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ACC. 1978/0003

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UNAMIR/NICOY/7404.9/G

HQ NICOY
UNAMIR HQ
BYUMBA CAMP SECTOR 1
BYUMBA

See Distribution

14 Oct 94

PRELIMINARY RECCE REPORT OF SECTOR 2

Reference:

A. FRAGO 06/94 dated 12 Oct 94.

1. Preliminary Recce of Sector 2B was carried out on 13 Oct 94, by a team from NICOY. The team Recce the CANCON location at KIBUNGO and it's environ.

2. On arrival, the team was received and briefed using OP Map of the Sector by the CANCON Commander. The brief was preceeded by a recce tour of KIBUNGO and surrounding towns. While on recce, the team noted a good number of returnee in the area. These facts, is proofed by the following:

- a. Good turn out of the returned Refugee.
- b. Impressive commercial activities.
- c. The usual road blocks and serchs conducted by RPA.

3. However the immediate deployment of NICOY Platoon to this area may not be possible due to lack of some important and obvious facilities by UNAMIR in the Sector. At the moment the NICOY is still building up in strength and materials, thus could not readily provide the lacking items in this loc. These lacked facilities and items are as follows:

- a. Communication Requirement. The issue of communication for NICOY platoon in the Sector has been made known to the UNAMIR Force Signal Officer. The communication requirement for this platoon is listed in the Annex A to this report.
- b. Accommodation of the Troops. The present location has no provision for accommodation of the troops. The alternative ehoice is the use of tent shelters in the open. The sanitation of the area will be neglected if field toilets are not constructed to serve the troops. Likewise the need for electric generator and deep freezer for storage of fresh food for the troops. For detail accommodation requirement See annex B.
- c. Field Engineer tools for the platoon. As the troops are to be located in the open, there is need for some measures of field defences, to cordon off unauthorized persons to the area. The requirement for this are listed in Annex C.

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d. The vehicle/POL requirement. For effective operation, the platoon needs to be highly mobile to cover the Sector 2. In the absence of the Armoured personnel carriers, the soft skin vehicles are suggested. Each vehicle is expected to cover a distance of two thousand kms per week during active patrols, thus the need to provide the platoon with enough POL. See Annex D to the report for Veh/POL requirement.

CONCLUSION

4. The NICOY Recce report on the requirement necessary for the deployment of its platoon in Sector 2 is a continuous one but for now we hope the accommodation, logistic, Engineer and Veh/POL requirements highlighted in this brief will make it possible to deploy with minimum waste of time. NICOY is coy ever ready to deploy as directed but the back up required is what may be causing the delay once this is met, the platoon will be in place.

G. Lawal

G. LAVAL
Maj
for Cont Comd.

Annexes:

- A. Communication Requirements for NIG P1 GP Deployment in Sector 2B KIBONGO.
- B. Accommodation store Requirement.
- C. Engineer Requirement.
- D. Vehicle/POL Requirement.

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ANNEX A TO
UNAMIR/NICOY/7404.9/G
DATED 11 OCT 94

COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR NIG
PL GP DEPLOYMENT IN SECTOR 2B KIBONGO

1. Based on the discussion between the NICOY Signal Officer and the UNAMIR Force Signal Officer, the following comm requirements are hereby made:

a. Setting up of a motorollar Repeater Station and the provision of:-

- (1) 10 x Handheld motorollar Radio Sets.
- (2) 20 x motorollar Radio Set Batteries.
- (3) 10 x motorollar Battery chargers.
- (4) Any assessories needed for the motorollar comm system not mentioned in sub- paragraphs a(1) - (3) above.

b. Establishment of effective communication links between BYUMBA - KICALI - KIBONGO and vice versa to enable the NICOY Commander exercise direct Command and control on the NIG platoon GP in KIBONGO.

2. It is however very necessary to meet the above communication requirements before the deployment of the NIG platoon on 17 Oct 94.

