

ICFY

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

26 JULY - 31 DEC 1993

PLEASE RETAIN  
ORIGINAL ORDER

[1 STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL]  
CONFIDENTIAL  
KMIWB JUNE 2012

UN ARCHIVES

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| SERIES | <u>S-1835</u>    |
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| ACC.   | <u>2011/0195</u> |

010/9

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

BIJELA BRIDGE



(BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA)


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

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'93 DEC 31 -4 :33

TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB FOR EIDE  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓  
STOLTENBERG, SARAJEVO  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 30 DECEMBER 1993  
NUMBER: MSC-2538  
SUBJECT: Alleged violation of diplomatic mail

30 DEC 31 P 027

1. Attached please find a letter from the Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina complaining that members of CIVPOL violated diplomatic mail privileges of Bosnian Government Officials. I would appreciate your comments.

2. As to the restrictions applied in respect of the luggage, I would appreciate further background information for an appropriate reply from this end.

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


*Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina*  
*Permanent Mission to the United Nations*  
*New York*

Mr. Human

Mr. Peters (Ambassador)

29 December 1993



H.E. Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali  
Secretary-General  
United Nations  
New York

Excellency:

I have the honor to present to you the attached letter dated 28 December, 1993 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr. Irfan Ljubljankic, addressed to your Excellency.

Please accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

Muhamed Sacirbey  
Ambassador  
Permanent Representative





Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Your Excellency,

on December 8, diplomatic bags, handed by Mr. Edin Raskold, Vice Prime Minister, returning from the Geneva Peace Talks, were opened and inspected, despite being duly marked, sealed and corresponding official document being presented by Mr. Dukvic;

- In view of the above mentioned cases, which have become quite frequent, we have lodged our protest with the UNPROFOR Command and UNHCR Office in Zagreb, requesting unconditional termination of such a practice. However, we have received no answer yet.

Since it is a question of inadmissible violations of diplomatic immunity of high officials of our state, i.e. violations of its dignity and sovereignty, we ask You to issue proper directions as to have such a practice immediately and unconditionally terminated.

John Ziegler

Dr Irfan Hübhanlıç

Tel: 04107057/ 413 182 126 FAX: 04107057/ 413 182 128  
003 003 813 004 004 891

Doc. Id. No. 67-1854-48-205. In: *State of Texas v. [redacted]*, 14.12.1977



010/9 ✓

UNGG Document Unit  
Palais des Nations

'93 DEC 30 17:31

PARLIAMENT OF BOSNIAN POSAVINA  
30th December 1993.

Ms 1433/12

Your Excellencies Owen and Stoltenberg,

We hope that you are well. We would like to express our gratitude on behalf of all Croatians and Muslims of Bosnian Posavina for receiving us and listening to our suggestions referring to the solution of the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

As you are aware the General Parliament of Bosnian Posavina was held in Slavonski Brod and the Decision on proclaiming the Province of Bosnian Posavina ( Province 3 of the Vance-Owen plan). Mr Ivan Stanic and myself forwarded those documents during our conversation in Geneva. The Vance-Owen plan is not dead in the souls of Croatians and Muslims from Tuzla to Orasje.

We would kindly ask you to invite us to the following Peace Talks in Geneva planned for 15th January 1994 so that we could constructively take part and give our contribution to peace and end to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We wish you all the best and a very Happy New 1994. We wish you a lot of strength that we all need, to pass through the darkness that lies between despair and hope. The hope that peace and good will, not war will win in 1994.

On behalf of the Parliament of Bosnian Posavina

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BP

Dr Anto Kovacevic

*Dr. Anto Kovacevic*

Ivan Stanic - Lawyer

*Ivan Stanic*

//



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| AP            | 010/9  |
| PN/11         |        |

Palais des Nations

93 DEC 23 14:41

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

CZM=1591

CZG=1476 OUTGOING CODE CABLE

M O S T I M M E D I A T E

FO=1415

Page 1 of 11

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, SRSG, GENEVA  
STOLTENBERG, SRSG, ZAGREB  
STOLTENBERG, SRSG, BRUSSELS

for RAMCHARAN 322-5116185

FROM: COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 23 December 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-1626 /fax 0690

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

**CODE RESTRICTED**

As requested in your 2500 of 22 Dec 93, we have attached three reports which update the military situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first is a recap of the events of the past few days from the straight military point of view as reported in our regular SITREPs. The second is an assessment completed by our military information branch on the likely trends which may develop. Finally, a report prepared by BH Command on convoy obstructions since the agreement on freedom of movement was signed is attached.

Sarajevo has been the scene of renewed shelling to a level not seen in two months. On 22 Dec alone, over 1700 impacts into the city were registered. As of 0800hrs 23 Dec, heavy shelling had begun again at 0600hrs, mainly on the eastern part of the city.

The Lasva valley had seen a stable level of conflict for the past month, until 22 Dec, when the BiH launched a major four-pronged attack on the Vitez Croat pocket. The HVO are defending

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COMMUNICATIONS

93 DEC 23 13:56  
UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS



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well, likely because they believe that the loss of too much of the pocket would marginalise its viability as an enclave. These last attacks come on the day before the agreed truce between the BiH and HVO (also joined by the Serbs) which was to come into effect 0001hrs 23 Dec 93. As of 0800hrs local 23 Dec 93, the situation was quiet in Vitez.

In the north of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serb forces have launched local attacks on the Sapna thumb and in the area of Doboj. Our assessment is that should the BiH make any gains in central BH and in Sarajevo, the HVO and BSA forces may renew hostilities at a greater pitch, possibly in this area.

As explained in the attached report, the Neretva valley continues to cause problems for UN movement around Mostar despite the agreement reached by Generals Delic and Roso.

Convoy movement has been hampered by all factions. The report provides detailed data which we can support with dates and times. In addition, the instances of fighting described above reduce safety to an unacceptable level along some of the sensitive areas thereby making it necessary for UNPROFOR to close access to the routes. Tonnages required daily by UNHCR are in the area of 1400. As the graph attached shows, since the latest round of fighting, we have averaged 600 to 700 metric tons.

A further point to note is the problem of non accredited (political?) convoys congesting the routes. The two latest, the "White Road" (Croat) and "Extreme Joy" (Bosnian) convoys are likely responsible for part of the reduction in tonnages delivered by UNHCR and accredited convoys. You will recall some months ago the "Convoy of Joy" causing similar difficulties.



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Although not accredited, ~~the~~ "White Road" convoy was accorded special and proportionally more extensive escorts by UNPROFOR; we attempted to meet all demands of the organizers who made several unreasonable ones. In spite of this fact, a sniper attack killed one of the drivers. This type of behavior and interference in an operation such as the UNHCR humanitarian relief does not always benefit the population.

Endall

Attachment: 8 pages



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## OPERATIONAL SITUATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA



### Sector Sarajevo

Sarajevo remains unstable with heavy fighting and shelling which started on the night 19/20 Dec 93 and continues till now. The city experienced its heaviest shelling on 21 and 22 Dec when around 1400 and 1744 impacts were confirmed. Most of the shelling is concentrated around the centre, north, south and western areas of the city specially around ZUC, RAJLOVAC and KOSEVO. Total casualties reported so far - 7 civilians killed and 39 wounded. Latest information reports heavy shelling in the eastern part of the city.

### Gornj Vakuf

Area Gornj Vakuf has remained relatively quiet over this period with a slight surge in activity and resurgence of mortar fire on 21 Dec which continued at the same level till 22 Dec. Things appear stable at the moment. On 22 Dec the "white road" convoy (Crout) was targeted by the BiH resulting in one driver being killed and another wounded.

### Lasva Valley

The focus point in the Lasva Valley has been Vitez where the BiH launched a multi-directional attack at 220632A Dec 93 into the area of BUKVE (YJ 2369), KRUSCICA (YJ 2290) AND SLINMENA (YJ 1497). The fighting continued 22 Dec. HVO troops have since then reinforced their locations, at the moment there seems to be a lull in the fighting.

### Neretva Valley

The main road though this valley - route GANNET - remains closed by the HVO contrary to their agreement signed on 16 Dec 93.

The HVO have continued to harass UN movement in this area by directing SA fire at them. The main recipients of this harassment have been the SPABAT troops providing security to Force Engineers working in the BIJELA BRIDGE area.

The latest report is that HVO have stated that they will not allow any movement of UNPROFOR vehicles in the MOSTAR region.



CZAJ 1581

5/11

MEMORANDUM FOR COO



23 DEC 93

From: DCMIO

SUBJECT: SITUATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

1. This info provided IRT to Annan code cable 2500, SAB, 22 DEC 93.

2. After the failure of the last GENEVA peace talks rejected by the Bosnians, from the end of Oct 93 the tension in SARAJEVO dramatically increased. The BiH has conducted limited scale infantry attacks and infiltrations provoking the BSA to retaliate with intensive indirect fire and troop reinforcement. On 22 Dec the rate of arty, tank and mortar fire increased sharply with 1744 impacts confirmed by the UNMOs, which was the heaviest exchange in two months.

3. The same day, 22 Dec 93, the BiH conducted a limited scale, coordinated offensive on multiple axes against the HVO-held Vitez Pocket (Lasva Valley). The HVO was surprised by this attack and lost some terrain. It is assessed that fighting in this area will continue with the BiH trying to consolidate their gains and the HVO defending in place and trying to retake the lost territory. Due to the fighting in this area Route DIAMOND (ZENICA/GORNJI VAKUF) was closed. The BiH offensive has increased tension between BiH and HVO all over BH.

4. The NERETVA Valley is a main route linking Central BH with the Adriatic coast. As an element of the steadfast BiH demand to have an approach to the sea, this area is gaining significance. Recently the BiH has started to put more pressure on the region conducting raids and other small scale military operations. In response the HVO has maintained indirect fire pressure against Mostar and Jablanica and massed its forces in Prozor south of BiH-held Gornji Vakuf. The situation is becoming more tense and is directly and indirectly affecting UNPROFOR and UNCHR convoys.

5. CONCLUSIONS: The above events seem to indicate an aggressive and provocative BiH posture which is probably directly related to the ongoing peace talks. The Bosnian government has been unsatisfied with Croat and Serb concessions. By provoking an elevated level of military activity, the BiH assures the Muslim plight continues to receive the world's attention. Any military success also furthers their aim of eliminating Croat-held pockets in central Bosnia. While the negotiations remain unresolved, the BiH will continue to exercise its military option with the BSA and HVO reacting strongly to each additional provocation.



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27/12/93MEMORANDUM

G3 CONV OPS 3006

20 DEC 93

ACOS G3

RESTRICTIONS TO UN MOVEMENT  
19 NOV 93 TO 19 DEC 93AIM

1. THE AIM OF THIS PAPER IS TO OUTLINE SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY UNPROFOR AND UNHCR IN MOVEMENT IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA BETWEEN 19 NOV AND 19 DEC 93.

GENERAL

2. THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN AID TO CENTRAL BOSNIA WAS SUSPENDED ON 25 OCTOBER 93, AFTER A CONVOY WAS ATTACKED IN THE AREA OF NOVI TRAVNIK. ON 19 NOV 93 MR BOUTROS-GHALI AUTHORIZED THE RESUMPTION OF CONVOYS TO CENTRAL BOSNIA, AFTER THE LEADERS OF THE WARRING FACTIONS SIGNED A DECLARATION ON 18 NOV 93 (ANNEX A) STATING THEIR COMMITMENT TO ENSURE THE DELIVERY OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE BY :

"ALLOWING FREE AND UNCONDITIONAL ACCESS BY THE MOST EFFECTIVE LAND ROUTES" AND WILL " ENSURE COMPLETE AND SECURE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT FOR ALL PERSONNEL OF THE UN AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS"

THIS DOCUMENT WAS FOLLOWED UP BY THE JOINT DECLARATION (ANNEX B) SIGNED ON 29 NOVEMBER 1993 BY THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF THE WARRING FACTIONS WITH THE EXCEPTION OF GENERAL MILADIC, IN WHICH CASE THIS DOCUMENT WAS SIGNED BY DR. KARADZIC ON BEHALF OF THE SERBS.

RESTRICTIONS

3. THERE HAVE BEEN A TOTAL OF 72 INCIDENTS RECORDED BY G3 CONVOY OPS, DURING THE PAST MONTH, CONCERNING RESTRICTIONS TO UN MOVEMENT. THE BREAKDOWN OF THESE INCIDENTS CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS 8 X HVO, 6 X BiH AND 58 X BSA RELATED. THESE INCIDENTS ARE NOT TO BE CONSIDERED AS AN ABSOLUTE, AS THEY ONLY REFER TO CONVOY MOVEMENT AND NOT NECESSARILY TO RESTRICTIONS ON THE MOVEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL VEHICLES, WHICH CAN HAVE A VERY SERIOUS IMPACT ON THE CONDUCT OF BOTH UNPROFOR AND UNHCR DAY TO DAY BUSINESS. IN FACT SOME OF THE INCIDENTS THAT ARE RELATED TO INDIVIDUAL MOVEMENT DO INFACCT RESULT IN THE CANCELLING OF CONVOYS UNTIL THE SITUATION IS CLARIFIED. EACH WARRING FACTION WILL BE DISCUSSED SEPARATELY.



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# HVO

4. A TOTAL OF 9 HVO RELATED INCIDENTS CAN BE DIVIDED INTO 5 THAT INVOLVE HOSTILITIES/FIGHTING IN AN AREA WHICH BLOCKED A ROUTE BEING USED BY UNPROFOR OR UNHCR. IN MOST CASES THIS RESULTED IN DELAYS OR CANCELLATION OF A PARTICULAR CONVOY. THERE ARE OTHER INCIDENTS THAT CAN BE CLASSED AS SOME FORM OF HARASSMENT, WHICH INCLUDE:

- ALLOWING ONLY ONE CONVOY PER DAY EACH WAY VICE UNLIMITED ACCESS,
- BLOCKING A ROUTE BY MINES AND
- SEARCHING LOADS AND DETAINING DRIVERS BECAUSE THE LOAD WAS "SUSPICIOUS"

THE ASSESSMENT, AT THIS TIME IS THAT THE WORD OF THE 19 NOV 93 AGREEMENT WAS SLOW TO REACH THE LOCAL CHECK POINTS AND SOMETIMES MISINTERPRETED. RESTRICTIONS, SUCH AS ONLY ONE CONVOY EACH DAY BEING ALLOWED TO TRANSIT THE METKOVIC-ZENICA ROUTE WAS LIFTED BY 27 NOV 93, WITH NO FURTHER PROBLEMS. AS THE FIGHTING CONTINUES IN THE PROZOR, GORNI VAKUF AND VITEZ AREA, THERE HAVE BEEN DELAYS TO CONVOYS DUE TO THE SHELLING AND SNIPER FIRE. THE CHECK POINT AT THE BUSOVACA T JUNCTION REMAINS IN EFFECT AND DEPENDING ON THE LOCAL SITUATION (ANTICIPATION OF A LOCAL ATTACK) TENSIONS MAY RUN HIGH AND RESULT IN MINOR DELAYS AND RESTRICTIONS.

# BiH

5. BiH RELATED INCIDENTS TOTAL 6 WITH 1 INVOLVING LOCAL FIGHTING IN WHICH BiH TROOPS IN THE TUZLA AREA USED AN UNPROFOR CONVOY AS COVER WHILE FIRING UPON BSA POSITIONS. THERE WERE 3 INCIDENTS INVOLVING BiH POLICE BEING VERY QUICK TO DETAIN AND SEARCH THE CONVOYS AND 2 OTHER INCIDENTS INVOLVING BiH CHECK POINTS RANDOMLY STOPPING CONVOYS AND INDIVIDUAL VEHICLES REQUESTING CLEARANCES, LOAD MANIFESTS, AND VARIOUS PERSONAL ITEMS SUCH AS CIGARETTES, COFFEE ETC.,.

6. AN AREA OF CONCERN REMAINS THE FIGHTING IN THE GORNI VAKUF AREA, WHICH BLOCKS ROUTE DIAMOND. LOCAL CIVILIANS IN BiH AREAS (KAKANJ) ALSO SET UP IMPROMPTU ROAD BLOCKS IN ORDER TO LOOT UNHCR CONVOYS. THIS IS ALSO SEEN IN SOME HVO AREAS. THERE ARE TIMES OF TENSION AS THE LOCAL SITUATION CHANGES. THE VISOKO - KISELJAK AREA APPEARS TO BE MOST VULNERABLE AND AS A DIRECT RESULT THE INCIDENTS OF HARASSMENT BY THE CHECK POINTS INCREASE.

# BSA

7. BY FAR, THE MAJORITY OF THE INCIDENTS DURING THIS PERIOD HAVE BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH THE BSA. THERE ARE A TOTAL OF 58 RECORDED INCIDENTS IN THE G3 CONVOY OPS DATA BASE AND SEVERAL MORE THAT ARE RECORDED WITH THE G3 OPS AND UNMO'S. THE PERCENTAGE OF EACH TYPE OF INCIDENT IS NOT AS IMPORTANT THAN THE REASON BEHIND



IT. THROUGHOUT THE LIST OF INCIDENTS, THERE ARE EXAMPLES OF "EXCUSES" AND "REASONS". THE TRICK IS TO SEPARATE THE TWO. EXCUSES APPEAR TO BE NEVER ENDING AIMED AT HAMPERING, HARASSING, DENYING CLEARANCES, SLOWING DOWN OR MAYBE JUST CREATING FRUSTRATION. EXCUSES INCLUDE SUCH THINGS AS :

- NO FAX PAPER
- FAX MACHINE BROKEN
- NOT ENOUGH INFORMATION
- DIDN'T RECEIVE THE REQUEST IN TIME
- WANT REQUEST IN SERBO-CROATIAN
- ETC...

THIS LIST APPEARS TO BE NEVER ENDING. THE FOLLOWING IS AN ATTEMPT TO BREAKDOWN SOME OF THE REASONS:

A. AREAS

THERE ARE FOUR DISTINCT AREAS (ZVORNIK CROSSINGS, GORAZDE, S1 AND STOLAC/VIPER) OF CONCERN, THAT RECEIVE DIFFERENT TREATMENT. THE DIFFERENCE CAN BE BECAUSE OF THE LOCAL COMMANDER OR UNIT OR THE ACTIVITY. EXAMPLES ARE: DEALING WITH THE "KING OF THE BRIDGE" AT ZVORNIK, AS OPPOSED TO THE BSA CHECK POINT AT STOLAC, OR TRYING TO RUN AID CONVOYS AS OPPOSED TO THE NORDBAT 2 DEPLOYMENT. FROM PANCEVO TO TUZLA.

B. BSA ARMY HQ VS POLITICAL POLICIES AND INDIVIDUALS

THERE ARE STILL INTERNAL POWER STRUGGLES THAT AFFECT CONVOY MOVEMENT. THE FACT THAT UNPROFOR DEALS WITH BSA ARMY HQ FOR ITS CLEARANCES AND IT WAS DR KARADZIC NOT GENERAL MAJADIC WHO SIGNED BOTH AGREEMENTS MAY BE A REASON FOR SOME OF THE DELAYS. THE PALE TO SARAJEVO STRAIGHT ROAD (ROUTE SPARROW) IS THE BEST EXAMPLE. BSA ARMY HQS APPROVED THE ROUTE, BUT IT WAS ABRUPTLY CLOSED BY THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES THE NEXT DAY.

C. TRUST

THERE ARE SEVERAL EXCUSES USED SUCH AS CLEARANCE REFUSAL BECAUSE IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE GOODS OR BENEFITS ARE GOING TO THE "OTHER" SIDE. THE SLOVAK ENGR TM WAS DENIED CLEARANCE AT ZVORNIK ENROUTE TO TUZLA STATING "ROAD REPAIR IN TUZLA AREA NOT ESSENTIAL FOR UNHCR USE". CLEARANCES WERE DENIED FOR INTERPRETERS WORKING FOR UNPROFOR AFTER THE BSA DEMANDED EXCESSIVE DETAILS ON WHAT THEY WOULD BE DOING. THERE IS A DISTINCT FEELING OF MISTRUST TOWARDS UNPROFOR AND UNHCR BASED ON THE VIEW THAT WE ARE NOT IMPARTIAL BUT RATHER "ARE" SHOWING FAVORITISM TOWARDS THE MUSLIMS. UNFORTUNATELY, BOTH UNPROFOR AND UNHCR MAY HAVE IN THE PAST HAVE UNINTENTIONALLY COMPROMISED THEIR POSITION BY FAVORITISM TOWARDS OTHER WARRING PARTIES SUCH AS TAKING LETTERS OUT OF GORAZDE TO RELATIVES IN SARAJEVO, (WHICH CAN BE SEEN AS DELIVERING MESSAGES TO THE "ENEMY").



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D. ISOLATION OF SPECIFIC AREAS

IF THE BSA WISH TO ISOLATE A SPECIFIC AREA FOR WHATEVER REASON, "NO" IS NEVER GIVEN IN A CLEARANCE BUT ONE WILL NOTICE A GREATER EMPHASIS ON ELABORATE EXCUSES. THE UNHCR CONVOYS AND ESCORTS HAVE BEEN HAMPERED FROM GOING INTO GORAZDE IN THE PAST BY:

- APPROVING THE CONVOY BUT NOT THE ESCORT,
- APPROVING THE ESCORT BUT NOT THE CONVOY,
- APPROVING THE ESCORT OR CONVOY FOR ONLY ONE WAY OF THE TRIP, OR
- BY SEARCHING THE CONVOY OR ESCORT TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THE RV OR TIMINGS ARE MISSED AND AN ATTEMPT MUST BE MADE THE NEXT DAY.

E. HIDDEN AGENDAS

THERE MAY BE SEVERAL SERB POLITICAL OR MILITARY OBJECTIVES, WHICH ARE BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS PAPER, BUT WHICH ARE HIDDEN BY DELIBERATE "SLOW" DOWN TACTICS. IN RECENT WEEKS THE CONTROL AT S1 HAS DRAMATICALLY INCREASED TO THE POINT THAT CLEARANCES ARE NOW DEMANDED FOR VIRTUALLY EVERY TYPE OF MOVEMENT. IT WOULD APPEAR SOMEWHAT STRAIGHT FORWARD THAT IF UNPROFOR SPENT MORE TIME AND EFFORT ON TRYING TO RESUPPLY ITSELF. LESS AND LESS TIME COULD THEN BE SPENT ON INTERFERING WITH BSA ACTIVITIES OR UNPROFOR COULD BE ACCUSED OF NOT BEING ABLE TO ASSIST UNHCR. THIS WOULD CREATE HIGH LEVELS OF FRUSTRATION AND LOWER LEVELS OF MORALE AS WELL AS DRIVE A WEDGE BETWEEN UNPROFOR AND UNHCR.

