

ICF4

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

8 SEPT - 8 OCT 1995

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

[2 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]  
CONFIDENTIAL  
KM/WG JUNE 812

UN ARCHIVES

SERIE:	<u>5-1835</u>
BOX	<u>29</u>
FILE	<u>1</u>
ACC.	<u>2011/0195</u>

CZN-1838  
CZG-1805  
CZB-092

UNOG Telecomm Unit  
701-CD5-15  
95 OCT -8 21 00  
T-159

OUTGOING CODE CABLE -8 21:59 SSN-2782

Page 1

IMMEDIATE

SSN-1838

CKZ-185

TO: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
UNPF D/SRSG, BELGRADE

FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO

VIA HQ 2AC

DATE: 8 OCTOBER 1995

CODED CABLE

REF NO: COM 059

TOTAL PGS.

Z-1847

SUBJECT: REPORT ON THE EFFORTS TO RESTORE ELECTRICITY TO SARAJEVO

Today, accompanied by the US Ambassador, I visited the Kokoska Hill feature near Kiseljak to observe the progress of the repairs to the electrical power lines running into Sarajevo. I can confirm, having consulted with senior UN Commanders on the ground, including the Commander of Sector South West, that all sides are working together to effect repairs. We are supporting this effort by providing the following:

- Engineering Assistance. UNPROFOR engineers are giving technical assistance to the mine clearance operation and to the efforts to repair the line. They have also deployed an Explosive Ordinance Disposal team to the site.
- An International Presence. Canadian and French peacekeepers are maintaining a 24 hour presence in the area as a confidence building measure to allay the concerns of the warring factions;
- Medical Support. An UNPROFOR ambulance and medical team are stationed at the scene to provide assistance should the need arise; and
- Coordination. UNPROFOR personnel have provided communications throughout the area for use by all sides. They are also liaising between the parties.

After visiting and seeing the site myself, I believe that compliance with the timings outlined in the agreement for the restoration of electricity to Sarajevo will not be easy. All parties are doing their best to clear the mines and effect the repairs, however, the operation is being carried out in hilly and wooded terrain, where it is difficult to work. The civilian engineers from all three sides are working side by side to restore the lines at great personal risk.

may pls protect BELGRADE TRS



UNOG Telecomm. Unit

Palais des Nations

T-27 CZN-1836  
CZG-1503  
SSN-2778

98 OCT -7 21:51

Page 1/1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Z-1845

IMMEDIATE

TOR/C03  
95 OCT -7 21:21

TO: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
UNPF D/SRSG, BELGRADE

FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO

DATE: 7 OCTOBER 1995

REF NO: COM 58

SUBJECT: SARAJEVO UTILITIES REPORT 001

CKZ-183  
SSN-  
*[Signature]*

TOTAL PGS. 1

The following is the latest update on the status of utilities as of 2032h, 7 October:

1. **Electricity:** The prerequisite mine clearance operation in support of the restoration of the electrical power for Sarajevo was delayed today by the late arrival of the HVO. The BSA have complied fully with the removal of their mines from the Kosoka Hill area and will be ready to begin repair work at 08 1000 October. BiH and HVO forces have yet to agree on the procedures for the clearance of mines in their areas of responsibility however, they have conducted a recce and will likely commence clearance operations 08 0700 October 1995. The repairs to the power line may take up to three days once the de-mining operations are complete due to the difficult nature of the ground.
2. **Gas:** The office of the Special Coordinator, (SCS), for Sarajevo is in contact with the Government of Hungary, who have received approval to resume the exportation of natural gas to Sarajevo from the Sanctions Committee. The Government of the Russian Federation has yet to grant permission to resume the supply. Once permission has been received, depending on technical considerations, it will take a minimum of 6 hours and a maximum of 3 days for the gas supply to reach Sarajevo.
3. **Water:** Although not specifically mentioned in the agreement, running water will be available throughout the city approximately 24hrs after the restoration of power from the double line running from Kiseljic.

Best regards

SRSG

OSRSG

'95 OCT -7 12:30

'98 OCT -7 12:44

CZN -1833

CZG -1500

CZK - 659

CZB - 092

CZM - 187

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

SSN-2774

IMMEDIATE

Page 1 Of 3

TO: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR-HQ, SARAJEVO

INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: UNPF Z- 1842

DATE: 7 OCTOBER 1995

SUBJECT: SARAJEVO AIRPORT; LETTER TO PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC

1. Following my Z-1818 of 4 October, and Annan's response in his 3161 of 4 October, I attach herewith a letter from me to President Izetbegovic on the subject of the Sarajevo airport, which I would kindly ask you to deliver. I suggest that a letter to Karadzic on the matter would best come from you rather than me, in light of the current negotiating context. I thus kindly request that you prepare such a letter based on the contents of the attached, and forward to me a copy. I will in turn send a copy to President Milosevic.

2. Thank you for your continued attention to this complex matter. Regards.

Int Distr: SRSG; FC; ASG M&C; DFC; COS; HAAU; DI; DOA; PLA; PC;  
CoM UNCRO; CoM UNPREDEP; D-SRSG BELGRADE;





United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters  
Siege des Forces de Paix des Nations Unies  
Zagreb

CZN 1833  
2/3

Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
for the Former Yugoslavia

7 October 1995

Excellency,

I am writing to you in connection with the Sarajevo airport, and in particular access to the airport by non-UN, non-EU and non-ICRC flights. This letter is a follow-up to the letter from the UNPROFOR Chief of Mission, Antonio Pedauye, to Minister Muratovic of 30 September, which also addressed the issue of the Sarajevo airport.

As Your Excellency will be aware, the "Agreement on the Re-Opening of Sarajevo Airport for Humanitarian Purposes" of 5 June 1992, provides access to the Sarajevo airport for three categories of air traffic. The Airport Agreement was endorsed by the United Nations Security Council in, *inter alia*, its resolutions 758 (1992) and 761 (1992). The United Nations Peace Forces and UNPROFOR are thus obliged to respect the terms of that Agreement, pending its mutual amendment by the parties signatory to it, and/or further action by the Security Council.

The United Nations can not under the present circumstances permit access to the Sarajevo airport for air traffic that falls outside the categories delineated in the Airport Agreement. We are however committed to full respect for the Agreement as it now exists. This means that the United Nations will in principle permit flights into the Sarajevo airport that fall within the three stipulated categories, whether or not those flights are of UN, EU or ICRC origin.

Each requested flight will need to be reviewed and approved in advance by the United Nations to ensure that it does indeed fall within one of the three categories stipulated by the Airport Agreement. The review by the United Nations of any flight requests will be based solely on application of the criteria established in the Airport Agreement, and will not make distinctions based on the origin of the request. However, any such flights will need to conform to relevant Security Council Resolutions including, *inter alia*, Resolution 713 (1991) and Resolution 942 (1994). UNPF/UNPROFOR will take the measures we consider necessary, including searching luggage and cargo, to ensure respect for those Resolutions and other legal obligations. I ask for your support and understanding in this regard.

H.E. Mr. Alijah Izetbegovic  
President  
The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

2/3

Your Excellency, if you or your authorities have a request for a flight, or become aware of a request for a flight from a third party, please forward the request with all relevant information, such as list of cargo and its destination, type of aircraft, etc... to the UNPROFOR Chief of Mission.

The United Nations, of course, can provide no security guarantees to and accept no responsibility for any non-UN flight that chooses to use the Sarajevo Airport, notwithstanding United Nations authorization to do so. As Your Excellency is well aware, the security situation around the Sarajevo Airport and its approach paths is precarious and dangerous, and is one over which the United Nations does not exercise total control. Any aircraft operator choosing to land at Sarajevo does so at its own considerable risk. In addition, in the event of an aircraft crash, emergency rescue efforts may be hampered by the prevailing security conditions and a lack of suitable rescue equipment. I urge Your Excellency to ensure that any third party submitting a request for a flight into Sarajevo that your authorities support is made fully aware by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the dangers involved in such an enterprise.

I have also taken note of the interest expressed by your government, and by officials of the United States of America, in opening the Sarajevo Airport to civilian and possibly commercial air traffic. As these categories of air traffic are not envisaged in the Airport Agreement, new arrangements will be necessary if such air traffic is to use the Sarajevo airport. In the coming days, UNPF/UNPROFOR officials will be contacting officials of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to begin exploring the possibility of a new regime for expanding the use of the Sarajevo Airport to include civilian and commercial traffic. I kindly request that you instruct the relevant officials in your government to lend the necessary cooperation to the United Nations in our efforts to develop this new regime.

Please accept, Excellency, continued assurances of my highest consideration.



Yasushi Akashi



CZ1 - 1822  
CZ4 - 1491  
SSN - 1820

TOR. COS - 15  
95 OCT -6 11:17

T-16

MOST IMMEDIATE RESTRICTED CABLE

SSN-2756

CKZ-175

Z-1831

TO: AKASHI, UNPF HQ, ZAGREB  
INFO: ANNAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
GAREKHAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
INTERNAL: CMDR  
FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO  
DATE: 6 OCTOBER 1995  
REF: COM0055  
SUBJECT: SARAJEVO AIRPORT

na HQ

*[Handwritten signature]*

98 OCT -6 12:39

UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations

Thank you very much for your comments in cable 1818 on expanded use of Sarajevo airport. I have read it with great interest, and think that it will serve as an excellent basis as we proceed with the elaboration of the new airport regime. Your paper is particularly useful, given that no reference to the airport was made in the ceasefire agreement signed yesterday. I would be interested to have the views of the Office of the Legal Advisor in New York.

CZN-1807

CZG-1482

SSN-2733

Page 1/2

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Z-1816

MOST IMMEDIATE

SSN-1804

CZEK-170

T-23

TO: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO

DATE: 4 OCTOBER 1995

REF NO: COM 52

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM PALE

*[Handwritten signature]*

TOTAL PGS. 2

Please find attached a letter received today from Mr. Krajisnik, President of the Assembly of the "Republic of Srpska."

INT DIST: COMD, COS, COMD/Sector Sarajevo

UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
Palais des Nations

98 OCT -4 16:48

SR26  
OSR26

UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
Palais des Nations  
98 OCT -4 17:04

95 OCT -4 13:58  
103



04-OCT-1995 14:42

BHC COMMAND SARAJEVO

1557240

P.02

2/2

IN 753

Page 1

UTC Time: 95-10-04 13:53.07

NL BURUM LES 493139470=7OKD X 4-OCT-1995 11:51:00 127117

TO : UNMO HQ UNPROFOR SARAJEVO  
FROM: UNMO LO PALE / INTERPRETERS  
DTG : 041247A OCT 1995  
SUBJ: URGENT MESSAGE (LETTER FROM PRESIDENT OF RS ASSEMBLY TO  
MR. PEDAUYE)

PLEASE FORWARD THIS LETTER TO THE OFFICE OF CHIEF OF MISSION  
IMMEDIATELY. THANK YOU VERY MUCH.

"REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA  
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY  
SARAJEVO

04 October 1995

MR. ANTONIO PEDAUYE  
UNPROFOR CHIEF OF MISSION

Dear Mister Pedaue,

I wish to express my gratitude for the efforts you have made concerning the Muslim offensive activities from the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone, because of which they were ceased yesterday.

However, I have to inform you that today they resumed the offensive activities, jeopardizing in that way the peace in Sarajevo once again. As their fighting activities are in progress at the moment, I would ask you to warn the Muslim side again, resolutely demanding that they cease the war operations in that region immediately in order to avoid the escalation of the conflict.

Believing that the peace in Sarajevo is worthy of your efforts, I remain

Sincerely yours,

Momcilo Krajisnik  
President of the Assembly"

CZV 1802

CZG 1477<sup>98</sup> OCT -3

SSN 2723

Z-1811

CODE / CRYPTO FAX

SSN 1796

T-36

## MOST IMMEDIATE RESTRICTED CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF HQ, ZAGREB  
 INFO: ANNAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
 GAREKHAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
 STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
 BACHELET, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO  
 INTERNAL: CMDR, COS  
 FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO  
 DATE: 3 OCTOBER 1995  
 REF: COM0049

HQ ZAG.

CZ-167

MHA-34

OCT  
3 19:24SUBJECT: MEETING WITH KRAJISNIK

I met with Mr Krajisnik in Pale today to talk with him about freedom of movement issues, mainly the movement of Bosnian civilians across Serb-held territory and access to Gorazde.

Krajisnik began the meeting by telling us that Bosnian forces had begun a concerted attack on the broader area of Trnovo this morning. He told us that heavy weapons had been firing from within the Sarajevo exclusion zone. He said that the Serbs might be forced to deploy heavy weapons of their own to counter the threat. "It would be a disaster," he said, "if the war were to return to Sarajevo."

We then discussed the question of Bosnian civilians moving across Serb-held territory around Sarajevo. Krajisnik was very concerned about our plans to support Bosnian civilian movement along the route Sarajevo-Ilidza-Kiseljak. I told him that UNPROFOR was committed to this idea, and that we understood that President Milosevic had explicitly endorsed it. "We will do it with or without Serb consent," I said, "though we would prefer the latter." He argued that there was no reason for Muslims to want to move to Kiseljak anyway, given that Kiseljak was a Croat-controlled town, entirely cleansed of its Muslim population. He said that the only possible reason for routing Bosnian civilians through Ilidza would be to provoke an incident which would bring NATO or the Rapid Reaction Force down on the Serbs. He was most emphatic about this. I asked him whether there were any other routes that the Serbs might find less 'difficult', and mentioned the route Sarajevo-Vogosca-Ilijas-Visoko. He indicated that this would be much better than the Sarajevo-Ilidza-Kiseljak route. He then agreed with my proposal that a meeting should be held in the next several days to discuss the matter. He said that he would ask Mr Stanisic and General Milosevic to attend. I said that we would send comparable representatives on our side. I have asked my staff to set up the meeting for Friday.



CODE / CRYPTOFA~~X~~

2/2

I then moved on to the subject of freedom of movement for UNPROFOR, noting that the Serbs were still making obstructions to UNPROFOR freedom of movement. I protested the boom-gate at Sierra One being closed sometimes (as I could confirm it had been when I passed through yesterday). Krajisnik said that the Serbs would continue to stop vehicles and to check identity cards, and that this was required for security reasons. I indicated that this was unacceptable to us, in that it was a violation of the Serb 'Framework' and of our understanding that freedom of movement should mean no clearance, no notification, no stops, no delays, no checks.

Finally, we discussed access to Gorazde. I asked the Serbs to guarantee two things: freedom of movement for UNPROFOR, UNHCR and ICRC to Gorazde from Sarajevo and along the route used by convoys coming from Belgrade; and support in our efforts to improve the route Sarajevo-Trnovo-Foca-Gorazde. He said he had no objection in principle to either of these propositions, but that he would have to consult with his colleagues. He proposed that the matter be taken up at the meeting planned to discuss freedom of movement for Bosnian civilians.

Throughout our meeting of almost two hours, I had the impression that President Milosevic had told him that he could not maintain his defiance of freedom of movement, and that he was therefore trying to negotiate certain concessions from us. Despite this, he seemed much more relaxed than when I saw him last, about a week ago. He repeated several times that the war was drawing to a conclusion, and was clearly thinking ahead.

**CODED CABLE**

CZV 1772

CZG 1454

CZK 621

'98 SEP 30 15:22

SSN 2691

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Page 1 of 1

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE: 30 SEPTEMBER 1995

NUMBER: Z - 1785

SUBJECT: Transport of Bosnian Officials

SEP 30

15:22

1. Re your code cable 3129 of 29 September 1995 asking for our comments about the offloading of FM Sacirby from a United Nations aircraft, we and UNHCR are unaware of any refusal to allow him to board an aircraft. Mr. Pedauyé's office has informed us that they believe Mr. Holbrooke was referring to a comment made to him in NY by FM Sacirby and not to a specific incident. We have never to our knowledge refused FM Sacirby access to our aircraft; in fact, he is scheduled to fly to Sarajevo on our Monday morning flight. We go to great lengths to accommodate Bosnian Government officials when they request transport, sometimes on very short notice, and we would be grateful if the US Mission would consider such allegations more carefully before charging us with actions that are apparently unfounded and contrary to our policy and practice. If we receive any further information on this issue, we will pass it on.

2. While we cannot speak for UNHCR nor for the policies implemented by the countries who participate in the airlift, our own policy on carriage of non-UN personnel has not changed from that contained in the SRSG's Directive No. 18/95 of 8 March 1995. When the airport re-opened, we restricted non-UN personnel from using our aircraft for a period of seven days while there was still a threat of airstrikes. Following that period, we resumed our previous practice, with one exception. We have not yet resumed booking the category of Bosnians designated "members of the BH Presidency". This particular category has created many problems in the past and has required an inordinate amount of work by our own staff. We are currently considering whether it would be an opportune time, as road access to Sarajevo has improved, to delete this category of passenger. We will, of course, ask your advice should we change our current policy.

DIST: FC, DFC, COS, ASG/M+C, DOA, DI, PROTOCOL, CoM/CMDR UNPROFOR



CZN 1769

CZG 1452

DATE 17 SEP 1995

Page 1

T-21

'98 SEP 30 12:15  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Page 1

1/2

Z-1782

MOST IMMEDIATE

SSN 2688

CKZ-158

SSN 1780

TO: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO

DATE: 30 September 1995

REF NO: COM036

TOTAL PGS. 2

SUBJECT: Dr. KARADZIC'S REMARKS ON THE PEACE PROCESS

INT DIST: COMD, COS

1. I am forwarding, herewith, a copy of Dr. Karadzic's remarks on the peace process. My impression is that Dr. Karadzic is preparing his people to accept both the peace process and its possible outcome which may fall short of what the Serb leadership has been promising.

*[Signature]*  
SEP 30 11:49

CZV 1769

T-21

2/2

## EXTREL PRESS REVIEW

Sarajevo, September 27 (Glas Srpski/Srna)

In his first official statement, Karadzic estimated that the New York agreement represents "a further recognition of the principle adopted in Geneva on 8 September, which are based on the recognition of reality and the equality of the RS and Bosnian Federation, as well as the recognition of the existence of the three nations in these areas. Karadzic estimated that a political solution might be expected to be reached in near future." That political solution may be painful for all three warring sides, but the significance of peace will prevail".



EZN 1768

CZG 1451

'98 SEP 30 12:15

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Z- 1781

MOST IMMEDIATE

T-21

Page 1

1/2

CKZ-157

SSN 2687

SSN 1775

TO: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO

DATE: 30 September, 1995

REF NO: COM035

TOTAL PGS. 2

SUBJECT: RESTORATION OF UTILITIES IN SARAJEVO

INT DIST: COMD, COS

1. Under the auspices of UNPROFOR and the Office of the Special Coordinator for Sarajevo, Bosnian Serb and BiH government representatives held a meeting on 27 September, to discuss the restoration of normal supplies of utilities to Sarajevo. The outcome of this meeting was an agreement by the parties to restore electricity to the Sarajevo area as soon as possible, depending upon the extent of repairs needed on relevant electricity infrastructure.

2. I am forwarding, herewith, a copy of the agreement.

Regards.

CZV 1768

2/2

# MINUTES OF THE AIRPORT UTILITIES MEETING 27/9/95

It was agreed between the two sides that:

- 1 Electricity should be restored to the area of SARAJEVO as soon as possible.
2. Repairs will be carried out as follows :
  1. SOKOLAC-VOGOSCA (on Thursday / Friday)
  2. VOGOSCA-VESELICI ( for 3 days starting on Saturday, under responsibility of SSVO)
  3. KISELJAK-RELJEVO (Political and Humanitarian Affairs will request agreement through UNPROFOR HQ of the 3 parties concerned.)
  4. RELJEVO-BLAZUI
3. SCS will organize technical meetings to prepare the work, starting as soon as possible, over Article 2.3
4. SCS (M. J PERREAUX) will carry out reconnaissances for materials for VOGOSCA sub-station, and will suggest ways of supplying them.
5. The lines discussed in Article 2 will be energized once all 4 repair missions have been carried out. The parties agree to the principle of exchange of energy, as before 26 May 1995, and will discuss longer term economic arrangements at the next meeting.
6. The next meeting will also discuss the repairs of other lines.

*Amer Hadjomeragic*  
AMER HADJOMERAGIC

*Maksim Stanisic*  
MAKSIM STANISIC

*M. J. Perreaux*  
FOR UNPROFOR PHA.



CZN - 1767

CZG - 1450

Z - 1780

JUL 2 4 11 PM '95

Patrol 1000 04 000

T-20

CKZ-156

08 SEP 30 12:05  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Page 1

1/5

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

955N 2686

155N 1778

95 SEP 30 11:44  
CDB

TO: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB  
INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO  
DATE: 30 September, 1995  
REF NO: COM038

TOTAL PGS. 5

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT IZETBEGOVIC'S INTERVIEW ON BOSNIAN TV

INT DIST: COMD, COS,

On 27 September, BiH President Izetbegovic gave an interesting interview on Bosnian TV to discuss, essentially, his perception of the results of the trilateral Foreign Ministers' peace talks in New York on 26 September. I am forwarding, herewith, a copy of the President's interview.

**INTERVIEW**  
**Mr. Alija IZETBEGOVIC**  
**President of the BiH Presidency**

Bosnian Television  
27 September 1995

Prepared by: Office of the Chief of Mission  
UNPROFOR HQ Sarajevo

**Q: Yet another round of the peace talks has been finished. How would you comment it?**

Izetbegovic: "To use sporting language - the first round (in Geneva) was tied and we won the second round. That is my estimation. The statement, or to be more precise translation of the document from New York, is rather bad. I will try to explain later on in simple terms what this is all about. But first, there is a wrong information here. Nothing has been signed in New York last night; we are still not signing anything. We will sign only a complete package. Something has been agreed last night but with one remark here - nothing is agreed until everything is agreed."

**Q: It seems that there are couple of very important provisions. What has been achieved in practical terms?**

Izetbegovic: "The meeting was a further development of the Geneva principles. We can say that we have two groups of issues that we had reached an agreement on. The first group concerns the future institutions of the Republic of BiH and also procedures to achieve that i.e. the elections. Bosnia-Herzegovina shall have the Parliament, the Presidency and the Cabinet. Secondly, we shall achieve this through free and democratic elections. Preconditions for elections have also been mentioned -- freedom of movement, restoration of human rights, return of the people to their homes or, if they do not want to, a just compensation. That means that the pre-conditions is restoration of a currently disturbed demographic ratio which implies return of refugees. Also, to assure social conditions. The translation is difficult, but essentially this involves political conditions for free elections -- free media, free political activities, etc. We had a very difficult diplomatic fight yesterday on the issue of elections. Our people have to bear in mind that through this the future institutions of the state has been established. Of course, the Constitution of BiH is mentioned here and that was not the case in previous documents. By this we have defined a state organisation."

**Q: The issue of the elections was one of the key ones. It seems that our initial decision not to take part in the meeting in New York has contributed to the better solution?**

Izetbegovic: "What happened was the following. The US negotiators took our paper -- the paper that had been agreed with us -- to Milosevic. They spent some 7 or 8 hours and we had been informed that they left with an entirely different paper. And instead of coming to Sarajevo again for further consultations, they left for the States. We have learned about



- 1 the content of the paper 30 minutes before the main news broadcast three nights ago. We reacted promptly and sent a message we would not be coming to the States. The negotiators were already half way to the States. I believe over Ireland. President Clinton ordered them to come back immediately after the news reached the States. They first landed in Ireland and then here. The most difficult round of the talks had started and lasted for almost 40 hours. Their return i.e. our decision were a consequence of changes to the document which had been previously agreed with us.

Yesterday's arguing, which ended only 15 minutes before the meeting in New York, concerned only a word or two in the text. The entire text was agreed except for the part on the elections. One would say that a word is not very important but it is. We insisted on so-called direct elections for the Parliament and the Presidency. Milosevic kept refusing that and the clock was ticking. We stated we would not give in on this issue. because of their opposition to free and democratic elections we could see that the other side had some hidden thoughts. We insisted to the last minute. At 12,45 -- and the meeting was due to start at 13,00 hour -- we instructed Sacirbegovic to accept the paper provided that there is a clear statement from the Contact Group and the American side that a term 'elections' means free and direct elections. Also, we demanded that the US side clearly express support to the integrity of BiH and to pledge to oppose any partition. As you know, President Clinton said that last night and it is a very important thing. So the document from New York should be interpreted together with the statement of the Contact Group and the statements of the officials."

**Q: The French Foreign Minister stated that it would be better to have longer talks if that would mean a comprehensive solution?**

**Izetbegovic:** "I fully agree with that but the most important thing is to assure guarantees for the implementation of what would be agreed. We are paying special attention to that. As you have probably heard, the implementation should be assured by the arrival of NATO forces and some others. We believe that that would include some 50,000 men, half of them Americans. This, of course, is not without difficulties. The US Congress has to approve arrival of US troops here. Some are sceptical about that but I believe that President Clinton would be able to persuade the Congress that (the deployment of the US troops) would be in the interest of the US. The current Administration really needs peace in due course. The question now is where these forces will be deployed. As far as we know, these forces shall be deployed throughout of Bosnia and shall represent a factor responsible for implementation of provisions relating to pre-conditions for free elections -- return of refugees, other political pre-conditions, free media, etc. The commission of OSCE shall only confirm whether all the above had been fulfilled. If it is not, we are not taking much risk and I will tell you why. The existing institutions of BiH continue their existence and functioning until the new institutions are in place."

**Q: How strong, if any, were the pressures from the US side?**

**Izetbegovic:** "I cannot say that there had been any direct pressure. I would describe only a threat or a blackmail as pressure. However, the entire process is somehow a pressure and we all feel it. It would be enough to say that we had some 20 to 30 telephone conversations between Washington and Sarajevo. But had we not applied pressure from our side by saying that we would not come to New York. That was a kind of pressure on



our side. But, there were no direct pressures on us."

**Q:** We have heard that the Americans are coming again to Sarajevo as early as tomorrow. According to some information, they would insist on cease-fire. Is something like that acceptable to BiH?

**Izetbegovic:** "First of all, I believe that Holbrook will come in two days. They are probably coming to seek cease-fire in order to, as they say, create conditions for normal continuation of the talks. True, the conditions for the talks would be more normal without fighting, that is the fact. However, it is also the fact that we cannot accept cease-fire under any terms. We have stated several quite reasonable conditions. First of all, we demand full normalisation of the situation which includes restoration of utilities, opening of the Kiseljak-Sarajevo road for civilian traffic -- now it is opened only for the UN convoys -- and to assure open road to Gorazde. Gorazde is in a very difficult humanitarian situation, there is a shortage of food and medicine. Of course, we cannot accept a cease-fire in such situation. As for Banja Luka area, our precondition is elimination of factors allowing continuation of ethnic cleansing in a aggressor-held territory and in Banja Luka in particular. In our opinion, this can be achieved through replacing military authorities with civilian ones. We believe that it would be for better. That implies that Karadzic's paramilitary troops would leave Banja Luka and we would commit ourselves not to enter the city."

**Q:** Can we say something more about the interview that President Tudjman of Croatia had with Le Figaro during his visit to Paris. His views presented in the interview certainly caused a lot of disturbance in the public and our media are full of comment. Are you surprised by such statements which bring us back to the time when our relations were not very harmonious?

**Izetbegovic:** "To be quite frank, I am not surprised. I can say that I am slightly concerned or saddened about such statement. But, I am not surprised. If that was Mr. Kohl or Mr. Chirac who stated that then I would have been surprised."

**Q:** Just to remind - Tudjman said that the world and Europe could not allow creation of the Islamic state in Europe; that Croatia has a mission to make Bosnia Europe; that the famous map on the back of the menu expressed reality on the ground. How true is this about the map?

**Izetbegovic:** "I can say that there are realities in BiH, like 200,000 of our armed soldiers. That is a major reality. Conscious Bosniak people is another major reality. President Tudjman used to say that the Muslims are, in fact, Croats but not aware of that. I kept convincing him that that was not the case. Before the elections he had been saying that HDZ would win over 50% votes in BiH. I told him that it would be 17-18% and that was the case. Only some 1% of the Muslims voted for HDZ. Others had nothing against HDZ but they simply did not feel as Croats. So, these are realities. The reality is a general support to Bosnia as a proud victim of the aggression. In spite of the aggression we stood still and abide principles of humanity. That recognition is a reality. I have no fear, when travelling abroad, that someone will ask me about our Army destroying churches, bridges, etc. I do not have that problem. I am well received everywhere, not as Alija Izetbegovic but as the president of the state which has justified its name of a civilized country. And to



say one more thing. The reality is that at least a billion of people, in the west and even more in the East, are always in support of BiH. Everyone should bear that in mind. I believe that very soon only two lobbies will exist in the world. A Jewish one and the one of the Bosnian Muslims. No one will dare to touch us in the future without putting at risk major national interests. These are realities."

**Q: How would you comment statements on 'europeisation' of the Bosniaks and the Federation being a way of preventing creation of the Islamic state?**

**Izetbegovic:** "First of all, President Tudjman knows that Europe had been simply pushing us to create Islamic state. Was that not the idea of the Owen-Stoltenberg plan? Was it not us who have rejected it? They had been offering that solution to us. However, the Bosniak people have linked their fate with unified Bosnia and we are persistently striving for that. The Islamic state had been offered to us and President Tudjman knows that better than many others. He have rejected that. As for 'europeisation' of the Muslims - we are European nation and we are European country. But I am emphasizing that merely as a geographic fact. That is the fact. If I would go to Africa and say that I was an African no one would believe that. I do not think it is correct to divide the world into Europeans and others. That is like an insult for other nations. I know for the fact that many feel insulted by such categorisation. Finally, Karadzic and Mladic are Europeans, too. And the General that destroyed the Old Bridge in Mostar is a European, too. And that makes no good to him. People should be divided into civilised and barbaric ones. That is the only true division."

**Q: Have you raised these issues in a meeting with the German ambassador today?**

**Izetbegovic:** "We discussed support of Germany to the Federation. It was said that Germany and France jointly established the Action Group for assistance to BiH. They will probably asked other countries to join and I think they will be successful in that. That is one of the realities one has to take into account. We have managed to convert even a sceptical ones in the world through our policy of insistent on human right and freedoms. The fact is that there is a certain level of democracy in spite of some problems; after all, we are a country in war. I have recently been in Great Britain and I was very well received. I heard statements from them, a very clear ones, I always wanted to hear. That shows that even the most persistent 'neutral' ones are slowly siding with us. I would like to remind you on a mathematically precise statement of John Mayor - 'We support united Sarajevo as capital of united BiH'. That was said in the Downing Street few days ago. We have support of France, Germany, US. We have unconditional support of the Islamic countries. We do not have to fear for our future."

