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Analysis (Political-Security Council Affairs)**

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P.S.C.A. Department Papers

European Affairs & East-West Relations

- ✓ 1A) Developments with European Organizations = 22 January 1965
AA. ✓ 1) Note on the Inter-relationships of European States - 4 February 1966
✓ 2) The Council of Europe - 12 April 1966
✓ 3) All-European Relationships - Including the German Question
9 May 1966
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✓ 9) Mr. Brezhnev's speech in Ulan Bator at a meeting of the signing
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✓ 16) 21st Session of the General Assembly - 5 October 1966 (Norway)
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✓ 19) 21st Session of the General Assembly - 5 October 1966 (Iceland)
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✓ 21) 21st Session of the General Assembly - 7 October 1966 (Yugoslavia)
✓ 22) 21st Session of the General Assembly - 10 October 1966 (Sweden)
✓ 23) 21st Session of the General Assembly - 10 October 1966 (Poland)
✓ 24) 21st Session of the General Assembly - 10 October 1966 (Ireland)
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✓ 26) 21st Session of the General Assembly - 11 October 1966 (United Kingdom)
✓ 27) 21st Session of the General Assembly - 11 October 1966 (Ukrainian SSR)
✓ 28) 21st Session of the General Assembly - 13 October 1966 (Byelorussian SSR)
✓ 29) 21st Session of the General Assembly - 13 October 1966 (Italy)
✓ 30) 21st Session of the General Assembly - 17 October 1966 (Romania)
✓ 31) 21st Session of the General Assembly - 18 October 1966 (Hungary)
✓ 32) Views in the General Debate General Assembly - 21st Session
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✓ 33) Note on All-European Relations (including the German Question)
18 November 1966
✓ 34) Survey on All-European Relations (including the German Question)
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10 January 1967
✓ 36) Survey of European Relations - 1 February 1967
✓ 37) Survey of European Relations - 9 March 1967
✓ 38) Monthly Surveys of International Developments - 5 April 1967
✓ 39) Monthly Surveys of Europe - 1967 May
✓ 40) Monthly Surveys of Europe - 1967 April
✓ 41) Question of European Security - Recent Developments - 17 May 1967
✓ 42) Note on Cyprus - 6 July 1967
✓ 43) 22nd Session of the General Assembly - European States - Major views
and positions - 13 October 1967

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AA.

- ✓44) Problems and Progress of European Block Politics - 9 January 1969
- ✓45) Problems and Progress in European Security Matters

30 October 1969

P.S.C.A. Department Papers

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and positions - 13 October 1967

Additional list

The following Papers are not on original
list and not marked :

- 1) " 21st Session of the General Assembly-
1428th Meeting, 4 October 1966 -"

CHAD

(It follows Paper N. AA-15)

- 2) "European Security Conference "

26 March 1970

(Chronologically it should follow Paper N. AA-45)

- continued

AA.

- 44) Problems and Progress of European Block Politics - 9 January 1969
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TO: U Thant
Secretary-General

	APPROVAL	XX	YOUR INFORMATION
	MAY WE CONFER?		AS REQUESTED
	YOUR SIGNATURE		FOR ACTION
	NOTE AND FILE		REPLY FOR MY SIGNATURE
	NOTE AND RETURN		PREPARE DRAFT
	YOUR COMMENTS		ATTACH RELATED PAPERS

Thant
26/1

DATE: 22/1/65

FROM:

V.P. Suslov

V. Suslov

22 January 1965

DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN EUROPEAN ORGANIZATIONS
AFFECTING THE UNITED NATIONS

It is reported that the Nordic Council, which is representative of Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Iceland and Finland, is proposing to organize a conference of inter-governmental organizations, to be held in Stockholm in June 1965. The broad purpose of the conference is understood to be the making possible of discussion regarding the experience of European co-operation within and between the various organizations invited. By reason of the organizations which it is proposed to invite, the proceedings of the conference may prove to be of some significance for the United Nations.

Fourteen organizations have been invited to send one or two representatives each. Of these, nine are primarily Western European international organizations, viz.

- 1-4. The Commission, the Council, the Parliament (Assembly) and the Court of Justice of the European Economic Community;
5. The Council of Europe;
6. The Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development;
7. The European Free Trade Association;
- 8-9 The Committee of Ministers, and the Inter-Parliamentary Council of Benelux.

The tenth organization to be invited is the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which is representative of the Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union. The four other organizations are UN agencies: The Economic Commission for Europe, together with the three specialized agencies: UNESCO, FAO and ILO.

The conference would thus bring together the representatives of organizations dealing with broad social and economic problems. European groupings dealing with special fields of activity, such as the European Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community have not been invited. Nor have European organizations concerned with defence, such as the Western European Union, NATO or the Warsaw Pact been invited.

The Nordic initiative should perhaps be considered in conjunction with the reports that the Council of Europe, on the initiative of its new Secretary-

General, Mr. Peter Smithers, has under consideration the proposal to secure recognition as a regional agency under the United Nations Charter. It is reported that, at the meeting of Ministers and Parliamentarians of the Council of Europe in December 1964, consideration was given to the participation of Eastern European countries in some of the activities of the Council.

The information regarding the initiative of the Nordic Council, and that regarding the development of the Council of Europe, is still fragmentary and it is too early to arrive at definite conclusions. Should this problem be of interest to the Secretary-General, the Department would follow further developments and supply the Secretary-General with relevant information.

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: The Secretary-General
A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	X	POUR INFORMATION

Howe
14/2

Date:
10 February 1966
CR.13 (11-64)

FROM: M.A. Vellodi
DE: Director and Deputy to
the Under-Secretary

CONFIDENTIAL

4 February 1966

FaP:pm

NOTE ON THE INTER-RELATIONSHIPS OF EUROPEAN
STATES -- JANUARY 1966

Copy No. I.....

NOTE ON THE INTER-RELATIONSHIPS OF EUROPEAN
STATES -- JANUARY 1966

1. A trend towards greater political stability in Europe, due to closer and friendlier East-West European relations, as noted at the 20th session of the General Assembly in the general debate and the discussion of the "Romanian item" ^{1/} continued during January 1966. There were two announcements, of General de Gaulle's acceptance of an invitation to visit the Soviet Union, and of the forthcoming visit of a high-level Romanian delegation to London which, in the words of The Times, was "regarded as part of the pattern of increasing contacts between Britain and East Europe".
2. The German question remains a grave issue. The main purpose of de Gaulle's European "reconciliation" is indeed to facilitate a German settlement. A thaw in non-official West German positions has been previously noted in the European surveys; in particular the significance was stressed of the Memorandum from a Chamber of the Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD) published on 21 October 1965, which advocated a policy of reconciliation with Poland implying German recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line. In January 1966 a West German Cabinet Minister discussed, more freely than ever before, some of the substantive aspects of the German question. This debate in West Germany coincided with developments in Poland where the Episcopate of the Roman Catholic Church, in answer to the EKD Memorandum and while upholding the integrity of the Oder-Neisse Line, advocated Polish-German reconciliation. The Government of Poland stated that the Polish Episcopate had moved from the spiritual to the political field and compromised Poland's stand with respect to its Western frontiers.
3. Although General de Gaulle's primary diplomatic concern is with East-West relations in Europe, and he abhors supra-national institutions, West European integration of six ^{2/} Continental Nato Members is likely to benefit

^{1/} "Actions on the regional level with a view to improving good neighbourly relations among States having different social and political systems."

^{2/} Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

the French economy, particularly French farmers.^{3/} A French effort was therefore made at two meetings of the six Foreign Ministers of the European Economic Community (EEC) to solve the six-month old crisis of the agricultural Common Market without giving up the many Gaullist positions on constitutional and related issues.

4. France's estrangement from her Continental NATO neighbours, which contrasted with her improved relations with more distant countries - geographically and politically - was shown at a meeting held under the auspices of the "European Parliament".^{4/} All delegates, except the Gaullist spokesman, in advance of the second of two EEC Ministers' meetings, expressing continued support of the Community institutions in their present form and of all Treaty provisions "in letter and spirit", were critical of de Gaulle's policies. A West German representative - a Socialist (SPD) Deputy - was particularly bitter. This was one sign among many of the "slow worsening of the climate in French-German relations",^{5/} other aspects of which will be described in the present Note in connexion with the German question. As a result France was drawn a small step closer to Germany's eastern neighbours.

5. As a result of the EEC crisis, "the question of British membership of the Common Market" in the words of The Times, has become alive here again.^{6/}

THE GERMAN QUESTION

6. Most of Germany's neighbours on both sides condemned, or were concerned with, West German policy on nuclear armament. The foreign policy of the West German Government was not clear, or not understood in the same way by all Cabinet Members, either in that respect or on issues related to a peace treaty.

The debate in West Germany and developments in Poland

7. The question of Germany's frontiers, and other main issues connected, in the Western view, with the signing of a peace treaty was being discussed, with increasing frequency and greater participation of official personalities, in the Federal Republic of Germany.

^{3/} Their votes may have been instrumental in M. Lecornet's good showing which prevented de Gaulle's election on the first ballot.

^{4/} The Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); European Economic Community (EEC); and European Community for Atomic Energy (EURATOM).

^{5/} Le Monde, 21 January, p.1 (leader).

^{6/} 4 January.

8. On 12 January in the Bundestag, the Federal Foreign Minister, Schröder, reported ^{1/} that he had made clear to the three Western Powers that the German people would be ready to make great sacrifices in the case of reunification.

9. In his reply, Herr Wehner, the Acting Chairman of the Opposition Social-Democratic Party (SPD), pointed out that the Government had said nothing about the nature of possible sacrifices by the German people in case of reunification, as mentioned to the Foreign Ministers of the three Western Allies. Herr Wehner said that his Party did not oppose the principles of the "Germany policy" of the Government, but that it was a question now of adapting such principles to modified world circumstances - apparently by spelling out German "sacrifices".

10. Whether or not as a follow-up to the Social-Democratic request for clarification, an interview with Dr. Gradi, ^{8/} the Federal Minister for Refugees appeared ^{9/} in Der Spiegel, the West German weekly, on 17 January. Dr. Gradi wrote that "a peace treaty will not simply come down from heaven. It must be prepared, so that one day it can be signed". Dr. Gradi accordingly hinted at the concessions which a reunified Germany could make as follows:

1. renunciation of certain types of weapons;
2. denuclearization arrangements in Central Europe;
3. renunciation of parts of "German territory" beyond the Oder;
4. substantial economic concessions such as the delivery of complete industrial plants.

11. Herr Gradi emphasized that the Germans must be reassured that "the sacrifices which we consent to make will really be taken into consideration... Hazardous sacrifices are only suitable on the green baize of the casinos".

12. While the West German Minister maintained his Government's stand that only an all-German Government could sign a German peace treaty, he said that discussions and then, at a suitable time, negotiations also must go ahead on what a peace treaty should contain. Specifically, West German policy did not imply "that the frontiers of 1937, unchanged to the last comma and full stop, so to speak, should be re-established" and "an agreement can be reached on a frontier which is not the Oder-Neisse Line, but differs from the frontiers of 1937".

^{1/} Frankfurter Allgemeine, 13 January, p.1.

^{8/} Johann Baptist Gradi, a Berliner, replaced Herr Lemmer as Minister for Refugees in the second Erhard Cabinet.

^{9/} The Times, 18 January, p.9.

13. A French interpretation ^{10/} of Herr Grall's statement was that he had defended "Gaullist theses":

"What did the French President say [on 4 February 1965] if not, in other words, the same thing as M. Grall - i.e. that the reunification of Germany would not be conceivable without an agreement with all her neighbours on the question of the frontiers and on the military status?"

14. The fact that Peace Treaty issues were discussed publicly by a West German Cabinet Minister cannot be regarded as insignificant, particularly as it was part of a series of statements, mostly from non-official sources. The present political situation in West Germany, however, precludes major developments on frontier issues and rules out optimism.

15. A basic factor in that situation is the "dictatorship of the refugee associations" on West German parties, and thereby political life, as described in Le Monde ^{11/} in connexion with a gathering organized by the Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD). In the opinion of the French newspaper, EKD endeavoured to loosen the refugees' grip on the parties by organizing a debate, with their participation, on the above-mentioned EKD Memorandum which described the basic importance for Poland of the new territories, completely changed by population transfers.

16. Even though the refugee groups, by their own admission, represented only 1,500,000 Germans out of 10 million from the former German provinces, their fanaticism, and even more so, their influence both upon the majority Christian Democrats and the Social-Democratic (SPD) opposition, rule out any official follow-up of the EKD Memorandum in the near future. While a number of SPD deputies condemned their Social Democratic colleague Metzger - a co-author of the Memorandum - Dr. Grall, according to Le Monde, had already been intimidated by the refugees. In a speech subsequent to his conciliatory article in Der Spiegel, the Minister for Refugees was "much more cautious", as he stated:

"The two parties have their positions. They will have to take this literally - as starting points so as to move towards each other."

17. Le Monde added that the idea of a "compromise" was just as "utopistic as a claim on the 1937 frontiers plus Danzig and Memel".

