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G3 OPERATIONS / PLANS

18 JUNE 1994 - 18 DEC 1995

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
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BOX 145

FILE 7

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From _____ 19__

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NOTE


DFC

Attached please find a EU document listing Rwandan refugees communes of origin dated 30 November 1995.


The SRSg considers that this is an important paper which could be of immediate use to the HAC cell (and perhaps others) for the upkeep of their data base.

We have kept a photocopy.

Best regards.


Isel Rivero, SA/SRSg
18 December 1995



18/12

1. Keep a photo copy with us.
2. Send a copy each to
 - HAC
 - 
 - and Dcos (ops).



EUROPEAN COMMISSION

With compliments of



EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
HUMANITARIAN OFFICE
Rue de Genève, 3
1140 Brussels
Belgium

*En restant à votre disposition
pour de plus amples renseignements,*

B. Artigaut



We should send a
copy to M.I. because they
need to have info in their
data base. See
18-12

Etude sur les communes
d'origine des réfugiés rwandais

30 novembre 1995

L'objectif de ce document est de présenter les diverses communes qui seront touchées par le rapatriement des populations rwandaises réfugiées à l'extérieur du pays depuis le mois d'avril 1994.

La majorité des données citées proviennent des recensements opérés par les différents bureaux du Haut Commissariat des Nations Unies pour les Réfugiés dans les pays d'asile.

Toutefois, ces données restent, malgré l'excellent travail réalisé par les équipes du terrain, sujettes à modification, étant donné les diverses causes possibles d'erreur (refus ou mauvaises informations fournies par les réfugiés de certains camps, erreurs de transcription, ...).

Les communes ainsi identifiées donnent cependant une idée des zones qui devraient accueillir les populations désireuses de rentrer au Rwanda. Cette étude devrait donc permettre d'identifier certaines communes où des travaux de réhabilitation pourraient, dès maintenant, être entamés.

Ce document tente, également, de faire un état des retours de cette population. Entre 700.000 et 800.000 réfugiés rwandais ayant quitté le pays avant les événements d'avril 1994, sont estimés être rentrés au Rwanda depuis le mois de mai 1994. Cependant, il reste difficile de définir avec précision leur destination dans le pays, étant donné qu'un grand nombre d'entre eux ne dispose pas de résidence spécifique.

Ce travail doit, bien entendu, être revu, corrigé et amélioré pour tenir compte de l'évolution permanente de la situation.

Merci à tous ceux et celles qui, de près ou de loin, y ont apporté leurs contributions et leurs soutiens.

EXPLICATION DES TABLEAUX DE DONNEES

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
				Population réfugiée						Population rapatriée							
				Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE		
Communes	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu

- 1- Communes rwandaises triées par préfecture
- 2- Résultats provisoires du recensement général de la population rwandaise en août 1991, par le Service Statistique du MiniPlan.
- 3- Réactualisation des données de la population, en appliquant un coefficient annuel de progression de 3,01%.
- 4- Estimation par le MiniRelSo de la population actuellement présente dans les communes; elle prend également en compte les "anciens réfugiés" rentrés récemment.
Les cases [] indiquent qu'aucun chiffre n'est disponible pour le moment.
- 5- Somme des populations réfugiées par commune d'origine
- 6- Population réfugiée au Burundi par commune, suite à la réactualisation du recensement du UNHCR Burundi en juin 1995. Suite à diverses opérations, la population (au 19/11/95) est de 151.002 personnes; la différence provient de départs en Tanzanie ou de retours spontanés inconnus.
- 7- Population réfugiée à Ngara (Tanzanie) par commune, suite au recensement du UNHCR Ngara en septembre 1995. Les camps de Lukole et de Kitali n'ont pu être recensés, ils sont estimés à environ 90.000 personnes.
- 8- Population réfugiée à Karagwe (Tanzanie) par commune, suite au recensement du UNHCR Karagwe en août 1995. Cependant, 7.969 personnes n'ont pu être identifiées par commune avec précision.
- 9- Population réfugiée à Goma (Zaire) par commune, suite au recensement du UNHCR Goma en septembre 1995. Le camp du Lac Vert (+/- 51.000 personnes) n'a pu être recensé.
- 10- Population réfugiée à Uvira (Zaire) par commune, suite au recensement du UNHCR Uvira en mars 1995. Il a fallu y ajouter 13.000 personnes, suite aux événements de Kibeho.
- 11- Population réfugiée à Bukavu (Zaire) par commune, suite au recensement du UNHCR Bukavu en février 1995.
- 12- Somme des populations rapatriées par commune de destination
- 13- Population rapatriée du Burundi par commune.
- 14- Population rapatriée de Ngara (Tanzanie) par commune
- 15- Population rapatriée de Karagwe (Tanzanie) par commune
- 16- Population rapatriée ou refoulée de Goma (Zaire) par commune
- 17- Populations rapatriée ou refoulée de Uvira (Zaire) par commune
- 18- Population rapatriée ou refoulée de Bukavu (Zaire) par commune

Explications complémentaires:

- Etant donné les approximations sur certains camps, la prise en compte des mouvements de retour entraîne l'apparition de chiffres négatifs sur les tableaux.
- La rubrique "non défini" contient à la fois
 - les personnes n'ayant pu être "affectées" à une commune précise
 - les estimations des populations des camps où la population a refusé d'être recensée
 - les retours spontanés de certains pays, évalués quantitativement mais pas avec précision

1. PREFECTURE DE BUTARE

				Population réfugiée						Population rapatriée							
				Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE		
Communes	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu
Gishamvu	37 769	41 283	21 877	9 521	5 050			383	359	3 729	932	878			2		52
Huye	28 754	29 243	20 260	3 543	158			355	394	2 638	85				1		84
Kibayi	45 200	49 406	6 380	35 922	35 044			448	56	374	1 464	1 463					1
Kigembe	48 552	53 070	15 308	30 253	28 300			425	434	1 094	4 494	4 445			2		47
Maraba	39 685	43 378		2 775	87			420	431	1 837	178				1		177
Mbazi	27 395	29 944	25 240	2 646	143			668	282	1 553	74				6		68
Muganza	36 141	39 504	12 049	16 288	15 648			279	49	312	920	920					
Mugusa	38 309	41 873	35 603	4 284	1 808			398	309	1 769	313	173					140
Muyaga	35 436	38 733	20 081	12 032	10 868			374	90	702	868	845			1		22
Muyira	43 704	47 770	26 102	9 134	5 464			502	699	2 469	518	367			1		150
Ndora	29 464	32 205	20 003	5 113	3 703			613	44	753	149	127			2		20
Ngoma	34 406	37 607	39 723	8 124	2 915			581	591	4 037	442	271			18		153
Ntyazo	55 567	60 737	38 203	9 891	6 104			331	872	2 584	248	119					129
Nyabisindu	37 272	40 740	24 050	3 982	36		1	668	618	2 659	199				9		190
Nyakizu	49 742	54 370	39 450	7 309	1 569			481	1 340	3 919	540	280			3		257
Nyaruhengeri	34 007	37 171	10 308	19 237	17 211			557	93	1 376	1 322	1 307			7		8
Ruhashya	29 097	31 804	26 132	2 204	37			435	338	1 394	148				14		134
Runyinya	43 726	47 794	27 400	3 557	744			527	534	1 752	179				6		173
Rusatira	34 179	37 359	27 000	3 485	83			429	750	2 223	116						118
Shyanda	40 434	44 196	9 042	3 352	637			739	239	1 737	115	15			5		95
Diverses Com.				19 801	-92	19 868		-10	46	-11	113	92			10		11
TOTAL	766 839	838 190	444 211	212 453	135 513	19 868	1	9 603	8 568	38 900	13 417	11 302			88		2 027
					63,78%	9,35%	0,00%	4,52%	4,03%	18,31%		84,24%			0,66%		15,11%

2. PREFECTURE DE BYUMBA

				Population réfugiée						Population rapatriée							
				Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE		
Communes	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu
Buyoga	47 539	51 962	33 829	13 231	4		13	12 743	38	433	103				100		3
Bwisige	31 406	34 328	31 643	1 789	14	382		1 128	22	243	13				9		4
Cyumba	39 177	42 822	36 184	16 081	3		2	15 553	28	495	496				478		18
Cyungo	46 294	50 601	48 000	9 625				9 212	13	400	40				40		
Giti	45 572	49 812	45 000	1 545	14		297	1 035	6	193	10				7		3
Gituza	46 656	50 997	40 700	10 597	4	5 731	3 764	890	16	192	14				9		5
Kibali	55 893	61 094	12 414	7 377	2		4	6 366	24	981	79				68		11
Kinyami	41 446	45 302		4 042	2		8	3 568	33	431	53				49		4
Kivuye	31 490	34 420	22 500	30 220	5	889		28 795	32	499	156				155		1
Kiyombe	35 563	38 872	37 469	14 961	5	10 120	312	3 730	17	777	50				13		37
Muhura	46 809	51 164	46 095	4 861	63	1 815	2 211	573	12	187	5				1		4
Mukarange	37 464	40 950	40 247	6 236	4	458		5 031	15	728	26				14		12
Murambi	86 751	94 823	76 000	46 580	11	25 448	19 952	832	32	305	25				13		12
Muvumba	59 696	65 250	60 000	37 172	1	31 173	3 148	2 248	49	553	20				3		17
Ngarama	59 842	65 410		18 492		5 257	11 639	1 176	28	392	57				40		17
Rutare	40 028	43 752		4 696	136		2 845	1 511	6	198	15				4		11
Tumba	31 724	34 676	25 000	13 387				13 046	75	266	95				91		4
Diverses Com.				-86	-10			-83	7		94	10			84		
TOTAL	783 350	856 237	555 081	240 806	258	81 273	44 195	107 354	453	7 273	1 351	10			1 178		163
					0,11%	33,75%	18,35%	44,58%	0,19%	3,02%		0,74%			87,19%		12,07%

3. PREFECTURE DE CYANGUGU

				Population réfugiée							Population rapatriée						
				Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE		
Communes	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu
Bugarama	53 311	58 271	40 000	10 310				196	9 831	283	58						58
Cyimbogo	40 971	44 783	23 467	12 373				453	431	11 489	111				3		108
Gafunzo	47 262	51 660	43 327	8 861				341	240	8 280	61				1		60
Gatare	53 135	58 079	51 772	4 781				508	283	3 990	60				4		56
Gishoma	40 075	43 804	34 337	6 159	8			197	2 995	2 959	59						59
Gisuma	46 951	51 320	43 502	7 995				404	616	6 975	282						282
Kagano	43 878	47 961	37 000	5 313				285	150	4 878	187				11		176
Kamembe	46 135	50 428	30 000	8 895	1			628	386	7 880	496						496
Karengera	59 480	65 014	50 000	2 434				346	651	1437	20						20
Kirambo	46 315	50 624	42 917	2 610				349	128	2133	55						55
Nyakabuye	37 616	41 116	36 759	2 592				296	993	1303	29						29
Diverses Com.				37	-67				104		67	67					
TOTAL	515 129	563 059	433 081	72 360	-58			4 003	16 808	51 607	1 485	67			19		1 399
					-0,08%			5,53%	23,23%	71,32%		4,51%			1,28%		94,21%

4. PREFECTURE DE GIKONGORO

				Population réfugiée						Population rapatriée							
				Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE		
Communes	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu
Karama	30 514	33 353	18 000	10 070	17			611	1 592	7 850	698				10		688
Karambo	24 865	27 179	17 067	2 307			6	252	509	1 540	43						43
Kinyamakara	32 598	35 631	24 402	7 156	24			474	858	5 800	468				2		466
Kivu	35 701	39 023	33 252	1 165	17			467	294	387	26						26
Mubuga	33 075	36 152	17 295	1 865	27			509	741	588	131				1		130
Mugasombwa	49 264	53 848	50 000	2 750	1			371	563	1 815	164						164
Muko	46 428	50 748	40 355	2 192	3			382	529	1 278	83						83
Musange	31 668	34 615	25 153	2 185	7			549	542	1 087	34				1		33
Musebeya	36 990	40 432	38 005	1 829	4			561	387	877	11						11
Nshili	44 713	48 873	44 337	2 118	38			676	644	760	45						45
Nyamagabe	38 415	41 989		8 268	24			407	1 030	6 807	509				4		505
Rukondo	32 060	35 043		5 699	7			736	929	4 027	432				1		431
Rwamiko	28 294	30 927	18 520	1 642	9			396	389	848	175						175
Diverses Com.				-33	-109			-9	94	-9	127	109			9		9
TOTAL	464 585	507 812	326 386	49 213	69		6	6 382	9 101	33 655	2 946	109			28		2 809
					0,14%		0,01%	12,97%	18,49%	68,39%		3,70%			0,95%		95,35%

5. PREFECTURE DE GISENYI

				Population réfugiée						Population rapatriée							
				Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE		
Communes	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu
Gaseke	53 868	58 880	51 000	10 499	30			10 212		257	2 291				2 291		
Giciye	60 721	66 371	37 000	16 832	38			16 354	13	427	2 596	1			2 595		
Kanama	70 317	76 860	65 828	8 720	2			8 494	24	200	485				485		
Karago	53 405	58 374	48 139	20 023	17			19 490	19	497	1 056				1 056		
Kayove	79 188	86 556	60 754	10 701				2 466	31	8 204	114				114		
Kibitira	54 462	59 529	45 350	9 230	7			7 695	49	1 479	404				404		
Mutura	71 329	77 966		28 602				28 380	12	210	589				589		
Nyamyumba	57 853	63 236	54 245	11 732				10 494	39	1 199	1 166				1 166		
Ramba	51 300	56 073	44 000	6 771	4			5 711	22	1 034	624				624		
Rubavu	62 009	67 779		14 901	6			14 558	32	305	1 632				1 632		
Rwerere	51 360	56 139	50 000	15 413	3			15 312	4	94	480				480		
Satinsyi	68 885	75 294		15 651	22			14 891	17	721	2 697				2 697		
Diverses Com.				-16				-24	8		24				24		
TOTAL	734 697	803 057	456 316	169 059	129			154 033	270	14 627	14 158	1			14 157		
					0,08%			91,11%	0,16%	8,65%		0,01%			99,99%		

6. PREFECTURE DE GITARAMA

				Population réfugiée						Population rapatriée							
Communes	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU	Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE		
						Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu
Bulinga	36 195	39 563	38 623	3 804	7			1 238	324	2 235	4				4		
Kayanzi	39 322	42 981	34 613	1 122	16			713	28	365	5				5		
Kigoma	61 099	66 784	57 517	3 434	13			706	516	2 199	16				16		
Masango	50 184	54 853	44 500	3 068	8			817	520	1 723	10				10		
Mugina	41 455	45 312	36 024	4 927	26			3 620	143	1 138	46				46		
Mukingi	37 976	41 509	35 731	2 711	3			613	183	1 912	12				12		
Murama	40 756	44 548	36 000	3 667	8			549	1 030	2 080	11				11		
Musambira	45 929	50 202	48 168	3 072	13			2 240	47	772	51				51		
Mushubati	63 932	69 881	59 993	3 798	3			878	136	2 781	25				25		
Ntongwe	74 150	81 049	54 835	8 144	1 883			1 255	1 230	3 776	7				7		
Nyabikenke	51 203	55 967	46 253	5 916	5			4 852	28	1 031	375				375		
Nyakabanda	45 964	50 241	48 604	5 166	15			3 395	12	1 744	210				210		
Nyamabuye	80 068	87 518	75 705	4 937	8			2 300	266	2 363	41				41		
Runda	46 116	50 407	36 800	5 710				4 720	67	923	113				113		
Rutobwe	35 234	38 512	36 856	2 805	7			1 551	23	1 224	56				56		
Taba	54 336	59 392	56 000	4 664	5			3 893	18	748	147				147		
Tambwe	47 597	52 026	42 811	3 559	13			930	322	2 294	7				7		
Diverses Com.				2 270	-74	2 382		-72	34		146	74			72		
TOTAL	851 516	930 746	789 033	72 774	1 959	2 382		34 198	4 927	29 308	1 282	74			1 208		
					2,69%	3,27%		46,99%	6,77%	40,27%		5,77%			94,23%		

7. PREFECTURE DE KIBUNGO

				Population réfugiée							Population rapatriée						
Communes	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU	Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE		
						Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu
Birenga	73 151	79 957	30 028	49 825	16 355	31 495	550	907	29	489	6 361	6 339			22		
Kabarondo	43 396	47 434	24 136	27 167	526	10 847	15 175	485	20	114	11				11		
Kayanza	46 297	50 605	19 876	33 835	185	6 326	26 422	633	57	212	2				2		
Kigarama	66 596	72 792	31 455	46 758	6 638	19 036	19 167	1 155	77	685	1 093	1 029			64		
Mugesera	49 222	53 802	33 319	10 924	1 544	5 649		1 896	48	1 787	566	551			15		
Muhazi	45 104	49 301	32 570	5 173	83	1 962	1 564	1 080	47	437	5				5		
Rukara	55 792	60 983	28 882	40 205	72	8 443	30 717	801	12	160	8				8		
Rukira	57 351	62 687	23 992	44 929	378	28 849	14 558	1 035	11	100	36				36		
Rusumo	122 457	133 851	31 455	111 043	112	106 910	3 115	697	67	142	3				3		
Rutonde	37 745	41 257	24 502	9 718	1 085	5 828	1 036	1 053	47	669	16				16		
Sake	58 257	63 678	38 046	18 519	8 268	5 600		1 880	435	2 336	2 426	2 415			11		
Diverses Com.				-374	-323			-54	3		377	323			54		
TOTAL	655 368	716 347	318 261	397 722	34 921	230 945	112 304	11 568	853	7 131	10 904	10 657			247		
					8,78%	58,07%	28,24%	2,91%	0,21%	1,79%		97,73%			2,27%		

8. PREFECTURE DE KIBUYE

				Population réfugiée							Population rapatriée						
				Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE		
Communes	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu
Bwakira	53 532	58 513	48 938	4 723				928	246	3 549	136				4		132
Gishyita	42 968	46 966		16 761				891	509	15 361	192				7		185
Gisovu	39 300	42 957	33 466	9 342	2			536	547	8 257	259						259
Gitesi	61 790	67 539	37 000	13 711	1			1 147	749	11 814	444				17		427
Kivumu	55 268	60 410	46 547	6 414				794	239	5 381	101				3		98
Mabanza	63 225	69 108	41 372	13 212	1			1 187	1 209	10 815	481				19		462
Mwendo	43 431	47 472	37 216	4 117	31			564	473	3 049	107				2		105
Rutsiro	56 816	62 102	58 737	4 878	5			1 618	42	3 213	75				23		52
Rwamatamu	54 417	59 480	30 640	15 782	308			1 127	433	13 914	210				4		206
Diverses Com.				-17	-11			-15	15	-6	32	11			15		6
TOTAL	470 747	514 548	333 916	88 923	337			8 777	4 462	75 347	2 037	11			94		1 932
					0,38%			9,87%	5,02%	84,73%		0,54%			4,61%		94,85%

9. PREFECTURE DE KIGALI RURAL

				Population réfugiée							Population rapatriée						
				Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE		
Communes	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu
Bicumbi	99 347	108 591	70 959	11 991	219		5	10 400	63	1 304	210	20			190		
Butamwa	34 094	37 266	12 500	13 839	3			13 542	38	256	306				308		
Gashora	76 604	83 732	52 168	13 581	2 744		6	7 141	1 001	2 689	466	365			101		
Gikomero	53 297	58 256	37 509	3 532	8		20	3 215	8	281	27				27		
Gikoro	52 604	57 499	32 000	3 113	6		49	2 599	18	441	18				18		
Kanombe	54 196	59 239	39 051	8 227	128			6 984	50	1 067	121				121		
Kanzenze	99 985	109 288	67 365	16 937	-22		4	14 277	256	2 422	157	22			135		
Mbogo	31 999	34 976	21 780	8 296	2			8 059	5	230	58				58		
Mugambazi	46 839	51 197	33 015	10 216	8		5	9 931	17	255	110				110		
Musasa	33 153	36 238	29 398	4 661	15			4 376	20	250	100				100		
Ngenda	115 031	125 734	103 799	25 603	8 737	6 187	4	1 685	2 925	6 065	1 165	1 160			5		
Rubungo	46 510	50 838	25 583	8 739	12			7 940	32	755	104				104		
Rushashi	37 775	41 290	37 859	8 004	18		9	7 774	36	167	128				128		
Rutongo	54 357	59 415	27 232	17 653	7			17 121	18	507	168				168		
Shyorongi	44 874	49 049	24 489	12 366	2			11 988	15	361	258				258		
Tare	38 204	41 759	35 206	11 111	15			10 683	25	388	171				171		
Diverses Com.				-142				-339	197		339				339		
TOTAL	918 869	1 004 365	649 913	177 727	11 900	6 187	102	137 376	4 724	17 438	3 906	1 567			2 339		
					6,70%	3,48%	0,06%	77,30%	2,66%	9,81%		40,12%			59,88%		

10. PREFECTURE DE KIGALI VILLE

				Population réfugiée						Population rapatriée							
				Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE		
Communes	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu
Kacyiru	57 553	62 908	68 567	10 986	-21		5	8 282		2 720	197	21			176		
Kicukiro	57 824	63 204		7 596				7 558		40	103				103		
Nyarugenge	122 405	133 794	118 850	14 304	54	3 196	2	10 620	413	19	443				443		
Diverses Com.																	
TOTAL	237 782	259 906	187 417	32 886	33	3 196	7	26 458	413	2 779	743	21			722		
					0,10%	9,72%	0,02%	80,45%	1,26%	8,45%			2,83%			97,17%	

11. PREFECTURE DE RUHENGERI

				Population réfugiée						Population rapatriée							
				Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE		
Communes	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu
Butaro	50 936	55 675	58 000	18 400	26			18 108	21	245	1528				1 528		
Cyabingo	49 088	53 666	53 390	8 838	30			8 513	16	277	859				859		
Cyeru	75 906	82 969	79 000	11 673	10		24	10 989	27	623	509				509		
Gatonde	38 228	41 785	43 200	6 640	23			6 438	19	160	376				376		
Kidaho	37 736	41 247	45 000	2 632			6	2 339	21	266	167				167		
Kigombe	53 929	58 947	52 500	9 349	25			9 005	17	302	1174				1 174		
Kinigi	55 293	60 438	52 000	14 812	10			14 577	16	209	3233				3 233		
Mukingo	44 119	48 224	42 000	14 588	1			14 337	32	218	1167				1 167		
Ndusu	43 765	47 837	44 000	7 271	16			7 145	2	108	424				424		
Nkuli	48 533	53 049	45 000	21 120	2			20 758	14	346	719				719		
Nkumba	50 425	55 117	65 000	7 339				7 015	10	314	746				746		
Nyakinama	37 381	40 859	41 222	7 462	15			7 276	20	151	497				497		
Nyamugali	47 799	52 246	48 121	8 817	9		4	8 493	45	266	271				271		
Nyamutera	31 670	34 617	40 000	7 142	14			6 951	55	122	341				341		
Nyarutovu	61 495	67 217	60 012	7 723				7 581	5	137	568				568		
Ruhondo	39 799	43 502	42 000	5 865	5			5 672	32	156	335				335		
Diverses Com.				1 450	-26				1 476		26	26					
TOTAL	766 112	837 395	810 445	159 119	160		34	153 197	1 828	3 900	12 940	26			12 914		
					0,10%		0,02%	96,28%	1,15%	2,45%		0,20%			99,80%		

12. TABLEAU RECAPITULATIF PAR PREFECTURE au 1 décembre 1995

Population réfugiée

Population rapatriée

				Population rapatriée															
				Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE			Totale	BURUNDI	TANZANIE		ZAIRE				
Préfectures	Pop. 91	Estim 94	B.D. HACU			Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu				Ngara	Karagwe	Goma	Uvira	Bukavu	Divers
Butare	766 839	838 190	444 211	212 453	135 513	19 868	1	9 603	8 568	38 900	13 417	11 302				88		2 027	
Byumba	783 350	856 237	555 081	240 806	258	81 273	44 195	107 354	453	7 273	1 351	10				1 178		163	
Cyangugu	515 129	563 059	433 081	72 360	-58			4 003	16 808	51 607	1 485	67				19		1 399	
Gikongoro	464 585	507 812	326 386	49 213	69		8	6 382	9 101	33 655	2 946	109				28		2 809	
Gisenyi	734 697	803 057	456 316	169 059	129			154 033	270	14 627	14 158	1				14 157			
Gitarama	851 516	930 746	789 033	72 774	1 959	2 382		34 198	4 927	29 308	1 282	74				1 208			
Ikibungo	655 368	716 347	318 261	397 722	34 921	230 945	112 304	11 568	853	7 131	10 904	10 657				247			
Ikibuye	470 747	514 548	333 916	88 923	337			8 777	4 462	75 347	2 037	11				94		1 932	
Kigali rural	918 869	1 004 365	649 913	177 727	11 900	6 187	102	137 376	4 724	17 438	3 906	1 567				2 339			
Kigali ville	237 782	259 906	187 417	32 886	33	3 196	7	26 458	413	2 779	743	21				722			
Ruhengeri	766 112	837 395	810 445	159 119	160		34	153 197	1 828	3 900	12 940	26				12 914			
Non défini *				91 868	-34 189	90 394	7 969	23 656	13 000	5 635	19 033	5 959	6 319			3 807		1 351	1 597
Total	7 164 994	7 831 663	5 304 060	1 764 910	151 032	434 245	164 618	676 605	65 407	287 600	84 202	29 804	6 319			36 801		9 681	1 597
					8,56%	24,60%	9,33%	38,34%	3,71%	16,30%			35,40%	7,50%		43,71%		11,50%	1,90%

Destinations inconnues :	24,20%
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Liste des communes d'origine des populations rapatriées au 1 décembre 1995.


