

PdeC

SECRETARY - GEN PAL'S TALKS - TALKS - GULF STATES -

12 OCT 1982 - 8 APR 1985

TEHRAN, IRAN

PLEASE RETAIN
ORIGINAL ORDER

CONFIDENTIAL (6 ITEMS / DECLASSIFIED)

EL/WG JULY 2006

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1022

BOX 79

FILE 11

ACC.

United Nations

Press Release

Department of Public Information
Press Section
United Nations, New York

*Trip
Iran*



SG/T/1332
8 April 1985

SECRETARY-GENERAL ARRIVES IN TEHERAN

(Received from a UN official accompanying the Secretary-General.)

TEHERAN, 7 April -- Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar arrived in Teheran on 7 April from Doha at 12:05 hours local time. He was received at the airport by the Foreign Minister of Iran, Ali Akbar Velayati, the Deputy Foreign Minister, Hossein Kazempour-Ardebili, and the Director-General for International Affairs, Mr. Mahallati.

The Secretary-General said: "I am pleased to be in Teheran to meet with Iranian officials and exchange views with them. I will listen to them and give my own assessment." In response to a question, the Secretary-General said "the only thing I would add is that I do not have with me a magic solution".

The Secretary-General then proceeded to his hotel where he had a working lunch hosted by the Foreign Minister, followed by a private meeting with the Foreign Minister.

At 15:45 hours local time, the Secretary-General is scheduled to call on President Khamenei and at 17:00 hours local time on the Speaker of the Majlis, Mr. Rafsanjani. The Secretary-General is scheduled to have a meeting with the Prime Minister, Hossein Musavi, either late this evening or tomorrow morning.

* * * * *

United Nations

Press Release

Department of Public Information
Press Section
United Nations, New York

*Trip
Iran*



SG/T/1333
8 April 1985

SECRETARY-GENERAL MEETS WITH PRIME MINISTER OF IRAN

(Received from a UN official accompanying the Secretary-General.)

TEHERAN, 8 April -- Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar met today, 8 April, with the Prime Minister of Iran, Hossein Musavi, for 45 minutes. The Secretary-General and his party then visited a theological school.

The Secretary-General left Teheran at 1035 hours local time for Doha en route to Baghdad where he is expected to arrive at approximately 1700 hours local time.

* *** *

NNNN

Trip M.E
Xref Iran

8-4

TEB

INCOMING

ACTION

0315

TO

FILE NO.

☐ ACTION COMPLETED

INITIALS

ZCZC DAL 1365 THR0007

RR NYK

.TEHRAN (UNDP) 7/4 0945

UNATIONS

NEWYORK

158 DAYAL (OSG) FROM PICCO. STAYING AT ESTEGHLAL (HILTON HOTEL)

TEL. NO. 290021/9 ROOM NO. 1539.

REGARDS

(SINGH)

=04070954

NNNN

GP/jk
Orig: SG
File: Iran-Iraq
XRef: Iran
b/f: VD/EO/AS
cc: Mr. Cordovez

Confidential

xref Trip Iran

NOTES ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH
THE PRESIDENT OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN

held at the residence of the President,
on 7 April 1985 at 16.10 hrs.

Present:

The Secretary-General	H.E. Mr. Seyed Ali Khamenei
Mr. Diego Cordovez	President of the Islamic Republic of Iran
Mr. Alvaro de Soto	H.E. Mr. Akbar Velayati, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran
Mr. Giandomenico Picco	H.E. Mr. Hossein Kazempour-Ardebili, Deputy Foreign Minister
	One Aide

After welcoming the Secretary-General, The President said he was prepared to talk about matters of mutual interest and to exchange views.

The Secretary-General said he had been following from the very beginning the situation between Iran and Iraq and had tried to be of help with impartiality within the framework of the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Charter and international guarantees were the backbone of the international community. It was within this framework that he had come to Teheran. Furthermore, as a man of the third world, he felt he could understand better the plight of the developing countries and regretted that all military confrontations were occurring within third world countries, while at times the developed countries were taking advantage of the situation. It was his duty to help the developing countries solve their conflicts so they could then proceed with their development.

