

Balkan Mission - REPORT #59
MISC



THE
WALTER M. BALLARD
COMPANY
WASHINGTON

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

3 August 1944

George:

With reference to Patterson's letter to Gerstenzang of 7 July 1944:

1. The question of office space is handled by joint cable of Sayre and yourself.
2. As nearly as we can determine the attached cables take care of the point brought up by Patterson.

I don't think anything else in the letter requires answer by you.

T. V. B.

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

8, SHARIA DAR EL-SHIFA - GARDEN CITY - CAIRO

DS - Mr. Eckhaus

July 7, 1944

CAWA No. 47

Mr. Leo Gerstenzang
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
1344 Connecticut Avenue
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Leo:

I have continued to send you material by pouch or bag every few days without having any idea as to when you may be leaving Washington. There have not been any startling new developments this week, but I will try to bring you up to date on a few things of interest.

Our accommodation problem in terms of office space is becoming increasingly acute, and at a staff meeting this week it was agreed in principle that all the operational staff, from district director down, would shortly have to move to Maadi, where each man will be assigned to work with his opposite number with AML. It is probable also that in the case of some of the divisions the entire group will make this move with possible exception of the division chief. I do not feel that our situation is yet sufficiently clarified to make an immediate assignment of any of our people feasible, nor do we really have enough personnel to consider the problem seriously. If the situation should reach the point where a decision in this respect must be taken, I shall try to read your mind as well as possible and go ahead. The possibility of additional office space in the city is being explored by Roseman, but it does not appear that any satisfactory permanent arrangement can be worked out. Possibly the developments in Europe will solve our problem for us.

We cabled early this week asking authority to hire certain men here for positions in our Bureau, not above grade nine, and I am hopeful that we shall have an answer from you in the next day or two. During your absence I have talked with more than a dozen men, several of whom would be excellent possibilities for positions of that type, either in transport or distribution work, and it seems a pity not to take them on here and thereby serve two purposes, one, the easing of the transportation problem from the States, two, the development of a more balanced staff in terms of nationalities.

I have had an excellent discussion with the medical people, and a further discussion with the welfare people on the question of transport allocated to the voluntary society teams from the

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point of view as to what control or supervision our Bureau should have over that rather large pool of transport. It appears that in general the medical units because of the special equipment and personnel they will carry will have to be rather independent in the use and control of transport allocated to them. The same may not be true of the welfare or relief units, and I am laying down our views on this matter to Mr. Greenstein to form a basis of a further discussion of the problem. I say "our views" with the full knowledge that I am forced in this instance to push ahead into the unexplored territory without knowledge of your views, but if we do not do so now these teams will inevitably come to consider themselves more and more as independent units subject to no overriding control. If transport should be short in the Balkans particularly in the early stages this might lead to considerable confusion as well as an inefficient use of available transport for tasks of the highest priority.

On the assumption that the budget received from Washington will be more or less binding upon us, I have drawn up a tentative plan allocating our personnel by districts in Greece, and hope in the next few days to discuss this in detail with Archer and such of his district directors as are already appointed. This also raises the problem as to how we may wish to use the services of some of the voluntary agency personnel and the relief teams who may be able to work along the same lines as our district and field officers, at least on a part time basis. Brownbridge, who has more or less taken over Barrett-Brown's job, vis-a-vis these teams, and tells me that he would estimate offhand that perhaps 30% of the 100 personnel on these teams for Greece would be of such calibre as to be extremely useful to us in developing our distribution organization. I do not believe that the number of field personnel allocated in the budget to us will be adequate without considerable other assistance to control the distribution of supplies down to the consumer level. There will be many many villages and portions of areas which these people cannot reach. In such places relief teams performing other tasks could at the same time assist in organizing distribution. All this thinking is naturally predicated upon the assumption that we are going to have a distribution job to do. This major issue remains unsettled and I have done nothing to try and force a decision feeling that events and many other factors will eventually dictate the broad policy to be followed. AML's thinking in this field has not officially changed, and your early return with some high up support for our point of view will doubtless be necessary before we can expect any results. So far as is possible we have continued and expanded our contacts with AML, and we shall make a special effort to orient the new arrivals in our division as rapidly and thoroughly as possible.

In closing I would stress one old familiar story: our complete lack of information as to Washington thinking in terms of

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Sincerely yours,

James T. Patterson

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B M - Reports
76

9 September 1944.
CATA No. 181
CALO No. 63

TO: M. Menshikov, Deputy Director General, UNRRA
1344 Connecticut Avenue, Washington 25, D.C.

FROM: Harry Greenstein, Director of Welfare Division

SUBJECT: Digest of the minutes of the meeting on the General
Purposes Committee.

Att: Frederick I. Daniels, Acting Director
of Welfare

For your information I am enclosing Digest of the minutes
of the meeting on the General Purposes Committee for the Cairo
Council of Voluntary Societies held on August 23rd.

Will try to send you similar digests as minutes are received
by us.

Encl.

CAIRO COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY SOCIETIES FOR BALKAN RELIEF.

DIGEST: Of proceedings of FOURTH MEETING of the GENERAL PURPOSES COMMITTEE, 23rd August 1944.

Present.

Dr. Wilson F. Dodd	N.E.F. Chairman	Mr. Barclay Jones	A.F.S.C.
Mr. Philip Sanford	F.A.U. Secretary	Mr. Charles Lindsay	I.V.S.P.
Mr. Canara	G.R.C.	Miss Margaret Pilkington	G.I.S.
Hon. Miss Isabel Catto	Y.W.C.A.	Mrs. Lothian Small	S.C.F.
Mr. F. S. Curtis	G.W.R.A.	Miss N.B. Smith	N.E.F.
Miss E. L. Fernandes	B.R.C.S.	Mr. Lewis E. Waddilove	F.A.U.

The Committee welcomed Mr. Barclay Jones of the American Friends' Service Council, who is occupying the third American place on the Committee.

Quartermastering. The secretary reported that U.N.R.R.A. has provided Lieut. Spiegel to assist Col. Langman at the U.N.R.R.A. Training Camp.

Premises. The address of the General Purposes Committee is from this date 9, SH. MALIKA FARIDA, CAIRO (THE PREMISES ARE ON THE 2ND. FLOOR, ENTRANCE ON THE LEFT).

Passport and Passes. No further difficulties are being experienced at the British Consulate at the moment. It was further reported that U.N.R.R.A. had stated that U.N.R.R.A. passes would be issued in the near future.

Welfare of Personnel. The following resolution was carried unanimously "that the four corresponding members be asked to meet the Chairman and Officers of the General Purposes on Wednesday, 6th September, 1944, to discuss the whole matter.

Corresponding member at Museirat: The General Purposes Committee have been informed by the O/C Museirat Camp, of the appointment of Miss Katherine McElroy, G.W.R. P.C.U. as corresponding member. They warmly endorsed this appointment.

Joint Medical Board. It was reported that A.M.L. and U.N.R.R.A. had decided that a Joint Medical Board should be set up to carry out Medical Examinations of all Voluntary Societies Personnel intended for use in the Balkans. Dr. Dodd, N.E.F., was recommended by the G.P.C. to represent them on the Medical Board.

Secondment to U.N.R.R.A. The secretary reported that Mr. Brownbridge of U.N.R.R.A. had been approached by various divisions of U.N.R.R.A. to ask for the secondment of Voluntary Societies Personnel. The secretary was instructed to inform Mr. Brownbridge:

- a) that no approach should be made at this stage to Voluntary Society Personnel on the subject of secondment.
- b) that the G.P.C. would appreciate it if Mr. Brownbridge would prepare and submit a draft of the suggested channel for making such approaches. The Committee strongly deprecates any direct approach to any individual either on the subject of secondment to or direct employment by U.N.R.R.A.

Date of next meeting: The next meeting of the General Purposes Committee to be held on Thursday, August 31st, at 9, Malika Farida, Cairo, at 16.30.

Distribution: Welfare Div. (- 5 copies), Areas, P.&T. Division, Health Division.

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

8, SHARIA DAR EL-SHIFA - GARDEN CITY - CAIRO

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS

UNRRA-CAIRO

TELEPHONES:

47816-41317

20 September, 1944

CAWA 209

DO-Mr. B. Eckhaus

Mr. Michael Menshikov
Deputy Director-General
Dupont Circle Building
1344 Connecticut Avenue
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Menshikov

The attached material summarizes the latest developments here with respect to airspace priorities. The last part of Mr. Rohrbaugh's memorandum mentions a particularly serious question, which of course has implications broader than just air travel.

In this connection, I urge that you work with the War Department to the end that that agency issue to all theatres instructions emphasizing the relationship of the U. S. War Department and UNRRA.

We shall continue to press the matter here, and will keep you informed of developments. At the same time, we are convinced that basic progress can best be made in Washington.

Yours sincerely

William T. Matthews
CHIEF OF MISSION

Matthews

18 September, 1944

TO: Cyril Pickard
Acting Deputy Chief for Finance and Administration

FROM: Lewis H. Rohrbaugh

SUBJECT: Airspace Priorities for UNRRA

The attached memoranda gives in sequence developments concerning our effort to get (1) more space on U.S. Army airliners for UNRRA personnel coming from the USA to Egypt, and (2) recognition that UNRRA personnel should be allowed to use U.S. air travel here in the Middle East and Balkans. Washington repeatedly urges us to "work on" the local military for more allocations in connection with above. Our latest efforts, in addition to letters sent by Sir William to General Hughes, etc., have been as follows:

1. Last week Col. Booker, Mr. Walters and I tried to see Col. Wild (USAFIME) on both matters. He was out.
2. My Sept. 9th memorandum to Maj. Harris (attached).
3. My Sept. 12th memorandum to Mr. Miller (attached).
4. Note on the Sept. 15th Rohrbaugh-Harris conference with Col. Norcross, deputy to Gen. Smith Dorian.

The results, as reflected in a Rohrbaugh-Norcross telephone conversation this morning are:

1. UNRRA air space on U.S. Army planes in Middle East and Balkans.

We may now use such air space in urgent cases related to our AME relationships. To get such space we will submit our requests directly to Col. Norcross. On approval by him, the requests will be honored by USAFIME.

I am passing on this information to Col. Langman so that it may be followed by Walters, the travel man.

2. U. S. ARMY Airspace from the U.S.A. to Egypt.

USAFIME disclaims any responsibility in this connection and indeed indicates they feel UNRRA priorities should not come out of general allocations made to this theatre but instead should be earmarked by the War Department in Washington.

This negative answer necessitates our describing to UNRRA in Washington our efforts and their results, and the hope that the War Department can (a) educate this theatre to its responsibilities, and (b) at the Washington level make an allocation direct to UNRRA. I shall prepare such a cable. At the same time, I believe we should continue efforts here (at the Sadler-Miller level) to get results from USAFIME.

(COPY)

Sept. 15

Conference with Col. Norcross (Deputy to Smith-Dorien)
Major Harris, CLO, along

1. UNRRA use of U.S. Army air transport in M E, etc.

Gen. Sadler had said O.K. Left authority to Norcross.
All applications should first go to Col. Norcross who will
approve and send to USAFIME, who will act on his approval.
He will talk to Col. Wild this afternoon.

2. UNRRA air priorities from Washington to M E via U.S. Army

General situation of allocation from War Dept. to
theatre. However, the authority entirely in D.C. and
real accomplishments can come from Lehman - Hilldring
arrangements. Col. Norcross thought perhaps theatre
might make representations to War Dept. Will discuss
with Col. Wild.

Will call me back on both.

L. R. 9/15

September 9, 1944

To: Major Harris

From: Lewis H. Rohrbaugh

Subject: Airspace for UNRRA use.

1. In the Middle East and Balkans

At the present, as I understand it, UNRRA personnel are not permitted to use U.S. Army airlines in travel between Italy and Egypt or between Egypt and other spots here in the Middle East. I believe that General Sadler has indicated that UNRRA employees could use such airspace in instances where the use of this space has a military connection.

We believe our activities definitely come under this category and would appreciate whatever steps are necessary being taken so that use of space in question may be available to us at the earliest possible date.

2. Airspace for UNRRA employees coming to Egypt from US and UK.

Our greatest need of course is for airspace for employees coming here from the United States. If we are adequately to carry out our cooperative arrangement with AML it is essential that we secure more airpriorities than have been made available to us. In August ten spaces were allotted then withdrawn, and six of these were restored. For September ten airspaces were allotted to UNRRA. Our understanding is that the allocation of airspace to this theatre is made in Washington and that theatre then makes a sub-allocation to UNRRA and other agencies. We have ready in Washington a large number of persons in categories for which there is urgent need here.

Commander Weissbuch has been very cooperative in following through our numerous repeated requests for additional space. We should much appreciate your efforts to further increase allocations for the current month, and to secure for us, at the appropriate time, a substantial allocation for the month of October. We have urged UNRRA Washington to use the sea-air combination, indicating to them General Sadler's guarantee to bring by air all persons landed in North Africa.

cc. Mr. Miller.

Curshace

September 12, 1944

To: Mr. Neville Miller

From: Lewis H. Rohrbaugh

Subject: Air priorities for UNRRA personnel

I believe you are familiar with our airspace situation. In August we got ten, lost them, got six restored. For September we got ten. Ten isn't enough to wink at.

Somewhere between Cairo and Washington the buck gets lost. UNRRA Washington always urges us to press this theatre to in turn bring pressure on the U.S. War Department. The theatre always replies that allocations are made entirely by Washington and that when this is done we then get our share allotted locally.

We have pressured through Commander Weissbuch and through Major Harris, as you saw in the data I sent him. And on August 28 Sir William sent a letter to General Hughes stressing the need for more space if we are to meet the needs outlined in our relationships with AML. We get comparatively little, but reports from incoming travellers indicate that American personnel going to the Arabian Oil Fields are quite numerous!

The action point of this memorandum is that the time for requesting October priorities is about here - the middle of September. I shall again go after the thing through Harris, but on past experience that will not get us what we wish. I believe it needs handling at a higher level than Weissbuch-Harris, and suggest you arrange to have Generals Wilson, Hughes and Sadler dealt with. This is in line with a current cable (460) from Washington indicating Governor Lehman has taken up air transport with General Hildring, that the whole matter is now solely a military responsibility, and urging us to approach Generals Wilson, Hughes and Sadler for theatre command pressure on Washington also, and that we endeavour to secure a better understanding by the military here of its complete responsibility for personnel transportation and of the seriousness of this bottleneck.

Incidentally the British War Office (Enjoin 120 September 7) is requesting the British Mediterranean Command to press U.S. military transportation authorities for air space allocation for Balkan Mission and Africa refugee camp personnel.

TELEGRAM RECEIVED.

FROM : FOREIGN OFFICE

TO : Minister Resident Cairo.

ENJOY 120.

7.9.44

DISTRIBUTION : FILE

ROMERBAUGH : ACTION

SIR W. MATTHEWS

ARCHER

ELKINTON

GERSTENZANG

MILLER

HALL.

Addressed to Washington telegram 759 Sept. 7th
repeated to Minister Resident Cairo.

The War Office are prepared to request British military
Mediterranean Command to press United States military transportation
authorities to allot passages for personnel for Balkans Mission and
refugee camps in Africa if you so desire.

2. If so please telegraph numbers of persons stating
destination and whether for mission or camps for whom you still need
passages.

(COPY)

Sept. 15

Conference with Col. Norcross (Deputy to Smith-Dorien)
Major Harris, CLO, along

1. UNRRA use of U.S. Army air transport in M E, etc.

Gen. Sadler had said O.K. Left authority to Norcross.
All applications should first go to Col. Norcross who will
approve and send to USAFIME, who will act on his approval.
He will talk to Col. Wild this afternoon.

2. UNRRA air priorities from Washington to M E via U.S. Army

General situation of allocation from War Dept. to
theatre. However, the authority entirely in D.C. and
real accomplishments can come from Lehman - Hilldring
arrangements. Col. Norcross thought perhaps theatre
might make representations to War Dept. Will discuss
with Col. Wild.

Will call me back on both.

L. R. 9/15

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION
G-5 Section, AFHQ
APO 512

10 December 1944

Governor Herbert H. Lehman
Director General, UNRRA
1344 Connecticut Avenue
Washington, D. C.

Report of Activities
Sept. 15 to Dec. 1

Dear Governor Lehman:

With reference to your cable requesting report of activities of this office from September 15 to December 1st, permit me to say that it is difficult to make a very specific report of the activities of a liaison office. Much of a liaison officer's time and efforts are required in keeping abreast of current conditions and plans, as well as in attending conferences, in the making of contacts and in the performance of advisory work both for the military as well as for UNRRA. This sort of activity does not show up in a tangible form; however, the influence of such efforts does have a considerable effect on policies and plans adopted.

I have construed my position as one calling for the furnishing of information and advice to the military as well as to UNRRA, keeping each advised as to thinking and plans of the other. This applies, of course, only to matters having to do with UNRRA operations or military operations in the same field. From the start it has been my objective to make the military people UNRRA conscious. In this, I believe, we have been successful, and I believe too that very satisfactory working relationships and understandings have been established between the military and UNRRA.

The beginning of the period covered in this report was marked by a general study of the refugee and displaced persons problem in this theater as a whole. Following visits to the Mideast camps being operated by UNRRA, to proposed camp at Philippeville and to the southern Italy camps, a joint understanding between AFHQ and UNRRA was reached on the whole refugee problem as it existed at that time, and an overall joint report by AFHQ and UNRRA was submitted both to UNRRA and CCS at Washington. Because of the prominence of the Yugoslav Committee of Liberation were consulted prior to submittal of report and their views obtained. All of this resulted in: (1) increasing the ceiling for number of Yugoslavs to be held in Italy, and (2) recognition of Philippeville, French North Africa, as a reserve camp, with additional reserve camp facilities in the Mideast for use if needed.

On my arrival at AFHQ discussions were had with the Chief of G-5 Section with reference to working out a plan for coordinating the work of all voluntary

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agencies working in the refugee and displaced persons field. The principal representative of UNRRA at AFHQ collaborated in the making of plans for accomplishing this objective. This resulted in the calling of a meeting by Lt. Gen. Clark, C.A.O. Mediterranean Theater. This first meeting was held on 2 September. The following organizations were represented:

American Friends Service Committee
American Red Cross
American Joint Distribution Committee
British Red Cross
Allied Control Commission, Internees and
Displaced Persons Sub-Commission
ACC, Italian Refugee Branch
Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees
War Refugee Board
Office of British Resident Minister
Office of U.S. Political Adviser
AFHQ, and
UNRRA

It was agreed that these representatives would constitute an advisory committee to the Supreme Allied Commander on all matters having to do with the refugee and displaced persons program for the Mediterranean Theater. Lt. Gen. Clark, Chief Administrative Officer at AFHQ was made chairman of the committee. The Chief of G-5 Section and the principal representative of UNRRA at AFHQ were constituted as co-vice chairmen. Since then a number of monthly meetings have been held. The Chief of G-5 presided at the first meeting, while in the absence of the Chief of G-5 Section, the principal representative of UNRRA, AFHQ, has presided at all subsequent meetings. This Committee has a joint secretariat consisting of the head of the Displaced Persons Division at AFHQ, and the head of displaced persons in the Italian Mission.

The benefits coming out of this Committee's operations have been:

- (a) The creation of a better understanding on the part of each organization in the work of all of the other organizations, as well, also, as in the work of the military.
- (b) Military command being given the thinking and advice of the other organizations above mentioned which work directly or indirectly in the refugee and displaced persons field, or which in any way deal with civil affairs.
- (c) Avoidance of duplication of efforts and divergence of reports in some areas of work.
- (d) A probable earlier transfer of responsibility from the military to UNRRA for care of displaced persons.

The principal representative of UNRRA at AFHQ, learning that a request was to

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be made for UNRRA to take over four southern Italy camps, accommodating about 7,000 refugees (all Yugoslavs except 500 Jewish) made an inspection of these camps and a report on same. Later negotiations were had with AFHQ and AC in which conditions of transfer were discussed. All of this was done prior to entrance of the Italian UNRRA Mission. Since its arrival it has been definitely agreed that UNRRA will take over these camps as of January 1, 1945.