Birenga	6 361	Kibungo
Kigembe	4 494	Butare
Kinigi	3 233	Ruhengeri
Satinsyi	2 697	Gisenyi
Giciye	2 596	Gisenyi
Sake	2 426	Kibungo
Gaseke	2 291	Gisenyi
Rubavu	1 632	Gisenyi
Butaro	1 528	Ruhengeri
Kibayi	1 464	Butare
Nyaruhengeri	1 322	Butare
Kigombe	1 174	Ruhengeri
Mukingo	1 167	Ruhengeri
Nyamyumba	1 166	Gisenyi
Ngenda	1 165	Kigali Rural
Kigarama	1 093	Kibungo
Karago	1 056	Gisenyi
Gishamvu	932	Butare
Muganza	920	Butare
Muyaga	868	Butare
Cyabingo	859	Ruhengeri
Nkumba	746	Ruhengeri
Kigali ville	743	Kigali ville
Nkuli	719	Ruhengeri
Karama	698	Gikongoro
Ramba	624	Gisenyi
Mutura	589	Gisenyi
Nyarutovu	568	Ruhengeri
Mugesera	566	Kibungo
Nyakizu	540	Butare
Muyira	518	Butare
Nyamagabe	509	Gikongoro
Cyeru	509	Ruhengeri
Nyakinama	497	Ruhengeri
Cyumba	496	Byumba
Kamembe	496	Cyangugu
Kanama	485	Gisenyi
Mabanza	481	Kibuye
Rwerere	480	Gisenyi
Kinyamakara	468	Gikongoro
Gashora	466	Kigali Rural
Gitesi	444	Kibuye
Ngoma	442	Butare
Rukondo	432	Gikongoro
Ndusu	424	Ruhengeri
Kibilira	404	Gisenyi
Gatonde	376	Ruhengeri
Nyabikenke	375	Gitarama
Nyamutera	341	Ruhengeri
Ruhondo	335	Ruhengeri

Mugusa	313	Butare
Butamwa	306	Kigali Rural
Gisuma	282	Cyangugu
Nyamugali	271	Ruhengeri
Gisovu	259	Kibuye
Shyorongi	258	Kigali Rural
Ntyazo	248	Butare
Nyakabanda	210	Gitarama
Rwamatamu	210	Kibuye
Bicumbi	210	Kigali Rural
Nyabisindu	199	Butare
Gishyita	192	Kibuye
Kagano	187	Cyangugu
Runyinya	179	Butare
Maraba	178	Butare
Rwamiko	175	Gikongoro
Tare	171	Kigali Rural
Rutongo	168	Kigali Rural
Kidaho	167	Ruhengeri
Mugasombwa	164	Gikongoro
Kanzenze	157	Kigali Rural
Kivuye	156	Byumba
Ndora	149	Butare
Ruhashya	148	Butare
Taba	147	Gitarama
Bwakira	136	Kibuye
Mubunga	131	Gikongoro
Rushashi	128	Kigali Rural
Kanombe	121	Kigali Rural
Rusatira	116	Butare
Shyanda	115	Butare
Kayove	114	Gisenyi
Runda	113	Gitarama
Cyimbogo	111	Cyangugu
Mugambazi	110	Kigali Rural
Mwendo	107	Kibuye
Rubungo	104	Kigali Rural
Buyoga	103	Byumba
Kivumu	101	Kibuye
Musasa	100	Kigali Rural
Tumba	95	Byumba
Huye	85	Butare
Muko	83	Gikongoro
Kibali	79	Byumba
Rutsiro	75	Kibuye
Mbazi	74	Butare
Gafunzo	61	Cyangugu
Gatare	60	Cyangugu
Gishoma	59	Cyangugu
Bugarama	58	Cyangugu

Mbogo	58	Kigali Rural
Ngarama	57	Byumba
Rutobwe	56	Gitarama
Kirambo	55	Cyangugu
Kinyami	53	Byumba
Musambira	51	Gitarama
Kiyombe	50	Byumba
Mugina	46	Gitarama
Nshili	45	Gikongoro
Karambo	43	Gikongoro
Nyamabuye	41	Gitarama
Cyungo	40	Byumba
Rukira	36	Kibungo
Musange	34	Gikongoro
Nyakabuye	29	Cyangugu
Gikomero	27	Kigali Rural
Mukarange	26	Byumba
Kivu	26	Gikongoro
Murambi	25	Byumba
Mushubati	25	Gitarama
Muvumba	20	Byumba
Karengera	20	Cyangugu
Gikoro	18	Kigali Rural
Kigoma	16	Gitarama
Rutonde	16	Kibungo
Rutare	15	Byumba
Gituza	14	Byumba
Bwisige	13	Byumba
Mukingi	12	Gitarama
Musebeya	11	Gikongoro
Murama	11	Gitarama
Kabarondo	11	Kibungo
Giti	10	Byumba
Masango	10	Gitarama
Rukara	8	Kibungo
Ntongwe	7	Gitarama
Tambwe	7	Gitarama
Muhura	5	Byumba
Kayanzi	5	Gitarama
Muhazi	5	Kibungo
Bulinga	4	Gitarama
Rusumo	3	Kibungo
Kayonza	2	Kibungo

Retour des populations rapatriées

Pop. rapatriée : 92.302
Carte établie pour 66%



Doc. ECHO du 30/11/95 - Source : UNHCR - MINIRESA


Liste des communes d'origine des populations réfugiées au 1 décembre 1995.

Rusumo	111 043	Kibungo
Birenga	49 825	Kibungo
Kigarama	46 758	Kibungo
Murambi	46 580	Byumba
Rukira	44 929	Kibungo
Rukara	40 205	Kibungo
Muvumba	37 172	Byumba
Kibayi	35 922	Butare
Kayanza	33 835	Kibungo
Kigali ville	32 886	Kigali ville
Kigembe	30 253	Butare
Kivuye	30 220	Byumba
Mutura	28 602	Gisenyi
Kabarondo	27 167	Kibungo
Ngenda	25 603	Kigali Rural
Nkuli	21 120	Ruhengeri
Karogo	20 023	Gisenyi
Nyaruhengeri	19 237	Butare
Sake	18 519	Kibungo
Ngarama	18 492	Byumba
Butaro	18 400	Ruhengeri
Rutongo	17 653	Kigali Rural
Kanzenze	16 937	Kigali Rural
Giciye	16 832	Gisenyi
Gishyita	16 761	Kibuye
Muganza	16 288	Butare
Cyumba	16 081	Byumba
Rwamatamu	15 782	Kibuye
Satinsyi	15 651	Gisenyi
Rwerere	15 413	Gisenyi
Kiyombe	14 961	Byumba
Rubavu	14 901	Gisenyi
Kinigi	14 812	Ruhengeri
Mukingo	14 588	Ruhengeri
Butamwa	13 839	Kigali Rural
Gitesi	13 711	Kibuye
Gashora	13 581	Kigali Rural
Tumba	13 387	Byumba
Mabanza	13 212	Kibuye
Cymbogo	12 373	Cyangugu
Shyorongi	12 366	Kigali Rural
Muyaga	12 032	Butare
Bicumbi	11 991	Kigali Rural
Nyamyumba	11 732	Gisenyi
Cyeru	11 673	Ruhengeri
Tare	11 111	Kigali Rural
Mugesera	10 924	Kibungo
Kayove	10 701	Gisenyi
Gifuza	10 597	Byumba
Gaseke	10 499	Gisenyi

Bugarama	10 310	Cyangugu
Mugambazi	10 216	Kigali Rural
Karama	10 070	Gikongoro
Ntyazo	9 891	Butare
Rutonde	9 718	Kibungo
Cyungo	9 625	Byumba
Gishamvu	9 521	Butare
Kigombe	9 349	Ruhengeri
Gisovu	9 342	Kibuye
Kibilira	9 230	Gisenyi
Muyira	9 134	Butare
Kamembe	8 895	Cyangugu
Gafunzo	8 861	Cyangugu
Nyamugali	8 817	Ruhengeri
Rubungo	8 739	Kigali Rural
Kanama	8 720	Gisenyi
Mbogo	8 296	Kigali Rural
Nyamagabe	8 268	Gikongoro
Kanombe	8 227	Kigali Rural
Ntongwe	8 144	Gitarama
Ngoma	8 124	Butare
Rushashi	8 004	Kigali Rural
Gisuma	7 995	Cyangugu
Nyarutovu	7 723	Ruhengeri
Nyakinama	7 462	Ruhengeri
Kibali	7 377	Byumba
Nkumba	7 339	Ruhengeri
Nyakizu	7 309	Butare
Ndusu	7 271	Ruhengeri
Kinyamakara	7 156	Gikongoro
Nyamutera	7 142	Ruhengeri
Cyabingo	6 836	Ruhengeri
Ramba	6 771	Gisenyi
Gatonde	6 640	Ruhengeri
Kivumu	6 414	Kibuye
Mukarange	6 236	Byumba
Gishoma	6 159	Cyangugu
Nyabikenke	5 916	Gitarama
Ruhondo	5 865	Ruhengeri
Runda	5 710	Gitarama
Rukondo	5 699	Gikongoro
Kagano	5 313	Cyangugu
Muhazi	5 173	Kibungo
Nyakabanda	5 166	Gitarama
Ndora	5 113	Butare
Nyamabuye	4 937	Gitarama
Mugina	4 927	Gitarama
Rutsiro	4 878	Kibuye
Muhura	4 861	Byumba
Gafare	4 781	Cyangugu

Bwakira	4 723	Kibuye
Rutare	4 696	Byumba
Taba	4 664	Gitarama
Musasa	4 661	Kigali Rural
Mugusa	4 284	Butare
Mwendo	4 117	Kibuye
Kinyami	4 042	Byumba
Nyabisindu	3 982	Butare
Bulinga	3 804	Gitarama
Mushubati	3 798	Gitarama
Murama	3 667	Gitarama
Tambwe	3 559	Gitarama
Runyinya	3 557	Butare
Buyoga		Byumba
Huye	3 543	Butare
Gikomero	3 532	Kigali Rural
Rusatira	3 485	Butare
Kigoma	3 434	Gitarama
Shyanda	3 352	Butare
Gikoro	3 113	Kigali Rural
Musambira	3 072	Gitarama
Masango	3 068	Gitarama
Rutobwe	2 805	Gitarama
Maraba	2 775	Butare
Mugasombwa	2 750	Gikongoro
Mukingi	2 711	Gitarama
Mbazi	2 646	Butare
Kidaho	2 632	Ruhengeri
Kirambo	2 610	Cyangugu
Nyakabuye	2 592	Cyangugu
Karengera	2 434	Cyangugu
Karambo	2 307	Gikongoro
Ruhashya	2 204	Butare
Muko	2 192	Gikongoro
Musange	2 185	Gikongoro
Nshili	2 118	Gikongoro
Mubunga	1 865	Gikongoro
Musebeya	1 829	Gikongoro
Bwisige	1 789	Byumba
Rwamiko	1 642	Gikongoro
Giti	1 545	Byumba
Kivu	1 165	Gikongoro
Kayanzi	1 122	Gitarama

Communes des populations réfugiées



Doc. ECHO du 15/11/95 - Source : UNHCR - MiniReiso



Pays: BURUNDI

Kibayi	35 044	Butare
Kigembe	28 300	Butare
Nyaruhengeri	17 211	Butare
Birenga	16 355	Kibungo
Muganza	15 648	Butare
Muyaga	10 866	Butare
Ngenda	8 737	Kigali Rural
Sake	8 268	Kibungo
Kigarama	6 638	Kibungo
Ntyazo	6 104	Butare
Muyira	5 464	Butare
Gishamvu	5 050	Butare
Ndora	3 703	Butare
Ngoma	2 915	Butare
Gashora	2 744	Kigali Rural
Ntongwe	1 883	Gitarama
Mugusa	1 808	Butare
Nyakizu	1 569	Butare
Mugesera	1 544	Kibungo
Rutonde	1 085	Kibungo
Runyinya	744	Butare
Shyanda	637	Butare
Kabarondo	526	Kibungo
Rukira	376	Kibungo
Rwamatamu	308	Kibuye
Bicumbi	219	Kigali Rural
Kayanza	185	Kibungo
Huye	156	Butare
Mbazi	143	Butare
Rutare	136	Byumba
Kanombe	126	Kigali Rural
Rusumo	112	Kibungo
Maraba	87	Butare
Rusatira	83	Butare
Muhazi	83	Kibungo
Rukara	72	Kibungo
Muhura	63	Byumba
Nshili	38	Gikongoro
Giciye	38	Gisenyi
Ruhashya	37	Butare
Nyabisindu	36	Butare
Kigali ville	33	Kigali ville
Mwendo	31	Kibuye
Gaseke	30	Gisenyi
Cyabingo	30	Ruhengeri
Mubunga	27	Gikongoro
Mugina	26	Gitarama
Butaro	26	Ruhengeri
Kigombe	25	Ruhengeri
Kinyamakara	24	Gikongoro

Nyamagabe	24	Cikongoro
Gatonde	23	Ruhengeri
Satinsyi	22	Gisenyi
Rushashi	18	Kigali Rural
Karama	17	Gikongoro
Kivu	17	Gikongoro
Karogo	17	Gisenyi
Kayanzi	16	Gitarama
Ndusu	16	Ruhengeri
Nyakabanda	15	Gitarama
Musasa	15	Kigali Rural
Tare	15	Kigali Rural
Nyakinama	15	Ruhengeri
Bwisige	14	Byumba
Giti	14	Byumba
Nyamutera	14	Ruhengeri
Kigoma	13	Gitarama
Musambira	13	Gitarama
Tambwe	13	Gitarama
Rubungo	12	Kigali Rural
Murambi	11	Byumba
Cyeru	10	Ruhengeri
Kinigi	10	Ruhengeri
Rwamiko	9	Gikongoro
Nyamugali	9	Ruhengeri
Gishoma	8	Cyangugu
Masango	8	Gitarama
Murama	8	Gitarama
Nyamabuye	8	Gitarama
Gikomero	8	Kigali Rural
Mugambazi	8	Kigali Rural
Musange	7	Gikongoro
Rukondo	7	Gikongoro
Kibilira	7	Gisenyi
Bulinga	7	Gitarama
Rutobwe	7	Gitarama
Rutongo	7	Kigali Rural
Rubavu	6	Gisenyi
Gikoro	6	Kigali Rural
Kivuye	5	Byumba
Kiyombe	5	Byumba
Nyabikenke	5	Gitarama
Taba	5	Gitarama
Rutsiro	5	Kibuye
Ruhondo	5	Ruhengeri
Buyoga	4	Byumba
Gituza	4	Byumba
Mukarange	4	Byumba
Musebeya	4	Gikongoro
Ramba	4	Gisenyi

Cyumba	3	Byumba
Muko	3	Gikongoro
Rwerere	3	Gisenyi
Mukingi	3	Gitarama
Mushubati	3	Gitarama
Butamwa	3	Kigali Rural
Kibali	2	Byumba
Kinyami	2	Byumba
Kanama	2	Gisenyi
Gisovu	2	Kibuye
Mbogo	2	Kigali Rural
Shyorongi	2	Kigali Rural
Nkuli	2	Ruhengeri
Muvumba	1	Byumba
Kamembe	1	Cyangugu
Mugasombwa	1	Gikongoro
Gitesi	1	Kibuye
Mabanza	1	Kibuye
Mukingo	1	Ruhengeri

Communes de retour des populations réfugiées au Burundi



Doc. ECHO du 15/11/95 - Source : UNHCR

Pays: TANZANIE - NGARA

Rusumo	106 910	Kibungo
Birenga	31 495	Kibungo
Muvumba	31 173	Byumba
Rukira	28 849	Kibungo
Murambi	25 448	Byumba
Kigarama	19 036	Kibungo
Kabarondo	10 847	Kibungo
Kiyombe	10 120	Byumba
Rukara	8 443	Kibungo
Kayonza	6 326	Kibungo
Ngenda	6 187	Kigali Rural
Rutonde	5 828	Kibungo
Gituza	5 731	Byumba
Mugesera	5 649	Kibungo
Sake	5 600	Kibungo
Ngarama	5 257	Byumba
Kigali ville	3 198	Kigali ville
Muhazi	1 962	Kibungo
Muhura	1 815	Byumba
Kivuye	889	Byumba
Mukarange	458	Byumba
Bwisige	382	Byumba
Gishamvu		Butare
Huye		Butare
Kibayi		Butare
Kigembe		Butare
Maraba		Butare
Mbazi		Butare
Muganza		Butare
Mugusa		Butare
Muyaga		Butare
Muyira		Butare
Ndora		Butare
Ngoma		Butare
Ntyazo		Butare
Nyabisindu		Butare
Nyakizu		Butare
Nyaruhengeri		Butare
Ruhashya		Butare
Runyinya		Butare
Rusatira		Butare
Shyanda		Butare
Buyoga		Byumba
Cyumba		Byumba
Cyungo		Byumba
Giti		Byumba
Kibali		Byumba
Kinyami		Byumba
Rutare		Byumba
Tumba		Byumba

Bugarama		Cyangugu
Cymbogo		Cyangugu
Gafunzo		Cyangugu
Gatare		Cyangugu
Gishoma		Cyangugu
Gisuma		Cyangugu
Kagano		Cyangugu
Kamembe		Cyangugu
Karengera		Cyangugu
Kirambo		Cyangugu
Nyakabuye		Cyangugu
Karama		Gikongoro
Karambo		Gikongoro
Kinyamakara		Gikongoro
Kivu		Gikongoro
Mubunga		Gikongoro
Mugasombwa		Gikongoro
Muko		Gikongoro
Musange		Gikongoro
Musebeya		Gikongoro
Nshili		Gikongoro
Nyamagata		Gikongoro
Rukondo		Gikongoro
Rwamiko		Gikongoro
Gaseke		Gisenyi
Giciye		Gisenyi
Kanama		Gisenyi
Karogo		Gisenyi
Kayove		Gisenyi
Kibilira		Gisenyi
Mutura		Gisenyi
Nyamyumba		Gisenyi
Ramba		Gisenyi
Rubavu		Gisenyi
Rwerere		Gisenyi
Satinsyi		Gisenyi
Bulinga		Gitarama
Kayanzi		Gitarama
Kigoma		Gitarama
Masango		Gitarama
Mugina		Gitarama
Mukingi		Gitarama
Murama		Gitarama
Musambira		Gitarama
Mushubati		Gitarama
Ntongwe		Gitarama
Nyabikenke		Gitarama
Nyakabanda		Gitarama
Nyamabuye		Gitarama
Runda		Gitarama

Rutobwe		Gitarama
Taba		Gitarama
Tambwe		Gitarama
Bwakira		Kibuye
Gishyita		Kibuye
Gisovu		Kibuye
Gitesi		Kibuye
Kivumu		Kibuye
Mabanza		Kibuye
Mwendo		Kibuye
Rutsiro		Kibuye
Rwamatamu		Kibuye
Bicumbi		Kigali Rural
Butamwa		Kigali Rural
Gashora		Kigali Rural
Gikomero		Kigali Rural
Gikoro		Kigali Rural
Kanombe		Kigali Rural
Kanzenze		Kigali Rural
Mbogo		Kigali Rural
Mugambazi		Kigali Rural
Musasa		Kigali Rural
Rubungo		Kigali Rural
Rushashi		Kigali Rural
Rutongo		Kigali Rural
Shyorongi		Kigali Rural
Tare		Kigali Rural
Butaro		Ruhengeri
Cyabingo		Ruhengeri
Cyeru		Ruhengeri
Gatonde		Ruhengeri
Kidaho		Ruhengeri
Kigombe		Ruhengeri
Kinigi		Ruhengeri
Mukingo		Ruhengeri
Ndusu		Ruhengeri
Nkuli		Ruhengeri
Nkumba		Ruhengeri
Nyakinama		Ruhengeri
Nyamugali		Ruhengeri
Nyamutera		Ruhengeri
Nyarutovu		Ruhengeri
Ruhondo		Ruhengeri