^{10/} Roland Delcour, the special correspondent in Bonn, in Le Monde, 18 January, p.3. De Gaulle's words on 4 February 1965 were as follows: "The point is that it should be recognized, above all by Germany, that the settlement of which she could be the object would necessarily imply that of her boundaries and her armaments by agreement with all her neighbours, in the East and in the West."

^{11/} Le Monde, 25 January, p.7.

18. German-Polish relations, with particular emphasis on their mutual frontiers, were also dealt with in unofficial Polish statements ^{12/} and answers thereto by the Government of Poland.

19. On 9 January, the Government of Poland announced ^{13/} that Cardinal Wyszynski, the Polish Primate, had been refused a passport because he had engaged in political activities detrimental to the vital interests of the State. The announcement stated that, by initiating a dialogue with the German bishops, the Cardinal had crossed from his spiritual duties into the realm of foreign affairs. The letter was a political and not a moral document; and, by his offer of reconciliation and his plea to the German bishops to forgive and to be forgiven, the Cardinal had compromised Poland's vital interests and its stand with respect to its Western frontiers.

20. In a speech of 14 January, Mr. Gosulka, the First Secretary of the Polish Unified Workers Party, inter alia, made ^{14/} the following points:

- (i) Consideration should be given not only to the Polish bishops' letter but also to the answer by the German bishops, speaking of a right to the Fatherland which the Polish Episcopate did not condemn;
- (ii) In a communique from Rome, the Polish bishops announced the sending to the German Episcopate of a "History of Poland" by Mr. Halecki, a Polish emigre in the United States, who wrote that the peoples enslaved by the Soviet Union would be freed before the second millenary of Poland through the cataclysm of a world war;
- (iii) Like Halecki and the reactionary Polish emigres, the Polish bishops wanted to fight for the Eastern territories.

21. While the Cardinal personally did not answer at first, ^{15/} there were prompt denials of the charges from Roman Catholic sources in Poland. A statement by the Polish Episcopate pointed out that letters of invitation had been sent to all Roman Catholic Episcopates and that the letter to the German Episcopate "like all the others, had above all, the character of a church document". Further, the Episcopate maintained the viewpoint of the inviolability of the Western frontier of Poland.

^{12/} Following a letter from the Polish Episcopate inviting the German, as all other bishops to participate in the Millenary celebration of the conversion of Poland to Christianity, the German Episcopate on 6 December accepted the invitation. (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 8 December, sheet 2).

^{13/} The Times, 10 January, p.10.

^{14/} Le Monde, 17 January.

^{15/} On 16 January, Cardinal Wyszynski in his Sunday sermon said "henceforth we are no longer charged with a lack of patriotism - let us wait and it will be acknowledged that we have served the nation well." (Le Monde, 18 January, p.3.)

22. In a radio interview, Monsignor Boleslaw Kominek, the Archbishop of Wroclaw on 10 January said ^{16/} that the letter of the Polish bishops to the German Episcopate was a purely religious document. On the Oder-Neisse line, the report of the interview in The Times read in part:

"The Oder-Neisse frontier could in no circumstances be the object of the dialogue proposed by the Polish bishops to their German brethren. This frontier was a matter of life and death and would not be revised. On that subject, bishops, communists and the Poles in exile were at one with the whole Polish people."

Sharpening of French-West German Differences

23. Prior to the half-yearly summit meeting under the French-West German Treaty of Cooperation of 22 January 1963, the respective, opposed positions on access of the Federal Republic to nuclear weapons, on the future of Nato, on EEC and on Vietnam were apparently sharpening.

24. On 12 January in the Bundestag, Dr. Schröder said ^{17/} that his Government would support the work of McNamara's "Special Committee" of Nato, but had not changed its basic standpoint that an organizational form for the immediate participation of the non-nuclear members in the nuclear potential of the alliance must be found - this did not necessarily mean co-ownership of nuclear weapons.

25. The above statement was not in direct contradiction with General de Gaulle's remark ^{18/} on 14 December that "the Germans ... cannot, must not make atomic weapons for themselves". But it seemed that Germany's aspirations to "participation" in the Nato nuclear potential as demanded by Dr. Schröder came under the heading of West Germany's "ambitions" to which de Gaulle referred in the same campaign speech.

26. In the opinion of Neue Zürcher Zeitung ^{19/} the West German Government itself was not of one mind on "Germany's role in nuclear strategy". The Swiss newspaper pointed out a discrepancy between the Bundestag statement by Foreign Minister Schröder on 12 January and an article on the following day by Herr Krone, Minister for National Defense Council Affairs.

^{16/} The Times, 12 January, p.9. Mr. Genuka on 14 January noted the positive character of some of Mgr. Kominek's statements.

^{17/} The Times, 9 January, p.9.

^{18/} La Nation, 15 December.

^{19/} 16 January, sheet 2.

27. The Foreign Minister did not rule out nuclear co-stewardship within Nato; while Herr Erone wrote that a joint nuclear striking force of Nato was, in his opinion, no longer possible, since not all Nato members could participate:

"But any formula that includes only a part -- perhaps a small part -- of the Nato members or that could be only adopted unilaterally between the United States and the Federal Government, could destroy more than construct."

28. As quoted by Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Herr Erone wrote that what the Federal Government wanted was equal security, not equal armaments; and the Swiss newspaper added that the Defence Council Chairman took French views into consideration more strongly than the Foreign Minister; this was also the position of Adenauer and Strauss who sought to keep open the "highly uncertain road" towards a European striking force.

29. In his Bundestag statement of 12 January, the West German Foreign Minister also said that no concrete proposals had been made by France on the reform of Nato, but the Federal Government opposed the weakening of any of the forms of cooperation upon which German security rested. "We recognize that the present form of the alliance is identical with our own interests", Dr. Schröder declared.

30. Also on 12 January in the Bundestag, Herr Schröder referred to the forthcoming Conference in Luxembourg of the six EEC Foreign Ministers as follows:

"We are ... of the opinion that this fraction of a European Constitution which the Rome Treaties constitute must be safeguarded."

31. With the sending of a West German hospital ship to Vietnam, announced on 12 January in Bonn, the Federal Republic was making more definite its position of support of the US side in the Vietnam war - referred to as "absurd" by General de Gaulle. On 24 January, the West German spokesman said that his Government would refrain from sending military aid of any kind to Vietnam but was leaving no stone unturned in its efforts to find ways of helping. ^{20/}

32. French press interpretation ^{21/} of the worsening of the French-West German relations placed the emphasis on the fact that, contrary to de Gaulle's expectations, the Federal Republic of Germany was not won over to his policy of "independence" from the United States. On the contrary, the West German

20/ New York Times, 25 January

21/ Le Monde, 21 January, p.1 (leader).

Government gave France to understand that, in its opinion, "nothing mattered more than US protection and that [Bonn] wished to be able to avoid a choice between Paris and Washington but if in the last instance Bonn was compelled to make a choice - Washington would be the West German choice".

Similarities between French and Soviet and East European Views

33. Even as Germany's Eastern neighbours re-stated their condemnation of West German policy on nuclear armaments, there was increased apprehension, or at least uncertainty, in France as to the course which German "ambitions" may take.

34. On 18 January in Paris, Ambassador Zorin warned ^{22/} against the "dangerous plans" of the Federal Republic of Germany to obtain access to atomic armament. Such plans endangered European security. The Soviet Union would regard any attack against the frontiers of the GDR, Poland or any other Socialist State as directed against itself.

35. Gaullist La Nation ^{23/} dealing with the question of "the participation of Germany in a nuclear system" stressed the importance of the "dual obstacle" (double barrage) of the Soviet Union and France.

36. On 10 January on the Hamburg radio Monsignor Boleslaw Kominek, the Archbishop of Wroclaw, said: ^{24/}

"We fear Germany because we do not know what in fact is simmering in the German soul... We have no nationalistic hatred against Germany in Poland but fear of remilitarization, nuclear weapons and the like."

37. While the Archbishop re-stated readiness to achieve reconciliation with the Germans through a dialogue, he stated:

"Without repentance, no forgiveness."

38. Polish uncertainty on Germany was reminiscent of remarks made ^{25/} by General de Gaulle during the campaign. Pointing out that France wanted to have "relations with everybody", the General explained that the world was "undergoing enormous changes" and that inter alia:

^{22/} Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 January, sheet 3.

^{23/} 23 December 1965.

^{24/} In the weekly feature Panorama, The Times, 12 January, p.9.

^{25/} On 13 December, La Nation, 14 December.

"There is Germany who is transforming herself - and we do not quite know where her ambitions will lead. Of course, we hope that they will go the right way and we have grounds for hope. But we cannot say that we are sure."

39. Having pointed out similarities between French and Communist views on the German question, it should be recalled that, following a Soviet report to the Chairman of the Economic and Social Council to circulate a GDR statement, France joined Britain and the United States in complaining, on 21 December 1965, about the status accorded to "the so-called German Democratic Republic". While France was anxious to maintain, in this respect, her continuing solidarity with her Western allies, the Soviet Union, with increasing emphasis, was advocating a GDR role which, in the opinion of The New York Times,^{26/} would be "at least equal to the observer status enjoyed by the West German Government".
40. France's attitude towards the GDR and on the Berlin question continued to hamper a strengthening of French relations with the Socialist Camp; and a change in the French stand which, in the Communist view, would be in keeping with other "realistic" aspects of France's foreign policy under de Gaulle, will be among the matters taken up in the forthcoming visit of the French President to the Soviet Union.

EUROPE - EAST AND WEST

41. Subject to the above developments relating to the Federal Republic of Germany, all-European relations are undergoing a slow but steady evolution, at the root of which are both political and economic facts. Politically speaking, a will in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to organize actively peaceful co-existence in Europe was apparent inter alia in the importance attached by the Soviet Union to relations with France - notably during M. Couve de Murville's visit to Moscow in October-November 1965 - and in the submission and discussion of the Romanian item 33.
42. In France, a desire for closer relations with Communist countries in Europe is closely connected with de Gaulle's steady purpose to reduce US political influence in Europe. In the words used, ^{27/} over a year ago, by the then Secretary of State for Information, Alain Peyrefitte,
- "the Americans refer themselves to the Monroe doctrine. Why shouldn't the Europeans refer themselves to the same kind of doctrine?"

^{26/} 13 January 1966.

^{27/} European Survey, December 1964, paragraph 45, p.13.

43. De Gaulle's acceptance of an invitation to visit the Soviet Union ^{28/} has now been announced on both sides. On 12 January, Ambassador Zorin, following an interview with General de Gaulle said ^{29/} that the President would visit Moscow "soon". On 19 January, M. Bourges, the new Secretary of State for Information declared: ^{30/}

"General de Gaulle is to go to the USSR. The principle has been accepted. In due time, the Government will inform the public of the dates and conditions of this journey."

44. On 18 January in Paris Ambassador Zorin, in a lecture on Soviet foreign policy, said ^{31/} that the visit was a contribution to a strengthening and developing of French-Soviet relations - a convincing example of collaboration between Capitalistic and Socialist countries in Europe.

45. A usually well informed French journalist, Andre Fontaine, made ^{32/} the following comments on the visit. On the same day as Ambassador Zorin's announcement, M. Fontaine pointed out that other visits to Central and Eastern Europe would probably not be made at the same time. As to the political significance of the journey,

"in Paris, at any rate ... it is placed in the context of a processus which, thanks to the detente in Europe and internal and external evolution in the Eastern countries, leads to an overcoming of the innumerable obstacles which until now have prevented a solution of the German problem - the basic objective of the policy of France, as stated by General de Gaulle last year."

46. A few days later M. Fontaine reported that the visit would be brief and there would be only stays in Moscow and Leningrad. As to the substance of the possible agreements, the following possibilities were ruled out:

- (1) A recognition of the GDR, "now or later", ^{33/} even though, in the French Government's opinion, it would be in West Germany's interest to develop contacts with East Germany;

^{28/} The Soviet invitation dating back to the journey of Mr. Khrushchev to France in 1960 had been repeated inter alia by Mr. Mikoyan on 31 October 1965 during the visit of M. Couve de Murville to the Soviet Union.

^{29/} This statement was made just as it was announced in Bonn that Chancellor Erhard would be in Paris on 7-8 February.

^{30/} Le Monde, 20 January, p.20.

^{31/} Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 20 January, sheet 3.

^{32/} Le Monde, 14 January, p.1 and 18 January, p.3.

^{33/} Andre Fontains pointed out on 14 January that France, as noted by the General Anzeiger in Cologne, was upholding the principle of self-determination of the Germans.

(11) a revival of the French-Soviet alliance - not even if coupled with a parallel US-French Treaty.

47. On the other hand, in view of West Germany's "more and more unconditional alignment" with the United States "things would have to change greatly in Bonn [For France] to reconsider the warning up in French-Soviet relations and disenchantment in French-German relations".

48. In the economic field, the announcement of the visit almost coincided, as noted by the New York Times ^{34/} with a liberalization of French import quotas on industrial goods from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Further, France and the German Democratic Republic have agreed ^{35/} to increase mutual trade to more than DM 200 million (£ 19 million) in 1966; and that East Germany would buy 700 goods wagons from France under an agreement signed last month.