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ANNEX B TO
UNAMIR/NICoy/7404.9/9
DATED 14 OCT 94

ACCOMMODATION STORE REQUIREMENT

Serial (a)	Items (b)	Quantity (c)	Remarks (d)
1.	Teulages	10	Ten - Man Tent
2.	Generator Set (25kv)	2	2.5 KVA
3.	Hurricane lamps	4	
4.	20 Ltrs jerricans	20	
5.	Buckets (10 Litres)	20	
6.	Cooking Pots large	4	
7.	Cooking Pots medium	4	
8.	Deep freezer	1	
9.	Field kitchen/Gas Cooker	1	
10.	Spoon Scoop large	3	

FIELD TOILET AND SANITATION

(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Corrigated Iron Sheet	5 Bundles	
2.	Timber (Lumbers)		
	2"x6"x8'	40 pbs	
	4"x6"x8'	40 "	
	2"x6"x8'	40 "	
3.	Plywood	25 pcs	
4.	Roofing Nails	2 Pkts	
5.	Nails		
	Sizes: 2"	25 kg	
	3"	25 kg	
	4"	25 kg	
	5"	25 kg	
6.	Cement	500 kg	
7.	Jerry cans (20 ltrs)	25	
8.	Surface tanks (1000 ltrs)	2	
9.	Water pumping set	2	

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ANNEX C TO
UNAMIR/NECOY/7404.9/G
DATED 11 OCT 94

ENGINEER REQUIREMENT

1. FIELD DEFENCE STORES

Serial	Items	Qty Required	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	Concertina Wire	6 Reels	
2.	Barbed Wire	6 Reels	
3.	Binding Wire	1 Reel	
4.	Pick axes	20 Pcs	
5.	Shovels	20 "	
6.	Sand Bags	3 Sets	
7.	Hammer (big)	3	
8.	Wire Hand gloves	5 Pairs	
9.	Matchet	30	

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ANNEX D TO
UNAMIR/NICOY/7404.9/G
DATED 15 OCT 94

VEHICLE/POL REQUIREMENT

Serial	Designation	Quantity	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
1.	5 ton truck	6	
2.	AGO (Diesel)	500L/Wk	
3.	Kerosine (DPK)	100L/Wk	
4.	LPG	41kg bottle/month	

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Minute

File file
file

From: Col J Arp
DCOS Ops
HQ UNAMIR

Ext No: 11186

To: DFC /COS

Date: 11 Oct 94

Subject: OP HOMEWARD REPORT

Ref: My minute covering G3 Plans 3 Synopsis.

1. As long as we have transport capability available, we can pursue the continuation of Op Homeward; however, once all contingents are in the AOR we will probably have to curtail our activity.
2. The coord of this type of task is ideal for Tac HQ due to its location etc, however, I am not sure that we should continue to man it to the current level. I would suggest that 1x Maj, 1x Capt, + HAC LO and RPA LO in addition to the sigs det should be sufficient to complete Op Homeward C2 and can be augmented as required for new tasks in the future.
3. In light of our Staff Officer ceiling of 43; which we will propose to UNHQ should increase to about 60 (without Tac HQ), I am not sure that we can substantiate a larger HQ if we want to fully man Tac HQ as well. I am less certain of what we can do with Tac HQ COO with respect to reemployment.
4. Your direction pls.

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[Signature]

21/10/94

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To: Distribution List

From: Col H. Osae-Addae, COO, TAC HQ Butare

Date: 29 September 1994

Subject: OPERATION HOMEWARD

References: A. Estimate prepared by LCol P Desnoyers dated 16 September 1994
B. Fragmentary Order to Operation Order No. 18 Op Homeward dated 18 September 1994

Background

1. On 16 September, LCol Desnoyers, newly appointed as Deputy Chief HAC created reference A to take advantage of a temporary surplus of UNAMIR vehs. The intent was to use these vehicles to assist NGO's in the return of IDP's to their homes before the rains render the camps difficult/impossible to support. The stated aim was "to propose a military option to assist relief agencies" in the relocation of IDP's. HQ UNAMIR adopted this proposal and issued reference B two days later. LCol Desnoyers called and chaired a meeting of NGO's and UN agencies at TAC HQ Butare on 29 September at which it was obvious that the civilian attendees had no prior knowledge of the initiative. At subsequent working meetings at TAC HQ it was obvious that the same individuals/agencies were both suspicious and unclear about what was perceived as a military solution foisted on them by UNAMIR: much laborious and repetitive explanation was required to reinforce the concept that UNAMIR was merely to help facilitate their actions. Further, it was obvious that they could not make themselves ready at the speed envisaged in the original estimate.

