

OPERATIONS

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
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4

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: DCOS Ops

INFO: DFC
CofS
CO GHANBATT
TAC HQ

FROM: COL K.M. Tutt 
DCOS Sp

MY REF: LOG 150/95

DATE: 10 Mar 95

SUBJECT: EMPLOYMENT OF GHANA SUPPLY PLATOON

1. It is my understanding that the Ghana Supply Platoon was initially deployed to Butare as a direct support unit for a specific operation in that area in late 1994.
2. Since then, it has remained in Butare, where it has provided some support to MALAWICOY and TAC HQ. With the imminent relief in place by SENBATT, which is a stronger contingent administratively self contained, one of the extant tasks of the Supply Platoon will cease. It is G4's intention that SENBATT be administratively self contained, as are all other contingents.
3. Furthermore, TAC HQ staff have a limited requirement for such support. What support is required could easily be provided by SENBATT, in much the same way as MALICOY supports Sector 3 HQ.
4. It therefore appears that the Supply Platoon will be left without a worthwhile role in Sector 3A. Given the accommodation shortage in Butare, it would seem detrimental to the proper housing of SENBATT to retain the Supply Platoon there for no real benefit.
5. Some possible alternatives to the current situation are:
 - a. **Option 1.** Remain in location at Butare, but be responsible for the storage and management of Force Reserve Stocks held forward for contingencies, if required.
 - b. **Option 2.** Deploy to Sector 5 and manage Force Reserve Stocks held forward in that sector for contingencies if required.
 - c. **Option 3.** Deploy to Sector 6 and act as a Combat Supplies Platoon under Op Con of 95 FLSG.
 - d. **Option 4.** Deploy to Sector 2 and revert to under command of GHANBATT
6. My preferred option is Option 4.

DFC

1. Thanks for your comments which I as usual take in very high regards.
2. The Headquarters is to remain in Butare.
3. It will assume the responsibility of Sector 3 Headquarters and become the focal point for the South.

for C
Wid FC 14.04.94

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

INTER OFFICE MEMORANDUM

To: FC

1000.7 (DFC) /G/1

From: DFC/COS

Date: 11 September, 1994

Subject: UNAMIR TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS
BUTARE

1. I paid a dawn working visit to the Tactical Headquarters today 11 Sep 94 to purposely find out information on conditions pertaining in Sector 4 following the deployment of RPA troops and the appointments of Prefects to the three PREFECTURES.

2. I made the following observations after a thorough briefing from the Staff Officers at the HQ:

a. Gikongoro. There is a very cordial working relationship between the RPA, the Prefect and the UNAMIR troops in the area. Since Gikongoro is not far from Butare, the Prefect consults quite often with the staff at the TAC HQ. Discussions are held daily between the Rwandese Authority and UNAMIR personnel for the appropriate liaison to facilitate a better conduct of operations in the area.

b. Kibuye. Normal routine has continued since the Prefect and his Protection Party arrived there.

c. Changuu. There is very little personnel movement between Zaire and Rwanda. This seeming stalemate in personnel movement may be attributed to the fact that Rwandese on both sides of the lake are as it may, "waiting to see what happens next". The only reported act of violence in the area was the shooting incident at the bridge at RUZIZI I.

2. Whilst at the TAC HQ, I seized the opportunity to listen to the views of the Staff Officers in view of the fact that there seem to be plans to either re-organize or close down the HQ. From the information gathered, the following are obvious:

a. That there is constant consultation between the RPA authorities and the TAC HQ regarding RPA's Operations and movement in the Sector. This established machinery is presently working without fault. And that it is even in the interest of UNAMIR that this healthy close liaison with RPA exists.

From this morning OGP it appears that this is not the case. However, if relations are not good, we must keep working at it¹ and therefore the TAC HQ may have a good purpose.

*MA
Let me (and this)
on my next visit
to Butare
15/9
DFC*

b. That the TAC HQ serves as the contact Point for all NGOs operating in the area from Butare through to Sector 4. This is evidenced by the sight of numerous articulated vehicles belonging to NGOs parked at the TAC HQ.

c. That the HQ acts as a center where all information concerning Human Rights abuses and other vital information on any major events taking or yet to take place are reported.

d. There is in location a Senior civilian administrative officer who is giving the necessary direction to the field officers serving the battalions in Sector 4.

e. The TAC HQ serves as a Transit Point for UNAMIR convoys travelling South to and from Kigali.

f. UNMOs and troops are deployed in the immediate vicinity of the TAC HQ - BUTARE and GITARAMA Prefectures.

3. It is worth mentioning that on my way to Kigali after my tour of the TAC HQ, I monitored on the radio the presence of RPA officers at the TAC HQ for a co-ordinating conference/meeting with our Staff Officers concerning the pending deployment of additional RPA troops in Sector 4. This information was duly relayed to the Ops Room at the FHQ.

