

AMIR

CODE CABLES - OUTGOING

17 FEB - 14 MAR 1996

CONFIDENTIAL

EL/WG APR 2009

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ORIGINAL ORDER

UN ARCHIVES

SERIES S-1120

BOX 65

FILE 2

ACC. 1998/0278



UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 072

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/AKASHI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar Khan

DATE: 14 March 1996

NO.: MIR 588

NO. OF PAGES: 1

SUBJECT: Movement of Zairean leaders

1. Our Representative in Kinshasa, Mr. A.K. Gaye, has informed me that President Mobutu is expected to represent Zaire at the Tunis Summit on 15-17 March. He will be accompanied by the Zairean Foreign Minister.

2. Mr. Gaye also told me that Prime Minister Kengo wa Dondo would be proceeding to USA from Sunday 17, for a 10 day visit. He would be in New York, Washington and San Francisco. A meeting with the Zairean Prime Minister would be useful provided, of course, that the Secretary-General can fit him in to his schedule.

3. Incidentally, at the request of the Rwandan Government, our Airops completed a successful operation to collect the undelivered Rwandan helicopter which was lying in a village near Kindu (Eastern Zaire). The operation required that our Hercules assisted by one of our helicopters lift the stranded helicopter, dismantle it and load it into our Hercules. The complex operation was carried out flawlessly by our technicians and airops. This is for your information.

Best regards.

UNAMIR
1996 MAR 14 P 3:00

UNAMIR
1996 MAR 14 P 3:15



UNAMIR - MINUAR

ORN 071

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNAMIR
1996 MAR 14 P 3:00

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/AKASHI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 14 March 1996

NO.:

MIR

587

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: European Union decision to withdraw Human Rights Component in Rwanda at 48 hours notice

1. Secretary-General's report to the Security Council and paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution No.1050 has already taken note of the financial problems being faced by the High Commission of Human Rights' office in Rwanda [HRFOR].

2. I was informed by Mr. Ian Martin, this morning (14 March), that the European Commission had decided to withdraw its component of field officers to HRFOR at 48 hours notice. This decision has created a crisis in HRFOR as many officers were holding responsible positions (e.g. 4 heads of Units) and would no longer be available after Friday 15. The decision has exacerbated the crisis within HRFOR which was already smouldering. It now finds itself hamstrung and in a crisis situation.

3. The effect of this decision, however, goes beyond the scope of HRFOR. Now that we have withdrawn UNAMIR formed troops and MILOBs from the prefectures, we have lost our eyes and ears to developments outside Kigali. It was through the Milobs and formed troops that we had kept an accurate pulse reading of how the people felt towards the Government and towards a number of issues that they were facing. Were refugees facing

CRN D71 B/L

oppression on return? Were they being given their houses and properties back? Were there revenge killings? How was the triage system working? What was the state of armed infiltration from the refugee camps? What were the conditions in the prisons and cachots? All this vital information was available to us through the UNAMIR contingent of formed troops and MILOBs. After their withdrawal, we were going to rely, almost entirely on our Human Rights Field Officers to provide us with answers that are so closely related to UNOR's new mandate.

4. HRFOR's problems therefore directly affect UNOR's ability to assess developments in the country. If, HRFOR's operations are seriously compromised by the European Union withdrawal and by its financial crisis, I am sure that UNOR's ability to assess developments, particularly outside Kigali would be seriously jeopardised. I would, therefore, strongly recommend that we should add our voice to that of High Commissioner, José Ayala Lasso in requesting European Union to delay its decision on withdrawing its component until a rational and orderly decision can be taken on the issue.

Best regards.

UNAMIR
1996 MAR 14 P 3:15



UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 071

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNAMIR
1996 MAR 14 P 3:00

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/AKASHI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 14 March 1996

NO.:

MIR

567

NO. OF PAGES: 2

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CRN 071 Bp

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Best regards.

UNAMIR
1996 MAR 14 P 3:15



CRN 069

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
1996 MAR 12 P 5:05

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 12 MARCH 1996
NO.: MIR 569
NO. OF PAGES: 4
SUBJECT: Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1050 (1996)

Shahane
1996 MAR 12 P 5:16
UNAMIR

1. Operative paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 1050 requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 5 April 1996 on what arrangements have been agreed with the Government of Rwanda for the protection of the personnel and premises of the International Tribunal for Rwanda after the withdrawal of UNAMIR and on the arrangements he has made pursuant to paragraph 4 of the same resolution.

2. With regard to the protection of the personnel and premises of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, the Registrar of the Tribunal informed me that the Government had agreed in principle on the short term and long term protection arrangements proposed by the Tribunal subject to some amendments.

3. Under the amended arrangements the Malawian company would continue, during the liquidation of UNAMIR, to provide protection for a period not exceeding four weeks. I have asked for Government's formal approval for the Malawian rather than Ghanaian company to provide protection. I expect the approval to be given shortly. Meanwhile the Government of Rwanda would provide the necessary gendarmerie contingent to be trained and paid for by the Tribunal for the external protection of the premises of the Tribunal and the protection of its installations in the prefectures including communication and radio equipment. The internal

(C)

protection of the Tribunal would be taken over by United Nations guards to be assigned from Headquarters. The whole security system of the Tribunal would be headed by UN professional security officers also to come from Headquarters.

4. Assuming that the Government of Rwanda approves the replacement of the Ghanaian company by the Malawian contingent in the transitional period as decided by Headquarters and conveyed to the Acting Force Commander in General Van Kappen's facsimile of 8 March 1996, the above arrangements would probably be confirmed and become part of the Secretary-General's report on the protection of the Tribunal.

5. Concerning the other report to be submitted in pursuance of the same paragraph 8 on the maintenance in Rwanda of a United Nations Office to perform the tasks described in operative paragraph 4 of the resolution, I should like to refer to my MIR 535 of 6 March 1996 in which I made a number of suggestions regarding the mandate and the size of that office as well as the facilities that would need to be retained in order for that office to carry out its mandate.

6. As announced in para 3 of the above cable, I wish to make the following detailed suggestions regarding the staffing of that office as this may be required for the preparation of the related budget:

A. Political, Economic and Humanitarian Component

1 SRSG

1 D-1 Principal Political Affairs Officer responsible for the overall coordination of various activities in the Office of the SRSG

2 P-5 Senior Political Affairs Officers including the Special Assistant to the SRSG

1 P-5 Senior Information Officer to serve as the Spokesman for the Office

(C)

- 1 P-5 Senior Military Adviser
- 2 P-4 One political Affairs Officer and one Humanitarian Affairs Officer
- 2 P-3 One Legal Affairs Officer and one Economic Affairs Officer
- 1 SS Security Officer
- 7 GS Secretarial Assistance Staff
- 5 LGS Drivers.

B. "Radio United Nations" Component

- 1 P-4 Head of the Radio
- 1 P-3 Programme Coordinator
- 2 P-2 Journalists of the English Section
- 2 P-2 Journalists of the French Section
- 1 GS Administrative Assistant
- 18 LGS Including local journalists for the Kenyan Section, Technicians and 4 Drivers.

C. Administrative Component

- 1 P-4 Administrative Officer

(C)

- 1 P-3 Administrative/Finance Officer
- 1 P-2 Associate Administrative/Finance Officer
- 4 GS Administrative/Finance Assistants
- 5 LGS Including Clerks and 2 Drivers.

The individual job descriptions of all the professional and above posts will follow shortly. While I am fully aware of the budgetary and financial constraints the Organization is currently facing, I believe, given the scope of the mandate assigned to the new Office, that the above staffing level will be required to make a significant impact on the future course of events in Rwanda.

7. Pending the completion of the liquidation of UNAMIR (19 April) and the installation of the new Office, I strongly recommend that the 8 staff of the professional and above categories as well as the 7GS staff currently assisting the SRSG be kept in place during this transitional period. This is all the more necessary as the assistance of a number of them is required in the liquidation process.

8. Best regards.

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AFC

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR

1996 MAR 11 P 4:51

UNAMIR - MINUAR

1996 MAR 11 P 5:14

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Reçu le 12 MARS 1996

CRW-dee f/y

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI
DATE: 11 MARCH 1996
NO.: MIR -561
NO. OF PAGES: 9
SUBJECT: UNAMIR'S CLOSURE CEREMONY - 8TH MARCH

Shaharyar M. Khan

A.K

P. G. ...

1. A brief and impressive UNAMIR closure ceremony was held at UNAMIR Headquarters on 8th March. The UNAMIR Flag was lowered and bugles sounded the last retreat. Rwandan Ministers, parliamentarians and senior officials attended the meeting. Heads of Mission, UN Agencies and NGO's were also present. The Government of Rwanda was represented by the Foreign Minister who inspected the guard of honour. On behalf of the Secretary General, I welcomed the guests and made a statement [copy attached]. The Rwandan Foreign Minister made an extempore speech in which he praised UNAMIR's contribution to Rwanda's recovery. He told me that he had set aside the speech written for him because "it was full of polemics". The following are my comments:

a) There was general disappointment that the government had not nominated one of the three leaders [President, Vice-President, Prime Minister] to attend the ceremony.

b) A small demonstration of "widows and orphans" was held outside the UNAMIR compound. Government Officials stated that it was spontaneous but I have no doubt that it was government sponsored. It left an unpleasant taste to an otherwise dignified ceremony.

c) It is apparent that the RPF hardliners had influenced the decision not to extend a limited UN military presence in Rwanda. The US Ambassador had asked Vice-President Kagame if he would accept the continuation of MILOBs. Kagame replied firmly in the negative.

d) Except for the RPF hardliners, the Rwandese people generally regret UNAMIR's departure. This is not due to sentimentality but a realization by leaders and cadres that they would be handicapped by not being able to call on our technical support. Of course, the majority ethnic community is apprehensive that UNAMIR's departure would increase their insecurity.

e) The opposition RDR have publicly criticised UNAMIR's departure. I have, no doubt, also that neighbouring countries, notably Tanzania and Zaire, will regard UNAMIR's closure as a retrogressive step in efforts to persuade refugees to return voluntarily.

Best regards.

chw-obb 3/9

UNAMIR'S CLOSING CEREMONY SPEECH
BY THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR RWANDA

8 MARCH 1996

Your Excellency Dr. Anastase Gasana, Foreign Minister of Rwanda

Your Excellencies Distinguished Ambassadors

Distinguished Heads of Agencies

Brigadier-General Sivakumar, Acting Force Commander

Honoured Guests

Fellow colleagues of UNAMIR

On behalf of the Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, I welcome you to UNAMIR's closure ceremony. I am grateful that you have done us the honour of gracing this occasion with your presence. Today, as we lower UNAMIR's flag for the last time, I look back with a sense of pride and fulfillment at the honourable end of UNAMIR's tenure in Rwanda.

I look back to the 4th of July 1994 when I arrived in this very compound in the midst of horror and genocide that enveloped this beautiful land. I look back on a country devastated, pillaged and numbed by one of the most shocking and horrendous tragedies in human history. I look back on savaged families, shattered lives, on the macabre scene at Nyarubuye where dogs fattened themselves on the flesh of massacred children. I look back with pride at the brave UNAMIR soldiers who - severely depleted though they were - risked their own lives to save the defenseless and the innocent from the marauding killers. I look back on the deafening silence in the towns and cities that greeted me when I first arrived.

And yet, today, 20 months later, we see around us thriving markets, bustling commerce, stability and security, children skipping to school in neat uniforms. The communes have come alive - agriculture, power, water, healthcare is almost back to pre-war levels. Today, child immunization has exceeded pre-war standards. There are flowers in the circle at Kiyovu roundabout where once hundreds of displaced persons lived in the open. There are no curfews and few road blocks. The Amahoro stadium where 10,000 frightened people were protected by a company of Ghanaian soldiers, is now the playground of youthful footballers and athletes. There is, all around us, normalcy, stability and peace.

There can be no doubt that this remarkable transformation has been due to the efforts, the resilience and the spirit of the Rwandese people and the direction that its Government has provided. UNAMIR's effort has been to assist the people and the Government of Rwanda in achieving this transformation. Our resources were limited, our means scarce but within these constraints, UNAMIR has strained every sinew, called on all its resources of energy and more, to help the people of Rwanda in turning away from horror and despair towards dignity and progress.

Here I must associate with a profound sense of gratitude, the support and cooperation that we have received from the UN family, the specialized Agencies, NGOs and the common people of Rwanda. I am indebted, also,

to the members of the diplomatic corps for their significant contribution in the uplift of the country. As the military leave and a civilian office carries forward the UN's banner, we shall join the Government and people of Rwanda in attempting to resolve the outstanding issue that face the country. Over a million and half refugees must be encouraged to return home and to settle in a ambience of security and fairplay. The Justice system must be revived so that each and every citizen is assured of transparent justice and that the climate of impunity is banished forever. The long road towards ethnic tolerance and national reconciliation has begun and must be encouraged. The suffering in prisons must be alleviated. These are some of the tasks that we shall address, jointly, with the Government of Rwanda. It is a difficult road ahead but I am encouraged by the example of the recent past.

I am deeply proud of the contribution that our formed troops, our technical cadres, our Milobs, our civilian personnel have made towards achieving this extraordinary recovery that we see around us. We have trained Rwanda's first gendarmes and communal policemen, we have provided medical support to over a million Rwandans, our engineers have dug canals, built bridges and repaired roads. We have revived water and power supplies across the country's communes, we have helped to expand detention centres, we have transported prisoners, refugees, food and agricultural seeds, we have helped to open schools for orphans and demobilized children, we have cleared land-mines and have levelled sites for refugee

resettlements. We have placed our helicopters and airplanes to meet the essential needs of the Government. In the communes, and prefectures, our soldiers have provided every conceivable assistance ranging from supporting an orphanage to reviving power supply from transporting essential supplies to preparing transit camps. In the fields, our troops have helped to sow the seeds and reap the harvests with refugee farmers beginning their lives anew. And, as we depart, I can assure the Government of Rwanda that a significant proportion of our equipment would be left behind for use in Rwanda by the UN Agencies and by the Government of Rwanda.

For this supreme effort, I am deeply indebted to the extraordinary zeal, discipline and commitment that UNAMIR's contingent, both military and civil have demonstrated. In addressing every member of UNAMIR's family, I want to state that, I feel deeply honoured to have been associated with a group of such dedicated men and women who gave of their everything and more, who walked the extra-mile and who risked their lives for the cause of humanity. Here, in Rwanda, African and European, Asian and American, Australasian and Middle Eastern made deep personal sacrifices to help a people who had been traumatized by tragedy. We all served, not to seek appreciation, jobs or gratitude, but for the cause of human dignity and common fellowship in this global village that we share.

There are many lessons to be learnt by the international community from its experience in Rwanda. Many shortcomings to be corrected, many potential dangers to be pre-empted. Nothing, however, can take away the extraordinary heroism and commitment of those who served with UNAMIR during the traumatic period of genocide and who have, since then, helped the Rwandese people in their quest for recovery and stability.

As the bugles sound UNAMIR's last retreat, each one of you that has served in UNAMIR can hold your head high at the success of your mission. You only have to look around to see how far we have come - from devastation to revival: from degradation to dignity: from terror to security. Today, the military completes its task with distinction. Your achievements will form a roll of honour in the annals of UN's peacekeeping history. Your courage in the months of genocide, your discipline at Kibeho, your commitment throughout the traumatic period of 1994. Your dignified forbearance in the face of unfair criticism and calumnies levelled against you. Your assistance in the revival of Rwanda will form a golden chapter of UN's peace-keeping. The names of General Dallaire, General Tousignant, Brigadier-General Anyidoho and Brigadier-General Sivakumar are now part of UN's glorious history. We owe you - the military component of UNAMIR - a profound debt of gratitude.

In conclusion, I want to thank you, Your Excellency, Mr. Foreign Minister and through you the Government and people of Rwanda for the support you have given UNAMIR. As we lower the UNAMIR flag for the last time, we depart with a deep sense of achievement and success. We have shared with you a part of your history - of your tragedy and of your revival - and though Government and politics have their own way of looking at issues we - the United Nations will never forsake the cry of the innocent child for help, anywhere in the world. I thank you .



UNAMIR - MINUAR

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UNAMIR

UNAMIR

1996 MAR 11 P 4: 51

OUTGOING CODE CABLE-06

Reçu le 12 MARS 1996

TO: MEDILI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 11 MARCH 1996

NO.: MIR - 560

NO. OF PAGES: 6

SUBJECT: RWANDA - THE EQUIPMENT ISSUE

1. Operative paragraph 3 of UN Security Council Resolution No. 1050 states as follows:

"Welcomes the intention of the Secretary-General to submit recommendations to the General Assembly regarding UNAMIR non-lethal equipment that may be released for use in Rwanda in accordance with paragraph 7 of its resolution 1029 (1995) ..."

Earlier, the Secretary General in his report to the Security Council had indicated that he will shortly "submit recommendations to the General Assembly regarding UNAMIR equipment that, in the context of the liquidation process, can be released for use in Rwanda".

2. Rwanda's request for UNAMIR equipment dates back to September 1995. I appreciate the complexity of the issue, the detailed data that has to be checked and the need for accountability and transparency in implementing UNGA resolutions. I hope, however, that we can give a partial response to the Rwandese request, and that a full response can be included in Secretary General's

ch-067

report to the Security Council due before April 5. Delay in giving our overdue response is now causing embarrassment and unnecessary suspicion. I am giving below some practical suggestions on the basis of my discussion with Messrs Medili/Waldrum in New York last January.

3. For facility of reference, I attach to this report Chart "X" - one of three charts already sent to FALD. Chart "X" states the proposals made by CAO to FALD on the basis of UNAMIR equipment, at original cost. In the Chart, horizontal column "A" may be disregarded as it relates to equipment that is no longer available. Only columns B and C are relevant and form the pool of available equipment.

4. Since my discussion in New York, the following three developments have taken place:

a) At FALD's request, UNAMIR has confirmed that the lists sent to New York have been checked against equipment available on the ground and, therefore, are as accurate as possible.

b) We have taken into account the request for equipment from the International Tribunal [ICTR] which had not been received earlier when the charts were drawn up. In accordance with Headquarters instructions, the transfer to ICTR would be under Vertical Column I (ie on the same basis as to other Peace Keeping Operations) rather than being "sold" to UN Agencies [ie Column II].

c) FALD had enquired the specific requests made by other Peace Keeping Operations for UNAMIR equipment. This information has been sent vide [Confidential Fax 1016 from Matthew to Medili dated 28 February 1996] so that Column I of "B" in Chart X can now be divided into I (a) which represents the equipment requested by other PKO's and I (b) which is the equipment which was scheduled to be stored in Brindisi. For facility of reference, this information is contained in Chart X (i) attached, which divides the equipment in Column B (i) into PKO bound [(B (i) a)] and Brindisi bound [(B (i) b)]. Our recommendation is that column B (i) a) should be finalised and the material shipped out [our Fax No. 1140 from Matthew to Medili dated 8 March 1996 refers] and that column B (i) b) - Brindisi bound - equipment should remain for use in Rwanda to cater to ICTR's demand and the remainder merged into B (ii).

Recommendations

5. I would, therefore, recommend that Headquarters may immediately authorise the finalisation of the following lists:

i) The equipment specifically destined for other Peace Keeping Operations ie list B (i) a) may be finalised.

ii) As soon as ICTR's final list is received, the equipment may be released to them so that their requirement is also dealt with under column B (i).

iii) The equipment in Column "C" (write-off) may also be finalised now.

6. This would leave the following lists to be completed by the end of March:

a) List B (i) b), ie Brindisi bound equipment which would presumably include some lethal equipment items;

b) List B (ii), [IOV items] and List B (iii) [Items for Rwanda]. Both these lists could be augmented by the merging of Brindisi bound [B (i) b)], items as recommended.

7. The decision on which equipment goes to B (ii) [IOVs] "for use in Rwanda" and which to B (iii) [Government of Rwanda/NGO's] to be written-off, purchased through the Trust Fund or directly by the Government of Rwanda could also be decided by the end of the month.

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8. I hope that the recommendations made in paragraph 5 can be made by the end of the present week. In addition, FALD would need to consider that, in any event, the equipment issue will not be resolved within the six-week period of UNAMIR's phase-down ie by 19th April. It would, therefore, be necessary for a small administrative unit to continue working within the UN Political Office for a short period in order to finalise the accounting and disposal of the equipment. The question of security for the equipment until it is disposed of would also need to be considered.

9. Please be assured that my intention in sending this telegram is not to seek to divert more equipment to Rwanda but to receive a definitive response to their request.

Best regards.