F. CONTROL

THE BSA ARE INHERENTLY INTERESTED IN KNOWING AND APPROVING EACH LITTLE ACTIVITY UNPROFOR IS INVOLVED IN. MOST MEMBERS OF THIS FORCE ARE NOT USED TO THIS OVER CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY TO A "WARRING FACTION". THIS TECHNIQUE HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED BY THE REQUESTS FOR THE DUTCH RECCE TO SREBRENICA, THE DEPLOYMENT OF NORDBAT 2 AND THE DEPLOYMENT OF VARIOUS PIECES OF ENGINEERING EQUIPMENT. THE CLEARANCE REQUESTS MUST BE VERY DETAILED AND ARE OFTEN TURNED DOWN IF THE BSA DOES NOT UNDERSTAND OR AGREE. INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED TO CONSOLIDATE NORDBAT CONVOYS CROSSING AT ZVORNIK. ALL CONVOYS WERE STOPPED UNTIL THIS REQUEST WAS ACTIONED BY UNPROFOR. WAS THIS A DEMONSTRATION OF CONTROL, OR WAS THERE A VALID REASON FOR IT FOR WHICH THE BSA DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN TO UNPROFOR.

THERE ARE PROBABLY SEVERAL OTHER "REASONS" THAT CAN BE ADDED AS THE AREA OF INFORMATION INPUT IS INCREASED TO INCLUDE UNHCR, CIVIL AFFAIRS ETC...

8. IT SHOULD ALSO BE REMEMBERED THAT UNPROFOR AND UNHCR ARE NOT



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TOTALLY FAULTLESS. THERE ARE SEVERAL EXAMPLES, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY RECORDED, OF CONVOYS SHOWING UP AT A CHECK POINT WITH A DIFFERENT NUMBER OF VEHICLES, LOAD, OR TIMINGS THAN HAD ORIGINALLY BEEN REQUESTED. CONVOYS THAT HAVE BEEN DENIED CLEARANCES FOR WHATEVER REASON OR EXCUSE THEN ATTEMPT ON OCCASION TO CROSS ANYHOW. IF SUCCESSFUL, THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT THE CHECK POINT OR LOCAL COMMANDER IS REPRIMANDED. THIS WILL NO DOUBT CHANGE HIS ATTITUDE TOWARDS FUTURE CONVOYS. INCONSISTENT BEHAVIOR BY CONVOYS IN REGARDS TO SEARCH PROCEDURES HAS ALSO CONFUSED THE CHECK POINT COMMANDER AND MADE THE SITUATION MORE DIFFICULT FOR FUTURE CONVOYS.

#### COMMENTS

9. THERE APPEARS TO BE A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON HOW EACH SIDE, INCLUDING UNPROFOR AND UNHCR, SEES ITSELF. WE SEE OURSELVES IN THE HUMANITARIAN LIGHT, DELIVERING FOOD AND HELPING THE NEEDY, WHERE AS THE WARRING FACTIONS MAY VIEW US IN THE MILITARY LIGHT AND AS AN INTERFERING FACTOR. THE REQUEST TO ANALYSIS THE RAW DATA (ANNEX C), IS VERY DIFFICULT, IN THIS CASE WE MUST SEPARATE LEGITIMATE REASONS, WHICH CAN BE ACTED UPON AND CORRECTED AS OPPOSED TO EXCUSES, WHICH ARE ONLY USED TO DELAY, FRUSTRATE OR ANNOY.

10. HOPEFULLY THIS IS CLOSE TO WHAT IS REQUIRED. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, PLEASE DO NOT HESITATE TO CONTACT THE UNDERSIGNED.



B. G. CAMERON  
MAJOR  
G3 CONVOY OPS

#### ANNEXES

- ANNEX A - JOINT DECLARATION WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT DATED 18 NOVEMBER 1993
- ANNEX B - JOINT DECLARATION WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT DATED 29 NOVEMBER 1993
- ANNEX C - G3 CONVOY OPS INCIDENT FILE 19 NOV TO 19 DEC 93




TONNAGES, MONITORED BY

BHCMD, G3 CONVOY OPS

BY ROAD, PER DAY

MONTH: DEC 93



TARGET : 1340 MT

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CNZ 1096 CYZ 960 P1/1 010/9

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TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB ATTN: SRSG/FC  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 22 DECEMBER 1993  
NUMBER: 2500  
SUBJECT: SITUATION IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA



1993 DEC 23 P 03:27

Members of the Security Council, in consultations today, expressed grave concern about the deterioration of the military situation in BiH, with reports of 68 killed in Sarajevo today, increased fighting in Gornji Vakuf and the Lasva Valley, and reports of harassment of UNPROFOR and UNHCR convoys in the Neretva Valley. The SecGen's Special Adviser, Ambassador Gharekhan, has asked for a special report from UNPROFOR by 1030 hours New York time Thursday 23 December, analysing the situation and drawing conclusions about these trends which can, upon request, be shared with the Council. Most grateful your urgent advice.

Seen by WS ✓  
to TS/BRG  
Brussel.

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UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations



PARLIAMENT  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
No, 03-155/93  
Sarajevo, December 22, 1993

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TO THE:

GENERAL SECRETARY OF UNITED NATIONS  
PRESIDENT OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT  
CO-PRESIDENTS OF THE CONFERENCE ON FORMER YUGOSLAVIA  
COMMANDER OF UNPROFOR FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA  
COMMANDER OF UNPROFOR FOR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA  
COMMISSION OF UNITED NATIONS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

At the meeting of the Parliament's President of the Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina, President of the Chamber of Citizens and representatives in the Parliament of the Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina from the different political parties, held on December 22, 1993, in Sarajevo, the President of the Commission for Foreign Relations of the Parliament of Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Edhem Bičakčić has informed the Parliament of R B-H about the incident of UNPROFOR Civil Police to the State Delegation of R B-H which has happened on December 19 and 20, 1993 at the Split Airport.

The UNPROFOR Civil Police was opening the private mail as well as the regularly certified and sealed diplomatic letters to the members of R B-H State Delegation, whose member was also Mr Edhem Bičakčić, the President of the Commission for Foreign Relations, who all had complete and regular documents and diplomatic passports.

The Parliament of the Republic Bosnia and Herzegovina points out that this is an unacceptable behaviour of UNPROFOR members to the members of State Delegation of R B-H, an internationally recognized State and the member of United Nations and thinks that it is nothing but violation of the rules of international law, in particular the international norms on basic human rights.

In that sense, as the Parliament of R B-H we here express our protest and demand from the authorized organs of International Community to undertake all the necessary measures.

Sincerely,

P R E S I D E N T  
OF THE PARLIAMENT OF R B-H

Milo Lazović



124-213

UNPROFOR

UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS

3  
DEC 20 13:42

010/9

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

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FSM1421-12

MSC1048/12

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| OUTGOING FAX NO.: FAX 672                 | DATE: 20 Dec 1993                            |
| TO: STOLTENBERG, NEW YORK                 | FROM: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB<br>COS <i>11-12</i> |
| FAX NO.:                                  | FAX NO.:                                     |
| ATTN:                                     | FILE REF. NO.:<br>DRAFTER: MA TO COS         |
| INFO: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB                 |  |
| FAX NO.:                                  |  |
| SUBJECT: INCREASE IN BSA ACTIVITY         |  |
| INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: FC, HCA, COS, CMIO |  |

101/3

MESSAGE

Assessment of Increase in BSA Activity attached for information.

UNOG Telecom. Unit

Palais des Nations

93 DEC 20 15:30

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(9)



2/3

ASSESSMENT OF INCREASED BSA ACTIVITY IN BHGeneral Situation

14 DEC 93

1. In recent weeks there has been a marked increase in BSA activity in the North and North East areas of Bosnia, compared to their previous levels of operations.

Background

2. In early Nov 93 the BSA in northern and north-eastern Bosnia were operationally restrained with occasional indirect fire against Bosnian targets, demonstrating an apparent reluctance to mount offensive ground operations and generally monitoring the situation between the HVO and BiH.

3. On 09 Nov 93, following the defeat of the HVO by BiH troops in VARES, BSA troops carried out an attack against BiH positions along the CL to the south-east of VARES. At the time of the attack the BiH were moving troops from KLADANJ to OLOVO and this attack appeared to be a warning to the BiH not to attempt an attack against BSA held territory in that area, rather than an attempt to make territorial gains.

4. Fighting continued between BSA and BiH in the area of VARES and BSA artillery also shelled the areas of OLOVO, TUZLA and the SAPNA THUMB throughout Nov 93. During this period the BSA also became increasingly hostile towards UNPROFOR and there were a number of incidents of shelling, or threats to shell, areas through which UNPROFOR vehicles were travelling. Towards the end of Nov 93 the BiH also claimed that BSA troops had attacked the areas of RAVNI ZAVID and TEOCAK.

5. On 24 Nov 93 BSA used an SA-2 AT missile against the BiH near TUZLA and similar attacks, using SA-2 and M-87 "Orkan" MBRL with cluster munitions, were carried out in the areas of TUZLA, SAPNA and KLADANJ on a number of occasions up until 04 Dec 93. There have been no further reports of SA-2 or M-87 being used by the BSA since 04 Dec 93, however levels of shelling have increased slightly in the same areas. BSA have made a number of territorial gains in the area as a result of their actions.

6. On 15 Dec 93 the BSA launched an attack in the area of DOBOJ and achieved territorial gains of approximately 4 Km eastward from the CL. At the same time shelling in the OLOVO/VARES area continued at a fairly high level.

ASSESSMENT

7. There are a number of possible reasons for the increased BSA activity along the north and north-eastern CLs. The initial increase on 09 Nov 93 appears to have been caused by the movement of BiH troops to the OLOVO area and was a demonstration of fire power to prevent the BiH from attacking BSA territory. The subsequent shelling of other areas along the CL may also have been intended as a deterrent to an attack, and also to keep the BiH troops occupied to prevent further redeployment.



3/3

8. It is also possible that the BSA is intending to launch an offensive to extend its territory to include the MSR running from SARAJEVO to VLASENICA, which is commanded by OLOVO. There has been no indication, however, that the BSA intend to launch an offensive to take the section of the MSR running from OLOVO to KLADANJ, which is essential for the MSR to be of use.

9. Another possibility is that the BSA are merely demonstrating their power in the VARES/OLOVO area, however this is unlikely as they have made territorial gains in this area and not in any area other along the BSA/BiH CL.

10. It is also possible that the BSA are attempting to keep BiH troops occupied in order to allow the creation of an autonomous state in TUZLA which would apply further pressure to the Bosnian officials to reach a peace agreement in Geneva. If this is the case the attack in DOBOJ may be the first indication of a BSA attempt to capture the MSR from TUZLA to DOBOJ.

11. The final possibility is that the BSA intend to attempt to establish a MSR from OLOVO to VOZUCA, effectively cutting the BiH held territory in half.

#### CONCLUSION

12. It is currently difficult to assess exactly the reason for the increase in BSA activity and its final objectives. This increase does, however, represent a major change from the earlier relatively static BSA-BiH conflict. The most likely of the objectives covered is considered to be the creation of the OLOVO/VOZUCA MSR, however the weather conditions for such an offensive operation are far from favourable. In the event of such an attack, the BSA would encounter fierce opposition from the BiH, who have reinforced the OLOVO/VARES areas and have already demonstrated their ability to conduct operations in poor weather conditions. The taking and subsequent defense of the MSR would therefore require a major military operation, although the BSA forces have the advantage of not having been in active combat for some time and are relatively refreshed and also well equipped. It is likely that the BSA will continue to apply pressure for the foreseeable future in order to further harass and weaken the BiH, and the possibility of an offensive remains, particularly if the weather continues to improve.



CZN-552  
CZG-224

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

548/92  
010/9.  
COMMUNICATIONS  
UNITED

TO: GOULDING, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: VANCE, ICFY, GENEVA  
FROM: NAMRIAR, UNPROFOR, BAGRED  
DATE: 17 December 1992  
NUMBER: UNPROFOR 2-481  
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH DR GANIC

17 92 DE 19 00 22Z

*Handwritten signature*  
*to Gen*  
**IMMEDIATE**

I attach for your information a message received today from BH Command on the above subject.

*M*

*#*

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COMMUNICATIONS



HQ BH COMMAND MAIN KISELJAK

Page 1 of 2

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MTHQ 085

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| OUTGOING FAX No:                              | DATE: 17 DECEMBER 1992/1400A   |
| TO: HQ UNPCL 22 ZACKER<br>HQ BH COMB BARAJCIC | FROM: HQ UN BH COMD KISELJAK   |
| FAX No:                                       | FAX:   |
| ATTN: GEN NAMBIAR                             | FILE REF.No. : CG/6055/92<br>DRAFTER : CORDY-SIMPSON<br>TITLE : COS<br>RELEASING OFFR: COS<br>SIGNATURE : R. Cordy-Simpson |
| INFO : 02, 03,                                |  |
| FAX NO :                                      |  |
| SUBJECT: MEETING WITH DR GANIC                |  |

MESSAGE

I HAD A TWO HOUR MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT GANIC ON TUE 15 DEC. COL SIBER, AN INTERPRETER AND MY PA WERE PRESENT. THE ATMOSPHERE WAS FRIENDLY BUT SIBER WAS VERY SUBDUED AND SAID NOTHING THROUGHOUT THE MEETING.

GANIC STATED THAT HE HAD FORBIDDEN HIS REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND THE SUB COMMITTEE OF THE MMWG AS HE WAS NOT PREPARED TO DISCUSS CORRIDORS FOR THE FREE PASSAGE OF THE POPULATION UNTIL THE ISSUE OF THE REMOVAL OF ALL HEAVY WEAPONS FROM AROUND THE AIRPORT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED. I POINTED OUT THAT HE WOULD CONTROL THE EXIT S FROM THE CITY WHEREAS THE SERES GAINED VERY LITTLE FROM THIS FIRST STEP. HE WAS ADAMANT THAT HE WANTED THE REMOVAL OF HEAVY WEAPONS AS THE FIRST STEP. WE DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL IN BROAD TERMS AND I PROMISED TO TRY AND PERSUADE THE SERBIANS AND HVO TO COME BACK AND NEGOTIATE ON THIS MATTER. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THEY WOULD HAVE DONE SO.

THAT EVENING I SENT HIM A LETTER AGREEING THAT THE MATTER SHOULD BE THE LEAD ELEMENT OF THE NEXT SUB COMMITTEE AND THAT HIS REPRESENTATIVE MUST BE PREPARED TO MAKE CONCRETE PROPOSAL AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER DISCUSSION AND THAT OUR "GOOD OFFICES" WOULD ACT AS THE ARBITRATORS TO FIND THE COMMON GROUND. I POINTED OUT THAT IT WAS ON HIS INSTANCES THAT THE AGENDA WAS BEING CHANGED AND THE ONUS WAS ON HIM TO MAKE A FIRM PROPOSAL. I AM NOT PREPARED ANY LONGER TO KEEP MAKING PROPOSALS WHICH SIMPLY GET

FC/DCM/1/005/COO/CAU/CMO/CBN OPS



PAGE 2 OF 2

TURNED ON THEIR HEAD BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. IF THEY ARE NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE IN GOOD FAITH, I AM NOT PREPARED TO ARBITRATE. I BELIEVE THAT THE SERBS HAVE BEEN MUCH MORE CONCILIATORY AND ARE GENUINELY PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE.

GANIC HAS REPLIED SAYING THAT HE WILL NOT SEND A REPRESENTATIVE TO THE SUB COMMITTEE AND HIS PROPOSAL WAS PART OF THE AIRPORT AGREEMENT. THIS STATEMENT LINKED WITH THE STATEMENT ABOUT SHOOTING AT UN VEHICLES AND THE SHOOTING OF A FRENCH SOLDIER LAST NIGHT ALL POINT TO THE FACT THAT HIS ATTITUDE HAS HARDENED AND HE HAS NO INTENTION OF NEGOTIATING IN GOOD FAITH. WITH SUCH AN ATTITUDE I CAN NOT SEE THE SERBIANS AGREEING TO REMOVE ALL THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS FROM ILIDZA, OTES, NEDARICI ETC.

I HOLD OUT LITTLE PROSPECT OF PROGRESS AT THE MMWG ON 18 DEC 92.



SRSG TEL: 008711301526

16.Dec.93 16:33 No.053 P.01

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PAGE 1 OF 2

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|  |  |
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| OUTGOING FAX NO:   | DATE: 16. 1400 DECEMBER 1993                             |
| TO: MR.CEDRIC THORNBERRY<br>HCA, UNPROFOR ZAGREB   | FROM: MR.DEYAN MIHOV<br>CIVIL AFFAIRS<br>SECTOR SARAJEVO |
| FAX NO:385-41-170 199  | DIRECT LINE: 071-460-556<br>SAT.PH:00or99/1-404-988-2866 |
| ATT: MS. EMMA SHITAKHA   | FILE REF:<br>DRAFTER: DEYAN MIHOV<br>TITLE: SCVAO        |
| INFO: GEN. BRIQUEMONT, BH COMMANDER KISELJAK AND FORWARD, MR. DE MELLO, SRSG'S DELEGATE, BH COMMAND FORWARD, MR HUSSEIN AL-ALFI OIC CIVIL AFFAIRS BH COMMAND KISELJAK,<br>INT.INFO: SC, COS, |  |
| SUBJECT: SZILAJDZIC - KRAJISNIK MEETING  |  |

## MESSAGE

SRSG  
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ACOS(oxi)  
ACOS(pxL)  
COO  
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Soo  
LO BHC

YESTERDAY'S BILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN KRAJISNIK AND SZILAJDZIC AT SARAJEVO AIRPORT WAS CANCELLED BY SZILAJDZIC BECAUSE OF THE SHELLING OF SARAJEVO DURING THE LAST DAYS. THE TENSION ALONG THE CONFRONTATION LINE REMAINED HIGH PARTICULARLY IN THE AREAS OF GRBAVICA AND STUP. HOWEVER THIS MORNING WE WERE CONTACTED BY THE PARTIES WITH A REQUEST TO ORGANIZE A MEETING BETWEEN THEM AT 10.00 AM. AS SZILAJDZIC POINTED OUT THE PURPOSE IS TO MAKE AN ATTEMPT AND DIFFUSE THE RISING TENSION AROUND SARAJEVO AS WELL AS TO CONTINUE THE CONSULTATIONS ON THE PEACE PROCESS.

ACCORDING TO THE CAC'S INSTRUCTIONS WE WENT ALONG WITH THE PREPARATIONS AND THE MEETING TOOK PLACE. THE DELEGATIONS WERE SMALL SZILAJDZIC AND KRAJISNIK BEING ACCOMPANIED RESPECTIVELY BY HASAN MURATOVIC AND SIMIC BRANKO.

BOTH PARTIES CHOSE TO PROCEED WITHOUT A PLENARY WITH A DISCUSSION ONLY BETWEEN SZILAJDZIC AND KRAJISNIK BEHIND CLOSED DOORS WHICH LASTED ABOUT TWO AND A HALF HOURS. UPON ITS END THEY JOINTLY BRIEFED BE ON THE TALKS.

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TEL: 008711301526

16.Dec.93 10:00 No.054 P.01

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ACCORDINGLY BOTH PARTIES HAVE AGREED TO ISSUE MODERATE STATEMENTS ABOUT THE MEETING.

THEY HAVE EXCHANGED INFORMATION ABOUT THE RECENT MILITARY ACTIVITIES AROUND SARAJEVO AND ABOUT THE CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. THE BH SIDE HAS PROTESTED ABOUT THE SHELLING OF THE CITY WHILE THE SERBS HAVE COMPLAINED ABOUT BH ATTACKS ALONG THE CONFRONTATION LINE AND SPECIFICALLY AGAINST GRBAVICA. THE BOSNIAN SERBS ALSO HAVE CLAIMED CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED THAT THEY WILL VERIFY THE EXCHANGED INFORMATION AND WILL MEET BILATERALLY IN GENEVA, BEFORE THE PLENARY.

THEY HAVE ALSO DISCUSSED TERRITORIAL ISSUES - MAINLY SARAJEVO AND EASTERN BOSNIA REPORTEDLY WITHOUT CHANGES IN THE PREVIOUS POSITIONS.

ON SARAJEVO THE SERBS HAVE MAINTAINED THE IDEA OF THE TWIN CITIES WHILE THE BH HAS SUPPORTED THE INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENT.

ON EASTERN BOSNIA THE SERBS HAVE NOT SHOWED WILLINGNESS FOR FURTHER TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS.

BOTH SZILAJDZIC AND KRAJISNIK SHARED SOME COMMENTS SEPARATELY AFTER THE MEETING.

ACCORDING TO SZILAJDZIC THE BOSNIAN SERBS ARE NOT INTERESTED AT THIS MOMENT IN THE UNION OF BH. HOWEVER BECAUSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN KRAJNA AND THE EXPECTED RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS IN SERBIA THEY ARE INTERESTED IN GETTING INTO AN AGREEMENT WITH THE BH ON "THE CENTRAL REPUBLIC". HOWEVER THEY WOULD LIKE THE TERRITORIAL DEMANDS OF THE BH BE SATISFIED AT THE EXPENSE OF THE CROATS.

KRAJISNIK EXPRESSED CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM STRESSING THE NEED AND THE AGREEMENT OF BOTH PARTIES TO MEET BILATERALLY IN GENEVA BEFORE THE PLENARY.

*Best regards!*

*D. Miller*



Brig Gen Pellna

010/1

010/9 ✓

10 December 1993

Note for the File

1. On Thursday, 9 December 1993, I discussed with Dr Karadzic, in Belgrade, the problems Nordbat was encountering, and I handed to him, for details, a paper prepared by the Force Commander and a copy of a letter sent to him by General Ramsay. I impressed upon Dr Karadzic that this kind of treatment of Nordbat was unacceptable - and unhelpful even to his side. I urged him most strongly to act immediately to remove these problems and to have a meeting with General Briquemont or General Ramsay as soon as possible. He promised that he would.

2. On the situation in Bihac, I spoke with Dr Karadzic and Mr Sarinic and asked them to use their good offices urgently with Mr Abdic to prevent him from going on a confrontation course with the United Nations. I specifically asked them to impress upon him that threats against the United Nations, such as those made against United Nations helicopters, were unacceptable. They said that they would speak to Mr Abdic urgently.

  
Thorvald Stoltenberg

Copies to:

Mr. V. Eide  
General J. Cot  
Mr. M. Goulding  
Mr. Y. Akashi  
Mr. K. Annan  
Brig-Gen B. Pellnas





# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



To: Ambassador Vollebaek

From: Major Samuelsson

2 December 1993

Subject: **MEETING WITH DR KARADZIC AND BRIG GEN PELLNAS ON 1 DECEMBER**

Pellnas asked Dr Karadzic if there were any outstanding problems before Nordbat could enter Bosnia via Zvornik to Tuzla, with the remaining APCs in Pancevo. He added that we would appreciate an answer before the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Copenhagen on the 3 December.

