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Title **Items-in-Peace-keeping operations - West Irian - background papers by Mr. Engers**

Date Created **5/31/1962**

Record Type **Archival Item**

Container **S-0876-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - West Irian (United Nations Temporary Executive Authority in West New Guinea - UNTEA)**

Print Name of Person Submit Image

Signature of Person Submit

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. I have gone through the files, which appear to be very incomplete. I have, however, found two on the record references to the sending of a Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to New Guinea. The first one is in Mr. Schurmann's letter of 4 January 1961 which refers to and repeats an offer made in June 1960 "that my Government would wholeheartedly welcome your sending a Personal Representative to the Territories and reporting to you, and through you, to the Members of the United Nations on the conditions in the territory".

2. This same suggestion is made in Mr. Schurmann's letter of 18 January 1962. (Both items are flagged.)

3. In addition there is in Mr. Hammarskjold's private files a paper emanating from the Netherlands Government entitled "Notes for a Talk with the Secretary-General", dated September 1960. This note states in paragraph 4 that the Netherlands Government has considered the following possible measures and "would invite the Secretary-General to give his views on them".

"a) Offer of trusteeship, under conditions to be discussed in more detail;

"b) Acceptance of visiting mission by analogy with Article 87 (c) of the Charter;

"c) One or more officials to be stationed by the Secretary-General in Netherlands New Guinea (personal or resident representatives);

"d) Visit by one or more officials to be appointed by the Secretary-General to report on progress towards self-determination; ....."

4. I also found an excerpt from Parliamentary proceedings in the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament on 23 February 1961 (which I had sent to Mr. Hammarskjold) in which Mr. Luns had intimated that the invitation of UN Observers had been made "on the compelling advice" of Mr. Hammarskjold. "He finds himself, however, because of the Russian attacks in a difficult position ...." "Under the present circumstances he might be inclined to give a narrower interpretation of his authority ...."

5. I remember that Mr. Hammarskjold was quite annoyed by this indiscretion on the part of Mr. Luns and while I do not know what exactly transpired between him and the Dutch Representatives on this subject, I vividly recollect him to say that this was incorrect and that it anyway automatically ended the matter.

6. There is also a letter from the Prime Minister of Malaya of 6 February 1961 in which he urged upon Mr. Hammarskjold to make an investigation on the spot or else send his own representative to do so on his behalf.

7. Whether, and if so in what way, Mr. Hammarskjold answered any of these communications is not on record.

31 May 1962

CONFIDENTIAL

12/5/61

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A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'E. H. H. H. H.' or similar, written in a cursive style.

31 May 1962

### On the sending of observers

The question of the sending of observers or personal representatives to West New Guinea has been raised a number of times during the last year and a half by the Netherlands Government. My predecessor was a number of times officially approached by the Netherlands on this subject and he, as you know, did not take any action. I do not recall that his attitude was criticized by anyone.

The Netherlands Government returned to the subject shortly after I had assumed my office and again some two weeks ago in the letter of the Prime Minister. In my reply I made it clear that I did not believe such action on my part to be appropriate unless a request were made by both the Netherlands and Indonesian Governments.

If certain people still feel strongly on the point, I may be allowed to suggest to them the possibility of an application to the Security Council which, under Article 40 of the Charter, might wish to decide on this device as a provisional measure, designed to prevent an aggravation of the situation. I am, of course, not saying that a situation has arisen where Article 40 is applicable. That is for the Security Council to decide.

Frankly, however, I would much prefer if parties would not divert their energies, but were to concentrate on finding an agreement on the basis of the Bunker proposals.

On the question of the present status of the negotiations

In view of the many questions that had reached us from all sides, it was decided to publish the text of the proposals made by Ambassador Bunker for the settlement of the West New Guinea problem. This was done on 25 May 1962. These proposals were designed by Mr. Bunker to form the basis for the preliminary discussions of the parties with Ambassador Bunker.

What was first needed was an indication from the parties of their willingness to start the preliminary negotiations on the basis of these proposals. While both parties have signified officially that they will accept these proposals as a basis for discussion, it now appears that both require further clarifications and assurances. It is my belief that these clarifications and assurances could be best thrashed out during the preliminary discussions with Ambassador Bunker and not prior to them. This to me does not only seem logical but also wise. The parties are no doubt aware that this part of the negotiating stage was carefully and painfully worked out, and that they would assume a heavy responsibility to upset arrangements this far worked out. If, as the parties acknowledge, they are in basic agreement on the Bunker proposals, I do not think it a profitable exercise to start altercations on what basically could not be more than relatively minor details.

~~Thus~~, all should point to a speedy resumption of the negotiations under Ambassador Bunker.