2. Preliminary meetings were held on 20 and 21 September and working/coordination conferences on 23, 24, and 25 September. Op Homeward began 26 September. Coordination meetings are held at TAC HQ every night except Fridays. They are meant to include all NGO's and UN agencies as well as RPA and Prefecture reps and of course TAC HQ which includes Brit MovCon.

Aim

3. To examine Op Homeward to identify lessons learned and recommend a way ahead.

Factors

4. The factors considered at reference A will be re-assessed in light of practical experience as follows:

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DCOS OPS

This is the report I spoke about. See my annotations. This report was not copied to me and I don't know why. Please read the whole report and let us have your views. Meanwhile I think we should retain the HQ at Butare whilst we contemplate a re-org and re-assessment.

H. O. S.
10-10-94
DFC/1

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a. **Will to Return Home:**

- (1) **Security.** The perception of safety is as important as the reality. Rumours of RPA retribution and, at the least, RPA harshness, abound. They come from various sources but share the common feature that they are easier to start than to stop. From the outset TAC HQ has vigorously pursued rumours and dubious/incomplete reports of all natures from all sources but TAC HQ's resources are not equal to the task. The lack of a massive, high-level counter-propaganda campaign is crippling, at best. Further, the NGO's and agencies will have no part of any such campaigns and resist so strongly that it may reasonably be argued that their lack of active support for relocation is perceived by the Rwandese as tacit support of the stay-put attitude. Since UNAMIR assists relief agencies and since the agencies control, in one way or another, the movement, the perception of safety as portrayed by the agencies outweighs the reality;
- (2) **Humanitarian Assistance Dependency.** The view from TAC HQ is that the IDP's are already dependent on the relief effort. More to the point, as long as a lack of safety is perceived, the indignity of a refugee camp is the lesser of two evils. It is noteworthy that if the rainy season will reduce/curtail the relief effort to some camps, it will at the same time reduce security within those camps by reducing the hours and randomness of observation by both UNAMIR and the relief agencies. It is argued by some that this is part of the RPA hidden agenda;
- (3) **Propaganda.** Discussed above; and
- (4) **Deduction.** The IDP's presently lack the will to return home as they perceive themselves better off where they are. This situation must deteriorate with the onset of the rains by which time the task of relocation/support will be more difficult and resources less plentiful. The desire to return home must be injected now if the status quo is to be avoided.

b. **Health Conditions.** Medical screenings are not always done and are usually cursory at best. They should be considered desirable not mandatory;

c. **RPA Verifications.** The RPA steadfastly refuse to conduct screenings in camps. To date they have been somewhat intransigent about improving their system to increase throughput. Cooperation is improving in some areas but high-level pressure must be applied to gain full cooperation and maximum efficiency in the verification process. As a start, direction from the RPA Chief LO that the local LO attend all coordination conferences and be available 7/24 (assignment of assistants?), would be most useful;

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- The prefects cannot.
- d. Final Destinations. Attendance of the receiving Prefects at coordination conferences is sporadic. Further, their ability to project themselves into the receiving commune/sector either personally or through their subordinates is either lacking or not being pursued aggressively. Prefects must place more emphasis on and effort into the positive reception of returnees: this must include positive control of the RPA garrison;
- e. Road Conditions. The assumption made by LCol Desnoyers remains valid. However, see staging;
- f. UNHCR/IOM Staging. We have avoided overnight staging where possible. As 90% of the population live away from urban centers, so they also live well off surfaced roads. This means that military-type vehicles are required for both ends of a trip although not necessarily in the middle. Overnighting, therefore, reduces available lift and should be avoided. We have developed alternate methods of providing the essential start-up ingredients;
- g. Mass Population Effect. No impact yet observed as relocation effort is in the hands of relief agencies who will not be seen to encourage return;
- h. Location of Camps. Although most are in Sector 4 as stated, the estimated population is questioned for several reasons. Airborne/satellite sensing devices should be employed to accurately identify the dimensions of the problem including internal migration on a regular and frequent basis;
- from what source?
- j. Available UNHCR/IOM Resources. Assumption correct but not necessarily pertinent. See Staging; and
- k. Available UNAMIR Resources. Assumption was optimistic. A more reasonable assumption is 30-50 vehicles.

