

handed over to Ms. Silver on 3 May 07 by JA.
(Regional Commission, NY office)

**General Assembly
Economic and Social Council**

A/61/ - E/2007/13
Distr.: General
April 2007
Original: English

Cleared on
behalf of the
Secretary General.
ARF figaro
05.03.2007

General Assembly
Sixty-second session
Item 43 of the preliminary list^{*}
Permanent sovereignty of the Palestinian people in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem,
and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan
over their natural resources

Economic and Social Council
Substantive session of 2007
Item 11 of the provisional agenda^{**}
Economic and social repercussions of the
Israeli occupation on the living conditions
of the Palestinian people in the occupied
Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem,
and the Arab population in the occupied
Syrian Golan

**Economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation
on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the
occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of
the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan**

Palestine

Note by the Secretary-General

In its resolution 2006/43 of 27 July 2006, the Economic and Social Council requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-first session, through the Council, a report on the implementation of that resolution. The Assembly, in its resolution 61/184 of 20 December 2006, also requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its sixty-second session. The annexed report, which has been prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, is submitted in response to the two resolutions.

^{*} A/62/50.

^{**} E/2007/100.



Annex

Report prepared by the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia on the economic and social repercussions of the Israeli occupation on the living conditions of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and of the Arab population in the occupied Syrian Golan*

Summary

The occupation of Palestinian territory by Israel continues to deepen the economic and social hardship for Palestinians. Citing the right to self-defense from such actions as the continuation of attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli civilians, launching of rockets into Israeli cities from the Gaza Strip, and the capture of an Israeli Corporal, the Israeli army continues to mount military operations in the occupied Palestinian territory, employing arbitrary detention, disproportionate use of force, house demolitions, severe mobility restrictions and closure policies. However, there was a marked decline in the Palestinian-Israeli violence in Gaza since the ceasefire of 26 November 2006.

The Israeli closure system remains a primary cause of poverty and humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory, and restricts Palestinian access to health and education services, employment, markets and social and religious networks.

The fiscal situation deteriorated significantly following the Legislative elections of January 2006. In line with the principles set by the Quartet on 30 January 2006, the election results led donors to reconsider their aid to the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian

Deleted: ,

Deleted: including

Deleted: frequently

Deleted: home

* The Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia would like to acknowledge with appreciation the substantive contributions of the United Nations Department for Political Affairs, United Nations Development Programme (Programme of Assistance to the Palestinian People), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the United Nations Population Fund, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations World Food Programme, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Health Organization, International Labour Organization and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.

GDP declined by approximately 8 per cent in the third quarter of 2006 compared to the same period in 2005. Economic indicators continue to show negative trends. Unemployment and poverty rates remained high, estimated at 30 and 64 percent respectively, while 65 per cent of households are relying on informal borrowing in order to subsist.

Israeli settlements, land confiscation and the construction of a barrier in the occupied Palestinian territory, contrary to the Geneva Convention and other norms of international law, isolate occupied East Jerusalem, bisect the West Bank and curtail normal economic and social life.

Refugees, women and children bear a significant brunt of these measures. Malnutrition and other health problems afflict a growing number of Palestinians at a time of curtailed access to needed services. In the Gaza Strip alone, 57.5% of children 6-36 months and 44.9% of pregnant women are anemic.

I. Introduction

1. In its resolution 2006/43 of 27 July 2006, the Economic and Social Council stressed the importance of reviving the Middle East peace process on the basis of Security Council resolutions, including 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973, 425 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 1397 (2002) of 12 March 2002, 1515 (2003) of 19 November 2003 and 1544 (2004) of 19 May 2004 and the principle of land for peace as well as compliance with the agreements reached between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people. In the same resolution, the Economic

and Social Council urged all parties to respect the rules of international humanitarian law, and to refrain from violence against the civilian population in accordance with the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949.¹ The Economic and Social Council, convinced that the Israeli occupation has gravely impeded the efforts to achieve sustainable development and a sound economic environment in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, and concerned of the formidable impact on the economic and social conditions of the Palestinian people caused by Israel's construction of the wall and its associated regime inside the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and the resulting violation of their economic and social rights, including the right to work, to health, to education and to an adequate standard of living, recalled in this regard the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,² the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights³ and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,⁴ and affirmed that these human rights instruments must be respected in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, as well as in the occupied Syrian Golan. The Council stressed the need to preserve the national unity and the territorial integrity of the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and to guarantee the freedom of movement of persons and goods in the Territory, including the removal of restrictions on going to and from East Jerusalem, and the freedom of movement to and from the outside world; also stressed that the wall being constructed at an accelerated pace by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is isolating East Jerusalem and dividing up the West Bank and is seriously debilitating to the

¹ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol.75, No.973.

² See General Assembly resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.

³ Ibid.

⁴ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol.1577, No.27531.

economic and social development of the Palestinian people, and calls in this regard for full compliance with legal obligations mentioned in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice⁵ and in General Assembly resolution ES-10/15. The resolution reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan to all their natural and economic resources, and called upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit, endanger or cause loss or depletion of these resources; it also reaffirmed that Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and the occupied Syrian Golan, are illegal and an obstacle to economic and social development and calls for the full implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions; and requested the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly, through the Council, a report on the implementation of the resolution.

2. In its resolution 60/184 of 20 December 2006, the General Assembly reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people and the population of the occupied Syrian Golan over their natural resources, including land and water; and called upon Israel, the occupying Power, not to exploit, damage, cause loss or depletion of or endanger the natural resources in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem and the occupied Syrian Golan; recognized the right of the Palestinian people to claim restitution as a result of any exploitation, damage, loss or depletion of, or endangerment of their natural resources resulting from illegal measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying Power, in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem. The Assembly stressed that the wall being constructed by Israel in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law and is seriously depriving the Palestinian people of their natural resources, and called in this regard

⁵ See A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1.

for full compliance with the legal obligations stipulated in the 9 July 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice⁶ and in resolution ES-10/15. The Assembly called on Israel, the occupying Power, to cease the dumping of all kinds of waste materials, including hazardous, untreated chemical waste and nuclear waste in the occupied Palestinian territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, which gravely threaten their natural resources, namely the water and land resources, and poses an environmental hazard and health threat to the civilian populations. The Assembly called upon Israel to cease its destruction of vital infrastructure, including water pipelines and sewage networks, which inter alia, has a negative impact on the natural resources of the Palestinian people. The Assembly requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to it at its sixty-second session on the implementation of the resolution.

II. Occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem

Death and injuries

3. Citing the right to self-defense from such actions as the continuation of attacks by Palestinian militants on Israeli civilians, launching of rockets into Israeli cities from the Gaza Strip, and the capture an Israeli Corporal, the Israeli army continues to mount military operations in the occupied Palestinian territory. However, there was a marked decline in the Palestinian-Israeli violence in Gaza since the ceasefire of 26 November 2006. Between January 2006 and February 2007, the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recorded 697 Palestinian fatalities and 3 558 injuries as a direct result of the conflict. 132 Palestinian children

Deleted: , including

⁶ A/ES-10/273 and Corr.1.

were among the deaths and 515 among the injured.⁷ Twenty-eight of those killed and 120 of those wounded were UNRWA pupils. One of the deaths in the West Bank, and two of the injuries in the Gaza Strip, occurred whilst the pupil was inside the classroom.⁸

4. With 15 unmarked Israeli minefields in West Bank and the Jordan Valley,⁹ at least 21 mine/Explosive Remnants of War related casualties were recorded in January–May 2006 (six killed, 15 injured), mostly children.¹⁰ In addition, Israel has introduced the use of Dense Inert Metal Explosive (DIME) missiles in Bayt Hanun and elsewhere in the Gaza Strip, causing injuries necessitating increased amputations.¹¹

5. Internal Palestinian violence, characterized by tensions between the main Palestinian factions, armed confrontations between established security organs, the creation of new security bodies, the proliferation of weapons in the Gaza Strip, and the hardening of political positions, caused, between January 2006 and February 2007, 248 fatalities, including 20 children. 1350 injuries were recorded.¹² It should be noted that the most significant increase in Palestinian deaths and injuries occurred as a result of intra-Palestinian violence. UNSCO calculated a tenfold increase in 2006 over 2005.¹³

⁷ OCHA, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/PoC_tables_Feb07.xls

⁸ UNRWA contribution.

⁹ UN, "2006 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects," pp. 442–43.

¹⁰ *Landmine Monitor 2006*, at: <http://www.icbl.org/lm/2006/palestine.html#fnB75>.

¹¹ Dugard, *op cit.*, para. 10.

¹² OCHA, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/PoC_tables_Feb07.xls

¹³ UNSCO contribution.

6. Between January 2006 and February 2007, attacks by Palestinian armed elements reportedly killed 29 Israelis and injured 524.¹⁴

Arbitrary arrests and detentions

7. As of March 2006, over 9,400 Palestinian political prisoners remain in Israeli prisons, 421 of who have been imprisoned for over ten years.¹⁵ Since January 2006, Israeli authorities have arrested an average of 500 Palestinians per month in serial raids on towns, particularly Bayt Hanun, Nablus and Jenin.¹⁶

8. About 120 Palestinian women political prisoners remain in Israeli jails, including two under 18.¹⁷ Eight female detainees have undergone childbirth in prison; three are imprisoned with their babies; 31 are deprived of caring for their children; six have been deprived of family visits; and eight have been diagnosed with chronic psychological problems.¹⁸

9. At the end of September 2006, the Israeli army was detaining 389 Palestinian children, including two 12-year-old boys. Israeli authorities have used physical coercion on a reported 60 per cent of the children.¹⁹

10. At the end of December 2006, Israeli authorities were detaining 20 of UNRWA's West Bank staff and denying UNRWA access to them.²⁰

¹⁴ OCHA, http://www.ochaopt.org/documents/PtC_tables_Feb07.xls.

¹⁵ PCBS contribution.

¹⁶ Dugard, op cit., paras. 10, 43.

¹⁷ WOFPP (December 2006), at: <http://www.wofpp.org/english/december.html>

¹⁸ UNIFEM contribution.

Formatted: French (France)

Field Code Changed

Formatted: French (France)

Formatted: French (France)

Population displacement

11. The on going construction of the barrier in the West Bank has contributed to population displacement throughout the West Bank and occupied East Jerusalem. Whereas 32.9 per cent of Palestinians living in Jerusalem recently changed their place of residence, 17.3 per cent did so because of the barrier's construction.²¹

12. Though population data will not be updated until the Census 2007 is conducted later this year, the closures on the towns and villages of the West Bank, the circumvention of occupied East Jerusalem, construction of the barrier, physical isolation and closure on the Gaza Strip.²²

Property destruction and confiscation

13. In 2006 UNRWA recorded a total of 233 Palestinian structures demolished by the Israeli army in the West Bank. Of those, 115 were residential homes, 74 agricultural sites, 35 commercial stores, and nine public facilities.²³ Currently, 29,314 households live in Israeli-damaged homes, 28,997 in Gaza Strip and 317 in the West Bank.²⁴

¹⁹ "Children and armed conflict" [report of the Secretary-General], A/61/529-S/2006/826, 26 October 2006, para. 65.

²⁰ UNRWA contribution.

²¹ BADIL Resource Center and Norwegian Refugee Council's IDMC, *Displaced by the Wall: Pilot Study on Forced Displacement as a result of the West Bank Wall and its Associated Regime* (Bethlehem: BADIL, 2006), p. 37. Survey conducted May-June 2006.

²² UNFPA contribution.

²³ UNRWA contribution.

²⁴ PCBS, "A Report about Housing Conditions in the Palestinian Territory, 2006," Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics Release, (27 December 2006).