17/8/62

### The Indonesian-Dutch agreement

The Agreement was the object of comments in the circle of delegates:

1. The question of West Irian was not the centre of attention previously. It was not a crucial problem; moreover it did not threaten the international security. Nevertheless the representatives of Indonesia and the Netherlands attempted often to make it a point of interest to the delegates.

2. The methods of negotiating this agreement was interesting.

In fact most of the delegates think that the agreement is the only political question which was settled within the framework of the United Nations, and was signed in the Headquarters under the supervision of the Secretary General. Some delegates point out that the questions brought to the attention of the General Assembly and the Security Council are numerous; however the questions which were solved ~~therein~~ found the solution outside the United Nations like the questions of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Laos and the Suez. Some believe that the recent agreement will open the way to solve other problems in the United Nations, and would restore its prestige to the United Nations.

### Comment of the Eastern bloc

The Ambassador of Roumania has no criticism against the agreement, and thinks it is a great step. However it is questionable whether to submit it ~~to the~~ rather to the General Assembly than to the Security Council. In fact the Security Council is the only organ to which such agreement should be referred. It should first approve it and then empower the Secretary General to implement it. The Ambassador referred to few instances where the former Secretary General followed this procedure and reached an acceptable solution, then informed the ~~Security~~ Security Council thereof, like the Buraimi case for example.

He added that it would be going over the jurisdiction of the Security Council to refer the question to the General Assembly. No member would oppose the agreement, but it will have more power if it is approved by the Council, and the Five Permanent members would be committed to support it. Although he has no idea of other delegations view on the matter, he believes the Socialist delegations are of his opinion. In my view, the Ambassador of Roumania is thinking of the far future, as most of the similar problems are submitted either to the G.A. or to the Security Council.

### The Seventeenth Session

1. The selection of candidates to the General Assembly is almost over. The positions of competition ~~is~~ <sup>is</sup> the Presidency of the General Assembly. It may be stated now that the delegate from Pakistan is the stronger candidate. Although the delegate of Ceylon makes a big effort and shows a great deal of activity, the Pakistan candidate will be elected, but with a narrow margin. Efforts are made by several Asian delegates to persuade the Ceylon candidate to withdraw and allow a unanimous vote for the Pakistani delegate. In this respect they are supported by the Socialist bloc, whose candidate will have the support of the Asians in the Eighteenth session.



2. The U.S. delegate had declared that Premier Khroutchev will attend the coming session. However I heard from some correspondents ( American) that the U.S. State Department and the Mission here requested from some correspondents to refrain from any comments concerning the statement of the American delegate. Nothing , in fact, confirms this report.

On the other hand, it is the belief of some delegates that the presence of Mr. Khrutchev is very normal. Ambassador Boland of Ireland ~~thinks~~ expects the Soviet Premier to come. This time will be however different from the last one . The Atmosphere would be one of more understanding and entente , as the agenda contains several important problems : the opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the contributions to the Congo expenditures, the Question of the Congo, and the election of a new Secretary General and other questions. The Middle East papers attaches some importance on the matter and think that the presence of ~~Head~~ the Heads of non-aligned countries is very possible.

~~Election of~~

#### Election of the Secretary General

After the appointment of Mr Monji Slim as Minister of Foreign Affairs of his country it is believed that there is no new competitor or candidate to the position of the S/G/. Mr. Boland of Ireland stated that he is excluding his candidacy. Every body here ~~wants~~ is waiting for Mr. U Thant trip to Moscow on which depend the question. Some believe that the Soviet shall raise again the question of the Troika, knowing well that they will have no support from any bloc in the U/N. Someone thought of calling the Afro Asian bloc to a meeting with view of taking a resolution supporting U Thant. The objection to such a meeting is that the support of U Thant by the Bloc is well known, and therefore there is no need to call such a meeting. It is then preferable to wait until U Thant return from Moscow.

#### Middle East problems

The Arab League Council will meet next wednesday to consider the complaint of Syria against the UAR. Syria believes that the UAR interferes in its internal Affairs and that some saboteurs from Cairo infiltrated Syria through Lebanon to undertake subversion and trouble there.

Such events evoke the memory of the ~~event~~ incidents that took place between Syria and Lebanon in 1958, and which were considered by the Security Council, and by the General Assembly in an Extraordinary session. One may remember that a unanimous resolution was adopted thereon.

Now the situation may evolve into similar conjectures . There is a rumor that if Syria does not succeed in the Arab League, it may bring it to the attention of the Security Council. Another rumor goes to say that Iraq and Syria on one hand, and Jordan and Saudi Arabia on the other would set up an economic boycott on Lebanon with view at forcing Lebanon to depart from his neutral policy and to separate him from Egypt. Thus the UAR would be isolated from the rest of the Arab World.