**Q: Tudjman also said that there are some pragmatic people in BiH Government?**

**Izetbegovic:** "I do not know what he meant. You know, pragmatics are those who can see but are pretending not to see; who remember things and pretend not to. We are sometimes pretending, in the interest of the future of our people and the state, not to see what we see and not to remember what we do. There are some things that we shall never forget but we are trying to look into future. These are, I believe, pragmatics.... And as for the problem of Jajce, I have a good news. Mr. Zubak promised to me today in a meeting that Jajce will very soon be opened for return of all refugees, including Bosniaks."

CZ N 1773

CODED ~~SECRET~~ - 36

CZ 6 1455

SSN 2692

Page 1

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

~~EXR~~

EX2 - 159

SSN 1781

~~SECRET~~  
*Sturgeon*

16:02  
C86

Z - 1786

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB  
INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
INT DIST: COMD, COS, HPHA, PINFO  
FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO  
DATE: 30 September 1995  
REF NO: COM040

TOTAL PGS. 2

SUBJECT: LETTER SENT TO MINISTER MURATOVIC IN RESPECT OF THE  
USE OF SARAJEVO AIRPORT

Following our conversation, I send you herewith a copy of the letter that I sent today  
to Minister Muratovic.

98 SEP 30 17:14

Palace des Nations

Office of the Secretary-General

1557240 P.01

BHC COMMAND SARAJEVO

30-SEP-1995 16:54

0134

1995-09-30 16:10  
CITY

ZAGREB

032



C2N 1773



**UNPROFOR**  
UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE

2/2

30 September 1995

Dear Minister,

I would like to confirm in writing our recent conversation concerning the use of Sarajevo airport.

We have no objection to the use of the airport by aircraft whose missions, in the determination of UNPROFOR, fall within the scope of the airport agreement of 5 June 1992. This would include aircraft associated with the distribution of humanitarian goods on territory controlled by the Bosnian Serbs.

In this regard, I am pleased to inform you that UNPROFOR has no objection to the flight referred to in your letter 01-91-1361/95 of 20 September 1995, on the understanding that the goods transported will be unloaded and distributed by UNPROFOR or UNHCR.

Yours sincerely.

Antonio Pedauye

Chief of Mission

Dr Hasan Muratovic  
Minister  
Chairman of the State Commission  
for Cooperation with the United Nations  
Sarajevo

ZAGREB

BHC COMMAND SARAJEVO

1557240

P.02

30-SEP-1995 16:54

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1995-09-30 16:10

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1995-10-01 17:27 0134

ZAGREB

023

01-OCT-1995 17:59

BHCR COMMAND, SARAJEVO

1557240 P.01

CZN 1777

Palace 080 401015

CZG 1457

'98 OCT -1 18:05

SSN 2696

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Page 1

Z-1790

MOST IMMEDIATE

SSN 1784

CKZ 1720

TO: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

VIA HQ

FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO

DATE: 30 September 1995

REF NO: COM041

TOTAL PGS. 2

SUBJECT: "SPEAKER OF RS ASSEMBLY". KRAJISNIK. COMMENTS ON  
"FURTHER AGREED BASIC PRINCIPLES"

INT DIST: COMD, COS

1. For the first time since the New York trilateral meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina and FRY on 26 September, a prominent member of the Bosnian Serb leadership, "RS Assembly Speaker" Momcilo Krajisnik, has publicly questioned the implications of some of the "Further Agreed Basic principles". Some of these principles, Krajisnik objects, are contradictory to some of the principles previously agreed to in Geneva on 8 September. You may find attached a copy of Krajisnik's remarks on Bosnian Serb TV on 29 September.

Regards



## BOSNIAN SERB RADIO NEWS SUMMARY 29 September 1995

"Speaker of RS Assembly", Momčilo Krajišnik, stated for the Serb radio that "the results of the unilateral summits in Geneva and New York are important and necessary steps towards establishing peace in BiH". He further said:

"In principle this agreement and the principles worked out there are a follow-up of the solutions actually leading to peace and we should be satisfied in that regard. When I say that we aspire to peace, then I think of a just peace and realization of the minimum of the interests and strategic goals of the Serb people, not peace at any cost and the peace that is very often insisted on: peace with no alternative. The agreement itself is characterized by a kind of caution, which we always have to bear in mind.

Since we have to join the future negotiations with caution, I am worried by certain things that are alterations in the New York paper compared to the agreement reached in Geneva. We settled certain things at the beginning of all agreements, this being that the Serbs would make a compromise by accepting a loose union of two entities, in which there would be a link between two republics; for, if RS is one entity, then the Federation as RBiH has to be the other one. This link must be created in order to preserve the reputation of the international community and to overcome the split in the diametrically different views on the resolution of the BH crisis by this compromise, the views being: the Serbs wanted a complete secession, an independent state and division of BiH, and the Moslems, since they are denied the right to build their state, want a shell, a BiH to stay, which would, in that imaginary solution, nevertheless satisfy all of the three sides.

It means that accepting this compromise we have accepted foreign affairs to be on the level of the union, in other words for international recognition to be on the level of the union and not on the level of republic. But there is no reason for international economic relations which can be maintained on the level of republic to be on the level of the union only because the union should deal with something. With this compromise, with the obligation for RS to be compact, we have also accepted this union to stay. We wanted to do it because it is the time of compromises, the time of solutions and the time of establishing peace. The Geneva paper itself contained those initial signs of agreement and compromise. The New York paper has actually altered the Geneva paper to a certain extent, which is worrying and one can clearly see from the New York paper the desire of Moslem and Croatian mentors and Moslem themselves to bring back through the back door the train that had passed the station. In other words they want to establish the state of BiH. If BiH is a state only because it is a UN member, then it is a state. However, since a state is not only the one that is a UN member, but it is the transferred authority of the two states (RS and BH Federation), this is sneaking through the back door."


Palace

CNZ 953/ CYZ 938 P 1

'98 SEP 30 -5 :30

**OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSQ/FC  
INFO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO attn COM/ CMDR UNPROFOR  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 29 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: **3129**  
SUBJECT: Transport of Bosnian Officials



The United States Permanent Mission called this evening to relay a strong protest from Mr Holbrooke to the effect that Foreign Minister Sacirbey had been offloaded by the United Nations from the aircraft on which Mr Holbrooke was travelling to Sarajevo. The US alleges that UNPROFOR and UNHCR are applying a more restrictive interpretation of the Airport agreement than even the Serbs themselves. We would appreciate your urgent comments on this particular episode as well as your current policy on the travel of Bosnian officials on United Nations aircraft.

RECEIVED  
OPERATIONS  
29 SEP 1995



CZV-1747

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UNPROFOR  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

T-34

1/2

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NY  
AKASHI, SRSG, UNPF HQ

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR  
GENERAL SMITH

FROM: EAGLETON, SCS, SARAJEVO

SCS REF: WE/422/tkn

DATE: 26 SEPTEMBER 1995

NUMBER: Z - 1760

SUBJECT: SARAJEVO UTILITIES UPDATE

CKZ-151

98 SEP 26 17:50  
70K CD3  
95 SEP 26 16:59UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations

The technical level meeting on utilities at the Sarajevo airport scheduled for 25 September did not take place because of logistic problems getting the delegations (Bosnian Serbs and BiH) there. Another meeting is scheduled for 27 September. Meanwhile the situation is as follows.

Gas

On 22 September the Government of BiH formally requested the Security Council Sanctions Committee to request Hungary to open the valve to the FRY and in turn BiH. As of 26 September the Committee had not yet issued a ruling. From our contact with Mr. Aleksander Ilitchev the Secretary of the Committee regarding developments, our understanding is that approval is awaiting word from the delegate of the Russian Federation who is in consultation with his government regarding their position. This may be merely a procedural problem or it could be related to the issue of payment. The Russian gas company is owed over US\$100 million for gas consumed in the FRY and BiH since the beginning of the war. Payment of this amount might be set aside, but payment for new gas might be required. Minister Muratovic tells us BiH representatives are active in New York and Hungary to try to expedite opening of the Hungarian valve. He believes Serbia will also be in touch with Russia in this regard and that in any case the Hungarians have said they will open the valve by 28 September.

At recent airport meetings and in Budapest the Serbs, Bosnian Serbs and Bosnians agreed to our technical proposal for opening all valves followed by international technical monitoring. The difference from past agreements is that all valves in BiH are to be opened. This includes the second main valve to Sarajevo and the valve to Visoko and Zenica. These have been closed since 1992. Representatives of ODA (working under our umbrella) have opened the second main valve north of

SRSG

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2/2

Sarajevo in preparation for the arrival of gas. They have also reced the gas pipeline for any new damages caused by NATO or RRF. They found no visible damage, but have proposed a Quick Impact Project to dig down to the pipeline in selected sites to confirm this. The monitoring system we proposed is an extension of the system we had in place in Sarajevo last winter. This system gives daily access to the valves to internationals who pass the technical information to both sides and make it public. They are also on hand to identify problems of a technical nature and begin generating the support needed to solve them. This system was successful last winter and we had very few 'political' problems with gas from December 6 through April 5.

### Electricity

At an airport meeting 18 September, the two parties agreed to UNPROFOR/SCS recce teams for the electrical network. The recces have been completed on the Bosnian and Bosnian Serb areas. The recce needed in the area under the control of the HVO has not yet happened, though Minister Muratovic has assured us that there will be no problem. The damages identified are not significantly more than the last time we checked in August. It appears that all damages on the BS side were from BiH army activity not NATO. To get some electricity restored will take a very small amount of money/materials, about US\$15,000. Other repairs will also follow on. We hope to start urgent repairs on Thursday 28 September.

### Water

The Bacevo plant is fed from electricity supplied through the lines passing through HVO, hence the urgency on that repair.

### Conclusion:

The BiH and Bosnian Serbs appear to be ready to restore utilities to Sarajevo. Gas should come first a few days after the valve is opened at the Hungarian border with Serbia. Electric repairs could take 10 days to 2 weeks with water shortly thereafter. However, experience cautions us to be prepared for delays.

701 003  
25 SEP 26 17:28



C2N 1729

C2K 583

C2G 1418

SSN 2625

CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

**IMMEDIATE**

95  
SEP 23  
Page 2 of 7

TO : PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO

INFO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM : AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE : 23 September 1995

NUMBER : 2 1741

SUBJECT: WESTERN BOSNIA

1. With reference to your COM 017 of 22 September.
2. We take a broader view of UNPROFOR competence in the area of human rights and humanitarian monitoring based not only on SCR 982 but various other Resolutions and SG Reports. We also believe SCR 1016 both in its preamble and in operative paragraphs 7 and 8 puts us under some immediate obligation to obtain as much information as possible about events on the ground. (Our Cable of 21 September was not of course limited to seeking access for Human Rights Teams).  
... Attached is an outline of some of the operative SCRs etc which refer to UNPROFOR in terms which can and should be interpreted as giving a mandate for work on Human Rights.
3. The fact that neither the Bosnian Government nor the Bosnian Serbs have been allowing access to UNCIVPOL underlines the need to press for this access at all levels. In this regard we note a welcome improvement in the access of UNMOs to Western Bosnia in the last few days.
4. We understand also that the parties are now involved in negotiation on a series of further Agreed Principles and that these are expected to include a package dealing with human rights (paras 2.4 and 3.2 of the Geneva Agreement). We also understand that the parties may have different views on which bodies should take the lead in human rights monitoring. However we are faced with a pressing need to obtain information and to report to the Security Council through the Secretary-General now, and can only do this with the combined resources that we have.

95  
SEP 23 15:21  
VVK

95  
SEP 23 14:27  
SARAJEVO

Internal Distribution:

SRSG/OSRSG

98  
SEP 23 15:50

5. The concept of the UN operating immediately after a military offensive with combined teams of people from various parts of the UN system has been recognized and supported by New York - and has proved very successful in the period following Operation Storm in Croatia.
6. The references to public commitments made by Foreign Minister Sacirbey will not be found in UN documents but are in the public domain, having been made by him in the media. (We attach some relevant papers).
7. I recognise that these matters are sensitive and that they may have serious political implications. However my experience in recent months has shown that only by pressing hard at all levels, as often as is sensible, do we obtain access to areas of interest to us, and of course of potential embarrassment to the parties. My letters to President Izetbegovic and President Zubak are an important part of this pressure and I would be grateful if they could be passed on without delay.

Regards.



### Outline of UNPROFOR Human Rights Mandate

The mandate of UNPROFOR in the area of human rights is primarily defined by SCR 982 (1995) which approved the provisions of the SG's Report of 22 March 1995 (S/1995/222) establishing UNPROFOR as an entity independent from UNCRO and UNPREDEP, and SCR 941 (1994) which provides for monitoring in "areas of concern". In addition, SCR 947 (1994), which approves the portion of the Report of the Secretary General of 17 September 1994 (S/1067) relating to the role of the civilian police, provides further definition for UNPROFOR's human rights role.

The relevant provisions of these SCRs and of the approved portions of Reports of the SG include:

- A. "improved observance of human rights, including appropriate international monitoring thereof is an essential step towards restoration of confidence between the parties and building a durable peace" (SCR 982/1995, Preamble);
- B. "decides that all previous resolutions relating to UNPROFOR shall continue to apply" (SCR 982/1995, para. 2);
- C. "Reaffirms that all parties to the conflict are bound to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law and in particular the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949" (SCR 941/1994, para. 1);
- D. "Requests the Secretary-General to arrange, when conditions permit, the deployment of UNPROFOR troops and United Nations monitors in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, and other areas of concern, and to intensify his efforts in this regard" (SCR 941/1994, para. 6);
- E. "approves the proposals [in SG report of 17 September 1994] concerning UNPROFOR's activities in relation to mine-clearance, public information and civilian police" (SCR 947/1994, para. 1); and
- F. "The continued harassment of minorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly by the Bosnian Serbs, has underlined the need for a more comprehensive mandate for UNCIVPOL. Currently, civilian police have a limited mandate to operate in Srebrenica, Tuzla and Mostar, an unofficial agreement to operate in Sarajevo and Gorazde, and no formal mandate to operate in other areas, including Velika Kladusa. It is my view that UNCIVPOL, under the supervision of the Head of Civil Affairs, should be given a mandate to operate throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Security Council may, therefore, wish to consider providing UNPROFOR with a uniform UNCIVPOL mandate for the whole mission area, similar to that already mandated for Croatia in resolution 743 (1992) of 21 February 1992. It is my hope that UNPROFOR could promote, as is already the case in some areas, the protection of human rights in the difficult period ahead, not least in the transition phase leading to the consolidation of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This would be a crucial role in the context of the return of refugees and displaced persons in safety and dignity" (SG Report of 17 September 1994, S/1067, para. 49).



Nyberg told a press conference today.

For the first time since the beginning of war, a UNHCR convoy managed to enter Sarajevo yesterday via Sarajevo-Mostar road, through Hadzici, although the Serbs tried to prevent its passage by bringing women and children in front of the trucks.

Nyberg told the press conference the UNHCR would also send today one humanitarian convoy to Gorazde, an eastern-Bosnian town which has been under total Serb blockade for months.

#### BOSNIAN SERB WITHDRAW 50-60 PERCENT OF HEAVY WEAPONS - U.N.

ZAGREB, Sept 18 (Hina) - Bosnian Serb forces have withdrawn between 50 and 60 percent of their heavy weapons from the exclusion zone around Sarajevo, UN spokesman Alexander Ivanko told a press conference in Zagreb on Monday, quoting UN reports from the ground.

The UN estimated that the Serbs had about 300 heavy artillery pieces around the Bosnian capital.

Ivanko said that the UN expected the pullout to continue in the next few days.

BOSNIAN, U.K. FOREIGN MINISTERS CALL BANJA LUKA SERBS FOR TALKS SARAJEVO, September 18 (Hina) - Top Bosnian and U.K. diplomats called on Monday, on behalf of their respective governments, the local Bosnian Serb authorities in Banja Luka to political negotiations on the fate of the city.

Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbey and his British counterpart Malcolm Rifkind held a joint news conference in Sarajevo Monday, on which Sacirbey said his government was "ready for dialogue with local officials in Banja Luka."

"We want all the people living in the city to stay in their homes, to avoid unnecessary destruction, and to reintegrate Banja Luka back to Bosnia-Herzegovina," Sacirbey told reporters.

The city was exposed to chaos and lawlessness by the paramilitaries, which led the Bosnian government to offer talks to local civilian authorities, in order to stop the violence, he added.

The proposal was discussed with the U.K. delegation, on a visit to Sarajevo today, and Rifkind said his government was willing to uphold it. Sacirbey stressed that some officials from Banja Luka have already visited London before, and had talks over the issue.

Rifkind said that the statement opened the road to new political agreement and to lasting ceasefire, adding that a very important period of the political process in Bosnia-Herzegovina was underway.

#### U.N. REPORTS ABOUT 70,000 SERB REFUGEES IN BANJA LUKA AREA

SARAJEVO, Sept 18 (Hina) - UNHCR and ICRC officials in the northern Bosnian town of Banja Luka said Monday that between 60,000 and 70,000 Serb refugees had fled fighting in northern and western Bosnia and sought shelter in the wider Banja Luka region



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 BG-YUGOSLAVIA-RUSSIA-UN

Russia cautiously welcomes UN resolution on Bosnia

MOSCOW, Sept 19 (Reuters) - Russia on Tuesday welcomed a U.N. Security Council statement demanding an immediate halt to all military activities in Bosnia, but it added that it did not go far enough.

"We think the declaration is a step in the right direction, but it is not enough," foreign ministry spokesman Mikhail Demurin told a news conference.

"We intend to take further steps in the Security Council to halt the new flare-up of military action," he said, warning that the Croat-Moslem offensive threatened to create a new humanitarian crisis in former Yugoslavia.

Monday's Security Council resolution, the second in less than a week, did not point the finger over the offensive, or say that its chief victims were Bosnian Serbs.

But it reflected fears that the Moslem-Croat offensive in western Bosnia could undermine current peace efforts.

1130 190995

REU1074 3 OVR 235 (RWS YU EEU LDC EMRG BA IIR US VIO DIP ) J1900560  
Bosnians give no pledge to halt army advance

ZAGREB, Sept 19 (Reuters) - Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbey on Tuesday declined to say whether his government was ordering a halt to its army's advance on the Bosnian Serb stronghold of Banja Luka, as demanded by the United Nations.

"There is no talk about military action. We are focused on the political process here. We have made an offer to the people of Banja Luka which is to enter a political dialogue and to ensure peaceful transition to the authority and sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina," Sacirbey said.

He was speaking in Zagreb before going into talks with U.S. peace envoy Richard Holbrooke and Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic. The U.N. and the United States, fearful that the latest battles might derail the peace process, have urged an immediate halt to all offensives in the area.

Granic said earlier that Croatian regular forces, whose artillery has greatly aided Bosnian Croat and government troops in their onslaught against the Bosnian Serbs, had ceased their military action.

Sacirbey said: "It is not our desire to cause any sort of military action, to create any sort of panic in Banja Luka. We want that the people of Banja Luka have an opportunity to stay in their homes."

"We all agree that in order to have a real victory we need to have military and political success. Here we are talking about ways to achieve political success in favour of peace," he said.

1047 190995 GMT

The Moslem-Croat offensive had threatened to derail the peace process, but U.S. Defence Secretary William Perry said on Wednesday in Prague that there had been "a slowdown in military activities" around Banja Luka, the northern town which lies in the path of the offensive.

Sacirbey said the Bosnian government wanted peace.

***"I want to make it clear that our objective is not to be engaged in military actions," he said.***

"We have offered political dialogue with the leadership of Banja Luka to bring about an orderly transition.

"We believe this process to be entirely consistent with the Geneva accords. We are not looking to change the Geneva accords, we are looking to bring about a realisation of the Geneva accords."

Asked to describe the current situation in Banja Luka, Sacirbey said: "We are not in Banja Luka, we are around Banja Luka. I wish to emphasise that the time has come to de-emphasise the military operations and emphasise the political discussion and dialogue, and that's what we're trying to do."

The U.N. reported on Tuesday that Bosnian-Croat forces were within 50 kilometres (30 miles) of the northern town, home to 100,000 refugees, and even within artillery range at one point.

But Agnelli said Italy was "very satisfied that military actions in Banja Luka and around Banja Luka appear to have stopped". She added: "We also think the peace process is now on a good course."

Sacirbey said his government's position was clear.

***"We are not at war with Banja Luka. We are not at war with***

*the Serbs. We are at war with (Bosnian Serb Army commander General Ratko) Mladic's forces and para-military terrorist forces of which some are in areas like Banja Luka."*

The Bosnian government was not looking to encourage the population of Banja Luka to leave but Sacirbey said ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs was still going on there. "That must somehow be stabilised."

He hoped that through political dialogue, Banja Luka could become a "symbol of how we would like to reintegrate Bosnia" and said he had discussed concrete proposals with Agnelli for an enterprise fund for Bosnia with international support from the private, as well as public, sector.

"We Bosnians are no longer looking for handouts," he said.

REUTER

1037 200095 GAT

BC-YUGOSLAVIA-BOSNIA-VIOLATIONS ISTLD

Government troops fire heavy weapons in Sarajevo (Adds new UN quotes, detail)



opportunity to set an example of mutual coexistence for the future of how the entire peace process should go ahead. We are trying in fact to create the symbol of a Bosnian southern breeze, rather than a Bosnian storm." The proposal however is unlikely to get far. The Banja Luka region is firmly under the control of the Bosnian Serb leadership, directly responsible for expelling thousands of non-Serbs. Furthermore their place has been taken by Serb refugees who left government-held regions, sometimes unwillingly, to settle in what they believed would be a future Serb state, the self-declared Republika Srpska. Rifkind said he welcomed the Bosnian government's proposal and accepted the idea that London could be an intermediary. "I very much welcomed the thinking behind it. It's important essentially we understand this proposal as an important new political dialogue which is crucially important. We hope it could provide the basis for a ceasefire throughout the country. The offer was announced after talks between the two men which appeared to have improved relations between the two governments. Acknowledging that at times there had been "a number of differences" between London and Sarajevo, Sacirbey said there increasingly "was more common ground." He paid respect to the "British government's commitment" to the current efforts to lift the siege of Sarajevo and the contribution of British General Rupert Smith, UN commander of forces in Bosnia, to that initiative. Rifkind in turn said that the "United Kingdom has felt privileged to be able to make an important contribution to the present situation here in Sarajevo." British forces with heavy artillery on Mount Igman overlooking the city played a direct role in silencing Bosnian Serb guns earlier this month, helping to target and destroy artillery firing into the city. The foreign secretary also said he supported the preservation of a united Sarajevo, currently divided between government and Bosnian Serb forces. "Sarajevo must be a united city. That is something that should be recognised by all concerned. The world has had too many examples of short-term solutions that have resulted in divided cities which have not in the end provided the long term stability and peace which is necessary." Rifkind said. awb/gk AFP /AA1234/181844 GMT SEP 95 EAA0522 3 1 0324 BEL /AFP-ON16

#### Yugo-Bosnia-EU

EU ready to help rebuild former Yugoslavia, but with conditions BRUSSELS, Sept 18 (AFP) - The European Union is ready to help rebuild the former Yugoslavia, but only under certain conditions, senior EU officials said Monday. European Commissioner for relations with eastern Europe Hans van den Broek and the EU mediator for the former Yugoslavia Carl Bildt said aid would depend on issues such as respect for minorities' rights. The competence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague to judge those suspected of war crimes during the conflict would also be a factor, said van den Broek. "We do not want to give aid to a government led by war criminals," he added. Bildt said: "It is important that the war ends in reconciliation, and Europe has the key to this process. "We have to start an in-depth debate as soon as possible on a programme for the region stretching from south of Slovenia to the north of Greece." Nevertheless, he added, it remained to be seen to what extent it would be possible in Bosnia-Herzegovina "to move from the map on the ground to the map as shown on the peace plan." The plan grants 51 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Croat-Moslem Federation, and 49 percent to the Bosnian Serbs. Van den Broek said the EU Commission would suggest to the EU member states that a conference of donor countries be organised as soon as the peace plan for the former Yugoslavia had been enforced. "We cannot commit ourselves to a programme without a clear, constitutional system for Bosnia-Herzegovina and that shows how important a political settlement is to the launch of a reconstruction programme," he added. Van den Broek said he would propose to the EU ministers that negotiations start for a trade agreement with the former Yugoslav republic



FO  
**MOST IMMEDIATE**

5048

003

1-22

MOST IMMEDIATE RESTRICTED CABLE

1/1

TO: AKASHI, UNPF HQ, ZAGREB  
INFO: ANNAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
GAREKHAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
INTERNAL: CMDR, COS, HPFA  
FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO  
DATE: 23 SEPTEMBER 1995  
REF: COM0020

VIA HQ

MHHQ-70

SUBJECT: AGREEMENT ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES FOR SARAJEVO

It is becoming increasingly apparent that the cessation of hostilities envisaged in the Serb 'Framework' is not going to happen in the immediate future.

You will recall that, when General Smith and I first raised the subject with President Izetbegovic and Foreign Minister Sacirbey, the Bosnians did not reject the idea. They noted that they would not be bound by a document drafted and signed by the Serbs without their involvement, but they did indicate that they might join the process once the utilities were restored.

Since then, certain progress has been made on the restoration of utilities, and it appears that gas at least might be available in the city soon. The two sides have reached an agreement on this matter, and the Government has consequently asked the Sanctions Committee to restore the flow through Hungary. Once the request has been approved, gas could be available in the city in four or five days.

Now, the Bosnians are adding more conditions, and are speaking only in terms of a 60-day COHA. In the middle of the week they started linking talks to 'unimpeded access' to Gorazde, and then they raised the subject of the demilitarization of Banja Luka, which was, of course, a non-starter. They have also said that a nation-wide COHA will not even get onto the agenda until there is agreement on 'the map'.

My assessment is that the Bosnians really do not want a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities yet. Their logic seems to be that stabilizing the military situation around the city would free up Serb forces which are presently pinned down in the greater Sarajevo area. With their present strategy, they present themselves as being reasonably cooperative, but making no progress at all. The Serbs, for their part, seem to be playing into the Bosnian strategy, by refusing high-level meetings and making delays on utilities.

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**MOST IMMEDIATE**



CZN - 1730

CZG - 1419

CZK - 584

OUTGOING CABLE

IMMEDIATE

**IMMEDIATE**

SSN 2626 1/3

95 SEP 23 14:12 1 of 3

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
CoM UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO  
COMMANDER UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE: 23 SEPTEMBER 1995

NUMBER: Z - 1742

SUBJECT: BANJA LUKA - POLITICAL OFFER

98 SEP 23 15:45  
UNOC  
Palace of Nations

1. With reference to your 3055, we offer the following comments and assessments of the political offer made by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina to the representatives of the Serb people in Banja Luka, and the related letter from the Sarajevo Serb leader.

2. The Political Offer. The offer made by Foreign Minister Sacirbey on 19 September, is assessed as intended primarily for the international rather than domestic audience. It was an overture designed to capitalise on the period of restraint enforced on the ARBiH and HV/HVO armies. This offer, ostensibly reasonable and measured, served to indicate to anxious observers that the Government of Bosnia and Hercegovina was sensitive to the calls for a peaceful resolution to the problem. Rejection by the Serbs would only serve to bolster their image of intransigence and perhaps help provide the justification for future ARBiH action. The timing of the announcement, immediately after meeting with the Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, and the chosen method of delivery, through the President of the Security Council, would support this interpretation. The reinforcement of the political offer by President Izetbegovic on 21 September, despite its rejection by the Bosnian Serbs, serves to suggest the Bosnian Government has calculated that the real audience is still listening.

3. A secondary aim of the announcement might have been to translate the dynamics of the situation on the ground, with the apparent collapse of the military resistance, into a division of the Bosnian Serb leadership. The division might be achieved between the military and political leadership, or alternatively within the political leadership itself. The offer was specifically made to Banja Luka, where elements of an opposition to Pale have previously surfaced, and where such an appeal would have maximum impact.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, DFC, COS, DI, HAAU, ICFY ZAGREB

95 SEP 23 14:31  
SARAJEVO

95 SEP 23 15:12  
NYK



4. The experience of the Croatian Serb exodus from the Krajina appeared to be repeating itself in western Bosnia with 90,000 persons already displaced and the prospect of this reaching an unprecedented scale with as many as 400,000 persons involved. An altruistic motive for the political offer cannot be ignored. The civilian population is moving en masse ahead of the confrontation line and creating de facto ethnically pure territories. While the pre-war multicultural vision of Bosnia and Hercegovina is an ideal sustained by only a few, it would be too cynical to present the Bosnian Government's policy in terms of pursuing an ethnically pure area. The defeat of the BSA, and political control of liberated areas is the primary aim. The ethnic nationalism which drives the policies of the Croatian Government is less of a force in the Bosnian Government.

5. It is to be expected that if such an offer was to be promulgated then it would be by the Government, but it is instructive to note that the Bosnian Croats have not used the Federation as a platform to support this. Their perspective is naturally much closer to that of the Croatian Government whose own silence is to be expected.

6. The political offer is an astute move. Although we assess it is unlikely to succeed, if it is accepted then western Bosnia could be controlled without the military losses, the humanitarian crisis or the population exodus. If it is rejected, as it has been by the Mayor of Banja Luka, as well as by Professor Koljevic, then the diplomatic scene has been partially prepared should a military solution be resumed.

7. The Letter from the Sarajevo Serb Leader. Mr. Mirko Pejanovic, the author of the letter, is the president of the Serb Civic Council. He also sits on the collective presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

8. The Serb Civic Council (SCC) is an organisation, not a political party, founded by Serb intellectuals in Sarajevo, following the establishment of the Bosnia and Hercegovina Federation in March 1994. The SCC works to represent the political interests of Serbs in Federation territory, who probably number between 70,000 and 150,00. However, the SCC also challenges the Pale leadership's claim to be the exclusive representatives of Serb national interests throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina.

9. The SCC upholds the full equality of the three peoples of Bosnia and Hercegovina, and the unity of the Republic in its recognised borders. It has supported solutions based on federalisation; to this end, the SCC has backed the efforts this year at starting a dialogue between opposition figures from the Federation (Tuzla) and "Republika Srpska" (Banja Luka), despite the Sarajevo leadership's strong criticism of these efforts. The SCC has lobbied for the Federation Constitution to be amended by naming Serbs as a constituent people of the Federation. This initiative has been obstructed by both the Muslim and the Bosnian Croat leaderships. In its contacts with the international community, the SCC has argued, again in vain, for its inclusion in the negotiating process.