(1)

CHART 'X'

(1)

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR)
DISTRIBUTION OF NON-EXPENDABLE PROPERTY (ORIGINAL COST)

Amendment 3

		GROUP I TRANSFER UPKO	GROUP II IOV UN AGENCIES	GROUP III LOCAL DISTRIBUTION	TOTAL	
A.	ALREADY DISTRIBUTED					
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT	\$ 12,610,985.36	\$ 34,247.31	\$ 121,208.28	\$ 12,766,440.95	1
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT	\$ 1,510,849.11	\$ 259,379.25	\$ 49,107.92	\$ 1,819,336.28	2
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT	\$ 47,996.84	\$ 20,431.98	\$ 6,679.01	\$ 75,107.83	3
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT	\$ 5,338,000.00	\$ 1,184,287.43	\$ 115,830.10	\$ 6,638,117.53	4
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT		\$ 5,433.00		\$ 5,433.00	5
6	GENERATORS	\$ 51,329.00	\$ 313,779.50	\$ 161,714.50	\$ 525,823.00	6
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES					7
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT	\$ 3,212.35	\$ 12,701.35	\$ 24,730.00	\$ 40,643.70	8
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT					9
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT	\$ 269,863.15	\$ 998.00		\$ 270,861.15	10
	SUB-TOTAL	\$ 19,832,235.81	\$ 1,831,257.82	\$ 479,269.81	\$ 22,142,763.44	
B.	PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION					
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT	\$ 7,578,913.63	\$ 1,673,357.59	1,739,936.62	\$ 10,992,207.84	1
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT	\$ 6,225,077.08	\$ 31,479.85	124,731.49	\$ 6,381,288.42	2
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT	\$ 973,854.80	\$ 154,886.71	392,632.40	\$ 1,521,373.91	3
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT	\$ 191,911.37	\$ 2,154,059.79	5,240,044.38	\$ 7,585,115.54	4
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT		\$ 86,139.00		\$ 86,139.00	5
6	GENERATORS	\$ 882,627.14	\$ 145,491.50	991,060.89	\$ 2,019,179.53	6
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES					7
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT	\$ 321,528.95	\$ 138,795.69	170,863.53	\$ 631,187.77	8
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT	\$ 73,600.00			\$ 73,600.00	9
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT	\$ 4,908,479.78	\$ 14,903.02	54,037.20	\$ 4,978,480.00	10
	SUB-TOTAL	\$ 21,156,092.35	\$ 4,399,173.15	\$ 8,713,305.61	\$ 34,268,572.01	
C.	EQUIPMENT FOR WRITE-OFF					
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT				\$ 3,645,720.07	1
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT				\$ 220,365.00	2
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT				\$ 219,710.00	3
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT				\$ 1,579,457.48	4
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT					5
6	GENERATORS				\$ 273,245.31	6
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES					7
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT				\$ 90,917.35	8
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT					9
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT				\$ 59,888.74	10
	SUB-TOTAL				\$ 6,089,303.95	
D.	GRAND TOTAL	\$ 40,988,328.16	\$ 6,232,430.97	\$ 9,192,576.32	\$ 62,500,639.40	

CHART-067
15 of 16

X(1)

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR)
DISTRIBUTION OF NON-EXPENDABLE PROPERTY (ORIGINAL COST)

GROUP I-TRANSFER

Amendment 1

BREAKDOWN OF ALLOCATION TO DPKO MISSIONS AND TO UNLB-BRINDISI

B.	<u>PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION</u>	<u>DPKO MISSIONS</u>	<u>UNLB-BRINDISI</u>	<u>TOTAL VALUE</u>
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT	\$ 5,409,624.04	\$ 2,169,289.59	\$ 7,578,913.63
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT	\$ 1,269,602.50	\$ 4,955,474.58	\$ 6,225,077.08
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT	\$ 852,284.28	\$ 121,570.52	\$ 973,854.80
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT	\$ 38,800.00	\$ 152,211.37	\$ 191,011.37
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT			
6	GENERATORS	\$ 882,627.14		\$ 882,627.14
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES			
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT	\$ 509.96	\$ 321,018.59	\$ 321,528.55
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT	\$ 73,600.00		\$ 73,600.00
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT	\$ 4,308,295.57	\$ 601,184.21	\$ 4,909,479.78
	TOTAL	\$ 12,835,343.49	\$ 8,320,748.86	\$ 21,156,092.35

ED
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UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR

1996 MAR 11 P 4: 51

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Reçu le 12 MARS 1996

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI *Shaharyar M. Khan*

DATE: 11 MARCH 1996

NO.: MIR -561

NO. OF PAGES: 9

SUBJECT: UNAMIR'S CLOSURE CEREMONY - 8TH MARCH

1. A brief and impressive UNAMIR closure ceremony was held at UNAMIR Headquarters on 8th March. The UNAMIR Flag was lowered and bugles sounded the last retreat. Rwandan Ministers, parliamentarians and senior officials attended the meeting. Heads of Mission, UN Agencies and NGO's were also present. The Government of Rwanda was represented by the Foreign Minister who inspected the guard of honour. On behalf of the Secretary General, I welcomed the guests and made a statement [copy attached]. The Rwandan Foreign Minister made an extempore speech in which he praised UNAMIR's contribution to Rwanda's recovery. He told me that he had set aside the speech written for him because "it was full of polemics". The following are my comments:

a) There was general disappointment that the government had not nominated one of the three leaders [President, Vice-President, Prime Minister] to attend the ceremony.

b) A small demonstration of "widows and orphans" was held outside the UNAMIR compound. Government Officials stated that it was spontaneous but I have no doubt that it was government sponsored. It left an unpleasant taste to an otherwise dignified ceremony.

c) It is apparent that the RPF hardliners had influenced the decision not to extend a limited UN military presence in Rwanda. The US Ambassador had asked Vice-President Kagame if he would accept the continuation of MILOBs. Kagame replied firmly in the negative.

d) Except for the RPF hardliners, the Rwandese people generally regret UNAMIR's departure. This is not due to sentimentality but a realization by leaders and cadres that they would be handicapped by not being able to call on our technical support. Of course, the majority ethnic community is apprehensive that UNAMIR's departure would increase their insecurity.

e) The opposition RDR have publicly criticised UNAMIR's departure. I have, no doubt, also that neighbouring countries, notably Tanzania and Zaire, will regard UNAMIR's closure as a retrogressive step in efforts to persuade refugees to return voluntarily.

Best regards.

chw-obb 3/9

UNAMIR'S CLOSING CEREMONY SPEECH
BY THE
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL FOR RWANDA

8 MARCH 1996

Your Excellency Dr. Anastase Gasana, Foreign Minister of Rwanda

Your Excellencies Distinguished Ambassadors

Distinguished Heads of Agencies

Brigadier-General Sivakumar, Acting Force Commander

Honoured Guests

Fellow colleagues of UNAMIR

On behalf of the Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros-Boutros Ghali, I welcome you to UNAMIR's closure ceremony. I am grateful that you have done us the honour of gracing this occasion with your presence. Today, as we lower UNAMIR's flag for the last time, I look back with a sense of pride and fulfillment at the honourable end of UNAMIR's tenure in Rwanda.

I look back to the 4th of July 1994 when I arrived in this very compound in the midst of horror and genocide that enveloped this beautiful land. I look back on a country devastated, pillaged and numbed by one of the most shocking and horrendous tragedies in human history. I look back on savaged families, shattered lives, on the macabre scene at Nyarubuye where dogs fattened themselves on the flesh of massacred children. I look back with pride at the brave UNAMIR soldiers who - severely depleted though they were - risked their own lives to save the defenseless and the innocent from the marauding killers. I look back on the deafening silence in the towns and cities that greeted me when I first arrived.

to the members of the diplomatic corps for their significant contribution in the uplift of the country. As the military leave and a civilian office carries forward the UN's banner, we shall join the Government and people of Rwanda in attempting to resolve the outstanding issue that face the country. Over a million and half refugees must be encouraged to return home and to settle in a ambience of security and fairplay. The Justice system must be revived so that each and every citizen is assured of transparent justice and that the climate of impunity is banished forever. The long road towards ethnic tolerance and national reconciliation has begun and must be encouraged. The suffering in prisons must be alleviated. These are some of the tasks that we shall address, jointly, with the Government of Rwanda. It is a difficult road ahead but I am encouraged by the example of the recent past.

I am deeply proud of the contribution that our formed troops, our technical cadres, our Milobs, our civilian personnel have made towards achieving this extraordinary recovery that we see around us. We have trained Rwanda's first gendarmes and communal policemen, we have provided medical support to over a million Rwandans, our engineers have dug canals, built bridges and repaired roads. We have revived water and power supplies across the country's communes, we have helped to expand detention centres, we have transported prisoners, refugees, food and agricultural seeds, we have helped to open schools for orphans and demobilized children, we have cleared land-mines and have levelled sites for refugee

resettlements. We have placed our helicopters and airplanes to meet the essential needs of the Government. In the communes, and prefectures, our soldiers have provided every conceivable assistance ranging from supporting an orphanage to reviving power supply from transporting essential supplies to preparing transit camps. In the fields, our troops have helped to sow the seeds and reap the harvests with refugee farmers beginning their lives anew. And, as we depart, I can assure the Government of Rwanda that a significant proportion of our equipment would be left behind for use in Rwanda by the UN Agencies and by the Government of Rwanda.

For this supreme effort, I am deeply indebted to the extraordinary zeal, discipline and commitment that UNAMIR's contingent, both military and civil have demonstrated. In addressing every member of UNAMIR's family, I want to state that, I feel deeply honoured to have been associated with a group of such dedicated men and women who gave of their everything and more, who walked the extra-mile and who risked their lives for the cause of humanity. Here, in Rwanda, African and European, Asian and American, Australasian and Middle Eastern made deep personal sacrifices to help a people who had been traumatized by tragedy. We all served, not to seek appreciation, jobs or gratitude, but for the cause of human dignity and common fellowship in this global village that we share.

There are many lessons to be learnt by the international community from its experience in Rwanda. Many shortcomings to be corrected, many potential dangers to be pre-empted. Nothing, however, can take away the extraordinary heroism and commitment of those who served with UNAMIR during the traumatic period of genocide and who have, since then, helped the Rwandese people in their quest for recovery and stability.

As the bugles sound UNAMIR's last retreat, each one of you that has served in UNAMIR can hold your head high at the success of your mission. You only have to look around to see how far we have come - from devastation to revival: from degradation to dignity: from terror to security. Today, the military completes its task with distinction. Your achievements will form a roll of honour in the annals of UN's peacekeeping history. Your courage in the months of genocide, your discipline at Kibeho, your commitment throughout the traumatic period of 1994. Your dignified forbearance in the face of unfair criticism and calumnies levelled against you. Your assistance in the revival of Rwanda will form a golden chapter of UN's peace-keeping. The names of General Dallaire, General Tousignant, Brigadier-General Anyidoho and Brigadier-General Sivakumar are now part of UN's glorious history. We owe you - the military component of UNAMIR - a profound debt of gratitude.

In conclusion, I want to thank you, Your Excellency, Mr. Foreign Minister and through you the Government and people of Rwanda for the support you have given UNAMIR. As we lower the UNAMIR flag for the last time, we depart with a deep sense of achievement and success. We have shared with you a part of your history - of your tragedy and of your revival - and though Government and politics have their own way of looking at issues we - the United Nations will never forsake the cry of the innocent child for help, anywhere in the world. I thank you .



CAN D65

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
1996 MAR -6 P 4:18

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/MEDILI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 6 MARCH 1996

NO.: MIR 536

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR. DUSAIDI - 5.3.96

1. I had my first meeting with Dusaidi since my return from New York. The following are the main points of the meeting which was also attended by communication expert Sam Nkusi.

Equipment

2. Dusaidi was extremely plaintive that the promised list of equipment had not been made available. He reminded me that UNAMIR's mandate would end in three days and that six weeks later UNAMIR would have left altogether. Rwanda had not received a reply to its formal request and despite Security Council Resolutions, there was no reaction from UN on the equipment. As usual, I stalled.

3. Dusaidi stated that Rwanda was ready to purchase equipment from its own funds and enquired if it was necessary to purchase equipment through the Trust Fund. I replied that the Trust Fund was a convenient formula but I assumed the government could directly buy equipment from its own funds provided the equipment was earmarked for that purpose. Dusaidi enquired if the government could negotiate some of the prices indicated in the equipment for sale as, in his view, some of our used items that we have loaned to the government and which we propose to adjust against the Trust Fund, were costing 20-30% more than the market price of new equipment in the same category. I would be grateful for a response from FALD on these two points.

UNAMIR
1996 MAR -6 P 4:24

Security

4. I informed Dusaidi that, taking Rwanda at its word, the UN and its Agencies would look to the government to provide protection. Specifically, I asked Dusaidi for the Rwandan Government's security protection for our transmitters in Kibungo and Kirongi. [The third transmitter at Rebero is already in the RPA compound].

5. I also requested Dusaidi for the Ghana Coy to continue its guard duties until ICTR's security is deployed in early April. Dusaidi stated that a one month extension of the Ghana Company's guard duties had been agreed by the Vice-President in his meeting with the Registrar, Mr. Adede earlier in the day.

Taxes

6. Dusaidi remonstrated at paragraph 9 of Secretary-General report which, he stated, had given a factually incorrect picture. He said that he had not signed the memorandum prepared by Mr. Ssekande and that the understanding was clearly dependent on a satisfactory conclusion of the equipment issue. As no lists had so far been seen, it was incorrect to state that Rwanda had agreed to waive the taxes. He stated that the UN should present the correct picture to the Security Council as Rwanda may, otherwise, be seen as reneging on a commitment.

UNAMIR closure ceremony

7. I requested Dusaidi to let me know a suitable time for holding of a closure ceremony on 8th March.

Best regards.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

CRN 064

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1996 MAR -6 P 2:21

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/MEDILI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar Khan

DATE: 6 MARCH 1996

NO.:

MIR

535

NO. OF PAGES: 5

SUBJECT: UNAMIR - POST MARCH 8

1. It is now evident that there are two possibilities for UNAMIR after March 8: a) that, we phase out altogether in six weeks time as suggested in the Secretary-General's report to the Security Council or, b) that members of the Security Council agree to Rwanda's acceptance of a civilian political presence to succeed UNAMIR. In this cable, I am raising certain issues in the likely event of the latter option emerging from the Security Council.

The mandate

2. Paragraph 3 of Secretary-General's report outlines the "outstanding agenda" items that need to be addressed in Rwanda. The Rwandan Foreign Minister's letter to the Secretary-General covers virtually the same ground. I would, therefore, recommend that the civilian political office should have as its mandate the implementation of these objectives, namely:

UNAMIR
1996 MAR -6 P 2:40

- (i) The repatriation and resettlement of refugees in accordance with the Bujumbura Action Plan.
- (ii) The revival of the national judicial system including improvement of detention centres.
- (iii) Support for socio-economic sectors especially survivors of genocide.
- (iv) Institutional capacity-building and infrastructural rehabilitation through early and equitable disbursement of pledges made at the Geneva Round Table.
- (v) National Reconciliation.
- (vi) Enhanced Co-ordination of UN Agency activity including financial contribution to Secretary-General's Trust Fund for Rwanda.

The size of the Mission

3. In my view, the Civilian Office should be headed by an SRSG and should have a deputy. Three relatively senior officers, including a Special Assistant, should help the SRSG in implementing the objectives mentioned in paragraph 2 above. Another four relatively junior officers should assist in coordination with UN Agencies including the Tribunal, the Human Rights Field Office and NGOs. In addition, Administrative Officers, a Spokesman, a Military Adviser and a Legal Adviser would be required. Necessary support staff, secretaries, clerical staff, security and local staff (drivers, etc.) would also need to be assigned. I shall be sending more detailed suggestions based on the proposal contained in this paragraph.

The hierarchical status of the Office

4. An enhanced co-ordinating role would be expected of the SRSG with the UN Agencies based on the requirements of the mandate. It would appear that the best formula would be to follow the Haiti model of the UNDP Resident and Humanitarian Co-ordinator acting as the SRSG's deputy. The Haiti model appears to have worked well and there is no reason why it should not also work effectively in Rwanda. The SRSG should have full authority to utilise Trust Fund expenditures.

The facilities

5. It is recommended that the following facilities may be retained for the civilian office:

i) A small fixed wing aircraft [Beechcraft]. The Tribunal, HRFOR, UNHCR and other UN Agencies will continue to be heavily represented in Rwanda. We would need to use the fixed wing aircraft, even, for internal travel if helicopters are excluded.

ii) **Helicopter facility.** We may reduce helicopter facility to two. Even though helicopter facility is expensive, there is a functional need to retain the capability of quick movement as refugees enter Rwanda and move to their communes from six entry points around the country. Moreover, at this morning's inter-agency meeting, there was an unanimous appeal from the agencies to retain helicopter facility particularly as insurgency in the western region has led to casualties due to mines, sabotage, etc. Agency field personnel in that region are insistent that helicopter, medivac capability should be retained.

iii) **A vehicle workshop.** A large number of vehicles will still be in use in Rwanda for the resettlement of refugees, HRFOR and ICTR. It has been agreed that UN Agencies would utilise the UNHCR workshop on a cost sharing basis as a result of the closure of UNAMIR's workshop.

iv) A medical unit that would be shared between us and ICTR. The current Normed contingent could be reduced from its current strength to a lower figure. Normed is prepared to stay on in Rwanda provided this facility is requested. Agencies, NGO's and diplomats would be eligible to use the clinic on a cost sharing basis.

v) Existing communications linking UNAMIR to New York must be retained. Moreover, our existing internal links to the prefectures may be transferred to ICTR who have requested the equipment. Ourselves, HRFOR, and other UN Agencies would continue to use the system when necessary. The security of this equipment would be handled by ICTR and the Government of Rwanda.

vi) Security - Each agency is making its own security arrangements. We have formally requested the Government of Rwanda to provide security to all UN Agencies and to ourselves [including our equipment]. ICTR would, however, make its own special arrangements with the Government of Rwanda.

6. I am aware that the above mentioned facilities, ie: provision for aircraft, vehicle workshop, medical support, communications, security, etc. would require special financial support from FALD and field operations staff. This may not be forthcoming if the successor political office ceases to be part of peace-keeping operations. In this regard, I would recommend appropriate formulation for both Security Council and ACABQ in order to retain certain logistical support as recommended in paragraph 5. Please bear in mind that the Rwandan terrain is difficult for road transport, that airline connections to Nairobi and elsewhere are infrequent and unreliable, and that medical services are below minimal standards.

Radio UNAMIR

7. Recently, I have received all-round appreciation for Radio UNAMIR. The Tanzanian government has indicated that Radio UNAMIR broadcasts have a beneficial effect in the camps and that Radio UNAMIR should continue even if UNAMIR phases out. An independent agency operating from the camps in Zaire has sent a similar recommendation. The Rwandese Minister for Rehabilitation told me that his government would not only favour Radio UNAMIR continuing but would encourage a larger, regional role for a UN radio. Accordingly, I recommend that the Security Council may be encouraged to support Radio UNAMIR (whose name may be charged to Radio UN Rwanda) with adequate financing along the lines of my recommendations made in my code cable no. 475. I have already requested the Government of Rwanda for protection of our transmitters in Kirongi and Kibongo.

HRFOR

8. The Human Rights Field Office in Rwanda is facing financial difficulties which have been mentioned in Secretary-General's report. I know that its Chief, Mr. Ian Martin, has reluctantly come to the conclusion that unless secure financing is available, he would advise the High Commissioner to close the office. Particularly after UNAMIR's withdrawal from the field when

HRFOR was expected to play an even more significant role, this recommendation would come as a serious setback for UN's human rights effort in Rwanda. Accordingly, the Security Council may wish to consider providing a way out for HRFOR in securing a regular budget. I realize that there are inherent difficulties involved in this suggestion, as stated in Mr. Goulding's letter to High Commissioner Ayala Lasso but I feel that in UN's overall perspective of Rwanda, HRFOR's problems need to be underlined.

9. UNAMIR's closure ceremony has been scheduled for Friday 8th March afternoon. A closure message from the Secretary-General would be appreciated.

Best regards.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1996 MAR -5 P 10: 52

UNAMIR-63
1996 MAR -5 P 11: 14

P.1/5

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

Shaharyar M. Khan

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 5 MARCH 1996

NO.: MIR -532

NO. OF PAGES: 5

SUBJECT: Update on returnee figures for the month of February

1. An update of the figures of refugees who returned to Rwanda during the month of February is hereby provided, should it be required to brief orally the Security Council before the debate on the Secretary-General's report.

2. Please find attached a list of figures provided by UNHCR in Kigali. From 1st to 27th February, a total of 23,061 refugees had returned to Rwanda, of which 13,580 from Burundi, 7,606 from Zaire, 1,441 from Tanzania and 434 from Uganda. As these figures show, the administrative closure of some of the camps in the Goma region has not resulted in a massive influx of refugees. The situation in these camps continues to be stable.

3. On 26 February, the Government of Zaire was reshuffled. Mr. Malumba Mbangula, former Vice Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior, who was in charge of the operation of the closure of the refugee camps in Zaire, has left the Government. He has been replaced by Mr. Kamanda wa Kamanda, who was until then Vice Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is yet too early to evaluate whether this reshuffling will have consequences on the return of refugees from Zaire.

4. From 26 to 28 February, a visit to their home communes in Rwanda by some 20 refugees from refugee camps of the Goma region took place, so that they could report to their fellow refugees in the camps about security conditions in Rwanda. This was the first time such a visit was organized for refugees from camps of the Goma region. The visit has proceeded well.

5. Best regards.

UNHCR Kigali
February 1996

UNAMIR

			Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5	Day 6	Day 7	Day 8	Day 9	Day 10	Day 11	Day 12	Day 13	Day 14	Day 15
BDI	Old	Spo.	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	11	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	281	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	1	7	0	5	1	0	1	11	0	0	5	3	4	0	0
		Org.	1,688	2,788	0	0	0	48	0	415	0	0	0	34	205	101	2,172
	Total O/N		1,689	2,795	2	5	1	48	1	426	1	0	5	318	220	101	2,172
TAN	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	129	0	0	0	0	84	0	65	0	0	0	0	353	0
	Total O/N		0	133	0	0	1	0	86	0	65	0	0	1	2	353	0
UGA	Old	Spo.	30	33	23	22	15	1	36	15	18	5	7	15	5	19	6
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total O/N		30	33	23	22	15	1	36	15	18	5	7	15	5	19	6
ZRE	Old	Spo.	263	218	177	100	116	112	436	688	770	120	20	160	224	137	35
		Org.	23	16	0	0	0	3	3	11	16	0	0	0	0	16	0
	New	Spo.	3	2	3	0	2	2	0	1	8	0	0	1	0	8	6
		Org.	49	86	13	0	89	34	123	46	81	0	0	168	55	124	130
	Total O/N		338	322	193	100	207	151	562	746	875	120	20	329	279	285	171
OTH	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total OTH		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	Old	Spo.	293	253	202	122	132	113	474	703	789	125	27	176	242	156	41
		Org.	23	16	0	0	0	3	3	11	16	0	0	281	0	16	0
	New	Spo.	4	11	3	5	3	2	1	12	8	0	5	4	4	8	6
		Org.	1,737	3,003	13	0	89	82	207	461	146	0	0	202	260	578	2,302
	Total O/N		2,057	3,283	218	127	224	200	685	1,187	959	125	32	663	506	758	2,349
Total	Old	Spo.	297	264	205	127	135	115	475	715	797	125	32	180	246	164	47
		Org.	1,760	3,019	13	0	89	85	210	472	162	0	0	483	260	594	2,302
	New	Spo.	316	269	202	122	132	116	477	714	805	125	27	457	242	172	41
		Org.	1,741	3,014	16	5	92	84	208	473	154	0	5	206	264	586	2,308
	Total O/N		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Grand total			2,057	3,283	218	127	224	200	685	1,187	959	125	32	663	506	758	2,349

2/5
FEBRUARY 1996 DAILY RETURNEE STATISTICS BY COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM.

UNHCR Kigali February 1996			Day 16	Day 17	Day 18	Day 19	Day 20	Day 21	Day 22	Day 23	Day 24	Day 25	Day 26	Day 27	Day 28	Day 29	Total Month	
BDI	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	17	35	
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	281	
	New	Spo.	0	5	12	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	58
		Org.	579	194	0	166	3,511	639	336	39	0	0	0	42	0	249	13,206	
	Total O/N		579	199	12	166	3,511	640	336	39	0	4	0	42	0	268	13,580	
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TAN	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	2	14	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	39	
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	New	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	
		Org.	265	0	0	0	0	256	0	0	0	0	0	216	0	31	1,399	
	Total O/N		265	0	0	0	0	258	14	15	0	0	1	216	0	31	1441	
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UGA	Old	Spo.	25	28	14	39	36	15	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	434	
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	New	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Total O/N		25	28	14	39	36	15	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	434	
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ZRE	Old	Spo.	196	42	4	9	75	86	7	10	39	6	14	6	150	147	4,367	
		Org.	2	0	0	16	2	1	2	55	0	0	3	5	4	0	178	
	New	Spo.	0	3	3	6	0	4	10	13	4	1	115	40	9	3	247	
		Org.	233	0	0	302	25	435	364	82	110	0	1	78	93	93	2,814	
	Total O/N		431	45	7	333	102	526	383	160	153	7	133	129	256	243	7606	
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	61	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	61
OTH	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	New	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
	Total OTH		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOT	Old	Spo.	221	70	18	48	111	103	48	25	39	10	14	6	150	164	4,875	
		Org.	2	0	0	16	2	1	2	55	0	0	3	5	4	0	459	
	New	Spo.	0	8	15	6	0	5	10	13	4	1	116	40	9	5	308	
		Org.	1,077	194	0	468	3,536	1,330	700	121	110	0	1	336	93	373	17,419	
	Total O/N		1,300	272	33	538	3,649	1,439	760	214	153	11	134	387	256	542	23,061	
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	61	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	61
Total	Spo.		221	78	33	54	111	108	58	38	43	11	130	46	159	169	5,183	
	Org.		1,079	194	0	484	3,538	1,331	702	176	110	0	4	341	97	373	17,878	
	Old		223	70	18	64	113	104	50	80	39	10	17	11	154	164	5,334	
	New		1,077	202	15	474	3,536	1,335	710	134	114	1	117	376	102	378	17,727	
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	61	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	61	
Grand total			1,300	272	33	538	3,649	1,439	760	214	153	11	134	387	256	542	23,061	

4/5
FEBRUARY 1996 DAILY RETURNEE STATISTICS BY RWANDESE ENTRY POINTS.