Dr Karadzic replied that this would be difficult because the Serbs saw APCs as a threat because "they are small tanks" but he would ask his civilian authorities and the military and would reply as soon as possible. Pellnas then emphasised that the APCs were not "small tanks". They were only used as protection for soldiers.

Dr Karadzic also replied that the answer would probably not be given before 3 December due to the fact that he would not return to Pale before 2 or 3 December. Pellnas reminded Dr Karadzic of the Foreign Ministers' meeting and said that a negative answer would cause considerable political concern. Dr Karadzic replied that he could not care less and did not care about threats. Pellnas responded that he never used threats in negotiations but thought that it would not hurt the Serbs if they acted in a way that could be the basis for some friendly sentiment towards them.

Dr Karadzic also referred to NATO as a threat to Serbs in Bosnia and that these "small tanks" could be used against Serb forces. Pellnas then replied that Sweden was not a member of NATO.

Dr Karadzic asked how many APCs still remained in Pancevo. Pellnas replied that there were 36. Karadzic then told Pellnas that this was too many for one battalion (Nordbat has 52 APCs and 20 SISUs). Pellnas responded that this was a Swedish battalion and could not be compared to one Serb battalion.

Dr Karadzic then commented that the APCs would damage the roads, commenting on the difficulties of maintaining the roads. Pellnas replied that Nordbat has equipment for maintaining roads and were maintaining the road between Zvornik and Tuzla. Further, Nordbat would probably get more equipment in the near future. (Assessment: Dr Karadzic may have raised this point to get himself in a bargaining position.)



OUT

010/9

IMMEDIATEOUTGOING FAX-3 PAGES

TO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA

INFO: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

COT, ZAGREB

ANNAN, NEW YORK

FAX: 1-212-963 9222

FROM: VIEIRA DE MELLO, SARAJEVO

FAX: 871-154 6345

No.: D-SRSG-SAR-0011

DATE: 1 December 1993

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SUBJECT: MEETING IN MOSTAR/MEDUGORJE WITH "HERCEG-BOSNIA"/HVO  
BH/BiH ARMY OFFICIALS - 29 November 1993

1. With reference to para. 2 of my 07 of 25 November, Gen. L. Feliu, Deputy BH Commander, the above-signed, local Civil Affairs officials and Spabatt officers held a series of meetings in Medugorje and Mostar on 29 November. Most of the meetings were also attended by Mr. A. Collomb, Deputy General Delegate for Europe, ICRC, Geneva and his local colleagues. The following questions were discussed.

Release of prisoners and wounded persons

2. The "Herceg-Bosnian"/HVO side was represented at the highest level, in the absence of Mr. Boban. "Prime Minister" J. Prlić, "Defence Minister" P. Jukić, Mr. V. Pogarčić (Human Rights Adviser), Mr. B. Pusić (POW Commissioner), Mr. M. Ruguz (in charge of displaced persons) and Senior HVO officers attended a long bilateral meeting and working lunch in Mostar with our delegation. The most senior of the officials listed above refused, however, to meet with the BH/BiH Army delegation arguing its level was too low. Indeed, only three "working level" officials came to Medugorje from East Mostar under Spabatt protection and his despite assurances given by Gen. Delić at our 25 November Sarajevo Airport meeting with Gen. Petrović and by President Izetbegović to Gen. Briquemont the following day that the State Commission on War Prisoners would lead the delegation. I was informed this morning that Mr. Mašović, President of the Commission had been appointed Head of the Delegation by Mr. Siladjić but was unable to reach Medugorje from Jablanica.

4. During our meeting with "H-B"/HVO, the following salient points were made by the three sides:



(a) The ICRC urged that the commitment made by Boban to Mr. Sommaruga at their recent meeting in Grude be honoured, i.e. that unilateral prisoner releases by the HVO (that holds a total of 4,400 persons against over 600 held by BiH) begin, but that such releases take place in accordance with established principles (not least "all for all" and free will of the individual in terms of timing and destination) and with the ICRC prisoners' release plan and scheduled;

(b) The above-signed insisted that the spirit in which the decision to hold these discussions was made be respected, namely that an effort be made by the two parties to unblock the prisoner/wounded release process without linking it to other matters, however important, particularly the sore issue of missing persons;

(c) Mr. Prlić and Mr. Jukić first complained bitterly about ICRC's silence after the BH side suspended the prisoners release programme, after only a day and-a-half, last October. They then affirmed the following principles: i) all applicable Conventions and norms will be respected; ii) all detention centres must be closed, if necessary unilaterally; iii) every cooperation will be extended to competent international organizations. Mr. Prlić then announced the following decisions: i) in the next ten days all detainees will be re-registered and at least 500 would be released, to be followed in the subsequent week, by another 200; ii) all Mostar East Bank wounded can be treated in West Bank hospitals with guaranteed security, if they so wish. Their departure will also be authorized, but the other side must make a gesture that would reassure and calm down relatives of Croat detainees/wounded (some of whom have been blocking two BiH Army helicopters at Medugorje for several weeks); iii) public kitchens can be organized on West Bank for inhabitants of East Mostar who would enjoy freedom of movement and full security; iv) details of the above could be discussed at "working level" in Medugorje that very afternoon with BH/BiH Army delegation.

5. Indeed, that same evening a 24 hour-long meeting began between the two delegations at Spabatt. Gen. Feliú, Mr. Collomb of the ICRC and the above-signed first met at length with each delegation separately in another attempt at steering the negotiations in the right direction. We also prevented the negotiations from breaking down, after a first round, by insisting that they neither return to West and East Mostar without results nor allow the issue of the missing to paralyze progress on prisoners release. The negotiations then continued into the night under the Chairmanship of Mr. Collomb and with Civil Affairs participation, were suspended and resumed yesterday morning, with the following results by the evening of 30 November (which we request you to take with a pinch of salt until the first releases actually take place):



(a) On 1<sup>st</sup> December 16 wounded HVO prisoners should be exchanged against 5 wounded BiH Armija prisoners, all from Mostar, so as to defuse tension in that area;

(b) ICRC will conduct a registration of all prisoners held at "helirome" in Mostar, to be concluded by 3 December;

(c) BiH helicopters at Medugorje can be inspected by technicians one day prior to the first prisoner exchange planned for 4 or 5 December;

(d) On one of latter dates some 250-300 prisoners would be released by the HVO and 70 by BiH, in accordance with ICRC priorities;

(e) Helicopter medevac flights would resume (with release of the two held at Medugorje) as soon as the first prisoner exchange takes place.

(f) The full release plan will be negotiated by the ICRC in the coming days and announced in due course.

6. The ICRC was quite encouraged by these results and so were we, not least because of the joint and integrated approach to these various humanitarian issues, of which the ICRC is often weary. I spoke with Collomb today, who is approaching Croat Foreign Ministry in Zagreb and BH Delegation to Geneva Conference, to press for respect of these decisions.

7. At a meeting with BH Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs Suljić this morning in Sarajevo, during which I briefed him, he said that he would convey the above to President Izetbegović and Prime Minister Silajdžić in Geneva by telephone and later this evening relay his instructions - which, he was convinced, would be fully supportive - to the Mostar leadership. It was essential, he said, that releases resume.

8. All the above should be kept confidential until the releases resume, as we hope.

#### Freedom of movement and security of humanitarian convoys

9. In a separate meeting with Mr. Prlić, I briefed him on the agreement reached with Gen. Petković on 25 November on the security of military personnel installing and, later, operating the ferry by-pass of the two damaged Bijela bridges north of Mostar, as well as on the security of convoys travelling on the main road - once it is reopened - between Mostar and Graboviča, i.e. where the road is the actual confrontation line. Mr. Prlić confirmed Gen. Petković's assurances ("not more, not less", he said).



TVA 1840

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COMMUNICATIONS010/9  
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HQ BH COMD 26 NOV 93 SARAJEVO

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Page 1 of 3

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Date:

27/11-93

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| OUTGOING FAX NO: 170-199   | DATE: 26 18:33 A November 93  |
| TO: CEDRIC THORNBERRY<br>HCA/DCM<br>Zagreb<br>FAX:   | FROM: VICTOR ANDREEV<br>Civil Affairs Coordinator<br>UNPROFOR, BH Command<br>FAX: 871-130.15.20 |
| ATTN: EMMA SHITAKHA  | FILE REF<br>DRAFTER: DAVID HARLAND<br>TITLE:<br>RELEASING OFFR:                                 |
| INFO: SRSG, FC, BH Cmdr, SRSG Delegate (De Mello, Fwd HQ)<br><del>All Civil Affairs Sub-Office</del> |   |
| DISTRIBUTION: COS, G1-G5, Chief UNMO, UNHCR LO, ECOM   |   |
| SUBJECT: BH-Serb negotiations on territorial division  |   |

## Message

1. Negotiations have been taking place between the BH and Serb sides on how to divide the territory of BH.
2. The BH side has been represented by Prime Minister Silajdzic. The Serb side has been represented by Assembly President Krajisnik. (Both hard-liners.) The meetings have been convened at Sarajevo airport through the good offices of Civil Affairs. Three face-to-face sessions have now been held. In addition, and at the request of the parties, I have undertaken a number of shuttle missions between the Sarajevo Presidency and Dr Karadzic in Pale.
3. The sides are proceeding more-or-less on the basis of the French-German proposal. The Serbs insist that -- while they are willing to consider some additional territorial concessions in conformity with the French-German plan and to secure greater territorial cohesion -- they are absolutely unwilling to be bound by a particular percentage formula. They emphasize the quality of land ceded or exchanged over the quantity.

SRSG, FC, DFC, COS  
HCA, CAO, CMOMHHQ 549  
MHTQ 441TVO/2140  
15



BRIEFING TELTYPE

TIME 08-11-93 10:17

4/3

4. The basic Serb proposal is to exchange territories around Sarajevo for the BH-controlled enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa in eastern Bosnia. The BH side is quietly indicating interest in that solution.

5. The BH side (Silajdzic) initially presented two maps indicating territories it would expect to be ceded in the Sarajevo area in return for areas lost in the east.

6. The Serb side (Karadzic and Krajisnik) presented five separate maps, each one proposing different solutions for the all-important problem of how to link the BH-controlled parts of Sarajevo with the main body of BH-controlled territory just to the west. The Serbs are also talking about ceding certain additional territories to the west of the main confrontation line. One such area being considered is Jajce. Jajce, which was predominantly Muslim before the war, was the ancient Bogomil capital of Bosnia, and therefore of great historical/emotional importance to the Bosnian Muslims. Another area being considered is Kupres, which was formerly a mixed Serb and Croat area. It might be ceded to the Croats in an exchange for some other territory in a three-way deal.

7. The apparent willingness of the BH side to consider large-scale territorial exchanges is an interesting development. It recognizes, apparently, that the viability and cohesion of any future Bosnian republic will require greater territorial rearrangement than anything hitherto entertained by the Presidency's negotiators. Such territorial exchanges will, of course, require equally large-scale population movements, something which has always been anathema to the BH side.

8. Implicit in the BH-Serb negotiations seems to be an assumption that a number of HVO-controlled areas in central Bosnia will pass into BH hands. There seems to be an understanding of sorts that the BH will moderate its demands against the Serbs if the Serbs in turn lessen will their support for the HVO, thereby ensuring that the BH will be able to recover the HVO-controlled territories in question.

9. Both sides are still very concerned about access to the sea. The Serbs seem to support the idea of BH access to Neum. This access would, of course, bisect Croatia's main Split-Dubrovnik highway. The Serbs are supporting the idea of an internationally-controlled tunnel or motorway overpass at the point of intersection. The Serbs, for their part, seem to be interested in securing access to the sea from Croatia at Poljice. (Poljice is the extreme southeast extension of Dalmatia, lying between Dubrovnik and the Montenegrin border.)



E-1 11/11/93 TELTOM

TOM 11-11-93 10:11

11/11/93

10. Negotiations are continuing vigorously and in a surprisingly friendly manner. The two hard-liners seem to work together reasonably well when they have to. There remains, of course, real distance between their two positions, but the process is, at last, moving again.

A large, stylized handwritten signature, possibly reading 'Rae', is written in the center of the page.



$R_2 \cos 50.6^\circ$

MOST immediate 2A

copy to  
SASG

HCA

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DFC

AL-2 (041)

new page

**References**

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## MESSAGE

- SASG'S OFFICE

Date: 25/11-93

SRSG: \_\_\_\_\_

DSRSGT —

SA: \_\_\_\_\_

DIR: \_\_\_\_\_

MA: \_\_\_\_\_

1991 = 3



CG/6043/93

Brigadier General Milovanovic  
Headquarters R. S. Army  
Pale

23 November 1993

*Dear General*

I am becoming increasingly concerned about what I see as a worsening state of relationship between UNPROFOR/UNHCR and the R.S. Army. In the hope that I am wrong, I am writing to you personally to try to clear misunderstandings before more damage is done.

UNPROFOR/UNHCR accept that we live and operate inside an area torn by war. Our mandate from the United Nations is to try to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and at all times to try to relieve hunger and suffering. To do this we need the help of all three of the warring factions.

It seems to me that during last summer the R. S. forces helped this aim of working for peace. Although other factions continued hostilities, the Serbs did not take the offensive, and permitted the free movement of aid to poor and weak people. This tolerance by the Serbs was noticed by UNPROFOR, and resulted in discussions between the EC and Security Council about lifting sanctions against Serbia.

But late in October relationships between the R. S. Army and UNPROFOR/UNHCR changed, and since then I have noted many examples of what appears to be a deliberate policy of obstruction by R.S. forces. This began on 27 October with the hold up of a French Logistic Battalion convoy at Sokolac (and my subsequent visit to General Mladic) and continued with the detention of 2 UNPROFOR helicopters, also at Sokolac. Since then I have received various letters, all of which focus on stopping convoys. The reasons given include alleged Muslim attacks, alleged mining of roads, snow on roads, and a requirement for more detailed transport manifests, despite the earlier decision by your HQ that this detail was to be



provided on demand by convoy leaders. As a result, there have been considerable difficulties with moving our convoys through areas controlled by your forces, and the result, of course, is the increase in suffering for the people. For several weeks I have telephoned, written and attempted to arrange a meeting with you to discuss such matters, but without success.

You will be well aware of the agreement signed by Dr Karadzic in Geneva on 18 November, which guarantees the freedom of movement for all personnel of the UN and international humanitarian organisations throughout Bosnia. But despite this, a recent NORDBAT convoy, which was given authority to move by Dr Karadzic personally, was delayed at the Serb checkpoint at Zvornik for over 24 hours.

On Monday 22 November I attempted as usual to speak to you about this convoy. You were away, so I spoke to Colonel Markovic at length; I read out to him on the telephone the agreement signed by Dr Karadzic, and after much discussion he agreed to abide by it and permit the NORDBAT convoy to pass. He then stated, and I quote, "The political level will not influence us in the future." I was so surprised by this statement, which is in contravention to all the rules affecting the armies of Western or democratic countries, that I would be grateful for clarification about this point. Is this Serb Army policy? If this is the case, then can you confirm that you do not intend to act in accord with the Geneva agreement signed by your President?

I find it odd that at the very time that there is some sympathy for the Serb case for a lifting of sanctions, that the forces of the R.S. should continue to cause difficulties for the U.N. forces in Bosnia Herzegovina - particularly when such actions disregard the wishes of Dr Karadzic. I therefore repeat that it may be that this level of misunderstanding between us is caused by the fact that we have not managed to discuss matters face to face for so long. Hence this letter, which I hope you will see as an honest attempt to set the record straight.

I look forward to your response, and meanwhile I will pass copies of this letter to Dr Karadzic, and to UNPROFOR and UNHCR Headquarters in Zagreb.



AI Ramsay  
Brigadier General  
Chief of Staff





Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
PRESIDENT  
OF THE PRESIDENCY

Sarajevo, November 18 1993

Dear Lord Owen,

Thank You for Your letter of November 13 1993.

I have just returned from a twelve day trip around Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Dr Haris Silajdžić is today in Geneva and has been instructed to discuss with You the ideas that You have presented in Your letter.

I am ready to be present at the suggested meeting, provided there be at least minimum of chances for progress in negotiations. I have advised Dr Silajdžić to make an assessment when talking to You. In my opinion bilateral talks would have more chances for success. For the beginning, I would suggest talks between our and Serbian side.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,



Alija Izetbegović

H.E.

Lord David Owen  
Geneva



010/9



# CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR L'ANCIENNE YOUGOSLAVIE

Palais des Nations, 1211 Geneva 10



1/12

## IMMEDIATE

TO: Mr. Stoltenberg/Mr. Ramcharan

c/o UN Plaza Hotel, New York

Fax 1-212-702 5051

FM: Pasi Karonen, ICFY, Geneva

DATE: 17.11.1993

PAGE: 1 of 12

SUBJECT: Inquiries

Ref inquiries Bertie made on Tuesday please find below and attached some details. I took these matters over from Wilson, who is on his way to Copenhagen - however, it remains to be seen when he will arrive there, as I learned this morning from Radio Finland that SAS airline personnel in Kastrup airport in Copenhagen have gone to strike.

1. Mass grave in Vukovar: an excavation team was sent by the Commission of Experts investigating war crimes to **Ovcara**, about six kilometres southeast of Vukovar, on 18 October. The team however was prevented from undertaking the exhumation by the Serb regional authorities of Vukovar. The Ovcara site is in Serb held territory in Sector East, and the Serb side has preconditioned that parallelly with exhumation on this site another, similar mission should be executed in Croat held area in Sector West, in a place by the name **Poljana Pakračka**, 18 kilometres west of Pakrac. In Poljana Pakračka the work already was commenced and 19 bodies were discovered, but a detailed, legal medical examination will be done only later. The assets for the mission, a Dutch Engineer Unit and additional Canadian forensic experts have now all returned home.

The most recent development is from yesterday, 16 November, when Mr. Kotliar, Secretary of the Commission of Experts, and Commander Fenrick, the On-site Investigator of the same, met with Mr. Hadzic, "President" of the "RSK". The understanding reached was as follows:

- the "President" of the "RSK" gave his full

2/12

authorization in writing for the investigation of the Ovcara site by the Commission

- investigation should commence in March or April 1994 depending on the weather conditions
- the Commission will have full cooperation of the local authorities in Sector East
- observers from the "RSK" will be present at the investigation - but just to watch, not to conduct
- post-mortem examination will not be done in Croatia
- the details will be finalized well in advance of the resumption of the work at Ovcara

2. Tuzla airport: for background three recent cables:

- a. 4.11. from Eide on the subject "Reopening of Tuzla airport": one page
- b. 12.11. from Annan on the subject "Reopening of Tuzla airport and repairing of Bijela bridges": one page
- c. 16.11. from Hannay, the Permanent Representative of the UK to the UN, to Annan on the subject "UNPROFOR: reopening of Tuzla airport": two pages. This letter has been passed on by Annan to Cot and for info to us. You may well have seen this already there in UNNY, but just making sure.

3. Opening of humanitarian routes in BiH:

- a. a memo of Wilson on the subject: "Humanitarian Routes": one page
- b. a cable from Cot dated 12.11. on the subject "Operation Lifeline and Humanitarian Aid Delivery": three pages
- c. another cable from Cot also dated 12.11. on the subject: "Repairs - Bijela Bridge": two pages. This is a rather technical message about details, but perhaps you want to know such things, too.

4. Vares area and allegation about BSA having massed 8.000 troops and appearing to be planning an attack in the village of Musici - the place is about 15 kilometres east-southeast of Vares, in fact closer to Olovo than Vares: Peeters checked the matter with HQ UNPROFOR, which was rather surprised about the question. There are some indications of possible BSA activity in the general area between Olovo and Vares, but no details are available at the moment about the strength and location of the troops. However, the figure 8.000 seems to be based on some confusion.

Hope these details sufficiently answer to your inquiries.

Best regards.



4. Vares area and allegation about BSA having massed 8.000 troops and appearing to be planning an attack in the village of Musici - the place is about 15 kilometres east-southeast of Vares, in fact closer to Olovo than Vares: Peeters checked the matter with HQ UNPROFOR, which was rather surprised about the question. There are some indications of possible BSA activity in the general area between Olovo and Vares, but no details are available at the moment about the strength and location of the troops. However, the figure 8.000 seems to be based on some confusion.

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010/9

SHSC - 07

Date: 18/11

HQ BH COMD KISELJAK

Page 1 of 8

ROUTINE/PRIORITY/IMMEDIATE/MOST IMMEDIATE  
UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO ONLY

|   |   |
|---|---|
| OUTGOING FAX NO: 041-170.199  | DATE: 17 19:39 A November, 93   |
| TO: CEDRIC THORNBERRY<br>Director Civil Affairs<br>UNPROFOR, Zagreb<br>FAX: 041-170.199                             | FROM: VICTOR ANDREEV<br>Civil Affairs Coordinator<br>UNPROFOR, BH Command<br>FAX: 871-130.15.20 |
| ATTN: EMMA SHITAKHA   | FILE REF<br>DRAFTER: DAVID HARLAND<br>TITLE:<br>RELEASING OFFR:                                 |
| INFO: BH Cmdr, SRSG Delegate (De Mello, Fwd HQ), All Civil Affairs Sub-Offices, UNPROFOR LO 5 ATAF (Vicenza, Italy) |   |
| INT. DIST: COS, G1, G2, G3, G5, UNHCR, ECOMM  |   |
| SUBJECT: Weekly BH political assessment (#41)   |   |

### Summary

- \* None of the three sides has real control over its forces. Sarajevo is losing the battle against the secessionist Abdic; its 'Muslim' fighters answer to no-one. The Croats are asking the UN to use force to impose order on unruly HVO units. Rogue elements of the Serb forces are sabotaging the plans of the leaders in Pale.
- \* It is snowing in Central Bosnia and BH diplomats are pushing hard to keep the aid convoy routes open through the winter.
- \* The HVO has launched an offensive against BH forces in Central Bosnia. Supported by forces from Croatia and by the Bosnian Serbs, they are gaining ground. Meanwhile, Croatian foreign minister Granic has been in Sarajevo talking peace.
- \* The Serbs are squeezing aid for the BH -- especially fuel and winterization materials. They are showing some interest in a French-German peace plan linking Serb withdrawals to the lifting of international sanctions against Belgrade.
- \* UNPROFOR's Force Commander talks of the use of force to keep aid convoy routes open.

Tv0/14



\* The resolution of the crisis in which the Serbs seized two BH officials travelling in an UNPROFOR APC highlights the extent to which local commanders follow their own agenda -- and the extent to which this disrupts plans laid at a higher level.

The result of the kidnapping, which was apparently carried out without Pale's prior knowledge, was that a convoy of Serb sick and old people was further delayed, and that the negative international image of the Serbs was reinforced.

\* The Serb leadership has been moderately supportive of the French-German peace proposal. Only extreme Serb hardliners have rejected it outright (eg Vice President Plavsic and Assembly President Krajisnik).