14. Nablus was the most affected area. On 26 August 2006, 19 residential houses were demolished by the Israeli authorities in Nablus city. Twenty-three commercial structures, used by farmers to market their produce on the road-side, were demolished in Bardala village and in Marj Najeh in the Jordan Valley for alleged lack of permit. The same reason was produced by the Israeli army to demolish 14 livestock barracks in Zbeidat, Khibat Atuf, Frush Beit Dajan, Jiftlik and Ash Shuna.²⁵

15. Confiscation orders continued to be issued by the Israeli authorities throughout 2006. Land confiscation orders were issued for 3,845 dunums in the southern West Bank (in Al Khader, Um Salmuna, Halhoul, Yatta, Addahreyeh and Beit Ummar), 1,768 dunums in the northern West Bank (in Deir Balaout, Burkin, Hajjeh, Faroun, Asera and Kufur Laqef), and 1,337 in the central West Bank (mostly in Anata and Bir Nabala).²⁶

16. During 2006, the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality used its NIS 4 million home-demolition budget to flatten 68 Palestinian homes. The Jerusalem Municipality conducted ten additional forced evictions of Palestinian inhabitants predicated on their homes' disrepair.²⁷ In 2006, Palestinian inhabitants of occupied East Jerusalem lost 6,000m² of residential space. The municipality also confiscated building machinery, especially cement mixers, forcing higher prices for building cement,²⁸ and increased the rate of financial guarantees required (NIS 30–50,000) for courts to suspend demolitions. Israeli authorities have forewarned increased demolitions of Palestinian homes in 2007.²⁹

²⁵ UNRWA contribution.

²⁶ UNRWA contribution.

²⁷ Land Research Center report, 19 February 2007.

²⁸ Israeli Committee against House Demolitions, "Report of East Jerusalem Home Demolitions, 2006," 1.

²⁹ Israeli Committee against House Demolitions, "Report of East Jerusalem Home Demolitions, 2006," 1.

17. Between March 2006 and end January 2007 in the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army damaged 3,077 refugee shelters and demolished 210 affecting 3,356 families. This is a major deterioration from 2005, where 116 shelters were damaged and 37 were demolished.³⁰

18. The Gaza Strip also saw a vast increase in land-leveling and excavating operations. At least 6,516 dunums of agricultural land were bulldozed in the Gaza Strip.³¹

19. On 27 June 2006, the Israeli Air Force destroyed six transformers of the Gaza Strip's only domestic power plant, which supplied 43 per cent of Gaza's daily needs. Full electrical capacity has since been restored to Gaza with technical assistance from Egypt and financial support from Sweden.³²

20. No quantification of the demolition and confiscation losses in the occupied Palestinian territory, including occupied east Jerusalem, presently exists. However, estimated direct damages from Israel's military offensive during 26 June–28 August 2006 reached US\$46 million in the Gaza Strip alone.³³

21. In April 2006, the Israeli army narrowed the "safety zone" for artillery shelling, allowing targeting much closer to Palestinian homes and populated areas. That contributed substantially to the increase in the loss of life and property. The assault on Bayt Hanun sequestered 40,000

³⁰ UNRWA contribution.

³¹ UNRWA contribution.

³² UNSCO and WHO contribution; Dugard report, para. 19. See also B'Tselem, *Act of Vengeance: Israel's Bombing of the Gaza Power Plant and its Effects* (September 2006).

³³ UNDP, "Assessment of Damages Caused by the Israeli Defense Forces Operations in the Gaza Strip," 2006.

residents to their homes under curfew, as Israeli military operations resulted in the destruction of 279 homes, an eight-century-old mosque, public buildings, electricity networks, schools and hospitals, orchards, water and sanitation networks, and ripping up paved roads with specially designed back-hoes.³⁴ Infrastructure damages are valued at \$2,372,970.³⁵

Mobility restrictions and closure policies, including access to humanitarian assistance

22. The Agreement of Movement and Access, agreed between the Palestinian Authority and the Government of Israel under the auspices of the Quartet, contains specific provisions for the movement of people and goods within the occupied Palestinian territory and outside it.³⁶

23. The first of the six points in the Agreement of Movement and Access was the re-opening of the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, which opened on 15 November 2005. It represented the first historical instance of the Palestinian Authority control over an international land border crossing. Between 26 November 2005 and 25 June 2006, Rafah was continuously open for passengers traveling both directions.³⁷

24. However, following an attack by Palestinians on an Israeli military post at Kerem Shalom and the capture of an Israeli soldier on 25 June 2006, the crossing closed and access of EU Border Assistance Mission to the Rafah terminal was restricted by the Israeli authorities on security grounds. Since then, the crossing has been opened on an exceptional basis, such as

³⁴ Dugard, op cit., para. 10.

³⁵ UNDP, "Report on Damages" assessment that resulted due to the Israeli incursion in Bayt Hanun town: Damages in infrastructure and public buildings" (November 2006), also cited in UNDP-PAPP contribution, p. 1.

³⁶ UNSCO contribution.

³⁷ UNSCO contribution.

during peak periods of movement by students or pilgrims. Overall, Rafah was open for an average of 14 per cent of scheduled days between 25 June and 15 December 2006. Infrequent and sporadic openings of the crossing have led to large crowds gathering at the terminal on designated days, leading to public insecurity. Although the Mandate of the EU Border Assistance Mission was renewed in November 2006, their access to the terminal remains restricted by Israeli security concerns.³⁸

25. Karni operations remained closed for over 50 percent of the scheduled time, openings were often only partial, due to perceived security threats by Israel. Both imports into Gaza and exports from the Strip to Israel, the West Bank and beyond suffered as a result. However, in the period between November 2006 and March 2007, exports through Karni increased by 115 per cent, reflecting better, though not full, performance against AMA targets. Shortages of food imports peaked in April and May, resulting in a drastic fall in Gaza's strategic reserves of wheat-flour, and the closure of main bakery outlets along the Strip. Import restrictions were eased in May under heavy international pressure. Gaza's exports, however, experienced the deepest and most sustained restrictions during 2006. A daily average of only 12 export truckloads were able to pass out of Gaza during January-November 2006, a mere fraction of the 400 trucks per day envisaged for end-2006 under the Agreement of Movement and Access. The effect of export restrictions on Gaza producers was severe, with some millions in lost revenues for the period.³⁹

26. Sufa is the main passage point for the import of aggregates used for construction into the Gaza Strip, and is covered by the Agreement of Movement and Access. The crossing was closed

³⁸ UNSCO contribution.

