

UNAMIR

PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICERS (PIO)

18 OCT 1994 - 29 SEPT 1995

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UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE TO POLITICAL INFORMATION OFFICERS

As you have drawn to our attention in your weekly reports, various prefects within your respective sectors have submitted requests to you outlining the requirements needed to assist them in the re-establishment of civilian administration at the provincial, municipal and local levels. Following discussions held on the subject in the office of the SRSG, and in an effort to develop a coordinated strategy, it would be appreciated if you could outline the perceived needs in your various sectors and make concrete proposals on how UNAMIR could be of assistance to the administrative authorities concerned. These proposals should be submitted to the Political Adviser who will, in turn, bring them to the attention of the Executive Director and the SRSG for appropriate action. -

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sammy Kuru Buo".

Sammy Kuru Buo
Political Adviser
1 March 1995

cc: ED

1 February 1995

- NOTE TO ED -

As you are aware, the political temperature in the country and in the subregion as a whole, seems to be heating up again. This could have important implications for the work of UNAMIR, especially with regard to the discharge of our mandate relating to the use of our good offices to promote national reconciliation. The attack against the MDR journalist, Mr. Edouard Mutsinzi, as well as the numerous incidents of violence which our SITREPS indicate are taking place throughout the country, could be seen as symptoms of this seemingly worsening political malaise. In this connection, therefore, I would like to propose the following measures for your consideration:

- a) UNAMIR should follow political developments more closely and systematically. In this connection, we should seek to accelerate the recruitment and deployment of the three remaining political information officers. We should also provide more support for those officers already deployed, for instance by ensuring that they receive our daily SITREPS, radio news transcripts, newspapers and magazines, as well as office and other supplies. I therefore propose for your consideration and approval that Ms. Ladan Rafii, Political/Legal Officer in the OSRSG, be designated to liaise with the PIOs. In this function, she would receive and analyze their reports with a view to finding solutions to problems or requests that the PIOs might raise. Naturally, substantive political issues raised in those reports will continue to be dealt with by the senior officers involved, namely the SRSG, yourself and, as appropriate, the Political Adviser;
- b) the Political Adviser and other officers in the political unit of the OSRSG should visit the various préfectures and sectors on a regular basis or as often as warranted by events;
- c) the officers of the political unit should meet at least once a week with you to review developments and, as necessary or appropriate, prepare briefing notes, position papers or recommendations to the SRSG and/or New York.

2. I hope the above ideas and suggestions, which are submitted as a result of a preliminary reflection on possible ways and means of strengthening our political activities, will meet with your positive consideration.

Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser

11/13/84

Political Information Officers

1. A critical concern and objective of the United Nations in Rwanda, as established by the Security Council, remains the alleviation of the suffering of the Rwandese people and the restoration of peace and national reconciliation. To this end, the Council has mandated UNAMIR to carry out a number of important humanitarian tasks and has also invited the Secretary-General and his Special Representative, in coordination with the OAU and countries in the region, to continue their efforts to achieve a political settlement in Rwanda within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement.
2. Since the RPF's unilateral cease-fire on 18 July and the setting up on 19 July of a Broad-Based Government of National Unity in Kigali, intensive efforts have continued at various levels to facilitate the repatriation of an estimated 4 million refugees and displaced persons and to promote political reconciliation in Rwanda.
3. The United Nations, as reflected in the Security Council presidential statement of 14 October, remains concerned about the need to stabilize the overall situation in Rwanda. In this connection, the Council, in that statement, endorsed the Secretary-General's call on the Government of Rwanda to maintain an open dialogue with all political interest groups in Rwanda in an effort to achieve genuine reconciliation between all elements of Rwandese society, within the framework of the Arusha Agreement and also called for assistance for Rwanda's socio-economic reconstruction, including the restoration of civil administration. The Council, in particular, also encouraged the Rwandese Government to continue its efforts to invite members of the former ruling party, the MRND, who were not involved in the massacres that took place in the country recently, to participate in the Government and to absorb members of the former Rwandese Government Forces (RGF), into the new national army.
4. In pursuance of its overall objective of promoting peace and reconciliation in Rwanda, UNAMIR is deploying Political Information Officers to the five Sectors covering the entire country outside Kigali. These Officers will work in concert with UNAMIR military forces deployed in those sectors, as well as with the provincial, municipal and local administrators and other segments of the society to promote and facilitate reconciliation. Among the specific tasks of the Political Information Officers, are the following:

.../...

- assist the Government in the re-establishment of civil administration at the provincial, municipal and local levels, and in the promotion of national reconciliation;
- monitor developments, especially in the areas of peace and national reconciliation, and report to the Office of the Special Representative;
- assist in the coordination of humanitarian relief operations in their respective sectors;
- assist in the coordination of emergency aid and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons;
- disseminate information on the activities and programmes of UNAMIR and other United Nations agencies;
- provide political advice the commanding officer of the UNAMIR military component in the respective sectors;
- assist the representatives of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights and of the Human Rights Commission to carry out their responsibilities.

Political Information Officers

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INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

18 October 1994

To: Maj. Gen. G. Tousignant
 Force Commander

From: Dr. A. H. Kabia
 Executive Director

Subject: **Deployment of Political Information Officers (PIO)**

1. As you are aware, Political Information Officers (PIOs) are to be deployed in the five sectors identified in the mission area, outside Kigali. The role of the PIOs will be to monitor and assess the political situation at the ground level, assist the Government in the re-introduction of civil administration in the area and promote national reconciliation in collaboration with both the UNAMIR military component and the local administration.

2. Two PIOs will be deployed soon to sectors IV and V, namely Mr. Milos Struggar, (Sector IV), and Mrs. Zena Zelleke, (Sector V). For security reasons and other considerations, including communications and logistical support, it has been recommended to co-locate, as far as possible, the PIOs with UNAMIR military headquarters in the various sectors. To this end, the assistance and co-operation of the respective UNAMIR military contingents would be highly appreciated.

INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

18 October 1994

To: Mr. A. H. Golo
OIC, Administration

From: Dr. A. H. Kabia
Executive Director

Subject: **Deployment of Political Information Officers (PIO)**

1. Political Information Officers (PIOs) are to be deployed in the five sectors of the mission area. At present, it is planned to assign two PIOs as follows:

- Mr. Milos Struggar, Sector IV, and
- Mrs. Zena Zelleke, Sector V.

2. The PIOs will each require a 4x4 sturdy vehicle, equipped with the necessary communications equipment (i.e. radio), hand-held radio, laptop computers with printer, as well as accommodation. These items are urgently needed since we plan to deploy the PIOs as soon as possible. Authorization is also requested to recruit locally an interpreter/driver for each PIO.

3. It would be appreciated if the various administrative services concerned could take the necessary action to facilitate their deployment at your earliest convenience.



21 November 1994

NOTE

To Executive Director

1. As requested, please find attached a copy of the document describing the tasks of our Political Information Officers. The document could be forwarded to the OIC/Administration in response to his memo of 17 November regarding our budgetary requirements.
2. Since the PIOs were not originally budgeted for, are we to assume that all the six PIO posts will constitute new requests? If so, that's all we would need in the form of international staff.
3. If the SRSG still plans to deploy two senior liaison officers in Zaire (Goma) and Tanzania (Ngara), then I suppose we would need to include these two posts in the new budget. Would the support staff include other international personnel? If that is not envisaged, then we could conclude that, with respect to paragraphs 2 and 3, we would need 8 additional international professional posts (6 P-4 and 2 P-5).
3. Concerning the Radio Unit, Mr. Hundley informs me that staff requests for the Unit have already been submitted to the OIC/Admin. and that you are aware.

Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser

cc.: Director, Information

Political Information Officers

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

DATE: 17 November 1994

TO: All Chiefs of Section/Unit

FROM: Ally H. Golo, OIC
Administration

SUBJECT: UNAMIR Budget Submission

... Please find attached fax from Mr. Denis Beissel, Acting Director FOD in relation to the UNAMIR budget and the visit of Mr. Peter Goddard who will arrive the 22 November 1994. The fax raises a number of important questions that must be addressed during his visit. Please prepare a report that addresses any issues or questions that pertain to your Section/Unit.

All responses should reach this Office no later than noon on 21 November 1994.

Thank you.

*PP/AG Spokesman
for your attention
re the additional points to 25 Radio.*

*done
FED
21/11*

- 5) *Details, by contingent, of COE abandoned (para 31 of A/49/501).*
- 6) *Locations and ratios of all equipment in relation to the numbers of personnel (paras 33 and 34 of A/49/501).*
- 7) *Justification of the vehicles at paragraph 35 of A/49/501.*
- 8) *Detailed explanations of tasked actually carried out under contractual services (Brown and Root) and those which will be carried out in the future. Also the tasked carried out by the engineers supplied by the UK and the relationship to the services supplied by contractors (paras 40 to 44 of A/49/501).*

2/2

Regards.

MSF 7116 11

Drafted by: PG	Authorized by:  Amir A. Dossal
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File: NOK for file
2) PIC (100-4)

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



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UNAMIR - MINUAR

NOTE FOR THE FILE

I received a telephone call from our Political Information officer, Mr. Milos Strugar, today informing us that, upon his doctor's advice, he would not be returning to rejoin UNAMIR in Kigali. He stated that despite the fact that his own personal inclination was to return to resume his work here, he had decided that it was in his best interests, for reasons of personal health, to follow his doctor's recommendation in this regard. I mentioned that his decision was understandable considering his recent personal ordeals, but that we would be sorry to lose him.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sammy Kum Buo".

Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser
6 June 1995

cc: SRSG
ED
CCPO

Note for file
2) P10 (sect. 4)

NOTE FOR THE FILE

After several unsuccessful attempts to reach our colleague, Mr. Milos Struggar, by telephone in South Africa where he is currently on sick leave, I wrote to him on 29 May 1995 to wish him a quick recovery and to convey our collective best wishes.

He telephoned me on 2 June to say that he was feeling much better, and that he had wanted to return to Kigali in mid-May, but that his doctor had advised against such a move, considering it to be premature. I mentioned that we had received a faxed note from his doctor indicating that Milos could not expect to be cleared medically to resume his duties before 30 June. Milos stated that he was aware of the doctor's opinion in this regard, and was working closely with him to see if his return could safely be expedited.

Milos enquired about the mandate and UNAMIR's plans for him. I brought him up-to-date on the mandate discussions and the staffing situation in the political unit of the OSRSG. He was very pleased to learn that we were looking forward to his return, and that the SRSG was thinking of reassigning him to UNAMIR Headquarters to perform the tasks left behind following Kristen Scott's departure.

He will be providing more precise information on his date of return when he contacts me again.


Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser
5 June 1995

cc: SRSG
ED

IN 1238

95 MAY 24 07

~~SECRET~~
P16 SECRET

Dr. P. J. GOUSE

M.B., Ch.B., M.Med. (Psych.)

PSYCHIATRIST — PSYCHIATRIST

Seen
Phone 475648
No one 303366
After Hours (H) 479316

Postbus 491
Barnesstraat 7
BLOEMFONTEIN

PR. Nr. 2200856

95052218

To SRSG 24/5

We received this fax
this morning from South
Africa where Milos is
undergoing psychiatric
consultation because of
his recent traumatic
experience. The fax
seems to indicate that we
should not expect him
back before 30 June. I will
try to call Milos later today.
S. Goo

P! speak to him. If he
wants to come back
I would like to give
him Krizan's job!

ED.

Jul
24/5

E/D/R

To whom it may Concern
Re Mr. M. Krizan

The abovementioned is
suffering from a post
traumatic reaction as
is as such unfit for
duty until June 30.
because he is still
receiving treatment.

Yours sincerely
P. J. Gouse

CAS

24. April 1995

TO: UHAMIR - Ligali
Mr. Shaharyar Khan
SRSG

Mr. Kiuso Nilsvang
CCPO

This is to inform you that I have taken a sick leave as of 24. April 1995. The medical evaluation is attached. Please note that I left Nairobi (mission area) on 21. April 1995. If you need to contact me, I will be at the following address: Palmolene 10, Barnes Street, Bloemfontein 9301 South Africa (Tel. 27 51480663).

Sincerely,
Strugar Wilos
STRUGAR WILOS

UNAMIR

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

MEMORANDUM

To: A.H. Kabia
Executive Director

14 April 1995

S.K. Buo,
Political Adviser

From: M. Strugar, *[Signature]*
Political Information Officer, Sector 4

Subject: National Reconciliation in Rwanda

S.K.S.

*P1. See my comments
Sect. 154.*

*Act. E.D.
Amf. Cant
TW Strugar.*

*Does it
want to?*

*I don't if this
was the
intention!*

1. Nine months after the end of the war, the situation in Rwanda is still characterized by the deep mistrust and even open hostility between the two ethnic communities. The government has failed so far to build up trust and confidence among the population and to create sound basis for the successful administration and governance of the country. Although a Broad-based Government of National Unity was installed in Kigali on 19 July 1994, there are some legitimate concerns regarding the composition of this government, and whether it is truly representative of all segments of the society. Around one third of the Hutu population, in the refugee and displaced people camps, are physically excluded from the life and developments in the country. In addition, the relations between the Government (RPA) and the local population inside the country are very strained, due to the number of arbitrary arrests, harassment and intimidation. Up to now there is no real channel of communication between the Government and most of the population (no progress in the transition from the military to the civilian rule, the civilian administration is powerless, the police and judicial system are non-existent). *yes!*

Against this backdrop there is an increasing risk of growing political and public unrest, which could destabilize the situation in Rwanda and lead to another ethnic conflict.

we cannot
promote something
that does not
walk on its
own!

2. Apparently, without the reconciliation, there can be no progress towards the lasting political solution, normalization of the political and economic life, and repatriation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people. This is also one of UNAMIR's principle tasks "to promote, through mediation and good offices, national reconciliation in Rwanda". However, this requires concentrated efforts of all involved, and especially it requires conciliatory approach and cooperation by the Government of Rwanda.

Let's forget
this. It's a
non-starter.

3. The important question is whether the government, which already claims to be broad-based, will enter into negotiations with other parties. This seems very unlikely, since the Government's position on the issue of dialogue and the reconciliation has become even more intransigent recently.

yes
infant key
not responsible
to citizens

Second important question is: Who are the legitimate representatives of the majority Hutu population? The issue of their political viability and credibility is crucial, since those associated with the former government and war crimes are a priori disqualified. Unfortunately, they are still in the leadership position, especially in the refugee camps.

In the light of the Government's position and in the absence of the acceptable and credible leaders of the majority Hutu population, the dialogue and reconciliation at the top political level seem impossible.

Agree

4. Nevertheless, if there is ever to be lasting peace and progress in Rwanda, there must be national reconciliation. In the light of the present situation, the government needs the international (UNAMIR) assistance to launch and sustain the reconciliation process.

yes

With the consent of the Government, the UNAMIR could initiate and develop alternative political strategy to this important issue. Presently, the priority is to establish channels of communication and cooperation between ethnic communities, and between the government and the population. The process should start from the grass root level in order to avoid major political obstacles, which made reconciliation impossible at the top political level.

yes

Local (reconciliation) committees could be established in every commune to work on dispute prevention and resolution, protection of human rights, economic development, political transition, return and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced people etc. The committees should be composed of the representatives of the government and security forces, traditional leaders and prominent personalities of the communes, NGOs, representatives of the local schools, industries and agriculture. The

(Good) membership should be open-ended and the work of the committees open to public. The UNAMIR could assume a leading role in setting-up the committees, and participate in the work in the observer capacity.

those in charge of political negotiations have money to play with?

The Government would probably have problems with this approach, for fear that "local committees" could undermine its role and authority. However, it should be clear that local committees will be informal bodies for the promotion of the dialogue and discussion, but without any executive power. Their activities would in fact contribute to the better functioning of the government institutions at the local level, and to the better understanding between the government authorities and the population. For the credibility of this government, both vis-a-vis its own nationals, as well as the international community, it is imperative that it start a dialogue with those Rwandese who are not represented in the current government. Foreign assistance and urgently needed funds could serve as an inducement for the adoption of a conciliatory approach on their part. That is, any assistance could be conditional upon the degree of their cooperation with reconciliation efforts.

However, if the Government fails to adopt a more conciliatory approach, a successful national reconciliation will not be possible, thereby resulting in the increased risk of a potential future conflict.

File

11 April 1995

NOTE TO SRSG

In a recent report dated 2 April 1995 submitted by the Political Information Officer for Sector 4, Mr. Milos Struggar, and in subsequent discussions held with him on 10 April 1995, Mr. Struggar indicated that some of our troops assigned to IDP camps for security and protection are not clear as to how to respond should the RPA, as has been reported, proceed to close down the camps with the use of force. If so, this could be a matter of some concern, since any forcible action in the camps is likely to be controversial and tense with a high probability that our forces would be caught in the middle. I am not aware of any standard operating procedures in place for such a contingency, but in any case, I think our forces should be informed of the measures to take in such an eventuality. It is evident from the reports received from Mr. Struggar that there is an urgent need to bring this matter to the attention of our military command.


Sammy Kum Buu
Political Adviser

cc: ED



INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Milos Struggar
Political Information Officer (Sector 4)

FROM: Sammy Kum Buo  DATE: 10 April 1995
Political Adviser

SUBJECT: Weekly Report (27 March - 2 April 1995)

Thank you for your informative report dated 2 April 1995 covering recent events and activities in your sector. In light of the developments you mentioned, we would appreciate it if you could follow the situation in Sector 4 closely, especially with regard to the situation of internally-displaced persons. In particular, please indicate whether the planned or reported closure, by RPA of IDP camps is to proceed and, if so, when this is likely to take place in each of the remaining camps.

Best regards.

cc: ED

CC: Mr. Conde
MJ. Ruffin

To: Lukanje
Good report from
Note to PIO: The
follow situation, esp. with
to IDP and indicate if the
or reported closure is to
What do our troops on the
Ground understand their
UNAMIR
be in
in the
IDP camps

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. A.H. Kabia,
Executive Director

2 April 1995

S.K. Buo,
Political Adviser

From: M. Strugar, *M. Strugar*
Political Information Officer, Sector 4

Subject: Weekly Report (27 March - 2 April 1995)

1. During the reporting period the PIO concentrated on the **Sector 4A (Gikongoro) and the problem of the internally displaced people**. He had meetings with the Prefect of Gikongoro, ORINFOR representative, Coordinator for NGOs, representative of the Ministry of Rehabilitation, as well as with the UNAMIR officials, Human Rights monitors and UNHCR. He participated at the coordination meeting on the problem of IDPs, convened and chaired by the Prefect of Gikongoro. He attended the public rally in the Nyamagaba commune addressed by the Prefect and visited Kibeho camp for IDPs. He also attended regular daily meetings on the Operation Retour in Butare.

2. **The security situation** - The security situation in the area is tense and potentially volatile, especially in and around the IDPs camps. Additional problem is the wide-spread rumor that the RPA will retaliate against the local Hutu population and attack the IDPs camps on 7 April. According to the UNHCR, around 20,000 Hutus, particularly from the Rwamiko and Nyamagaba communes in Gikongoro area, and from Maraba commune in Butare area, left their homes and moved to the Kibeho camp during this week. It is also reported that the RPA increased deployment in the area, particularly around the IDPs camps. The RPA also conducted weapon-firing tests in the whole area, which also contributed to the feeling of insecurity and reinforced rumors about an imminent attack on the Hutu population.

3. The internally displaced people - The Prefect and the representative of the Ministry of Rehabilitation outlined the Government plan and position on the problem of the IDPs. The general position is that all IDPs camps must be closed down as soon as possible, through the coordinated efforts of the Government and the international organizations, and peacefully if possible.

First phase is to sensitize the IDPs, which already started with the visit of the Minister of Interior, Minister of Information and the Gendarmerie Chief of Staff to the Kibeho camp. The objective of the information campaign is to "pressure" the IDPs and to convince them that administrative and judicial system are functioning, and that the Government and UNAMIR will provide protection in their home communes. In addition, an increased number of local and international observers should be deployed in the home communes (80% of IDPs are from 9 communes in Kigali, Butare and Gikongoro area). The Government will also deployed field officers in all camps and home communes to monitor the progress of the operation.

Second phase would start next week. The Government will impose curfew in two communes (Rwamiko and Mubuga) where the camps are located, and on 11 April it will start to close down markets in the camps. After that, the operation could proceed with the closure of the camps, starting from Kamana (probably in two weeks), than Munini, Ndago and Kibeho at the end. The Prefect and the representative of the Ministry of Rehabilitation pointed out that the IOC endorsed this plan in its entirety.

The Prefect emphasized that the Government will have a leading role in this operation, and it will remain the Government's prerogative to arrest people and to decide how to deal with the IDPs who refused to leave the camps.

Observation: The outlined plan contains the high risk of confrontation between the RPA troops and the IDPs, causing human casualties, suffering of the innocent and vulnerable people in the camps, and probably a new flow of refugees. The plan overlooks the fact that a significant part of IDPs (around 50,000) will never accept to return home voluntarily and peacefully. If the Government decides to close down the camps forcefully, this will endanger the credibility and mandate of the UNAMIR, or its relations with the Government. According to the present mandate, the troops should assist and protect the IDPs. However, this will probably lead to the confrontation with the RPA. Therefore it is necessary to develop a contingency plan for this situation, to formulate a political position and to give concrete instructions to the troops on the ground.

4. The functioning of the civilian administration - There is no progress in the functioning of the civilian administration. However, it is expected that the Government will appoint five sub-prefects soon (two in the Prefecture in charge of Security and Administration, and three for sub-prefectures). According to the Prefect, there are problems regarding the appointments of burgmestres, and they will not be appointed in the near future. At present, only three temporary burgmestres (out of 13 communes) are in the office. The burgmestre of Mudasomwa was arrested recently (total of nine burgmestres were arrested so far, and one had left the country).