Other Factors

5. Other factors worthy of consideration are:

- a. Will to Walk. Considered by LCol Desnoyers under Mass Population Effect as the willingness to walk home once the migration had started. This view is not shared by TAC HQ. The Rwandese walked for their lives and, given the degree of support available in the camps, will probably not walk home unless forced to;
- b. Reception on Return. One aspect overlooked is the return of refugees from previous conflicts. They now live in the homes of the current IDP's and bear a grudge;

- c. RPA Hidden Agenda. The RPA are intransigent to an almost inexplicable degree. Assurances given at national level in Kigali are not translated into action on the ground. One argument advanced is that the RPA are as well-behaved as they are because they know their turn is coming when the rains isolate the camps from prying eyes. This is perhaps reinforced by an often-stated RPA point of view (local) that those in Sector 4 probably have something to hide. The status quo in Sector 4 can thus be preceived as a target of opportunity. While this hypothesis is not necessarily supported, its' potential implication are too great to be overlooked; and
- d. Appropriate Agencies. The initial meeting and the subsequent coordination conference included the agencies from Butare area. It became clear later that the Gikongoro area reps of those agencies must also be included in the operation as they are almost separate entities and communications between different offices of the same agency is not what we are accustomed to in the Army. Including them in the coordination Conferences however is cumbersome and problematic. For the time-being it is sufficient that the Butare rep coordinates with the Gikongoro rep after a TAC HQ conference but this is potentially a weak link. Care must be taken to ensure coordination between different Sector reps of agencies is effected.

Conclusions

6. It is concluded that:

- a. Op Homeward, while disappointing to date, is probably the best available option albeit in a modified form. It enjoys the advantage of being in place so that relief agencies don't have to be reconvinced;
- b. current UNAMIR capability will achieve at best a limited result;
- c. the agencies and NGO's must either positively support Op Homeward and BBGNU resources employed to a much greater degree for best results;
- ✓ d. more UNAMIR resources should be dedicated to counter-propaganda;
- e. rumour quashing must receive higher priority;
- who will? f. the RPA must be compelled to effect closer liaison with TAC HQ;
- will take h. g. local civil authorities must be more closely integrated;
- h. overnighting should be avoided; and
- j. the number of IDP's must be more accurately identified.

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Options

7. There appear to be three options:

- a. maintain status quo. Op Homeward will, at best, achieve extremely limited results;
- b. cancel Op Homeward. While this would avoid a very heavy resource bill for minimum return this option is unconscionable; or
- c. adopt a more vigorous approach to Op Homeward.

Recommendation

8. It is recommended that Op Homeward continue (Option C) with the following modifications:

When local govt auth should be w-ward.
the relief agencies or the BBGNU be coopted to pursue a vigorous relocation propaganda campaign;

Do they have?
b. every effort be made to maximize transport resources, perhaps employing RPA vehicles;

c. counter-propaganda be emphasized to include rumour quashing as a high priority;

In any case it will be improper stopping it
✓ d. the RPA and local civil authorities be directed by their central command to participate fully;

e. the number of IDP's be more accurately identified using airborne sensors; and

f. TAC HQ continue to conduct Op Homeward focused on Sector 4 and incorporate the other refinements mentioned above.