Contacts have been maintained with the Director of Fedhala Refugee Camp located at Casablanca, French Morocco. Assistance has been given at military headquarters in clearing matters at AFHQ such as the screening and repatriating of refugees, in addition to making arrangements for shipment of refugees into the camp as well as to assist in accomplishing evacuation of refugees to other points. Assistance was given in the closing of the camp at Casablanca and in the transferring of medical and administrative personnel (except for necessary custodian service), to other UNRRA Camps and services.

Starting in August the principal representative of UNRRA at AFHQ participated in all of the planning for UNRRA to take over the Philippeville Refugee Camp located in French North Africa. This operation involved planning for transfer of equipment and supplies, etc., as well as planning for movement in of necessary UNRRA personnel. In connection with Philippeville Camp, also, the principal representative of UNRRA at AFHQ was responsible for any necessary negotiations and agreements with the French Government. Among other things this involved the securing of waivers from the French Government of all restrictions on supplies to be shipped in to North Africa. This has recently been accomplished as indicated by following letter:

"The Embassy (United States) has received today a note from the Foreign Office dated November 10, a copy of which is enclosed for your information, stating that the Government General of Algeria was informed that the French authorities were in accord with the importation without restriction of supplies destined for the use of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. This same note goes on to say that new instructions were repeated to the Government General of Algeria on November 10. The substance of the foregoing is being telegraphed to you today."

This office has effected necessary liaison between the Balkan Mission and AFHQ. This has involved not only liaison between the Balkan Mission and AFHQ but more recently (because of the movement forward of the country missions of Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece) operations have called for liaison between the individual country missions and AFHQ, this latter has been necessary because of the location of Balkan Mission Headquarters being in Cairo and very much out of the line of communications between these country missions and AFHQ. This work has included at times the giving of judgments to G-5 Section of AFHQ in the forming of policies and directives. It has also involved the making of recommendations to UNRRA, Washington, with reference to operations in these countries.

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During the month of November about one-half of the time at this Headquarters and Rome has been consumed in assisting the Italian Mission in getting started in Italy. When the Mission first arrived we spent five days here at military headquarters working with Keeny and his organization. This was followed by five days' work in Rome, in deliberations with AC. Since that time there have been visits back and forth with the Chief of the Italian Mission, as well as considerable correspondence and almost daily telephone calls.

During the past two months the functions of this office has been continually extending. A part of these additional functions have been formalized in directive from the Central Office, as shown by following cable sent by Washington with reference to Theater-wide operations envisaged in the supply, shipping and displaced persons fields:

"8. Decision reached here is that Mediterranean Liaison office shall have responsibility for (1) over-all military liaison with AFHQ covering operations which are treated on a theater basis such as transportation, displaced persons, etc.; (2) supply and shipping coordination on an over-all theater basis and liaison with AFHQ on all supply and shipping questions which are treated on a theater basis. Shall discuss with chief of the Mediterranean Liaison office or his designated representative supply and shipping requirements of all countries and missions within the theater. Chief of the Mediterranean theater office is vested with authority to make final act decisions on all supply and shipping questions requiring immediate action and which are dealt with on a theater basis questions involving major decisions on shipping and supply problems shall be referred for approval to Washington by chief of the Mediterranean liaison office if time and operating conditions permit; (3) liaison with AFHQ for any matter specifically referred by the chiefs of the Italian Mission, Philippeville Camp and Balkan Mission to Chief of the Mediterranean liaison office and on any other matters involving over-all theater considerations; (4) the Chief of the Mediterranean liaison office will not (except as regards the matters contained in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above) be responsible for any operations affecting the Balkan or Italian Missions or Philippeville camp and will not be in a position to issue any instructions to chiefs of the Balkan Mission, Philippeville Camp or Italian Mission except as regards the matters described in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above."

"Theater to include for purposes mentioned herein Philippeville Camp, Albania, Greece, Italy and Yugoslavia. After actual operations in field, instructions herein will be reviewed, and in the light of new developments, if necessary, changes will be made in the line of responsibility."

This operation will require a small number of additional personnel. This quotation is given to indicate pattern of functioning of this office for the future.

In addition to the above, this office has been called on to perform many administrative services, such as making arrangements for travel, billets, communication, mail, and at times furnishing considerable stenographic services. It appears to me that this point has become pretty much of a crossroads and a reception center

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for arriving personnel and for intra-theater movements as well. This office handles all cable service for the Balkan Mission Supply Division and also all incoming mail, directives, etc. for them.

The above situation has prompted me to make the following observations and recommendations in report to the Bureau of Areas:

"With the doubt that exists at present and will continue for some time as to personnel needs in Balkan countries, Philippeville and to some extent Italy, including the southern Italy camps, it looks like in the future there will be need for some shifting of personnel from one operation to another. To handle problems mentioned in two paragraphs above, it is recommended that a small personnel and travel unit be set up here consisting of one or two persons. The function of this unit would be to maintain a record of personnel in the theater, make available to one Mission list of any surpluses in another mission which might require their services. In addition this unit would handle travel and perform any other services to incoming personnel."

At the request of Gen. Spofford, Chief of the G-5 Section, I made a trip to France in the latter part of October, in company with the Chief of displaced Persons Division of the G-5 Section, and a representative of G-2, Counter Intelligence. The purpose of this trip was to inquire into the displaced persons problem in southern France and the probable or possible impact of evacuation of displaced persons from France on accommodations in Italy. We spent two days each in Marseille, Lyon and Paris. It was found that the number of Italians who might require evacuation from France to Italy would probably be considerably less than estimates previously indicated. This was likewise true as to other nationalities. The need for screening prior to shipment was emphasized by the military representatives and relationships established which are intended to improve working relationships.

In summary I would say: the work of UNRRA representative at AFHQ has increased to a point where G-5 Section believes I should have a deputy who could act for me during my absence on necessary trips. To this I have replied that I would expect to have my supply and shipping officer, as soon as I get one, fill the role of deputy as well as to perform functions in supply and shipping. As a matter of fact, at the present time, I am personally functioning in the supply and shipping work, as well as performing many other duties not originally envisaged in liaison work. I have worked seven days a week continually for five months with but one day off for a trip to Capri. I have liked it, however.

I am submitting this just prior to my leaving for London to meet you and shall hope at our meeting to get any unsettled questions as to future operations of this office resolved there.

Respectfully submitted,

/sgd/ R. L. Cochran

R. L. Cochran, Principal Representative of UNRRA for Liaison

COPY

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION
8, Sharia Bar El-Shifa - Garden City - Cairo

CAHA/377

3 November 1944

x Birk, Louis

Dear Morse:

Several things have reached me, that I should like to comment on - some through the mail and one letter from you dated 29 September which Alvin Roseman brought with him. As Alvin was in Italy when I returned from London, the letter just came through.

First - congratulations on the superb information job at Montreal which I heard about in London through Cummings and your own modest summary. I think the rest of this letter would mean more to you if I used a rambling gossip tone. Too much has happened to give a detailed report.

As you know, I went to Italy early in September, chiefly to see if I could be of any help to Colonel Baird Ryder, ML Public Relations Balkans, in straightening out publicity programs for Yugoslavia and Albania. I did try in Italy to locate personnel, with no immediate success. Since it seemed to me of paramount importance to complete the ground work organization of Public Relations in the Balkans and country missions, I proceeded to London, arriving the fourth of October.

There I ran into very interesting situations - the free Yugoslav broadcast spurning UNRRA had just made the London press, and steps were under way to correct it. It was corrected, of course, and I had a chance to tell Sir Frederick all about our relationships in the Balkans. Then with the help of Bill Phillips and Leonard Ingrams I did get to see a large number of people connected with BBC, OWI, PID (Political Intelligence) and other London Ministries. The result was that I located an excellent second man for Yugoslavia, a very competent woman for routine work in the Albania office, and a talented British girl who had lived in Greece for ten years and had made her living in England during the war by lecturing and feature writing about Greece. My present intention is to use her as a translator-writer for this office, transferring her later to Greece if the cost is to be gained by such a move.

Then I got a valuable lead through Mr. Ingrams on Major Stephen Clissold, then and now in Bari, as member of the British Military Mission to Yugoslavia. He had at one time been press attache in Zagreb and wrote the very comprehensive intelligence report on growth of the National Committee for Liberation. He speaks Serbo-Croat fluently, of course, and has spent much time in the country during the past two years. British Army authorities are willing to have him civilianized to help UNRRA, according to advice from Bari, and our own people there have very high praise of him personally, and believe his qualifications just about perfect for our work. You can imagine what a relief this was to me, for it was by far the most difficult job of all to fill. I think we have got not only a talented information man, but one who is thoroughly aware of every current and undercurrent, and who will be of great assistance in smoothing UNRRA's operations in Yugoslavia.

On my return to Cairo I met Sydney Morrell, now on his way to America. He has instructions to call on you, and he bears a lengthy report which I dictated to him during a long cab ride to the airport. Morrell is my choice for the head Albania Public Relations Officer. I think he would be good anywhere in the Balkans, and we expect to use him at intervals wherever tight spots occur in any one of our

three country missions. Morrell has about a perfect background for us -- eight years with the Express papers of London, four years of which were spent as chief Balkan representative -- two years on loan to OWI under Sherwood, and some time as assistant to Colonel Donovan of OSS. He also worked at Young and Rubicam with Dr. George Gallup, and I believe he has applied for his first papers as an American citizen. His latest job was an assignment at the British Ministry of Information to re-organize the TEHRAN NEWS, an important sheet suffering from adverse comments on all sides. This was a six months' contract on which he succeeded unusually well. Just now, he has an MOI assignment which will take him to Canada and the United States, reporting back here to Cairo. When he gets back here, he will report to UNRRA where his papers are already being processed.

I should like to ask that you and Shelby (if he is there), Marvin Beers, Chester, etc. get to know Morrell and load him down with instructions or suggestions for me. I have asked Ollie by letter to have you, Shelby, and Marvin out to dinner with Morrell because I know how busy you are in the office.

I am happy to say that with the five people listed above, my recruiting job is just about finished, and we have now set about stepping up all lines -- when these people report for duty to UNRRA. As you know, I have been at my wits' end for lack of man-power with only Major Noble (during the last three weeks) and Miss Gilruth on the production line. Homer Davis spent his time primarily in meetings and negotiations with members of the Greek Government as a sort of aide to Archer. No one can deny that this is the most valuable sort of Public Relations, and for UNRRA's sake, in the general sense, I would not for a minute try to keep him from this type of work. It does not, however, produce many photographs and press releases. Homer has chosen as his program in Greece "assistant to Chief of Greece Mission for Government and Public Relations" which is a true picture of his present job, but a good man like Davis is far too rare out here to allow me to make a suggestion I made originally, namely that the valuable services Davis could render would justify another budget line, but that the Public Relations budget line be vacated. After consideration of all elements of this problem, I should like to let things remain as they are. Chris James is still here, awaiting his call to Greece and being useful in the matter of news releases, in the matter of personalities arriving, and general press relationships concerning Greece. The Greece Public Relations office has submitted a very well planned organizational chart, not calling for any additional staff on the UNRRA "I or S" payroll, but anticipating aid of key personnel recruited in Greece. I would like you to look over this chart which will give what is, in my opinion, the sort of set-up the country missions are going to have to have to aid UNRRA operations -- and get the stuff back home.

There was never an organization which so badly needed promotion and explanation as UNRRA at the present moment. I realize how difficult it is to work the American press with anything but sensational news stories, and we do have an opportunity here to clothe news stories with UNRRA's more important objectives. My present dearth of man-power on the job is but one of the difficulties. In military theatres, especially in the case of ML relations, censorship and slow communications complicate things hellishly. We no sooner lick one obstacle than another pops up. On top of all this is the naturally hectic condition obtaining when part of the mission is breaking up, and we are able only to grab what we can. Mr. Noble knows the ins and outs of Middle East press complexities as well as any one alive, and you can be sure we shall do everything possible to get news to you and to London.

I am sure our division in Washington did all it could to expedite Allen Fields, whose absence has been my greatest handicap to date. What stumps me is why the home office organization is not capable of clearing up a delay in passport issue. I am mystified by the whole thing.

Your cable in regard to Jerry Morris reached me in London. I delayed any further comment on her participation in the Balkans Mission partly because her plans were uncertain when I left, and partly because I wanted to be sure we had a niche for her here. By the time I reached London, I was sure, and will welcome her at the earliest. It seems to me, Mrs. M., that in Public Relations especially, UNRRA can well afford to have trained people on tap. The work of this division is so inter-connected and wide-spread that we can shift our personnel from one country or one continent to another with little loss of efficiency. Also this business of having four to six months elapse between an employee's appointment and his reporting for duty might work in the case of nurses and technical people, but Public Relations men must be in at the beginning of things. I reckon that Public Relations Division in the Balkans was six months behind when I came, and two months behind now. There are so many things which take place now and which would not occur if a proper informational program had been started in time. It just means that we have to take two steps forward and one back.

Arthur Calder Marshall, the Beddington representative, has done one of the finest shooting scripts I have ever read on the subject of the Yugoslav refugees. His group intends to do the Greek picture later, when operations have begun there, and I think the two films can become milestones in UNRRA's job of explaining itself. I shall try to get hold of a copy of the script from Mr. Marshall and send it with this letter. Marvin Beers' letter No. 305 is also at hand, and I think his proposed radio program is excellent and feasible. Tell him that it is possible for him to get the El Shatt chorus for background music since OWI has made an excellent recording, fairly recently. Also some members of the chorus do speak good English, and there is a wealth of interesting personality stuff -- as he put it "thumbnail personality sketches about chorus members". I shall find out if the chorus repertoire includes the Pilgrims Chorus. There has been no date set for departures from El Shatt to Yugoslavia. Our feeling here is that they cannot begin very soon in any quantity. What I shall do now is to collect the brief personality sketches of the chorus members and forward them to you. This means a trip to El Shatt that may take about two weeks to complete the job. I assume Marvin would want a dozen to twenty such sketches from which he could choose.

I am enclosing a copy of a brief report we did for Mr. Adair of London who was here in Cairo trying to get a full picture of Balkan operations. I am disturbed by the slowness with which materials reach you from us and note from Alastair Taylor's letter of the 14 October that you had not received answers to the questions he set forth in letters of the 8 and 19 August. We got all the material together and sent it early in September. We are cabling him now, "14 October letter just received".

I have vexing personnel worries and you will find attached a memorandum to our personnel head here, which I hope will clear up the picture. As a matter of fact, I have not asked for many additional people above the original budget lines okayed in Washington. We think we can get along with the budget positions outlined for the country missions provided enough leeway is given in the recruiting of nationals for our Public Relations offices in those countries, and so my problems relate to the Balkans Mission where certain needs became evident very soon after I arrived. For example, a press officer is indispensable and a staff writer for pamphlets, brochures, fact sheets, etc. would enable us to serve the other divisions effectively. Work along these lines has simply been neglected. In short, the only additions I asked Washington's approval for were (1) press officer (2) staff writer (3) two interpreters of the type who could use judgment in selecting and translating material destined for the home publics of the United Nations. The Middle East press is more limited, but later on we shall have access to the national press of the Balkan nations for invaluable lead stories. I kept Miss Gilruth, of course, and

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she is now Publicity Officer, working full time on the camps on materials coming out and in the very heavy assignment we have of distributing materials going in. Our sources of these are various, and the volume steadily increases. Our services in this regard are, I am sure, appreciated by the Camps Division, and can have an appreciable effect on the attitude of the 50,000 refugees whose return to their homelands will find them either good or bad ambassadors from UNHRA camps.

I think you would like to get a sharp focus on our main lines of activity at the present time. Here they are in order of emphasis on time required:

1. Ten to twenty weekly news releases about individual people with their photographs. We think that the drip, drip, drip in publications of the U.S. and U.K. especially will build UNHRA acquaintances. Most of the people sent over here are well known in their home towns or states, and if we say a little about their work, then UNHRA is explained thereby. Write-ups on American citizens are going to you, and on British citizens go to Ingrams where they can be released to the proper papers.

2. A series of "feature articles" touching upon various phases of UNHRA's present or proposed activities dealing with such matters as the crop program for Greece and the post-military period rehabilitation of the Greek fishing industry, the status of world food supplies from the UNHRA viewpoint, etc., etc. Naturally, all these have to be cleared tediously through our won divisional heads and the censors. Our output along these lines is highly educational and valued. I need a staff writer before much can be done to increase the volume. Mr. Noble here has his hands full with releases and censorship.

3. Picture magazine spreads. I wrote one of these when I was in London for PICTURE POST, which was accepted, and then we sent additional photographs from here with assurance that PICTURE POST would give us several pages. It has over a million circulation in England, and half a million outside. The magazine PARADE, the MIDE journal of the Middle East, published an excellent piece by Arthur Calder Marshall who worked with us on its preparation. Several other picture articles are in the stage of preparation.

4. Lecture Bureau. There is a great deal of lecturing going on here in the Middle East, and we are called upon to provide on the average of a speech a day to some group either inside the organization or of the military forces of the United Nations of various camps nearby. We try to pay attention to these requests because the audiences are always made up of people from all over the world, and in some cases, important organizations like the British Council will give us coverage beyond the occasion of the lecture.

5. Radio preparation. Just now we have persuaded Sir William to let us draft a speech for him to give over BBC (BBC having been approached, and then consented). If we can get around the handicaps of having to say too little about certain aspects of our Balkan organization such an address would do a world of good.

We are building up radio items for Marvin Beers and, as you know, BBC London offered us time on the air for anything we could supply within reason. These would be brief items introduced by short wave in many languages.

6. As soon as possible we should like to introduce our colorful UNHRA Balkan people with personal history stories. Sir William is an excellent prospect. Neville Miller, Gerstenzang, Kelsey, Major General Sir Michael Creagh, Roseman, country mission chiefs, etc. should become more widely known as people. Then the stewardship of UNHRA would be more acceptable. UNHRA would get the reflected credit of having picked such men.

7. At the Balkan level, there are services which we should be able to supply to the country missions, especially digests of Washington and London information and the relay of Washington and London requests on specific matters. I have set Mary Rubin up as a communicating link between Cairo and country missions, both on the inflow and the outflow. But if we are to put this service on an effective basis, and get the channels working from the scene of action to Washington and London, my full quota of manpower is necessary. We could not do it now in the absence of Fields, Jerry Morris, and the two translator-interpreter-writers.

I hope you understand, and can pass it on to the proper authorities, the fact that manpower out here is probably half as efficient as it would be at home. Communications, censorship and supplies cause us to spend time most uneconomically. Still there is a minimum amount of services which the information division should render. That has been my sole objective, and the staff I have asked for will provide it, I hope.

On the personal side, I have just taken a lively flat across the street from our headquarters which are in a very nice residential area. This will step up my own productivity at least two hours a day - this is the way we have to figure things out here - and I shall be able to keep in much closer touch with division chiefs and visitors from other agencies with whom we work. I am holding open a place for Fields in this set-up as I cannot bear the cost of the apartment alone. Three servants are included in the bargain, but don't let that alarm the Finance Division; their total wages amount to less than \$6 a month - \$23. Servants are the only thing out here which don't cost much - apartment rents, for example, about \$240 a month. Space both for UNRRA and individual use is at a high premium.

Now that I am back in harness, out of the organization part and into the production part, you can expect to hear from me frequently. For our part, we need everything you can send us - like principal addresses and news releases from UNRRA officials, new booklets, pamphlets, etc. (in quantity) confidential warning of probable UNRRA positions in any of the world. We can use all these things to excellent advantage.

We have been jammed into two rooms so far, but the committee on office space has now decided to let us move to the second floor where the information division can become a real information center. And we shall also have four rooms to accommodate the twelve or sixteen people who will either be stationed here or passing through on their assignment to country missions. In the latter case we have important orientation duties.

I have cleared personnel channels at this end as far as I can, and would ask that you help me out in Washington. I haven't asked very much, but it is awfully hard to explain Public Relations needs, especially five or six thousand miles away.

I shall bring this rambling letter to an end. The election results cheered most of the people in the Middle East. Now everybody looks for steps toward post-war world order.

My best wishes to all of you.

Yours,

Louis (Birk)

B M - Report FORM 1-51

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

8, SHARIA DAR EL-SHIFA - GARDEN CITY - CAIRO

TELEGRAPHIC ADDRESS

UNRRA-CAIRO

TELEPHONES:

47816-41317

*A-00-3. Echbaum
Mr. Xanthaky*

23 October 1944

Mr. George Xanthaky
United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration
1344 Connecticut Avenue
Washington, D. C.