There is no progress in the setting-up of the judicial system and the communal police. The Prefect is still waiting for the instructions from the Ministry of Interior to start recruiting potential candidates to be trained as communal policemen.

The Prefect submitted to the PIO the list of the most immediate requirements for the normal functioning of the administration at the provincial and local levels (attached).

5. The relations between the Government and UNAMIR - At the meeting on the problem of IDPs, the Prefect of Gikongoro and particularly the RPA commander criticized the UNAMIR's approach to the IDPs problem. The RPA commander pointed out that decision by the ZAMBATT to withdraw from some northern communes and to increase its forces inside the Kibeho camp, indirectly confirmed and reinforced the rumors that the RPA is planning an attack on the camps and local Hutus. He attributed that ZAMBATT decision provoked huge movement of local population to the camps during the last week.

The Prefect and RPA commander also criticized UNAMIR's and other UN high officials, who recently visited Kibeho camp, for not coordinating their visit with the local authorities and for allegedly avoiding contacts with them.

The representative of ORINFOR in Gikongoro pointed out that his relations with the UNAMIR troops (ZAMBATT) are strained, following his report on the Radio Rwanda that two Zambian soldiers killed in the incident last week were fighting over a woman. He said that his report was factual and based on the information from reliable sources. However, he, as a journalist, could not reveal his sources to the ZAMBATT, as being requested.


He categorically denied that Radio Rwanda is conducting a campaign against the UNAMIR, and said that journalist should not be blamed for the negative perception created in the public. For example, he said that report of 28 March from Butare about UNAMIR troops and prostitution is based on the discussion at the meeting between the acting prefect of Butare, the RPA commanding officer and burgmestres from the area, and Radio Rwanda reported only what was said there.

Observation: The Government and the RPA are hardening their attitude towards the UNAMIR, and use every occasion to criticize and undermine UNAMIR's role and credibility. Apparently, the purpose of this negative campaign is to influence deliberations in the Security Council about the mandate and the strength of UNAMIR.

**POUR LE BON FONCTIONNEMENT DES ACTIVITES DE LA
PREFECTURE GIKONGORO**

<u>I. Besoins très urgents</u>	<u>Préfecture</u>	<u>Sous-Préfecture</u>	<u>Communes</u>
1. Vehicules pick-up(4 WD)	1	3	-
2. Motos	2	3	13
3. Machine à écrire	5	6	13
4. Polycopieuse	1	3	-
5. Photocopieuse	1	3	-
6. Ordinateur et ses accessoires	1	3	-
7. Téléphones	-	3	13
8. Téléphone-fax	1	-	-
9. Réhabilitation (building)	-	1(Munini)	1 (Kivu)
 <u>II. Besoins urgents</u>			
1. Réhabilitation (buildings)	-	2	12
2. Equipement de bureau	1	3	13
3. Matériel de bureau	1	3	13

Le Préfet de Préfecture
ZISIRINSHUTI Félix.



File: P10 (Sector 4)
cc: Mr. Conde
Mr. Lafri

UNAMIR

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. A.H. Kabia,
Executive Director

11 March 1995

S.K. Buo,
Political Adviser

From: M. Strugar, *M. Strugar*
Political Information Officer, Sector 4

Subject: Internally Displaced People

1. The problem of the IDPs is presently the main humanitarian, security and political challenge facing the UNAMIR. The present situation is fraught with danger of developing into the major humanitarian catastrophe, and therefore requires immediate, preventive action. The Operation Retour, its concept and strategy, reached the limit, and a new approach to the problem should be contemplated.

2. The general feeling of insecurity and the absence of the police and judicial protection in the home communes are the main obstacle for the successful repatriation of the IDPs. The security situation all around the country deteriorated recently (increased number of arrests, armed clashes, house searches etc.) The civilian administration is powerless, and the police force and judicial structure are non-existent. The Government of Rwanda is also becoming more intransigent on the issue of national reconciliation and dialogue.

3. On the other hand, a significant part of the population in the camps (around 50,000), former government and military members (hard-core), will never accept to return home voluntarily, because of their involvement in the genocide. They have strong base and influence in the camps as "elected" leaders and administrators. They are also

in charge of food distribution, which they successfully use to control and intimidate other IDPs. The concentration of the IDPs in few big camps makes the intimidation and disinformation campaign more efficient.

4. Against this background, there is a little hope for a speedy and voluntary repatriation of IDPs. At present, it looks imminent that the Government will resort to other means (force) to close all the camps in the country. However, it should be acknowledged that the camps are the big threat to the national security and major political problem in the country, and it is logical that the Government wants to resolve it as soon as possible. In the light of the results of the Operation Retour, it is very difficult for UNAMIR to ask the Government to continue to be patient, unless the new more successful strategy for repatriation and control of the camps is not developed soon.

5. If the Government decides to close camps forcefully, this will inevitably cause human casualties, suffering of the innocent and vulnerable people in the camps, and probably a new flow of refugees to Burundi. This would also endanger the credibility and mandate of the UNAMIR. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a contingency plan for this situation as soon as possible.

First, a political decision should be made: whether to condemn, justify or overlook the use of force and its consequences. This decision will also influence the reaction of the Security Council, Secretary-General and the rest of the international community.

Second, the troops on the ground should have concrete instructions how to react in this situation. According to the mandate ("to contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons"), the troops should assist and protect the IDPs, or even try to stop the Government troops from entering the camps. However, this will probably lead to a confrontation with the Government troops. Another possibility is to cooperate with the Government in the effort to close the camps, trying simultaneously to protect civilians and to prevent chaos and armed confrontation between the RPA and IDPs. Another possibility is to withdraw from the camps and to provide protection for international staff only.

Third question/dilemma is whether to get involved in the forceful movement of the IDPs and to provide them with the transport. If the UNAMIR helps in the transportation of the IDPs, it could be accused of assisting the forceful repatriation and expulsion of civilians from the country. If the UNAMIR does not get involved, it could be accused of doing nothing to stop the suffering and to assist the civilians.

6. Apparently, the use of force by the Government will be damaging for the UNAMIR in one way or another. Therefore, the only viable alternative is to develop and carry out a new, more resolute strategy and program for repatriation of IDPs and for the better control of the camps.

The UNAMIR could increase its presence in the camps, assume the responsibility for the security and for the distribution of food, and start the registration and screening process in the camps, in cooperation with the Government. This will significantly diminish the power and influence of the hard-core, and could lead to dismantling of the present leadership and administrative structure in the camps. This will also reduce the intimidation and disinformation campaign, and create more favorable atmosphere for the voluntary return of displaced people.


There are also other, more radical, possibilities for the control of the situation in the camps. One is for the UNAMIR troops to separate the ordinary IDPs from the hard-core, similar to the task of the Zairian troops in the refugee camps (this would require approval by the Security Council and amendment to the mandate). The other one is to establish and maintain a secure humanitarian area around the remaining camps (this is already contained in the present mandate).

The second factor is the security in the home communes. The CIVPOL should start training of the communal police without further delay. The Government should be pushed to accept temporary appointments of the foreign magistrates, and the human rights mission should provide concrete technical assistance in rebuilding the judicial system. Meanwhile, the UNAMIR troops could provide more protection and security for the returnees, by monitoring their reintegration in the home communes and visiting them after their return.

If this action is pursued and implemented successfully, the UNAMIR would prevent the use of force, human casualties, more refugees, and enhance the security in the camps and the rest of the country. The important question is whether the UNAMIR is capable and willing to assume additional responsibilities and risks. If not, there is an increasing risk that the UNAMIR will once again fail in its mandate, and be just a witness to a new round of human sufferings in Rwanda.

NOTE TO POLITICAL INFORMATION OFFICERS

As you have drawn to our attention in your weekly reports, various prefects within your respective sectors have submitted requests to you outlining the requirements needed to assist them in the re-establishment of civilian administration at the provincial, municipal and local levels. Following discussions held on the subject in the office of the SRSG, and in an effort to develop a coordinated strategy, it would be appreciated if you could outline the perceived needs in your various sectors and make concrete proposals on how UNAMIR could be of assistance to the administrative authorities concerned. These proposals should be submitted to the Political Adviser who will, in turn, bring them to the attention of the Executive Director and the SRSG for appropriate action.


Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser
1 March 1995

cc: ED

File: P10 (Sector 4)

cc: Mr. Conde
Mr. Ruffi

UNAMIR

sub
10 March

United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda

MEMORANDUM

**To: Dr. A.H. Kabia,
Executive Director**

5 March 1995

**S.K. Buo,
Political Adviser**

**From: M. Strugar, *[Signature]*
Political Information Officer, Sector 4**

Subject: WEEKLY REPORT (27 February - 5 March 1995)

1. During the reporting period the PIO concentrated on the **Sector 4 A (Gikongoro)**. He had meetings with the Deputy Prefect, the State Prosecutor, the Director of the Central Prison in Gikongoro, the ORINFOR representative, the Government Coordinator for NGOs, a counsellor from the Karambo commune, as well as with the UN officials and human rights monitors in the area. He visited the Central Prison in Gikongoro and Karambo communal office. PIO also attended daily coordination meetings on the Operation Retour in Butare.

2. The political situation and the functioning of the civilian administration -
The political and security situation in the area has deteriorated recently, due to the raising confrontation between the RPA and the IDPs, and a number of arrests of the government officials and local people.

There is no improvement in the organization and functioning of the civilian administration. The authorities are still confronted with many problems, such as: delay in the appointments of the government officials, absence of the communal police and judicial system, lack of manpower and basic equipment, arrests of the civilian officials by the RPA. During last week, the RPA arrested two more burgemestres from the Rukondo and Nyamagabe communes (total of seven burgemestres has been arrested

so far in this area), Director of School in Kaduha, and one judicial inspector from the Prosecutor's office. Presently, the RPA is in charge of the police duties, and supervises and controls all civilian affairs and the activities of the civilian authorities.

For the normalization of the life in the area, as well as for the successful repatriation of refugees and displaced people, it is essential to have an efficient and independent civilian administration. The UNAMIR should also, within its mandate, encourage and assist speedy transition from the military to the civilian rule.

At present, the priority is the appointment of the government officials at the local level and the establishment of the police force and the judicial system. These issues should be raised with the Government at the national level in order to expedite the appointment of the administrative and judicial officials, and the recruitment of candidates for the communal police to be trained by the UNAMIR. The CIVPOL could also assist the activities of the Prosecutor's office, especially the investigation. The Prosecutor of Gikongoro, for example, is prepared to work with the UNAMIR, and suggested that he and judicial inspectors (six in the area) travel with the UNAMIR vehicle when investigating some cases. It is also necessary to speed-up the deployment of magistrates (from other countries), since presently there are no magistrates operating in the area.

3. The internally displaced people - The results of the Operation Retour in the last two weeks were disastrous. The IDPs are not ready to go home, mainly because of the lack of security in their home communes (there are many reports and rumors among the IDPs about the increased number of arrests and intimidation of returnees by the RPA). An additional problem is the presence of many perpetrators of genocide in the camps, who intimidate the IDPs and agitate against the return to home communes.

On the other hand, the camps serve as the recruitment base and the ground for the anti-government activities, and therefore represent the biggest threat to the national security. For these reasons, the Government is determined to close all remaining camps as soon as possible. Apparently, it is also prepared to use all necessary means, including force, despite possible negative international implications.

File: PIO (Sector 4)
CC: Mr. Conde
Ms. Rufu

UNAMIR

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda

MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. A.H. Kabia,
Executive Director

26 February 1995

S.K. Buo,
Political Adviser

From: M. Strugar, 
Political Information Officer, Sector 4

Subject: WEEKLY REPORT (20-26 February 1995)

1. During the reporting period, the PIO visited Sector 4C (Cyangugu) and Sector 4A (Gikongoro).

In Sector 4C, PIO had meetings with the Prefect of Cyangugu, local representative of the ORINFOR, ETHIOBATT CO and MILOBs CO. He visited two posts on the border with Zair and met the immigration and custom officers. He also attended the security coordination meeting in the Cyangugu Prefecture.

In Sector 4A, PIO had meetings with the Prefect of Gikongoro, the burgemestre and group of counsellors from the Nyamagabe commune, the representative of the Agricultural Foundation, as well as with the ZAMBATT CO, MILOBs CO, ZAMBATT chief operations and intelligence officers, and Human Rights monitors. He attended a public rally at the marketplace in Gikongoro, which was addressed by the Prefect. He visited Rukondo and Cyanika villages, after the camps for internally displaced people in these areas had been closed. He also visited the Kibeho and Munini camps for IDPs and Nyakizu commune (Butare area) to monitor the return of the IDPs. He attended daily coordinating meetings on the Operation Retour in Butare.

2. The political situation and the functioning of the civilian administration -

The political and security situation in the area deteriorated recently. Apparently, there is a deep mistrust between the RPA and local population, which is further exacerbated by the arrests of civilian officials and communal leaders by the RPA. The general feeling of insecurity also impedes the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced people to their homes in this area.

The civilian administration still plays a marginal role in governing both Prefectures. There is no progress in appointing different government officials (only prefects are formally appointed by the Government), nor in establishing the police force and judicial system. The activities of the civilian administration are supervised by the RPA, and the RPA is in full control of all civilian affairs.

In the Cyangugu Prefecture the RPA recently arrested three burgemestres from Bugarama, Gishoma and Kagano communes (two burgemestres from Kamembe and Gatare communes were arrested last month), five counsellors from Nyamagana, Gikundamwura, Bunyereri, Muganza and Gitambi, and one magistrate from Bugarama. The situation is especially difficult in the Kagano commune, where the RPA arrested over 20 intellectuals, including the Director and inspector of schools, eight teachers and the representative of the Agricultural Foundation. All of them are accused of taking part in the genocide. However, according to the Prefect of Cyangugu, the RPA arrested all these officials in order to remove them from their functions and to appoint the RPA members and sympathizers. He said that the RPA already appointed three new counsellors, without consulting or even informing him. The Prefect also complained that he is pressured to accept appointments of some people as bourgemestres, who are not qualified for this job. **The Prefect asked whether UNAMIR could raise this issue with the Government at the national level.**

The Prefect informed that 150 candidates from nine communes were recruited to be trained as communal police by UNAMIR, and inquired about the delay in organizing the training. (The list of candidates is attached; two communes have not provided the list of candidates yet.) He pointed out that local government will not be able to organize the training in Cyangugu, and to provide accommodation and food for all candidates. **The Prefect expressed desire to meet with the UNAMIR CIVPOL representatives next week to discuss all these issues.**

In the Gikongoro area, few local people informed the PIO that the RPA became more aggressive recently (house searches and arrests), thus increasing the feeling of insecurity especially in Gikongoro and villages where the IDPs camps had been closed down. During last two months, the RPA arrested five burgemestres in this Prefecture as well, few counsellors and a representative of the Agricultural Foundation.

The Prefect organized a public meeting in Gikongoro (3,000 people) to address the security problems and raising fears among the local population.

3. The internally displaced people and the Operation Retour - All camps for the IDPs in the Northern part of the Sector were closed, and the Operation Retour now shifted to the big camps in the South (Kibeho, Munini, Ndago). However, the number of returnees significantly decreased during this week to only few hundreds per day. The situation in the camps in the South is more complex and most of the IDPs are not willing to go home yet. Apparently, there is the need for the more aggressive and comprehensive propaganda/information campaign to sensitize the displaced people and to encourage them to go home.

The camps in the North were successfully closed down because the IDPs had a choice either to go home or to move to the camps in the South, while now there are no other camps that people can move to. However, there are reports (which cannot be confirmed yet), that a number of displaced people and local population is moving across the border to Burundi.

The additional problem is the continued supply of food to the camps in the South, mainly by the ICRC. To overcome this problem, **it is necessary to improve the coordination and cooperation between the Operation Retour and the ICRC, which should be done at the higher level in Kigali**, since working relations in the Sector are strained. The RPA commanding officer publicly warned the NGOs not to distribute food to the IDPs, except in the already existing camps. He also emphasized that they will not allow the IDPs to open any new camps in the Sector and "will use all necessary means to stop that."

4. The situation in the refugee camps in the Bukavu area - According to the ETHIOBATT CO, the deployment of the Zairian troops in the refugee camps in Bukavu area brought confusion and division among the refugees and ex-government officials. There are many refugees who would like to compromise with the Government in Kigali and return home peacefully. Among them are many teachers, journalist and some ex-government officials. On the other hand, ex-militia and army hard-core around General Kabilingi are speeding-up military training and preparations for the armed attacks. In the view of the ETHIOBATT CO, the RGF forces are not yet prepared for the military offensive, but taking into account their numbers and continued arms supply, he thinks that they represent a serious threat and he doubts that the RPA could successfully defend this area.

Page 4

The Prefect pointed out that the Government started preparations to receive thousands of refugees in the near future. This issue was the main topic at the security coordination meeting in the Prefecture on 22 February, and all government officials are requested to organize and prepare to receive the refugees in their respective communes. The Government expect that many refugees will return home, provided that the Zairian troops separate them from the ex-military and militia elements. The Prefect said that the increased interest among the refugees to return is spontaneous, and that there are no leaders who can organize and represent the views of those who want to go home.

CC: Mr. Conde, Mr. Rafi
File: Pio (sect 4)


United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
U N A M I R

MEMORANDUM

5 February 1995

To: Dr. A.H. Kabia,
Executive Director

S.K. Buo,
Political Adviser

From: M. Strugar, 
Political Information Officer, Sector 4

Subject: Weekly Report (30 January - 5 February 1995)

1. During the reporting period, PIO visited Sector 4A (Gikongoro) and Sector 4C (Cyangugu). In Gikongoro, he had meetings with the Prefect, the representative of ORINFOR and the RPA battalion political commissar, he visited Rukondo, Cyanika and Kibeho camps for internally displaced people and attended a meeting between IDPs and Government officials in Rukondo. He also participated at the regular coordinating meetings on Operation Retour in Butare and had meetings with the representatives of the UNAMIR, UN specialized agencies, Human Rights monitors and NGOs. In Cyangugu, PIO had meetings with the Prefect, Sus-Prefect in charge of Economy and Administration, the representative of ORINFOR, UNAMIR commanding officers and he visited the Gisuma commune.

2. The political situation and the functioning of the civilian administration - There is a little progress in the transition process from the military rule to the civilian administration in both sectors. The RPA is still in full control of all developments, and the civilian administration plays a marginal role in governing these areas. The RPA officers pointed out that the situation is still volatile, and for security reasons they cannot transfer more authorities to the civilian government yet. On the other hand, the civilian authorities are not prepared and equipped to govern efficiently and assume their responsibilities. The Prefects are the only officials appointed by the Government, and all Sus-Prefects, Bourgmestres, Prosecutors and Magistrates are working on the temporary basis, pending official appointments by the Government.

check with
CIVPOL
training

The additional problem is the absence of the regular police force. Both Prefects of Gikongoro and Cyangugu, emphasized the need for speedy establishment of the communal police to replace the RPA in policing duties at the local level. They urged the UNAMIR to start training of the communal police as soon as possible. The Prefect of Cyangugu pointed out that recent deployment of gendarmes did not bring real changes on the ground, since gendarmes operate under the RPA command.

There are also some problems in the relations between the RPA and the civilian administration. Two bourgmestres of the Nshili and Musange communes in the Sector 4A and the Director of the ADENYA in Kivi have been arrested recently by the RPA for alleged participation in the genocide (totals of five bourgmestres in the Gikongoro area have been arrested so far). According to the HRM reports, the bourgmestre from the Mubuga commune was also intimidated by the RPA and apparently left the country for Burundi. In the Sector 4C, two bourgmestres of the Gatare and Kamembe communes have been arrested by the RPA as well. The RPA also overruled the decision of the Acting Prosecutor in Cyangugu to release some prisoners, against whom the Acting Prosecutor could not substantiate the charges.

Nevertheless, the RPA and civilian officials are making efforts to improve their relationship. The Prefect of Gikongoro organized the meeting of all security forces in order to clarify their responsibilities and improve the coordination. It was agreed that only the acting prosecutor could give orders for arrest and prolonged detention in the prison. He must also bring charges against all arrested within the 48 hours. It was also agreed that the RPA will continue to assist in policing duties, until proper communal police and gendarmerie are fully operational.

If this
is true,
it is a
big sign
and goes
to
pluralist
nature of
National
Assembly
and Govt

The Government (RPA) banned all public activities of the political parties and other political manifestations. According to the Government officials, it is premature to allow free political activities, since it could be counterproductive and bring additional division among local population and further destabilize the situation.

3. The Internally Displaced People - The number of returnees from IDPs camps moderately increased. The main problem encountered during this period was lack of cooperation by the NGOs. For example, ICRC distributed food in the Kibeho camp during the Operation Retour, thus significantly reducing the number of returnees (only 100). The meeting in the Rukondo camp between three bourgmestres from the Butare area and IDPs from those communes was very fruitful and contributed to the better understanding between the two sides. The IDPs expressed special interest in the security situation and government structures in their respective communes. The UN representatives (UNREO, Human Rights monitors, UNHCR) are also taking part in these meetings.

An additional obstacle in the repatriation efforts is administrative structure in the camps (prefects, bourgmestres etc.), which is composed of former government officials. They avoid contacts with the UN representatives and Government officials and have negative attitude to the Operation Retour. It is reported that they intimidate IDPs to stay in the camps.

Fact or wishful thinking?