4. Whilst I am not in any way attempting to vainly support the continued existence of the Tactical Headquarters, I wish to re-iterate the fact that the establishment is serving a very good purpose and therefore it is my candid suggestion that the HQ is maintained until such a time that the emergency situation in the Sector 4 and its immediate surroundings normalizes. It is also suggested that all the necessary requirements are provided to the HQ to enable it function more effectively. I further maintain that the TAC HQ will continue to serve a very useful purpose whether it is designated a 'Liaison Office' or which ever name it may assume later even after normalization in Sector 4.

5. Again, status of officers at the HQ having changed from Staff Officers to MILOBS should not be a reason for closing down the TAC HQ. As the situation stands now, Command has no other choice but to use MILOBS as Staff Officers for the simple reason that since the UNMOS terms and conditions of service are more attractive than that of a Staff Officer, troop contributing countries do not seem too eager to send staff officers but UNMOs. Therefore the only way one can continue the mission is to use ^{with} MILOBS on the ground for staff duties. This is the situation we have found ourselves for sometime now.

6. The above are my humble observations and suggestions. I shall avail myself for any further discussion on the issues raised.

7. I had wanted to discuss these issues personally with you before writing the report but upon my arrival in the afternoon you were not immediately available and the fact that I have to leave with the SRSG for Zaire tomorrow, I decided to put my thoughts on paper for your consideration.

8. Submitted for your information and consideration, please.

INTEGRATED TASK FORCE

Briefing note, 6 March 1995

Current Options for Southern Camps

Background: Since the end of December 1994, some 37,000 people have been transported to home communes from camps in the southwest of Rwanda. Many more people have left the camps without assistance. Initial estimates are that 60% of those moved officially or who have left the camps spontaneously went to their home communes.

In spite of earlier positive signs, movements of people into home communes has sharply declined in the last two weeks. There is a steady drift of people into the larger southern camps. Many people in home communes are also moving back into the larger camps. The populations of Kibeho and Kamana camps have risen significantly. Kibeho now holds some 120,000 people, possibly more, out of a total camp population of around 250,000. ICRC is providing food and other assistance to these camps, providing an important safety net. It is estimated that only some 10% of people leaving camps are crossing the border into Burundi and eventually Zaire.

While it is evident that many people in the southern camps will not return to their home communes because of their part in the genocide, large numbers of people are genuinely concerned about their safety if they return home. Many believe that they will be arrested, imprisoned or killed. In addition, security in some home communes, particularly those close to camps, is also precarious. Reports from medical establishments, MILOBS and other sources reveal an increasing number of attacks, usually with machetes, on commune populations. Numbers of arrests have risen over the last few weeks, including arrests that do not appear to follow correct legal procedures. Illegal occupation of homes and shortage of food and services in home communes, have also been cited as reasons for not wanting to go home.

The drift into camps like Kibeho is worrisome in that it has helped to strengthen the grip of the "hardcore" on camp populations. Through the use of intimidation, killings and misinformation, many people are prevented from leaving the camps. It has also resulted in a "hardening" attitude of camp populations towards efforts to encourage them to go home. Equally worrisome are the strong indications from some Government and RPA officials that their patience with the camps, and with the international community in general, is fast running out. An additional factor which must be considered is the cost of maintaining the present trucking operation, given the relatively low numbers of people taking advantage of the transport.

Alternative Approaches: Given all of the above, it is evident that urgent steps must be taken to review the present situation and agree on appropriate courses of action. Based on the interests of the various concerned partners, a number of options are open. These are discussed below.

The first option is based on the Government's wish to see the camps close as soon as possible "by any available means".

rest 2 months

Option One: The Government announces that all camps will be closed forthwith and that people should go home. RPA takes actions to disperse the populations.

Probable Outcome: A mass chaotic dispersion of camp populations, with large numbers heading across the border into Burundi, probably into Zaire. The option would probably result in a large number of deaths, particularly young children.

Advantages: i. The camps are closed immediately.

Disadvantages: i. The forced closure would be a violation of the agreed principles of organised return of people from the camps. ii. The credibility of the Government with its own people would be seriously affected. iii. A major rift would occur between the international community and the Government.

The second option is based on the principle of voluntarily return, but answers some of the Government's concerns about the number of camps remaining open and the concerns of camp population regarding security in home communes.

Option Two: While continuing to provide people in camps with the opportunity to return to home communes, announcements will be made that food supplies to all but one or two camps (to be determined) will cease at a certain date. Transport will be offered to those as yet unwilling to go home, but too frail to move elsewhere, to move to the chosen camp or camps. Efforts to improve conditions in home communes continue and issues, such as security concerns and arrest procedures, are addressed. In the chosen camp(s) transport for those deciding to return home would continue to be made available. Those who remain in the camp(s) receive basic food and services until such a time the judicial system is back in place and their "cases" can be heard.