H. Osae-Addae
Col
Comd TAC HQ

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RPA ATTITUDES AND COOPERATION IN OP HOMEWARD

1. The first organizational meeting for OP HOMEWARD on 20 Sep 94 was well attended by the RPA and the civil authorities; the Prefects for Gikongoro and Butare were present as were the Sous-Prefect and the RPA LO to TACHQ. Arriving late for the meeting were two representatives from the Ministries of Rehabilitation and of the Interior. Unfortunately these officials did not get a chance to address the meeting regarding the Government's position towards OP HOMEWARD. Nonetheless Capt Zegara, the Prefect for Gikongoro assured the meeting that the Government fully supported the operation although lacking the resources to take a major part. He emphasized however that security measures would not be compromised for the sake of speed in moving people.
2. Following the meeting, the representatives from Kigali spoke with the Prefects but it is not known what was discussed nor whether their discussion carried on after leaving the OP HOMEWARD meeting.
3. A second organizational meeting was held on the evening of 21 Sep 94 where again the RPA and civil authorities from the previous meeting were in attendance. The position of the government was again reiterated and their concern emphasized that action had to be taken to return people to their homes as soon as possible. At all times it was stressed that the operation was a cooperative venture between UNAMIR, the NGO and the Government of Rwanda.
4. The first coordination conference was held on 23 Sep with the Sous-Prefect for Butare and the RPA LO in attendance. It was identified that the Kizi checkpoint would become a bottle neck to the operation unless additional personnel were assigned to the search of baggage and registration of individuals. The RPA LO in addition to saying that he would be present at the checkpoint also agreed to provide additional personnel and it was suggested to him that two searchers and one register be assigned to each truck load of people arriving at Kizi so as to minimize delay. It was forecast that the convoy packets would likely be 10 vehicles in size however no specific numbers of vehicles could be determined at this point and thus the actual number of people necessary to man Kizi checkpoint could not be given. This detail would only have been available at the Sunday night, 25 Sep, conference.
5. The problem with the physical layout/separation of the security check and registration points was identified and an offer was made by an NGO group to set up a ~~mass~~ processing site at Kizi to handle large numbers of people quickly and with security. It appeared that the RPA LO would not entertain any suggestion of

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changing the layout of the checkpoint nor any explanation of what was envisioned. Consequently, he rejected the offer of resources to process people. Several subsequent attempts by both the military and NGO to explain what was being offered were rejected as was an offer to recce Kizi checkpoint on Saturday afternoon 24 Sep. The reason given for not wanting to recce Kizi checkpoint is that the RPA LO knew what the site looked like.

6. There was no representation at the 24 Sep coordination conference by either the civil authority or the RPA LO; although the LO was at TACHQ several hours before the meeting for 30-40 minutes and did not advise that he would be absent from that night's meeting nor the one scheduled for the following evening.

7. The coordination meeting on 25 Sep 94 was the final coordinating meeting for the lift scheduled on Monday 26 Sep. It was a critical meeting as all tasks were finalized and/or confirmed except those of the RPA at Kizi checkpoint. The only representation from the civil authority was the Sous-Prefect who could not comment upon the manning of Kizi.

8. The operation commenced at 0800 hrs, Monday, 26 Sep and the RPA LO was not available nor was Kizi checkpoint manned with sufficient people to handle the volume of transported persons envisioned. The lift went faster than expected and the first truck arrived at about 0900 and there was only one person searching baggage and one person at the registration point. Attempts to find that RPA LO, Prefect or a responsible individual at RPA Brigade Headquarters (the Commander or a Duty Officer) proved unsuccessful. The LO eventually appeared at about 1030 hrs saying that he had come from Kigali. He was surprised that there was a problem as personnel had been detailed for the checkpoint. Eventually the personnel were found and the problem resolved. It was fortunate though that only half the displaced persons registered for the move in fact showed up for the vehicles.

9. The atmosphere in the following three nightly meetings slowly degenerated between the RPA/civil authority and the NGOs because of a divergence in attitudes regarding the perceived security situation in Sector 3 and who OP HOMEWARD was serving; the people of Rwanda as typified by the displaced people or the Government of Rwanda. This was a situation which had not existed previously as the reluctance of people to return was not known. No senior member of the civil authority was present hence the RPA dominated what was largely a civil affairs matter. The RPA maintained that the NGOs were responsible for spreading rumors/not supporting the legal authority of the Rwanda government including straying beyond their (NGO) mandate if they question people on their state of well being and/or report any suspicions to UNAMIR. The NGOs countered that the RPA were insensitive to the rights of individuals and being purposely difficult to work with.

