of Tesnja;
- the 104th CA brigade, Ivan Rukljan, Commander, is carrying out combat activities in Eastern Hercegovina; formed in Lipik;
- the 119th CA brigade, LCol Ivan Muzina, Commander, is carrying out combat activities in Hercegovina; formed in Otocac;
- the 153rd CA brigade, formed in Velika Gorica near Zagreb, is carrying out combat activities on the line of the villages of Korace - Kostres, near Bosanski Brod; Damir Gorseta, Commander;
- the 102nd CA brigade, formed in Sunj, mobilised on 04/09/1992, is in part carrying out combat activities in the area of Bosanski Brod; Col Tomsic, Commander;
- the 162nd CA brigade, called "Zrinj", formed in Petrinje is carrying out combat activities in the larger area of Orasje;



- the 67th independent unit of around 1,000 military police, Spoljar, Commander, mobilized on 04/09/1992, is located between Bosanski and Slavonski Brod whose task is to prevent desertion by Croatian soldiers from the theatre of operations in the Republic Srpska;
- the 105th CA brigade, formed in Osijek, currently located in the area of Sujica, West Hercegovina;
- the 114th CA brigade, formed in Split, is carrying out combat activities toward Trebinje, disposes of 14 "ZIS" canons;
- the 103rd CA brigade, formed in Djakovo, is carrying out combat activities in the area of the village of Gornji Svilaj (Republic Srpska);
- the 145th CA brigade, formed in Zagreb, is currently temporarily located in the area near Orasje;
- the 163rd CA brigade, is currently performing combat activities in the larger area of Trebinje;
- the 2nd CA brigade, formed in Dugo Selo near Zagreb, is currently performing combat activities on the larger territory of Trebinje, the brigade's Commander is Boris Jastovic;
- the "Francopan" independent unit of around 1,000 men (composed of hirelings from the French Foreign Legion and foreign citizens, formed and equipped in Kumrovec near Zagreb, is currently located in Hercegovina), from among the members of this unit in the area of the Mostar military airport we arrested Marija Pesa, USA citizen, of Croat nationality, arrested while performing terrorist activities against the JNA, and still under internment by the Army of the Republic Srpska of B&H (the "Francopan" unit of around 1,000 men is a unit intended exclusively for terrorist activities, deep within the military disposition of the Army of the Republic Srpska, and whose activities are performed under the slogan "there are no prisoners");
- the 4th CA "Zrinjski" independent unit of around 1,000 men (composed of hirelings from the French Foreign Legion and foreign citizens, formed and equipped in Kumrovec near Zagreb; it is now located in the larger area of Tomislavgrad);
- the 140th CA brigade, formed in Valpovo, reinforced by a tank battalion, is performing combat activities in the direction of the villages of Korace - Gornje Barace - tt 183 (Bosanski Brod);
- the 100th CA brigade, formed in Zagreb, is active in Bosanska Posavina;



- the 1st and 3rd CA brigades brought from the territory of Dubrovnik, replaced the 153rd CA brigade in the area of Bijelo Brdo and the village of Kostres near Derventa on 06/09/1992, Col Andabak Djuro is the Commander of the 1st brigade;
- the 166th CA brigade, in part engaged in the battle on the territory of Bosanski Brod;
- the 175th CA brigade, partly engaged in the battle on the territory of Bosanski Brod;
- the 127th CA brigade, formed in Virovitici, Decak Djuro, Commander, is preparing for engagement in the direction of Gornji Svilaj Odzak;
- the CA helicopter squadron, Katovic, Commander, actively supports the CA and delivers weapons and ammunition to the Cazin Krajina onto the airport in the village of Coralic near Cazin;
- the 141st CA brigade, formed in Split, is currently performing combat activities in the larger area of Tomislavgrad and Bugojno, Col Zarko Tole is the brigade Commander (he is a former JNA Major, arrested on 26-27/05/1992 in Cekuljic village, opstina Bugojno, still in internment by the Army of the Republic Srpska;
- on 01/07/1992 the Army of the Republic Srpska has in the area of Ivanjica village near Trebinje downed a piston aircraft of the Croatian Air Force while it was performing combat activities against the positions of the Army of the Republic Srpska;
- the 77th CA brigade, formed in Rijeka, composed of Muslims, is currently performing combat activities in the area of Tarcin and Pazaric near Sarajevo, Col Mustafa Porobic is the brigade Commander;
- on 22/06/1992 between Prnjavor and Derventa (Republic Srpska) members of the Army of the Republic Srpska downed an aircraft of the Croatian Air Force (MIG-21) while it was performing combat activities against the positions of the Army of the Republic Srpska;
- on 09/07/1992 at 09:05 hours a "MIG-21" aircraft of the Croatian Air Force performed combat activities in the area of Foce;
- currently underway is the formation of the battlefiled command of the Croatian Army for Slavonia and Bosanska Posavina, which command will be located in Bosanski Brod. Gen Stipetic, of the Croatian Army, is appointed Commander of the battlefield, while the Commander of the military police will be Jakob Milanovic, who is currently member of the command for the defense of the Croatian Army in Derventa. (Note: this Croatian Army command for



the territory of Hercegovina was formed beginning of May 1992 and is now located in Grude, General Janko Bobetko is its Commander;

- the main centre of the Croatian Army in Zagreb is currently developing operations for seizing Kupres and the Kupres plateau in which aim they are bringing in fresh forces to the region of Livno and Tomislavgrad. Hence, for example, they have brought onto the region of Livno the CA "Ante Starcevic" brigade of the strength of 5 infantry battalions, division 105mm and anti-air defense battery.

From the above cited, it is clear that 31 complete brigades of the Croatian Army, 2 independent regiments, 11 independent units of around 1,000 men (battalion), 1 helicopter squadron and 1 squadron of "MIG-21" combat aircrafts of the Croatian Air Force are currently performing combat activities on the territory of the Republic Srpska.

(illegible) equivalent to approximately 60,000 soldiers, 120 tanks and approximately 150 artillery weapons of 100mm calibre and more. The forces of the Croatian Army are generally grouped on the territory of Bosanska Posavina (Bosanski Brod - Derventa and Orasje), Eastern Hercegovina (Trebinje, Stolac) and Central Bosnia (Bugojno, Travnik).