Probable Outcome: The congregation of populations in one or two locations seems to be the current trend. Hence, option two would serve to move the process along at a faster pace. The closure of other camps may lead to some people trying to cross the border, others may go home, or disperse elsewhere in the country.

Advantages: i. The problem is contained in one area. ii. Provides an alternative to the perception that all camps have been forcibly closed. iii. More cost effective logistics. iv. Security might be improved through increased presence of RPA and UNAMIR redeployed from other camps.

Disadvantages: i. Failure to fulfil the Government's concern about large numbers of "displaced" persons. ii. A "Goma-type" situation may be created where distributions, etc are in the hands of the hardcore. iii. Increased difficulty to manage services. iv. Greater difficulty in persuading people to return to home communes. v. More risk of epidemics and diseases.

The third option is based on the principle of voluntary return, the Government's concerns about growing camp populations in the south, and fears on the part of camp populations vis-a-vis their return to home communes.

Option Three: Camp populations are encouraged to move into smaller camps situated within their home communes. These smaller camps could be based around the present ORCs, providing people with basic services, food and security until such a time they can be encouraged to move back into their homes. Similar to ongoing arrangements, exchange visits are arranged between returning populations and residents in the communes. hap!

Probable Outcome: Undoubtedly the "hardcore" will attempt to hang on to the camp populations, and some movement over the border will be inevitable. However, it is possible that those who fear insecurity in home communes will take up the smaller camp option and eventually return to their homes.

Advantages: i. Smaller concentrations of people would enable better interaction between the humanitarian community and IDPs. ii. Security could be improved through increased presence of RPA and UNAMIR. iii. The grip of the hardcore can be removed. iv. Difficulties such as illegal house occupancy etc can be resolved while people remain in the ORCs.

Disadvantages: i. Government may be reluctant to have new camps established. ii. Proliferation of camps could increase logistics problems.

The fourth option keeps open the nine camps that currently receive food from the ICRC. It reorganises their populations into commune groups to facilitate their orderly and voluntary return home.

Option Four: All smaller camps are closed. The nine remaining camps (Kibeho, Ndago, Munini, Kamana, Rwamiko, Ruramba, Bivumu, Buhoro, Nyamigina), all of which receive food from the ICRC, are reorganised so that they contain only persons from specific communes. Each camp will contain some 35,000 people. The reorganisation of the camps can be done by food distribution. For example, all displaced persons from the Nyakizu commune will be told that they will only receive food, in two/three weeks time, at a certain camp. They will be assisted to move to that camp (trucks and for large numbers of persons a corridor can be created). When camps are established by commune a new structure of authority for each commune will be developed. This structure will include individuals from UN agencies and RPA LOs.

Probable Outcome: By restructuring the camps we will change the present power structures that exist within them. It will be chaotic moving thousands of people from camp to camp, but it will sort out many of the present problems and is much more realistic for a long-term solution, as opposed to creating one or two large camps.

Advantages: i. When people are moved we can assure that new communal structures are created. ii. When camps are organised in this way it will be easier to bring people back to their home communes because the process can be done commune by commune. iii. By organising the population of the camps, and by having six to eight smaller camps, it will be much easier for the administration of the camps. Food distribution in home communes can increase in direct proportion to people leaving specific camps. iv. Greater facility in

the provision of services. v. Reduced risk of epidemics and other sanitation problems (nb rainy season very near). vi. Improved security because of less numbers.

Disadvantages: i. It will be chaotic moving people from camp to camp. ii. Does not address the concern of the government to quickly close all camps. iii. Possibility of new intimidation between guilty and innocent elements from same commune.

The fifth option proposes registration by photographic Identity Card (ID card) for all those remaining in the camps. The people would then be grouped by commune in maximum 4 camps, which would be fenced and constantly patrolled by the RPA and UNAMIR.

Option Five: Considering the worsening security situation and the increasing proportion of the criminal element in the camp population, option 5 proposes to register all IDPs who do not want to go home, using ID cards with photographs. Commune authorities could then analyse copies of the registration forms to identify those accused of crimes. Once registered, the IDPs would be divided by commune of origin and grouped into 3 or 4 fenced camp sites, possibly new sites close to current camp locations. Constant joint RPA/UNAMIR patrolling, from bases in the camps, would contain negative propaganda, improve perceptions of the RPA and reduce intimidation by militias. The whole operation would be preceded by a one-week information campaign to inform camp populations of the government's and international community's future plans.