49. Also in the economic field, another reason for East-West relations in Europe to become closer was that, in the opinion of The Christian Science Monitor ^{36/}

"A bridge now exists between the two systems - the changed concept of planning. Liberalizing their economic system, the Soviets and their partners in Europe are approaching the bridge from the East. Strengthening their planning systems, free countries are approaching it from the West. Planning may possibly provide a new bridge between two still very different types of society that are also changing."

50. The US journalist also referred to the forthcoming debate ^{37/} in Geneva on a study, made by the UN Secretariat, of the world's planning systems. Further, Poland and Czechoslovakia were expected to make fresh efforts in the summer to become members of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

51. In a quieter style than General de Gaulle, but with apparent effectiveness, Britain was also promoting her relations with Eastern Europe. In connexion with the forthcoming visit of a Romanian delegation headed by the First Deputy Prime Minister to London, the diplomatic correspondent of The Times wrote ^{38/}

"The visit is regarded as part of the pattern of increasing contacts between Britain and East Europe, but the strength of the present delegation, which includes also a number of senior officials, indicated that in addition to an exchange of views, there are good prospects that some real progress can be made in expanding trade."

^{34/} 13 January.

^{35/} The Times, 19 January, p.10. On the other hand, technical disagreement on modifications to the French SECAM (Sequential and Memory) colour television system was reported from Paris by a French businessman. On 24 January a Soviet delegation arrived in Paris for talks on such modifications. (The Times, 18 January, p.9 and 25 January, p.6.)

^{36/} 7 January.

^{37/} In June 1966 under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE).

^{38/} 20 January, p. 12.

52. Additional West European political support for a policy of European reconciliation championed by de Gaulle and pursued by Britain was forthcoming at the 14th national conference of the Italian Social-Democratic Party. Signor Cariglio, Vice-Secretary of the Party, favoured ^{39/} a "specific and constructive dialogue" with the Soviet Union.

THE JANUARY MEETINGS OF THE SIX FOREIGN MINISTERS

Conflict between France and the Five

53. The crisis which broke out in June 1965 and led to France's almost complete absence from Brussels was ostensibly due to economic issues. The Six failed to agree on financial regulations for the proposed agricultural Common Market by the appointed time-limit of 30 June 1965; and it is true that important economic interests were at stake. France wants her partners to buy French excess agricultural products or, if they will not, accept financial regulations that compensate for her deficit selling on other markets. On the other hand, France's partners or, at any rate^{40/} primarily industrial countries like West Germany, need export markets for their excess industrial products; and, in order to keep or find customers, they must buy food and other agricultural items from countries outside the Common Market. While they have agreed that France should be compensated, they are trying to keep their financial sacrifices at a lower figure than desired by France.

54. Political differences were also at the root of the current crisis. De Gaulle's West European policy was defined ^{40/} by his political adversaries, aptly on the whole, as follows:

"The Fifth Republic has been disagreeing for eight years with the 'integrationist' trend of Europe of the Six, regarding it at the same time as impinging upon State sovereignty, lacking in realism since it does not allow for the survival of Nationalism and, lastly, an obstacle to a widening of Europe towards the countries of the East."

55. The following are the developments in the three weeks preceding the session ^{41/} on 17-18 January during which the six Foreign Ministers, meeting for the first time since June 1965, sought to avoid a collapse of the European Economic Community.

^{39/} The Times, 11 January, p.7.

^{40/} L'Express, 25-31 October, p.28

^{41/} France agreed to attend such meetings provided they were held not at the seat of EEC - Brussels - but in Luxembourg and the Commission of EEC was not represented.

Immediate Political and Economic Background

56. De Gaulle's concern that France could, if she so decided, remain neutral in any future war was reaffirmed during the Presidential campaign and in the New Year broadcast. On 31 December, the newly elected President said ^{42/} that everything necessary was being done to ensure that France was not "integrated" in any war not her war.

57. Thus, in de Gaulle's mind, West European Federation could prejudice France's attitude in case of a major war. The argument of freedom of decision in that event was increasingly being used by the French President in opposing supranational rules and organs as favoured by all Community members except France.

58. Disagreement on this score between France and Italy was apparent in the speeches at the 14th national congress of the Italian Social Democratic Party. The Vice-Secretary of the Party, Antonio Cariglia, reaffirmed ^{43/} Social Democratic support for "the construction of a European political power which will progressively overcome national sovereignty in favour of a supranational sovereignty". ^{44/}

59. The French Government, having recalled in July 1965 its Permanent Representative to EEC, continued to be present at the meetings of regular subsidiary organs. On 5 January, as announced by the then Information Minister, Alain Peyrefitte, France approved a further 10 per cent tariff cut between EEC members reducing such tariffs to 20 per cent of the original, 1958 level. ^{45/} France further agreed that adjustments to external tariffs may be delayed four months pending an EEC accord.

60. In the words of M. Bourges, ^{46/} the Six at the 17-18 January Conference in Luxembourg, "will talk about the principles on which the working out of the Common Market can be pursued, since the Government does intend to pursue the building of Europe". Together with French concurrence in tariff adjustments,

^{42/} The Times, 1 January, p.9.

^{43/} The Times, 11 January, p.9

^{44/} Another area of French-Italian differences was that Signor Cariglia recommended an agreement for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

^{45/} The Rome Treaty establishing EEC, signed on 25 March 1957, went into effect on 1 January 1958.

^{46/} Le Monde, 13 January, p.20. On 8 January, Yvon Bourges replaced Alain Peyrefitte as Secretary of State in charge of Information in the Prime Minister's office.

this statement was intended to show a spirit of conciliation on the eve of crucial conferences.^{47/}

Meeting of the Six Foreign Ministers on 17-18 January

61. According to detailed press reports,^{48/} the meetings on 17-18 January went as follows:

(i) Voting procedure in the Council of EEC.

62. France declared that this was the crux of the problem; that it should be solved by 31 January and that France would then resume her participation in EEC work.

63. On the substance of this issue, Belgium submitted compromise proposals, which offered safeguards but preserved as a final recourse majority voting.

64. Both France, on the one side, and the Five on the other remained firm. The French position was that only unanimous decisions may be taken on questions of vital national interest and that each country, as a sovereign nation, should decide what its vital interests were; but such an assessment, the French delegation said, would be made in a spirit of good will.

65. M. Couve de Murville, in substance, repeated his own statement of 20 October in the French National Assembly. In the interpretation of Gaullist La Nation, that earlier speech "was aiming at an inter-governmental agreement rather than a revision of the Rome Treaty".^{49/}

66. The Five seemingly offered a common front in defense of the principles of the Treaty of Rome.

(ii) Powers and membership of the Commission.

67. The French delegation proposed that, when France returned to Brussels, following a solution of the majority vote issue, the question of the role and membership of the Commission should be discussed by the six governments, rather than in the presence of the EEC Commission as customary under EEC rules of procedure.

^{47/} As interpreted by the European Economic correspondent of The Times, the pressure of French public opinion, expressed in the Presidential election, was an "important new fact in the European situation": "France's behaviour confirms the judgment that she could not suddenly quit the Community without doing incalculable and wanton harm to her own interests. What has changed is that the French people themselves have shown that they recognized this truth." (3 January 1966.)

^{48/} The Times, 18 January, p.8, and 19 January, p.12. La Nation, 18 January, pp.1 and 4. Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 January, sheet 2; Le Monde, 20 January, p.2.

^{49/} M. Couve de Murville reportedly acknowledged that a revision of the Treaty of Rome would raise great difficulties for Parliamentary ratification for some countries.

68. M. Couve de Murville submitted a ten-point Memorandum which, according to La Nation was "very technical and carefully worked out" and related to the

"style of the Hallstein Commission's behavior, not its functions as defined by the Rome Treaty: the French delegation does not ask for a revision of the Treaty of Rome. But it seems, notably in the light of what happened at the end of June, that the Hallstein Commission is inclined to give itself a role that goes beyond ... its terms of reference under the Treaty. The French would like an inter-governmental agreement to make more precise the exact terms of reference of the Commission." 50/

(iii) Other French proposals

69. The French Foreign Minister made it clear that, if the two main issues were solved by the end of January, France would adopt the Community budget through a written procedure by 7 February and resume negotiations on the financial regulations for the agricultural common market on the basis of the Commission proposals of 22 July 1965. Such negotiations with the participation of the old Commission should be completed by 31 March. Further, France reportedly asked that an agreement on the membership of the new joint commission should be reached between 1 February and 1 March; that it should be understood between the Six that the Commission President's two-year mandate may not be renewed; that ratifications of the agreements on the fusion of the Community institutions should be submitted before 1 April; and that the new Commission should be installed by 18 April. 51/

70. Contrary to French expectations, West Germany, both at the meetings and in subsequent statements and speeches, was least sympathetic to the position of France. In Luxembourg Herr Schroder reportedly said that the French Memoranda were an attempt to force the will of France upon her partners.

71. On 19 January an official statement 52/ from the Federal Government expressed the hope that France also supported her five partners' efforts to overcome the crisis, but regretted additional French demands for discussion of the membership of the future joint Commission or for a rigid time-table.

50/ For instance, according to the French Memorandum, the Commission should consult Governments before making important proposals, and, if these proposals were not acceptable to a Government, the Commission should amend them. Similarly, in the course of debates the Commission should not modify its proposals, and public statements by the Commission should observe a "decent neutrality". In the opinion of The Times, "the way proposals are made and presented impinges on the power of the Commission, rather than its style". (3 January.)

51/ While the French "calendar" caused some apprehension among the Five, a French Gaullist Deputy subsequently made clear that "this is only a proposal which is meant to be discussed" (M. de Lipkowski in the European Parliament on 20 January in Strasbourg).

52/ The Times, 20 January, p.10.

72. As regards the two main issues to which the Six at meetings to be held at the end of January should, in the opinion of the Federal Government, confine their discussions, the West German reaction to the French proposals was analyzed ^{53/} by The Times as follows:

(i) Council-Commission relations

The 10 points were "a possible basis for discussion", but outright acceptance would have amounted to a violation of the Rome Treaties";

(ii) Majority rule in the Council

The Federal Government was ready to give a member country, which felt its vital interests at stake, a second opportunity in the Council. However, "a clear legal definition of 'vital interests' is, in its view, impossible".

Strasbourg meetings

73. On 20 January in Strasbourg there was a joint meeting (colloque) of the European Parliament with the Communities' Council of Ministers and the Commission of EEC. ^{54/} The main significance of this gathering was that it immediately followed the Luxembourg meetings.

74. At the colloque Mr. Spaak rejected the possibility of a revision of the Rome Treaty to change the rule of majority voting in the Council:

"I believe the majority voting system, in the Europe which I have wanted for so many years, will be a necessity."

75. Similarly Mr. Luns, the Dutch Foreign Minister, said that his Government's position consisted in remaining faithful to the Rome Treaty, in letter and spirit.

76. The Gaullist viewpoint was expressed by M. de Lipkowski, in the name of the European Democratic Union (Union démocratique européenne, UDE). French opposition to majority rule in the Council of Ministers was explained as follows:

"In the minds of the Treaty's authors, such a voting procedure was to coincide with a certain evolution towards political unity which did not materialize."

77. The account of the Strasbourg debate in The Times was significant. Not only was there complete approval of the position of the Five but the article "From our European economic correspondent" began as follows: "This was a good day for Europe". The practice of equating West European integration of a group

^{53/} 20 January, p.10

^{54/} Also, the four-day winter session of the "European Parliament" ended on 21 January. (The Times, 22 January, p.7.)

of NATO countries with "Europe", which is commonplace on the Continental part of Western Europe was, in this instance, followed by the correspondent of The Times. On the other hand, the Gaullists regard this as a confusion between the means and the end. In the words of their daily newspaper:^{55/}

"The Fifth Republic has always regarded Europe of the Six as indispensable. The EEC is a choice basis of a greater Europe with a view to operating through Communities comprising six countries rather similar as to their level of development and their social and economic structures. But the true Europe will be that which, covering the whole of the Continent, will include Spain and Portugal as well as Great Britain and the countries of the European East."

Question of British membership in the Communities

78. Britain, on her part, is in no way prepared to accept such limitations on her sovereignty as the "Europeans" favour; and, even though de Gaulle at one stage opposed Britain's entry into the Common Market, his policies may be more likely, in the long run, to bring about acceptable conditions for EEC membership of Britain and her European Free Trade Association (EFTA) associates. As pointed out in a leading article in New Commonwealth:^{56/}

"It is the political issue which still remains intractable [between the Six] and above all the matter of sovereignty. The ardent Europeanists would resist to the bitter end any attempts to dilute the political aims of the Rome Treaty. Yet that is President de Gaulle's intention, and it is the only foreseeable way to interest Britain and other EFTA members in a closer union."