10. The SCC is, for obvious reasons, always delicately placed. However, the present moment confronts it with extra dangers. If negotiations proceed on the basis of the principles agreed in Geneva on 8 September, Serbs in the Federation are quite likely to vanish both as a political factor in the Federation "entity", and also as a potential bridge



to the Serb "entity". A settlement on current terms would definitively confine the Serbs, politically if not demographically, within a single "entity" of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

11. Mr. Pejanovic's request presumably reflects the SCC's desire to broadcast its genuine concern for the welfare of civilians in "Republika Srpska". This is intended to demonstrate the SCC's credentials as an institution capable of representing the actual interests of Serbs throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina, which should be taken seriously by the international community. The request suggests that the SCC may hope that the UN might help it to gain a role as a channel of communication between Federation authorities and local authorities in Banja Luka and elsewhere in "Republika Srpska". The SCC might indeed prove useful in this respect; certainly, any influence which it could be helped to exert would be likely to benefit the peace process.

Regards

CNZ-935 CY2-923 P1/2

**OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

**IMMEDIATE**

UNITED NATIONS  
FIELD OPERATIONS

22 SEP 23 P 3:22

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: 3081  
SUBJECT: Sarajevo airport

Attn. SRSG/TFC



With reference to your Z-1702 and your Z-1732, please find attached a self-explanatory note from the Legal Office. We recall that in the context of the original opening of the airport, there have been contacts with ICAO. You may wish to pursue the same route again.

98 SEP 23 19:29

UNICEF  
Palais des Nations




CNZ-935 CYZ-923 P2/1

NOTE TO MR. PETER SCHMITZ

With regard to your routing slip of 19 September 1995 attaching correspondence between DPKO and UNPF regarding the Sarajevo airport, our views thereon are as follows:

(1) As to whether the term "humanitarian" appearing in the 1992 Sarajevo airport agreement can now be interpreted more broadly to mean "any cargo or passengers not of a military nature" (Janvier's cable 1702), such an interpretation is possible as long as all the parties to the 1992 agreement agree thereto. The law of treaties allows for the subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation or application of the original agreement.

(2) With regard to the United Nations as the sole operator of the airport, permitting the return of scheduled commercial air traffic, that matter raises various questions. First, allowing such traffic could subject the United Nations to substantial liability claims; some way would have to be devised to ensure that the Organization would be held harmless in the event of claims arising out of the UN operation of the airport, such as receiving written agreement to that effect from the other parties to the agreement, the commercial aircraft owners, crew and civilians using such aircraft. Second, allowing commercial airlines from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina to utilize the Sarajevo airport would engage the United Nations in international civilian aviation, an activity regulated by ICAO. That specialized agency should be requested to advise the Organization of the implications of the UN assuming the operation of an airport for civilian aviation purposes, such as the technical requirements which would have to be met, etc. In that connection, you may also wish to contact your colleagues responsible for UNFICYP as there has been a long-standing proposal that UN/ICAO operate the Nicosia International Airport for commercial air traffic purposes.

 Ralph Zacklin  
22 September 1995

CZK - 578  
CZV - 1720  
CZG - 1412

SSN 2614

1/5

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 Of 5

SEP 22 15:04

Cable

TO: PEDAUYE, UNPF-HQ, SARAJEVO

INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

NUMBER: UNPF Z- 1732

DATE: 22 SEPTEMBER 1995

SUBJECT: Chartered Aircraft into Sarajevo

*[Handwritten signature]*

1. This Cable is in response to your Cable of 20 September entitled "Chartered Humanitarian Airlift", and should be read in conjunction with UNNY's 3033 of 18 September entitled "Sarajevo Airport". As UNNY's 3033 suggests, the concept of expanded access to the Sarajevo airport, to include civilian aircraft, is supported in principle. In addition, I have consulted with the UNHCR Special Envoy, who has no objection to the proposal in your Cable referred to above, with the following understandings: the flight would be coordinated with the air operations cell in the SE's Geneva Office (this is necessary for reasons of time slot allocation); the flight would clearly be understood not to be a UNHCR flight, and would not fly under UNHCR auspices. The SE did say that UNHCR was willing to accept the aid carried in the flight upon its arrival in Sarajevo for further distribution.

2. The above notwithstanding, I believe that opening the Sarajevo airport to chartered flights on an ad hoc basis, prior to formulation of a clear policy for such flights, may well produce serious problems for us in the future. As far as I am aware, there is as of yet no policy as to what flights carrying what type of cargo and passengers will be accepted to land in Sarajevo, and who will be responsible for immigration and customs. If we accept the proposed UAE flight without a governing policy, we may then be obliged to accept a flight carrying humanitarian assistance destined solely for the Bosnian Serbs. If a state wishes to send an aircraft with "aid" and "aid workers" to Sarajevo for the Bosnian Serbs, will the Bosnian government have the authority to reject such a flight?

Int Distr: SRSG; FC; ASG M&C; DFC; COS; HAAU; DI; DOA; PLA; PC;  
UNHCR SE;

SEP 22 15:23

SEP 22 15:34

UNHCR  
Palat...



If not, who will be responsible for customs and immigration? Does the Bosnian government have a sovereign right to exercise immigration controls at the airport? Although I believe that we can find answers to these and other related questions, I think that the answers must be found prior to embarking on what could be precedent setting new procedures.

3. Consequently, I suggest that, in consultation with my office, you seek to develop a new regime to govern operations at the Sarajevo airport. Our UN military colleagues and UNHCR will also of course need to be included in the discussions on this matter. You should also consult with the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs during the development of a new regime, without making any commitments with respect thereto until a final proposal is approved here and in UNNY. Until such time as a new regime is put into effect, the airport should operate based on established practice as defined in para 1 of UNNY's 3033. Furthermore, I would be willing to consider, on a case by case basis, recommendations that you or states may make to send in non-airlift flights to the airport.

4. I recognize the value of a "symbolic" civilian flight into Sarajevo. Nonetheless, the long-term benefits that would accrue to Sarajevans are more important than mere symbolism, and we should be able to open the airport safely and viably for civilian use, following development of a new regime.

5. I am attaching for your information a self-explanatory message from UNHCR regarding use of the Sarajevo airport by non-airlift countries.

E2K-578

3/5

**FAX COVER SHEET  
ROUTINE****UNHCR AIRLIFT OPERATIONS CELL, GENEVA****TO: EMMA SHITAKHA  
UNHCR ANCONA**

Attn: John Dixon

385-41-176-709  
39-71-916-1339**FROM: AOCG**41-22-739-8663/8754  
8126/8750  
Fax: 739-8752/8596**DATE: 21 Sep 95****NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER: 3****CHARTERED HUMANITARIAN AIRLIFT TO SARAJEVO AIRPORT**

1. I refer to your fax to Anne-Willem Bijlleveld timed at 1300 21 Sep 95 on the subject of the offer of humanitarian aid for Bosnia from the UAE. Please find attached an extract from the "UNHCR Policy Guidelines for Movement Into and Out Of Sarajevo by Air" and the "UNForm E" mentioned in the text. You will see that the guidelines (Para 8) requires such aid to be transported via Falconara Airport, Ancona, Italy. If the flight is to land at Sarajevo airport then the type of aircraft to be used is of critical importance since the equipment available to unload arriving aircraft is very limited and ramp parking space is also limited. Furthermore, the airport is only open during the daylight hours.

2. Regards.

**R PARSLEY  
Wg Cdr  
UK Rep**



EZK 578

4/5

Sarajevo by air diverts UNPROFOR and UNHCR personnel from their primary job, disrupts logistic operations, and could jeopardize the UN mission if perceived by any of the warring parties as a breach of the 5 June 92 agreement. Passenger movement thus has the potential of reducing the humanitarian airlift capacity and increasing security risks.

6. Part III contains the key elements which will be taken into account by the UN (UNPROFOR/ UNHCR) in considering authorization for the use of the airport and/or airlift aircraft for transportation of passengers, and UNPROFOR for their escort.

## PART II. UNHCR AIRLIFT OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

7. The military cargo aircraft in the airlift transport humanitarian assistance, operational support items, and approved passengers into/out of Sarajevo. In order to prevent unnecessary delays at Sarajevo and reduce movement capacity through incompatible loading arrangements, aircraft will depart from Falconara, Split, or Rhein-Main AB for Sarajevo unless a waiver of this requirement is granted by the AOCG. All cargoes and their loading arrangements will be subject to spot-check inspection by UNHCR airlift staff before take-off for Sarajevo. Flights to Sarajevo by other aircraft, not involved in the airlift, must be coordinated in advance with the AOCG, since all landing slots are scheduled through the AOCG.

### ► "Irregular Airlift Participants" (non-US, UK, CN, GE, FR, NO/SW aircraft)

8. Governments of other sovereign nations that wish to participate in carrying humanitarian goods into Sarajevo by air should follow the procedures below:

a. Coordinate with UNHCR, Geneva, Fund Raising Department and AOCG by submission of a UNForm E.

b. Route the plane through Falconara Airport, Ancona Italy, for UNHCR inspections, aircrew and operational briefings.

c. Use an AOCG-allocated Sarajevo landing slot time and callsign.

d. Adhere to the passenger guidelines stated below if carrying passengers into or out of Sarajevo.

Note: UNHCR will coordinate flight approval with UNPROFOR Air Operations, Zagreb.

### ► "Non-Airlift Aircraft" (i.e. not carrying humanitarian donations)

9. Governments of other sovereign nations may bring planes into the airport for the transportation of persons if:

11 Feb 94

**CZK 578**  
**UNHCR AIR OPERATIONS AIRLIFT PARTICIPATION APPROVAL**  
**FOR "IRREGULAR PARTICIPANTS"**  
(i.e., non-US, UK, GE, FR, CN, NO)

5/5

1. PARTICIPATING COUNTRY: \_\_\_\_\_

2. DATE OF PARTICIPATION: \_\_\_\_\_

Preferred ETA at Sarajevo: \_\_\_\_\_

3. TYPE AIRCRAFT: \_\_\_\_\_

4. TYPE OF GOODS: \_\_\_\_\_

5. PASSENGER DATA (Types approved to be carried)(Circle Yes or No for each):

- MEDEVACS YES NO

- UN/OTHER EMPLOYEES YES NO

- JOURNALISTS YES NO

- THIRD COUNTRY NATIONALS YES NO

6. APPROVAL SIGNATURE BLOCKS:

-UNPROFOR/Zagreb Air Ops: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

(UNPROFOR/Zagreb will coordinate with UNPROFOR/Sarajevo and Commander of Sarajevo Airport

French Detachment (Tower))

- COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_

- UNHCR Air Ops: \_\_\_\_\_ Date: \_\_\_\_\_

- COMMENTS: \_\_\_\_\_



CODE  
RESTRICTED

MOG Telecomm. Unit

Para 5.1.1 Nations

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'98 SEP 21 18:51

MOST IMMEDIATE

C43

'95 SEP 21 18:10

Page 1 of 9

CZNY-17N  
CZG-1407  
SSN-2605

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB  
DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: Z- 1727  
SUBJECT: THE SITUATION IN WESTERN BOSNIA

*Y. Akashi*

1. Both the military situation and the plight of the civilian population in Western Bosnia are of great concern.
2. We have been severely hampered during the last few days by our lack of presence on the ground in the area, and we have thus not been able to monitor the situation effectively - either from a military point of view or from the point of view of movement of population and of human rights on either side of the confrontation line.
3. I have today written to Presidents Tudjman, Izetbegovic and Milosevic, reminding them of their responsibility to allow the freedom of movement to UNCRO and UNPROFOR personnel, which would permit effective monitoring of the situation on the ground. I have written in similar terms to President Zubak. Copies of these letters are attached.
4. We have today co-ordinated our plans to take advantage of the freedom of movement for which we have asked, and we will be ready to deploy UNMOS and Human Rights Action teams without delay. We are, of course, keeping closely in touch with UNHCR and the ICRC on these matters.
5. It would be very helpful if you were to draw the attention of the Permanent Representatives of Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina and the FRY to our action here and seek their support.

Regards.

INT DISTR: SRSG; FC; CoM UNCRO; CoM UNPROFOR; D-SRSG Belgrade;  
ASG M&C; HAAU; DI

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters  
Siege des Forces de Paix des Nations Unies  
Zagreb

Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
for the Former Yugoslavia

21 September 1995

Excellency,

The recent military advances made by the combined armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina and Croatian Defence Council have resulted in large-scale population movements. In connection with this, I welcome the strong commitments that have been made to protect human rights and the encouragement of Bosnian Serb civilians to remain in their homes.

In order to permit the civilian population to remain in safety, it is essential that international humanitarian organisations are allowed access to the newly taken areas in western and central Bosnia and Hercegovina. The expressed commitment by the Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Hercegovina Mr Sacirbey to permit access to humanitarian agencies and the ICRC are positive steps towards the furtherance of these aims.

In order to translate the positive statements already made into practical application on the ground, I am requesting that you issue orders to the responsible military and civilian authorities to permit freedom of movement for aid agencies, human rights monitors and military observers. I would also ask that arrangements be made to extend this freedom of movement to the territories jointly taken with other Croatian forces.

His Excellency  
Mr. Kresimir Zubak  
President of the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina  
Sarajevo

2/9



-2-

As the President of the Federation, your early intervention would help facilitate this access and ensure that the suffering of the civilian population is minimised. Freedom of movement will also ensure that human rights issues, an expressed concern of the United Nations Security Council, are monitored and accurately reported.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Yasushi Akashi



United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters  
Siege des Forces de Paix des Nations Unies  
Zagreb

Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
for the Former Yugoslavia

21 September 1995

Excellency,

The rapidly evolving military situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina has resulted in a large-scale movement of the Bosnian Serb population and a consequent humanitarian crisis.

Despite the extremely difficult circumstances, the international community has only limited access to the Bosnian Serb controlled territories. In the region of Banja Luka, where an estimated 90,000 displaced person have converged, there is only one UNHCR office and the staff are working in a very constrained environment.

In order to permit the Bosnian Serb civilian population to remain in safety, and to ensure adequate provision is made for their humanitarian needs, it is essential that international humanitarian organisations are allowed access to the effected areas. Any influence that you may be able to exert on the Bosnian Serb military and civilian authorities to facilitate this access would be most welcome.


His Excellency  
Mr. Slobodan Milosevic  
President of the Republic of Serbia  
Belgrade



-2-

Your early cooperation will ensure that the suffering of the civilian population is minimised and that human rights issues, which are an expressed concern of the United Nations Security Council, are monitored and accurately reported.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Yasushi Akashi



United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters  
Siege des Forces de Paix des Nations Unies  
Zagreb

Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
for the Former Yugoslavia

21 September 1995

Excellency,

The recent military advances made by the combined armed forces in the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina have resulted in large-scale population movements.

In order to permit the civilian population to remain in safety, it is essential that international humanitarian organisations are allowed access to the newly taken areas in western and central Bosnia and Hercegovina. I have written to President Izetbegovic asking that the very positive statements made by Foreign Minister Sacirbey, concerning freedom of movement, now be furthered by issuing appropriate instructions to the responsible military and civilian authorities.

In order that complete access can be gained to the Federation controlled areas, I am seeking your cooperation in ensuring freedom of movement for aid agencies, human rights monitors and military observers, across the international border from Croatia into western Bosnia, and at checkpoints controlled by the Croatian army.

His Excellency  
Dr. Franjo Tudjman  
President of the Republic of Croatia  
Zagreb



-2-

Your early intervention will help ensure that the suffering of the civilian population is minimised. Freedom of movement will also ensure that human rights issues, an expressed concern of the United Nations Security Council, are monitored and accurately reported.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

  
Yasushi Akashi



United Nations Peace Forces Headquarters  
Siege des Forces de Paix des Nations Unies  
Zagreb

Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
for the Former Yugoslavia

21 September 1995

Excellency,

The recent military advances made by the combined armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina and Croatian Defence Council have resulted in large-scale population movements. In connection with this, I welcome the strong commitments that have been made by your Government to protecting human rights and encouraging the Bosnian Serb civilians to remain in their homes.

In order to permit the civilian population to remain in safety, it is essential that international humanitarian organisations are allowed access to the newly taken areas in western and central Bosnia and Hercegovina. The commitment by Foreign Minister Sacirbey to permit access to humanitarian agencies and the ICRC are positive steps towards the furtherance of these aims.

In order to translate the positive statements already made into practical application on the ground, I am requesting that you issue orders to the responsible military and civilian authorities to permit freedom of movement for aid agencies, human rights monitors and military observers.

His Excellency  
Mr. Alija Izetbegovic  
President of the Presidency  
of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina  
Sarajevo



-2-

Your early cooperation to facilitate this access will ensure that the suffering of the civilian population is minimised and that human rights issues, which are an expressed concern of the United Nations Security Council, are monitored and accurately reported.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.



Yasushi Akashi

SSN 2596

MOST IMMEDIATE

T-22

MOST IMMEDIATE RESTRICTED CABLE

CKZ-141

SSN 1717

TO: AKASHI, UNPF HQ, ZAGREB  
 INFO: ANNAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
 GAREKHAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
 STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA } HQ  
 INTERNAL: CMDR, COS, SCS, HPHA, PINFO } PLS PROTECT  
 FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ; SARAJEVO  
 DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1995  
 REF: COM0013

Z-1723

SUBJECT: SERB USE OF THE ROUTES ACROSS SARAJEVO AIRPORT

Bosnian Serb civilian traffic has begun to use the routes across Sarajevo airport. Traffic was very light yesterday, with less than 100 people moving in each direction, but is expected to pick up today and, hopefully, in the future.

You will recall that UNPROFOR declared the routes open on 3 September, and that large numbers of Bosnian vehicles have been using the routes Dobrinja-Butmir and Butmir-Dobrinja since then. Material life in Sarajevo has improved dramatically as a result. The Serbs have not been using the routes, and recently said that they would not do so until the timings were adjusted to better suit their needs. Sector Sarajevo has now changed the timings, and the Serbs seem to be satisfied.

I take the Serb decision to use the routes across the airport as a positive development, indicating, perhaps, that they have now come to terms with UNPROFOR's decision to open the routes. It is also indicative of their interest in stabilizing the situation around the city.

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1995-09-22 01:45

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UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

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CNZ-928 CYZ-917 P1

**CODED CABLE**  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNITED NATIONS  
CABLE OPERATIONS

1995 SEP 21 P 9:31

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG/ FC

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: *for* ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *for Annan*

DATE: 21 SEPTEMBER 1995

NUMBER: 3067

SUBJECT: Situation in Western Bosnia

Thank you for your Z-1727. We would be happy to Intervene with the three Permanent Representatives, as you suggest, in support of a specific action or set of actions requiring the co-operation of their Governments. Vague promises of freedom of movement are all too easily obtained in New York; we would prefer you to test these on the ground by despatching aid officials, human rights monitors and UNMOs as soon as practicable. We will then Intervene on your behalf if the authorities concerned obstruct your efforts. Regards.

98 SEP 22 -2 :32  
Palais des Nations  
UNITED NATIONS

CZN-1709  
CZG-1401  
CZK-565-

UNPF - HQ  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE  
SEP 20 17:39  
Page 1 of 2  
BSN-2591

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB

DATE: 20 SEPTEMBER 1995

NUMBER: UNPF Z- 1721

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr Igor Ivanov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation

1. This afternoon I met with Mr Ivanov of the Russian Federation. He was in a buoyant mood and expressed his delight that the situation since our last meeting had changed. He said that he strongly welcomed the suspension of the NATO air strikes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the BSA withdrawal of heavy weapons that was currently underway. He hoped that progress on the latter matter would result in a definitive end to the air strikes. Both he and his delegation erupted in laughter when I briefed them on the progress achieved so far on the withdrawal of weapons, particularly with regard to the BSA tanks - they were highly amused that the BSA had withdrawn almost double the number of tanks that we had believed they had in the exclusion zone. Ivanov was also pleased when I informed him that General Janvier and Admiral Smith were currently in Sarajevo and that the Force Commander would be proposing a complete cessation of air strikes as a result of BSA compliance with his conditions. I noted, however, that there was a technical problem as to whether air strikes would be completely terminated or suspended indefinitely - regardless of terminology, the result would in substance be the same.

2. On the way forward, Ivanov stressed the importance of Generals Janvier and Smith wasting no time in establishing a comprehensive cessation of hostilities in BH. In this regard, Ivanov said that President Tudjman's assurances both to Holbrooke and himself that the HV and HVO would stop their offensive in BH, and definitely not attack Banja Luka, was very important. In response to my request for clarification on this matter, Ivanov said that Tudjman had only agreed to stop offensive action in BH, not to withdraw HV troops currently in Bosnia. On the issue of a lack of similar assurances by the BH government, Ivanov also noted that Tudjman had said that 85% of the forces and offensive operations in western Bosnia had been undertaken by the HV, implying, therefore, that the BiH would be unable to continue with their offensive without HV support (this has also been the view of our UNPROFOR military analysts). Tudjman also admitted that President Izetbegovic supported

Internal distribution: SRSG, FC, DFC, CoM UNPROFOR -1715201



continued offensives to take both Banja Luka and Prijedor. As a point of information, Ivanov noted that he had met Izetbegovic briefly at the airport this morning and had made clear Russia's views on a continued offensive in western BH. He did not indicate Izetbegovic's response.

3. Again returning to the need to quickly pursue a cessation of hostilities, Ivanov rather pointedly said that he hoped that our military commanders would "show the same readiness" in pursuing peace as they had in pursuing air strikes. He said that a cessation of hostilities was essential for the continuation of peace talks, particularly as there was a need to accelerate discussions on constitutional issues. He indicated that the offensive in western BH had, in Croatia's view, essentially solved the territorial division issue, apart from questions on corridors, Sarajevo and some other areas. The main problem remained the Bosnian government position on the equality of rights for the two entities to be formed in Bosnia. On this matter, Ivanov said that it was important to adhere to the Geneva principles wherein both entities would have equal rights. Also important was the need to start thinking of the guarantees that would be necessary to implement a final settlement. It was only when these issues were resolved that an international conference could be held.

4. I informed Ivanov that following the progress achieved in Sarajevo, our immediate focus would be on stabilizing the military situation in and around the city. Unfortunately, the Bosnian government had shown little interest in this matter and were more focused on a restoration of utilities to the city. As a result, the Chief of Mission was visiting Pale today to pursue the issue of utilities. It was possible, however, that the Bosnian Serbs would only cooperate on utilities if there was progress on achieving a cessation of hostilities in the Sarajevo area. There could be a need, therefore, for the international community to exert pressure on the Bosnian side for a linkage of the two issues. Only after the situation in Sarajevo had been stabilized could we think of moving to a comprehensive cessation of hostilities in BH - again, united and firm pressure from the international community could be required if the Bosnian side was to cease its offensives throughout western BH, including the Ozren salient. I assured Ivanov that given the right conditions and firm support, UNPROFOR was both willing and able to pursue the issue of a cessation of hostilities. Ivanov promised to impress upon Izetbegovic the need to cooperate on a cessation of hostilities when he meets with him tomorrow in Sarajevo. He also said that he will call on the United States to make a similar demarche to Izetbegovic (although he noted that Holbrooke had got no assurances from the President when he met with him yesterday).

5. Finally, Ivanov expressed some concern over the recent letter of the Secretary-General to the Security Council. He stressed that the Russians believed that some form of continued UN involvement was essential in Bosnia, no matter what final framework for implementation was chosen. He pointed out that any decision on this matter would set a precedent for the future role of the UN in resolving conflicts, and deplored the "shadowing" of the organisation's role by NATO. I assured him that the Secretary-General would take no action on the matter without a decision by the Security Council.

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UNITED NATIONS  
CABLE OPERATIONSCNZ-923 CYZ-913 P.

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SEP 20 21 28 **OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG/FC  
INFO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO attn COM/ CMDR UNPROFOR  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: *for* ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *AKASHI/Hansen*  
DATE: 20 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: 3055  
SUBJECT: Letter from the Chargé d'Affaires of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Please find enclosed for your information a copy of a self-explanatory communication from the Chargé d'Affaires of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We would appreciate your comments on the evolving situation around Banja Luka and the prospects for the "political offer" made by the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the residents of that city.

A related letter from a Sarajevo Serb leader is also attached. We would welcome your comments.



CNZ-923 CYZ-913 ~~ST~~ PS

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/1995/808  
19 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE  
PERMANENT MISSION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have been instructed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, ~~THE~~ Mr. Muhamed Sacirbey, to convey to you that there is no foundation to doubt the positions of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with reference to the basic principles established in Geneva on September 8, 1995 and agreed to by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The actions of the defense forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, HVO (Croatian Council of Defense) and parts of the Croatian Army, in Western and Central Bosnia are not calculated to undermine the above mentioned principles, but are undertaken within the framework of total efforts towards halting the occupiers' terror against the civilian population and preventing further destruction and devastation of the territories currently under occupation.

In particular, these actions have been designed to halt the practice of ethnic cleansing which has intensified in this region in the last several weeks. In this recent process of ethnic cleansing, which has not stopped even after the signing of the Geneva principles, more than 21 000 Bosniac Muslims and Bosnian Croats have been expelled from their homes and their homeland, Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is one other evident sign that the Serbian side is clearly deviating from one of the important points of the agreement achieved with respect to the right of refugees to return to their homes. Those who strive for peace, based on the agreed principles, may not engage in such criminal acts which represent the gravest violation of humanitarian law.

We are convinced that these actions by the Bosnian Army, HVO and Croatian Army will contribute to a more effective achievement of the political solution on the basis of the Geneva Principles.

The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina has on many occasions invited the population of Serbian nationality from the region of Northwestern and Central Bosnia not to abandon their homes, offering guarantees for their full personal safety, protection of their property and full enjoyment of all the rights and liberties that belong to them as citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

1995-09-21 01:43 5604

SEP-19-1995 01:41

MISSION OF BOSNIA & HERZ.

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

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Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Permanent Mission to the United Nations  
New York

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
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1995 SEP 19 P 3:50

Mr. H. H. H.  
Mr. G. G. G.  
Mr. P. P. P.  
C. G. S. C. A.

September 19, 1995

H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros Ghali  
Secretary General  
United Nations  
New York



Excellency:

I have the honor to transmit a letter dated September 19, 1995 from H. E. Dr. Mirko Pejanovic, member of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and President of the Serbian Civil Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, addressed to your Excellency.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Ivan Z Masic  
Ambassador and Charge d'Affaires, a. i.

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Action by:	SJ/PS
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* Please return originals to Central/other: _____	



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SEP-19-1995 01:41

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

CNZ-923 CYZ-913 P4/4

**THE SERBIAN CIVIC COUNCIL  
OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**



Secretary General of the United Nations  
Boutros Boutros Ghali

Commander of UNPROFOR for the former Yugoslavia  
General Janvier

Commander of UNPROFOR for Bosnia and Herzegovina  
General Smith

Honorable gentlemen,

Due to current military activities, a mass exodus of Serbian civilians is taking place in the towns of the Bosnian Krajina region. The Serbian Civic Council is asking you to contact the local authorities in Banja Luka and other towns and assist the protection of civilians from military activities and to prevent new exoduses of people. It is necessary to do everything to avoid the exodus of the civilian population of the kind that happened in the Knin Krajina in the Republic of Croatia.

The further worsening of the situation can endanger the peace process for finding a political solution to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Regardless of the possible balance of military powers, it is of crucial importance that the Serbian people remain in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because there can be no stable future for Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor for peace in the region, without the Serbian people.

Sincerely,

Washington - Sarajevo  
September, 18 1995

The Serbian Civil Council  
President

Mirko Pejanovic

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Mirko Pejanovic", written over the printed name.

ZAY-001

006

UNITED NATIONS UNPROFOR <sup>to 223 T-29</sup>  
Office of the <sup>95 SEP 20 14 29</sup>  
SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR SARAJEVO

FO

Page 1 of 4

ROUTINE

IMMEDIATE


MOST IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN SECRET ONLY

~~5062~~

		DATE: 20 SEPTEMBER 1995
TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NY V/A HQ TO: AKASHI, SRSG, UNPF HQ  MHHQ=61- TOT 1355		FROM: WILLIAM EAGLETON SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR SARAJEVO  SIGNATURE: 
FAX NO: 385-41 170 199		FAX: 387-71-664-088 or VSAT 7239 BH COMMAND FORWARD HEADQUARTERS OR THROUGH ZAGREB 385-41 170-199
ATTN:		SCS REP: SCS/311/95 DRAFTER: TITLE:
INFO: VIA HQ { HCA, UNPF HQ STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA, FAX 41-22 917 0079		
SUBJECT: MINUTES OF COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING		

ATTACHED PLEASE FIND MINUTES OF COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON 12 SEPTEMBER 1995.

REGARDS.

ckn\coordcom\annan

SRSG

HCA 3062

RELAY



UNITED NATIONS



Office of the  
SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR SARAJEVO

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006  
~~5062~~

MINUTES OF COORDINATION COMMITTEE MEETING  
HELD ON 12 SEPTEMBER 1995

- Opening the meeting, the SCS noted that the Sarajevo Diplomatic Community was now back to full strength and was well represented at the meeting. SCS welcomed the Director of Operations, Mr. Marc Defournaux, who had joined the Office at the end of August. A key priority for the coming months was to keep donor states informed of progress of the Action Plan. At the Donors Conference in Vienna, the representatives of donor countries had been very supportive, and now was the time for a fundraising campaign. SCS noted that the Trust Fund was now the most appropriate system for getting funds into Sarajevo for urgently needed works, and he would be travelling to Vienna during the following week to brief donor countries on the need for additional resources, especially for the Trust Fund.
- The general situation had improved recently, most notably with the road opening over Mount Igman. This road was now open for commercial traffic and it was essential that it remained open. Nevertheless, maximum effort should now be put into bringing in urgently needed materials, especially those needed for the coming winter.

Review of the Minutes

- The COS reviewed the minutes of the last meeting, noting that all the reconnaissance missions to review damage to electricity installations had been completed save for that near Kiseljak, where problems had been encountered with HVO. The IRC representative informed the meeting that 40% of the materials they required for their boiler house projects had reached the city, with the remainder on the way. It was hoped that repair works could commence.

Utilities Situation

- SA Mr. Fawcett, gave a report on the recent meeting the Bosnian and Serbian representatives in Budapest to discuss the restoration of gas supply. Following action by the UN "Sanctions Committee" the gas supply to Serbia had been cut at the Hungarian border. The Budapest meeting had explored the possibility of an agreement on uninterrupted flow of gas through the pipeline, with international monitoring (but not control) of all the valves. Representatives of Serbia had agreed to relay the outcome of the discussions to the authorities in Pale.
- No progress had been made on restoration of water and electricity supplies, and there was little opportunity for contact with the Pale Authorities at the present time. Further reconnaissance missions would be required once it was possible to move



ahead, and it was anticipated that repairs to electricity supplies would take between 10 to 14 days once a genuine agreement to restore utilities was forthcoming.