Probable outcome: Resistance to reorganisation of camp populations, to RPA patrolling in the camps, and to photographic ID cards. Some IDPs will probably abscond. In effect this option is a modification of option four, differing in the number of camps, the fencing, and the ID cards.

Advantages: i. Fewer camps are easier logistically. ii. ID cards will enable easy identification of suspects. iii. Joint RPA/UNAMIR patrolling within the camps will reduce intimidation and increase security.

Disadvantages: i. Fewer camps means larger sizes, causing problems with controlling their internal security, even with patrolling inside the camps. ii. Fencing and ID cards may encourage more people to cross into Burundi. iii. Danger of misuse, or fear of misuse, of ID cards and registration documents.

The sixth option is based on the premise that continued food distribution in camps will only delay the resolution of the current problem and that in the interests of national security, numbers of people in the camps should be reduced as quickly as possible.

Option Six: After an extensive information campaign to inform people of the impending closure of the camps, the camps would be closed in a series (one after the other), beginning with the two largest and most problematic camps, Kibeho and Ngado. People in these camps would be informed that food distribution will cease and that they should go home. It will also be made clear to them that there will not be any registration of new populations for food distribution in other camps. Commune populations within the camps would be given their last and final distribution of food. Food would be cut off commune by commune, starting with the principle communes. As a parallel action, the presence of international agency personnel in these communes will be increased to the degree possible for a predetermined period after the final food distribution. People will be informed that during this period concerns over their security will be better addressed because of increased international presence in their communes.

Probable Outcome: As with other options, the population of camps will decrease as food stocks are depleted. As with option 2, camp populations would leave the camp, either going home, crossing the border or dispersing into the countryside.

Advantages: i. Large camps such as Kibeho would be closed, satisfying the concerns of the Government regarding national security and allowing those people under control of elements in the camps to return home, if they so wish. ii. The selection of communes would encourage international organisations to focus resources on priority communes.

Disadvantages: i. There is no provision for services inside the country for those who are innocent but afraid to return home. ii. The ability of the international organisations to focus on priority communes would be limited to only a specific period of time, iii. The rate of those who decide not to go home but to leave the country may be faster than in Option 2 or 4. iv. People presently leaving communes because of various factors would have nowhere to go except across the border.

* *Change Government*

Strategy for the Southern IDP Camps.

1. The return of IDPs from the camps in Gikongoro to their home communes in Butare, Gitarama, Kibungo, and South Kigali has come to a virtual standstill. While it has been known from the beginning of this operation that the last camps remaining open would contain a high percentage of "hard core" - those who would refuse to return to their communes because of their participation in the genocide - it is generally accepted that there are still numbers of people in the camps not guilty of such crimes. As the principal motivation for people to return home has always been information on conditions in their communes, it is assumed that the growing reluctance of non-criminal IDPs to return home is based on serious concern over the security situation in their commune.
2. The group consists of mostly women and children, who are either closely associated with the hard core and those who fear arbitrary arrest and detention in their commune. These perceptions of arbitrary justice in home communes is further fueled by recent reports from the camps that people from communes are returning or entering camps for the first time, fearing for their personal safety.
3. This situation is further complicated by heightened concerns on the part of the government over national security. The death of the Prefet of Butare and increased reports of a possible destabilization campaign by the former government have put more pressure on national security forces to control their borders and the population within. In this regard the IDP camps are considered the greatest threat to national security inside the country.
4. Any strategy which must address the current situation in the southern camps will fail if it does not fully take into account the complexity and magnitude of the IDP problem. The principal task facing the government now can be summarized as follows: The arrest, prosecution and detention of those guilty of genocide or involved in efforts to destabilize the government, while at the same time assuring the voluntary and safe return of innocent IDPs to their home communes and their reintegration into normal society. Without the full cooperation of the government and organizations at the highest levels, the separation of the innocent and the guilty and the proper treatment of the two will be impossible.

5. The following strategy was developed in a series of meetings with representatives from the ministries of Rehabilitation and Social Reintegration, Interior, and Defense, as well as UNREO, UNHCR, UNHCHR, UNDP, WFP, UNICEF, FAO, and UNAMIR. It is intended to address both the concerns for national security and those of IDP return and reintegration. As soon as it is approved by the government final plans will be drawn up and implementation should start within a week.

6. The operation will begin by assessing the present situation in eleven high priority communes (where over eighty percent of the IDP population originates), and preparing these communes for the arrival of the IDPs. This will be accomplished by strengthening judicial and security structures in the commune, and ensuring that the immediate material needs of the returning IDPs can be met. At the same time, the information campaign in the camps will be strengthened, and security improved by increasing UNAMIR presence in the camps. Food distribution will be stopped in camps chronologically, starting with Kibeho. Within the camps final distributions will be staggered by commune (see attached schedule). Transportation will then be made available for those unable to walk home.