³⁹ UNSCO contribution.

on 14 February. Since then it has not opened regularly. Overall, Sufa remained open for 60 per cent of scheduled days during the first year of the Agreement implementation, restricting the importation of aggregates into the Gaza Strip. One effect of this restriction has been to raise the price of aggregate building materials in the Gaza Strip.⁴⁰

27. The Agreement of Movement and Access provided for measures to ease the movement of Palestinians and commercial goods within the West Bank. The decrease in West Bank checkpoints, which had been verified at the end of 2005, was reversed in 2006. In 2006 the number of physical obstacles in the West Bank grew from 475 in January 2006 to 550 in February 2007.⁴¹ The main impact of these measures has been to cause a fragmentation of the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and to seriously disrupt normal links between communities and public services, employment and land.⁴²

28. In order to link the West Bank with the Gaza Strip, and in accordance with the Agreement, the target date for establishing bus convoys was 15 December 2005, and for establishing truck convoys 15 January 2006. Neither deadline was met and there has been no movement towards implementation of this provision of the Agreement of Movement and Access.⁴³

29. The construction of a seaport has not started. In addition, discussions on the issues of security arrangements, reconstruction and operation of the airport have not taken place.⁴⁴ The

⁴⁰ UNSCO contribution.

⁴¹ OCHA, "The Humanitarian Monitor: Occupied Palestinian Territory", February 2007.

⁴² UNSCO contribution.

⁴³ UNSCO contribution.

⁴⁴ UNSCO contribution.

Israeli army occupied the Gaza Airport for five months up to the week of 22 November 2006. Airport damages as a result of the Israeli military operation amount to an estimated USD 16 million.⁴⁵

30. West Bank ID holders' access to occupied East Jerusalem has deteriorated further with the new, elaborate terminal systems restricting access from both the Bethlehem (southerly) and Ramallah (northerly) directions. Since January 2006, the Israeli army barred Palestinian pedestrians and vehicles from using eight of the 12 routes to occupied East Jerusalem.⁴⁶ Ever more-restricted access to occupied East Jerusalem impedes UNRWA's ability to deliver refugee services in West Bank, as 65 per cent of its West Bank Field Office staff are West Bank ID holders.⁴⁷

31. In the West Bank, among the thousands of incidents of delayed and denied access reported by UNRWA staff, a good number affected the delivery of emergency humanitarian assistance, in particular through the hindrance of the movement of agency or contracted vehicles transporting food aid, medicines, mobile health teams or food distribution teams. Regular programmes were affected by the impeded movement of teachers, social workers and field office staff, and the imposition of curfews on West Bank camps, villages and towns, further added to the disruption of agency services. The West Bank field office lost an estimated 832 man-days since March 2006.⁴⁸

⁴⁵ UNRWA contribution.

⁴⁶ OCHA, West Bank closure and Count Analysis, September 2006.

⁴⁷ UNRWA contribution.

⁴⁸ UNRWA contribution.

Barrier

32. Israel continues construction of the barrier, contrary to General Assembly resolution ES-10/15 of July 2004, which acknowledged the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that its construction in the occupied Palestinian territory, including in and around occupied East Jerusalem, is contrary to international law.

33. Construction of the barrier is having a major humanitarian impact on Palestinian communities living in the West Bank. On 30 April 2006, the Israeli Cabinet approved a second revision of the barrier route. Accordingly, the barrier will be 703 km long - a 33 km increase compared to the previous plan.⁴⁹ The Emmanuel and Ari'el settlement groups will be split into separate fingers surrounding more than 25,500 Palestinians on 3 sides with one access route on the east side of the barrier. As a result, 10,771 Palestinians from Deir Ballut, Rafat and Az Zawiya villages will remain on the west side of the barrier (stuck between the Green Line and the barrier). Though this will leave three Palestinian villages east of the barrier, the environmental impact on their lands will be detrimental. According to the new revised route, the barrier will move approximately one and a half km northwards from road 465 and incorporate olive groves and land from Rantis village. Beit Iksa village and surrounding lands will become part of the Biddu/Beit Surik enclave (about 46,321 people), presently surrounded by the barrier on 3 sides and closed by road 443 northwards. Al Walaja village will be encircled by the barrier and isolated from its farm land. Many sections of the barrier in the south, originally planned to be built on the Green Line, will be moved inside the West Bank.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Israeli Ministry of Defense (<http://www.seamzone.mod.gov.il>).

⁵⁰ OCHA, Preliminary Analysis of the Humanitarian Implications of the April 2006 Barrier Projections.

34. By February 2007, 58 per cent of the barrier had been completed (408 km) and 9 per cent was under construction. Construction advanced in occupied East Jerusalem, where about 55 per cent of the plans have been accomplished and 10 per cent are under construction. As a result, about 3,000 bedouins living in the Ma'ale Adumin area, most of whom are refugees, are likely to be forcibly displaced. Once completed, 80 per cent of the barrier will lie within the occupied Palestinian territory and only 20 per cent on the Green Line. Furthermore, 575 km² (about 10 per cent of the West Bank area) will be isolated between the barrier and the Green Line in the "Seam Zone". Based on the current route, 60,500 Palestinians living in this area will be severely affected in their access to the West Bank and main sources of livelihoods, and 31,400 will be completely encircled by the barrier.⁵¹

35. Palestinian communities located east of the barrier are facing increasing difficulties in reaching their farm and grazing land in the closed areas. Although the Government of Israel maintained that the barrier would not affect ownership of land and residents' access to their sources of livelihoods,⁵² the Israeli permit regime, along with erratic operations of gates are severely hindering Palestinian farming practices. Over 230 km² of the West Bank's most fertile land (approx. 15 per cent of all West Bank agricultural land) has already been confiscated in connection to the construction of the barrier⁵³ and the risk of further dispossession is very high due to Palestinian farmers' inability to secure continuous access to their land.

⁵¹ UNRWA contribution and OCHA, West Bank Barrier Route Projections, July 2006.

⁵² OCHA, Annex I: Summary Legal Position of the Government of Israel, report of the SG pursuant to GA resolution-10/13, 24 November 2003.