Dear George:

I have tried very hard to hold down four jobs since July, and I have done so cheerfully only because you promised faithfully to come to my relief by sending top-notch personnel as my counterparts for the country missions. You recall that you thought it important that I remain with the Balkan Mission, rather than go with a Balkan country mission. As usual, the relief I have gotten is in being left as Acting Chief of the Balkan Mission by Sir William, during his absence, which I hope will be of short duration. So you can well imagine that at the moment I am the busiest cockroach in eight counties. One minute I am trying to solve the troubles of Albania, the next wondering how we are going to fit into the negotiations with the Yugoslavs (where we are not too well represented and are limited to observations only). Then I am thinking of trying to jump into Athens for a look-see, being particularly anxious lest the talks with the Swedish-Swiss Commission get off to a bad start. Now, having the care of the Balkan Mission, I really have my hands full and cannot decide on any definite plans for the near future until Sir William returns.

I hope sincerely that he will, during his visit with the big boys, obtain some encouraging results. I mean that I hope that the other fellows will finally decide to accept us as partners and play ball, and stop kidding us with nice phrases and useless paper work.

So far, as I see it, two serious blunders have been committed. Unless we recognize them and try to correct them, their eventual consequences may be serious. I refer to (1) the April 3rd agreement, and (2) the stubborn determination on the part of the military to turn over all supplies direct to the governments concerned. In the case of the agreement, looking back over the last six months, it now seems to me that we have learned the lesson that the army is liable to use its agents in a rather cavalier manner. Perhaps it would have better developed for UNRRA had we not subordinated our organization to the military. In the second case, the top responsible people have been determined to carry out plans they began a year ago. Unless they get a positive reaction from their U. S. Deputies, the arrangements they will make with the governments will make it very difficult for us to alter the set-up after the military period. Of course, AML do talk about controls and

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about using UNRRA personnel as supervisors of distribution, but I am afraid that the damage will have been done by the time we are able to apply controls. I know that you may well think that I am a crank on the question of control of supplies. You will remember, I am sure, that in May, 1943, at one of our first sessions, I advocated proper control of supplies as being the key to the success of any field operation. I have tried to persuade our military friends to this philosophy. On my last trip to Washington, I again pointed out that the comparative failure of the Italian relief program was due primarily to lack of control of supplies, including transport. Again I emphasize the fact that we must not compromise when it comes to our own activities. As I see it, now, our only hope is the breakdown of the system in the military phase, and an inevitable evolution to a different system.

A few days before Sir William left, I was quite taken by surprise when he mentioned to me that he thought I might be interested in the mission being organized for Poland, and that he would be very happy to recommend to the Governor that I be appointed as chief. I assume he has written to the Governor along those lines, but you know, George, that I did not entertain before, nor would I entertain now, the proposition that I become the chief of any mission, particularly that to Poland. I would, however, be very happy to be considered for the number two position in the Polish set-up. I could be placed in charge of the Bureau of Distribution and Transport, with the understanding that it would be the second spot, in which case the position of senior deputy is unnecessary. I hope you will agree that my request is not an unreasonable one, and, if so, I suggest that my name be included among those scheduled to go to negotiate for the mission shortly. I am told that this party will pass thru here, and they would have no difficulty in picking me up. I feel very strongly that if I am offered this very important position, it would be useful if I were to participate in the negotiations from the start. There is one hitch, however, and that is the fact that I may be too busy with my job here to make the trip. This decision should be left with me. It is for this reason that I am urging you to have this question settled and inform me as soon as possible, so that I may guide myself accordingly and prepare things.

The decision as indicated by your recent cable that Washington would negotiate with the respective governments of Greece and Yugo-Slavia is a very sound one and I am hopeful that it will bring the desired results. Do not interpret this as an admission of our inability here to properly negotiate with these governments, but somehow I have always felt the presence of unnecessary influence at this end.

Best regards and wishes. Very anxious to see you.

Sincerely,

Leo
Leo

LG/en

COPY

A. F. H. C. (G-E) C. H. F.

23 October 1944

Telegraphic Address
UNRRA-CAIRO

Mr. Roy Hendrickson
Deputy Director General
UNRRA
Washington, D. C.

Dear Roy:

Your recent letter (undated), signed by Fred McMillen, and brought forward by Alvin Rossmen, is indeed helpful. The re-statement and clarification of certain policies and suggestions as to procedures are timely.

As you know, I have moved and am bringing most of my staff to Italy in order to plan our supply and shipping program in conjunction with the military program. The Military (Balkans) supply picture has been changing markedly in recent weeks; the changes have involved delays and reduction in supplies. I have not up to now endeavored to keep your office informed as to the military supply program for the Balkans. The reason for this is two-fold. First, Mr. Leo Gerstenzang informed me that he had supplied such information to UNRRA, Washington, until last April when he was advised by the Washington office to cease sending the military supply data. Secondly, the military here informed me that CCAC Washington has the most up to date and complete record of military Balkans stockpiles and shipping programs and that CCAC would be the most appropriate source of such data for UNRRA Washington. However, a cable, No. 541, Lehman to UNRRA Cairo, and Fred McMillen's P.S. to your letter clearly indicate that you want us to send this information from here. Accordingly, I sent by cable, October 18, the quantities of the various goods now held in this area for use in the Balkans. Today I am sending by Air Pouch more complete data, including for each of the three countries and for the Balkans as a whole the CCAC approved military period Balkans requirements, the approved stockpile, the actual stockpile or availabilities as of October 1 and the deficiencies, i.e., the difference between the approved stockpile and the actual availabilities. As you will note, there are some rather serious deficiencies, shoes and leather, clothing and textiles, and soap being the most serious. However, I have for some time been in agreement with UNRRA policy to the effect that UNRRA cannot supplement the military supplies. I have at no time been sympathetic to the proposal calling for UNRRA supplementation of military supplies for commodities falling within the military relief program. However, until September I felt and supported the position that UNRRA might well make an effort to supply, during the military period, some commodities which are not called for in the military program. Examples of such commodities are medical laboratory units, some emergency water supply materials and emergency housing repair materials. The military does not view such materials as appropriate to their program. On the other hand they not only are presumably within the scope of the UNRRA program but the need for them is indeed urgent if intelligence reports provided us are moderately accurate. In short, I have felt that some provision for such needs in the military period by UNRRA would greatly reduce the relief task during the UNRRA period. However,

early in September the military Balkans supply people here convinced me that the availability of such supplies and shipping and port facilities are such as to preclude any such addition to military supplies. This being the case I have strongly urged our Administration and our country missions staff to cease their continuous pressure and requests for such supplementation. You are quite correct in stating that there has in the past been confusion, at least, shall we say, a difference of opinion relative to this matter.

In moving to Italy we look forward to the experience it will afford in formulating our supply program and the possibility that it may be necessary that UNRRA take over relief operations in the Balkans before six months after the beginning of military responsibility, which means that we would also take over the military supply program. It is essential that the staff should, at the earliest possible date, become thoroughly familiar with all aspects of that program. The essential points we plan to cover are:

1. Revised AML requirements for the Balkans and the allocations granted by the CCAC.
2. Current position as to Middle East stockpiles, supplies en route, those requested and available but not shipped and quantities requested but neither available nor shipped.
3. The AML shipping program as now set up. A complete study of the reasoning behind the development of this program will be made in order that we may know exactly how and why priorities between commodities and as to time of shipment were established. It will be of special interest to analyze the decision made in this respect in the following cases:
 - a) Shipments during the first 15 to 30 day period.
 - b) Shipments during the 30 to 60 day and beyond 60 day periods.
 - c) Allocation of limited shipping and/or port space.
 - d) Determination of priorities among commodities and between commodity groups as the relief program goes forward.

Final preparation of UNRRA estimates of requirements for the first six months after the military period (the end of the military period as far as supplies are concerned can now be determined within a reasonable margin) together with a tentative shipping schedule, priorities, etc., by commodities and commodity groups for submission to Washington. This must be in the hands of the Washington office not later than 1st December 1944.

Preparation of industrial rehabilitation and raw material programs especially for textiles and emergency housing to be presented to Washington and possibly to CCAC. These programs also should reach Washington by 1st December.

In conjunction with the military authorities we will prepare comprehensive surveys of every phase of the economy of the respective countries. These

surveys to be carried out by country personnel and military and UNRRA personnel during the military period will be essential to both the military and UNRRA in the work of revising requirements estimates.

Your lucid statement relative to consolidating all UNRRA Middle East requirements and supply activities, including refugee camps, in the Supply Bureau under my supervision clarifies a troublesome problem. I do not want to review the record of the refugee camps requirements and procurement program here as I have discussed it in detail in another report which I have submitted here and which I expect to forward to you within a week. Suffice it to say here that because the camps supply program was unsatisfactory as it had functioned with authority and responsibility divided between the Camps Division and the Bureau of Requirements and Supply, I asked late in August that a change be made. At that time I asked that the Bureau of Requirements and Supply be given full authority and full responsibility for determining camps requirements and carrying out of procurement for the camps. This request was made in order that this phase of the supply program could be effectively coordinated with the other phases of the UNRRA Middle East supply activities. This proposal was not accepted and a counter proposal was offered which gave the Camps Division most but not all of the camps supply responsibility. This alternate proposal was unacceptable to me and I asked that the Requirements and Supply Bureau should have complete control and responsibility for this program or no responsibility whatever. A committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Neville Miller, with representation from the Office of the Chief of Mission, the Bureau of Finance and Administration, the Camps Division, and the Bureau of Requirements and Supply was set up on September 19 to consider this problem. This committee considered the alternative proposals and gave all responsibility for camps requirements and procurement to the Camps Division. In accord with the proposal in your letter, immediate steps will now be taken to set up the Middle East Supply functions in a fully coordinated manner.

We have hired and left in charge of Middle East supply activities at Cairo a Colonel Webb. Webb is British, approximately fifty years of age, experienced in civil affairs work and fully conversant with MESC and UKCC activities and acquainted with the personnel of those organizations. We are having him civilianized and I feel that he is a good man for the job. Webb already has instructions relative to working through MESC and reporting frequently on Middle East supplies available and on prices along the lines suggested in your letter. I will now amplify these instructions and in addition set forth procedure for dealing with the Camps supply functions.

Webb has something less than a skeleton staff at the moment and it must be expanded along the lines of the new budget shortly.

Enclosed you will find a confirmation of a conversation which Tolley had with a Lt. Col. Bailey of Q 5, Cairo, on September 27, 1944. You will be interested, I am sure, in Col. Bailey's comments both with respect to UNRRA Camps Division and procurement for the Balkans. We (the Bureau of Requirements and Supply) have at no time discussed the camps supply program with the British Army nor were we informed of any such discussions prior to the talk with Col. Bailey on September 27 at which time it became apparent that there had been talks between Camps Division personnel and the British Army. In line with your proposal, I will ask Webb to discuss this matter ~~the~~ with the appropriate British Army personnel with a view to reaching a definite agreement as to future responsibility for supplying the camps.

Two weeks ago Mr. Wm. Johnston, who replaced Alan Hall on our staff, discussed with personnel of Q (AB), GHQ, allocation procedure relative to the Middle East Command surplus and salvage stocks. Johnston was informed that the Middle East Command may have surpluses over Middle East demand but not surpluses beyond British Army global demands. It was further stated that such surpluses would not be revealed to UNRRA Middle East by the Middle East Command but would be transmitted to the War Office, London. The War Office, he was told, would allocate such surpluses to other theatres and advise CCAC of any balance to be made available for further allocations. Under this procedure UNRRA could only ask for an allocation from this balance.

In the interest of conserving time and shipping, we are of course anxious to draw directly from surplus Middle East Command stocks. I suggest that you discuss this procedure with CCAC. We are taking the matter up with Mr. Admir of our London office this week and will ask him to urge the London office to open discussions with the War Office.

Before leaving Cairo for Italy all Divisions were asked to complete their review and appraisal of requirements estimates submitted by the Greek and Yugoslav governments by October 15. Since these estimates were not received until September 11 it has been difficult to meet this deadline with the very limited personnel available. However, the agricultural rehabilitation and medical requirements review work has been completed before October 15 and the remaining estimates appraisal work will be completed by October 25. We expect to forward this material to you by November 1. It is most difficult, as always, to get requirements estimators to formulate complete and defensible justifications.

As yet I have learned only the general outlines of the UNRRA program for Italy. However, I hear that Sam Keeny will arrive here in the near future, in which case we will get a more complete picture from him. The supply program and its relation to the Balkans program will be of special interest to me. Alvin Roseman suggested that you may ask me to participate in the Italian program. If this should be the case, I will want to get a better picture of the over-all policies promptly.

We have, this week, reviewed with Alvin Roseman the revisions which you made in our proposal which he took to Washington. We feel that your budget proposal, with very few exceptions, is realistic in terms of the job to be done. The exceptions, for which we are asking you to make modifications, have been pointed out to Roseman, together with statements of justification supporting our recommended modifications. You made inquiry relative to the personnel assignments we have made to date. These you will find attached.

We have recently been concentrating some on the problem of priorities, which we must look forward to facing. The question of priorities to be applied in case shipping availability is below commodity tonnage availabilities is, as you know, a knotty problem. The Army has used an arbitrary technique that would scarcely satisfy our members. We have at least tentatively concluded that rather than attempt to formulate a general rule or formula based upon a string of assumptions we had better set forth and describe factors which should be considered in establishing priorities under operating conditions, conditions such as the season, indigenous supplies, presence of epidemics (for example typhoid resulting from infected water supply would lead to high priority for corrective materials). I mention the priority problem

here to indicate that we have not forgotten it and also to ask for suggestions relative to it if your staff has been giving it consideration.

Your staff complaints relative to information from us are pretty much in order and we will send our ways in this matter.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Chas. M. Elkinton

Chas. M. Elkinton
Deputy Chief of Mission

Enclosure

Copies to: Messrs. McMillen (to coordinate reply)
Weintraub
Gold
Borders
Dominick
Funkhouser
Myers
Wilson
Coins
Reggie
Day
Stein
West

COPY

5 Oct RECD

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Procurement of supplies for UNRRA

GHQ MED
83909/E/45

UNRRA

27 Sep 44

Copy to: USAFIME
UNRRA Camps Division
MESC
Q(AE)
ST 4
Brig Q (Quartering)

Confirming conversation MR. TOLLEY - Lt. Col Bailey

1. There are two aspects of provision for UNRRA which are at the moment causing us some concern: First, UNRRA Camps Division and second the post military period procurement for BALKANS in so far as it will affect ME.

UNRRA Camps Division.

2. This organization is being supplied with foodstuffs and other stores from military sources. The bulk of these stores come from US or UK and although put to non military use in ME are demanded in the normal military provision programme thus achieving a military priority both as regards supply and shipment, and in fact, coming before the needs of our own civil populations in US and UK.

3. WASHINGTON have recognised this fact and have expressed their surprise that this situation should still obtain, and have made it clear to USAFIME that they are not prepared to supply any further stores on this basis unless the requirements are budgeted three months ahead so that military surpluses can be utilized.

4. UNRRA Camps Division are now in process of budgeting their supply programme three months ahead. We have not yet had their first estimates, but I think it is clear that we must first ask MESC what of these items can be procured locally in ME countries in order to see what we must ask US and UK to provide.

5. It is rumored too that FEA have built up in US a stockpile of civil supplies for UNRRA: if this is so, it seems clear that LONDON, WASHINGTON and CAIRO are not thinking on the same lines, and I feel that UNRRA here should ask UNRRA Headquarters in WASHINGTON what steps are being taken to effect provision from that end.

6. At the moment it will probably be uneconomic in personnel to set up a duplicate supply line since already, I believe, UNRRA is experiencing difficulty in finding personnel, with the result that the military are having to provide personnel which they can ill afford to spare.

UNRRA BALKAN Requirements.

7. UNRRA requirements for the BALKANS will be very considerable and it is apparent that many of the items which they will require should be found from ME sources.

8. Although UNRRA will not be entering into this market until some months after hostilities in EUROPE have ceased, supply planning must be done many months ahead. I think the time has now come when UNRRA with MESEC should begin thinking of the possibility of drawing on productive resources which may be thrown up by the Army.

9. Although the production capacity thrown up may not exactly be analogous to the requirements of UNRRA, I think that given careful investigation in phrasing of the entry of UNRRA with the withdrawal of WD much could be done to ease the post war employment and supply situation in ME.

10. I suggest that the problem is primarily one between UNRRA and MESEC. The Army will, of course, keep you advised of any probable withdrawals that can be foreseen, although there is no sign as yet.

11. I would like your comments.

(signed) H.C.D. Brownjohn

Maj Gen
D Q M G

LJWB/GSB
TOS...1300....hrs.

REPRODUCED UNRRA NAPLES BUR REQ & SUP 10 OCT 44 (rr)

file
2nd November 1944
CAWA/321

Governor Herbert Lehman
Director General, UNRRA,
1344 Connecticut Avenue,
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Governor Lehman,

Since writing you last I have visited Naples, Caserta and Rome and had full practical discussions ranging over the whole field of UNRRA activities with the highest military and civil authorities including General Wilson, General Hughes, General Clark and their staffs. Also with Mr. Kirk and Mr. Macmillan.

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As you will be aware, responsibility for Balkan military operations except as regards the Dodecanesse has been transferred from GHQ, Middle East to AFHQ. At the same time the Balkan Headquarters of AML has been very considerably reduced and amalgamated with G-5. Brigadier-General Spofford is in command of G-5 with a staff for supply, finance and legal questions coupled with a few attached liaison officers. General Hughes now has an undefined position as a general inspector of Balkan Relief operations.

In the prevailing situation it was difficult to foresee exactly what questions would arise at AFHQ. Certainly so long as the Supreme Allied Commander is responsible for shipping allocations in the Mediterranean area, Caserta should be the central point at which decisions are taken on priorities of supply on which the day to day movements of shipping will be determined. Beyond that it is difficult to speculate. I must add, however, that Caserta seems to me a very uneasy set up for Balkan relief operations, and it would not surprise me, therefore, to learn of a reversal of the previous decision transferring the seat of operations from GHQ, ME to AFHQ, Caserta.

Be this as it may it was generally agreed, however, that it was unlikely that Caserta would be the centre at which policy decisions on more general matters would or could be taken. It was also clearly recognised

that as governments became established the main relationship would be between AML and UNRRA and the governments concerned, and that if decisions were not made in the field they would probably be of such importance that they would need to be referred back either to CCAC or to UNRRA Headquarters. The accredited Ministers and Ambassadors would tend to communicate not through AFHQ but direct to their own governments.

27 July 1945
I also found that although it had been in our minds that Balkan Mission supply staff should be located in Caserta, there was no strong wish for any other part of the Mission to move over to Italy. It was fully appreciated on all sides that apart from the important preoccupations in the Middle East itself, (Camps, etc.), the main duty of the Balkan Mission at this stage was to build up the country Missions. Further that the physical difficulties of work in Caserta were very considerable. There is not enough space in Caserta itself, nor is there yet enough transport to make it possible to set up any sizeable office in Naples and provide for any reasonable flexibility of movement between Naples and Caserta. The attached Memorandum was produced after discussion and was generally agreed.

The Washington telegram suggesting transfer of supply functions to Caserta for the whole Mediterranean area now cuts across the arrangements referred to in the Memorandum. Taken by and large the effect of this telegram is to dissociate one of the most vital bureaus of the Balkan Mission from its parent body. In my view, any arrangement which sets up a new authority at Caserta concerned independently with Balkan supply questions can only lead to difficulties. Clearly, if independent responsibility rests outside the Balkan Missions, whoever is responsible for exercising that authority must be in a position to issue instructions to supply divisions of country Missions. These instructions must equally clearly pass through the Chiefs of the country Missions, and thus they will find themselves in the position of reporting to two authorities on supplies with the result that responsibility and procedures inevitably will become inextricably mixed. The supply functions of Country Missions can hardly be dissociated from distribution functions or from work for example of the Medical, Industrial Rehabilitation or Agricultural Divisions. In these circumstances I sincerely trust you will agree to suspend the operation of the proposals outlined in your telegrams 619 and at least until the country Missions begin operating in the field and we are in a position to review the whole functions of the Balkan Mission and its future.

see him

I am also greatly concerned lest further confusion may result from the parallel negotiations which are going on as regards the Yugoslav operations. It is not clear to me that Biscanci has authority to speak for the United Yugoslav Government including the Partisans. The Ports of Split and Dubrovnik are now free and ships are loading in the Middle East to take relief supplies to Yugoslavia. In my view, if the present confused state of negotiations leads to delay in the delivery of these supplies, it may well hamper our whole position in Yugoslavia. The difficulty about the present Bari negotiations as far as UNRRA is concerned is that the Military, who expect UNRRA to act as their agents as regards distribution, are being forced into the position, by directives from COAC and from London and the State Department, that specified numbers of observers are made a pre-requisite of the delivery of relief supplies. On the other hand, it is perfectly clear that these observers will need to be supplied from UNRRA staff. Thus UNRRA will have attached to it the odium of providing that staff about whom the Yugoslavs are most resentful and sensitive. It appears to me imperative that UNRRA's operations must be based on the assumption of good faith on the part of the Government which it is assisting. The Bari negotiations unfortunately are based on the opposite assumption. The emphasis is on the basis of observing first and assisting later.