The President concurred with the views of the Secretary-General and said it was advisable for him to listen to the Secretary-General. Indeed, it was important that the Secretary-General was a third world man and was able to comprehend what was in the hearts of others. The United Nations philosophy required an understanding of each other. What was important for the United Nations was to be trustworthy. This was the basis of the United Nations' power. Unfortunately, the United Nations, during the last several years, had not behaved in a way to bring

about trust, if one excluded one or two actions taken by the Secretary-General. The Security Council had been frustrated in its actions. The Secretary-General's positive stand on chemical weapons and civilian areas had been noteworthy. It further showed the seriousness of the Secretary-General and the correctness of the expectations placed in him. It was indeed a great pain in his heart that wars in the third world were imposed by others. The war had been used as a matter to pressure the Iranian people. The escalation of the war was another way of pressuring his people. The humanitarian statements of the Secretary-General were greatly appreciated. To take a more specific action, one should first identify the issues upon which action was needed.

The Secretary-General referred to his conversations in New York two weeks earlier with Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili. He felt the atmosphere in the United Nations and in the Security Council was changing in the direction of a better understanding of the Iranian position. It was important to make a new effort to find a just solution. His eight-point proposal represented a starting point. It could be a basis for indirect negotiations between the two parties and a way to limit the dangers to the two countries. The ideas which had been accepted in principle by Iran were not accepted by Iraq which could only accept them if a global approach to the problem were clearly linked to them. He stressed that his appeal of June 1984 was still standing and recalled in this regard that he had sent some doctors to see the Iranian wounded in European hospitals and he expected a report soon. He wished to start a process which would lead to the end of the sufferings, in a speedy and progressive way.

The President said the points listed by the Secretary-General were accepted unconditionally. Those points were totally separate from the war itself. The attack on civilian areas was a crime, as it was a crime to attack merchant ships or to use chemical weapons. To start an aggression was also a crime. The end of the war was linked to certain conditions. To try to end the war by using such crimes was a crime in itself. By attacking the cities, Iraq hoped to make Iran forget the conditions which were needed to end the war. If Iraq continued such a policy, heavy losses would be inflicted upon it. The Iraqi officials believed in the logic of force. They had begun the war and wanted to abort the Iranian revolution; but a revolution can never be aborted by war. Iraq did not take this into account when it committed aggression, but the United Nations did not condemn this aggression; the Secretary-General alone had shown seriousness and indeed had

proven to be trustworthy. If the United Nations did not condemn such aggression, would it not have failed in its responsibilities? If a country decided to land 100 soldiers on the territory of another country, would not the United Nations have told the aggressor that it had violated the peace? Yet ten Iraqi armoured divisions attacked Iranian soldiers and dragged the Iranian people into an unnecessary war. The United Nations in the Security Council not only failed to condemn this aggression but in fact, condemned Iran in one way or another in their resolutions in spite of the fact that Iran was the victim. In fact, when Iraq was inside Iranian territory, the United Nations suggested a ceasefire. If that recommendation had been implemented, would Iran have been able to free its own land from the occupier? Iraq then used chemical weapons and yet this action was not condemned by the Security Council or by the United Nations. Iraq was exploiting the patience and restraint of the Secretary-General. A regime which operated only by force should be vigorously condemned for its use of force. If the bombardment of the cities was to continue, Iran would be more prepared and stronger than Iraq despite its desire for an end to the war. Iran accepted the eight-point proposal of the Secretary-General because of its humane approach. The aggressor should be punished and the damages should be repaid, but he expressed no hope that all this could happen as long as Saddam Hussein remained in power. The appeals of 12 June were violated by Iraq. The proof of that was given by the Secretary-General himself when he stated that Ahwaz was bombed on Monday and Basra was shelled on Tuesday. It was not too late to condemn Iraq. Iran had confidence in the Secretary-General; pressure should be put upon the Iraqis, and they should be told that they could not take advantage of the patience of the Secretary-General.