79. In Britain, statements envisaging the possibility of joining the Common Market were made mainly, but not exclusively, on the Conservative opposition side. Indeed, on 14 January, Sir Con O'Neill, a Deputy Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, at a Benelux Committee luncheon in The Hague, stated ^{57/} that "there is no future in isolation" and that the public saw Britain's future more and more within the frame of closer relations with Western Europe. There was accordingly a growing readiness "to accept an involvement in the Common Market". Reservations made by Sir Con were, in the main, three-fold. The present EEC agricultural policy would end the low cost of British food and raise industrial prices. It would therefore have to be adjusted considerably before Britain could join. Yet, the Deputy Under-Secretary declared:

^{55/} Lucienne Hubert-Rodier in La Nation, 22 November 1965

^{56/} December 1965, p.591

^{57/} The Times, 15 January, p.7

"I hold that the Common Market agricultural policy is difficult to be adopted by Britain, but I do not say that it could never be adopted. In fact, we accepted it in principle, three or four years ago."

80. Secondly, while British relations with the United States were no barrier to joining the Common Market, in Sir Con's view, the question of British external trade was more difficult. British exports to EEC had been increasing, but exports to EFTA were about three-quarters of those to the Common Market. EFTA was important to Britain and would remain so. Thirdly, British interests in the Commonwealth had to be safeguarded.

81. As understood in Paris,^{58/} the position of Britain was that she may, the case arising, accept a unanimous invitation from the Six, but that it is more than ever out of the question that Mr. Wilson should intervene in EEC quarrels either by agreeing to occupy a seat vacated by France or by backing France against the Five. In other words, a solution to EEC's internal quarrels was a prerequisite to the Community's enlargement.

82. In London, the second alternative - "that General de Gaulle might permit Britain to join as a way of securing his ends in the Community" - was in fact rejected^{59/} as "dangerous and cynical doctrine. It is surely unthinkable that Britain should allow herself to be used as a pawn in that sort of game".

83. On the other hand, the possibility was in no way ruled out that, if negotiations with France failed, Britain should join the Five:

"To suppose that Britain would spring into the empty chair left by France, as it were by a conjuring trick, is absurd. The new Europe cannot be built without France, for obvious reasons. But - if it had to go on for a little time, while waiting for France - the crucial point would arrive when the Five felt they had to take decisions by themselves... It is at this moment that the Five might well invite Britain to rejoin them in Brussels - the negotiations never having been formally suspended, only interrupted. This is one point when a British Government must be ready to act... The possibility cannot be excluded of Britain playing her part in maintaining the strength of a Community which would otherwise be weakened."

84. Although British opinion, on the whole, moved closer to "Europe", differences remained between the Conservatives and Labour. At a meeting of EFTA members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe on 23 January, Maurice Edelman

^{58/} Andre Fontaine in Le Monde, 18 January, p.3.

^{59/} The Times, "From our European Economic Correspondent", 4 January.

(Labour) said 60/ that it was difficult to advise France to accept the conditions of the Five - to which England, on her part, would not agree.61/ Duncan Sandys (Conservative) said that Britain should inform the Six that she was ready at the end of the EEC crisis 62/ to enter into negotiations with a view to joining the Common Market and setting up a political union.

60/ Le Monde, 25 January, p.17. This is in keeping with the remark made in New Commonwealth (para. 72 above).

61/ A Labour peer, Lord Winterbottom, similarly said (The Times, 24 January, p.9) that, if Britain became a member of EEC, she would surely come into conflict with the EEC Commission over the control of finances and powers.

62/ The agreement which reportedly ended the EEC crisis will be dealt with in the February European Survey.

CONFIDENTIAL

MA:ms

7 February 1966

NOTE ON LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS - JANUARY 1966

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CONFIDENTIAL

7 February 1966

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NOTE ON LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS

January 1966

I. General

1. The Dominican crisis was still at the centre of political affairs in Latin America. The tense situation in the Dominican Republic has become potentially dangerous again. Several incidents and new fighting erupted in Santo Domingo. The commanders of the Dominican Armed Forces openly disobeyed the orders of the Provisional President to leave the country. While, on one side, the former rebel officers have obeyed Mr. García Godoy's order to leave on diplomatic missions, on the other side, the regular military officers are still balking.
2. It was reported that US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, head of the OAS Ad hoc Committee in the Dominican capital, was trying to persuade the regular army men to leave the Republic. In this connexion, according to the New York Times ^{1/} "an ugly situation" could develop if Comodoro Rivera Caminero, former Minister of the Armed Forces, the main rightist figure, and his associates, "do not now also get out of the country - and soon". The United States, added the paper, had the power to make them go. **If the situation was not resolved quickly, President García Godoy would have to ask the United States or the OAS to help him and "the alternative will be another bloody flare-up" in the Dominican Republic.**
3. Serious internal political troubles were reported in several countries of the Continent, particularly in Colombia, Guatemala and Peru. On the whole, political and social instability continued to be a characteristic feature of the development in Latin America.
4. The First Tricontinental (Afro-Asian-Latin American) Conference of Havana, aimed at strengthening the solidarity of the peoples of the three Continents, was also an important development. The Conference adopted a "global strategy" - a united front of the anti-imperialist forces against Imperialism - and set up an Organization of solidarity of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America. USSR participation in the Conference was deemed to constitute "intervention" in Latin American affairs by the Peruvian Government which, together with Colombia and Venezuela, formally called for OAS condemnation.

^{1/} 27 January 1966.

II. The Situation in the Dominican Republic

5. The situation in the Dominican Republic remained tense and the future of the country was uncertain. On the evening of 3 January, President Garcia Godoy addressed the nation on the Santiago incident of 19 December 1965. After recalling that the Government had ordered an investigation into the incident, the President stated that he had studied the documentation relating to the investigation and the only certainty was that human lives had been lost in the Santiago incident; the responsibility for the incident lay not with the military alone but with the tragic division between Dominicans. He went on to state that this was not the moment to establish blame, but of working for unity and listening to the voice of common duty. The President then announced that an important group of military personnel of various ranks would leave the country on missions abroad. Among the senior military officers appointed to posts in the diplomatic service were Commodore Francisco Rivera Gaminero, former Minister of Armed Forces, and Colonel Francisco Caamafio Deño, the chief of the Dominican rebels.

6. As a result of President Garcia Godoy's statement, the "Constitutionalists", political parties (including the Dominican Revolutionary Party of former President Bosch), labour unions and other leftist organizations expressed opposition and demanded the punishment of the commanders of the armed forces whom they regarded as responsible for the Santiago incident. The spokesman for the Dominican rebels accused the President of "legalizing crime in the Dominican Republic" and Mr. Bosch declared that the Provisional President had opened "the way for anarchy" in the country. Accordingly, both the Dominican Revolutionary Party and the "Constitutionalists" withdrew their support of the Provisional Government.

7. The aim of the Provisional Government was to get the top military leaders on both sides - rightist and "Constitutionalist" - out of the country and into diplomatic posts abroad. The ex-rebels, including Colonel Caamafio, ^{2/} left the country during the month, thus complying with the President's decision, but the regular army group refused to leave. The former Minister of Armed Forces, Commodore Francisco Rivera Gaminero, said that the Supreme Junta of the regular Dominican armed forces should consider the changes decreed by the President. Meanwhile, General Wessin y Wessin caused additional trouble from his post of exile in Miami by saying that he was ready to return to the Dominican Republic.

^{2/} Indicating his readiness to accept the President's decision, Colonel Caamafio requested guarantees for the safety of former "Constitutionalist" troops billeted in the "27 February Camp". On 20 January, President Garcia Godoy established new rules concerning this camp and agreed with the OAS Ad hoc Committee on a number of measures designed to ensure the safety of the personnel billeted there.

8. Le Monde of 8 January wrote that the Dominican crisis - contrary to President Garcia Godoy's conception - was not a question of personalities. The root of the crisis could be found in "30 years of dictatorship" and half a century of "American domination". Without US intervention, added the paper, the Dominican rightist forces would have been defeated.

9. On 7 January, members of the regular Armed Forces, acting on orders from their superiors, occupied the plant and studios of Radio Televisión Santo Domingo. President Garcia Godoy requested assistance from the OAS, and after an agreement concluded by the Commander of the Inter-American Peace Force with the Dominican Minister of Armed Forces, the Dominican troops evacuated the plant and studios.

10. Several other disturbances took place in Santo Domingo in January, particularly on 18 and 19 January when a son of former President Bosch was seriously wounded by a Sergeant of the Dominican Armed Forces.

11. An interpretation of Dominican developments in the last weeks was that the rightists could not make a successful coup d'Etat while the Inter-American Armed Force was there. The Ad hoc Committee of the OAS issued a communiqué expressing its full support to the Provisional Government. The Committee issued a warning to rebellious commanders of the Dominican Armed Forces that any attempt to overthrow the Provisional Government would be considered open defiance of its efforts towards restoration of peace and democracy in the Republic; the Inter-American Peace Force, including nearly 7,000 American soldiers, would be called into action to prevent a coup d'Etat. The Committee, headed by US Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, was apparently working behind the scenes to help the Provisional President obtain the support of leading Dominican civilians in bringing pressure on the military officers to leave the country.

12. The United States Government reportedly declared that the Provisional Government in Santo Domingo had its full support since, it was said, Dr. Garcia Godoy's Government represented the "best vehicle" to carry the Dominican Republic forward to general elections, scheduled to take place on 1 June 1966. The military changes were regarded as an attempt by Dr. Garcia Godoy to eliminate influence considered to be prejudicial to free and fair elections. 3/

3/ There has been growing concern in Santo Domingo that the elections might have to be postponed because of the continuing dispute between both factions of the Dominican Army.

13. Two changes of command took place on 17 January in the Inter-American Peace Force. General Hugo Panasco Alvim, of Brazil, transferred the command of the IAFP to General Alvaro Alves De Silva Braga, also of Brazil. General Bruno Palmer, Jr., handed over the command of the US Forces in the Dominican Republic to Brigadier-General Robert R. Linvill. The change of the Commander of the IAFP was apparently the result of differences of opinion between General Alvim and the US representative in the Dominican Republic. The Brazilian General had expressed doubt that Dominican military leaders ordered to take overseas diplomatic posts would go. In fact, he said, they had applied to the Inter-American Defense Board for guarantees against "expulsion" by the Provisional Government.

14. US Ambassador Ellsworth Barker countered the statement of General Alvim and pointed out that the Inter-American Defense Board "could have no possible role in a situation involving a sovereign government". At the same time, President Garcia Godoy accused the former IAFP Commander of interference in the Dominican Republic's internal affairs.

15. The civil war has harmed the Dominican economy. Exports in 1965 dropped off by a third. The major export item, sugar, was down 42 per cent. The picture appears to be somewhat brighter for 1966. A larger sugar crop of 876,000 tons was predicted, as well as larger exports (354,381 tons) to the United States market. Under the international agreement on coffee, the Dominican Republic was allowed to export more coffee, its second-ranking export product, and a recent programme of exporting fruits and vegetables to the United States was being intensified.

16. The Dominican economy has been depending on US aid. The United States has given the Dominican Republic \$90 million in economic aid since the outbreak of the civil war in April 1965. All the assistance was in direct grants. By the end of January the figure is supposed to reach \$100 million. It covers emergency food shipments, the payment of Dominican Government salaries and some works projects.

III. Relations between the United States and Latin America

17. No fundamental change took place in the relations between the United States and Latin America. According to Mr. Walter Lippman, ^{4/} it has been evident for some time that US relations with Latin America "are deteriorating" and that "there has been an urgent, almost desperate, need for change" at the highest levels in Washington. Latin American criticism towards the United States policy in the area, especially in the economic field, has continued.

^{4/} New York Herald Tribune, 20 January 1966.

18. A significant fact in the development of US relations with Latin America appeared to be the appointment of the US Ambassador in Brazil, Mr. Lincoln Gordon, to the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. However, this appointment suggested "little change in current US policy towards Latin America".^{5/} It was reported that the new Assistant Secretary, as US Ambassador in Brazil, advocated support of the military government of President Castello Branco because it was, in his view, a progressive government. Some Latin American Governments have criticized this attitude arguing that, by abandoning democratic intransigence, the US was abandoning its chances of political leadership. Mr. Gordon, however, stated that "constitutional democracy... exists in full panoply only in the United States, Canada, in some countries in Europe and a few other places".^{6/}

19. The main elements of the present Latin American distrust seem to be the fear that the US Government would use military force and economic power to thwart or suppress radical social changes. In the view of many Latin American political leaders, the OAS itself cannot prevent the United States from acting unilaterally if vital American interests are considered to be at stake. On the other hand, the US obsession with the danger of Communism is regarded as exaggerated. Moreover, US foreign policy seems to be more preoccupied with Asian and European problems.

20. In the political field, Latin American Governments were reserved on giving material support, especially in troops, to the United States in the war in Vietnam. However, they expressed support for the Pope and President Johnson's efforts to end the war. The President of Mexico declared on 3 January that his country was willing to offer its co-operation to take the Vietnamese conflict from the battlefield to the conference table. The President of Chile made a similar statement.