5062

### Trust Fund Projects

- COS Mr. Saunders reported that all the money deposited in the Trust Fund had now been committed to projects under the Action Plan. The Project Review Group (Zagreb) were considering the project to purchase a new Tunnel Oven for the Klas Bakery, to be funded out of the Japanese contribution to the Trust Fund, and this project would be ready to send to New York for final approval once UNIDO, the implementing partner, provided a breakdown of the estimated cost of US\$200,000. The project to manufacture failsafe gas burners, AP SCS/1995/51 had been approved by Zagreb and final approval from New was expected in the very near future. Regarding the Quick Impact Fund, it was reported that 55 applications had been received, of which 18 had been approved for funding. The first tranche of US\$100,000 had now all been committed and a second tranche of the same amount had now been requested. Of the 55 applications, 11 had been rejected because they exceeded the Quick Impact Fund ceiling of US\$10,000.

### Reports from Action Group Managers

#### ■ AG Gas

DRDS AGM, Mr. Selmanovic once again raised the need to find donors to meet the cost of gas supplied to the city by the Russian Federation. In response, the SCS noted that he continued to mention this matter in his meetings with donors and would continue to do so.

#### ■ AG Electricity

DRDS AGM, Ms. Nikolic asked SCS, UNPROFOR, DRDS, Elektroprivreda and donors to assist in bringing the 3rd French convoy of electrical spares into the city, now that the route over Mount Igman was open. The DO said he was currently examining what assistance UNPROFOR might be able to offer to facilitate delivery of the equipment.

#### ■ AG Water

Mehmet Kopcic reported that there had been no significant change in the water supply situation since the last Coordination Committee meeting with the Brewery, IRC Plant and some gravity supplies still providing the majority of the city's water. Equipment for the development of the water supply at Sokolovici had now arrived at Ploce, and arrangements were being made to transport them to the city.

#### ■ AG Civil Engineering

Mr. Lazitic, DRDS Roads Section reported that the 1st Road contract had now been finished and the second phase was under execution, with an estimated 30m<sup>2</sup> being



completed daily. The steel frame for the anti-sniping wall on the Igman Road had been erected and work would begin soon on completing the first phase with sandbags. With the winter approaching, it was suggested that money be set aside for clearing of roads during possible bad weather to ensure routes in and around the city were maintained. SCS noted that the UNPROFOR works to the Igman Road were progressing very well, and that work had also started on the Butmir section of the road. Mr. Topic, AGM Railways informed the meeting that the European Union-funded railway project had been sent to Zagreb for approval by the Project Review Group. The ODA had agreed to implement three of the seven railway projects. High water levels had hampered work on the bridges causing some delays, but the project was now back on schedule.

■ AG Education

Mr. Pozum, DRDS Education Section pointed out that although work was continuing on school and faculty repairs, it represented only a small proportion of actual need, and expressed the wish that these emergency repairs could be accelerated during the coming 12 months. Colonel Saintenac, SCS AGM Civil Engineering reminded NGOs and other implementing agencies working on school repair projects to liaise with his team before commencing work, as it would often be possible to provide detailed specifications and technical assessments for these projects. Both the Italian and Japanese funded school and faculty repair projects were underway, with some of the repairs in a very advanced state.

■ AG Health

SCS AGM Dr. Pukkila reported that the utilities crisis still represented the biggest health threat in the city, with communicable diseases representing a major risk factor. Preliminary design work on the Ambulantas was nearing completion and the work itself would be commencing as soon as next week. It was also pointed out that the Rodent Control Project was still in urgent need of funding.

Other Matters

- The Italian Ambassador gave a brief report on the recent support of his government for Sarajevo, including ongoing projects in the health sector for most vulnerable groups, including mental health care and urgently required medicines.
- It was agreed that the next meeting of the Coordination Committee would take place on 3 October 1995 at 1.00 p.m.

QZN-1703  
CZG-1396  
CZK-580

702-005-19  
95 SEP 20 12:08

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

SSN-2581

Page 1 of 2

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO

FROM : *for* JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB

DATE : 20 SEPTEMBER 1995

NUMBER : UNPF HQ Z- 1715

SUBJECT : DANBAT SHELLING UPDATE

REFERENCES: A. UNNY 3046 Dated 19 September 1995  
B. UNPF HQ Z-1710 Dated 19 September 1995  
C. UNPF HQ Z-1706 Dated 19 September 1995

98 SEP 20 12:32

UNHCR Telecom Unit  
Palais des Nations

1. In response to your 3046, and further to our Z-1710 and Z-1706, the fire exchange continued unabated between the HV and the BSA in Kostajnica. The HV had crossed the Una River and fighting was ongoing on the east bank. The HV were providing fire support from positions along the west bank and the BSA were returning fire.

2. At approximately 1800 hours, there was a dramatic increase in the level of fire between the HV and the BSA. It was at this time that the HQ Danbat camp in Kostajnica (Grid XL 223093) received several direct impacts. One of these impacts resulted in four Danbat soldiers being wounded, of which two were assessed as serious. Shortly after, another impact caused a further two soldiers to be slightly wounded. In both cases, the injuries occurred as a result of Danbat attempting to withdraw from the camp. To do this, they had to leave the safety of the shelter to get to their APCs, thereby exposing themselves. Four of the wounded soldiers were evacuated by air to the MASH in Pleso at 1925 hours. The other two others were evacuated by air in a second helicopter at approximately 2230 hours.

3. There were no HV troops immediately around the Danbat camp in Kostajnica at the time of the shelling, although there were fire positions in Kostajnica itself. It is assessed that the camp was deliberately targeted as the rounds appeared to be bracketing

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, DFC, ASG M&C, COS, COS UNCRO,  
DCOS OPS



the camp and intensified when the Danbat personnel left the protection of their shelter to try to withdraw. In addition, direct fire at the camp was reported from the east bank of the Una River. CAS was requested by Danbat but was not approved by UNPF HQ as addressed in a separate cable.

4. In the area of Dvor, the HV continued to deploy weapon systems near and around the Danbat HQ Company camp (Grid XL 086915). These HV weapons systems were in constant engagement with the BSA. In particular, one weapons system, assessed as a tank or self propelled artillery piece, actually deployed along the Danbat perimeter security fence contrary to pledges received 18 September by the HV that this would not happen again. As a result, several artillery and mortar rounds impacted inside and around the camp and one guided anti tank missile impacted in the compound. No casualties were sustained in this engagement.

5. The HV weapon systems deployed around the Dvor camp eventually left after substantial pressure was brought to bear by UNPF HQ at the highest military and political levels. A lull in the shelling in Kostajnica and Dvor occurred which allowed Danbat to withdraw the majority of its troops.

6. Currently, a small rear party of approximately 20 soldiers remain in the Kostajnica and Dvor camps respectively. Company locations in Velesnja, Petrinja and Kostajnicki Majur are still manned and are not being shelled. D Coy in Dubica is experiencing some shelling around the camp, resulting in OP ND-35 being evacuated. The remaining OPs in the area are still thought to be occupied, ready to be withdrawn if the situation worsens. Communications are now difficult and are reduced to one mobile phone. Commander Danbat remains in close contact with the HV LO.

7. I wish to reiterate my comments in Z-1706, that both warring factions should be held accountable for this blatant disregard for the safety of UN personnel.

CZN - 1710  
CZG - 1402  
PSN - 1715

95 SEP 21 -5 51  
'98 SEP 21 -6 :19

SSN - 2593

Page 1 / 1

**OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

UNPF-Z-1722

TO: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

5749

FROM: PADAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO

**DATE:** 20 SEPTEMBER 1995

REF NO: COM

**TOTAL PGS. 1**

**SUBJECT: CHARTERED HUMANITARIAN AIRLIFT**

1. Further to 3033 para. 3, the Bosnian Government has received an offer from the U.A.E. to deliver 50 tonnes of humanitarian aid to the Sarajevo airport. The Bosnian Government is prepared to arrange transfer of all goods to UNHCR for general distribution and requests UNPROFOR provide instructions regarding next steps to effect transport of the aid to Sarajevo.

2. We await your guidance on how to proceed in this matter.

Regards.

INT DIST: COMD, COS, MAO, HPHA, PINFO

ckz - 139

SEP 21 -6 :10



CZN-1696  
CZG-139Z  
SSN-2577

UNOG International  
Palace des Nations

SSN-1695  
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'98 SEP 19 CODE / CRYPTOFAX

MOST IMMEDIATE CODE CABLE

T31  
CKZ-134

TO: AKASHI, UNPF HQ, ZAGREB  
INFO: ANNAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
GAREKHAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, NEW YORK  
EAGLETON, SCS, SARAJEVO  
FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO  
DATE: 19 SEPTEMBER 1995  
REF: COM0009

HA  
PLS. PROTECT - ZEN

~~CODED CABLE~~

Z-1708

SUBJECT: Restoration of utilities for Sarajevo

As you know, General Smith and I approached President Izetbegovic on Tuesday to gauge his interest in joining the cessation of hostilities referred to in the Serb 'Framework' document. Izetbegovic expressed some interest, but insisted that real progress should be made on the restoration of utilities for Sarajevo before the Bosnians committed themselves.

On gas, the Bosnians have been very suspicious of Serb actions. Twice in the past three months the Serbs have promised to let gas flow to Sarajevo if the Bosnians would first allow gas to flow to Serb-controlled areas; twice the Bosnians have done their part, and twice the Serbs have reneged. Recently, therefore, the Bosnians have been insisting that Belgrade should provide written assurances, agreeing that the gas should be cut off completely if Pale again cuts off the Bosnians. These guarantees have not been forthcoming. Nevertheless, Bosnian and Serb representatives did meet at Sarajevo airport yesterday, and agreed, at the technical level, on how the gas should be turned on once the Bosnians have asked the Sanctions Committee to allow it to flow.

Progress on water and electricity will be more difficult. Most of Sarajevo's water comes from Bacevo, in Serb-controlled territory. Bacevo produces almost no water, however, unless there are electrical pumps to pump it. And there has been no electricity since May, when the Serbs cut it off to protest NATO air attacks. Since then the electricity grid has sustained some damage, first during the Bosnian offensive in June, and then, apparently, at the hands of NATO and the RRF.

At the same airport meeting referred to above, the Bosnians and Serbs agreed that preliminary damage assessments of the electrical grid should be made according to a certain schedule, and that repairs should follow. At best, the assessments will be done over the weekend, and work will begin next week. Delays are expected, however, not least because some of the work has to be done in Croat-controlled territory, and the Croats appear to be in no hurry to have electricity restored to Bosnian- and Serb-controlled territory. Whether or not, when the electricity is back on, the Serbs then allow water to be pumped to the Bosnian side remains to be seen.

INT DISTR: Comd, COS, MAO, PAHA, UNHR, SCS

SRSG, OSRSG

for COS  
15 SEP 19 14

2/2

Following yesterday's airport meeting, I met with Minister Muratovic. He seemed broadly satisfied with the progress that had been made at the airport, and added a list of projects he would like to get underway once the utilities were restored. These included the reopening of the Bratsva-Jedinstva bridge for civilians wishing to cross the confrontation line to visit friends and relatives, and restoration of the main rail and road links for use by both sides. He suggested that I should meet with the Serb civilian leadership as soon as possible to pursue these matters.

He also informed me that he was satisfied with the arrangements made yesterday at the airport, and that the Permanent Representative of Bosnia to the UN would be writing to the Sanctions Committee today, recommending that the gas pipeline be opened again. Gas might begin to flow from Hungary, via Serbia, into Serb-held territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina by Thursday or Friday. If the Bosnian Serbs do not renege again, the people of Sarajevo could have gas early next week.

CODE / CRYPTOFAX

043  
to T myk  
95 SEP 19 16:22



CZN-1697  
CZG-1393  
CZK-JT  
SSN-2574

**CODE  
RESTRICTED**  
**OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

MOST IMMEDIATE

CD.3  
95 SEP 19 16:33

**CODED CABLE**

Page 1 of 1

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO  
FROM : for JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB  
DATE : 19 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER : UNPF HQ Z- 1709  
SUBJECT : WITHDRAWAL OF BSA HEAVY WEAPONS FROM  
SARAJEVO EZ

*[Signature]*  
M Gen Kolaharian  
COS

UNOG Telecom Unit  
Palais des Nations

98 SEP 19 16:43

1. This cable provides an update on the withdrawal of BSA heavy weapons from the Sarajevo EZ.
2. No heavy weapons were reported as having left the EZ on 18 September, although there was some movement within the EZ, as the BSA concentrated its equipment in preparation for moving out.
3. As at 1400 hours today, HQ UNPROFOR reported that 43 x 120mm mortars, 2 x tanks and 3 x artillery pieces had moved out of the EZ in a northerly direction. As at 1430 hours, a further 10 x 120mm mortars and 4 x 82mm mortars left the EZ to the South.
4. HQ UNPROFOR also reported that French recce teams will move into the BSA held area to investigate heavy equipment that the BSA have reported as being present but immobile.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, ASG M&C, DFC, COS, DCOS OPS,  
DCOS L/A, DOA, HAAU.

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATEUNITED NATIONS  
ARMS OPERATIONS

SEP 19 A 11:22

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB

Attn. SRSG/TEC

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 19 SEPTEMBER 1995

NUMBER: 3037

SUBJECT: Update for Security Council on HV/HVO/BIH  
offensive in western and northern Bosnia

Further to the telecon. between Schmitz and Fisk, I would appreciate receiving **no later than 3 p.m. New York time today** a comprehensive update on today's military developments in western and northern Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Security Council is particularly interested to learn whether the Croatian Army has indeed stopped its offensive as promised in today's public statement. Your update should clearly identify the sources on which you base your assessment as well as the limitations of your observation capabilities in the areas concerned. In the event UNPF determines that the military operations are continuing, the Council is likely to adopt a resolution insisting on an immediate cease-fire and threatening "further measures".

1995-09-19

16:29

PAGE = 0

1995-03-23

10:46

PAGE = 02



CZN - 1688  
CZG - 1384  
SSN - 2565

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

CD3  
95 SEP 18 16:44

Page 1 of 3

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO

FROM: JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB

DATE: 18 September 1995

NUMBER: UNPF HQ Z- 1700

SUBJECT: UPDATE ON BSA COMPLIANCE

98 SEP 18 17:24

UNOG Telecomm Unit  
Palais des Nations

1. Late last night, I spoke with Admiral Smith and it was in our common judgement that the BSA actions to date constitutes compliance with my three conditions of 3 September within the limits that can be expected within the first 72 hours. Therefore, the suspension of NATO airstrikes has been extended for a further 72 hours.

### Withdrawal of Heavy Weapons

2. Below are the latest details on the removal of BSA heavy weapon from the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone. At present it is confirmed that 146 heavy weapons have left the Exclusion Zone on the three routes agreed to earlier between General Smith and General Milosevic, the Sarajevo Romania Corps commander. The movement is being observed by Sector Sarajevo escorts deployed with each convoy and by monitor teams deployed at the edge of the Exclusion Zone. I assess that approximately 57% of the known BSA heavy weapons have been removed from the Exclusion Zone.

Weapons System	Quantity
Mortars	43
MLRS	8
122mm artillery	11
Self Propelled Guns (calibre unknown)	34
Tanks	49
Total	146

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, ASG M&C, DFC, COS, HAAU, PLA, CMO, DI, PC

Freedom Of Movement

2. Sarajevo Airport. No problems have been encountered with the unrestricted access to Sarajevo airport. To date, 213 metric tons of humanitarian aid have been delivered. Air traffic at Sarajevo airport since its reopening 15 September is as follows:

SER	DATE	UNHCR	UNPF	REMARKS
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
1	Fri 15 Sep	1	1	
2	Sat 16 Sep	3	6	
3	Sun 17 Sep	8	4	and 7 Hel flts ( white and green)
4	Mon 18 Sep	7	2	Planned flights

3. Route Swan. Single vehicles and convoys have been able to move without difficulty and checkpoint S1 was open.

4. Hadizi - Sarajevo Route. This route was used for the first time Sunday by a convoy including UNHCR vehicles. Progress was slow due to route damage, however, the operation was judged a success by Sector Sarajevo.

5. Airport Road S4 - Stup - Sarajevo. Although the BSA have opened checkpoint S4, this route is not completely free of restrictions due to the BiH checkpoint at Stup. The BiH have not opened the Stup checkpoint other than for ICRC and UNHCR traffic only.

Attacks on Sarajevo Safe Area

6. The BSA have not attacked the Safe Area of Sarajevo in the last 72 hours.

The Future


7. At this stage, the siege of Sarajevo has been partially lifted. The success of the opened land routes and unrestricted access to the airport is gaining momentum. I believe that traffic, both air and land, into Sarajevo will increase dramatically in the near future. This will likely also include scheduled civilian air flights. On Sunday the BSA accepted the removal of their anti aircraft weapons from the airport flight path. General Smith has advised General Milosevic that the freedom of movement will continue and that clearance procedures will not be required nor will vehicles be stopped, held or searched at any point.

8. I will continue to keep you appraised of the situation.



# HEAVY WEAPONS IN SARAJEVO AREA

(AS DEFINED UNDER CONDITIONS OF THE AGREEMENT)



TOTAL

MOVING

CONFIRMED OUT

AS OF 181300B SEP



C2N-1690

C2G-1386

C2K-549

83N-2568

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO  
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO

FROM : JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB

DATE : 18 September 1995

NUMBER : UNPF-HQ Z- 1702

SUBJECT : SARAJEVO AIRPORT

98 SEP 18 18:19

JMUG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations

1. In your recent cables on the subject (1529, 1729, and 2959) you have emphasised the need to operate Sarajevo airport according to established practice. Indeed, our understanding is that our only entitlement to operate the airport stems from the 1992 airport agreement. The scope for interpreting this agreement was recently expanded through the efforts of Mr. Holbrooke. The framework agreement signed by the Serb leadership on 14 September 1995 stipulates that the airport will be opened for unrestricted use by humanitarian traffic for all sides and UNPROFOR traffic. The definition of "humanitarian" was clarified in further discussions between Mr. Holbrooke and Serb leaders on 16 September. We were informed on 17 September that President Milosevic and General Perisic now consent to a broad interpretation of "humanitarian," to include any cargo or passengers not of a military nature (our 1690).

2. Today, I met with Mr. Holbrooke, who expressed his desire to see the return of scheduled commercial air traffic to Sarajevo airport. It is not clear to us that unrestricted commercial cargo and passenger traffic, albeit for both sides, is within the scope of the 1992 Airport agreement. Nor is it clear to us that the unilateral consent of the Serb leaders in Belgrade constitutes sufficient grounds to embark on a venture which may bear considerable political and physical risk.

3. To demonstrate our willingness to lift the siege of Sarajevo, in accordance with the commitments undertaken by Serb leaders, it seems desirable to permit any commercial aircraft with non-military passengers or cargo to land at Sarajevo airport. This would include Bosnian or Serb aircraft, and passengers and cargo destined for either side of the confrontation line. If you approve of this approach, UNNY should give instructions to this effect. States permitting commercial flights must accept the risks associated with use of Sarajevo airport. It will also be necessary to pursue a new agreement on the use of the airport which reflects the new situation.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, DFC, COS, HOLBROOKE LO



4. Established practice for air transport of non-UNPROFOR personnel is outlined in SRSG Directive 18/95, which permits the carriage of non-UN personnel on UNPF aircraft to or from Sarajevo on the basis of "UNPROFOR-related functional necessity". The SRSG will continue to control the application of this policy, delegated as appropriate to the Head of Mission.

5. Under the circumstances, since it is clear that Mr. Holbrooke wishes to open the airport to commercial traffic, and it is not clear that this falls within the scope of the existing 1992 agreement, we would welcome your immediate guidance on how we should proceed. In the meantime, unless you direct otherwise, we will accept commercial civilian flights at Sarajevo airport, subject to the established procedures to ensure that their passengers and cargo are strictly non-military.

CZN-1682 CZG-1379

SSN-2NT

UNPROFOR



FORPRONU

SSN - 1086

T04

CK2-132

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

CODE / CRYPTOFAX

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INTO: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB  
HQ CHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
PLS. PROTECT { STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO

DATE: 18 September 1995

REF NO. COM003DH

SUBJECT: EFFORTS TO STABILIZE SITUATION IN SARAJEVO

98 SEP 18 -7 :15

Page 1 of 2

Please refer to the attached in respect of the above-referenced subject.

INT DISTR: COMD UNPROFOR, Mr Fecci, UNHCR, Mr Eagleton, SCS

SRSG

OSRSG

mk/cjs  
95 SEP 18 -6 :42

UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations



OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
INFO: AKASHI, UNPF HQ, ZAGREB  
GAREKHAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO  
DATE: 17 SEPTEMBER 1995  
REF: COM003DH

CODE / CRYPTOFA

SUBJECT: EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN SARAJEVO

Ambassador Holbrooke and his delegation called on UNPROFOR this afternoon, and briefed us on their meetings with President Milosevic and President Izetbegovic.

Holbrooke and Smith discussed at some length the Serb interpretation of the 'Framework' signed by Mladic and the Bosnian Serb civilian leadership. Holbrooke explored the idea that 'freedom of movement' should include the free movement of Bosnian citizens along the roads Sarajevo-Kiseljak and Sarajevo-Hadzici-Pazarić. Smith said that he had not addressed this issue in his talks this morning with General Milosevic, and did not see it as feasible in the short term. Smith reported, however, that General Milosevic had accepted four important points: (i) that the definition of 'heavy weapons' should include mortars of 82 mm and artillery pieces of 100 mm; (ii) that anti-aircraft weapons would be removed away from the airport and the approaches thereto; (iii) that 'freedom of movement' would mean no checkpoints and no stops at all; and (iv) that 'humanitarian' goods would mean all goods, including commodities such as cement, other than weapons and ammunition.

As soon as the Americans left, General Smith and I proceeded to the Presidency, where we met President Izetbegovic and Foreign Minister Sacirbey, and discussed, *inter alia*, the matter of a cessation of hostilities agreement for the Sarajevo area, as presented in article 7 of the Serb 'Framework'. The Bosnians did not reject the proposal out of hand, but Sacirbey did say that they would not be bound by a timetable laid down by the Serbs unilaterally. As we discussed the matter, Izetbegovic raised the subject of utilities for Sarajevo, and I told him that I envisaged the restoration of utilities coming as part of a package including a cessation of hostilities agreement for Sarajevo, an agreement on utilities and a reaffirmation of the airport agreement of 5 June 1992. He did not oppose this, though he did say that the Bosnians would insist that the utilities be turned on before they bound themselves to a cessation of hostilities.

Tomorrow, therefore, if UNPROFOR and NATO have officially declared that the 'pause' will continue for another 72 hours, I will contact the civilian authorities on the Bosnian side and see how we can proceed on the utilities issue. Later, if it seems that progress is possible, we will endeavour to develop this process as a part of the negotiations on a cessation of hostilities in the Sarajevo Total Exclusion Zone.



Palais des Nations

CNZ-912 CYZ-904 P1/1  
(ZAG: PLS PROTECT SRJ)

'98 SEP 19 -4 :52

**OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG/FC  
INFO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO attn COM/ CMDR UNPROFOR  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: *for* ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK *Marki Marica*  
DATE: 18 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: 3033  
SUBJECT: Sarajevo Airport

RECEIVED NATIONS  
CABLE OPERATIONS  
SEP 18 P 9 26

1. Thank you for your Z-1702 and Pedauye's COM002DH on the above subject. While appreciating the points made in the latter, we cannot agree to any dilution of the established practice in regard to journalists and official missions. The more restrictive conditions proposed by COM/UNPROFOR are, in our view, unlikely to be acceptable to the Security Council. UNPROFOR should therefore seize the opportunity afforded by current events to restore, at a minimum, the operating conditions that prevailed prior to the closure of the airport in April 1995.

2. As discussed in my telecon with Janvier, I accept the proposal in your Z-1702 to go beyond established practice and permit the return of scheduled commercial air traffic. I have raised with the Office of the Legal Counsel the question of whether this would fall within the scope of the 1992 airport agreement, though at first sight we are inclined to think the agreement can be so interpreted (as indeed you suggest in your para 1). At the same time it must be made very clear to any civilian airliner planning to fly into Sarajevo that the United Nations declines all responsibility for the safety of the aircraft, its passengers and crew. We assume the commercial aircraft concerned would carry appropriate war risk insurance. This also raises the question of our capacity for such tasks as the operation of Sarajevo airport, which, in the intermediate term, may go beyond the ability and resources of a peace-keeping operation and require the elaboration of other arrangements.

3. Please let us know of any commercial airliner intending to take up this opportunity.



LN-1678  
-2G-1376  
2K-537  
SN-2548

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

95 SEP 17 <sup>TOR</sup> 14:18

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK ONLY  
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA ONLY  
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO  
FROM : JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB  
DATE : 17 September 1995  
NUMBER : UNPF-HQ Z-1690  
SUBJECT : MEETING WITH MR. HOLBROOKE, 17 SEPTEMBER

98 SEP 17 14:35

UNITED Nations Unit  
Palais des Nations

1. The Force Commander met with Mr. Holbrooke and a large US Delegation which included General Clark and Ambassador Galbraith. The meeting reviewed and discussed points which had previously been discussed by the Holbrooke mission with President Milosevic and General Perisic in Belgrade yesterday, and with President Tudjman, Minister Susak, General Cervenko, and Minister Granic this morning in Zagreb.

2. General Janvier opened with a summary of the military situation. The Federation advance in Western Bosnia continues. It seems likely that Sanski Most will fall tonight and Prijedor will fall today or tomorrow. By tonight, Federation forces may be within artillery range of Banja Luka. There is little evidence of organized Serb defence. Force Commander attributes the rapid collapse to the Serbs' inability to re-establish effective command and control after the destruction of communications infrastructure during the air strikes. The meeting then discussed cessation of hostilities, the definition of humanitarian traffic, the extent of unimpeded ground access, use of the airport, and definition of heavy weapons.

3. On the subject of cessation of hostilities, it was agreed that the Sarajevo area is largely quiet. Mr. Holbrooke indicated that while the fall of Sanski Most would not undermine the peace process, the fall of Banja Luka would. Any move against Brcko would be "a catastrophe," and it was his intention to discuss this with Mr. Izetbegovic on his next stop. The fall of Banja Luka might force President Milosevic to choose between accepting several hundred thousand refugees or intervening on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs. Neither course would be in the interests of peace in the region.

4. The definition of "humanitarian" in the context of the framework agreement was revisited. President Milosevic and General Perisic now consent to a broad interpretation of "humanitarian". Any non-military material including all commercial civilian consumer goods can now be considered within the definition of "humanitarian" traffic, and will therefore not be restricted in any way.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, DFC, COS, NATO LO, HOLBROOKE LO



5. Similarly, the question of unimpeded access along ground routes into Sarajevo has been clarified. The Serb leadership agrees that all civilian traffic, including private cars and commercial vehicles travelling without UN escort, were to have unimpeded access along ground routes into Sarajevo. The Serbs made only two requests: that military traffic be excluded; and that the Ilidza-Lukavica-Grabovica route (a Serb "blue route" running east-west across the airport) be opened. The second condition has already been fulfilled, and UN checkpoints will be established to verify the first condition.

6. It was agreed by the Serb authorities that Sarajevo airport would be open to all flights without restriction. These flights may bear any UN or humanitarian cargo, according to the definition above.

7. Finally, the definition of heavy weapons in the framework agreement was clarified. A clerical error caused the phrase "greater than" to included instead of the intended "greater than or equal to..." It was agreed that guns of 100mm and mortars of 82mm were included in the definition of heavy weapons. President Milosevic is not prepared, on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs, to entertain a more restrictive definition of heavy weapons. Mr. Holbrooke's military advisors argue that verification of withdrawal for smaller weapons would be problematical.

8. Although these five points have been agreed between Mr. Holbrooke and Serb leaders in Belgrade, four remain to be confirmed and implemented by General Smith in Sarajevo. General Mladic is in hospital in Belgrade for several days, and General Milosevic, commander of the Romanije Corps in the Sarajevo area, has been designated the interlocutor for subsequent discussions.

9. Mr Holbrooke emphasised that the US will assess the movement of heavy weapons very carefully, and would not hesitate to recommend that air strikes recommence if there was any sign of the Serbs "playing games". The Force commander indicated that about 15 percent of heavy weapons were already thought to have moved out of the Sarajevo exclusion zone and that a concerted effort would made to identify further movement with precision. General Janvier considers progress so far to be substantial, but stated that today would be decisive in determining whether the conditions for a further suspension had been met.

10. Following the meeting, General Janvier and Admiral Smith agreed to speak at 2030 hours to assess the situation and render their common judgement on an extension to the suspension of air strikes.





CZV 1676

CZG 1374

UNPROFOR

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FORPRONU

T-30

United Nations Protection Force Headquarters  
 Siege des Force de Protection des Nations Unies  
 Sarajevo

OJSSN 2545  
 ISSN 1681

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Z-1687

MOST IMMEDIATE

75 SEP 16 18:09

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK → VIA HQ  
 INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICIFY, GENEVA → VIA HQ  
 AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB  
 SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO  
 FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO  
 DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1995  
 NUMBER: COM-002  
 SUBJECT: Return of CoM/UNPROFOR

C1K2-127

Further to Z-1652, I returned to Sarajevo on 15 September to resume my responsibilities. I entered the city using the Mt. Igman route and was accompanied by Maj. Gen. Van Kappen.

Best regards.

C2N-1671  
C2G-1369  
SSN-2540

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MISSION  
CODE CABLE  
CODE / CRYPTO FAX

Page 1

SSN-1677  
1/3

Unclassified Routine  
UN Restricted Priority

Immediate  
UN Confidential

SEP 16 12:10  
More Immediate  
UN Secret

Only

Date/Time:	16 September 1995	File Ref:	COM-001dh	Stm Srl No:	T-14	
From:	MR A. PEDAUYE CHIEF OF MISSION UNPROFOR HQ SARAJEVO	From Fax:	VSAT 155 7298	Route:	No:	TOT
To:	MR K. ANNAN UNDERSECRETARY- GENERAL UN NEW YORK	To Fax:	1 212 963 9222	CKZ	124	
Info:	AKASHI, SRSG, UNPF, HQ ZAGREB  GAREKHAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA	Info Fax:	151 3063   41 22 917 0096	VIA ZAG.		
Subject:	IMPLEMENTATION OF SERB FRAMEWORK			Total Pages:	3	
Int Distr:	FC UNPROFOR					
Drafter:	D. HARLAND SNR POLITICAL AFFAIRS OFFICER	Dept/Tel:	155 7304	Signature:		
Releasing Officer:	A. PEDAUYE CHIEF OF MISSION UNPROFOR HQ SARAJEVO	Dept/Tel:	155 7301	Signature: <i>A. Pedauye</i>		
Acc Ck:	Router:	FTx Op:	Distr Op:	Check Op:		

UNPF-Z-1682

Please find attached text as above referenced.