The Secretary-General said that he could see the point of a clean war but the ultimate objective remained the termination of war. It was his duty to avoid the violation of international law, but it was not a clean war that was the objective of the Secretary-General, rather, it was peace. His record with regard to violations of international law did not restrain him from continuing to fight for peace. He understood that Iran wished to have a proper reaction by the Security Council, but in order to obtain such a reaction, it was important to embark on a new course and to do so, Iran should attend the meeting of the Council. His advice therefore, was for Iran to go to the Security Council at the highest possible level.

The President said the position of the Council had been influenced by the big powers. The Security Council would not play again a determining role in ending the war. There was no hope in the Security Council. As for the position of the Secretary-General about ending the war, the President said he understood that the Secretary-General had to act according to the responsibilities assigned to him. However, war had its rules and crimes were crimes, no matter when they were committed. It would be important, therefore, for the Secretary-General to bring an end to the war crimes committed by Iraq.

* * * * *

At the end of this meeting and while waiting for Mr. Rafsanjani, Mr. Ardebili, who had asked me to sit next to him, stressed to me that even the President had referred only to two conditions, namely, condemnation and reparations.

0075/10

GP/jk
Orig: SG
File: Iran-Iraq
XRef: Iran
b/f: VD/EO/AS
cc: Mr. Cordovez

Confidential

xref: Trip Iran

NOTES ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH
THE SPEAKER OF THE MAJLIS OF OF IRAN

held at the Office of the Speaker,
on 7 April 1985 at 17.45 hrs.

Present:

The Secretary-General	H.E. Mr. Rafsanjani,
Mr. Diego Cordovez	Speaker of the Majlis, Islamic
Mr. Alvaro de Soto	Republic of Iran
Mr. Samir Sanbar	H.E. Mr. Akbar Velayati, Minister for
Mr. Giandomenico Picco	Foreign Affairs of Iran
	H.E. Mr. Hossein Kazempour-Ardebili,
	Deputy Foreign Minister
	Three Aides

The Speaker welcomed the Secretary-General and wished him success in his task of rendering service to humanity.

The Secretary-General said it was the lack of political will which made his task more difficult.

The Speaker said that one thing that made the task of the United Nations more difficult was revolution, as revolution created new conditions.

The Secretary-General said that the United Nations was not against revolution, since revolution only meant accelerated evolution. But the United Nations was an organization of governments, and there was a need for 158 revolutions to change the United Nations.

The Speaker said that a revolutionary personality at the helm of the United Nations would help.

The Secretary-General added that if revolution was development and justice, he was for it.

The Speaker added it was a matter of regret that the Secretary-General was coming to Iran only when the situation was so serious. Iran would have wished to have the Secretary-General visit Teheran in a time of peace. Iran wished to have peace so that it could proceed with the process of reconstruction.

The war was imposed upon Iran. There was no way of comparing the situation of Iran with that of Israel as Israel was surrounded by neighbours at war with it. The war against Iran started because of the Iranian revolution. Iran had been defending its territory for a long time and some territory was still under Iraqi occupation. Five important provinces of Iran had been completely devastated and emptied of inhabitants. Two million Iranians had become refugees.

For this and other reasons Iran did not wish war, but Iran was suspicious that those who started the war could not become peace-loving so quickly. Iran had always been in favour of abiding by international law. This attitude should be maintained even during war. On the other hand, the aggressive attitude of Iraq was proven, not only by the fact that they started the war but also by the destruction they inflicted. In Iran 1,500 towns had been wiped out; the civilian population had been erased; marine life had been devastated and chemical weapons had been used. It was only at this point that Iran took retaliatory measures. Iraq continued its policies even to the point of changing the names of parts of Iran it had occupied and publishing new maps with those changes.

Iran could not trust those who came as mediators when they had shown no justice: those who wanted to pass judgement but did not even attempt the elementary reality that Iraq was the aggressor. They asked Iran to forgive but they did not dare to say who the aggressor was. The only truthful position was the one taken by the Secretary-General in his statements. As soon as that was done, the Secretary-General found out that Iran was appreciative.