21. The US Ambassador to Chile was strongly criticized for a statement in connexion with the land reform in that country. He was accused by the Chilean Conservative Party of having intervened in the internal affairs of Chile and of exceeding the limits in the field of custom. 'The Chilean Liberal' called his statement arising from "ignorance" of Chile, which was "unworthy" of an Ambassador.

22. A Parliamentary Commission of Colombia demanded at the end of January a thorough investigation of the US "Operation Simpatía", a "research" programme designed to test the effectiveness of military and civic action in rural areas.

5/ Christian Science Monitor, 15 January 1966.

6/ New York Times, 19 January 1966.

The legislators would propose to the Government that this "operation" be suspended on the grounds that it violated the sovereignty of Colombia. The Parliamentarians asserted that the results of the "research" were sent to the Special Operation Research Office in Washington, which had been in charge of the "Canelot project", a similar study made last year in Chile under the guidance of the Pentagon.

23. New Latin American criticism has become evident in the economic field. The President of Venezuela recently stated that the US discriminatory petroleum measures which favoured Canada and Mexico, at the expense of Venezuela, affected the relations between Venezuela and the United States. The Venezuelans claim that the revised US oil quotas allot them a smaller share of the US market than they could win in the absence of protection against imports. And the fact that the Canadians, largely because of joint defense considerations, are permitted to export all they want to the United States has served to increase Venezuelan resentment.

24. The Brazilian Coffee Institute announced that Brazil would abandon the International Coffee Agreement if it turned out to be against its interests.

25. It was also reported that the new Chilean copper legislation had opened the way for foreign investment; Argentina has substantially settled a dispute with foreign oil companies; while Brazil opened up its iron-ore riches to foreign capital collaborating with Brazilian private interests. However, the possibility of increasing foreign private investment in Latin America comes up against nationalist resistance in some cases. Thus, the US Government has asked Latin American Governments, some of which have agreed, to give guarantees for nationalization, revolutions and other risks. Such US investment-guarantee treaties with Brazil and Argentina have recently been ratified.

IV. The relations among Latin American countries

a) Latin American integration

26. Most Latin American Governments seem to be in favour of economic integration and recently the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) called for a high level technical committee to speed up the integration. Though some Governments agree on the necessity of a Latin American common market, there are serious obstacles to integration, arising from the principle of national sovereignty.

27. The results of LAFTA in 1965 were not spectacular. LAFTA trade for the first quarter of 1965 reached \$120.5 million, an increase of 28.3 per cent over 1964. The countries registering the greatest increases were Brazil, Mexico and Argentina, the most industrialized nations of the Trade Association, while Peru and Uruguay suffered

slight declines. Mexico's trade within LAFTA increased by 22.1 per cent in the five months of 1965 in relation to the same period of the preceding year. The trends in LAFTA trade appeared to confirm the fears of the less industrialised countries that the Association would be more profitable to the relatively more developed Latin American member nations.

28. At its fifth annual conference in Montevideo at the beginning of January, LAFTA appointed its Executive Committee for 1966. The delegate of Brazil was elected President, and those of Chile and Venezuela were elected Vice-Presidents. Other members of the Executive Committee are: Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. The Conference re-elected Alberto Sola (Argentina) as LAFTA's Executive Secretary.

29. Representatives of Chile, Ecuador and Peru met in Paracas (Peru) early in January to discuss matters pertaining to the territorial waters - 200 miles wide. Peru, reportedly proposed the creation of a joint international police composed of the three countries to patrol the territorial waters, which were being violated by fishing vessels, especially from the United States and Japan.

b) Relations between Mexico and Central America

30. President Gustavo Díaz Ordaz of Mexico paid a visit to the countries of Central America during the month of January. The visit was regarded as an effort to strengthen Mexico's ties with that area as a means towards broadening economic relations.

According to the New York Times, ^{7/} it was the first time that a Mexican President had shown such interest in Central America. Mexico's insistence on the principle of self-determination and non-intervention was supported by the peoples of the area. The final Mexican-Panamanian communiqué on 21 January quoted President Díaz Ordaz as having expressed "great confidence" that the current negotiations on the status of the Panama Canal would lead to the achievement of Panama's "just national aspirations".

31. But this communiqué and the five preceding it also took note of suspicions and grievances held against Mexico in the economic field. All six Central American countries have been running deficits in trade with Mexico. They are fearful that the region would be hard put to find products it could sell to Mexico if more Mexican products came in.

32. The communiqués have consequently asserted that ways would be sought to redress the commercial imbalance. Mexico offered the same trade concessions to the area as to its partners in the IAPTA. President Diaz Ordaz emphasized that the eventual goal was economic integration of the entire Latin American Continent.

V. Relations between Latin America and European and Asian Countries

33. The most significant political event in the relations of Latin America with European countries was the visit paid by the British Foreign Secretary to several Latin American countries during January. After the visit, Mr. Michael Stewart acknowledged that the United Kingdom had paid "too little attention" to Latin America. In Peru, Chile and Argentina, the British Foreign Secretary explored ways of increasing British trade and capital export to the area. He signed two technical assistance commitments with Peru and Chile. In the political field no concrete results of the visit were reported. The dispute between Britain and Argentina over the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands has not yet been settled.

34. On the other hand, the trend in favour of increasing Latin American trade with other countries, especially European, has continued. Several Latin American countries expressed interest in receiving foreign capital and technical assistance from Europe. In this connexion, it was reported that West Germany granted Chile loans amounting to DM 21.3 million. Also, Lufthansa Airlines in January inaugurated its West Germany - Peru flights. The French Government agreed to grant the Chilean Development Corp. a 25 million francs loan to buy materials and equipment for Chilean industry. Also, France agreed to another 20 million francs loan to buy French equipment for Chilean Government organizations.

35. Mexico obtained a joint \$21 million loan from the U.K., France, Belgium and Japan to boost development of the oil industry. In addition, Italy will grant Mexico a \$5 million loan for the electrification programme.

36. The Peruvian Senate authorized President Belaunde Terry to continue discussions with a German-English consortium for the construction of a hydroelectric plant. Further, the Japanese Mitsui firm plans to begin the exploitation of rich and extensive copper mines situated at Chapl. in Southern Peru.

37. The Japanese Prime Minister recently declared that his Government would make efforts to contribute to the economic and social development of Latin America. Japan's ties with Latin America were being strengthened through 600,000 Japanese immigrants, he added. In Japanese opinion, Latin America is an important supply source of raw materials for Japanese industry and a promising market for Japan's heavy and chemical industrial products. Japan hopes to boost its exports to Brazil, Mexico, etc. and to obtain contracts worth \$270 million from Argentina in the next five years.

VI. The First Tricontinental Conference of Havana ^{8/}

38. The Havana Conference was regarded by almost all the participants as a new phase in the building of solidarity of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America in one united anti-imperialist front. The Conference adopted a global strategy against "Imperialism", since Imperialism - it was asserted - had acted similarly against anti-imperialist movements.

39. One of the major results of the Conference was the setting up of the Organization of Solidarity of African, Asian and Latin American peoples, with headquarters of its Executive Committee in Havana, with a view to furthering the solidarity of the peoples of the three Continents. This would parallel the Afro-Asian peoples solidarity organization of Cairo.

40. A permanent Secretariat was also set up, with temporary headquarters in Havana, headed by a Secretary-General, and composed of 12 other members, four each from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Elected to this Secretariat were a Cuban (Osmani Cienfuegos, Minister of Construction) as Secretary-General, and delegates from the UAR, Guinea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Portuguese Colonies, South Vietnam, North Korea, Pakistan, Syria, Chile, Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico and Venezuela.

41. The Conference established a committee of assistance and aid for the national liberation movements, composed of delegates from Algeria, Ghana, Tanzania, Congo (Brazzaville), British Guiana, Guatemala, Brazil, Cuba, USSR, PRC, Cambodia and Japan. It was further agreed to hold a second Tricontinental meeting in Cairo in 1966.

42. A general resolution - the "Tricontinental Declaration of Havana" - was adopted, as well as several special resolutions supporting the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Conference condemned the US policy in Vietnam and at the same time reaffirmed the principle of peaceful co-existence.

43. The attitude of the United States and several other Governments in the Western Hemisphere was adverse to the Conference. The President of Venezuela warned other Latin American Governments on the possibility of "indirect aggression" resulting from the deliberations of the Havana Conference. The Prime Minister of Peru declared that the Soviet support of wars of liberation, including Peruvian guerrillas, constituted "Soviet interference" and "aggressive tactics". Political leaders of Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala have regarded the Conference as an encouragement to the use of "violence", "subversion" and as an attempt to "export revolution" in the Continent, and expressed

^{8/} This Conference has been dealt with in detail in a separate Note of 20 January 1966.

concern on the repercussions in their respective countries. The Peruvian Government requested an extraordinary meeting of the OAS Council to discuss the "case of intervention" resulting from the agreements of the Tricontinental Conference. This request was co-sponsored by Colombia and Venezuela. The Council's discussions have so far been inconclusive but a resolution on the subject is under consideration by a reportedly divided Council. The question is also being considered by the United Nations Latin American Group which has set up a committee to draft a Note to be addressed to the U.N. Secretary-General.

44. The Latin American participants to the Havana Conference set up a Latin American Solidarity Organization in Havana on 18 January, aimed at helping the national liberation movements in the area. The Committee of Co-ordination of this Organization is composed of delegates from Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Guatemala, British Guiana, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. A first Latin American solidarity conference is to take place in 1967.

VII. Other problems

45. Some uneasiness developed in the relations between Cuba and the People's Republic of China. The Cuban Prime Minister said on 2 January that the 1966 volume of trade between both countries would fall below that of 1965 as a result of the Chinese refusal to supply 250,000 tons of rice in return for 370,000 tons of sugar. The PRC Foreign Trade Ministry stated on 9 January that the Cuban claim was groundless; while Cuba had asked for 285,000 tons of rice, the People's Republic of China had offered 135,000 tons - the same amount as in 1964 - since the PRC did not have enough grain for its domestic needs and its commitments to other countries. According to Western observers, the PRC action may have commercial as well as ideological motives. On the one hand, the People's Republic of China needed hard currency and, on the other, it was not content with the "pro-Soviet orientation" of the Cuban Government.

Department of Political and
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THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

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THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

1. The purpose of this note is to give an account of the origin, structure and functioning of the Council of Europe and of the attitudes adopted towards it by some countries. ^{1/}

Origin and Membership

2. The Council of Europe was established on 5 May 1949 when its Statute was signed in London by ten European nations comprising the five Brussels Treaty Powers (Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, and the United Kingdom), Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Ireland and Italy. The initiative for the establishment of the Council had been taken earlier by the five signatories to the Treaty of Brussels of 17 March 1948. ^{2/} These five Powers had in October 1948 appointed a Committee for "securing a greater measure of unity between European countries."

3. The Council of Europe is a form of loose inter-governmental association with wide membership, currently comprising 18 States. It may be regarded as part of a process aimed at achieving political and economic integration of Western Europe.

4. Under Article 1 (a) "the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater unity between its Members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage." In order to assess the scope of "the ideals and principles", this Article should be read

^{1/} The following West European organisations have also to be taken into account: (a) loose association with wide membership: Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC, 1948) replaced under a Convention of December 1960 by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) including Canada and the United States; (b) closer integration with limited membership - in certain sectors: European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951), European Economic Community (EEC, or Common Market, 1957) and European Community for Atomic Energy (EURATOM, 1957), all three grouping the Benelux countries, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy. (The "European Parliament" which like the Council of Europe is located in Strasbourg is the Common Assembly of the three Communities) Western European Union (WEU, 1954), the Six and the United Kingdom, dealing notably with military matters; European Free Trade Association (EFTA or Outer Seven, 1960) Britain, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Austria, Portugal and Switzerland, with Finland as an associate member.

^{2/} Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense.

in connection with the second paragraph of the preamble to the Statute which states: "Reaffirming their devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy." These purposes have accounted up to now for a policy which has excluded Portugal and Spain from membership of the Council and created certain difficulties in the path of closer relations with Eastern Europe. Special agreements have been entered into, however, with non-member States, such as Finland, Portugal and Spain, informally associating them with the work of the Council.

5. The bulk of the present membership of eighteen is made up of the six members of the three Communities ^{3/} and the "Outer Seven" of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) ^{4/} except Portugal. In addition Ireland, Cyprus (1961), Greece (1949), Iceland (1949), Turkey (1949) and, since April 1965, Malta, are members of the Council.

Structure and Functions

6. The organs of the Council are the Committee of Ministers, the Consultative Assembly and the Secretariat.

7. "The Committee of Ministers is the organ which acts on behalf of the Council of Europe in accordance with Articles 15 and 16." (Article 15)

8. Under Article 15 (a), the Committee of Ministers - on which each member is represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs or an alternate - "on the recommendation of the Consultative Assembly or on its own initiative ... shall consider the action required to further the aim of the Council of Europe, including the conclusion of conventions or agreements and the adoption by Governments of a common policy with regard to particular matters."