Regards.



## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
 INFO: AKASHI, UNPF HQ, ZAGREB  
 GAREKHAN, UNHQ, NEW YORK  
 STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
 FROM: PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR HQ, SARAJEVO  
 DATE: 16 SEPTEMBER 1995  
 REF: COM001DH

SUBJECT: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SERB 'FRAMEWORK' FOR SARAJEVO

I met this morning with General Smith, US Contact Group representative Christopher Hill and US Ambassador John Menzies to discuss implementation of the Serb 'framework' for Sarajevo.

General Smith began by noting three elements of the 'framework' that fall short of General Janvier's original demands, and which might pose some problems for us. They were:

- i. The definition of heavy weapons: The definition of heavy weapons used by the Serbs would allow them to keep about a hundred weapons (or a third of the total weapons they have in the area) -- weapons which UNPROFOR would normally have considered 'heavy'. Mortars and field artillery pieces of calibre less than 100 mm would be allowed to stay under the Serb definition, as would anti-aircraft cannons. Smith indicated that he would prefer to have the cut-off point for mortars and field artillery at 76 mm, and would like to have anti-aircraft weapons removed, if only to be in conformity with the airport agreement.
- ii. Freedom of movement: The Serb 'framework' speaks of 'unimpeded road access' only around Sarajevo. Smith noted that this still left the problem of access to Gorazde, and stated that he would like to secure freedom of movement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, as originally demanded.
- iii. Definition of 'humanitarian': The Serb 'framework' speaks of freedom of movement, by land and air, for 'humanitarian traffic' and UNPROFOR. Smith noted that potential disputes over the definition of 'humanitarian' could lead to substantial restrictions in our freedom of movement, as had happened in the past.

Ambassador Hill stated that he would be travelling to Belgrade today, and that, when he met with President Milosevic, he would raise these points with him, with a view to having them included in an 'addendum'. I proposed that Hill inform the Serbs, through Milosevic, that the 'framework' would have to be accepted by UNPROFOR and NATO, and that those organizations might have difficulties in accepting it if these elements were not introduced. Hill agreed that he would take this line with Milosevic.

Smith then brought up problems posed by the actions of the Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats. He stressed two points:

C2N-1671 3/3

i. Gorazde: He noted that the Bosnians did not seem particularly inclined to accept the 'framework', and seemed to be planning military activity to the south of the city, perhaps in an effort to create a land corridor between central Bosnia and Gorazde. Answering my question, he noted that this could be done without necessarily operating within the Sarajevo TEZ, but that it remained a distinct possibility that the Bosnians should be warned against.

ii. Human rights violations: He noted that there were reports -- so far without confirmation -- of human rights violations by Bosnian government forces in the area of Donji Vakuf and Ozren. The reports could not be substantiated or dismissed, due to restrictions on freedom of movement. He noted that reports of this nature could cause alarm within the Serb-held areas around Sarajevo, and might lead local Serb commanders to continue in their refusal to withdraw their weapons. Hill agreed to take the matter up with the Bosnian authorities.

The Americans then left for Belgrade, and General Smith and I discussed the way forward. After a brief review of problems that are likely to arise in the elaboration of a cessation of hostilities agreement for Sarajevo (a project which is meant to be under way by tomorrow evening), Smith gave me his military assessment of the situation in Bosnia as a whole. The point which struck me most was that the Serbs now appear to control somewhere between 50% and 55% of the total territory of Bosnia, and this figure is likely to fall in the near future as Bosnian forces push out in the direction of Sanski Most and Prijedor. Very soon the Serbs might have less than the amount of territory they would be expected to have after a peace agreement (49%). This will create problems for the current round of negotiations, given that the incentive for the Bosnians and Croats to settle (the prospect of gaining land in return for peace) will have been considerably diminished.



UNUG Telecomm. Unit

Palais des Nations


CNZ 900 CYZ 893 P 1/  
(ZAG-PLS PROTECT SAR

'98 SEP 16 -1 :43

**OUTGOING CODE CABLE**

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG/FC  
INFO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO attn COM/ CMDR UNPROFOR  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 15 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: **3015**  
SUBJECT: Situation in Sarajevo



As news comes in of the reopening of Sarajevo airport and the "blue routes", I should like to let you know, and in particular Generals Janvier and Smith, how much we here at Headquarters admire the calm and courageous leadership shown by them during the recent critical period. The initiative you have shown in seizing this opportunity to restore humanitarian aid to the suffering civilians of Sarajevo and to restore the mission to its primary purpose stands in the finest traditions of the United Nations. Congratulations to you and your staff, civil and military. We all count on you to keep up the good work in the crucial days ahead, and assure you of our unstinting support, as always.

UNITED NATIONS  
CHILL OPERATIONS  
1995 SEP 15 P 8:54

CZV 1658  
CZG 1359  
CZK 522

SSN 2513

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

Page 1 of 2

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
FROM : JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB  
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO  
DATE : 14 September 1995  
NUMBER : UNPF HQ Z- 1669  
SUBJECT : VULNERABILITY OF SARAJEVO AIRPORT

*[Handwritten signature]*  
SEP 14 16 34  
ps 096

1. The vulnerability of the Sarajevo airport remains high. NATO air strikes and RRF shelling have not destroyed or forced the withdrawal of a satisfactory number of BSA heavy weapons.
2. The air strikes have eliminated much of the radar-guided Surface to Air Missile (SAM) threats in most areas of Bosnia. They have also seriously degraded the Command, Control, and Communications (C3) infrastructure and the Integrated Air Defense Network System (IADS) that support SAMs such as the high-altitude SA-2 and medium-altitude SA-6. However, the tactical, low-altitude systems remain. These are infrared (IR) guided Man-Portable Air Defense System (MANPADS) including SA-7, SA-14, and SA-16. There are also mobile IR systems in the BSA inventory including the SA-9 and possibly the SA-13. In the Sarajevo area in particular, there is still no evidence that any of the Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA), artillery, or heavy mortar weapons have been removed. All of these systems present a potent threat to aircraft both on the ground and during takeoff and landing.
3. SAM systems known to be in the Sarajevo area include MANPADS and the SA-9:
  - a. The MANPADS threat is primarily from the SA-7. The BSA has these systems in large numbers, and since they only require one person (without associated equipment or IADS support) to operate them, they can be rapidly and covertly deployed to positions in BSA territory. The SA-7 is capable of rear-aspect only firing from a maximum range of 4-5 km at an altitude of 2400m. The more capable MANPADS SA-14 and SA-16 are also believed to be in the Sarajevo area. They have a maximum range of 6 and 7 km. respectively, with an improved IR homing device; and

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, DFC, COS, COS L/A, PLANS/POLICY

98 SEP 14 17:07

Palace des Nations



- b. The mobile SAM threat in the Sarajevo area comes primarily from the SA-9. This system is installed on the highly mobile BRDM-2 chassis (capable of speed up to 50 km/hr) and consists of four missiles mounted over a rotating observation turret. The range of this system is 7-9 km at altitudes up to 6000m. SA-9 have been seen occasionally within the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone, though none are confirmed at the present time. The BSA may also operate the SA-13, though this has not been confirmed. The SA-13 has a shorter range than the SA-6; 7km at 5000m altitude, however, it has greater mobility due to its MT-LB tracked chassis.

4. The AAA threat in the Sarajevo area is also high. BSA are known to operate a wide spectrum of weapons from the lightweight 20mm AAA with a range of 1200m to the very capable 57mm S-60 with a range of 4000-5000m. They also have in their inventory a variety of mobile AAA systems with ranges from 1200-3000m. Some of these mobile systems have up to three barrels that can fire up to 800 rounds per minute each. AAA systems are known to be within the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone and are not presently accounted for.

5. The threat to aircraft and aircraft support operations on the ground is also high. Numerous mortar and artillery pieces remain within the exclusion zone. These range from short-range 82mm and 120mm mortar to 155mm howitzers. Tanks, self-propelled guns, heavy machine guns, and even small arms present a clear danger to ground operations at Sarajevo Airport.

6. The threat to operations in and around Sarajevo Airport remains high. The BSA still have very capable SAM, AAA, and other weapons within the exclusion zone and have shown a willingness to use them. Present countermeasures such as close air support and the RRF cannot eliminate the threat to aircraft. Even if the BSA comply with my conditions and withdraw their heavy weapons from the Exclusion Zone, there will still exist a very substantial threat from mobile systems, as described above, which could easily deploy within range and cause a disproportionate amount of damage. This also holds true for small arms fire, which can easily threaten aircraft during the approach or on the runway. Several examples exist to support this.

8. It is, therefore, my assessment that the threat to the Sarajevo airport is high. This situation will not markedly change even if the BSA withdraw their heavy weapons as they can maintain the capability to destroy aircraft using the airport by concealing shoulder launched man portable systems and other similar mobile weapon systems or simply readily available small arms. The real question is whether or not they have the political will to exercise restraint and that will take careful judgement.


CZN 1668  
CZG 1367

SSN 2533

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Page 1 of 1

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: JANVIER, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB  
DATE: 15 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: Z - 1679  
SUBJECT: Visit of Senator Destexhe and other requests for access to Sarajevo



95 SEP 15 14:41  
CDB 16

Re your code cable 3002 of 14 September 1995 requesting our assistance to Senator Destexhe to enter Sarajevo, I have decided that due to the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo in particular, all assistance to persons not essential to the ongoing operation will be curtailed for seven days. At that time, we will reassess the situation and our capabilities.

Please assure Senator Destexhe that as soon as the situation is normalized, we will be pleased to accede to his request.

Regards.

UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
Palais des Nations  
98 SEP 15 14:59

DIST: SRSG, DFC, COS, ASG/M+C, DOA, PC, DI, PROTOCOL, CMO, MLO,  
CoM UNPROFOR, BHC/LO



CZV 1656

CZG 1357

UNOG Telecomm. Unit

Palais des Nations

SSN 2511

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

98 SEP 14 15:59

117

**LOST IMMEDIATE**

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB  
DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: Z - 1667  
SUBJECT: Serb Proposal for a Cessation of Hostilities in  
Sarajevo

**CODED CABLE**

At about 1000 hours this morning, Mr. Holbrooke and his team visited me and General Janvier. On arrival, Holbrooke said that he understood that a technical pause in NATO air operations was in effect for 12 hours from 1000 hours local time this morning.

Holbrooke stated that he had arrived in Belgrade yesterday with the intention of continuing discussions on the peace plan. President Milosevic, however, insisted that a proposal for a ceasefire in Sarajevo should first be dealt with, and that Dr. Karadzic and General Mladic were standing by. Holbrooke agreed after some discussion, following which the attached proposal was tabled, discussed, and signed.

Holbrooke made a number of points in conveying the Serb proposal to us this morning. First, the proposal is from "the Serbs." These words have been chosen carefully, as Holbrooke will not carry out political discussions with the Pale regime. He is, however, prepared to deal with Pale representatives acting as part of the Serb negotiation team led by President Milosevic. President Milosevic also insists on this arrangement. Second, although the Holbrooke team "had a part in shaping it," the proposal is simply being conveyed without comment. It is expected that General Janvier and Admiral Smith will now examine it and reach their own decisions. Third, the Holbrooke team will convey the proposal to government representatives at a meeting today in Mostar. They will not ask the government to agree or disagree. Fourth, the first item in paragraph 3 is a statement of fact. The second item, concerning BiH heavy weapons, is a proposal, not a condition. Fifth, the Holbrooke team has no further role to play beyond conveying the proposal, and will now "return to the job they were sent to do by President Clinton, which is to work on a peace agreement." Sixth, Holbrooke's press line, if asked why he postponed a meeting with the Russians in Geneva, will be: "We had an important message to convey from the Serb side concerning a possible ceasefire in the Sarajevo area." All further queries will be forwarded to UNPF.

Internal distribution: FC/DFC/

CZ N 1656

2/ 7

Mr. Holbrooke, in our brief subsequent discussion, stated that yesterday's press statement by the President of the Security Council has "little meaning" as the Bosnian government is prepared to exercise restraint only in and around Sarajevo. Elsewhere, they will "continue to want to gain ground after so many years of being kicked."

An initial review by our civilian staff is attached. General Janvier's assessment, and that of Admiral Smith, will be forwarded when available.



Assessment of Serb Proposal for a  
Cessation of Hostilities in Sarajevo

1. Description of Serb proposal:

- a. "Immediately" (not defined):
  - (1) cessation of offensive operations within Sarajevo exclusion zone
  - (2) Begin to withdraw heavy weapons
  - (3) Suspension of NATO bombing for 3 days
- b. Within 24 hours:
  - (1) Open Hadzici and Kiseljak roads
  - (2) Open Sarajevo airport
- c. At 3-Day Point. UN and NATO assess compliance. If satisfactory, air campaign is suspended for another 3 days
- d. Within 24 hours following UN and NATO concurrence as to compliance (it is not clear if this is "substantial" or "complete" compliance):
  - (1) Military commanders meet to formalize a cessation of hostilities for Sarajevo exclusion zone
  - (2) Military commanders begin discussing a country-wide cessation of hostilities
- e. After 6 days - withdrawal of heavy weapons completed
- f. After formalization of cessation of hostilities and compliance with provisions - NATO bombings cease. (It is not clear if this is the cessation of hostilities agreement for Sarajevo, or that for the whole country.)

2. General. The proposal appears to address the outstanding demands in General Janvier's letter of 3 September 1995 (General Mladic agreed not to attack safe areas in a previous letter to General Janvier). The proposal, which is the first document originated by the Serbs which makes mention of the "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," includes:

- a. A realistic timetable that, if followed, will demonstrate serious intent; and
- b. Acknowledgement that NATO enforcement will continue in event of non-compliance.

3. Acceptability. The proposal meets the demands of General Janvier:

a. Withdrawal of Heavy Weapons

- (1) 6 days is a realistic time for a proposal that is phased and carried out in conjunction with negotiations for a cessation of hostilities in Sarajevo, and then nation-wide
- (2) The proposal indicates a Serb intention to begin withdrawal of "substantial amounts" of heavy weapons "immediately." The language could, however, create the impression that withdrawal is contingent on a cessation of hostilities in Sarajevo. If the Serbs begin withdrawing their weapons without waiting for a agreement on cessation of hostilities from the government, NATO is likely to be able to accept this proposal. If, on the other hand, the Serbs insist on government agreement to a cessation of hostilities, it is possible that this proposal will not be accepted.
- (3) There is an indirect reference in the proposal to the importance of cooperation by government forces in achieving an orderly withdrawal of heavy weapons
- (4) The Serb proposal only "asks" that UNPROFOR monitor Bosnian government weapons. It does not set this as a precondition. Even if the Bosnian government accepts this proposal, we should recognize that UNPROFOR cannot ensure that all weapons will be monitored. It is too easy to hide weapons in Sarajevo.
- (5) The definition of heavy weapons in the Serb proposal is not in compliance with the NAC Declaration of February 1994, which forbids all artillery and mortars, and adds APC cannons, anti-aircraft guns, rocket launchers, missiles, and anti-tank weapons. These prohibitions have been interpreted by the previous Commander BH Command and NATO to comprise direct fire weapons of calibres larger than 12.7mm/.50 cal, and indirect fires larger than 81mm.

b. Agreement not to Attack Safe Areas. Although not mentioned in this proposal, Mladic has undertaken not to attack safe areas in a previous letter to General Janvier.

c. Free Use of Roads. The proposal goes beyond the conditions in General Janvier's letter of 3 September 1995, in that it adds the road through Hadzici, which is more direct and superior to the Kiseljak road for heavy volumes of traffic. There



is no mention of "the usual controls," as has appeared in past Serb proposals. It may be that we will receive freer access.

- d. Opening of Airport. This proposal is in compliance with the terms of General Janvier's letter of 3 September 1995, which required free access for "UN and authorized international humanitarian organizations." We should note that this proposal falls short of the full use of the airport as authorized under the agreement of 5 June 1992.

4. Feasibility. The following should be noted:

- a. Immediate removal of a substantial portion of heavy weapons will be possible provided that the Bosnian forces exercise the current level of restraint in and around Sarajevo.
- b. UNPROFOR must maintain, at least for the immediate future, a posture on the ground that avoids the possibility of hostage-taking should it be necessary to resume enforcement operations in Sarajevo or elsewhere in response to attacks on safe areas. This means that:
- (1) Provided that it is not necessary to approach close to Serb-held positions, UNPROFOR may be able to monitor the location of BiH heavy weapons in and around the city. UNPROFOR's ability to monitor in Serb-held areas will be limited to long-range visual means including aircraft. The ease with which weapons can be hidden requires that UNPROFOR not accept any commitment to ensure their total absence on either side.
  - (2) Considerable caution and security measures may be needed for use of the Kiseljak or Hadzici roads.
  - (3) It will be necessary to assess the behaviour of both sides around the airport in taking a decision to resume flights.
- c. We do not know, at this point, if the Bosnian government will be prepared to go beyond its present commitment to restraint around Sarajevo by entering into negotiations for a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities there or elsewhere.



CZN 1656

6/7

#### A Framework for a Cessation of Hostilities Within the Sarajevo TEZ.

In an effort to further the American peace initiative, the Republica Srpska has agreed to the following framework for the immediate cessation of hostilities in the Sarajevo TEZ:

1. In the context of cessation of hostilities, the Army of the Republica Srpska would cease all offensive operations within the Sarajevo TEZ and begin immediately to relocate substantial amounts of its heavy weapons beyond the limits of the Sarajevo TEZ with the aim of a completed relocation of heavy weapons within 144 hours.
2. NATO would suspend bombing for 72 hours to facilitate initiation of a cessation of hostilities within the Sarajevo TEZ.
3. The Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina has stated it will refrain from all offensive operations within or from the Sarajevo TEZ. It would be asked to present to UNPROFOR a listing of a substantial number of its heavy weapons locations within the TEZ, and thus enable UNPROFOR to monitor these weapons within the aim of complete monitoring of all BiH heavy weapons within the Sarajevo TEZ.
4. Within 24 hours of the beginning of the bombing suspension, unimpeded road access would be opened to Sarajevo, including the Kiseljak and Hadizi routes, for humanitarian traffic for all sides and UNPROFOR traffic.
5. Within 24 hours of the beginning of the bombing suspension, the Sarajevo airport would be opened for unrestricted use by humanitarian traffic for all sides and UNPROFOR traffic.
6. At the 72 hours point, the UN and NATO military commanders would assess compliance with the foregoing requirements. If the heavy weapons relocation has been judged in compliance with the provisions of this agreement, the NATO air campaign would continue to be suspended for another 72 hours until the relocation has been completed.
7. Within 24 hours following the UN and NATO Commanders' concurrence as to compliance, the Commanders of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Army of the Republica Srpska would meet with the UNPROFOR Commander to formalize the cessation of hostilities agreement within the Sarajevo TEZ and to discuss the extension of a cessation of hostilities country-wide within the context of the overall momentum toward a peace agreement.



CZV 1656

7/7

-2-

8. When this cessation of hostilities has been formalized and the provisions have been complied with, the NATO bombings would cease.

9. Any attack concerning Sarajevo, or other non-compliance would be subject to investigation and resumption of air operations.

## ADDENDUM

1. Heavy weapons are defined as artillery greater than 100MM, mortars greater than 82MM and tanks.

2. Additional weapons may be included in this agreement with the concurrence of both parties.

3. Within 12 hours of the initiation of the Agreement both sides would provide to Commander, UNPROFOR their plans for compliance. Commander, UNPROFOR would make arrangements to insure verification of the agreement.

4. For the purpose of this agreement, the bombing suspension commenced at (date/time to be determined).

## SIGNED:

Momcilo Krajsnik, Bosnian-Serb Assembly Speaker  
Radovan Karadzic, Bosnian-Serb President  
Nikola Koljevic, Bosnian-Serb Vice President  
Ratko Mladic, Bosnian-Serb Commander

## WITNESSED:

Serbian Foreign Minister Milutinovic  
Serbian President Milosevic  
Montenegrin President Bulatovic

CNZ 893 CYZ 887 P 1/-  
(ZAG - PLS PROTECT SAR

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB ATTN: SRSG/FC/COM  
INFO: AKASHI, UNPF, SARAJEVO ATTN: COM/CMDR BHC  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: 3002  
SUBJECT: Visit of Senator Destexhe

RECEIVED  
CABLE OPERATIONS  
14 SEP 14 P 8:52

The former Secretary-General of Médecins sans Frontières, Dr. Alain Destexhe, who is now a Senator in Belgium, has sent us the attached self-explanatory request. We would like to be helpful to the Senator, to the extent possible. The improved prospects for the reopening of the airport would, of course, make a positive response easier, but in case that does not occur, we would appreciate your urgent comments in order to permit us to reply.

CHOC Telecom Unit  
Palais des Nations  
'98 SEP 15 -1 :16



SECRET

**URGENT**

Fax à l'attention de Monsieur Shashi Tharoor  
Fax n° 0101-212-963 9222

De : Alain Destexhe Fax : 02/502.35.36  
Tel : 02/515.87.07.

Date : 14 septembre 1995

Nombre de page(s) celle-ci incluse : 3

Cher Shashi, *Cher ami,*

Je me permets de vous solliciter pour obtenir l'assistance de la FORPRONU afin de pouvoir me rendre à SARAJEVO, le plus rapidement possible.

Comme vous le savez, je suis Sénateur de Belgique. Dans le cadre du jumelage entre Sarajevo et Bruxelles, dont le principe a été approuvé et qui doit être officialisé fin septembre, le maire de Bruxelles m'a demandé d'effectuer une mission d'évaluation des besoins médicaux afin d'établir une collaboration avec les hôpitaux. Je souhaiterais, par ailleurs, me rendre compte personnellement de la situation dans cette ville que j'ai eu régulièrement l'occasion de visiter lorsque j'étais secrétaire général de MSF.

Vous trouverez ci-joint la lettre du maire de Bruxelles ainsi qu'une invitation officielle du Président du Parlement de Bosnie Herzégovine, Monsieur LAZOVIC.

Je souhaite rencontrer les autorités bosniques (présidence, maire de Sarajevo,...), les principaux responsables de la santé ainsi que quelques connaissances (Ibrahim Spuhic, Charlie 99,...)


Je suis évidemment bien conscient des problèmes de sécurité actuels. Je sollicite l'assistance de la Forpronu pour me rendre à Sarajevo - sur place je me débrouillerai - mais je décline par avance toute responsabilité de la Forpronu en ce qui concerne ma sécurité. Je suis prêt à signer tout document allant dans ce sens.

Je pourrais arriver à Zagreb le mercredi 20 dans la soirée et aller à Sarajevo pour 48 heures à partir du 21 si possible.

Je crois aussi qu'il est important de maintenir des contacts entre la ville assiégée et l'extérieur, même dans les moments difficiles.

Je vous saurais gré de me faire savoir rapidement si il est possible d'organiser ce voyage.

D'avance, je vous remercie et je vous prie de croire, Cher Shashi, à l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

  
Alain Destexhe  
Sénateur

*Amicalement  
Shashi Tharoor*

Passeport belge 220 631 expiration 10/07/96

1995-09-15 01:12 5603

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Fax sent by : 32 2 5441815

GROUPE PARL SENAT

A4->A4 14/09/95

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CNZ 893 CYZ 887 P 3/4

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11/09 '95 21:48 32 2 6441898

MISSION REP B&E

11/09/95

21:29

Pg: 3

0003

REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
PARLIAMENT  
REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Sarajevo, September 6, 1995.


Honourable Senator Destexhe,

Having high regard for you as a proved friend of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it has been both my honour and pleasure to invite you to come to its Capital city of Sarajevo.

Hoping that your visit will be arranged in the nearest future, we kindly ask you to inform us on the date of your coming as well as on your wishes, so that the programme of your visit be arranged as better as possible.

Please accept the assurances of my most distinguished consideration,

Miro LAZOVIĆ  
President of the Parliament of  
the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina





STAD BRUSSEL  
KABINET VAN DE BURGEMEESTER



CNZ 893 CYZ 887 P 4/4

VILLE DE BRUXELLES  
CABINET DU BOURGMEESTRE

Bruxelles, le 4 septembre, 1995

N°ref. à rappeler s.v.p. SE/MI/RS/2028/95

# A QUI DE DROIT

Madame, Monsieur,

La ville de BRUXELLES a récemment décidé le principe d'un jumelage avec la ville de SARAJEVO, capitale de la Bosnie Herzégovine. Dans ce cadre, plusieurs hôpitaux bruxellois ont proposé d'entamer une coopération avec les structures médicales de la ville assiégée. Aussi, j'ai demandé au Docteur Alain Dostexhe, membre du Sénat fédéral de Belgique, de m'aider à établir un état de la situation sanitaire dans la ville assiégée. A cette fin, et sous sa propre responsabilité, il souhaite se rendre le plus rapidement possible sur place.

Je me permets de vous écrire pour solliciter l'assistance de la FORPRONU afin qu'il puisse accéder à la ville.

En vous remerciant par avance, je vous prie de croire, Madame, Monsieur, à l'expression de mes sentiments les meilleurs.

Le Bourgmestre,

François-Xavier de DONNEA,  
Ancien Ministre,  
Député.

CNZ 894 CYZ 888 P  
(ZAG - PLS PROTECT SAR)

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB ATTN: SRSG/FC/COM  
INFO: AKASHI, UNPF, SARAJEVO ATTN: COM/CMDR BHC  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 14 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: 3003  
SUBJECT: Western Bosnia

UNITED NATIONS  
CABLE OPERATIONS  
14 SEP 14 P 8 52

Please find attached the statement issued jointly by the Secretaries  
General of the UN and NATO today.

5403 Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations  
'98 SEP 15 -1 :16



~~Draft of~~ a joint statement to be issued by the  
Secretary-General of the United Nations and the  
Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

We have been following with deep concern the intensification of military activities by the Bosnian parties in recent weeks, particularly in the Western parts of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are also disturbed by reports of the exodus of large numbers of civilians from the affected areas. We call upon all the parties to cease immediately all offensive military activities and hostile acts in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the United Nations Security Council and the North Atlantic Council have repeatedly emphasised, there can be no military solution to the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. We affirm our full support to the ongoing efforts to find a political solution which would bring lasting peace throughout the region.

CZU - 1650  
CZG - 1351  
CZK - 576  
SSN - 2500

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95 SEP 13 16 21

UNPF - HQ  
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Page 1 of 2

IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK - 1628

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB

DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1995

NUMBER: UNPF Z- 1661

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Russian Vice Foreign Minister, Mr Ivanov



98 SEP 13 17:24

UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations

1. The Force Commander and I today held a meeting with Mr Ivanov, the Russian Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, which focused solely on the issue of air strikes. Mr Ivanov said in his opening remark that he had come to ask just one question: what needed to be done to stop the NATO air strikes? He had recently discussed the issue with General Mladic and it was clear to him that Mladic would never accept the NATO ultimatum as it currently stood. Therefore, there was a need to find another intermediate solution which would allow for a suspension of the air strikes and a negotiation on a cease fire. Mladic had indicated that he was ready to discuss a cease fire and a cessation of hostilities provided that certain guarantees were given to the Bosnian Serbs.

2. Mr Ivanov's proposal was that there be a temporary suspension of air strikes during which time there would be an elaboration of plans to stabilize the situation. Also during this period, the three sides in BH should be brought together to discuss a cessation of hostilities, and the results of their negotiations guaranteed by major powers. If air strikes were to continue, it would be difficult to find any formula for a peaceful solution. In addition, the infrastructure in Sarajevo would continue to be destroyed by NATO, making it very difficult for the people in the city to face the forthcoming winter.

3. I informed the Minister that I fully shared the Russian apprehension at an escalation in the situation. However, the Force Commander was not in a position to suspend air strikes on his own. Air strikes could only be suspended if Mladic agreed to the Force Commander's three conditions, and I urged that he be pressed to do so in writing, as had been done by the Bosnian Serb civilian leadership. On the other issues, I agreed that there was a need to find a mutually balanced arrangement to stabilize the situation and to give some form of assurances to the BSA that the Bosnians would not attack if they withdrew their heavy weapons. The Contact Group could, perhaps, extract a commitment from the Bosnian side not to take advantage of the situation.

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4. Ivanov responded to my comments by stating that Mladic had told him that he was not under the control of the Bosnian Serb civilian leadership. This was not a good sign but it was a fact which had to be accepted and taken into account. Continuing, Ivanov said that Mladic had stated that he would fight for as long as he had the forces to do so, and would not accept the Force Commander's conditions as long as "bombs continue to fall". With regard to the Bosnian side, it was clear that they would not be willing to accept either a cease fire or a cessation of hostilities - in this regard, Ivanov said that Holbrooke had told him that the United States was unable to get the Bosnians to sit down and negotiate on these issues. Ivanov clarified that all he was asking for was a pause in the air strikes; a short two to three month cease fire; negotiations for the withdrawal of BSA heavy weapons; and a system of guarantees for all sides. No-one, he said, had a formula acceptable to all sides and there was an urgent need to find one in a "peaceful atmosphere". He was certain that the Force Commander agreed with this view point.

5. The Force Commander stated that he did not agree and explained his reasons for not doing so. He pointed out that he had clearly explained the situation to Mladic - that once there was clear evidence of heavy weapons' removal from the exclusion zone, air strikes would be suspended. Mladic continued to refuse to abide by the FC's conditions and had, in fact, turned the problem around: his position was that once air strikes were stopped, he would be willing to discuss other issues. Under these conditions of non-compliance, neither the Force Commander nor Admiral Smith could propose a suspension of air strikes for political reasons - this would require a decision by the NAC and the UN. While understanding fully Mladic's concerns on guarantees, the Force Commander noted that one way or another - air strikes or a cease fire - the heavy weapons would have to be withdrawn. The key to resolving the situation was with Mladic but he continued to refuse to turn it.

6. Mr Ivanov countered with a question: against whom were the air strikes directed? Were they against General Mladic or the Bosnian Serb people? "The population are suffering [despite the fact that] Mladic is the only one we are fighting against. We all have the key and we must use our heads. While the Contact Group is dealing with the political negotiations, the UN is the main organisation here. It is the UN which invited NATO here." Once again expressing concern over the situation and the need to proceed with negotiations, Mr Ivanov noted that the Force Commander had already temporarily suspended the air strikes before and suggested he do so again.