July

I notice that discussions will take place in Washington on the question of the personnel of the UNRRA Yugoslav Mission. It is most important that the position of the Chief and Deputy Chief should be cleared up almost at once. I gather the present intention to be to appoint an American as Chief of the Mission with a Russian as Deputy Chief. If this is the case, Hall, who has done good work, should I think be given a somewhat special position as Personal Assistant to the Chief of Mission. I feel bound to point out, however, that I am subject to a good deal of criticism in that none of the high ranking positions of any of the three country Missions is held by a British national.

*what is
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operating*

The importance of maintaining proper financial controls of the administrative expenditures of field Missions is fully realised by everyone here, but I believe the present "line item" budget system is not only extremely confusing, but also involves delays which may be very serious in an operating period. It is my impression that fully half of the cables between Washington and Cairo deal essentially with the assignment of personnel to Budget lines and related matters which could be obviated by the allocation of a lump sum personnel budget for the Balkan Mission, with proper reports, of course, concerning expenditures. In certain cases it would be necessary for

*Rec'd
Cairo*

us to take emergency action authorising appointments which are not in the Budget, and it would undoubtedly be necessary for us to take similar action as further exigencies develop.

Perhaps I may take this opportunity of giving you some impression of the situation in Athens. At the moment two overwhelming problems face AML, inflation and port clearance. After an initial enthusiastic welcome to the troops, something like a panic has set in. The German demolitions in Piraeus harbour were such that few ships could unload. The drachma has fallen catastrophically. I was given a 2,000,000,000 drachma note this morning which had been bought in Athens at the rate of ten for sixpence. Mr. Eden has been at Athens and is doing his best to give emergency assistance to the Greek Government on the currency question. This led to a request by him to the British Treasury to fly out Sir David Waley urgently to deal with the problem. The British Minister Resident requested of me the services of two British nationals with wide experience in the financial field to the release of Lloyd and Hugh-Jones on the strict condition that UNRRA should not in any way or in any circumstance be involved. This condition will be very strictly observed.

The food situation is also acute. Headquarters troops and staff who have already gone in are living on half rations. For this reason there is a very evident reluctance on the part of Force HQ to allow the entry of the full UNRRA Greek Mission at this stage. I have, however, represented strongly to the Military authorities that it is of the utmost importance that UNRRA staff should proceed to Greece to render such help as they can and begin with the planning of post military phase work with the Greek authorities. I am satisfied that we have the utmost sympathy and support of AML in this matter. General Wilson and Lord Moyne have also both expressed their desire to see UNRRA staff working in Greece at the earliest possible opportunity. Under our present plans I expect all the UNRRA Greece Mission to be in Greece by the end of the present month.

2 EC

We have also given considerable thought over the last few weeks to the future of the Balkan Mission. I hope to be able to send you very shortly a Memorandum embodying our ideas on the subject. Apart from the importance we attach to the supply functions of the Balkan Mission to which I have referred above, we are chiefly concerned with setting up an adequate machinery for reporting developments to you in Washington, at the same

*Communication
to Channel
through Cairo?
interlogs*

time to ensure that we keep the field Missions fully informed both on particular matters affecting them and the more general developments of UNRRA policy.

We fully recognise that in the past we have not been able to send you all the detailed reports which we would have liked to be able to provide. This is solely due to the very heavy burden of immediate work and the manifold problems involved in establishing the country Missions. The administrative burden falls on too few shoulders and we are not yet provided with staff of the right calibre and experience to handle the intricacies of the varying situation.

The present period is one of excessive strain and anxiety. At the same time I feel able to assure you that in this first field operation we hope to be able to acquit ourselves most worthily.

Yours sincerely,

Wm. Matthews /s/

CHIEF OF BALKAN MISSION

THE LOCATION OF THE BALKAN MISSION

The best location for the UNRRA Balkan Mission is that place where it can best perform its present and future tasks. CASERTA is the centre for such policy questions as do not need to be referred to LONDON or WASHINGTON. Transfer of the Balkan Mission to NAPLES would be advantageous in that the UNRRA Balkan Mission will then be close to AFHQ, the British Resident Minister, and his American colleague. On the other hand, transfer there would be accompanied by grave disadvantages. Firstly, the administrative difficulties are very considerable. Secondly such a transfer would lead to serious handicaps in the performance of those functions which lie outside relationships with the military and the political machinery now established in CASERTA.

Although there must be close cooperation between UNRRA and AFHQ, UNRRA must necessarily retain its place as an international organisation, answerable to forty-four nations. Too close an integration with AFHQ may prejudice this position. At CASERTA, UNRRA Balkan Mission would be dependent on the military to an even greater extent than in the MIDDLE EAST.

It is essential at this stage, in view of imminent events, that the Balkan Mission should concentrate its efforts to ensure that the country Missions are capable of independent operations at the earliest possible date. To this end it is important that the Balkan Mission should work as a coherent unit in developing its planning, laying down basic procedures, instructing and equipping its personnel, and receiving and allocating staff arriving from Washington and London. In Cairo adequate machinery to accomplish these tasks has been established, and all Bureaus and Divisions are working together on a unified policy. At Caserta, on the other hand, G 5 has no sections dealing with Health, Welfare, Agriculture and Industrial Rehabilitation. The Balkan Mission would, therefore, either have to split up into two groups, or else move sections to Caserta which would have no point of contact in AFHQ. Moreover even in the most favourable circumstances, the move of the Balkan Mission would take at least four weeks to accomplish. These few weeks are vital, and dislocation of the Mission during this period is a risk which should not be taken if it can be avoided.

The balance of advantage seems therefore in the direction of a middle course. The most important point is that the supply functions both of AFHQ and the UNRRA Balkan Mission should be integrated to the fullest extent possible. With this in view UNRRA supply and shipping representatives should be appointed to work with the Supply Section of ML (Balkans) and AFHQ, so that UNRRA personnel may be thoroughly familiar with the present machinery, and in a position to operate effectively when UNRRA itself becomes responsible for the formulation of supply requirements and the procurement and shipping of supplies to the Balkans. In addition UNRRA personnel for medical supply questions, and displaced persons problems should also be assigned to work with AFHQ.

To achieve these purposes it is proposed that a Deputy Chief of the Balkan Mission, Mr. C. Elkinton, should be designated as Chief Representative of the Balkan Mission with AFHQ. He would also be head of the supply and shipping section at Caserta while retaining his position as Deputy Chief of Balkan Mission Requirements and Supply. He would be empowered to interpret UNRRA Balkan Mission's policy. He would keep the Balkan Mission fully informed on all matters and cable or otherwise report to the Balkan Mission as necessary.

Close contact would be maintained with General Sadler at Cairo, and also high ranking officers of the Balkan Mission would hold themselves available at any time to fly to such conferences on major policies as may be called by AFHQ.

The proposals set out in this Memorandum have been fully discussed with ML (Balkans) and responsible officers ~~of the~~ at AFHQ, as well as with SAC and the appropriate British and American Diplomatic Representatives. It is agreed that the proposals outlined should satisfactorily meet the present requirements of the Allied authorities concerned.

21.10.44

Answer to CAWA 321 -

Balkan M. -
Reports
Cawa 321

1. Would it be possible to get more detail of the discussions held in Caserta and Rome than just information that they were held?
2. Try and find out if the relationship between Spofford and Matthews may not be based on personal dislike or a dislike for having British in control.
3. The most important thing is for UNRRA to be near the military as long as they are acting as agent. However, I agree with Matthews on the folly of moving the ~~XXXXX~~ Mission to Italy in view of the fact that operations are beginning. However as soon as the Greek Mission gets moved The overall Balkan Mission should follow the military.
4. The question of moving the supply functions to Caserta must be taken up with the Bureau of Supply but again it seems that if we are to work with the military we must be where they are.
5. Inform Matthews that Bicanic is authorized to speak for the Yugoslav government. On the ~~XXXXXXXX~~ question of observers it seems perfectly obvious to anyone that we are not going to give the supplies away and not find out where they are going. Especially in a country that is as full of political unrest as Yugoslavia is. It would not be in keeping with the resolutions of the Council if we did not make sure that such relief goods were not being used as political tools. If they won't accept the observers they don't have to take the food. I think entirely too much attention is being paid to giving the governments what they want and too little to the fact that we are spending a good deal of money on the deal and thus have a major interest in it.
6. Giving Cairo a lump sum might be o.k. if we had been getting regular reports but on the basis of past performance I don't think there is much hope that we will. The trouble probably is that they don't like the idea of being dependent on Washington and want to have the money to spend as they feel it should be spent. They want to operate more like an independent organization than a regional office.
7. Any emergency appointments in the country missions are likely to be in local currency and they have authority to expend those funds. The few appointments they will make that have to be paid in foreign exchange they can wait to get an ok from headquarters on in line with the policy established on the appointment of personnel above and below a certain grade.
8. What has he done with Lloyd and Hugh-Jones?

9. With the disestablishment of the Balkan Mission communications will come directly to headquarters in Washington or London whatever the case may be. In the meantime though I would ask them to make their ~~own~~ channels of communication a little quicker since we have been getting information about UNRRA movements that our own people should have been giving us from ~~XXXXXX~~ War, State and everyone but UNRRA -Cairo.

On the attached memorandum the only paragraph I question strongly is paragraph 2. It seems to me that Sir William should understand that during the military period we act as an agent of the military authorities no matter whom they may be. Thus there must be a close intergration that should in new- no way prejudice our relations with the other 44 nations. In the case of the Balkans we must ~~be~~ cooperate closely with AFHQ, in ~~the~~ ~~Ca~~- China with the Chinese Military, etc.

BM-Report

UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

8, Sharia Dar El-Shifa - Garden City - Cairo

Ref. No. 17

CAWA No. 523

20 December, 1944.

TO: Dr. James A. Crabtree, Deputy Director of Health,
UNRRA, Washington.

FROM: Lt. Col. E. K. Musson, Acting Director, Health Division,
UNRRA, Balkan Mission.

SUBJECT: Monthly report - Health Division - November 1944.

1. General review of activities; Country Missions.

Activities during the month of November were mainly centered upon the country missions.

a. Greece Mission

Soon after the liberation of Athens in October, Lt. Col. G. S. Osincup, Director of Health, and Major G. E. Smith, Sanitary Engineer, Greece Mission, proceeded to Athens to start the Public Health program and to prepare for the sending of the remainder of the Public Health personnel of the Mission. This ground work had progressed to the point that personnel representing all of the major activities of the Health Division had been called to Greece during the first part of November.

Among the main problems were the distribution of drugs, working arrangements with Greek medical and public health officials and related non-official agencies, and the general ground work essential in setting the Public Health program in motion.

Colonel Osincup visited the outlying regions of District #1, while Dr. Valaoras, his Deputy, made a trip down to the Peleponesus to make a survey of the conditions in that area and of the need for medical supplies. Due to lack of transportation facilities, Colonel Osincup confined his work to District #1.

During his stay in Athens, Colonel Osincup made numerous contacts with the various medical and public health authorities in the Greek Government and amongst the Voluntary Agencies and was successful in establishing working relations with all of these groups. General Sbarounis was designated as the Liaison Officer between the military and the Greek Government.

During the same period Colonel Osincup acted as Medical Officer for District #1, under ML.

Colonel Osincup appointed Dr. V. G. Valaores of the Faculty of the Institute of Hygiene, Athens, as his deputy, and Dr. Messinzy as the UNRRA Medical Officer for one of the regions in District #1. These two medical officers have proved to be of value due to their excellent medical and public health training and their knowledge of local conditions.

Because of the illness of Lt. Col. Osincup, Lt. Col. W. E. Brown assumed the duties of Director of Health, Greece Mission, temporarily, arriving in Athens on November 17, 1944. Upon arrival Colonel Brown was designated by ML as the Liaison Officer between ML, UNRRA and the Greek Government.

The first assignment given to Lt. Col. W. E. Brown, was the organization, equipping, clothing and supplying of transportation for a medical mission to be sent to Thrace and Macedonia. The mission was to leave Athens on December 2, 1944, and was to proceed direct to Salonika. There the group was to be divided up into six units going into six of the devastated areas in this region. The groups were to operate in cooperation with the military authorities and UNRRA. The mission personnel consisted of 85 doctors, and 47 nurses, while the remaining personnel was composed of midwives, sanitarians, welfare nurses and clerical workers. The group had to be supplied with heavy clothing, food medical supplies and soap.

The purpose of this mission was to provide drugs and medical and nursing personnel for Thrace and Macedonia and to return to their former homes persons who had sought refuge in Athens during the period of Axis occupation. Major Niblack, a Medical Officer, and Miss Varley, a Regional Nursing Consultant - both of UNRRA - accompanied the mission.

The Nursing Section of the Greece Mission, under the direction of Miss O. Baggaley, spent much of its time in getting acquainted with the Greek nurses in Athens and in studying the various hospitals to determine their present nursing facilities.

The problems to be dealt with by the Sanitation Section were: malaria control, water supply in Athens, sewage and garbage collection and disposal, and louse disinfection. Plans for the carrying out of this work have been drawn up by Colonel D. E. Wright in cooperation with the Greek Ministry of Health. The general sanitary problem in Greece is a difficult one due to lack of sufficient equipment, personnel and transportation facilities and will require careful cooperation on the part of the Public Health authorities in conjunction with the military and UNRRA.

Considerable difficulty is also encountered in the handling of medical supplies due to lack of transportation facilities and competent personnel.

During the month various conferences have been held by the various staff members of the Health Division, with the following individuals:

General Sbarounis, the Liaison Officer between the military and the Greek Government -- Discussed relations to be established between the military, the Greek Ministry of Hygiene and UNRRA. Also discussed the possibility of sending Greek doctors to America for special training.

Dr. Kopanaris, the General Director of the Greek Ministry of Hygiene -- Arranged for the recruiting, equipping and maintenance of the medical mission to be sent into Thrace and Macedonia. Discussed relations between the Ministry, the Joint Relief Committee and the various relief organizations in Athens and the provinces.

Dr. Logaros, who is in charge of the distribution of medical supplies for the Swedish-Swiss Relief Committee -- Discussed the question of obtaining certain supplies which are not available from other sources, from the Swiss Red Cross.

Dr. Lividas, the Director of the School of Hygiene -- Discussed plans for malaria control and training of personnel for disinfection.

Close contact has also been maintained with:

Captain Herbert, U. S. Army, in charge of medical supplies;

Captain Nicolaidis, Vice President of the Greek Red Cross;

Captain Moyers, U.S. Army, OSS, Medical Officer from ML, for the Lamia Region; and

Major Middleton, U. S. Army, Officer in charge of relief for ML.

Unfortunately the political and military situation late in November began to deteriorate and orders of all additional personnel scheduled to go forward to Greece were held in abeyance. By the 1st of December it appeared that activity of personnel now in Greece would be seriously curtailed by "internal strife or actual civil war". As soon as the resumption of activities is possible, the remaining personnel allocated to the various staff positions will be sent to Greece. In the meantime such plans and activities as can be carried on from Cairo are going forward. This includes completion of supply units, procurement of additional supplies and equipment and plans for the medical care of personnel.

b. Albania Mission.

Lt. Col. E. E. Sappington, Director of Health, Albania Mission, during a conference here in Cairo completed arrangements, and obtained necessary supplies for the medical care of personnel.

Other persons to occupy existing staff positions have been nominated for employment.

c. Yugoslavia Mission

The Yugoslavia Mission also is completing details of organization involving personnel and supplies.

If the Mission does not go into Yugoslavia soon, it is planned to use some of the medical units in camps in Italy, on a temporary loan basis, to be returned to the Mission when it is activated.

2. Review of Activities - Balkan Mission.

Lt. Col. E. K. Musson returned from Chios on November 1, 1944, and resumed his duties as Deputy Director and Epidemiologist.

Lt. Col. W. E. Brown, Director of Health, Balkan Mission, departed for Athens on November 17, 1944, to assume duties as Acting Director of Health, Greece Mission.

Mr. V. B. Norelli, Medical Requirements Specialist, Balkan Mission, departed for Naples, Italy, for the purpose of discussing medical supply problems and policies with UNRRA and Army officials. As a result of this conference it was agreed that the Army would place all available warehouses at the disposal of UNRRA and that medical supplies would be turned over to UNRRA at the end of military period.

At the request of the Bureau of Requirements and Supply, the Nutrition Section of the Health Division made an analysis of the supplies being sent to Chios. An analysis of the supplies being issued to the people of the Athens area as given on November 8, 1944, was also submitted.

3. Camps.

The plan for the construction of a 40-bed hut at the Hamlin Memorial Tuberculosis Sanatorium in the Lebanon mountains near Beirut has received financial approval from Washington. The agreement with the American Mission for the control of this sanatorium has been revised and sent to Beirut for signature.

In the report for the month of October there was suggested a possible arrangement with the Cyprus Government for the treatment of tuberculous patients from the refugee camps in the Middle East. This was not found to be practical from the standpoint of the Cyprus Government and the plan has been dropped.

A severe storm occurred at Nuseirat with the destruction of many of the old tents and with the creation of considerable havoc.

On November 11, 1944, the Yugoslav Camp at Khatatba was closed and the last of the refugees were sent to other camps.

On November 15, 1944, a meeting was held at the British Embassy. Mr. Sterling of that Embassy, a representative of the Egyptian

Ministry of Health, Mr. Beck of the Camps Division, Hamdi Pasha and the Director of the Health Division, Balkan Mission, were present. There was a discussion of the possible release of the camp at Moses Wells to the Egyptian Government as that camp has in the past been the quarantine station for the Egyptian Government. It was agreed at this meeting that every effort should be made to release this camp at the earliest possible date. It was called to the attention of the Egyptian Government that the removal of as large a group of refugees on such a short notice as was given us, was impossible. In order to protect the Egyptian Government against possible quarantine problems of an immediate and emergency nature, it was agreed that steps would be taken to supply the Egyptian Government with disinfection equipment to be made available in case of an emergency. It was also agreed that other camp sites would be immediately investigated to determine whether or not it was feasible to move the 3500 Greek refugees from Moses Wells Camp to another site in the near future. The possibility of obtaining the U.S. Army camp site at Ataka was discussed. Mr. Beck agreed to investigate this immediately. UNRRA agreed to find an emergency quarantine camp in case the Egyptian Government should require such a camp for the isolation of exposed ship passengers en route through the Middle East.

Attention has again been called to the necessity for adequate clothing and heating facilities for the refugees in the Middle East camps.

4. Personnel - Arrivals and assignments.

Lt. Col. W. E. Brown departed for Athens, Greece, on November 17, 1944, to replace Lt. Col. G. S. Osincup.

Lt. Col. E. K. Musson returned from Chios on Nov. 1, 1944.

The following named Medical Officers reported for duty with the Health Division, Balkan Mission.

Captain Gene Haber - Assigned to Health Division, Balkan Mission.

Captain M. Kamp - Assigned to El Shatt Refugee Camp.

Lt. A. I. Mendeloff, Lt. A. McQueeney, Lt. C. B. Chapman - Assigned to the Nutrition Section of the Health Division, Balkan Mission.

Major H. Niblach - Assigned to the Health Division, Greece Mission - Departed for Athens on or about November 18, 1944.

Dr. Sinclair Loutit, Deputy Director of Health, Yugoslavia Mission, departed for Bari, to join that Mission.