Communes de retour des populations réfugiées à Ngara



Doc. ECHO du 15/11/95 - Source : UNHCR

Rukara	30 717	Kibungo
Kayonza	26 422	Kibungo
Murambi	19 952	Byumba
Kigarama	19 167	Kibungo
Kabarondo	15 175	Kibungo
Rukira	14 558	Kibungo
Ngarama	11 639	Byumba
Gituza	3 764	Byumba
Muvumba	3 148	Byumba
Rusumo	3 115	Kibungo
Rutare	2 845	Byumba
Muhura	2 211	Byumba
Muhazi	1 564	Kibungo
Rutonde	1 036	Kibungo
Birenga	550	Kibungo
Kiyombe	312	Byumba
Giti	297	Byumba
Gikoro	49	Kigali Rural
Cyeru	24	Ruhengeri
Gikomero	20	Kigali Rural
Buyoga	13	Byumba
Rushashi	9	Kigali Rural
Kinyami	8	Byumba
Kigali ville	7	Kigali ville
Karambo	6	Gikongoro
Gashora	6	Kigali Rural
Kidaho	6	Ruhengeri
Bicumbi	5	Kigali Rural
Mugambazi	5	Kigali Rural
Kibali	4	Byumba
Kanzenze	4	Kigali Rural
Ngenda	4	Kigali Rural
Nyamugali	4	Ruhengeri
Cyumba	2	Byumba
Nyabisindu	1	Butare
Gishamvu		Butare
Huye		Butare
Kibayi		Butare
Kigembe		Butare
Maraba		Butare
Mbazi		Butare
Muganza		Butare
Mugusa		Butare
Muyaga		Butare
Muyira		Butare
Ndora		Butare
Ngoma		Butare
Nhyazo		Butare
Nyakizu		Butare
Nyaruhengeri		Butare

Ruhashya	Butare
Runyinya	Butare
Rusalira	Butare
Shyanda	Butare
Bwisige	Byumba
Cyungo	Byumba
Kivuye	Byumba
Mukarange	Byumba
Tumba	Byumba
Bugarama	Cyangugu
Cymbogo	Cyangugu
Gafunzo	Cyangugu
Gatare	Cyangugu
Gishoma	Cyangugu
Gisuma	Cyangugu
Kagano	Cyangugu
Kamembe	Cyangugu
Karengera	Cyangugu
Kirambo	Cyangugu
Nyakabuye	Cyangugu
Karama	Gikongoro
Kinyamakara	Gikongoro
Kivu	Gikongoro
Mubunga	Gikongoro
Mugasombwa	Gikongoro
Muko	Gikongoro
Musange	Gikongoro
Musebeya	Gikongoro
Nshili	Gikongoro
Nyamagabe	Gikongoro
Rukondo	Gikongoro
Rwamiko	Gikongoro
Gaseke	Gisenyi
Giciye	Gisenyi
Kanama	Gisenyi
Karogo	Gisenyi
Kayove	Gisenyi
Kibilira	Gisenyi
Mutura	Gisenyi
Nyamyumba	Gisenyi
Ramba	Gisenyi
Rubavu	Gisenyi
Rwerere	Gisenyi
Satinsyi	Gisenyi
Bulinga	Gitarama
Kayanzi	Gitarama
Kigoma	Gitarama
Masango	Gitarama
Mugina	Gitarama
Mukingi	Gitarama

Murama	Gitarama
Musambira	Gitarama
Mushubati	Gitarama
Ntongwe	Gitarama
Nyabikenke	Gitarama
Nyakabanda	Gitarama
Nyamabuye	Gitarama
Runda	Gitarama
Rutobwe	Gitarama
Taba	Gitarama
Tambwe	Gitarama
Mugesera	Kibungo
Sake	Kibungo
Bwakira	Kibuye
Gishyita	Kibuye
Gisovu	Kibuye
Gitesl	Kibuye
Kivumu	Kibuye
Mabanza	Kibuye
Mwendo	Kibuye
Rutsiro	Kibuye
Rwamatamu	Kibuye
Butamwa	Kigali Rural
Kanombe	Kigali Rural
Mbogo	Kigali Rural
Musasa	Kigali Rural
Rubungo	Kigali Rural
Rutongo	Kigali Rural
Shyorongi	Kigali Rural
Tare	Kigali Rural
Butaro	Ruhengeri
Cyabingo	Ruhengeri
Gatonde	Ruhengeri
Kigombe	Ruhengeri
Kinigi	Ruhengeri
Mukingo	Ruhengeri
Ndusu	Ruhengeri
Nkuli	Ruhengeri
Nkumba	Ruhengeri
Nyakinama	Ruhengeri
Nyamutera	Ruhengeri
Nyarutovu	Ruhengeri
Ruhondo	Ruhengeri

Communes de retour des populations réfugiées à Karagwe





Doc. ECHO du 15/11/95 - Source : UNHCR

Kivuye	28 823	Byumba
Mutura	28 662	Gisenyi
Kigali ville	26 554	Kigali ville
Nkuli	20 926	Ruhengeri
Karogo	19 649	Gisenyi
Butaro	18 324	Ruhengeri
Rutongo	17 124	Kigali Rural
Giciye	16 432	Gisenyi
Rwerere	15 656	Gisenyi
Cyumba	15 578	Byumba
Satinsyl	14 953	Gisenyi
Kinigi	14 871	Ruhengeri
Rubavu	14 824	Gisenyi
Mukingo	14 545	Ruhengeri
Karzenze	14 293	Kigali Rural
Butamwa	13 555	Kigali Rural
Tumba	13 061	Byumba
Buyoga	12 749	Byumba
Shyorongi	11 995	Kigali Rural
Cyeru	11 079	Ruhengeri
Tare	10 692	Kigali Rural
Nyamyumba	10 560	Gisenyi
Bicumbi	10 410	Kigali Rural
Gaseke	10 269	Gisenyi
Mugambazi	9 951	Kigali Rural
Cyungo	9 235	Byumba
Kigombe	9 210	Ruhengeri
Kanama	8 561	Gisenyi
Nyamugali	8 551	Ruhengeri
Mbogo	8 065	Kigali Rural
Rubungo	7 954	Kigali Rural
Rushashi	7 792	Kigali Rural
Nyarutovu	7 701	Ruhengeri
Kibilira	7 695	Gisenyi
Nyakinama	7 385	Ruhengeri
Ndusu	7 250	Ruhengeri
Gashora	7 165	Kigali Rural
Nkumba	7 105	Ruhengeri
Nyamutera	7 019	Ruhengeri
Kanombe	6 996	Kigali Rural
Cyabingo	6 627	Ruhengeri
Gatonde	6 488	Ruhengeri
Kibali	6 383	Byumba
Ruhondo	5 745	Ruhengeri
Ramba	5 733	Gisenyi
Mukarange	5 032	Byumba
Nyabikenke	4 911	Gitarama
Runda	4 733	Gitarama
Musasa	4 383	Kigali Rural
Taba	3 898	Gitarama

Kiyombe	3 733	Byumba
Mugina	3 620	Gitarama
Kinyami	3 578	Byumba
Nyakabanda	3 403	Gitarama
Gikomero	3 220	Kigali Rural
Gikoro	2 599	Kigali Rural
Kayove	2 498	Gisenyi
Kidaho	2 349	Ruhengeri
Nyamabuye	2 310	Gitarama
Muvumba	2 249	Byumba
Musambira	2 243	Gitarama
Mugesera	1 900	Kibungo
Sake	1 884	Kibungo
Ngenda	1 688	Kigali Rural
Rutsiro	1 621	Kibuye
Rutobwe	1 551	Gitarama
Rutare	1 511	Byumba
Ntongwe	1 255	Gitarama
Bulinga	1 238	Gitarama
Ngarama	1 201	Byumba
Mabanza	1 191	Kibuye
Gitarama	1 190	Kibungo
Gitesi	1 153	Kibuye
Bwielge	1 130	Byumba
Rwamatamu	1 128	Kibuye
Muhazi	1 081	Kibungo
Rukira	1 070	Kibungo
Rutonde	1 054	Kibungo
Giti	1 036	Byumba
Tambwe	930	Gitarama
Bwakira	929	Kibuye
Birenga	914	Kibungo
Gituza	894	Byumba
Gishyita	892	Kibuye
Mushubati	883	Gitarama
Murambi	838	Byumba
Masango	821	Gitarama
Rukara	801	Kibungo
Kivumu	794	Kibuye
Shyanda	740	Butare
Rukondo	736	Gikongoro
Kigoma	714	Gitarama
Kayanzi	713	Gitarama
Rusumo	697	Kibungo
Nshili	676	Gikongoro
Nyabisindu	669	Butare
Mbazi	668	Butare
Kayanza	633	Kibungo
Kamembe	628	Cyangugu
Mukingi	614	Gitarama

Ndora	613	Butare
Karama	612	Gikongoro
Ngoma	583	Butare
Muhura	573	Byumba
Mwendo	564	Kibuye
Musebeya	561	Gikongoro
Nyaruhengeri	559	Butare
Murama	553	Gitarama
Musange	550	Gikongoro
Gisovu	536	Kibuye
Runyinya	527	Butare
Mubunga	510	Gikongoro
Gatare	508	Cyangugu
Muyira	502	Butare
Kabarondo	485	Kibungo
Nyakizu	481	Butare
Kinyamakara	475	Gikongoro
Kivu	467	Gikongoro
Cyimbogo	453	Cyangugu
Kibayi	448	Butare
Ruhashya	436	Butare
Rusatira	429	Butare
Kigembe	425	Butare
Maraba	420	Butare
Nyamagabe	407	Gikongoro
Gisuma	404	Cyangugu
Mugusa	398	Butare
Rwamiko	396	Gikongoro
Gishamvu	384	Butare
Muko	382	Gikongoro
Muyaga	375	Butare
Mugasombwa	371	Gikongoro
Huye	355	Butare
Kirambo	349	Cyangugu
Karengera	346	Cyangugu
Gafunzo	341	Cyangugu
Ntyazo	331	Butare
Nyakabuye	296	Cyangugu
Kagano	285	Cyangugu
Muganza	279	Butare
Karambo	252	Gikongoro
Gishoma	187	Cyangugu
Bugarama	196	Cyangugu

Communes de retour des populations réfugiées à Goma





Doc. ECHO du 15/11/93 - Source : UNHCR

Gishyita	15 361	Kibuye
Rwamatamu	13 914	Kibuye
Gitesi	11 822	Kibuye
Cyimbogo	11 493	Cyangugu
Mabanza	10 819	Kibuye
Gafunzo	8 280	Cyangugu
Gisovu	8 260	Kibuye
Kayove	8 204	Gisenyi
Kamembe	7 880	Cyangugu
Karama	7 856	Gikongoro
Gisuma	6 975	Cyangugu
Nyamagabe	6 807	Gikongoro
Ngenda	6 065	Kigali Rural
Kinyamakara	5 808	Gikongoro
Kivumu	5 381	Kibuye
Kagano	4 878	Cyangugu
Nyakizu	4 170	Butare
Ngoma	4 062	Butare
Rukondo	4 027	Gikongoro
Gatare	3 994	Cyangugu
Ntongwe	3 776	Gitarama
Gishamvu	3 730	Butare
Bwakira	3 549	Kibuye
Rutsiro	3 213	Kibuye
Mwendo	3 049	Kibuye
Gishoma	2 969	Cyangugu
Mushubati	2 781	Gitarama
Kigali ville	2 779	Kigali ville
Gashora	2 689	Kigali Rural
Huye	2 640	Butare
Nyabisindu	2 603	Butare
Muyira	2 599	Butare
Nhyazo	2 524	Butare
Kanzenze	2 422	Kigali Rural
Nyamabuye	2 363	Gitarama
Sake	2 336	Kibungo
Tambwe	2 294	Gitarama
Rusatira	2 247	Butare
Bulinga	2 235	Gitarama
Kigoma	2 199	Gitarama
Kirambo	2 188	Cyangugu
Murama	2 080	Gitarama
Mukingi	1 912	Gitarama
Mugusa	1 887	Butare
Maraba	1 837	Butare
Shyanda	1 832	Butare
Runyinya	1 820	Butare
Mugasombwa	1 815	Gikongoro
Mugesera	1 787	Kibungo
Nyakabanda	1 744	Gitarama

Masango	1 723	Gitarama
Mbazi	1 553	Butare
Karambo	1 540	Gikongoro
Kibilira	1 479	Gisenyi
Karengeru	1 437	Cyangugu
Ruhashya	1 357	Butare
Bicumbi	1 304	Kigali Rural
Nyaruhenge	1 284	Butare
Muko	1 278	Gikongoro
Nyakabuye	1 278	Cyangugu
Rutobwe	1 224	Gitarama
Nyamyumba	1 199	Gisenyi
Mugina	1 138	Gitarama
Kigembe	1 094	Butare
Musange	1 087	Gikongoro
Kanombe	1 067	Kigali Rural
Ramba	1 034	Gisenyi
Nyabikenke	1 031	Gitarama
Kibali	981	Byumba
Runda	923	Gitarama
Musebeya	877	Gikongoro
Rwamiko	852	Gikongoro
Kiyombe	778	Byumba
Musambira	772	Gitarama
Nahili	760	Gikongoro
Rubungo	755	Kigali Rural
Taba	748	Gitarama
Mukarange	728	Byumba
Satinyi	721	Gisenyi
Kigarama	685	Kibungo
Rutonde	669	Kibungo
Cyaru	623	Ruhengeri
Ndora	623	Butare
Mubunga	594	Gikongoro
Muyaga	574	Butare
Muvumba	553	Byumba
Rutongo	507	Kigali Rural
Kvuye	499	Byumba
Cyumba	498	Byumba
Karogo	497	Gisenyi
Birenga	489	Kibungo
Gikoro	441	Kigali Rural
Muhazi	437	Kibungo
Buyoga	433	Byumba
Kinyami	431	Byumba
Giciye	427	Gisenyi
Cyungu	400	Byumba
Tare	388	Kigali Rural
Kivu	387	Gikongoro
Ngarama	387	Byumba

Kibayi	374	Butare
Kayanzi	365	Gitarama
Shyorongi	361	Kigali Rural
Nkuli	346	Ruhengeri
Nkumba	314	Ruhengeri
Murambi	305	Byumba
Rubavu	305	Gisenyi
Kigombe	302	Ruhengeri
Bugarama	286	Cyangugu
Gikomero	281	Kigali Rural
Cyabingo	277	Ruhengeri
Kidaho	266	Ruhengeri
Nyamugali	266	Ruhengeri
Tumba	266	Byumba
Gaseke	257	Gisenyi
Butamwa	256	Kigali Rural
Mugambazi	255	Kigali Rural
Musasa	250	Kigali Rural
Butaro	245	Ruhengeri
Bwisige	243	Byumba
Mbogo	230	Kigali Rural
Mukingo	218	Ruhengeri
Kayonza	212	Kibungo
Mutura	210	Gisenyi
Kinigi	209	Ruhengeri
Rutare	204	Byumba
Kanama	200	Gisenyi
Giti	193	Byumba
Gituza	192	Byumba
Muhura	187	Byumba
Muganza	175	Butare
Rushashi	167	Kigali Rural
Gatonde	160	Ruhengeri
Rukara	160	Kibungo
Ruhondo	156	Ruhengeri
Nyakinama	151	Ruhengeri
Rusumo	142	Kibungo
Nyarutovu	137	Ruhengeri
Nyamutera	122	Ruhengeri
Kabarondo	114	Kibungo
Ndusu	108	Ruhengeri
Rukira	100	Kibungo
Rwerere	94	Gisenyi

Communes de retour des populations réfugiées à Bukavu




Doc. ECHO du 15/11/95 - Source : UNHCR

Bugarama	9 831	Cyangugu
Gishoma	2 995	Cyangugu
Ngenda	2 925	Kigali Rural
Karama	1 592	Gikongoro
Nyakizu	1 340	Butare
Ntongwe	1 230	Gitarama
Mabanza	1 209	Kibuye
Murama	1 030	Gitarama
Nyamagabe	1 030	Gikongoro
Gashora	1 001	Kigali Rural
Nyakabuye	993	Cyangugu
Rukondo	929	Gikongoro
Ntyazo	872	Butare
Kinyamakara	858	Gikongoro
Rusatira	750	Butare
Gitesi	749	Kibuye
Mubunga	741	Gikongoro
Muyira	699	Butare
Karengera	651	Cyangugu
Nshili	644	Gikongoro
Nyabisindu	618	Butare
Gisuma	616	Cyangugu
Ngoma	591	Butare
Mugasombwa	563	Gikongoro
Gisovu	547	Kibuye
Musange	542	Gikongoro
Runyinya	534	Butare
Muko	529	Gikongoro
Masango	520	Gitarama
Kigoma	516	Gitarama
Gishyita	509	Kibuye
Karambo	509	Gikongoro
Mwendo	473	Kibuye
Sake	435	Kibungo
Kigembe	434	Butare
Rwamatamu	433	Kibuye
Cyimbogo	431	Cyangugu
Maraba	431	Butare
Kigali ville	413	Kigali ville
Huye	394	Butare
Rwamiko	389	Gikongoro
Musebeya	387	Gikongoro
Kamembe	386	Cyangugu
Gishamvu	359	Butare
Ruhashya	338	Butare
Bulinga	324	Gitarama
Tambwe	322	Gitarama
Mugusa	309	Butare
Kivu	294	Gikongoro
Gatare	283	Cyangugu

Mbazi	282	Butare
Nyamabuye	266	Gitarama
Kanzenze	256	Kigali Rural
Bwakira	246	Kibuye
Gafunzo	240	Cyangugu
Kivumu	239	Kibuye
Shyanda	239	Butare
Mukingi	183	Gitarama
Kagano	150	Cyangugu
Mugina	143	Gitarama
Mushubati	136	Gitarama
Kirambo	128	Cyangugu
Nyaruhengeri	93	Butare
Muyaga	90	Butare
Kigarama	77	Kibungo
Tumba	75	Byumba
Runda	67	Gitarama
Rusumo	67	Kibungo
Bkumbi	63	Kigali Rural
Kayonza	57	Kibungo
Kibayi	56	Butare
Nyamutera	55	Ruhengeri
Kanombe	50	Kigali Rural
Kibilira	49	Gisenyi
Muganza	49	Butare
Muvumba	49	Byumba
Mugesera	48	Kibungo
Muhazi	47	Kibungo
Musambira	47	Gitarama
Rutonde	47	Kibungo
Nyamugali	45	Ruhengeri
Ndora	44	Butare
Rutsiro	42	Kibuye
Nyamyumba	39	Gisenyi
Butamwa	38	Kigali Rural
Buyoga	38	Byumba
Rushashi	36	Kigali Rural
Kinyami	33	Byumba
Kvuye	32	Byumba
Mukingo	32	Ruhengeri
Murambi	32	Byumba
Rubavu	32	Gisenyi
Rubungo	32	Kigali Rural
Ruhondo	32	Ruhengeri
Kayove	31	Gisenyi
Birenga	29	Kibungo
Cyumba	28	Byumba
Kayanzi	28	Gitarama
Ngarama	28	Byumba
Nyabikonke	28	Gitarama

Cyeru	27	Ruhengeri
Tare	25	Kigali Rural
Kanama	24	Gisenyi
Kibali	24	Byumba
Rutobwe	23	Gitarama
Bwisige	22	Byumba
Ramba	22	Gisenyi
Butaro	21	Ruhengeri
Kidaho	21	Ruhengeri
Kabarondo	20	Kibungo
Musasa	20	Kigali Rural
Nyakinama	20	Ruhengeri
Gatonde	19	Ruhengeri
Karogo	19	Gisenyi
Gikoro	18	Kigali Rural
Rutongo	18	Kigali Rural
Taba	18	Gitarama
Kigombe	17	Ruhengeri
Kiyombe	17	Byumba
Mugambazi	17	Kigali Rural
Satinsyi	17	Gisenyi
Cyabingo	16	Ruhengeri
Gituza	16	Byumba
Kinigi	16	Ruhengeri
Mukarange	15	Byumba
Shyorongi	15	Kigali Rural
Nkuli	14	Ruhengeri
Cyungo	13	Byumba
Giclye	13	Gisenyi
Muhura	12	Byumba
Mutura	12	Gisenyi
Nyakabanda	12	Gitarama
Rukara	12	Kibungo
Rukira	11	Kibungo
Nkumba	10	Ruhengeri
Gikomero	8	Kigali Rural
Giti	6	Byumba
Rutare	6	Byumba
Mbogo	5	Kigali Rural
Nyarutovu	5	Ruhengeri
Rwerere	4	Gisenyi
Ndusu	2	Ruhengeri
Gaseke		Gisenyi

Communes de retour des populations réfugiées à Uvira



Doc. ECHO du 15/11/95 - Source : UNHCR



Office of the Spokesman

Biographical Note

BOUTROS BOUTROS-GHALI, UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL

Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the sixth Secretary-General of the United Nations on 1 January 1992, when he began a five-year term. At the time of his appointment by the General Assembly on 3 December 1991, Mr. Boutros-Ghali had been Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt since May 1991 and had served as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs from October 1977 until 1991.

The Secretary-General's priority has been to strengthen the United Nations Organization, to enable it to seize the opportunities offered by the post-cold-war era, and to realize the goals of the Charter and the objectives of peace, development and democracy.

On 31 January 1992, the Secretary-General, at the *first Security Council meeting ever held at the level of heads of State and government*, was invited to prepare an analysis and recommendations on ways to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations for *preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*. The Secretary-General added to these dimensions of peace a further concept, that of post-conflict peace-building. His report, entitled *An Agenda for Peace*, was published on 17 June 1992.

An Agenda for Peace defines the role and functions of the United Nations in a new era which has seen the establishment of numerous peace-keeping operations and observer missions under the authority of the Security Council and the command of the Secretary-General. The report, which has been translated into at least 29 languages, has been the focus of wide-ranging discussions.

On 3 January 1995, the Secretary-General issued a supplement to *An Agenda for Peace* as a position paper. This paper highlights certain areas where unforeseen difficulties have arisen with regard to United Nations peace-keeping operations. The supplement reviews the lessons learned and offers guidelines for improving future operations.

Since the cold war ended, the United Nations has mounted more peace-keeping operations than in its previous 40 years, involving the deployment of some 70,000 troops, military observers and civilian police, in addition to civilian personnel. These operations include notably the United Nations Angola Verification Mission III, the United Nations Observer Mission in *Salvador*, the United Nations Operation in *Mozambique*, the United Nations Operation in *Somalia*, the United Nations Protection Force in the republics of the *former Yugoslavia*, and the United Nations Transitional Authority in *Cambodia*.

The Secretary-General has also appointed a number of Special Envoys and Representatives to advise him on the creation of conditions for ending hostilities, defusing tensions or consolidating peace in various areas of the world. Peace-building activities, to provide the foundations for lasting peace, include measures to enhance confidence, to reform and strengthen democratic institutions.

to integrate former combatants into civilian society, and to restore the fabric of war-torn societies so as to prevent a recurrence of conflict.