9. Under Article 15 (b) the Council may make recommendations to the member Governments and may request them "to inform it of the action taken by them with regard to such recommendations."

10. Under Article 20, important decisions of the Committee of Ministers,

^{3/} The Federal Republic of Germany joined the Council in May 1951.

^{4/} Austria and Switzerland joined the Council, respectively, in 1955 and 1963.

including recommendations to members concerning the aim of the Council, require a unanimous vote. However, the Committee, by a two-thirds majority, may "decide with binding effect" on "internal" matters, including the budget and the financial contributions of members.

11. The Committee meets before and during the beginning of every session of the Consultative Assembly "and at such other times as it may decide."

12. The main achievement of the Committee has been the preparation of agreements in economic, social, cultural, scientific, legal and administrative matters by committees of governmental experts. Such agreements on a great variety of subjects include the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights dating back to November 1950 and supplemented by protocols. ^{5/}

13. The Consultative Assembly is "the deliberative organ of the Council of Europe."^{6/} In May 1963 the number of members of the Assembly was set at 144.^{7/} France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom have eighteen seats each. Other countries have smaller delegations, numbering no less than three deputies.

14. According to the Statute the representatives to the Assembly were designated following a procedure established by each government. Since May 1951, however, the Assembly is composed of representatives of each member country elected by its Parliament or designated through a procedure determined by Parliament.

15. While the Consultative Assembly "shall meet in ordinary session once a year", (Article 32), it has been a practice to divide such a session into three parts, held, since 1957, in January, May and September.

^{5/} The European Court of Human Rights, provided for by the Convention, came into being in September 1958 and the 15 judges were elected by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in January 1959. In May 1965, Professor René Cassin (France) replaced Lord McNeill for a three year term as President of the Court.

^{6/} Article 22 of the Statute. The Statute "for the first time in history... created as part of an international organization a parliamentary assembly whose members derive their mandate not from the governments but from the national parliaments and who participate in the work of the organization as individual representatives of public opinion and not governmental delegates" (Arthur H. Robertson, Problems of European Integration, Académie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours, 1957, p. 121).

^{7/} Malta, subsequently, received three seats.

16. The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe is competent to make recommendations to the Committee of Ministers on matters referred to it by the Committee or approved by the Committee for inclusion on the Assembly's agenda on the proposal of the latter. With the exception of internal matters, all resolutions require a two-thirds majority.

17. Although not endowed with powers of decision, the Consultative Assembly, recognized by the Ministers as "the general framework of European policy", has indeed been a sounding-board for the discussion of matters of general European interest, including integration proposals. In the words of Robertson "the Assembly has acquired a right of review over all international activities in Europe - even though it has not been granted, as it has wished, the right of supervision."

18. The Consultative Assembly has concerned itself with the political aspects of European peace and security and with such West European issues as the rivalry between West European economic groups. On the whole, representatives of Community members praised their own form of integration and outsiders showed apprehension of a political rift in Western Europe.^{8/}

19. In Strasbourg, Cabinet Ministers can meet Parliamentarians from all other Council member countries. In addition, the Assembly arranged for the setting up of a Mixed Committee of two delegations of eight members, respectively representing the Committee of Ministers and the Assembly. Enlarged sessions of the Mixed Committee - colloques - have taken place in December each year since 1961.^{9/}

20. The Secretariat of the Council is composed of international civil servants headed by a Secretary-General, an Assistant Secretary-General and a Clerk of the Assembly - with the rank of Assistant Secretary-General.^{10/}

8/ Such was particularly the atmosphere at the January 1965 session of the Consultative Assembly, during which the internal West European clash was so sharp that, in the opinion of Neue Zürcher Zeitung, things were going more smoothly in East-West European relations (see para. 39 below).

9/ The "colloques" of 17 ministers and 30 parliamentarians are held in private.

10/ 350 staff members - 6 Divisions and 3 Services. Important problems relate to geographical distribution and the promotion opportunities of career officers in the face of the appointment of seconded personnel to high posts.

21. While the first two Secretaries-General of the Council of Europe, J.C. Paris (1949 - 1955) and L. Marchal (1955 - 1956) were career diplomats, the Committee of Ministers in December 1956 decided to submit to the Assembly the name of a statesman with personal experience in Parliamentary responsibilities. The next two Secretaries-General were Parliamentarians from Italy, L. Debenuti (1957 - 1963) and the present one, Peter Smithers, from Britain, appointed on 15 January 1964. ^{11/}

22. The following appraisal has been given ^{12/} of the office of the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe who admittedly plays a more important role than foreseen in the rules and regulations:

"The Secretary-General appears to be ... a civil servant of the Council of Europe to whom his post, the circumstances of his appointment, the importance and the multiplicity of his functions, the personal contacts which he is bound to have, his European sense and the alleged favour of public opinion as well as of political and diplomatic circles give, the ease arising, the best opportunities of becoming, for the Continent, an equivalent of what the Secretary-General of the United Nations is for the whole of the world."

Achievements and prospects

23. In the economic field the Council of Europe at the outset had its possible activities curtailed by the existence of an organization more technical and devoid of parliamentary control - the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). In view, however, of the economic rift between the Communities and EFTA the view was expressed in January 1964 by Spaak, that the main role of the Council was now in the economic field.

24. In the social field, the Council of Europe has been co-operating with the International Labour Organization (ILO). The Council has taken initiatives on matters including the status of European workers, demographic questions, hygiene and public health.

25. The cultural policy of the Council has consisted notably in proclaiming and protecting a "European" culture. A European Cultural Convention was signed in December 1964.

^{11/} Born in 1915; Doctor of Philosophy; Parliamentary (Conservative) Under-Secretary of State in the Foreign Office (1962 - 1964); Delegate to United Nations General Assembly (1960 - 1963); Member of Consultative Assembly of Council of Europe (1952 - 1956 and 1960)

^{12/} Pierre Duclos, Le Conseil de l'Europe, 1964, p. 78.

26. In a broader sense "integrationists" still regard the three six-member Communities as the true nucleus of a united Europe.^{13/} The Council's supporters, however, point out that the supranational features of the Communities are increasingly being criticised; and that, if Europe is headed towards a comparatively loose Confederation, the Council of Europe may yet "come into its own" in the political field.^{14/}

Attitudes of Member Nations

27. President de Gaulle's objections to European technocrats or "Eurocrats" would seem to apply only minimally, if at all, to officials of the Council of Europe in view of the limited powers enjoyed by the Council.

28. Britain which was also very active in the setting up of the Council remains, it was pointed out,^{15/} the member of the Council most "ruthless in maintaining its original features, that is, refusing any encroachment, however light, on the sovereignty of the member States. Such is the attitude of all of Britain's representatives in Strasbourg, whether Cabinet members or Parliamentarians, Conservatives or Labourites - with the exception of a very few personalities, steadily disowned by their parties."

29. The Federal Republic of Germany was not an original member but decided in July 1950 to accept an invitation to join the Council. Its participation has been based on "mutual respect and a watchfulness in forgetting the past which honour the whole institution."^{16/}

30. Italy has firmly supported the Council and the first "political" Secretary-General was an Italian. Yet Italian Governments have apparently

^{13/} In 1950 the question was debated whether all members of the Council of Europe should act together in any move towards European integration; and an approach closer to federation prevailed with the setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). As a result, Britain and the Scandinavian countries, for instance, did not participate in that phase of European organization and eventually established a rival economic group (EFTA).

^{14/} In answer to disparaging names of "old cart-horse" and "residuary legatee of the high hopes of European union", the champions of the Council of Europe say that the Six have usurped the name of "Europe". Moreover, the emphasis in the Communities on "economic processes, the supposed primacy of high-consumption levels, the cult of technocracy", are not, it is argued in Strasbourg, the true European spirit.

^{15/} Pierre Duclos, Le Conseil de L'Europe, p. 42.

^{16/} Ibid., p. 40.

placed more hope in the stronger organs of the union, the other communi-
ties. 17/

31. A similar position of emphasis on efficiency has been even more
"resolutely" defended 18/ by the Netherlands, which has been quite critical
of the Council of Europe. On the other hand, such reservations were
tempered by a desire on the part of the Netherlands to maintain the best
possible relations with Britain, a staunch supporter of the Council.

Attitude of the United States

32. Since the establishment of the Organisation for European Economic
Co-operation (OEEC) which was set up in connection with the Marshall Plan,
the United States has consistently encouraged West European integration. 19/

33. Although relations have, perhaps, been closer and more significant
between the United States and the Communities, 20/ the Consultative Assembly
of the Council of Europe in 1953 approved a policy of partnership on a
footing of equality with the United States. American parliamentarians have
been frequent visitors to Strasbourg, where a delegation of United States
Congressmen was received in the Consultative Assembly on 4 May 1965.

34. While the "Kennedy Round" of tariff negotiations involving primarily
the United States and Western Europe is to take place in the framework of
GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe in a communiqué of 20 April 1964, supported the
objectives of the tariff negotiations.

17/ The forthcoming fusion, under a Treaty of 8 April 1965, of the
three "executives" - and of the three Councils of Ministers - of
the Communities, which is intended to be followed by a merger of
the Communities themselves, will make the new unified Commission
even stronger.

18/ Pierre Ducloux, p. 41.

19/ The United States is a member of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) which replaced OEEC in 1960.

20/ Herr Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic
Community, has been a strong advocate of West European "partnership"
with the United States.

Attitude of the Soviet Union

35. The attitude of the Soviet Union towards the Council of Europe at the time of its creation was negative. No official statements concerning the Council of Europe were made in recent years. The accounts of the activity of the Council of Europe were limited in the Soviet press and publications.

36. It was considered that "the Council of Europe was created in order to consolidate the reactionary capitalist countries of Europe. The aim of the Council of Europe was to establish a super national parliament, a supreme organ on the matter of European integration, which in due time should be a real European political power. But it failed because of contradictions among members. In fact, the Council is an appendage of the NATO to propagate the Western ideas, i.e., to create an anti-Soviet bloc." ^{21/}

Questions of opening to the East and of relationship to the United Nations

37. The two most significant trends in the Council in the last two years were towards an opening to the East and the recognition of the Council as a Regional Agency of the United Nations.

38. The efforts to correct the ideological imbalance of the Council "of Europe" which does not include any Socialist country, may be traced back to a meeting of the Committee of Ministers in December 1964, at which "the development of the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe and its possible consequences" were reviewed. ^{22/}

39. At the January 1965 session of the Consultative Assembly, Dr. Josef Klaus, the Austrian Chancellor, said that the work of the Council's Committees of Experts should be extended, where possible, to the Eastern European nations, and he referred to this process as building "the eastern wing of the House of Europe." The Consultative Assembly at the same session adopted a recommendation to the member Governments on the desirability of

21/ International Economic Organization, Reference Book, 1962, Academy of Science of the USSR, The Institute of World's Economy and International Affairs.

22/ Further it was agreed at a colloquy of Ministers and Parliamentarians on 19 December 1964, that East-West European relations should be encouraged.

intensified trade relations with Eastern Europe.

40. In November 1965, the Political Committee of the Assembly heard a statement by M. Maurice Schumann on recent political and economic developments in Eastern Europe. The President of the French National Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee supported a suggestion for allowing West European countries to take part in certain areas of technical co-operation in the Council of Europe.

41. In December 1965, the Committee of Ministers considered relations with European non-member countries, and Secretary-General Salferens reviewed developments in this respect over the past year so far as the organization was concerned.

42. During the Cyprus crisis, a feeling of frustration was noticeable in the Council of Europe. The Consultative Assembly, through its Standing Committee, declared, inter alia, that the Council "must be ready at all times, in a spirit of European solidarity and within a European institutional framework to take all practical steps likely to contribute effectively to the re-establishment of order and to the solution of the dispute." ^{23/} In this context the question of the Council's relationship with the United Nations acquired greater significance.

43. Soon after assuming his office as Secretary-General of the Council of Europe, Mr. Salferens, in April 1964, pointed out a gap (lacune) in the hierarchical structure of the United Nations. According to Mr. Salferens, while the American States had acquired the status of a regional organization at the United Nations and the African States had been making "valorous" efforts in this direction, Europe had not as yet done anything in this connection. The Council of Europe would have more weight among international organizations if it were a regional agency, the new Secretary-General of the Council declared.

44. This possibility was considered inter alia by the Political Committee of the Consultative Assembly at a meeting in Stockholm in September 1964.

23/ Recommendation of 24 February 1964.

45. In May 1965, in the Consultative Assembly, Mr. Smithers said that "much had been done" within a year in making relations closer with other international organizations, including the United Nations, "particularly with UNESCO, ILO, WHO, FAO, and OEEC. In any case, there is an increasing realization of mutual interest and the role of the Council of Europe is becoming increasingly clear." Mr. Smithers added that "the same problems of co-operation in technical matters, which will promote greater unity in Europe, can also make a valuable contribution towards the work of the world organization. By acting as a regional advance guard in international co-operation we can thus lay down the precedent and carry out the experiment which may be of service to others in due time. This is a truly acceptable and characteristically European contribution to the emerging world structure. In numerous projects of co-operation or consultation between the Council of Europe and the United Nations agencies, it is coming to be an accepted and welcome reality."