On the other hand, the Security Council persisted in its mistakes. The Secretary-General had presented to the Security Council a report on the prisoners of war which proved that no physical torture had been committed against prisoners of war in Iran but that whatever action was done to them "pertained to the ideological field". Many events had occurred because Iran had gone through a revolution and because of Iraq's aggression: therefore, the revolution had to defend itself. The revolution itself required that the punishment of the aggressor could not be forgone. Iran would continue to defend the rights of humanity as the punishment of the aggressor was not only a duty for Iran but a duty for all mankind. However, while pursuing this goal, Iran insisted that international law be abided by.

As far as chemical weapons were concerned, the Speaker said, "We possess more advanced facilities to produce chemical weapons, but we do not want to use them." He added that he would not do so even if the Iraqis continued to use them. (Foreign Minister Velayati tried to correct the interpreter by saying that Iran did not want to produce chemical weapons. He was corrected by the Speaker, who insisted the interpreter say that Iran did not wish to use chemical weapons.)

With regard to navigation in the Gulf, Iran intended to respect the international law of free navigation unless it was forced to do otherwise.

He insisted that if there was any way to end the war, this was the way adopted by the Secretary-General to limit it first and then to put an end to the suspicions Iran had of the international community. Iran would not be curbed by military strength. To prove his point, the Speaker referred to a film which showed an Iraqi bomb falling on groups of Iranians at Friday prayers. The people continued to pray without leaving the scene. What Iran expected from the Secretary-General was that he continue his initiative with courage and sincerity; Iran, contrary to any propaganda, "had no aggressive desire nor the intention of disturbing others"; Iran believed in justice under conditions of peace.

The Secretary-General referred to his efforts aimed at putting an end to attacks on civilian targets and the use of chemical weapons. Indeed, his position on these matters had displeased many. But the Secretary-General of the United Nations could not but say that he abhorred chemical weapons. He had sent some doctors to Europe to examine the Iranian wounded.. At the same time, it was his duty to act within the framework of the Charter, not only to reduce the effects of war but to find a peaceful solution to the war itself. The Secretary-General had to uphold all international conventions and all aspects of the Charter, which mandated him to help resolve conflicts through peaceful means.

The eight points he had suggested should be seen within this framework. He felt that on this basis, something could be done which would lead to beginning a process for an over-all solution. In the meantime, he was convinced that a new recourse to the Security Council should be undertaken. Some Permanent Members were becoming more flexible, and it just could be that the Security Council would take a more impartial position.

He advised Iran to make a new presentation to the Security Council so that the Security Council could take a new position. He had come to Teheran to listen with interest but he had no magic formula. He wanted only to have the parties bring about peace again.

The Speaker said that he had a recommendation for the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General was acting for the purpose of raising the hopes of nations. Iran wished that the mistakes of others not be repeated by the Secretary-General; the aggressor and the victim could not be treated equally. If this were realized, then we could raise our expectations. The solution lay in just such an approach. If this were done at the very beginning, we might be hopeful. He would pray for the Secretary-General's success in this endeavour.

The Secretary-General said that his success would depend on the political will and determination of the parties concerned.

0075/14

GP/jk
Orig: SG
File: Iran-Iraq
XRef: Iran
b/f: VD/EO/AS
cc: Mr. Cordovez

Confidential

Xref Trip Iran

NOTES ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH
THE PRIME MINISTER OF IRAN

held at the Office of the Prime Minister,
on 8 April 1985 at 08.40 hrs.

Present:

The Secretary-General	H.E. Mr. Mir Hossein Mousavi,
Mr. Diego Cordovez	Prime Minister of the Islamic
Mr. Alvaro de Soto	Republic of Iran
Mr. Samir Sanbar	H.E. Mr. Akbar Velayati, Minister for
Mr. Giandomenico Picco	Foreign Affairs of Iran
	H.E. Mr. Hossein Kazempour-Ardebili,
	Deputy Foreign Minister
	Three Aides

The Prime Minister said that by now the Secretary-General was acquainted with his country's views, which had never been ambiguous. A new phase in the war had now been reached with the recent escalation on all fronts by the Iraqi side. The Iraqi side not only had continued bombing the cities but had taken civilian prisoners, among whom were many women. The Iraqis also destroyed systematically the towns they occupied by blowing them up with dynamite. It had been a mistake for the international organization not to condemn these actions when they occurred. Only recently the Secretary-General of the United Nations had taken positive action, though the Security Council had not yet changed its stand.