10. As a result of the friction between the RPA and NGOs, the Prefect Security officer and Maj Wilson (suspected of being the

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Brigade Information Officer) attended the last coordination meeting for the first week's task of OP HOMEWARD. Maj Wilson requested a meeting with the UNAMIR staff following the conference and in a purely military audience confided that the RPA consider the NGOs as a subversive element and asked that UNAMIR be cognizant of hidden agendas on the part of the NGOs. This meeting was also used to air some outstanding local grievances on the part of UNAMIR forces from TACHQ and MILOB sector 4A:

- a. the availability of the RPA LOs at TACHQ and Gikongoro was discussed in that their attendance was irregular and that they had conflicting priorities. A suggestion was made for the RPA to assign more LOs to each location so that there would be someone available whenever they were needed.
- b. the denial of access to non-military facilities and restrictions on the freedom of movement of UNAMIR troops. It was explained that such actions hamper the ability for UNAMIR to gather evidence to refute rumors and in fact add to the problem the RPA are experiencing with distrust by the populous.
- c. the unwillingness of civil authorities to visit camps in Sector 4A so as to appease the inhabitants request for information on what the government is doing and what the people can expect if they return home.
- d. the lack of direct face to face communications between senior RPA officers and senior UNAMIR officers to resolve problems rather than passing messages among intermediaries.

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ANNEX B TO
TAC HQ
OP HOMEWARD DATED
29 SEPT 94

PSYOPS ASPECTS OF OP HOMEWARD - RECOMMENDED TACTICS

ASSUMPTIONS

- * That a large proportion of IDP's believe that they are guilty of a crime committed during the recent war. They are currently unaware of the scope of the RPA's intentions to apply the process of law to those returning to their home locations.
- * That the IDP's are better provided with food, shelter, water, health care and security in the refugee camps than in their home locations.

STRATEGY

- * Any PSYOPS effort must be coordinated at the highest level.
- * PSYOPS will not be effective unless it is seen as clear Government policy with the support and involvement of UNAMIR.
- * NGO support of a PSYOPS campaign is fundamental to it's success. They need to be convinced that the concept is sound in terms of the Government's commitment to the provision of both a secure environment for returnees and a legal process which is open to public scrutiny.
- * The sources of current anti RPA propaganda need to be identified.
- * The RPA must be persuaded that there is a need for the investigation of both actual incidents and rumours of same. Subsequent dissemination of the findings of these investigations is necessary.
- * NGO effort be redirected to regional centers to facilitate the transition from refugee camps to home locations.

METHODOLOGY

- * Monitoring of radio transmissions carrying anti RPA/Government propaganda.

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- * Jamming of illegal transmitters.
- * Radio broadcasts of government policy including:
 - a. Method of resolution of house and land ownership disputes;
 - b. explanation of Government's intentions regarding prosecution of alleged criminals; and
 - c. continuing support of NGOs and presence of UNAMIR forces in home locations.
- * Leaflet campaigns supplementing radio broadcasts.
- * Use of transportable loud speaker systems to disseminate information and detail of Op Homeward timings, destination, reception arrangements, etc.
- * A concerted effort by UNAMIR and other UN agencies to investigate reports of any incidents which suggest subversive activity, anti-government action, RPA activity which falls outside stated Government policy and any other incidents which impact on the security situation. Freedom of movement for UNAMIR forces and the candid passage of information between the RPA and UNAMIR are critical to this aspect of operations.
- * Use of both radio and transportable loud speaker system to provide results of investigations into both illegal radio broadcast and specific rumours effecting individual camps or areas.
- * Ensure that NGO presence in rural areas is coordinated to provide adequate coverage for returned persons.

B-2/2

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PRIORITY

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PAASZYUW RCCLFNA0004 2561400-SSSS--RCCLKSA.