## 2. Violation of the embargo on import of weapons and military equipment in the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina

- currently, at the Pleso airport in Zagreb an Iranian Army cargo airplane is located, which 3-4 days ago delivered weapons for the Government of B&H; the weapons were supposed to be transferred by road to Central Bosnia and by "Pajper" type plane to the Cazin Krajina. However, because of disagreement between the HVO\* and the Army of B&H, the weapons were not delivered to the customer, the airplane was halted by the Government of the Republic of Croatia, and possibly moved to the Pula or Split airports;

- in the centre for terrorist training near Innsbruck in Austria there are currently 6 individuals of Muslim nationality in training: Mesud Topalovic, Mirsad Topalovic, Mehmed Krivdic, Ramo Krivdic, Mirsad Makelic and Safet Ogrinac. Their training ends around 25/09/1992 when they should be transferred onto the territory of the Republic Srpska in order to perform sabotage-terrorist activities;

- in Germany, a group of pilots is being trained for the needs of the Croatian Air Force on NATO combat planes "F-116" and "Tornado";



- beginning of September 1992 in the out-of-customs zone in Vienna, weapons (armoured personnel carriers, artillery weapons, ammunition and infantry weapons), for the needs of the CA, were loaded on 4 ships, with the capacity of approximately 100,000 gross register tons, after which they were moved to the port of Budapest, where they were unloaded and by road transported to the following locations in Zagreb: basements of the new hospital building in Novi Zagreb and one of the buildings of the main Zagreb fair, while the tanks have been moved on the former JNA proving ground in Jastrebarsko;

- in Stuttgart on 13/09/1992, the CA bought 2 combat armoured vehicles for reconnaissance purposes, which will soon be transferred to the Republic of Croatia;

- the Croatian Army delivers part of the weapons and ammunition from secret warehouses in Djakovo and Slavonski Brod to the territory of former B&H for the use of the so-called Army of B&H. Weapons are imported from Germany, Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia to these secret warehouses in Croatia, while weapons from overseas countries, as for instance from Argentina and Turkey, are delivered to the Adriatic ports (Split and Ploce);

- approximately 600 Muslims, training at the Croatian Army training centre in Jastrebarska, are planned to be committed on the territory of the Cazin Krajina, across the territory of the Republic of Sprska Krajina which is under the protection of UNPROFOR, in the direction across Plasko and Slunj;

- on 02/09/1992, a convoy of 27 trucks loaded with weapons, ammunition and shells for various artillery weapons arrived in Zenica from Split; the weapons and ammunition are of Turkish and Iranian origin;

- on 31/08/1992 approximately 250 "mujahedins", or as they are called "saintly jihad warriors", have been brought onto the territory of B&H from Turkey, Qatar, Bahrain and Iran in the organization of the Vice-President of the Government of B&H, Muhamed Cengic. They are accommodated in the home for the elderly in Babina Rijeka in Zenica, while a smaller number is accommodated in Kakanj. These "warriors of the saintly war for an Islamic state", prior to attack activities, compulsorily pray to Allah and utter "BISMILLAH", which is a kind of oath of loyal service to Allah and whose text must be an integral part of every command in the so-called "Army of B&H";

- one way in which the Croatian Army arms its regular units on the territory of former Bosnia and Hercegovina is by taking out heavy armaments from the shelters of the Croatian Army, which are under the control of UNPROFOR forces (so-called "Pink Zones"), declaring that the armaments are going to Zagreb for overhaul;



after they have been taken out, they transfer them onto the territory of former B&H.

- 300 Muslim terrorists broken up at (illegible) and Plasko: 150 killed, 38 imprisoned, the rest dispersed.

3. Burned and destroyed places on the territory of Bosnia and Hercegovina on which exclusively or in majority Serbs lived:

- OA\*\*\*\*\* Kupres: entire city of Kupres and villages of Gornji and Donji Malovan burned;

- OA Bugojno: village of Cipuljic burned;

- OA Bosanski Petrovac: village Perna burned (approximately 100 Serbian households);

- OA Bihac: all apartments and houses of Serbs robbed under the control of the Army of B&H, members of the Army of B&H moved into approximately 2,500 apartments in which Serbs lived;

- OA Brcko: burned Serbian villages: Bosanska Bijela and Cerik;

- OA Srebrenik: burned Serbian village: Tinja;

- OA Zvornik: burned Serbian village: Boskovici;

- OA Kalesija: burned Serbian villages of Dubica, Zolje and Jaginov Kuk;

- OA Zivinice: burned Serbian villages: Brnjica, Vrnojevici and Dunevici;

- OA Kladanj: burned Serbian villages: Matijevici, Olovci, Vranovici, Gradina, Mladovo, Brdijeli, Obrcevac, Pajici, Kovacici, Pjevor and Stupari; as well as the village of Pljesan in which Vojin Pljesan (65 years old), Grozda Pljesan (63 years old), Radovan Pljesan (43 years old) and Bogdan Pljesan (58 years old) were killed;

- OA Rogatica: burned Serbian villages: Pljesko, Kamen, Rasput Njive, Borac, Izgumanje, Donji Mesici, Gornji Mesici, Dolovi, Crni Vrh, Vrazalice and Starcici;

- OA Gorazde: burned Serbian villages: Jabuka, Crvljivac, Ilino, Pijevac, Podmjera, Hranjen, Podhranjen, Ostro, Vlahovici, Petrovice, Bukvica, Jelah, Povrsnica, Cerje, Borak Brdo, Sopotnica, Hrid, Ostruzno, Gornje Selo, Konjbaba, Brekovi, Vukasinovici and all Serbian houses in the city of Gorazde on the left bank of the Drina river;

- OA Mostar: burned Serbian villages: Ruska Gora and Bogodol;
- OA Bratunac: burned Serbian village: Derventa;
- OA Konjic: burned Serbian villages: Bradina and Celebic;
- OA Novi Travnik: burned Serbian villages: Trnovac and Opare;
- OA Vitez: burned Serbian village: Tolovici;
- OA Olovo: burned Serbian village: Cemernice;
- OA Srebrenica: burned Serbian villages: Crkvine, Opaci, Orahovica, Bibici, Biogor, Takiya, Podrid, Postolje, Garasnica, Crni Vrh, Karno, Grubanovici, Jasenova, Sapt, Cicevci, Pribicevac, Dvorista, Ducici, Polinci, Gornji Ratkovic and Donji Ratkovic;
- OA Bosanski Brod: burned Serbian villages: Sijekovac, Novo Selo and Kostres;
- OA Visoko: burned Serbian villages: Topuzovo Polje, Muhasinovici, Gornja Zimca, Donja Zimca, Bradve, Kolosici, Paljike, Maurovici, Vilenjak, Rodovlje, Kondzilo, Zbilje, Kralupi, Porijecani and Mumci;
- OA Zenica: burned Serbian villages: Drivuse and Raspotocje;
- OA Vares: burned Serbian villages: Stupni Do, Neprivoj, Debela Medja, Planince and Dabravine;
- OA Hadzici: burned Serbian village: Gornji Zovik;
- OA Trnovo: burned Serbian villages: Tosici, Presjenica, Obla Brda, Mocevici and Ledici;
- OA Kalinovik: burned Serbian villages: Boljanovici, Dobro Polje, Osija, Rudjice, Poljice, Pijevac, Varizi;
- Sarajevo: robbed and in great part burned: all Serbian apartments and houses and completely burned: approximately 100 Serbian houses in the settlement of Pofalici;
- OA Velika Vlasova: burned Serbian village Bosanska Bojna.