*

Since his first year in office, the Secretary-General has worked towards a *reinvigorated and expanded vision of development*. A series of landmark conferences has been held, including the Summit on the Economic Advancement of *Rural Women*, held at Geneva in February 1992, the United Nations Conference on *Environment and Development*, held at Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and the World Conference on *Human Rights*, held at Vienna in 1993. In May 1994, the World Conference on *Natural Disaster* Reduction was held in Yokohama. In September 1994, the International conference on *Population* and Development was held in Cairo, and the World Summit for *Social Development* was held in Copenhagen in March 1995. In September 1995, the Fourth World Conference on *Women* will be held in Beijing. The Second Conference on *Human Settlements*, "The City Summit", will take place in Istanbul in 1996. The Secretary-General sees this series of conferences as a continuum, offering unique opportunities to raise levels of awareness and to set norms and standards. *In these conferences and summits, Member States and non-governmental organizations, as well as concerned individuals, work together to create a global commitment to all aspects of development.* In this year, as the United Nations celebrates its fiftieth anniversary, global awareness of the crucial importance of development is an important aspect of the work of the Organization.

The Secretary-General's own vision of development was set out in May 1994 in a report to the General Assembly entitled *An Agenda for Development*. In his report, the Secretary-General addressed peace, the economy, the environment, society and democracy as the five foundations of development. The Secretary-General also examined the multiplicity of actors engaged in development work and outlined his vision of the role of the United Nations in development in an increasingly complex world. *Universal respect for and protection of human rights is an integral part of development*, he declared. Human rights, including group rights such as those of indigenous peoples, women, children and the disabled, are a focus of the Secretary-General's attention. In November 1994, in response to the request of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General issued his recommendations on the implementation of *An Agenda for Development*.

The two agendas, peace and development, are inextricably linked. In February 1995, the Secretary-General published in companion volumes, as parallel texts, the revised *An Agenda for Peace* and *An Agenda for Development*.

*

The Secretary-General has advocated a strong supporting role for the United Nations in the democratic transformation which has characterized the post-cold-war period. The United Nations has responded to the calls of some 40 nations for assistance in the organization and supervision of democratic elections. The presence of more than 2,100 observers in the South African elections in April 1994 made it the largest United Nations electoral assistance operation ever mounted. Recognizing that democracy is far more than the holding of free and fair elections, the United Nations has also developed various programmes to cooperate in the development of democratic

institutions, rule of law and popular participation. In addition, *the best support for democracy must lie in the democratization of international life*, which the Secretary-General has pursued throughout his term.

*

The financial crisis, suffered by the Organization because assessed contributions for the regular budget and for peace-keeping are not paid on time and in full, threatens the effective operations of the Organization. The Secretary-General has commissioned a number of studies aimed at ensuring that the United Nations is an organization capable of meeting the challenges of the next 50 years.

The Secretary-General has undertaken a programme of restructuring and reform designed to reduce the number of high-level posts in the Secretariat, to decentralize decision-making and to reduce costs and managerial inefficiencies. However, the capacity of the United Nations to deal with vastly expanded operations has been a particular source of concern to the Secretary-General.

*

Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali has travelled to more than 50 countries to represent the United Nations and to offer his good offices to further the cause of peace. In December 1993, he was the first non-Korean to cross the DMZ from Seoul to Pyongyang.

*

Honorary Degrees, Awards, Memberships

The Secretary-General's role in advancing the goals of peace, development and democracy has been recognized by many awards and honorary degrees.

He was awarded a doctorate of law *honoris causa* from the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (September 1992); a doctorate *honoris causa* from l'Institut d'Etudes politiques de Paris (January 1993); the Christian A. Herter Memorial Award from the World Affairs Council, Boston (March 1993); a doctorate *honoris causa* from The Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium (April 1993); the "Man of Peace" award, sponsored by the Italian-based Together for Peace Foundation (July 1993); an honorary doctorate degree from the University of Laval, Quebec (August 1993); and the Arthur A. Houghton Jr. Star Crystal Award for Excellence from the African-American Institute, New York (November 1993).

In addition, he was given an honorary membership of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Moscow (April 1994); an honorary foreign membership of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow (April 1994); an honorary foreign membership of the Academy of Sciences of Belarus, Minsk,

(April 1994); an honorary doctorate from the University of Carlos III of Madrid (April 1994); an honorary degree from the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. (May 1994); a doctorate in international law honoris causa from the University of Moncton, New Brunswick, Canada (August 1994); and honorary doctorates from the University of Bucharest (October 1994), University of Baku (October 1994), University of Yerevan (November 1994), University of Haifa (February 1995), University of Vienna (February 1995), and University of Melbourne (April 1995). He was made a Fellow of Berkeley College, Yale University (March 1995).

*

His Early Career

Mr. Boutros-Ghali has had a long association with international affairs as a diplomat, jurist, scholar and widely published author.

He became a member of the Egyptian Parliament in 1987 and was part of the secretariat of the National Democratic Party from 1980. Until assuming the office of Secretary-General of the United Nations, he was also Vice-President of the Socialist International.

He was a member of the International Law Commission from 1979 until 1991, and is a former member of the International Commission of Jurists. He has many professional and academic associations related to his background in law, international affairs and political science, among them, his membership in the Institute of International law, the International Institute of Human Rights, the African Society of Political Studies and the Academie des Sciences morales et politique (Academie Française, Paris).

Over four decades, Mr. Boutros-Ghali participated in numerous meetings dealing with international law, human rights, economic and social development, decolonization, the Middle East question, international humanitarian law, the rights of ethnic and other minorities, non-alignment, development in the Mediterranean region and Afro-Arab cooperation.

In September 1978, Mr. Boutros-Ghali attended the Camp David Summit Conference and had a role in negotiating the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel, which were signed in 1979. He led many delegations of his country to meetings of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, as well as to the Summit Conference of the French and African Heads of State. He also headed Egypt's delegation to the General Assembly sessions in 1979, 1982 and 1990.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali received a Ph.D. in international law from Paris University in 1949. His thesis was on the study of regional organizations. Mr. Boutros-Ghali also holds a Bachelor of Laws degree, received from Cairo University in 1946, as well as separate diplomas in political science, economics and public law from Paris University.

Between 1949 and 1977, Mr. Boutros-Ghali was Professor of International Law and International Relations at Cairo University. From 1974 to 1977, he was a member of the Central Committee and Political Bureau of the Arab Socialist Union.

Among his other professional and academic activities, Mr. Boutros-Ghali was a Fulbright Scholar at Columbia University (1954-1955); Director of the Centre of Research of The Hague Academy of International Law (1963-1964); and Visiting Professor at the Faculty of Law, Paris University (1967-1968). He has lectured on international law and international relations at universities in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and North America.

Mr. Boutros-Ghali was President of the Egyptian Society of International Law from 1965; President of the Centre of Political and Strategic Studies (Al-Ahram) from 1975; member of the Curatorium Administrative Council of The Hague Academy of International Law from 1978; member of the Scientific Committee of the Academie Mondiale pour la Paix (Menton, France) from 1978; and associate member of the Institute Affari Internazionali (Rome) from 1979. He served as a member of the Committee on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organization from 1971 until 1979. Mr. Boutros-Ghali also founded the publication Alahram Iqtisadi, which he edited from 1960 to 1975, and the quarterly Al-Seyassa Al-Dawlia, which he edited until December 1991.

The more than 100 publications and numerous articles that Mr. Boutros-Ghali has written deal with regional and international affairs, law and diplomacy, and political science.

During the course of his career, Mr. Boutros-Ghali has received awards and honours from 24 countries, which, besides Egypt, include Belgium, Italy, Colombia, Guatemala, France, Ecuador, Argentina, Nepal, Luxembourg, Portugal, Niger, Mali, Mexico, Greece, Chile, Brunei Darussalam, Germany, Peru, Cote d'Ivoire, Denmark, Central African Republic, Sweden and the Republic of Korea. He has also been decorated with the Sovereign Military Order of Malta.

*

Mr. Boutros-Ghali was born in Cairo on 14 November 1922. He is married to Leila Maria Boutros-Ghali.



UNAMIR-MIRICAR

Demo

Recalling that the prohibitions on the delivery of arms and material to Rwanda were originally

Office of the Spokesman

and confirming that the security of that country is the primary responsibility of the Government of Rwanda,

Deeply concerned by the situation in Rwanda's prison and judicial system, particularly

SECURITY COUNCIL EXEMPTS RWANDA FROM ARMS EMBARGO

in the wake of the arrest of persons of concern, and in this regard, welcoming the efforts of the Government of Rwanda, in coordination with the Government of Zaire, to improve this situation.

Resolution 1011 (1995) adopted unanimously

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolutions 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 997 (1995) of 9 June 1995 and 1005 (1995) of 17 July 1995,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on monitoring of the restrictions on the sale or supply of arms dated 9 July 1995 (S/1995/552),

Having also considered the progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) dated 8 August 1995 (S/1995/678),

Emphasizing that the uncontrolled circulation of arms, including to civilians and refugees, is a major cause of destabilization in the Great Lakes subregion,

Welcoming the proposal of the Government of Zaire to establish an international commission under United Nations auspices to investigate reports of arms supplies to former Rwandan government forces,

Recognizing that the registration and marking of weapons are of considerable assistance in monitoring and enforcing restrictions on the illicit deliveries of weapons,

Noting with great concern reports of military preparations and increasing incursions into Rwanda by elements of the former regime and **underlining** the need for effective measures to ensure that Rwandan nationals currently in neighbouring countries, including those in camps, do not undertake military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda or receive arms supplies, in view of the great likelihood that such arms are intended for use within Rwanda,

Stressing the need for representatives of all sectors of Rwandan society, excluding those political leaders suspected of planning and directing the genocide last year, to begin talks in order to reach an agreement on a constitutional and political structure to achieve lasting stability,

Taking note of the letter dated 5 July 1995 from the Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/1995/547), requesting urgent action to lift the restrictions on the sale or supply of arms and **matériel** to the Government of Rwanda to ensure the security of the Rwandan population,

Welcoming the improvement in the working relations between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR and **recalling** the mandate of UNAMIR, as adjusted in resolution 997 (1995), in particular to help achieve national reconciliation,

Recalling that the prohibition on the delivery of arms and matériel to Rwanda was originally aimed at stopping the use of such arms and equipment in the massacres of innocent civilians,

Taking note of the Council's decision in resolution 997 (1995) to reduce the force level of UNAMIR, and reaffirming that the security of that country is the primary responsibility of the Government of Rwanda,

Deeply concerned by the situation in Rwanda's prisons and judicial system, particularly overcrowding, the lack of judges, detention of minors and elderly prisoners, and absence of speedy judicial or administrative review of charges, and in this respect, welcoming renewed efforts by the United Nations and donor countries, in coordination with the Government of Rwanda, to initiate, on an urgent basis, measures to improve this situation,

Underlining the need for increased efforts by the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of stability and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,

A

1. Commends the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Special Envoy in pursuing regional responses to the problem of illicit arms supplies in the region and encourages the Secretary-General to continue his consultations in this regard;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, as proposed in paragraph 45 of his report (S/1995/678), to make recommendations to the Security Council, as soon as possible, on the establishment of a Commission mandated to conduct a full investigation to address allegations of arms flows to former Rwandan government forces in the Great Lakes region of Central Africa;

3. Calls upon the Governments of Rwanda and neighbouring States to cooperate with the Commission's investigation;

4. Encourages the Secretary-General to continue his consultations with the Governments of neighbouring States concerning the deployment of United Nations military observers in the airfields and other transportation points in and around border crossing points and calls on the neighbouring States to cooperate with and assist these observers to ensure that arms and related matériel are not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within one month of the adoption of this resolution on his efforts for the preparation and convening, at the earliest possible time, of the regional Conference on Security, Stability and Development, as well as for the convening of a regional meeting to address the problems facing the repatriation of refugees;

6. Calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue its efforts to create an atmosphere of trust and confidence for the safe return of refugees and take further steps to resolve the humanitarian problems in its prisons, and to expedite disposition of the charges against those detained;

B

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

7. Decides that, with immediate effect and until 1 September 1996, the restrictions imposed by paragraph 13 of resolution 918 (1994) shall not apply with regard to the sale or supply of



Demo

arms and related matériel to the Government of Rwanda through named points of entry on a list to be supplied by that Government to the Secretary-General, who shall promptly notify all Member States of the United Nations of the list;

Office of the Spokesman

8. Decides also that on 1 September 1996 the restrictions imposed by paragraph 13 of resolution 918 (1994) on the sale or supply of arms and related matériel to the Government of Rwanda shall terminate, unless the Council decides otherwise after its consideration of the second report of the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 12 below;

9. Further decides, with a view to prohibiting the sale and supply of arms and related matériel to non-governmental forces for use in Rwanda, that all States shall continue to prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related matériel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts, to Rwanda, or to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if such sale or supply is for the purpose of the use of such arms or matériel within Rwanda, other than to the Government of Rwanda as specified in paragraphs 7 and 8 above;

10. Decides also that no arms and related matériel sold or supplied to the Government of Rwanda may be resold to, transferred to, or made available for use by, any State neighbouring Rwanda, or person not in the service of the Government of Rwanda, either directly or indirectly;

11. Further decides that States shall notify all exports from their territories of arms or related matériel to Rwanda to the Committee established by resolution 918 (1994), that the Government of Rwanda shall mark and register and notify to the Committee all imports made by it of arms and related matériel, and that the Committee shall report regularly to the Council on notifications so received;

12. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within 6 months of the date of adoption of this resolution, and again within 12 months, regarding, in particular, the export of arms and related matériel referred to in paragraph 7 above, on the basis of the reports submitted by the Committee established by resolution 918 (1994);

13. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.



UNAMIR - MINUAR

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: Mr. Cheikh Tidiane Gaye
Director, UNAMIR Liaison Office
Kinshasa, Zaire

FAX NO: 212 963 769466

FROM: Sharharyar M. Khan
SRSG

DATE: 13 November 1995

SUBJECT: Inquiry Commission's Visit to Zaire

1. The Inquiry Commission would like to schedule its visit to Kinshasa as soon as Zaire's Prime Minister and Foreign Minister return. The Commission would call on them as also on other dignitaries in Kinshasa.
2. The Commission then intends to proceed to Gbadolete to call on the President, to whom the leader would present Secretary-General's letter personally. Thereafter, the Commission intends to travel to Eastern Zaire for a visit of several days.
3. Please make arrangement for these appointments/visits. You may consult the leader Ambassador Mohamoud Kassem at Nairobi telephone no. 254-2-62244, fax no. 254-2-62668.
4. Please keep us informed of Commission's Programme.

cc: ED
CAO
CPO
Mr. Tikoca
Col. Nelson
Ms. Rafii

The Meeting with the International Commission of Inquiry

List of Participants

The Commission

Chairman	-	Ambassador Mahmoud Kassem, Chairman
Members	-	Inspector Jean-Michel Hanssens
		Colonel Jurgen G.H. Almeling
		Lt Colonel Jan Mujoogel
		Brigadier Mujahid Alam
		Colonel Lamek Mutanda
Support Staff	-	Miss Ladan Rafii; Legal Affairs
		Mr. Isoa D. Tikoca, Political Affairs
		Colonel André C. Nelson, Military Officer
		Mr. Jack Klassen, Security

Heads of Agencies

UNHCR	-	Mr. Roman Urasa, Country Delegué
UNICEF	-	Mr. Daniel Toole, Country Representative
WFP	-	Mr. Techeste Zergaber, Country Director
HRFOR	-	Mr. Ian Martin, Chief
WHO	-	Dr. Amidou Baba-Mousa, Country Representative a.i.
World Bank	-	Mr. Dirk Nicolaas Prevoo, Resident Representative a.i.
OIM	-	Mr. Joost Van der Aalst, Representative
UNESCO	-	Mr. Johan Brasten, Office-in-Charge
ICRC	-	Mr. Philippe Lazzarini, Chief of Delegation
UNDP	-	Mr. Sukehiro Hasegawa, Resident Representative
	-	Mr. Babacar Cissé, Deputy Resident Representative
	-	Mr. Nguyen X. Luong, Senior Economist
	-	Mr. John Cleland, Security Officer

URGENT**URGENT**

UNITED NATIONS

ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES

MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR

NOTE VERBALE

SRSG/NV/220/95

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR) présente ses compliments au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et de la Coopération Internationale de la République Rwandaise et a l'honneur de porter à sa connaissance que la Commission d'Enquête Internationale sur les Armes, établie par le Conseil de Sécurité conformément à sa propre Resolution 1013 du 7 septembre 1995 arrivera le 8 novembre à Kigali où elle séjournera jusqu'au 11 novembre. Cette commission est composée de six membres dont les noms suivent:

- | | | | |
|---|----------------------------------|-----------|-------------|
| - | Ambassadeur Mahmoud Kassem, | Président | (Egypte) |
| - | Inspecteur Jean-Michel Hanssens, | Membre | (Canada) |
| - | Colonel Jurgen G.H. Almeling, | Membre | (Allemagne) |
| - | Lt. Colonel Jan Mujoogel, | Membre | (Pays-Bas) |
| - | Brigadier Mujahid Alam, | Membre | (Pakistan) |
| - | Colonel Lamek Mutanda, | Membre | (Zimbabwe) |

Au cours de sa première visite au Rwanda la Commission souhaite rencontrer les Autorités locales suivantes :

- | | | |
|---|---|---------------------------------|
| - | Le Président de la République: | S.E. M. Pasteur Bizimungu; |
| - | Le Vice-Président de la République
et Ministre de la Défense: | S.E. General-Major Paul Kagame; |
| - | Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères
et de la Coopération Internationale: | S.E. M. Anastase Gasana. |

La Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Assistance au Rwanda remercie à l'avance le Ministère des dispositions qu'il voudra bien prendre pour faciliter ces rencontres et saisit cette occasion pour lui renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération



Kigali, le 6 novembre 1995

Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
et de la Coopération Internationale
de la République Rwandaise
KIGALI

DEMO

SENIOR STAFF MEETING

3 November 1995

Approved -
Shaweezy J.C.

Former Prime Minister's Press Conference

1. A paper needs to be prepared to counter questions relating to former Prime Minister's recent press statements.

Action: Spokesman

Commission on Arms Flow

2. Col. Nelson and Ms. Rafii would be required to join the experts group in Nairobi.

Action: CAO

Isel Rivero, SA/SRSG

cc. FC
ED
CAO
Spokeperson
CP

C.N. Nelson ✓

UNITED NATIONS



NATIONS UNIES

F/cr - 2760

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

 Colonel NELSON
 DCMR
 Rec'd 2/11/95
 el 17400
 UNAMIR

Outgoing FaxNo.:	Date: 30 October 1995 1995 OCT 31 A 7 04
To: Ms. Susan Matthew CAO UNAMIR	From: Luiz C. Da Costa Chief PMSS Savitri Butchey
Fax:	Fax:
Number of transmitted pages: one 4	Ref.:
Attn: Mr. Dimetros	
Subject: International Commission of Inquiry to investigate arms transfer to Rwanda	

Re your fax 5752 and telecon with Butchey, attached is a copy of the draft note for the above mentioned Commission for your reference. Thank you for your prompt action for the preparation of the Commission. Please be advised that the Commission will be assembled in New York on 30 Oct. '95. A series of meetings will take place from 31 Oct. to 1 Nov. The members are scheduled to leave for Nairobi on 2 Nov. Their flights have not yet been finalized; we will advise you as soon as they are.

The concept of administrative support is as follows: We would like to request your assistance in designating Mr. Dimetros as Administrative Officer for the Commission in addition to his current function as Liaison Officer of UNAMIR office in Nairobi. We would appreciate your assistance in this regard. Since Nairobi will be the main base for the Commission, we would also like to ask that Mr. Dimetros provide all necessary administrative support to the Commission, i.e., coordination of travel arrangements within the area of operation, payment of DSA, settlement of travel claims and ad hoc secretarial support services.

The Commission's members will be provided with a travel advance in New York (see original PT.8s). Each advance should be recovered from their DSA entitlement. The payment of DSA and the settlement of travel claims should be done in the manner described in the attached note. The account number for IOV will be provided shortly. Where Ms. Raffi, Legal officer, Col. Nelson and the Secretary, selected from UNAMIR, undertake official business travel with the Commission members, the payment of travel subsistence should follow the current UNAMIR practice. Should you need further clarification, please do not hesitate to contact my office.

Many thanks your usual co-operation.

Cleared by: Savitri Butchey Butchey	
Drafted by: M. Sato/ J. Seafortis	Authorized By: Luiz C. Da Costa

RECEIVED

31 OCT 1995

OFFICE OF THE SRSG
UNAMIR

Reçu le 1 NOV. 1995

copy Ladan Rajin

Draft

**Note for
International Commission of Inquiry**

October 27, 1995

1. Composition of the Commission:**Member**

Amb. Mahmoud Kassem, Egypt - Chairman
Inspector Jean-Michel Hanssens, Canada
Col. Jurgen G.H. Almeling, Germany
Lt.Col. Jan Meijvogel, Netherlands
Brigadier Mujahid Alam, Pakistan
Col. Lamek Mutanda, Zimbabwe

Support Staff

Legal Officer	Ms. Raffi (UNAMIR)
Security Officer	Mr. Jack Klassen (recruit, travel from NY)
Political Officer	to be identified
Admin Officer	Mr. Jeffrey Dimetros (UNAMIR Nairobi Office)
Military Officer	Col. Nelson (UNAMIR)
Secretary	to be identified (UNAMIR)

2. Contractual Status:

The Chairman will be appointed at the D-1 level. The other members are assigned to serve the Commission on a loan basis by the governments of Member States and will be treated in a manner similar to that which is described in the guidelines for military observers.

3. Duration of the Commission:

Duration of the Commission is two to six months. The exact period will be determined at a later stage or as progress is made on its work.

4. Duty Station and area of operation:

The office of the Commission will be located in Nairobi. An office space is being prepared by UNAMIR. The Commission is envisaged to travel extensively to Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi and Uganda.

5. Medical requirements:

Full medical examinations and required/ recommended immunizations will be performed by the UN Medical Service in New York.

6. Advance Fund:

In order to alleviate initial difficulties, an advance fund of \$600 will be provided to the members in addition to DSA for New York. This will be recovered from DSA entitlement in Nairobi.

7. Baggage Allowance:

The members will be provided with 45 kgs excess baggage allowance in addition to free baggage allowance provided by the air lines. The UN does not accept responsibility for insuring accompanied baggage taken on the airplane. However, since airline tickets for the Commission are purchased by American Express, accompanied baggage is covered under American Express insurance. A member requiring additional insurance for accompanied baggage should arrange it at his or her own expense.

8. Administrative Support:

A designated administrative officer from UNAMIR, Nairobi office, will provide administrative and logistical support to the Commission.