4. The situation in the refugee camps in Zair - According to the Director of ORINFOR and Prefect of Cyangugu, the power base of the ex-government and military forces in the refugee camps in Zair has weakened recently. First, they lost huge financial funds after the change of currency notes in Rwanda. They are also loosing the political influence and significance, since the international support to the Government in Kigali is growing every day (financial loans, appointment of the French Ambassador etc.). There are also reports of internal divisions among ex-government forces.

Speculation? Any concrete evidence?

For these reasons, ex-government decided to step-up their military activities against the territory of Rwanda to prove that they are still an important factor in the overall situation, which cannot be disregarded. They also increased the intimidation of ordinary refugees to prevent them from going home. The militia and ex-army troops moved recently from the Goma area to Ijwi Island (there are around 50,000 refugees on the Island) and around Uvira on the border with Burundi, which could be in connection with the deteriorating situation in that neighboring country. The Prefect of Cyangugu also pointed out that ex-military forces are supported not only by the Interahamwe of Burundi, but also by the Zairian security forces.

UNAMIR

United Nations Assistance Mission In Rwanda

MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. A.H. Kabia,
Executive Director

23 January 1995

S.K. Buo,
Political Adviser

From: M. Strugar, *[Signature]*
Political Information Officer, Sector 4

Subject: WEEKLY REPORT (16 - 22 January 1995)

1. During the reporting period, PIO concentrated on Sector 4A (Gikongoro) and the Operation Retour. He attended four regular coordinating meetings on Operation Retour and visited Cyanika and Rukondo camps for internally displaced people during the registration and transportation of returnees. He had meetings with the Director of ORINFOR, Maj. W. Rutayisize, Prefect and Sub-Prefect of Gikongoro, Bourgmestre of Musebeya, the Government Coordinator for NGOs' activities in the Sector, and with the representatives of displaced people. In addition, PIO had meetings with the MILOBs CO, GHANBATT and ZAMBATT Chief Operations officers, Human Rights monitors, UNHCR and UNREO representatives.

2. At present, the number of internally displaced people in the Sector is estimated at around 280,000. In the last two months around 70,000 displaced people have returned home (90% of them were transported as a part of the Operation Retour/Homeward and 10% used their own means of transportation to avoid registration). During the week under review, the number of returnees significantly increased to up to 2,000 per day.

*This data
differs
from our
military.*

According to the Government officials and the displaced persons interviewed by PIO, there are three key factors/prerequisites for the successful repatriation process:

First, continued supply of food for returnees at their home communes. However, the NGOs, as main distributor of food, have refused so far to shift distribution of humanitarian assistance from displaced people to returnees. The Government Coordinator for NGOs pointed out

that AICF, as well as some individuals from other NGOs, were telling IDPs that they will get humanitarian assistance only in the camps, thus encouraging them to stay (meanwhile, AICF seized the activities in the Sector). According to the MILOBS CO and GHANBATT Chief Operations Officer, the NGOs have also refused to cooperate and participate in the Operation Retour. Apparently, UNREO and the Government should try to sensitize NGOs to take more active part in the Operation Retour and to increase supply of food to the returnees.

Second factor is the security of the displaced people upon their return home. The representatives of the IDPs stressed that they trust only UNAMIR to provide security. Often they demanded that UNAMIR forces escort IDPs from the camps to their home communes, and to increase presence in other areas of the country. They also emphasized the need for speedy restoration of an independent and transparent judicial system in the country, as an additional guarantee for their security.

The third factor is the need for the more aggressive and comprehensive propaganda/information campaign to encourage the IDPs to return home. The IDPs need more information about the general situation in the country, and particularly on the situation in their respective home communes. The exploratory visits by the IDPs representatives to their home communes to assess the security situation and to report to IDPs in the camps prove to be very efficient way of disseminating information and encouraging IDPs to go home. Considering the results of these visits, the number should be increased in the future.

According to the Prefect of Gikongoro, the meetings between government officials and displaced people in the camps also have very positive effect, resulting in the immediate increase in the numbers of returnees. For example, 4,000 IDPs attended the meeting with the Government officials in the Rukondo camp on 19 January. The government should be encouraged to organize more of these meetings, if necessary with the assistance of UNAMIR.

In addition, there is a need for the UN information campaign among IDPs. The UN representatives (UNAMIR, UNREO, UNHCR, Human Rights monitors) should organize meetings with the IDPs (possibly together with the Government) and explain not only the situation in the country, but also the purpose and structure of the Operation Retour, and the UN role and mandate. Radio UNAMIR could play a very important role in disseminating relevant information to the IDPs, especially if loudspeakers are installed in the camps. Distribution of pamphlets is also effective, but in the future it should target the specific group of IDPs from the same commune and contain concrete and verified information on the security situation, supply of food, government structure, and UN presence in the commune.

I agree
This was
recommended
in Dec '94

3. There is no progress in the setting up of the civilian administration in the Gikongoro area. The Prefect is the only official formally appointed by the government, and all others are still employed on the temporary basis pending the official appointments by the government. There is only one Sub-Prefect in charge of administration and security, while three posts of Sub-Prefects in charge of Sub-Prefectures are still vacant. At present there are no Bourgmestres in five

Page 3

communes. Four of them were arrested (bourgmestres of Karama and Musange were arrested recently) and one left the country. The Gendarmerie Unit in Gikongoro (around 20 gendarmes trained by UNAMIR) is doing essential police activities with the support of the RPA troops. There is no progress in reinstating the communal police force. Four magistrates and the Deputy Prosecutor are back in the office and ready to start proceedings as soon as the Ministry of Justice give necessary orders.

The Prefect asked UNAMIR to assist, if possible, in repairing the government buildings and telephone lines. Currently the UNAMIR troops occupy government buildings in Rukondo, Cyanika and Musebeya. He also asked for one pickup truck for the Prefecture. (The UNHCR provided a car for the Prefect.)

5 December 1995

To: Mr. Milos Strugar,
Political Information Officer
Sector IV

From: Sammy Kum Buo,
Political Adviser

Subject: Security Council Documents

As you are aware, the Security Council, on 30 November, adopted resolution 965 by which it, *inter alia*, extended UNAMIR's mandate until 9 June 1995.

Among the responsibilities entrusted to the mission under the said resolution, is for UNAMIR to "exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement."

Also on 30 November, the Council, in a Presidential Statement, stressed "the imperative of reinvigorating the political process to provide a framework for any action taken to address security in the camps and the repatriation of Rwandese refugees to Rwanda. The framework should include a mechanism for sustaining a dialogue between the Government of Rwanda, refugee representatives and the United Nations."

Taking into account in particular the above, and on the basis of the situation in your Sector, it would be greatly appreciated if you could send us suggestions, comments or observations on possible ways and means by which UNAMIR could contribute to the reinvigoration of the political process, as well as exercise its good offices to achieve national reconciliation.

I attach hereto for your information copies of the Presidential Statement and Security Council resolution 965.

Best regards.

cc: Executive Director

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File: P10 (sect.4)

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. A.H. Kabia
Executive Director

Date: 5 December 1994

S.K. Buo
Political Adviser

From: M. Struggar *[Signature]*
Political Information Officer
Sector 4

Subject: WEEKLY REPORT NO. 4
(28 November-5 December 1994)

1. During the reporting period, PIO visited all 3 Sectors. In Sector 4A (Gikongoro) he attended a meeting between the Minister for Public works and Social Affairs, Prefect of Gikongoro, Buoguemestres, Church leaders, Representatives of displaced people and NGOs operating in the area. He also attended public rally at the market place in Gikongoro addressed by the Minister.

In addition, he had meetings with the Prefect, Sub-Prefect in-charge of administration and security, as well as with the representatives of UNHCR, UNREO, OXFAM, Chief MILOBS and GHANBATT Humanitarian Officer.

In Sector 4C (Cyangugu) PIO had meetings with the Prefect, representative of the Ministry of Information (ORINFOR), Acting Sector Commanding Officer (ETHIOBATT), Chief, MILOBS and Human Rights Monitors. He also accompanied an UNHCR convoy of internally displaced people from Sector 4C to transit station in Butare.

In Sector 4B (Kibuye) PIO attended Chadian National Day ceremony in Burambo.

2. Number of internally displaced people returning home from camps in Sector 4A slightly increased in the last ten days (around 1,000 a day). On the other hand, many displaced people, forcibly evicted from camps in Sector 4B, moved to camps in Gikongoro area. It was also reported that over 1,000 people from Butare area recently returned to camps since their homes were occupied.

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city should be
protected
from
criminals

In Sector 4C only around 2,000 displaced people are still in the camps. According to the Prefect, 1,000 of them are from Cyangugu, but they are afraid to go home because they took part in atrocities and want to stay under UNAMIR protection. There are also around 200 people who expressed the wish to return to their homes in Kibuye area, but the Prefect of Kibuye and UNHCR refused to repatriate them because their homes are allegedly occupied.

The representatives of UNHCR and UNREO foresee big problems if displaced people start returning in large numbers. They pointed two limiting factors:

- (a) transport (lack of vehicles).
- (b) ability to absorb large numbers of displaced people both at transit stations and at their final destination.

Apparently, the Government's approach towards the problem of displaced people has become more resolute and rigorous. In Sector 4A the RPA established permanent presence in some camps, which resulted in increased flow of displaced people. Moreover, the RPA announced that they will close Muko camp with around 8,000 displaced people and gave a deadline, Monday 5th December, for all displaced people to leave the camp. The Prefect of Gikongoro visited 3 camps and had meetings with representatives of displaced people trying to convince them to leave.

At the meeting with the representatives of NGOs operating in Gikongoro area, Minister for Public Works and Social Affairs outlined government policy on the problem of displaced people. He emphasized that the government intends to close all camps as soon as possible because they represent great security risk and economic burden for the Country. The Government in conjunction with UNAMIR, Human Rights Monitors and EU Monitors, will provide and guarantee security throughout the country for all returnees. UNAMIR and Human Rights Monitors will be requested to redeploy from Sector 4 to other parts of the Country. However, he said that those implicated in the genocide must be arrested and punished, especially members of interahamwe. The Minister said that the Government will request UNAMIR to arrest former militia elements who are still hiding in the camps.

The Minister informed that UNHCR agreed to provide all returnees with one month supply of food. He pointed out that NGOs should also take an active part in efforts to speed up repatriation of displaced people by providing food and assistance to local population all over the country instead of doing that in camps.

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The Minister, as well as Prefect and Bouguemestres were very critical about the role and activities of NGOs. They said that NGOs provide assistance only for displaced people while

.../

neglecting the needs of the local population who live in hunger and misery. They also criticized them for refusing to cooperate with the Government and for obstructing the repatriation programme. The Minister said that the government will not allow those NGOs which refuse to cooperate with the Government to continue with their activities in Rwanda. He proposed that a coordinating body be established which will include representatives of NGOs, international organizations, community leaders and government authorities, to coordinate all humanitarian efforts and distribution of aid.

*we need to
coordinate with
govt authorities*

The representative of displaced people pointed out that people in the camps are afraid to return home since there are many reports of arbitrary arrests and retaliation by RPA. In his view priority should be given to the restoration of the judicial system which would make displaced people feel protected and encouraged to go home.

3. The situation in Sector 4C (Cyangugu) has deteriorated in the last ten days following violent incidents between RPA and local population (18 people killed) and a number of arrests. The Prefect of Cyangugu said that local population does not trust RPA any more and live in a state of panic. In his view, the RPA overreacted and resorted to force when it was not really necessary. He informed the Government in Kigali about the situation and emphasized negative implications of the RPA actions. The Prefect pointed out in confidence that the RPA govern the prefecture and control every aspect of life in the area, using civilian administration as a cover for their action.

ETHIOBATT Acting Commanding Officer informed that RPA recently arrested sub-Prefect of Cyangugu and Bouguemestre of Kamembe. He said that RPA became more aggressive rising fear and frustration among the local population. In his view, the Government should invest more efforts in a political canvassing in order to calm the local population. Even if RPA actions could be justified from military and security point of view, ~~they~~^{they} do not explain to local population the reasons of their actions leaving them in fear and terror.

4. Both the Prefects of Cyangugu and Gikongoro informed that they got instructions to replace all Bouguemestres who were part of the previous administration or who were appointed by French troops. They are in the process of appointing new bouguemestres in those communes. The Government paid salaries for civilian staff in the prefectures for the month of October. CARITAS also provided food for the employees of the Gikongoro prefecture. Primary school teachers were also paid for the month of September.

28 November 1994

To: Mr. M. Strugar,
 Political Information Officer, Sector 4

From: Sammy Kum Buo,
 Political Adviser

Subject: **Weekly Report No. 3 (21-28 November 1994)**

1. Thank you for your above-mentioned report which I read with great interest. However, some important questions raised in the report, such as the relations between the RPA and UNAMIR, should be clarified or developed. For instance, can you compare and contrast RPA and former RGF reasons for their hostile attitude towards UNAMIR, especially in Sector 4? Have you met ordinary civilians who are openly hostile to UNAMIR? If so, what do they cite as reasons for their views? What can UNAMIR/UN do to improve relations/its image in the area?
2. Can you also tell us if members of the recently installed transitional national assembly were selected by the political parties concerned on the basis of nominations made by their representatives in the various prefectures and communes? If so, how were such nominations made?
3. I look forward to receiving answers to the above and to issues raised in my memo of 21 November.
4. Best regards.

cc.: Executive Director

Sh Buo
27/11
File : R10 (Sec 4)

U N A M I R
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda

M E M O R A N D U M

To: Dr. A.H. Kabia,
Executive Director

28 November 1994

S.K. Buo,
Political Adviser

From: M. Strugar, *Strugar Milob's*
Political Information Officer, Sector 4

Subject: Weekly Report No.3 (21-28 November 1994)

1. During the reporting period PIO visited **Sector 4B (Kibuye)**. He had meetings with the Prefect of Kibuye, Mr. Asiel Kabera, Deputy Prefect of Kibuye in charge of Administration and Legal Affairs, Mr. Raymond Ratabayiru, Deputy Bouguemestre of Gitesi Commune, RPA Liaison Officer, and RPA Battalion Political Commissar, Mr. Joseph Safari. He attended the seminar for Bouguemestres, organized by the Government, and addressed the participants. PIO visited Nyamishaba camp for internally displaced people and attended a meeting between the Prefect and representatives of IDP. He visited an orphanage in Kibuye and Ndaba camp for displaced people, which was recently vacated. He also had meetings with UNAMIR Sector Commanding Officer, FRABATT Operations and Intelligence Officers and with the Chief and Deputy Chief, MILOBS. PIO made contacts with few NGOs operating in the area.

2. **Political Situation** in the area is very tense and potentially volatile. Apparently, there is a deep mistrust and even open hostility between the RPA troops and local population. The RPA unsuccessfully attempted to organize meetings with the representatives of the local population, and up to now there is no channel of communication between them whatsoever. The RPA battalion deployed in this area seems to be much more aggressive and hostile than battalions in other parts of Sector 4 (Gikongoro and Cyangugu). There are many reports of reprisals, killings, arrests, looting and raping committed by RPA troops (only in one instance RPA killed around 60 people in Gisovu). RPA also used force to empty three camps for displaced people.

On the other hand, during the last war, worst atrocities against Tutsis were committed in this area. Only in Kibuye there are two mass graves, at the stadium with over 10,000 corpses

Page 2

and local church over 6,000. Before the war, Kibuye Sector had the highest percentage of Tutsi population in the whole country, over 30% or 250,000. Almost all of them have been killed or forced to leave and it is estimated that only 10,000 Tutsis still live in the area.

Against this background, there is little hope for speedy reconciliation. In addition, general feeling of insecurity will certainly impede repatriation of refugees and displaced people to their homes in this area. The present tension in Kibuye could also spill over the borders of the area and destabilize neighboring sectors, especially Gikongoro and Cyangugu.

3. **Relations between the RPA and UNAMIR** forces are also very strained. According to Sector Commanding Officers, the RPA distrusts UNAMIR, particularly FRABATT, simply because it was a part of Operation Turquoise, and openly suspect them of collaborating with the ex-Government. During a meeting with NGOs, former Prefect of Kibuye (RPA captain) said that UNAMIR troops are protecting and collaborating with the criminals in the camps for displaced people.

For UNAMIR it is necessary to make additional efforts in order to improve relations with RPA and local authorities. It seems that this area was generally neglected by the UN. For example, UNICEF and UNREO do not have offices there and human rights monitors are not deployed in Kibuye yet.

4. The RPA forcibly closed all camps for **internally displaced people** in the area. Most IDPs moved to other camps in Sector 4A (Gikongoro) or with local population, and only a small number returned home. At present, there is only one camp Nyamishaba with around 4,000 Tutsi refugees who recently returned from Burundi. At a meeting with the Prefect, representative of IDPs expressed desire to go home as soon as possible.

5. The government started transition to **civilian administration** in the area. The Civilian prefect assumed his functions two weeks ago. He is originally from Kibuye, but left the country in 1991 after he was wounded and imprisoned for few months. The last three years he lived in the USA. He has a Master degree in business management and administration. Both FRABATT and MILOBS commanding officers pointed out that contacts and cooperation with the new prefect are better than with the former one from RPA, who was openly hostile towards UN.

The Government appointed three Deputy Prefects for Legal Affairs and Administration, for Economy and Technology and for Social and Cultural Affairs. Bouguemestres and Deputy Bouguemestres are also appointed in all 9 communes, but on a temporary basis. All Bouguemestres are without any experience in civil administration, unlike in Gikongoro and Cyangugu Prefectures where some members of the previous administration were reinstalled to their functions.

Civilian Administration in the area is confronted with many problems. Apparently their activities are supervised and controlled by the RPA. For example, RPA organized training

Page 3

seminar for Bouguemestres and RPA political commissar was instructor. They do not have basic office equipment such as typewriters, stationery, telephones etc. (UNAMIR Force Commander promised to have telephone lines restored). Lack of vehicles significantly limit their activities, since they cannot reach many communes and villages. It has negative political impact as well, because the prefect and others travel everywhere with RPA cars and armed guards. Administrative staff has not been paid since July. There is serious problem of manpower. Currently only 7 people are working in the office of Prefecture, while it used to be 39 before the war. At present there is no Police force and the RPA is in charge of security. However, the Government intends to train 40-60 policemen for each Commune. The Judicial Administration is non-existent since most of the magistrates were killed or left the country during the war. The Prefect informed that the Government of Burkina-Faso offer to provide a number of experts who will be appointed as local magistrates until Rwandese cadres are trained. Most primary schools are open, but in some areas (Gisovu commune) parents refuse to send children to schools for security reasons. The prefect informed that Government promised to pay teachers for the month of September.



21 November 1994

To: Mr. M. Strugar
Political Information Officer, Sector IV

From: Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser

Subject: Your Weekly Report No. 2 (14-21 November 1994)

Thank you for your Weekly Report No. 2, dated 21 November 1994.

1. We would appreciate clarification/information on the following points:
 - a) Party affiliation(s) of the new préfets in Sector IV.
 - b) In the third sentence of your para. 2 (e), you say "there are reports of internal divisions within the ex-government forces". Could you identify the sources of these reports.
 - c) In the fourth and the fifth sentences of the same paragraph, you imply the existence of a more moderate group within the population. We would appreciate your informing us how this determination was arrived at. Do you personally know some of these politicians, journalists and members of the intelligentsia? What is the ethnic base of this group of moderates? Is the group within or outside Rwandese territory?
 - d) In your para. 3 (c), you report that, according to the préfet of Gikongoro, UNICEF had promised to pay the salaries of primary school teachers. Could you clarify if indeed UNICEF has paid and if not, if it plans to pay and if so, when?
2. Finally, could you kindly forward us a copy of your weekly report No. 1 which, unfortunately, never received.

Warm regards.

cc.: Executive Director

U N A M I R
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda

M E M O R A N D U M

To: Dr. A.H. Kabia, Executive Director
S.K. Buo, Political Adviser
From: M. Strugar, Political Information Officer, Sector 4
Subject: Weekly Report No.2 (14-21 November 1994)

21 November 1994

1. (a) During the reporting period, PIO concentrated on Sector 4C (Cyangugu). He had meetings with new Prefect of Cyangugu, Mr. Theobald Rutinhuza, RPA Liaison Officer and Government Inspector for primary schools. He also met Sector commanding officer (ETHIOBATT), Chief MILOBS, ETHIOBATT Operations Officer, as well as Human Rights Monitors, UNHCR, ICRC and some NGOs operating in the area. PIO attended the meeting between UNAMIR Force Commander and representatives of UN Humanitarian Organizations and NGOs. He visited Mururu camp for internally displaced people and Nyagatare transit camp for refugees.

(b) Political situation in Sector 4C is tense, but stable. Most of local population had already returned home (current population is estimated at 95 % of the pre-war level). Repatriation of the internally displaced people is proceeding very well. Only 15,000 people are still in the camps out of 78,000 in August this year (12,000 of them went to refugee camps in Zaire). It is expected that all displaced people will leave the sector by the end of November. According to the UNHCR, most of the refugees returning from Zaire are Tutsis. Last week, UNAMIR and UNHCR registered around 5,000 Hutus from Burundi who took refuge in border area around Bugarama.

(c) There is also certain progress in reinstating civilian administrative structures in the sector. The new Prefect of Cyangugu has assumed his functions as of 7 November. He is well known human rights activist and President of an NGO from this region. In 9 communes old bouguemestres, appointed by french troops, resumed their functions. Bouguemestres in the remaining two communes (Bugarama and Gisuma) are supposed to be elected by local political parties, religious leaders and chief of sectors next week. Local prosecutor have been recently appointed by the Government and three former local magistrates resumed their functions

The most difficult problem is to reinstall local police force since most of policemen in the area were implicated in the genocide and left the country. However, the Ministry of Interior promised to assign in the area some of those who have been trained by UNAMIR. There are supposed to organize and conduct training of the new local police force (10 policemen per Commune chosen from the local population).