Lt. Col. H. O'Brien departed for Washington for assignment to the Far East Mission.

Major G. W. Weber departed for Rome on or about November 12, 1944.

Lt. Col. K. Dodge departed for Athens on or about November 19, 1944.

Lt. Col. E. E. Sappington, Director of Health, Albania Mission reported to the Cairo Office for conference with the Director of Health, Balkan Mission.

b. Hospital Administrator

Lt. Col. Neil MacDonald, Hospital Administrator, Balkan Mission, reported for duty.

c. Medical Requirements Specialists.

Mr. Norelli departed for Bari and Naples for the purpose of discussing medical supply problems and policies with UNRRA and Army Officials.

Mr. F. Bosquet departed for Rome on or about Nov. 12, 1944.

d. Sanitary Engineers.

The following sanitary engineers reported for duty with the Health Division, Balkan Mission.

Captain H. F. Ludwig - Assigned to the Sanitation Section, Health Division.

Captain F. Griffin - Assigned to the Nuseirat Refugee Camp.

Captain F. Erickson - Assigned to the El Shatt Refugee Camp.

Captain V. Crockett - Assigned to the Sanitation Section, Health Division.

Captain R. Kennedy - Assigned to the Tolumat Refugee Camp.

Captain G. Ferguson - Assigned to the Moses Wells Refugee Camp.

Colonel D. E. Wright departed for Athens on or about November 14, 1944.

Lt. Col. V. B. Lamoureux departed for Rome on or about November 12, 1944.

Major F. Aldridge departed for Athens on or about Nov. 19, 1944.

e. Nurses

Miss M. G. Arnstein departed for Athens on or about November 14, 1944. She returned to Cairo on or about November 26, 1944.

Miss O. Baggalay, Chief Nursing Consultant, and Miss L. True, Regional Nursing Consultant, Greece Mission, departed for Athens on or about November 19, 1944.

The following named nurses reported for duty with the Health Division, Balkan Mission:

Favier, Muriel	-	Assigned to Nuseirat
Piette, Genevieve	-	" " Moses Wells
Goodell, Lois	-	" " "
Berkey, Thelma	-	" " "
Biddle, Celia	-	" " "
Petrovich, Ann	-	" " El Shatt
Sutherland, Dorothy	-	" " "
Sears, Mary	-	" " "
Augsberger, Grace	-	" " "
Scanlon, Margaret	-	" " "
Sullivan, Elizabeth	-	" " "
Cameron, Helen	-	" " "
Commins, Mary	-	" " "
Breear, Sarah	-	" " "
Yuhl, Martha	-	" " "
Erickson, Nell	-	" " "
Henderson, Mary	-	" " "
Glass, Velma	-	" " "
Johnson, Ruth	-	" " "
Creegh, Mary	-	" " "
Ethel Wilsey	-	" " "
Gordon, June	-	" " "
Woldhaus, Arlene	-	" " "
Michaelson, Norma	-	Assigned to Greece Mission
Reiner, Helma	-	" " Tolumbat
Lomnason, Melanie	-	" " "
Eldred, Helen	-	" " "
Polson, Jeanette	-	" " "
Kilpatrick, Heather	-	" " Nuseirat
Jahraus, Christine	-	" " "
Viehman, Louise	-	" " "
Chladek, Marion	-	" " "
Edmonds, Elizabeth	-	" " "
Johnson, Helen	-	" " "

/s/ E. K. Musson,
Lt. Col., USPHS,
Acting Director,
Health Division.

This report was prepared jointly by Lt. Col. W. E. Brown and Lt. Col. E. K. Musson.

General Distribution - Copies sent to all Bureaus and Division Chiefs.

B.M. -
Reports

Case 846
-14 Feb 45

DT 506/2

12 February 1945

TO: Sir William Matthews
Chief of Balkan Mission

FROM: Leo Gerstenzang
Deputy Chief of Balkan Mission
Bureau of Distribution and Transport *hcg*

SUBJECT: Report of Bureau of Distribution and Transport for
Month of January 1945.

1. The "IMERRA": The UNRRA caique "IMERRA" was commissioned on January 2, at a ceremony held at Port Said. Among the guests present were the Governor of the Suez Canal Zone, the Captain of the Royal Hellenic Navy, and the Senior British Officer in charge of Port Said. Since you had not at that time returned to Egypt, you were represented by Mr. Louis Birk. I was unfortunately ill and unable to attend myself, but from all accounts the affair was most successful.

The "IMERRA" sailed for Syros, headquarters of No. 5 District, Greece, shortly afterward and, although delayed by damage sustained from a storm while enroute to Cyprus, I am informed that she has been repaired and is again enroute to her destination.

Her completion was delayed by the difficulty in obtaining many items without which she could not safely leave Egypt. Due in large measure to the efforts of Mr. F. P. Spinks, Assistant Chief Transport Officer of the Greece Mission, these items were obtained in one way or another at what I believe were reasonable prices under the circumstances. I should also mention that members of the Greek Colony at Alexandria and Port Said were extremely helpful.

2. Personnel: The staff of the Bureau at the end of the month totalled seventy-seven, of whom two were assigned to the Balkan Mission, forty-five to the Greece Mission, nineteen to the Yugoslavia Mission, and eleven to the Albanian Mission.

Despite the arrival of a few additional men from the United Kingdom and the United States, there was an actual decrease in the total staff available for duty because of resignations.

Mr. Felix Dospil, head of the European Section of the Inland Transport Division of the Bureau of Areas, arrived from Washington at the end of the month on temporary detail to take charge of transport planning and operations in Greece. He will proceed to Greece in the near future.

Due to the lack of transportation to most of the districts, and the continued uncertainty as to the Distribution and Transport program in Athens, it was possible during the month to send personnel only to District No. 5, the Cyclades. Mr. Ernest Mill, Distribution Officer, arrived safely in Syros on January 29, along with five other UNRRA representatives, some of whom will concentrate their efforts on distribution work for the time being, even though they are formally members of other divisions.

By arrangement with Mr. Harry Greenstein, but subject to ultimate agreement in Athens, personnel of the Welfare Division, Greece Mission, who are qualified to act as Distribution Officers have been lent to this Bureau because of the general feeling here that distribution is the most pressing task confronting the Mission in Greece. Under this arrangement, personnel shortly to leave for District No. 4, the Aegean Islands, will include only one member of this Bureau but will be reinforced by at least two welfare men to do distribution work. A similar arrangement in respect to Field Officers has been reached with Mr. Lincoln Kelsey, Acting Deputy Chief of the Greece Mission in Cairo, and two such men still in Cairo have thus been nominally added to our staff.

We received an urgent call from Mr. William Harris at Bari during the last week of January to send forward at once all members of this Bureau assigned to the Yugoslavia Mission. They have been awaiting air transportation for some ten days, but will join that Mission as soon as possible for immediate service in Yugoslavia. We have since received an additional request from Mr. Harris for seven more men to be sent forward by sea at once and four additional men to be held in readiness against an early call. These men are not available from our present staff and although every effort will be made here to recruit suitable candidates, the majority will have to be found among the members of the Welfare Division, and the Voluntary Society representatives attached to that Division

3. The Warehousing Section: Under the direction of Mr. J. W. Kent, Chief Warehouse Officer of the Greece Mission, and at the request of Mr. Philip Beck, Director of Camps Division, and Col. John Webb, Director of the Middle East Division, Bureau of Requirements and Supply, the staff of the Warehousing Section has been active during the month in the warehouses of Camps Division at Cairo, El Shatt, Nuseirat, and Tolumbat. Stocks on hand in these warehouses have been rearranged in an orderly manner, inventory has been taken, and recommendations made as to technical improvements which can be effected in the warehousing practices now in effect. Some of the members of the Transport and Distribution Sections of the Bureau have assisted in this work.

By mutual agreement between the Bureau of Distribution and Transport and the Bureau of Requirements and Supply during the summer of 1944, it was decided that responsibility for warehousing in the Middle East would be assumed by the latter Bureau, in view of the fact that the procurement operation for camps and other UNRRA needs in the Middle East would be a continuing one, whereas the staff of this Bureau would all be required in the field in the Balkans long before the camp operation in the Middle East would terminate. Arrangements were subsequently made between the Bureau of Requirements and Supply and Camps Division for the carrying on of this operation. It is a source of pleasure to me, however, that we have been able to utilize the experience and technical qualifications of some of our Warehouse Officers, due to our inability to place them in the field during the last month, in a manner which I believe has been of material assistance to the other divisions involved.

Plans for operations in Yugoslavia during the military period call for the assignment of one UNRRA Warehouse Officer to work with ML and the Yugoslavs at each of the Adriatic ports as well as at Salonica. We have had Mr. William C. Wild at Salonica for sometime past, and Mr. Berry White will be in charge of the men on the Adriatic Coast.

4. Transportation: There is increasing evidence in each report received from the field that transportation facilities are and will continue to be the most pressing need in Greece. I have mentioned this in previous reports and letters to Washington but it seems worthwhile to stress it once again. The possession of a few trucks, at a given moment, in the right place, can contribute so much to the success of any distribution program that I hope every effort will be made to secure and ship a satisfactory

allocation without delay. Information has just reached me from Athens that the military have in Greece approximately 677 trucks of various sizes, and are calling forward another 144. JRC has 50 more operating, 200 more in Greek ports being assembled, and an additional 50 enroute. Aside from these there are approximately 500 Greek trucks which are in various stages of repair. The caique position appears to be not quite so desperate as the motor transport situation, but there is no doubt but that an increasing flow of supplies in the months to come will severely tax all available means of transport.

One of the chief projects of our transport section in Greece will be to attempt a complete survey of transportation under the direction of Mr. Dospil. It was not possible in November and December to do this because of the limitation on the ability of our personnel to move about in the country. I know that an effort is being made in Athens now to begin this and we hope to be able, as soon as our staff is established in Greece, to complete this task in cooperation with the Bureau of Requirements and Supply and present to Washington the basic evidence for requirements to support our requests before the Combined Boards. Any available transport should be shipped without delay if shipping can be obtained.

5. The Distribution Section: Those members of the Distribution Section of the Bureau who were in Cairo during the month were organized into four committees which carried out the following programs:

The Committee on Coordination with the Bureau of Requirements and Supply and Other Divisions studied the supply picture and requirements programs in process for the first three months of the UNRRA period (May June and July 1945).

The Committee on Administrative Procedures and Personal Problems had a two-fold task of checking into the internal organization proposed for the Bureau, and also on specific needs of personnel in the field.

The Committee on Intelligence collected and disseminated within the Bureau all available intelligence information.

The Committee on the activities of the Joint Relief Commission in Greece made a study of the Commission and prepared a draft plan for a take-over of the functions of the Commission by UNRRA.

Looking ahead to the distribution task in Greece, I am more and more convinced that for some time to come we shall have to do a job similar to that done by the Joint

Relief Commission, with every effort being made, of course, to expand that program so as to bring within its scope the very important field of local production and over-all price and rationing regulations. While, in principle, I recognize fully that it is primarily the responsibility of the Greek government to distribute supplies, under existing conditions I am very much afraid the job will not be done unless UNRRA is prepared to accept, for the time being, a more positive role than that of observing. While keeping in mind always that our chief principle must be to help the Greek people to help themselves, it nevertheless seems to me probable that we shall have to accept certain managerial functions if our mission is not to fail and if we are to be justified in bringing into Greece quantities of supplies which may, in many cases, be on the critical list.

6. Reports from Greece: The staff of the Bureau continued to function during the month in Districts 2, 3, 4 and 5. Work in District No. 2 was largely confined to the Patras area, where we were unable to send forward additional personnel to assist Mr. William J. Russis. One Warehouse Officer was, in fact, evacuated by ML. Col. H. P. Henderson, Distribution Officer, left Preveza with ML and subsequently resumed work on the Island of Corfu, but no detailed report is available from him yet.

Several reports were received from Mr. Leon Fontaine, District Distribution Officer at Salonica, on the work of his staff in Macedonia. He has asked for additional personnel, and we have now been able to arrange to send forward to him three distribution men and one Warehouse Officer. A significant factor in Mr. Fontaine's reports has been that UNRRA representatives are the only people able to work outside the twenty mile perimeter established around Salonica. This has also been true in District 2 where UNRRA representatives have travelled in ELAS-controlled areas without difficulty.

In conversations here with one American and one British Officer from the Salonica district, it has become clear to me that for sometime to come supplies brought into that area must be strictly controlled if an equitable and efficient distribution is to be expected. It is also clear that a substantial staff and additional transport for that staff are essential.

Mr. Robert DeForest continued his work as District Distribution Officer in No. 4 District and submitted an extremely interesting report on his visit to the Sporades where he was able to supervise the distribution of supplies in an area into which the military felt unable to go.

Mr. W. S. Finlayson, Acting District Distribution Officer in No. 5 District, the Cyclades, has continued to assist ML in arranging for the distribution of supplies in each of the eighteen islands of the Archipelago and has personally visited a number of the islands. Bad weather conditions both there and in No. 4 District have made travelling on caiques extremely hazardous, and I believe that considerable credit is due to the UNRRA personnel who have gone ahead in the face of such difficulties and done an excellent job.

I anticipate that we shall be requested shortly to send men into District No. 6, the Island of Crete, where an advance party of UNRRA Welfare workers, headed by the District Director, have already gone in. We shall do our best to meet the demands upon us from the limited staff available.

7. Conclusion: I am not reporting separately on the work of the Bureau of Distribution and Transport of the Yugoslavia Mission because that will doubtless be done by Mr. William Harris, Chief of the Bureau, and our isolation from Bari makes it difficult to keep abreast of the work of the Bureau there. Its members are either already in Yugoslavia or on their way there.

I do wish to refer, however, to the situation in Athens insofar as this Bureau is concerned. You are aware that you and I have been in complete agreement for some time past as to the necessity for my proceeding to Athens and taking charge of distribution and transport matters. You are also aware that Washington has urged such action. I have several times indicated to Athens my readiness to proceed there, and I have discussed with you the eight-point program, attached hereto, which I have suggested as a basis for negotiations with ML, the Greek government and the Joint Relief Commission to put the distribution program in Greece on a sound footing. I have now been finally called forward by Athens and will proceed there without delay. I trust that it will be possible immediately to call forward the remaining members of our staff who are assigned to work there. At the moment we are inadequately represented in Athens, the bulk of our headquarters staff being still in Cairo. This is an unhealthy situation which I believe should now be corrected within a short time.

Georg Strunz

Draft Program
for
Bureau of Distribution & Transport Operations in Greece

1. It is agreed that distribution is the most important task to be undertaken in Greece.
2. To perform the above task properly, a much larger staff is needed than now available in the Bureau of Distribution and Transport in the Mediterranean area.
3. The need for additional Distribution and Transport Staff can partially be met by: (1) Detachment of personnel from other functional divisions for temporary assignment to the Bureau of Distribution and Transport; (2) Selection of suitable JRC staff members; (3) Civilianization of ML officers.
4. It is our opinion that the distribution functions of the JRC should be continued.
5. Subject to the approval of the Greek government, and at its request, the Bureau of Distribution and Transport would be prepared to assist the government in assuming the present functions of the JRC within thirty days after arrival of Distribution and Transport personnel in Greece. This period would be utilized for understudying the present JRC officials.
6. It will be desirable to create a three-man commission as a quasi-governmental organization to control and determine all operational policy questions in respect to distribution. This commission should include representatives of the Greek government, ML, and UNRRA.
7. ML would be relieved of distribution responsibility. It is expected, however, that Movements and Transportation will continue to move supplies to depots until the Bureau of Distribution and Transport is ready to take over this function. Also, ML would continue to operate Supply and Provision Depots for thirty days after arrival of Distribution and Transport personnel in Greece.
8. When ML withdraws, supplies, transport facilities and equipment etc. will remain behind to be turned over to UNRRA or to the Greek government for the use of the Bureau of Distribution and Transport in performing the functions assigned to it. Because of the shortage of transport, UNRRA Washington should be urged to send additional transport as soon as possible.

10 October 1944

Mr. L. M. Menshikov, Director
Bureau of Areas, UNRRA
1344 Connecticut Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Menshikov:

Since my last report to you by letter considerable changes have taken place in the Mediterranean theater as a whole.

Advisory Committee of Voluntary Societies and Governmental Agencies

I have previously written you about the formation of an advisory committee to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to deal with refugee problems of all kinds. The second monthly meeting was held in Rome on September 28. As co-Vice-Chairman I presided in the absence of General Spofford. I am enclosing copy of proceedings, which I believe are self-explanatory. Incidentally, I believe that this committee is performing a very useful service in focusing the attention and efforts of all agencies interested in refugee problems, and will serve to avoid duplication of efforts as well as divergence of reports. As you will note from these recommendations, which have yet to be approved by the top military command, it is the intention to work UNRRA into the displaced persons program as rapidly as possible. General Spofford has told me that he thought I should make a trip to southern France, together with one of his officers from this headquarters, for the purpose of contacting those dealing with the displaced persons program in that area, and to get a view of the picture in that area and its possible impact on other areas in the Mediterranean theater. It is probable that this trip will be taken within the next week or two.

In connection with the displaced persons program I sent the following cable to Fred Hochler in London (October 5):

"I believe that it is necessary that personal contact be established between your office and mine in view of the rapidly changing situation of the refugee program in the Mediterranean theater. Will you or one of your deputies visit here shortly or would you prefer I come to London?"
(Paraphrase.)

I hope that he or one of his people may be coming this way, but in the event that they do not, it is felt here that a contact should be made in the near future. Mr. Ackerman, representative of the War Refugee Board, is leaving shortly for the States, and I have asked him to stop and see you. I am also enclosing mimeographed copies of a statement of

functions of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees in this theater and a statement of its personnel which is working here; also a similar statement of the American Friends Service Committee and the War Refugee Board.

Philippeville Camp.

The French Government has accepted the statement of principles for operation by the military, and AFHQ is now attempting to obtain acceptance of the same basis of operation for UNRRA. (Copy attached.)

With reference to waiving of import duties, requested in your cable No. 15 of 25 August, there has been considerable delay in obtaining this waiver, due apparently to the removal of the French Government, as well as our own mission, from Algiers to Paris. I am still pressing Mr. Chapin for action on this. We are not certain here whether the action can be taken in Algiers or whether it will need to be passed upon by the French Government in Paris. In the meantime I cabled you some time ago (No 27) asking your opinion regarding the sufficiency of paragraph 14 of the Clark-Barlan agreement and whether or not you agree with the opinion of the legal representatives of AFHQ that this provision is sufficiently broad to cover import duties.

It appears in any event, due to delay in arrival of personnel, that UNRRA will not be able to take over Philippeville camp before the last of October.

At the present time it is quite questionable what use, and the extent of the use that will be made of Philippeville camp. Since I wired you about transfer of 2,000 Yugoslavs from the Mideast to Philippeville, a situation has arisen which may delay this movement and possibly rule it out altogether. This comes about as a result of a prevailing feeling of optimism among some of the Yugoslavs, whereby they see an early return of Yugoslav refugees to their own country. At the present time we are awaiting reply from General Poljanc, Tito's representative whom made the request for transfer originally. It appears quite improbable that any additional Yugoslavs will be transported out of Italy, and it is the feeling of this headquarters that Philippeville camp, as well as Fédhala should be held as a reserve for refugees of any Allied nationality.

In view of this situation I am trying to resolve these questions: (a) how much personnel, and of what categories, should be kept at Philippeville, and (b) how many and what categories of personnel assigned to Philippeville can be released for duty elsewhere, that is, for the Balkan Mission and for southern Italian camps, assuming approval by you and the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the recommendation that UNRRA take over these camps. Mr. Neville Miller of the Balkan Mission has been here for almost two weeks, and Mr. Matthews is expected within the next day or two. I have discussed this with Mr. Miller, and will with Sir William as soon as he arrives, having in mind that some of the personnel will be needed by the Balkan Mission. The best thinking at the present time is that only a skeleton staff would need to remain at Philippeville, and surplus personnel can be used for the Balkan Mission and the southern Italy camps.

Southern Italy camps.

See my cable No. 29, which is a report in reply to your No. 8 of 11 September.