UNAMIR

UNHCR Kigali February 1996			Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	Day 5	Day 6	Day 7	Day 8	Day 9	Day 10	Day 11	Day 12	Day 13	Day 14	Day 15
BYU	Old	Spo.	30	33	23	22	15	1	36	15	18	5	7	15	5	19	6
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total O/N		30	33	23	22	15	1	36	15	18	5	7	15	5	19	6
BUT	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	1	7	0	5	1	0	1	11	0	0	5	3	4	0	0
		Org.	986	884	0	0	0	48	0	407	0	0	0	0	186	101	2,002
Total O/N		987	891	0	5	1	48	1	418	0	0	5	3	190	101	2,002	
CYA	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Old	Spo.	17	0	2	0	116	0	13	0	1	14	0	0	11	6	17
		Org.	23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	281	0	10	0
	New	Spo.	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	1	7	0	0	0	0	8	4
		Org.	6	52	0	0	89	0	27	0	33	0	0	34	0	27	0
Total O/N		46	54	2	0	207	0	40	1	41	14	0	315	11	51	21	
GIS	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Old	Spo.	246	218	177	100	0	112	423	688	770	106	20	160	224	131	18
		Org.	0	16	0	0	0	3	3	11	16	0	0	0	0	8	0
	New	Spo.	3	0	3	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	2
		Org.	43	34	13	0	0	34	96	46	48	0	0	168	55	97	130
Total O/N		292	268	193	100	0	151	522	746	835	106	20	329	279	234	150	
KBG	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Old	Spo.	0	2	0	0	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	129	0	0	0	0	84	0	65	0	0	0	0	353	0
Total O/N		0	133	0	0	1	0	86	0	65	0	0	1	2	353	0	
KBY	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total O/N		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
SKI	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	702	1,904	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	19	0	170
Total O/N		702	1,904	0	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	19	0	170	
Total	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Old	Spo.	297	264	205	127	135	115	475	715	797	125	32	180	246	164	47
		Org.	1,760	3,019	13	0	89	85	210	472	162	0	0	483	260	594	2,302
	New	Spo.	316	269	202	122	132	116	477	714	805	125	27	457	242	172	41
		Org.	1,741	3,014	16	5	92	84	208	473	154	0	5	206	264	586	2,308
Grand total O/N			2,057	3,283	218	127	224	200	685	1,187	959	125	32	663	506	756	2,349

8/5
20-03
FEBRUARY 1996 DAILY RETURNEE STATISTICS BY RWANDESE ENTRY POINTS.

UNHCR Kigali February 1996			Day 16	Day 17	Day 18	Day 19	Day 20	Day 21	Day 22	Day 23	Day 24	Day 25	Day 26	Day 27	Day 28	Day 29	Total Month
BYU	Old	Spo.	25	28	14	39	36	15	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	434
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Total O/N		25	28	14	39	36	15	27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	434
BUT	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	0	5	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	55
		Org.	515	194	0	166	27	630	274	39	0	0	0	42	0	235	6,736
CYA	Total O/N		515	199	12	166	27	630	274	39	0	0	0	42	0	235	6,791
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	37	0	2	0	4	0	0	17	71	328
		Org.	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	330
	New	Spo.	0	0	2	0	0	1	10	9	0	0	0	37	2	2	87
Org.		176	0	0	54	24	39	235	33	110	0	0	15	0	39	993	
GIS	Total O/N		176	0	2	57	24	78	245	56	110	4	0	52	19	112	1,738
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Old	Spo.	196	42	4	9	75	49	7	8	39	6	14	6	133	93	4,074
		Org.	2	0	0	13	2	0	2	43	0	0	3	5	4	0	129
	New	Spo.	0	3	1	6	0	4	0	4	4	1	115	3	7	3	163
Org.		57	0	0	248	1	396	129	49	0	0	1	63	93	54	1,855	
KBG	Total O/N		255	45	5	276	78	449	138	104	43	7	133	77	237	150	6,221
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	61	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	61
	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	2	14	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	39
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3
Org.		265	0	0	0	0	256	0	0	0	0	0	216	0	31	1,399	
KBY	Total O/N		265	0	0	0	0	258	14	15	0	0	1	216	0	31	1,441
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Org.		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
SKI	Total O/N		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Old	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Org.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	New	Spo.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Org.		64	0	0	0	3,484	9	62	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	6,436	
Total	Total O/N		64	0	0	0	3,484	9	62	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	6,436
	Refouled		0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Spo.	221	78	33	54	111	108	58	38	43	11	130	46	159	169	5,183	
	Org.	1,079	194	0	484	3,538	1,331	702	176	110	0	4	341	97	373	17,878	
	Old	223	70	18	64	113	104	50	80	39	10	17	11	154	164	5,334	
Grand total O/N	New	1,077	202	15	474	3,536	1,335	710	134	114	1	117	376	102	378	17,727	
	Refouled	0	0	0	0	61	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	61	
	Grand total O/N		1,300	272	33	538	3,649	1,439	760	214	153	11	134	387	256	542	23,061



UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 061

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

1996 MAR -5 A 2:04

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/MEDILI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 5 MARCH 1996

NO.:

MIR

524

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: EQUIPMENT

✓
1996 MAR -5

UNAMIR
1996 MAR -5 A 2:17

1. Please refer to your code cable no. 602.
2. Re paragraph 2, we fully appreciate UNGA regulations assigning top priority to peace-keeping operations in the disposal of assets. We also fully understand that ICTR would be receiving the same priority [paragraph 3].
3. With regard to paragraph 5, your comments have been noted and I shall send you our plan later this week.
4. We have sent you all the information that you have requested regarding the finalisation of the lists for a) peace-keeping operations, b) UN Agencies and c) NGO's and local government. Our mandate ends in four days and the delay in finalising the list is weighing heavily on us. Moreover, in his report to the Security Council, the Secretary-General has committed himself on the equipment issue as follows:

"In paragraph 7 of its resolution 1029 (1995), the Security Council requested me to examine, in the context of existing United Nations regulations, the feasibility of transferring UNAMIR non-lethal equipment, as elements of UNAMIR withdrew, for use in Rwanda. In a letter dated 13 February 1996, the President

of the Council also asked me to exert flexibility in the disposition of UNAMIR equipment (S/1996/103). Accordingly, I will shortly submit recommendations to the General Assembly regarding UNAMIR equipment that, in the context of the liquidation process, can be released for use in Rwanda."

5. I would, therefore, strongly recommend finalisation of lists for approval by the Controller.

Best wishes.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 061

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

1996 MAR -5 A 2:04

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/MEDILL, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 5 MARCH 1996

NO.: MIR 524

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: EQUIPMENT

UNAMIR
1996 MAR -5 A 2:17

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CRN 061

PAGE 2 OF 2

of the Council also asked me to exert flexibility in the disposition of UNAMIR equipment (S/1996/103). Accordingly, I will shortly submit recommendations to the General Assembly regarding UNAMIR equipment that, in the context of the liquidation process, can be released for use in Rwanda."

5. I would, therefore, strongly recommend finalisation of lists for approval by the Controller.

Best wishes.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 060

OUTGOING CODE CABLE
MOST IMMEDIATE

UNAMIR
1996 MAR -5 A 2:04

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 5 MARCH 1996

NO.: MIR 523

Vu

NO. OF PAGES: 6

W

SUBJECT: LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF RWANDA

1. Attached is a letter from the Foreign Minister of Rwanda dated 1 March 1996 addressed to the Secretary General that was hand carried last night to my office. It is not clear whether the Minister has sent a similar letter to their Ambassador for transmittal to the Secretary General.

2. The new elements in this letter not contained in Mr. Dusaidi's non-paper which was handed over to Mr. Kouyate in Addis Ababa, have been bracketed by me and are as follows:

Page 2 Paragraph which begins "In order to coordinate"

Page 4 Last sentence in first paragraph under "D": "The UN Secretary General should continue to mobilize both human and financial resources for the Tribunal so that it can accomplish its task".

Page 5 Third paragraph which begins "The Government of Rwanda takes this opportunity".

3. The new paragraph on page 2 is of course the most relevant for the United Nations post UNAMIR involvement in Rwanda and coincides with views we had exchanged while I was in New York. I would assume that this document which reflects the Rwandese Government official position on the matter should be circulated to the Security Council as an official document.

Best regards.

UNAMIR
1996 MAR -5 A 2:16



UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

UNAMIR

1996 MAR -4 P 2:09

1996 MAR -4 P 2:09
OUTGOING CODE EABLE

CRN-059

P.1/13

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 4 March 1996

NO.:

MIR

517

NO. OF PAGES: 13

SUBJECT: Follow-up meeting on Bujumbura Plan of Action - February 29, 1996, Addis Ababa

AK
Vu closer
5-3-96
WS

1. I attended the above meeting which was co-chaired by OAU Secretary-General Dr. Salim A. Salim and Higher Commissioner for Refugees, Mme Ogata. Former President Julius Nyerere also attended the Conference. Assistant Secretary-General Lansana Kouyate represented the Secretary-General. Donor countries were represented by delegations led, mainly, at officials level, though the Belgian Minister for Cooperation was present. Rwanda was represented by the Minister for Rehabilitation Patrick Mazimpaka, Tanzania and Burundi by their respective Foreign Ministers, Zaire by their CDA (a cabinet reshuffle having taken place in Zaire immediately before the Conference). SRSGS from Burundi and Rwanda and as also Mr. Aldo Ajello, the European Special Envoy on the International Conference for the Great Lakes Region were also present. The main speeches were made by the Co-Chairmen, the Assistant Secretary-General Kouyate and the countries of origin and asylum. The final communiqué is attached.

2. I summarise below the salient features of the Conference:

- a) There was a marked improvement in the atmosphere between Rwanda and the asylum countries, notably Zaire. There was agreement across the board to take

effective steps to implement the Bujumbura Action Plan. These included cross-border visits by Rwandan Ministers into refugee camps, separating political elements in the camps from the ordinary folk by moving them into different camps, the need for transparency and fair treatment by Rwanda to returning refugees and strong follow-up measures which included a 10 member Steering Committee.

b) Rwanda argued that, in fact, over 1.2 million refugees had returned in 1994, though not through regular channels. The Rwandan Minister acknowledged the role of justice and stated that the national system would be revived within the next few months. [He admitted to me, privately, that Rwanda had lost a year because the previous Minister of Justice was not a good organizer and administrator].

c) Rwanda called for the separation of the intimidators from the ordinary people. Tanzania and Zaire also supported measures for separation and stated that they were in the process of doing so. Zaire called for donor assistance to carry out its obligations.

d) The Conference supported the concept of effective follow-up action. It was agreed that a 10 member Steering Committee would meet every 3 months to ensure implementation. The SRSG's in Burundi and Rwanda have been included in the Steering Committee.

e) Rwanda continued to oppose the concept of an International Conference, recording a reservation in the final communiqué. Its stated reason is that the Bujumbura Action Plan should first be implemented before an International Conference is scheduled. Rwanda's real opposition stems from fear of political pressure being brought to bear on it to negotiate with the opposition.

3. In my brief intervention, I endorsed the co-chair's view that a 'convergence of interest' existed for the return of refugees as also a political will to implement the Bujumbura Accords. It was now necessary for all parties concerned - the countries of asylum, origin and donors - to take simultaneous, co-ordinated and sustained action to develop momentum. A quick solution should not be conceived but the main effort should be to engender momentum. I then suggested focus and fine-tuning of the Action Plan on the following four

issues:

- a) Separation of political elements (who might not necessarily be criminals) to more distant camps. This should not be confused with re-location which was a separate and more expensive plan that could be reviewed later.
- b) Revival of the entire pyramid of the judiciary in Rwanda which included the Triage Commission, communal police, gendarmerie etc.
- c) The need to project positive results, in the camps. I argued that while negative news travelled quickly on its own, positive results of which there were numerous examples needed to be carefully and deliberately projected. I stated that this projection had not taken place. I suggested greater use of UN Radio and the neutralisation of "hate radios".
- d) I referred to the negative effect of militarised infiltration and sabotage from the camps that created tensions and a vicious circle of violence. I underlined Zaire, Tanzania and UNHCR's concern at this development which took place despite their efforts to control this activity.

3. Generally, the Conference was more concerned with Burundi than with Rwanda. At a lunch convened by Secretary-General of the OAU, President Nyerere offered his personal services in Burundi to assist OAU in improving the political situation. At the Conference itself, concern was expressed at developments in Burundi. Ambassador Kouyate and SRSG Faguy will no doubt be sending their assessments of the Conference related to Burundi. My personal impression is that President's Nyerere's initiative supported by OAU found general support with a few reservations. The Secretary-General's proposal for a reserve force, despite Burundi's opposition, found increasing favour and the concept of an International Conference was generally approved (except Rwanda) but seen as an event that should be well prepared and predicated on movement forward on the Bujumbura Action Plan.

Best regards.

C25-059 4/13
7/11RECOMMENDATIONS

The Second Meeting of the Implementation of the Plan
of Action of Bujumbura, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
on February 29th, 1996

ALL STAFFThe Committee,

Recalling the principles of the Bujumbura Plan of Action, most particularly those outlined under Section C, D and E, concerning the measures to be taken by respectively, the countries of origin, the countries of asylum and the international community,

Recalling the concerns reflected in the Communiqué of the First Meeting of the Follow-up Committee of the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region held on May 26, 1995 in Addis Ababa,

Having considered the progress report prepared by the OAU/UNHCR Secretariat on the Implementation of the Plan of Action of the Regional Conference of Bujumbura on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region,

Taking note of the statements made by the most affected countries in the Great Lakes Region, namely Burundi, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zaire on the progress achieved in the implementation of the Bujumbura Plan of Action,

Deeply concerned about the deterioration of the security situation in Burundi and its consequences on displacement of populations,

Conscious of the burden on asylum countries and the adverse effects of the presence of refugees on their environment, infrastructure and security of the local communities,

Noting with appreciation the efforts of the Members of the Follow-up Committee and the Joint OAU/UNHCR Secretariat in the implementation of the Bujumbura Conference Plan of Action, especially in the search for durable solutions to the humanitarian problems in the Great Lakes Region,

Taking note of the efforts undertaken by the Rwandese Government in addressing the issue of internally displaced persons as well as the success in implementing voluntary repatriation from Burundi,

Considering the obvious consensus that voluntary repatriation in conditions of safety and dignity remains the most viable solution,

Taking note of the positive role played by the Zairian camp security contingent and the Tanzanian police in cooperation with UNHCR in the improvement of the security condition in refugee camps,

Reaffirming the civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps.

CRN-059 5/13

2

8/11

A. COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN**Rwanda**

Calls on Rwanda to reinforce the confidence building measures to encourage and accelerate repatriation by adopting the following measures,

1. Intensify the mass information campaign through active and more regular contacts between Rwandese authorities at all levels and the refugees on one hand and the local population on the other. Urgent attention should be given to visits between Rwanda and Zaire,
2. Disseminate information on the rehabilitation of the judicial system, the categorization of culpability in crime of genocide, the arrest procedure and the functioning of the Commission de Triage (Screening Committee),
3. Address expeditiously and comprehensively the issue of property rights by :-
 - a) expediting the mobilization, disbursement of resources and allocation of land for the resettlement and reintegration of the old caseload returnees in Rwanda,
 - b) providing clear information and guidelines on the restitution of property to the new caseload of refugees,
4. Continue to collaborate with UNHCR and other concerned international organizations in the communes of return to ensure that monitoring activities receive the full cooperation and support of the local authorities,
5. Continue to contain security incidents and take appropriate measures in a transparent manner in order to correct the perception of refugees about the prevailing security situation in Rwanda,
6. Commends all parties to the various Tripartite Agreements with Rwanda for their efforts in making full use of this mechanism and encourages them to pursue this process,

Burundi

In view of the potential danger of the deteriorating political and security situation in Burundi,

7. Encourages the Government of Burundi in its effort to create confidence and the necessary security conditions for the return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

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8. Calls upon the International Community to continue providing assistance to the internally displaced persons and refugees from Burundi and commends countries from the region which continue to grant asylum to Burundi nationals in need of protection and security.
9. Calls upon the Government of Burundi to continue in its efforts to ensure the voluntary and accelerated repatriation of Rwandese refugees.
10. Further calls upon the Government of Burundi to continue its sensitization campaign in collaboration with UNHCR on repatriation and to address the problem of intimidators.
11. Requests the Burundi authorities to ensure the security of the refugees pending their repatriation and to implement at the appropriate time its decision on the relocation of the residual caseload.
12. Urges the Government of Burundi to ensure the safety of humanitarian personnel and operations.

B. COUNTRIES OF ASYLUM

Appeals to countries of asylum to continue their efforts in the promotion of voluntary repatriation by :-

13. Expediting the process of separation from the refugee camps of the intimidators and political activists who are obstructing the voluntary repatriation of refugees.
14. Strengthening the measures aimed at curbing commercial activities in the camps and reducing other economic activities of refugees which motivate them to remain in exile.
15. Cooperating fully with the International Tribunal for Rwanda and initiating steps in accordance with the Resolution of the Security Council to enact national laws to enable them to prosecute suspected perpetrators of genocide in their respective territories.
16. Reviewing periodically, together with UNHCR, the need for protection and assistance of refugees on their territories.
17. Providing full support to UNHCR in its mass information campaign to promote repatriation by informing and correcting prevailing perceptions of the refugees on the security situation in the country of origin.

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C. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

18. Expresses its appreciation for the role of the OAU Mission in Burundi (OMIB) and calls upon the international community to strengthen the OMIB's presence by providing additional resources,
19. Urges the international community to continue to assist the countries of asylum and meet the basic needs of refugees, especially by ensuring continuity in food supply,
20. Urges the international community to provide needed assistance to various agencies and organizations involved in the repatriation of refugees to Rwanda and to help Rwanda in its rehabilitation efforts and the reintegration of returnees,
21. Calls upon the international community to provide the needed resources for the functioning of the International Tribunal for Rwanda and to cooperate with it in tracking suspected perpetrators of genocide,
22. Requests the international community to expeditiously locate hate-radios and to take appropriate measures to neutralize them,
23. Urges the international community to participate actively in and to support the work of concerned countries in their efforts to separate intimidators and dismantle political structures in the camps which discourage repatriation,
24. Supports the coordination of the various political initiatives aimed at finding a comprehensive solution to the prevailing situation in Burundi,
25. Takes note of the on-going initiatives aimed at finding a comprehensive solution to the crisis in the region and supports the convening, as soon as possible, of an international conference on peace, security and development under the auspices of the United Nations and the OAU. 1/
26. Supports any initiatives aimed at restoring confidence in Burundi notably through the rehabilitation of the judicial system, education and the return of the internally displaced persons and calls upon the international community to approve the comprehensive plan adopted by the Government of Burundi,

1 NB:

The Rwandan delegation expressed its reservation regarding the convening of the International Conference on Peace, Stability and Development under the auspices of United Nations and OAU to which it does not wish to be associated with.

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27. Supports the initiatives of donor countries to assist countries of asylum on bilateral basis to cope with the adverse impact of large numbers of refugees on the environment, infrastructure and local communities and urges them to continue funding such activities.
28. Having considered the progress report on the UNDP/UNHCR initiative in the Great Lakes Region, approves the short term strategy for assistance to countries of asylum and calls upon the donor community to honour its financial commitments as soon as possible; furthermore, it endorses the establishment by UNDP, in close liaison with the host countries, of a coordination and information mechanism for its implementation and reiterates the importance of convening a Round Table at some stage.
29. Requests that the bilateral and multilateral assistance to the refugee affected areas should be given wide publicity to inform and educate the general public on international solidarity, the burden sharing with the host countries and the coordination mechanism.

D. FOLLOW-UP MECHANISM

30. Having reviewed the present Follow-up Mechanism of the Bujumbura Conference Plan of Action recommends :-
 1. The setting up of a Steering Committee composed of ten Members with equal distribution between affected and donor countries, namely Burundi, Rwanda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zaïre, the United States of America, the Representative of the European Union, the Representative of the Secretary-General in Burundi, the Representative of the Secretary General in Rwanda, the OAU and UNHCR. The competence of this Steering Committee, will be to monitor and evaluate on a regular basis the implementation of the Bujumbura Plan of Action and report to the Follow-up Committee,
 2. The Steering Committee will be alternatively chaired by the Secretary General of the OAU and the High Commissioner for Refugees and will meet every three months,
 3. The setting up of sub-committees of the Steering Committee at national levels in the countries of the region to facilitate follow-up action in the implementation of the Plan of Action,
 4. The strengthening of the OAU/UNHCR Secretariat by designating focal points in both Addis Ababa and Geneva to ensure close interaction and better communication between the two institutions.

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RECOMMANDATIONS

Deuxième Réunion pour la Mise en oeuvre du Plan d'Action
de Bujumbura, tenue à Addis-Abeba, Ethiopie,
le 29 février 1996

Le Comité.

Rappelant les principes du Plan d'Action de Bujumbura, plus particulièrement ceux reflétés dans les Sections C, D, et E relatifs aux mesures qui doivent être prises par les pays d'origine, les pays d'asile et la communauté internationale respectivement,

Rappelant les préoccupations exprimées dans le Communiqué de la première réunion du Comité de Suivi de la Conférence Régionale sur l' Assistance aux réfugiés, Rapatriés et Personnes déplacées dans la Région des Grands Lacs tenue le 26 mai 1995 à Addis-Abeba,

Ayant examiné le rapport d'évaluation élaboré par le Secrétariat OUA/HCR sur la mise en oeuvre du Plan d'Action de la Conférence Régionale de Bujumbura sur l'Assistance aux Réfugiés, Rapatriés et Personnes déplacées dans la région des Grands Lacs,

Prenant acte des déclarations des pays les plus touchés dans la Région des Grands Lacs à savoir le Burundi, le Rwanda, la Tanzanie et le Zaïre sur les progrès réalisés dans la mise en oeuvre du Plan d'Action de Bujumbura,

Profondément préoccupé par la détérioration de la situation sécuritaire au Burundi et de ses conséquences sur les populations déplacées,

Conscient de la lourde charge que supportent les pays d'asile et des conséquences résultant de la présence des réfugiés sur l'environnement, l'infrastructure et la sécurité des communautés locales.