The Prefect is trying to organize a seminar on protection of human rights on the International Day of Human Rights, 10 December.

(d) At present, the Cyangugu Prefecture lacks money and other resources for speedy transition from the military rule to the civilian administration. Its office building has been damaged (it is currently occupied by ETHIOBATT). Telecommunications are not working and the activities of the Prefect are currently limited to the city of Cyangugu since he does not even have a car. 75% of the primary schools are reopened, but teachers threatened to go on strike because they have not received their salary yet. Conditions in the prisons are very bad and there is shortage of food, so the Authorities transfer prisoners to Butare prison. The RPA troops in the area have ^{NOT} received their salaries and they are provided only with one meal a day. According to the Prefect, this increases the risk of banditry against local population and international representatives operating in the area.

(e) According to local RPA and civilian authorities, and UNAMIR Commanding Officer, there is no immediate danger of resumption of war in this area. The RGF forces in the camps in Zaire are actually not capable to organize larger military operations. In addition, there are reports of internal divisions within the ex-government forces. Some politicians, journalists and intelligentsia are apparently more prepared for a compromise with the Government in Kigali. However, they also demand power sharing on the basis 60% Hutus, 40% Tutsis.

3. (a) PIO also visited Sector 4A (Gikongoro) in order to follow up on the Government initiative to take a group of representatives of internally displaced people on a visit throughout the country (ref. weekly report no.1). He had meetings with the new civilian prefect of Gikongoro, Mr. Felix Zigirishuti, former Prefect of Gikongoro, RPA Captain J. Zigira, representatives of UNHCR and with the new Sector Commanding Officer (GHANBATT).

(b) UNHCR representatives informed that initiative to take representative group of displaced people on a visit throughout the country was a total failure. The group of 94 representatives of displaced people were taken from Sector 4A to their first stop in Butare, where RPA had arrested 5 of them. Although they were released next morning the entire group decided to call off their visit and immediately return to their camps. The result of this action could only further contribute to the existing fears among displaced people and make even more difficult their voluntary repatriation.

U N A M I R
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda

MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. A.H. Kabia,
Executive Director

14 November 1994

S.K. Buo,
Political Adviser

From: M. Strugar,
Political Information Officer, Sector 4

Subject: ^{No. 1}
Weekly Report (8-14 November 1994)

1. During the reporting period, PIO concentrated on Sector 4A (Gikongoro). He had meetings with the outgoing Prefect of Gikongoro, RPA Captain Mr. John Zigira, representative of the Ministry of Information (ORINFOR) in Gikongoro, Mr. Henry Mugabo and RPA Liaison Officer with the Gikongoro Prefecture, Sgt. Gashumba Jonnies. He also had meetings with the Sector Commanding Officer (Ghanbat), Chief MILOBS, Ghanbat operations and intelligence officers, who briefed him on the situation in the area of their operation. He established initial contacts with the representatives of UN agencies, NGOs and human rights monitors operating in the sector. PIO visited Kibeho, Ndugo, Munini, Rwamiko, Kamana and Kigeme camps for internally displaced persons. He also accompanied MILOBS during the border patrol and visited two posts on the border with Burundi.

2. The political situation in Sector 4A is increasingly volatile, due to the raising confrontation between the Government (RPA) and internally displaced people (around 350,000). Apparently, the normalization of the political, economic and social life cannot progress without repatriation of internally displaced. However, the intimidation by former militia and army elements in the camps, as well as a campaign of disinformation and reports of reprisals by the RPA troops, is the serious obstacle to the successful implementation of the repatriation program. In addition, there are many former army and interahamwe members who are afraid to live camps because of their role in the genocide.

The camps (which PIO visited) look very much like permanent settlements with markets, stores, restaurants, new shelters under construction and old shelters which are being fortified for prolonged stay. Obviously, people are not encouraged to go home since they have everything they need in the camps (food, medicine, cloth, protection).

The prefect and information officer of Gikongoro briefed the PIO about government's efforts to resolve the problem of displaced people. First, it has launched a public

Page 2

information campaign to counter distortions of truth and the dissemination of false information about reprisals by RPA troops. The ministry of information is distributing in the camps the national weekly newspaper "Imvaho" and few private newspapers, and is trying to improve the poor reception of Radio Rwanda in this area. Second, it has proposed to the leaders in the camps to select a representative group of displaced persons, which would travel throughout the country and then return to camps and inform others about the situation. The government will invite UNHCR and UNAMIR to take part in this action.

However, the prefect, Captain Zigira was pessimistic concerning the outcome of these measures. In his view, the only way to resolve this problem is that Government, UNAMIR, UN humanitarian agencies and NGOs all agree on a deadline for displaced people to leave camps (he mentioned 31 December), and to stop to provide food and protection in the camps as of that date.

According to the Ghanbat intelligence officer, the RPA also carries out other forceful methods to speed up the repatriation. Last week they raided the camp Nsili and apprehended "community leaders". Next day, all displaced people in the camp were sent home and the camp were closed.

Observation: UNAMIR could also contribute more to Government's "peaceful" efforts to resolve this problem, by providing necessary technical assistance to Radio Rwanda to improve its broadcasting capabilities. Radio UNAMIR should also become operational as soon as possible. Another idea is to expand "Operation Homeward" to monitor and assist reintegration of those who already returned home. Such a measure could instil confidence between the displaced people and make an impact on successful repatriation efforts. The Humanitarian organizations could also provide incentives for the displaced to return home by offering them one month supply of food and medicine if they leave the camps.

3. The government made initial attempts to install **civilian administration** in this area: new civilian prefect was appointed as of 14 November; 10 out of 13 bourgmestres (appointed by French troops) are back in office; a custom officer was on duty at the border post with Burundi (an immigration officer is also expected soon); most of schools are functioning; water and electricity supply is almost normalized.

However, the Government is confronted with many problems. First, it does not have funds to pay salaries (teachers threatened to go on strike this week) and it lacks other resources to normalize civilian life in the area. In addition, the government (RPA) does not have strong base in this area and will have difficulties to recruit "loyal" local people for civilian posts. The RPA officers acknowledged that Government has to rely on previous administrative

structure set up by French troops, including bourgmestres and communal policemen since that job could be successfully performed only by the locals.

AT TH N

OFFICER
BT
ZEN 1121

(2) Per Adm
For your attention: H
Date
11/11

cc
Please forward to
Dr KABIA
H
G3 OPS
13/11

File: P10 (Sector 5)

cc: Amb. Conde
Col. Tixoca
Ms. Rafii



UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

29/9

TO : Mr. W. de Souza
Executive Director

FROM : Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer
Sector V B

SUB : SITUATION REPORT

Attached please find " SITUATION REPORT " covering the period
17 September to 27 September 1995.

Best regards.

cc : Senior Political Adviser ✓

27 September 1995

SITUATION REPORT
17 September to 27 September 1995

I. GENERAL

After the incident in Kanama commune on the night of 11/12 September, the situation in most regions seem to return to normal although the affected area is still tense. This incident has also resulted in the closure of the Zairean/Rwanda border on the side of Zaire for immigration of Rwandese nationals to prevent mass exodus into Zaire as happened last year. Furthermore, the border remains closed both for humanitarian and UNAMIR traffic. On the other hand, the RPA have finally consented to reopen border post no. 4, opposite Kibumba camp to facilitate the return of refugees from that camp.

Cattle theiving, robbery and incidents of killings and arrest by RPA continue to be reported but at a much reduced rate. In the Gishwate forest area, activities of interhware persists although a cordon and search operation by RPA did not produce any material evidence of their presence.

II. MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES

The planned organized repatriation, of 2 000 persons per day, from the camps in Goma did not materialize. During the period under review, while the return of those refugees who left in April (mostly Hutus) has not been massive (668 persons from Kibumba and Katale camps) a significant number, i.e. 4 681 persons, of the 59/60 caseloads have returned to Rwanda all from Masisi region in Zaire. Majority are women and children and some young men of military age have also been noted.

The returnees are taken to Nkamira transit centre for screening and registration and later transported to either their home communes or to areas identified by MINIREISO for resettlement, so far to Kibungo and Nderere (Kigali prefecture). HCR/IOM are facing transport problem i.e. lack of sufficient trucks. If the expected 2 000 per day is achieved there will be a congestion at the centre since this centre can only accommodate a maximum of 3 000 persons. At this stage MINIREISO is reluctant to re-open the centre at the "Collge", which can hold 10 000 persons, but would prefer to transport a daily quota of 1 000 to prescribed destination. However, present capacity is only for 600 persons. MINIREISO requested UNAMIR's assistance to transport 400 persons but the response was negative.

UNHCR is conducting a sensibilization programme at the camps in Goma to assure and encourage the refugees to return to Rwanda. However, the presence of former government forces in the camps, in particular Mugunga and Ile Vert camps, renders this exercise difficult as the refugees are subjected to harassment and intimidation with the aim to control the group and thus prevent repatriation, e.g. on 26.09.95 only 28 refugees were repatriated from Mugunga camp.

Returnee figures for the period covered are :

Spontaneous	:	687
Organized	:	5 081 (Masisi only)

III. RPA/SECURITY

After a turbulent week following the incident in Kanama commune, the situation is returning to normal . Nevertheless a certain feeling of insecurity and mistrust of RPA prevails. It is difficult to interview the local population because of the presence of RPA soldiers either in uniform or civil attire. Consequently accurate information or even rumour is hard to come by. The RPA has also instituted curfew in several communes, either from 18.00hrs. or 20.00hrs to dawn. Anyone found in the streets during the curfew hours is beaten or detained.

The Brg. Cmd., Lt. Col. Bagira has been relieved of his duties and replaced by Col. Charles Ngoga as of 20.09.95 and a new Bte. Cmd. for Gisenyi, Major J.B. Murasi, has also been appointed.

IV. OBSERVATION

PIO approached both military and civilian authorities to determine the cause of the incident in Kanama commune. Most claim, especially the military, that this is the work of infiltrators but there is no evidence of this. Judging from their response revenge and reactions in anger to the killing of one of their men, seems to be the motive for the occurrence of the massacre. In view of the magnitude of this massacre it is difficult to establish links with past occurrences other than that this seems to be the result of persons acting under the assumption that they have impunity over their action. The scope of the operation, the number of soldiers involved can only point to the involvement of high ranking military personnel.

SL
file: P13 (Vektor)
cc: Amb. Conde
Col. Ticoka
Ms. Ruffin

25 August 1995

To : Mr. W. de Souza
Executive Director

From : Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer
Sector V

Sub : SITUATION REPORT

Attached please find " SITUATION REPORT" covering the period 17 August to 24 August 1995.

Best regards.

cc : Senior Political Adviser ✓
Gen. Ticoka

SITUATION REPORT
17 August to 24 August 1995

I. GENERAL

The main events that took place during this period is the visit of the SRSG, which was highly appreciated by the authorities, and the expulsion of refugees from MUGUNGA camp in Goma (Zaire). Incidents of mine explosion, exchange of fire between RPA patrol and infiltrators cordon and search operation by RPA were also reported.

With regards to the expulsion of refugees, which started on the night of 19 August, three types of refugees were identified. These included :

- a) **Ex-FAR** - these are to be handled by the Ministry of Defense. Those who are found to be non-participants in the genocide will be integrated into the Rwandan army, if they so wish. Those involved will be prosecuted according to the law and procedure. Decision for integration into the army rests with the Ministry of Defense.
- b) **Prisoners** - This category will be handled by the Ministry of Justice. The prisoners were expelled without their files and the authorities will contact the Zairean authorities to obtain information on their case and also determine whether they were involved in the genocide. Some of the prisoners were identified as ex-FAR members.
- c) **Ordinary Rwandans** - these are considered as ordinary repatriates but the authorities will investigate to ensure non-involvement in the genocide.

II. CRISIS MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

A " Crisis Management Committee " was established, at the local level, composed of the Ministries of Interior (Prefet), Defense (local RPA commander), Rehabilitation, Information, Public Works and Health and from the international community UNHCR, WFP including their implementing partners, i.e. MSF, INTERSOS and COOPI. I understand that at the first meeting of the Committee UNAMIR was not accepted as member because the authorities determined that UNAMIR would not be able to contribute in any significant manner to the work of the crisis committee. The same is true for the Human Rights team. However, during the visit of the SRSG, the Minister for Integration invited UNAMIR to participate. The Committee meets every evening to assess the days activities as well as problems encountered and attempts to find solutions to

these problems.

III. MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES

The massive expulsion of refugees started on the night of 19 August when MILOBS were informed that some 150-200 returnees were gathering at border post 1. The returnees claimed that they were intimidated and forcibly evicted from the camp by the Zairean soldiers. They separated the males from the children and families leading to a considerable problem at the border and transit camp.

A contingency plan was immediately put into effect. UNHCR and IOM were the leading organizations for the plan. All other UN agencies' and NGOs were in a supportive role.

It was observed that a large number of the returnees were women, children and aged males. The statistics of returnees who were expelled during the last few days are as follows :

20 August :	181	
21 August :	1 981	
22 August :	1 967	
23 August :	1 738	TOTAL : 5 867

At 11.30 hrs. (24 August) information was received from Goma that agreement was reached between UNHCR(Goma) and Zairean authorities to suspend expulsion of refugees for the next two days. HCR is expected to resume organized repatriation in a massive scale, i.e. at least 2 000 per day. If this criteria is not met the Zairean authorities have threatened to resume automatic expulsion.

IV. LOGISTICS

On the night of 20 August about 800 returnees were stranded in "no-man's land" through lack of transport. The next day UNAMIR, through the intervention of the SRSG, provided 17 trucks which enabled UNHCR to transport all the returnees to the transit centre in NKAMIRA. However, the transport to home communes is very slow because the process of screening by the RPA and the registration process by HCR and MINIRIESO is extremely slow, thus causing delay and overload at the centre. With the suspension of automatic expulsion for two days, about six UNAMIR trucks have been assigned for the transport of returnees to home communes.

V. SECURITY/RPA

The security situation in the Sector has somehow changed from a relative calm to tense, especially in certain areas. A brief summary including comments of the major incidents during the period under review is listed below :

-Infiltration - this activity is in the up-swing, mainly occurring along the land border with Zaire and the Lake. There is a

likelihood that groups of such persons are in hiding in the prefecture, mainly in Rubavu commune and Gishwati forest area, with

an active or passive support from the local inhabitants.

- **Killings** - killing incidents have mainly occurred in Gisenyi town by the RPA with few exceptions where armed infiltrators are suspected. The RPA, in two cases summarily eliminated five persons allegedly suspected of participating in the genocide. In both incidents RPA claimed that they were attacked by grenades.

- **Mine incidents** - mine attacks have destroyed two vehicles belonging to two NGOs (one to CARITAS and the other to MEMISA). In the case of MEMISA three locals working for the organization were killed. MILOB investigation showed that the mines were freshly laid and on a track road only used by the hospital staff. The motive is unclear since there is no RPA presence in that area. One can only infer that this is a warning and / or to demonstrate that infiltrators can hit the most vulnerable group at will.

VI. OBSERVATION

In my last report, I stated that the authorities were only paying "lip service" and not showing any sense of urgency for the return of the refugees. However, since the forced expulsion of the refugees by the Zairean authorities started, there seem to be a genuine concern and, after the initial shock, the authorities are ready to accommodate and promote the return of the refugees. To this end, a meeting of all the Bourgemestres of the Prefecture are convoked to a meeting in Gisenyi on 25 August 1995. The purpose of the meeting is to sensitize the population at the commune level and to determine needs and priorities including action to be undertaken.

Concerning the action taken by the Zairean authorities, I foresee four motives :

1. Retaliation for accusation directed to them for delivering weapons and training of the former Rwandese army;
2. Domestic opposition to the presence of the refugees from certain segment of the population and hence to appease and avert instability within the country;
3. Embarrass and test the Rwandan authorities whether they have the capacity to absorb and manage such mass influx;
4. Some observers allege that this action was taken in retaliation for the suspension of the arms embargo. However, I consider this a weak excuse since the resolution was adopted with the consent and agreement by the Zairean government.

While welcoming the return of the refugees, we must not lose sight of the danger still lurking. Rwanda still faces acts of

sabotage and destabilization activities from across the border. There are those refugees who will not give up and sooner or later will want to return whether peacefully or by force.

File P10 (Sector 5)

Amb. Conde
cc: Col Tixoca
Ms. Rafii

17 AUGUST 1995

To : Mr. W. De Souza
Executive Director

From : Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer
Sector V B

Sub : SITUATION REPORT

Attached please find "SITUATION REPORT " covering the
period 1 August to 16 August 1995.

Best regards.

cc : Senior Political Adviser ✓

SITUATION REPORT

1 August to 16 August 1995

I. GENERAL

During the reporting period, there has been a number of incidents of robbery, including robbery with murder, sabotage on water and electricity installations and escalation in the activities of alleged interhware infiltrators. These include the following :

- On 3 August in GISA sector, RUBAVU commune, four to five persons planted an explosive device on a T junction of a water pipeline and caused a disruption in the water supply in Gisenyi town and at the local brewery. An RPA patrol opened fire but failed to apprehend the culprits.
- RPA liaison Officer reported that on 8 August infiltrators started shooting at an army position in BYAHI sector, RUBAVU commune. The exchange of fire lasted one hour resulting in two persons killed and one injured and captured. The remaining persons fled in the direction of Zaire. This was confirmed by MILOB patrol team.

During interrogation, the captured person revealed the following : (i) infiltrators numbered about 30 persons; (ii) that they were members of interhware and their intention was to steal food in the surrounding area of Gisenyi; and (iii) the culprits were wearing uniform and carrying weapons. One AK 47 rifle and two grenades were recovered from the injured person.

- On 8 August, an RPA patrol heard a loud and rowdy conversation in a house near the market place in Gisenyi town. When asked to open the door a grenade was thrown from the house as a result of which the RPA opened fire and two persons were killed, two arrested, including the owner of the house (a woman) and one escaped.

According to result of the investigation, it seems RPA had prior knowledge of the gathering and locality frequented by people allegedly to be supporters of the previous government. The following day a public meeting called by the Prefet and in the presence of the Bte. Comd., was held at Rubavu commune. The detainees were

brought before the public and the population was urged to refrain from harbouring infiltrators.

- On 11 August a mother and her three children, ranging between the ages of years and two months were brutally murdered. One child age 9 was injured and hospitalized while the father managed to escape. It was also found that RF 50 000 was missing.

There has been a spate of armed robberies in Rubavu commune recently. However these have not been accompanied by murder as the perpetrators have been able to steal by terrorizing their victims with weapons. The above case is exceptionally savage as the victims were riddled with bullets. According to information gathered from relatives, there may be a political motive behind the the killing. The escapee was appointed as " responsable de cellule " in August 1994 and is known to have sheltered many Tutsis during the genocide.

- 13 persons were killed in RUSEBEYA sector, commune RUTSIRO by RPA. These persons were identified by locals as non-resident of the area and were suspected of belonging to interhwame.

II. MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES

During the reporting period the number of returnees totalled 1 395 of which 499 came under the organized repatriation scheme.

The mass return of refugees expected to arrive on 15 August as a result of religious movement taking place in the camps, did not materialize. In fact the number of returnees for that day amounted to 12 persons under organized scheme and 32 spontaneous. However, the leader of this religious movement, Mrs. HELEN THEATRE, arrived in Gisenyi prefecture accompanied by one pasteur who also calims to be a visionary, and two other ladies.

This group entered the country at an unofficial border point from Kibumba camp, near Mutovu. She was met by RPA soldiers and a MILOB/HR team and accompanied to Mutura commune office. She was escorted to Ruhengeri prefecture where she planned to stay.

Unfortunately, there was no follow-up made concerning her arrival in Ruhengeri or her whereabouts. On 16 August, round 20.00 hrs. we were informed that the authorities have expelled her and detained the pasteur and one lady whose whereabouts is unknown. HCR/HRFO are investigating the matter.

This incident is very detrimental to thew image of the Rwandan authorities. Admittedly, these persons entered Rwanda through an unofficial entry point. However, the stand taken by the

authorities confirms the suspicions of the refugees that on return they risk detention and arrestation. It is possible that the expected inflow of refugees will diminish. Furthermore, I believe that the authorities are playing only lip-service when they claim their readiness to facilitate the return of refugees. As I have mentioned in earlier reports, the country is not ready nor has the material and financial capacity to absorb the millions of refugees.

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

File: P10 (sect 5)

cc: Mr. Conde
Ms. Rafii
Col. Tikoza

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. De Souza
Executive Director

FROM: Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer

DATE: 11 August 1995

SUBJECT: Situation Report

Please find attached "Situation Report" covering the period 1 July to 31 July 1995.

Best regards.

cc: Senior Political Adviser ✓

SITUATION REPORT
1 July to 31 July 1995

I. GENERAL

The overall situation both in Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures remains relatively calm. Incidents of banditry and cattle thieving continues. The perpetrators are usually reported to be armed and wearing military attire. Such incidents are generally reported in the region of Gishwate forest along the Zaire/Rwandan border and also in Mutura and Rwerere communes in Gisenyi prefecture. With the view to tighten security and ensure safety of the local population, RPA has moved about 360 families further inland and a reasonable distance away from the border.

A vicious attack on two night watchmen of Electrogaz water treatment station took place in the first week of July. The watchmen were bound hand and foot and hacked to death with garden hoe and machette. Furthermore, two explosives were attached to the motor of the water purification pump. One explosive ignited causing a minor damage.

In Rubavu commune an explosion felled a power pylon and a secondary transformer which were completely destroyed resulting in power disturbances in Gisenyi town. One person was apprehended the next day.