His Government believed that it had enough power - manpower, that is - to win. Nevertheless, it insisted on respect for international law with respect to chemical weapons and all other humanitarian principles. Iran would retaliate in kind only if forced to do so. He had been informed that Mr. Rafsanjani had told the Secretary-General about Iranian production of chemical weapons. Iran, however, did not support the use of such weapons. At present, Iran was receiving some sophisticated weapons but it was still relying mainly on the sacrifice of its own people. The use of chemical weapons was not only inhumane but was also anti-Islamic. For this reason, Iran was hopeful that the initiative of the Secretary-General would bear fruit.

The Secretary-General said that the remarks of the Prime Minister confirmed the clear-cut position of Iran. As for his position, it remained very clear: The appeals he had made in June 1984 remained valid. This position was based on legal and moral grounds. However, it was the duty of the Secretary-General to pursue a solution to the overall issue and to put an end to the hostilities. The ideas he had sounded with the Iranian Government had been accepted by it. He would continue his contacts on the basis of this support. He was prepared to return to Teheran if so desired by the Iranian authorities and to continue to work on concrete steps.

These efforts could be combined with a new recourse to the Security Council which might decide to reassess the whole problem. If an open debate were called for by the Council, Iran could attend and express its position and its complaints. He intended to report to the Security Council upon returning to New York. If the Council followed his advice, it would open some kind of hearings which might be followed by the Secretary-General's personal efforts on the basis of his eight points. He reiterated that should this be acceptable, he would be prepared to return to Teheran. He felt the war first should be limited and then halted as otherwise it would waste the resources of the two countries and might lead to direct interference in the area by the superpowers.

The Prime Minister said his Government would be glad to welcome the Secretary-General back to Teheran not once, but many times. These trips should help the Secretary-General acquaint himself with the culture of Iran. He was convinced that the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council would be very useful; the incorrect position taken by the Council might only contribute to an escalation of the war.

The positions adopted by the Security Council had been over-shadowed by the influence of the big powers. In fact, the big powers were already involved in new ways in the war. It was mainly through their supply of arms to Iraq that such involvement was taking place. Furthermore, there were provocative acts taken by the NATO powers around the Straits of Hormuz.

No country wanted peace more than Iran, which needed to proceed with its reconstruction. But the war was imposed upon Iran in order to put an end to the Islamic system. Iran had proof to substantiate this statement. For instance, President Saddam Hussain was supposed to lecture in Ashwaz three days after the beginning of the war, thus already planning on the occupation of that city.

His Government hoped that the destructive aspect of the war would be brought to an end very soon. It was tragic to see how many innocent people were being killed. He hoped that the visit of the Secretary-General would contribute to de-escalating the war and that he would tell Saddam Hussain he could not end the war in his own way. Furthermore, if Saddam Hussain thought that through these violent attacks he could save himself, he should be told that Iran would then be forced to continue the war to consolidate the unity of the Iranian people.

The Secretary-General repeated his commitment to finding a just solution to the war. After his visit to Iraq he would be in touch with the Iranian side through its Ambassador in New York.

The Prime Minister said that the Iranian missile which had hit Baghdad two days earlier was supposed to be the last one in the possession of the Iranian authorities. This was a grave mistake. Iran was indeed very well equipped with missiles. He asked the Secretary-General to inform the Iraqi authorities of this wrong assumption.

GP/jk
Orig: SG
File: Iran-Iraq
XRef: Iran
b/f: VD/EO/AS
cc: Mr. Cordovez

Confidential

Xref Top Gran

NOTES ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH
THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAN

held at the Esteghlal Hotel, Teheran,
on 7 April 1985 at 15.00 hrs.