Notant avec appréciation les efforts déployés par les membres du Comité de Suivi et du Secrétariat conjoint OUA/HCR dans la mise en oeuvre du Plan d'Action de la conférence de Bujumbura, en particulier dans la recherche de solutions durables aux problèmes humanitaires dans la Région des Grands Lacs,

Prenant note des efforts déployés par le gouvernement rwandais dans le traitement du problème des personnes déplacées ainsi que du succès réalisé dans la mise en oeuvre du rapatriement volontaire à partir du Burundi,

Considérant le consensus évident selon lequel le rapatriement librement consenti dans des conditions de sécurité et de dignité demeure la solution la plus viable,

Prenant note du rôle positif joué par le contingent zaïrois pour la sécurité dans les camps et par la police tanzanienne en coopération avec le HCR dans l'amélioration des conditions de sécurité dans les camps de réfugiés,

Réaffirmant le caractère civil et humanitaire des camps de réfugiés,

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Demande au Gouvernement Rwandais de renforcer les mesures de restauration de confiance en vue d'encourager et d'accélérer le processus de rapatriement en adoptant les mesures ci-après:

1. Dans le cadre de la Campagne d'Information de Masse, intensifier la campagne de sensibilisation de masse à travers des contacts plus actifs et réguliers entre les autorités rwandaises à tous les niveaux et les réfugiés d'une part et les autorités rwandaises, à tous les niveaux et la population locale d'autre part. Une attention urgente doit être accordée aux visites entre le Rwanda et le Zaïre,
2. Diffuser l'information sur la réhabilitation du système judiciaire, la catégorisation des crimes liés au génocide, la procédure d'arrestation et le fonctionnement de la Commission de Triage,
3. Traiter rapidement et globalement la question des droits de propriété par:
 - a) l'accélération de la mobilisation et du décaissement des ressources et de l'attribution des terres pour l'installation et la réintégration des anciens réfugiés au Rwanda,
 - b) la fourniture d'information et de directives détaillées sur la restitution des biens aux nouveaux réfugiés,
4. Continuer à collaborer avec le HCR et les autres organisations internationales concernées dans les communes de retour pour s'assurer que les activités de suivi des rapatriés, sont l'objet d'une coopération et d'un appui entiers des autorités locales,
5. Continuer à contrôler les incidents de sécurité et assurer la transparence des mesures prises afin de corriger l'image que se font les réfugiés de la situation sécuritaire au Rwanda,
6. Louer les efforts déployés par toutes les parties aux différents accords tripartites dans la mise en oeuvre de ce mécanisme et les encourage à poursuivre ce processus,

Burundi

Vu le danger potentiel de la détérioration de la situation politique et sécuritaire au Burundi,

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7. Encourage le gouvernement burundais dans ses efforts visant à créer la confiance et les conditions de sécurité nécessaires pour le retour des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées.
8. Lance un appel à la communauté internationale pour qu'elle poursuive son assistance aux personnes déplacées, aux réfugiés et aux demandeurs d'asile burundais et loue les efforts des pays de la région qui continuent de donner asile aux nationaux burundais en besoin de protection et de sécurité,
9. Lance un appel au gouvernement du Burundi de poursuivre ses efforts pour le rapatriement volontaire et accéléré des réfugiés rwandais,
10. Lance en outre un appel au gouvernement du Burundi pour continuer, en collaboration avec le HCR, sa campagne de sensibilisation sur le rapatriement des réfugiés et le traitement du problème des intimidateurs.
11. Demande aux autorités burundaises de garantir la sécurité des réfugiés en attendant leur rapatriement et de mettre en oeuvre, le moment venu, la décision relative au transfert des cas résiduels,
12. Exhorte le gouvernement du Burundi à assurer la sécurité du personnel et des opérations humanitaires,

B. PAYS D'ASILE

Lance un appel aux pays d'asile pour poursuivre leurs efforts dans la promotion du rapatriement volontaire par:

13. Une accélération du processus d'isolement des intimidateurs et activistes politiques qui entravent le rapatriement volontaire des réfugiés,
14. Un renforcement des mesures visant à réduire les activités commerciales dans les camps et à limiter les autres activités économiques des réfugiés qui les encouragent à rester en exil,
15. Une pleine coopération avec le Tribunal International pour le Rwanda et l'adoption, conformément à la résolution pertinente du Conseil de Sécurité, d'une législation nationale leur permettant de poursuivre les auteurs présumés du génocide sur leurs territoires respectifs,
16. Un examen périodique, en collaboration avec le HCR, du besoin de protection et d'assistance des réfugiés sur leurs territoires,
17. Un soutien entier au HCR dans sa campagne d'information de masse visant à promouvoir le rapatriement par la sensibilisation et la correction de l'image que les réfugiés se font de la situation de sécurité dans le pays d'origine.

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C. COMMUNAUTÉ INTERNATIONALE

18. Exprime son appréciation pour le rôle de la mission de l'OUA au Burundi (MIOB) et lance un appel à la communauté internationale pour le renforcement de la présence de la MIOB par la fourniture de ressources supplémentaires.
19. Exhorte la communauté internationale à continuer d'assister les pays d'asile et à faire face aux besoins essentiels des réfugiés en assurant notamment la continuité en matière d'approvisionnement en vivres,
20. Exhorte en outre la communauté internationale à fournir l'assistance aux agences et organisations participant au rapatriement des réfugiés au Rwanda et à aider le Rwanda dans ses efforts de réhabilitation et d'intégration des rapatriés,
21. Lance un appel à la communauté internationale pour fournir les ressources nécessaires au fonctionnement du Tribunal International pour le Rwanda et coopérer avec lui dans la poursuite des auteurs présumés du génocide,
22. Exhorte la communauté internationale à localiser rapidement les stations de radio de la "Haine" et à prendre les mesures nécessaires afin de les rendre inopérantes,
23. Exhorte la communauté internationale à participer activement et à soutenir les pays concernés dans leurs efforts pour neutraliser les intimidateurs et mettre fin aux structures politiques dans les camps dont le but est de décourager le rapatriement.
24. Soutient la coordination des différentes initiatives politiques visant à trouver une solution à la situation prévalant au Burundi,
25. Prend note des initiatives en cours visant à trouver une solution globale à la crise dans la région et donne son appui à la convocation, le plus tôt possible, d'une conférence internationale sur la paix, la sécurité et le développement sous les auspices des Nations Unies et de l'OUA. 1/
26. Soutient toute initiative visant le retour à la confiance au Burundi notamment par la réhabilitation du système judiciaire, l'éducation et le retour des personnes déplacées et exhorte la communauté internationale à approuver le plan global d'insertion adopté par le gouvernement du Burundi,

1/ NB: La délégation du Rwanda a émis des réserves quant à la tenue d'une conférence internationale à laquelle elle ne voudrait pas être associée.

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27. Apporte son soutien aux initiatives des pays donateurs visant à assister les pays d'asile, sur une base bilatérale, à faire face aux incidences négatives de la présence des réfugiés sur l'environnement, l'infrastructure et les communautés locales et les exhorte à poursuivre le financement de telles activités.
28. Ayant examiné le rapport d'évaluation sur l'initiative du PNUD/HCR dans la région des Grands Lacs, approuve la stratégie à court terme sur l'assistance aux pays d'asile et exhorte la communauté internationale à honorer le plus tôt possible ses engagements; il appuie, par ailleurs, la mise en place, par le PNUD, en liaison étroite avec les pays hôtes, d'un mécanisme de coordination et d'information pour sa mise en oeuvre, et réitère le besoin de convoquer une Table Ronde sur l'assistance aux pays d'asile,
29. Demande que l'assistance bilatérale et multilatérale aux zones d'accueil des réfugiés fasse l'objet d'une ample publicité afin d'informer et de sensibiliser l'opinion publique sur la solidarité internationale, le partage du fardeau avec le pays hôte et le mécanisme de coordination.

D. MECANISME DE SUIVI

30. Ayant examiné le présent Mécanisme de Suivi du Plan d'Action de la Conférence de Bujumbura, recommande:
 1. La mise en place d'un comité permanent, composé de dix membres du Comité de Suivi (avec parité entre les pays affectés et les pays donateurs, notamment le Burundi, le Rwanda, la Tanzanie et le Zaïre, le Représentant de l'Union Européenne, le Représentant du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies au Rwanda, le Représentant du Secrétaire général des Nations Unies au Burundi, l'OUA et le HCR. La compétence de ce Comité permanent sera de suivre et d'évaluer régulièrement la mise en oeuvre du Plan d'Action de Bujumbura et de faire rapport au Comité de Suivi,
 2. Ce Comité sera présidé alternativement par le Secrétaire Général de l'OUA et le Haut Commissaire des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés et se réunira tous les trois mois,
 3. La constitution de sous comités du Comité Permanent au niveau de chaque pays de la région pour faciliter le suivi de la mise en oeuvre du Plan d'Action,
 4. Le renforcement du Secrétariat OUA/HCR en désignant des points focaux à Addis-Abeba et à Genève afin d'assurer une étroite interaction et une meilleure communication entre les deux institutions.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

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1996 MAR -4 P 2:44
OUTGOING CODE CABLE
UNAMIR
1996 MAR -4 P 2:44

CHN-058 1/7

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN/FAREED, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar Khan

DATE: 4 March 1996

NO.: MIR - 516

NO. OF PAGES: 7

SUBJECT: UNAMIR - Post 8 March - development in Addis Ababa

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1. I have separately reported my assessment of the Addis Ababa Conference on the Bujumbura Action Plan. In this cable, I shall refer to developments, outside the Conference, related to Rwanda and the post March 8 syndrome.

Meeting with Nyerere

2. Former President Nyerere was on my flight from Kigali to Addis Ababa on 28 February. He asked me to sit next to him and to up-date him on Rwanda's attitude towards UNAMIR. I recalled my meeting with him in December during which President Nyerere had told me that, after long discussion, he had persuaded Rwandan leadership to agree to UNAMIR's continuation. I then referred to Nyerere's meeting on December 17 with the Secretary-General who had expressed his scepticism of Rwanda's "change of heart". I briefed the Tanzanian former President of the formula that Rwanda's friends and I had discussed with Rwandan leaders aiming, basically, to provide a face-saving way out for Rwanda, should it indeed, as Nyerere had indicated, have had a change of heart. I concluded my briefing to Nyerere by stating that, the Rwandan leadership had steadfastly maintained that it would not contemplate a UN military presence after March 8. I told

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Nyerere that Rwanda's position had been confirmed in Kagame's meeting with Baroness Chalker in London on 27 February.

3. Nyerere was troubled and surprised at my briefing. He told me that, aware of Secretary-General's scepticism about Rwanda's assertions, he had returned to Rwanda in mid-January. In Kigali, the Vice President had repeated his earlier affirmation that Rwanda would allow UNAMIR to continue in the following words: "Mwalimu, I (Kagame) am not personally convinced by your reasoning but since you say so, we have agreed to the continuation of UNAMIR. We have discussed the issue in the National Executive and they have also been persuaded to accept your advice". Nyerere was, obviously, chagrined at being 'taken for a ride' and proposed to take no further steps to persuade the Rwandans to change their minds. Both he and the OAU Secretary-General Dr. Salim considered that Rwanda was acting unwisely.

4. While in Addis Ababa, I met Dusaidi. He confirmed Rwanda's firm stand that UNAMIR should phase out on March 8. He added that Rwanda would accept a civilian political office as a successor to UNAMIR. Dusaidi then gave me a paper (copy attached) which called on the UN to address eight subjects on a priority basis. He had earlier given the paper to Ambassador Kouyate. These eight subjects are almost exactly the issues that the Secretary-General's report [paragraph 3] refers to as 'the unfinished agenda' in Rwanda. Dusaidi's paper does not address the three options given in the Secretary-General's Report but vaguely calls on the UN to address the 8 priority targets. Rwanda expects the UN's political office, with a mandate from the Security Council and possibly a Trust Fund under its belt, to drive the UN Agencies towards achieving the objectives stated in the paper.

5. Patrick Mazimpaka, Minister for Rehabilitation who holds an important position the RPF, confirmed to me on the flight back to Kigali from Addis Ababa that his Government would welcome a civilian political office but would not agree to armed UN troops staying on in Rwanda. His reasoning was that while UN formed troops remained in Rwanda, potential investors considered that the country was still in crisis. Investment in Rwanda would flow only after Rwanda demonstrated normalcy, without UN troops! However abstruse this reasoning, it seems that the die is cast and the Government has decided not to accept the option that would enable the military to stay on with a different mandate and name.

6. In my opinion, Kagame has been pressured into reversing his earlier commitment to Nyerere. I also believe that the postponement of the Tunis Summit is due to Rwanda wishing to avoid, as at Cairo, being pressurised by all parties into allowing UNAMIR or a clone with a different nameclature to stay on. Certainly, Bizimungu would face acute embarrassment when facing former President Nyerere.

Best wishes.

chr-058 4/7

THE GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA'S PROPOSAL FOR INCREASED UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE TO NATIONAL RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION OF THE COUNTRY.

In the 1994 Genocide over one Million people were brutally murdered. Each village in Rwanda was affected with about 4 million people internally displaced and 2.5 million refugees lured into exile by the perpetrators of genocide.

The tragedy has left a big problem of orphans, widows, and other helpless people who survived death but have hardly any means of survival. The National wealth, including money in Banks, was looted and both the physical and economic infrastructures were completely destroyed.

The government of Rwanda has stopped genocide and restored relative peace and security, but it is still confronted with the enormous task of rebuilding a nation shattered by genocide. Given the fact that Rwanda lacks adequate resources, the government appeals to the international community to mobilize both bilaterally and multilaterally, and particularly through the United Nations system, for the recovery and rehabilitation of post-genocide Rwanda.

With the end of UNAMIR's peacekeeping mandate on 8 March 1996, there will still be need for meeting specific post-genocide peace building requirements and for undertaking rehabilitation and reconstruction of the country for which UN agencies should increase their activities in Rwanda through special programmes and greater collaboration with the Rwandan government. Furthermore, upon UNAMIR's departure UN agencies will need to strengthen their collaboration in order to benefit from common services on a cost-effective basis, so that the bulk of their assistance can benefit Rwanda directly.

Appropriate UN Agencies, in addition to those already present in Rwanda such as UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR etc. should concentrate their common initiatives in the following areas of activities:-

1. Repatriation of refugees.
2. Resettlement of returnees & Internally displaced .
3. Support for survivors of genocide.
4. Justice & Human Rights.
5. Improvement of detention centres.
6. Institutional capacity building.
7. Infrastructure rehabilitation.
8. National Reconciliation.

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A trust fund for rehabilitation and reconstruction should be pursued as a mechanism for the donor countries to contribute resources to enable the government and UN agencies to undertake these recovery and rehabilitation activities.

A. Repatriation of Refugees:-

Repatriating all Rwandese nationals would promote the process of national reconciliation. The Government is committed to the unconditional return of all Rwandan nationals to the Country. Bilateral and multilateral agreements have been reached between the government of Rwanda and the governments of neighbouring countries on the repatriation mechanism.

The government has translated its commitment to the return of refugees through the following actions:-

1. Advocacy for national reconciliation.
2. Restoration of security within our borders.
3. Discouraging revenge through enforcement of law and order.
4. Promoting a culture of transparency by, for example, allowing human rights monitors throughout the country.
5. Enforcement of laws governing Property Rights.
6. Resettlement and reintegration of returnees both in the administration, army and in other social structures.

These measures have already led to the return of 2,272,000 in only one year. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has played an instrumental role in the conclusion of repatriation agreements with neighbouring countries and should continue to be the lead agency during the repatriation process. Resources should be made available so that the UNHCR could continue to coordinate and cooperate closely on that matter with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the World Food Programme (WFP).

B. Resettlement of Returnees and Internally Displaced Persons.

During the Thematic Consultation on Refugees held in Kigali in November 1995, the government of Rwanda presented to the International Community a plan of action for the repatriation, resettlement and social reinsertion of refugees and internally displaced persons.

This plan of action indicates priority actions which are estimated to cost \$ 131 million over the next 3 years to resettle and offer support for the socio-economic reintegration of all refugees coming back to the country and internally displaced persons.

The Ministry of Rehabilitation and Social Integration (MINIREISO) will continue to require support from the UNDP to strengthen its capacities to support, coordinate and monitor the implementation of the plan of action at the national and Prefectoral level. The UNDP, through the various specialised UN agencies, such as the UN center for Human Settlement (HABITAT) and the UN office for project services, should continue to support resettlement and social reintegration in, respectively, urban areas and rural areas. The UNHCR will be expected to facilitate first stage resettlement through the provision of reinstallation Kits and shelter material.

C. Support for the Survivors of Genocide.

The genocide of 1994 left hundreds of thousands of people, such as handicapped, widows, orphans or unaccompanied children, elderly, etc. in Rwanda in deplorable living conditions. These vulnerable groups could be assisted by the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Women Fund (UNIFEM), UN Centre for Human Settlement (HABITAT) and World Food Programme (WFP), who will develop, in close collaboration with the government as well as international and local Non-governmental organizations, targeted assistance projects and programmes to reduce the vulnerability of these groups.

D. HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUSTICE

1. International Tribunal for Rwanda

The Government of Rwanda recognizes the complementarity of the mandate of the International Tribunal for Rwanda to its own action to bring to justice the Rwandese presume guilty of acts of genocide and will continue to support its work in the country.

2. Monitoring of Human Rights Situation

The Government of Rwanda recognize the importance of the monitoring of the human rights situation in the country as a factor contributing to the establishment of a climate of confidence. The UN Human Rights Operation in Rwanda will thus continue to monitor the human rights situation in the country, carry out investigations on acts of genocide for the International Tribunal for Rwanda and promote post-conflict confidence building.

3. Rehabilitation of the Judiciary and Improvement of Detention Conditions

The rehabilitation of the judiciary is one of the main priority of the Government of Rwanda and it will continue to need the assistance of the international community in order

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to support its proper functioning over the years to come. The United Nations Development Programme and its executing agency in that sector the UN Department for Development Services and Management Support (UNDDSMS) will be requested to continue to provide assistance to strengthen national capacity and support the coordination of external assistance in that sector.

Following the tragic events of 1994 during which thousands of criminals participated to the genocide of up to 1 million persons, large number of Rwandese are currently in custody. Detention conditions in Rwanda have been largely recognized as being below human standards and should be radically improved. The United Nations Department for Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) will be requested to continue to bring to the attention of the International Community the need for their support to improve the detention conditions. The United Nations Development Programme, in collaboration with the Government, will continue the implementation of the rehabilitation work.

E. HUMAN SECURITY

1. Internal Security

The Government of Rwanda has already started to reorganize and strengthen its Gendarmerie and Communal Police and has expressed its intention to proceed to the demobilization of part of its army. The United Nations Development Programme will continue to provide support to the strengthening of Rwandese Gendarmerie and Communal Police, particularly in the areas of training and non lethal equipment, and the World Bank will support the preparation and implementation, in collaboration with other agencies such as the International Organization for Migration and UNICEF, of a comprehensive demobilization and social reinsertion programme.

D. TRUST FUND FOR REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OF RWANDA

It is suggested that financing of the above mentioned activities be provided by bilateral and multilateral donors through the expanded Trust Fund for rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda. All funds contributed will be managed by a committee composed of representatives of the Rwandese Government, bilateral and multilateral donors and United Nations agencies. UNDP will assure the secretariat of the committee and will report to donors on the use of the funds.

CRN 057 OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
1996 FEB 29 P 6:49

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: KHAN/DE SOUZA, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 29 FEBRUARY 1996

NO.: MIR 504

NO. OF PAGES: 9

SUBJECT: Cabinet Reshuffle in Zaire

1. Please find attached the report prepared by Cheikh-Tidiane Gaye, Director of UNAMIR's Liaison Office in Kinshasa, on the recent Cabinet reshuffle in Zaire.
2. Best regards.

100-443887-147

UNAMIR
1996 FEB 29 P 7 13

Reçu le 29 FEV. 1996

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
LIAISON OFFICE
KINSHASA-ZAIRE



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA
BUREAU DE LIAISON
KINSHASA-ZAIRE

UNAMIR - MINUAR

307533118 FAX NO. 010/00/007.

MIR NO. _____

MISC NO. _____

RECEIVED

29 FEB 1996

OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

TO: M. Shaharyar Khan Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général KIGALI, RWANDA FAX NO.: (1) (212) 963 3090	FROM: Cheikh-Tidiane Gaye Directeur du Bureau de Liaison de la MINUAR KINSHASA, ZAIRE. baf
ATTN.:	DATE: 28 février 1996
CC:	PHONE: 243 88 45 325 FAX NO: (212) 3769466
CC:	SECTION:
OBJET: NOUVEAU GOUVERNEMENT ZAIROIS.	

1. Le Premier Ministre Léon Kengo wa Dondo a publié lundi soir 26 février 1996, la liste du nouveau gouvernement zaïrois. (Voir en annexe la liste des ministres).
2. La première constatation porte sur l'absence de l'opposition radicale dirigée par M. Etienne Tshisekedi wa Mulumba, Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS) qui se considère toujours comme étant le Premier ministre légitime désigné à l'issue de la Conférence nationale par le parlement de transition.
3. A défaut de la présence de M. Tshisekedi dans la nouvelle équipe ou de son représentant, on avait spéculé sur la participation éventuelle de M. Kibassa Maliba, Président de l'Union Sacré de l'Opposition Radicale et Alliés (USOR) et membre du Directoir national de l'UDPS, son ancien allié qui depuis plusieurs mois a repris les contacts avec le Président Mobutu.
4. La nomination d'un partisan de M. Gizenga, Parti Lumumbiste (PALU), qui se considère comme l'héritier spirituel de Patrice Lumumba, ne passe pas non plus inaperçue. Monsieur G.G. Ginday Gifuza, nouveau ministre des PTT était le porte-parole de M. Gizenga.

5. Par ailleurs, parmi les vice-ministres, on relève le nom de M. Luzanga Shamandevu (agriculture) militant du (PALU) de M. Gizenga.
6. Les organisations féminines notent la faible représentation des femmes dans les nouveau gouvernement. Selon ces organisations, 30 % des postes, soit 15 portefeuilles, auraient dû revenir aux femmes qui se retrouvent avec seulement 2 postes dans le nouveau gouvernement. Toutes deux appartiennent au même parti Union des Fédéralistes Républicains Indépendants (UFERI). L'une d'elle Mme Wivine N'landu Kavidi, ministre de la coopération internationale, est l'épouse de M. Nguz-A-Karl-I-Bond, ancien premier ministre, actuellement en Afrique du Sud où il se soigne.
7. Deux ministères traditionnellement considérés comme techniques, ont acquis, pour des raisons conjoncturelles, une dimension politique.
8. Le premier est le ministère du portefeuille chargé de gérer les actions et la participation de l'Etat dans les sociétés mixtes.
9. Une lutte sourde fut engagée entre les partis politiques composant la majorité gouvernementale pour désigner le titulaire de ce ministère; lequel aurait l'occasion de dégager des fonds importants pour le financement de la campagne électorale de son parti lors des prochaines élections législatives et présidentielles.
10. C'est M. Mboso Nkodia Mpuanga du Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) et proche collaborateur du Président Mobutu qui a été choisi. Les observateurs pensent que sa carrière politique et administrative découle uniquement de sa fidélité et loyauté au Président Mobutu.
11. Le second ministère technique ayant acquis une dimension politique est celui de la Jeunesse, des sports et loisirs.
12. La victoire des foot-balleurs sud africains les bafana-bafana lors de la coupe d'Afrique des nations (CAN 96) et la gloire qu'en a tirée le Président Nelson Mandela ont convaincu les zaïrois et leur Président de la gloire que le sport en général et le foot-ball en particulier peuvent apporter à un pays et à son président.

13. La bataille fut également âpre entre les partis de la majorité pour l'obtention de ce département.
14. Encore une fois, le Président de la République dans son rôle d'arbitre s'est fait attribuer ce ministère. M. Kisombe Kiaku Mwisi (MPR) est également un proche du Président.
15. Les pronostics sont d'avis que le Président Mobutu, impressionné par le grand succès remporté par le Président Nelson Mandela et ses bafana-bafana va donner de grands moyens au nouveau ministre pour lancer sur l'orbite de la prochaine coupe du monde de foot-ball l'équipe nationale du Zaïre appelée les léopards et son Président.
16. Vingt trois (23) personnalités quittent le gouvernement: 2 vice-premiers ministres, 13 ministres et 6 vice-ministres.
17. La coalition présidentielle (MPR) et ses alliés de l'opposition modérée, Union des Démocrates Républicains (UDR) se partagent plus de 40 postes sur les 46 que compte le nouveau gouvernement.
18. Le départ de M. Pay-Pay du ministère des finances et celui de M. Malumba Mbangula du ministère de l'intérieur sont bien accueillis et font l'objet de nombreux commentaires à Kinshasa.
19. M. Pay-Pay, ancien gouverneur de la Banque Centrale, considéré aussi riche sinon plus que le Président Mobutu est très impopulaire au Zaïre.
20. La majorité de la classe politique (mouvance présidentielle et opposition confondues) contemplait avec inquiétude la perspective de voir M. Malumba, en sa qualité de ministre de l'intérieur, organiser les prochaines élections présidentielles et législatives.
21. Par contre l'arrivée au ministère de l'intérieur de Me Gerard Kamanda wa Kamanda est bien accueillie par une bonne partie de la classe politique et de l'opinion.
22. Me Kamanda wa Kamanda est certainement l'un des vainqueurs de ce remaniement. Depuis des mois des bruits ont couru sur son différend avec le Président de la République. D'aucuns ont longtemps spéculé sur son départ définitif du gouvernement.