⁵³ UNCTAD, Report on UNCTAD's Assistance to the Palestinian People, July 2006

Israeli settlements

36. According to military sources, Israel's Civil Administration (the military administration in the occupied Palestinian territory) has handed over "thousands of dunums" of Palestinian lands in the Jordan Valley for illegal settlement construction and army bases.⁵⁴ Meanwhile, Israel authorized the establishment of a new settlement, Maskiot, in the Jordan Valley through a permit for the first 30 of 100 residential units. Construction of the units has not yet started.⁵⁵

37. In March 2006, Israeli settler population in the West Bank totaled 246,100. Their growth rate remains high, at 5.1 per cent, and contrasts with the 1.8 per cent general population growth rate in Israel.⁵⁶ By January 2007, settlers numbered 260,000, in addition to the near 200,000 living in occupied East Jerusalem.⁵⁷

38. Israeli military orders confirmed the confiscation of 1,328 dunums in occupied East Jerusalem, reportedly for expansion of the Almon settlement near Ma'ale Adumim,⁵⁸ which bloc bisects the West Bank. A mid-2006 Israeli government decision authorized the near doubling of occupied East Jerusalem's Ramat Shlomo settlement (with about 2,000 units).⁵⁹ Some 2,700–3,000 Jahalin Bedouin now face further displacement by end 2007 to make room Ma'ale Adumim (E1 Block) expansion and the construction of the barrier.⁶⁰

⁵⁴ "Jordan Valley Short Takes," *Settlement Report* Vol. 17, No. 1 (January–February 2007); also EU Presidency statement, 27 December 2006.

⁵⁵ UNSCO contribution and "EU Presidency Statement on the Israeli-Palestinian relations" Press release 544/2006 (27 December 2006).

⁵⁶ "Population in Israel and West Bank Settlements, 1995–2005," *Report on Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories*, Vol. 16, No. 5 (September–October 2006).

⁵⁷ PCBS contribution, p. 3.

⁵⁸ OCHA (13 November 2006).

⁵⁹ *Kol Ha'Zeman* (26 May 2006).

⁶⁰ Report of Badil Resources Center on Palestinian Refugee and Residency Rights, 7 March 2007.

39. More than 3,500 housing units were under construction in West Bank settlements in October 2006, compared to 4,144 in October 2005.⁶¹ Formerly temporary West Bank outposts have become permanent, as in the notable cases of Neve Erez, Nofei Porat, Palgei Mayim and Zayit Raanan in the Ramallah area.⁶²

Natural resources, water and environment

40. The barrier's construction has foreclosed Palestinians' access to 95 per cent of Palestinian's own water resources (630 million cubic-metre [Mm³] of 670Mm³ annually)⁶³ by destroying 403 wells and 1,327 cisterns. It has foreclosed 136 wells from owners' access, amounting to 44.1 Mm³ annually. The barrier has closed 46 springs (23Mm³/year) and 906 dunums of underground water (99 per cent of underground West Bank water).⁶⁴ Consequently, over 7,000 Palestinian agriculture-dependent families have lost their livelihood⁶⁵ in a region where water resources are scarce and increasingly costly to develop.⁶⁶ The latest barrier route will isolate another 62 springs and 134 wells in the "seam zone."⁶⁷

41. The quantity and quality of water supply and sanitation services for Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territory are insufficient, inefficient and unreliable. The overall average per capita of water consumption in the occupied Palestinian territory is 85 liters per capita daily

⁶¹ Peace Now report in *Ha'aretz* (3 October 2006).

⁶² *Yediot Aharonot* (16 November 2006).

⁶³ PCBS contribution.

⁶⁴ Palestinian Agricultural Association (PARC), "Impact of Occupation and Globalization on the Agricultural Sector in the Occupied Palestinian Territories," presentation at World Social Forum 2007, Nairobi, Kenya (20–25 January 2007), p. 2.

⁶⁵ PCBS contribution.

⁶⁶ UNDP, "Water Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory," *Human Development Report* (New York: UNDP, 2006).

⁶⁷ The Applied Research Institute – Jerusalem (ARIJ), *The Effect of the Israeli Segregation Wall on the Palestinian Natural Resources*, October 2006.

(l/c/d) (75 l/c/d in West Bank and 95 l/c/d in Gaza Strip), far below WHO's minimum standard (150 l/c/d). Only 45 per cent of domestic water services meet WHO quality standards in Gaza Strip, where high chloride and nitrate concentrations abound. In West Bank, 87 per cent of the population accesses piped water, where 220 un-served communities mainly rely on rainwater harvesting and costly water purchases, subjecting them to water-borne diseases and deeper impoverishment.⁶⁸

42. Israeli settlements and settler behavior strain the environment, destroying hundreds of fruit-bearing trees in 2006 by burning, felling and uprooting. Settlements occasionally direct their sewage flow onto agricultural lands of Palestinian farmers affecting West Bank villages of Yatta, Wadi Fukin and Nahhalin.⁶⁹

43. While Israel's settlement practices are the primary determiner of environmental degradation, weak and fragmented wastewater and waste management also contribute.⁷⁰ The lack of solid waste-disposal services leads to increased burning, and smoke from waste burning was the principal air pollutant for 48.4 per cent of exposed households in 2006 in the occupied Palestinian territory.⁷¹

Palestinian Fiscal Crisis

⁶⁸ UNDP-PAPP contribution.

⁶⁹ Baytar Illit incident reported on 14 April 2006 (OCHA), as cited in "Settlement Timeline," *Settlement Report* Vol. 16, No. 4 (July–August 2006); the Karmel incident reported on 20–26 September 2006 (OCHA), as cited in "Settlement Timeline," *Settlement Report* Vol. 17, No. 1 (January–February 2007).

⁷⁰ UNDP-PAPP contribution.

⁷¹ PCBS, "Report about the Household Environmental Survey 2006 (10 January 2007), p. 1.