The presence of FRGF militia and interhwame, a group of about 25-30 persons, is reported in Kayove commune, bordering the Gishwate forest. Apparently a boat, containing mines and grenades, was found moored along the lake. Two persons were caught, attempting to flee to Zaire, and admitted to belonging to this group. During the exchange of fire, two RPA soldiers were killed. Situation in the area is reported to be deteriorating as a result of the presence and activities of these infiltrators. The RPA claim that these persons are assisted by the local population. However, a search and cordon operation carried out by RPA gave an inconclusive result.

The local population of Kayove commune reported to UNAMIR/MILOBS that a radio programme called "milles collines" is broadcasting propaganda programme which can be heard in the evenings around 23.00 hrs. However the source of the transmission is unknown

Initially this started at a low pace but has picked momentum in the last two weeks. The returnee figures for the month of July are as follows (all new caseloads):

Katali	-	264
Kahindo	-	212
Kibumba	-	644
Mugunga	-	111
Lac Vert	-	9

(The low figure of returnees from this camp is attributed to the strong influence still exercised by interhame leaders)

b) Spontaneous repatriation

The figure for spontaneous repatriation during the reporting period tottled 1 626, of which 1 254 are of the "old caseload". Returnees entering through Cyinika border post amounted to 198.

c) Reception centre

With the closure of the CARE way station and the reception centre at the College, the UNHCR have established a new centre at Nkamira (ex-TUNBATT HQ) twenty-five kms from Gisenyi town. The centre became operation on 31 July. The day-to-day management of the centre is handled by COOPI, with INTERSOS (both Italian NGOs and implementing partner of UNHCR) taking responsibility for distribution of food and non-food items to the returnees.

d) UNHCR/Gisenyi and UNHCR/Goma

Two meeting were held , on 14 and 28 July, between the two field offices, including HRFO/Gisenyi and PIO, concerning plans to attract refugees to return to Rwanda. The question that UNHCR/Goma has about Rwanda mainly centred on (i) arrest and detention, especially the rumour concerning ex-FAR soldiers who, it is claimed, are taken prisoners at the Rwandan border and (ii) general security, including the specific communes identified for resettlement of the returnees.

V. GENERAL OBSERVATION

The continued banditry, cattle theft and sabotage to installations gives a strong indications that a group of persons allegedly interhame, are intent on carrying out these on a regular basis. As indicated earlier the militia/interhame at present does not have the capability to attack any RPA unit/sub-unit. However, attempt to distabilize the security and discredit is eminent thus undermining the authority of the present government.

Amsale,

As I will be away from tomorrow until Wednesday, 12 July, I would be grateful if you would kindly give the attached Request for Leave to Zena Zelleke, please.

Thank you.

P
Pauline
7 July 1995

Zena,

The attached is a copy.
Original with Amsale.

Pauline
7/7



UNAMIR - MINUAR

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE
IN FOUR COPIES

REQUEST FOR LEAVE

Name: ZELLEKE, Zema Section: SRSG Political
Index Number: _____ Functional Title: Political Info. Off. Grade: 4
Parent Organization: UNCTAD EOD UNAMIR: 12.10.94
LUMP SUM OPTION REQUESTED: YES ☐ NO ☒

Type of Leave:

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Annual Leave	<input type="checkbox"/> Home Leave
<input type="checkbox"/> Family Visit Travel	<input type="checkbox"/> Accelerated Home Leave

Place of Leave: _____ (For official Leave)

Duration of Leave: from: 15 July 1995 to 25 July 1995

Contact Address: UNCTAD, Commodities Division
Geneva Phone: 41-22 907 4887

Staff Member's Signature: [Signature] Date: 07.07.95

Section Chief's Approval:

Signature: [Signature] Date: 7-7-95

For Personnel Use Only: [Submit one to FO when this section is completed].

Annual Leave Requested: _____ Balance as of: _____

R & R Requested: _____

MSA Leave credit balance as of: _____

Cable/Administrative Report to New York: _____

New York Approval: _____

Date of Departure: _____

Approval Chief Civilian Personnel Officer (CCPO):

Signature: _____ Date: _____

CC: Personnel Section (Original)
Finance Section (1st Copy)
Staff Member's Section
Staff Member

File: Sector 5 P10

cc: Amba Conde
SD done. Col. Tikoca-✓
Mr. Ladan Rapi

Seen and
discussed
with P10
sub
7/7

29 June 1995

To : Mr. W. De Souza
Executive Director

From : Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer
Sector V

Sub : SITUATION REPORT

Attached please find the SITUATION REPORT covering the
period 15 June to 29 June 1995.

Best regards.

cc : Political Adviser ✓

SITUATION REPORT
15- 29 June 1995

I. GENERAL

During this period the situation has been extremely calm; no major incident was reported except the continued infiltration by forces from the other side. However, rumours abound of the likely attack (round July) from across the border. Also some NGOs, working in Goma, have reported on the increased military activity in the camps. However there is no way to verify the veracity of these allegations.

Clashes between Rwandan refugees, Interhware/militia, and local inhabitants are also reported around **MASISI** area (see attached clipping). Otherwise the following events took place :

- A seminar on the " Procedures for arrest and detention ", organized by HRFO and UNHCR, was held from 23-25 June 1995 for Gisenyi prefecture. Participants were bourgmestres, gendarmerie and RPA. The subjects covered included :
(a) arrest procedures and how they have been adopted and the Arusha Accord; (b) international human rights standard concerning arrests; (c) rights of prisoners under international law and meaning of these rights; (d) UNHCR's concern with arrested and detained persons, etc.
The seminar was a resounding success and the same will be organized for Ruhengeri prefecture.
- On 16 and 20 June 1995, the "Day of the Child" and the "Day of African Refugee", organized by MINIFAPRO and UNHCR respectively, was celebrated.
- NGOs operating in Goma are planning to have a mock evacuation exercise on 1-2 July. Such exercise might impact negatively and cause unnecessary tension within the camp population.

II. GOMA

PIO and HRFO team held a meeting with Protection Officer of UNHCR Goma on 15 and 26 June to evaluate and exchange information on the security situation prevailing in both Rwanda and the camps in Goma. HCR Goma are seeking information on a wide range of issues (security, judiciary, military presence in communes, detention and arrests, occupied houses and procedure of claim, etc.)

for the prefectures of Byumba, Gitarama. Gisenyi, Kigali and Ruhengeri as these areas will be the major destinations for the returnees. The information is to be dissiminated throughout the camps with the view to encourage refugees to regain their home communes.

HCR Goma also reported that there are a number of Rwandese coming into the camps clandestinely. Alleged reasons for fleeing Rwanda were : risk of being detained under accusation of involvement in the genocide; member of interhwame/militia; fear of looting, etc. A random interview is undertaken by HCR, about five per camp weekly, in order to determine main reasons for fleeing Rwanda. The exact number of these new comers is not known . However, between March and June 15, 1995 a total of 2 509 have been identified, which is an insignificant number as compared to the population in the camps. Once in the camps, each refugee presents itself to the camp authorities of their commune of origin for screening. There is a systematic distrust of new arrivals as there is a strong fear amongst camp habitants of infiltration by RPA.

II. REFUGEE MOVEMENT

The number of "new" refugees returning into the country continues to decline. This reduction is not only due to intimidation and dissuasion by the militia or political leaders at the camps but also of rumours, brought by new comers at the camps (see above), of insecurity within the country and fear of reprisals by the government.

The number of 1994 returnees for the period covered amounted to only 43 persons, while the pre-1994 returnee figures continued to rise with the arrival of over 800 persons, mainly from the MASISI region. HCR Goma is attempting to restart organized repatriation by mid-July. They expect to handle about 600 persons daily.

III. SETTLEMENT

The reception centre at the " College " in Gisenyi, which housed mainly the 59/60 returnees, was officially closed on 21 June. About 4 000 persons were transported to various prefectures in the country. Some vulnerable and needy persons, without families, were identified and MINIRIESO is seeking temporary relief and humanitarian assistance for this group. About 100 persons refused to vacate the location and the local authorities have given them houses (presumably belonging to those still in exile) around Gisenyi town.

The closure of the " College " has left the surrounding inhabitants, who were dependent for food distribution from this location, destitute. HCR (Gisenyi) is searching for a suitable location to establish a new reception centre. However, the local authorities have indicated that such centre should not be located in the vicinity of Gisenyi area.

In Ruhengeri registration of returnees was completed. Most have opted to settle around the periphery of the town, while a large number are found in KINIGI commune. UNHCR and MINIRIESO undertook a joint recece to identify government-owned land. It will be recalled that the local authorities have consented to settle over 4 000 families in the prefecture.

After a successful discussion between MINIRIESO and authorities in Kibuye, the latter has agreed to receive additional returnees of 59/60 group into the prefecture. Following is a table showing settlement of returnees that were lodged at the College and transported between 1 and 22 June 1995 :

From/to	No.of families	No. of persons
College : Bugesera	30	102
Kibungo	418	1 109
Kibuye	566	1 376
Kayove	60	127
Kinigi	12	55
Total	1 086	2 769

Although not entitled to land or property under the Arusha accords, the expectations of this group is high and many are likely to take, if the opportunity arises, land and property belonging to refugees and displaced persons.

IV. OBSERVATION

While a climate of relative stability and calm prevails in the area, nevertheless the general atmosphere is pregnant with tension and uncertainty. The persistent rumour of attack from across the border continues. Despite RPA 's tight security and strict monitoring of the border area, including patrolling by boat on lake Kivu, cross-border incursion and infiltration by interhwame/militia elements occurs regularly. In fact infifltrators are known to have taken residence in certain communes, specially in Ruhengeri prefecture and an armed gang of 15-30 persons operating in Mutura

(Gisenyi) have been identified locally as employee of FRGF. I should imagine that RPA's concern would be not only a direct attack from across but also the extent of penetration and support existing within the country.

According to RPA LO, there are about 5 - 6 battalions spread out throughout Sector V, i.e. at Gisenyi (Gr.1712), Bigogwe (Gr3520), Mukamira (Gr 4521), Kinigi (Gr 5440) and Ruhengeri (Gr 5834). If we are to believe the reports of Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International on the state of preparedness and arms and weapons availability to the FRG, then sheer determination and the will power to survive would be the only ammunition left to the government in power. However, in the event of an attack there are two possible scenarios foreseen :

- (a) a hit-and-run attack all along the border causing both economic and political destabilization, including killings;
- (b) a concentrated attack either in Gisenyi or across from Bukavu in the south with a view to occupy and control a portion of the country (as did RPA in the north). This could be used as a lever to negotiate with the government for a political settlement.

At this stage option (a) is the most likely to occur

Alerte à Masisi

KATOYI SOUS LA BOTTE DES REFUGIES RWANDAIS

La zone de Masisi plus précisément la collectivité secteur de Katoyi est-elle une partie intégrante du Zaïre ou tout simplement a-t-elle été vendue ou cédée aux réfugiés rwandais? Et pour cause? Cette collectivité secteur compte 7 groupements qui, à l'heure actuelle, sont occupés par les interhamwes, les forces armées rwandaises (FAR) et des éléments de la garde présidentielle du feu président Habyarimana sans aucune forme de procès. Et chaque jour qui passe, on déplore des morts par balles. Les autorités politico-militaires du Nord-Kivu ont été informées de cette nouvelle au chef-lieu de la zone de Masisi, lors de la récente mission de M. Christophe Moto Mupenda, gouverneur de région intérieure.

L'heure est grave : la situation sur terrain est glissante et difficile à contrôler; les vies humaines sont en danger permanent. Tous les signaux sont au rouge! La population de Masisi, et surtout celle des localités environnantes vit dans la psychose de la guerre. Ce n'est plus les tueries inter-ethniques qui ont eu lieu du 20 mars au 17 juillet 1993 entre Hunde-Nyanga contre les Banyarwanda immigrés des zones rurales de Masisi et Walikale. Loin de là; présentement toutes les données ont changé : les conflits interethniques ont pris une autre ampleur. Cette fois-ci, il est question d'une véritable guerre avec tout un arsenal militaire très important.

Des sources concordantes et rassurantes ainsi que les différents rapports en notre possession ont démontré à suffisance que la collectivité-secteur de Katoyi est devenue aujourd'hui la base militaire des réfugiés rwandais avec ses différentes sections : Kikoma et Mihima en groupement Nyamakobo II, Bitoyi et Bivumu en groupement Ufamandu II; et aussi Bulolero, Kyachinge-Kasinga et à Luke en groupement Nyamakobo I : aucun Hunde, Tembo, Tutsi ne vit plus à Nyamakobo; toute la popu-

lation a fui vers la zone de Walikale et de Kalehe au Sud-Kivu. En plus, les victimes souffrent de multiples épidémies et ne reçoivent aucune aide alimentaire et humanitaire de la part des organismes internationaux. Au total : 39 villages incendiés. Ce tableau est réellement sombre. A l'instar de la Collectivité secteur de Katoyi, les trois autres Collectivités Osso, Bahunde et Bashali sont aussi à la merci des interhamwes. Pres-

qu'un seul m² de notre pays soit occupé par des étrangers".

Il a exhorté la population à la patience et promis de réunir à nouveau le Comité de sécurité afin de revoir ce crucial problème qui tenaille la population autochtone. Il a, en outre, souligné que le Zaïre n'est pas une jungle où n'importe quel anarchiste de mauvais goût peut s'installer. "Nous ne manquons pas d'éléments capables de neutraliser ces envahisseurs",


conclu sans ambages.

Quant aux groupements Banyarwanda, l'un de ces groupements de la Collectivité secteur de Osso, Banyungu, le plus désorganisé d'ailleurs à cause des conflits de pouvoir existant entre le Chef de Groupement Abel Mushushu et ses deux chefs de localité, celle de Muhanga, dirigée par Alexis Tutsi et Kaniro, dirigée par M. Mwinshure. Le Gouverneur de région a tenté de mettre fin à ce conflit perpétuel. Cette fois-ci, en associant les gardiens de ces zones qui, à priori,

débat et délibération, sont parvenus à signer un acte d'engagement dans lequel ils promettent de garantir la paix, de réprimer ce triste conflit entre leurs Chefs respectifs. Ils ont, par ailleurs, souscrit aux sanctions exemplaires en cas où les trois chefs ne parviendront pas à s'entendre, malgré cette sage médiation. A défaut d'une entente durable, aucun de tous ces ambitieux ne pourra quitter la zone rurale de Masisi sans l'autorisation du Chef de Collectivité ou du Commissaire de Zone.

Avant même que le Gouverneur ne regagne le chef lieu de la région, un message macabre faisait état d'une tuerie qui serait le fait des interhamwes sur la population Nyanga de la localité Banyungu du groupement Waloo-yungu en zone de Walikale, Bilan: 36 morts et plusieurs blessés.

Albert TULINABO Ma;



que la quasi totalité des localités sont assiégées. L'autorité coutumière n'existe plus dans ces contrées, leurs fauteuils étant occupés par les présidents des comités d'accueil soutenus par les unités d'intervention de Kinii. Ces chefs usurpateurs sont en même temps les commanditaires de tous les troubles sanglants qui ne cessent d'endeuiller la Zone de Masisi.

Ces envahisseurs à mains armées ont déjà créé leurs propres positions : Nyabisi, Kazinga, Rubowa, Kaloba, Mbitso, Kibabi, Kinii, Miandja, Muhanga, Muhanga, Shakingi, Kahira, Mukoto, Butshindo et Kahanga. Trop c'est trop, a déclaré le gouverneur de région au cours d'une adresse populaire aux habitants massés le lundi 29 mai 1995, au chef-lieu de la zone rurale de Masisi. Qui a ajouté : "l'hospitalité a néanmoins ses limites. Nous sommes obligés à frapper fort; car nous ne pouvons pas accepter

File : No (Jetho 5)

Rec'd 19 June
cc : Amis Conde
Ms. Rafi

15 June 1995

To : Mr. W. de Souza
Executive Director

From : Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer
Sector V

Sub : SITUATION REPORT

Attached please find the SITUATION REPORT covering the period 1 June to 14 June 1995.

Best regards.

cc : Political Adviser ✓

SITUATION REPORT
1 June to 14 June 1995

I. GENERAL

The security situation in Sector V remains calm. The major humanitarian problems continue to be the settlement operations and related issues concerning the old caseloads; monitoring and development of a project of assistance to the judicial system. The main highlights during this period include :

- Visit of the President of Rwanda to Gisenyi town on 5 June where he addressed the population (about 7 000 people).

On 8 and 10 June 1995, the President attended a burial ceremony in **BAGOGWE**, Gaseke commune and in **NYUNDO**, Rubavu commune, respectively for those people victims of the genocide.

- Monthly inter-agency co-ordination meeting was held on 1 June for Gisenyi prefecture. Emphasis was placed on rehabilitation oriented issues, including old caseload settlement activities.
- HRFO, in collaboration with UNHCR, is organizing a seminar on the " **PROCEDURE OF ARRESTATION AND DETENTION** " from 24 to 25 June 1995 for Gisenyi prefecture. Participants will be all bourgmestres and gendarmerie. UNAMIR will assist in logistics, i.e. transport for bourgmestres.
- The Gisenyi/Goma border continue to remain closed both for UNAMIR personnel and transport of humanitarian aid destined for refugees in Goma.

II. SECURITY/RPA

The security situation in the northwest region is relatively calm. Reports of banditry, interhame infiltration and killings in **MUTURA**, **RWERERE**, **RUBAVU** and **KAYOVE** communes have been reported . Some of the acts committed by the infiltrators appear to have been well planned and executed operation. The manner in which the intruders deployed themselves throughout the villages and regrouped to leave, by sounding a whistle, suggests a military style operation that is more sophisticated than similar incidents from the past in this prefecture. Considering the tight security maintained by the RPA in these areas, particularly along the border, it is believed that this kind of operation can only be carried out through assistance from within the community. It has been noted that some people enter the country clandestinely and reside in the commune in order to identify and target their

victims for either robbery or killings. This information is relayed across the border and invariably is followed by a criminal act. Example of such incidents include :

- RUBAVU commune : band of individuals numbering between 15 to 30 people, around 6/7 June, most wearing uniforms and carrying guns, surrounded BUZUTA cellule stole everything they could find from several houses and in the ensuing struggle one person was killed and six badly beaten. They departed on cue when one of them blew a whistle.
- REWERERE commune : a similar incident occurred in this commune on 2 June, where one woman, suspected of belonging to interhame was intercepted and killed, while one person was accidentally killed.
- KAYOVE commune : acts of banditry and infiltration by interhame/militia continues in this area despite strengthened presence of RPA specially in the forest area bordering lake Kivu.

In Ruhengeri prefecture a political/security meeting was held on 2 June at the stadium (about 5 000 persons present). The authorities indicated that the population are harbouring subversive elements in the community. To strengthen the security suggestion was made to organize the community into " NYUMBA KHUMI" which means a grouping of ten house sectors who will be responsible to ensure the security and conduct night patrol of their area. The military (RPA) will patrol and guard strategic points. In addition the authorities urged those responsible for arrest and detention to exercise restraint and undertake a thorough investigation before laying charges against suspects of criminal activities.

III. MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES

Organized repatriation from north Kivu is still suspended. While spontaneous returns continue but at a much reduced rate. For the period covered in this report, the figure is 1 513, of which 189 came through the Cyanika border. Again 89 % of this total are from the 59/60 caseload. One detrimental factor which inhibits the repatriation of the refugees, especially the "new", is the high number of arrests for alleged involvement in the genocide. Thus creating a sense of insecurity within the communes.

IV. SETTLEMENT

PIO visited some of the settlement sites for the 59/60 refugees, in Gisenyi prefecture to evaluate and assess the situation, including humanitarian assistance needs. The communes where the returnees have been settled are : KANAMA, KARAGO, KAYOVE, MUTURA, NYAMYUMBA and RUBAVU. The highest concentration of settlement operation is in Mutura commune, comprising of ten sites where 2 481 families are settled. This is a government identified

land and parcels of 1.3 hectares have been allotted per family. The majority are living in plastic shelters, except at two sites where the returnees are occupying abandoned houses or are lodged in empty houses belonging to those still in exile.

Another government identified area is inb GISHWATE forest, Kayove commune. There are 310 families settled in the area, 200 actually in the forest. They have been given 100 sq.m of land to install the plastic shelter and are awaiting to be given land for cultivation purpose. According to the Bourgmestre of Kayove there is disagreement between the ministries of Rehab, Agriculture and Environment to use this area for settlement purpose (to which he concurs).

Concerning the situation in the remaining communes, these sites resemble a de facto refugee camps. The communes do not possess extra land for distribution. In fact UNHCR has been requested by KIBUYE prefecture, where a number of the returnees have been transported, not to send any more returnees for settlement as the as the prefecture is unable to absorb such numbers.

The situation has now been compounded by the decision of MINIRIESO to close the reception centre at the " College"(Gisenyi) and HCR has been given a week to move out the remianing (about 5 000) returnees, hence the dilemma where to settle these people.

The massive return of the 59/60 caseloads has placed heavy demands on the communes, many of which are already in fragile state. These people are likely to remain without cultivable land for sometime to come and hence will require sustained food assistance for the foreseeable future.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

File: 110 (Sect. 5)
cc: Amb. Conde
Ms. Laban Rathi
31 May 1995
Suz
8 June

To : Mr. S. K. Buo
Political Adviser

From : Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer
Sector V

Sub : SITUATION REPORT

Attached please find " SITUATION REPORT " covering the
period 21 May to 31 May 1995.

Best regards.