23. En conservant son rang de Vice-premier ministre, il prend le ministère de l'intérieur et de la décentralisation. Ce poste est sans nul doute le plus important en cette période pré-électorale.
24. Me Kamanda wa Kamanda aura donc la lourde responsabilité d'organiser les futures élections. Au préalable, il devra mettre en place une nouvelle administration territoriale en nommant les gouverneurs des régions, les commissaires des zones etc...
25. Me Kamanda wa Kamanda que beaucoup de zairois et d'observateurs étrangers voient comme possible remplaçant du Président Mobutu, dispose d'atouts non négligeables: sa formation de juriste, son expérience à l'intérieur du pays, et le soutien dont il bénéficie sur le plan international.
26. Par contre, la nomination de M. Kititwa Tumansi au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères fut moins bien accueillie. Le nouveau chef de la diplomatie zaïroise n'a pas que des amis dans les milieux politiques de Kinshasa. Certains vont jusqu'à prédire que le départ de Me Kamanda wa Kamanda des Affaires Etrangères sera ressenti à court terme au niveau des chancelleries et des organisations internationales.
27. Personne ici n'envisage de changement dans la politique étrangère du pays. Elle sera toujours conçue par le Président avec la collaboration du Premier Ministre dans certains domaines (par exemple la question des réfugiés). L'exécution de la politique étrangère reviendra comme par le passé, en partie à la présidence, en partie à la primature et en partie au ministère des affaires étrangères.
28. Le maintien du grand amiral Mavua Mudima, un proche du Président au ministère de la défense nationale et sécurité, prouve que le Président tient à contrôler directement l'armée et toutes les forces de sécurité.
29. La nomination des hommes très proches de M. Kengo wa Dondo aux ministères des finances, de l'économie, du plan, du commerce, du budget, travaux publics etc... est interprétée comme étant une volonté du Premier Ministre de contrôler les secteurs économiques et financiers en vue de remettre en marche l'économie zaïroise.

30. Au terme de longs mois d'attente pendant lesquels le pays était pratiquement paralysé dans tous les secteurs clefs de l'économie, le Premier Ministre, avec la bénédiction du Président, se succède à lui même.
31. La configuration du gouvernement fait apparaître que le Président consolide sa position dans le domaine politique et celui de la défense et sécurité.
32. Tandis que le Premier ministre, avec l'appui des bailleurs de fonds, consolide son contrôle sur les structures économique-financières, avec certainement un droit de regard du Président Mobutu.
33. Pour redémarrer l'économie zaïroise, les bailleurs de fonds (FMI, Banque mondiale, Union européenne, USA, Canada et autres) ont prescrit la privatisation des secteurs clefs de l'économie en commençant par les transports.
34. En ce qui concerne les chemins de fer, le gouvernement Kengo a déjà privatisé deux tronçons sur les trois que compte Siza-Rail.
35. Le gouvernement a engagé des discussions pour la privatisation de l'office nationale des transports (ONATRA) qui gère le transport maritime et ferroviaire de Boma-Matadi-Kinshasa.
36. Egalement, des discussions ont lieu avec la SABENA pour privatiser les compagnies nationales et les voies aériennes.
37. Le nouveau gouvernement appelé Kengo IV par certains, s'est fixé avec l'appui des bailleurs de fonds deux objectifs :
 - La remise en marche de l'économie en privatisant ses secteurs clefs.
 - La préparation et la tenue des élections libres et transparentes avant fin juillet 1997.
38. La privatisation des secteurs clefs de l'économie a commencé dans les transports (ferroviaire, maritime et aérien). Les télécommunications vont suivre avec la poste, le télécel et télécom.

39. En ce qui concerne les élections, les deux familles politiques (mouvance présidentielle et opposition radicale) ont adopté le règlement intérieur de la Commission nationale des élections qui est composée de quarante-quatre membres. Chaque groupe politique a déjà désigné ses 22 membres. Des négociations sont en cours pour la désignation du Président de la Commission.
40. Cependant trois questions préalables auxquelles il faut des réponses satisfaisantes pourraient être posées:
41. Le gouvernement saura-t-il instaurer la paix, la sécurité et la stabilité dans le pays, et pourra-t-il trouver les voies et moyens pour réconcilier les principaux acteurs de la vie politique zaïroise pour soutenir son programme qui s'articule sur la relance économique et la tenue des élections présidentielles et législatives avant fin juillet 1997 ?
42. L'immense majorité de la population - civils et militaires confondus - vivant, dans un dénuement total, aura-t-elle encore la patience d'attendre les résultats positifs du programme gouvernemental?
43. Pour le moment, l'Etat ne dispose d'aucun moyen pour payer régulièrement les salaires des militaires et des fonctionnaires, pour assurer l'éducation et pour résoudre les problèmes de santé. Sommes-nous à l'abri d'une soudaine flambée de pillages effectués par les militaires? La population de Kinshasa garde un triste souvenir des deux pillages précédents.
44. Les syndicats reprochent souvent au gouvernement de ne pas faire du social l'une de ses préoccupations. Seuls, disent-ils, les problèmes macro-économiques et ceux de la monnaie focalisent l'attention des 12 ou 13 gouvernements qui se sont succédés depuis le début de la transition.
45. En tenant compte d'un côté du dosage hétéroclite: politique, économique, ethnique et régional, et d'un autre côté en examinant le profil des ministres dont certains suscitent beaucoup d'espoir alors que d'autres sont très controversés, il serait prématuré de répondre dans quelque sens que ce soit aux questions posées aux paragraphes 41, 42 et 43.

CRW 57/8/9

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46. Pourtant la réalisation satisfaisante des deux objectifs du paragraphe 37 est la condition sine qua non posée par les bailleurs de fonds avant d'apporter leurs concours financiers et techniques au gouvernement.

Haute considération.

La liste du nouveau gouvernement rendue publique lundi soir

Vice-premiers ministres.

Intérieur et Décentralisation: Me Gérard Kamanda wa Kamanda (FCN/URD), Bandundu.

Défense nationale et Sécurité du Territoire: Grand Amiral Mavua Mudima FPC, Bas-Zaïre.

Affaires étrangères: Kitiwa Tumansi (PDSC/URD), Chrétien, Sud-Kivu.

Mines: Me Mutombo Bakafwa Nsenda (MPR). Elevé au rang de vice-premier, Kasai Oriental Renforce l'axe Mukamba Kadiata Nzemba-Mobutu.

Ministres.

Coopération internationale: Wivine N'landu Kavidu (UFERI). Voulait garder le portefeuille de l'Agriculture élevé au rang de vice-primature. Devra se contenter de la Coopération, secteur nouveau pour elle.

Réformes institutionnelles, Justice et Garde des sceaux: Joseph N'Singa Udjuu (UCKJ, Allié URD), Bandundu.

Information et Presse: Boguo Makeli (MPR). Le ministère avait besoin d'un sang neuf et d'un homme plus ouvert. Ancien de l'UNESCO, avait été dans le passé vice-ministre à l'Enseignement supérieur.

Plan: Mambu ma Khenzu (UDI). Proche d'Umba di-Lutete, ancien directeur de cabinet de Kengo wa Dondo alors Premier Commissaire d'État, plusieurs fois

ministre, il avait souvent été ignoré dans le partage. Son heure est enfin venue. Région Bas-Zaïre.

Finances: Kiakwama kia Kiziki (PDSC/URD). Très proche de Kengo.

Budget: Idambituo Bakaato (MPR). Proche de Mandungu Région Haut-Zaïre.

Agriculture: Mme Tshikung Naweji, UFERI Kyungu, Région du Katanga.

Economie nationale, industrie, artisanat et PME: Marco Banguli (UDI). Il vient du secteur privé, a souffert des pillages mais n'a jamais pu remonter son entreprise Fanair. A laissé très mauvaise impression lors d'un éphémère passage à la DGC. Avait toujours revendiqué le poste de maire de la ville comme "ressortissant teke-humbu."

Portefeuille: Mboso Nkodia Mpuanga (MPR). Région du Bandundu/Kwango. Proche de Banza.

Energie: Docteur Mpetshi Ilonga.

Travaux publics, Urbanisme et Habitat: Thambiwe Mwamba (UDI). Président du parti du Premier ministre, son départ du ministère des Transports et Communications apparaît comme une sanction après les graves accidents qu'a connus le secteur. Région Kivu/Maniema.

Transports et Communication:

tions: Charles Mwando Nsimba (UNADEF/URD). Région du Shaba.

Commerce extérieur: Kasongo Muindinge.

Affaires foncières: Kayumba Bin Amani, FPC.

Enseignement Supérieur, Universitaire et Recherche scientifique: Moshobekwa Kalimba wa Katana (RSF/CROP, Allié). Région du Kivu.

Enseignement primaire, secondaire et professionnel: Sekimonyo wa Magango (DSN). Région du Kivu.

Santé et famille: Professeur Kasongo Numbi, membre du HICR-PT. URD.

Affaires sociales: Lumbu Lumbu (président du ROPE, Regroupement de l'opposition de l'Est). Très proche de Kibassa mais désavoué dès sa nomination.

Travail et Prévoyance sociale: Ombe Pene Djunga, FPN/URD, Kasai.

Fonction publique: Venant Tshipasa Vangi (DCF Nyamwisi).

PTT: Gérard Godefroid Ginday Gifuza (PALU), ancien professeur à l'Université de Libreville, secrétaire général du PALU. Porte-parole de Gizenga, Région de Bandundu-Gungu.

Environnement: Tshibanda Ntunga Mulondo.

Jeunesse, Sports et Loisirs: Kisombe Kiaku Mwisi (MPR),

proche de Banza.

Culture et Arts: Epee Gambwa, FPC, transfuge du PDSC, ancien ministre. Région Haut-Zaïre.

Vice-ministres.

Défense nationale: Boboy Nyebacka.

Intérieur: Bayombo Mbokoliabwe.

Relations extérieures: Lokondo Yoka.

Coopération: Léopold Bandobash Nadeto.

Justice: Kiambale Kia Muhandiro.

Information et presse: Oscar Lugendo Lula.

Plan: Masudi Mungilima (MPR).

Finances: Ekumbaki Ombata.

Budget: Gervais Kabamba wa Kabamba (COACA), ancien ministre des Cultures et Arts du gouvernement Tshisekedi issu de la CNS. Région Kasai Occidentale.

Mines: Onyangandji Dimandja.

Energie: Ntumba Omer.

Economie nationale: Mananga Ma Pholo, MPR. Région Bas-Zaïre.

Portefeuille: Mpako Tokime.

Travaux publics: Matabisi Iyauleke, MPR. Région Bandundu.

Transports et Communication: Ngandu Diemo.

ESURS: Makinda Watawata

EPSP: Masiala ma Solo.

Agriculture: Luzanga Shamandevu (PALU).

Quittent le gouvernement

Vice-premiers ministres.

Malumba Mbangula (Intérieur). Mozagba Ngbuka (Coopération).

Ministres.

Masegabio Nzanu (Information). **Pay-Pay Bolenge** (Finances). **Mokenzombo** (Budget). **Katanga Mukumadi** (Economie). **Kisanga Kabongelo** (Portefeuille). **Bofassa Djema** (Energie). **Jibi Ngoy** (Commerce Extérieur). **Mangwanda Gifudu** (Affaires Foncières). **Soki Fwani Eyenga** (Santé). **Rubana Mirindi** (Affaires sociales). **Modeste Bahati Lukwebo** (Fonction publique). **Mwamba Nduba** (PTT). **Kisimba Ngoy** (Environnement). **Assea Mindre** (Sports). **Faustin Lukonzola** (Culture).

Vice-ministres.

Me Kikadi (Justice). **Claude Boba Kiyeka Mwana Muteba** (Plan). **Mayo Mambeki** (Mines). **Lionga Akafomo** (TPAT). **Weloli Kanda Nzale** (ESURS). **Willy Mishit** (Agriculture).

CRN 57 19/9

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UNAMIR - MINUAR

P/15

UNAMIR

1996 FEB 28 P 12:41

CAN 056

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: KHAN/DE SOUZA, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 28 FEBRUARY 1996

NO.: MIR 486

NO. OF PAGES: 5

SUBJECT: Situation in the Refugee Camps in Zaire

UNAMIR
1996 FEB 28 P 12:49

1. Please find attached for your information two reports prepared by Cheikh Tidiane Gaye, Director of UNAMIR's Liaison Office in Kinshasa, on recent developments concerning the refugee camps in Zaire.

2. Best regards.

Reçu le 28 FEV. 1996

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA
LIAISON OFFICE
KINSHASA-ZAIRE



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KINSHASA-ZAIRE

UNAMIR - MINUAR

RECEIVED
27 FEB 1996
OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

CUTGOING FAX NO. 017736/OFF.

MIR NO. _____

MISC NO. _____

TO: M. Shaharyar Khan Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général KIGALI, RWANDA	FROM: Cheikh-Tidiane Gaye Directeur du Bureau de Liaison de la MINUAR KINSHASA, ZAIRE.
FAX NO.: (1) (212) 963 3090	
ATTN.:	DATE: 27 février 1996
CC:	PHONE: 243 68 45 325 FAX NO: (212) 3769466
CC:	SECTION:
OBJET: SITUATION DANS LES CAMPS ENCERCLÉS.	

1. De jour en jour, la situation dans les camps des réfugiés situés au Kivu redevient normale.
2. Les camps encerclés, Kibumba (190.000 réfugiés), Nyangesi-Mulwa (26.000 réfugiés) sont chacun gardés par une soixantaine de soldats zaïrois au lieu de 250, chiffre annoncé officiellement.
3. Le rapatriement volontaire reste dérisoire à Kibumba, tandis que dans le camp de Nyangesi, la tendance est à la baisse, à peine une centaine par jour.
4. Une des conséquences de la restriction du déplacement des réfugiés, beaucoup de chantiers et d'entreprises industrielles souffrent de pénurie de la main d'oeuvre. Par ailleurs, les travaux champêtres des fermes environnantes ne sont pas réalisés; retard dû à l'absence de travailleurs saisonniers que sont les réfugiés hutu.
5. Cependant, avec le relâchement de l'encerclement et la diminution progressive des soldats zaïrois, les coupeurs de bois reprennent à la tombée de la nuit, le chemin des forêts et s'adonnent à leurs activités.

CPW 016 P2/5

- 2 -

6. Les organisations internationales humanitaires poursuivent sans relache la distribution de nourriture, médicaments etc...
7. A ce jour, une situation normale et stable se consolide de plus en plus dans les camps du Kivu.

Haute considération.

(O)

CPW056 P4/1-

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UNAMIR MINUAR

OUTGOING FAX NO. 017/96/OFF.

MIR NO. _____

MISC NO. _____

RECEIVED

24 FEB 1996

OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

TO: M. Shaharyar Khan Representant Special du Secretaire General KIGALI, RWANDA FAX NO.: 963 3090	FROM: Cheikh-Tidiane Gaye Directeur du Bureau de Liaison de la MINUAR KINSHASA, ZAIRE. <i>bf</i>
ATTN.:	DATE: 23 février 1996
CC:	PHONE: 243 88 45 325 FAX NO: (212) 3769466
CC:	SECTION:
OR.IET: SITUATION ACTUELLE DANS LA REGION DU KIVU.	

1. Suite à votre fax no 907 reçu le 22 février 1996, voici en bref le point de la situation actuelle dans la région du Kivu tel que rapporté par différents observateurs à Goma, Bukavu et Kinshasa.
2. Le camp de Kibumba situé près de Goma et celui de Nyangezi près de Bukavu sont toujours encerclés par les militaires zaïrois (250 militaires autour du camp de Kibumba).
3. Depuis le bouclage des camps, l'annonce des mesures administratives, la restriction des déplacements et la campagne de sensibilisation pour un rapatriement spontané, le nombre de réfugiés candidats pour un retour volontaire est toujours négligeable.
4. Toutefois à Nyangezi, on a noté une faible tendance à la hausse. Hier 22 février 1996, on a enregistré 205 rapatriés volontaires. On prévoit à peu près le même chiffre pour aujourd'hui 23 février 1996.
5. Les réfugiés ne peuvent plus quitter les camps pour aller travailler dans les chantiers à Goma, Bukavu ou dans les fermes environnantes.

(5)

.../...

Reçu le 26 FEV. 1996

6. Les activités des organisations humanitaires (HCR, PAM, ONG etc...) continuent comme par le passé avec la distribution de nourriture et des médicaments à l'intérieur des camps encerclés.
7. En conclusion, on peut dire que pour le moment un statu quo est observé par les autorités zaïroises, les réfugiés et les organisations humanitaires.
8. Cette stagnation totale va-t-elle évoluer vers un refoulement des réfugiés suite à leur refus de rentrer volontairement?
9. Quoi qu'il en soit, on est loin de l'application de la politique qui consiste à affamer les réfugiés dans le but de les asphyxier économiquement pour les obliger à retourner au Rwanda.
10. Depuis quelques jours, en dépit des déclarations alarmantes diffusées par la presse internationale, on constate une baisse de la tension.
11. Les journalistes qui ont tant contribué à médiatiser les événements de Goma ont quitté la ville.

Haute considération.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 055

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
1996 FEB 28 A 9:47

P/K

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 27 FEBRUARY 1996

NO.: MIR 485

UNAMIR
1996 FEB 28 A 9:55
Shaharyar Khan

NO. OF PAGES: 4

SUBJECT: Milobs Conference

1. I attended a Milobs Conference at Kibungo on 21 February 1996. These conferences are held periodically to assess developments at grass roots level and I find them invaluable. The Milobs sectors have been revised in keeping with their reduced strength as shown in the attached chart.

2. A summary of the main issues is attached. As before, the pattern is not uniform. For example, security in Sector 1 [Byumba/Kibungo] is good and improving. In sector 2 [Kibuye/Gitarama] it is grim and deteriorating. I am sure you will find the summary to be of interest.

Best wishes.

Summary of Milobs Conference held at Kibungo on 21 February 1996Armed Infiltration and Sabotage in sector bordering Zaire and Tanzania

There were clear signs of improved training, better equipment and increased local support for armed infiltrators crossing from Zairean territory into Rwanda. Until about 3 months ago, the success rate was around 50%. Now it is rated at 80%. RPA patrols are being ambushed and hit frequently. When Zairean forces recently surrounded Kibumba camp, it was noticeable that armed raids stopped, clearly establishing a link between the camps and armed infiltration into Rwanda. The high success rate by the infiltration has caused increased oppression and tension in the border area. There are no signs of similar cross border activity from Tanzania.

Security

The security picture was not uniform. In Sector 1, there was a generally improving climate with prefects and bourgmestres making special efforts to return houses/lands to returning refugees. There was no harassment by RPA. In Sector 1, normalcy prevailed though there were two areas - Akagera Park and Bugesera - which were "out of bounds" and where some deaths were reported to have taken place. Sector 2, as last time, was particularly grim. Milobs reported harassment of the Hutu population by undisciplined boy soldiers. Much of the population lived in fear, hiding in fields at night, and generally regarded as suspected collaborators. Generally, Hutu enlightened intelligentsia was being targeted, often by professional accusers. In Sectors 4 and 5, headed by competent and enlightened prefects, a brave effort at reconciliation and fair treatment was being made. It was not always successful at the lower levels but, generally, the security climate was satisfactory despite sabotage and armed raids. Interpreters working with UNAMIR had received regular threats from anonymous sources.

Refugee Return

A large number of refugees from Burundi were coming through and being efficiently treated and settled by the government and UN Agencies. A special effort by the government to treat the returnees humanely, especially around Butare-Gikongoro, was noticeable. Houses were being returned and only a small number were being detained as genocide suspects. Refugees from Tanzania had also begun returning after Prime Minister's visit to the camps. Milobs in all border sectors felt that if they were permitted to visit the refugee camps, it would help produce confidence-building inducement to the refugees. The UNHCR and Agencies were prepared, on the ground, to receive 10000-15000 refugees per day. However, there was no sign of movement from Zairean camps despite pressure by Zairean forces.

Mass Killings

I deliberately enquired from the Milobs if, as had been suggested by the former Prime Minister and by some others, massive retributational killings could be carried out behind the backs of Milobs and Human Rights Field Officers. The unanimous view was that a few killings could and did take place, but any killing that went into double figures could not possibly be kept hidden from Milobs and from Human Rights Field Officers.

Situation in Refugees Camps

Milobs reported that Tanzanian Government had not, so far, been able to separate political elements from the ordinary folk in the camp. RDR influence, therefore, remained predominant in the camps. In Zaire, the RDR had persuaded refugees to offer peaceful resistance to Zairean efforts to pressurise them into returning.

UNAMIR withdrawal

Generally the majority population was fearful of the consequences of UNAMIR's withdrawal and felt that UNAMIR's presence was an insurance against oppression and subjugation. The Tutsi, except for the extremists, also increasingly recognized the value of UNAMIR and were not opposed to its continuation. Generally, relations with RPA and local administration had improved because the recognition that UN was prepared to leave had reduced hostility and underlined the advantages of cooperation.

Prisons and Cachots

There had been a marginal improvement in the prisons particularly in the Eastern Sector [Kibungo, Nsinda]. Gitarama prison was also less crowded with increased space. Kibuye was appalling as were the cachots which were now on the verge of stifling point. Prisons and cachots were part of a terrible humanitarian tragedy. Neither the judicial system nor the triage commissions were working.

Reconciliation

Despite efforts from the top, there was no real movement towards reconciliation. Generally, the government appeared to be losing the battle to win over hearts and minds to the majority. It was noticeable that unlike in the early days, government leadership did not address large crowds in stadiums but restricted themselves to addressing civil servants and military officers during their tours of the country-side. Sector 3 confirmed that the deployment of the Gako regiment [former FRGF now RPA] had helped calm fears among the Hutus.

05-Feb-96
06:30 AM

DEPLOYMENT OF MILOBS AS ON 05 FEB 96

SER	COUNTRY	TOTAL	FHQ	MHQ	SECT-1 KIGALI/KIBUNGO	SECT-2 GITARAMA	SECT-3 BUTARE	SECT-4 CYANGUGU	SECT-5 GISENYI	REMARKS
		STR								
1	AUSTRIA	1	1							
2	BANGLADESH	1		1						
3	CANADA	0								
4	CONGO	7			2		2		3	
5	GHANA	24	2	5	3	3	3	4	4	
6	GUINEA	15			3	2	3	3	4	
7	GUINEA-BISSAU	1					1			
8	INDIA	22	4	2	4	4	2	2	4	1 X NBO
9	MALAWI	8			3			2	3	
10	NIGERIA	15	3	2	3	3	2	2		
11	RUSSIA	12		1	2		2	3	4	
12	SENEGAL	2	1	1						
13	URUGUAY	17	1		3	4	2	4	3	
14	ZAMBIA	8	1	1	2	2		2		1 X NBO
15	ZIMBABWE	13	1	2	1	3		3	3	
16	TOTAL	146	14	15	26	21	17	25	28	

CRN 055 P/L



UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

1996 FEB 27 A 11: 25

1996 FEB 27 A 11: 52

CHW-054 B/z

TO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 26 February 1996

NO.:

MIR -475

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: Future of UNAMIR Radio station

Vu
AK
Phase file
28-2-96
WS

1. Reference your code cable number 518 dated 23 February 1996.
2. The present locations and security arrangement of UNAMIR Radio stations are given below:

Location

Security Arrangements

a) Mount Ribero
(Kigali)

Security provided by
RPA elements

b) Mount Karongi
(near Kibuye)

Under direct protection
of a Platoon of UNAMIR troops

c) Kibungo

Co-located with MILOB
Sector HQ

3. In the event of Radio UNAMIR continuing to broadcast after 8 March, the following options are open:

a) that the RPA be requested to provide security for the transmitters;

CRN-054 b2/r

- b) that the transmitters be co-located where UN Agency offices are operating;

4. I would strongly recommend option 3 (a), as the Government has stated that the state can ensure the security of UN, its Agencies and their equipment. We should take them at their word.