The French-German proposal apparently links the lifting of sanctions against Serbia to Serb withdrawals from certain territories in BH.

What Serb support there is for the French-German proposal rests on two foundations. First, the proposal appears to be based on an arrangement for ethnic separation, which the Serbs very much support. (The Serbs understand the proposal to mean going back to the Owen-Stoltenberg map tabled in Geneva, with an additional 3 per cent of BH territory going to the Bosnian republic.) Second, the plan states clearly the criteria that have to be met for the lifting of sanctions. The Serb point out that, until now, it has never been precisely clear how and when sanctions could be lifted. Now, at least, there is something for them to negotiate about.

The Serbs are talking insistently about their need for access to the sea.

\* Serb President Karadzic has hosted a meeting of all the SDS Parties in Pale. The SDS (Serbian Democratic Party) is the ruling Serb nationalist group in "Republic of Srpska" and "Republic of Srpska Krajina". The SDS is a smaller player in Serbia (where the erstwhile communists rule) and in other Serb communities.

Karadzic spoke again of the need to advance the policy of "all Serbs in one state." No formal union of Serb-controlled territories is likely in the immediate future, however.

Belgrade seems to view Karadzic's forum as an attempt to become a bigger player on the political stage in Knin and Belgrade.

\* The Bosnian Serbs have become a major election issue in Serbia (the election is scheduled for 12 December).

Two extreme nationalists in the Belgrade opposition, Seselj and Arkan, are accusing each other of arming the Bosnian Serbs before the war, provoking fighting, committing war crimes against



The Rump BH

\* The BH has been working hard to secure its winter supply of aid.

PM Silajdzic held long meetings with Croatian foreign minister Granic on 12 November, the result of which was a Joint Declaration.

Article 1 of the Declaration announced that "both sides would refrain from all military activities" for one week. (The next day, however, the HVO launched an attack on the BH-held town of Fojnica in Central Bosnia.)

Article 2 elaborated a convoy plan with wide-ranging consequences for the United Nations. The parties spoke of a joint "appeal to the UN Security Council, European Community and NATO to provide for the free passage of humanitarian convoys, including the use of force."

It has been a long-standing goal of the BH to bring the international community directly into the BH conflict. Article 2 of this Declaration would go a long way towards achieving that goal.

\* BH-Serb negotiations continue under the auspices of the High-Level Committee for Cooperation. An agreement designed to settle disputes over the supply of gas to Sarajevo is likely to be signed tomorrow.

\* The BH establishment is delighted by Italian proposals that sanctions be applied against Croatia because of its involvement in the war in BH.

There is a general feeling in BH that Croatian support for the Bosnian Croats is more overt and more comprehensive than the support given to the Bosnian Serbs by Belgrade.

\* The BH media, presumably in response to a political directive, has stopped using the word 'Muslim' to describe the nationality of Bosnia's largest community. Those people are now referred to as Bosnjak -- 'Bosnian' or 'Bosniac'. The word 'muslim' is now used only to describe the minority of Bosnians who practice Islam.

Bosnians have long argued that the label 'Muslim' was given to them by Tito's regime inappropriately and against their will. In every other republic of Tito's Yugoslavia the name of the nation followed the name of the republic (eg Macedonia, Macedonian). Only in Bosnia was the predominant nationality given a different name.

\* As part of a continuing effort to reassert Sarajevo's control over outlying BH-controlled territories, President Izetbegovic has been touring the regions from Brcko in the North to the frontier of



Herzegovina in the South.

Izetbegovic has spent most of his time in Central Bosnia, where he has publicly expressed his concern over the 'independent' behaviour of III Corps' elite 7th 'Muslim' Brigade.

\* More meetings have taken place in Central Bosnia on population exchanges. All three sides now agree in principle that populations wishing to move across the confrontation should be allowed to do so, and should have some support from local authorities in terms of documentation of property, skills etc. One small exchange has taken place.

\* The Serbs and the HVO are both blocking the flow of winterization materials into Central Bosnia, delaying convoys with endless checks.

\* In Southern Bosnia the humanitarian situation is a awful. There is fighting in Mostar, and civilian suffering -- already intense -- seems likely to increase, especially in BH-controlled East Mostar.

\* In Northern Bosnia the BH authorities have agreed to meet all UN conditions for the opening of Tuzla airport (complete UNPROFOR control, complete vacation of the premises by BH authorities, etc.). Gaining the support of the Serbs for the opening will be difficult, however.

\* In Vares the BH II Corps is making a concerted effort to encourage remaining Croats to stay. Most of the Croats, however, are already gone. Indeed, evidence has emerged that, during the fighting in Vares, the BH struck a deal with the Serbs: Croats would allowed to move through Serb-controlled territory to the HVO pocket of Kiseljak.

The deal is interesting. By facilitating the movement of Croats, the BH side appears to have taken another step towards accepting ethnic separation. Previously, the BH side has resisted this option, clinging to the idea that people must return to their own homes. Now the BH seems to accept that this is impossible, and that the only solution is to settle people evicted by the Serbs in Eastern Bosnia, and to put them in homes evacuated by defeated Croats.

\* The BH military in has been hard pressed to the East of Vares. Serb forces are holding the village of Dastansko in the remnants of the Vares pocket. They seem to be fighting together with HVO soldiers. The Serbs have also been active around Olovo.

\* In Western Bosnia Abdic's 'economic offensive' appears to be gaining momentum. The main vehicle is Abdic's company, Agrokomerc.



Abdic is exporting industrial stock to Krajina. He is importing electricity, though so far only in relatively small amounts. He is also importing diesel and gasoline from Croatia, via Krajina. These are now freely available at pumping stations. The price of basic commodities has decreased dramatically in the Abdic-controlled areas of West Bosnia.

Abdic's basic strategy seems to be that, as a Bosnian, he can be a profitable conduit to sanction-bound Serb territories in Krajina, BH and Serbia proper. He is starting with fuel and energy. Milosevic has offered almost unlimited electricity in return for fuel. Plans for a rail road linking Krajina, Velika Kladusa, Bosnian Serb territories and Serbia itself are apparently well advanced.

The military situation inside the pocket is tense. Abdic forces have taken some ground from the pro-Sarajevo BH V Corps forces in the South of the pocket.

#### Bosnian Croats

\* Croatian foreign minister Granic has been in Sarajevo talking peace.

Croatia's motivation for signing the Joint Declaration with the BH is unclear. Two principal possibilities emerge:

(a) Worried about the possibility that it may soon have sanctions applied against it because of its role in BH, Croatia is doing some (mainly cosmetic) diplomatic work to appear even handed.

(b) Preparing for a possible new round of hostilities in Krajina, Croatia is trying to calm down its second front against the Armija in BH.

If the Joint Declaration were implemented, one consequence would be that the Croatian government would be approving UNPROFOR military action against uncooperative Croat commanders on the ground. The potential for political disaster for the UN would be high.

\* The HVO has launched its largest offensive yet in Central Bosnia.

On the northern front, the HVO is using equipment rented or on loan from the Bosnian Serbs. On the southern front, from Prozor to Gornji Vakuf, the HVO is being supported by men and equipment of the HV.

The first attack on 13 November came from the Kiseljak pocket. The attack was supported by up to two dozen Serb armoured vehicles



transferred to the HVO under a scheme known at the UN as Rent-A-Park. The attempt to retake Fojnica (lost to the BH in July) failed. The HVO did, however, succeed in taking one hospital for mental retards and threatening another. The patients are suffering badly despite assistance from the Canadian Battalion.

Two days after the attack on Fojnica a heavy bombardment began of the area around Gornji Vakuf. Artillery and tanks, believed to have been moved in recently from Croatia, were heavily deployed.

Croat leaders say that the HVO is trying to link the main body of its territory in Herzegovina with the isolated HVO pockets of Central Bosnia. Nothing in the HVO's combat record indicates that it will be successful in this endeavour without substantial help from the Serbs.

\* The HVO has a new Commander, its third in three months.

The new man is Maj Gen Ante Rosso, who leaves his post as commander of the Croatian Army (HV) Special Forces. He speaks English, has lived many years in the USA and was a non-commissioned officer in the French Foreign Legion (2nd Parachute regiment).

Like his predecessor, Praljak, Rosso has closer ties to Zagreb than to Grude.

The removal of Praljak is seen as a response to the lacklustre performance of the HVO in recent months.

#### Bosnian Serbs

\* The Bosnian Serbs continue to take a hard line of humanitarian aid for BH-controlled communities. With snow on the ground all over Central and Northern Bosnia, the Serbs appear to be focusing on strangling the supply of fuel.

Serb Prime Minister Lukic has written to UNPROFOR announcing that the Serbs are cutting off the gas to Sarajevo every second day. The Serbs claim that the BH side has instructed Hungary to reduce the pipeline pressure entering BH so much that there is now not enough pressure for Sarajevo to have gas every day. IRC states that this is untrue. The BH side has told the Serbs that if they fail to restore pressure to at least a constant one bar then they will instruct the Hungarians -- via the UN sanctions committee -- to cut off gas to BH altogether, leaving nothing at all for any of the communities.

A convoy of wood and coal is still waiting to move from Central Bosnia to Sarajevo. The Serbs refuse to guarantee the safety of Muslim drivers transiting Serb-controlled territory. International drivers have not yet been found.



15-11-1993

010/9✓

IMMEDIATEOUTGOING FAXRec'd on SRSG's fax  
6 pm. 15 Nov 93

TO: STOLTENBERG, NEW YORK

ANNAN, NEW YORK  
FAX: 1-212-963 9222INFO: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB  
COT, ZAGREBFROM: VIEIRA DE MELLO, SARAJEVO  
FAX: 871-154 6345

DATE: 15 November, 1993

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Suljic, BH Under-Secretary for  
Foreign Affairs

1. On 14 November, I had a meeting, at their request, with Mr. Suljic, Under-Secretary, and Mr. Panic Counsellor, at the Foreign Ministry. Mr. Suljic wished to brief me on recent important developments.

#### Natural Gas

2. Following the visit paid to Moscow by a BH delegation, the gas issue was being politicized, mainly in the context of forthcoming elections in Serbia. The problem had a priority humanitarian dimension in Sarajevo. However, it also had important financial ("who pays for what?"-e.g. BH used to pay for large quantities of gas used for industrial purposes in Zvornik, which is now under Serb control) and political facets.

3. BH would soon be submitting a "brief and precise" aide-memoire to the Security Council and the Sanctions Committee on this subject.

#### Relations with HVO

4. Mr. Granic's visit and the Joint Declaration of 13 November (my fax of 13 November refers) were encouraging developments but actual willingness of Croatia to change its policy towards BH, particularly in Central part, would be tested on the ground.

5. We went over our problems with HVO, not least in reopening main humanitarian corridor and repairing Bijela bridges. Suljic confirmed that according to their information, HVO Field Commander, Gen. Pualjak, had been replaced by Gen. Boso (allegedly former French Foreign Legion NCO) and that the reopening of that axis was crucial



test. I said much would depend on Gen. Roso's attitude towards UNPROFOR and on his own ability to control his men and prevent further damage to road/bridge infrastructure. He agreed to put this issue high on the agenda for Mr. Silajdzic forthcoming follow-up visit to Zagreb.

#### Prisoners and Missing Persons

6 Suljic said that present impasse could have serious impact on political negotiations, as well as on winter humanitarian activities. This was a "small key to big doors, but it can also block everything else". His Government, however felt that the issue of prisoners and missing persons now required a more forceful political rather strictly humanitarian law approach. This, he said, would be raised with ICRC President C. Sommaruga when he visits Sarajevo later this week. He would come back on this subject, possibly with concrete proposals.

Tun: 13:16  
vbn: 2638

spmh: 137  
spth: 516  
spdv①: 274  
spdv②: 275  
spdv③: 276

UNPROFOR



CIVIL AFFAIRS

CENTRAL & SOUTHERN BH

010/9 SRSG'S OFFICE

Date: 14/11-93

SRSG: \_\_\_\_\_

DSRSG: \_\_\_\_\_

SA: \_\_\_\_\_

DIR: \_\_\_\_\_

MA: \_\_\_\_\_

Page 1 of 4

IMMEDIATE/ UN RESTRICTED

|  |  |
|--|--|
| OUTGOING FAX NO.   | DATE: SATURDAY, 13 NOV. 93                                 |
| TO: 1) VICTOR ANDREEV, CAC<br>2) BRIG. RAMSEY, COS<br>3) COL. JOHN ALMSTRON, G3<br>BH COMMAND KISELJAK | ALBERT BENABOU, CIVAFF<br>CENTRAL & SOUTHERN BH,<br>MOSTAR |
| FAX NO:  | FAX: 088 - 642 268   |
| INT: COL. CARVAJAL, SPABAT CMDR<br>LTCDR. FINLAYSON, UNMO SMO<br>JERRIE HULME, HOO UNHCR               | SIGNATURE:   |
| INF: 1) CEDRIC THORNBERRY, HCA UNPROFOR, HQ ZAGREB<br>2) BRIG. JOHN REITH, BRITFOR CMDR, DIVULJE       |  |
| SUBJECT: REPORT ON MEETING WITH GEN. GRUBAC  |  |

MESSAGE

DEAR VICTOR, SHALOM!

ON THURSDAY 11 NOVEMBER 1993, I MET DURING CLOSE TO TWO HOURS IN JAZINA (ON THE CROSSING POINT BETWEEN MONTENEGRO AND THE SERB TERRITORY IN EASTERN HERCEGOVINA) WITH GEN. RADOVAN GRUBAC AND COL. NOVAK MILOSEVIC FROM THE BSA. AT THIS ENCOUNTER PARTICIPATED THE SMO FROM MEDUGORJE, LTCDR. FYNLAYSON GRANT, AND THE UNMO OFFICERS: MAJ. JAKUB MATULIK, MAJ. SHAHRIAR AHMED, CPT. ROALD SOLVIK. THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WERE BROUGHT UP :

ACTUAL MILITARY INITIATIVES

1. GEN. GRUBAC SPECIFIED THAT THE BSA IS NOT INITIATING ANY MILITARY ACTION AND THAT THEY ARE RESPECTFUL OF THE CEASEFIRE ALONG THE CONFRONTATION LINES.

TUC/1335-  
J2



2. HE COMPLAINED ABOUT THE INFILTRATION OF BIH ARMIJA SOLDIERS, WHICH ARE PERPETUATING PROVOCATIONS AND ACTS OF SABOTAGE IN THE AREAS OF GORAZDE, TRNOVO AND KONJIC.

3. HE CLARIFIED THAT THE SERBS ARE OBSERVING THE MILITARY CLASHES BETWEEN THE BIH ARMIJA AND THE HVO IN THE CENTRAL ZONE (VARES, BUGOJNO, VITEZ). HE ASSUMED THAT ARMIJA WILL NOT GIVE UP THE BATTLE FOR VITEZ.

4. HE CLAIMED THAT THE ACCUSATIONS BLAMING THE SERBS FOR THE LAST BRUTAL SHELLING OF SARAJEVO WERE GROUNDLESS STATING THAT HE IS IN POSSESSION OF THE PROOFS THAT THIS WAS AN OPERATION OF THE HVO USING THEIR ARTILLERY FROM KISELJAK. TO HIS OPINION THIS IS A REVENGE CONDUCTED BY CMDR. RAJIC AGAINST THE BIH ARMIJA WHICH HAVE DISMANTLED LATELY THE CROAT "KRALJ TVRTKO" BRIGADE FROM SARAJEVO.

#### MILITARY PROSPECTIVE FOR THE WINTER

5. IZETBEGOVIC IS CONCENTRATING ALL HIS EFFORTS PREPARING THE WINTER MILITARY OFFENSIVE, STATED GRUBAC. THE HOSTILITIES WILL CONTINUE PRIMARILY IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY, WHERE THE CLIMATE CONDITIONS PERMIT SUCH ACTIVITIES.

6. IN THIS CASE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY MUST UNDERSTAND THAT THE SERBS, LIKE BOTH MUSLIMS AND CROAT, CONSIDER STRETCH OF TERRITORY IN EASTERN HERCEGOVINA UP TO NERETVA RIVER AS A SERB TERRITORY AND THAT THEY ARE DETERMINED TO FIGHT FOR IT.

7. THE SERBS CONSIDER THE ACCESS TO THE SEA TO BE THEIR UNALIENABLE RIGHT. CONSEQUENTLY THEY ARE AT PRESENT READY TO EXERCISE THAT RIGHT MAYBE THROUGH THE AREA OF DUBROVNIK WHERE THERE IS LATELY A MILITARY BUILD UP (ON BOTH PARTIES, CROAT AND SERB).

8. HE CLARIFIED THAT ALL THE DECISIONS AND ORDERS MADE BY THE "SUPREME BSA ARMY COMMANDER" MR. RADOVAN KARADZIC WILL BE RESPECTED AND OBEYED. THE SERB ARMY IS A DISCIPLINED ARMY UNLIKE THE MUSLIMS AND CROATS WHO ARE CONSTANTLY CHANGING THEIR ATTITUDES DUE TO THE LACK OF OBEDIENCE AND COORDINATION BETWEEN THE FIELD AND THE POLITICIANS.

#### THE POLITICAL LEVEL

9. THE SERBS ARE THE ONLY ENTITY WHO HAVE DECLARED CLEAR POLITICAL GOALS AND ARE PURSUING THEM FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE CONFLICT IN BIH.



18. HE RECOGNIZED HAVING MET THE OFFICIALS FROM MOSTAR, HOWEVER, HE CLARIFIED THAT ONLY AGENDA ADMITTED BY BSA WAS ON HUMANITARIAN MATTERS. ANYWAY HE SAID: "WE MADE AN AGREEMENT ON POW EXCHANGE AND THEY DID NOT RESPECT IT. IT IS TYPICAL OF THEM, THEY HAVE NO CENTRAL AUTHORITY, YOU CAN NOT RELY ON THEM".

REMARK:

SINCE OUR LAST MEETING, GEN. GRUBAC AND COL. MILOSEVIC EXPRESSED MORE FAVORABLE APPROACH TOWARDS THE CROATS. IT SEEMS THAT THEY ARE GETTING CLOSER TO THE CROAT POSITION AND DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM THE MUSLIMS WHICH ARE DESCRIBED AS UNRELIABLE AND DISRESPECTFUL OF ANY AGREEMENTS.

HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

19. THE MEAGER CROPS DURING THIS SUMMER HAVE CAUSED CRITICAL SITUATION IN FOOD SUPPLY FOR THE LOCAL POPULATION WHICH IS NOT RECEIVING ANY HUMANITARIAN RELIEF.

20. GEN. GRUBAC REQUIRED THE REIMBURSEMENT OF THE COSTS (PREFERABLY IN FUEL) WHICH HE FACES WHILE EXERCISING HUMANITARIAN ACTIONS ACROSS HIS TERRITORY.

21. THE PROBLEM OF GACKO THERMAL POWER PLANT WAS RAISED AGAIN AND FOR THIS I WAS INVITED TO HOLD A MEETING ON TUESDAY, 16 NOVEMBER 1993 AT 10.00 HOURS IN GACKO WITH THE MAYOR OF GACKO AND COL. MILOSEVIC.

22. A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY ROUTE WAS MADE. THE SUGGESTED LINE: STOLAC-GACKO-MILJEVINA-TRNOVO-SARAJEVO.

REMARKS:

23. UNMO TEAM IN THE AREA HAS ALREADY COLLECTED INFORMATION CONCERNING HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND PROCEEDED THEM TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

24. STRONG SHAKEHAND AND COMPLIMENTS TO THE UNMO TEAM IN THE AREA WHICH FACILITATED THE MEETING AND OFFERED HOSPITALITY IN THEIR PREMISES IN BILECA.

P.S. ALL ALONG THE MEETING GEN. GRUBAC REFLECTED THE DETERMINATION OF HIS WILL TO IMPLEMENT WHAT HE WAS DECLARING.

BEST REGARDS AND WARM SHALOM,  
ABA



10. SARAJEVO GOVERNMENT IS CONSIDERED TO BE MILITANT AND HARDLINERS, ESPECIALLY AFTER THE LATEST PROMOTION OF MR. HARIS SILAJDZIC TO THE POST OF PRIME-MINISTER.

11. AS FAR AS THE SERB SIDE IS CONCERNED, AT THE MOMENT, MR. BOBAN IS MORE REASONABLE AND RELIABLE PARTNER FOR NEGOTIATIONS AND ANY EVENTUAL DEAL. HE HAS FIRMER AND CLEARER POLITICAL POSITIONS, ALTHOUGH SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRICTED BY THE DIRECTIVES FROM ZAGREB.

#### PEACE ARRANGEMENTS

12. GEN. GRUBAC DESCRIBES THE SERB PRESENT INTERESTS TO BE RATHER IN PEACE THAN IN CONTINUATION OF THE WAR (ALTHOUGH STRONG DETERMINATION WAS EXPRESSED THAT IN CASE OF LACK OF UNDERSTANDING MILITARY OPTION IS OPEN). BEING ASKED ABOUT HIS PREFERABLE PARTNER IN PEACE NEGOTIATION HE ANSWERED THAT TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS ARE MORE ADVANTAGEOUS.

13. PROSPECTIVE OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL SOLUTION MAY INCLUDE CERTAIN LOCAL AUTONOMOUS ARRANGEMENTS (ABDIC) IN THE BiH HELD TERRITORIES. MOSTAR MAY IN THE FUTURE ATTEMPT TO ACHIEVE CERTAIN AUTONOMOUS FEATURES BUT SARAJEVO GOVERNMENT IS SEEN AS A SERIOUS OBSTACLE TO SUCH AN INTENTION.

14. HE EXPLAINED THAT MR. KARADZIC REJECTED THE GERMAN FRENCH-PROPOSALS SINCE THE CARDINAL MATTERS WERE IGNORED; THE CRUCIAL POINT OF THE 3% OF TERRITORY REQUIRED FROM THE SERBS ARE NOT THE QUANTITY AS MUCH THE QUALITY OF THIS TERRITORY. HE REITERATED THAT IF THE MUSLIMS AGREE TO GIVE 1% OF A CERTAIN AREA, THE SERBS ARE READY TO OFFER THEM IN EXCHANGE UP TO 5% IN OTHER AREAS.

#### CROAT - MUSLIM RELATIONSHIPS

15. CROAT - MUSLIM ALLIANCE IS ACCORDING TO GEN. GRUBAC, UNNATURAL, AND THUS NOT ON THE SOUND GROUNDS. THAT WAS REVEALED IN THEIR LATEST CONFLICTS IN CENTRAL BOSNIA AND NERETVA VALLEY.

16. GEN. GRUBAC STATED THAT IT WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT BOTH MUSLIMS AND CROATS HAD EXPERIENCED GENOCIDE ON THEIR OWN POPULATIONS DUE TO THEIR MUTUAL CONFLICT. THIS ALSO PROVES THE RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF THIS WAR.