#### 4. Evacuated Serbian places on the territory of B&H:

- all Serbian villages that have been burned are also evacuated, as well as:



- OA Srebrenica: villages of Spionica, Podpec and Jasenica; Smoluca (7,000 Serbs);

- OA Gradacac: village of Srnice;

- OA Lopare: villages of Miladici, Sibosnica, Visori;

- OA Tuzla: villages of Konjkovici, Kovacica, Pozarnica, Simin Han, Kovacevo village and Caklovici;

- all Serbian villages on the territories of: OA Zivinice, OA Banovici, OA Kladanj, OA Srebrenica (except village of Skelani), OA Modrica, OA Gracanica, OA Kresevo, OA Busovaca, OA Vitez, OA Novi Travnik, OA Travnik, OA Zenica, OA Gornji Vakuf, OA Olovo, OA Breza, OA Kakanj and OA Vares which are completely "cleansed" of Serbs and where ethnically clean Muslim and Croatian populations live. On the territory of Bihac city, which Muslim formations have occupied, 14,500 Serbs alone have been expelled. The number of burned and evacuated Serbian places on the territory of former Bosnia and Hercegovina, even if adding up to 150, is unfortunately not final.

4. Most characteristic examples of exiled and expelled Serbs in B&H, expressed in percentages (data from the 1991 census) or in number:

Opstina	Number of Serbs prior to the war in % (or number)	Serbs now in % (or number)
Modrica (liberated)	33%	not a single Serb
Tuzla	15,5%	appx. 4,5%
Zivinice	5%	not a single Serb
Kladanj	25%	not a single Serb
Banovici	14%	not a single Serb
Kalovija	16%	appx. 3% (on the territory under the control of the Army the SR B&H)
Travnik	11%	not a single Serb
Novi Travnik	13,3%	not a single Serb

Bugojno	18,9%	appx 5%
Derventa (liberated)	40,8%	appx 5%
Bosanski Brod	33,8%	not a single Serb
Jajce	19,3%	appx. 4% (on the territory under the control of the Army the SR B&H)
Sarajevo	33%	appx. 7-8% (either conc-camps or on the territory under the control of the Army the SR B&H)
Bihac	16,000	appx. 500
Livno	2,800	837 (in the concentration camp)
Duvno	1,000	appx. 400 (in the conc camp)
Mostar	20,000	appx. 1,000

According to the data we currently possess, on the territory of former Bosnia and Hercegovina which is controlled by the forces of the Army of B&H and the Army of the Republic of Croatia, 350,000 Serbs have been evacuated and expelled.

#### 6. Concentration camps for Serbs on the territory of Bosnia and Hercegovina:

1. - Livno (fortress - old city) - appx. 950 Serbs;
2. - Tomislavgrad (secondary school centre) - appx. 500 Serbs;
3. - Tomislavgrad - village of Rascani, all Serbs in that village blocked, without food supplies nor medical care; altogether, there are appx. 1,000 Serbs;
4. - Bugojno (in the house of the killed Serb, Relje Lukic) - appx. 50 Serbs;
5. - Bugojno ("Slavko Rodic" factory) - appx. 700 Serbs;
6. - Jajce (old fortress) - appx. 500 Serbs;



7. - Bihac ("Famos" football club stadium) - appx. 900 Serbs;
8. - Orasje (football club stadium) - appx. 100 Serbs, Pero Vincentic, from the village of Donja Mahala, is the Commander of the conc. camp;
9. - Odzak (Mijo Barisic is the Commander of the conc. camp) - in the primary school - appx. 400 Serbs;
10. - Odzak ("Stolit" enterprise) - appx. 150 Serbs;
11. - Odzak (village of Novi Grad) - appx. 1,000 to 1,500 Serbs, primarily women and children;
12. - Odzak (primary school in the village of Poljari) - 59 Serbs;
13. - Odzak (former military shelter in the village of Rabici) - appx. 300 Serbs;  
(From the camp in Odzak in the village of Rabic on 01/07/1992, Serbs were transferred in the direction of Bosanski Brod. Killed Serbs from the camp in Odzak have been buried with a dredging machine in the merzaluk\*\*\*\* near the hospital in Odzak, for which Fuad Alijagic is responsible);
14. - Konjic (railway tunnel above the village of Bradina) - appx. 3,000 Serbs;
15. - Hadzici (cultural centre in the village Pazaric) - appx. 150 Serbs;
16. - Ilidza ("Famos" football club stadium, the investigation is being carried out by Pero Sutalo from Vinkovaca, Samir Lokvancic and Ciko Haris) - appx. 800 Serbs, mainly children and women;
17. - Tuzla ("Tusanj" stadium) - appx 4,000 Serbs;
18. - Bosanski Brod (settlement near the Sava river) - appx. 400 Serbs;
19. - Zenica (facilities of the correctional centre) - appx. 2,000 Serbs, up to date many killed by being thrown into the "Zenica" blast forges;
20. - Jablanica (village of Celebici near the Jablanica lake) - appx. 500 Serbs;
21. - Kladanj (village of Stupari) - appx. 50 Serbs, they daily take out and hang one;

22. - Sarajevo ("Kosevo" stadium, "Zetra" fortress, Sarajevo railway station, women's prison, "Mladen Stojanovic" student centre, "25th of May" nursery school, shelter of "Sipad" enterprise, "Pofalici" correctional centre);

23. - Sarajevo: former "Viktor Bubanj" JNA barracks in which appx. 250 Serbs are placed, living in impossible conditions. 10 to 12 individuals are placed in space intended for one person. The chief investigator is Mile Davidovic, former basketball judge, and 20 Arabs are among the prison guards;

24. - Sarajevo: vault of the "Sarajevo" bank in which appx. 170 Serbs are placed. Members of the "Kvadrant" HVO\* unit, who guard the camp, call it the "Serbs' place of torture". Zlatko Lagumdžija, member of the so-called Government of B&H, is the Commander of the HVO "Kvadrant" unit. Dragoslav Dojcinovic, karate expert, is the Commander of the camp;

25. - Sarajevo: "Vladimir Nazor" school for retarded children in which appx. 200 Serbs are placed;