7. After having explained his reasons for the suspension of air strikes for a two day period, the Force Commander again stressed that, under the current conditions, he was unable to take a clearly political decision on a pause now. Ivanov, with some exasperation, then asked who could make the decision. We informed him that it could only be made by the NAC and the Secretary-General. In haste to catch his flight, Mr Ivanov, without further ado, promptly departed.



CZN-1652  
CZG-1353  
SSN-2502

# CODE RESTRICTED

UNOC Telecomm. Unit  
Palais des Nations

'98 SEP 13 19:04

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

### MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 Of 2

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB  
NUMBER: UNPF Z- 1663  
DATE: 13 SEPTEMBER 1995  
SUBJECT: Meeting with Bildt.



1. Together with the Force Commander, I met today with Carl Bildt, General De Lapresle, General Elliot, and Ambassador Louis Sell (the latter seconded by the US State Department to the Bildt team). Most of the meeting was taken up by briefings given by the Force Commander and myself on the current situation, how we arrived where we are, and how we might get out. Mr. Bildt offered some views on the situation as it affected the United Nations, but revealed little of what might be happening in the context of broader peace negotiations. He met with Milosevic yesterday and will meet with the Holbrooke team tomorrow in Geneva. Below is a summary of the meeting.

2. Bildt informed us that his meeting with Milosevic and Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milutinovic had been "good", though clearly they wanted to stop the NATO air campaign. Bildt responded, he informed us, that there was "no way" the bombing will stop unless there was a substantial withdrawal of BSA heavy weapons from the Sarajevo EZ. Bildt was dismissive of Koljevic, especially in light of the commitments he had made on the withdrawal of BSA heavy weapons which had been totally ignored by Mladic. Bildt said that "Professor Koljevic is not a person to spend a lot of time with," and that the "RS" Supreme Command, which took the decision communicated by Koljevic to withdraw the weapons, apparently "doesn't control more than a typewriter." Bildt felt it necessary to address the security concerns raised by Mladic, and wondered if it would be possible to involve more Russian troops on the Serb side of the lines in Sarajevo. He remarked, however, that Russian Minister Ivanov had expressed doubts to him about the prospects of sending additional Russian troops to Sarajevo as a stabilizing measure. I pointed out that such a proposal might require a Security Council Resolution authorizing

Int Distr: SRSG; FC; DFC; COS; HAAU; DI; DOA; PLA; PC;



CEN-1652  
CZG-1353

2/2

additional troop strength for UNPROFOR. I also agreed that additional security guarantees for the population in Serb controlled Sarajevo were indeed desirable, and suggested that perhaps the Contact Group countries were the ones best placed to first extract the guarantees and second to convey them to General Mladic. I suggested that a staged withdrawal of heavy weapons from the EZ, together with prospects for a cease-fire at least in Sarajevo, would help to induce Mladic to accept the terms established by General Janvier. Afterwards, I proposed that efforts should be directed toward achieving a more comprehensive cease-fire for all of Bosnia. I warned however that current fighting in western Bosnia, and the likelihood of substantial HV(O) and BiH territorial gains, could cast a dark shadow over the broader peace process.

3. General Janvier provided a review and assessment of the current operations, and of the prospects for continuing with Option 2. He observed that BSA air defense and communications systems had been seriously degraded by the NATO bombing, but that the BSA still had large quantities of ammunition and weapons; it had also recently received some re-supply from Montenegro. The FC also pointed out that NATO and the UN had discarded many targets due to the possibilities of civilian casualties and/or collateral damage. Nonetheless, the air strikes had, according to the FC, produced a greater equilibrium of forces between the BSA on the one hand and the BiH/HVO on the other. The changed strategic environment was likely to lead, in addition to the fighting already taking place in western Bosnia, to two further attacks: one by the BiH around Doboj, and the other by BiH/HV(O) forces from the Bihac area toward Prijedor. In response to a question from General Elliot, the Force Commander stated that the use of cruise missiles against targets in the Banja Luka region reflected an appropriate choice of weapon for the given mission, and that Admiral Smith had discussed his intention to use the weapons with General Janvier in advance. The Force Commander also clarified that the decision to stop air strikes under Option 2 was that of the military commanders, whereas the decision to move to Option 3 or not was that of the relevant political authorities. In response to a question by General de Lapresle about the origins of the conditions for compliance, the FC responded that they had originally been stated in his letter of 30 August, which was the product of thorough consultations within UNPF/UNPROFOR; the second set, now in use, resulted directly from the decision taken by the NAC on 2 September. The FC also emphasized that UNPROFOR could not be a guarantor of the security of civilians on the Serb side of the lines in Sarajevo, rather it must be major powers that provide guarantees for Mladic; assurances by the Bosnian government alone are insufficient for Mladic.

4. I observed that Milosevic's power had been left unchallenged so far, but in the wake of a string of Serb defeats in Croatia and in Bosnia, and with the Bosnian Serbs now under serious threat from both their traditional enemies on the ground and from NATO in the air, Milosevic no longer had much manoeuvre room. It was evident that progress on several fronts was necessary, I noted, but that, due to the complexities of the negotiation process and the plethora of negotiators, an "orchestra conductor" was needed to harmonize the activities of the different players.

ENDALL./

CZN-1644  
CZG-1345  
CZK-570  
SSN-2492

UNOC Telecomm. Unit.  
Palais des Nations  
**OUTGOING CODE CABLE**  
'98 SEP 13 12:59  
**MOST IMMEDIATE**

7202-CDS-125  
95 SEP 13 11:27

Page 1 of 1

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK -  
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO  
FROM : JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB  
DATE : 13 September 1995  
NUMBER : UNPF HQ Z- 1655  
SUBJECT : CONFIRMATION OF DATA USED IN UNNY FINAL REPORT  
OF MORTAR INCIDENT OF 28 AUGUST

*[Signature]*  
COS

This is to confirm that the report presented in your cable MSC 2976 is accurate with one minor exception. In paragraph one:

- a. On line 9, after "1130LT", insert: "the BiH Chief of Police requested UNMO assistance to investigate the incident. The UNMO team arrived at 1155LT, and"
- b. On line 9/10 delete: "two teams" insert: "a team".

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, ASG M&C, DFC, COS, HAAU, PLA,  
CMO, DI, PC



1995-09-13 01:05 5603

1995-09-13 01:05 5603

1995-09-13 01:05 5603

1995-09-13 01:05 5603

CNZ 882 CYZ 878 P 1/3

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

IMMEDIATE

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 12 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: MSC- 2976  
SUBJECT: Final Report on 28 August mortar incident

Attn. SRSG/TFC

UNITED NATIONS  
CABLE OPERATIONS  
1995 SEP 12 P 8:48

1. Thank you for your Z-1633 transmitting the final report on the mortar incident in Sarajevo on 28 August. Please find attached a summary of that report which we intend to make available as a "non-paper" to the Security Council tomorrow.
2. We would appreciate your urgent comments as to whether the summary accurately reflects the findings of the Final Report. We would appreciate receiving these comments no later than 9:00 a.m. New York time, tomorrow 13 September.

## INVESTIGATION OF SARAJEVO MORTAR ATTACK 28 August 1995

### PROCEDURE OF THE INVESTIGATION

1. Following the mortar attack on the Markale Market Sarajevo at 1110 hrs on 28 August 1995, UNPROFOR conducted a three stage investigation:

- a. Investigation by the UNPROFOR Engineer Cell Sector Sarajevo.
- b. Investigation by an UNMO patrol from Sector Sarajevo.
- c. Follow up Investigations and analysis conducted by UNPROFOR Headquarters considering and analysing the above reports together with additional evidence from Cymbaline Radar detachments and reports from UNPROFOR observation posts at the confrontation line.

At 1130 LT, on-site investigations were conducted concurrently by two teams from the Sector Sarajevo Engineer Cell (French) and an UNMO team from Sarajevo (comprised of a Dutch, British and a Spanish officer with extensive experience in crater analysis). Both teams were assisted by Bosnian police investigators.

### KEY EVIDENCE

2. Five rounds landed in the vicinity of the Markale Market at 1110 hrs on 28 August 1995. One round in particular, caused the majority of the deaths, casualties and damage.

3. Crater Analysis The initial investigations focused on a crater analysis of the impact which had caused the multiple deaths and injuries. It was concluded from the examination of the tail fin, that the ammunition used was a 120 mm mortar and that its design matched ammunition currently employed by the Bosnian Serbs. After comparing the results of the two investigations and a follow-up analysis, the direction of the five rounds was assessed to be 220 - 240 degrees, i.e. south-west.

4. Cymbaline Radar The evidence from the Cymbaline Radar was used to establish the distance from where the mortar rounds had been fired. At the time of the firing incident, the radar was operating on a direction arc and at an elevation that would have detected the trajectory of any mortar fired at a range of 950 metres or less. A round fired from 900 metres would have reached a vertex height on its trajectory which would have registered on the radar beam. It was



CNZ 882 CYZ 878 P 3/3

thus concluded that the mortar rounds were fired at a lower trajectory which passed under the radar beam. Any round fired at such a low trajectory would have come from a firing position, depending on the charge, at a range between 1550 - 3500 metres. The distance to the Confrontation Line from the impact point at the Markale Market is 1050 metres.

5. UN Observation Posts Reports from all observation posts on the Southern Confrontation Line were analysed. There were no reports of mortar firing, only the five impacts. Any firing of five mortar rounds from the area of the Confrontation Line would have been heard and detected.

### CONCLUSION

6. Taking into account all available data, it was concluded that beyond reasonable doubt that all five mortar rounds fired in the attack on the Markale Market had been fired from Bosnian Serb territory. It was assessed that the minimum firing range was 1500 metres and that the most probable range was between 1500 and 3500 metres, i.e. well inside an area controlled by the Bosnian Serbs.

# CODED CABLE

CNZ 877 CYZ 874 P 1/1  
(ZAG - PLS PROTECT SARAJEVO)

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB attn SRSG/FC  
INFO: AKASHI, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO attn COM/ CMDR UNPROFOR  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 11 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: 2953  
SUBJECT: Sarajevo Airport

UNITED NATIONS  
CABLE OPERATIONS  
11 SEP 11 P 0000

1. Thank you for your Z-1614. We do not have any difficulty in principle with the proposed attempt to seek the reopening of Sarajevo Airport, provided that any new regime would not fall short of prior "established practice". Since it appears that Gen Smith's proposals go well beyond established practice, the Security Council is unlikely to object if he is able to prevail along the lines proposed.

2. We assume, nonetheless, that the text of the letter attached represents an initial negotiating position and that some concessions may have to be made before an agreement is finalized. In particular, we agree with your comments on Article 3, and we wonder if the proposed Article 6 is not unduly restrictive, since it may violate undertakings on liaison arrangements provided at the time of the original handover of the airport. You may recall that one important factor then was the need for the parties to be assured that the airport would not be abused to transport war materiel to either side. This remains a legitimate consideration and it would be unwise for us to overlook it in working out the liaison arrangements. In the absence of such assurances, the airport could easily become a military target. In this connection, we are also anxious to have a military assessment of the vulnerability of the airport to attack. We have hitherto been led to believe that our negotiating position was weakened by the fact that one hostile soldier with a howitzer could close the airport down. If that is still true, the tone of the draft letter reads too much like a *diktat*.

3. The above underscores once again the importance of the Chief of Mission personally taking charge of his responsibilities. I trust that, following our telecon, Mr Pedauye has taken immediate steps to return to his duty station. He is needed more than ever in Sarajevo where it is unacceptable for the United Nations to continue to be deprived of senior civilian representation at this crucial time.

DISTRIBUTION:	
BR	
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BL	CG
	WD
	ED

UNITED NATIONS  
Palace of Nations

SEP 12 -1 :14



C2N-1622  
C2G-1325  
C2K-496  
SSN-2462

UNCLASSIFIED

Page 1 of 22

## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

'95 SEP -9 14:37

MOST IMMEDIATE

Page 1 of 22

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO

FROM : JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB

DATE : 9 September 1995

NUMBER : UNPF HQ Z- 1633

SUBJECT : FINAL REPORT MORTAR INCIDENT OF 28 AUG 1995

REFERENCES : A. UNNY Z - 2921, dated 05 September 1995  
B. UNPF HQ Z - 1560, dated 01 September 1995  
C. UNPF HQ Z - 1578, dated 02 September 1995  
D. UNPF HQ Z - 1537, dated 29 August 1995



1. Regret the amount of time required to answer your UNNY 2921. However, the time was required to collect all possible detail with the ultimate aim of maximum accuracy.
2. The personal data of the investigating team members was forwarded under cover of reference B.
3. The attached report is the final and most comprehensive report compiled by HQ UNPROFOR. Although we have nothing to hide, I support Comd UNPROFOR's concerns with reference to the release of this information to public scrutiny. There is a danger that other experts, real or self-proclaimed, will be selective in the evidence that they choose from this report to support their judgements. I advise that this report receive considerable care and discretion.

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, ASG M&C, DFC, COS, HAAU, PLA, CMO, DI, PC.

SEP -8 20:16  
155N-1678

FROM: HQ UNPROFOR SARAJEVO  
OFFICE OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL RUPERT SMITH  
MOST IMMEDIATE  
CODE CABLE

T-38 1622  
2/22  
1/21

DTG: 081945B SEP 95		File Ref:		Stn. Serial No:	
Fm: THE OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER				Route:	No: TOT
To: (1) HQ UNPF ZAGREB		Fax No:		CKZ	112
FAO: DFC, COS, FC					
Subject: MORTAR INCIDENT REPORT					Page: 21
Int Dist: COS					
Drafter: LT COL J R J BAXTER		Dept/Tel: VSAT 7201 MENTOR 0002		Signature: 	
Releasing Officer: LT COL BAXTER MA TO COMD		Dept/Tel: VSAT 7201 MENTOR 0002		Signature: 	


MESSAGE

1. ATTACHED IS THE FINAL AND COMPREHENSIVE REPORT ON THE SARAJEVO MORTAR INCIDENT OF 28 AUGUST 1995 AS REQUESTED IN UNNY CODE CABLE 2921.

2. WE WISH TO REPEAT OUR VIEWS AND CONCERNS RAISED IN OUR FAX OF 021925Z SEP THAT THIS REPORT SHOULD BE TREATED WITH CONSIDERABLE CARE AND DISCRETION. WE MUST CONTINUE TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT REVEALING OUR EVIDENCE AND DATA TO PUBLIC SCRUTINY. WE REAFFIRM THAT WE HAVE NOTHING TO HIDE. BUT BY DECLARING OUR INFORMATION WE RISK ENTERING AN EXPERT ARGUMENT WHICH LED A JUDGEMENT. OTHER SO CALLED EXPERTS HAVE BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE SELECTIVE IN WHAT EVIDENCE THEY CHOOSE TO CONSIDER AND ADDUCE TO SUPPORT THEIR JUDGEMENTS.

Dist: DFC, COS, FC



  
Lt Col J R J Baxter  
MA to Commander  
HQ UNPROFOR  
Sarajevo

1622 3/

HQ UNPF

8<sup>th</sup> September 1995

UNPROFOR INVESTIGATION INTO SARAJEVO MORTAR ATTACK - 28 AUGUST 1995

GENERAL

1. Following the mortar attack on the Markale Market Sarajevo at 1110 hrs 28 August 1995 UNPROFOR completed a three stage investigation which was briefed verbally to Comd UNPROFOR late in the evening of 28 August. A written report was submitted to him at 0800 hrs 29 August 1995.

The investigations were:

- a. Investigation by Engineer Cell Sector Sarajevo. The full report is at Annex A.
- b. Investigation by UNMO patrol from Sector Sarajevo. The full UNMO report is at Annex B.
- c. Follow up investigations and analysis conducted by G2 HQUNPROFOR who considered and analysed the above reports with additional evidence from Cymbaline Radar detachments and UN OP reports. The final report submitted to Comd UNPROFOR is at Annex C.

KEY EVIDENCE

2. Five rounds landed in the vicinity of the Markale Market at 1110 hours on 28 August 1995. One round, in particular, caused the majority of the deaths, casualties and damage.

CONFIDENTIAL



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3/21

CONFIDENTIAL

3. Impact Analysis The initial investigations focused on crater analysis of the impact that caused the multiple deaths and injuries. The first reports record the bearing to the firing point as 2850 mils (French Engineers Report). 170 degrees UNMO report. The crater analysis of the other four impacts produced bearings to a firing point of 220-240 degrees. The follow on investigation by the HQUNPROFOR G2 sought to clarify this apparent discrepancy. Their investigation of the crater and fuze farrow of the 'killing' mortar round produced a bearing to the firing point in the similar to the other four rounds. The fuze farrow is the deeper indentation in the crater caused by the impact of the fuze. There are several reasons for this apparent anomaly; the most probable explanation is that the tail or body of the mortar struck a building on its flight path which caused a different crater displacement pattern.

4. Cymbaline Radar The evidence from the Cymbaline Radar was used by the HQUNPROFOR G2 staff to ascertain the firing range of the mortars. At the time of the firing incident the radar was in operation on a direction arc and at an elevation that would have detected the trajectory of any mortar fired at a range of 950 metres or less. Analysis showed that a round fired from 900m would have reached a vertex height on its trajectory which would have registered on the radar beam. The assessment was that the mortars were fired at a lower trajectory which passed under the radar beam. Any round fired at such a trajectory to pass under the radar beam would have come from a firing position, dependent on the charge, at a range between 1550 - 3500 metres. The distance to the Confrontation Line from the impact point is 1050 metres.

5. UN Observation Posts Reports from all OPs on the Southern Confrontation Line were scrutinized. There were no reports of firing, only the five impacts. Any firing from the area of the Confrontation Line would have been heard and detected.

6. Munitions The report from the French engineer confirms that the 'killing' mortar was unmarked and unpainted with a brushed steel finish. The origin of manufacture was assessed to be Serb and matches the ammunition in common use by the RSA.

#### SUMMARY

7. The UNPROFOR investigation produced clear and unequivocal evidence that the direction from the impact point to the firing position was 220 - 240 degrees and that all impacts were from the same weapon or part of the same salvo. Based on further analysis from OPs and Cymbaline Radar it was judged that the minimum firing range was 1500m and that the most probable range was between 1500m and 3500m.

8. After analysing all available data, the judgement was made that beyond reasonable doubt all mortar rounds fired in the attack on the Markale Market were fired from Bosnian Serb territory.

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

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4/21

9. Comd UNPROFOR is satisfied that all investigations were conducted in a thorough, competent and professional manner.



J R J Baxter  
Lt Col  
MA to Comd UNPROFOR

Annexes:

- A. Sector Sarajevo Engineer Cell Report.
- B. UNMO Report.
- C. HQ UNPROFOR G2 Report.

CONFIDENTIAL

1622 6/ ANNEX  
A.  
9/21

CWO Quesne final report

Objet : Crater analysis.

Annexes : A : MAP detail with direction of fire.  
B : Diagram of impact seen from above.  
C : Diagram of type explosion.

Analysis :

At 1110 Hrs on 28 aug 95, a salvo of 5 or 6 shells landed on the old town of Sarajevo. One of these exploded in the Masala street 50 m west of Markale market causing a large number of casualties.

After the discovery and examination of the tailfin, it appeared that it was a 120 mm mortar that had been fired from 2850 mls (the angle from the point of impact towards the firing point).

This munition is of serb manufacture, being unmarked and unpainted with a brushed steel finish, which matches current bosno-serb war design.

Coordinates of point of impact : BP 34 T 929 - 595.


Le Lieutenant-colonel MOUGEY

S.O.O.  
M




SCHEMA DE L'IMPACT VUE DE DESSUS.


COORDONNÉES BP.34T - 929 - 595



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


TOP VIEW



SIDE VIEW







NL BURUM LES-493438670=FOJV X 28-AUG-1995 17:26:12 612370

IMMEDIATE

UNMO SEC SARAJEVO DAILY SITREP

FROM : UNMO HQ SECTOR SARAJEVO  
DTG : 28 13053 AUG 95  
FILE REF : 95SITREP/AUG  
FAX NO : VSAT 155-5589  
PREPARED BY : MAJ MIZAN, DO  
RELEASED BY : LT COL OIEN, SMO

TO : UNMO UNPROFOR HQ SARAJEVO  
SECTOR SARAJEVO HQ (BY HAND)

INFO : UNMO HQ ZAGREB  
UNMO HQ SW  
UNMO HQ NE  
UNMO HQ DIHAC  
UNMO TEAM GORAZDE  
UNMO TEAM KONJIC

SUBJECT: UNMO SECTOR HQ DAILY SITREP: 28 AUG 95 0001-1800 HRS

## 1. HIGHLIGHTS.

- \* 120MM MORTARS IMPACTED IN CROWDED AREA OF CITY CENTRE AT 1110 HOURS KILLING 34 AND WOUNDING 84 (NOT UNMO CONFIRMED). FULL REPORT OF INCIDENT WILL FOLLOW THIS DSR.
- \* SNIPER FIRE FROM SHARPSTONE AT 0815 HOURS WAS RESPONDED TO BY EGYBAT ANTISNIPING TEAM

## 2. SMO's ASSESSMENT.

- \* THERE WAS A HIGHER THAN NORMAL LEVEL OF ACTIVITY TODAY. THE INCIDENT IN THE CITY CENTRE IS LIKELY TO CAUSE FURTHER INCREASED ACTIVITY FOR THE NEXT 24 HRS. THE GENERAL SITUATION IN SARAJEVO IS EXPECTED TO REMAIN TENSE.

## 3. MILITARY INFORMATION.

## a. MILITARY ACTIVITY.

## (1) FIRING INCIDENTS:

DTG	OBSERVED FROM	TYPE OF FIRE	ORIGIN	IMPACT AREA	RMKS
-----	------------------	-----------------	--------	----------------	------



280001B OP-2 3xRD 40mm ILINACA GA BUTMIR FIRED  
BP857560 AAG BP870535 BP8455 BSA

280002B- MALI HUM 5xEXPL GRBAVICA GRBAVICA NIL  
280340B BP899610 21xBURST BP9158 BP9158  
MGF

280002B- OP-2 13xEXPL UNKNOWN LOGISTIC RD NIL  
280019B BP8253

280015B MALI HUM 2xEXPL UNKNOWN DEBELO BRDO NIL  
BP918583

280020B- OP-2 3xEXPL UNKNOWN GA BUTMIR NIL  
280034B BP8455

280032B OP-4 1xSHELL GA OP-4 UNKNOWN FIRED  
BP861596 OUTGOING BP9659 ABIH

280035B- MALI HUM 12xEXPL UNKNOWN GRBAVICA NIL  
280330B BP9158

280119B OP-4 1xBURST ALIPASINO UNKNOWN FIRED  
HMGF POLJE ABIH  
BP866577

280525B OP-4 8xBURST RAJLOVAC UNKNOWN FIRED  
HMGF BIH SIDE ABIH  
BP8460

280635B OP-4 10xBURST ILINACA UNKNOWN FIRED  
HMGF BP870535 BSA

280755B MALI HUM 3x BURST JEWISH JEWISH NIL  
HMGF CEMETARY CEMETARY  
BP917585 917585

280815B- SEDRENIK 8xRD SAF SHARDSTONE SEDRENIK NIL  
280823B BP941610 SNIPER BP941618  
ACTIVITY

(EGYBAT ANTI SNIPER TEAM DEPLOYED AT BP942611 REACTED AND RETURNED  
FIRE)

281045B OP-4 2xRD 40MM NEDARICI UNKNOWN NIL  
GA BP8557

281110B MALI HUM 5xEXPL UNKNOWN 500M E OF NIL  
FREBAT4 HQ  
BP921591

(IMPACTS REPORTED WERE COINCIDENT WITH MORTAR IMPACTS IN CENTRAL  
CITY. DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION BELOW)

10/21

1122 u

IN.003

Page 3

UTC Time: 95-08-28 19:50:40

1622 12  
11/21

281110B	OP-1	1xEXPL	BARJAK E BP972598	105 BDE BIH HQ BP924597	NIL
281205- 281220B	OP-4	4xEXPL	OTES BP8257	LOGISTIC ROAD GA BP8253	NIL
281210B	OP-4	5xBURST HMGP	ILINCA HT BP870535	UNKNOWN	NIL
281320B- 281344B	OP-4	12xEXPL	UNKNOWN	1 KM W ILIDZA BP8256	NIL
281331B	MALI HUM	7xBURST HMGP	GRBAVICA	GRBAVICA	NIL
281335B	OP-4	10xBURST HMGP	STUP BiH BP8457	UNKNOWN	NIL
281344B- 281355	OP-4	7xEXPL	2KM W DOGLODI BP8259	GA HRASNICA (H) CIV POLICE STA & COMMUNITY CENTRE BP 839529 & BP 8838539	NIL
281350B	OP-2	2xEXPL	DOGLODI	BUTMIR BR BP846546	NIL
281405B	OP-4	12xBURST HMGP	AZICI BP842584	UNKNOWN	NIL
281412B	OP-4	8xEXPL	BARE BP8358	DOBRINJA BP8756	NIL
281420B	OP-4	1xEXPL	DOGLODI	UNKNOWN	NIL
281455B	OP-4	2xEXPL	STUP BSA BP8357	UNKNOWN	NIL
281513B	OP-4	1xEXPL	UNKNOWN	AZICI	NIL
281555B	MALI HUM	2xEXPL	UNKNOWN	JEWISH CEMETARY	NIL
281592B	OP-4	4xARTY SHELL	1KM W DOGLODI	SOKOLOVIC BP 8454	FIRE BSA
281600B	OP-4	3xMOR BOMB	BARE BP8358	UNKNOWN	NIL
281620B	OP-2	6xBURST	STUP BSA	UNKNOWN	NIL



HMGP

EP8357

281712B OP-2 2XRD 20mm UNKNOWN GRBAVICA NIL  
281718B- MALI HUM 20xEXPL UNKNOWN CHAPEL NIL  
281721B BP917585  
DEBELO BRDO  
GRBAVICA

1622 13/  
12/21

- A TOTAL OF (108) EXPLOSIONS, 1 OUTGOING SHELL WERE OBSERVED DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.  
- THE MAXIMUM CONCENTRATION OF THE IMPACTS (41 EXPLOSIONS) WERE OBSERVED IN THE GA DEBELO BRDO/GRBAVICA AREA WITH ACCOMPANYING HY EX AA/MG FIRE.  
- ALSO, FOR A THIRD DAY, HIGHER THAN NORMAL LEVEL OF IMPACTS IN HRASNICA AREA.

(2) AIR ACTIVITY REPORT: NTR

b. UNMO OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATIONS.

(1) CRATER ANALYSIS.

FEDERATION SIDE:

INVESTIGATION ON IMPACTS IN THE CITY CENTRE IS STILL ONGOING AND WILL BE PROVIDED WHEN COMPLETE

BSA SIDE: NTR

(2) CASUALTY REPORT.

FEDERATION SIDE:

CASUALTY FIGURES PROVIDED BY THE BiH MINISTRY OF HEALTH AUTHORITIES WERE:

27 0900B AUG TO 28 0900B AUG - 6 CIVILIAN WOUNDED (TWO CHILDREN)  
(NOT UNMO CONFIRMED)

CASUALTY FIGURES PROVIDED FROM INCIDENT IN CITY CENTRE WERE:

34 KILLED AND 84 WOUNDED

BSA SIDE NTR

c. SUMMARY OF MEETINGS.

FEDERATION SIDE:

(1) AT 28 1100B AUG, PATROLS FROM TEAM MALI HUM AND TEAM POFALICI ALONG WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM FREBAT 2 AND FREBAT 4 HELD A REGULAR MEETING WITH THE LO FROM 101 BDE. THE LO STATED THE FOLLOWING (NOT UNMO



CONFIRMED):

- 13/21  
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04
- THE LAST WEEK WAS VERY QUIET IN HIS AOR
  - HE EXPECTS A SUDDEN RISE IN ACTIVITIES IN THE NEAR FUTURE
  - HE STATED BSA WERE MAKING A LARGE AMOUNT OF PREPARATIONS TO BLOCK THE CITY BY TAKING THE AIRPORT AND CUTTING THE BiH SUPPLY LINE TO THE CITY
  - HE STATED HE EXPECTS BSA TO MAKE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO CAPTURE MORE AREA IN ORDER TO BETTER THEIR POSITION AT THE PEACE NEGOTIATION TABLE
  - ON THE SUBJECT OF IMPROVISED AIR BOMBS RECENTLY USED BY BSA, THE LO STATED HE DID NOT KNOW HOW MANY LAUNCHERS THE BSA HAD OR WHERE THEIR FIRING POSITIONS WERE BUT HE BELIEVED AT LEAST ONE FIRING POSITION COULD BE IN FRONT OF 101 BDE AOR. HE FURTHER STATED HE BELIEVED MOST OF THESE DEVICES WERE LAUNCHED FROM THE WESTERN PART OF THE CITY. IN ADDITION, THE LO DID NOT BELIEVE BSA HAD THE CAPABILITY TO MAKE SUCH DEVICES, HE BELIEVED THEY WERE MADE IN SERBIA
  - THERE WERE NO CHANGES TO THE CFL IN HIS AOR
  - WHEN THE LO QUESTIONED THE FREBAT REPS ABOUT THE "SIX" FR TANKS STOLEN BY THE BSA AND HOW MANY ROUNDS THEY CONTAINED, THE FREBAT REP STATED THERE WAS A TOTAL OF 120 RDS.

BSA SIDE: NTR

## d. OTHER SIGNIFICANT/RELEVANT INFORMATION.

FEDERATION SIDE:

(1) THE FOLLOWING IS A REPEAT AND UPDATE OF THE INTERIM DAILY SITREP PASSED ON TO SELECTED ADDRESSEES AT 28 1415B AUG CONCERNING A SIGNIFICANT FIRING INCIDENT WHICH OCCURRED EARLIER TODAY.

(A) AT APPROXIMATELY 1115HRS, HQ SEC SARAJEVO OPS REQUESTED THIS HQ TO CONFIRM A REPORT THEY RECEIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES OF SEVERAL IMPACTS IN THE CITY CENTRE RESULTING IN MANY CASUALTIES. THIS CORRESPONDED TO AN INCREP FROM TEAM MALI HUM (BP 899610) OF FIVE EXPLOSIONS IN GA BP928595, WITH TIME OF IMPACT 28 1110B AUG.

(B) AT APPROXIMATELY 1130HRS, THE BiH CHIEF OF POLICE REQUESTED UNMO ASSISTANCE TO INVESTIGATE THIS INCIDENT. A TEAM SEDRENK PTL ARRIVED AT THE SCENE AT 1155HRS AND WAS INCLUDED, ALONG WITH SECTOR ENGINEERS AND BiH POLICE INVESTIGATORS, AS PART OF A JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM.