#### SERB - MUSLIM RELATIONSHIPS

17. COL. MILOSEVIC DENIED THE ALLEGATIONS ACCORDING TO WHICH THERE IS OR THERE WAS ANY MILITARY ACTIVITY COORDINATED WITH THE BiH ARMIJA IN MOSTAR.



010/9 14 -11- 1993

DIST 2420/1

Date: 14/11

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

COPY: ANNAN, NEW YORK, Fax No. 1-212-9639222  
COT, ZAGREB

FROM: VIEIRA DE MELLO, SARAJEVO

DATE: 13 November 1993

SUBJECT: VISITS TO SARAJEVO OF MINISTER GRANIC OF CROATIA,  
MINISTER CETIN OF TURKEY, MR. TCHURKIN, RUSSIAN  
SPECIAL ENVOY, AND US AMBASSADOR JAKOVIC ON 12  
AND 13 NOVEMBER

SRSG: \_\_\_\_\_

DCSRG: \_\_\_\_\_

SA: \_\_\_\_\_

DIR: \_\_\_\_\_

1. The above officials visited Sarajevo yesterday and today. Please find below some of the salient points I had the opportunity of discussing with them. Mr. Papoulias of Greece was also supposed to spend a few hours in Sarajevo today, but was unfortunately prevented from doing so by weather conditions. He may be arriving tomorrow.

Minister Granic

2. Minister Granic told me that he would be leaving tomorrow for New York, where he was planning to remain for three days and that he would share with the Secretary-General some of the latest proposals that he had submitted yesterday to Primer Minister Silajdzic. These ideas are intended to put an end to the ongoing fighting between HVO and BiH and also included possible mutual territorial concessions. Mr. Granic informed me that Mr. Silajdzic would be visiting him in Zagreb next Thursday, 18 November. I am attaching a copy of the Sarajevo Joint Declaration, also signed by Minister Cetin of Turkey, in case you have not yet received it from other sources (apologies for the poor quality of the copy). Silajdzic's visit might of course be linked to paragraph 1 of the Joint Declaration.

3. Mr. Granic enquired about yesterday's incident involving three former liaison officers of the HVO Sarajevo Brigade with UNPROFOR Sector HQ which, as you are aware, culminated with their arrest at the Presidency and their transfer to BiH First Army Corps Headquarters. Granic then spoke by telephone with Silajdzic and informed me that he had proposed that the three be freed and that Croatia was willing to accept them as refugees. He also asked me to pass the same message through UNPROFOR channels. I immediately informed the Chief of Staff who had already been in touch, yesterday evening, with the BiH Deputy Army Commander Siber, to whom he has now sent a message repeating Mr. Granic's offer.



Mr. Tchurkin

4. In my conversation with Special Envoy Mr. Tchurkin, we discussed the support that Russia would give to the Secretary-General's Humanitarian Winter Truce Appeal. He stated that there was no hesitation on the part of Russia as regards the substance of the appeal, but rather on the level at which his country should publicly back it. They wondered whether it would be appropriate for President Yeltsin himself to issue the statement, thereby depriving themselves of the possibility of resorting to the President's intervention, should that be made necessary at a later stage by the non-compliance of the parties with the appeal. Also in connection with the appeal, Tchurkin made the following points:

- (a) He doubted very much whether the Serbs would agree to the opening of Tuzla Airport, as they are arch-suspicious that the airport could be used to bring weapons into the BiH area. He had offered Russian Observers to monitor the use of the airport, but the Serbs had turned down the offer.
- (b) The Serbs might also be weary that the Winter Truce might be a cover for the reinforcement of the BiH Army in preparation for the "Spring Offensive".
- (c) When we discussed alternative Winter routes for humanitarian aid, Mr. Tchurkin said that President Milosevic yesterday and Mr. Karadzic today had offered that Belgrade Airport be used for humanitarian assistance that could then be either trucked or railed into Bosnia. He added that this would be an "important gesture" which, in turn, could ease the movement of humanitarian convoys through Bosnian Serb-held territory. I said a gesture had already been made with the decision to use the Port of Bar in Montenegro and that I could foresee difficulties with the notion of reopening Belgrade Airport, to which Tchurkin replied that this could be explained to and discussed with those who might raise objections. When I said that the use of Belgrade Airport for humanitarian aid may not necessarily lead to a greater freedom of movement on Bosnian Serb territory, he said that Milosevic had given his guarantee and that one could be made conditional on the other.
- (d) On gas, Tchurkin said that although Russia would, of course, be delighted if Bosnia would pay its debt, this was not a pre-condition to the continued supply of gas. He said that Bosnia

was presently holding bilateral discussions with Hungary on this issue and a solution may be imminent. Bosnian Vice-President Ganic had told him what Silajdzic had indicated to Mr. Stoltenberg on 9 November (Please refer to paragraph 3 of my 9 November Fax on Stoltenberg's visit).

Ambassador Jakovic

5. I met with Ambassador Jakovic at Sarajevo Airport, after he spent only 2 hours in town today. I requested that he recommend early and full support of the United States to the Secretary-General's Truce Appeal and he replied he had no doubt that would be the case.

Suggestion related to Winter Truce Appeal

6. With reference to my conversation with Stoltenberg on 11 November, I wish to make the following additional suggestion:

It appears important to me that in his Appeal the Secretary-General clearly indicate that he would be closely monitoring compliance and drawing all the necessary conclusions from non-compliance therewith by, say, mid-December. He could also state that he intends to present a special report to the Security Council on the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina immediately thereafter.



## SARAJEVO JOINT DECLARATION

During their meeting in Sarajevo on November 12 1993, Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dr Haris Silajdzic and Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign affairs of the Republic of Croatia, Mr Mate Granic, in their capacity of Presidential Trustees following the Geneva Declaration of September 14 1993, in the presence and with active participation of M.E. Hikmet Cetin, Minister of Foreign affairs of the Republic of Turkey, have extensively discussed the present political and military situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

During the talks the special emphasis was put on the recent flare up of fighting between the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and HVO forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in central Bosnia area in particular, and urgent necessity to end all hostilities and military activities.

Three sides have also extensively discussed the necessity to revive the peace process in order to bring about the immediate, comprehensive and durable solution to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the region, in particular in the light of tragic deterioration of humanitarian conditions.

They have agreed that Basic Principles of Geneva Peace Agreement, Joint Declaration signed by Presidents dr Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic, as well as their Statement from Vienna represent a basis for comprehensive solution to the relations between the two parties aimed at reaching final agreement to the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this context particular attention was paid to the latest peace initiatives.

In this respect they have agreed that every political effort must be exerted on bilateral and multilateral level to end further deterioration of relations between the Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs in order to create positive framework for the restoration of the peace process.

In order to implement these principles, Dr Haris Silajdzic and Dr Mate Granic, in their capacity of Presidential Trustees, and with the active participation of Mr Hikmet Cetin, have agreed on the following:

1. To prepare and organize an urgent meeting of the highest political and military leadership of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and HVO, not later than within 5-7 days, in order to reach a comprehensive agreement on all military issues relating the establishment of cease fire and final cessation of all hostilities and military activities. It was agreed that during the preparations for this meeting both sides will strictly refrain from all military activities.

2. The immediate assurances and guarantees for free and unhindered passage of humanitarian aid convoys to all parties and areas shall be given by respective highest authorities. For the purposes of the realization of the above mentioned the parties have agreed on the following:

- (a) to jointly appeal to the UN Security Council, European Community and NATO as to provide for the free passage of humanitarian convoys by all means, including the use of force.

- (b) to open immediately a humanitarian aid corridor on the route Ploče - Metković-Čapljina-Mostar-Jablanica-Tarčin-Kiseljak-Visoko.

- (c) to use the Kamensko-Tornjauvgrad-Gornji Vakuf-Novi Travnik-Travnik-Zenica corridor until the above mentioned corridor is available.

(d) to organize immediately two convoys for Central Bosnia area, i.e. one for Nova Bila and the other for Maglaj;

(e) to establish a Joint Commission, with the mandate to coordinate all activities relating humanitarian convoys and to cooperate with UNPROFOR, UNHCR and other humanitarian agencies.

(f) to coordinate their activities in order to provide for the reparation of energy supply systems.

3. To continue to revive the activities of previously established Joint Working Groups for the release of all detainees, in cooperation with ICRC and other international agencies.

4. All other remaining controversial political, military, territorial and other issues between the Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs shall be resolved only through political means and without the use of force and a special mechanism for the coordination of all activities regarding the protection of rights and interests of the two peoples shall be established with the good offices of Turkey and other countries.

5. The sides shall continue their working dialogue on ministerial and other levels on all open questions with the view to bring about the solution to the Croat-Bosniac relations and preparations for the reactivation of the peace process.

Dr Maris Silajdzic and Dr Mate Granic have expressed their joint great appreciation and gratitude to the Republic of Turkey and to the Minister Hikmet Cetin personally for the most valuable and continuous political assistance and humanitarian support to the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in search for lasting solution to the crisis in the region.

Sarajevo, November 12 1993

PRIME MINISTER OF THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA,  
DR MARIS SILAJDŽIĆ

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER  
AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA,  
DR MATE GRANIĆ

WITNESSED BY:

H.E. HIKMET CETIN,  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY



010/9



HQ UNPROFOR  
Geographic Branch  
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM



To: SRSG  
COS

From: Chief Geographic Officer

Telephone: 2078

Info: ACOS (O&I)

Geo 200

Date: 13 November 1993

Signed:

.....  
Lt Col WHITTINGTON  
CGO

SUBJECT: WARRING FACTIONS - AREAS OF INFLUENCE

1. Attached is a copy of the assessment made by BH COMD of the areas of influence of the Warring Factions, as at the BH PICINFSUM dated 31 Oct 93.

2. Please note that, although quoted in decimal places, on the basis of the source and method, it is recommended that the figures should at best be taken as approximate:

|                |      |      |
|----------------|------|------|
| BSA Controlled | 72%  |      |
| BSA Occupied   |      | 67%  |
| HVO Controlled | 11%  |      |
| HVO Occupied   |      | 13%  |
| BiH Controlled | 17%  |      |
| BiH Occupied   |      | 20%  |
| Totals         | 100% | 100% |

3. Unless specifically requested, this information will not be maintained by BH COMD

To: MAJ

PASI KATRONEN

GENEVA

FROM:

MA / SRSG

Date:

14/11-93

SRSG:

OSRSG:

SA:

DIR:

MA:

BA

7h

BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA  
Warring Factions Controlled/Occupied Territory

The approximate square kilometers of territory either controlled/occupied by the three warring factions were computed using a 2 centimeter grid matrix as depicted on the 1/500,000 scale, HQ B-H COMMAND PICINSUM DATED 31/10/93. Total area computed for B-H was 50,100 KM2.

BSA (Bosnian Serb Army)

|                               |            |        |
|-------------------------------|------------|--------|
| BSA CONTROLLED AREA           | 35,900 KM2 | 71.66% |
| (SOUTHEAST AND NORTHWEST B-H) |            |        |
| BSA OCCUPIED AREA             | 35,900     |        |
| BIHAC, BiH POCKET             | (1,200)    |        |
| MAGLAJ, HVO POCKET            | (300)      |        |
| ORASJE, HVO POCKET            | (200)      |        |
| SREBENICA, BiH POCKET         | (150)      |        |
| ZEPA, BiH POCKET              | (150)      |        |
| GORAZDE, BiH POCKET           | (425)      |        |
| SARAJEVO, BiH POCKET          | (50)       |        |
| BSA TOTAL OCCUPIED            | 33,425 KM2 | 66.72% |

HVO (Bosnian Croatian Army)

|                         |           |        |
|-------------------------|-----------|--------|
| HVO CONTROLLED AREA     | 5,500 KM2 | 10.98% |
| (SOUTHWEST CENTRAL B-H) |           |        |
| HVO OCCUPIED AREA       | 5,500     |        |
| KONJIC, HVO POCKET      | 25        |        |
| KISELJAC, HVO POCKET    | 250       |        |
| VITEZ, HVO POCKET       | 200       |        |
| MAGLAJ, HVO POCKET      | 300       |        |
| ORASJE, HVO POCKET      | 200       |        |
| HVO TOTAL OCCUPIED      | 6,475 KM2 | 12.92% |

BiH (Bosnian Muslim Army)

|                        |           |        |
|------------------------|-----------|--------|
| BiH CONTROLLED AREA    | 8,700 KM2 | 17.37% |
| (CENTRAL B-H)          |           |        |
| BiH OCCUPIED AREA      | 8,700     |        |
| SARAJEVO, BiH POCKET   | 50        |        |
| GORAZDE, BiH POCKET    | 425       |        |
| ZEPA, BiH POCKET       | 150       |        |
| SREBRENICA, BiH POCKET | 150       |        |
| BIHAC, BiH POCKET      | 150       |        |
| KONJIC, HVO POCKET     | (25)      |        |
| KISELJAC, HVO POCKET   | (250)     |        |
| VITEZ, HVO POCKET      | (200)     |        |
| BiH TOTAL OCCUPIED     | 9,150 KM2 | 20.36% |



FO = 548  
F = 1264

UNPROFOR

MSC 653/11  
Page 1 of 2

'93 NOV 11 19:08

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

ROUTINE      PRIORITY      IMMEDIATE      MOST IMMEDIATE  
UNCLASSIFIED      UN RESTRICTED      UN CONFIDENTIAL      UN SECRET ONLY

|  |                                |
|--|--------------------------------|
| OUTGOING FAX NO.: C 774  | DATE: 11 NOV 93                |
| TO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA :<br>STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB                                     | FROM: HQ UNPROFOR ZAGREB<br>FC |
| FAX NO.:   | FAX NO.:                       |
| ATTN: STOLTENBERG  | FILE REF. NO.:<br>DRAFTER: COS |
| INFO: BH COMMAND MAIN KISELJAK<br>BH COMMAND FWD SARAJEVO                            |                                |
| FAX NO:  |                                |
| SUBJECT: <u>TOTAL BLOCKAGE OF UNPROFOR CONVOYS IN B-H BY SERBS</u>                   |                                |
| INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: FC, HCA, CAO, DFC, COS, ACOS (O&I), ACOS (P&L),<br>CLOGO, COO |                                |

MESSAGE

1. I seek your urgent help in ending the blockage by Serbian authorities of all UNPROFOR military convoys attempting to deliver supplies in Serb held territories of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
2. All UNPROFOR resupply convoys have been blocked since the 4th of November either at the ZVORNIK crossing point from the FRY or whilst taking other routes and attempting to enter SARAJEVO. No reason has been given for what appears to be an official policy to prevent UNPROFOR being resupplied, especially with fuel.
3. The situation is becoming so critical that NORDBAT 2 at TUZLA only have 8 days worth of rations left. In SARAJEVO we are running short of food.
4. Attached is an account of what happened to the last two convoys that set out for SARAJEVO. Convoy 43 eventually arrived whilst convoy 44 had to return. Your assistance to restore our freedom of movement will be greatly appreciated.

One Copy has been sent to  
Re STOLTENBERG

*[Signature]*

|               |      |
|---------------|------|
| DISTRIBUTION: |      |
| ACTION        | INFO |
| JW            | WS   |
|               | BR   |
|               | DL   |
|               | J-PM |
|               | JRB  |

(7)

PS



**SARAJEVO CONVOYS WEEKS 44 and 45**  
**SITREP**

**SARAJEVO 43**

**TUESDAY** DEPARTURE OF THE CONVOY WITH 240 CUM POL.  
**OCT. 26th**

**WEDNESDAY** IT OVERNIGHTED IN PODROMANIA. BUT, AT 21.30, GENERAL  
**OCT. 27th** MLADIC CAME TO THE CONVOY AND MADE PROPAGANDA  
AGAINST MUSLIMS. HE REPROACHED UNPROFOR TO TRANSPORT  
MILITARY MATERIALS FOR MUSLIMS AND SAID THAT HE WOULD  
RESTRAIN HALF OF THE POL THE NEXT TIME BUT FINALLY, THE  
CONVOY COULD RESTART.

**THURSDAY** BH-COMD HAD A MEETING WITH GENERAL MLADIC CONCERNING  
**OCT. 28th** THE CONVOY. FINALLY, IT WAS ALLOWED TO PROCEED AFTER  
HAVING BEEN BLOCKED ONE ALL DAY.

**FRIDAY** IT STARTED ON 07.45 ~~am~~ TO JOIN SARAJEVO. THE CONVOY COULD  
**OCT 29th** CARRY OUT ITS SCHEDULED PLAN WITHOUT OTHER PROBLEMS.

**SUNDAY** RETURNED TO PLES0 WITH ONE DAY LATE.  
**OCT. 31th**

**SARAJEVO 44**

**TUESDAY** CONVOY POSTPONED ON NOV 3rd : NO CLEARANCE DELIVERED  
**NOV. 2nd** DUE TO THE COMMEMORATION OF "ALL SAINTS DAY".

**WEDNESDAY** DEPARTURE OF THE CONVOY WITH 240 CUM POL.  
**NOV. 3rd**

**THURSDAY** THE CONVOY IS BLOCKED AT DEPARTURE OF THE CONVOY WITH  
**NOV. 4th** 240 CUM POL. NEGOCIATIONS ARE GOING ON TO PASS TROUGH  
**FRIDAY** STILL BLOCKED IN ZVORNIK CROSSING POINT.  
**NOV 5th**

**SATURDAY** STILL BLOCKED IN ZVORNIK CROSSING POINT.  
**NOV.6th**

**SUNDAY** NEGOCIATIONS TO GET CLEARANCES WERE SUCCESSFULL. BUT  
**NOV.7th** WHEN THE CONVOY TRIED TO PASS TROUGH THEY WERE  
STOPPED AGAIN.

**MONDAY** IT TRIED TO PASS THE CROSSING POINT BUT DIDNT SUCCEED. IT  
**NOV.8th** RETURNED TO PLES0 STILL LOADED.

**TUESDAY** CONVOY S44 TURNED BACK IN PLES0.  
**NOV.9th** A NEW CONVOY S45 (REDUCED TO 25 VHLS WITHOUT POL) IS SENT  
TO SARAJEVO THIS DAY.



010/9✓

REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA  
GOVERNMENT  
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
PALE-SARAJEVO  
November 1993  
FAX: 071-783-449

Co-Chairmen of the Conference on the Former Yugoslavia

Your Excellencies,

I should like to draw your attention to a great discrepancy between the positions and stances of the Security Council, the European Community, the United States of America and other international factors, and the present situation and tendencies in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Namely, in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina the process of establishment of three national state entities is coming to an end, both in territorial and state-political terms: the Republic of Srpska, the Moslem Republic of Bosnia and the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia. The territories of these states correspond to a large extent to the Owen-Stoltenberg delimitation plan, while their political set-ups testify to all the attributes of independent states: these three national republics have separate administrations, separate parliaments, Governments and presidents, their own currencies and armies, etc. The Serbs and Croats increasingly recognize to each other the state of facts, while the Moslems have so far usurped the right to present Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole. In this, they have been generously supported by the international community.

However, now that a new Moslem Government in Sarajevo has been formed, headed by Mr. Silajdžić, even the last mask behind which this deception was concealed has been removed. It is a well-known fact that the Sarajevo Parliament had only been a Moslem parliament even earlier. In the new Moslem Government there are only four non-Moslems out of 21 MPs. Mr. Izetbegović is and has been only a Moslem national leader, and now only the president of the Moslem Republic of Bosnia. (Judging by the latest developments, he might not be even that).

This discrepancy, having more and more tragic effects every day, lies in the fact that the international community still acts without recognizing these facts. The international community keeps recognizing Moslem representatives, the Moslem state symbols, Moslem institutions, especially those abroad, as representatives, symbols and institutions of all the three nations in the former Yugoslav federal republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, the Serbs and Croats have been brought in an unequal position, and the peace process is being hindered.

My Government is of the opinion that it is the high

time to correct this blunder, and to call things by their real names. My Government also believes that this could be the decisive step that would end the standstill in the peace process in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

This step is all the more urgent since the three national republics in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina de facto treat each other as three separate states. As regards the Croat and the Moslem parties, unfortunately, they are still at war, while the Government of the Republic of Srpska is already establishing economic, transport, humanitarian and other links with the Government of the Moslem Republic of Bosnia and the Government of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, on the basis of equality and mutual recognition. The Republic of Srpska has also concluded a peace contract with the Moslem side in the Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia.

It is the assessment of my Government that a peace process initiated from the inside is a new phenomenon and can be a real way to peace, i.e. to a settlement of the crisis and the civil war. If this process were also supported from the outside, by the relevant international factors, in the spirit of recognition of the state of facts as presented here, the Government of the Republic of Srpska is convinced that we would fast arrive at a political solution that would satisfy the people and the nations in the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Please accept, your Excellencies, the assurances of my highest consideration.



*Aleksa Buha*  
Prof. Dr. Aleksa Buha  
Minister of Foreign Affairs



CODE RESTRICTED

MOST IMMEDIATE  
UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS

0109

UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

'93 NOV -5 19:32

C2N 934967-5 19:42  
C2G-1266

CRYPTO CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

Seen by WS

Page 1 of 3

TO : ANNAN, UNATIONS NEW YORK -1935 Z

INFO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY UNOG

FROM (fm) STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR ZAGREB *Cedric Thornberry*

DATE : 5 NOVEMBER 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR-Z-1406

SUBJECT: REUR MSC-2129: GRANIC LETTER

## DISTRIBUTION:

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|        | PS   |

(5)

Further to the FC's cable entitled "Vares as a Safe Area", some further specific observations on Granic's letter:-

1. In his third paragraph, referring to Novi Travnik, he alleges that this town is "cut off from any aid for almost six months".  
.... This is, unfortunately, false, and I attach figures provided to me today by UNHCR. They show a food target of 1438 MTs in the last six months, of which 807 MTs were delivered. There have rarely been problems with deliveries to Novi Travnik, except when the BiH armija and the HVO were fighting in the Lasva valley. There were, however, security problems and lack of food in the Zenica warehouse, caused also by denial of access by the HVO.
2. As regards para. 5 and Nova Bila hospital, it should be said that approximately 150 casualties and seriously ill patients had been evacuated from this hospital under agreements negotiated in August by Thornberry and Briquemont for mutual evacuations from Nova Bila and East Mostar. The process has now been brought to a halt by the HVO, which is holding two BiH helicopters at Medjugorje, to which they had flown to pick up ex-East Mostar patients. The HVO is holding them because the BiH, they allege, have failed to release some Croat pow's. UNPROFOR has been negotiating for days to break this impasse.
3. As regards this fifth paragraph, and generally, it should be noted that the HVO, for several months, has been making the humanitarian activities of UNPROFOR, UNHCR, the ICRC and other like



bodies extremely difficult. Alleging systematic bias against BH Croats, and building up propaganda to this effect in southern and central BH, they have whipped up anti-UN feeling to such a degree as to cause repeated and persistent incidents endangering UNPROFOR and UNHCR personnel. UN personnel have been frequently targeted by HVO military, and stoned and spat upon by Croat civilians, in the area. However clearly and unambiguously UNPROFOR and UNHCR demonstrate their impartiality, outrageous propaganda is invented to defame our endeavours: - e.g., that we deliver aid only to Moslems and that we are running arms to them (to give two of the more benign regular inventions). Meanwhile, the HVO is obstructing our convoys (sometimes using Rentamob, whom they bus in for the occasions); refusing to cooperate on Operation Lifeline (despite Granic's endeavours) and even blowing up, on 3 November, the remaining spans of the Bijela Bridge; refusing to allow us to establish a presence in W. Mostar; targetting, with snipers, our UNMO presence in E. Mostar; and, generally, trying to show that they are even harder to love than anybody else in Bosnia-Herzegovina, despite impressive rivals.