ZNY SSSSS/PPPPP

P 131316Z SEP 94

FM DHTC OTTAWA

TO RCCLKSA/CCUNAMIR RWANDA

INFO RCCPJSA/NDHQ OTTAWA//ACOS J3//

BT

S E C R E T EXCLUSIVE FOR COS UNAMIR AND NDHQ OTTAWA ACOS J3 204

SUBJ: OP FLAGRANT - DEPLOYMENT OF DHTC MBRS

REF: NDHQ OTTAWA DCDS 207 091630Z SEP 94

1. THIS TO ADVISE THAT THE FIRST TEAM LEAD BY CAPT MIKE DAY WILL ARRIV
IN KIGALI ON FLT NO 7136 SCHEDULED TO ARRIV 151200 SEP

2. WE DO NOT HAVE COPY OF COMDS ROE. GRATEFUL IF TEAM COULD BE
BRIEFED IAW REF PARA C 5 AND PROVIDED WITH A COPY OF SAME

3. ANTICIPATE THE FIRST ROTATION OF PERS NOT BEFORE 17 OCT SUBJECT TO
YOUR DIRECTION

4. MOST GRATEFUL FOR YOUR SP EXCLAM

5. UBIQUE

BT

#0004

93BV021 DELIVERED 2561418 911215

4 pers

1 capt
1 Sgt

ADC
Drd they finally come?
15/9
DTC

ADC

Sir,

4 Canadians arrived yesterday:

1 x Capt

1 x Sgt

1 x CPL

1 x MCPL

16/9
DTC

So what are they
here for? Do you
understand OP FLAGRANT?
DHTC MBRS? Your
findings must be complete

16/9
DTC/CW

SECRET

UN CONFIDENTIAL

G2 Cell
HQ UNAMIR

// Sep 94

G2/2000

See Distribution

FORCE COMMANDERS PRIMARY INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
- SUPPLEMENTARY REQUIREMENTS

Reference:

A. Force Commanders Primary Information Requirements Dated 10 Sep 94.

1. The following primary information requirements have been identified in addition to those listed at Reference A.

a. Determine the original homes of the refugees/DPs in the camps in order to facilitate their return.

b. Determine whether the RGF are being paid and if so, by whom?

c. Identify the location of any mass graves and a description of such graves to indicate whether or not they are above or below ground.

d. Determine any action required to ensure that mass graves do not become a risk to health.

2. The above information requirements are to be added to Reference A.

GII

*Seen but how do we follow-up?
you must have a check list
by the units on all the points.*

[Signature]

*15/9
DFC/WS*

Kamange
C E KAMANGE
Maj
For FC

UN CONFIDENTIAL

UN CONFIDENTIAL

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Action:

TAC HQ
MILOB GP HQ
BRITCON
1 CDHSR
AUSMED
GHABATT
ETHIOBATT
FRAFBATT
MALAWICOY
ZAMBATT
TUNBATT
NIGBATT
CIVPOL

Internal:

Action:

FC
DFC
DCOS Ops

UN CONFIDENTIAL

8/7

*I want some re-action
from Ghazni on this.*
*17/9
DFC/COS*

UN RESTRICTED

UNAMIR
Force HQ
Ops Branch

To: See distribution
From: Force Commander
Date: 10 September 1994

Subject: FORCE COMMANDER'S DIRECTIVE
AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 9: OPERATIONAL DIRECTIVE
NO. 02

Reference: Operational Directive No. 2 dated 22 Jul 94

1. In order to simplify and clarify the UNAMIR Rules of Engagement, effective forthwith paragraphs 7, 24 and 26 are to be amended as follows:

A. AMEND PARA 7 TO READ:

"AUTHORIZATION LEVELS FOR THE USE OF FORCE

7. The use of deadly force for the different types of weapons systems will be authorised as follows:

a. Force Commander or His Delegate:

(1) heavy support weapons (i.e. rocket launchers, artillery pieces, light mortars, etc.); and

(1) heavy machine guns or cannons (.50 cal, 20 mm etc.).

b. In situations which are life threatening to UNAMIR troops, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, soldiers may use the following weapons:

(1) medium machine guns (i.e. FN MAG, M60, etc.)