26. - Sarajevo: sky-scraper number 2 on "Pera Kosorica" square, Edin Bahtic, former football player, is the Commander of this conc. camp. Massive killings are performed on the cantilever across Miljacka river. In one night 27 Serbs were killed, and the main mass murderers are Edin Bahtic, Safet Klepo, Omer Bezbjed, Safet Kopic, Haris Terzic, and Uzeir Saric;

27. - Sarajevo: Sarajevo central jail where appx. 600 Serbs are placed, Ismet Bajramovic, called Celo, reknowned international criminal, is the Commander;

28. - Sarajevo: nursery school in Palmir Toljatića street - appx. 580 Serbs, Rika Pero, prison manager. (Safet Isovic, representative of the SDA\*\* in the Parliament of the so-called B&H, is the manager of the "Zetra" concentration camp, in that conc. camp there are 1,500 Serbs and up to date 300 have been killed;

29. - Bugojno: "Rostovo" ski centre - appx. 150 Serbs;

30. - Bugojno: high-school building - appx. 200 Serbs;

31. - Bugojno: in the coal mine in the village of Gracanica - appx. 250 Serbs;

32. - Konjic: new housing complex - appx. 1,500 Serbs;

33. - Konjic: in the village of Donje Selo - appx. 500 Serbs;

34. - Konjic: in the village of Buturovic Polje - appx. 200 Serbs;



35. - Zenica: 5 pavilion of the Correction Centre - appx. 300 Serbs;
36. - Ljubuski: pretrial confinement in Ljubuski - appx. 80 Serbs;
37. - Grude: garage space - appx. 30 Serbs;
38. - Hrasnica: "Aleks Santic" Primary School - appx. 160 Serbs;
39. - Pazaric: in the warehouses in the village of Krupska Rijeka - appx. 140 Serbs, Serif Mesanovic, manager;
40. - Mostar: district prison - appx. 300 Serbs;
41. - Gorazde: village of Vitkovici - appx. 380 Serbs;
42. - Gorazde: village of Sasici - appx. 100 Serbs isolated;
43. - Capljina: in the village of Dretelj - appx. 400 Serbs, appx. 25 to 30 hirelings from Italy, Germany, France, Great Britain and the USA interrogate them;
44. - Tarcin: grain elevators - appx. 250 Serbs;
45. - Novi Travnik: manhole for distributing fluid chemicals in the "Bratstvo" factory - appx. 100 Serbs;
46. - Metkovic (Republic of Croatia): tobacco factory buildings - appx. 150 Serbs;
47. - Split: Lora port buildings - appx. 500 Serbs;
48. - Vrgorac: private garage - appx. 50 Serbs;
49. - Imotski: police facilities - appx. 20 Serbs and
50. - Zagreb: Kerestinec prison - appx. 500 Serbs.

Currently on the territory of Bosnia and Hercegovina Croat and Muslim forces hold approximately 50,000 Serbs, mostly women and children, in concentration camps while approximately 10,000 Serbs have been killed and this number is increasing daily.

7. Brothels of Serbian women created by Muslim and Croat forces:

1. - Sarajevo: in the basements of the "Zagreb" hotel, there are approximately 40-50 women of Serb nationality on whose account members of the Muslim TD B&H are living it up;

2. - Sarajevo: "Bjelave" student centre - appx. 30 women of Serb nationality;
3. - Sarajevo: "Zetra" sports centre - appx. 30 women of Serb nationality;
4. - Sarajevo: "Borsalino" cafe - about 10 women of Serb nationality;
5. - Sarajevo: Ciglane settlement, in the facilities of the former "Djordjevic" firm - appx. 30 women of Serb nationality;
6. - Sarajevo: school of civil engineering - appx. 100 women of Serb nationality, Mirza Delibasic, reknown international basketball player, is the manager of the brothel;
7. - Hadzici: village Urduk near Pazaric - about 10 women of Serb nationality;
8. - Hadzici: primary school building in the village of Tarcin - appx. 50 women of Serb nationality;
9. - Tuzla: secondary school centre - appx. 100 women of Serb nationality;
10. - Tuzla: student centre - appx. 200 women of Serb nationality;
11. - Tuzla: private house on the road toward Srebrenica near Previla - appx. 15 women of Serb nationality;
12. - Bugojno: house of killed Serb Relje Lukic - appx. 15 women of Serb nationality;
13. - Bugojno: "Rostovo" ski centre - appx. 30 women of Serb nationality;
14. - Konjic: in the village of Buturovic Polje - appx. 50 women of Serb nationality;
15. - Konjic: "Amadeus" cafe in centre city - appx. 20 women of Serb nationality;
16. - Bihac: the inn buildings of Mustafa Vukovic who is simultaneously the manager of the brothel in which appx. 30 women of Serb nationality are located;

In addition to these 16 brothels, about which we have succeeded in obtaining data and in which approximately 800 women of Serb nationality are located, on whose account members of the Muslim TD B&H and Croatian soldiers are living it up, in all



concentration camps for Serbs unseen terror is as well being carried out on women, young girls and even small girls of Serb nationality.

8. Most characteristic examples of massacres of Serbs by the units of the Croatian Army and the Muslim TD B&H:

- In the city of Kupres, beginning of April of this year, units of the Croatian Army have killed 52 Serbs (cutting off heads and ears, plucking out eyes and brain, breaking legs and arms, killed by hammer hits on the head, while an unconfirmed number of Serbs who have been killed in the area of the village of Gornji Malovan, near Kupres, have been buried in a mass grave on Borova Glava, whose corpses have not been found). We possess sound tape, photographs and TV documentation on the above cited.

- On 21/05/1992 in the village of Derventa, Opstina Assembly Bratunac, Muslim TD B&H units, under the command of Hedib Sulejmanovic, carried out a massacre on Serbs from that village. 31 individuals were killed, mostly elderly, women and children. The entire village which was inhabited exclusively by Serbs was burned.

- On 25/05/1992 in the village of (illegible), Opstina Assembly Gorazde, Muslim TD B&H units, under the command of Suada Hamzic, killed 8 Serbs: Veljko Vukasinovic (72 years old), Danica Vukasinovic (65 years old), wife of Veljko, Milos Vukasinovic (64 years old) Jovanka Vukasinovic (60 years old), wife of Milos, Vukasina Vukosinovic (90 years old), Bozan Vukasinovic (75 years old), husband of Vukasina, Milorad Vukasinovic (78 years old) and Grozdo Vukasinovic (56 years old), husband of Perka Vukasinovic, who was the only one to survive the killed. The Muslim unit, which Ibro Salispahic and Ferid Aganovic were in, after killing them, burned the Serbs together with the houses. The following night the same unit killed 9 Serbs in the hamlet of Leleci and burned the houses.