SITUATION REPORT

21 May to 31 May 1995

I. GENERAL

In both prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri the general atmosphere outwardly appears calm. However, some new incidents have occurred and additional information provided on those incidents reported in the last " situation report ". These include the following :

- a) in **KAYOVE** commune a husband and wife were murdered on the night of 16/17 May. The culprits stole 50 000 RF. Eight suspects were arrested and are detained at the commune prison. In **SYIKI** (same commune) ten persons were arrested on charges of genocide as well as sympathizing with interhware. The accused are now detained at Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prisons.
- b) in **KIBILIRA** commune the law and order situation has deteriorated ever since the RPA pulled out from the area. According to the Bourgmestre IDPs are now moving into the area and carrying out banditry. So far one man was injured and one killed by machet during such attack.
- c) in **NYAMYUMBA** commune three persons were killed, a 16 year old and his grand-parents, by an RPA soldier during the night of 26/27 May. According to investigations carried out, the victims were unknown to the assailant since he was recently deployed to the area. The RPA has arrested the culprit and presently detained in Gisenyi prison.
- d) The killing reported last week in **MUTURA** commune was investigated this week. The victim was a Tutsi resident of the area who fled to Zaire in 1993 and returned in July 1994. As his house was destroyed, he occupied that of a Hutu neighbour presently in exile in Zaire. The neighbour and two accomplices are reported to have infiltrated into Mutura through the forest from Kibumba camp killed the victim and escaped using same track.
- e) There was an attempted robbery at the residence of the NGO INTER-SOS, implementing partner of UNHCR, during the early hours of 28 May. In the ensuing mele one NGO staff was stabbed and sustained injury on his stomach. No trace of the intruder.
- f) The rumoured demonstration against UNAMIR, planned for the afternoon of 27 May, did not materialize. This was in protest

of UNAMIR's helicopter involvement in the transport of two fugitives on 15 May from Kigali to TUNBATT HQ at Gisenyi.

- g) The Bte. Commd. of Ruhengeri informed UNAMIR/MILOBs to suspend all heli recce in the sector. According to latest information new procedures are to be introduced soon in respect of heli flights throughout the country.

II. REFUGEE MOVEMENT

Although UNAMIR is fulfilling its mandate of facilitating refugee repatriation, in collaboration with UNHCR and IOM, at the present time there are a number of obstacles which are impeding the process of spontaneous repatriation, namely : (a) the incident that took place in Kibeho; (b) interhwame and militia and hardline elements which continue to intimidate refugees to prevent repatriation; (c) continued distabilization attempts made by infiltrators outside and within the country; and (d) fear of reprisal by the government for suspected involvement in the genocide.

During the the period covered in the report spontaneous repatriation has dwindled, the lowest recorded for one day was three. Total for the week from both Gisenyi and Cyanika border was 1 068, of which 86 percent were of the 59/60 caseload.

III. RESETTLEMENT

In an attempt to reduce the congestion at the reception centre in Gisenyi, UNHCR, in collaboration with MINIREISO, have continued to transport families to several communes, mainly in Gisenyi and Kigali prefectures. Between 21 and 31 of May a total of 550 families have been transported to and resettled in the communes of KAYOVE (Gisenyi prefecture), KIBUNGO , NGENDA (Kighali prefecture) and KIBUYE. UNHCR and MINIREISO plan to empty out the congested reception centre within the coming two weeks.

With the end of the emergency period, the authorities in this sector have expressed their readiness to launch, as soon as possible, the rehabilitation phase in order to avoid social conflicts between the 59/60 old caseload and the local population. Moreover, the problems evolving around the allocation of land and resettlement of returnees have evoked the necessity to draw-up an action plan. To this end the representatives of MINIRIESO of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri prefectures have decided and prepared a joint plan which will be submitted for approval by the Council of Ministers.

IV. LOCAL AUTHORITIES ACTIVITIES

The Prefet of Gisenyi held a mass gathering (between 600 - 800 persons) in NYAMYUMBA commune on 28 May 1995. Also present were the Bde. Commd., Head of the Gendarmerie of Gisenyi and other high

officials from the prefecture. The theme was "security". This was chosen as a result of incidents that took place on 27 May (see in I (C) above). It appears that there is considerable amount of weapons (guns, grenades, etc.) in possession with the locals. The Prefet appealed to the crowd to handover these weapons and also requested the RPA to show some restraint in their relation with the local population.

| During question time, the main issue raised was the question of property rights. The local population accused the Bourgmestre of distributing land indiscriminately to the 59/60 returnees.

With so many of this group in the process of being settled in the various communes of the sector, there is a possibility for land dispute to escalate because not all the returnees are given government-owned land but allotted properties whose owners are still in exile. This was confirmed to PIO by the representative MINIRIESO who forsee an acute problem in the near future.

On 22 May, upon invitation by the Bourgmestre of Giciye commune, Human Rights and UNHCR conducted a workshop. The workshop covered a variety of subjects on human rights and protection issues. Participants included all relevant communal authorities, including representatives from women's organizations.

PIO met with Prefet of Gisenyi on 30 May and discussed the issues of (i) security; (ii) the dwindling return of refugees; and (iii) the question of the rehabilitation of the civil administration. He was particularly concerned with (ii) as this constituted a factor of peace, national unity and reconciliation. However, he was apprehensive of the fact that the situation which prevailed in Kibeho could have impacted negatively.

On the question of reconciliation, as perceived in the Arusha accord, he said that it would not be possible at this stage but every effort should be made to sensitize the population within the country by organizing workshops/seminars on pertinent issues.

Concerning the rehabilitation of the civil administration, I informed him that this is still in the pipeline but given the situation prevailing in the country, it is put on HOLD.



UNAMIR-MINUAR

23 May 1995

To : Mr. S. K. Buo
Political Adviser

From: Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer
Sector V

sub : **SITUATION REPORT**

Please find attached **SITUATION REPORT** covering the period shown.

Best regards.

SITUATION REPORT

15 April 1995 to 15 May 1995

I. GENERAL

Although isolated infiltrations continue to occur along the Zairean border with Mutura and Rwerere communes, the overall situation in Sector V remains calm. However, of late there have been instances of isolated NGO posts becoming targets of armed robbery by uniformed miscreants.

The border with Zaire remained closed intermittently due to problems in trade between the two governments and tension during the commemoration week. As a protest against frequent stealing of cattle belonging to returnees during border crossing, the locals blocked all commercial traffic into Goma. Despite a successful outcome of the meeting between Rwandese and Zairean authorities, as a result of which the Gisenyi/Goma border was declared open to all traffic, including WFP trucks, reality has meanwhile proven that the border continues to remain closed for humanitarian aid destined for the refugees in Goma.

During the reporting period, the following incidents have been reported :

- the NGOs running the Karisoke research centre reported that on 26 April, an RPA patrol consisting of about 30 soldiers accompanied by two local staffs employed by the centre, came upon a group of 8 men removing the roof of the research centre. In the ensuing fire-fight the RPA killed one and wounded the other. The killed intruder was later identified as member of the RFG. The group is believed to have crossed into Rwanda from Kibumba camp.

Damage to the research centre was extensive and 85 % of the roofing was stolen. The population feels insecure because of the increased banditry in the area.

- a joint MILOB/HR/RPA-LO team patrolled the border area **MUTOVU** and **RWERERE**. On the night of 12/13 May there was an attempted incursion resulting in a shoot-out. According to locals RPA has established good relations in the community. A sharp drop in the rate of infiltration is evident as is the decline in interhwa activities. The tightening of security by the RPA and the hardening of attitude by Zairean authorities towards the FRG appears to account for this marked change.
- 10 persons were reported killed in a shoot out on Lake Kivu near the Gisenyi brewery. The victims were fishermen shot by mistake by RPA assuming them to be infiltrators. The

fishermen were out fishing in the night without proper authorization.

- a mine explosion was reported on 11 May in the Ngororero area. Investigation reveals that the incident was a case of ambush by infiltrators along the RPA routine patrol route. The mine in question was an anti-transport mine which exploded and killed two RPA soldiers and injured three others. No other mine was found in the vicinity and there is no trace of the culprits.
- in Ruhengeri the electric tower was destroyed. It seems to have been a sabotage by experts. Plastic explosives were used and the transformer completely destroyed. Furthermore, another electric pylon in Mukingo commune was damaged by an explosion. Also an employee of elctrogaz, trying to repair the earlier damaged transformer, stepped on a land mine and was seriously injured.
- RPA Liaison Officer reported that the son of a former government minister, who was imprisoned in Gitarama, was smuggled out from the prison and transported to Kigali by UN helicopter. Threafter he was brought to the TUNBATT HQ at Mareru and released to escape to Zaire. UN complicity has been alleged in this matter. The date of this incident is believed to be 15 May 1995. Appreciate receiving clarification in this matter to prevent damage to UNAMIR image.

II. IDPS

Over the last two months NDUSU commune (Ruhengeri prefecture) has been receiving a steady influx of IDPs from Gitarama, Kigali and Byumba sectors. As of 20 May an estimated number of over 1 000 are found to be in the area. The presence of the IDPs was actually reported earlier in the year (see Sitrep of 29.12.94 - 06.01.95) but their number was negligible (see also Sitrep 16.03.95 - 30.03.95).

On 5 May 1995 the Prefet of Ruhengeri addressed a gathering of the IDPs in Ndusu urging them to return to their home communes. A seven days notice was accorded to them. Certain measures were to be taken if they do not comply, e.g. UNHCR to stop distributing food to discourage their continued stay in Ndusu; NGOs to curtail humanitarian assistance. If these failed, the Prefet warned the IDPs of the inevitable use of force. Reason given by the authorities for the removal of the IDPs at such a short notice was the increasing tension between locals and IDPs and the shortage of food.

MILOB teams monitoring the situation with effect from 5 May had two conflicting versions to report. As per information provided by the Bourgmestre of Ndusu 1 000 had already departed to their home

communes. Those remaining, about 161, comprised of the sick and old people and children. However, talking to the locals and some IDPs reveals that these people are afraid to return because of fear of reprisal of "TUTSI DEATH SQUADS", apparently still active in some communes in Gitarama. Consequently most of the IDPs have not moved to their home communes but are scattered within the area, including Nemba where there are about 100 IDPs camped near TUNCOY. There was also a report that RPA had marked the houses of IDPs for identification purpose but this could not be verified. However, 12 IDPs were found in the commune prison on charges as varied as genocide, theft and adventist tendencies (?). Other IDPs are still in Ndusu co-located with the TUNBATT. These have expressed unwillingness to return to their commune of origin and have requested for UNAMIR protection.

In light of the above, it is apparent that a large number of the IDPs have not regained their home commune but relocated themselves in other areas in Kigali and Gitarama prefectures, frequently changing location to avoid arrest. There is also the possibility that the IDPs have returned to the said prefectures but not necessarily to their home commune.

Handwritten notes:
H.N. 10
1000
H.N. 10
1000

III. MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES

A total of 4 245 refugees returned from Zaire and Uganda for the month of April as compared to 15 557 in February and 6 800 in March, reflecting a drastic fall of 40 percent. Several reasons could be attributed for this reduction : closing of border during the commemoration week, suspension of IOM operations indefinitely, withdrawal of IOM trucks for the operation in southern Rwanda and increased activities of interhwama/FRG on the border.

During the week 15 - 22 April, 203 were repatriated under the "organized repatriation scheme" from North Kivu. Since that time this mode of repatriation has been suspended indefinitely because of events that took place in Kibeho.

Spontaneous returnees continue to trickle in consisting mainly of 59/60 caseloads. According to information received from UNHCR/Goma, most camp residents do not wish to return. The returnee figures for the period 1 - 20 May 1995 is 2 840 of which 86 percent are 59/60 caseloads.

With the closing down of the reception centre in Giseenyi town, the reception centre at the "College" wears the looks of a near ghetto. It has as of now almost 13 000 old caseloads awaiting resettlement. This is a very volatile group capable of being provoked at the slightest pretext. This was demonstrated when this group demonstrated against UNAMIR and mounted road blocks against all UNAMIR cars during the week of commemoration.

The resettlement programme for this group is progressing very slowly because some of the government identified lands are inaccessible for the type of transport available (Kanama commune)

and additional government land has not been made available. The Ruhengeri MINIREISO representative has submitted a settlement plan for 4 600 families (i.e 23 300 persons) currently residing in various communes of the prefecture. Except for the communes of Nkuli and Mukingo settlement lands have been identified .

IV.SECURITY / RPA

In general the treatment meted out to returnees by RPA seems to have taken a better turn for the better, except in Kayove commune. There are fewer reports of arrests and excesses as compared to earlier months. The same is however not true for Kayove commune where frequent arrests of locals on charges of genocide has recommenced.

The border region in the northwest remains sensitive and the trend of distabilization of the security situation continues. In Gisenyi prefecture, the area of Mutovu and Rwerere sees frequent small scale probing attacks and infiltration attempts. The proximity of Kibumba camp on the Zairean side with the Rweansese border makes it a safe haven for the interhwame to operate from. There are plans to shift this camp further inward into Zaire.

The RPA has complete control of the situation in this area with increased strenght and heavy patrolling. One significant incident was the murder of the Assistant Bourgmestre of Mutura who was attacked and killed by a group of armed interhwame infiltrators. The deceased was a Hutu returnee.

In Ruhengeri prefecture, the RPA reports frequent fire fights and arrests of armed persons in the border area streching along the National Volcano park to Kidaho. Here again the RPA has stepped-up its forces in the general area of Kinigi.

UNITED NATIONS
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM



UNAMIR-MINUAR

NATIONS UNIES
MEMORANDUM INTERIEUR

cc. Mr. Gault
Mr. Rafii

P10 (Sect.5)

TO: Mr. S.K. Buo
Political Adviser

FROM: Zena Zelleka
Political Information Officer

SUBJECT: Assistance for Rebuilding Local Administration in Sector V

DATE: 14 April 1995

I refer to your memorandum of 10 April 1995 regarding the above mentioned subject. The "Note for the File" referred therein was submitted to the SRSG and I believe decision was made to include this as part of the projects to be submitted for financing from the "Trust Fund" (see attached).

In addition, I have given a copy of the same note to the Prefet of Gisenyi and representative of MOR for their consideration and requested them to identify the priority communes needing re-habilitation.

The same will be submitted to the Prefet of Ruhengeri on my return from leave.

Mr. Rafii, please
update the list of items
of requirements for
Sector 4 (A,B+C)
as supplied by P10
and send copy to me.

Thank
S.B.
15/4

Can we help
with the forest fund?

NOTE FOR THE FILE

K

En

ASSISTANCE TO RE-ESTABLISHMENT
OF
CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

I refer to your note addressed to Political Information Officers, dated 1 March 1995, regarding possible assistance by UNAMIR to the administrative authorities concerned.

As you are aware at present the civil administration is in disarray due to lack of human and material resources. To respond to the most urgent need and to facilitate the authorities' programme of rehabilitation of the civil administration, the following undertakings are considered as high priority :

a) Rehabilitation of public buildings:

- the main prefecture buildings, including most commune offices were not severely damaged or rendered inhabitable as a result of the war. Most buildings are in a reasonably good conditions but require repairs including replacement of doors windows and painting, etc.

b) Transportation/communication

Both Prefets are in dire need of transportation, especially if they are to carry out mass rallies in the interior and thereby promote peace and reconciliation. Hence the urgent need for a 4 x 4 vehicle. At times they rely on PIO and MILOBs for their transportation. Communication is also another major problem.

c) Training

- Training of human resources at the local level is very much needed. The administrative cadres have been depleted and will require to be filled by new trained personnel. Already both Prefets have expressed the inadequacy and inexperience of present employees.

Workshops could be organized for a duration of four to six weeks to train administrative and personnel officers, who in turn will be expected to train junior staffs.

d) Refurbishing of offices


- Supply of basic office materials (desks, chairs, shelves, etc.) and equipment (computer, typewriters, etc.) and a minimum of three-month supply of stationary will be required. List of requirements submitted by Prefets has been transmitted to your office already.

Activities undertaken under (a) will encourage local initiatives and promote the reconciliation process by supporting communal work groups to repair and/or re-build public buildings. Secondly, it will stimulate the local rural economy by purchasing materials manufactured locally and provide employment for builders, contractors, carpenters, etc.

The Prefets will be responsible for ensuring that repairs of public buildings is in accordance with government guidelines and that contracts are honoured by all parties. The Bourgmestres will be responsible for mobilizing the population, overseeing the repair work and liaising with contractors, builders, etc.

In the " Note for the File ", dated 6 March 1995, I had mentioned the contact made with "Food for the Hungry International", a US based NGO, who have agreed, in principle, to participate in this venture. Probably, to refurbish and rehabilitate 28 (twenty-eight) communes might be excessive for one organization. Therefore, UNAMIR might consider providing assistance to the two prefectures and/or selected communes.

Reactivating the administrative service, providing interim employment and soliciting contracts which can indirectly provide jobs and stimulate the local economy are essential activities to encourage refugees to return to their home communes.


Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer
16 March 1995



INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Ms. Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer (Sector 5)

FROM: Sammy Kum Buo  DATE: 10 April 1995
Political Adviser

SUBJECT: Assistance for rebuilding local administration in Sector 5

Thank you for your "Note for the File" dated 16 March 1995 regarding UNAMIR's assistance to the re-establishment of civil administration in your sector. Although we have noted the areas of possible assistance you mentioned, we would appreciate it if you could also provide us with a copy of any official request received from the Prefet seeking assistance for the rebuilding of the local administration, listing specific areas or types of assistance needed.


Warm personal regard

cc: ED



INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

TO: Ms. Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer (Sector V)

FROM: Sammy Kum Buo  DATE: 8 April 1995
Political Adviser

SUBJECT: Response to matter raised in Situation Report dated 31/3/95


I am writing in response to your situation report covering the period 16 to 30 March 1995 in which you indicated that UN civilians in your sector are being subjected to increasing acts of harassment and intimidation by the RPA. I would like to inform you that the issue of searches of UN vehicles at RPA check-points, as well as other related issues concerning the rights and immunities of UN, and particularly UNAMIR, personnel are currently the subject of discussions between UNAMIR and the Rwandese Government. We hope that these matters will be resolved to our satisfaction in the near future. In the meantime, we urge you to continue demonstrating patience and tolerance despite the obstacles raised in the performance of your duties.

cc: SRSG
ED

File : P10 (Sect.5)
CC : Mr. Rafii (action)
Ang. Condo'.

31 March 1995


To : Dr. A. H. Kabia
Executive Director

From : Zena Zelleke 
Political Information Officer
Sector V

Sub : SITUATION REPORT

Attached please find SITUATION REPORT covering the
period 16 March to 30 March 1995.

Best regards.

cc : Political Adviser 

SITUATION REPORT

16 March to 30 March 1995

I. GENERAL

The Prefet of Gisenyi held a mass gathering in GISENYI, GICIYE and RAMBA on 22, 24, and 28 March 1995 respectively. The purpose of the gathering was to assure the population and dispel rumour, presently circulating, that another spate of ethnic killings will take place on 6 April, anniversary of the massacre. Furthermore, he also spoke of peace and reconciliation and called on the population to forget the past and strive to build a united Rwanda.

The UNHCR have been requested by the Ministry of Education to evacuate the " Nursing School ", one of the reception centers for the 59/60 caseload returnees in Gisenyi, within forty-eight hours. The reason given is that the Ministry want to reopen the school. There are over 3 000 returnees lodged at the school. However, because of lack of transport and logistic support attempt is being made to delay the operation for at least a couple of days.

Food for the Hungry International (FHI) have a representative , Mr. Daniel Curran, assigned to this location. FHI programme target vulnerable foster families and provide support to prevent abandonment of orphans that those families have been fostering. As mentioned in last situation report the organisation has also agreed, in principle, to assist UNAMIR, as an implementing partner, in the rehabilitation of the civil administration for the Gisenyi prefecture.

MERLAN, a British medical NGO, has started operation in Gisenyi. Their objectives are to rehabilitate three to four health dispensaries and carry out a vaccination programme.

The bi-monthly Inter-agency meeting for the Gisenyi prefecture took place on 30 March 1995. Most UN organizations and NGOs participated in the meeting and gave an up-date of present and future activities.

II. REFUGEE MOVEMENTS

During the period covered, organized repatriation from the various camps in Goma continued at a lower pace , totalling 1 081 persons. These have been transported to their home communes, mainly in the prefectures of Kigali, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri. Returnees

avoid arrest. Some are appearing to prevent arrest.

- RPA carried out a cordon and search in Ruhengeri town. According to reports, several people were detained for possession of weapons. Bangladesh had their house searched.

The screening and search are getting more intense everyday. A are subject to search of vehicles. Furthermore, we are subjected to a register that the sentry keep. This situation has led to intimidation of civilian personnel in the field distances in the day's work and Since we have not received any highly appreciate if the matter with the authorities.

Ladan,
could
you
please
prepare
a note
to the
PIO on

the last
print and
to indicate
that this and
related issues
concerning the
rights and
immunities of
UNAMIR ~~and~~ personnel
~~are being~~ are being looked
into. Thanks
S.B.
16 April

ily giving bribes to RPA soldiers

earch operation on 30 March 1995
o reports some persons were
pons and firearms. MILOBS from
ched.'

ried out at RPA check-points is
l UN civilians, other than MILOBS
as well as personal belongings.
descend from vehicle and sign a
at the place of his own choice.
idation and harassment of UNAMIR
ld who have to traverse large
cross many check-points enroute.
struction concerning this, would
could be taken up , on your side,

CC: Mr. Conde
Ms. Rafii

To Ladan;

Note to PIO Sect. 5
acknowledging receipt of
the present "note for file". Ask for any
official request received
from Prefet for
assistance for
local administration,
listing specific
areas or types of
assistance.

for
10/4

NOTE FOR THE FILE

ASSISTANCE TO RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION

I refer to your note addressed to Political Information Officers, dated 1 March 1995, regarding possible assistance by UNAMIR to the administrative authorities concerned.