5. In the event of Radio transmission ceasing, the question of the disposal of the transmitters may be decided in consultation with the British Government who initially financed them.

Best wishes.



CRN 051

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR

1996 FEB 23 P 4:21

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN/SEVAN/MEDILI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 23 FEBRUARY 1996

NO.: MIR 455

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE TRIBUNAL

UNAMIR
1996 FEB 23 P 28

1. Please refer to your code cable no. 483.

2. It is evident from the correspondence between Chief Prosecutor, Judge Goldstone and the UN Security Coordinator Mr. Benon Sevan that, despite sincere efforts on all sides, the processing of the case for the Tribunal's independent security guards which has to pass through a maze of UN channels will not have matured in time for the security guards to take over from UNAMIR on March 8th. A practical solution, therefore, needs to be found.

3. One of the delaying hurdles has been the Tribunal Budget. It appears that end of March is the earliest that the budget can be passed and only then can the formal request for the recruitment of guards take effect. [The question of how many guards are required should, in my opinion, be left for the Tribunal to decide on the advice of its Chief Security Officer]. Therefore, the earliest that the security guards can be expected to take over in Rwanda would be end April/beginning May. Thus, an approximately 3 months gap would need to be bridged from March 8 before the Tribunal's security guards take over. I state below possible, practical solutions that may be considered:

i) One of the possible solutions would be to find a short cut to the budgetary process. An arrangement between the Chairman ACABQ, Tribunal and the administration could be made so that, instead of waiting for the budget to be formally passed at the end of March, the Tribunal could utilise its Trust Fund in anticipation of the budget being passed and begin the recruiting process now. We could then aim to have enough security guards in place in Kigali by mid-April to prevent a closure of the Deputy Prosecutor's office. For the period of 8th March - mid-April - a 6-week period in which UNAMIR forces would remain in Rwanda but would not be performing mandated tasks, we could request the Government of Rwanda to permit the Ghana Coy to continue its function. Minor adjustments in Ghana Coy's departure schedule would be necessary and the required approval obtained from their government.

ii) A second option as suggested by Judge Goldstone, is to seek the Rwandan Government's permission for the Ghana Coy to be allowed to continue performing its guard duties for the 3-month bridging period. The Unit could be called the "Tribunal Protection Unit". This seems to be the most practical solution. Of course, the Government of Rwanda would have to agree to the proposal. The difficulty in this option appears to be at Headquarters and perhaps with the Ghana Government.

iii) A third option is to request an African government (eg Tanzania) to perform the 3-month bridging function through a civilian police (not military) contingent. Tanzania has a well-trained police force and could perhaps be persuaded to deploy it on an urgent basis. Even a combined Ugandan/Tanzanian security force acting as an OAU unit could be conceived.

iv) A fourth option would be for a private security firm, though not Rwandan, to be hired to cover the three month period. This firm could even be headed by 8-10 security officers who could be recruited immediately from UN personnel to be in position by 8th March [2 to 3 of them are available here currently with UNAMIR].

4. You may wish to send a copy of this cable to the Tribunal so that Judge Goldstone and Mr. Adede can review the options I have proposed. Once a decision has been made, I would seek the GOR's approval on behalf of the UN and the Tribunal.

Best wishes.

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CRN 050

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

UNAMIR
1996 FEB 23 P 1:15

P1/4

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar Khan

DATE: 23 February 1996

NO.: MIR 451

NO. OF PAGES: 4

SUBJECT: Equipment for Rwanda

UNAMIR
1996 FEB 23 P 1:31

1. Please refer to your code cable No.366 dated 7 February 1996.
2. I attach a draft response from the Secretary-General to the Rwandese Foreign Minister's letter.

Best wishes.

CAN 050
F/4

(0)
DRAFT

My Dear Foreign Minister,

Thank you for your letter dated 13 August 1995.

Regarding the issue of United Nations equipment, I regret not having replied to your letter earlier but I was aware of the fact that the Security Council was seized of the issue and had since referred to it in its Resolution S/1029(1995). Before responding to your request, I felt it was desirable to await the Security Council's guidance.

Allow me, at the outset, to state that the United Nations fully understand the considerations on which you have based your request. The devastation caused in Rwanda by the genocide in 1994, the fact that the country was left bereft of equipment and the need for Rwanda to have access to such equipment in order to accelerate the pace of national reconstruction and the resettlement of refugees is fully recognized and appreciated. Therefore, in consonance with the relevant paragraph of the Security Council Resolution, the United Nations Secretariat shall endeavour to respond positively to your request. The relevant paragraph states as follows:

"Requests the Secretary-General to examine, in the context of existing United Nations regulations, the feasibility of transferring UNAMIR non-lethal equipment, as elements of UNAMIR withdraw, for use in Rwanda"

You will see that in giving broad direction on the issue, the Security Council has indicated the following conditionalities relating to the disposal of the equipment: a) that it should be non-lethal, b) that the disposal should be according to United Nations regulations, which are approved by the General Assembly and c) that the equipment should be 'for use in Rwanda'.

CANOTO
P3/16

The General Assembly of the United Nations has approved certain guidelines for the disposal of assets following liquidation of peace-keeping operations. These guidelines lay down the following priorities that the Secretariat is obliged to follow:

- a) All equipment that meets the requirements of other United Nations operations and that is cost-effective to move shall be redeployed to such operations or held in reserve for use by future operations;
- b) Other equipment shall be transferred to United Nations organizations, as well as to national and international non-governmental organizations already operating in [mission area] or in the process of establishing a presence there, upon request and against appropriate credit to the Special Account for the United Nations [Assistance Mission to Rwanda];
- c) Any remaining material that cannot be moved shall be sold commercially on an 'as is, where is' basis in accordance with standard United Nations procedures;
- d) Assets or installations that cannot be dismantled, including airfield installations, shall be [donated] to the Government of [Rwanda] "upon authorization of the General Assembly".

These guidelines have been communicated to your government in writing, by my Special Representative during the discussions on UNAMIR's mandate in November/December 1995. We are, at present, engaged in examining how best, within the parameters of these guidelines, we are able to implement the Security Council's directive. You will appreciate that the rationale of the United Nations General Assembly's resolutions is that the disposal of the equipment which has been financed by Member States should be fully accounted for so that member states can, in turn, satisfy their respective constituencies.

Keeping in mind United Nations General Assembly Resolutions and Security Council's directives, the recommendations for the disposal of equipment are being actively examined by the Departments of Administration and Management and of Peacekeeping Operations. I assure you that in accordance with the Security Council's guidance, we shall endeavour to leave as much material for use in Rwanda as possible. I hope to be able to convey our preliminary conclusions to you within the next few days.

CPW050
P4/6

(03

Meanwhile, some equipment that is contingent-owned or is urgently required by other peace-keeping operations needs to be transported out of Rwanda. I hope that your Government will ensure that there will be no delays or difficulties in transporting this equipment which does not, in any case, fall within the purview of equipment that is to be left behind in Rwanda.

Please accept, Mr. Foreign Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Boutros-Boutros Ghali



UNAMIR

UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

1996 FEB 22 P 5:48

1996 FEB 22 P 5:57
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CRN-049 1/2

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING , UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 22 February 1996

NO.: MIR - 440

NO. OF PAGES: 2

SUBJECT: Meeting with President Bizimungu on 21 February 1996

1. I called on President Bizimungu on 21 February for a one hour meeting which I had requested to brief him on the outcome of my discussion in New York relating to United Nation's possible role after March 8.

2. I briefed President Bizimungu on the various Options, focusing in detail on B(i) - the civilian successor presence for UNAMIR and B(ii) the enlarged technical support option. I made it clear that while B(i) would present no problems of acceptance, B(ii) was not a proposal but the reflection of some ideas of some member states based on Rwanda's own expectations of United Nations. I added that B(ii) aimed to bridge the ideal with the practical but could not be guaranteed success even if Rwanda accepted it in principle. I referred to President Nyerere's discussion with the Secretary-General and the subsequent denial by the Rwandan Permanent Representative of any brief to convey Rwanda's acceptance of UNAMIR's continued presence. [The Rwanda Permanent Representative had later informed me that while Rwanda would not itself initiate the proposal, it would favourably consider such a proposal if made by a third party]. I also briefed President Bizimungu on the equipment issue.

2. I summarise below President Bizimungu's response:

CD-049 2/2

a) A reply would be given after consulting the Government.

b) He confirmed the conversation with former President Nyerere rationalising the apparent Rwandese turnabout on UNAMIR by stating that Rwanda was against a United Nation's military presence signifying a continuing crisis in the country but would favourably consider a smaller presence that was helpful to Rwanda.

c) The President enquired about the number of technicians (engineers etc) that formed part of UNAMIR's current component. This loaded question gave me the opening to make it clear to the President that if it is decided to retain the present UNAMIR military component to perform infrastructure - restoration tasks, possibly with a changed name or mandate, no reduction of its strength could be contemplated.

3. My impression remains that although Rwandan leadership may have conveyed to Nyerere the message that the Government would agree to a UNAMIR military continuation, the RPA would raise insurmountable conditionalities of detail. The picture would emerge more clearly on Vice-President Kagame's return from Ghana next Tuesday 27 February.

Best wishes.



UNAMIR
1996 FEB 22 P 2: 29
UNAMIR
1996 FEB 22 P 2: 33
OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CHD-048 1/2

TO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: ANNABI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 21 February 1996

NO.: MIR - 435

NO. OF PAGES: TWO

SUBJECT: Disposal of arms, ammunition and other equipment held by UNAMIR

1. Please refer to your code cable no.447 of 15 February 1996.
2. It is confirmed that all items that qualify under the category of lethal equipment whether UN owned or contingent owned would not be handed over to the Rwandan Government. We have made this abundantly clear to the Rwandan Government.
3. The problem that we face is related to the destruction of lethal equipment as the RPA has categorically denied permission to destroy any lethal equipment whose ownership is in doubt.
4. After the Belgian and French Government's intercessions in which they had asked for their weapons which were in UNAMIR storage to be destroyed, we proceeded with the destruction of some ammunition which was stopped by the RPA on the grounds that the weapons and ammunition belonged to the Former Government Forces and not to UN peace-keeping contingents (UNAMIR) and should therefore be handed over to them.

5. We have asked the Belgian and French Governments to provide us with lists of equipment left behind for UNAMIR peace-keeping. While the Belgians have agreed to provide us a list of what was left behind by them, the French have no such list available, as they were neither a part of UNAMIR nor did they hand over anything to us. The decision to grant ownership to all weapons recovered in the mission area having French markings as being French, may have been premature on our part. After further analysis, it is now apparent that the French Government supported the Former Rwandan Government Forces (FRGF) with Military hardware. In all likelihood, the weapons recovered by UNAMIR troops were left behind by the FRGF when they fled the country after the civil war. Moreover, weapon systems like the 30 mm Anti Aircraft Guns, recovered in the mission area are not part of any contingents inventory, and definitely were not brought into the host country for Peace Keeping Operations. It can be reasoned that all such French equipment was part of the former Government's weaponry and that its ownership should pass to the successor government. This is a delicate and sensitive issue and needs to be examined and negotiated between all concerned parties.

6. For the present we are not destroying the arms nor handing over any weapons or ammunition to the Government of Rwanda. If the Belgian Government provides a list of equipment which was left for UNAMIR's use, we would recommend shipping back these arms to Belgium rather than destroying them here. As regards the French arms, the question of ownership needs to be clarified from a legal point of view and in consultation with both the French and Rwandan Governments.

Best regards.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

*Vu
Pleasant
25.2.96
w/c*

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 21 February 1996

NO.: MIR _____

NO. OF PAGES: 3

SUBJECT: Overall situation in Rwanda

1. Since my return from leave and consultations in New York, I have noted the following developments in Rwanda.

Security & Normalcy

2. As before, the security situation in Rwanda is calm. Only in the belt adjacent to the border with Zaire is there tension created by armed infiltration and sabotage. Kigali appears the safest capital in the region with no curfews, hijackings or armed robberies that were so common last year. Private business, commerce, transport, utilities and education improve visibly by the week and FAO reports that agriculture is back to 82% of pre-war conditions. Our milobs and human rights observers report that, in general, returning refugees are being fairly treated by the administration. Efforts are made by administration to return houses and land to them.

3. On the negative side, the prison conditions with 66000 prisoners remains appalling due to sheer overcrowding. There are no reports, however, of maltreatment. In fact, there is discipline and order in the prisons. ICRC and Agencies continue efforts to expand prison space.

Some responsible Hutu officials have shown signs of restlessness and the Rwandan Chief Prosecutor has informed the Human Rights Field Office (HRFOR) that he fears arrest. HRFOR have taken appropriate steps to protect his legitimate rights although neither they nor any other UN Agency can provide asylum or assistance in leaving the country. Sabotage and armed infiltration in the Zaire border zone appears to have increased in the past month particularly in comparison with the post Iwawa period when RPA seemed to have gained an upper hand in the counter-insurgency. This belt of tensions remains limited to the western border prefectures.

Relations with neighbours

4. There has been a marked improvement in Rwanda's relations with Tanzania and Zaire. Under President Mpaka a new chapter of Tanzania-Rwanda bilateral relations has been opened with Rwandan Prime Minister's visit to Tanzania, his meetings with Tanzanian leaders and visits to Rwandan refugee camps. Tanzania has agreed to re-open its Embassy in Kigali at Ambassador level. President Mpaka has also been instrumental in thawing out the glacial relations between Kenya and Uganda. Previously, the two Presidents were not on speaking terms and both governments were ranged in a hostile confrontation. However, President Mpaka's intercession has led to President Moi's visit to Uganda with signs of cordiality and co-operation between the two Presidents and countries. This augurs well for a reduction in tension, though Rwanda-Kenya relations remain tense. It is possible that with an improvement in Uganda-Kenya relations, Rwanda's relations with Kenya may also improve in the future.

5. Rwanda-Zaire relations have also shown an improvement after a period of mutual recrimination and high tension. President Mobutu's meetings with President Bizimungu and his recent receiving the Rwandan Foreign Minister have been important factors in the improved bilateral climate. These meetings were followed-up by the return of equipment at Gisenyi on February 13 which was a symbolic occasion indicating a better atmosphere between the two countries. The equipment returned was of poor quality and the Rwandan Government has stated that it expected further instalments. It must be recognized that the former President of Mali, Mr Amadou Toure who is one of the Cairo facilitators' has played an important role in achieving this positive turn of relations between Rwanda and Zaire. Rwanda-Zaire relations, however, remain fragile and prone to regression over small incidents.

Refugee Return

6. While media focus has been in Goma and Bukavu where no movement of returning refugees has been noted, a significant increase in the return of refugees is under way from Burundi and Tanzania. The average monthly return in the second half of 1995 had settled between 5-10 thousand, mainly from Zaire and including a high percentage of the old case load. In December 1995 and January 1996, this total monthly figure rose to 15000 in each month. In the first half of February this figure (15000) has already been passed and if refugee returns continue at the current level, we shall by the end of February reach 30,000 which was the average high-level of 1994, 1995 (January/February).

7. To place the refugee return in perspective, it is apparent that UNHCR and all countries of the region i.e. Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire are making a significant and sincere effort to achieve a lift-off of refugee return to Rwanda. Although there are no signs, so far, of success from the Zairean camps, there is movement from Burundi and to a lesser extent from Tanzania. The coming weeks will show whether this recent trend builds up and influences Zairean refugees as well or whether it will settle into a low-level groove that does not significantly alter the refugee situation in and around Rwanda.

Best wishes.



UNAMIR
1996 FEB 22 P 2:29 OUTGOING CODE CABLE
UNAMIR
1996 FEB 22 P 2:33

chr-048 1/2

TO: KITTANI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: ANNABI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 21 February 1996

NO.: MIR - 435

NO. OF PAGES: TWO

SUBJECT: Disposal of arms, ammunition and other equipment held by UNAMIR

1. Please refer to your code cable no.447 of 15 February 1996.
2. It is confirmed that all items that qualify under the category of lethal equipment whether UN owned or contingent owned would not be handed over to the Rwandan Government. We have made this abundantly clear to the Rwandan Government.
3. The problem that we face is related to the destruction of lethal equipment as the RPA has categorically denied permission to destroy any lethal equipment whose ownership is in doubt.
4. After the Belgian and French Government's intercessions in which they had asked for their weapons which were in UNAMIR storage to be destroyed, we proceeded with the destruction of some ammunition which was stopped by the RPA on the grounds that the weapons and ammunition belonged to the Former Government Forces and not to UN peace-keeping contingents (UNAMIR) and should therefore be handed over to them.

5. We have asked the Belgian and French Governments to provide us with lists of equipment left behind for UNAMIR peace-keeping. While the Belgians have agreed to provide us a list of what was left behind by them, the French have no such list available, as they were neither a part of UNAMIR nor did they hand over anything to us. The decision to grant ownership to all weapons recovered in the mission area having French markings as being French, may have been premature on our part. After further analysis, it is now apparent that the French Government supported the Former Rwandan Government Forces (FRGF) with Military hardware. In all likelihood, the weapons recovered by UNAMIR troops were left behind by the FRGF when they fled the country after the civil war. Moreover, weapon systems like the 30 mm Anti Aircraft Guns, recovered in the mission area are not part of any contingents inventory, and definitely were not brought into the host country for Peace Keeping Operations. It can be reasoned that all such French equipment was part of the former Government's weaponry and that its ownership should pass to the successor government. This is a delicate and sensitive issue and needs to be examined and negotiated between all concerned parties.

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Best regards.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR
1996 FEB 21 P 3:24

CRN 047

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

21/3

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/HANSEN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: KITTANI/GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 21 February 19⁹⁶

NO.: MIR 432

NO. OF PAGES: 3

SUBJECT: Overall situation in Rwanda

UNAMIR
1996 FEB 21 P 3:29

1. Since my return from leave and consultations in New York, I have noted the following developments in Rwanda.

Security & Normalcy

2. As before, the security situation in Rwanda is calm. Only in the belt adjacent to the border with Zaire is there tension created by armed infiltration and sabotage. Kigali appears, the safest capital in the region with no curfews, hijackings or armed robberies that were so common last year. Private business, commerce, transport, utilities and education improve visibly by the week and FAO reports that agriculture is back to 82% of pre-war conditions. Our milobs and human rights observers report that, in general, returning refugees are being fairly treated by the administration. Efforts are made by administration to return houses and land to them.

3. On the negative side, the prison conditions with 66000 prisoners remains appalling due to sheer overcrowding. There are no reports, however, of maltreatment. In fact, there is discipline and order in the prisons. ICRC and Agencies continue efforts to expand prison space.

UN 047
P2/3

Some responsible Hutu officials have shown signs of restlessness and the Rwandan Chief Prosecutor has informed the Human Rights Field Office (HRFOR) that he fears arrest. HRFOR have taken appropriate steps to protect his legitimate rights although neither they nor any other UN Agency can provide asylum or assistance in leaving the country. Sabotage and armed infiltration in the Zaire border zone appears to have increased in the past month particularly in comparison with the post Iwawa period when RPA seemed to have gained an upper hand in the counter-insurgency. This belt of tensions remains limited to the western border prefectures.

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CRN047
P 3/3

Refugee Return

6. While media focus has been in Goma and Bukavu where no movement of returning refugees has been noted, a significant increase in the return of refugees is under way from Burundi and Tanzania. The average monthly return in the second half of 1995 had settled between 5-10 thousand, mainly from Zaire and including a high percentage of the old case load. In December 1995 and January 1996, this total monthly figure rose to 15000 in each month. In the first half of February this figure (15000) has already been passed and if refugee returns continue at the current level, we shall by the end of February reach 30,000 which was the average high-level of 1994, 1995 (January/February).

7. To place the refugee return in perspective, it is apparent that UNHCR and all countries of the region i.e. Rwanda, Tanzania, Burundi and Zaire are making a significant and sincere effort to achieve a lift-off of refugee return to Rwanda. Although there are no signs, so far, of success from the Zairean camps, there is movement from Burundi and to a lesser extent from Tanzania. The coming weeks will show whether this recent trend builds up and influences Zairean refugees as well or whether it will settle into a low-level groove that does not significantly alter the refugee situation in and around Rwanda.

Best wishes.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

UNAMIR

1996 FEB 21 A 8:35

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

CHW-046

1/8

TO: ANNAN/GOULDING/CONNOR, UNATIONS, NEW YORK
INFO: GHAREKHAN/MEDILI, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: SHAHARYAR M. KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shaharyar M. Khan

DATE: 21 February 1996

NO.: MIR -428

NO. OF PAGES: 8

SUBJECT: Equipment issue in Rwanda

UNAMIR
1996 FEB 21 A 9:00

1. As we near the end of UNAMIR's mandate, the equipment disposal issue requires sensitive and urgent handling. In this report, I shall a) evaluate the data being sent with this report b) comment on the issues and c) make my recommendations from a political viewpoint.

A) Data Evaluation

The UNGA Resolution on Equipment

2. At the outset, it is important to re-state the existing General Assembly resolution A/Res/49/235 that regulate the disposal of peacekeeping equipment in the following order of priority:

- a) All equipment that meets the requirements of other United Nations operations and that it is cost-effective to move shall be redeployed to such operations or held in reserve for use by future operations;
- b) Other equipment shall be transferred to United Nations organizations, as well as to national and international non-governmental organizations already operating in [mission area] or in the process of establishing a presence there, upon request and against appropriate credit to the Special Account for the United Nations [Assistance Mission to Rwanda];

- c) Any remaining material that cannot be moved shall be sold commercially on an 'as is, where is' basis in accordance with standard United Nations procedures;
- d) Assets or installations that cannot be dismantled, including airfield installations, shall be [donated] to the Government of [Rwanda], 'upon authorization of the General Assembly'. (Source: A/RES/49/235 on the Financing of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique.)

UN Security Council Resolutions

3. Next, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1029(1995) paragraph 7 states as follows:

"Requests the Secretary-General to examine, in the context of existing United Nations regulations, the feasibility of transferring UNAMIR non-lethal equipment, as elements of UNAMIR withdraw, for use in Rwanda".

4. This resolution has been followed up by a letter from the President of the Security Council to the Secretary-General No.S/1996/103, dated 13 February 1996 which states, inter alia: "The members of the Security Council urge you, in light of the unique circumstance and recent history of Rwanda, to employ flexibility, while staying within the bounds of the regulations established by the General Assembly, in resolving the question of the disposition of UNAMIR's equipment".