- On 26/05/1992 units of the Croatian Army attacked the Serbian villages of Raska Gora and Bogodol near Mostar in which they killed approximately 200 Serbs and burned the villages.

- On 02/06/1992, Muslim TD B&H units, from the territory of Olovo and Kladanj, have killed 32 Serbs in the village of Gornjica (seven Trifkovic, seven Bunjevac, six Petrovic and twelve Damjanovic). They burned one young man in the stables, after which they burned the entire village. Only one young girl escaped the killing and, as a result, she suffered a nervous breakdown for which she was given medical care during 20 days. Serbs were first killed, then massacred by means of axes, pickaxes and shovels.



- on 15/06/1992, Muslim TD B&H units carried out an attack on the following Serbian villages around Srebrenica: Crkvine, Opaci, Orahovica, Bibici, Biogor, Turija, Podrid, Postolje, Darasnice, Crni Vrh, Karno, Brubanovici, Jasenova, Spat, Cicevci and Bukova Glava. The villages were robbed, Serbs killed and massacred, after which both the Serbs and houses were burned. The above mentioned TD B&H unit attacked Serbs in the village of Pribicevac while they were attending a funeral. They were mostly elderly, women and children, while the total number of killed Serbs in these villages is approximately 400.

- on 21/06/1992 Muslim extremists attacked the remaining 5 villages around Srebrenica: Dvoriste, Ducici, Polimce, Gornji and Donji Ratkovic. In the cited villages around Srebrenica there isn't a single living Serb left while the villages are burned to the ground.

- at the beginning of July 1992 the Croatian Army on the territory of Hercegovina burned the orthodox monastery Zetomislic and 14 orthodox churches in the valley of the Neretva river, while in the village of Prebilovci it killed all Serbs and burned the village.

On the territory of Bratunac the following villages were burned: Spat, Derventa and Zavala and 32 local residents of Serb nationality were killed. Recently, in central Podrinja, 21 Serbian villages were burned and robbed, while all inhabitants caught were killed. The names of these Serbian villages are announced in the mass media. The most recently burned Serbian villages are those of Bukovica and Vukasinovici in the opstina of Gorazde. In Vukasinovici alone, 15 Serbs were killed, in the hamlet of Zeleci 11, while all material goods and houses were burned.

- Milan Kukobrat, born in Glamoca, living in Duvno for some time, was taken into custody on 10 May of this year along with 22 other Serbs. They were kept some time in the SJB Dubno and in the village of Galecici near Suice where they suffered horrible tortures of which two of them died. From there he was transferred to Ljubuski where they were until 17/08 while he was exchanged on 18/08/1992 in Stolac\*\*\*\*\*.

During his stay in Stolac and Ljubuski, the following Serbs were brought from Livno: Nikola Jovetic, Miso Ubavic, Marho Vulic and Stevan Vujicic who were supposed to be exchanged in Zitnic, but as it is known, that exchange did not succeed. Filip Begic, Mijo Jolic and Drago Banovic, who in 1985 were sentenced to 15 years in prison for their connection with and participation in Ustashi emigration terrorist activities, took into custody Serbs in Tomislavgrad without any legal or any other basis except that they are of Serb nationality.



All three performed "investigations" in Ljubuski and in Stolac. Ivan Susac, from Mostar, is the prison commander. At the occasion of the visit of the International Red Cross in Ljubuski, the prison administration dressed the Serbs in JNA uniforms and introduced them as imprisoned Montenegrin volunteers on the territory of Hercegovina.

- Some escaped individuals from Livno stated that 20 to 30 Serbs were liquidated on 31/07/1992 in the area of Basajkovica, above Livno. Marija Ognjena, the orthodox saint, was commemorated on the same day of 1941 when Serbs on the territory of Livno were killed and thrown into pits by the Ustashi.

- Alija Izetbegovic declared the state of war in order to legalize massacres of Serbs among those who are of age to fight on the territories under the control of the Muslim TD B&H. From the time of the declaration of the state of war, the TD B&H units have, at the time of the forced mobilization of Serbs in Sarajevo until now, liquidated approximately 1,000 Serbs who refused to fight against their own people. The liquidations are carried out on the spot, the families of those killed are taken to concentration camps, at which point the entire property of Serbs is confiscated, apartments and all immobile property is seized. A part of the Serbs forcefully mobilized are sent to the first rows of the front line to serve as living shields to Alija's "Jihad" assault-fighters. They force them, unarmed, to demine the mine fields and dig shelters at the forefront of the front. In Dobrinje in Sarajevo, Serbs are used as a living wall during the so-called "ethnic cleansing" which the recently formed special Muslim MUP\*\*\* B&H unit is carrying out.

- In the concentration camps on the territory of former Bosnia and Hercegovina where Serbs are imprisoned, unseen terror, torture and leashing it out on their account is being carried out. The most mistreated are women of Serb nationality by the self-proclaimed agas and beys who introduce old custom rules on these territories which were applied during the Ottoman empire (the aga or the bey sleeping with a young Serbian girl, circumcision of young male Serbian children, conversion to the islamic religion and the like). These developments are particularly outstanding on the territory of central Bosnia (Zenica, Travnik, Gornji Vakuf, Jajce).

- In Novi Travnik the prison for Serbs is located in the chutes for liquid chemicals distribution, 12 meters deep in the structure of the "Brastvo" factory. The prisoners have to hold on to vertical steps round the clock, otherwise they would fall into poisoned fluid. Metal covers are placed on the chutes and locked, thus making it impossible for the public at large to know about these prisons. Prisoners are transferred from these chutes to the village of Tisovac near Busovaca, where they are kept in a pool with water up to their throats, until their skin tissue

begins to deteriorate, after which they are transferred to Grude for sunbathing.

The data on the aggression of the Republic of Croatia on Bosnia and Hercegovina and the genocide of the Serb population in Bosnia and Hercegovina are incomplete because the Republic of Croatia daily sends new units of the regular armed forces of Croatia on the territory of Bosanska Posavina and Hercegovina, while the data on the genocide of Serbs in B&H are not complete because of the unattainable territories which the Croatian Army and the Muslim TD B&H control, and where the genocide of Serbs is in fact the greatest.



UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
Palais des Nations

UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

I M M E D I A T E

'93 JAN 13 20:49

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CZM-043

010/12

SECRET  
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13 93 JAN 20 472

CZG-32

Page 1 of 3

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: VANCE, UNATIONS, GENEVA  
FROM: *(for)* NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB *Cedric Thornberry*  
DATE: 13 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 020  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH CROATIAN OFFICIALS

DISTRIBUTION:	
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	<i>JW/SM</i>

1. Following-up on the meeting with Ministers Susak and Mudrinic on 10 December in Zagreb, and on the meeting in Belgrade on 14 December with the Knin authorities, today we met with Cojko Susak, Defence Minister; Ivica Mudrinic, Minister of Transport and Communications; and Ivan Milas, Deputy Prime Minister of the Government of Croatia and President of the Government Commission for UNPROFOR. We had Thornberry and Mohamed Abdul-Aziz.