9. Travel to and from the mission area:

FALD will be responsible for providing air transportation to Nairobi. All internal official travel will be arranged by the administrative officer in Nairobi, including return travel to members' home countries upon completion of assignment.

The travel of the members who hold no UN contract shall be governed by conditions equivalent to the relevant provisions of Staff Rules.

10. Settlement of Travel Claims:

Travel claim (home country/ NY/ Nairobi) should be settled by Nairobi Office, UNAMIR. Also, travel claim in conjunction with investigation within the region must be settled by the same office. FALD will handle travel claims on repatriation (Nairobi/ home country).

11. Visas:

Kenyan visas and visas for the country where flights are connected will be obtained in New York if necessary. The other visas for the countries which the Commission plans to visit will be arranged in Nairobi.

12. Subsistence Allowance:

Due to the short term and frequent travel of the commission members, they will be entitled to receive appropriate DSA (higher rate for D-1 and above is applicable), for travel within the region, provided that their stay does not exceed more than one month in one location. For instance, the members should receive DSA payment while they are in Nairobi. Therefore, there will be no provision for the payment of retained accommodation. If travel is completely organized by UN vehicle or UN air craft, no terminal expense should be reimbursable.

13. Allotment Advice:

OPPBA authorized FALD to temporarily borrow necessary funds from UNTSO's budget (UNA-02131-XXX) until further notice.

14. Initial Expense:

Below is the estimated cost for the Commission based on one-way travel to Nairobi with DSA for New York and terminal expenses. The costs of DSA in Nairobi and in the region are not included.

Route	Airfare	DSA & other	Sub total
Egypt/NY/Nairobi	\$4,700	\$760	\$5,460
Ottawa/NY/Nairobi	\$2,600	\$670	\$3,270
Hamburg/NY/Nairobi	\$4,300	\$670	\$4,970
Amsterdam/NY/Nairobi	\$3,100	\$670	\$3,770
Lahore/NY/Nairobi	\$3,750	\$670	\$4,420
Harare/NY/Nairobi	\$4,200	\$670	\$4,870
NY/Nairobi	\$2,450	\$36 x 2	\$4,972
			\$31,732

15. Flight schedule from New York:

First Option via Amsterdam

2 Nov.

LV JFK 18:55 FLT: KLM642 AR AMS 07:55 + 1

3 Nov. (overnight in AMS. Accommodation provided by the airlines)

4 Nov.

LV AMS 10:45 FLT: KLM565 AR NBO 21:05

Second Option via London

2 Nov.

LV JFK 21:00 FLT: BA176 AR LHR 08:45 + 1

3 Nov.

LV LHR 09:50 FLT: BA67 AR NBO 21:20

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OFFICE OF THE SRSG

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28 OCTOBER, 1995

[Handwritten signature]

TO: MAJ GEN VAN KAPPEN NEW YORK	FROM: MAJ GEN TOUSIGNANT FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI RWANDA
INFO: MADAM ELIZABETH LYNDEN MAYER NEW YORK	
FAX: 001 (212) 963 9053	FAX: (250) 84265
SUBJECT: <u>NOMINATION OF UNAMIR OFFICER</u> <u>AS MEMBER OF UN EXPERTS COMMISSION</u>	
NUMBER OF PAGES, INCLUDING THIS ONE:	

1. REF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FC UNAMIR AND MADAM ELIZABETH LYNDEN MAYER ON 27 OCT 95, COLONEL NELSON CHARLES ANDRE UNID M9454, A SENEGALESE NATIONAL IS NOMINATED AS A MEMBER OF THE COMMISSION.

2. PLEASE INFORM HIS COUNTRY'S PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE AT UNNY FOR CLEARANCE.



UNAMIR/AM/1995/148

Office of the Spokesman

PRESS RELEASE

UNAMIR NR 95-38

19 July 1995

REPORT ON SUPPLY OF MATERIEL FOR USE IN RWANDA

In his report dated 9 July 1995 (S/1995/552) on the implementation of the arms embargo imposed against Rwanda and Rwandan factions in neighbouring countries by Security Council resolution 918 (1994), the Secretary-General of the United Nations describes the results of consultations held between his Special Envoy and the countries neighbouring Rwanda on the proposed deployment of United Nations military observers in their respective territories, including at the airfields located in eastern Zaire, to monitor the sale or supply of arms and matériel. The report states that although Rwanda and Burundi welcomed the proposal, there was strong opposition in some countries to the deployment of United Nations observers.

The report is issued in accordance with resolution 997 (1995) of 9 June which affirmed the Council restrictions under Chapter VII of the Charter by resolution 918 (1994) applied to the sale or supply of arms and matériel to in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if they were for use within Rwanda. The resolution called upon those States steps to ensure that arms or matériel were not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories. It also requested the Secretary-General to consult with the neighbouring governments and to report to the Council on the matter within one month.

The Secretary-General's Special Envoy visited Rwanda and its neighbouring countries from 20 June to 28 June. He found that all countries reiterated their support for efforts to prevent the resumption of armed conflict in Rwanda and stressed the link between stability in Rwanda and the situation in the subregion generally. They showed a growing recognition not only of the gravity of the risks confronting them but also of the need for them to take individual and collective measures to address the dangers. While many took the view that the primary responsibility lay with the Government of Rwanda, there was general acknowledgement of the value of action at the regional level.

The Special Envoy emphasized the Council's concern over increasing reports of military activities that threatened to destabilize Rwanda. All of the neighbouring countries reiterated their support for efforts to prevent the resumption of armed conflict and to ensure the return and settlement of its refugees and to promote lasting reconciliation. They agreed that a broader approach, with the involvement of Rwanda and its neighbours and the support of the international community, would offer better opportunities for a lasting solution to the crisis.

Officials in Rwanda welcomed the proposed deployment of military observers in neighbouring countries but emphasized the need to bring to justice those who had masterminded the genocide in 1994. The Government of Burundi welcomed the Security Council's initiative.

In contrast, the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania refused to consider the deployment of military observers in its territory, suggesting instead that the United Nations strengthen its military presence in Rwanda to ensure the safe return of refugees. It stated that the main obstacle to their return was in Rwanda itself.

According to the report, Uganda neither objected to nor showed enthusiasm for the Council's proposal. It stressed that the Council should address the causes of the crisis and identify the countries that were providing support for the delivery of weapons and military training to the former Rwandan government forces.

The Government of Zaire, while expressing support for any effective action that could prevent the destabilization of Rwanda, again denied accusations that it was aiding the former Rwanda government forces with arms and training to enable them to attack Rwanda. It recalled that it had called for an inquiry, under United Nations auspices, to investigate those allegations. It pointed to the millions of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi it had welcomed despite the resentment of its own population.

For more information, please contact the Office of the Spokesman in Kigali: phone: 84266 ext.: # 11075 or 11124 or 11066.

*Bureau du Porte-parole***COMMUNIQUE DE PRESSE****UNAMIR NR 95-38****19 juillet 1995****RAPPORT SUR LA VENTE OU LA LIVRAISON D'ARMEMENTS ET DE MATERIELS
DESTINES A ETRE UTILISES AU RWANDA**

Le Conseil de sécurité avait à examiner un rapport du Secrétaire général daté le 9 juillet (S/1995/552) sur l'application de l'embargo sur les armes contre le Rwanda et les factions rwandaises dans les pays voisins, décidée par la résolution 918 (1994) du Conseil de sécurité.

Le rapport décrit les résultats des consultations tenues entre l'Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire général et les pays voisins du Rwanda sur la possibilité de déployer des observateurs militaires des Nations Unies dans leur territoire respectif, y compris aux aéroports situés dans l'Est du Zaïre, afin de contrôler la vente ou la livraison des armements et des matériels. Le rapport note que le Rwanda et le Burundi ont salué la proposition alors qu'une forte opposition existe dans certains pays au déploiement d'observateurs des Nations Unies.

Le rapport était soumis conformément à la résolution 997 (1995) du 9 juin qui soulignait que les restrictions du Conseil imposées au terme du chapitre VII de la Charte par la résolution 918 (1994) sur la vente ou la livraison des armements et des matériels concernaient des personnes se trouvant dans des Etats voisins si l'objet de cette transaction était l'utilisation au Rwanda aux fins de déstabilisation de ce pays.

La résolution invitait ces Etats à prendre des mesures pour s'assurer que les armements et les matériels n'étaient pas transférés dans les camps rwandais se trouvant sur leur territoire. Elle demandait aussi au Secrétaire général de consulter les gouvernements voisins et de faire rapport au Conseil sur la question un mois au plus tard après l'adoption de la résolution.

L'Envoyé spécial du Secrétaire général s'est rendu au Rwanda et dans les pays voisins du 20 au 28 juin. Il a constaté que tous les pays renouvelaient leur appui aux efforts déployés pour éviter la reprise des hostilités au Rwanda et soulignaient le lien entre la stabilité au Rwanda et la situation dans la sous-région de manière générale. Ils ont manifesté une réelle inquiétude non seulement sur la gravité des risques que court la sous-région, mais aussi la nécessité, pour eux, de prendre des mesures individuelles et collectives en vue de redresser la situation et l'empêcher de dégénérer en conflit. Alors que de l'avis général on estimait que la responsabilité principale incombait au Gouvernement du Rwanda, l'intérêt d'une action au niveau régional était généralement reconnu.

L'Envoyé spécial a mis l'accent sur la préoccupation du Conseil de sécurité compte tenu des informations qui, de plus en plus, faisaient état d'activités militaires qui menacent de déstabiliser le Rwanda. Tous les pays voisins ont réitéré leur appui aux efforts pour prévenir la reprise des hostilités et pour assurer le retour et la réinstallation des réfugiés, ainsi que pour promouvoir une réconciliation durable. Ils sont convenus qu'une approche plus large, avec la participation du Rwanda et de ses voisins et l'appui de la communauté internationale offrirait de meilleures opportunités à une solution durable de la crise.

UNANIM Les responsables rencontrés au Rwanda se sont félicités de l'initiative prise par le Conseil de sécurité en proposant de déployer des observateurs militaires dans les pays voisins tout en soulignant qu'il était indispensable de traduire en justice les instigateurs du génocide de 1994.

Le Gouvernement du Burundi a salué l'initiative du Conseil de sécurité.

En contraste, le Gouvernement de la République unie de Tanzanie a refusé d'envisager un déploiement d'observateurs militaires sur son territoire, suggérant plutôt que l'ONU renforce sa présence militaire au Rwanda pour s'assurer que les réfugiés puissent rentrer chez eux en toute sécurité. Il a noté que le principal obstacle à leur retour se trouvait au Rwanda et non dans les pays voisins.

Selon le rapport, l'Ouganda n'était pas hostile à la proposition du Conseil, mais n'a manifesté aucun enthousiasme. Il a douté de l'efficacité du déploiement proposé et des résultats qu'il permettrait d'obtenir. Ce pays a estimé que le Conseil devrait plutôt se pencher sur les causes de la crise et identifier les pays qui apportent leur concours aux livraisons d'armes aux ex-forces gouvernementales rwandaises et à l'entraînement militaire de ces troupes.

Le Gouvernement du Zaïre, tout en se déclarant favorable à toute action efficace qui pourrait empêcher la déstabilisation du Rwanda, a, une fois encore, vigoureusement rejeté les récentes accusations selon lesquelles il aidait les ex-forces gouvernementales rwandaises en leur fournissant des armes et en assurant leur entraînement pour leur permettre d'attaquer le Rwanda. Il a fait observer qu'il avait demandé la création, sous les auspices de l'ONU, d'une commission internationale d'enquête chargée d'examiner les accusations portées et de clarifier définitivement la situation. Le Gouvernement zaïrois a rappelé avoir accueilli des millions de réfugiés du Rwanda et du Burundi, et ce, malgré le mécontentement de sa propre population.

Pour de plus amples informations, contacter le bureau du Porte-parole: tél. 84266 poste 11075 ou 11124 ou 11066.



Office of the Spokesman

**SECURITY COUNCIL EXTENDS AND ADJUSTS MANDATE OF
UNAMIR UNTIL 8 DECEMBER 1995****Resolution 997 (1995) adopted unanimously
9 June 1995****Text of the Resolution****The Security Council,**

Recalling all its previous resolutions on the situation in Rwanda, in particular its resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993 by which it established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), and its resolutions 912 (1994) of 21 April 1994, 918 (1994) of 17 May 1994, 925 (1994) of 8 June 1994, and 965 (1994) of 30 November 1994, which set out the mandate of UNAMIR,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on UNAMIR dated 4 June 1995 (S/1995/457),

Recalling also its resolution 955 (1994) of 8 November 1994 establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and its resolution 978 (1995) of 27 February 1995, concerning the necessity for the arrest of persons suspected of certain offences in Rwanda,

Stressing the importance of achieving genuine reconciliation among all members of Rwandan society within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

Noting with great concern reports of military preparations and increasing incursions into Rwanda by elements of the former regime and underlining the need for effective measures to ensure that Rwandan nationals currently in neighbouring countries, including those in camps, do not undertake military activities aimed at destabilizing Rwanda or receive arms supplies, in view of the great likelihood that such arms are intended for use within Rwanda.

Underlining the need for increased efforts to assist the Government of Rwanda in the promotion of a climate of stability and trust in order to facilitate the return of Rwandan refugees in neighbouring countries,

Emphasizing the necessity for the accelerated disbursement of international assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Rwanda,

Calling again upon all States to act in accordance with recommendations adopted by the Regional Conference on Assistance to Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons in the Great Lakes Region, held in Bujumbura in February 1995,

Recognizing the valuable contribution that the human rights officers deployed by the High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda have made towards the improvement of the overall situation,

Acknowledging the responsibility of the Government of Rwanda for the safety and security of all UNAMIR personnel and other international staff serving in the country,

Reaffirming the need for a long-term solution to the refugee and related problems in the Great Lakes States, and welcoming, therefore, the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a special envoy to carry out consultations on the preparation and convening, at the earliest possible time, of the regional Conference on Security, Stability and Development,

1. Decides to extend the mandate of UNAMIR until 8 December 1995 and authorizes a reduction of the force level to 2,330 troops within three months of the adoption of this resolution and to 1,800 troops within four months;

2. Decides to maintain the current level of military observers and civilian police personnel;

3. Decides, in the light of the current situation in Rwanda, to adjust the mandate of UNAMIR so that UNAMIR will:

(a) Exercise its good offices to help achieve national reconciliation within the frame of reference of the Arusha Peace Agreement;

(b) Assist the Government of Rwanda in facilitating the voluntary and safe return of refugees and their reintegration in their home communities and in assisting the Government of Rwanda in its ongoing efforts to promote a climate of stability and trust through the performance of monitoring tasks through its military and civilian police observers;

(c) Support the provision of humanitarian aid and of assistance and expertise in engineering, logistics, medical care and demining;

(d) Assist in the training of a national police force.

the Prosecutor's Office, as well as those of human rights officers, and to contribute also to the security of humanitarian agencies in case of need;

4. Affirms that the restrictions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations by resolution 918 (1994) apply to the sale or supply of arms and matériel specified therein to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if that sale or supply is for the purpose of the use of such arms or matériel within Rwanda;

5. Calls upon the States neighbouring Rwanda to take steps, with the aim of putting an end to factors contributing to the destabilization of Rwanda, to ensure that such arms and matériel are not transferred to Rwandan camps within their territories;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of neighbouring countries on the possibility of the deployment of United Nations military observers, and to consult, as a matter of priority, the Government of Zaire on the deployment of observers including in the airfields located in Eastern Zaire, in order to monitor the sale or supply of arms and matériel referred to above; and further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the matter within one month of the adoption of this resolution;

7. Takes note of the cooperation existing between the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR in the implementation of its mandate and urges the Government of Rwanda and UNAMIR to continue to implement the agreements made between them, in particular the Status of Mission Agreement of 5 November 1993 and any subsequent agreement concluded to replace that Agreement in order to facilitate the implementation of the new mandate;

8. Commends the efforts of States, United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations which have provided humanitarian assistance to refugees and displaced persons in need, encourages them to continue such assistance, and calls upon the Government of Rwanda to continue to facilitate their delivery and distribution;

9. Calls upon States and donor agencies to fulfil their earlier commitments to give assistance for Rwanda's rehabilitation efforts, to increase such assistance, and in particular to support the early and effective functioning of the International Tribunal and the rehabilitation of the Rwandan judicial system;

10. Encourages the Secretary-General and his Special Representative to continue to coordinate the activities of the United Nations in Rwanda including those of the organizations and agencies active in the humanitarian and developmental field, and of the human rights officers;

11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council by 9 August 1995 and 9 October 1995 on the discharge by UNAMIR of its mandate, the humanitarian situation and progress towards repatriation of refugees;

12. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



NB

The UNAMIR had originally been established by resolution 872 (1993) of 5 October 1993. Resolution 918 (1994) had expanded the mandate of the Mission to include responsibility for the security of civilians and of humanitarian operation, had increased its strength up to 5,500 troops and imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda.

By its action today, the Council affirmed that the Chapter VII restrictions imposed by resolution 918 (1994) apply to the sale or supply of arms and matériel to persons in the States neighbouring Rwanda, if such arms or matériel are for use within Rwanda. It called upon the States neighbouring Rwanda to take steps to ensure that such arms and matériel are not transferred to Rwanda camps within their territories.

In a statement to the Council, the representative of Zaire called for an independent investigation to refute the claims that his country had been involved with the sale or supply of arms for use in Rwanda. He said it was up to the Government in Rwanda to create a favourable climate for the return of the refugees.

The representative of Rwanda, speaking after the vote, called for an end to the arms embargo against his Government and for an international commission to study the problem of the refugee camps. He added that the change in the UNAMIR mandate reflected the changed situation in his country.



Bureau du Porte-parole

LE CONSEIL DE SECURITE MODIFIE ET RENOUVELLE LE MANDAT DE LA MINUAR JUSQU'AU 8 DECEMBRE 1995

Résolution 997 (1995) adoptée à l'unanimité, le 9 juin 1995

Texte de la résolution

Le Conseil de sécurité,

Rappelant toutes ses résolutions précédentes sur la situation au Rwanda, en particulier sa résolution 872 (1993) du 5 octobre 1993, par laquelle il a créé la Mission des Nations Unies pour l'assistance au Rwanda (MINUAR), et ses résolutions 912 (1994) du 21 avril 1994, 918 (1994) du 17 mai 1994, 925 (1994) du 8 juin 1994 et 965 (1994) du 30 novembre 1994, qui énoncent le mandat de la MINUAR,

Ayant examiné le rapport du Secrétaire général sur la MINUAR en date du 1 juin 1995 (S/1995/457),

Rappelant aussi sa résolution 955 (1994) du 8 novembre 1994, portant création du Tribunal International pour le Rwanda, et sa résolution 978 (1995) du 27 février 1995, concernant la nécessité d'arrêter les personnes soupçonnées de certains crimes au Rwanda,

Soulignant qu'il importe de parvenir à une réconciliation authentique de tous les membres de la société rwandaise dans le cadre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha,

Prenant note avec une vive préoccupation d'informations selon lesquelles des membres de l'ancien régime mèneraient des préparatifs militaires et feraient des incursions de plus en plus fréquentes au Rwanda et soulignant la nécessité de prendre des mesures efficaces pour que les Rwandais se trouvant actuellement dans des pays voisins, y compris ceux qui sont dans des camps, n'entreprennent pas d'activités militaires destinées à déstabiliser le Rwanda et ne reçoivent pas d'armements, étant donné qu'il est fort probable que ces armements seraient destinés à être utilisés au Rwanda,

Soulignant que des efforts accrus sont indispensables pour aider le Gouvernement rwandais à instaurer un climat de stabilité et de confiance propre à faciliter le retour des réfugiés rwandais se trouvant dans des pays voisins,

Soulignant aussi qu'il est nécessaire d'accélérer le versement de l'aide internationale pour le relèvement et la reconstruction du Rwanda,

Demandant de nouveau à tous les États d'appliquer les recommandations adoptées par la Conférence régionale sur l'assistance aux réfugiés, rapatriés et personnes déplacées dans la région des Grands Lacs, tenue à Bujumbura en février 1995,

Mesurant l'utilité du concours que les spécialistes des droits de l'homme déployés au Rwanda par le Haut Commissaire aux droits de l'homme ont apporté en vue de l'amélioration de la situation générale,

Considérant qu'il incombe au Gouvernement rwandais d'assurer la protection et la sécurité de l'ensemble du personnel de la MINUAR et des autres membres du personnel international servant au Rwanda,

Réaffirmant qu'il est nécessaire de régler à long terme les problèmes de réfugiés et problèmes connexes dans les États des Grands Lacs et notant avec satisfaction, par conséquent, que le Secrétaire général a l'intention de nommer un Envoyé spécial chargé de procéder à des consultations concernant la préparation et la convocation, dans les plus brefs délais, de la Conférence régionale sur la sécurité, la stabilité et le développement,

1. Décide de proroger le mandat de la MINUAR jusqu'au 8 décembre 1995 et autorise une réduction des effectifs, qui seront ramenés à 2 330 soldats trois mois après l'adoption de la présente résolution et à 1 800 soldats un mois plus tard;

2. Décide de maintenir à son niveau actuel l'effectif des observateurs militaires et du personnel de la police civile;

3. Décide, compte tenu de la situation actuelle au Rwanda, de modifier le mandat de la MINUAR en lui assignant les fonctions suivantes:

a) User de ses bons offices pour faciliter la réconciliation nationale dans le cadre de l'Accord de paix d'Arusha;

b) Aider le Gouvernement rwandais à faciliter le retour librement consenti des réfugiés, en toute sécurité, ainsi que leur réinsertion dans leur milieu d'origine, et, à cette fin, appuyer les efforts faits par le Gouvernement rwandais pour instaurer un climat de stabilité et de confiance, grâce à des activités de surveillance menées dans l'ensemble du pays par des observateurs militaires et des observateurs de police;

c) Faciliter l'aide humanitaire, ainsi que la fourniture d'une assistance et de services spécialisés en matière de génie civil, de logistique, de santé publique et de déminage;

e) Contribuer à assurer la sécurité, au Rwanda, du personnel et des locaux des organismes des Nations Unies, du Tribunal international pour le Rwanda, notamment en assurant en permanence la protection du Bureau du Procureur, ainsi que des spécialistes des droits de l'homme, et contribuer également, si besoin est, à assurer la sécurité des organismes humanitaires;

4. Souligne que les restrictions imposées par la résolution 918 (1994) en vertu du Chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies s'appliquent à la vente ou la livraison des armements et des matériels qui y sont spécifiés à des personnes se trouvant dans des États voisins, si ces armements ou ces matériels sont destinés à être utilisés au Rwanda;

5. Demande aux États voisins du Rwanda, de façon à éliminer des facteurs contribuant à la déstabilisation de ce pays, de prendre des mesures pour veiller à ce que ces armements et ces matériels ne soient pas fournis aux camps de réfugiés rwandais se trouvant sur leur territoire;

6. Prie le Secrétaire général de tenir des consultations avec les gouvernements de pays voisins concernant la possibilité de déployer des observateurs militaires des Nations Unies, et de consulter en priorité le Gouvernement zaïrois concernant le déploiement d'observateurs, y compris dans les aéroports situés dans l'est du Zaïre, afin de contrôler la vente ou la livraison d'armements et de matériels susmentionnés; prie aussi le Secrétaire général de lui faire rapport sur cette question un mois au plus tard après l'adoption de la présente résolution;

7. Prend note de la coopération existant entre le Gouvernement rwandais et la MINUAR aux fins de l'accomplissement de son mandat, et prie instamment le Gouvernement rwandais et la MINUAR de continuer à mettre en oeuvre les accords conclus entre eux, en particulier l'Accord sur le statut de la Mission, en date du 5 novembre 1993, ou tout accord qu'ils pourraient conclure ultérieurement pour remplacer cet Accord en vue de faciliter la mise en oeuvre du nouveau mandat;

8. Rend hommage aux États, aux organismes des Nations Unies et aux organisations non gouvernementales qui ont fourni une aide humanitaire aux réfugiés et aux personnes déplacées qui étaient dans le besoin, les encourage à persévérer et demande au Gouvernement rwandais de continuer à faciliter l'acheminement et la distribution des secours;

9. Demande aux États et aux organismes donateurs d'honorer l'engagement qu'ils ont pris d'apporter une aide au relèvement du Rwanda, d'accroître l'aide qu'ils apportent déjà à cette fin et, en particulier, de favoriser la mise en place à bref délai et le fonctionnement efficace du Tribunal international ainsi que le rétablissement de l'appareil judiciaire rwandais;

10. Encourage le Secrétaire général et son Représentant spécial à continuer de coordonner les activités des Nations Unies au Rwanda, dont celles des organisations et organismes qui s'occupent de questions humanitaires et de développement, ainsi que celles des spécialistes des droits de l'homme;

la situation humanitaire au Rwanda et sur les progrès réalisés en ce qui concerne le rapatriement des réfugiés:

12. Décide de rester activement saisi de la question.

NB

La MINUAR a été, à l'origine, établie par la résolution 872 (1993) du 5 octobre 1993. La résolution 918 (1994) a étendu le mandat de la Mission pour inclure la responsabilité de la sécurité des civils et de l'opération humanitaire; elle a augmenté sa force à hauteur de 5.500 soldats et a imposé un embargo sur les armes au Rwanda.