4. This evening, Granic called HCA to say that Tudjman, Susak and he had been receiving messages all day from a group of between 300 and 1200 Croats (some HVO, some civilian) in the Vares pocket at a village called Bari. This group was cut off by the armija and the BSA. Though some were armed, they did not want to fight. They wanted to be evacuated safely to Croat-controlled territory. As they are "in very much trouble", would UNPROFOR please assist and get them safe passage? Tonight BHC is seeking to send a patrol to the village as soon as possible to provide whatever assistance it can, bearing in mind that it is dark, and the roads are full of mines.

5. We have no other comment on the letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Croatia, at this time.

6. In response to Schmits/Thornberry telecon at 1345 hours NY time, BHC say they cannot provide a report on Stupni Do until 18 November. We have however now requested such report by noon on 10 November.

endall.





L'Envoyé Spécial  
pour l'ex-Yugoslavie

VISOKI KOMESARIJAT  
UJEDINJENIH NARODA  
ZA IZBJEGLICE

The Special Envoy  
for former Yugoslavia

FAX TRANSMISSION

TO: Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, SOHA/SRSG  
FROM: Nicholas Morris *Nicholas Morris*  
DATE: 5 November 1993  
REF: OSE/235  
SU: UNHCR assistance for Bosnian Croats in Novi Travnik

1. Herewith the statistics on assistance over the last six months. The reasons for the shortfalls were security problems and lack of food in the Zenica warehouse, caused by both security problems and denial of access into Western Herzegovina by HVO. We have had no problems with access to Novi Travnik except during fighting in the Lasva valley.

| <u>Month</u> | <u>Beneficiaries</u> | <u>Food Target</u><br>(MT) | <u>Food Delivered</u><br>(MT) |
|--------------|----------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------|
| May*         | 18,000               | 304                        | 228                           |
| June         | 10,000               | 169                        | 108                           |
| July         | 10,000               | 169                        | 114                           |
| Aug          | 15,500               | 247                        | 30                            |
| Sept         | 15,500               | 247                        | 147                           |
| Oct          | 15,900               | 302                        | 180                           |

\* until June no distinction was necessary between deliveries to the Red Cross and Merhammet: the May totals are therefore combined for both communities. From June onwards the figures cover only the Croat community through the Novi Travnik Red Cross (our operational partner).

2. In September 22 MT of non-food items were delivered to the Red Cross and in October 14 MT. These included domestic items, blankets, mattresses, and stoves.

CZK 570  
CZG 1263  
CZV 1397

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Vares.  
INS  
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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
UNPROFOR

'93 NOV -5 16:52

'93 NOV -5 16:09

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

M O S T I M M E D I A T E

Page 1 of 2

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, SRSG, GENEVA  
STOLTENBERG, SRSG, ZAGREB  
BRIQUEMONT, BH COMMAND, KISELJAK (BY CRYPTO FAX)  
FROM: COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB  
DATE: November 1993  
NUMBER: UNPROFOR-Z-1403  
SUBJECT: VARES AS A SAFE AREA

CODE RESTRICTED

**MOST IMMEDIATE**

Reyr MSC-2129 of 4 Nov 93 regarding the letter of Dr Granic to the President of the Secco, I know that you have been following closely the situation from the UNPROFOR SITREPs. Our latest information confirms that the city is back in Bosnian hands. The fear of widespread looting was, I believe, well founded, but mercifully minimized in the main. There was some removal of property which is now under control. The elements of the BiH Corps (7th Bde) which had been of some worry have begun to move out (with some of their bounty) and their positions will be taken by other BiH forces. There are now no indications that the remaining elements of the Corps have committed atrocities. UNPROFOR forces in the area consist of two companies in Vares proper, one from NORDBAT 2 and another from FREBAT 2, commanded by the CO of NORDBAT 2. CANBAT 2, though not in Vares, continues patrolling to the west, and the NL Transport battalion has been in and out of the area.

ACTION

INFO

NORDBAT CO has sent patrols to neighbouring villages to seek

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out refugees and possible violations of the law of war.

Currently, the refugee situation seems to be under control. UNPROFOR is operating in close coordination with UNHCR and other agencies. At this time, there are approximately 600 refugees at the NORDBAT 2 camp (of which 100 are Croats), 600 in a school in the centre of town (of which 350 are Croats). They have sufficient food and water for the short term, and UNHCR has brought a convoy with blankets and shelter. The estimate is that 3000 people are left in Vares. In Kiseljak, the ICRC estimates that 2200 DPs are present.

On the question of making Vares into a "safe area," you are aware of the problems we are having with our present resources to implement the areas required by Secco resolution 844. The only activated safe areas, that is those whose boundaries have been determined and which have been the subject of a signed agreement with the parties, are Srebrenica and Zepa. The Srebrenica safe area is about to be abandoned by UNPROFOR troops because NORDBAT 2 is not permitted by their government to take over this mission and I cannot protect it until the NL Battalion arrives in Jan 94.

Although UNPROFOR had anticipated that other areas might be considered as future safe areas, I could not agree with any concept of making Vares into a safe area without first receiving additional forces to enable me to do so.

Endall

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## OUTGOING CODE CABLE

Palais des Nations

IMMEDIATE

IMMEDIATE

CZG-1227

CZK-529

'93 OCT 27 14:57 OCT 27 14:29

P.11

010/9

TO : BRIQUEMONT, BH COMD, KISELJAK

INFO : STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, GENEVA  
STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

FROM : COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE : 27 October 1993

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z- 1364

SUBJECT : BREAKDOWN OF AUTHORITY

1. In reading the reports of recent events in BH, I am developing a perception that we are witnessing the beginning of a breakdown of order and authority among the warring factions. The Bihac situation, the recent VAB/VBL hijacking incident and comments made by senior political and military leaders suggest to me that a state of anarchy may soon be a possibility in certain areas of BH.

2. This situation is of great concern to me. The tragic incident on 25 October involving the UNHCR and NI/BE Tpt Bn convoys has demonstrated how vulnerable United Nations personnel are to uncontrolled elements. It is these uncontrolled groups who will not follow orders from their own chain of command which, I believe, pose the greatest threat to the security of UNPROFOR personnel in the field.

3. I am therefore interested in your HQ's assessment on both the state of affairs with respect to the ability of the military command structure and civilian administration of all warring parties to maintain authority and order and on the longer term prospects (2-4 months) for a breakdown of the present system into anarchy.

Internal distr: FC, DFC, COS, CMIO

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UNPROFOR-SRSG →→→ SRSG GENEWA 001

The Rump-BH

\* In Sarajevo three new members of the Presidency have been appointed to replace three ousted members.

The long-absent members of the Croat nationalist party (HDZ) have been officially "released from their duties." They are Franjo Boras and Miro Lasic, both hard-liners loyal to Grude and Zagreb. They have been replaced by two local Croats, Stjepan Kljucic (nominally of the HDZ) and Ivo Komsic of the Croat Peasant Party. The West Bosnian separatist Fikret Abdic has been replaced by Nijaz Durakovic of the (former-communist) Social Democratic Party. The Presidency is now constituted as follows:

|                            |                                |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| For the Muslim community:  | Alija Izetbegovic (SDA)        |
|                            | Nijaz Durakovic (SDP)          |
| For the Serb community:    | Mirko Pejanovic (SDP)          |
|                            | Tatjana Ljubic-Mijatovic (SDP) |
| For the Croat community:   | Stjepan Kljucic (HDZ)          |
|                            | Ivo Komsic (CPP)               |
| For the "other" community: | Ejup Ganic (SDA)               |

Interestingly, none of the new members are members of -- or commonly associated with -- Izetbegovic's Muslim nationalist Party, the SDA. All three, however, are well-known for their support of a united BH.

Haris Silajdzic, formerly Foreign Minister and prominent SDA hard-liner, has been appointed to fill the vacant post of Prime Minister. He is expected to name his cabinet today. It is likely to be heavily SDA-oriented.

\* High-level BH and Serb civilians have been holding talks at Sarajevo airport, principally under the auspices of the High-Level Committee for Cooperation. This weekly civilian forum brings together the representatives of the BH and Serb State Commissions for Cooperation with the UN. It is chaired by CAC.

The delegation chiefs, Muratovic (BH Forestry Minister) and Koljevic (Srpska Vice-President) have made considerable progress on the topic of supplying fuel for Sarajevo over the winter.

- Coal is now coming into Sarajevo accross Serb territory, albeit slowly. An estimated 30,000 tonnes is required for the winter; about 1,000 tonnes has moved so far; the rate may now increase somewhat. The sides disagree about prices so most of the fuel being moved to Sarajevo is coming from BH mines.

- Wood is a problem. Suppliers on both sides are demanding from UNHCR inordinate amounts of diesel and parts to allow production to continue.

- There was something of a breakthrough on diesel; the sides made an informal agreement that, for a price, the Serbs would transport BH diesel from the coast, accross HVO territory and up to Sarajevo.



Silajdzic (as of today, BH Prime Minister) and Krajisnik (Srpska Assembly President) appeared to make progress on the subject of civilian population exchanges as a first step towards unblocking a much-delayed POW release programme. This programme is a key element in the BH-Serb Joint Declaration of 16 September.

The subject of population exchange has never advanced very far until now because the BH has always insisted that 'ethnic cleansing' be resisted. The BH normally refuses to allow non-Muslims who would like to go to Croat or Serb territory to leave BH-controlled areas. Recently, however, things have been changing. Some BH authorities in Central Bosnia (notably Spahic, the mayor of Zenica) have given qualified approval to the idea of regulated population exchanges. And this week Silajdzic announced at an ICRC meeting that he had no objection to a limited exchange of populations between Tarcin and Hadzici, two small towns near Sarajevo.

Silajdzic and Krajisnik asked UNPROFOR Civil Affairs to oversee the operation. CAC indicated that the United Nations would not be party to ethnic cleansing. In order to help unblock the detainee release programme, however, CAC said that UNPROFOR would provide limited security at the front line for people exercising freedom of movement -- subject to certification that every individual crossing the line was doing so of his or her own free will. UNPROFOR did this on 24 October but, to nobody's surprise, a dispute between the parties arose and the operation was postponed. There will be a second try later today.

\* Following a not-very-successful BH bombardment and ground offensive, Sarajevo has been pounded with the heaviest artillery bombardment of recent months. Almost a thousand shells fell in one 9-hour period during the week.

\* Sniping by both sides is also on the increase. UNPROFOR has taken three sniping casualties in the past week.

\* WHO experts suggest that the biggest humanitarian problem facing Sarajevo at the moment may be water. Recent shelling has cut the electricity to the Bacevo pumping station and has further disrupted the water distribution system. In addition, the Serbs have now cut off water coming from Moscanica, the small back-up system the city used to use when Bacevo was not functioning. The amount of available water in Sarajevo has consequently shrunk considerably. The incidence of Hepatitis A in the city is increasing. An epidemic is possible.

\* The BH government appears to be trying to clamp down on organized crime, which has been spiralling out of control in Sarajevo recently. Warrants have been issued for the arrest of BH Xth Mountain Brigade Commander Musan Topalovic (better known as 'Caco') and Ramiz Delalic ('Celo'), Deputy Commander of the BH IXth Mechanized Brigade. Both are prominent figures of the gangland underworld.



\* In Central Bosnia the struggle between the BH and Croats continues. UNPROFOR has been caught in the middle, and the UN's aid operation is grinding to a halt.

\* A UN convoy was caught in BH-Croat cross-fire near Travnik yesterday. One Danish UNHCR driver was killed and 11 people were injured -- 9 UN soldiers and two Croatian nationals employed by UNHCR. As a result an order has been issued in the name of the Secretary General closing the UN main supply route (Route Diamond) and suspending all aid to Central Bosnia. The suspension of aid is likely to seriously aggravate the antagonism directed against the UN in Central Bosnia. To limit the backlash and to get the aid flowing again soon, Civil Affairs is proposing that the Zagreb office of the Centre for Human Rights be tasked to undertake an urgent investigation this affair.

\* The BH has launched an offensive against the HVO enclave of Vares.

Vares, which lies astride the main road joining Central Bosnia to the Northern BH redoubt of Tuzla, has been in a difficult political situation for some time. The Croats to the South are violently anti-BH; but the Croats to the North fight alongside the BH without obvious conflict. Vares has tried to avoid taking sides. Recently, however, HVO authorities have been making overtures to the Serbs, to whom they are connected by a single road. This was apparently too much for the BH, which is reported to have put three brigades into the offensive. The Croats are retreating -- so far in good order -- and are evacuating their people.

There are a number of Muslim villages in the HVO-controlled area of Vares. One of these, Stupni Do, seems to have been the site of a massacre by Croats. Local residents are reporting that only about 20 of the 250 inhabitants of the village escaped alive. NordicBat, whose area of responsibility extends to Vares, is trying to get into the village, but the HVO has sealed it off. HVO COS Petkovic has indicated that the HVO is conducting its own investigation and that two people have already been arrested. He has promised to try and get UNPROFOR in, but so far without results. This is another area in which an immediate investigation by the Centre for Human Rights is called for.

\* In Northern Bosnia a great deal of attention is being paid to the question of Tuzla airport.

There are four interested parties: the BH, the Serbs, UNHCR and UNPROFOR.

- The BH wants the airport open for commercial traffic.

- The Serbs want it to stay closed until Banja Luka airport is opened. As a rail-back position the Serbs might be willing accept an arrangement along the lines of Sarajevo airport (ie complete UN control, evacuation by the warring factions, presence of BH and Serb Liaison Officers).



- UNHCR wants the airport opened.

- UNPROFOR insists that it remains closed, at least until its "no-fly" mandate is changed. UNPROFOR's present mandate simply does not allow for the factions to operate their own airports. The UN must have full control, as it does in Sarajevo.

Until recently this conflict of goals has kept the airport closed. The BH side, however, is showing signs of moving. It seems now to recognize two critical points. First, BH authorities appear to accept that although Serb territory does not adjoin the airport, that they control it with their fire and that their agreement must therefore be secured. Second, they recognize that the UN will only let it be opened if the BH evacuates it altogether -- earlier they had only offered to "demilitarize" it.

\* In Western Bosnia the situation seems to be settling into a stalemate. Drekovic's pro-Sarajevo V Corps forces control about three quarters of the pocket's 300,000 inhabitants, Abdic controls about one quarter, mainly in the northernmost opstina of Velika Kladusa. Neither side seems willing or able to use military force to resolve the crisis. Abdic seems to be trying to win back lost areas of his Autonomous Province by political means: he is working vigorously to make sure that the pocket is safe and reasonably prosperous. His methods are enraging Sarajevo.

Abdic has signed two Joint Declarations this week. The first was with Bosnian Croat leader Boban; the second was with Bosnian Serb leader Karadzic. The content of the two declarations was much the same. The sides agreed to stop fighting, to allow freedom of movement and to broaden their (already-considerable) commercial links. To add insult to Sarajevo's injury, the Joint Declarations refer to BH as "the Bosnian Republic" -- a name which implies that the BH is not a sovereign state, but one of three equal constituent republics.

\* In the BH enclaves the bleak situation has improved slightly. Military activity has been limited in the East. To the West, a long-awaited convoy has got through to the estimated 30,000 people of Maglaj/Tesanj -- the first relief for that area since it was cut off three months ago. UNHCR reports that the situation in Maglaj/Tesanj is appalling, with starving people living in cellars under almost constant fire.

### The Bosnian Serbs

\* The Bosnian Serbs appear to be using a two-track policy. The first track is negotiations, the second is military pressure designed to balance the military effectiveness of the BH and the HVO.



\* The Serbs are taking their civilian political negotiations with the BH side seriously. Karadzic has appointed his Vice President, Koljevic, chief negotiator at the High-Level Committee for Cooperation. That Committee is making progress -- though relatively slow progress -- on a number of humanitarian issues: convoy routes, fuel for Sarajevo, freedom of movement for civilian minorities wishing to leave their homes, etc.

\* The Serbs are also applying military pressure on the BH. This pressure seems designed not so much to take territory as to force the BH to keep its troops engaged -- the object, perhaps, being to provide relief to the hard-pressed forces of the HVO. Military parity between the BH Armija and the HVO is a long-standing objective of the Serbs.

The Serb "pressure" has consisted mainly of increased artillery bombardments around the Northern corridors and around Sarajevo. Following a consistent tit-for-tat pattern, the Serb bombardment of Sarajevo began after a BH bombardment of Serb positions on the main Pale road.

Civil Affairs assesses that the Serbs, although they are flexing their military muscles, will not launch a full-scale offensive. That would bring unwanted attention from the international community, and it could strain relations between Pale and Belgrade (Belgrade wants a peace settlement in BH in order to get sanctions against it lifted). The Serbs may start giving more material support to the HVO if the HVO continues to lose ground to the BH Armija.

\* The question of Bosnia is a major issue in the election in Serbia. Milosevic is going to the polls under pressure from Seselj's extremist Serbian Radical Party. Seselj, who is a Bosnian Serb, is accusing Milosevic of having "sold out" the Bosnian Serbs. Substantial gains by him in the upcoming elections would probably lead to a serious increase in military action from the Bosnian Serbs.

### Bosnian Croats

\* For several weeks the Bosnian Croats have been very quiet, concentrating, reasonably successfully, on resisting military pressure from the BH Armija in the Lasva, Vrbas and Neretva Valleys, and now around Vares.

\* The BH-Croat detainee release programme ground to a halt shortly after it began -- but not before more than 1,000 detainees were released (about 20% of the total number slated for release). The normal problems arose: the BH side insisted on having information about people believed to be dead but officially listed as "missing"; the HVO started to impose unacceptable conditions. At the end of the week the top political leaders gave orders for their sides to withdraw the conditions and linkages that had stopped the process. More releases are therefore scheduled for the coming week.



\* HVO COS Petkovic entered into (yet another) agreement with UNPROFOR on arrangements for the repair of the Bijela Bridge on the main Mostar-Sarajevo road. Shortly after this agreement, another bridge, two-and-a-half kilometers Northwest of Bijela, was destroyed. Engineers assume that the HVO is responsible, though there is no direct evidence as the bridge crosses the Neretva River which marks the confrontation line between BH and HVO forces.

\* The HVO continues to be on the political defensive, accused of a number of major war crimes in Herzegovina, in Central Bosnia and, especially, around Vares.

\* The humanitarian situation in East Mostar continues to get worse. UN personnel are still having great difficulty in securing access through HVO-controlled West Mostar. Widespread suffering can be expected during the winter months.

\* The Croats -- even more than the other sides -- continue to use UNPROFOR as a scapegoat for their problems (most recently blaming UNPROFOR for the failure of the scheduled medevacs from Nova Bila). The Croat media, both local and Zagreb, paints a picture of UNPROFOR not so much as ineffectual as actively advancing the cause of the Muslims. The suspension of aid to Central Bosnia (which will directly affect the HVO pocket around the Lasva Valley town of Vitez) will certainly be grist for the Croat propaganda mill.

*Best regards*  
*[Signature]*

UNOG Telecomm. Unit  
Palais des Nations

CNZ 908 CYZ 781 P1/1

010/9

OUTGOING CODE CABLE  
'93 OCT 26 -5 :01

TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

FOR COT

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA ✓

FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

DATE: 25 OCTOBER 1993

NUMBER: MSC-2069

1993 OCT 25 P 9:46

UNATIONS

SUBJECT: Harassment of UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina

I have noted with great concern the increasing number of incidents in B+H in which UNPROFOR units are being harassed, endangered or their equipment is taken away by force. I would appreciate an assessment and your comments as to whether the situation has deteriorated to such an extent that it should formally be brought to the attention of the Security Council.

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010/9/

UNITED NATIONS



Office of the  
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL  
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

FAX TRANSMITTAL SHEET

To: OFFICE OF THE SRSG  
ATTENTION: MR W C STROMMEN

From: K VOLLEBAEK

Info:

Date: 25 October 1993

Subject: AGREEMENTS REACHED BY ABDIC  
WITH MILOSEVIC, KARADZIC AND BOBAN

---

Attached is a translation of the agreements reached by Abdic with Milosevic, Karadzic and Boban.

Karadžić — Abdić Declaration of 22 October 1993

1

At the invitation of the President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, and motivated by the goal of securing a durable peace between the Serbs and Moslems in the area of former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the President of the Republic of Srpska, Radovan Karadžić, and the President of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia, Fikret Abdić, have met in Belgrade and decided to propose, jointly, and with the involvement of the President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, the following

#### D E C L A R A T I O N

1. The Republic of Srpska recognizes the existence, the will of the people, and the legal authority of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia, one of the three constituent Republics of the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as defined by the Owen and Stoltenberg Peace Plan.

2. The Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia recognizes the existence, the will of the people, and the legal authority of the Republic of Srpska, one of the three constituent Republics of the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as defined by the Owen and Stoltenberg Peace Plan.

3. Presidents Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić, in the name of their citizens and Governments, solemnly proclaim the peace, and declare the start of the building of good neighborly relations and universal cooperation in the fields of politics, economy, traffic and communications, culture, sports, and other fields.

4. Full freedom of movement shall be guaranteed to all citizens of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia through the entire territory of the Republic of Srpska, and to all citizens of the Republic of Srpska through the entire territory of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia, with the official travel or personal identity documents issued by the relevant authorities of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia, or the Republic of Srpska, respectively.



Karadžić -- Abdić Declaration of 22 October 1993

2

5. The borders between the Republic of Srpska and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia shall be opened at the locations to be determined by the Representatives of the Governments of the Republic of Srpska and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia, within 48 hours of the pronouncement of this Declaration. The border crossings shall be opened and put in order, on the basis of agreement of both sides, within 7 (seven) days of the pronouncement of this Declaration.

6. All fundamental freedoms and human rights, as provided for by the relevant international legal instruments, shall be mutually guaranteed, in accordance with the Owen and Stoltenberg Peace Plan.