In addition to the descriptions given in this cable, it should be explained that these camps are somewhat scattered, due to the fact that use is being made of scattered summer villas to a very large extent, so that in none of these camps do we have the compactness that generally prevails in an operation of this kind. However, on the whole they seem to be sufficiently concentrated to permit of successful operation by the military. In the visit which I made to these camps, I was impressed by the job that was being done by A.C.C. in their operation, when you consider the small amount of personnel they are using. I think the standard should be raised somewhat, particularly in the medical field, and have accordingly recommended in the cable above referred to, that the number of doctors be increased by one and the number of nurses by 6. Looking forward to the coming winter, I am impressed by the need for winter clothing among these refugees, particularly in view of there being no provision for artificial heat for any of these camps. It is hoped that either through UNRRA, FEA stores in Naples, Red Cross, or other sources, clothing may be made available. AOC and AFHQ are very anxious that UNRRA should take over these camps as soon as possible, they hope by December 1, with responsibility for supplies to be assumed three months later, March 1. I recommend most highly that this date be set up as an objective and that some personnel might be put into the camps by November 1 or very soon thereafter. I shall keep in close touch with the Philippeville operation from AFHQ standpoint, and attempt to determine the minimum staff which will need to remain there and hence the surplus of staff which may be used for the Balkan Mission and the southern Italian camps. As I have previously indicated, I believe that the southern Italy camps, as well as Philippeville, should report to the Italian Mission.

Fedhala camp.

The feeling here is very strong that Fedhala, as well as Philippeville, should be treated as a reserve camp; that Fedhala would be for the most part a transit camp, capable of taking care of up to 1,000 refugees. This view is supported strongly by the Advisory Committee on Refugee Problems. Mr. Beckölmán has written me telling of repairs that will need to be made and equipment which will need to be acquired in the event that this camp is to continue through the winter. I have requested AFHQ to get an estimate through the Engineers of the minimum needs for making this camp suitable for winter occupancy. As I have cabled you, it is desired to know who will be responsible for the operation of Fedhala if continued, both as to personnel, repairs, and cost of operation (cable No. 32). I recommend that UNRRA assume these responsibilities.

Additional personnel.

Please note my cable No. 28, which is in fact a recommendation of G-5 Section, AFHQ, with reference to the need for additional personnel here at headquarters to deal with the overall question of supplies. For the

sake of continuity I will quote that part of the cable to which I refer:

- "(7) So long as AFHQ remains in operation it is necessary or certainly desirable all problems of supply and concomitant problems of shipping be cleared and managed those headquarters.
- (8) UNRRA's proposed program Italy Balkans and to lesser degree program in Displaced Persons camps will require UNRRA liaison representative at AFHQ to consider many technical social welfare subjects and programs and to advise UNRRA Washington concerning their validity or desirability.

Recommendations. (1) That competent personnel be appointed to serve at AFHQ under UNRRA liaison officer to manage centrally problems of supply and shipping for whole theater. This to include one competent supply officer and one competent shipping officer plus clerical help. (2) Need for experienced man or woman from present theater force or to be otherwise assigned or recruited to fulfill duties outlined paragraph (8).

AFHQ considers this should have high priority and that personnel should be available here between 15 November and 1 December. Please reply with suggestions as to personnel. May be possible obtain in whole or in part this theater."

In addition to the above, I attach a copy of a memorandum to me from the Supply division of G-5 Section. This is for the purpose of pointing out the supply and shipping operations in this theater, and emphasizes the need for personnel above referred to.

Balkan Mission

There has been considerable delay in moving the personnel of the Balkan Mission, as well as of the Yugoslav and Albanian Missions. This has been due largely to conditions set up at Cairo which ML and AFHQ did not feel could or should be met. These conditions had to do with provisions of definite numbers and categories of military personnel to service UNRRA personnel and also provision for definite amount of motor equipment.

We had a meeting yesterday with Neville Miller and G-5 people in my office, at which a plan of movement was worked out which contemplates 85 people coming to Italy at an early date. This was arrived at without guaranteeing fulfillment of conditions set up by Cairo, but rather by a statement to the effect that UNRRA personnel would be taken care of on arrival and until more permanent arrangements could be made by UNRRA people, also that the military will assist UNRRA in making such more permanent arrangements. This relieves a situation here which was not good in the way of relationships.

A few days ago General Sadler, Neville Miller and myself had a conference with General Spofford, chief of G-5 Section (which is in effect now pretty much in charge of all civilian operations in this theater, Balkan included). It was decided what personnel from the Balkan Mission should be located here at AFHQ headquarters (a total of 11). General Spofford expressed the desire to have liaison activities and a certain amount of clearance continued through me as heretofore on Balkan operations, even with the Balkan Mission head here, because of the impact of this operation on other operations in the theater as a whole.

UNRRA operations in Italy as a whole.

Colonel Butterworth returned this morning and brought with him tentative ideas of operations in Italy. These are having ^{AFHQ} attention; and they have had some discussions with me about plans of operation.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Very sincerely,

R. L. Cochran
Principal Representative of UNRRA
for Liaison, Mediterranean Theater

Attachments: Agenda and Proceedings, 2nd meeting,
Advisory Committee on Refugees
Statement of Functions, Intergov. Comm. on Refugees
" " " American Friends Service Comm.
" " " War Refugee Board
Statement of principles, operation, Philippeville camp
Memorandum from Supply division, G-5, AFHQ

Carbon copy to: UNRRA London

HQ Distribution General (Despatch Office, Bureau of Areas)
Original forwarded to Southern European Division.

Personal and Unofficial as presented to Committee. Slight revisions were made by Committee*

PROBLEMS OF DISPLACED PERSONS, STATELESS
PERSONS AND THEIR REPATRIATION AND TRANSFER
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS

PRELIMINARY

This draft paper is an attempt to bring the problem of displaced persons in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations into focus. It is consistent with and to a certain extent based upon the plans made by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and by Military Headquarters (Balkans), and incorporates information received from these Headquarters. It is intended as a statement of the problem by the Advisory Council to ensure uniformity of thought and make certain recommendations to which the attention of the Supreme Allied Commander may be invited. At this stage the status of this paper is that of an unofficial draft for discussion.

I. OBJECT

The repatriation and resettlement of displaced persons within the Mediterranean Theater of Operations as soon as possible. In order to achieve this object, control of movement, registration, collecting in assembly areas and care and maintenance therein is essential.

II. DEFINITIONS

Repatriation. The restoration of persons to the State to which they belong. Such persons are the civilian nationals of united, enemy and neutral nations who either must be, or desire to be, returned to the State to which they belong. Included are all persons other than prisoners of war and those whose status may be defined by the Supreme Allied Commander as ex-prisoners of war.

Transfer. The transfer of stateless persons to their temporary or ultimate destination.

Displaced Persons. There are three classes of displaced persons:
or others.*

- a. Civilian nationals of united or enemy nations/who are to be repatriated.
- b. Former civilian residents of such nations who are to be returned to their places of previous residence.
(in law or fact)*
- c. The stateless/ for whom a place of temporary or permanent residence needs to be found.

III. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

Estimates of the numbers of displaced persons in Europe vary considerably. The latest figures which concern the Mediterranean Theater of Operations are at their maximum very approximately as follows:

a. Displaced persons who require to be returned from outside their country to their country within the Mediterranean Theater of Operations. These are largely Italians, Yugoslavs, and Greeks to whose numbers the following is a rough guide:

(excluding soldiers)***

Italians, (largely in Germany, Hungary & Poland	380,000
(France	200,000
*Yugoslavs, largely in Germany, Czechoslovakia	
and Austria,	360,000
**Greeks, largely in Bulgaria and Germany	180,000
	<u>1,120,000</u>

*Exclusive of Yugoslavs in Mideast Camps and in Italy.

**Exclusive of Greeks in Mideast Camps.

b. Displaced persons who require to be returned from various places within the Mediterranean Theater of Operations to their own countries outside the Mediterranean Theater of Operations:

1. In Austria

Russians	290,000	
Poles	200,000	
French	225,000	
Belgians	25,000	
Czechoslovaks	<u>75,000</u>	815,000

2. In Italy

Germans	25,000	
Czecks & Poles	<u>5,000</u>	30,000

3. In Yugoslavia

Germans		14,000
(There are also Austrians and Germans in annexed Slovenia	50,000	
There are Bulgars and Macedonians in South Serbia	80,000	
There are resettled Magyars in Bacha	17,000	

4. In Greece

Poles	59,500	
Bulgars	150,000	
Germans	23,000	
Mixed nationalities to go to Asia Minor, Middle East and Africa	<u>38,500</u>	271,000

c. Within the countries concerned and within the theater as a whole, there is a further considerable problem of actual displacement. For example:

1. In Greece it is estimated that up to 5000,000 Greeks may have been the victims of internal displacement, of whom up to 150,000 may be totally destitute.
2. In Yugoslavia there has been considerable internal population displacement; Servia has lost some 70,000 Croates "repatriated" to Croatia, and gained about 350,000 Serbs from other sections of Yugoslavia. Croatia lost about 20,000 Bosnian Germans and 3,000 Magyars and its Serbian minority was decreased by 15-20%. It gained the 70,000 Croates mentioned above, and in addition several thousand Germans "repatriated" from the South Tyrol, Bukovina and Bessarabia.

d. Stateless Persons. There does not seem at present to be any approximately reliable figures available.

IV. RESPONSIBILITIES

The responsibilities for dealing with the above vary considerably

***Pencilled insertions.

according to the status of the indigenous governments in the various countries within the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations.

a. In general, it will be desirable for the responsibility of Allied Force Headquarters to be similar to the responsibility of SHAEF in the areas respectively under their control.

e.g. The responsibility of SHAEF in the operational zones has been defined as follows: To prevent any hindrance to military operation or military government which might be occasioned by the massing, control on movement, of displaced persons. To prevent and control outbreaks of disease among displaced persons. To relieve as far as practicable, conditions of want among Allied displaced persons and to relieve, as necessary, destitution among enemy displaced persons.

b. The responsibility of Governments in Liberated Areas has been defined by SHAEF as follows:

1. They will normally have full responsibility for displaced persons and refugees and for their own nationals returned to their countries by Allied Military authorities.
2. They should make available specialist personnel to issue repatriation visas and help as necessary in controlling their displaced nationals.
3. They should issue stand fast instructions and instruct the frontier guards to direct into assembly centers or processing centers persons attempting self repatriation. They will so far as possible ensure that a uniform theater policy is carried out for dealing with displaced persons, including registration and reciprocal acceptance of registration and medical clearance records. There should be an agreement to accept and interchange with other national authorities liaison officers to assist in the supervision and control of displaced persons of their own nationality who will be empowered to issue repatriation visas. There must be agreement to admit to their territory all their former nationals who may have been displaced by the war into other countries without discrimination on account of race, religion, or political beliefs.

c. The responsibility of UNRRA has been defined as follows:

1. In Allied territories, the responsibility for the care and relief of displaced persons may be delegated to UNRRA at the time and to the extent determined by the Supreme Allied Commander in agreement with the respective governments. The position of UNRRA so far as relief and rehabilitation in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia is governed by directives issued by MHQ Balkans based on an agreement dated the 3rd of April 1944, copy attached at Appendix_____.
2. In enemy territory UNRRA will assume responsibility for the care and relief of Allied displaced persons at a time and to the extent to be determined by the Supreme Allied Commander.

d. The responsibility of Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees has been defined as follows:

The Committee will continue its responsibility for persons who have been obliged to leave their homes for reasons of race, religion or political belief and who cannot be or do not desire to be repatriated. It is believed that UNRRA will be prepared to assist for a reasonable period in the care of such persons as cannot be repatriated until the Intergovernmental Committee is prepared to help remove them to new places of settlement.

e. The responsibility of the International Red Cross and other foreign voluntary societies has been defined as follows:

1. International Red Cross will facilitate dispatch and receipt of communications to, from and about displaced persons.
2. (Foreign voluntary societies will have responsibility for relief and welfare at a time and to an extent to be determined by the
* ? * (Supreme Allied Commander. * (The will be required to work in collaboration with UNRRA whenever the latter is at work in the area concerned.)

f. The responsibility of enemy governments has been defined as follows:

1. Enemy authorities should be required to carry out the following functions as directed by Military Commanders:
 - a. Be responsible for the care, shelter, maintenance and medical attention required by Allied displaced persons in the territory.
 - b. Be responsible for the care and control of enemy displaced persons.
 - c. Be responsible for ensuring that wages and benefits to Allied displaced persons who were or are workers in the territory and remittances to their family are paid when due.
 - d. Be responsible for the production when requested of full information regarding the number, location, employment and condition of Allied nationals in enemy territory and in territory occupied by the enemy at the time of surrender.
 - e. Be responsible for the production on demand of lists of ^{*past} present workers in internment and concentration camps and lists of places of confinement of political prisoners, their location and the character and nature of accommodation.
 - * f. Be responsible for the release of food, sanitary, medical and clothing stocks held in the territory.
 - g. Be responsible for setting up of assembly centers for enemy and satellite nationals displaced within the territory.
 - h. Be responsible for setting up reception centers as required for repatriating enemy nationals.
 - i. Be responsible for dissemination of stand fast orders for displaced persons and responsible for the passing on of the Supreme Allied Commander's instructions to Allied enemy or Satellite displaced persons in their territory.

V. METHODS OF ACHIEVING OBJECT.

The various plans for the methods to be adopted in the areas inside the Mediterranean Theater of Operations will differ somewhat in each case. Some of the more important points are suggested below.

a. Traffic Control

It may be necessary to require evacuation in the whole or in part of selected frontier towns for use as Assembly Centers to which displaced persons attempting self repatriation may be directed.

Military Commanders will presumably determine the routes which may be utilized and establish traffic control machinery to keep the routes required

for military traffic clear. Military Commanders will presumably direct and control the movement of displaced persons within formation areas employing military police and troops until indigenous police can be organized.

It will be necessary to provide suitable signs designating or pointing the way to highway routes, information bureau and assembly centers. Military Commanders should ensure that an Information Bureau should be set up in any area in which there are large numbers of displaced persons and furnish such Information Bureaus with all available intelligence.

Displaced persons should be given an opportunity to join the armed forces of their country if represented in the Theater, or to serve in labor battalions organized by the military provided their loyalties to the Allies have been determined and they qualify physically and otherwise.

Nationals of the United and Associated Nations and neutrals confined, interned, or otherwise under restraint by German authorities should be freed from confinement as a military responsibility. Displaced persons will be transferred to Assembly Centers where they will be held as may be appropriate pending other disposition under military control or in restricted residence.

b. Travel Control

Movement will be strictly controlled under direction of Allied military authorities. Frontier guards will be used to reinforce indigenous frontier control personnel at border control stations. Displaced persons who arrive at border control stations without proper documentation will be directed back to the nearest Assembly Center.

*in the same area there would be
* (or Accommodation)
c. Processing Centers.

Processing Centers are accommodation areas which may be either Assembly Centers, Reception Centers or Border Control Stations. For instance- an Italian Center near the Italian-Austrian border may serve as a Reception Center for displaced Italians returning from Germany. It may also serve as an Assembly Center for processing displaced Poles in Italy seeking repatriation. At the same time it might serve as a Border Control Stations for displaced persons attempting to cross the frontier.

*Repatriation Control Center

It will clearly not be desirable to accommodate enemy and allied displaced persons in the same Processing Centers and the operation of normal Processing Centers should be modified as required for enemy nationals, probably on the lines of detention camps.

Reception Centers. The function of Reception Centers will be for the purpose of receiving and providing temporary care for displaced nationals within the territory to which they have returned.

Assembly Centers. The function of an Assembly Center will be the temporary care of displaced persons for whom both clothing and medical facilities will have to be provided until they can be given temporary gainful employment or be repatriated. It is here that clothing and shelter will be provided, disease controlled and emergency medical attention given, security examinations facilitated, Red Cross facilities employed to permit communication with the outside world, registration performed, grouping arrangements made for accommodation and classification according to nationalities and desired destinations, the compilation of reports on presence and number of nationalities.

Border Control Stations. It is suggested that these should be established as a military responsibility on civilian traffic routes at or near international boundaries for the control of movements across these boundaries. Displaced persons who have not been registered should normally be directed from the Border Control Station to the nearest Assembly Center where they can be processed and wait orderly repatriation.

d. Registration

It will be necessary that all displaced persons should be registered in a uniform manner, employing standard registration forms. It will be desirable to follow the procedure already prepared by SHAEF. It will also be necessary to make periodical reports and returns upon the resident population in the Assembly Centers.

e. Repatriation Control

It will be of vital importance to control and coordinate transportation in all areas. In this connection, it is understood that a European Inland Transport Commission is likely to be set up, among whose tasks will be the provision and coordination of such transportation.

f. Supply

The maximum use of local resources and organizations should be made. Where such are inadequate, the necessary provision will have to be made from military sources.

VI. PROBLEMS

It is clear from the above short summary that a number of problems will arise. Among them will be

a. Coordination on all matters with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force and that part of the military organization assigned to specific tasks in connection with displaced persons (known at SHAEF as DPX). It will probably be thought desirable that liaison officers be exchanged between the Theaters as soon as possible.

b. Coordination of transportation and movement. This is a major problem. It is not only a problem within the Theater, but also requires closest coordination with SHAEF in view of the many hundreds of thousands of transient displaced persons who will have to pass from one Theater to the other in both directions. *and outside Europe

c. Minimum standards of welfare and relief should be uniform in both Theaters and policy as to a definite ^{measures} ~~measure~~ adopted both by the military and by voluntary organizations.

d. Preparation will have to be made for large scale but unorganized attempts at self repatriation. The ideal solution would be such rigorous control as to make individual action impossible, but experience has proved that no method of control can achieve that object. It must, therefore, be realized that although as strict control as possible should be imposed, yet arrangements to cater for individual wanderers running into many thousands must be made. The alternative will be vagrancy and banditry on an unprecedented scale, together with very serious medical and sanitary implications. One of the first steps to be taken might well be a coordinated "stand still" propaganda.

e. The position of all non military assistance, particularly UNRRA, should be defined as early as possible. UNRRA's relations with the military are centrally determined and the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, as the agency of the combined Chiefs of Staff, has been designated as the agency through which UNRRA's contact with the Combined Chiefs of Staff is to be maintained. As a practical matter, however, it is clearly desirable that UNRRA personnel should be infiltrated into all areas with the military at the earliest possible date, so that there may be a gradual taking over by UNRRA of military responsibilities for relief and rehabilitation rather than that the change should be sudden and abrupt.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

It seems feasible at this stage to recommend that certain further steps be taken and the committee make the following recommendations which it

*Pencilled insertions

instructs the Secretariat to bring to notice through the appropriate channels.

1. That liaison be established at once with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force in connection with the problem of repatriation of displaced persons throughout Europe, and that civilian agencies represented in the Theater make similar contact with their own agencies and report accordingly. The object will be to make sure that all plans made in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations are so far as possible, coordinated with the plans already made or about to be made for the European Theater.

2. That particular attention be paid to the problem of transportation and movement and that the Movement and Transportation Section of Allied Force Headquarters in particular be invited to study the problem with representatives of G-5 Section. In the event of a European Inland Transportation Commission being set up, it is recommended that there should be representation thereon competent to present the problems of transportation of displaced persons within this Theater.

3. That existing machinery of propaganda be utilized to give as much publicity as possible to the necessity for obeying "stand still " orders within this Theater.

4. That the definition of responsibilities of the various parties involved in Paragraph IV hereof and the outlined methods of achieving the object summarized in paragraph V hereof be adopted as a basis for standard operating procedure within the Theater.

*and agencies cooperating with UNRRA

5. That personnel of UNRRA be infiltrated into the military organization at the earliest possible stage.

6. That camps already set up within the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, e. g. Philippeville and Fedhala be not disbanded until it is clear that all future use for them is over.

*Pencilled insertions

C O P Y

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Office of the Chief of Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL

5 October 1944

SUBJECT: Yugoslav Refugee Camp - Philippeville.
Principles governing control of
Yugoslav Refugees located in French North
Africa in relation to French Civil Law.

TO: G.O.C. North Africa District.

1. Reference letter A.394/1 of 29 July 1944 and telegram of even number dated 21 August 1944, it has been decided to suspend the formal setting up of a Commission as suggested in letter G-5: 383.17-8 of 3 August 1944.