Operational Outline

7. **Preparation of the Home Communes**-Approximately eighty percent of the of the total camp population comes from only eleven different communes, nine in Butare, and two in Kigali. To maximise limited resources, it is suggested that the majority of our efforts be concentrated in these eleven communes, however, some information activities will be conducted in all affected communes. Prior to the commencement of the operation, activities in the home communes will be focused on increasing the information available to local officials and the local population, and strengthening security and judicial structures in the commune.

8. Preparing the people in the home communes for the arrival of the IDPs is primarily the task of the Rwandan government, with support provided by the IOC. Local authorities will be briefed on the potential problems which might arise from a sudden influx of IDPs into the general population (disorder and lawlessness, theft, property disputes, intimidation of witnesses to genocide, revenge killings), and provided with methods and resources to deal with them.

9. The Rwandan government will assure that local authorities and local populations are informed of the proper procedures for filing a complaint or conducting an arrest. In the past there have been incidents where returning IDPs were arbitrarily arrested and jailed, simply because they were IDPs. It is necessary that the perpetrators of the genocide be caught and punished, but it is essential for reconciliation and peace that the innocent feel safe from unwarranted persecution. Arrests, accusations of genocide, or property disputes, must be handled in a legal and transparent manner.

10. The international community will intensify its presence in the targeted home communes, and in these same communes there will be specifically identified "assistance zones", staffed by a committee of relevant local authorities and international representatives. This committee will be responsible to address the needs faced by bourgmestres in the reception of new arrivals, as well as the security concerns of the returnees.

11. Roving information teams will visit all of the receiving communes not included in the primary eleven. These teams will be composed of representatives of the judiciary, the RPA, and UNHCHR, and will brief commune officials, security officers, and NGO and UNAMIR representatives, about their roles and responsibilities.

12. Protection for the population, and the returning IDPs, will be enhanced by increasing the security presence in each of the primary target communes. This increased presence will consist of RPA and police, UNAMIR troops CIVPOL, and human rights monitors.

13. **Preparation in the Camps**-Absolutely essential to the success of the proposed operation is that security be improved in the camps, that sources of disinformation within the camps are neutralized, and that accurate and truthful information about government policies and the situation in the home communes is readily available to the entire camp population.

14. At present, representatives and sympathizers of the former government control much of the camp population through concerted campaigns of disinformation and intimidation. In order to create an environment in the camps where people can feel safe in making the decision to return home, it will be necessary to increase the presence of security forces within the camps, especially during and immediately after the final food distributions. The majority of this increased security presence will be in the form of UNAMIR troops.

15. To further improve the security situation UNAMIR troops, in cooperation with local authorities, will conduct an operation in the camps to arrest known intimidators, and people suspected of participation in genocide.

16. Prior to the commencement of the operation, the government will conduct an extensive information campaign in the camps. The campaign will explain the plan and rationale for the closure of the camps, and more importantly, will seek to reassure the camp population that the actions being taken are in their own interest.

17. People will be informed that subsequent food distributions will take place in the home communes, and that there will be no further registration for food distributions of populations moving to other camps. Camp populations will be assured that the government wants them to return home to begin the process of reconciliation, that they will be welcomed in the home communes, that they will be safe from arbitrary arrest, that property disputes will be settled fairly, and that those who make false accusations for personal gain will be discovered and punished.

18. **Transport and Registration**-Due to time constraints and lack of resources, it will be impossible to transport all of the IDPs to their home communes. Fortunately, the vast majority of the IDPs come from the nearby prefecture of Butare, and can easily walk home. Minimal transport will be provided for the sick and elderly, and those living in the most distant communes. Whether walking home, or riding the buses, all IDPs will be registered when leaving the camps.

19. **Schedule for Final Food Distributions**-The following is a proposed schedule for stopping food distribution in the camps. It may change slightly to accommodate new population information, and existing food distribution schedules.

WEEK	CAMP	COMMUNE	POP.	
1	Kibeho	Runyinya*	17,000	
		Ngenda*	12,500	29,500
2	Kibeho	Gishamvu*	10,000	
		Gashora*	5,000	
		Nyakizu*	9,000	
		Ntyazo*	6,200	30,200
3	Kibeho	Huye*	6,000	
		Muyira*	5,700	
		Mbazi	5,500	
		Mugusa	5,800	
		Ngoma*	3,500	
		Maraba*	700	
		Kigembe*	3,200	30,400
4	Kibeho	Rusatira	3,600	
		Shyanda	3,700	
		Muyaga	2,300	
		Sake	2,200	
		15 OTHERS	14,200	
	Buhoro	Ngenda*	400	
		Ntyazo*	350	
		35 OTHERS	3,250	30,000
5	Ndago	Nyakizu*	16,500	
		Gishamvu*	7,200	
		Ngoma*	6,400	30,100
6	Ndago	Kigembe*	5,000	
		Runyinya*	3,500	
		Gashora*	2,500	