44. The Palestinian Authority's fiscal situation was already considered to be unsustainable by the end of 2005. At that time, the World Bank reported that the Palestinian Authority wage bill had grown beyond the limits excepted in the World Bank Trust Fund. The fiscal situation further deteriorated following the victory of Hamas in the Legislative elections of early January 2006. These electoral results occasioned a significant review of donor policies towards the Palestinian Authority. From March 2006 onwards, a number of key donors re-channeled their financial support to Palestinians away from the Palestinian Authority pending its commitment to the three principles set down by the Quartet on 30 January 2006 – namely nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including the Roadmap. For its part, Israel withheld Palestinian Authority's customs and VAT revenues amounting to roughly \$60 million per month plus interest, or approximately 50 per cent of the Palestinian Authority's monthly budget.⁷² Through the Quartet and other channels, the United Nations worked to facilitate the release of Palestinian customs and tax revenues through agreed mechanisms, and following the Abbas-Olmert Meeting of December 2006, Israel authorized a transfer of USD 100 million. Transfer was implemented in January 2007. The UN views this as a first positive step, and encourages a return to regular transfers as agreed between the parties.⁷³

45. The Palestinian Authority own financial resources shrunk by 60 per cent, from 1.2 billion in the third quarter of 2005 to 0.5 billion by the same quarter of 2006.⁷⁴ This decline placed significant strain on Palestinian institutions, particularly those providing basic public services

⁷² UNSCO contribution.

⁷³ UNSCO and DPA contributions.

⁷⁴ IMF *West Bank and Gaza; Recent Fiscal and Financial Developments*, October 2006, quoted in UNSCO contribution.

and security, and all but halted salary payments to approximately 165,000 Palestinian Authority employees (supporting an estimated one-quarter of the Palestinian population).⁷⁵

46. Loss of public salaries was partially compensated for by the distribution of cash allowances to public sector workers and social hardship cases. Overall, the equivalent of 40 per cent of salaries was paid out through EC's Temporary International Mechanism and through Presidential accounts during 2006.⁷⁶ In addition to this, the international community channeled some USD 450 million, equivalent to 15 per cent of the GDP and 90 per cent of government revenues for the year, in direct humanitarian assistance to Palestinians through United Nations agencies and NGOs. Together, these measures helped to mitigate the full effect of the Palestinian Authority's fiscal crisis in 2006.⁷⁷

Public health and food insecurity

47. Under the Temporary International Mechanism, which supported the payment of allowances and non-salary costs for the health sector, health workers received, on average, up to 60 per cent of their normal wages between April 2006 and January 2007. Nevertheless, the financial crisis has left the public health system unable to sustain care levels, especially as 2006 was a non-investment year. Hospitals lack adequate supplies, equipment maintenance, cleaning agents and hygienic environments necessary to control infections.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ UNSCO contribution.

⁷⁶ IMF *Mission Statement: December 17, 2006*, as quoted in UNSCO contribution.

⁷⁷ UNSCO contribution.

⁷⁸ UNFPA contribution.

48. The 15-week public workers strike over unpaid wages also crippled health services and placed more pressure on international and NGO-run clinics. Meanwhile, occupied East Jerusalem's Augusta Victoria Hospital, which serves West Bank Palestinians, actually saw a 30 per cent decrease in-patient numbers, due to the barrier and associated movement restrictions.⁷⁹

49. Access to reproductive health care, including antenatal, delivery and postnatal care has been jeopardized by the long closures, financial crisis to the Ministry of Health and ongoing Israeli military incursions. Both primary and secondary services have declined, especially with the large majority of delivery and newborn care services (80 per cent of the deliveries in six Health Ministry hospitals in the West Bank and Gaza Strip) unable to keep regular maintenance. Pregnant women with postnatal complications also may be at greater risk when discharged too early from hospital due to lack of staff and space. Emergency obstetrics becomes a priority.⁸⁰

50. Five UNRWA mobile clinics in the "seam zone" and frontier villages are increasingly becoming the only accessible health services for residents of remote localities, seeing 11,200 patients monthly in 2006. Logistical constraints foiled plans to facilitate access to primary health care services in isolated rural areas through five additional health points.⁸¹

51. Food insecurity disproportionately affects women and children. The results of a study conducted by UNRWA in September 2006 revealed that 57.5 per cent of children 6-36 months and 44.9 per cent of pregnant women in the Gaza Strip are anemic.⁸² Of children under five, 22

⁷⁹ "Children and armed conflict" [report of the Secretary-General], A/61/529-S/2006/826, 26 October 2006, para. 67.

⁸⁰ UNFPA and WHO contributions.

⁸¹ UNRWA contribution.

⁸² UNRWA contribution.

per cent are vitamin A deficient;⁸³ 20 per cent show signs of iodine deficiency (32 per cent in West Bank and 3 per cent in the Gaza Strip), and 4.1 per cent suffer from clinical Vitamin D deficiency (rickets) in the Gaza Strip.⁸⁴ The increased incidence of non-communicable diseases such as diabetes mellitus, cardiovascular diseases and cancers represents an epidemiological shift that imposes additional burdens on the scarce human and financial resources.⁸⁵

52. Significantly, 65 per cent of households are relying on informal borrowing in order to subsist.⁸⁶ Data indicate that the majority endures a degraded quality of life, including reduced caloric intake and resorting to greater economic dependency and aid reliance. With lower per capita GDP,⁸⁷ food consumption declined by 8 per cent. Palestinians also reused wastewater at a rate of 45.3 per cent of households, up from 44.7 per cent in 2005 and 39.3 per cent in 1999.⁸⁸

53. Mental health is an increasing concern in the occupied Palestinian territory. Comprehensive data is missing. Localized studies showed that stressors such as severe movement restriction and lack of access to education and health care are present in everyday life. About 1 in 4 reports suffering from sort of psychological strain.⁸⁹

Youth and Education

⁸³ WHO considers a major public health problem a prevalence above 20%

⁸⁴ WHO/MOH/AEI, 2006, in WHO contribution.

⁸⁵ UNRWA contribution.

⁸⁶ UNCTAD, TD/B/53/2, p. 6.

⁸⁷ PCBS, "Preliminary Estimates of Quarterly National Accounts, 3rd Quarter 2006," November 2006.

⁸⁸ PCBS, "Report about the Household Environmental Survey 2006 (10 January 2007).

⁸⁹ WHO contribution.