2. This decision has been taken on the representation of the parties concerned.

3. The following points are laid down as the procedure normally to be followed:

(a) That the administration of day to day discipline within the perimeter of the camp shall be the responsibility of the Military Commandant of the camp; and in this matter the French Authorities shall have neither say nor part.

(b) That, in the event of a felony being committed within the perimeter of the camp and being one with which it was beyond the powers of the Commandant to deal (e.g. murder), the Commandant shall, after consultation with the Superior Military Authority, hand over the offender for trial under French Civil Law.

(c) That the Superior British Military Authority shall be the sole arbiter as to whether a refugee charged with an offense committed within the perimeter of the camp should be handed over for trial under French Law. or whether his case should be dealt with by the Commandant of the Camp.

(d) That the French Civil and Military Authorities shall have no right of access to the PHILIPPEVILLE Refugee Camp, and that this camp shall have the status of any other Military Camp established in North Africa. Similarly, no other representative bodies or individuals shall have the right of access to the camp without passes issued by the competent Military Authority. Such passes will not be unreasonably withheld from accredited representatives of interested bodies, e. g. Yugoslav Mission.

(e) That, in the event of a refugee committing an offense outside the perimeter of the camp, the offender shall be liable to arrest by the French and to trial in a French Court of Law under French Law. In the event, however, of a simple misdemeanour, more aptly dealt with by the Military Authorities, the alleged offender will be handed over to the Commandant of the camp for trial.

(f) That, in the event of a refugee committing a more serious offence outside the perimeter of the camp and escaping back to the camp, the Commandant of the camp, shall, after consultation with the Superior Military Authority, hand over the alleged offender to the French Civil Authorities for trial.

(g) That the Superior British Military Authority shall be the sole arbiter as to whether or not an offender, claimed for trial for an offence committed outside the perimeter of the camp, shall be handed over to the French Civil Authorities. Such release to the French Authorities will not be unreasonably withheld.

(h) That the above principles do not affect in any way those Yugoslav soldiers employed in the camps. These have the status of Combatants (Not P.W.) and remain solely under British Military Jurisdiction and subject solely to British Military Law.

(i) That all matters capable of solution as between the Commandant of the Camp and the Garrison Commander on the one hand, and the local French Civil Authorities on the other hand, should be settled locally, and only when matters of policy or principle are involved should either the British Military or the French Civil Authorities refer the matter to Higher Authority.

By Command of General WILSON:

/s/ DANIEL NOCE, Maj. Gen.
for
JAH. GAMMELL,
Lieutenant General,
Chief of Staff.

Copy to:

British Resident Minister
United States Political Adviser
UNRRA Representative AFHQ
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Algiers
(through Brit. Res. Minister)

C O P Y

25 September 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Gov. R. L. Cochran
UNRRA - Med. H. Q.

FROM: Lt. Col. G. H. Rulf.

The object of this memorandum is to appraise some of the operational problems that will face UNRRA in the procurement and shipment of supplies to its Field Units in the Mediterranean Theatre.

In many ways UNRRA problems will be the same as those which have faced the military authorities in their civil relief operations. For example, UNRRA will be operating in several different countries--it will be subject to a central Theatre control of shipping and movement during the military phase and almost certainly after that phase has passed--it will still be necessary to utilize indigenous Med. resources to the utmost--to coordinate UNRRA availabilities within the Theatre--and generally to screen and coordinate requirements submitted by the several Field Units.

It is pertinent therefore to consider the Procedure now followed by AFHQ in this connection. Assuming for the purpose of this illustration that UNRRA is operating, and following the same procedure, the following is, briefly, what would happen.

- (1) 130 days in advance of requirement.

Each Field Unit prepares a long term estimate of requirements covering a 3 month period-phased monthly and as to ports and submits it to UNRRA-Med. (Thus: estimates will be received from Italy, N. Africa, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania.)

UNRRA-Med. screens requirements (See Note*).

A consolidated return of tonnage requirements is next submitted to Mov. & Tn (AFHQ) and cleared by them.

Approved requisitions are then forwarded to UNRRA-Washington, where procurement is initiated and preliminary shipping arrangements made.
- (2) 100 days in advance of requirement.

Tonnage allocation meeting covering period of one month held at AFHQ. UNRRA-Med. would attend and bid for its requirements in common with other shipping users.
- (3) 60 days in advance of requirement.

UNRRA-Med decides its detailed requirements for each area against a month's tonnage (within(1) above) and, after clearing with Mov & Tn. signals a firm "call forward" to UNRRA-Washington.

Only on receipt of this advice are definite

- (4) 30 days in advance of ships' arrival
- (5) 10 to 14 days in advance of ships' arrival

loading and shipping arrangements made at the source of supply.

The shippers at source of supply signal a Planned Loading Advice to AFHQ.

Manifests arrive in the Theatre giving actual loadings and tonnages.

Here again UNRRA-Med extracts relevant information and advises each of its Field Units.

It is most unlikely that UNRRA supplies will come as complete shiploads but will probably be loaded over several ships with other supplies for the same area. Detailed information of what supplies are arriving--advised at each stage as above--is most important to "the Field" in order that their warehousing, transport and other plans can be made in advance.

Summarizing the above, the work involved falls under three heads:

- (1) The job of coordinating and screening the requirements of all UNRRA-Med units. (See Note* below.)
- (2) Bidding for tonnage and handling the detailed shipping and movement arrangements.
- (3) Keeping Field Units advised of what supplies are coming to them.

It is possible that the job at (1) above could be done by UNRRA-Washington but the experience of G-5 (AFHQ) definitely indicates that much saving of time and greater efficiency would result from some measure of Theatre coordination and screening at UNRRA-Med.

Some indication of what this job involves may be gathered from the fact that G-5 employs two officers and three clerks to screen and deal with civil supply requisitions (Italy and S. France only)--in addition to which it has the assistance of the technical military Services to screen from the technical angle.

The work at (2) and (3) above must however necessarily be done at UNRRA-Med HQ. (Presumably this will remain at AFHQ during the military phase and thereafter at the point of Theatre shipping control.)

(G-5 staff for shipping work alone (civil supplies only) is three officers and two clerks. Shortly to be increased as relief operations in the Balkans commence.

NOTE *

Screening of requirements within the Theatre.

At the present time all demands for civilian relief supplies are screened at three levels:

- (1) At country level -- by ACC, AML, AMG, CA HQ, as the case may be, according to the country concerned.
- (2) At theatre level -- by AFHQ (G-5).
- (3) At world level -- by CCAC.

At theatre level screening is necessary for the following reasons:

- (a) to check "justification" --i.e. to ensure that all relevant data and information is given so that the need can be properly assessed and a decision taken by Washington.
- (b) to determine availability from indigenous Mediterranean sources, and, in the case of UNRRA, the possibility of supply from other UNRRA-Med stocks.
- (c) to check that quantities are within scheduled "budgets" and to ensure that the requisition is properly prepared, giving all technical and other details, to prevent delay in procurement. (One would expect that "the Field" could prepare a proper requisition, but our experience is that it just doesn't and constant scrutiny and screening is necessary on this count alone.)

Although on a smaller scale, UNRRA-Med position will be broadly analogous to AFHQ and the same reasons for screening may be expected to apply.

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

SAG/as

Agenda

Meeting - Advisory Committee on Refugees and
Displaced Persons LCO

Rome - 29 September 1944 at 1115 hours

1. Minutes of meeting of 2 September.
2. Report of Committee on Repatriation - Lt. Col. D.C. Jackling.
Copies of paper to be available.
3. Additions to Committee
... Representative of I. HC, Balkans.
B. Representative of Austrian Mission.
4. Problem of conversion of funds by Displaced Persons.
Appointment of a Committee to concern itself with this problem; to work in close coordination with Financial Advisor, G-5, AFHQ.
5. Possibility of Relief Organizations' obtaining service and supplies (latter on reimbursable basis) from central and technical services being established by UNRRA?
6. Does the question of priorities arise in repatriation of Displaced Persons?
7. Any other business.

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

SAG/cjm

G-5: 383.7

22 September 1944

SUBJECT: Meeting Advisory Committee Refugees and Displaced Persons,
Mediterranean Theatre of Operations.

To: See Distribution below.

1. The next meeting of the Advisory Committee will be held in Rome, in the Conference Room of the Allied Control Commission's Headquarters, on 29th September (Friday), beginning at 11:15 hours.

2. Attention is called to the fact that members desiring items to be placed on the Agenda should communicate their wishes to the undersigned secretary.

3. The American Red Cross and the War Refugee Board have submitted statements on their work, expenditures, etc. It is desirable that representatives of other organizations do so, in advance of the meeting of the 29th. (See letter WDW/jjr of 7 September).

S. A. GOLDSMITH,
Major, A.U.S.
Secretary,

Distribution:

Lieut. General J.G.W. Clark, C.B., L.C., C.A.O., A.F.H.Q.
Brigadier General Charles E. Spofford, A.C. of S. G-5, A.F.H.Q.
Governor Robert L. Cochran, U.N.R.R.A. Representative, A.F.H.Q.
American Red Cross, Civilian War Relief, (Mr. Mason Dobson) Rome.
Lieut. General Sir Kenneth McLeod, K.C.I.E., C.B., D.S.O.
H.Q. South Europe Commission, British Red Cross, C.M.F.
Major A. Knight, H.Q. South Europe Commission, British Red Cross, C.M.F.
Sir Clifford E. Heathcote-Smith, H.Q.A.C.C., APO 394,
for Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.
Mr. A.A. Soricri, UNRRA (Italy Representative)
Mr. L. Ackerman, War Refugee Board
Mr. H. Wiggins, American Friends Service Committee, H.Q.A.C.C.
(Att: Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees)

Refugee Section-FSC-FRI, c/o H.JEL-APO 399-c/o PM NYC

Mr. Arthur Greenleigh

H.Q.A.C.C. APO 994 (att: Intergovernmental committee on Refugees
for American Joint Distribution Committee)

Colonel C.E. Findlay, Internees & Displaced Persons Sub-Commission, A.C.C.

U.S. Political Adviser's office for Mr. G. D. Horner

British Resident Minister's office for Sir Anthony Rumbold

Lieut. Col. D. S. Jackling, G-5, AFHQ.

Major S. ... Goldsmith, G-5, AFHQ.

Mr. Gibson (Friends Ambulance Unit-DE-S 57th Area)

Activities of Special Representative, U.S.
War Refugee Board -- Mediterranean Theatre
of Operations.

(A) The objects of the War Refugee Board are stated in the Executive Order issued by President Roosevelt on 22 January 1944 which stated in part as follows:

"It is the policy of this Government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death and otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief consistent with the successful prosecution of the war.

"There is hereby established in the Executive Office of the President a War Refugee Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board). The Board shall consist of the Secretary of State, The Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War. The Board may request the heads of other agencies or Departments to participate in its deliberations whenever matters specially affecting such agencies or Departments are under consideration.

"The Board shall be charged with the responsibility for seeing that the policy of the Government, as stated in the Preamble, is carried out. The functions of the Board shall include without limitation the development of plans and programs and the inauguration of effective measures for (A) the rescue, transportation, maintenance and relief of victims of enemy oppression, and (B) the establishment of havens of temporary refuge for such victims. To this end the Board, through appropriate channels, shall take the necessary steps to enlist the cooperation of foreign governments and obtain their participation in the execution of such plans and programs.

"The Board shall be directly responsible to the President in carrying out the policy of the Government, as stated in the Preamble, and the Board shall report to him at frequent intervals concerning the steps taken for the rescue and relief of war refugees and shall make such recommendations as the Board may deem appropriate for further action to overcome any difficulties encountered in the rescue and relief of war refugees."

(B) Current operations. The Special Representative in the Theatre is constantly engaged in a study of refugee conditions both in the theatre and in adjacent areas still in enemy hands. As the result of such study recommendations are made to the Board or to other authorities for measure to carry out the duties imposed upon the Board by the Executive Order.

Within the past few months the Special Representative has worked among other matters, in connection with the establishment of the refugee center at Fedhala, Morocco, and in the selection and movement of refugees to the United States. At present some of the specific matters on which work is being done are the following:

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- (1) The maintenance of contact with intelligence agencies to collect information on the refugee situation in Hungary and Rumania. Information so collected is forwarded to the Board and to Representatives of the Board in Turkey for use in connection with operations in that area.
- (2) The maintenance of contact with appropriate army authorities and others for the purpose of securing information on the refugee situation in German-occupied Italy. Recommendations as to action to be taken based upon such information are made from time to time.
- (3) The maintenance of similar contacts and the making of similar recommendations with respect to Yugoslavia.
- (4) The making of recommendations to the Board for action along psychological or propaganda lines.
- (5) Co-operation with the assistance to military, intergovernmental and private agencies in the carrying out of their programs.

Since the directive given to the Board relates to the "Rescue of victims of enemy oppression" it is believed that the work of the Board will end with the cessation of hostilities.

(C) and (D). The Board has no regular budget for its operations and expenditures are made only for specific projects.

(E). The only person employed by the Board in the theatre is the Special Representative.

No regular periodic reports are furnished to the Board by the Special Representative. The majority of the reports submitted are in the form of cables making specific recommendations for action or reporting on current conditions.

Activities of B.R.C. Organisation for Relief
and Rehabilitation - Mediterranean Theatre
of Operations.

1. Early in September 1943 the British Red Cross and the American Red Cross were invited by A.F.H.Q. to assist the A.M.G. in the Italian Theatre of War. A Conference was held at Palermo in this connection when it was agreed that the British Red Cross should supply personnel to be attached to the Allied Military Government for general welfare work in connection with the Armies, Italian Refugees and Displaced Persons.

Until just recently the American Red Cross and the British Red Cross ran a combined operation, but profiting from past experience it was felt that better work could be accomplished if the Americans took over all work in the Regions and operations connected with the 5th Army, and on the other hand the British Red Cross would become responsible for work on the 8th Army Front, the Italian Refugee Branch, and the Internees and Displaced Persons Sub-Commission.

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This concerns the Italian Theatre of War only and it must be borne in mind that this is entirely a short time policy connected with the Army and the Allied Military Government to whom all personnel are attached.

2. As regard the proposed activities of the British Red Cross in GREECE and the BALKANS a quantity of personnel are now waiting in Egypt and are working and will work under the direction of U.N.R.R.A. when the time arrives to enter Greece.

In Italy the present operations are constituted as follows:

- a. In the 8th Army Area British Red Cross Workers, both men and women are attached on a Corps basis to assist the Allied Military Government Officers in dealing with an emergency situation after battle.
- b. In the I.R.B. Red Cross Workers are stationed in each Camp and assist the Camp Commandant in general welfare work.
- c. In all Camps run by the Internees and Displaced Persons Sub-Commission again there are Welfare Workers to assist in the organization of the Camps and general welfare. The British Red Cross are also entirely staffing, with trained Nurses, there Hospitals for Yugoslavs in the foot of Italy. With reference to the above it is contemplated that the same kind of work is likely to continue in the back Areas until U.N.R.R.A. takes over. By far the greatest commitment, however, in the future will be for the Internees and Displaced Persons Sub-Commission and the eventual repatriation of these Displaced Persons as the Army moves forward.

PERSONNEL.

ITALY. The total number of personnel employed in the Italian Theatre totals fifty one.

Administration	4.
Medical Officer	1.
Nurses	7.
Welfare Workers	37.
Storekeeper	1.
Transport driver	1.
Total	51.

In addition to the above a further draft are being equipped in England and will come out when shipping is available - up to it is hoped a further to a total of 36.

MIDDLE EAST. The following personnel are now in the Middle East awaiting orders:

Drivers	13.
Nurses	11.
Dispensers	3.
Storemen	3.
Catering	14.
Medical	2.
Interpreters	2.
Welfare Officers	17.
	(Total 65)

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Activities of Civilian War Relief, American
Red Cross, in the Mediterranean Theater of
Operations

The object of the Civilian War Relief section of the American Red Cross is to :

a. Assist the Allied Military Government, the Allied Control Commission and the Civil Affairs section of G-5 in restoring as quickly as possible all the functions of civil government which enable the people of a war area to care for themselves, thus keeping civilians from becoming a burden upon the military arm and a handicap to the winning of the war.

This assistance often takes the form of distribution of clothing to the needy, the delivery of food and medicines, the establishment of emergency dressing stations for wounded and sick civilians, restoration of civilian hospitals, control of the movement of refugees and displaced persons, establishing camps for their care, organizing committees to deal with problems of health and welfare, making surveys which show exact conditions among the civilian population and thus provide a scientific basis for relief and rehabilitation measures, and in general giving every assistance possible to the restoration of all facilities which improve the public welfare.

Both a military and a humanitarian purpose is served by Civilian War Relief, which undertakes (1) to relieve the immediate war-time emergency, and (2) to set up the framework of civilian organizations which themselves can carry out long-range projects when the immediate emergency has passed.

b. Civilian War Relief, American Red Cross, presently operates with AMG of the Fifth Army, with regional AMG/ACC commands in all the activated regions of Italy, and its personnel are at all times available to responsible military authority for assistance in the handling of displaced persons and refugee problems, and in all projects dealing with civilian health and welfare.

Subject to military exigencies and the orders of appropriate military authority, the plans for the next six months contemplate a continuation of the same program of assistance.

c. During the last fiscal year clothing of a value of approximately six million dollars was distributed in liberated areas of Italy, Sardinia and Sicily. A great majority of these garments were made by volunteer Red Cross workers in the Red Cross chapters of the United States. There also was a substantial expenditure of moneys contributed by the people of the United States for the maintenance of personnel in the Mediterranean theater.

d. Expenditures for the current fiscal year call for continuance of clothing distribution in equal or greater amounts than the previous year and for further maintenance of personnel during the period of the emergency.

e. American personnel serving in this theater number sixty-seven (67), with six more enroute. These divide into the following categories:

i.	Administrative	3
ii.	Office staff and supply	5
iii.	Field personnel, including supervisors in the field.	59

*Field personnel includes experts in relief, welfare, disaster, health, child welfare, community organization and administration.

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Activities of the American Joint Distribution
Committee of Italy

The American Joint Distribution Committee was established in 1914 to bring assistance to persons of the Jewish faith outside the continental United States who may be in jeopardy or who may be in need, and for whom no other source of aid is available.

In Italy, the program was initiated in 1934 to give temporary assistance to Jews who had been driven out of Germany by Nazi persecution, and to aid them to emigrate. The Delagazione per L'Assistenza agli Emigranti Ebrei, known as Delasem, was organized under the Union of Italian Jewish Communities to deal with this growing problem, but by 1938 the Italians of Jewish faith could no longer meet the entire costs and requested subventioning by the AJDC. Such subventions as were necessary were supplied by the AJDC each month without interruption as long as permitted. After that date, the Delasem was financed by means of borrowings authorized by the AJDC.

A similar and much more extensive program has been operating in France financed in the same way by the AJDC. By means of this program, thousands of Jewish men women and children have been saved from deportation or death. The work in France has been directed particularly to the saving of children through the paying for their hiding and maintenance in monasteries, other institutions and with private families. The AJDC is also carrying on similar programs of relief and rescue through local committees and by the device of AJDC authorized borrowings in the occupied countries of Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Belgium, and in enemy occupied Italy. Programs of assistance to Jewish displaced persons are operating through local committees of the AJDC in the neutral countries Sweden, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal and Turkey, as well as in most of the countries of South and Central America.

In Italy, during the next six months, it will be necessary to continue the program in those areas in which it is presently operating, and to extend it to newly liberated communities as soon as that is possible. This program will include relief for non-Italian refugees and for some Italian refugees for whom no other source of assistance is available. In addition, it is intended that some effort and some funds will be devoted to aiding the Italian Jewish communities to reestablish their cultural, philanthropic and religious institutions, which had been suppressed during the application of racial laws.

Until all of Italy has been liberated, there is no way of knowing exactly how much was expended by the Italian committees of AJDC in that country during 1943. It can be estimated that approximately one million lire a month was borrowed locally against the guarantee of AJDC that repayment would be made after the war. This guarantee was transmitted to the Delasem committees through the good offices of the United States and British Ministers to the Vatican, with the full knowledge and approval of their respective governments. In that way the program of relief did not have to be interrupted because of inability to transmit funds during the war and the subsequent Nazi occupation.