As you are aware at present the civil administration is in disarray due to lack of human and material resources. To respond to the most urgent need and to facilitate the authorities' programme of rehabilitation of the civil administration, the following undertakings are considered as high priority :

a) Rehabilitation of public buildings:

- the main prefecture buildings, including most commune offices were not severely damaged or rendered inhabitable as a result of the war. Most buildings are in a reasonably good conditions but require repairs including replacement of doors windows and painting, etc.

b) Transportation/communication

- Both Prefets are in dire need of transportation, especially if they are to carry out mass rallies in the interior and thereby promote peace and reconciliation. Hence the urgent need for a 4 x 4 vehicle. At times they rely on PIO and MILOBs for their transportation. Communication is also another major problem.

c) Training

- Training of human resources at the local level is very much needed. The administrative cadres have been depleted and will require to be filled by new trained personnel. Already both Prefets have expressed the inadequacy and inexperience of present employees.

Workshops could be organized for a duration of four to six weeks to train administrative and personnel officers, who in turn will be expected to train junior staffs.

d) Refurbishing of offices

- Supply of basic office materials (desks, chairs, shelves,etc.) and equipment (computer, typewriters, etc.) and a minimum of three-month supply of stationary will be required. List of requirements submitted by Prefets has been transmitted to your office already.

Activities undertaken under (a) will encourage local initiatives and promote the reconciliation process by supporting communal work groups to repair and/or re-build public buildings. Secondly, it will stimulate the local rural economy by purchasing materials manufactured locally and provide employment for builders, contractors, carpenters, etc.


The Prefets will be responsible for ensuring that repairs of public buildings is in accordance with government guidelines and that contracts are honoured by all parties. The Bourgmestres will be responsible for mobilizing the population, overseeing the repair work and liaising with contractors, builders, etc.

In the " Note for the File ", dated 6 March 1995, I had mentioned the contact made with "Food for the Hungry International", a US based NGO, who have agreed, in principle, to participate in this venture. Probably, to refurbish and rehabilitate 28 (twenty-eight) communes might be excessive for one organization. Therefore, UNAMIR might consider providing assistance to the two prefectures and/or selected communes.

Reactivating the administrative service, providing interim employment and soliciting contracts which can indirectly provide jobs and stimulate the local economy are essential activities to encourage refugees to return to their home communes.

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Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer
16 March 1995



cc : Mr. Conde
Mr. Ruffi

Sn-S
10/7

15 March 1995

To : Dr. A. H. Kabia
Executive Director

From : Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer
Sector V

Sub : **SITUATION REPORT**

Attached please find **SITUATION REPORT** covering the period 1 March to 14 March 1995.

Best regards.

cc : Political Adviser ✓

SITUATION REPORT
1 March to 14 March 1995

I. GENERAL

In connection with the celebration of the International Women's Day, PIO held discussion with the representative of the Ministry of Family and Promotion of Women Affair (Gisenyi), Mrs. KAYIRERE Annonciate. The discussion centred on the following :

- invitation for UNAMIR, UNHCR and UNHCHR to participate in the celebration, including financial contribution;
- assist in the establishment, in each commune of Gisenyi prefecture, of an "ASSOCIATION OF WIDOWERS ", the aim of which would be to render both material and financial aid with the view to alleviate the predicament in which they find themselves. According to the representative in five communes of Gisenyi prefecture there are over 10 000 widowers;
- assist to place over 6 000 orphans (in same communes) in foster homes in the belief that these children will thrive better in a " normal " home environment than in an institution. This proposal was also presented to Food for Hungry International who have already undertaken such exercise in Mugunga camp (Zaire) and Gitarama and Kigali.

Celebration of International "Women's Day" took place at the stadium where over 5 000 people attended the gathering in the presence of the Bde. Comm., Lt. Col. C. KAYONGA (the Prefect was represented by the sous-prefet). In addition to the usual parade/dance by school children, women and certain commune representatives, the military also demonstrated drill and combat tactics which received a tremendous applause from the crowd.

A number of speeches were made on behalf of the communes and the womenfolk in general. The following messages came through

- The people were reminded of the torture, pain, abuse and killing that the women went through during the war. The wounds were fresh, and the horror was yet to fade but the women were asked to draw their strength from these very incidents and strive for improvement of their lot;
- The women thanked the army for rescuing their country from the clutches of evil forces;

- The message of reconciliation was strong and clear. The women were ready to forgive and bury the past in spite what had happened, but they wanted that the actual killers be brought to bear punishment for their heinous crimes.

The women group of Gisenyi attempted to establish dialogue and exchange information with their counterparts in Goma (Zaire) but unfortunately they were denied authorization from Kigali.

II REFUGEE MOVEMENTS

For the period covered the number of returnees totalled 4 191 of which 1 097 came under the organized repatriation scheme , mostly from Mugunga, Kidaha, Katali and Kibumba camps. Most protection and security problems arising are that refugees are unable to reach departure points without being threatened or robbed. According to HCR Goma one way to improve security for potential returnees is to increase the number of convoys so that these convoys become a daily feature of camp life and not any more a focus of attention. Patrols in the camps, upon deployment of Zairean security forces, will also further protect the potential returnees. With these added measures it is expected to transport 1 000 persons per day. It seems that the majority of the population in the camps want to return to Rwanda.

However, the same cannot be said of the 59/60 caseload who are still kept at the two reception centres in Gisenyi. Out of a total of over 11 000 returnees, only 337 persons were transported to Kibuye and another 329 were resettled in Mutura region. Living conditions at this centres is atrocious, specially the sanitation. The main complaint lodged by the returnees are : lack of sufficient food, health care and medication (malaria and dysentery rampant) and skin disease.

There is a need for action to be taken at higher level to resettle these people or at least for a responsible person to visit these centres and make a firm commitment.

Attached please find the latest population figures at the various camps as provided for by the UNHCR sub-office in Goma.

III. UP-DATE VOLCANO

According to the latest prediction by experts, the chances of an eruption now are supposedly slim but cannot be ruled out. The possibility of Gisenyi and its surrounding being affected by the eruption of NYIRAGONGO cannot be ruled out either.

The contingency plan prepared by MILOB/UNHCR and follow-up activities are being pursued. Main focus is to prevent movements of panic. In the meantime, seismic measurements are being taken on a regular basis and feed-back given to MILOBs to keep abreast with developments. However, it was found impossible to co-ordinate the various aspects of the plan at the sector level due to both the physical and material limitations. It was suggested to organize a meeting involving the main role players (i.e. HCR, ICRC, ifrc, MILOBS and WFP) in Kigali in order that each organization make a firm commitment and task accordingly.

RPA has also agreed to open border post four (opposite KIBUMBA camp) but expects the mass to remain within the agreed site. Any person found wandering outside this limit is subject to arrest or detention.

IV. SECURITY

The security situation in the Sector while still remains calm, there is however an increase in the number of killings and arrest in many communes. This appears to be a direct link with the new influx of organized repatriation. Organized repatriation has quite evidently achieved substantial success in its primary aim of getting people to their home commune but ultimately if it is to expose returnees to intimidation and harassment then the authorities need to be convinced to stop witch-hunting.

This situation is illustrative of what can happen in the absence of a proper judicial system. People have no protection and can be arrested or detained for any reason, usually through fingerprinting. If this continues it will be detrimental to those potential returnees.

At a security meeting, held on 10 March 1995, in Ruhengeri, it was disclosed that the security situation in the prefecture was insufficient and specific cases of "interhware" harassment over the recent weeks were quoted, e.g. mine planting near the market and ICRC compound; shooting incident on the Cyanika road. Four interhware members, from a group of nine, were intercepted in the

outskirts of Ruhengeri who admitted being sent from Zaire with the aim of distablizing the situation in the main cities, especially Kigali. According to the culprits their activities included the planting of mines in key and crucial areas, assassination of high ranking government officials as well as military cadres.

The meeting recommended to intensify security measure through search of all vehicles passing check-points including NGO and UN civilian vehicles; increase number of undercover agents operating in the interior, random patrols in all areas and reinforce security guards at check points. Following this instruction, PIO was stopped and had vehicle as well as handbag searched at the entrance of Ryhengeri town.



Sous-Délégation de Goma
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Goma, le 9 mars 1995

A l'attention de: Toutes les Agences de Goma

Objet: Nouveaux chiffres de population par camp

Suite aux résultats des deux phases de l'enregistrement des réfugiés, qui s'est déroulé à partir du 29 Janvier jusqu'au 6 Février, et aux premiers résultats de la vérification de ces derniers au niveau de chaque camp, nous avons arrêté les chiffres de travail suivants:

<u>Camp</u>	<u>Chiffre de travail</u>
Katale	200.000
Kahindo	108.000
Kibumba	200.000
Mugunga	140.100
Kituku	14.500
Lac Vert	2.100
Tshondo	14.000
ENA	8.242
Réfugiés de Masisi au Lac Vert	10.400
<hr/>	
TOTAL	697.342

=====

A cela il faut ajouter les réfugiés vivant dans la ville de Goma et à Keshero qui continueront à recevoir l'assistance à Mugunga, en attendant d'être installés sur le camp du Lac Vert à savoir:

Keshero	13.233
Goma ville	11.266

Ainsi on arrive à un total général de 721.841 arrondi à 722.000

Ces chiffres pourront être modifiés lorsque la vérification et le triage des résultats de la phase deux de l'enregistrement auront été achevés.

Les chiffres concernant Mugunga et Lac Vert seront également constamment modifiés pour tenir compte de l'installation des réfugiés de la ville de Goma, Keshero, Kituku et Tshondo sur le camp du Lac Vert.

Les réfugiés provenant de Masisi constituent un nouveau groupe de réfugiés qui s'ajoutent aux réfugiés enregistrés lors du recensement. A ceux installés au Lac Vert au cours des semaines passées et qui ont été enregistrés lors de leur arrivée s'ajoute un nombre non défini de réfugiés dont l'enregistrement est en cours.



Joël Boutroue
Chef de la
Sous-délégation du HCR
Goma



Pierre Saille
Coordinateur des Urgences
Programme Alimentaire Mondial
Goma

cc: S. E. M. Le Gouverneur
M. Le Commissaire Urbain
R.O. Kinshasa

File: P/O (Sector 5)
cc: Mr. Conde
Ms. Rafii
SWS
6/3/95

28 February 1995

To : Dr.A.H. Kabia
Executive Director
From : Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer
Sector V
Sub : SITUATION REPORT

Attached please find the SITUATION REPORT covering the period 19 February to 28 February 1995.

In addition I am enclosing a preliminary findings of "Survey of opinions and intentions of IDPs with regard to movement out of Gikongoro camps " prepared by OXFAM. I have suggested to UNHCR representative if a similar exercise is feasible for the camps in Goma.

Best regards.

cc : Political Adviser ✓

SITUATION REPORT
19 February to 28 February 1995

I. GENERAL

At a meeting held between UNAMIR, MILOB and UNHCR, the latter informed about a request made by Bde. Commander, Lt. Col. KAYONGA on the following :

- a) streamline and slow-down the repatriation, especially the organized type, of refugees from the camps in Zaire as this was creating problems both for the home communes (administratively) and the RPA from the security point of view. Home communes are not given sufficient time to
|| establish support structures that will enable those
|| returning to integrate into the community and also
encourage the return of those still at camp[s];
- b) request was also made to re-start the movement of WFP food trucks into Goma. This is rather a turn-about from previous position and attitude expressed by RPA.

After a lengthy discussion, it was agreed to take the following action :

- i) to request UNHCR (Goma) to submit list of returnees (with names and destination) at least 24 hrs. before repatriation so that local authorities and RPA could be informed. || Returnees are to be retained over night, if necessary, at the reception centre in Gisenyi until all formalities are completed;
- ii) UNHCR to improve reception centre as well as provide shelter and other facilities for immigration personnel;
- iii) RPA to provide additional security at border posts by detailing more gendarmerie;
- iv) WFP trucks to be held at the milk factory near TUNBAT HQ, for security reasons. Trucks are to be moved in small numbers (about 8) to avoid congestion at the border;
- v) increase the number of loading/unloading personnel at the border to expediate movement of trucks ASAP.

The above proposals are to be discussed with the Prefect of Gisenyi and the Bde. Commander.

II SECURITY/RPA

The relative calm that this sector had enjoyed so far has somewhat changed in the last ten days. The security situation has become more precarious. Since the incidents at the TUNBATT HQ. and looting of WFP food trucks a number of murders, killings, harassment and arbitrary detention by RPA have been reported. Unfortunately some of the incidents have conflicting reports thus making it more difficult to ascertain facts from rumours. Nevertheless, the following are events which have far more implications in terms of security :

- Dr. Anatole BUCYENDORE, health authority for the Gisenyi prefecture and Director of the hospital was murdered on the night of 22 February, including his two years old son, at his residence, and his wife and other members of the family were gravely wounded (five persons) of which one twelve years old boy was badly battered on his head.

- on the 22/23 February, about mid-night, a group of 10-20 persons attacked the trading centre in MUTURA commune, sector RUSEGA and GASESERO, by firing randomly at buildings and wounding one twelve years boy who the next day identified one of the culprits as a member of "interhwame" before the war and presently residing in Zaire (this was confirmed by the RPA). The infiltrators attacked three separate families, killing nine persons (most of them young girls). These were recent returnees and all of HUTU ethnic group.

These incidents are to some extent inter-related and well co-ordinated. The murdered persons are all of the HUTU ethnic group and according to information obtained from locals all had received some kind of warning, including the doctor.

These were senseless and brutal murders, specially since most of the people involved were young children. One can only infer that this was carried out firstly, as a warning to moderate Hutus collaborating with the government; secondly, to discourage potential returnees claiming that there is no security within the country and thirdly, to discredit and destabilize the government.

The attack on the TUNBATT HQ. could be a message to UNAMIR personnel that our presence is irrelevant to maintaining or promoting peace in the country.

Acts of harassment, killings, torture and arbitrary arrest by RPA are on the rise. This might be RPA's response to recent spat of killings supposedly perpetrated from across the border. The soldiers claim that their arrest is directed at those suspected of taking part in the genocide. But if one looks at the cases reported in KAYOVE commune, the acts committed are excessive and notorious.

Another point of significance related to security is the presence of 11 000 returnees of the 59/60 caseload at the two UNHCR reception centres in Gisenyi. The people have become restive and therefore volatile. The looting of WFP food trucks is traceable to this group. A similar act was planned for 28/02 at CARE way station, but was contained as a result of the intervention of the MILOBS and TUNBATT platoons.

Acts of lootings and demonstrations are likely to recur unless the returnees are resettled at the pre-selected resettlement areas or other communes where land is available. Attention should be drawn to the authorities that this is a **TIME - BOMB** and immediate action is necessary.

III. REFUGEE MOVEMENT

For the month of February 1 -27, 1995, the number of returnees from Goma (Zaire), especially from Kibumba and Mugunga camps was 13 260, of which 4 510 were repatriated under the " organized scheme ". For the same period, those using Cyanika border (through Uganda) totalled 1 657.

The returnees have been transported to their main communes in the southern part of Gisenyi prefecture.

IV. LOCAL AUTHORITIES

The Ministry of Rehabilitation has appointed its representatives in each commune of the Gisenyi prefecture.

WFP has ceased its operation of " food-for-work " programme benefiting primary school teachers, who were finally paid their salaries. Same cannot be said to civil servants working in the communes. In some cases last salary was paid in September 1994.

QUESTIONNAIRE PRELIMINARY RESULTS
Survey of Opinions and Intentions of IDPs with Regard to
Movement out of Gikongoro Camps (January 1995).

A) Background:

There is a great deal of speculation amongst the agencies as regards the intentions, opinions and priorities of Displacees in the Gikongoro camps. All of us talk a great deal about what the IDPs are doing or thinking, and yet, up to now there has been no attempt to collect information in a systematic way from the subjects of our deliberations: the IDPs themselves.

This survey was an attempt to do just that: to ask the same questions in the same way to a meaningful cross-section of the IDP population in different camps, and to record these in such a way as to be able to discern trends, main opinions etc. The main purpose of the survey was to find out:

- i] Displacee intentions as regards movement in case of camp closures.
- ii] Displacee opinions on main obstacles to going home
- iii] Displacee opinions on main things that would help them to go home.

From the Oxfam perspective (and that of any other interested agency) this information may be useful as a general guide for use in planning and preparedness. It may also provide some clues as to the priorities that need to be addressed in assisting with a solution to the current IDP crisis.

Preliminary results simply consist of a tabulation of results as they came in. At present we are unable to do more due to lack of a suitable database program, lack of time and lack of staff (except overworked expat staff) able to work a program if and when we get one. In the longer term however (once databased), the questionnaire has been designed to allow cross referencing of answers/opinions according to age group, gender, and conditions under which interviews were conducted, as well as by camp (already done). Divisions into these different categories may help give a more accurate picture of what is going on at the intrafamily level.

B) Methodology:

Beyond the details of age, gender, camp and interview conditions, the questionnaire can be divided into three main sections:

- a] The first (questions 3-5) helps to determine the history of the interviewee's movements to date.
- b] The second (6, 6a) helps to determine the likely course of action of the IDP over the near future.
- c] The third (6b, 6c and 7) helps us to determine the problems and priorities which must be addressed in the opinion of IDPs in order to assist the process of 'normalization'.

Questions are for the most part of the closed end (multiple choice) variety, so as to make data processing easier. However, in all cases where relevant, the opportunity was given to express other views. Also, in recognition of the complexity of issues

being discussed, the opportunity was given for multiple answers to a number of questions.

Interviews were conducted over a period of 3 weeks (from January 5th) in six IDP camps where OXFAM has been working. All were undertaken by Oxfam's 'animateur' staff on the camps. These are staff members who are themselves displacedes living in the camps, and who have extensive everyday contact with large numbers of camp residents. They are thus trusted, and this, along with the assurance of anonymity for the respondents, has hopefully contributed to accuracy. Animateurs on the camps are of both genders and of various ages.

An initial pilot project of 50 questionnaires was distributed at Kibeho camp, and changes made on the basis of feedback from the interviewing staff there. All participating animateurs then had the purpose of the survey explained to them, were taken through the questions, and were given instructions on how to carry it out. A short discussion was encouraged in all cases to iron out any problems/misunderstandings.

Animateurs were told to approach every tenth person (to give some degree of randomness) in the quartier in which they work, and ask whether they mind answering the questionnaire. It was emphasised that answering the questionnaire (or any single question in it) must be done voluntarily, and no coercion should be used to force people. If someone refused, they were told to count to ten again.

780 questionnaires were sent out to the camps, with different numbers going to each reflecting to some extent the differences in camp sizes. Questionnaires distributed and recieved back in a useable state were as follows:

	NDAGO	KIBEHO	MUNINI	RURAMBA	RWAMIKO	KAMANA	TOT
SENT	170	250	70	110	80	100	780
RECD.	169	180	70	107	50	100	676

Note: not all of the above recd were fully filled out.

C) Some Basic Facts:

1] Under what conditions were answers to the questionnaire given?

Conditions of questionnaire	Ndago	Kibeho	Munini	Ruramba	Rwaniko	Kamana	Total
Large group present	94	112	26	43	4	22	301
Family group present	23	24	10	34	16	20	127
Respondent alone	35	18	23	15	26	56	173
Wrote own answers	0	0	2	0	0	0	2
Details not filled in	17	26	9	15	4	2	73

2] Age groups of respondents:

Under 15 years	17	4	6	2	1	8	38
15 to 25 years	40	37	31	34	11	27	180
26 to 45 years	68	104	23	52	17	39	303
Over 45 years	25	34	10	18	10	22	129
Not filled in	9	1	0	1	11	4	26

3] Male to female ratio for respondents:

Male	65	48	26	33	19	33	224
Female	87	124	43	61	28	62	405
Not filled in	17	8	1	13	3	5	47

4] Length of time respondents have been in the camp:

	Ndago	Kibeho	Munini	Ruramba	Rwaniko	Kamana	Total
less than a week	2	4	4	9	0	3	22
Less than a month	3	10	3	12	4	2	34
Over a month	159	162	62	82	41	86	592
Not filled in	5	4	1	4	5	9	28

D) Main Questionnaire: (Q number on left hand side corresponds to question number in the actual questionnaire)

4) Have you been in other camps before this one?

Yes	37	45	28	45	14	26	195
No	127	135	42	58	34	74	470
Not answered	5	0	0	4	2	0	11

4a) If yes, which camps? (28 respondents mentioned more than one)

Ndago		8	3	1	1	1	14
Kibeho	4		3	12	2	2	24
Munini						1	1
Ruramba		1			1		2
Rwamiko	2	1		2			5
Kamane		3		1			4
Burundi	4	3	2		5	2	16
Kisaro		1					1
Byumba		1					1
Nyacyonga		1					1
Nyamiyaga	8					2	10
Gatumba	1	1	1				3
Nshili	2		1				3
Mubumbano	14	12	10	2	2	4	44
Cyanika	12	15	6	11	4	4	52
Kiraro		1	1	1			3
Kaduha	4	3	3		6	6	22
Mbogo	1	1	1	3			6
Mbazi	1			9			10
Karambi		1					1
Other	1	1		3		3	2

4b) What made you leave that/those camps? (multiple answers given to this by individual respondents).