2. At the outset, we informed them of our contacts with the Knin authorities concerning the possibility of organizing, as soon as possible, a meeting between both parties to revive the negotiations on important economic issues and reach agreement thereon, particularly with respect to Obrovac Power Station, Peruca, Maslenica Bridge, water supply-Drno, Zadar, Teslingrad, railways, the Belgrade-Zagreb highway, power lines and PTT lines between Zagreb and Belgrade. It was explained that the Knin authorities had suggested that all issues be considered together "as a package deal", without entering into discussion of political and sovereignty concerns. As to the venue of the proposed meeting, the Knin people were not prepared to meet in Croatia but would meet in Belgrade, Maslenica or at any location within Sector South. With respect to the level of participation, on their part, their delegation would consist of Spanovic, Martic and Bjegovic, and they had suggested that the Croats should also be represented by high level decision-makers. UNPROFOR would participate at the highest level. We also informed them that the Knin authorities seemed to be serious and to have a real interest in reaching an agreement on these economic matters. We believed the time could be ripe to make progress in this regard.



Knin had proposed that 24 January would be a suitable date for the meeting since they needed to prepare in advance for such an important event.

3. Milas, while welcoming our initiative to bring the two parties together to discuss issues of mutual interest, pointed out, however, that contacts should only be made between local officials at the local level, and saw no need to meet with the Knin authorities at that level. He reiterated his Government's desire to establish peace in its territory and demanded that the total control of the Croatian territory should be materialized through the establishment of local authorities, based on the demographic composition of the territory prior to hostilities. UNPROFOR should make more efforts to implement the Vance Plan and see to it that the Croatian borders were respected. He expressed concern over the fact that Krajina was preparing for the establishment of its own army, contrary to the pronouncements of the Peace Plan. He added that all non-Serb population were driven out of the UNPAs and that thousands of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina were crossing to Croatia. UNPROFOR's task was to rectify the situation.

4. Susak stated that the Croatian position on the economic issues under consideration had been forwarded to Mr. Vance and to Lord Owen in Geneva. He quoted them as having said that Maslenica was not in the package. The official stand of the Croatian Government was to go to Maslenica with or without the consent of the Knin authorities. The Co-Chairmen, he suggested, had agreed with the Croatian Government that they should start work on Maslenica unilaterally.

5. For our part, we emphasised that Knin appeared willing to seek agreement on these issues. Approaching them only at local levels might prove inutile. The authorities in Knin were the main decision-makers and controlled the Milicija, the special police and the border police. We saw no other alternative than to deal with them. The best way to achieve progress was to discuss the substance of these issues face-to-face and to reach an agreement on how to fulfill the tasks lying ahead, after proper preliminary groundwork had been done. We clarified that UNPROFOR's initiative to bring the two parties together was based on prior positive indications by both parties that they were prepared to negotiate such important issues which were of benefit to their local population. Examples of success, such as the recent meeting between the deputy of Martić, the so-called Minister of Interior of Krajina, and the Croatian Deputy Minister of Interior, which had taken place the day before, and at which an agreement was reached to meet once every two weeks, and meetings recently proposed by Milas himself to various Serb sector leaders were fully supported by UNPROFOR. It was desirable to seize the opportunity to build upon the success that had been achieved.



CZN-043

CZG-037

P3/3

-3-

6. At the end of the meeting, while Milas stated that by tomorrow the position of the Croatian Government on the proposed meeting would be forwarded to UNPROFOR, Susak suggested that UNPROFOR should explore the possibility of having such a meeting at an earlier date. We agreed, but emphasised that we had been pressing for this, unsuccessfully, for several days.

7. It was a rather bizarre meeting, with Milas doing most of the talking - much of its content being quite inconsistent with actions he had himself initiated the previous day, and of which he seemed to think we were in ignorance; and with Susak initially taking positions diametrically opposite to those adopted on 10 December. Perhaps the Government here is even less unified than we had imagined. They are certainly trying to play different negotiators - even within UNPROFOR - off against one another. We will keep you fully informed of developments.

Endall



# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10

Office of the Co-Chairmen



To: Ambassador Geert Ahrens  
From: Herbert S. Okun

Geert -

I am attaching a self-explanatory letter to Mr. Vance which was delivered to our hotel during our visit in Belgrade on January 6. As you will see, the letter from Mr. Dusan Zlokas, "Representative of Gorski Kotar Serbs in the Republic of Croatia", asks that special status be granted his people and that this be examined in the Working Group on Minorities.

Herbert S. Okun  
10 January 1993

cc. Ambassador Hall



REPRESENTATIVE OF GORSKI KOTAR  
SERBS IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

Belgrade Office

Phone: 466-078

fax: 468-336

Mr. Cyrus Vance

Special Envoy

of UN Secretary General

Dear Mr. Vance,

On behalf of 6,000 Serbs living in the last Serbian enclave in Croatia (Gorski Kotar) I am requesting your distinguished mediation at the OSCE Conference on ex-Yugoslavia, co-chaired by yourself, to put the issue of our special status guaranteed by the Croatian Constitution, at the agenda of the minority rights group.

I am at your disposal for any additional information or documents about my compatriots, who never took up arms but attempted to tackle their problems through negotiation.

Yours sincerely,

  
Dušan Zlokas

Bgd, 6. 01. 93.

REPRESENTATIVE OF  
GORSKI KOTAR SERBS  
Belgrade Office  
November 1992

4-207

MAIN DOCUMENT  
FOR INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS ABOUT SPECIAL STATUS OF  
SERBS IN GORSKI KOTAR



## MAIN DATA

ABOUT THE ENDANGERED SERBIAN ENCLAVE OF GORSKI KOTAR IN  
THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA OUTSIDE UNPAs AND PINK ZONES IN  
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

1. In the eastern part of Gorski Kotar for some 400 years now live the Serbs on the land they bought from the Austrian crown. The area covers central part of Velika Kapela Mountain, the slopes of which extend towards North East to the line of Generalski Sto-Bosiljevo-Severin na Kupu. The whole area is known as KAPELSKO. Therefore we opted for a working title of the area "SERBIAN KAPELSKA REGION".