		Ndora	2,200	
		19 OTHERS	10,000	
	Nyamigina	Huye*	300	
		34 OTHERS	2,000	
	Bivumu	Muyira*	400	
		32 OTHERS	3,500	29,400
7	Munini	Ngenda*	5,500	
		Nyakizu*	5,200	
		Gashora*	2,400	
		Kigembe*	1,000	
		Runyinya*	750	
		Kigali-ville	600	
		22 OTHERS	5,000	
	Rwamiko	Runyinya*	5,100	
		Huye*	650	
		Gishamvu*	650	
		49 OTHERS	3,600	30,400
8	Kamana	Nyakizu*	8,500	
		Ngenda*	5,100	
		Gashora*	2,600	
		Butare	1,000	
		Muyaga Sud	1,000	
		12 OTHERS	6,100	
	Ruramba	Runyinya*	3,100	
		Huye*	400	
		Maraba*	250	
		36 OTHERS	1,300	29,350

NOTE FROM THE UN HEADS OF AGENCIES

In reviewing the present situation regarding the return of internally displaced persons in camps in Rwanda to their home communes, the UN Heads of Agencies recommend the following actions for the consideration of the Government of Rwanda:

1. While recognizing the Government's concerns about the implications of internally displaced persons camps in the south-west of Rwanda, UN agencies are gratified that the Government remains determined to uphold the principles that underscored the IDP returnee operation to date.
2. The main principle as mentioned in several reports of the UN Secretary General which were endorsed by the UN Security Council, remains the principle of voluntary return in conditions of safety and dignity. This principle is also contained in the Plan of Action of the Bujumbura Conference on Refugees, Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons, in which the Rwandese Government took part.
3. The UN agencies fully recognize that the prolonged existence of camps inside Rwanda is not a humane option for the persons living in these camps, and can moreover generate serious problems of security. The UN agencies remain therefore committed to assist the Rwandese government in finding a solution to this situation. However, utmost care should be applied so as to avert further compelled population movements inside Rwanda, or across the border into Burundi and beyond.
4. The UN agencies believe that it is essential to intensify and extend the present information campaign in the IDP camps to encourage people to return to their home communes. This information campaign should be based, inter alia, upon extensive use of radio transmissions as well as visits by Government officials to the camps, preferably at Ministerial or senior level.
5. The principle of voluntary return in conditions of safety and dignity applies only to internally displaced persons who have not committed crimes in the past, and who do not resort to harassment and intimidation in the camps. Known suspects of participation in genocide should, as a first step, be isolated by
 - publishing and widely disseminating their names, as soon as possible
 - excluding them from any role whatsoever in the camps (food distribution etc.).

6. Furthermore, at short notice the possibility should be examined by UNAMIR, in consultation with the relevant Rwandese authorities, to undertake another law and order action to apprehend at least the known intimidators in the camps.
7. At the same time, it is vital that the camp populations will be reassured, through the information campaign and especially through high level visits to the camps, that all those who are innocent will not have to fear to be arrested and will be welcomed by the authorities in their home communes.
8. As part of the information campaign, the camp populations, are to be informed about the objective to close all camps, and to ensure security and assistance in the home communes. Instead of abrupt camp closures, there should be a gradual reduction in food assistance, on a commune by commune basis if possible. Populations from camps targeted will be informed (a) that subsequent distributions will take place in the respective home communes and (b) that there will be no registration for food distribution of populations moving to other camps.
9. At the same time, the international community will intensify its presence in targeted home communes for a period still to be determined. In these same communes, there will be specifically identified "assistance zones", staffed by a committee of relevant local authorities and international representatives. This committee will be responsible for addressing the needs faced by bourgmestres in the reception of new arrivals, as well as the security concerns of returnees. These initiatives, which will have to be implemented with all due speed, will also be reflected in the intensified information campaign.
10. In presenting this proposal, the UN Heads of Agencies would like to draw to the attention of the Government that since the next planting season is at least six months away, the continued arrival of returnees who have not sowed crops will lead to an increasingly significant food requirement in home communes. The disincentive of returning to communes with limited food stocks and the problems associated with new arrivals is of paramount importance. In light of the depleted food stocks of international organizations special initiatives, such as food for work programmes, will need to be developed in cooperation with government agencies.

11. The UN agencies look forward to their efforts with the Government to ensure the humane and expeditious return home of the internally displaced. They recognize the complexity of the operation and also its direct relationship with the return of refugees in neighboring countries. Steady progress to bring people home must be made, recognizing the need for careful planning and implementation. An essential element in this process will be clear cooperation between the international community, including UNAMIR, and the RPA to provide security in the home communes.