	Main reason	Contrib. Reason	Not an Issue
Food Problems	14	17	42
Health Problems	17	21	37
Insecurity	179	7	2

Subdivision by camp (4c cont):

	Ndago	Kibeho	Munini	Ruramba	Rwawiko	Kamana	MAJ
	M C N	M C N	M C N	M C N	M C N	M C N	TOT
FOOD DIST	3 6 26	1 8 17	4 1 0	7 4 0	0 0 0	0 0 0	15
HEALTH	16 6 31	1 10 14	1 1 0	0 2 0	1 0 0	0 0 0	19
SECURITY	29 2 4	54 7 0	18 3 0	30 2 0	29 0 0	26 0 0	186
CLOSER HOME	0 2 24	1 1 12	0 0 0	29 1 0	1 0 0	1 0 0	32
OTHER	1 0 0	3 0 0	1 0 0	- - -	- - -	- - -	5

6) Are you intending to return home soon?

	NDAGO	KIBEBO	MUNINI	RURAMBA	RWAMIKO	KAMANA	TOT.
YES	38	8	14	3	4	15	82
NO	124	170	50	50	45	83	522

6a) If told that the camp had to close, where would you go?

Where to go?	Definite	Possible	No	Don't Know
Other Camp	69	96	57	36
Burundi	47	41	51	15
Zaire	325	67	15	10
Tanzania	35	32	37	10
Rome Commune	54	12	81	147
Other (Peaceful country)	20			
Other (Anywhere abroad)	19			
Other (Suicide or Death)	3			

Breakdown by camp (6a):

[illegible]

6b) What is stopping you from returning to your home commune?

	MAJOR REASON	CONTRIBUTING FACT	NOT AN ISSUE
FOOD PROBLEMS	3	53	151
FAMILY HEALTH	18	41	123
LACK OF RESOURCES (GENERAL)	27	9	116
INSECURITY	507	10	9
LACK OF TRANSPORT	1	53	159
OTHER (ARBITRARY ARRESTS)	16	-	-
OTHER (NO CREDIBLE GOVT)	3	-	-

Breakdown by camp (6b):

	NDAGO			KIBEHO			MUNINI			RURAMBA			RWAMIKO			KAMANA		
	M	C	N	M	C	N	M	C	N	M	C	N	M	C	N	M	C	N
FOOD PROBLEMS	2	44	67	0	5	78	1	2	0	0	1	2	0	1	4	0	0	0
FAMILY HEALTH	0	6	71	10	30	50	3	2	0	1	1	2	3	1	0	1	0	0
LACK RESOURCES	4	5	54	5	4	56	7	0	5	7	0	1	0	0	0	4	0	0
INSECURITY	112	2	5	153	7	4	42	1	0	86	0	0	40	0	0	74	0	0
TRANSPORT	0	1	04	0	1	52	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0
ARRESTS (ARB)	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
NO CRED GOVT	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

6c) What factors might convince you to return to your home commune?

	Major ^{Factor} Reason	Contributing	Not an Issue	Negative Fact
Better aid in Home Comms	11	87	105	
UNAMIR high profile in HCs	48	89	64	54
RPA high profile in HCs	4	7	10	300
HRM high profile in HCs	88	68	63	30
Better Information from HCs	45	34	80	
HCR/IOM Transport	9	18	146	
Other (see below)	312			

Breakdown of 'other' (6c):

	NDAGO	KIBEHO	MUNINI	RURAMBA	RWAMIKO	KAMANA	TOTS
RPA back in barracks	10	1	1	9	1	4	26
Effective peace + stability	6		1	1	27		35
Return of refugees	2	10	13	6	4	2	37
Giving back of property and assets to IDPs	2		2				4
Fusion of armed forces	10	27	2	4	2		45
Arusha accords respected	3	110		2			115
Power sharing in Govt (old + new)		17	3	1			21
A trustworthy and effective judiciary		2	1	2	1		6
Effective security both en-route and at home	15						15
Those from who I escaped must leave...						3	3
Security ensured by French				5			5

Breakdown by camp (6c):

	NDAGO				KIBEHO				MUNINI				RURAMBA				RWAMIKO				KAMANA			
	M	C	NP	N	M	C	NP	N	M	C	NP	N	M	C	NP	N	M	C	NP	N	M	C	NP	N
AID RESOURCES	6	68	37		4	14	52				1			4	6			1	9		1			
UNAMIR	7	62	31	22	9	21	30	22	6	1		6	1	2	4		8	3	3		17			
RPA	2	5	8	96	1	2	2	133			9		1		28				32					1
HRMS	11	30	21	12	10	22	42	14	9	1			20	11	4		2	4			36			
INFORMATION	20	21	25		14	5	54		11	4	1			2				2						
TRANSPORT	5	7	83			7	48							1	3		3	2	12		1			
OTHER	48				167				23				30				35				9			

7) What material assistance would you most need if you went home?

	Absolute priority	Less important
Food Distributions in Home Commune	104	37
Sheeting and Building Materials	40	88
Seeds and Tools	89	42
Other (Opportunities for paid work)	20	25

Breakdown by camp (7):

	NDAGO		KIBEHO		MUNINI		RURAMBA		RWAMIKO		KAMANA	
	PRI	LESS	PRI	LESS	PRI	LESS	PRI	LESS	PRI	LESS	PRI	LESS
FOOD DISTRIBUTIONS	37	8	8	5	15	4	37	13	0	2	7	5
BUILDING MATERIALS	11	27	2	12	8	8	13	28	5	1	1	12
SEEDS AND TOOLS	32	7	7	5	11	5	15	22	7	1	17	2
OTHER (PAID WORK)	6	0	0	1	4	4	6	20	4	0	0	0

8) Brief summary of preliminary conclusions:

a] The majority of respondents (64% of those where details are given) are female, with the greatest incidence (47%) in the 26 to 45 age range. To a great extent this mimicks the gender spread in the camps.

b] Most respondents have been in the camp over 1 month. This is partly due to questionnaires being taken round established camp quarters, and also to suspicion on the part of new arrivals.

c] Most respondents (71%) have not been to another camp previously. In this questionnaire we are thus dealing with a relatively stable IDP population.

⇒ d] Of those who had moved camps, insecurity was the major factor in 85% of cases. Patterns of reasons for movement appear surprisingly consistent in the different camps (Q4b).

⇒ e] Again, reasons for people moving to their current camp (4c) shows security as the main issue (a major factor for 72% of answers), compared to food (6%) and health care (7%). This rather negates the argument of NGO services being a significant 'pull factor' in the camps. However, one thing not surveyed, that might, is the amount of NGO jobs and salaries.

An interesting added bit of information that came out is that 12% moved to their current camp to be closer home. These however were almost exclusively at Ruramba.

Security seems to have been of particular concern to those who moved to Rwamiko (94%), Kibeho (90%) and Kamana (96%). The first of these camps has a UNAMIR base in it, and the other two are known to have a strong[ish] militia presence.

⇒ f] 86% of those who answered the question said they were not intending to return home in the foreseeable future. For IDPs in all camps Zaire seems by far the favoured option if the camp closes, with going to another camp as the second option. Very few said they would think about returning home in most camps. In Kibeho, three respondents said they would die fighting or commit suicide rather than leaving the camp. (Q6a).

g] In terms of what is stopping people going home (6b), security concerns are by far the main reasons expressed (92% give it as a major factor). Lack of general resources comes a poor second at under 5%, with food behind that. This again puts doubt on the

arguments that agencies can 'pull' IDPs home by re-deploying resources.

h] Answers to 6c also give some interesting insights:

- ⇒ i] Aid to the home communes is not a pull factor in getting people home (5% consider it a major factor, 43% a contributory one, and 52% consider it irrelevant to their decision).
- ⇒ ii] A UNAMIR presence in the home communes is considered irrelevant to maintaining peace by 25% of respondents, whilst another 23% consider them actually a negative factor. This lack of confidence in UNAMIR is particularly marked in Kibeho and Ndago, where the 'search and cordon' operation was carried out last december, and where they are seen as RPA collaborators.
- iii] Not surprisingly, the majority of respondents (93%) consider a high profile RPA presence in the home communes as a negative factor.
- ⇒ iv] Human Rights Monitors do not enjoy the full confidence of large numbers of the IDPs. 25% of respondents consider them irrelevant to ensuring security, and a further 12% consider them a negative factor. Against this, 35% think they are of major importance. As with UNAMIR, it is the IDPs of Kibeho and Ndago who are least impressed.
- v] Information and transport, the two central pillars of OpRetour do not seem of very great importance to IDPs in terms of getting them home. 50% said that better information would not convince them to go home until a number of other things happened first (28% say it is a major factor). To 84%, the presence of transport is irrelevant.
- vi] Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is the political solutions, and those signifying a measure of reconciliation that are among the greatest crowd pullers home. Out in front by a long way is a return to the Arusha Accord (though note that this appears to be a party line almost exclusively from Kibeho). Issues such as a fusing of the armed forces, power sharing with the old regime and a mass return of refugees are also considered significant.
- ⇒ i] From Q7, it is fairly clear that although food is not a significant pull factor home, food-aid is nonetheless considered essential by a majority of respondents, as are seeds and tools to help rebuild livelihoods. Perhaps surprisingly, there appears to be considerably less importance given to shelter and building materials.

What is given above are just the results of an initial cursory glance at the data coming out of the questionnaires. I felt it important to do so in order to give us some initial impressions and themes, as situations are moving fast at present. Given some time, it would be worth doing a far more in-depth assessment of the data and its significance, so I hope this will become possible over coming weeks. For now though, I hope this initial first step will be of some use to the Kigali office and possibly Oxford (as well as to myself) in understanding a little more of what people are thinking in the camps here.

Mark Radford,
Gikongoro Rwanda, February 1995.

-OXFAM GIKONGORO EMERGENCY PROGRAMME-
SURVEY OF ATTITUDES, OPINIONS AND INTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO
MOVEMENT OUT OF THE IDP CAMPS.

Date: _____ Name of Interviewer: _____

Camp: _____

Circumstances of Interview: Large group present/ Family group present/ Alone.

Other comments? _____

EXPLAIN TO INTERVIEWEE THAT THIS INTERVIEW IS BEING CONDUCTED BY OXFAM IN ORDER TO FIND OUT HOW PEOPLE ARE MOVING, THEIR WORRIES AND THEIR PRIORITIES, SO THAT WE CAN BETTER ASSIST THEM. THEIR NAME WILL NOT BE ASKED, AND THEIR ANONYMITY WILL BE RESPECTED.

QUESTIONNAIRE:

1) Age: Under 15/ 15-25 / 26-45 / Over 45. 2) Sex: Male/ Female

3) How long have you been in this camp? >1 WEEK/ 1 WEEK-1 MONTH/ <1 MONTH

4) Were you in any other camps before you came here? Yes/ No

If yes go to 4[a], [b] and [c]. If no go to 5.

4[a] Which other camps have you been in? _____

4[b] What made you leave those camps?

Problems of Food? Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

Problems of Health? Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

Problems of Security? Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

Other? _____

4[c] What made you come to this camp?

Food Availability: Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

Good Health or other Services: Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

Security: Major factor/ Contribution factor/ Not a factor

Close to Home: Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

Other? _____

5) What is your commune/region of Origin? _____/ _____

6) Are you intending to return there soon? Yes/ No

If Yes go straight to question 7, if No go to 6[a], [b] and [c]

6[a] If you were told that the camp had to close, where would you go?

Another camp: Very likely/ Quite likely/ Not likely/ Don't know

To Burundi: Very likely/ Quite likely/ Not likely/ Don't know

To Zaire: Very likely/ Quite likely/ Not likely/ Don't know

To Tanzania: Very likely/ Quite likely/ Not likely/ Don't know

To Home Commune: Very likely/ Quite likely/ Not likely/ Don't know

Other: _____

6[b] What is stopping you from returning to your home commune?

Food problems: Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

Health of family members: Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

Lack of Resources: Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

Security: Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

Lack of Transport: Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

Other: _____

6[c] What factors might convince you to return to your home commune?

Materials and services provided by the NGOs in the home communes:

Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

A high profile UNAMIR security presence in the home communes:

Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor/ Negative factor

A high profile RPA security presence in the home communes:

Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor/ Negative factor

A high profile presence of Human Rights Observers in the home communes:

Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor/ Negative factor

More or better information: Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

UNCHR Transport: Major factor/ Contributing factor/ Not a factor

Other: _____

7) What material assistance would you most need if you went home? (put in order 1 to 4 with 1 as ^{most} important and 4 as ^{least} important).

Food distribution in home commune : _____

Sheeting and building materials: _____

Seeds and Tools: _____

Other (_____): _____

cc: Mr. Curran
Ms. R. f.

6 March 1995

NOTE FOR THE FILE

You will recall that in my previous "Note for the File" dated 14 January 1995 I had raised the issue concerning assistance to the Prefectures in the re-establishment of the civil administration and the difficulties faced in executing this part of UNAMIR's mandate.

Furthermore, in "Situation Report", covering the period 1 - 8 February, I had suggest to introduce a "Bureau de Commune Start-up Kit" comprising basic office requirements to enable the communes to carry out their work. During our discussion, the response you gave was that UNAMIR does not have the necessary fund and that I should identify a willing NGO to undertake such task.

To this end PIO held discussion with the representative of "FOOD FOR THE HUNGRY INTERNATIONAL" (FHI), USA based NGO, Mr. Daniel Curran, presently assisting the UNHCR in protecting vulnerable families throughout repatriation.

The FHI programme target vulnerable foster families and provide support to prevent the abandonment of orphans (unaccompanied minors) that those families have been fostering. Assistance to families include material assistance; training in income generation; social support and housing construction.

FHI and PIO recognize that the international community cannot socially rehabilitate the society without physical and material rehabilitation of the commune administration. Therefore, FHI has in principle agreed to assist UNAMIR in this effort by refurbishing the commune offices, i.e. provide the basic office requirements (desks, chairs, shelves, etc. All of these items are to be made locally, thus generating income to the local carpenters), including three months supply of stationary.

Mr. Curran will draw-up and prepare a detailed programme budget. He will also contact other funding agencies. However, in order to make the project saleable UNAMIR is requested to provide the necessary logistics, especially transport.

Zena Zelleke
Political Information Officer
Sector V

To ED from Samy Buo. 11 March 1995

If the NGO concerned is indeed prepared and able to assist then it should be encouraged to do so. I therefore recommend that UNAMIR consider providing the logistical support mentioned in the last para. of the PIO's note above. If you agree, PIO should be requested to provide more detailed information on the support the NGO needs.

14 January 1995

NOTE FOR THE FILE

As you are aware the administration is disorganized more so at the Prefecture and commune level. The structures are paralyzed because of the non-existence of human and material resources : lack of trained personnel, absence of office material and equipment, including transportation, etc.

One of the tasks which the PIO is to undertake, is to render assistance to the local government in the re-establishment of the civil administration. This is highly appreciated by all concerned but, at this point in time it has become pointless to talk about giving assistance towards the re-building of the administration since we are unable either to meet the expectations or to deliver the goods needed to bolster the administration. Please find attached the request submitted by the Prefects of Gisenyi and Ryhengeri (Annex A and B)

Another concern is that both Prefet have no means of transport and rely heavily either on PIO or MILOBs for their displacement during their visits to the communes for political rallies. These political rallies are important instruments for reducing the mistrust that prevails between the different political and ethnic groups and also meets UNAMIR's overall objective of promoting peace and reconciliation in Rwanda.

I understand that this is a matter to be decided at the national level but since some sectors have received assistance from UNAMIR, e.g. car for the Kibuye Prefet, I wonder if it would not be possible to render some assistance to this sector. This would not only boost the local administration but also improve UNAMIR's image and credibility which at present is practically nil.

Zena Zelleke

Political Information Officer

cc: Senior Political Adviser

Political Adviser

② To Officer-in-Charge, OSRS
SLS 20/1/95

The issue of assistance - logistical and material - to the administration at the national, prefectural and local levels needs to be addressed in a comprehensive manner in order to establish clear guidelines. I suggest

that you discuss with ED upon his return to see what proposals our Office should make to the OSRS.
Samuel
Political Adviser

cc: ED

① Recorded 21/1/95
OIC. ED/OSRS. DRKASIA

③ Not clear
These discuss
this unclear with
the OSRS who
that your office
should come
with proposals
covering all
the prefectures
25/1/95

REPUBLIQUE RWANDAISE
PREFECTURE GISENYI

Annex A

FOURNITURES DE BUREAU DONT ON A BESOIN DANS LA PREFECTURE GISENYI.

! N° !	DESIGNATION	QUANTITE
! 01 !	TABLES DU BUREAU / PREFET	! 4 !
! 02 !	ARMOIRES POUR CLASSEMENT	! 5 !
! 03 !	COMPUTER ou ORDINATEUR	! 2 !
! 04 !	MACHINES ELECTRIQUES	! 2 !
! 05 !	MACHINES MECANQUES	! 10 !
! 06 !	MACHINES PHOTOCOPIEUSES	! 2 !
! 07 !	MACHINES STENCILEUSES	! 2 !
! 08 !	DICTIONNAIRE : LAROUSSE FRANCAIS	! 10 !
! 09 !	DICTIONNAIRE : ANGLAIS - FRANCAIS	! 4 !
! 10 !	PAPIERS DUPLICATEURS (Grand Form.)	! 200 rames !
! 11 !	PAPIERS DUPLICATEURS (Petit Form.)	! 200 rames !
! 12 !	PAPIERS PELULES	! 100 rames !
! 13 !	PAPIERS MINISTRES	! 50 rames !
! 14 !	CARBONES A MACHINE	! 100 Paquets !
! 15 !	REGISTRES LIGNES	! 50 !
! 16 !	FARDES A ETRINGLE	! 50 !
! 17 !	REGISTRES QUADRILLES	! 50 !
! 18 !	FARDES CHEMISES	! 50 !
! 19 !	CLASSEURS A LEVIER	! 100 !
! 20 !	SIGNATAIRES	! 20 !
! 21 !	CAHIERS DE TRANSMISSION	! 20 !
! 22 !	CLASSEURS A TABLE	! 15 !
! 23 !	BLOCS NOTES	! 50 !
! 24 !	CALENDRIERS	! 30 !
! 25 !	RUBANS / MACHINE	! 50 !
! 26 !	ENVELOPPES KAKI (Grand Format)	! 200 !
! 27 !	ENVELOPPES KAKI (Moyennes)	! 200 !
! 28 !	ENVELOPPES ORDINAIRES	! 1000 !
! 29 !	AGRAFFEUSES	! 50 !
! 30 !	DESAGRAFFEUSES	! 50 !
! 31 !	PERFORATEUR	! 50 !
! 32 !	ATTACHE-LOU	! 50 !

... / ...

! N° !	DESIGNATION	! QUANTITE !
! 33 !	AGRAFFES	! 50 Boîtes !
! 34 !	LIQUIDES DE CORRECTION	! 50 FLANCONS !
! 35 !	DILUANT	! 30 FLANCONS !
! 36 !	ENCRE A TAMPON	! 20 !
! 37 !	TAMPON	! 50 !
! 38 !	LATTES	! 50 !
! 39 !	PAPERS COLLANT	! 50 !
! 40 !	COLLES	! 50 !
! 41 !	CRAYONS NOIRS	! 50 !
! 42 !	GOMMES	! 50 !
! 43 !	BICS MARQUEURS / FEUTRES	! 10 Boîtes. !
! !		! !

Fait à Gisenyi, le 10 janvier 1995



ZILIMWABAGABO CHARLES

PREFET DE GISENYI.

ETAT DE BESOIN PREFECTURE.

Annex B

N°	D E S I G N A T I O N	Q U A N T I T E
01	Ordinateur	2
02	Machine à écrire électronique	13
03	Ruban pour machine électrique	50
04	Machine à écrire mécanique	32
05	Ruban pour machine mécanique	64
06	Photocopieuse	5
07	Stencileuse électrique	2
08	Stencileuse mécanique	5
09	Encre pour stencil	50 tubes
10	Rame pour stencil électrique	10
11	Rame stencil mécanique	30
12	Stylen pour signer sur stencil	10
13	Papier duplicateur A4	40 Rames
14	Papier duplicateur A6	40 "
15	Papier pelure	40 "
16	Agrafeuse	30
17	Boîte d'agrafe	30 boîtes
18	Encre correcteur	20
19	Vernis correcteur	20
20	Encre pour tampon	15
21	Registre indicateur des lettres	25
22	Registre de commerce	1
23	Registre	20
24	Dictionnaire Petit Larousse	15
25	Dictionnaire Français - Anglais	4
26	Agenda 1995	20
27	Note - book	30
28	Calendrier 1995	20
29	Coupe papiers	10
30	Classeurs à suspendre	4.000
31	Chemises pour dossiers	1.000
32	Classeurs	400
33	Lettre - grande	18
34	Marqueur	40
35	Crayon	2 boîtes
36	gomme	20

N°			DESCRIPTION		QUANTITE	
37					10	boîtes
38					10	"
39					10	"
40					20	
41					10	boîtes
42					10	"
43					10	"
44					1.100	
45					1.100	
46					1.100	
47					20	paquets
48					10	
49					10	
50					20	
51					15	
52					6	flacons
53					25	
54					1	
55					2	
56					20	


Fait à Ruhengeri, le 28 / 12 / 1994.

— : Ignace KARIHIRE : —

Préfet de Ruhengeri.

NOTE TO POLITICAL INFORMATION OFFICERS

As you have drawn to our attention in your weekly reports, various prefects within your respective sectors have submitted requests to you outlining the requirements needed to assist them in the re-establishment of civilian administration at the provincial, municipal and local levels. Following discussions held on the subject in the office of the SRSG, and in an effort to develop a coordinated strategy, it would be appreciated if you could outline the perceived needs in your various sectors and make concrete proposals on how UNAMIR could be of assistance to the administrative authorities concerned. These proposals should be submitted to the Political Adviser who will, in turn, bring them to the attention of the Executive Director and the SRSG for appropriate action.


Sammy Kum Buo
Political Adviser
1 March 1995

cc: ED