The Serbian Kapela Region covers some 600 sq.m. This is mountainous karst, surrounded by other mountains and a big number of smaller karst fields and narrow canyons along river valleys while the rest is cut by depressions and hardly accessible beyond roads. Well developed network of communications is characteristic of the region. Three main routes, highway Zagreb - Rijeka, highway Ogulin - Senj and railway line Zagreb - Rijeka are going through the area, along with thick network of local good quality roads leading to every village, which makes it the shortest way from Zagreb to the Adriatic coast.

Following WW II, more precisely in 1954, the Serbian communes were abolished. The Serbs used to be absolute majority in those communes, namely five times more Serbs were living there by 1954 than at present.

In October 1992, the area was inhabited by some 6,000 Serbs in 175 settlements, organized in 8 local communities: Srpske Moravice, Gomirje, Jasenak, Potok Musulinaki, Dreznica, Gornji Kraj, Ponikve, Gornje and Donje Dubrave. Those local communities were in 1954 administratively organized in three communes: Vrbovsko, Ogulin and Otočac, so that Serbs remained minority population in each.

Under the present Croatian constitution we belong to the županija Rijeka.

The population in the area was engaged in forestry, timber industry, they were employed with the Zagreb railway management and small-scale business, prior to the war in Yugoslavia.

According to the census of 1991 the mentioned local communities were inhabited by:

(1) Srpske Moravice	28 settlements	1,758 inhabitants
(2) Gomirje	36 settlements	1,500 inhabitants
(3/4) Jasenak and Musulinski Potok	12 settlements	500 inhabitants
(5) Drežnica	34 settlements	780 inhabitants
(6) Gornji Kraj	29 settlements	752 inhabitants
(7/8) Ponikve and G. and D. Dubrave	34 settlements	850 inhabitants
<hr/>		
Total	175 settlements	6,498 inhabitants

This part of the territory of Croatia is the narrowest belt between Slovenia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, cut through by vital communications - roads, railway line, long-distance power transmission and oil pipeline.

It may be said in all fairness that this is the only area in Croatia inhabited by compact Serbian community, without any conflict ever, where Serbs and Croat are living in fragile peace.

2. The Serbian population of Gorski Kotar requests that the Republic of Croatia abides by its Constitutional Law and grant to the Serbian population in the Serbian Kapela Region special status. Therefore we propose:

1) Present local communities should be transformed into communes as they used to be between the two WW and for a decade after WW II. It means that the Serbian Kapela Region would have the following communes:

- (1) Srpske Moravice with Gornje and Donje Hajdine
- (2) Gomirje with Vujnovići, Tuk, Hambariste, Kamensko, Ljubostina, Brestovac, and Vitunj
- (3) Jasenak with Potok Musulinski, Bijelsko and Brezno



- (4) Drežnica
- (5) Gornji Kraj
- (6) Dubrave Gornje and Donje with Ponikve, Popovo Selo and Gojak Administrative seat of the Serbian Kapelska Oblast would be Gomirje due to its historic and geopolitical position.

2. The Serbian Kapela Region should be directly connected to the Government of Republic of Croatia.

More detailed explanation of the proposal is presented in the main paper.

October, 1992

010/12

CZG - 021

CZN - 027

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA

INFO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 8 January 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z-004

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SUSAK  
FOLLOW-UP

DISTRIBUTION:	
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MOST IMMEDIATE

93 JAN -8 17:49

UNPROFOR Unit  
Palais des Nations

Reference my UNPROFOR Z-564 of 7 January 1993.

1. It has not been possible to set up a meeting between the Croatian Government representatives and those from Knin for tomorrow (Saturday, 9 January 1993), as appropriate representation from the latter is not available.
2. I have informed Susak accordingly; a copy of my letter is attached.
3. I must bring to your notice that the stance adopted by Susak and his colleagues at yesterday's meeting, unfortunately using alleged assurances by you and Lord Owen, to resort to unilateral action for repair work at the Maslenica Bridge site, has placed us in a rather difficult position.
4. At Thornberry's meeting with Susak on 10 December 1992 (which you will recall was at your instance after the Brioni meeting), he had the impression that the Croatian Government was prepared to talk to the Knin authorities to work on a "package". In fact his discussions with Spanovic and Martic at Belgrade on 14 December 1992 were based on such a premise. In a subsequent meeting Auger had with Mudrinic on 18 December 1992 at Zagreb, such an impression was further reinforced. Since then we had



2/8

- 2 -

made a number of efforts to set up the intended meetings but could not do so due to Susak's apparent non-availability. In this context our UNPROFOR 2-512 of 28 December 1992 (copy attached) refers.

5. In view of the above, the complete turn-around at yesterday's meeting took us by surprise. Notwithstanding whatever assurances Milosevic may have given, if we are to avoid conflict in the area, the local Serbs would have to be associated with discussions and understandings; particularly, since the impression has been conveyed to them that such discussions are intended to take place. Hence, may we request that in meetings you have with President Tudjman or Susak on Sunday, you and Lord Owen dissuade them from taking any precipitate and unilateral action; they should be asked to abide by the assurances they had given Thornberry and Gaudreau/Auger. Endall.

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

UNPROFOR

8 January 1993

3/8  
My dear Mr Susak,

1. With reference to our discussions yesterday, I am afraid we have not been able to set up a meeting for tomorrow (Saturday, 9 January 1993) as intended, due to the non-availability of appropriate representation from the local authorities in Knin. However, attempts are being made to arrange the meeting as early as possible, possibly early next week, and I will keep you informed accordingly.

2. I appreciate your desire for early commencement of work at Maslenica and assure you of all possible cooperation and support on the matter. However, in keeping with the situation on the ground, you would appreciate that any action which could lead to renewed tension and conflict in the area would best be avoided. Hence, I would once again urge restraint on your part and would request that you make a positive effort to arrange an understanding with the Knin authorities during the forthcoming meeting so that it is possible to recommence traffic through Maslenica as early as possible. On our part, I can assure you of our continued efforts to provide all possible support to activities contributing to the maintenance of peace and an early return of normalcy to the area.

With warm regards,  
Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Satish'.

Lieutenant General Satish Nambiar  
Force Commander

Mr. Gojko Susak  
Minister of Defence  
Republic of Croatia  
Zagreb



CZV-601-0X

CZG-267-0X

UNPROFOR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

M O S T I M M E D I A T E

Page 1 of 5

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: VANCE, UNATIONS, GENEVA

FROM: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 28 DECEMBER 1992

NUMBER: UNPROFOR Z- 532SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP TO THORNBERRY'S MSC 10544

1. Please refer to the above-mentioned cable from Thornberry, copy of which is attached for ease of reference.

2. On receipt of this cable, a follow-up meeting was set for 18 December at the Croatian Ministry of Defense. The meeting took place between Gaudreau and Auger, on our side, and Mudrinic and Zloik, Susak's Chief of Staff, on the Croatian side. We were advised that Susak was still absent and would be returning to Zagreb on 22 December. We went through the various economic issues covered in Thornberry's note of the 14 December meeting in Belgrade. Mudrinic agreed that a high level meeting should be held with the Knin authorities with a view to reaching agreement on these issues. Mudrinic indicated that he would fully brief Susak on his return. Zloik then said that they would get back to us on 22 December.