54. The public workers strike also disrupted education services. The majority of public schools were totally or partially closed, affecting some 70 per cent of students.⁹⁰

55. In the 2006/2007 academic year, none of Gaza's students were able to attend technical training centres in the West Bank because none received permits to travel there. Only 10 applied, down from 277 students who had been rejected in the previous school year.⁹¹

56. Although 2005–06 examination scores improved over the previous year, educational achievement continues to wane.⁹² Only 50 per cent of West Bank eighth-grade students passed their mathematics examinations, and only 56 per cent of eighth graders passed their science examinations.⁹³

57. Internal closures forced teachers in the Gaza Strip away from their duty stations. Since October 2000, UNRWA schools have lost some 277,973 days at a cost of over \$5,559,460. During the 2005–06 scholastic year, UNRWA teachers, including at the Gaza Training Centre, recorded a total loss of 13,674 teaching days. This represented improvement over the previous reporting period (56,000).⁹⁴

Economic indicators

⁹⁰ UNICEF, "Six Months without Pay Spark Teachers' Strike in Gaza and West Bank," New York, 5 September 2006.

⁹¹ UNRWA contribution.

⁹² UNRWA contribution.

⁹³ UNRWA contribution.

⁹⁴ UNRWA contribution.

58. The unemployment rate rose to 30 per cent in the third Quarter of 2006 from 29.4 per cent in end 2005, affecting 265,000 Palestinians and their dependants.⁹⁵ This would appear to be relatively stable under the crisis circumstances but further analysis reveals discrepancies between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the latter showing an increase of 2.2 per cent.⁹⁶ The refugee population endured a higher unemployment rate (32.7 per cent in November 2006) and is fast deteriorating.⁹⁷ In the first half of 2006, their unemployment rose 5.7 per cent over the same period of 2005.⁹⁸ Youth (20–24 years) showed the highest unemployment rate: 32.3 per cent in the West Bank, 53.7 per cent in Gaza Strip. Around 44,000 youth are expected to enter the labor force annually.⁹⁹ It should be noted that while 2005–06 employment rates appear to have remained relatively stable, however, the rate is now about twice that of 1999.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, income derived from formal employment is likely to have fallen thus explaining the sharp rise in poverty.

59. The number of Palestinians living in poverty in the occupied Palestinian territory is estimated at 64 per cent.¹⁰¹ This increase was most pronounced in the Gaza Strip where 87.7 per cent of households live below the official poverty line.¹⁰² The number of Palestinians living in deep poverty, throughout the occupied Palestinian territory, expanded by 64.3 per cent to affect

⁹⁵ In contexts of protracted crisis, the standard unemployment definition might be somehow deficient as a considerable number of people are simply no longer seeking employment. A “relaxed definition” of unemployment is here applied, by adding to the total number of unemployed people according to ILO standards the number of people currently not engaged in active job search (commonly defined as “inactive”).

⁹⁶ OCHA, *Humanitarian Monitor* November 2006, as quoted in UNSCO contribution.

⁹⁷ UNRWA, *Prolonged Crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Socio-Economic Impacts of the New Phase on Refugees and Non-refugees* (Gaza: UNRWA, November 2006), p. ii.

⁹⁸ PCBS contribution.

⁹⁹ UNRWA, *Prolonged Crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Socio-Economic Impacts of the New Phase on Refugees and Non-refugees* (Gaza: UNRWA, November 2006), p. ii.

¹⁰⁰ ILO contribution.

¹⁰¹ OCHA, *Humanitarian Monitor* November 2006, as quoted in UNSCO contribution.

¹⁰² UNRWA *Prolonged Crisis in the oPt: Recent Socio-economic Trends* November 2006, page iii, as quoted in UNSCO contribution.

an average of 1,069,200 people.¹⁰³ At the end of the second quarter 2006, poor Palestinians increased to 2.1 million persons, compared with 1.3 million at end 2005.¹⁰⁴

60. Palestinian GDP declined by approximately 8 per cent in the third quarter 2006 compared to the same period in 2005. This decline was considerably less than was initially expected mainly on account of both official and private inflows including increased humanitarian assistance. Effects were felt the hardest in the Gaza Strip where closures and poverty rates have been most severe.¹⁰⁵

61. Poverty, unemployment, closures and land loss conspire in the current Palestinian housing crunch. However, a fuller crisis is looming: 401,867 of the households in the occupied Palestinian territory need to build new housing units during the next ten years. However, the number of households who are able to build new housing units is only 117,909.¹⁰⁶

62. According to the International Monetary Fund, the Banking sector in the occupied Palestinian territory remains sound, despite the depressed economy. Private sector deposits continued to expand slowly in 2006, and banks have continued to extend credit.¹⁰⁷

63. Two dimensions of Israeli controls over the Palestinian economy have been discussed above: intensifying closures within and around the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; and

¹⁰³ UNRWA *Prolonged Crisis in the oPt: Recent Socio-economic Trends* November 2006, page iii, as quoted in UNSCO contribution.

¹⁰⁴ PCBS, "Demographic and Socioeconomic Status of the Palestinian People at the end of 2006" (Ramallah: PCBS, December 2006).

¹⁰⁵ UNSCO contribution.

¹⁰⁶ PCBS, "A Report about Housing Conditions in the Palestinian Territory, 2006," Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics Release, (27 December 2006).

¹⁰⁷ IMF *Mission Statement: December 17, 2006*, as quoted in UNSCO contribution.

withholding of customs and VAT revenues since the first quarter of 2006. In addition to these, a new set of external financial controls has been introduced with the implementation of the EC's Temporary International Mechanism. These are designed to ensure that the Palestinian Authority government channels are bypassed while still allowing for public institutions to function and aid to be transferred to social hardship cases.¹⁰⁸

Status of women

64. A large majority of women in households (83%) are not at all involved in economic activities. Younger females mostly assume the domestic work and are least involved in economic activities.¹⁰⁹

65. In occupied East Jerusalem, as elsewhere in the West Bank affected by closures and the barrier, many families are reluctant for their daughters to go through the degrading experience of waiting at checkpoints or barrier crossing points, being searched and subjected to Israeli soldiers' harassment or having to walk long distances in order to avoid these experiences. Consequently, families are now much more likely to pressure young women to drop out of school and/or not pursue their higher level of education.¹¹⁰

66. The general fragmentation of Palestinian communities has exacerbated women's isolation and accordingly, rural women constitute a particularly vulnerable group. Rural girls'

¹⁰⁸ UNSCO contribution.

¹⁰⁹ Graduate institute of development studies (IUED), June 2005, Palestinian Public Perceptions (Report VIII), cited in UNDP-PAPP contribution.