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- (2) light machine guns; and
 - (3) all personal weapons on automatic or single shot fire.
- c. In situations which are not life threatening to soldiers, members of their unit or those they are ordered to protect, the use of deadly force for the different types of weapons will be authorised as follows:
- (1) Sector Commanders:
 - (a) medium machine guns (i.e. FN MAG, M 60, etc.),
 - (b) light machine guns; and
 - (c) all personal weapons on automatic fire.
 - (2) Battalion Commander down to NCO level at the scene of a threat:
 - (a) personal weapons for single shot fire.

NOTE: Commanders should be aware when using weapons of the principles of military necessity and proportionality."

B. AMEND PARA 24 AS FOLLOWS:

"Rule No. 5 Intervention and Warning Shots

- a. State A: Intervention between warring factions is prohibited.
- b. State B: Intervention with deadly force against positively identified and designated targets only after warning shots have been fired as part of the warning process."

C. AMEND PARA 26 AS FOLLOWS:

"26. There are three ROE states that may apply in any given sector in Rwanda. These states are GREEN, YELLOW and RED and are described on UNAMIR Levels of Readiness/Alert pages in the directive subsequent to Annex A. In normal circumstances, the ROE status shall be GREEN.


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NOTE: Changes in the normal status of the ROE for UNAMIR Forces as a whole will be ordered by the Force Commander or his delegate. Sector Commanders may order changes in normal status of the ROE for their sectors, if authorised by the Force Commander or his delegate. Contingent Commanders will inform or, if necessary, seek approval from national authority for the change in status."

2. Contingent Commanders of all contributing nations are also directed to obtain the appropriate national authority and concurrence for these amendments in order to achieve uniformity among all UNAMIR personnel.

3. Furthermore, Contingent Commanders are directed to ensure that all subordinate personnel are properly briefed and that ROE aide-mémoires are amended accordingly.



Guy C. Tousignant
Major-General
Force Commander

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FORCE COMMANDER'S PRIMARY INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

a. The UNAMIR Force Commander has identified severe gaps in the process for the collection, collation and dissemination of information deemed critical to the success of the UNAMIR mission.

b. The following information requirements have been identified by the UNAMIR Force Commander and all action addressees should attempt to fill them as a matter of urgency.

2. REFUGEE/DP MOVEMENT AND CAMP CONDITIONS

a. Identify all refugee and displaced person camps in Rwanda and surrounding countries.

b. Determine numbers and direction of flow of refugees in Rwanda and the surrounding area.

c. Determine the structure and organisation of each of the refugee and DP camps, to include the number of people in each camp.

d. Determine the conditions in each of the refugee camps, to include;

i. Death rate.

ii. Amount of food and water available.

iii. Harassment of refugees.

iv. Any outbreaks of disease.

e. Determine whether the population in the camps is prepared to return to their homes.

f. Identify the number and location of any weapons which may be in the hands of Refugees/DPs.

3. RGF DISPOSITIONS AND INTENTIONS

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- a. Identify the location of large groups of former RGF troops (to include those within refugee camps).
- b. Identify the location of any caches of food, ammunition or weapons which the former RGF may have made.
- c. Identify the leaders of the former RGF, their place in the hierarchy and the extent of their influence over the RGF and refugee population. Identify whether the influence enjoyed by the leaders of the former RGF over their forces is reducing.
- d. Determine the offensive capability of the former RGF, to include:
 - i. Weapon numbers and types.
 - ii. Locations of any weapons (especially any heavy weapons).
 - iii. Any training or supplies from a foreign power.
 - iv. The state of morale and discipline.
 - v. Amount of C Sups available.
 - vi. Number and type of vehicles at their disposal.
- e. Determine the intentions of the former RGF. Are they re-equipping or re-organising to begin a conventional or insurgent campaign against RWANDA.

3. INTERAHAMWE ACTIVITY

- a. Identify any attacks carried out by INTERAHAMWE.
- b. Determine where and when INTERAHAMWE supporters meet and the number of supporters attending each meeting.

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4. MASS GRAVES AND WAR CRIMINALS

- a. The location of any mass graves.
- b. The approximate number of bodies contained in each grave.
- c. The names and likely locations of any suspected war criminals.

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