3. On 23 December, Auger spoke with Zloik and was told that they would get back to us on the same day or the following day. She was advised that Susak had been very busy the previous day in parliament and that he would be meeting with Mudrinic to be briefed on the 18th December meeting.

4. Since no call from Susak's office followed, Auger had a call placed on 25 December to his office. Both Susak and his Chief of Staff were absent. Susak is expected back tomorrow, 29 December, and Zloik towards the end of the week. We will try to contact Susak tomorrow and continue to follow up on this matter.

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TO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: THORNBERRY, ICFY, GENEVA

DATE: 16 December 1992

NUMBER: MSC10564

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH KNIN AUTHORITIES

1. Herewith is a summary note regarding the positions taken by the Knin authorities on well-known issues at Monday's meeting. These had previously been discussed with Susak and Mudrinic on 10 December. Copy has been provided to the ICFY Co-Chairmen who expect to see, i.e., Susak in Zagreb tomorrow.

2. These matters should now be followed up ASAP, having first checked with the Co-Chairmen on the progress made at tomorrow's meeting with the Croats. I would suggest Auger should action, having consulted with FC and Gaudreau. It is most desirable that each side be given specific tasks with timetables, once we have a package agreement between them.

Endall

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C2N-601 8/3/91  
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Notes of Meeting at DCM's Office, SIV-III, Belgrade

14 December, 1992

15.00 - 17.45 hours

Present: Thornberry DCM, Gaudreau DFC, Echard Acting CAC, Knin;  
Spanovic, Martic, "Foreign Minister", Starevic

The positions of the Knin authorities on matters previously discussed between Susak, Croatian Minister of Defence, and Thornberry, on 10 December, are as follows:

Peruca

Both they and the Croats, they say, are in a hurry. They need the place as a going concern by June. Repairs will take 4 - 6 months. They are willing to remove the explosive charges immediately, under UNPROFOR supervision and management. They would then, under UN supervision, control, and management, repair the generators - they guarantee UN access to all the documents and with the decisive role at all stages. They would guarantee deadlines, and that repairs would be completed in a given time-frame. It was a matter of "small detail", which could be negotiated, whether the Croats could send experts, from time to time, under UN protection, to see what was going on. They foresaw that the ultimate result would be for them to use the Peruca power station and for the three, downstream, to work for the Croats. We explained that the S.C. had given us a mandate to control the dam until a final agreement had been worked out.

This, plus Obrovac, seems the heart of their "package" which would allow the Croats to re-build the Maslenica Bridge.

Obrovac Power Station

Knin says that the basic issue here is that the Croats will not return the repaired "poles" which are crucial to the functioning of this power station. They regard it as a vital issue for them, and link it to Peruca and Maslenica. Susak had promised Thornberry to look into the return of the poles during their meeting on 10 December.



2.

22/10/95  
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### Maslenica Bridge

They said they were well aware of what this means to Croatia, and "have no intention to try to cut Croatia in two". They are willing to discuss it at any time, and "think it best to deal with it, Perucica and Obrovac as a package".

In their view UNPROFOR could secure the building work; but, they said, their flexibility on this "would depend on Croatia's attitude to their basic interests".

### Water - Drnis, Zadar, Tuzlingrad

They are willing to go ahead with the restoration of water to these places, needing reciprocity, a time-frame, and each side being specifically tasked to do specific work.

### Railways

They are willing to have the railways re-opened; in the context of security and entry controls which would involve them, UNPROFOR, and the Croats. They see it as, essentially, a technical matter to be dealt with by experts in the first place. This relates to the lines through both sectors South and West.

### The Highway

Martić said he had "prepared everything" for re-opening. Controls would be conducted at the entry to the highway through the two sectors (East and West) under their control. It would be open for civilian traffic only. UNPROFOR would monitor their checkpoints. It would be important, also, for their traffic to be guaranteed towards Belgrade. Initially, it could be open on alternate days, with UNPROFOR accompanying convoys of vehicles. The "crucial issue" was that the Croats would have to stop interfering with "their" corridor in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their checkpoints would check documents, and there would be no arms brought in. There would be no taxes imposed on transit goods.

### Power lines

Power lines between Krajina and Croatia should be repaired. The Sub-Commission of the JC had been working on this. The experts have been getting on well with their work, but have been running into problems as soon as political decisions are necessary. Kralj promised that their side would in future ensure that every support was given to the experts, including as regards de-mining of certain related areas.



3.

*Handwritten:* 8/8  
*Signature:* [illegible]

PTT lines between Zagreb and Belgrade

The line was damaged in two or three places in Sector West. If there were a political agreement on this between Belgrade and Zagreb, it would be easy for the lines to be repaired. Otherwise, they said, it basically required "only one or two switches" in Zagreb to be activated.

On the Joint Commission

They wanted it to re-convene, but, perhaps, at a high level, and perhaps dealing with the full range of practical issues between the Sectors and Zagreb. Issues had been coming up which repeatedly required higher level authority than either Serb or Croat delegations currently possessed.

The Knin side said that they were ready for direct talks with the Croatian Government. The UN's base at Pleso Airport at Zagreb was a possible location, as mentioned by Susak; or outside the immediate area.

Christmas visits by priests

Knin said they were ready to organize Christmas visits as had occurred on 1 November - only better organized. The Croatian side should provide, locally, lists of places and of the religious people who would be attending. Reciprocally, Serb priests would like, at their Christmas, to visit Sibenik, Zadar and Split.

Copy given to Secretary Vance and Lord Owen;  
PC, DPC  
Mrs. Auger

CYZ 009 CNZ 010 P1/1

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UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
Palais des Nations  
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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'93 JAN -8 '23:55

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA ✓  
INFO: NAMBIAR, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
FROM: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 8 JANUARY 1993  
NUMBER: MSC-028  
SUBJECT: Maslenica Bridge

**CODED CABLE**

1993 JAN -8 P 6:49  
UNATIONS  
TELECOMMUNICATIONS

This is to let you know that I strongly support Satish Nambiar's request, in his UNPROFOR-2-004 to you, that you should try to discourage the Croatian Government from taking unilateral action over Maslenica which, as Nambiar says, could lead to a resumption of fighting in that area.

Best regards.

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