The data evaluated

5. Attached to this report are the following three data sheets sent to FALD by this Mission.
- i) Chart 'X' which states the equipment disposal chart in terms of original cost.
 - ii) Chart 'Y' which states the disposal chart of the same equipment in terms of depreciated value.
 - iii) Chart 'Z' which subtracts the lethal items from the table and therefore provides more accurate data and percentages of equipment that is eligible for disposal in Rwanda. The data for 'Z' is based on original cost and not on depreciated value.
6. The following are basic comments on the three Data Sheets:
- The vertical columns, referring to 10 broad equipment items, are divided into 3 categories of recipients. Group I consists of other peace-keeping operations and UN

offices (e.g. Tribunal and UN Office in Bujumbura). Items transferred to Group I would continue to be utilised by UN and not "sold" or transferred to any other organization. Group II comprises UN Agencies to whom equipment would be transferred against payment and Group III, refers to the government of Rwanda for equipment either transferred against payment or gifted as a write off.

The horizontal columns relate to:

- i) Column A - items already transferred to Group I, II and III above. These items of equipment are, therefore, no longer available in the equipment pool for disposal.
- ii) Column B - items in stock and available in the equipment pool for disposal.
- iii) Column C - items to be written off.

B) Comment on Data Sheets

7. As far as disposal of equipment to Rwanda is concerned, horizontal column A may be disregarded as it represents items that have either already been shipped out of the country or transferred to a UN Agency or loaned to the home government for appropriate adjustment on payment. Thus, this column (A) is not relevant to the future disposal of equipment as these items are not part of the pool of disposable equipment. Therefore, only items shown in categories B & C may be treated as part of the available pool of equipment. Column 'A's relevance is essentially for accounting purposes and gauging the total amount of equipment sent to Rwanda. For the purposes of this report, Column A is virtually irrelevant.

8. Taking a closer look at Columns B and C - the available pool of equipment. It will be evident that when calculating the proportion to be kept by DPKO [i.e. column I of Group B], against the items to be transferred to the Rwandese [Column III Group B] the chart at X (i.e. original cost) gives a more equitable apportionment [i.e. 61%:13%:26%] than chart Y (depreciated value) [i.e. 80%:7%:13%] Chart 'Z' provides the most even apportioning of all [i.e. 54%:15%:31%]. Of course, Chart 'Y' (depreciated value) gives a more accurate picture of the equipments real apportionment.

9. Considering column B [Proposed Distribution Column] it will be seen that a heavy proportion of the equipment especially vehicles, communications and other equipment is being retained for DPKO [Group I]. For instance, in chart 'Z' vehicles add up to 6.4m out of a total of 9.8m; communications 6.2m out of a total of 6.3m and other equipment .652m out of .721m.

According to Chart Z, the balance in favour of Group I remains too heavily tilted in its favour and does not fall in line with the directives of the Security Council.

Recommendations

10. The data on equipment included in the charts have been based on factual, administrative information. Taking an overall political view and particularly the recommendations of the Security Council on the issue, I have the following suggestions to make:

a) Equipment Allocation still appears too heavily weighted in favour of Group I as against the Groups II [UN Agencies] and Group III [Rwanda]. Surely some items from Group I [DPKO] can be transferred or "sold" to Group II [UN Agencies] for UN schemes/projects that require available equipment e.g. vehicles, communications, generators etc. at depreciated cost. Such a transfer to UN agencies would mean that i) the items are "sold" to UN Agencies, ii) are accountable to donor countries [ACABQ] and their tax payers, iii) saves UN money on transportation costs out of Rwanda and iv) enables UN Agencies to obtain serviceable equipment, immediately available at reduced cost, as compared to buying new equipment for their projects in Rwanda. Thus, this transfer from Group I to Group II would be cost-saving and would fulfil Security Council's directive of transferring equipment "for use in Rwanda".

11. Secondly, items shown in Group III [column B] should be written off and not sold to the government. In fact these items should be on the same footing as column C [write off]. Many of the items [in B, Group III] such as prefabricated houses cannot be moved except at a high-cost of dismantling and transportation. Similarly, most of the items in column B, Group III would be prohibitively costly to transport. While it may be true that these items could be auctioned in Rwanda, it would seem churlish to take this step and not hand over this equipment as a gift to Rwanda as a gesture of goodwill. I would therefore propose that the UNGA be approached to write off both, Column 'C' as well as Column B Group III.

12. In short, given the factors and considerations stated above, I submit the following recommendations.

a) Column B Group I may be reviewed. Only those items may be retained in this column which are absolutely vital for DPKO. The remaining items may be "sold" to UN Agencies [i.e. transferred to Group II of 'B'] against payment. These items would be

integrated into UNDP and UNHCR projects currently being launched and for which equipment is urgently needed. Therefore, a substantial movement [e.g. 20-30% of depreciated value] from B I to B II may be considered.

2

b) Items shown in B III may be gifted to Rwanda as their transportation and dismantling costs would be prohibitive. This column should be merged with Column 'C' for write off and gift to Rwanda.

c) I may be authorised to provide the Rwandan government with the list of B (I) whenever it is approved by the Secretariat. This would not mean conveying the entire list [i.e. B II, B III and C] but only one element [B I] which would serve as a basis for seeking transfer out of Rwanda. The list would be given with a written proviso that it could be altered at any time in case DPKO requires the material due to an emergency e.g. in Burundi.

d) I may be authorized to give a general, generic description of items and equipment available in Group II and III without providing a numerical list. This will enable the Rwandan government to know the type of equipment available for sale against Trust Fund financing.

13. The charts at X,Y and Z are based on a purely administrative assessment. It is now necessary to provide a political rationalisation to the equipment disposal issue based on the Security Council directive which would also meet the requirements of UNGA regulations. I would be grateful for immediate decisions on the above recommendations.

Best regards.

CHART 'X'

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR)
DISTRIBUTION OF NON-EXPENDABLE PROPERTY (ORIGINAL COST)

Amendment 3

		GROUP I TRANSFER DPKO	GROUP II IOV UN AGENCIES	GROUP III LOCAL DISTRIBUTION	TOTAL	
A.	ALREADY DISTRIBUTED					
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT	\$ 12,610,985.36	\$ 34,247.31	\$ 121,208.28	\$ 12,766,440.95	1
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT	\$ 1,510,849.11	\$ 259,379.25	\$ 49,107.92	\$ 1,819,336.28	2
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT	\$ 47,996.84	\$ 20,431.98	\$ 6,679.01	\$ 75,107.83	3
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT	\$ 5,338,000.00	\$ 1,184,287.43	\$ 115,830.10	\$ 6,638,117.53	4
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT		\$ 5,433.00		\$ 5,433.00	5
6	GENERATORS	\$ 51,329.00	\$ 313,779.50	\$ 161,714.50	\$ 526,823.00	6
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES					7
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT	\$ 3,212.35	\$ 12,701.35	\$ 24,730.00	\$ 40,643.70	8
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT					9
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT	\$ 269,863.15	\$ 998.00		\$ 270,861.15	10
	SUB-TOTAL	\$ 19,832,235.81	\$ 1,831,257.82	\$ 479,269.81	\$ 22,142,763.44	
B.	PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION					
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT	\$ 7,578,913.63	\$ 1,673,357.59	\$ 1,739,936.62	\$ 10,992,207.84	1
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT	\$ 6,225,077.08	\$ 31,479.85	\$ 124,731.49	\$ 6,381,288.42	2
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT	\$ 973,854.80	\$ 154,886.71	\$ 392,632.40	\$ 1,521,373.91	3
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT	\$ 191,011.37	\$ 2,154,059.79	\$ 5,240,044.38	\$ 7,585,115.54	4
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT		\$ 86,139.00		\$ 86,139.00	5
6	GENERATORS	\$ 882,627.14	\$ 145,491.50	\$ 991,060.89	\$ 2,019,179.53	6
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES					7
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT	\$ 321,528.55	\$ 138,795.69	\$ 170,863.53	\$ 631,187.77	8
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT	\$ 73,600.00			\$ 73,600.00	9
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT	\$ 4,909,479.78	\$ 14,963.02	\$ 54,037.20	\$ 4,978,480.00	10
	SUB-TOTAL	\$ 21,156,092.35	\$ 4,399,173.15	\$ 8,713,306.51	\$ 34,268,572.01	
C.	EQUIPMENT FOR WRITE-OFF					
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT		represents 13%	26%	\$ 3,645,720.07	1
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT		61% of total		\$ 220,365.00	2
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT				\$ 219,710.00	3
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT				\$ 1,579,457.48	4
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT					5
6	GENERATORS				\$ 273,245.31	6
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES					7
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT				\$ 90,917.35	8
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT					9
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT				\$ 59,888.74	10
	SUB-TOTAL				\$ 6,089,303.95	
D.	GRAND TOTAL	\$ 40,988,328.16	\$ 6,230,430.97	\$ 9,192,576.32	\$ 62,500,639.40	

B + C
40
8.7(BIII)
6.1(C)
14.8 = 36%
of tot

CHART 7

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR)
DISTRIBUTION OF NON-EXPENDABLE PROPERTY (DEPRECIATED COST)

		GROUP I TRANSFER DPKO	GROUP II IOV UN AGENCIES	GROUP III LOCAL DISTRIBUTION	TOTAL	
A.	ALREADY DISTRIBUTED					
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT	\$ 4,479,713.93	\$ 15,467.22	\$ 43,436.59	\$ 4,538,617.74	1
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT	\$ 650,365.27	\$ 121,151.50	\$ 22,179.88	\$ 793,696.65	2
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT	\$ 16,226.03	\$ 5,833.97	\$ 1,805.85	\$ 23,865.85	3
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT	\$ 1,330,750.00	\$ 45.00	\$ 257.00	\$ 1,331,052.00	4
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT		\$ 1.00		\$ 1.00	5
6	GENERATORS	\$ 7,164.95	\$ 47,921.48	\$ 67,848.34	\$ 122,934.77	6
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES					7
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT	\$ 1,284.94	\$ 4,249.54	\$ 6,532.00	\$ 12,066.48	8
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT					9
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT	\$ 269,863.15	\$ 998.00		\$ 270,861.15	10
	SUB-TOTAL	\$ 6,755,368.27	\$ 195,667.71	\$ 142,059.66	\$ 7,093,095.64	
B.	PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION					
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT	\$ 4,852,906.77	\$ 806,475.01	792,607.36	\$ 6,451,989.14	1
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT	\$ 2,646,679.50	\$ 9,639.27	29,216.99	\$ 2,685,535.76	2
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT	\$ 380,144.55	\$ 51,992.96	100,790.14	\$ 532,927.65	3
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT	\$ 72,041.58	\$ 107,939.40	476,883.29	\$ 656,864.27	4
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT		\$ 30,111.20		\$ 30,111.20	5
6	GENERATORS	\$ 438,299.71	\$ 35,881.32	328,628.66	\$ 802,809.69	6
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES					7
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT	\$ 194,489.38	\$ 35,394.95	44,282.20	\$ 274,166.53	8
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT	\$ 29,440.00			\$ 29,440.00	9
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT	\$ 3,012,565.11	\$ 3,614.75	10,402.92	\$ 3,026,582.78	10
	SUB-TOTAL	\$ 11,626,566.60	\$ 1,081,048.86	\$ 1,782,811.56	\$ 14,490,427.02	
C.	EQUIPMENT FOR WRITE-OFF					
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT	representing	7.6%	12.4%	\$ 1,453,193.59	1
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT	80%			\$ 66,616.44	2
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT	of total			\$ 58,282.71	3
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT				\$ 76,994.06	4
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT					5
6	GENERATORS				\$ 41,722.18	6
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES					7
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT				\$ 19,083.34	8
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT					9
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT				\$ 13,720.39	10
	SUB-TOTAL				\$ 1,729,612.71	
D.	GRAND TOTAL	\$ 18,381,934.87	\$ 1,276,716.57	\$ 1,924,871.22	\$ 23,313,135.37	

B + C
16
1.8(BIII)
1.7(C)
3.5 = 21.1

Chart Z

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN RWANDA (UNAMIR)
SUMMARY SHEET WITH ADJUSTMENTS/DELETIONS

		GROUP I TRANSFER	GROUP II IOV	GROUP III LOCAL		
		DPKO	UN AGENCIES	DISTRIBUTION	TOTAL	
A.	<u>ALREADY DISTRIBUTED</u>					
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT	\$ 333,585.36	\$ 34,247.31	\$ 121,208.28	\$ 489,040.95	1
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT	\$ 1,510,849.11	\$ 259,379.25	\$ 49,107.92	\$ 1,819,336.28	2
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT	\$ 47,996.84	\$ 20,431.98	\$ 6,679.01	\$ 75,107.83	3
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT		\$ 1,184,287.43	\$ 115,830.10	\$ 1,300,117.53	4
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT		\$ 5,433.00		\$ 5,433.00	5
6	GENERATORS	\$ 51,329.00	\$ 313,779.50	\$ 161,714.50	\$ 526,823.00	6
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES					7
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT	\$ 3,212.35	\$ 12,701.35	\$ 24,730.00	\$ 40,643.70	8
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT					9
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT	\$ 269,863.15	\$ 998.00		\$ 270,861.15	10
	SUB-TOTAL	\$ 2,216,835.81	\$ 1,831,257.82	\$ 479,269.81	\$ 4,527,363.44	
B.	<u>PROPOSED DISTRIBUTION</u>					
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT	\$ 6,392,313.63	\$ 1,673,357.59	\$ 1,739,936.62	\$ 9,805,607.84	1
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT	\$ 6,225,077.08	\$ 31,479.85	\$ 124,731.49	\$ 6,381,288.42	2
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT	\$ 973,854.80	\$ 154,886.71	\$ 392,632.40	\$ 1,521,373.91	3
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT	\$ 191,011.37	\$ 2,154,059.79	\$ 5,240,044.38	\$ 7,585,115.54	4
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT		\$ 86,139.00		\$ 86,139.00	5
6	GENERATORS	\$ 882,627.14	\$ 145,491.50	\$ 991,060.89	\$ 2,019,179.53	6
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES					7
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT	\$ 321,528.55	\$ 138,795.69	\$ 170,863.53	\$ 631,187.77	8
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT					9
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT	\$ 652,659.64	\$ 14,963.02	\$ 54,037.20	\$ 721,659.86	10
	SUB-TOTAL	\$ 15,639,072.21	\$ 4,399,173.15	\$ 8,713,306.51	\$ 28,751,551.87	
C.	<u>EQUIPMENT FOR WRITE-OFF</u>					
1	VEHICULAR EQUIPMENT				\$ 3,645,720.07	1
2	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT				\$ 220,365.00	2
3	ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT				\$ 219,710.00	3
4	ACCOMMODATION EQUIPMENT				\$ 1,579,457.48	4
5	AIR TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT					5
6	GENERATORS				\$ 273,245.31	6
7	FURNITURE AND FIXTURES					7
8	OFFICE EQUIPMENT				\$ 90,917.35	8
9	DE-MINING EQUIPMENT					9
10	OTHER EQUIPMENT				\$ 59,888.74	10
	SUB-TOTAL				\$ 6,089,303.95	
D.	GRAND TOTAL	\$ 17,855,908.02	\$ 6,230,430.97	\$ 9,192,576.32	\$ 39,368,219.26	

Represents
54%
of total

15%

31%

B + C
34.8
16.1 (C)
8.7 (BIII)
14.8=42.5%
of total

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

CPN-045

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

Shahary Khan

DATE: 19 FEBRUARY 1996

NO.: MIR 413

NO. OF PAGES: 15

SUBJECT: Secretary-General's Draft Report on Rwanda - Rev.I

1. On Friday 16 February, the first draft of the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council was sent to Headquarters. This report required up-dating and editing. Accordingly, a revised draft is being sent {Revision I}. Please note the following comments:

(a) It is proposed that the lengthy report from the High Commissioner for Human Rights may be added as an annex to the report. In our draft we have reflected the essential elements of the report.

(b) Some figures in the draft have been left blank and would need to be up-dated before the report is issued.

Best wishes.

P1/15

UNAMIR

1996 FEB 19 P 2:2

UNAMIR
1996 FEB 19 P 50



SECURITY COUNCIL

Distr.
GENERAL

S/
FEBRUARY 1996
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to resolution 1029 (1995) of 12 December, by which the Security Council adjusted and extended the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) for a final period until 8 March 1996 and requested me to gradually reduce its troop level. Since the adoption of the resolution, I have reported to the Council and the General Assembly on the situation in Rwanda on 30 January (S/1996/61 and A/50/868). The present report describes the activities carried out by UNAMIR in implementation of resolution 1029 (1995), provides an update of the situation as of 4 March and contains recommendations regarding the United Nations role after the conclusion of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda on 8 March.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

2. Since my last report, relative calm and stability continue to prevail throughout Rwanda, with the exception of areas bordering Zaire where the situation is tense due to an increase in the level of insurgent activities by elements of the former Rwandan Government Forces (RGF). The process of normalisation is apparent from the following statistics: agricultural produce has reached 82% of pre-war output, child immunisation, sanitation, urban water supply and healthcare 80%, industrial production 75%, public transport, primary schools and university education are above 60%. In terms of security and crime-rate, Kigali is the safest capital in the region. Considering the fact in 1994, Rwanda had been devastated by genocide and civil war with the result that there was no administration, no economy, no judiciary system, no schools, no water, no electricity, no transport and a population that was traumatised, the achievements of the Rwandan Government and people are highly creditable.

3. On the negative side, there are outstanding issues that are a source of concern and need to be addressed with the full cooperation of the international community. These include the return and resettlement of 1.6 million refugees, meaningful progress towards national reconciliation, the revival of the national judicial process, improvement in prison conditions, the equitable disbursement of aid and effective measures to curb sabotage and destabilisation by armed infiltrators from refugee camps. Although UNAMIR is no longer responsible for security in Rwanda, its phase-out on March 8 has also led to concern among members of the

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international community in Rwanda about their treatment, particularly after the abrupt expulsion of 38 NGOs and an incident, albeit isolated and immediately denounced by the Government, in which three members of the International Tribunal were ordered out of their car and assaulted by an RPA guard unit. The offending RPA soldiers were arrested and are being tried.

4. The months of January and February have seen a marked increase in insurgent actions carried out by former RGF elements who infiltrated Rwanda, particularly in the north-western Prefecture of Gisenyi. The most important of these actions was the sabotage on the night of 2 February of the electricity power line and water intake to the local brewery in Gisenyi. According to statements made to the RPA by captured infiltrators, a large number of infiltrators have been sent into Rwanda to coordinate insurgent activities. As a result, RPA has increased its patrolling and its questioning of suspected collaborators in the belt adjacent to the Zairian border.

5. As I mentioned in my last progress report on UNAMIR (S/1996/61 and A/50/868), the allegations of sale or supply of arms to the former Rwandan government forces continue to be a matter of concern. The International Commission of Inquiry established pursuant to resolution 1011 has continued its activities and presented to the Council its interim report (S/1996/67). The President of the Council informed me in her letter dated 13 February 1996 (S/1996/103) of the decision taken by the Council that the Commission shall continue its work and submit its final report in due course. This decision also reflects the position of the Rwandan Government, as expressed in the request put to the President of the Council by the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations (S/1996/84). I urge the assistance of all Member States in resolving some of the difficulties encountered in the past by the International Commission so as to enable it to successfully carry out its mandate.

6. Rwanda's relations with Zaire and Tanzania have continued to show an improvement. With Zaire, bilateral visits have been exchanged which Vice-President Kagame has characterized as working towards normalization of relations between both countries. The hand over by Zaire on 13 February of some military equipment belonging to Rwanda that was taken to Zaire by former Rwandan government forces is seen as a step forward in the improvement of bilateral relations and in the implementation of the recommendations of the Cairo summit. In receiving the equipment on behalf of the Government of Rwanda Foreign Minister, Dr. Anasthase Gasana stated, inter alia, that the equipment returned constituted only a few of the assets of the Rwandan government in Zaire, and that this gesture should be viewed as a symbol, though a significant one.

7. Rwanda's contacts with Tanzania have intensified as apparent from the four-day visit paid to Tanzania from 6 to 9 February by a Rwandan delegation led by the Prime Minister which focused on measures to accelerate the return of Rwandan refugees. The Rwandan Prime Minister met with the Prime Minister of Tanzania and addressed the Tanzanian Assembly to explain the current situation facing Rwanda. The Rwandan Prime Minister then visited the refugee camps in Ngara and Cyabalisa. During these visits, the Prime Minister was informed of the refugees' concerns with regard to the prompt return of their lands and houses. The Prime Minister explained that the Government had devised a plan which includes the assistance by the international community for the construction of new houses to relocate those (mainly refugees from 1959 and subsequent migrations) who are currently occupying properties which do not belong to them. Over the past weeks, there has been a marginal increase in the voluntary return of refugees from Tanzania.

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(C)

8. In accordance with its mandate, UNAMIR has focused its activities on facilitating the safe and voluntary return of refugees. It is evident that the UNHCR and the affected countries namely, Rwanda, Zaire, Burundi and Tanzania have made a concerted effort to achieve a significant repatriation of refugees. The response to these efforts has not been uniform. From Zaire, despite the Zairian Government's decision to deploy additional troops to induce a camp-by-camp closure, the return of refugees has, so far, been negligible. On the other hand, refugee returns from Burundi have increased dramatically and movement is also discernible from Tanzania. The overall figures [at annex A] indicated that from an average of around 5000 per month from March 1995 to November, the past three months have shown an increase to 13,500 in December 1995, January and 16,000 till mid February. These efforts need to be sustained and encouraged with a view to finding durable solutions. In this context, I feel that a well prepared, regional conference which provides for an opportunity for meaningful discussion of these and related issues needs to be convened in co-operation with UNHCR and OAU.

9. One of the factors which discourages refugees from returning to Rwanda continues to be non functioning of the justice system. Although, some constitutional changes have been introduced to allow the adoption of special procedures to deal with the cases of those suspected of crimes related to the genocide, no trials have yet taken place. The Minister of Justice has recently declared that the first trials will start in April. Meanwhile, the population in detention in Rwanda has reached the figure of 65,515 detainees by the end of January. Despite over-crowding, conditions in prisons have improved through the construction of new detention centres. No maltreatment of prisoners has been reported. Overcrowding in prisons can be expected until the justice system resumes its normal functioning.

10. On 19 February, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda [ICTR] announced two further indictments. The Tribunal is expected to commence trials from March 1996. Temporary arrangement are being made for the detention of prisoners in Arusha pending, the construction of ICTR's own detention cells. ICTR has also been informed that after the termination of UNAMIR's mandate, on March 8, security for the Deputy Prosecutor's office would be the responsibility of the ICTR itself.

11. Relations between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR have been stable. There are, however, a number of issues which remain to be resolved. Paragraph 7 of Security Council resolution 1029 (1995) requested me "to examine, in the context of existing United Nations regulations, the feasibility of transferring UNAMIR non-lethal equipment, as elements of UNAMIR withdraw, for use in Rwanda". Both my Special Representative in Rwanda and Mr. Gharekhan, my Special Advisor, have recently briefed the Council on this issue. I have taken note of the request of the Security Council members contained in the letter addressed to me by the President of the Council on 13 February to exert flexibility in the disposition of UNAMIR equipment. Taking into account the above, I have instructed my Special Representative to submit his recommendations regarding UNAMIR equipment which, in the context of the liquidation process and conforming to existing regulations, can be released for use in Rwanda. As regards other categories of equipment for which current regulations prevent me from making a final decision, the Secretariat will submit its recommendations to the competent legislative bodies. I wish once again to express my hope

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that, in the meantime, there will be no obstacles to the transfer of equipment to other peace-keeping operations.

12. As mentioned in my last progress report, I dispatched a team of experts to Kigali to discuss with Government officials other issues of common concern to the United Nations and the Government of Rwanda, such as payment of corporate taxes by United Nations contractors operating in support of UNAMIR. Following a series of exchanges, both the Government and the United Nations have shown flexibility in their respective positions. I am confident that satisfactory solutions will be found by the Government and the United Nations to this and other issues of contention in a spirit of mutual cooperation and understanding.