46. These two trends in the Council of Europe of an opening to the East and closer relations with the United Nations seem to be connected; ^{24/} but difficulties remain, in spite of the current trend towards an opening to the East. On 1 October 1965 Pierre Pflimlin, the President of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, at a press conference, said that "we would not receive representatives that are not democratically elected", although "we could, nevertheless, for reasons of opportunity in a more distant future, hear Communist Government personalities in the Hall of the Council of Europe."

24/ In the same speech in which he dealt with relations with the United Nations, Mr. Smithers, in April 1964, raised the question of extending the Council membership to Eastern Europe and to the Iberian peninsula where, he said, "changes had taken place" - presumably of a kind to warrant membership in the Council of Europe.

Secretary - General

AA 3

CONFIDENTIAL

9 May 1966

FHP/flr

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ALL-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIPS - INCLUDING THE GERMAN QUESTION

(APRIL 1966)

Copy No. 7

ALL-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIPS - INCLUDING THE GERMAN QUESTION
(APRIL 1966)

1. The Soviet Union suggested, and the Gaullist newspaper "La Nation" apparently favoured, a pan-European security conference. ^{1/} This may be one of the main political topics during President de Gaulle's June visit to Moscow.
2. The Germans may take a first step, through mutual visits of Social-Democratic ^{2/} and SED (Socialist Unity of Germany) party leaders, towards dealing with the reunification question between themselves, in the face of misgivings and overt opposition respectively in West Germany's Christian Democratic (CDU) and Bavarian Christian Social (CSU) circles.
3. The Italian-Soviet meeting and the French visit to Romania showed different approaches to an East-West European rapprochement. While in Rome concrete problems - particularly in economic relations - were in the forefront, objectives such as "the disappearance of the blocs" ^{3/} and the "principles of sovereignty and national independence" ^{4/} were given prominence in Bucharest.

EUROPE-EAST AND WEST

4. At his press conference on 27 April in Rome, Mr. Gromyko dealing with European security, said ^{5/} that the Soviet Government favoured the calling of a pan-European Conference ^{6/} at the highest level, at which the various proposals could be considered and discussed. While the calling of such a conference would not in itself solve the problems, one could approach and study them:

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- ^{1/} Jacques de Montalais wrote that Mr. Gromyko's suggestion was "an additional brush-stroke-Russian, this time - in the picture (fresque) boldly outlined first by de Gaulle". (La Nation", 29 - 30 April, p. 2).
 - ^{2/} The Social-Democrats (SPD) are in opposition to the coalition government of the CDU-CSU Party and the Liberals (Freie Demokratische Partei, FDP).
 - ^{3/} Speech by M. Couve de Murville, the French Foreign Minister on 26 April.
 - ^{4/} Speech by Mr. Birladeanu, the First Vice-President of the Council of Ministers of Romania on 26 April.
 - ^{5/} "The Times", 28 April, p. 14; "Le Monde", 28 April, p. 1.
 - ^{6/} References to such a possible meeting had been made before by Soviet leaders including M. Gromyko himself (see para. 13 below).

"When you do not wish to agree, you may use the modern technique which consists in bartering increasingly violent insults. On the other hand, the quickest way, if you want to reach an agreement, consists in talking to one another, meeting and discussing mutual proposals". I/

5. Together with the Romanian visit to Britain in February, high-level European meetings in April 1966 confirmed a view, often expressed in European surveys - Gaullist claims that France, and France alone, kept up the dialogue with Eastern Europe ^{8/} were not born out by the broader trend in relations across ideological barriers on that continent. Two other states in Western Europe Britain and Italy, were also actively promoting, as far as they were concerned, closer relations with the Socialist part of Europe.

6. On 25 April M. Couve de Murville was received ^{9/} in Bucharest in a climate of "cordiality and simplicity":

"Everyone takes pleasure in noting that on most of the great political problems - national independence, peaceful coexistence, European security, closer ties between Europe's East and West - the views of the two sides are even closer to-day than two years ago".

7. The two parties, in M. Couve de Murville's words, "understood each other well". Mr. Birladeanu proclaimed "the principles of sovereignty and national independence, equality of right, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual respect". On 26 April in an after-dinner speech, the French foreign minister said that French foreign policy aimed at "the development of peaceful relations between all countries"; and he also referred to the principles of respect of the independence of all nations and non-intervention in anybody's internal affairs ("les affaires intérieures de personne"). M. Couve de Murville went on to say:

"This is the message which France has in mind to propose to the world and on which she bases her belief that there can be established, with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of ideological - so called - blocs, a true, fruitful détente".

I/ On being asked about US participation at such a pan European Conference, Mr. Gromyko said: "When I speak of European problems, I presuppose that European problems should interest Europe above all"

8/ C'est la France qui maintient le dialogue, Lucienne Hubert-Rodier in "Le Nation", 10 February 1966.

9/ Jean Schwobel, "Le Monde", 27 April, p. 1.

8. On 21 April Foreign Minister Gromyko arrived in Rome. The Italian Government is still concerned lest an improvement in its relations with the Soviet Union may benefit Italian Communists. However, in the words of "The Times" own correspondent 10/

"Internal politics apart, the Italians are now in the process of seeking an increase in their commercial contacts with the Russians and with the Communist countries of East Europe. A Russian delegation is in the country to deal with the technical details of an agreement with Fiat, which looks likely to be one of the biggest to be signed by Russia with a Western private firm".

9. On 23 April a new Soviet-Italian economic agreement was signed, as noted 11/ by the "Christian Science Monitor",

"Italian and Soviet economies are to some degree complementary. Italy lacks raw materials the Soviets can provide. Italy has industrial products, skills and know-how that Moscow wants". 12/

THE GERMAN QUESTION

Soviet foreign minister's speech 13/

10. In his speech of 2 April at the 23rd CPSU Congress, Mr. Andrey Gromyko defined 14/ the German problem, and the Soviet approach to its solution as follows:

"Departure from Potsdam... politically... backlashed in the form of /FRG/ demands for recarving the map of Europe. Militarily it backlashes in the form of a buildup of West German armaments... Could there be any greater betrayal of Potsdam than the readiness of certain Western powers to give the FRG access to nuclear armaments?". 15/.. "Take a closer look at what is going on in West Germany... Herein Europe lies the state which made revenge, for its defeat in war, the motto of its foreign policy".

10/ 22 April, p. 10.

11/ 26 April, p. 2, "The Times", 25 April, p. 9.

12/ As summarized by "Le Monde" the main headings in the agreement was cooperation in research, industrial progress, exchange of experts and the setting up of mixed commissions. (24 - 25 April, p. 3). On this occasion, Italy's deficit in trade relations with the Soviet Union was widely noted in the Western press.

13/ The Soviet position on the establishment, "existence" and foreign policy of the two German States was also set forth in the Statement of the USSR

11. In this connexion the Soviet foreign minister referred to the part of the recent FRG Notes dealing with frontiers ^{16/}:

"Not a single frontier post on European soil needs the blessing of those who dislike the results of the war. The question of the frontiers in Europe has been settled finally and irrevocably".

12. In order to remedy the situation of insecurity resulting from the present nature and foreign policy of the FRG, Mr. Gromyko defined the problem of European security as follows:

"European security has many components and one of the principal of these is the German problem or, to be more precise, the creation of such conditions as would preclude repetition of German aggression forever... The Soviet Union advanced many ideas to strengthen European security and develop cooperation both on a bilateral and general European basis while maintaining the national look and sovereignty of states... Regrettably up to this time the governments of certain Western states in fact did not make serious efforts to find areas of agreement in the positions of the sides, to identify the common elements in the interests of specifically European states. This is due to different causes. An obvious one is the influence of a major non-European power".

13. In addition to envisaging a solution to the problems of Germany and European security through "an appropriate international conference", Mr. Gromyko dealt with bilateral USSR-FRG relations as follows:

"We stand for normalization and improvement of relations with the FRG on the basis of its turning to the policy of peaceful cooperation and realism. We know that far from all Germans in West Germany are poisoned by the ideas of revanche... The response by Bonn officials to the policy in European affairs set forth by the CPSU Central Committee at our congress, however, shows how strong the revanchiste fever in West Germany is".

- 13/ Cont'd Government concerning the GDR application for UN membership (S/7259); and it was stated inter alia that "the admission to the United Nations of the GDR and possibly also of the FRG - while bearing in mind the reservations regarding the incompatibility of its policies with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations Charter - would contribute to the necessary mutual understanding between the two German States and thus to their gradual reapprochement".
- 14/ FBIS, Daily Report, Supplement, USSR and East Europe, No. 64 (10S) - 1966, pp. 68-77.
- 15/ Unwillingness on the part of the United States to permit West German participation in a system of collective ownership of nuclear weapons was reported, but subsequently denied (See Note on East-West relations).
- 16/ P. 74. Although the FRG Notes of 25 March 1966 mentioned the possibility of "sacrifices" for the sake of reunification independent observers in the West, such as "The Times" of London and "Le Monde" were disappointed.

SED-SPD Contacts and the two Germanies

14. Following an initiative of the GDR Socialist Unity of Germany (SED) Party on 11 February for contacts with the Social-Democrats (SPD) and a SPD answer of 19 March, new proposals were made on 26 March by the SED Party First Secretary Herr Ubricht for mutual visits ^{17/}. Some newspapers, both in the two Germanies and abroad, hailed an "all-German spring".

15. An independent West German newspaper expressed ^{18/} a belief in common interests of the inhabitants of the two parts of Germany, not necessarily shared by their respective Allies nor indeed Government leaders:

"For them [the four victorious Powers] the German question is truly solved, in fact ideally solved. Through partition and reciprocal integration in the politically, militarily and spiritually antagonistic blocs, Germany is already neutralized... In both parts of Germany power structures have arisen which can only continue to exist in this form if the partition continues. For that reason any process which could scratch the power of the [East German] SED, is stopped by the cold warriors in Bonn"

16. The above remark was in reference to an incident between the Vice-Chancellor - a Liberal - and the Christian-Democrats. On 4 April, Herr Mende, at a press interview, envisaged the possibility that the FRG Government, under a mandate from the Four Allied Powers, might enter into conversations with those in power in East Germany ("Machthabern der Soviet Zone"). On 6 April the Federal Government, at a "secret" meeting criticized ^{19/} Herr Mende's statement. A Liberal (FDP) spokesman deplored the fact that the matter should have been handled in obvious ignorance of what Mende had actually said and in his absence.

17. Herr Mende's remarks were apparently due to the Liberals' desire to keep up with the Social-Democrats.

18. On 14 April in Bonn, the Social-Democratic (SPD) leadership informed the SED that they were ready ^{20/} to send to Chemnitz their President - Herr Brandt - and his two assistants, Fritz Erler - the head of the SPD Parliamentary Group - and Herbert Wehner. It was proposed that the meeting in West Germany should take

^{17/} European Survey for March 1966, paras 20-22, pp. 4-5. On 2 April the GDR news Agency A.D.N. stated that an invitation by the West German television for a public discussion between the SED and SPD "was obviously not intended as a frank exchange of arguments and standpoints to serve the end of agreement and reconciliation". While such a discussion could be held at a later date "with necessary modifications", understanding between the SED and the SPD was "too important for the future of Germany to allow its being endangered by provocative interpolations from interested parties". ("Frankfurter Rundschau", 4 April, p. 1., "The Times" 4 April, p. 10).

^{18/} Karl-Hermann Flach, deputy chief editor, in "Frankfurter Rundschau", Easter 1966, p. 3, "The awakening of the sleeping lioness" - German reunification "the shattering of the taboos"; "the melting of the ice" at Easter 1966 were some of the phrases used in "Frankfurter Rundschau".

^{19/} "Frankfurter Rundschau", Easter 1966, p. 1.

place in Hanover ^{21/} instead of Essen. The following dates were suggested for the two meetings - 9 - 13 May in Chemnitz (Karlmarxstadt) and 16 - 20 May in Hanover. Further the SPD undertook to "invite the other parties represented on the Bundestag to participate in the Hanover meeting".

19. Also in his answer of 14 April, Herr Brandt stated ^{22/} in part:

"Our opinion towards SED has not changed - all prerequisites to a cooperation with that party are lacking".

20. Yet, the public meeting was accepted by Herr Brandt with an agenda defined by the SPD leader as follows:

"Our speakers will talk about the basic problems of the German policy that is, in the main, what can be undertaken so as to alleviate the fate of the inhabitants of divided Germany... It will be fitting that on both sides press, radio and television should report - correctly and widely - on these meetings".

21. Further Herr Brandt called upon the other West German political groups to participate in the meetings.

22. On 15 April, the Council of State of the GDR met ^{23/} in Pankow. The choice of speakers in the meeting to be held on 9 May in Karlmarxstadt was reportedly considered.

23. On 15 April, on a West German TV program, Herr Brandt said ^{24/} that the Social-Democrats (SPD) did not envisage joint meetings with the East German (SED) Communists. In Chemnitz the SED would call a meeting at which the SPD speakers would take the floor - while the opposite would take place in the FRG.