7. All persons officially proven to have violated the provisions of international legislation of the conduct of war, shall be prosecuted before the regular Courts of Law of the Republic of Srpska and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia, respectively.

8. The right to return to their hearths, should they desire to do so, shall be recognized to all persons displaced from them by the civil war.

9. Presidents Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić shall appoint a Border Commission with the mandate to demarcate the borders between the Republic of Srpska and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia, within 7 (seven) days. Here, the most notable task shall be the demarcation of the borders in the area of the town of Krupa on the right bank of river Una.

10. Presidents Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić reaffirm that free passage to all international humanitarian aid convoys shall be facilitated on the entire territories of the Republic of Srpska and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia, with the aim of providing help to all those who may need it.

11. Presidents Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić express their hope that the leadership of the Republic of Bosnia in Sarajevo shall join this Declaration, and emphasize their readiness to start the talks to that effect immediately.

Karadžić — Abdić Declaration of 22 October 1993

3

12. Presidents Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić express their gratitude to the President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, for the great contribution he has given to the arrangement of the just and durable peace between the Republic of Srpska and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia.

In Belgrade, 22 October 1993

PRESIDENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF SRPSKA

Dr Radovan Karadžić

PRESIDENT OF THE AUTONOMOUS  
PROVINCE OF WESTERN BOSNIA  
OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA

Fikret Abdić

Witness to the agreement achieved,  
and assuming the obligation to  
mediate in the case of difficulties  
arising in its implementation:

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Slobodan Milošević

---

(End of text)



## JOINT STATEMENT

President of the Croatian Republic of Herceg Bosnia Mate Boban  
and  
President of the AP Western Bosnia Fikret Abdic

Accepting the principles of the London conference and taking into consideration provisions for the constitution of the future Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, put forward by the Geneva Peace Conference;

Respecting the traditional interests of the Croatian and the Muslim peoples;

Convinced of the need for the permanent confidence building between the Croatian and the Muslim peoples and for the implementation of efficient measures thereof;

Respecting the Declaration and the Geneva agreements between the representatives of the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina of 14 September 1993;

## WE STATE

1. In the light of the excellent cooperation between the Croats and the Muslims in the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, whose legitimate authorities and predominantly Muslim population have been exposed to attacks by the B&H Army, we are determined to exert efforts on the cessation of all hostilities in the territory of the Union of the Republics and on the establishment of an immediate and lasting cease fire in the territory of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. To that effect the HVO units for the Bihac region will remain incorporated into the armed forces of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia.

2. Changes in the B&H Presidency by a faction of the Presidency led by Alija Izetbegovic we consider un-constitutional and illegal because a member can be dismissed from the Presidency only if he hands in his resignation or if he has been revoked by his constituency. That act, which runs contrary to the Geneva agreement and the arrangements for the establishment of friendship and cooperation between the Croats and the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, brought an end to the last remaining democratically elected institution in B&H.

3. The signatories of this statement are committed to the establishment of the closest possible relations between the Autonomous republic of Western Bosnia and the Croatian Republic Herceg Bosnia, in the Union of the Republics of B&H.

4. By the same token we are calling on all the parties to strictly respect internationally recognized human rights and freedoms and to ensure unrestricted movement of humanitarian convoys and civilians.

Zagreb, 21 October 1993.

President of the Croatian Republic  
Herceg Bosnia

Mate Boban

President of the AP  
Western Bosnia

Fikret Abdic



*Translation from Serbian*

Acting on the initiative of the President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević,

Determined to achieve durable peace between the Serbs and the Moslems on the territory of the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

the President of the Serbian Republic, Radovan Karadžić, and the President of the Autonomous Province Western Bosnia of the Bosnian Republic, Fikret Abdić, met in Belgrade and, jointly and with the mediation of the President of the Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milošević, made the following

D E C L A R A T I O N

1. The Serbian Republic acknowledges the existence, the will of the citizens and the legal authorities of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Bosnian Republic, one of the three constituent republics of the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it is envisaged by the Owen - Stoltenberg Peace Plan.

2. Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Bosnian Republic acknowledges the existence, the will of the citizens and the legal authorities of the Serbian Republic, one of the three constituent republics of the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as it is envisaged by the Owen - Stoltenberg Peace Plan.

3. The Presidents, Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić, in the name of their citizens and their Governments, are solemnly signing a peace declaration and announcing the beginning of good neighbourly relations and co-operation in all domains: politics, economy, traffic, culture, sport and so on.

4. Full freedom of movement on the whole of the territory of the Serbian Republic is guaranteed to all citizens of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Bosnian Republic, provided they are in possession official passport or identity card. Likewise, the citizens of the Serbian Republic are guaranteed full freedom of movement on the whole of the territory of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Bosnian Republic, under the same conditions.

5. The borders between the Serbian Republic and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Bosnian Republic shall be opened on the points determined by the Governments of the Serbian Republic and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Bosnian Republic, 48 hours upon the proclamation of this Declaration and the border crossings shall be established and opened, as agreed upon by the two parties, no later than 7 days upon the proclamation of this declaration.



6. Both parties guarantee all freedoms and human rights stipulated in the relevant international legal instruments and political agreements, in accordance with the Owen - Stoltenberg Peace Plan.

7. All persons who are officially found guilty of breaching the international martial law shall be tried in the courts of the Serbian Republic and the courts of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Bosnian Republic.

8. All persons who have left their homes during the civil war shall be permitted to return to them if they so wish.

9. The Presidents Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić will appoint a Commission for Territorial Delimitation within 7 (seven) days, with the task of defining borders between the Serbian Republic and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Bosnian Republic, with the special attention to be given to the border in the area of the town of Krupa on the right bank of the river Una.

10. The Presidents Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić confirm once again that all the convoys carrying international humanitarian aid will be permitted free passage on the whole of the territory of the Serbian Republic and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Bosnian Republic so that the humanitarian aid can reach all those who need it.

11. The Presidents Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić express the hope that the leadership of the Republic of Bosnia in Sarajevo will adhere to this Declaration and stress their readiness to begin talks with them in respect to that matter.

12. The Presidents Radovan Karadžić and Fikret Abdić express gratitude to the President of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, for the contribution he gave to the signing of the agreement on a just and durable peace between the Serbian Republic and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Bosnian Republic.

Done in Belgrade, 22 October 1993

PRESIDENT OF THE SERBIAN REPUBLIC:

PRESIDENT OF THE  
AUTONOMOUS PROVINCE OF  
THE BOSNIAN REPUBLIC:

Dr Radovan Karadžić

Fikret Abdić

WITNESSED BY:

Slobodan Milošević

who commits himself to act as mediator  
in case of difficulties arising in the implementation  
of this agreement

(ORIGINAL SIGNED)



На позив председника Републике Србије Слободана Милошевића мотивисаним циљем да се између Срба и Муслимана на просторима бивше југословенске републике Босне и Херцеговине закључи трајан мир, у Београду су се састали председник Републике Српске Радован Караџић и председник Аутономне Покрајине Западна Босна Републике Босне Фикрет Абдић и одлучили да, заједнички и уз ангажовање председника Републике Србије Слободана Милошевића, донесу следећу

### Д Е К Л А Р А Ц И Ј У

1. Република Српска узимава постојање, вољу грађана и легалну власт Аутономне Покрајине Западна Босна Републике Босне, једне од трију конститутивних република Уније Босне и Херцеговине, како је предвиђено Мировним планом Озена и Столтенберга.
2. Аутономна Покрајина Западна Босна Републике Босне узимава постојање, вољу грађана и легалну власт Републике Српске, једне од трију конститутивних република Уније Босне и Херцеговине, како је предвиђено Мировним планом Озена и Столтенберга.
3. Председници Радован Караџић и Фикрет Абдић, у име својих грађана и влада, сачекао закључују мир и објављују почетак изградње добросуседских односа и свестране сарадње на политичком, економском, саобраћајном, културном, спортском и другом плану.
4. Гарантује се потпуна слобода кретања свих грађана Аутономне Покрајине Западна Босна Републике Босне кроз читаву територију Републике Српске и грађана Републике Српске кроз читаву територију Аутономне Покрајине Западна Босна Републике Босне, уз показивање званичних путке или личне исправе издате од надлежних органа Аутономне Покрајине Западна Босна, односно Републике Српске.
5. Границе између Републике Српске и Аутономне Покрајине Западна Босна Републике Босне отвориће се на местима која одраде представници влада Републике Српске и Аутономне Покрајине Западна Босна Републике Босне, 48 часова по објављивању ове Декларације, а гранични прелази у целини отвориће се и уредити, на основу сагласности двеју страна, у року од 7 /седан/ дана по објављивању

11. Председници Радован Караџић и Фихрет Абдић изрежавају заду да ће се руководство Републике Босне у Сарајеву прикључити овој Декларацији и наглашавају спремност да о томе са њим одмах поведу разговоре.



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
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12. Председници Радован Караџић и Фикрет Абдић изражавају захвалност председнику Републике Србије Слободану Милошевићу на великом доприносу који је дао ваључењу правичног и трајног мира између Републике Српске и Аутономне По-  
крајине Западна Босна Републике Босне.

У Београду, 22.10.1993 године


ПРЕДСЕДНИК РЕПУБЛИКЕ СРПСКЕ

Др Радован Караџић



ПРЕДСЕДНИК АП ЗАПАДНА БОСНА  
РЕПУБЛИКЕ БОСНЕ

Фикрет Абдић



Сведочи о постигнутом споразуму и  
преузима обавезу да посредује у  
случају настанка тензија у везом  
спровођењу

ПРЕДСЕДНИК РЕПУБЛИКЕ СРБИЈЕ

Слободан Милошевић



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UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE  
M O S T I M M E D I A T E

Page 01 of 05

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| Outgoing Fax Number: 553                              | Date: 15 October 1993  |
| To: H.E. Ambassador Masset<br>ICFY<br>Geneva          | From: Li Chuansheng<br>OIC, Civil Affairs<br>Belgrade <i>L. Chuansheng</i> |
| Fax No: 41 22 917 0081                                | Fax Inmarsat: 873-1512477<br>or Belgrade: 38-11-609368                     |
| Attn.   | Ref.<br>Originator:  |
| Info: Mohamed Abdul-Aziz, SPAO, Civil Affairs, Zagreb |  |
| Subject: President Milosevic's Talks with R. Karadzic |  |

I believe you have received the 10 page press coverage on the above mentioned meeting we sent to you earlier.

The UNPROFOR Press Summary contains much analysis of the meeting between President Milosevic and R. Karadzic. I basically agree with the analysis.

This present development, I think, should be interpreted in the context of the difficulties President Milosevic have been facing lately. And these difficulties have apparently been multiplied by both the Bosnian Parliament's rejection of the Bosnian peace package late September and the recent conflict in the Krajina leadership.

Upset by and opposed to the suggestion of a "global approach" to the settlement of all the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, President Milosevic has been eager to find a way out for the FRY and also for himself. It is without doubt that he will continue to make positive contributions to the reconvening of the Bosnian peace talks. But at the same time, in terms of diplomatic tactics, the

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announcement of his talks with R. Karadzic and the official press coverage point to Milosevic's two more immediate concerns: political isolation of Bosnian President Izetbegovic and improvement of his own standing both internationally and at home.

In a way, the conflict in the Krajina leadership is a reflection of the on-going contention for influence between President Milosevic and the Serbian Radical Party's leader Seselj in Krajina. Therefore, the result of the proposed November elections in Krajina could have a major bearing on Milosevic's own standing in the FRY, as a victory for the "RSK" Interior Minister Milan Martic could further weaken Milosevic's foothold in Krajina which has already been overtaken by Seselj's. In this context, a major diplomatic initiative on Bosnia would probably prop up Milosevic's position in the FRY.

The following are also for your information:

ONE: Excerpts from "Note on CAC's Conversation with the Canadian Charge d'Affaires", 14 October 1993

Yesterday morning (14 October), CAC Jeannie Peterson called on the Canadian Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade Mrs. Mary Mosser. Mrs. Mosser showed great interest on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the prospects of the renewal of the peace talks. She told Ms Peterson that she met that morning with her interlocutor at the FRY Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who expressed tremendous optimism of the prospects of a revival of the talks on the future of Bosnia. This optimism was partly based on indications from the Bosnian Serbs, to the effect that they said they were willing to make more concessions, even in terms of another 4 per cent of territory. The Canadian Charge d'Affaires apparently wanted to compare notes with the CAC on this as she herself was rather sceptical of this.

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- 3 -

Another impression the Canadian Charge d'Affaires got from her interlocutor at the MFA was that the FRY authorities seemed to have been much upset by the idea of <sup>4</sup> "global approach" on the settlement of various conflicts in the former Yugoslavia. The FRY Government, her interlocutor remarked, would want to see the Bosnian issue settled first and then the "intractable" Krajina issue taken up.

TWO: "Appeal to the Serbs for Restraint"

Editorial of Politika, 15 October 1993

(See next two pages)

Best regards.



POLITIKA 15 October 1993  
Editorial

*Slobodan Milosevic discussed the peace plan for B&H with  
the "RS" leadership and the Serbian Premier*

### APPEAL TO THE SERBS FOR RESTRAINT

Yesterday in Belgrade **Slobodan Milosevic** and the Serbian Premier **Nikola Sainovic** met with the President of the "RS" **Radovan Karadzic** and the "RS" Parliament President **Momcilo Krajisnik** where they discussed the situation in the former B&H.

It was assessed that the requests for the establishment of peace, which are getting louder all the time, coming from the Bosnian Moslems together with the confrontations between the citizens of Western Bosnia and the regime in Sarajevo and demonstrations held in Tuzla, central Bosnia and especially in Zenica against the extension of the war, are clearly showing that the political forces which had pushed Bosnia into the war have receding support of the Moslems in B&H.

It is without doubt that the policy of war and divisions is urged by only a handful of officials and a part of the army controlled by extremists.

At yesterday's meeting it was unanimously assessed that under such circumstances the leadership, citizens and the Army of the "RS" should contribute to the acceleration of the peace process through their actions in the following way:

- 1) they will strictly respect the ceasefire in the whole territory of B&H;
- 2) they will render full humanitarian assistance to the Moslem civilian population, which is faced with intensified conflicts and is seeking refuge in territories under "RS" control and is requesting refuge in FRY, at the same time enabling the accommodation of refugees;
- 3) they will provide free access to humanitarian organizations and unhindered passage to convoys in their complete territory;
- 4) they will return to the negotiating table the complete agreement on peace that had been previously offered, because there is no doubt now that it was not rejected by the wish of the people, but exclusively by the will of a part of the leadership that is linked with outside factors that are in favour of the continuation of war.

/It was.....

It was concluded that under such circumstances a constructive and generous approach by the Serb side towards Moslems and their interests was necessary because of the difficulties which the Moslem nation in B&H is facing. The message from today's meeting was that those who are sincerely for peace will not play on the card of divisions which have surfaced among the Moslems. Instead, with their peaceful constructive and generous behaviour they will accelerate the peace process and enable the establishment of a just and permanent peace.

The truth should be shown both to the Moslems in Bosnia and to the Moslem countries worldwide that the Serb nation is not an enemy of the Moslems and that for the unfortunate war, that was forced on the Serb nation in B&H, the Serb nation is not blaming the Bosnian Moslems, but the extreme political forces which have turned the Bosnian Moslems into a tragic resource for the civil war.

At yesterday's meeting in Belgrade full accord was reached on the need for the "RS" authorities to make the initiative, both on the ground and through the mechanisms of the Geneva Conference, in the aim of establishing conditions for the acceleration of the peace process in such a way as to give the advantage to direct contacts of the three sides.

The participants of yesterday's meeting sent an appeal to the Croat and Moslem sides to end the war raging between them, and at the same time called the Croatian side to return the peace package, from their side, to the negotiating table and continue negotiations.

The offer for permanent peace and guarantees that they will not be attacked anywhere by the Serb side is the only humane position in the difficulties in which the Moslem nation in B&H found itself now, was written at the end of the announcement.

CIVIL AFFAIRS/MV  
UNPROFOR/BELGRADE



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IMMEDIATE

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TO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA  
STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB

FROM: SCOT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

INFO: BRIQUEMONT, BH COMMAND, KISELJAK

DATE: OCT 13, 1993

93 OCT 13 12:51

UNOG Telecom. Unit  
Palais des Nations

NUMBER : UNPROFOR Z -1294

IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: MEETING WITH MR SILAJDZIC, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA IN ZAGREB, 12 OCTOBER 1993.

1. At his own request, Mr Silajdzic called upon the FC and saw him for one hour.

2. The main topic of concern was Bihac. Mr Silajdzic asked the FC not to favour Mr Abdic and to route future convoys via the Licko-Petrovo Selo crossing point, in order to break Mr Abdic's monopoly. The FC assured him that UNPROFOR would remain neutral and that there was no intention of favouring one party or the other.

3. Mr Silajdzic then asked for UNPROFOR's help for a meeting at Sarajevo Airport on 13 October 1993, during which he was to meet Mr Krajisnik and Generals Mladic and Delic, on the subject of prisoner exchanges. UNPROFOR's help might also be required for a meeting in Konjic on the same subject, on 14 October. The FC assured him that he would pass on this information to BH Command.

4. Taking advantage of this visit, the FC broached the matter of the Peace Agreement and the Bosnian's refusal to sign. He pointed out that he was surprised that the Military Commanders were not aware of the map and he then asked what would become of the populations.

5. Mr Silajdzic said that everyone knew the map, but that it was not accepted. It existed only as an outline and it was impossible to sort out the proposed modifications, or to get an accurate idea of its configuration on the ground.

6. As for the populations, Mr Silajdzic understood the FC's concerns. He felt that the populations would follow the armies in their withdrawal and there would therefore be large transfers that would be difficult to stop.

7. Touching upon the matter of the Bijela Bridge, the FC reiterated BH Command's position and announced that UNPROFOR would take control of the bridge. Mr Silajdzic welcomed this, stressing in conclusion that, in fact, he wished for a UN/NATO protectorate over Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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 UNITED NATIONS  
 COMMUNICATIONS

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TO : STOLTENBERG, ICFY GENEVA

FROM : */m* STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR ZAGREB *Edin Thunberg*

DATE : 11 October 1993

SUBJECT : BH Weekly Political Assessment

... I attach, for your information, copy of the CAC's weekly assessment, which seems to us both interesting and rather sound.

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| OUTGOING FAX NO.  | DATE: 10 15:00 OCTOBER 1993   |
| TO: CEDRIC THORNBERRY, DCM<br>HQ, ZAGREB  | FROM: VICTOR ANDREEV, CAC<br>BH COMMAND KISELJAK                                      |
| FAX NO:   | FAX:  |
| ATTN: EMMA SHITAKHA<br>CIVIL AFFAIRS, ZAGREB  | FILE REF NO :<br>DRAFTER : DAVID HARLAND<br>TITLE :<br>RELEASING OFF :<br>SIGNATURE : |
| INFO : CMDR, LT GEN BRIQUEMONT -- (FORWARD)<br>COS, BRIG HAYES -- (KISELJAK)<br>G2, G3, G5<br>ECLO<br>ALL CIVIL AFFAIRS SUB-OFFICES |   |
| FAX NO :  |   |
| SUBJECT: Weekly political assessment: BH quiet -- no war, no<br>peace; no new initiatives; humanitarian crisis looming              |   |

## MESSAGE

Introduction

1. BH seems to be in limbo: no real war, no stable peace. The parties are focussing on implementing the bilateral Joint Declarations they made recently.
2. The Bosnian side has been torn by struggle between the government in Sarajevo and Abdic's Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia. At the week's end it looked likely that the two sides would come to some sort of peaceful accommodation.
3. The Serbs are increasingly preoccupied by events in Croatia and by the state of their economy. Since the collapse of the last peace initiative they have been talking a harder line than before. So far, however, they have not launched any military operations.

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4. In Sarajevo attention has been focused on how to deal with Abdic and his break-away Autonomous Province of West Bosnia (see below). As soon as Abdic announced his Autonomy Declaration, he was removed from the Presidency. He was replaced in the Presidency -- on doubtful constitutional grounds -- by Ljubjankic. The move seems to have somewhat weakened the legitimacy of the Presidency. Abdic gained more votes than any other candidate of any nationality in the free elections of 1990. He is overwhelmingly popular in his home area of West Bosnia, and has a considerable following among moderates on all sides of the conflict.

5. BH authorities are putting much stake in improving their relations with the Serbs. They feel that they might gain more by following up on the Joint Declaration than by signing an international peace agreement. So far, however, BH-Serb cooperation has not come to much. Izetbegovic and Karadzic signed their Joint Declaration in mid-September. The cease-fire element of this has been holding reasonably well. Other areas have not advanced as far. A signed agreement on the transport of solid fuel to Sarajevo has not yet been implemented (a further meeting on this subject will be held on Wednesday). Agreement has been reached on an exchange of prisoners in Central Bosnia, but so far no exchanges have occurred. The BH side has suggested a high-level meeting of civilian authorities on this issue. Karadzic has agreed, even suggesting that the status of the meeting be raised to the 'Foreign Minister' (Silajdzic-Krajsnik) level.

6. Izetbegovic spoke to the UN General Assembly during the week. If anything, the speech represented a slight hardening of the BH position. Izetbegovic laid much blame on the United Nations for what he described as its failure to implement its own resolutions. He called again for the principles of the London Conference to be upheld, for the arms embargo to be lifted, for formerly-Muslim territories to be given back, and for the international community to provide meaningful implementation guarantees for any peace settlement. The question of implementation guarantees is now foremost in the minds of the BH leaders. Some of these leaders, however, doubt whether the United States has a serious interest in an early peace. They perceive that the US may have an interest in keeping the Serbs 'engaged', and therefore weak, for some time.

7. For the first time, Izetbegovic spoke of the Sandzak Muslims as "the Bosnian minority in Serbia." He demanded that they be given the same status as the Serbs are insisting on for their people in Croatia.

8. Sarajevo officials indicate that they believe that the war will continue through the winter. Rather than placing their hopes on a general peace accord, BH authorities are working out how to reduce the humanitarian cost of another winter at war. They are particularly concerned about the Mostar-Sarajevo road.



Izetbegovic is calling on the UN to repair this road (there is a major break at the Bijela bridge between Mostar and Jablanica). He insists that the UN has a mandate to do this, even if the HVO objects. And, Izetbegovic insists, the UN has the mandate to use air strikes to defend itself if the HVO tries to stop engineering works or to obstruct the route once it is opened.

9. The BH attitude to the Croats is complicated. On the one hand, the Croats are an easier target than the Serbs -- and they have gained considerable territory from them since they began fighting in May. On the other hand, the BH is interested in gaining a respite from the fighting. Izetbegovic, when he negotiates with the Croats, usually goes straight to Tudjman and to his cabinet, by-passing the Bosnian Croat leadership altogether. The latest example of this is the Joint Declaration made this week in Vienna. Izetbegovic and Tudjman agreed that all territory disputed between Croats and Muslims in BH should be put under immediate NATO control. This agreement is likely to founder on NATO's reluctance to come in without a clear mandate.