13. In anticipation of UNAMIR's closure, co-ordination meetings have taken place with Agencies with a view to replacing the facilities being provided by UNAMIR. These include medical, security, air transportation, communications for which alternative arrangements are being made. It is proposed that Radio UNAMIR should continue to be utilized as an independent, non-political mouthpiece of the UN in Rwanda and that all UN Agencies participate and share in the cost of running "Radio UN-Rwanda".

III. HUMAN RIGHTS

14. A full report on the Human Rights Field Operation in Rwanda HRFOR is attached at Annex 'B'. For the purposes of this report, HRFOR has established a presence in all but one of Rwanda's eleven prefectures, and has developed relationship with the authorities, including the security forces, which contribute to the prevention of human rights violations and to appropriate investigation and action. It presents information regarding reported human rights violations systematically to the competent ministries. The Ministry of Defence, which is responsible for the National Gendarmerie as well as for the RPA, has established formal liaison channels with HRFOR at national and local levels. The information resulting from HRFOR's own investigations, together with the Government of Rwanda's response, is reported to the High Commissioner for Human Rights and made fully available to the Special Rapporteur on Rwanda.

15. Conditions of detention are one of the most serious aspects of the current human rights situation. They form an important part of HRFOR's overall monitoring, dialogue with the authorities and reporting. In seeking to redress violations of the human rights of detainees and to improve conditions of detention in accordance with international human rights standards, HRFOR coordinates its work with that of the ICRC. HRFOR plans to give high priority, as the judicial system becomes operational, to promoting the processing of cases of detainees according to the law and with a view to progressive reduction of the numbers of those detained without charge or trial.

16. HRFOR assesses the state of readiness of home communes to receive returnees, and assists those communes in the resettlement process. UNHCR has expressed its concern that the presence of human rights field officers in the receiving prefectures and communes should be maintained and strengthened so that HRFOR can continue providing its important information and evaluation on the state of readiness in communes that may receive returnees and assist in their resettlement and reintegration.

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17. Following the appointment of a new Chief of HRFOR in October 1995, the High Commissioner for Human Rights has reviewed the priorities of the operation for 1996. The conclusions have been shared with the Government of Rwanda and with those governments which have provided voluntary contributions to the Trust Fund for HRFOR. The Government of Rwanda has made clear its wish to have the presence of HRFOR maintained after UNAMIR's mandate expires. I believe that HRFOR must continue to constitute a most important element of the U.N. presence in Rwanda, beyond March 1996.

18. Unfortunately, the High Commissioner has faced great difficulties in securing sufficient voluntary contributions to fund HRFOR. In his report of 13 November 1995, he drew these difficulties, and their adverse implications for the management of the operation, to the attention of the General Assembly. In its resolution 50/58L of 22 December 1995, the General Assembly recognized the valuable contribution that the human rights officers have made, and requested me to take appropriate steps to ensure adequate financial and human resources and logistical support for HRFOR.

19. The request for regular budget funding for HRFOR had unfortunately not been approved by the last session of the General Assembly. HRFOR's financial difficulties have therefore continued. The High Commissioner therefore then appealed to donors in January, and so far had received pledges of some USD 2.5 million, available to fund HRFOR beyond its current financial allotment covering the period to 31 March 1996. However, the High Commissioner is committed to reimburse a \$3 million loan received from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund to start operation in September 1994, and the financial requirement for 1 April - 31 December 1996 is estimated at approximately \$7 million. This is based upon a staffing of 120, of whom 80 would be United Nations Volunteers. Additional administrative, logistical, communications and security needs may have to be separately funded if in the event that a peace-keeping operation no longer provides them.

20. The High Commissioner has therefore asked me to draw to the attention of the Security Council and the General Assembly that, unless sufficient voluntary funds can be secured in the very near future, he will not be able to maintain a field operation with human rights officers deployed throughout the prefectures of Rwanda and will have to close down HRFOR in its present form. I share his view that it would be most regrettable if this closure had to occur before the major return of refugees has taken place, the Rwandan justice system is functioning adequately, and national institutions are better able to promote and protect human rights. Accordingly, I have proposed in paragraph 41 that HRFOR may be included as part of UN's successor entity to UNAMIR.

IV. MILITARY AND SECURITY ASPECTS

21. In accordance with the provisions of the current mandate, the reduction of the UNAMIR force level to 1,200 formed troops and 200 military observers and headquarters staff was achieved by early February. Some adjustment had to be made to the original projections of reduction of personnel due to the decision taken by Canada to withdraw its contingent with effect from 2 February. The result of the removal of the force logistics support unit at this late stage of the Mission has placed some strain on the Mission, and the functions this unit had been performing have had to be contracted out or deleted from the capability base.

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22. As stated in my last progress report, in order to maintain the ability of UNAMIR to assist UNHCR in the refugee repatriation process, two logistic bases of about 40 personnel each have been deployed at Nyundo, near Gisenyi, and Shagasha, near Cyangugu, which allow UNAMIR to provide the necessary logistic support to move refugees from border crossing points to transit camps in Sectors 4 and 5. All other formed troops are deployed in Kigali, although some elements were provided to ensure security at the communications site on Mount Karongi and for the protection of members of the International Tribunal working on the site of Kibuye, in Western Rwanda. The troops stationed in Kigali continue to be tasked to contribute to the security of the Tribunal, the provision of humanitarian assistance, the protection of United Nations property and assets, construction works and assistance in rehabilitation and the repair of infrastructure. Military observers are deployed in five sectors, with their regional headquarters at Kibungo, Gitarama, Butare, Cyangugu and Gisenyi, which allow UNAMIR to monitor the return of refugees and their subsequent resettlement in their home communes.

23. UNAMIR's troops have continued to assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the safe and voluntary return of refugees to their home communes. When Burundi authorities closed the camp of Ntamba in the first week of February, UNAMIR troops and military observers, working in support of UNHCR and other agencies, provided assistance to resettle in a smooth manner returnees to their home communes. Work continued throughout the period under review to provide assistance in the construction and improvement of transit camps, to provide transportation on behalf of United Nations agencies and other partners, and engineering capabilities to develop new projects and repair roads and bridges. When some military assets belonging to Rwanda were returned by Zaire, UNAMIR assisted the RPA in transporting a number of weapons systems and major pieces of equipment into Rwanda. Military observers have continued to patrol and monitor the situation. Although the relationship with the RPA remains amicable, as manifested by the exchange of information on incidents within the country in the interest of mutual cooperation, the reduced numbers of military observers have severely curtailed UNAMIR's reporting and investigation activities.

24. In implementation of resolution 1029, which requires that the Mission be closed within six weeks of the end of the mandate, a liquidation plan has been drawn up. It envisages the departure of the last military element on 14 April, with staff officers departing on 19 April. During the closure phase, an adequate level of security troops will be maintained until 14 April, at which time all installations should be closed or turned over to other United Nations agencies for their use.

V. HUMANITARIAN DEVELOPMENTS

25. During the period under review, the number of refugees returning to Rwanda has considerably increased as a result of actions taken in countries of asylum to prompt the return of refugees. An estimated 1.8 Rwandans are still in refugee camps in neighboring countries: 1,100,000 in Zaire, 600,000 in Tanzania and 100,000 in Burundi. Regrettably, countries of asylum have continued to refole Rwandan refugees. Tanzania forcibly sent back to Rwanda 119 persons and Burundi 26 persons during the month of January. Figures indicate that the return of refugees from Burundi is assuming significant proportions. There is an increase of refugees returning from Tanzania though not yet significant while new case-load refugees from Zaire remain at a trickle despite major efforts by UNHCR and the Zairian Government.

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26. On 24 January, UNHCR and UNDP convened a technical meeting of donors in Geneva in which they proposed a US\$ 70.5 million programme to contribute to the repair of damage to the environment and infrastructure in countries hosting Rwandan refugees. The proposed portfolio of projects was designed for rapid implementation over a short period and would complement projects already underway. They involve efforts to stop environmental damage, including an end to unregulated wood cutting by refugees outside the camps; reafforestation; rehabilitation of roads, ports and communication facilities and sanitation, health and education services; and poverty alleviation and income generating activities.

27. Following the abandonment of Ntamba camp in Burundi by some 14,000 refugees fearing the spread of ethnic fighting, as described in my last progress report, on 27 January a delegation from the Government of Rwanda led by Mr. Patrick Mazimpaka, Minister for Rehabilitation and Social Integration, in an unprecedented move to encourage voluntary repatriation, visited Ntamba camp to urge the refugees which had returned to the camp to go back to Rwanda. The visit of Minister Mazimpaka was followed by the visits of the members of the Burundi/Rwanda/UNCHR Tripartite Commission and of a second delegation from the Government of Rwanda. As a result of those visits to the camps, a total of 4,476 refugees decided to repatriate on 1 and 2 February and the camp was subsequently closed by the Burundi authorities. Ntamba became the third refugee camp in Burundi to close after Majuri in November 1995 and Mugano in early January.

28. During its fourth meeting in Bujumbura on 29 and 30 January, the Burundi/Rwanda/UNCHR Tripartite Commission decided to have the remaining camps in Burundi progressively closed, starting with those nearest the border with Rwanda. The Commission expressed the hope that all remaining Rwandan refugees in Burundi would have repatriated by July, and all the camps closed. Those refugees who decide not to return will be transferred farther away from the border areas inside Burundi.

29. The deteriorating security situation in the Masisi region in Zaire has prevented UNCHR from organizing the repatriation of some 5,500 "old caseload" refugees. Meanwhile, some of these refugees are crossing spontaneously into Rwanda through the Gisenyi entry point, in the North-west of the country, on a daily basis. The Government of Rwanda has designated Nasho in the prefecture of Kibungo (South-east) as a settlement site for those returnees. However, some of them, claiming they hold Zairian citizenship, are unwilling to go to Kibungo and wish to stay in the communes bordering Zaire hoping that they can return to Masisi as soon as the unrest is over. The Government of Rwanda has decided that those claiming Zairian citizenship will be granted asylum as refugees and a camp will be set up for them in either Gisenyi or Ruhengeri, prefectures bordering Zaire.

30. The expulsion of 38 NGOs, as mentioned in my last progress report, is being felt throughout the country. The provision of medical services to the population is the sector which has been most affected, causing in certain areas of the country a shortage of medicines and medical equipment.

31. The percentage of people receiving food aid through targeted distributions in Rwanda remained low during the reporting period as WFP's emphasis is now on food-for-work (FFW) directed toward rehabilitation and development programmes. At present FFW represents 62% of all food aid distributed, much higher than one year ago when the country still had internally displaced persons' (IDP) camps and a large vulnerable population in

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urban and rural areas. WFP continues to regularly provide food for most of the children placed in Rwandan institutions for unaccompanied minors. During January, over 7,500 such children benefited from WFP's assistance.

32. UNICEF, through its Trauma Recovery Programme began recruiting 11 new trauma advisors to collaborate with 14 others already working in the prefectures. In 1996 training will be focused on teachers and medical workers as they have the most direct contact with traumatised children.

33. The ICRC has continued to operate the Red Cross Message (RCM) service, which is an integral part of re-establishing links between family members. More than 124,000 Red Cross Messages were distributed and 133,000 collected during the month of January. As of 15 February the exchange of RCMs between Rwanda and Burundi remained suspended due to the general insecurity prevailing in Burundi.

VI. REHABILITATION, RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT

34. On the first anniversary of the Geneva Round Table conference disbursements by donor countries reached US\$ 404 million, representing nearly 70% of pledges made by donors in January 1995. Donors' disbursements have accelerated over the last quarter of 1995, which has contributed to a stabilisation of the exchange rate, reduced price inflation and a significant increase in foreign exchange reserves, bringing Rwanda's import coverage in mid-February to 5.1 months. Preparations are underway for the 1996 Round Table, due to be held on 2 and 3 May in Geneva. Three working groups have been established to focus on the Government's three priority areas: justice and security, capacity building, and the transition from humanitarian assistance to development. Support documents outlining their strategies on each of these topics are being prepared by various Ministries, with the support of UNDP, UNICEF and WFP.

35. Progress is being made regarding rehabilitation of the justice system. The Ministry of Justice has communicated its revised plan for UNDP's "Rehabilitation of the Justice System" project. The plan proposes the recruitment of ten legal advisors to assist in the establishment of "special chambers" to handle genocide cases, which must be viewed in light of the recommendations made by the Conference on Genocide held in Kigali from 1st to 5th November, as mentioned in my report S/1995/1002. The plan further contemplates providing enhanced remuneration for over 1,000 judicial personnel in order for the Ministry of Justice to attract qualified staff. The project will also provide equipment for the public prosecutor's office and tribunals in the prefectures.

36. The total number of detainees in Rwanda's prisons rose during the reporting period, with the largest increases seen in Kibungo and in Kigali Central Prisons. By the end of January, 65,515 detainees were registered by the ICRC in 262 places of detention. Transfers of prisoners were carried out from communal detention centres in Butare and Kibungo Prefectures to the Nyanza and Kibungo Prisons. An extension to Cyangugu prison, a site experiencing acute overcrowding, will be financed through a project recently approved by the Government and UNDP. ICRC began installing water/sanitation and kitchen facilities in two warehouses in Byumba and Kibungo that will serve as temporary detention sites. UNDP is constructing security perimeters at these same sites. Construction work continued on three other temporary detention sites in Kigali and Byumba. Despite these improvements,

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overcrowding in several prisons and most other places of detention remains a matter of serious concern.

37. Capacity building activities have continued during the reporting period. Phase II of the Rwandan Communal Police Training Programme signed by the Ministry of the Interior and UNDP on 18 January will fund training for a third group of 750 cadets at the training facility in Gishari and provide for the construction of living quarters for police in 100 communes. In a joint programme with UNDP, WFP is providing food for communal police trainees and continues to assist the training centre for Gendarmes in Ruhengeri.

38. In the health sector, various efforts were undertaken by WHO and UNICEF to provide equipment and supplies to hospitals and to rehabilitate health centres. Work on two hospitals in Gikongoro and Cyangugu and three health centres in Butare is expected to begin in early March. These efforts concentrated on Training and Education regarding preventive measures on contagious diseases, epidemic diseases and nutrition. To improve the quality of teaching in primary schools, UNICEF has been financing the in-service training of 5,600 under-qualified teachers. The programme, which also includes instruction in land mine and cholera awareness, is now in its final stages. UNICEF also continues to provide technical assistance and logistical support to the Government of Rwanda in its efforts to assist children in especially difficult circumstances. The Ministry of Justice, in collaboration with UNICEF, has decided to expand the "Children in Conflict with the Law" Project to include legal defence for children claiming property left by their deceased parents. UNICEF and UNESCO-PEER are collaborating with various Government ministries in the elaboration of strategies for reintegrating child detainees into the Rwandan school system.

39. As reported in December (S/1995/1002), agricultural production in Rwanda is recovering beyond initial estimates. According to the FAO/WFP crop survey for the 1996-A season and food-needs assessment report published in January, the area under cultivation in Rwanda increased by 14%, as compared to the 1995-A season. The report estimates the aggregate food production for the 1996-A season 24% higher than in the 1995-A season. The total production represents 82% of the average for 1989-1993. The largest problem facing farmers remains the low availability of inputs.

VII. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

Input from Headquarters.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS

40. As UNAMIR's final mandate draws to its conclusion, it is important that careful consideration should be given to the shape and form, of UN's presence, if any, in Rwanda after March 8. Obviously, any alternative, successor presence would have to be willingly accepted by the Government of Rwanda with whom discussions have been held on this issue through my Special Representative. Basically, the following three broad options were under consideration.

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Option A: To phase out altogether and to entrust the UN's Specialized Agencies, the International Tribunal and High Commission for Human Rights to carry out UN's agenda in Rwanda.

Option B: To have a successor political mission that would co-ordinate UN activities and would address the outstanding issues referred to in para. 3 of this report.

Option C: To have a successor mission which would, in addition to responsibilities of Option B, assume a regional role.

These Options need to be evaluated in further detail.

41. With regard to Option A, it can be argued that having assisted in achieving the present level of normalcy, stability and security, UN can hand over its future responsibility to the specialized UN Agencies. On the other hand, it can be reasoned that the outstanding agenda (para.3 above) requires a continuing political, co-ordinating successor presence to UNAMIR, {Option B}. Option C represents a laudable objective but is fraught with practical difficulties of location and relationship with my Special Representative's responsibilities in Burundi. On balance, I believe Option 'B' to be the most viable, and I note from the President of the Security Council's letter dated 13 February 1996 (S/1996/103), the Council emphatically shares this conclusion.

42. Examining Option B in greater depth and developing the concept of a successor entity to UNAMIR, it is necessary to take into account the consistent stand taken by the Government of Rwanda during previous negotiations on this issue. In a nutshell, the Government has insisted on a phase-out of the military component of UNAMIR, and the need for a UN assistance mission to provide technical assistance (engineers, doctors, experts, etc.) to address Rwanda's immediate needs of post-conflict, socio-economic infrastructural restoration. These objectives of the Security Council, on the one hand and the Rwandan Government, on the other, can be met through one of the following two formulations:

B(1) The Civilian Office

A UN civilian office [UNOR] to succeed UNAMIR with the following formulation and mandate:

(a) A civilian office headed by an SRSG which would retain the civilian element of the current UNAMIR with an appropriate scaling down of numbers based on the phase-out of the military. The SRSG would be given an enhanced co-ordinating role related to the operations of the UN Agencies, International Tribunal and HRFOR especially with a view to supervising the direction and timing of expenditures and implementation of major projects. An appropriate Trust Fund should be placed at the disposal of the SRSG and all existing Trust Fund dispensations may be made only with the approval of the Special Representative.

(b) A mandate that would entrust UNOR with achieving objectives stated in paragraph 3 above.

(c) A change in the nomenclature so that UNAMIR is succeeded by the UN Office for Rwanda (UNOR).

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- (d) UNOR may include, specifically, HRFOR as part of its operation.
- (e) Retention of Radio UN as a facility to be shared with other UN Agencies.
- (f) UNOR would retain helicopter as also a fixed wing (Beechcraft) facility to be shared with Specialized Agencies, HRFOR and the Tribunal.
- (g) International Tribunal and Deputy Prosecutor's Office would coordinate closely with UNOR but would continue to operate independently. The security of the International Tribunal and the Deputy Prosecutor's office would be the responsibility of the Tribunal.

B(ii) The Confidence Restoration Formula {UNCREMIR}

43. The second formula for a successor UN presence for UNAMIR aims to respond to the Government's consistent stand that the UN should provide direct support for socio-economic, structural restoration that bridges the gap between the end of civil war and normal development programmes by UN Agencies, World Bank, etc. In effect, this direct support aims to address peace-preservation tasks with a view to preventing a break-down of fragile stability. Consequently, the second formula envisages an expansion of the formula B(i) outlined in paragraph 42 with the following additions/amendments:

- (i) The nomenclature for the successor presence would be changed to UN Confidence Restoration Mission for Rwanda (UNCREMIR).
- (ii) The mandate, in addition to items (a) through (e) in paragraph 42 above would include:
 - (a) Employing logistic/construction units [engineers, logistic, communications units] whose tasks would be to provide a rapid response to construction/logistics projects in support of the Government, UN Agencies and NGO in their rehabilitation and socio-economic infrastructural restoration efforts.
 - (b) Transporting material for returnee housing and social infrastructure such as schools, clinics.
 - (c) Preparation of returnee transit camps and commune level resettlement camps.
 - (d) Providing assistance to support survivors of genocide in rural areas and towns.
 - (e) Monitoring resettlement programs.
 - (f) Repairing of roads and bridges, water, power and communications.
 - (g) Assisting in the improvement of prison facilities.
 - (g) Assisting in de-mining and de-mobilization projects.

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44. In order to achieve this objective that would aim to respond to Rwanda's expectations, the ideal solution would be to introduce civilian engineering, logistic units to perform the tasks outlined in paragraph 43. However, funding for such an operation would come from voluntary contributions and, in any case, it is unlikely that civilian units would be available from member States to take over these functions. Thus, for practical reasons of finding time and space, a civilian component cannot realistically be expected to fulfil this task.

45. The alternative to a civilian unit is for the existing military component of UNAMIR, consisting of engineers, logistic and communications units, supported by a minimum number of support troops, to take over the responsibility for the expanded mandate outlined at paragraph 43 above. Should this formulation be acceptable to the Government of Rwanda, it is necessary to point out that the new mandate would be carried out with the revised nomenclature (UNCREMIR), a new mandate as at paragraph 43 with no security tasks except its own protection and with the existing component of UNAMIR's military contingent which has a total of 1400.

46. In my assessment the first formula at paragraph 42 represents the minimum common denominator of the objectives aiming to be achieved by the UN, the Security Council and by the Government.

47. The second formula at paragraph 43 would need to be accepted, in writing, by the Government of Rwanda as it has previously firmly opposed the continued presence of any UN military contingent in Rwanda. It would also need to have the acceptance of the Security Council as a peace-keeping operation financed by assessed contributions. In this context, I would like to add that similar post-conflict peace-preservation operations have been carried out by UN armed contingents in Somalia, Haiti, Salvador etc. funded by UN Peace-Keeping budgets.

48. As regards the issue of equipment, I shall recommend to the appropriate legislative body of the UN that in consonance with Paragraph 7 of Security Council Resolution 1029(1995) and the President of the Security Council's letter dated 13 February 1996 (S/1996/103) that within the prescribed regulations of the UNGA, as much non-lethal material as possible may be left behind by UNAMIR for use in Rwanda.

49. The Security Council may wish to ensure with the cooperation of the Government of Rwanda, that the equipment to be transferred out of Rwanda is transported smoothly. Also that the remaining issues of tax dues from contractors, amendments to SOFA and other administration issues are resolved in a spirit of cooperation and flexibility.

50. I would also recommend that measures to prevent armed infiltration into Rwanda from neighbouring refugee camps may be supported as recommended by the International Inquiry Commission in its final report to be submitted later this month.


51. As regards the voluntary return of refugees, the current efforts of the UNHCR and member states deserve to be encouraged and supported. Development projects aiming at the resettlement and rehabilitation of returning refugees deserve to be given full support.

52. I welcome the International Tribunal for Rwanda announcement of further indictments and that trials are expected to start in March 1996. I hope that the national judicial system will also begin holding trials from April, as stated by the Rwandan Minister of Justice. Both the international and national systems of justice deserve to be supported not only with a view to banishing the climate of impurity and providing transparent justice to 65,515 detainees in

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Rwandan prisons but also to encourage the process of reconciliation at all levels of society in Rwanda.

53. I also welcome the improvement in relations between countries of the Great Lakes Region. I believe that durable peace in the region would be assisted by the holding of a well prepared regional conference that has the support of all member states.



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UNITED NATIONS
UNAMIR MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

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OUTGOING CODE CABLE

TO: KITTANI/GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: GHAREKHAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

FROM: KHAN, UNAMIR, KIGALI

DATE: 17 FEBRUARY 1996

NO.: MIR - 408

NO. OF PAGES: 1

SUBJECT: Lessons-Learned Team's visit to UNAMIR

1. Reference is made to your code cable 459 by which you informed us that a team from the Lessons-Learned Unit of DPKO comprising two staff members and one external expert would visit UNAMIR from 23 February to 2 March 1996.

2. My colleagues and myself welcome the proposed mission and would be glad to share our experience with its members. However, the projected timing of the visit does not seem appropriate as most components of UNAMIR would be engaged in a number of urgent tasks during that period. We would therefore suggest anytime after 8 March.

3. Best regards.