Present:

The Secretary-General	H.E. Mr. Akbar Velayati, Minister for
Mr. Diego Cordovez	Foreign Affairs of Iran
Mr. Alvaro de Soto	H.E. Mr. Hossein Kazempour-Ardebili,
Mr. Gian Domenico Picco	Deputy Foreign Minister
	Mr. Mahallati, Director-General for
	International Affairs
	One Aide

The Foreign Minister welcomed the Secretary-General to Iran. The Government of Iran was pleased to have the Secretary-General in Teheran, though the reason for the visit was not a pleasant one. It was a matter of regret that the discussions were to focus on something which the Iranian side did not like to discuss; but there was no option, as this was the duty of the Secretary-General. Iran was involved in a war against its own wishes. Iran was confronting the ruler (of Iraq) who did not comply with any international obligations. He had abrogated the 1975 Algiers Agreement by attacking Iran. At that time, he announced the war would be over in a week and that a new government would be set up in Teheran. He had used all possible ways to bring Iran to its knees and to topple the Iranian Government. Iran could not feel safe with him as a neighbour. He had abrogated the Algiers Agreement because, as he had said at that time, he felt Iran was weak. International law should be abided by on its own merits. It was a duty of the United Nations to prevent violation of international law and to make sure that violators abided by their agreements. International agreements were signed without conditions. Therefore, Iraq could not say now that it would not abide by international law until the end of the war. The repetition of violations should be presented and the efforts of the Secretary-General were indeed constructive ones; but the Security Council had not taken a neutral position as it should have done. Iran was ready to speak before the Security Council. It should be recalled that nobody protested against the Iraqi aggression when the war started.

With regard to the position of the Secretary-General, Iran appreciated his good will and his actions so far. It was a further proof that when a just position was taken, the Iranian people were appreciative. It was hoped that through the trip of the Secretary-General the United Nations would take the position that Iraq should be forced to abide by international law and covenants.

The Secretary-General assured the Foreign Minister that the Secretary-General had always been understanding of the position of the two sides and had made an effort to try to be in Iran's "shoes". As an honest broker, the Secretary-General had to try to understand the position of the parties. He recalled that he had taken clear-cut positions on all issues pertaining to humanitarian matters. Very recently he had been in touch with ICAO with regard to the Iraqi declaration of Iranian space as a war zone so that Iraq would be reminded of its obligations. At the same time, the Secretary-General was devoted to an over-all solution to the problem. His attitude was dictated by the Charter, which was the most important international law. The Charter required that problems be dealt with through negotiations.

He then referred to the situation in the Security Council and to a larger degree on the open-mindedness shown by the Security Council. Indeed, it appeared a feasible moment for Iran to approach the Council. Following his trip, he intended to report to the Security Council; this would add to the information he had provided to the Council when illustrating the eight-point proposal presented to the parties some three weeks earlier. He intended to inform the Security Council of any further discussions which might develop during his trip with regard to the eight-point non-paper. What would be needed might well be a timetable for all the different points; a truce for three months could also be conceived to work out further matters. At the end of the three months, a cessation of hostilities could be considered.

The Foreign Minister noted that implementation of individual points should not be related to other issues.

The Secretary-General recalled that his appeals proved his moral and legal position on issues like civilian targets and chemical weapons was unchallengeable. Still, a moratorium of three months on every issue referred to in the Secretary-General's eight-point paper could provide enough time to proceed further.

* * * * *

When asked by Mr. Picco if Iran would let the Secretary-General go empty-handed, the Deputy Foreign Minister replied that the Secretary-General would be given the reaction of Iran on going to the Council as indicated by the Foreign Minister.

You will also observe that our people are ready and will rely on themselves when a world organization maintains continuous silence in front of aggression. The best way and the lasting way for acting to pursue an international achievement is the restoration of our rights."

The Secretary-General expressed his gratitude for this new expression of confidence in him by the Iranian authorities. He was quite ready to visit Teheran as this would provide him with an opportunity to meet with high-level officials and to initiate direct conversations in the framework of the discussion which he had with Deputy Foreign Minister Ardebili Kazempour.