12. To facilitate the operation, the UN agencies amongst other things have committed themselves to strengthening the Justice and Security Cells of the Integrated Operations Centre, and to do all in their power to provide the material required to enhance services in targeted home communes.

IOM TRANSPORT PROGRAM

OPERATION RETOUR EXERCISE OF 17 MARCH 1995

KIBEHO
PATRICK BI-1.2

2 ZAMBIA
1 IOM / HCR

07.00

NDAGO
JEAN BAPTIST BI.9

1 IOM / HCR

07.00

OPERATIONS
JEAN PIERRE BI-1

SUPERVISION
MATHIAS BI-2

CAMP DE N.DAGO..

VOI DU 16.03.1995

REFECTURE	COMMUNE	SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR COMMUNE	NOMBRE PAR PREFECTURE
GITARAMA	NTONGWE	GISARE	1	1	2
	MASANGO	RWOGA	1	1	
BUTARE	MUYIRA	MATARA	2	2	2
TOTAL GENERAL					4

CAMP DE .KIBEH.O....

NOI DU 16.13.1.1995

PREFECTURE	COMMUNE	SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR COMMUNE	NOMBRE PAR PREFECTURE
BUTARE	HUYE	RUKIRA	1	11	43
		NYANZA	3		
		MKIMA	3		
		MPUNQWE	2		
		KABUREMERA	2		
	MBAZI	KABUGA	2	9	
		MBAZI	1		
		MWUHIRE	1		
		MUHORORO	5		
	NGOMA	MATYAZO	2	9	
		CYARWA	7		
	GISHAMVU	MUBUMBANO	1	5	
		NYAKIDANDA	1		
		GISHAMVU	2		
		SHORI	1		
	MUYAGA	GAKOMA	1	1	
	SHYANDA	KAMUDAHUNGA	1	1	
	MUGUSA	NYARUBUYE	1	4	
		MVSHA	1		
		GAFUMBA	2		
	MARABA	KIBANDA	1	1	
	NDORA	MUZENGA	2	2	
TOTAL GENERAL					→

CAMP DE . KIBEHU....

DU 16.1.31.1995

REFECTURE	COMMUNE	SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR COMMUNE	NOMBRE PAR PREFECTURE
IGALI-VILLE	NYARUGENGE	MUHIMA	4	5	11
		GASYATA	1		
IGALI-SUD	KACYIRU	REMERA	6	6	8
	NGENDA	GAKOMEYE	2	6	
		MAREBA	4		
ITARAMA	GIKOMERO	GISHAKA	2	2	1
BYUMBA	KIGOMA	BUTARE	1	1	2
	BUYOGA	KAYUMU	2	2	
TOTAL GENERAL					65

CAMP DE N. DAGO..

VOI DU 16.03.1995

REFECTURE	COMMUNE	SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR COMMUNE	NOMBRE PAR PREFECTURE
GITARAMA	NTONGWE	GISARE	1	1	2
	MASANGO	RWOGA	1	1	
BUTARE	MUYIRA	MATARA	2	2	2
TOTAL GENERAL					4

CAMP DE .KIBEHO....

NVOI DU 16.13.1.1995

PREFECTURE	COMMUNE	SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR COMMUNE	NOMBRE PAR PREFECTURE
BUTARE	HUYE	RUKIRA	1	11	43
		NYANZA	3		
		MKIMA	3		
		MPUNQWE	2		
		KABUREMERA	2		
	MBAZI	KABUGA	2	9	
		MBAZI	1		
		MWUHIRE	1		
		MUHOROZO	5		
	NGOMA	MATYAZO	2	9	
		CYARWA	7		
	GISHAMVU	MUBUMBANO	1	5	
		NYAKIBANDA	1		
		GISHAMVU	2		
		SHOKI	1		
	MUYAGA	GAKOMA	1	1	
	SHYANDA	KAMUDAHUNGA	1	1	
	MUGUSA	NYARUBUYE	1	4	
		MVSHA	1		
		GAFUMBA	2		
	MARABA	KIBANDA	1	1	
	NDORA	MUZENGA	2	2	
TOTAL GENERAL					→

CAMP DE . KIBEHU...