(C) UNMO INVESTIGATION SO FAR HAS DETERMINED:



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- TIME OF IMPACT APPROXIMATELY 281110Z AUG
- 2-5 IMPACTS OF 120MM MOR. IT WOULD APPEAR ONLY TWO IMPACTS CAUSED CASUALTIES, ONE CAUSING THE MAJORITY THE OTHER APPROXIMATELY SIX CASUALTIES.
- ONE MOR TAIL WAS RECOVERED WITH BATCH MARKING NO - NK/M74/KB93070
- POINT OF IMPACT OF MOR CAUSING GREATEST CASUALTIES WAS BP 927594, NEAR A MARKET PLACE IN THE OLD CITY
- THE BEARING TO THE FIRING POINT WAS 170 DEGREES MAGNETIC. POSSIBLE FIRING POINT ARE STILL BEING CALCULATED.
- AS OF 28 1600Z AUG, THE BiH MINISTRY OF HEALTH CASUALTY FIGURES GIVEN TO OUR UNMO LO ARE 34 KILLED AND 84 WOUNDED. THESE FIGURES ARE INTERIM AND MAY CHANGE AS THE INVESTIGATION PROCEEDS. THE VAST MAJORITY OF THESE CASUALTIES WERE CAUSED BY ONE ROUND. UNMO TEAM SEDRENK VISITED KOSOVO HOSPITAL AND CONFIRMED CASUALTY FIGURES WILL BE FORWARDED.
- INVESTIGATION OF OTHER IMPACTS ARE CONTINUING AND THE TEAM REMAINS WITH THE JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM AT PRESENT.
- EFFORTS ARE ALSO CONTINUING TO GAIN BETTER ACCESS TO HOSPITALS TO OBTAIN GREATER UNMO CONFIRMATION OF CASUALTIES.

(FULL INCIDENT REPORT WILL FOLLOW THIS DSR WHEN TEAM HAS REPORTED HAS CONCLUDED INVESTIGATION AND REPORTED TO THIS HQ)

BSA SIDE:

AT APPROXIMATELY 28 1110Z AUG, A GENERAL ALARM WAS GIVEN IN THE ILIDZA AREA.

4. ACTS AGAINST UNMOS/OTHERS.

- a. INCIDENTS AND ATTACKS.
- b. ROM.

(1) ONGOING: ROM ONGOING ARE SUMMARIZED IN SEPARATE REPORT TO UNMO HQ UNPROFOR SARAJEVO.

(2) NEW/SOLVED/CHANGES ROM: NSTR.

(END OF SITREP)



NL BURUM LES 493138670=FOJV X 28-AUG-1995 22:06:41 614364

IMMEDIATE

UNMO SEC SARAJEVO HQ DAILY SITREP  
UPDATE

FROM : UNMO HQ SECTOR SARAJEVO  
DTG : 29 0005B AUG 95  
FILE REF : 95SITREP/AUG  
FAX NO : VSAT 135-5589  
PREPARED BY : CAPT IHAB, DO  
RELEASED BY : CAPT FORD, OPSO

TO : UNMO UNPROFOR HQ SARAJEVO  
SECTOR SARAJEVO(BY HAND)

INFO : UNMO HQ ZAGREB  
UNMO HQ SW  
UNMO HQ NE  
UNMO HQ BIHAC  
UNMO TEAM GORAZDE  
UNMO TEAM KONJIC

SUBJECT: UNMO SECTOR HQ DAILY SITREP UPDATE 28 AUG 95  
1720-2359 HRS

## 1. HIGHLIGHTS.

\* CONTINUED HIGH LEVEL OF ACTIVITY IN THE EARLY PART OF  
THE EVENING THROUGHOUT THE CITY.

\* FULL REPORT OF CENTRAL CITY SHELLING BELOW.

## 2. SMOs ASSESSMENT.

\* NO CHANGES.

## 3. MILITARY INFORMATION.

## a. MILITARY ACTIVITY.

## (1) FIRING INCIDENTS:

DTG	OBSERVED FROM	TYPE OF FIRE	FIRE ORIGIN	IMPACT AREA	RMKS
281720B-	MALI HUM	EXCH HMGF	DEBELO BRDO	STARO BRDO	NIL
281830B	BP899610		BP918593	BP920578	
			STARO BRDO	DEBELO BRDO	
281725B	OP-2	7XEXPL	OTES	SOKOLOVIC	FIRE



	BP837560		BP8257	BP8454	BSA
281723B NIL	OP-4	4xEXPL	UNKNOWN	AZICI	
	BP861596			BP842584	
281735B- 281740B	OP-4	7xEXPL	UNKNOWN	MOJMILO OP BP878572	NIL
281801B	MALI HUM	15xEXPL	UNKNOWN	GA KOSEVO BP9260	NIL
281820B	POFALICI BP897602	20xEXPL	UNKNOWN	GA HRASNO BP8857	NIL
281831B	POFALICI	5xBURST FMGF	GRBAVICA STADIUM BP900583	GA NASELJA BP8757	FIRE BSA
281835B	OP-4	1xEXPL	RAJLOVAC BiH SIDE BP8460	OTES BP8257	FIRE ABIH
281843B- 281905B	OP-4	5xEXPL	UNKNOWN	300M SW BSA CP/STUP BP8357	NIL
281855B	OP-4	1xRD ARTY OUTGOING	GA ILIDZA BP8256	UNKNOWN	FIRE BSA
281859B	MALI HUM	1xEXPL	UNKNOWN	GA CHAPEL BP9168	NIL
281910B	OP-4	4xEXPL	RAJLOVAC BP8459	SOKOLOVIC BP8454	FIRE BSA
281910B	OP-4	2xRD ARTY OUTGOING	RAJLOVAC BP8459	UNKNOWN	FIRE BSA
281905B	OP-1 BP942579	2xEXPL	SHARPSTONE BP941618	CITY MOSQUE BP936594	FIRE BSA
281916B	MALI HUM	2xEXPL	UNKNOWN	CHAPEL BP916588	NIL
281935B	MALI HUM	7XSHELL OUTGOING	SW GRBAVICA STADIUM BP9058	UNKNOWN	NIL
281935B- 282237B	MALI HUM	7XSHELL OUTGOING	NEDARICI BP8557	UNKNOWN	NIL

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17



IN.014

Page 3.

UTC Time: 95-08-29 00:15:11

281940B-	MALI HUM	3XEXPL	UNKNOWN	STARO BRDO	NIL
281959B-				BP920573	
282007B-	OP-4	3XEXPL	UNKNOWN	STUP(BSA)?	NIL
282015B		(MOR)		BP2357	
282317B	MALI HUM	3XBURST	GRBAVICA	GRBAVICA	NIL
		HMGF	BP9158	BP9158	

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1622

18/

- A TOTAL OF 74 EXPLOSIONS AND 17 ROUNDS OUTGOING WERE OBSERVED DURING THIS REPORTING PERIOD.
- THE MAJORITY OF IMPACTS, 20 EXPLOSIONS, WERE OBSERVED IN THE GA OF HRASNO. 15 IMPACTS WERE OBSERVED GA KOSEVO AND 11 IMPACTS IN SOKOLOVIC. GA GRBAVICA, STARO BRDO AND DEBELO BRDO WERE ALSO ACTIVE WITH 2X HMGF

(2) AIR ACTIVITY REPORT: NTR

## b. UNMO OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATIONS.

## FEDERATION SIDE:

UNMO TEAM SEDRENK WAS TASKED TO INVESTIGATE THE IMPACTS IN THE GENERAL AREA OF THE MARKET PLACE (CENTRAL CITY SARAJEVO). THE PATROL CARRIED OUT INVESTIGATION IN CONJUNCTION WITH SECTOR ENGINEERS, THE LOCAL CIVILIAN POLICE AND A LOCAL JUDGE FROM SARAJEVO COURT. THE COMBINED TEAM CONDUCTED ALL INVESTIGATIONS TOGETHER INCLUDING VISITS TO KOSEVO AND STATE HOSPITAL TO CONFIRM DEAD/INJURED PEOPLE. THE LOCAL POLICE INVESTIGATION TEAM WILL ISSUE A REPORT TOMORROW ON BEHALF OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE UNMO PATROL SUBMITTED CRATER ANALYSIS (SEE CRATER ANALYSIS BELOW) AND PATROL REPORT TO THIS HQ. FOLLOWING ARE THE MAJOR POINTS OF THE PATROL REPORT:

- PTL INVESTIGATED 05 IMPACTS, ALL OF THEM WERE 120MM MOR PROJECTILES.
- ONE PROJECTILE WAS FIRED FROM 170 MAG DEG, KILLED 33 PEOPLE (UNMO CONFIRMED 31 KILLED) AND WOUNDED 79 (64 NAMES PROVIDED BY MIN OF HEALTH) IN A BUSY SHOPPING / MARKET PLACE
- THE BEARING IN COMBINATION WITH ESTIMATED ANGLE OF IMPACT COULD NOT PROVIDE EXACT MOR POSITION OR AN ACCURATE ORIGIN OF FIRE SINCE IT WAS NOT KNOWN WITH WHICH CHARGE THE MOR PROJECTILES WERE FIRED, THEREFORE RANGE OF FIRING POSITION ALONG BEARING LINE COULD NOT BE DETERMINED.
- TWO OF THE REMAINING FOUR IMPACTS CAUSED 07 INJURIES (NOT CONFIRMED). THESE FOUR ROUNDS WERE FIRED FROM A DIFFERENT BEARING (220-240 MAG DEG)



AND IMPACTED 300M FURTHER SOUTH FROM THE ABOVE PROJECTILE.

THE UNMO PTL WAS PRESENT AT A MEETING OF THE JOINT INVESTIGATION TEAM. DURING THIS MEETING THE UNMO TEAM PROVIDED SOME GENERAL INFORMATION CONCERNING USE OF MORTARS, TECHNICAL AND TACTICAL ASPECTS. UNMO TEAM SEDRENJK WILL MEET THE SAME LOCAL INVESTIGATION TEAM ON 29 AUG 95 TO COMPARE EACH OTHERS' REPORTS AND WILL RECEIVE THE DETAILS ABOUT THE CASUALTIES AT THAT MEETING. UNMO TEAM RECEIVED THE LIST WITH NAMES OF 64 WOUNDED PERSONS.

COMMENT: UNMOS ARE UNABLE TO CONFIRM WHICH WF FIRED THE ROUNDS.

(1) CRATER ANALYSIS:

- (a)
- |                      |                                                                                                                          |
|----------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| 1. TIME A            | : 281145B AUG 95                                                                                                         |
| 2. TIME B            | : 281114B AUG 95                                                                                                         |
| 3. GRID              | : BP927594                                                                                                               |
| 4. BEARING           | : 170 (+-5) DEGREE MEGNETIC                                                                                              |
| 5. TYPE OF WEAPON    | : 120mm MOR BATCH NO<br>MK, M74KB9307                                                                                    |
| 6. FRAGMENTS FOUND   | : YES                                                                                                                    |
| 7. NO OF IMPACTS     | : 01                                                                                                                     |
| 8. CASUALTIES        | : 33 DEAD & 79 INJURED<br>(31 DEAD UNMO CONFIRMED ONLY)                                                                  |
| 9. WHAT WAS DAMAGED  | : SUPERFICIAL DAMAGE TO MAIN<br>MARKET BUILDING                                                                          |
| 10. COMMENTS/REMARKS | : IMPACT ANGLE DATA : HEIGHT OF<br>BUILDING 11.45M. DISTANCE<br>FROM CRATER 4.8M MIN POSSIBLE<br>IMPACT ANGLE 67 DEGREE. |
| 11. TEAM             | : UNMO TEAM SEDRENJK                                                                                                     |
- (b)
- |                      |                                                     |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|
| 1. TIME A            | : 281450B AUG 95                                    |
| 2. TIME B            | : 281100B AUG 95                                    |
| 3. GRID              | : BP928591                                          |
| 4. BEARING           | : 240(+5) DEGREE MEGNETIC                           |
| 5. TYPE OF WEAPON    | : 120mm MOR MK, M74, KB9307                         |
| 6. FRAGMENTS FOUND   | : YES                                               |
| 7. NO OF IMPACTS     | : 01                                                |
| 8. CASUALTIES        | : <del>UNMO TEAM SEDRENJK</del>                     |
| 9. WHAT WAS DAMAGED  | : SUPERFICIAL DAMAGE TO THE UPI<br>BUSSINESS CENTRE |
| 10. COMMENTS/REMARKS | : NIL                                               |
| 11. TEAM             | : UNMO TEAM SEDRENJK                                |
- (c)
- |           |                  |
|-----------|------------------|
| 1. TIME A | : 281450B AUG 95 |
| 2. TIME B | : 281100B AUG 95 |
| 3. GRID   | : BP928591       |



4. BEARING : 240(+5) DEGREE MEGNETIC  
5. TYPE OF WEAPON : 120mm MOR MK, M74, KB9307  
6. FRAGMENTS FOUND : YES  
7. No OF IMPACTS : 01  
8. CASUALTIES : ~~04 INJURED (NOT CONFIRMED)~~  
9. WHAT WAS DAMAGED : DAMAGE TO THE UPI  
BUSINESS CENTRE  
10. COMMENTS/REMARKS : NIL  
11. TEAM : UNMO TEAM SEDRENİK

(d) 1. TIME A : 281445B AUG 95  
2. TIME B : 281100B AUG 95  
3. GRID : BP928591  
4. BEARING : 220(+5) DEGREE MEGNETIC  
5. TYPE OF WEAPON : 120mm MOR MK, M74, KB9307  
6. FRAGMENTS FOUND : YES  
7. No OF IMPACTS : 01  
8. CASUALTIES : NIL  
9. WHAT WAS DAMAGED : DAMAGE TO THE UPI  
BUSINESS CENTRE AND CAR PARK  
10. COMMENTS/REMARKS : NIL  
11. TEAM : UNMO TEAM SEDRENİK

(e) 1. TIME A : 281500B AUG 95  
2. TIME B : 281050B AUG 95  
3. GRID : BP927590  
4. BEARING : 220(+5) DEGREE MEGNETIC  
5. TYPE OF WEAPON : 120mm MOR MK, M74, KB9307  
6. FRAGMENTS FOUND : YES  
7. No OF IMPACTS : 01  
8. CASUALTIES : NIL  
9. WHAT WAS DAMAGED : DAMAGE TO THE UPI  
BUSINESS CENTRE AND CAR PARK  
10. COMMENTS/REMARKS : NIL  
11. TEAM : UNMO TEAM SEDRENİK

BSA SIDE: NTR

(2) CASUALTY REPORT:

FEDERATION SIDE:

LATEST FIGURES PROVIDED BY BiH MIN OF HEALTH FOR THE  
IMPACTS DESCRIBED ABOVE (NOT UNMO CONFIRMED) ARE AS  
FOLLOWS:

86 WOUNDED, 33 KILLED

THE UNMO INVESTIGATING TEAM CONFIRMED 31 KILLED AND WERE  
PROVIDED WITH A LIST OF 64 IDENTIFIED INJURED PERSONS  
(THESE WERE NOT CONFIRMED)



BSA SIDE: NTR

c. SUMMARY OF MEETINGS. NTR

d. OTHER SIGNIFICANT/RELEVANT INFORMATION. NTR

4. ACTS AGAINST UNMOS/OTHERS.

a. INCIDENTS AND ATTACKS. NTR

b. ROM.

(1) ONGOING: ROM ONGOING ARE SUMMARIZED IN SEPARATE  
REPORT TO UNMO HQ UNPROFOR SARAJEVO.

(2) NEW/SOLVED/CHANGES ROM: NSTR.

(END OF SITREP UPDATE)

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21/



ANNEX C

7/21

1622

22/22

UNPROFOR

FORPRONU

United Nations Protection Force  
Force de Protection des Nations Unies  
Sarajevo

UN CONFIDENTIAL

Date: 29 August 1995  
To: Commander  
From: G2  
Subject: 28 August 1995 Sarajevo Firing Incident

Following an investigation and analysis of all evidence, it has been concluded beyond doubt, that the firing position of the five mortar rounds was in BSA territory between Lukavica (BP 89 55) and Miljevici (BP 9056).

## Main Points:

## 1. IMPACT ANALYSIS:

- a. 4 x rounds fired from a bearing of 220 - 240 degrees.
- b. 1 x round assessed to be fired from a bearing of 170 degrees based on angle of impact.

- Analysis of the fuse farrow shows the bearing of this round was most likely from 220-240 degrees and would have been fired from the same position as the other four rounds. There most likely was an anomaly with this round.

2. CYMBALINE: Radar was operating but the elevation of the antenna was higher and would have detected hence in a higher trajectory. At least several of the five rounds would have been detected if fired close to the CL. If fired from a longer range, the arc of trajectory would most likely have been below the beam of the Cymbaline radar, thus, not detected.

3. UN OP'S: None of the UN OPs in the general area along this portion of the CL observed or heard any firing at the time of the incident (1110-1120). This includes the Old Fort Cymbaline position. If the firing position was close to the CL it would have undoubtedly been heard.

4. CONCLUSION: Based on the evidence presented, the firing position of the five mortars was in BSA territory and probably fired from the Lukavica area at a range of between 3,000 and 5,000 meters.

Lt Col Brian E. Powers  
G2

UN CONFIDENTIAL



1995-09-09 03:58 5604

UNOG Telecomm. Unit

Palais des Nations

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

CNZ 875/ CYZ 872 P 1/30

'95 SEP -9 -4 :54

**OUTGOING CABLE**

**IMMEDIATE**

TO: AKASHI, UNPF, ZAGREB  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 8 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER: MSC- ( **2956**  
SUBJECT: **Security Council meeting**

Attn. SRSG/TFC

95 SP -9  
UN 36Z

Please find attached for your attention a summary of this evening's formal session of the Security Council which was held at the request of the Russian Federation.

Summary of Security Council Meeting  
on 8 September 1995, 18:00 - 20:30 hrs.

1. At the request of the Russian Federation, the Security Council this evening held two formal sessions to discuss the NATO/UNPROFOR actions around Sarajevo as well as the agreement on basic principles at the meeting in Geneva today.
2. During the preceding informal consultations, the representative of the Secretary-General provided a short briefing on latest developments in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina based on the daily reporting cable Z-1626. The Russian Federation requested a clarification as to UNPROFOR's seemingly biased approach towards violations of the safe area regime by the BSA and the BiH. According to briefing at a NAC-C meeting in Brussels, in response to an exchange of artillery fire in the evening of 6 September in Sarajevo, which had been initiated by the BiH, the RRF had launched warning fire against the BSA, but had only sent a letter of protest to the BiH. **(Please advise whether this incident is the one referred to in your Z-1616)**
3. The Members of the Contact Group circulated the attached Joint Statement adopted at the Geneva meeting. The United States proposed a Presidential Statement welcoming the development in Geneva and urging the parties to negotiate expeditiously and in good faith towards a lasting peace throughout the region. The draft statement was adopted without amendments and read out in the subsequent second formal Session of the Council as S/PRST/1995/45 **(see attached text)**
4. In the opening statement of the first formal session, the Russian Federation requested that the NATO air operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina be stopped immediately. The operation undermined the ongoing peace effort and went beyond the framework of the existing Security Council resolutions. The daily bombing made the United Nations a party to the conflict in favour of one side and, since the targets included the civilian infrastructure such as bridges and communications, it could no longer be considered a deterrence against attacks on safe areas. No damage assessment or reports on civilian casualties had been made available yet and the Council had to insist that such information be provided without delay. Moreover, the Russian Federation had repeatedly but unsuccessfully requested that the investigation of the 28 August mortar incident be made available. After all, this incident had been used to justify the action taken by NATO and the RRF. In the event of the February 1994 mortar incident in Sarajevo, the investigation had been inconclusive, but in the end, air strikes had been launched regardless.



5. The Russian Federation continued that no consultations with the Security Council had taken place before initiating the use of air power although this would be required under SCR 844 (1993). The Council had been informed belatedly of this major and disproportionate use of air power which was not authorized by the pertinent SCRs. The Council needed to know who decided to change the arrangements with NATO. The Secretary-General in his letter to the Council dated 26 July had stated that the "existing dual key procedures remained in force". Only the day before, the Secretariat had informed the Council that the United Nations could no longer stop the use of air power on its own volition. According to the UNPROFOR press spokesman in Sarajevo, there existed a memorandum of understanding with NATO which had changed the existing procedures. This MOU should be made available to the Security Council without delay.

6. Furthermore, the Russian Federation stated, the RRF had clearly exceeded its mandate set out in SCR 998 (1995), according to which it was to protect UNPROFOR rather than to launch an attack on the Bosnian Serbs. In that resolution, the parties had been called upon to agree on a cease-fire and the Secretary-General had been encouraged to reach agreement with the parties on the modalities for a demilitarization of the safe areas. But instead of negotiating with both parties, UNPROFOR had declared an ultimatum against just one side. Since the adoption of SCR 998 (1995), there had not been a single report from the Secretariat on any efforts made in regard to such negotiations.

7. The Russian Federation welcomed the developments in Geneva, which had been achieved despite NATO's bombing campaign. The Serb side had accepted the 51/49 formula and was ready to continue negotiations. Therefore it was imperative to stop the air action and to move from a logic of war to a logic of peace. **(Please note for urgent comments the attached letter from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Secretary-General on the above points as well as the statement of President Yeltsin of 7 September which was circulated as a Security Council document. A response will have to be prepared by Monday, 11 September. In light of the above, it is even more pressing to obtain the summary of the investigation which has been repeatedly requested by this headquarters.)**

8. In their statements, the other members of the extended Contact Group (United Kingdom, France, the United States, Germany and Italy) supported the NATO/UNPROFOR action as an appropriate and justified response to the attack on a safe area which was covered by the authority of SCR 836 (1993). The air strikes were not a punitive action but necessary measure to restore Bosnian Serb compliance with SCR 836 (1993).



Moreover, the Bosnian Serbs had been given ample and advance warning at the London Conference and subsequently by the NAC of the measures that could be expected in case of further attacks on a safe area. **(The statements of the U.K., the U.S., France and Germany are attached)**

8. Among the Council members, the Czech Republic, Nigeria, Indonesia, and Argentina also expressed their full support for the current NATO/UNPROFOR action. China expressed its support for the Geneva Joint Communiqué as a starting point for a peaceful settlement acceptable to all parties. In light of the encouraging development in Geneva, it was essential to immediately cease the NATO air operation in order to create a favourable climate for the final phase of the negotiations. Ukraine, Egypt, Turkey and Pakistan, speaking as non-Council members, expressed their full support for the NATO/UNPROFOR response to the 28 August mortar attack and the objectives set by General Janvier.

9. Bosnia and Herzegovina expressed its appreciation for the NATO/UNPROFOR action which in their view was fully consistent with SCR 836 (1993). Alas, this resolute action only came after many months of suffering of the civilian population of the safe areas, and too late for the 200,000 non-Serbs who had been killed in the conflict and the 500,000 other civilian casualties. The Geneva process had the full support of the Government, though Serb cooperation with a peaceful settlement could have been attained earlier, had not the arms embargo deprived the Government of its means of defence while the "Karadzic Serbs" enjoyed the benefit of continuous and uninterrupted arms supplies.

10. Croatia stipulated that NATO's continued pressure on the Bosnian Serb was necessary to bring the peace process to conclusion. While appreciating the Joint Communiqué of Geneva, Croatia regretted that the FRY had not subscribed to the principle of peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia into the Republic of Croatia **(The Croatian statement is attached)**.

11. Ambassador Djokic (chargé d'affaires of the FRY) demanded an immediate end to the air strikes for which there was no moral authority at a time when the Bosnian Serbs had accepted the to participate in the negotiations and accepted the Geneva principles. NATO's bombs could only fuel the military ambitions of the BiH. The FRY was making the greatest efforts towards a lasting peace, but if the cruel bombardment continued, the FRY should not be held responsible for the tragic consequences that could ensue **(Ambassador Djokic's statement is attached, as well as his letter to the Secretary-General requesting a joint investigation of the 2 August mortar incident)**.



CNZ 875/ CYZ 872 P 5/30


05


September 8, 1995


Excellency:


We have the honor to transmit to you the text of the Joint Statement and Agreed Basic Principles signed on September 8 in Geneva by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia, and the Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and witnessed by Representatives of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and by the European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia.


We would be grateful if you would have this document circulated as an official document under item 28 of the preliminary list of the 50th General Assembly, and of the Security Council.

  
Ambassador Jean-Bernard Merimee  
Permanent Representative of  
France to the United Nations

  
Ambassador Prof. Tono Eitel  
Permanent Representative of  
Germany to the United Nations

  
Ambassador Sergey V. Lavrov  
Permanent Representative of  
the Russian Federation to  
the United Nations

  
Ambassador Sir John Weston  
Permanent Representative of  
the United Kingdom to the  
United Nations

  
Ambassador Edward W. Gnehm  
Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the  
United States to the United Nations

His Excellency

Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali,

Secretary-General of the United Nations,  
New York.

SEPT 8, 1995

**BOSNIA/CROATIA/FRY**  
Joint Statement

06

We have just concluded a meeting, held under the auspices of the Contact Group, of the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Republic of Croatia (Croatia), and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia).

The Contact Group announces today that the three Foreign Ministers, speaking for their governments -- the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; the Republic of Croatia; and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which also represents the Bosnian Serbs in a joint delegation -- have authorized us to issue the attached Agreed Basic Principles. All three governments -- and their Presidents -- agree that these principles will govern the difficult negotiations to come, and all agreed, after some tough discussions, to the exact words of this important statement. With regard to Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srijem, the Co-Chairmen are committed to a solution as part of an overall peace settlement and will make it a top priority when they return to the region next week.

The statement takes us an important step closer to peace. Yet, important as it is, this statement does not constitute the end of the tragedy in the Balkans. Far from it. Significant differences exist between the sides -- differences that will require continued intense negotiations. We will return to our respective capitals tonight for consultations. Next week Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke and European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia Carl Bildt will return to the region with their delegations, and tomorrow First Deputy Minister Igor Ivanov of Russia will go to Belgrade.

The Contact Group will meet again in Geneva next week at the Russian Mission to the United Nations. Subsequent meetings will be held in Moscow and in an expanded format in Rome. Following yesterday's important meeting in Paris, we have also been consulting closely with the representative of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and will continue to do so within an institutionalized coordinating structure.

The statement we are issuing today is an important milestone in the search for peace. Today's statement contains many significant points. Within its current internationally recognized borders, it is agreed that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be comprised of two democratic entities, the existing Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska. Bosnian territory will be divided -- the Federation with 51 percent and the Serbian entity with 49 percent. They also agreed today to create a Commission to enforce accepted international human rights standards.



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within their territories. They agreed to allow freedom of movement within Bosnia's borders and allow displaced persons to return to their homes. Each entity will be self-governing, with its own constitution. While the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue, additional joint institutions at the level of Bosnia and Herzegovina are envisioned.

Clearly much remains to be done. The hardest work still lies ahead. The entities have yet to develop a design for a central connecting structure to oversee the agreed cooperative efforts and to elaborate other joint efforts in areas where cooperation is the only way to solve common problems. In addition, the parties need to define their internal borders within Bosnia in accordance with the 51-49 principle. We should be under no illusions that these will be easy tasks; they can be solved only through intense negotiations backed by a genuine desire to achieve peace. Finally, any agreement must be implemented by all sides, and this could be the hardest part.

The attached Basic Principles have been agreed upon today by H.E. Muhamed Sacirbey, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina); H.E. Mate Granic, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Croatia (Croatia); and H.E. Milan Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia), and witnessed by Representatives of France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and by the European Union Special Negotiator for the Former Yugoslavia.

Text of principles agreed to Friday in Geneva as the basis for talks on ending the war in Bosnia:

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#### Agreed Basic Principles

1. Bosnia and Herzegovina will continue its legal existence with its present borders and continuing international recognition.

2. Bosnia and Herzegovina will consist of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as established by the Washington Agreements, and the Republica Srpska (RS)

2.1 The 51:49 parameter of the territorial proposal of the Contact Group is the basis for a settlement. This territorial proposal is open for adjustment by mutual agreement.

2.2 Each entity will continue to exist under its present constitution (amended to accommodate these basic principles).

2.3 Both entities will have the right to establish parallel special relationships with neighboring countries, consistent with the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

2.4 The two entities will enter into reciprocal commitments (a) to hold complete elections under international auspices; (b) to adopt and adhere to normal international human rights standards and obligations, including the obligation to allow freedom of movement and enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation; (c) to engage in binding arbitration to resolve disputes between them.

3. The entities have agreed in principle to the following:

3.1 The appointment of a Commission for Displaced Persons authorized to enforce (with assistance from international entities) the obligations of both entities to enable displaced persons to repossess their homes or receive just compensation.

3.2 The establishment of a Bosnia and Herzegovina Human Rights Commission, to enforce the entities' human rights obligations. The two entities will abide by the Commission's decisions.

3.3 The establishment of joint Bosnia and Herzegovina public corporations, financed by the two entities, to own and operate transportation and other facilities for the benefit of both entities..

3.4 The appointment of a Commission to Preserve National Monuments.

3.5 The design and implementation of a system of arbitration for the solution of disputes between the two entities.



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~~DRAFT~~ PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

8 September 1995

The Security Council welcomes the meeting held under the auspices of the Contact Group in Geneva on 8 September 1995 between the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of the Republic of Croatia and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). It welcomes the joint statement issued at the conclusion of that meeting and in particular the agreement by the parties on the Declaration of Principles. It strongly urges the parties to negotiate in good faith and expeditiously on the basis of that Declaration with the aim of achieving a lasting peace throughout the region.

CNZ 875/ CYZ 872 P 10/30

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Постоянный Представитель  
Российской Федерации  
при  
Организации Объединенных  
Наций



DPKO

Permanent Representative  
of the Russian Federation  
to the United Nations

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New York N.Y. 10021

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New York, September 8, 1995

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Mr. Secretary-General,

During recent discussions in the Security Council as well as at the troop-contributors' meetings the delegation of the Russian Federation raised a number of questions related to the NATO air force action in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including on mechanisms of coordination and interaction between the UN and NATO. Those discussions showed that many of the questions asked remain unanswered and have not received a clear explanation from the UN Secretariat.

We note in particular that in your letter to the President of the Security Council of 1 August 1995 (S/1995/623) you clearly stated that as far as coordination between the UN and NATO on the use of NATO air power to deter Bosnian Serb attacks on Gorazde is concerned, the "dual key" arrangements remain in place.