There followed a brief discussion on the time and method of reaching Teheran. It appeared that the Iranian authorities would leave the time and means to the Secretary-General but were ready to help. It was also understood that a truce would be observed in the area. It appeared that the Qatar authorities might provide an aircraft for the trip.

The Chargé d'Affaires added that he was convinced that the Secretary-General's visit would produce great results. He stated that the Secretary-General would be welcome at any time and so would the people he chose to bring with him.

0075/54

GP/jk
Orig: SG
File: Iran-Iraq
XRef: Iran
b/f: VD/EO/AS
cc: Mr. Cordovez

ref. Trip Iran

Confidential

NOTES ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEETING WITH
THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF IRAN TO QATAR

held at the Sheraton Hotel in Doha, Qatar
on 6 April 1985 at 15.30 hrs.

Present:

The Secretary-General
Mr. Diego Cordovez
Mr. Giandomenico Picco

The Chargé d'Affaires of Iran to Qatar
One Aide

The Chargé d'Affaires informed the Secretary-General that the message he had conveyed to his colleague in Muscat had been received in Teheran and that Teheran had asked him to convey the following reply:

"The authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran welcome the respected Secretary-General and are ready for conversation with yourself within the framework of your honourable statement issued in New York '26 March', after the meeting and conversation with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran and the Foreign Minister of Iraq. It is further stated that the vast and extensive propaganda of the Arabs and the Government of Iraq against the Islamic Republic of Iran are causing obstructions in the way of removing tensions, and we are expressing our anxiety over this matter. We have denounced this matter on several occasions and we again do so at this time."

While this was the message conveyed from Iran, the Chargé d'Affaires added the following remarks attributable to himself and not to the authorities in Iran:

"The Secretary-General is a guardian of peace and should notify the Arab countries of his duty. We hope that with your visit to Iran you will acquaint yourself with the real facts, bearing in mind the responsibility assigned to you. We hope that your efforts will result in the restoration of the rights and security of the region. Your Excellency will clearly observe in Iran the bloodshed we have been victim to; and, having seen that, we know that you will act with a better understanding in the light of the responsibilities assigned to you."

File: Iran
XRef: Iran/Iraq
Afghanistan *question*
GP/nl Orig: SG
cc: Cordovez
bf: VD/EO/AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L

ref future trip

NOTES ON THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S MEET-
ING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF IRAN

held at United Nations Headquarters on
Tuesday, 12 October 1982, at 1530 hours.

Present: The Secretary-General
Mr. Diego Cordovez
Mr. Giandomenico Picco

H.E. Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati
Foreign Minister of Iran
H.E. Dr. Said Rajaie-Khorassani
Permanent Representative of
Iran to the United Nations
One Aide

but was fighting to maintain its territorial integrity. He thought that the United Nations should play its genuine role. To this effect, Teheran had sent to New York one of its best Ambassadors.

The Secretary-General agreed that Ambassador Khorassani had been extremely active since his arrival in New York.

Ambassador Khorassani added that as far as other efforts were concerned, he would keep the Secretary-General informed. He then added that when these efforts would fail then the Secretary-General's good offices would be needed.

The Foreign Minister then referred to the question of Afghanistan and said that Teheran was prepared to receive Mr. Cordovez at any time. Iran was determined to see the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country. The result of this, however, should not be the transformation of that country into a state similar to those members of the Warsaw Pact. If the USSR forces were to leave, they should not leave their agents inside the country. He welcomed the idea that the problem might be solved by the United Nations. The situation in Kabul should return to what it was before the invasion and the Afghan people should be left to determine their own future. At present, the Afghan population was victim of Soviet warfare and could not accept to negotiate directly with the Soviet Government. Even in Iran the will of the people was such that the Government could not act against it.

The Secretary-General said that his efforts were aimed at solving the present situation. These efforts might well have to bring about a new state of affairs. In this connexion, he mentioned the case of Finland. He expressed his wish to visit Iran in better times. Years of oppression and years of war would necessitate a major reconstruction.

The Foreign Minister extended an invitation to the Secretary-General to visit Iran and said that his Government would be most pleased to receive him.

* * * * *