Dans son acte de ce jour, le Conseil a affirmé que les restrictions du chapitre VII imposées par sa résolution 918 (1994) s'appliquent à la vente ou la livraison des armements et des matériels à des personnes dans les Etats voisins du Rwanda, si ces armements et matériels sont destinés à être utilisés au Rwanda. Le Conseil a lancé un appel aux Etats voisins du Rwanda pour qu'ils prennent des mesures afin de veiller à ce que ces armements et ces matériels ne soient pas transférés dans des camps Rwandais situés sur leur territoire.

Dans une déclaration au Conseil, le Représentant du Zaïre, a demandé une enquête indépendante pour réfuter les allégations selon lesquelles son pays était impliqué dans la vente et la livraison des armements destinés à être utilisés au Rwanda. Il a déclaré qu'il revenait au Gouvernement du Rwanda de créer un climat favorable au retour des réfugiés.

Le Représentant du Rwanda, prenant la parole après le vote, en a appelé à la fin de l'embargo sur les armes contre son Gouvernement et a demandé l'établissement d'une commission internationale chargée d'examiner le problème des camps de réfugiés. Il a ajouté que les modifications au mandat de la MINUAR reflétaient l'évolution de la situation dans son pays.

**REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY ON THE EVENTS AT KIBEHO
APRIL 1995**

An outbreak of violence at the camp for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Kibeho (south-western Rwanda) on 22nd April 1995, which resulted in a considerable number of deaths, has aroused shock and horror both in Rwanda itself and the international public. Diverging accounts were given of what exactly had happened, of the numbers of casualties and of the responsibilities of different parties.

In a speech on 27th April 1995, the President of the Rwandese Republic, Mr. Pasteur Bizimungu, announced the establishment of an independent International Commission of Inquiry and invited Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Nations organization and the Organization of African Unity to participate, together with Rwanda, in the work of the Commission. President Bizimungu set out a number of questions (see below) concerning the Kibeho incident, to which the Commission was to answer and which were to serve as Terms of Reference (TR).

The Commission was formally established in Kigali on 3rd May 1995 and it held its first working session on 8th May 1995 with the following members present:

- Mr. Marc Brisset-Foucault, Prosecutor (France)
- Mr. Bernard Dussault, Diplomat (Canada)
- Mr. Koen de Feyter, Professor of International Law (Belgium)
- Mr. Karl Flittner, Diplomat (Germany)
- Mr. Ataul Karim, Diplomat (United Nations organizations)
- Dr. Ashraf Khan, Forensic Pathologist (United Kingdom)
- Mr. Maurice Nyberg, Lawyer (United States of America)
- Colonel-Major Abdelaziz Skik, military expert (Organization of African Unity)
- Ms. Christine Umutoni, lawyer (Rwanda)
- Mr. Ernst Wesselius, Prosecutor (the Netherlands)

In its first working meeting, the Commission appointed by consensus Colonel-Major Skik as its President, Mr. Dussault as its Vice-President and Mr. Wesselius as its Secretary/Rapporteur.

The Commission was assisted in its work by:

- Mr. Claude Cozar, Prosecutor (France)
- Mr. Ron Newman, Criminologist (Canada)
- Mr. Jan Wilken, Criminologist (the Netherlands)

as well as by representatives of different ministries of the Government of Rwanda in their capacity as expert advisers.

On the basis of numerous interviews with witnesses of the events, held in Kigali, Kibeho and Butare between 10th and 17 May 1995, several visits to the site and forensic investigation research in the Kibeho area, as well as briefings given by UN and Rwandan officials, the Commission hereby submits its report to the President of the Republic of Rwanda on May 18th 1995.

I.

- a. IN WHICH CONTEXT WAS TAKEN THE DECISION TO CLOSE THE CAMPS, AND WHAT ABOUT THIS VERY ONE (KIBEHO)?
- b. ESPECIALLY, WHAT INFORMATION ABOUT MILITIA IN THE CAMPS WAS AVAILABLE?
- c. BEFORE PROCEEDING WITH THE CLOSURE DID THE GOVERNMENT CONSULT VARIOUS PARTNERS INVOLVED IN THIS MATTER?
- d. WAS THE CLOSURE OPERATION AIMED TO ELIMINATE A CERTAIN CATEGORY OF PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY ONE ETHNIC GROUP?

Following the assassination of the Presidents of Burundi and Rwanda in the vicinity of Kigali Airport on 6th April 1994, a genocide began which would cost the lives of several hundred thousand Rwandans. A civil war started which would lead to the liberation of the country and the establishment of a national coalition government on 19 July 1994.

During those sad months, Rwanda saw both its material and social infrastructure practically destroyed. Kigali city had no more than some tens of thousand of inhabitants and a large part of the Rwandan people were refugees in Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi or were displaced within the country. In addition of hundreds of thousands were dead. Administrative buildings had been pillaged, damaged and sometimes destroyed and services (water, electricity, communications, social) were nonexistent. The Government found itself faced with an enormous and complex task, compounded by the problems of bringing the perpetrators of genocide to justice.

As soon as the Government was instituted it could see, as could the international community, that one of the priorities had to be the return of refugees and displaced persons to their home communes. The return of these people was necessary and urgent in order to re-start the Rwandan society and economy, to relieve the destabilizing pressure of the presence of these refugees throughout the region and also for reasons of national security. Indeed, it appeared obvious that as long as these refugees and displaced persons were not re-integrated into Rwandan society they would constitute a threat to security of the Rwanda and a permanent social burden.

At that time, the international community saw the importance of assisting Rwanda to instill a feeling of security in the country so as to facilitate the return of refugees and displaced persons. Upon the request of the Rwandan Government the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), with a contingent of more than 5,500 troops, was deployed with this intention already in early September 1994. In the course of the same month, international cooperation was mobilized in order to rehabilitate certain infrastructures. Discussions were begun with neighboring countries, the OAU, the UN and particularly with UNHCR in order to organize a conference on refugees and displaced persons. Studies were also begun jointly by Rwandans and international experts with a view to preparing a national plan of action which could be supported by donors. The plan in question was submitted in January 1995 in Geneva and the international community responded by pledging some USD 600 million of the USD 780 million requested.

All these initiatives made possible a steady and significant return of refugees and displaced persons to their communes. Rwanda began normalizing and, over the months, the Capital re-established its population and its activities. Many peasants returned to their communes and a sizable population inhabits Rwanda today. It was still important, however, that all refugees and displaced persons should return home. Unfortunately, a significant number of refugees outside the country and internal by displaced persons (IDPs) in camps located in the former protected zone in southern Rwanda refused to return voluntarily for reasons of security, but also because many of these camps were infiltrated by genocidal criminal elements, groups of militia-men and re-grouped military. There was fear of eventual re-arming; military training was observed to take place. Another factor was that refugees and IDPs gradually became dependent on living conditions provided in the camps.

In December 1994, there still remained within the country 38 IDPs camps and Kibeho camp appeared to be a center of hostility and a threat to internal security.

UNAMIR, in consultation with the Government, decided to launch "Operation Hope" in order to disarm Kibeho. While UNAMIR searched for arms within the camp, the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA) maintained a security cordon on the outside. This operation, which had worried humanitarian organizations, proceeded well, without loss of life. It sent a clear message to those inside Kibeho camp that the Rwandan Government as well as the international community would not accept subversion at Kibeho camp.

There was still an urgent need to close the IDPs camps. The Rwandan Government announced the final closure of the camps by the end of December 1994. The discussions that followed between the Rwandan Government and UNAMIR led to the launching of Operation Return.

With a view to supporting Operation Return, a working group was established with the assistance of UNAMIR, including government authorities, United Nations' Agencies and the NGO's, for the purpose of defining and developing policies and strategies concerning IDPs with a view to putting forward as soon as possible a plan of action to make possible the return of these people to their home communes. In order to facilitate the task of the working group and to oversee the implementation of the action plan, the Integrated Operation's Center (IOC) was established and in March 1995, 21 persons were employed there full time and 38 persons part-time.

The first formal meeting of the IOC working-group was held on 6th February 1995. Operation Return was reviewed and it was agreed as of then to launch Phase II, the initial operation having had some success but beginning to run out of steam.

In the meantime, faced with the urgency of the situation and the deterioration of security within the camps, the international community, with the support of OAU, the UNHCR as well as many individual countries, agreed to the terms of reference of a conference on refugees and displaced persons in the Great Lakes area, to be held in Bujumbura, from 12th to 17th February 1995. A plan of action was adopted at the end of the Ministerial Conference. Those components concerning Rwanda were as follows:

Measures to be taken by Rwanda:
(para 23, Sub para b):

" To continue to broadcast solemn declarations by all competent authorities involved in welcoming in dignity and security, refugees and displaced persons within its national borders. "

(Sub. para d):

" To continue to fully cooperate in the context of a coordinated, humanitarian strategy and making good use of functions of the Integrated Operations Center, with the UN agencies and the NGO's in order to facilitate the voluntary return of persons displaced within its national borders. "

Measures to be taken by the International Community:
(para 30, Sub. para a):

" To support and encourage activities in Burundi and Rwanda which encourage the process of national reconciliation and the voluntary return of displaced persons and refugees to their home communes. "

On 20th February 1995, the IOC working group could but observe that very few IDPs had returned to their communes in the preceding week.

On 27th February 1995, the IOC working group noted that Operation Return was no longer yielding satisfactory results, that IDPs did not want to go home, that Kibeho camp was a source of insecurity and that the publicity campaign was not yielding the expected results. The conclusion was reached that Kibeho was becoming a criminals' sanctuary and that there was no final strategy to have the IDPs return home.

In the course of the month of March 1995, the question of security continued to dominate Operation Return. The operation was paralysed by questions of security in the communes, in the camps and in the country. This increased the urgent need that something had to be done.

On 6th March 1995, it was agreed officially that 37,000 persons had been transported to their home communes and that a similar number had gone home by foot. It was also agreed that of that number, 60% had stayed home. Finally, it was noted that there remained 250,000 IDPs, and of that number 120,000, were then in Kibeho.

In view of the new importance of Kibeho camp, of the insecurity, the continued dependency of the IDPs on relief and of the growing impatience of the Government vis-à-vis these camps and the international community, it had become urgent to review the situation. Many options were discussed on 6th March 1995; more specifically the five following possibilities were considered:

1. Closure, as soon as possible and by all possible means.
2. Voluntary return and the closure of some camps while keeping one or two.
3. Moving the displaced persons to smaller camps in the vicinity of their home communes.
4. Reorganization of existing camps by grouping people from the same home commune.
5. Photographic record of all displaced persons and regrouping in four permanently patrolled camps.

At the meeting of 9th March 1995, the IOC agreed on the need to close the camps and the five options were reviewed.

On 15th March 1995, a strategy was worked on to cover both national security concerns and the need for the return of displaced persons to their home communes. It was agreed to improve reintegration facilities and security in communes; in the camps, it was agreed to increase security and improve the publicity campaign, to arrest intimidators and those who had participated in the genocide. Finally, a proposal was made to register IDPs, to have them move by foot and by vehicle and to end the distribution of food. The

operation would end after 4 weeks with the systematic interrogation of persons remaining in the camps. This strategy, after acceptance by the Government, would be set in motion, at most a week after its approval.

On 20th March 1995, the urgent need to close the camps was stressed.

On 27th March 1995, the Prefect of Gikongoro stated that, for reasons of public order, he could no longer accept the presence of camps in his prefecture.

In its information bulletin of 27th March 1995, the IOC stated that the Government had reiterated its desire to see IDPs back home as soon as possible. It is interesting to note that at that time the figure of 84,000 was used for the number of people in Kibeho.

At the time of that IOC meeting the representative of the IOC declared that it would be unfortunate to begin the operation as decided within a fortnight because it would coincide with the 6th April 1995, the day of the first anniversary of the start of the genocide, and that it would therefore be preferable to postpone it for a week.

The meeting of 2nd April 1995 served to clarify certain components, including transport of refugees and curfew in the camps.

In a document signed by the Chairman of the Task Force of the IOC, dated 15th April 1995, it was noted that at the 3rd April 1995 meeting, it was decided to identify cooperation mechanisms between the armed forces, UNAMIR and Human Rights observers with regard to the operation as well as to arrest and detention procedures. It was also agreed that all members of the working group were ready to launch the operation.

In support of the strategy to close the camps, at the request of the Minister of Rehabilitation and Social Integration and of the Minister of Interior, and after consulting with the President, the Vice President/Minister of Defence decided to deploy the armed forces to surround the remaining eight IDPs camps, including Kibeho.

There is no evidence to suggest that the operation was intended to eliminate a certain category of people, especially those belonging to one ethnic group.

II - HOW WAS THE OPERATION CARRIED OUT SINCE 18th APRIL AND
WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED FROM THE 22nd TO THE 23d APRIL 1995?

During the night of the 17th to the 18th April 1995 the RPA surrounded the remaining IDPs camps, including the Kibeho camp. At Kibeho, the frightened IDPs moved into the area between ~~Zambian~~ Company Headquarters and the ~~Zambian~~ platoon compound ("Zambatt"). There is conflicting evidence as to whether they moved voluntarily or were coerced to move.

According to both the RPA and UNAMIR witnesses, there was sporadic gunfire. On the morning of the 18th, witness testimony agreed that a stampede resulted in the death of 8 to 11 children.

On the 19th April 1995, ~~the RPA~~ Chief of Staff and the UNAMIR Deputy-Force Commander visited the camp to explain the situation. Many IDPs indicated that they were willing to go home. The slow progress of the registration procedure and the lack of transport added to the problems.

During the 19th-20th April 1995, approximately 5000 IDPs were searched and successfully registered by the RPA and other Government agencies and transported to their home communes by UNAMIR. During the process of registration, some of the IDPs were identified as having participated in the genocide by some witnesses.

Over this period, the sanitary and other living conditions in the camp deteriorated drastically.

Generally, there was no intimidation or violence directed at the IDPs by the RPA, nor hostility by the IDPs towards the RPA. There is some evidence of hostility among IDPs. In a few instances, IDPs threw stones at the RPA and, according to some reports, tried to snatch RPA weapons, which resulted in RPA opening fire and killing between 13 and 22 IDPs.

The limited delivery of food, water and general facilities were used as an incentive for IDPs to leave the camp.

In the late afternoon of the 20th April 1995, it started to rain. This affected road conditions and worsened the transportation problems.

Around midday of the 22nd April 1995, a large group of IDPs broke through the cordon in the vicinity of the Zambatt positions. According to RPA witnesses there was firing from among the IDPs and the RPA suffered casualties. IDPs continued to run down the side of the hill into the valley. The RPA responded by firing into the crowd. There is agreement that automatic rifles and machine guns were employed. Numerous IDP casualties resulted.

After the incident the cordon was re-established. In the late afternoon the cordon was breached for a second time, this time to the west of the camp. Large groups of people ran down the valley. RPA witnesses indicated that some IDPs carried rifles and others were armed with traditional weapons such as machetes and stones. RPA witnesses indicated that there was firing from the IDPs which caused casualties to some RPA soldiers. There is evidence that firearms were captured.

The RPA again responded by firing into the crowd causing numerous casualties. It is clear that automatic rifles and machine guns were used. Most witnesses from UNAMIR and from one NGO indicate that heavier weapons such as grenades and rocket propelled grenades were used. There is conflicting UNAMIR testimony on the use of a mortar. It is of interest to note that no physical evidence of mortar fire has been found.

There is evidence to indicate that many suffered injuries from machete, stampede and weapons fire, but the exact proportions cannot be determined. There is agreement that machetes were not used by uniformed personnel but rather by civilians.

UNAMIR witness testimony indicates that a number of summary executions of IDPs by RPA soldiers took place.

During the night of the 22nd April 1995, there was sporadic fire around the Kibeho camp area including, according to some UNAMIR and RPA sources, sniper fire from the IDP compound over the Zambatt Company Headquarters. UNAMIR soldiers were unable to respond because of an inability to distinguish between hostile and non-hostile targets. There were also machete attacks among the IDPs.

UNAMIR witnesses indicate that RPA soldiers were burying bodies in pit latrines and shallow graves. Approximately 15 latrines were examined by the Commission and in one of them the body of one child was found. RPA witnesses indicate that bodies^{were} washed up in rain after the incident and were subsequently reburied.

The scientific evidence corroborated other evidence that bodies related to the Kibeho incident had been buried outside the Kibeho camp. In the bodies identified, the cause of death ranged from machete, firearm injuries and findings consistent with trampling and hunger. Due to logistic and time constraints, it was not possible to determine the exact number of fatalities but it is apparent that the numbers are more than those formally counted in the Kibeho camp.

It is interesting to note the unusual discrepancy between the various initial counts and estimates of fatalities and the actual number of non-fatal casualties, suggesting over-estimation in the initial fatality counts and estimates.

III a. WHAT WAS THE ROLE, THE LIMITATIONS AND THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE RWANDESE ARMY, THE NGOs AND UNAMIR?

The Commission finds that the operation of the Government of Rwanda to close the IDP camps was well-planned but that failures occurred in the implementation and ensuing panic. The reactions of the RPA soldiers to the threat at that stage were disproportionate and, therefore, violative of international law. The RPA did not distinguish between hostile and non-hostile targets and indiscriminate fire by the RPA soldiers occurred. There are credible indications that individual RPA soldiers committed summary executions.

The following circumstances contributed to the behavior of the RPA :

1. Deficiencies in Communication Systems

Within the RPA, radios exist at best at the level of the Company Commander and above. The RPA relies on couriers and word-of-mouth to communicate information up the chain-of-command and orders back down. In a crisis situation that changes quickly, it can be very difficult for commanding officers to remain in control.

2. Deficiencies in Equipment

The RPA has limited means with which to apply force. The RPA uses presence as a form of deterrence and firing in the air as a means of non-lethal force. When these methods are exhausted, there exists an escalation to deadly force. Such methods as tear gas, water cannons, rubber bullets and batons and shields as used for crowd control are not available within the RPA.

3. Deficiencies in Training

The RPA is trained as a guerrilla army and not in law enforcement and security techniques.

4. Deficiencies in Experience

The RPA has never engaged in a similar operation of this kind. Once the operation unfolded, soldiers relied on a background of little relevance to the problem of separating hostile from non-hostile forces.

5. Foreseeability

Given the background of genocide, the insecurity in the camp and surrounding area, the unwillingness of people to leave the camp, and examples of hostility towards the RPA from within the camp, it is suggested that the RPA command failed to appreciate the determination with which hard-core elements would refuse to leave the camp voluntarily.

NGOs

There are credible indications that some NGOs actively contradicted the policies of the Government of Rwanda by encouraging IDPs to remain in Kibeho camp and by pursuing discriminatory hiring practices. Moreover, the decision of a number of NGOs not to cooperate with the closure operation once it began exacerbated the humanitarian crisis.

UNAMIR

The mandate of UNAMIR requires it to :

Contribute to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda, including through the establishment and maintenance where feasible of secure humanitarian areas.

UN Security Council Resolution 965 (1994).

This mandate requires UNAMIR to protect displaced persons against risks from whatever source, including from the IDPs themselves. There is strong evidence that hardened criminal elements existed within UNAMIR protected zones where they engaged in intimidation and acts of violence. UNAMIR did not respond adequately to this situation.

III b. WHAT WAS THE PART PLAYED BY THE MILITIA?

There was very strong evidence that over the months that preceded the camp closure operation, there was a heavy build-up of what is known in Rwanda as hard-core elements. By hard-core elements, the Commission means extremists who most likely were deeply involved in criminal activities. The Commission found numerous indications of the widespread use of machetes and other traditional weapons in acts of violence and of a number of firearms within the camp population.

The activities of these hard-core elements ranged from verbal intimidation to physical violence and were instrumental in creating an atmosphere of panic among the IDPs culminating on 22nd of April 1995. The Commission was not able to obtain specific information on the organization and structure of these hard-core elements.

CONCLUSIONS

(III c. WHO IS ACTUALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATHS IN KIBEHO?)

1. In the opinion of the Independent International Commission of inquiry, the tragedy of Kibeho neither resulted from a planned action by Rwandan authorities to kill a certain group of people, nor was it an accident that could not have been prevented.
2. The Commission recognizes the legitimate interests of the Rwandan Government and of the international community to have the displaced persons camps closed as quickly as possible, both for reasons of national security and in order to remove an important obstacle to the country's efforts to recover from the devastating effects of last year's genocide.
3. The Commission recognizes the efforts made by UN Special Representative, UNAMIR, the Government of Rwanda and other organizations to keep the situation at Kibeho under control.
4. The Commission regrets that UN Agencies and NGOs were not able to contribute more efficiently to the speedy evacuation of IDPs from the camp.