The estimated monthly needs in Italy for the AJDC program during the second half of 1944 on the basis of current expenditures, may be estimated to be as follows:

For assistance to 1500 non-Italian refugees, most of them stateless	lit.	2,000,000
For assistance to 1000 Italian refugees		1,000,000
For supplementary aid in reconstituting Jewish community activities, including religious, cultural, medical, child care and relief institutions		1,000,000

For supplemental assistance in camps for approximately 800 refugees	300,000
For medical care for refugees	150,000
For vocational rehabilitation for 300 refugees	250,000
For non personnel administrative costs for local committees, including rent, light equipment, transportation, postage, etc.	100,000
For administrative personnel for local committees	30,000
Total Lit.	4,830,000

This estimate is for only that portion of Italy already liberated. Although it is virtually impossible to estimate the needs which will have to be met after liberation of that section of Italy still occupied by the enemy, it conservatively may be estimated that an additional amount equal to the estimates above will be required. It is hoped that the need for some of these expenditures by the American Joint Distribution Committee no longer will be necessary should UNRRA enter the field in Italy, and should other governmental resources be developed. Any improvement in the economic situation in Italy also will permit a reduction in relief requirements subventioned by the AJDC.

The American Joint Distribution Committee staff at present in this theatre are two administrative personnel, Mr. Max S. Perlman for the south of Italy, and Mr. Arthur D. Greenleigh for Rome and north. It should be noted, however, that the local Delasem committees subventioned by the AJDC employ some clerical and administrative personnel, both Italian nationals and non-Italian refugees.

Activities of Organisations and Agencies for Relief and Rehabilitation - Mediterranean Theatre of Operations.

The Friends' Ambulance Unit is a wartime voluntary pacifist organisation which operated during the Great War 1914-18 in France and Belgium and was reconstituted at the beginning of the present war, to provide opportunities of service at home and overseas for some 800 men and women, sharing Quaker views on peace and war.

The Unit is responsible to a Council which is independent of the Society of Friends, though it works in close consultation with the official committees of the Society.

Its members are available for work in the Unit in accordance with the terms of exemption granted by the Tribunals set up under the National Service Act 1939, and the Unit seeks to find openings for work in the relief of suffering where suffering is most obvious and acute. The average age of its members is 24.

For this work extensive training is provided for its members at home, including an initial training camp of six weeks: medical training for a minimum of three months in short-staffed hospitals in England and Scotland; cooking and catering - a nine months course; driving and mechanics;

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language study and the study of continental relief problems; and additional experience in building and constructional work, Citizens Advice Bureau, food and quipment stores, camps and clinics.

The Unit worked during the heavy raids on Britain in September 1940 in shelters, rest centres, emergency feeding and housing, and this provided experience which has since been of value in its work in India, China, Ethiopia and the Mediterranean.

Current operations in the Mediterranean theatre include:-

1. Work with the RAMC in providing staff for blood transfusion units. This work is under the direction of the DMS, AFHQ.	19 men.
2. Work with the Fighting French Forces in staffing the Hadfield Spears Mobile Hospital. This Unit has recently moved to Southern France.	38 men.
3. Providing the administration and European staff of the Spears Mobile Clinics - a group of village medical clinics in Syria and Lebanon.	19 men.
4. Stores officers seconded to the British Red Cross Society and operating in Italy, Egypt and Palestine.	6 men.
5. Refugee relief work in Italy under the direction of A.C.C. (I.R.B. and I.D.P.S.C.) and I.G.C.R., engaged on medical occupational and welfare work in camps.	16 men.
6. Relief work in the Balkans, under the direction of A.M.L. and U.N.R.R.A. in conjunction with other voluntary societies through the agency of the Council of British Societies for Relief Abroad, in London, and the Council of Voluntary Societies in Cairo. Mobile Hygiene and First Aid Units, Relief Units, Mobile Laboratory Units, stores dirvers and officers are being mobilized for Jugoslavia, Albania and Greece; and a MH FAU has been allotted under direct arrangements with ATB (1) for work in the Dodecanese Islands	75 men. 10 women
7. Administrative HQ staffs in Naples and Cairo	10 men.
Total	193

Work contemplated during the next six months consists of maintaining these present commitments by reinforcements of personnel from England, and by adding to the numbers of relief personnel working in Italy by at least twelve men, for whom a request has recently been sent to England.

In addition, arrangements have been made to provide a party of twenty-five medical personnel from England to staff a Jugoslav military hospital under the direction of the D.M.S., A.F.H.Q.

The Friends Ambulance Unit is not a fund-dispensing organisation. Its object is to provide personnel and to seek where possible for their maintenance by those for whom they work. Members are unpaid, receiving only their board, lodging and small allowances to cover the necessities of life.

Total number of personnel employed in the Theatre;

(i)	Administrative	11
(ii)	Field Workers	182

(iii) Division of personnel employed in Italian and Balkan Relief and according to skills. These are approximate only and in a number of cases over lap.

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	Balkans	Italy
(a) Medical: Doctors	2	
Lab technicians	7	1
Dispensers	<u>1</u>	10
(b) Nursing: SRNs	2	
Assistant Women Nurses	4	
Male Nursing Orderlies	11	5
(c) Welfare		9
(d) Storekeepers and Quartermasters		1
(e) Transport, Mechanics (all FAU members are drivers)		5
(f) Caterers and cooks	5	
Interpreters	3	
Hygiene and sanitation technicians	14	22
Total		<u>85</u>
		<u>16</u>

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Equals British Secret

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
G-5 Section
APO 512

S.G./mls

5 October 1944

2 more *

For addition to Statements on work of organizations
associated in Advisory Committee on Refugees and Displaced Persons,
etc.

S. A. GOLDSMITH,
Major, U. S.

Distribution:

Lieut. General J. G. W. Clark, CB, MC, C.A.O., AFHQ.
Brigadier General Charles M. Spofford, A.C. of S. G-5, AFHQ.
Governor Robert L. Cochran, UNRRA Representative, AFHQ.
American Red Cross, Civilian War Relief, (Mr. Mason Dobson) Rome.
Lieut. General Sir Kenneth McLeod, KCIE, CB, DSO.
R. South Europe Commission, British Red Cross, CWF.
Major ... Knight, H.Q. South Europe Commission, British Red Cross, CWF.
Sir Clifford E. Heathcote-Smith, HQ ACC, APO 394.
for Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.
Mr. A. ... Serieri, UNRRA (Italy Representative).
Mr. L. Ackerman, War Refugee Board
Mr. H. Whiggins, American Friends Service Committee, HQ ACC.
(Attention: Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees).
Refugee Section-FSC-FEL, c/o NAJEM-APO 399-c/o P. NYC.
Mr. Arthur Greenleigh
HQ ACC APO 394 (attention: Intergovernmental Committee on Refugee
for American Joint Distribution Committee)
Colonel C. B. Findlay, Internees & Displaced Persons Sub-Commission,
ACC.
U.S. Political Adviser's office for Mr. G.D. Horner
British Resident Minister's office for Sir Anthony Rumbold
Lieut. Colonel D.S. Jackling, G-5, AFHQ.
Major S. A. Goldsmith, G-5, AFHQ.
Mr. Gibson (Friends Ambulance Unit - ADLS 57th rec).

* Pencilled insertion.

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES - (Italy)
HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394.

1. The Inter Governmental Committee on Refugees was set up in 1938 to aid in every possible way the victims of Axis persecution on account of race, religion or political views. To-day some 40 Governments are represented on it, including all the United Nations and the chief neutrals. Its Headquarters are in London, and its Directorate and Executive international.

2. Its Objects are:-

- (a) To have an over-all mandate for all refugees:
- (b) To report on and survey all and any conditions involving refugees:
- (c) To initiate or cooperate in any plans for rescuing refugees from Axis hands:
- (d) To become, in a special way, the protector of all "Stateless" refugees, and to care for them until places of settlement are found:

3. To effect the above I.G.C.R. has to work in cooperation, conjunction and liaison with U.N.R.R., W.A.B. and any other bodies, including primarily the United Nations' military and other authorities who are caring for and maintaining refugees.

4. The next point has a most important bearing on I.G.C.R. work. As things stand at present, I.G.C.R., as regards care and maintenance of refugees, would only become active if and when no other body has taken over this responsibility: therefore, if for example, U.N.R.R.A. takes over the care and maintenance of refugees, I.G.C.R. would only become operative in a residual capacity, that is, if and when U.N.R.R.A. ceased to function or covered only part of the field.

5. Current operations, and those contemplated in, say, next six months.

i) Current:

- (a) Endeavouring to discover fullest possible information about Internees still in Axis hands.
- (b) Supplying such information and lists of these internees to D.F. and I.S.C. of H., I.C.C.
- (c) Aiding in all repatriation schemes.
- (d) Proposing rescue plans to London and following them up.
- (e) Obtaining offer of Italian Nationality for stateless refugees, however short the length of their residence in Italy and implementing this by sponsoring and carrying through their applications for citizenship.
- (f) Forming a special body of "the Stateless", i.e. the unrepresented who are not looked after or recognised by any existing Government authority.
- (g) Case work among individual refugees.
- (h) Occupational programmes.

- (i) Aiding individuals in preparing Emigration documents; contacts; tracing relatives, etc.
- (j) Distribution of relief among the stateless, particularly by J.D.C.
- (k) Distribution of clothing, books, etc.

ii) During the next six months:

During the next six months a continuation of the same work is contemplated, while it is not unlikely that certain considerable changes may occur, the nature of which cannot be fully foreseen at present.

6. Expenditure Incurred.

This office began to operate in Italy in May 1944: it has an office at Bari in the Provincial Commissioner's building, and works in the three Camps of di Bagni, Ferramonte, and Bari Transit, as well as among Stateless (nearly all Jews) in some eight centres in Southern Italy including Naples.

Its Headquarters are in Rome, and its work takes it to the many cities north of Rome, particularly where there are Jewish refugees.

7. So far no expenditure has been incurred, but London contemplates now an active programme of expenditure in relief directions.

8. Personnel.

The total number of personnel employed in the theatre is at present 10. Others are expected.

Administrative = 4. All the rest are field workers.

Specialist personnel: Welfare 6.

Transport - 1 Italian driver supplied by A.C.C.

/s/ C.E. Heathcote-Smith
/t/ C.E. HEATHCOTE-SMITH
R.R. I.G.C.R.

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American Friends Service Committee Operations,
Mediterranean Area

1. General. A.F.S.C. has offices in Lisbon, Madrid, Casablanca, Algiers, Cairo and a delegation in Italy working under the auspices of the Inter Governmental Committee on Refugees, and is affiliated with Secours Quaker in France.
2. The work in Lisbon and Madrid is concerned almost exclusively with refugee evacuation, and maintenance pending arrangements for departure from these countries.
3. North African and French operations will be reported upon separately by Kendall Kimberland, Director of the North African Delegation, A.F.S.C.
4. Middle East: Barclay Jones has recently arrived in Cairo as Commissioner for the American Friends Service Committee. The scope of this work is not yet clear, although he will be working closely with U.N.R.R.A. on their refugee assistance program, and will represent A.F.S.C. in coordination of whatever A.F.S.C. program may be developed with U.N.R.R.A. He will also be responsible for the A.F.S.C. personnel temporarily on loan to U.N.R.R.A. for the Balkan Mission (12 people).
5. Current Italian Operations: Operating under the auspices of the I.G.C.R., and in collaboration with I. & D.P.S.C., Red Cross, J.D.C. and F.A.U. personnel, A.F.S.C. Delegates are developing a program on the following general lines:
 - (a) Representation of Unrepresented: On behalf of I.G.C.R. and in consultation with I. & D. P.S.C., U.N.R.R.A., etc., A.F.S.C. personnel are negotiating more direct representation of and responsibility for stateless and unrepresented displaced persons in Rome, Bari and other areas of liberated Italy.
 - (b) Individual Counseling: In Bari and in Rome, preparation of individual emigration documentation, contacting families abroad, limited assistance to those not receiving assistance elsewhere, and wide variety of individual problems requiring attention.
 - (c) Supplementary Welfare Services in Refugee Camps and elsewhere: Augmenting occupational activity in refugee camps (e.g. handicraft and shop work producing goods for use in the refugee community and nearby hospital at Sta. Maria Camp; supplying two sewing machines - J.D.C. supplying two - to Cinecitta Red Cross workers for repairing salvage clothing much needed by displaced persons for the coming winter, etc.)
Supplying small quantities of books, paints, etc. to Fiugi and Camps in the South, etc.
6. Future Plans: Since A.F.S.C. generally conceives of its role as being largely supplementary, what operations it takes up frequently depend on what other agencies are able or unable to do. However, it is generally contemplated that the work for the next six months will be largely along the above lines, although it is expected that certain quantities of used clothing and occupational supplies will shortly be available.
7. Financial: As long as the A.F.S.C. program remains so largely a service program, the budget will remain very modest. It is not at present expected that expenditure will be more than 2 to 3,000 dollars per month, unless considerable augmentation of operations seem advisable.

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8. Present Personnel: At present the A.F.S.C. has as its Delegation in Italy two persons, David Hartley stationed in Bari and Howard Wriggins stationed in Rome. Both delegates are neither exclusively administrative nor executive. Also working under the auspices of the I.G.C.R. two members of the Friends Ambulance Unit are being of great assistance to A.F.S.C. Sam Marriage is at Sta. Maria de Bagni, and Dennis Mann is in Rome (the latter, in addition to his aid to Sir Clifford Heathcote-Smith, is helping Howard Wriggins with the Rome activities).

/s/ Howard Wriggins
/t/ HOWARD WRIGGINS,
Delegate,
A.F.S.C.

AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE

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3. Historical: The A.F.S.C. has had a Delegation in North Africa since the 10th September, 1942. The first Delegate came as a result of reports received of conditions in concentration camps in North Africa. The aim was to endeavour to alleviate conditions in the camps and, where possible, to work towards the liberation of the internees.

4. Joint Commission: After the landings of the Allied Forces the process of liberation of the "pre-8th November, 1942" internees might have been expected to proceed much more rapidly; but such was not the case. So great was the pressure of public opinion, however, that the "Joint Commission for Political Prisoners and Refugees in French North Africa" was created under General Eisenhower's order, with instructions to clear up the concentration camp situation.

5. Negotiations: To implement the work of the above mentioned "Joint Commission", several of the Refugee Section were made members, and carried negotiations with the appropriate authorities for the liquidation of the "pre-8th November" internees.

6. O.F.R.R.O.: Meantime the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations (O.F.R.R.O.) sent a mission to North Africa, under Fred K. Hoehler. He found the A.F.S.C. Delegation on the ground (other Delegates had by then arrived) and invited them to form the "Refugee Section, Division of Public Welfare and Relief, North African Economic Board". The Section continued with the same general program as before;

- (a) Aiding internees in concentration camps;
- (b) pressing for their liberation (where consonant with military security), and assisting with their documentation;
- (c) aiding the families of internees when their resources become exhausted;
- (d) helping ex-internees to find employment (mostly with the Allied Forces);
- (e) assisting financially and materially ex-internees as well as other refugees, without regard to race, creed or nationality;

7. Financial Aid: The financial help referred to was at first either from A.F.S.C. funds (from private donations) or by means of cable transfers from relatives or friends in the United States, remitting to individual refugees in North Africa through A.F.S.C., Philadelphia under U. S. Treasury license. Later the Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee was permitted to remit U.S. Dollars 5,000 per month, also under license, to the undersigned for the aid of refugees from the Spanish Civil War.

8. Material Aid: The material help was mainly in the form of clothing distribution, and also involved the establishment of refugee centres around Casablanca and Algiers.

9. Amicales: The largest part of the work for Spanish War refugees (including ex-International Brigaders) has been carried on through "Amicales", or mutual aid societies, formed by the refugees themselves under the auspices of the Joint Commission in Algiers, Oran, Casablanca and Tunis. Those in the first three cities are still functioning, and receive their respective shares of the above mentioned J.A.F.R.C. remittances. Approximate Spanish refugee population served:

Algiers	1500.	Oran	3500
Casablanca and other cities in Morocco	2200	Tunis	1000
		Total	8200

10. F.E.A.: Subsequently, until the 29th February 1944, the Refugee Section continued its work of assisting refugees in North Africa under the auspices of O.F.R.R.O. The latter being absorbed in the Foreign Economic Administration (F.E.A.), our A.F.S.C. Delegation has continued to work unofficially under F.E.A. Not only have the above mentioned financial and material aids for refugees been continued, but we have acted as intermediary for Mr. Robert M. Ferguson, Chief of the F.E.A. North African Mission, with various French organisations in general relief supply questions.

11. Children's Services: In addition to the foregoing our Delegation has aided three local French organisations to undertake "garderies" in Algiers for children of mothers who must work because their husbands are mobilized, or for some other reason are unable to maintain their families. Also, partly in cooperation with the American Red Cross, clothing and layettes were distributed to needy mothers and children (mostly, although not exclusively, refugees) in both Algiers and Casablanca.

12. U.N.R.R.A.: Our delegation has maintained a point of liaison for U.N.R.R.A. in Algiers, particularly with respect to the North African Refugee Centre at Fedala, and the presently organising Yugoslav Refugee Camp at Philippeville.

13. I.G.C.R.: Our Delegation has maintained close contact with the Representative for France and the French Empire of the I.G.C.R., Monsieur le Gouverneur des Colonies Victor Valentin-Smith, and has been of service to him from time to time, but up until the time of writing no cooperative arrangement has been worked out such as that with the I.G.C.R. in Italy.

14. Financial: Our Delegation is in the process of preparing a budget for our Philadelphia head office, a copy of which will be submitted to you upon completion. Without these figures and past expense accounts at hand it is possible only to say roughly that our balances in North Africa have diminished in recent months at about 7-8,000 dollars per month, including the 5,000 dollars per month of J.A.F.R.C. funds mentioned above distributed through Amicales for the relief of Spanish Civil War refugees. These balances are replenished periodically from the U.S. under Treasury license.

15. Personnel: Our Delegation consists at present of:-

Algiers:

- i) Director (General administration)
- ii) A.F.S.C. Delegate in Algiers,
(in charge of clothing distribution and children's services),
- iii) A Representative (an English Quaker) of the Service (maintaining liaison between A.F.S.C., F.A.U. and F.R.S., carrying on the major part of the individual refugee case work of the Algiers Office, as well as handling miscellaneous supply and transport problems),
- iv) Secretary,
- v) Bookkeeper and assistant secretary.

Casablanca:

- i) Delegate in Charge,
- ii) Secretary and bookkeeper,
- iii) part-time employment specialist (in conjunction with the N.A.R.C. at Fedala),
- iv) part-time employee for relief and clothing distribution (in conjunction with the local Amicale, which for legal reasons operates as a Division of our Delegation's Office).

16. Projected Program: The A.F.S.C. North African Delegation proposes to continue for the present its offices in Algiers and Casablanca, and to continue to render the services described above. In general, our work and our policy with refugees has been similar to

that already described by Howard Wriggins as being carried on by the A.F.S.C. Delegation in Italy under the auspices of the Inter Governmental Committee on Refugees, namely:

- (a) Representing the unrepresented, such as stateless and other refugees without consular representation;
- (b) Individual counseling and assistance; such as aid in finding employment, in documentation, in emigration, as well as financial and material assistance as described above;
- (c) Supplementary Welfare Services, especially to refugees, to families of internees, and to children;
- (d) Shipments of relief supplies requested by Secours Quaker in France (relief organisation of French Quakers which has continued to operate in France during the total occupation).

17. France: It should be mentioned that the A.F.S.C. has kept in touch with both the French authorities in Algiers and representatives in Washington in connection with planning for relief. However, it is A.F.S.C.'s intention only to work in close cooperation with Secours Quaker, which is already on the ground. It is hoped that Secours Quaker will invite European and other Friends to assist in carrying on the program of child feeding and care, as well as refugee relief work, which Secours Quaker has continued ever since the internment around the end of 1942 of the American Friends who were working in France. The A.F.S.C. does not plan to send more than a few Delegates to join Secours Quaker in the earlier stages of resuming their work together. On the other hand, before any shipments of supplies are made, (which have been requested through G-5 A.F.H.Q., and which may be made in cooperation with the French over-all relief organisation "Entr'Aide Francaise pour la Liberation" (E.F.L.) our experience in Italy indicates the practical necessity of having an A.F.S.C. Delegate with Secours Quaker on the receiving end.

/s/ K.G. Kimberland

/t/ KENDALL G. KIMBERLAND