At the same time we learned from the comments by the UN Secretariat officials in the Security Council and in the meeting with troop contributors, as well as at the UN press-briefings, that these "dual-key

H.E. Mr. Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI  
Secretary-General  
United Nations

New York, NY



arrangements have been in fact "qualitatively" modified. In particular, we were told that now the UN can not order the cessation of the use of air force unless NATO agrees to this. It is indeed a crucial change in policy especially for those countries who, like Russia, have their contingents in UNPF and who are not members of NATO. However, we do not recall that after your letter of 1 August 1995 the Security Council was informed about the proposed changes as to the UN approach to the "dual-key" arrangements and to the conduct of operations in BiH.

We therefore would appreciate if you could explain at what stage the above mentioned change in existing procedures has taken place and why the Security Council and troop-contributors were informed on this account only post-factum and only in response to persistent inquiries.

We also noted that in your letter of 1 August 1995 you informed the Council that you had instructed the UN commanders in the field to undertake the necessary planning, in consultations with NATO, in order to formulate proposals on the possible use of air power in Sarajevo and Bihac pocket, and that Mr. K. Annan and the Force-Commander General Bernard Janvier had been instructed by you to go to Brussels for consultations with NATO on the operational modalities for implementing the measures you had agreed with NATO. We would highly appreciate if information on the outcome of those two consultations could be urgently made available to us (and, of course, to other interested members of the Council).

We would also be grateful to you if you could provide clarifications on the actual mechanism of coordination between the UN and NATO, existing regimes of interaction between both Organizations, zones of

operations, the scale of use of force, as well as on a memorandum of understanding between the UN and NATO to which UNPROFOR spokesman A.Ivanko referred during his recent press-briefing.

We look forward to an early reply to the above mentioned questions which, as you certainly understand, are extremely important to Russia as not only a member of the Security Council, but also a troop-contributing country to UNPF.

Yours sincerely,



S.LAVROV



UNITED  
NATIONS

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## Security Council

Distr.  
GENERAL

S/1995/776  
7 September 1995  
ENGLISH  
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE  
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO  
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a statement issued by the President of the Russian Federation, Mr. Boris N. Yeltsin, on 7 September 1995.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) S. LAVROV

S/1995/776  
English  
Page 2

Annex

Statement by the President of the Russian Federation  
dated 7 September 1995

The ongoing NATO air strikes and artillery shelling of the Bosnian Serbs undermine efforts for a political settlement. They go beyond the limits of United Nations Security Council decisions and draw the international community into a conflict against one of the parties to the conflict in Bosnia.

While declaring its "peacekeeping mission", the North Atlantic alliance has, in fact, usurped the role of both the judge and the bailiff.

Should such a policy continue to be pursued, we will have to carefully weigh, in the light of circumstances, our strategy, including our approach to relations with the North Atlantic alliance.

The time left to reach political solutions is critically short, yet there is still time.

The Russian side will actively contribute to the effectiveness of the meeting in Geneva with the foreign ministers of Yugoslavia, Croatia and Bosnia under the auspices of the Contact Group. For my part, I intend to continue energetically promoting the search for political solutions.

What is most important now is to abandon the reflex use of force for a balanced approach and collective actions at the negotiating table. There is a clear understanding of this in Moscow; our partners should also understand it.

I am calling upon all those interested in a settlement to realize the seriousness and significance of this moment.

B. Yeltsin

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8 September 1995

Press Release 080/95

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THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Statement in the Security Council on 8 September 1995 by  
Sir John Weston KCMG, Permanent Representative of the  
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

We are confident that the recent UN/NATO action in Bosnia has been appropriate and justified. It has had clear and specific objectives, designed to protect the Safe Areas in line with Security Council Resolutions. The Bosnian Serbs have only to comply with the requirements explained to them by the UN commanders in theatre and the action will end.

It is clear that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Bosnia. We have emphasised throughout the crisis that all sides, including the Bosnian Serbs, must work towards a peaceful solution. We welcome the outcome of the meeting between the Contact Group and the Foreign Ministers of the FRY, Bosnia and Croatia in Geneva today. The principles agreed at this meeting represent an important step forward in the search for a political settlement. In particular, it means in effect that the Bosnian Serb leadership have agreed to negotiate on the basis of the Contact Group plan.

This is only a step on the path to peace. Difficult negotiations lie ahead. All of the parties must be prepared to make compromises if a settlement is to be achieved. But a start has been made.

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Monsieur le Président,

Je voudrais d'abord souligner que l'action militaire de l'ONU et de l'OTAN en Bosnie-Herzégovine résulte des décisions arrêtées à la Conférence de Londres du 21 juillet dernier dans le cadre de la protection des zones de sécurité. Ces opérations ont été déclenchées par le bombardement particulièrement odieux du marché central de Sarajevo que la Communauté internationale toute entière a condamné avec vigueur.

Est-il besoin de rappeler que ces opérations découlent du mécanisme de la "double-clé" ONU/OTAN dont la légitimité ne saurait donc souffrir d'aucune contestation, dans le strict respect des prérogatives qui sont celles de notre Conseil et plus généralement des responsabilités qui sont celles des Nations Unies.

Monsieur le Président,

Ceci étant, la réunion de notre Conseil intervient à un moment particulièrement important pour la relance du processus de paix dans l'Ex-Yougoslavie. La réunion des trois ministres des Affaires étrangères de Bosnie-Herzégovine, de Croatie et de Serbie aujourd'hui à Genève, sous les auspices du groupe de contact, a permis de dégager un accord sur des principes de base acceptés par ces trois pays. Cet accord constitue un progrès déterminant.

Ce premier résultat qui doit conduire le plus rapidement possible à l'ouverture de négociations de paix, est fondé sur les propositions du groupe de contact. Il a été obtenu grâce aux efforts diplomatiques de tous, en particulier les initiatives des Etats-Unis, de la France et de ses partenaires de l'Union européenne. Nous ne devons pas oublier le soutien déterminé des pays de l'Organisation de la Conférence Islamique avec lesquels s'est établi un partenariat permanent et durable pour travailler dans le sens de la paix.

Je rappelle que de longue date, la France pour sa part avait milité pour des contacts directs entre les trois pays, avancé des propositions en ce sens et réaffirmé, à maintes reprises, son souhait qu'une réunion au sommet puisse se tenir. Nous espérons, ainsi, voir s'engager une dynamique de paix.



Ces progrès dans la voie d'un règlement du conflit dans l'Ex-Yougoslavie sont constatés alors même que la détermination militaire sur le terrain se fait plus marquée, témoignant ainsi que les actions en cours sont au service d'une solution diplomatique d'ensemble.

Monsieur le Président,

La fermeté militaire est la condition essentielle du succès de l'action diplomatique. Nous devons continuer à faire montre d'une grande vigilance. A cet égard, il reste absolument indispensable que le siège de Sarajevo soit levé, que les armes lourdes soient retirées de la zone d'exclusion de Sarajevo. Toutes les attaques contre les zones de sécurité doivent cesser.

Monsieur le Président,

Notre Conseil peut donc noter avec satisfaction aujourd'hui qu'une étape importante dans le chemin de la paix a été atteinte. Il doit continuer à faire preuve de la même détermination si nous entendons progresser dans la voie d'un règlement négocié d'ensemble.

Nous appelons solennellement les trois parties à aborder les prochaines étapes du processus de règlement dans un esprit d'ouverture et de compromis. La France engagera tout son poids en faveur de la paix et veillera à ce que la cohésion de la Communauté internationale, facteur essentiel d'un règlement, continue de se renforcer./.



**Security Council**

**The Situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina**

**Statement by  
Ambassador Tono Eitel  
Permanent Representative of Germany  
to the United Nations**

**New York, 8 September 1995**

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Mr. President,

Most often, when the Security Council meets to discuss the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the reason for our meeting is another painful turn of events, with more human suffering and a further deterioration of the situation.

Today, we meet under different circumstances. Today, as the German Foreign Minister has said, a light of hope and peace has become visible at the end of the tunnel of despair:

A few hours ago, we have all witnessed the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in Geneva. Germany welcomes the constructive deliberations and outcome of this meeting. These talks under the auspices of the Contact Group have confirmed that there is a realistic chance for peace.

Mr. President,

What is now urgent, is to proceed with firmness and determination on the path to a peaceful settlement. We therefore urge again the leadership in Pale to bring about a suspension of the air attacks against military targets of the Bosnian Serbs. As they have been told by the competent United Nations authorities the following steps must be taken:

- Cease attacks on Sarajevo and other safe areas.
- Withdrawal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from the total exclusion zone around Sarajevo without delay.
- Unrestricted use of Sarajevo airport.
- Complete freedom of movement for UN forces and personnel.

Unfortunately, there have been assertions that the air attacks are of a retaliatory or punitive nature. This cannot be true: As we all know punishment, once decided upon, is independent of the culprit's subsequent behavior. He may regret his deeds, he may repent, the sentence will be executed.

Here, the situation is quite different. All sides, including the Bosnian Serbs are aware, that, when the Bosnian Serbs comply with the demands just mentioned, the air attacks will end. That is why the air strikes are clearly not of a punitive nature but coercive and enforcement measures.

What is enforced is international law in the form of decisions by the competent United Nations organ, i.e. the Security Council.

The Security Council itself has by resolution 836 provided the basis for military action. It authorizes Member States to take, "subject to close co-ordination with the Secretary-General and UNPROFOR, all necessary measures, through the use of air power, in and around the safe areas...., to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its mandate". The air attacks of NATO were requested by the UN. They are aimed at purely military targets. Moreover, the use of force is of a limited nature. Its objective remains attaining the compliance of the Bosnian Serbs with the legitimate demands mentioned before.



Mr. President

We rejoin all the other members of the Council in welcoming as a first great achievement the outcome of the Geneva meeting.

Germany has a fundamental interest in putting an end to the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. Today, after the meeting in Geneva, we are hopeful that we can pursue with better chances for success the negotiations for a peaceful settlement. We will spare no effort for this goal, which has eluded us so long.

Thank you, Mr. President.



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### PRESS RELEASE

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PRESS RELEASE USUN #137-(95)  
September 8, 1995

Statement by Ambassador Karl F. Inderfurth, United States Alternate Representative to the United Nations for Special Political Affairs, in the Security Council, on the Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, September 8, 1995

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Mr. President, we may be at a turning point in the bloody conflict that has ravaged former Yugoslavia.

With the signing today in Geneva of a Joint Statement and Agreed Basic Principles the basis is laid for an end to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Even though the threat of war is still with us, these events have opened a narrow and precarious window of opportunity for peace. The international community has worked hard to broker a durable and just negotiated settlement. This has not been the work of one nation, or even of a few nations, but has included the efforts of the UN, the ICFY, the Contact Group, the EU, and the OIC. We must all continue our efforts to assist the parties, who have the ultimate responsibility, to decide in favor of peace.

Mr. President, the United States agrees with all other members of this Council that the conflict in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be settled on the battlefield. That is why we have placed so much emphasis, and invested so much effort, in finding a diplomatic solution. We believe that it was to defend the possibility of a diplomatic solution that the international community had no choice but to respond robustly to the Bosnian Serb attack on the Sarajevo market place. The Bosnian Serb leadership knew the decisions of the Security Council which declared Sarajevo a safe area; they had been warned that continued attacks on the safe areas would lead to a strong response. They chose to ignore that warning and now must accept the consequences of their actions.

The United Nations has made clear that it is not at war with the Bosnian Serbs. The current round of air strikes will end as soon as the Bosnian Serb leadership complies with the conditions put to them by General Janvier, which call for nothing more than the implementation of Security Council resolutions. While my government regrets that air strikes are necessary, we fully support the action taken by the United Nations and NATO to deter further attacks on the





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**STATEMENT BY MR. VLADIMIR DROBNJAK, MINISTER-COUNSELLOR  
DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED  
NATIONS**

**3575TH MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
"SITUATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA"**

Mr. President,

Allow me to congratulate you upon your assumption of the Presidency of the Council for the month of September. My delegation is confident that the Council shall be on the safe and prudent course under your guidance. Further, I would like to express the deep appreciation of my delegation to H.E. Ambassador Nugroho Wisnumurti of Indonesia for leading the work of the Council during the month of August.

The Republic of Croatia fully and firmly supports the present ongoing operation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. We strongly believe that it is necessary to continue exerting pressure on the Bosnian Serb party, and that NATO's course of action shall decisively assist to bring about an overall lasting peaceful settlement in the region. Croatia is assisting in that effort, by allowing the use of its airspace for by NATO air-forces, and providing the use of its ports for the rapid reaction capacity of UNPROFOR. Croatia shall continue to give its full support and assistance to these endeavors of international community with confidence that we are finally on the right track towards the peace and stability in that part of Europe.

While supporting the newest peace initiative, let me emphasize the importance of mutual recognition of the countries in the region of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is essential to protect and unconditionally respect all international borders in the region, as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all the successor states of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Only upon the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia by the Belgrade government, the world community shall be able to conclude that their quest for "Greater Serbia" has been abandoned, and that "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" is BONA FIDE involved in the peace process.

In this regard, my delegation has to state that Croatia does not find any encouragement in today's refusal of the delegation of the "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)" to subscribe to the basic principle of peaceful reintegration of Eastern Slavonia into the Republic of Croatia.

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S T A T E M E N T

BY HIS EXCELLENCY MR. DRAGOMIR DJOKIC, AMBASSADOR  
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION  
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA  
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Meeting of the Security Council on agenda item:  
"The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina"  
held on 8 September 1995



Mr. President,

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia most energetically demands from the Security Council of the United Nations to take most resolute and urgent measures to end the ruthless and senseless NATO air strikes and attacks of the Rapid Reaction Force against Bosnian Serb military and civilian targets. Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be achieved by merciless bombardment of one the parties to the conflict, the Bosnian Serbs, in an attempt to make them succumb to the will of the Western alliance. As has been the position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, peace can only be attained by the full and equal respect of the vital interests of all three peoples.

The NATO air strikes commenced as a retaliation for the shelling of Sarajevo, the culprits for which have never been clearly and unambiguously identified. However, the scale, intensity and duration of the strikes go far beyond a mere retaliatory measure and their clear aim is to inflict serious injury to the Bosnian Serb military capability, economic infrastructure and even civilian facilities. The scope and intensity of the bombing greatly exceeds the mandate that was given to the Secretary-General and NATO by relevant Security Council resolutions with the aim of protecting the "safe areas" in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The question must be raised - what possible moral authority do the NATO and UN have to pursue a relentless campaign of mass bombardment of the Republic of Srpska causing unprecedented material damage and numerous civilian casualties.

The continuation of air and other attacks with the simultaneous calls for negotiations is unacceptable and incomprehensible when it is known that the leadership of the Republic of Srpska has accepted the negotiations and shown readiness to resume, together with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the efforts aimed at finding a solution acceptable to all parties to the conflict.

The continuation of NATO air strikes and the actions of the UN Rapid Reaction Force are a direct attack on the ongoing peace negotiations. It is absolutely incomprehensible why NATO and the UN pursue with their ruthless air and ground campaign against the Bosnian Serbs while important breakthroughs have been made at the ministerial meeting in Geneva of the Foreign Ministers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia and the Bosnian Muslims where basic principles for the establishment of a just and lasting peace have been adopted.

The continuation of the air strikes can only fuel the ambitions of those parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina who are in favor of pursuing a war option. By ruthlessly attacking the Bosnian Serbs, NATO is in fact giving an unambiguous signal to the Bosnian Muslims that it is prepared to fight a war on their side and to



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weaken the Bosnian Serbs to such an extent that the Muslim army will be in a position to achieve a significant military advantage. This is certainly not a policy that can lead to peace but can only be conducive to an uncontrollable escalation of the conflict and its spill-over throughout the Balkan region and beyond with unforeseeable consequences.

By departing from the traditional principles of peace-keeping, neutrality and impartiality the UN and NATO have taken a slippery slope which can lead them to further involvement on the side of the Bosnian Muslims and full scale war against the Bosnian Serbs.

At the time when a real chance for just and lasting peace which would satisfy the vital interests of all three peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina is at last within reach, it is essential that this opportunity should not be missed and that all measures be taken that NATO air strikes, which threaten to undermine the entire peace process be immediately stopped.

The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not only having a severely destabilizing and dangerous effect on the Balkans but also for the future of peace and security in Europe as a whole. By deciding to side with the Bosnian Muslims against the Bosnian Serbs, NATO has raised serious questions on the future of security and cooperation in Europe. Rightly, the Russian Federation has expressed strong concerns for not having been consulted about the air strikes and has vigorously opposed the decision of NATO to pursue them. We welcome such an approach by the Russian Federation since it is in full compliance with the position that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has advocated from the beginning of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely that the political settlement is the only possible solution if the international community truly seeks to achieve peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and stability in the entire territories of the previous Yugoslavia.

NATO's credibility cannot be strengthened by forcing the Bosnian Serbs into accepting solutions contrary to their vital interests. Peace can only be achieved by a painstaking and very difficult but attainable political process through which the vital interests of all peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina will be satisfied.

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is ready to make the greatest effort towards the achievement of lasting peace in the Balkans. We pledge that we will do our utmost to ensure that a balanced and equitable compromise is achieved on the basis of the basic principles which have been agreed upon in Geneva today. However, if the cruel bombardment of the Bosnian Serbs continue, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cannot be responsible for the tragic consequences that could ensue.

Thank you, Mr. President.



1995-09-09 04:22

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СТАЛНА МИСИЈА САВЕЗНЕ РЕПУБЛИКЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ ПРИ УЈЕДИЊЕНИМ НАЦИЈАМА

PERMANENT MISSION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS

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No. 847/95

SEP 7 1995

7 September 1995

Your Excellency,

Upon instructions of my Government, I am writing to express utmost concern regarding the inconsistencies displayed by the competent authorities within the UNPROFOR in establishing the facts following the explosion in the vicinity of Markale market in Sarajevo, whereupon many civilians were killed or wounded.

The unusually prompt investigation and the report of the UN officials on the ground, singled out the Bosnian Serb side as the one responsible for this crime. The initiative of the political authorities of the Republic of Srpska and the Commander of the Bosnian Serb Army, General Mladic, that a joint commission consisting of the representatives of the UN, the Serb and the Muslim side, be set up, was rejected. The events that followed culminated in the unprecedented and relentless "retaliation" of the NATO forces against the Bosnian Serbs with far-reaching and serious consequences, loss of life and extensive material damage.

Skepticism relating to the UNPROFOR reports has been especially heightened following the explicit report of Colonel Demurenko in which it is said that the culprits for the "Markale crime 2" should not be sought on the Serb side i.e. that the chances that the Serbs were responsible, are only theoretical, with the 1:1,000,000 margin.

According to the Reuters news agency report No. 52176 of 2 September 1995, the statement made for the press by Lieutenant-Colonel Chris Vernon of 2 September 1995 further corroborates those suspicions. It says that "Demurenko is not the only one to have challenged the official version of the event". During the same press conference, C. Vernon also indicated that there were a number of reports of vital importance for the establishing of the facts that reached the UN Headquarters including the one made by the officers in Sarajevo and two originating from the USA, but those were never revealed.

His Excellency  
Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali  
Secretary-General of the United Nations  
New York

cc SG  
on Bali  
cc Egon  
Annex  
- for local file



1995-09-09 04:23

5604

21


2

It should be recalled that this is not the first time that such events are being orchestrated on the eve of crucial negotiations on the establishment of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina or important decisions for the resolution of the crisis in those territories. For example, the shelling of Sarajevo following the so called "bread-line incident" in May 1992, the explosion in the Sarajevo cemetery during the funeral of orphans in August 1992 and the shelling of the Markale market in February 1994, have had an aim to undermine the resumption of the peace process and provide an excuse for those who advocate the war option. It should be emphasized that the culprits for any of the above tragic incidents have not been definitely identified, that the UNPROFOR reports at the time have been questioned by the experts and severely criticized as dubious by the world media. Most importantly, they have never been publicized. Nevertheless, then as today, an in-depth investigation by joint teams of experts has never been conducted. However, without clear-cut proofs, the retaliatory measures against the Bosnian Serbs were undertaken as well as against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by introducing the sanctions against it.

In view of the above facts, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia demands that the investigation to establish the true culprits for the latest shelling in the vicinity of the Markale market, which served as a pretext for the unprecedented NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb military and civilian targets, be immediately initiated and that all reports which reached the UN in this regard, be circulated and made public with a view to establishing the accurate facts.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest considerations.



Dragomir Djokic  
Ambassador  
Charge d'affaires a.i.



1995-09-09 04:24

5604

UNITED NATIONS HQS NEW YORK

002

*Perisic*  
Dist.  
GENERAL

S/1995/778  
8 September 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1995 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF  
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS  
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honor to transmit herewith the "Demand of the  
Federal Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to stop  
the bombardment of the Republic of Srpska" adopted by the Federal  
Government on 7 September 1995.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its  
annex circulated as an ~~official~~ document of the Security Council.

Please accept, Your Excellency, the assurances of my highest  
consideration.

*(Signed)* *Dragomir Djokic*  
Dragomir Djokic  
Ambassador  
Charge d'affaires a.i.

O.K.

(F)

His Excellency  
Mr. Paolo Fulci  
President of the Security Council  
of the United Nations  
New York

CBZ 875/ CYZ 872 P 30/30 30

A N N E X

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia energetically demands from the Security Council of the United Nations that the bombardment of the Serb positions and other targets in the Republic of Srpska be immediately stopped. That would eliminate the danger of a possible escalation of the conflict in former Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the threat to the international peace and security in the entire region for which the Security Council is directly responsible under the Charter of the United Nations.

The continuation of NATO's air strikes and the actions of the Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF) represent a direct attack on the ongoing negotiations and the announced peace initiatives supported and accepted by the Republic of Srpska. It also seriously threatens the steps taken so far with a view to finding a peaceful and just solution to the crisis in former Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the territories of the former Yugoslavia.

It is unacceptable and incomprehensible to continue with air and other attacks and push for the negotiations and peace at the same time, particularly when it is well-known that the leadership of the Republic of Srpska accepted the negotiations and demonstrated readiness to continue with the efforts, together with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, towards finding a solution acceptable to all parties to the conflict. Such military actions cannot possibly contribute to peace. Military intervention of the UN and NATO exclusively against one side encourages the other sides to the conflict to undertake military actions, which plays into the hands of those who advocate the war option and thus initiates a chain reaction with unforeseeable consequences that may be difficult to avert.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia therefore demands that the Security Council of the United Nations undertake most resolute and urgent measures in order to halt immediately air and other NATO attacks and thus create the conditions for the resumption of negotiations and a return to the so-much needed peace.

Belgrade, 7 September 1995



C2N 1618  
C2G 1322  
C2K 493  
C2B 63

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

SEP -8 18:05  
SSN 2456

TOR 0208

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

1 OF 2

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
SMITH/PEDAUYE, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO  
MIKOTNYKH, UNPF, BELGRADE

✓ 105 18:10

95 SEP -8 18:21

FROM: AKASHI, UNPF-HQ, ZAGREB

DATE: 8 SEPTEMBER 1995

NUMBER: Z - 1630

SUBJECT: Contacts with President Milosevic, Foreign Minister  
Sacirbey, and Mr. Bildt

I had telephone conversations this afternoon with President Milosevic, Foreign Minister Sacirbey, and Mr. Bildt. The main subject was the the removal of Bosnian Serb heavy weapons from around Sarajevo.

Milosevic asked me to clarify whether General Janvier had proposed a meeting between General Mladic and General Delic. I replied that we had not initiated any proposal for a meeting between Mladic and Delic, but that Janvier favoured a meeting between General Smith and Mladic if required to clarify the modalities for the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

Milosevic expressed concern about the security of Serb civilians in the Sarajevo area, as well as the threat of a Croat attack toward Titov Drvar. I replied that we and the Security Council are aware of the need for the Bosnians to exercise restraint, and will take Mladic's concerns into consideration to the extent possible. However, Mladic must make the first move, including a letter and concrete action on the ground, before there can be any pause in air operations. I added that I would be contacting the highest authorities in the United Nations as to what might be done to accelerate momentum towards ending the current crisis in a manner that supports, and does not hinder, the Geneva negotiations. In response to Milosevic's observation that verbal statements are not guarantees, I suggested that several governments may take up the issue of the security of Serbs in Sarajevo.

With regard to a meeting between Smith and Mladic, I suggested that details be left to the generals. I added that I was distressed that contact had not occurred in the last 48 hours. Our representative in Belgrade will pass on to President Milosevic's office the details as to how Mladic can contact Smith. Milosevic said that he would ask General Periscic to propose that Mladic contact Smith.

President Milosevic expressed his great satisfaction that

the term "Republika Srpska" would be included in the statement to be issued by today Holbrooke and Bildt in Geneva.

Foreign Minister Sacirbey was present in Mr. Bildt's office when I returned Bildt's telephone call. In response to my points on the need for adequate security assurances for the Serbs around Sarajevo, Mr. Bildt said that he intends to issue a statement on the situation in and around Sarajevo. This statement will mention the necessity for restraint by the Bosnian government. Sacirbey then affirmed to me the willingness of the government not to take advantage of any Serb withdrawal.



CEN-1611  
CZG-1315  
CZK-486  
SSN-2445

ROUTING CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE -8

JOR 15:14

Page 1 of 1

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO  
FROM : JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB  
DATE : 8 SEPTEMBER 1995  
NUMBER : UNPF HQ Z- 1622  
SUBJECT : INVESTIGATION INTO THE MORTAR ATTACK ON  
SARAJEVO ON 28 AUGUST 1995  
REFERENCE: MSC 2947 dated 7 September 1995.

MSC 2947 seeks an urgent response to your 2921, which required an in depth report on the mortar attack and a report on sniper activity concluded by UNPROFOR. The report concerning the mortar investigation is being prepared in Sarajevo, by a staff who are working under difficult circumstances. Nevertheless the importance of the report is fully understood and its preparation has a high priority. It will be forwarded as soon as it is ready.

UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations  
95 SEP-8 15:27

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, ASG M&C, DFC, COS, HAAU, PLA, CMO, DI, PC

CZU- 1612

CZG- 1316

CZK- 487

SSN- 2446

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE SEP -8

TOR 15:16

Page 1 of 2

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY, GENEVA  
SMITH, UNPROFOR, SARAJEVO  
FROM : JANVIER, UNPF, ZAGREB  
DATE : 8 September 1995  
NUMBER : UNPF HQ Z- 1623  
SUBJECT : "MUJAHIDEEN" IN CENTRAL BOSNIA  
REFERENCE : UNNY 2935, dated 6 September 1995

95 SEP -8 15:30

UNOC Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations

1. This is in response to your UNNY 2935.

Background

2. Mujahideen is an emotive word which requires a definition for the purposes of this briefing note. Mujahideen are Muslim fundamentalist fighters who operate independently in small groups. They employ guerilla warfare tactics which are enhanced by a reputation for ruthless (terrorist) prosecution of their tasks. The term Mujahideen is often applied loosely by HVO and BSA to the extent that its usage is becoming as common as "Chetnik" and "Ustashe". All exist, all are exaggerated, and all are equally unhelpful for analysis.

3. There is a distinction between indigenous Muslim forces who are religiously motivated (Muslim Brigades) and those foreign groups who form small irregular units (usually of Middle Eastern and South Asian Origin). The distinction is important because the Muslim units appear in regular ABiH organizations and are used in the traditional infantry role. As these brigades are generally referred to as Mujahideen, this can cause confusion when statistics are being compiled. Therefore, for the purpose of this cable, Mujahideen will refer to those foreign elements only.

Role, Authority and Location

4. The Mujahideen are reportedly part of the 4 Lt Muslimski Brigade (HQ : BRADINA: BP 6047), 7 Muslimski Brigade (aka "7 Islamska"; HQ in ZENICA) and the 8 Muslimski Brigade (aka "8 El Mujahid"; HQ in MEHURICI : YJ 3481). It is assessed

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: SRSG, FC, ASG M&C, DFC, COS, HAAU, PLA, CMO, DI, PC



that they are also present in a number of para-military groups (Black Swans?). Estimates on the foreign presence in these units varies between 300 and 1,500. The 7<sup>th</sup> and 8<sup>th</sup> Brigade are directly dependent on the BiH Army staff for supplies but operate in a decentralised way. They are used as special purpose forces or shock troops in the areas the BiH launches large scale offensive operations. They are considered by many ABiH sources however, as being of little military value beyond their much-vaunted reputation. On balance, their contribution, psychological as much as military, could accurately be described as a political force multiplier.

### Impact on Political and Military events

5. There have been reports that the number of foreign volunteers participating in the fighting has decreased and that they are being replaced by advisers. These foreign advisers are not only involved in military and religious training of locally recruited forces, but also try to influence the educational system and other aspects of civilian society. There have been for example rumours about the distribution of Iranian school books in schools in ZENICA and greater emphasis on religious education.

6. Although there have been indications of the development of some kind of Muslim nationalism (not to be confused with fundamentalism), in most areas, the population is not sensitive to the increased religious propaganda. This also explains why relations between the local population and the Mujahideen remain essentially poor. The mostly secular population dislikes the extreme lifestyle of the foreign Mujahideen. The foreign Mujahideen consider the conflict in BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA as a "Holy War", whereas most of the Bosnian Muslims have always been very moderate in their profession of religion. Therefore, the influence of the Mujahideen on the local population can be assessed as being limited.

7. In 1994, Dario Kordic, ("CRHB" President of the HDZ), held a meeting with President Izetbegovic where the presence of Mujahideen, in BiH, was cited as a limitation on the development of the Croat and Muslim relationship. In 1995, the same accusations were again made by Dario Kordic who insisted that the redeployment of Mujahideen units from Central Bosnia was a precondition for further talks on the functioning of the Federation. The presence of Mujahideen, even if exaggerated in number, is therefore used by the Bosnian Croats seeking political advantage.

8. The Bosnian government seems to show less antipathy towards the Mujahideen. When Bosnian television highlighted scenes of the 31 Jan parade in ZENICA, in which soldiers of the 7 Muslimski Brigade were given the title "Glorious", this induced a rift in the Bosnian collective presidency. Five (one Muslim, two Bosnian Croats and two Bosnian Serbs) of the seven members protested against what they called islamisation of the armed forces and accused President Izetbegovic and Vice-President Ganic of encouraging this process. It is thought that President Izetbegovic is influenced by their role as a conduit for funds from the Gulf and Middle East. Later, President Izetbegovic played down the protest and denied that there was an increased influence of religion on the armed forces.

9. The Mujahideen presence is assessed as not significant enough to influence political stability at a national level or pose a threat to regional stability. They may still however, present an occasional practical problem, possibly even a threat, to the international agencies on the ground.