5. There is sufficient reliable evidence to establish that, during the events at Kibeho camp between the 18th and the 23rd April 1995, unarmed IDPs were subjected to arbitrary deprivation of life and serious bodily harm in violation of human rights and humanitarian law committed by RPA military personnel.
6. There is sufficient reliable evidence to establish that, during the events at Kibeho camp between the 18th and the 23rd April 1995, unarmed IDPs were subjected to serious human rights abuses, including arbitrary deprivation of life and serious bodily harm, committed by armed elements among the IDPs themselves.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Commission welcomes the initiative taken by the Rwandan Government to carry out an investigation at the national level.

The Commission calls upon the Rwandan authorities to carry out an analysis of mistakes which occurred in the preparation and handling of the closure of the camps, as well as a thorough, prompt and impartial investigation of individual responsibilities within its armed forces and any other factors which may have contributed to the event.


2. In the future, high priority should be given to improving the capability of Rwandan State and local authorities to react adequately and within the internationally recognized framework of human rights and of humanitarian law to situations of social tension and emergency.
3. The Commission recommends to the international community to continue encouraging and assisting the Rwandan Republic in its efforts to achieve justice, national reconciliation and reconstruction.


REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ON THE EVENTS AT KIGALI


4. The Commission calls on the United Nations system to review its chain of command and its operation procedures to make sure that in the future an entire operation is not held hostage or bogged down by one or several agencies and organisations with limited mandates and responsibilities.

Done at Kigali,


on the 18th of May 1995
















HANDOVER/TAKEOVER NOTES

1. This is to certify that I, UNID MO 003 Col Moeen U Ahmed have on this day..²⁹April, 1995 handed over my duties as Deputy Chief Military Observer to UNID M-9454 Col Charles Andre Nelson on my repatriation.

29 April 1995

MOEEN U AHMED
Col
OUT GOING DCMO

2. This is to certify that I, UNID M- 9454 Col Charles Andre Nelson have on this day ..²⁹..April, 1995 taken over the duties of Deputy Chief Military Observer from UNID MO 003 Col Moeen U Ahmed on his repatriation.

29 April 1995

CHARLES ANDRE NELSON
Col
INCOMING DCMO

HANDING/TAKING OVER NOTES

General

1. UNAMIR in Rwanda is operating since Oct 93. Since then a lot of changes took place. When it was ready to execute its initial mandate, war broke out (06 Apr 94) between the two fighting factions. It was impossible for UNAMIR to arrest the situation. Security Council decided to thin out peace keeping forces from Rwanda and the strength was brought down to 420.

2. According to the initial mandate, 270 MILOBS were authorised for this mission. During the war 70 stayed and the rest were evacuated to Nairobi. With the change of mandate, the MILOB strength was increased to 320.

3. From the very beginning of the mission, it suffered logistically. Almost every piece of equipment required by the MILOBS for efficient operation was in short supply. Conditions began to improve gradually with the arrival of vehicles and other communication equipment. However, this gradual improvement came to a halt when this country plunged into a civil war (6 Apr 94 to 18 July 94). The logistics situation turned from bad to worse. With the new UNAMIR mandate, a lot of improvement has been achieved but still not adequate.

Aim

4. The aim of these notes is to highlight the duties and responsibility of DCMO and the areas of concern of MILOB Group.

Duties and responsibilities

5. The duties and responsibilities of DCMO are as under:
- a. Be responsible to CMO for all MILOB activities.
 - b. Run day to day activities of MILOB Group.
 - c. Command, control and administer all MILOB Sectors on behalf of CMO.

- d. Command, control and administer MILOB Group HQ on behalf of CMO.
- e. Supervise works of MILOB Sector Commanders and Branch Heads of MILOB Group HQ.
- f. Meet DFC/CMO daily in the morning in his office. Brief CMO about MILOB activities of the previous day and receive orders/instructions from him for the day.
- g. Visit each Sector once in a month. Find out their operational activities and administration on ground. Welfare of MILOBS should be important agenda of your visit.
- h. Arrange monthly MILOB Sector Commanders Conference. Details are already known to you.
- j. Posting of MILOBS will be personally supervised by you. Before posting MILOBS, study the country balancing sheet and prepare a draft posting order. Once CMO approves the posting, publish the order. SMPO is conversant with the rules for posting. He will be a good hand in this regard.
- k. Arrange induction training (03 days) for new MILOBS. Ops Br is responsible for the trg.
- l. Attend following briefings/conferences:
 - (1). Daily morning brief at FHQ at 0800 hrs (less Sundays and UNAMIR holidays).
 - (2). Daily Senior Offrs Briefing at FC's Conference Room, FHQ at 0830 hrs (less Sundays and UNAMIR holidays).
 - (3). Weekly COS's Conf.
 - (4). Fortnightly UNAMIR/RPA Staff level Conf.
- m. Write Confidential Reports of all Sector Commanders and branch heads. I have written Confidential Reports of all Sec Commanders and Br Heads who served with me more than three months.
- n. Sanction leave to Sector Commanders and Branch Heads as per existing rules.

Committees

- 6. You are a member of the following Committees:

- a. Vehicle Establishment Committee (VEC).
- b. UNAMIR/RPA Staff Level Committee.

Table of Organization of MILOBS

- 7. Strength. Authorised strength of MILOBS are 320. At present we are holding 300. Detail strength countrywise as at Anx'A'.
- 8. Organization. Organization of MILOB is at Anx'B'.

Vehicle and Equipment

- 9. Vehicles. The total number of vehicles required for MILOBS operation and administration were estimated as 129 vehicles. As at now 88 vehicles have been allocated to the MILOBS and out of which 15 are out of order. Details are at Anx'C'. On 11 Feb 95 we were promised 15 additional vehicles. So far we have received one only (microbus). One veh (UNAMIR 1254) was stolen by bandits/RPA.
- 10. Communication Eqpt. There is no shortage of communication equipment in general. All Secs are operating with maximum communication eqpt. Chief Communication Officer is always helpful to entertain our additional needs.
- 11. EDP Equipment. All MILOB Secs have one computer each. We do need additional computers specially for sub-sectors and for MILOB Branches. Computers are arriving from UNOSOM. You should pursue for additional computers.

MILOB Operations

- 12. As DCMO you have to be always alert and concerned about MILOB Operational activities. Any incidents in any Sector MUST be informed to you immediately. Duty Offr and SOO will always keep you up-to-date. Basing on the issue you must act immediately and give your direction. Also keep CMO and COS informed.
- 13. Ops Branch, MILOB HQ. This is the hub of all MILOB Operational activities. You need to be constantly supervising

their work. Ops Branch will give you a detail brief about their tasks, organization and functions of their branch. Presently Ops Br is co-located with Ops Br of FHQ. It is expected that rest of MILOB HQ will be shifted to FHQ building soon.

14. Monitor Channel 14. You must be in listening of this net 24 hrs. Do intervene when you feel necessary. Many a times MILOBS misuse this channel for private conversation. It must be insisted that this channel is the Operational Channel of MILOBS Group.

15. Visiting Sectors and MILOB Branches. After you take over, I suggest that you visit all the Sectors so that you are acquainted with the country and also know the Sectors. Sector Commanders will give you a detail brief of their Sectors. I have also asked all branch heads to give you a detail brief.

16. In Coming /Out Going MILOBS. I introduced a system through which all in coming/ out going MILOBS are interviewed by the DCMO. All in coming / out going Lt Cols and above are interviewed by CMO. I am sure you will also continue the same procedure.

17. Leave/ CTO. Some of the MILOBS have a tendency to overstay leave/CTO and Sector HQ usually don't report these to this HQ. We have asked travel Section to provide us the passengers list. This will help determining the MILOBS overstaying leave/CTO. If anyone is caught, his MSA should be deducted for the period of absence and disciplinary action to be taken against him.

Reading Materials

18. You are suggested to read the followings docus:
- a. All the mandates for UNAMIR.
 - b. Operational Orders.
 - c. SOP.
 - d. All policy letters issued by FHQ and MILOB HQ.
 - e. SRSG's Directives.

f. Instruction on Security Matters.

Conclusion


19. Logistically MILOBS have never had all the vehicles and eqpt. It has not been easy getting the required equipment. However with diplomacy and good rapport with the Section heads, the requirement of MILOBS have been brought up to an appreciable standard.

20. Commanding 320 officers is a challenging job but definitely not tough. Present CMO is an excellent person to work with. With his guidance, assistance and cooperation you will have a smooth sailing.

21. These notes are by no means exhaustive. The verbal briefing that I have given you, coupled with your military experience will enable you to start the job as DCMO.

22. I wish you all the best in your new assignment. Best of luck and may God bless you.

Date : 29 Apr 95



MOEEN U AHMED
COL
OUT GOING DCMO


Distribution:

F C
DFC/ CMO
MILOB GP HQ
A/DCMO

DEPLOYMENT OF MILOBS

SER	COUNTRY	MILOBS													REMARKS
		TOTAL	FHQ	MHQ	SECT-1	SECT-2	SECT-3	SECTOR 4			SECT-5	SECT-6	NBO	NY HQ	
		STR			BYUMBA	KIBUNGO	GITARA	GIK	BUTARE	CYA	GISENYI	KIGALI			
1	AUSTRIA	15	1		1	2	3	2	2	2		2			
2	BANGLADESH	34	2	5	3	4	7	3	1	3	4	1	1		
3	CANADA	19	8	2		2	2		1	2	1	1			
4	FIJI	1								1					
5	GHANA	35	3	5	5	4	3	5	2	2	3	3			
6	GUINEA	17			2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2			
7	INDIA	18		1	2	2	2	2	2		3	2	1	1	
8	MALAWI	14			2	2	1	2	2		3	2			
9	MALI	31	4		5	5	4	2	3	2	4	2			
10	NIGERIA	17	2		2	2	2	2	3	2		2			
11	POLAND	2		1								1			
12	RUSSIA	17	1	1	1	1	4	2		2	3	2			
13	SENEGAL	2		1								1			
14	TUNISIA	10			2	2	2				2	2			
15	URUGUAY	24		1	2	3	5	2	2	3	4	2			1XTRG
16	ZAMBIA	20			3	2	4	2	2	2	2	3			
17	ZIMBABWE	24			4	3	4	2	3	2	3	3			
	TOTAL	300	21	17	34	37	45	28	25	25	34	34	2	1	

ORGANISATION OF MILOBS GROUP



LEGEND: * NOT COUNTED

VEHICLE DISTRIBUTION SUMMARY/MILOB HQ AND SECTORS

TYPE OF VEHICLE	M/HQ	SECT1	SECT2	SECT3	SECT4A,B,C	SECT5	SECT6	TOT
MINIBUS	01	-	-	-	01	-	-	02
NISSAN PICK-UP	04	02	02	02	03	02	02	18
TOYOTA 4 RUNNER	02	07	05	10	17	06	06	53
TOYOTA L-CRUISER	01	01	03	02	04	02	01	14
TOYOTA SALOON	01	-	-	-	-	-	-	01
TOTAL	09	10	10	14	25	10	09	88

COMMENTS:

a. TOYOTA 4 RUNNER	= 53
(b. TOYOTA UNOMUR	= 01)
c. TOYOTA L-CRUISER	= 12
d. NISSAN PICK-UP	} = 18
TOYOTA PICK-UP	
e. TOYOTA SALOON	= 01
f. MINIBUS	= 02
(g. MOTORCYCLES	= 02)
TOTAL VEH	= 88 AND 02 MOTORCYCLES)

1. SERVICEABLE VEHICLES = 70
2. UN-SERVICEABLE VEHICLES = 17
 - a. ACCIDENT VEH = 08
 - b. WAITING PARTS = 09

VEHICLE RF-ALLOCATION AS AT 26 APRIL 95

SER	SECT 1	STATE	TYPE	SECT 2	STATE	TYPE	SECT 3	STATE	TYPE				SECT 4A	STATE	TYPE
1	431		NISS P-UP	418		NISS P-UP	151 M		MOTORBIKE				407		NISS P-UP
2	518		NISS P-UP	423		NISS P-UP	159 M		MOTORBIKE				1000		TOY 4R
3	1022		TOY 4R	632		TOY L-CR	422		NISS P-UP				1010		TOY 4R
4	1023		TOY 4R	1006		TOY 4R	468		NISS P-UP				1016	CHASSIS	TOY 4R
5	1029		TOY 4R	1008		TOY 4R	747		P-UP				1030		TOY 4R
6	1047		TOY 4R	1013		TOY 4R	1004		TOY 4R				1058		TOY 4R
7	1052	*	TOY 4R	1089		TOY 4R	1019		TOY 4R				1072		TOY 4R
8	1096		TOY 4R	1091		TOY 4R	1044	ACC	TOY 4R				1112	CHASSIS	TOY 4R
9	1132		TOY 4R	1204		TOY 4R	1049		TOY 4R				1262	ACC	TOY L-CR
10	1232	WP	TOY L-CR	1253		TOY L-CR	1089		TOY 4R						
11							1080	CHASSIS	TOY 4R						
12							1082		TOY 4R						
13							1084		TOY 4R						
14							1097	ACC/WO	TOY 4R						
15							1118		TOY L-CR						
16							1217	WP	TOY L-CR						
17							1278	WP	TOY L-CR						
SER	SECT 4B	STATE	TYPE	SECT 4C	STATE	TYPE	SECT 5	STATE	TYPE	SECT 6	STATE	TYPE	MILDB HQ	STATE	TYPE
1	457		NISS P-UP	226		MINIBUS	428	*	NISS P-UP	469		NISS P-UP	39		TOY SALO
2	624		TOY L-CR	501		NISS P-UP	487		NISS P-UP	483		NISS P-UP	232		MINIBUS
3	1041		TOY 4R	1021		TOY 4R	1002		TOY 4R	800		TOY 4R	405		NISS P-UP
4	1048	CLUTCH	TOY 4R	1061		TOY 4R	1005		TOY 4R	1031		TOY 4R	425		NISS P-UP
5	1074		TOY 4R	1070	CHASSIS	TOY 4R	1012		TOY 4R	1040	ACC	TOY 4R	434		NISS P-UP
6	1124		TOY 4R	1077		TOY 4R	1017		TOY 4R	1080	ACC	TOY 4R	459		NISS P-UP
7	1141		TOY 4R	1123		TOY L-CR	1032		TOY 4R	1075	CHASSIS	TOY 4R	1046		TOY 4R
8				1127		TOY 4R	1076		TOY 4R	1121		TOY 4R	1125		TOY 4R
9				1282		TOY L-CR	1115		TOY L-CR	1254	STOLEN	TOY L-CR	1272		TOY L-CR
10							1231		TOY L-CR						
11															
12															
13															
14															
15															
16															
17															
18															
19															
20															

NOTES: BR=BODY REPAIR WP=WAITING PARTS ACC= ACCIDENT (*) IN PROGRESS

DEMO

IMPORTANT TASKS PERFORMED BY MILOBS

General

1. MILOBS are the eyes and ears of SRSG/FORCE CDR/CMO/DCMO. MILOBS are reasonably senior, highly mature and experienced military officers who are carefully selected for an objective and unbiased reporting in war torn countries. They are performing very important tasks in UNAMIR(RWANDA). Hence it is felt that even in the revised mandate, the strength of MILOBS should not be reduced/ be only marginally reduced. Some of the important tasks performed by the MILOBS are given in succeeding paras.

Patrolling.

2. Patrolling is an essential activity for observing, dominating, enquiring and assessing the prevailing situation in the area of responsibility. The main aims of patrolling are:-

- (a) To confirm/verify/supervise an incident, agreement or any violation.
- (b) To obtain information about terrain and topography.
- (c) To assess the general situation in a given area.
- (d) To show the presence of UN.
- (e) To interact with local people and other agencies to obtain any information which could be useful to UNAMIR operations/tasks.

Visits to Communes.

3. Visit various Communes in the area of responsibility to enquire about the following and take necessary actions/ info concerned agencies for necessary actions:-

- (a) Meet Commune Bourgemestre and enquire about Commune problems.
- (b) Population. Population details , ethnic groups and their interrelationship.
- (c) Assess living conditions of local population.
- (d) Food. Check availability of food and water in the Commune. Distribution of food if any and what agency?
- (e) Orphans. Their number, condition and problems.
- (f) Education. State of education, number of children attending, availability of teachers and problems if any.
- (g) Prisons. Check conditions of prisons and detention centres . Check condition of prisoners, human right violations and the judicial system available.
- (h) Agriculture. Check availability of agricultural implements, seeds and water for cultivation.
- (i) Health. Check prevalent diseases hospitals/health centres, availability of doctors/nurses and supply position of medicines.
- (j) Security. Assess the security situation, cases of banditry arrests, killings by RPA and others.
- (k) RPA. Deployment , strength, Commanders and their attitude towards local population.

(l) Administrative Setup. The setup, their attitude, efforts towards reconciliations and inclinations.

(m) Returnees. Their numbers, integration in mainstream, problems, assistance provided by local administration, security/harassment if any, housing, food and attitude of locals and RPA.

Escort Duties.

4. MILOBs provide unarmed escorts to :-

- (a) VIPs and other visiting persons.
- (b) NGOs.
- (c) For the IDPs, while moving back to their home communes, the MILOBs are tasked for following:-
 - (i) Monitoring of target Communes.
 - (ii) Liaise and coordinate between Open Relief Centres (ORC), local authorities and IDPs.
 - (iii) Escort IDP convoys from Displaced Persons Camps (DPC) to ORC/ home communes in conjunction with RPA and UN troops.
 - (iv) Provide liaison between RPA and UN troops.

Humanitarian Situation.

5. MILOBs are monitoring the humanitarian situation in their respective sectors. Each sector has a Hum Offr who works in close coordination with local Humanitarian, Human Rights and other NGOs. Some of the important tasks are:-

- (a) Close contact with the Prefect and representative of the Ministry of Rehabilitation.
- (b) To work in close cooperation with UNHCR and render necessary assistance to them in execution of their tasks in rehabilitation of IDPs and returnees.
- (c) Assist World Food Programme (WFP) in coordination of food and aid delivery to medical centres and orphanages.
- (d) Works in close coordination with HR and ICRC to assess the situation in Commune cachots and prisons.

Advantages of MILOBs

6. MILOBs have tremendous advantage over other agencies in carrying out accurate observation, evaluation and assessment since they are all offr with good experience, sound military background and possess analytical mind. Some of the striking advantages of Military Observers (officers) are:-

- (a) Even in absence of comprehensive guidelines, they can carry out their tasks effectively. They do not need supervision.
- (b) Because of their military background, they can carry out an accurate assessment of the prevailing security situation.

(c) It is much easier for an officer to interact with the local population (keeping in mind the language problem in Rwanda).

(d) Correct assessment is very essential for optimum utilisation of meagre UN resources. MILOBs can make an accurate assessment of existing situation as also to what is likely to happen in the near future due to their constant interaction with local population and NGOs.

(e) It has been experienced that often representatives of HR and other NGOs insists on MILOBs accompanying them.

(f) Where numbers are playing predominant role (as the Rwandese Govt is insisting on certain numbers of total strength of UNAMIR all inclusive), retention of maximum number of MILOBs may be more useful to UNAMIR.


Recommendations.

7. In view of foregoing , it is strongly felt that one of the following options could be adopted:-


(a) Option One. The strength of MILOBs to remain at the existing level. This option would be most beneficial to the organisation due to reasons given above.

(b) Option Two. The strength of MILOBs be marginally reduced from present 320 to 288 (a reduction of 10 %) as per following details (detailed Revised Organisation chart is given at Appx attached).

APPX A



SUGGESTED ORGANISATION OF MILOBS GROUP



LEGEND: * NOT COUNTED

HANDING/TAKING OVER NOTES

General

1. UNAMIR in Rwanda is operating since Oct 93. Since then a lot of changes took place. When it was ready to execute its initial mandate, war broke out (06 Apr 94) between the two fighting factions. It was impossible for UNAMIR to arrest the situation. Security Council decided to thin out peace keeping forces from Rwanda and the strength was brought down to 420.

2. According to the initial mandate, 270 MILOBS were authorised for this mission. During the war 70 stayed and the rest were evacuated to Nairobi. With the change of mandate, the MILOB strength was increased to 320.

3. From the very beginning of the mission, it suffered logistically. Almost every piece of equipment required by the MILOBS for efficient operation was in short supply. Conditions began to improve gradually with the arrival of vehicles and other communication equipment. However, this gradual improvement came to a halt when this country plunged into a civil war (6 Apr 94 to 18 July 94). The logistics situation turned from bad to worse. With the new UNAMIR mandate, a lot of improvement has been achieved but still not adequate.

Aim

4. The aim of these notes is to highlight the duties and responsibility of DCMO and the areas of concern of MILOB Group.

Duties and responsibilities

5. The duties and responsibilities of DCMO are as under:
- a. Be responsible to CMO for all MILOB activities.
 - b. Run day to day activities of MILOB Group.
 - c. Command, control and administer all MILOB Sectors on behalf of CMO.

- d. Command, control and administer MILOB Group HQ on behalf of CMO.
- e. Supervise works of MILOB Sector Commanders and Branch Heads of MILOB Group HQ.
- f. Meet DFC/CMO daily in the morning in his office. Brief CMO about MILOB activities of the previous day and receive orders/instructions from him for the day.
- g. Visit each Sector once in a month. Find out their operational activities and administration on ground. Welfare of MILOBS should be important agenda of your visit.
- h. Arrange monthly MILOB Sector Commanders Conference. Details are already known to you.
- j. Posting of MILOBS will be personally supervised by you. Before posting MILOBS, study the country balancing sheet and prepare a draft posting order. Once CMO approves the posting, publish the order. SMPO is conversant with the rules for posting. He will be a good hand in this regard.
- k. Arrange induction training (03 days) for new MILOBS. Ops Br is responsible for the trg.
- l. Attend following briefings/conferences:
 - (1). Daily morning brief at FHQ at 0800 hrs (less Sundays and UNAMIR holidays).
 - (2). Daily Senior Offrs Briefing at FC's Conference Room, FHQ at 0830 hrs (less Sundays and UNAMIR holidays).
 - (3). Weekly COS's Conf.
 - (4). Fortnightly UNAMIR/RPA Staff level Conf.
- m. Write Confidential Reports of all Sector Commanders and branch heads. I have written Confidential Reports of all Sec Commanders and Br Heads who served with me more than three months.
- n. Sanction leave to Sector Commanders and Branch Heads as per existing rules.

Committees

- 6. You are a member of the following Committees:

- a. Vehicle Establishment Committee (VEC).
- b. UNAMIR/RPA Staff Level Committee.