¹¹⁰ UNIFEM contribution.

school attendance declines with each education level. While women account for 44.8 per cent of public-sector workers in rural communities, the public-sector strike and wage withholding have affected rural areas reaching an alarming 59.4 per cent.¹¹¹

67. With family coping mechanisms exhausted, children and women (especially pregnant women) are most vulnerable to domestic and gender-based violence.

III. Occupied Syrian Golan

68. The Golan remains under the Israeli occupation that began in 1967. Israel prevents the return of the Arab population of the occupied Syrian Golan expelled in 1967. As of March 2007, 27 of the 33 Israeli settlements, developed as agricultural colonies, produce wine, beef, fruits and mineral water for Israeli domestic and export markets at preferential terms that disadvantage the Syrian Arabs' produce.¹¹²

69. In April 2006, Israel began construction of three new tourist settlements on the occupied Lake Tiberius lowlands.¹¹³ Matzok-Orvim is a new neighborhood expanding Qela settlement, where tenders for 300 dunums of settlement construction were published in 2006. Additionally, 100 families are expected to join the settlement by summer 2007.¹¹⁴ Katzrin, the largest settlement in the occupied Golan, grows by 100 residents annually.¹¹⁵ On 2 July, south Golan's Avne Eitan settlement announced the arrival of 20 former Gaza settler families with a

¹¹¹ UNIFEM contribution.

¹¹² Syrian International Cooperation Agency contribution.

¹¹³ Syrian International Cooperation Agency contribution.

¹¹⁴ *Ma'ariv* (11 October 2006).

¹¹⁵ *Washington Post* (30 October 2006).

plan to build them 60 homes, plus 40 homes for more newcomers. Their settlers enjoy a 35 dunum land allotment.¹¹⁶ In December 2006, Interior Minister announced the intention to facilitate accelerated settlement construction near the border with Syria.¹¹⁷ Israel officially seeks to double its Golan Heights settler population within ten years.¹¹⁸

70. Israel's Ministry of Health funds one basic-health clinic operated by the Golan Arab community. The community operates and funds five health clinics by themselves, providing basic maternal-newborn health services, including vaccinations. When necessary, Syrian Arab patients seek treatment in clinics inside the Israeli settlements, or at distant referral hospitals in Israel. In June 2006, the International Committee of the Red Cross opened the Majdal Shams emergency and diagnostic medical centre and provided two ambulances,¹²¹ addressing long-assessed needs.¹²²

Deleted: 70. . Israeli authorities confiscated 900 dunums of al Ghajar village and ordered inhabitants to evacuate the northern area of the village, where 90 per cent resided.¹¹⁹ ¶
71. . Israel's destruction of fruit trees belonging to Syrian Arabs has continued. There are claims that Israel is dumping nuclear waste in some 20 sites, including a tract of land close to the Syrian border in a tunnel 95m deep and 5.7 m wide.¹²⁰ ¶

Deleted: 2

71. Israel has replaced the Syrian curriculum with its own educational system since 1967. Israel now operates six elementary schools, three junior high schools and two high schools for Syrian Arabs.

Deleted: 73

72. Israel's destruction of fruit trees belonging to Syrian Arabs has continued. Israel is harvesting all the Banyas River's estimated 121 Mm³ water flow per year.¹²³ The Golan Heights

Deleted: 74

¹¹⁶ Syrian International Cooperation Agency contribution.

¹¹⁷ Foundation for Middle East Peace, "Golan Update," *Settlement Report* Vol. 17 No. 1 (January–February 2007).

¹¹⁸ *Washington Post* (30 October 2006).

¹²¹ ICRC, "Majdal Shams Hospital' project, occupied Golan: ICRC statement," (20 June 2006), at:

<http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/conference29-statement-200606>

¹²² www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/

¹²³ "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories," (9 October 2006).

supply one-third of Israel's water consumption, while Israel sells water to Syrian Arabs at fees higher than to Israeli settlers.¹²⁴ Israel has confiscated a number of Arab-owned acreage traditionally used for pasture. That has transformed production, commercial and land-use patterns and eliminated traditionally rural/pastoral occupations. Indigenous Syrian production and trade in livestock have decreased. Trade in Syrian Arab-produced apples, olive oil and honey, etc. are dependent on Israeli markets. This year, International Committee of the Red Cross helped to transport 10,000 tonnes of Arab-produced Golani apples to the Syrian market.¹²⁵ Israel helped to facilitate this transport and subsidised the farmers.

73. The occupied Golan's Syrian Arab labour force numbers approximately 6,500 workers,

Deleted: 75

of whom some 750 work in local services. Another 3,200 work in Israel in agriculture and construction. Local opportunities in the construction sector remain limited due to planning criteria, particularly restricting Syrian Arab housing.

IV. Conclusions

74. A combination of intensified external and internal closures, withholding of vital financial

Deleted: 76

assistance from the Palestinian Authority and intensified conflict in 2006 have led to a measurable deepening of the socio-economic crisis in the occupied Palestinian territory. All social and public health indicators reveal declining living conditions, social and spatial dismemberment, growing despair and violence. This crisis on the ground was accompanied by a

¹²⁴ Syrian International Cooperation Agency contribution.

¹²⁵ "Occupied Golan: ICRC supports local communities by transporting apples" (2 March 2007), at: <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/fromthefield/220224/191cfd29ce6b306bf05478513bcd60e.htm>.

weakening capacity of Palestinian institutions to independently provide for the essential services and welfare of the Palestinian population.¹²⁶

Deleted: 77

75. The crisis was partly offset by increased international investment through alternate

funding channels. The situation prompted the United Nations country team to launch a common appeal in December 2006 which, at USD 453 Million was double the value of that which was requested in 2005. Increasing proportions of international assistance shifted from long-term development support towards immediate emergency response. While these temporary measures served to stabilize the situation to a significant degree, they were not expected to contribute to the long-term improvement of socio-economic conditions in the occupied Palestinian territory. Nor were they expected to substitute for the direct responsibility of local parties, or for a rejuvenated political process that could address the underlying issues of the conflict.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ UNSCO contribution.

¹²⁷ UNSCO and DPA contributions.