DU-16.3.1.1995

PREFECTURE	COMMUNE	SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR COMMUNE	NOMBRE PAR PREFECTURE
IGALI-VILLE	NYARUGENGE	MUHIMA	4	5	11
		GASYATA	1		
	KACYIRU	REMERA	6	6	
IGALI-SUD	NCENDA	GAKOMEYE	2	6	8
		MAREBA	4		
	GIKOMERO	GISHAKA	2	2	
ITARAMA	KIGOMA	BUTARE	1	1	1
	BUYOGA	KAYUMU	2	2	2
TOTAL GENERAL					65

IOM TRANSPORT PROGRAM

OPERATION RETOUR EXERCISE OF 16 MARCH 1995

KIBEHO
PATRICK BI-1.2

2 ZAMBIA
~~12~~ IOM / HCR

07.00

46

~~65~~

NDAGO
JEAN BAPTIST BI.9

1 IOM / HCR

07.00

2

4

KAMANA
NAPOLEON BI.3

~~20~~ ZAMBIA
1 IOM / HCR

07.00

0

0

GISUNZU
ANASTASE BI-1.1

1 BUS -IOM / HCR

07.00

0

0

STATION
ROGER BI-4

OPERATIONS
JEAN PIERRE BI-1

SUPERVISION
MATHIAS BI-2

Security
Judicial system
Land tenure

48

69

CAMP DE NDAGO.....

VOI DU 15.03.1895

[illegible]

CAMP DE KIBEHO.....

CONVOI DU 15.1.3.1.1995

PREFECTURE	COMMUNE	SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR COMMUNE	NOMBRE PAR PREFECTURE
KIGALI-VILLE	KICUKIRO	GIKONDO	2	2	2
KIGALI-SUD	NGENDA	MAREBA	1	2	3
		RUHURUHA	1		
	GIASHORA	RIRIMA	1	1	
BUTARE	NGOMA	MATYHO	8	11	41
		BUTARE-VILLE	1		
		NKUBI	1		
		CYARWA	1		
	RUNYINYA	GIKOMBE	2	13	
		RUKARA	9		
		KABUREMERA	1		
		VUMBI	1		
	RUSATIRA	KATO	1	2	
		RUSATIRA	1		
	MUGUSA	MUGUSA	1	3	
		CYAYI	2		
	MBAZI	MUTUNDA	2	2	
	GISHAMVU	SHORI	3	3	
	HUYE	KABUREMERA	3	3	
	SHYANDA	GIATOKI	2	2	
	RUHASHYA	RUHASHYA	2	2	
TOTAL GENERAL					46

CAMP DE .K.I.B.E.H.O....

CONVOI DU 7. / 3. / 95

PREFECTURE	COMMUNE	SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR COMMUNE	NOMBRE PAR PREFECTURE
BUTARE	MUGUSA	NYARUNGWE	2	3	104
		GAFUMBA	1		
	MARABA	KABUSANZA	4	6	
		NYANGAZI	2		
	HUYE	MPUNGWE	2	24	
		KABUREMERA	8		
		RUKIRA	8		
		UPARE	6		
	LUBAZI	GISHAMVU	1	5	
		LUBAZI	2		
		MUHOKORO	2		
	GISHAMVU	GISHAMVU	5	24	
		SHORI	11		
		NYAKIBANDA	8		
	NGOMA	MATYAZO	6	17	
		CYARWA	11		
	SHYANDA	KAMUKAHUNGA	2	5	
		BUREMERA	1		
		GATOKI	2		
	NYARUHENGWE	KANSI	5	5	
	MUYIRA	MATARA	9	9	
	RUSATIRA	KINAZI	6	6	
TOTAL GENERAL					

CAMP DE . KIBEHU.....

CONVOI DU 7.13.95

PREFECTURE	COMMUNE	SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR COMMUNE	NOMBRE PAR PREFECTURE
KIGALI VILLE	NYARUGENGE	BIRYOGO	1	6	7
		NYAMIRAMBO	3		
		MUHIMA	2		
	KACYIRU	KACYIRU	1	1	
KIGALI SUD	GASHORA	RIRIMA	3	3	14
	NGENDA	RUHUKA	10	11	
		GAKAMBA	1		
TOTAL GENERAL					125

CAMP DE NDAGO.....

CONVOI DU 07.103/1995

PREFECTURE	COMMUNE	SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR COMMUNE	NOMBRE PAR PREFECTURE
BUTARE	GISHAMVA	NYAKIBANDA	3	3	3
KIGALI-VILLE	KACYIRU	KIMIHURURA	2	3	3
		REMERA	1		
TOTAL GENERAL					6

CONVOI DU 07.03.1995

[illegible]

CAMP DE GIKONGORO-VILLE

CONVOI DU 07/03/1995

PREFECTURE	COMMUNE	SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR SECTEUR	NOMBRE PAR COMMUNE	NOMBRE PAR PREFECTURE
BUTARE	GISHAMBU	SHORI	4	5	5
		BWERAMANA	1		
	NGOMA	CYARWA	3	3	3
TOTAL GENERAL					8

SHAKA KHAN

PRELECTURE		NOMME		NOMME		PRELECTURE	
AUTRE		CHAMUN		CHAMUN		AUTRE	