Table of Organization of MILOBS

7. **Strength.** Authorised strength of MILOBS are 320. At present we are holding 300. Detail strength countrywise as at Anx A.
8. **Organization.** Organization of MILOB is at Anx B.

Vehicle and Equipment

9. **Vehicles.** The total number of vehicles required for MILOBS operation and administration were estimated as 129 vehicles. As at now 88 vehicles have been allocated to the MILOBS and out of which 15 are out of order. Details are at Anx C. On 11 Feb 95 we were promised 15 additional vehicles. So far we have received one only (microbus). One veh (UNAMIR 1254) was stolen by bandits/RPA.
10. **Communication Eqpt.** There is no shortage of communication equipment in general. All Secs are operating with maximum communication eqpt. Chief Communication Officer is always helpful to entertain our additional needs.
11. **EDP Equipment.** All MILOB Secs have one computer each. We do need additional computers specially for sub-sectors and for MILOB Branches. Computers are arriving from UNOSOM. You should pursue for additional computers.

MILOB Operations

12. As DCMO you have to be always alert and concerned about MILOB Operational activities. Any incidents in any Sector MUST be informed to you immediately. Duty Offr and SOO will always keep you up-to-date. Basing on the issue you must act immediately and give your direction. Also keep CMO and COS informed.
13. **Ops Branch, MILOB HQ.** This is the hub of all MILOB Operational activities. You need to be constantly supervising

their work. Ops Branch will give you a detail brief about their tasks, organization and functions of their branch. Presently Ops Br is co-located with Ops Br of FHQ. It is expected that rest of MILOB HQ will be shifted to FHQ building soon.

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21. These notes are by no means exhaustive. The verbal briefing that I have given you, coupled with your military experience will enable you to start the job as DCMO.

22. I wish you all the best in your new assignment. Best of luck and may God bless you.

Date : 29 Apr 95

MOEEN U AHMED
COL
OUT GOING DCMO

Distribution:

F C
DFC/ CMO
MILOB GP HQ
A/DCMO

72110

UNITED NATIONS
ASSISTANCE MISSION FOR RWANDA



NATIONS UNIES
MISSION POUR L'ASSISTANCE AU RWANDA

UNAMIR - MINUAR

HANDOVER/TAKEOVER NOTES

1. This is to certify that I UNID M2102 Brig Gen HK Anyidoho have on this day 13 March, 1995 handed over my duties as Deputy Force Commander to UNID M7683 Col KS Shivakumar due to my absence on leave.

HK ANYIDOHO
Brig Gen
DFC/CMO

13 March 1995

2. This is to certify that I UNID M7683 Col KS Shivakumar have on this day 13 March, 1995 taken over the duties of Acting Deputy Force Commander from UNID M2102 Brig Gen HK Anyidoho whilst he is absent on leave from the mission area.

SHIVAKUMAR
Col KS
COS

March 1995

11150

HANDOVER/TAKEOVER NOTES
OFFICE OF DEPUTY FORCE COMMANDER
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE
MISSION FOR RWANDA (UNAMIR)
FROM: BRIG GEN HK ANYIDHO
TO : COL KS SHIVAKUMAR

INTRODUCTION

1. I am handing over my duties as Deputy Force Commander as an additional duty to those you already carry out as Chief of Staff from 13 March to 8 April, 1995 when I will be on leave.

RESPONSIBILITIES

2. Your responsibilities as the DFC are as follows:

- a Deputizes for the FC and assumes command in his absence.
- b Carries out special assignments of cross-border or cross faction liaison.
- c Carries out all operational tasks on behalf of the FC.
- d Provides advice and suggestions on various aspects of the operations.
- e Directs, supervises and co-ordinates the work of the Military Staff.
- f Co-ordinates military and civilian staff effort. All civilian staff co-ordinate their activities through you on all matters of importance with a military pertinence.
- g Ensures FC is kept informed of the on-going situation as required.

3. In addition to the above-mentioned responsibilities, be reminded to endeavour to conduct regular visits, as I do, to troop locations to see what problems they are encountering as well the conditions under which they operate. Ensure to take necessary remedial action before things get out of hand. Specifically, if there is a report from a particular unit, you must try to visit that location to make an on-the-spot study of the situation. In this way it is possible to keep in close contact throughout the mission.

TROOP ROTATION

4. Currently as you are aware, three units have recently rotated - AUSMED,

SENBATT and MALAWI COY. I have carried out some initial visits and as such there are problems in particular with MALAWI COY in Butare which need to be studied critically before an attempt is made to swap that unit with SENBATT in Kibuye. ETHIOBATT'S rotation is now more than likely to take place even though the actual confirmation is yet to be received from Addis-Ababa.

SECURITY

3. **Security in the theatre:** As the COS you are naturally already aware of the security situation in the theatre, however I cannot overemphasise the fact that there is a need for all to remain vigilant. In this respect I would advise well coordinated patrolling in all sectors and the need to inculcate a stronger sense of vigilance amongst all contingents and MILOBS.

4. In view of the recent spate of serious incidents around the country, I would advise that all units be made very much aware of the various states of alert and be able to apply them at the appropriate time. Commanders from all units should take care of the security situations as they develop.

5. OUTSTANDING MATTERS:

- a **UNAMIR/RPA meetings:** It is necessary that we continue to have regular meetings between UNAMIR/RPA staff officers even though there may be some reluctance on their part to participate. The meetings must continue and I don't need to overemphasize this fact.
- b **SOPs:** This was recently distributed for comments but we are yet to receive it back for any amendments. This ought to be pursued in order that we can produce a final report which should be adopted. It is too late in coming out.
- c **Security Situation:** Regular appraisal of the security situation by the INT CELL needs no emphasis in view of the prevailing circumstances.
- d **"OP RETOUR" and HAC Reorganization:** Both these issues need closer studying before a final recommendation is given to the FC.

- e **Vehicle Establishment Committee.** It is likely that some vehicles will be available to the mission for distribution whilst I am away. The CTO will advise you accordingly after which you and OIC Admin can fix a date for the meeting. You will be a co-chairman with him.

CMO'S DUTIES:

6. Colonel Moeen as DCMO is conversant with this aspect of my work. On a daily basis, after morning prayers, he will meet with you to discuss relevant matters.

CONCLUSION:

7. As you have been here for some time now and have regular meetings with me, you know essentially my attitude towards the mission and the way I go about harmonizing the various contingents on behalf of the FC so I do not need any elaboration. I also have no doubts about your ability to combine my duties with those of the COS. My staff are all capable and will provide you with necessary information on routine matters as and when it becomes necessary.

8. Finally, I wish you good luck and God's guidance in your additional responsibilities.

13 March 1995



HK ANYIDOHO
Brig Gen
DFC/CMO

Distribution:

SRSG
FC
ED
OIC ADMIN
DCMO
MILOB GP HQ ✓
CTO

FC
CMO
MILOB GP HQ
A/DCMO

Respected Gen Tougsignant

Dr Kabia

Col Tikoca

Ladies and Gentlemen

1. Good evening. This evening we are here to bid farewell to Col Tikoca. Col Tikoca is an UN Peace Keeping veteran. In his total 26 yrs service he has served in 10 missions starting from 1976.

a. He had three tenure in UNFIL

b. Was a part of multinational Force in Sinai between 83-86.

c. Was appointed as Chief Military Observer in UNOSOM in 1992.

d. was a member of Military adviser to the Rwanda peace talk in Arusha.

e. Was appointed as a member of recce team to Rwanda from Aug-Sep 93.

f. And finally appointed as Chief Military observer, UNAMIR.

2. I can assure you it will be

1

very difficult to find a Military officer with such a wide experience in UN peace Keeping mission. He has utilised his experience and helped UNAMIR in decision making and crisis management.

3.Col Tikoca is an excellent Military leader. His professional competence, dedication towards service, relentless efforts, crisis management, handling officer on ground, feeling for human beings, name any quality in a leader, Col Tikoca has them all. We admire you from our cathedral of our heart.

4.I had the opportunity to see Col Tikoca very closely during the Rwadan crisis. From the very beginning of the crisis in Rwanda Col Tikoca has done every thing to save the country and the people. With limited resources Col Tikoca has produced wonders. In the initial days of the crisis, Col Tikoca was one of us who had sleepless

nights without food, water and worked for humanity. These are now fairly tales.

5. Col Tikoca's personal intervention has saved many lives. I would like to narrate one such incident . 4 Milobs were tasked to evacuate 30 Tanzanians from gen area Rwandex. As they were carrying out the mission , Interhamways stopped them and got them out from vehicles and wanted to kill them. The life of 30 Tanzanians and four Milobs were at stake. Getting this information Col Tikoca along with four Milobs immediately rushed for the spot. As they were going to Rwandex he picked up one RGF Cpl from Kanombe Check Point for negotiation. As they were proceeding to Rwandex RPA soldiers in RGF uniform stopped them. When they found a RGF soldiers in the UNAMIR vehicle, they were furious and ordered all of them to come out of the veh. But Col Tikoca asked the

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RGF Cpl to remain in the veh. RPF soldiers then dragged Col Tikoca and four Milobs out of the veh, took them near a bush, asked them to knee down and brought member of Fire skod to kill them. At the face of the death Col Tikoca did not give up hope and negotiated with them. He reminded them if any thing happens to them the whole world would condemn them for this action. Negotiation contd for an hour . By this time three RPA officers arrived in the scene and asked Col Tikoca and four other Milobs to leave the place immediately leaving behind the RGF Cpl. Other wise face death. Seeing no alternative Col Tikoca with other Milobs left but Col Tikoca said if anything happens to the RGF Cpl he would blow it up to the highest level. By this time RGF Cpl was bitten up mercilessly. As they were falling back to Force HQ they were ambushed by the same group and Capt Bow got shot. I was

standing out side the Ops room of Force HQ when Col Tikoca arrived he was shivering with anger. He quickly briefed me and went to CND to discuss the matter with Col Chargles who was then the incharge of RPA in Kigali.

6. After a lot of negotiation Col Chargles agreed to release the RGF Cpl. Col Tikoca immediately went to the spot and recovered the RGF Cpl. By this time the Cpl lost two teeth but he was alive. He brought him back and paid some money and said sorry for what had happened. The Cpl was very happy to have his life back.

7. There are many such incidents, If I narrate them all I think you have to sit here till dawn.

✓ 8. Time has come for us to say good bye to you but I can assure you that all Milobs who served under you will remember you for years to come. We the Milobs are feeling bad to say farewell to

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you but we are definite your country and your family are eagerly waiting to have you back home. With your leadership qualities, we sure that you will climb the highest ladder of your Army.

9. In the end we all wish you the very best in your new assignment and Bon Voyage.

10. Now I would request Gen Tougsignant to present our token of love to Col Tikoca on behalf of all Milobs.



OUTGOING FAX NO. _____

PAGE 1 OF 1

TO: A. GOLO OIC/ADMINISTRATION UNAMIR, NAIROBI	FROM: MGEN. DANLAIRE FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI
ATTN: CFO, TTAO	DATE: 3 AUG 1994
FAX NO: 254-2 622 668	PHONE: 1 212 963 3092
INFO:	FAX NO: 1 212 963 3090
Internal dist: DFC, COO, CMO, CMPO	DRAFTED BY:
SUBJECT:	
REFERENCE:	

1. COL MOEEN WILL TRAVEL TO NAIROBI ON 04 AUGUST 94 ON DUTY THERE UNTIL 07 AUG 94. PLEASE ARRANGE FOR PAYMENT OF DSA AS COL MOEEN IS CONSIDERED STAFF PENDING CONVERSION TO UNMO STATUS.

2. REGARDS.

Received UN vehicle
no 1217 from CA Moeen

Maj B T Mofsin
~~Signature~~

26/7/94

Received UN vehicle
no 1217 from CA Moeen

May B T Mofsin

~~Signature~~

28/7/94

KyF.1168

UNAMIR MIR 1395

UNAMIR FORCE HQ
OUTGOING FACSIMILE

UNAMIR

94 JUL 20 11 46

NO OF PAGES TRANSMITTED INCLUDING THIS: TWO

94 JUL 20 11 22

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK	FROM: DALLAYRE MAJ GEN FORCE COMMANDER UNAMIR, KIGALI, RWANDA
FAX: 212-963-4879 FAX: 8802-883233	FAX: 250-84265 PHONE: 250-84271
INFO : MAJ GEN BARIL UNATIONS, NY ARMED FORCES DIVISION PRIME MINISTER'S SECRETARIAT DHAKA, BANGLADESH	FILE NO. FAX01 <i>CONCERN N.Y. PLS PASS TO BANGLADESH. IMPOSSIBLE TO raise them from here MKS.</i>
REF: 3000/15/OPS	DATED: 20 JULY 1994

SUBJECT: BANGLADESHI CONTINGENTS FOR UNAMIR

1. BANGLADESH HAD THE HIGHEST CONTRIBUTION OF TROOPS IN UNAMIR TILL 21 APRIL 94. AS PER THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 912 DATED 21 APRIL 94, THE UNAMIR STRENGTH WAS BROUGHT DOWN TO 450 PERSONNEL IN RWANDA. REST OF THE FORMED TROOPS WERE SENT TO THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTRIES.

2. FORCE ENGINEER COY (BANGLADESH) WAS DEPLOYED IN GENERAL AREA BYUMBA. THEY CARRIED OUT DETAIL RECCE AND HAVE GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENGINEER EFFORT REQUIRED FOR THE COUNTRY. IT MAY BE MENTIONED HERE THAT THE COY HAVE LEFT BEHIND ALL THEIR VEHICLES. SOME OF THAT MATERIAL IS STILL OPERATIONAL BUT SOME WILL BE REQUIRED TO MAKE UP THE LOSSES AND FILL THE GAP OF WHAT WAS NEVER BROUGHT IN FIRST PLACE. EQUIPMENT ON HAND CAN BE READILY TAKEN OVER BY THEM IF BANGLADESH DECIDES TO SEND THE SAME ENGINEER COY.

3. WITH THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF CEASE-FIRE AND A NEW GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA, THE POLITICAL SITUATION IS FAST RETURNING TO NORMAL IN ALL AREAS EXCEPT THE HUMANITARIAN PROTECTION ZONE WHERE LARGE NUMBER OF EXTREMIST STILL ROAM. THIS IS THE TIME WHEN THE COUNTRY REQUIRES INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE AND THE BANGLADESH ENGINEER COMPANY (BECAUSE OF THEIR BACKGROUND KNOWLEDGE) WILL BE ABLE TO PLAY A SIGNIFICANT ROLE. BY PROVIDING THE ENGINEER COMPANY, BANGLADESH WILL BE GREATLY CONTRIBUTING IN RE-BUILDING THE COUNTRY.

4. THE FORCE IS ALSO IN DIRE NEED OF INFANTRY, BE IT INDEPENDENT COMPANIES (3) OR FORMED BATTALIONS (3).

KE EDIA (COO)

5. IN THE LIGHT OF ABOVE, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO APPROACH BANGLADESH GOVERNMENT TO CONSIDER IN SENDING THE SAME ENGINEER COMPANY AND/OR SOME INFANTRY ELEMENTS AT AN EARLY DATE.

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH

July 1994

3000.1(COO)

SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF COL MOEEN UDDIN AHMED REGARDING RECCE TO GISENYI ON 17 JUNE 1994.

1. On 16 June 1994 DFC has asked me to send a recce team to GISENYI. According, I put the demand for two UNMO teams to MILOB GP HQ. I have also put our request to RGF and RPF through our LOs for the clearance of two vehicles and four persons. While I was putting the request to our LO (CL1), CO, GHANBATT came in the net and said he would also go to GISENYI as DFC has asked him to go. I then corrected and passed to LOs that three vehicles and 7 persons would go to GISENYI on 17 June 1994 starting at 0600 hrs.

2. A number of reminders were given to our LOs for the clearance but I did not receive the clearance. On 17 June 94 morning DFC inquired about the recce. I replied that we had not received clearance yet. I also said we follow a procedure before sending team out of KIGALI and clearance was a requirement. During prayers in the morning (17 June 94), I stated that we had not got clearance from both the parties to go to GISENYI and we should not under take this mission until we get clearance. However, it was a command decision to send the recce teams to GISENYI and GITARAMA at 1000 hrs even clearance were not given, as it was very important to maintain contact with the interim government.

3. After the conf, I requested Lt Col Austdal to brief the teams as he has carried out the planning for the recce teams. In this briefing, I told him to emphasise on the tasks and routes. I also told him that if any parties do not allow them to cross their check points, they should fall back to Kigali.

4. While the recce team was going out of the HQs, I saw Capt Sharif who told me that he was going to GISENYI with the recce team. Till 1600 hrs I did not know that a separate team consisting of CO GHANBATT, Capt Sharif and others went to GISENYI. Later I learnt they were separately briefed by DFC himself. Neither Lt Col Austdal nor I knew about this separate mission.

5. At about 1145 hrs I was told by MILOB duty offr that the first vehicle of GISENYI recce team was hit either by land mine or mortar. Maj Sosa and Maj Ahsan were seriously wounded. I quickly arranged their evacuation.

6. I have following recommendations so that such incident do not occur in future:

a. No move should be under taken outside Kigali without clearance.

- b. All moves outside KIGALI must be coordinated by Ops Branch.
- c. If any branch or office or units need to send people outside Kigali, has to go through Ops Branch. Ops Branch in turn will get necessary clearance from both the parties.
- d. Unless situation improves, minimum movement to be under taken outside Kigali.
- e. UNAMIR should have its own surgical team ASP.
- f. Arrangement be made to have our own medevac helicopter, to be stationed in Kigali.

MOEEN U AHMED
Col
COO

05 July 1994

3000.1(COO)

SUBJECT: STATEMENT OF COL MOEEN UDDIN AHMED REGARDING RECCE TO GISENYI ON 17 JUNE 1994.

1. On 16 June 1994 DFC has asked me to send a recce team to GISENYI. According, I put the demand for two UNMO teams to MILOB GP HQ. I have also put our request to RGF and RPF through our LOs for the clearance of two vehicles and four persons. While I was putting the request to our LO (CL1), CO, GHANBATT came in the net and said he would also go to GISENYI as DFC has asked him to go. I then corrected and passed to LOs that three vehicles and 7 persons would go to GISENYI on 17 June 1994 starting at 0600 hrs.

2. A number of reminders were given to our LOs for the clearance but I did not receive the clearance. On 17 June 94 morning DFC inquired about the recce. I replied that we had not received clearance yet. I also said we follow a procedure before sending team out of KIGALI and clearance was a requirement. During prayers in the morning (17 June 94), I stated that we had not got clearance from both the parties to go to GISENYI and we should not under take this mission until we get clearance. However, it was a command decision to send the recce teams to GISENYI and GITARAMA at 1000 hrs even clearance were not given, as it was very important to maintain contact with the interim government.

3. After the conf, I requested Lt Col Austdal to brief the teams as he has carried out the planning for the recce teams. In this briefing, I told him to emphasise on the tasks and routes. I also told him that if any parties do not allow them to cross their check points, they should fall back to Kigali.

4. While the recce team was going out of the HQs, I saw Capt Sharif who told me that he was going to GISENYI with the recce team. Till 1600 hrs I did not know that a separate team consisting of CO GHANBATT, Capt Sharif and others went to GISENYI. Later I learnt they were separately briefed by DFC himself. Neither Lt Col Austdal nor I knew about this separate mission.

5. At about 1145 hrs I was told by MILOB duty offr that the first vehicle of GISENYI recce team was hit either by land mine or mortar. Maj Sosa and Maj Ahsan were seriously wounded. I quickly arranged their evacuation.

6. I have following recommendations so that such incident do not occur in future:

- a. No move should be under taken outside Kigali without clearance.
-


b. All moves outside KIGALI must be coordinated by Ops Branch.

c. If any branch or office or units need to send people outside Kigali, has to go through Ops Branch. Ops Branch in turn will get necessary clearance from both the parties.

d. Unless situation improves, minimum movement to be under taken outside Kigali.

e. UNAMIR should have its own surgical team ASP.

f. Arrangement be made to have our own medevac helicopter, to be stationed in Kigali.



MOEEN U AHMED
Col
COO

UNAMIR
FORCE HQ
OPS BRANCH

18 June 1994

3000.1(COO)

To: Force Commander

SUBJECT: COMMENTS ON STATEMENT OF LT COL AM AUSTDAL REGARDING
RECCE TO GISENYI

1. On 16 June 1994 DFC has asked me to send a recce team to GISENYI. According, I put the demand for two UNMO teams to MILOB GP HQ. I have also put our request to RGF and RPF through our LOS for the clearance of two vehicles and four persons. While I was putting the request to our LO (CL1), CO, GHANBATT came in the net and said he would also go to GISENYI as DFC has asked him to go. I then corrected and passed to LOS that three vehicles and 7 persons would go to GISENYI on 17 June 1994 starting at 0600 hrs.

2. A number of reminders were given to our LOS for the clearance but I did not receive the clearance. On 17 June 94 morning DFC inquired about the recce. I replied that we had not received clearance yet. I also said we follow a procedure before sending team out of KIGALI and clearance was a requirement. During prayers in the morning (17 June 94), I stated that we had not got clearance from both the parties to go to GISENYI. However, it was decided in the conference that recce team to GISENYI and GITARAMA would move at 1000 hrs if clearance were not given.

3. After the conf, I requested Lt Col Ausdal to brief the teams as he has carried out the planning for the recce teams. In this briefing, I told him to emphasise on the tasks and routes. I also told him that if any parties do not allow them to cross their check points, they should fall back to Kigali.

4. While the recce team was going out of the HQs, I saw Capt Sharif who told me that he was going to GISENYI with the recce team. Till 1600 hrs I did not know that a separate team consisting of CO GHANBATT, Capt Sharif and others went to GISENYI. Later I learnt they were separately briefed by DFC himself. Neither Lt Col Austdal nor I knew about this separate mission.

5. At about 1145 hrs I was told by MILOB duty offr that the first vehicle of GISENYI recce team was hit either by land mine or mortar. Maj Sosa and Maj Ahsan were seriously wounded. I quickly arranged their evacuation.

6. I personally regret for this tragic incident. I have following recommendations so that such incident do not occur in future:

a. No move should be under taken outside Kigali without clearance.

Handwritten notes:
1. The above information was received from Lt Col Ausdal on 18 June 1994.
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- b. All moves outside KIGALI must be coordinated by Ops Branch.
 - c. If any branch or office or units need to send people outside Kigali, has to go through Ops Branch. Ops Branch in turn will get necessary clearance from both the parties.
 - d. Unless situation improves, minimum movement to be under taken outside Kigali.
 - e. UNAMIR should have its own surgical team ASP.
 - f. Arrangement be made to have our own medevac helicopter, to be stationed in Kigali.
 - g. A strong protest be launched to RPF on this incident.
7. I am attaching statement of Lt Col Austdal for your necessary action please.



MOEEN U AHMED
COL
COO