10. The BH Armija has apparently been preparing for a major pre-winter offensive against the HVO for some time. It has not happened yet for reasons that are not clear.

11. In Central Bosnia BH and Serb regional authorities have held a second meeting. Municipal leaders from Zenica, Travnik, Banja Luka, Donji Vakuf and elsewhere met in Borik (just over the confrontation line at Turbe). The agenda included population exchange (which the Serbs are pushing strongly), telephone 'hot-lines' and trade. Following the pattern of Northern Bosnia, the parties, while acknowledging that their armies are fighting, seem quite keen to develop trade links, insisting that the war should not interfere with commercial ties. The coming winter seems to be adding impetus to these negotiations. The Turbe crossing could be the principal trade nexus.

12. Serb-Croat relations in Central Bosnia appear to be reasonably good. Commercial ties are booming -- mainly in the form of Croat communities paying Serbs for the right to transport goods across Serb-controlled territory. HVO units continue to transit across Serb territory without obvious problems. One problem that does emerge from time-to-time is the question of treatment of each other's minority populations.

13. The humanitarian outlook in Central Bosnia continues to worsen. Despite the recent increase in the flow of aid coming via Banja Luka, the humanitarian operation for Central Bosnia is still far from meeting its requirements for the region. With UNHCR's staff reduced because of recent security concerns, the ability of that organization to monitor deliveries and assess its operation is severely curtailed. Indications are that UNHCR is on the verge of requesting UNPROFOR assistance in carrying out its mandate in the region.



14. In Western Bosnia the BH political crisis continues.

15. As soon as Abdic made his Autonomy Declaration, Sarajevo objected, calling the Declaration unconstitutional. The pro-Sarajevo military, under the leadership of BH V Corps commander Drekovic, then proceeded to attempt to force Abdic to back down. Both sides seemed to realize, however, that widespread Muslim-Muslim violence would be a catastrophe. V Corps has therefore sought to reassert Sarajevo's authority without resorting to full-scale military operations.

16. Negotiations have been difficult. Sarajevo sent a State Delegation to the pocket led by BH Armija Commander Delic. Abdic refused to meet with this delegation, though he did give representation at a lower level. Abdic has insisted that he must negotiate directly with Izetbegovic.

17. Despite the fact that V Corps is mostly under pro-Sarajevo control, Abdic appears not to be beaten. First, he and his Initiative seems genuinely popular in the region. This gives his cause a certain legitimacy. Second, a purely military operation by V Corps would be a political disaster for the Sarajevo government -- and it might not even bring the quick military victory Sarajevo would need. Third, Abdic is toying with Croatia and the Krajina Serbs. If Sarajevo pushes Abdic too far, Abdic may be able to use his influence with the Serbs and Croats to frustrate the central government. Abdic is scheduled to meet Karadzic, and possibly Tudjman, in the very near future.

18. Civil Affairs in Western Bosnia assesses that Abdic, though still carrying many important cards, has lost the necessary momentum for victory. A face-saving negotiated solution is therefore likely. The parties may ask for the good offices of UNPROFOR in these negotiations.

### Bosnian Croats

19. The Bosnian Croats have been rather quiet in the past week. The main areas of BH-HVO conflict (Lasva Valley, Vrbas Valley, Neretva Valley) continue to see fighting, but without any major change in the situation.

20. Military activity in the Lasva Valley is likely to increase in the near future. Every peace proposal discussed so far places the Lasva Valley under the control of the Croats, connected to the main body of Croat territory to the south via Prozor. The BH clearly doesn't like this, and is willing to expend men and resources to further divide the Lasva pocket and to seize important objectives. The BH III Corps is focusing on the ammunition factory in Vitez. Meanwhile the HVO commander in Gornji Vakuf is talking of a push north to the Lasva Valley. The BH objectives are perhaps more realistic, though the BH has been having more trouble than anticipated in the region. The last major effort to take the factory from the HVO signally failed.



21. The BH-HVO agreement on the protection of civilians in the Mostar area has failed. The hospital in East Mostar -- one of the institutions seen as being in particular need of relief -- has continued to come under heavy shelling. The situation there seems to be getting worse rather than better.

22. Under the auspices of the ICRC -- and following talks between Izetbegovic and Croat officials including Croatian Foreign Minister Granic -- a very large detainee-release operation has been organized. During the next 8 days 1,500 Croat and 4,000 Muslim detainees are slated for release; most are being held in different parts of Southern Bosnia. The first group of 300+ detainees (Croats from near Konjic) are scheduled to be taken to Mostar under UNPROFOR escort on Monday 11 October. Given the almost total lack of good will between the sides, however, the operation seems likely to fail.

### Bosnian Serbs

23. The Bosnian Serbs are increasingly preoccupied by events in Croatia. Both Dr Karadzic and Gen Mladic have made strong public statements recently warning Croatia that the wider Serb community is standing firmly behind the Krajina Serbs. The President of the Serb Assembly, Krajsnik, has stated that, if Croatia does not deal with Krajina in a diplomatic way, then "we may soon come to a situation in which we are forced to make a request at the state level for the unification of the Serbs in the whole region." The Krajina Serbs have been making similar statements. RSK leader Hadzic has stated that "we want to live in a united state with other Serbs in the Balkans," and, "wherever a Serb soldier is, that is a Serb state."

24. The Serbs are also very concerned about the state of their economy. The main problem is international trade sanctions on Serbia. The Serbs are insisting that these be lifted as a precondition for signing any peace accord. Karadzic admits openly that the recent unrest in Banja Luka was sparked by economic hardship. The concern of the Serb leadership seems to be that economic unrest can be easily manipulated by radical political forces. The growth of more radical forces in the Serb community could be a threat to Karadzic's own position.

25. Recent public statements by the Serbs have been more hard-line than usual. The Serb Assembly has officially withdrawn the territorial concessions made as a part of the now-defunct Geneva peace package (though they have stated that they are still interested in a negotiated settlement). Karadzic has stated that he would prefer not to have a united Sarajevo -- under anybody's administration -- and that he would prefer a divided city in which the Serb-held area of Grbavica was exchanged for BH-held areas in the West of the city.

26. Despite the hard talk, the Serbs have been rather quiet militarily. The shelling in Northern Bosnia continues (they are serious about taking and holding the Brcko area), and shelling



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PAGE 2  
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## CODE RESTRICTED

has increased somewhat in civilian areas of Sarajevo. There have been no ground offensives, however.

27. The Bosnian Serbs have a dilemma. When they are quiet, the BH side senses weakness and becomes more hard-line. When the Serbs go on the offensive, the BH side comes to the negotiating table, as happened after the Igman episode. The Serbs want an early peace settlement, and the best way for them to get it would be to apply military pressure. Pressure on them from Serbia, which wants sanctions lifted, and from the international community, however, makes that almost impossible. Thus the only way in which they can apply real pressure on the BH is by holding the territories they have and by making difficulties for the flow of humanitarian aid. Mladic has threatened to squeeze the aid routes recently, though so far nothing has happened (indeed, UNHCR has delivered 7,000T of aid in the last week -- not too far from a record).

28. The Serbs are actively encouraging the growth of trade between themselves and the other parties. They already have very considerable links with HVO territory, and links with BH-controlled territory looks set to expand, both in Central and Northern Bosnia.

29. The mayor of Banja Luka, Radic, believes that international humanitarian organizations should become involved in 'voluntary' population exchanges. Radic is proposing that people who are willing to move voluntarily should be adequately documented with regard to property, education, skills, etc., so that matches can be made in the area to which they will be exchanged. The advantage of this system, according to Radic, is that the moving parties will know that they are going to an area where they will be able to find a livelihood and a comparable standard of living.

30. The Serbs have established a State Commission for Cooperation with UN Agencies. It will be headed by Koljevic 'Vice-President of the Republic of Srpska'.

best regards  
V. Koljevic



1993-10-07 15:24

1993-10-07 15:51

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UN GENEVA

UNPROFOR ZAGREB

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MOST IMMEDIATE

MOST IMMEDIATE

UNPROFOR  
COMMUNICATIONS

'93 OCT -7 14:51

1/2

TO: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK

INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA  
STOLTENBERG, ZAGREB  
DFC/COS/CMO/HCA.

FROM: COT, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB

DATE: 7 OCTOBER 1993

NUMBER: UNPROFOR 2- 1262

SUBJECT: MAGLAJ

DISTRIBUTION:

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6

1. As I mentioned several times during our discussions, I would not like to be asked to produce immediate replies each time a media specialized in propaganda publishes a news report.

2. Nevertheless, in response to your 1877 of 6 October, I must inform you that it is difficult for me to provide you with an update situation as I have no UNPROFOR personnel in the MAGLAJ area.

3. However, we have been in permanent discussion with the parties concerning the possibility of posting UNMOs in MAGLAJ.

4. The besieged town is currently airdrop supplied.

5. As soon as I have some relevant information on the military and humanitarian situation, I will forward it to you. In this connection, I am going to order air recce above this area.

6. On a different subject and unrelated to this question, I am transmitting to you an interesting text by the Duke of Wellington.

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03 OCT -7 14:54

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(...)

Le texte suivant fut écrit d'Espagne en 1810 par le duc de Wellington au Ministre de la Guerre du Royaume-Uni.

*En Campagne, 1810*

*Sir,*

*Si j'essaye de répondre à toute la correspondance inutile qui m'arrive, je ne pourrai plus m'occuper des choses sérieuses, à savoir : la guerre.*

*Je vous rappelle, et ceci pour la dernière fois, qu' aussi longtemps que je commande, je veillerai à ce que personne sous mon commandement ne soit embarrassé par des futilités émanant de vos bureaux; futilités qui l'empêchent de remplir son premier devoir qui est et sera toujours celui de conduire les hommes de telle façon que ceux-ci puissent battre l'ennemi sur le champ de bataille!*

*Je suis, Sir, de Votre Excellence.  
Le dévoué serviteur*

*Wellington*

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# UNPROFOR OPERATIONS

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ROUTINE

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| OUTGOING FAX NO. OPS 10020      | DATE/TIME: 071230A OCT 93                             |
| TO: UNNY                        | FROM: HQ UNPROFOR, ZAGREB<br>OPS CENTRE               |
| FAX NO.:                        | FAX :   |
| ATTN: UNPROFOR SITROOM, OIC     | FILE REF. NO.:<br>DRAFTER: MAJ BIGNON, ODO <i>319</i> |
| INFO:                           |   |
| SUBJECT: MAGLAJ                 |   |
| INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION: R, FILE, |   |

## **MESSAGE:**

Ref.: Our fax 1877/07 Oct 93.

In answer your referenced fax, no significant information can be provided because neither troops nor UNMOs are allowed to conduct patrol in this area.

According to ECMM, 25 % of the vital needs are covered, mainly by humanitarian airdrop supply. But this is not confirmed.

Best Regards.

*ACTION INFO*

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'93 OCT -7 -4 :21

OUTGOING CODE CABLE

MOST IMMEDIATE

TO: STOLTENBERG, UNPROFOR, ZAGREB ATTN: COT  
INFO: STOLTENBERG, GENEVA  
FROM: ANNAN, UNATIONS, NEW YORK  
DATE: 6 OCTOBER 1993  
NUMBER: 1877  
SUBJECT: Maglaj

*[Handwritten signature]*

173 OCT -6 P 10:03

The Reuters despatch below and associated media reporting quoting UN sources has raised concern here about the military and humanitarian situation around Maglaj. Most grateful you send us an urgent update for the information of the Security Council. We would appreciate receiving this by 0900 hours New York time on Thursday 7 October.

Elsewhere, fighting was reported around Maglaj in north-central Bosnia, and between Serbs and Muslims in eastern Bosnia in the Zvornik region and Olovo, Bosnian radio said. The UN said Maglaj, a mainly Muslim town, was under its 100th day of siege by Croat and Serb forces Wednesday. All sides reported some sniping and shelling in Sarajevo, and sniper fire could be heard in the morning. A UN spokesman, Maj. Idesbald van Biesebroeck, said Mostar's Muslim quarter had come under increased Croat shelling after a Muslim-Croat ceasefire fell apart. (REUTER)

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SRSG'S OFFICE

02-10-1993 11:07

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BH Command Kiseljak

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HQ BH COMMAND MAIN KISELJAK

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MHGB 539 tuz:

MHSA 482 tuz:

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UNCLASSIFIED/RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL/CRYPTO/ONLY

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| OUTGOING FAX NO.   | DATE: 03 10:00 OCTOBER 1993   |
| TO: CEDRIC THORNBERRY, DCM<br>HQ, ZAGREB   | FROM: VICTOR ANDREEV, CAC<br>BH COMMAND KISELJAK                                      |
| FAX NO:  | FAX:  |
| ATTN: EMMA SHITAKHA<br>CIVIL AFFAIRS, ZAGREB   | FILE REF NO :<br>DRAFTER : DAVID HARLAND<br>TITLE :<br>RELEASING OFF :<br>SIGNATURE : |
| INFO : CMDR, LT GEN BRIQUEMONT -- (FORWARD)<br>COS, BRIG HAYES -- (KISELJAK)<br>G2, G3, G5<br>ECLO<br>ALL CIVIL AFFAIRS SUB-OFFICES  |   |
| FAX NO :   |   |
| SUBJECT: BH weekly political assessment -- peace process in<br>disarray, but little eagerness to resume full-scale fighting -<br>- political radicalization threatens leaders' positions |   |

## MESSAGE

## Introduction

1. The Geneva peace process is in trouble. The BH side has asked that the map be redrawn. The Serbs have withdrawn the territorial concessions they had made. The Croats are set to do the same.
2. Despite this, no new fighting has broken out yet. Pressure on all the sides is intense, and an early agreement may still be possible. The three sides have bilateral cease-fire agreements with each other.
3. The humanitarian outlook for BH is bleak. BH-HVO fighting is affecting convoy routes from the Adriatic. The Serbs have signalled that they will be less cooperative. Winter is near.



6/19  
1993The rump BH

In Sarajevo the BH Assembly effectively rejected the latest peace package by attaching conditions which would be unacceptable to the other sides.

The pattern is now a familiar one. The BH insists that peace can be reached if the fighting dies down, and if certain 'final' concessions are made by the other sides. The other sides make some limited concessions (withdrawal from Igman, then access to the sea, then territories in the East), but peace never comes. Each time the concessions are made, the BH announces new demands.

In the run-up to the BH Assembly a meeting of the Bosnian Muslim community was held. It was the first time that the all-Bosnian Muslim Sabor had met, and the fact that it met at all was seen by many -- even inside the BH -- as a sign of the growing influence of the Islamic community in the BH. 73% of the 370 Sabor delegates voted to reject the proposed peace package unless all the territories which were predominantly Muslim before the war were returned.

The BH Assembly followed the Sabor. 4 delegates voted in favour of the package, 68 delegates voted either to reject the package outright or to impose conditions obviously unacceptable to the other sides.

BH President Izetbegovic has said that he has no new peace proposals but that he 'hopes' negotiations can be resumed soon, and that bilateral cease-fires with the other sides will hold. Izetbegovic's room for manoeuvre is affected by the continuing power-struggle in the BH. He is under pressure now not only from the radical hard-liners (Ganic, Silajdzic), but also from the increasingly assertive anti-war party (Abdic).

BH Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, Suljic, has said that territory is only one reason for rejecting the peace package. Another, which is even more important, is guarantees of implementation. He argues that there is simply no point in the BH signing any agreement if there is no way to enforce that agreement. They want clearer international guarantees; they want an implementation agreement signed at the same time as the peace agreement; and they want a new, much stronger, mandate for UNPROFOR. They would also like an international tribunal (backed by credible force) to deal with territorial issues separately -- after peace and reconstruction get under way.

BH hardliners confirm that the BH does not want to accept a bad deal now when Croatia appears close to war with the Serbs -- something that might greatly strengthen the relative position of the BH Armija.

BH politicians -- both hardliners and moderates -- argue that the BH has accepted the principle of secession by Serbs and Croats from the Union of Republics, and that the other sides should make compensating concessions. The argument is usually



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framed in this way: "If the Serbs and Croats want strict ethnic division; OK, but then all the lands which were Muslim-majority before the war must go to the Muslim republic."

Following the decision of the BH Assembly, BH Armija Commander Delic announced a unilateral cease-fire. This was ignored.

In Central and Southern Bosnia there is little sign of any Islamic radicalization. On the other hand, Armija commanders seem resigned to the fact that the war will continue for some time, and are making their plans accordingly. They believe that a peace agreement will be useless without NATO (or US) commitments to enforce the agreement. They doubt that the territories allocated to them (Mostar, Gornj Vakuf, Kresevo, Kiseljak etc) would be fully recovered without, at least, a credible threat of force from outside.

BH Commanders in the area do not project a coherent vision for the immediate future.

SpaBat detects an intention to push harder against Vrdi, Gornj Vakuf/Prozor and outward from Jablanica. Jablanica Brigade commander Zuka speaks strongly against signing any peace agreement until all Muslim objectives are reached.

There are some indications -- and HVO fears -- that the Armija may continue their offensive in the Lasva Valley, attempting to further divide the area.

UNPROFOR-BH Armija relations have deteriorated recently in Central Bosnia. The problem began some weeks ago when the BH implied that the HVO could not have conducted such an effective offensive on Grbavica (near BritBat) without being assisted by 'someone'. The Armija is now insisting on searching all BritBat vehicles.

There is a general feeling in Central Bosnia that another winter of war will be a humanitarian disaster for the area.

In Northern Bosnia the military situation has been stable. The Serbs keep up pressure around the perimeter. Inside the area BH-HVO cooperation is good.

More and more, however, Northern Bosnia is finding it difficult to cope with displaced people in the area. As in Central Bosnia, there is growing evidence of tension between long-term local residents and newly-arrived displaced persons (DPs). A delegation of DPs -- claiming to represent over 200,000 people -- recently met with the mayor of Tuzla and with humanitarian organizations. The DPs are becoming increasingly activist in their demands. They are threatening a hunger strike if they do not get more food (they are demanding 600g/day as against the current ration of 300g/day); they are putting up barricades, obstructing traffic and harassing UN vehicles.



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Economic links between Tuzla and the Serb-controlled area of Zvornik continue to grow. So far these contacts are still 'unofficial' but municipal and regional authorities from both sides are closely involved.

There is a general feeling in Northern Bosnia that another winter of war will be a humanitarian disaster for the area.

In Western Bosnia the struggle between backers of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia and Sarajevo continues. For the moment Province leader Abdic is still in control, although under heavy pressure from the local military.

Abdic timed his Autonomy Declaration to coincide with the BH Assembly. Just as the Assembly was becoming more hard-line and more 'Muslim', Abdic moved in precisely the opposite direction. The new Provincial government is multi-ethnic, secular and anti-war.

BH V Corps commander Drekovic responded by taking over key media and other installations. Drekovic announced that Abdic had launched a "bloody attack" on the BH forces -- an attack which, he said on the radio, was being supported by UNPROFOR. From Sarajevo, the BH government announced that Abdic (who won more votes than any other candidate in the free elections of 1990) was being expelled from the Presidency. Abdic seemed unconcerned by this, calling the Sarajevo leadership "a group of irresponsible and criminal people."

The military's freedom of action appears to have been limited by widespread popular support for Abdic. V Corps military units were at one stage surrounded by crowds of civilians loyal to Abdic. Abdic has succeeded in removing several hard-liners from V Corps, and much of the military has announced their loyalty to him. Only in Bihac town is there serious resistance to Abdic. At the time of writing the situation there was unclear.

### Bosnian Serbs

The Bosnian Serbs are clearly unhappy that the BH Assembly has rejected the latest peace package.

The first official reaction of the Serbs to the collapse of the latest package was to withdraw the concessions they had made as a part of the package. Despite this, they have said that they want peace negotiations to continue. They are under enormous pressure from Serbia to reach a settlement soon.

The Serbs will probably not go onto the offensive against the BH immediately -- they are beset by a number of problems of their own -- but they will certainly seek to apply pressure where they can. They are likely to become noticeably less cooperative on humanitarian matters. They are already starting to close off a convoy route through Stolac and Foca. BSA Commander Mladic



9/12

told UNPROFOR that he is giving consideration to a new policy of "What the Serbs don't get, nobody gets." Gen Mladic told has told BH Commander Briquemont that a whole range of humanitarian issues "will have to wait until the Muslims sign a peace agreement." Mladic has also made a number of threats to hijack diesel fuel from "wherever it might be."

The Serbs are openly acknowledging the dire effects of international trade sanctions. Karadzic stated that the recent uprising in Banja Luka was attributable to the parlous state of the Serb economy. Certainly, the Serb community does seem less stable now than before. As with the other sides, there is a process of radicalization going on. If the radical tendency continues to gain ground in the Serb community then Karadzic might be replaced by a more extremist figure.

One such extremist is Belgrade-based Seselj, whose influence has been seen in the Banja Luka affair. Interestingly, the ruling party in Belgrade, the SPS, has stepped up its attacks on Seselj. The SDS accuses Seselj of having been responsible for starting the war in BH, for arming and leading fanatics who committed war-crimes against Muslims, and for a number of other things which the Serbs have hitherto denied any responsibility for.

The Serbs have recently repeated their strong opposition to NATO forces deploying in or accross Serb-controlled territories.

### Bosnian Croats

The Croats are also disappointed by the rejection of the Geneva plan by the BH Assembly. Boban conceded in his address to the Neum Assembly that, with each successive phase in the negotiations, the Croats are losing territory. No serious challenge to the Boban is evident at the moment, but the potential exists as Croat populations, fed up with war and promises, manifest their anger.

The plight of Croats -- and the HVO Brigade -- in Sarajevo is now a Boban preoccupation. He has asked for UNPROFOR intervention in order to balance the distribution of food in Central Bosnia between Croats and Muslims.

Boban states that the Muslims, while professing to want a multi-ethnic state, have sold out the concept by coming to an accommodation with the Serbs. He sees the talks on the *Invincible*, in Geneva, and in the recent BH Assembly as nothing more than playing for time -- time in which the Muslims try to extract further concessions from the other sides, recuperate from the earlier phases of the conflict, and focus on taking ground from the Croats.

Tactically, the HVO seems resigned to defending its ground against a Muslim offensive up and down the Neretva valley. Boban predicts a quiet military and political period over the next ten

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days, and is therefore willing to "wait and see" whether the Armija broadens its offensive, and whether the Krajina explodes. The Croats have suggested a deadline of 15 October for the Muslims to accept the plan before they withdraw their concessions.

An agreement was signed today between the BH Armija and the HVO on measures to protect civilian populations in Mostar and other areas.

Boban has said that he is interested in the demilitarization of the city of Mostar.

Best regards  
V. Auf