20/ "Le Monde", 16 April, p. 1.

21/ Hanover, the capital city of Lower-Saxony is the seat of a Social-Democratic Land Government.

22/ "Le Monde", 16 April, p. 1.

23/ "Le Monde", 17 - 18 April, p. 3.

24/ "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", 17 April, sheet 1.

24. West German Government circles, with the exception of the Liberals (FDP), had "increasing hesitations" ^{25/}. On 15 April Chancellor Erhard said that, in the present phase of all-German politics, it was in the interest of all Germans to uphold the determination and unity of all responsible political forces of the FRG.

25. Also on 15 April, the FRG spokesman, while greeting ^{26/} "any initiative likely to serve the cause of the German policy - agreed jointly by the parties represented in the Bundestag", announced that his Government would examine whether the current plans amounted to such an initiative.

26. On 18 April Chancellor Erhard, and a number of Cabinet Ministers, met ^{27/} with majority leaders, including Herr Barzel (CDU/CSU) and V. Kuhlmann-Stamm (FDP). Herr Wende gave explanations on his press interview of 4 April. In a statement published after the meeting, it was pointed out that there was "agreement in principle between Herr Wende's remarks and the common policy of the three parties the aim of which remained the re-establishment of a German State reunited in freedom; all political activities must, as in the past, be directed at the achievement of that aim".

27. The FRG Government on 20 April issued ^{28/} a statement, proposed by the Chancellor and unanimously approved by the Cabinet, on an all-German policy. Referring to the FRG "peace" Notes of 25 March, the statement pointed out that the all-German policy was part of the "peace" policy, since a reunification of Germany on the basis of self-determination was the prerequisite to a European peaceful settlement. The Government approved all efforts to contribute to this policy through direct discussions with the Communists of the "Soviet Zone". These direct discussions were an expression of the political consciousness of the Federal Republic.

^{25/} "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", 19 April, sheet 1.

^{26/} "Le Monde", 17 - 18 April, p. 3.

^{27/} "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", 20 April, sheet 1.

Their success required caution, reflection and a respect of the principles on which the Constitution of the Federal Republic was built; and three-point requirements for all-German contacts were set forth ^{29/}.

28. On 22-23 April the Berlin section of the Social-Democratic (SPD) Party unanimously approved ^{30/} "an exchange of arguments" with the East German Communists, in the two parts of Germany. Herr Brandt, speaking in his capacity as SPD chairman at the local party meeting in West Berlin, said ^{31/} that he considered it "rather likely" that the meetings at Chemnitz and Hanover would take place, since Herr Ulbricht's remarks during the past week seemed to indicate that the East German SED leadership was ready in principle to have these meetings. Whether they would actually take place would depend on a satisfactory settlement of the technical conditions.

29. The East German understanding of the significance of the contacts was made clear by the SED leadership. On 21 April in East Berlin Herr Ulbricht, the SED First Secretary, made ^{32/} a two-hour speech in the presence of Government and Party leaders; the exchange of views between the SED and the West German (SPD)

^{29/} Firstly political arrangements with individuals and groups of the "Soviet zone" could not be an end in themselves, but must be directed towards the goal of a reunification in a free constitutional state. "Those in power in the zone cannot therefore be partners in conversations with the freely-elected German Government". Secondly, the discussions must serve the solidarity of the Germans, their instruction, the strengthening of the free conscience - not the established system of authority in "the Zone". Thirdly human improvements must be requested and obtained for the inhabitants of the Soviet Zone, particularly freedom of circulation and information and a revision of political justice; such results must neither be begged from the regime as a sign of its kindness nor paid for in political concessions".

^{30/} "Le Monde", 26 April, p. 2.

^{31/} "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", 25 April, sheet 1 - "The Times", 25 April, p. 9.

^{32/} "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", 23 April, sheet 1.

Social Democrats was to be the opening (Auftakt) of a policy of gradual establishment of a "Confederal" system of bilateral agreements between the GDR and the FRG. Such a German Confederation would be "the third power in the world", with considerable economic and political potentialities, which would lead its own policy and make possible a secure existence for all Germans. De Gaulle, Herr Ulbricht said, showed the Germans how to shake off dependence from the United States and what a national policy looked like. West Berlin could be part of a "Confederation" and its situation could be improved if the Senate and people of the city revised their attitude towards the GDR. Lastly, during the transition period of the Confederation, the power structure and foreign policy position of the FRG would have to be gradually changed through disarmament, rationalization of the enterprises, land reform and changes in the school and cultural systems.

30. On 22 April the CDU Praesidium stated that the party was not ready to recognize as a partner for conversations "a man like Ulbricht or a non-influential satellite like the so-called Eastern CDU" but welcomed any possibility to give open, clear expression anywhere in Germany to the voice of Freedom and Right. Further, Chancellor Erhard, at his press conference on 25 April, said ^{33/} that there would be no objection to the Chemnitz SPD-SED meeting; any step was to be welcomed that gave hope of a better life to the East German people. Chancellor Erhard was also asked whether he would be ready to negotiate with East Germany, should the Allies suggest it; he answered that it could be done only if the Allies asked the FRG Government to negotiate for a strictly defined purpose ^{34/}

Contacts between East and West German Liberals

31. In the wake of the contacts between Socialists, the East Berlin newspaper "Morgen" on 5 April published ^{35/} a letter dated 2 April from the Secretary-General of the Eastern Liberal-Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD), Gerlach, to Herr Mende, President of the West German Liberal (FDP) Party ^{36/} proposing that conversations should be held in turn in the GDR and the FRG and that discussions should first take place between the party leaders. Herr Gerlach requested Herr Mende to set a date and place for a first meeting.

^{33/} "The Times", 26 April, p. 11.

^{34/} At the same press conference, the Chancellor voiced concern over the Western allies' policy on trade with East Germany. Since there was no legal title to prevent intensified trade, all Bonn could do was to point out to its friends that activities in trade policy should not be the opposite of what in politics had become a principle - that only the FRG had the legal title to represent Germany.

32. On 15 April the FDP President Wende announced ^{37/} that the Liberals intended not only to support the all-German discussions between the Socialists and Communists, but to participate as partners in conversations.

33. On 22 April the West German (FDP) Liberals, through their Executive Committee (Vorstand) informed the LDPD Central Committee that they would not enter into discussion with them until it was clear that the LDPD could have such talks independently and on their own responsibility. However, the debate on 31 March at Bad Homburg had shown that conversations without negotiations between the party leaderships were possible. The (West German) FDP would therefore be happy if, contrary to earlier contacts, representatives of their party were given the possibility, on public occasions, with full radio and television coverage, to speak on decisive questions of German politics. Designated FDP officials were ready to prepare such discussions.

Problem of reunification through détente - unofficial British views and question of a shift in the FRG Government's approach.

34. On the occasion of the FRG Notes of 25 March a leader in "The Times" of London criticized ^{38/} "West Germany's old misconception that progress towards reunification must precede relaxation instead of the other way round". ^{39/}

35. Until recently the FRG Government was indeed less receptive than other West European great powers, to an approach to reunification requiring a prior détente. Foreign Minister Schröder actually said ^{40/} on 6 October 1965:

"The solution of the German question cannot and must not be left for a long-range allegedly natural process" /such as envisaged by France/

^{35/} "Frankfurter Rundschau", 6 April, p. 1.

^{36/} As well as Vice-Chancellor.

^{37/} "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", 17 April, sheet 1.

^{38/} 26 March.

^{39/} The Notes envisaged that a reduction of the number of nuclear weapons in Europe would be linked inter alia with "essential progress in the solution of political problems in Central Europe."

^{40/} European Survey for October, para. 25, p. 10.

36. Coinciding, however, with the Social-Democratic contacts with the GDR, Chancellor Erhard on 25 April, commented ^{41/} on General de Gaulle's forthcoming visit to the Soviet Union as follows:

"That does not worry us. The policy of de Gaulle helps us for the future, but not immediately. We share the opinion according to which an improvement in relations with the countries in Eastern Europe can, in the long run, ensure peace in Europe - and thereby further the reunification of Germany".

37. The discrepancy was clear-cut between Herr Schröder's rejection, in October 1965, of a "long range" process and Chancellor Erhard's acceptance of the fact that German reunification may have to wait for such a détente to take place "in the long run".

38. The question remained whether the West German Government would be in a position to carry out a new policy, either on frontier or reunification issues, in the face of the expellee organizations' strong influence ^{42/} and even of extreme rightist advances locally ^{43/}.

39. As regards the frontier with Czechoslovakia the FRG Notes of 25 March, while declaring that the Munich agreement no longer had "any territorial significance", refrained from declaring the Agreement null and void. Even so, the representatives of Sudeten organizations took exception to the Notes. On 3 April in Munich Herr Seeborn, the Federal Minister for Communications and a Sudeten German himself, told ^{44/} Sudeten and officials of expellee organisations that the Notes had not been discussed "either in substance or in the text" ^{45/} in the West German Cabinet. Two Socialist (SPD) deputies thereupon demanded the withdrawal of Seeborn. One of them, Herr Wischniewski, cabled the Chancellor that, if the Notes were not decisively vindicated, the Chancellor must draw the consequences, lest the impression might be created abroad that "the German Government played a double game".

^{41/} "La Nation" 26 April, p. 1.

^{42/} "Le Monde" recently described their "dictatorship" in West German political life.

^{43/} While the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) recently decided not to compete in local elections on 10 July in the North-Rhine-Westphalia Land, the NPD was concentrating its efforts in Bavaria where a new Landtag is to be elected in November (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 27 April).

^{44/} "Neue Zürcher Zeitung", 8 April, sheet 2.

^{45/} Herr Seeborn pointed out that "one had not fought for every word", since the Document was produced in an hour in the Chancellor's bungalow (Frankfurter Rundschau, 4 April, p. 5).

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: The Secretary-General
A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	X	POUR INFORMATION

*How
22/6*

Date:
28 June 1966
CR.13 (11-64)

FROM:
DE: A.E. Nesterenko,
Under-Secretary, PSQA.
A. E. Nesterenko

AA-4

CONFIDENTIAL

28 June 1966

AHO:pmm

NEW TRENDS IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

NEW TRENDS IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

1. On 7 June ^{1/} the British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, at the close of the Atlantic Council Meeting in Brussels, pointed out that NATO members should attempt collectively and separately to improve their relations with the Eastern Bloc. There are signs that Turkey - which has heretofore been on the conservative wing of NATO and CENTO - may attempt to establish closer ties with the Soviet Union and the East European States.
2. Foreign Minister Caglayangil, in a statement before the National Assembly on 17 June, stressed the advantages of an East-West rapprochement to which, he said, Turkey had been attaching great significance for a long time. He pointed out, inter alia, the following:

"The impending visits to Turkey of the Premiers of Romania and Bulgaria will serve further to strengthen our relations with these countries. Our relations with the Soviet Union, especially in the economic and commercial fields, will be expanded. In recent years, relations between the East and the West have recorded unexpected progress..."

The Foreign Minister, emphasizing that the objective of expanding relations with East European countries had been incorporated into the Government's Programme, declared that NATO membership was no obstacle to the pursuit of an independent foreign policy.

3. On 21 June, the new Soviet Ambassador to Turkey, Mr. Andrei Andreyevich Smirnov, ^{2/} upon his arrival in Ankara stated, inter alia,

"We are next-door neighbours. Neighbours always have many things in common. Our people attach great value to friendship with other peoples."

^{1/} Manchester Guardian Weekly, 9 June.

^{2/} Previously Ambassador in Bonn (1957-66).

"The development and strengthening of good neighbourly relations between our countries is not only in conformity with the permanent interests of the Soviet and Turkish peoples. This, at the same time, could serve as a great benefit to the strengthening of peace both in our geographical area and the whole world." 3/

4. There is growing realization on the part of the Turkish Government that the country is very much isolated in its current foreign policy and that it is lagging behind most other NATO countries in establishing friendly relations with members of the Warsaw Pact. Turkish public opinion, led by the intelligentsia which has become deeply disillusioned with the United States in several important respects, could be expected to welcome "independent" and imaginative thinking by the Government with a view to revitalizing Turkey's foreign policy. The Soviet Union, in the Turkish view, would welcome the prospect of establishing, to so speak, a "show-case" relationship with Turkey. Such a bilateral rapprochement may in turn serve as a bridge between the present concept of the two Alliances and new forms of European relationships.

TO: THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

A:

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION		POUR INFORMATION

Herewith you will find an
informative Note on the Gibraltar
question.

Maur
21/5/66

Date:

27 May 1966

CR.13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE:

A. E. Nesterenko

A. E. Nesterenko

CONFIDENTIAL

MAM:pmm

27 May 1966

THE GIBRALTAR QUESTION

1. By resolution dated 16 December 1965 (2070 (XX)) the United Nations General Assembly invited the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom "to begin without delay the talks envisaged under the terms of the consensus adopted on 16 October 1964 by the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples", and requested the two Governments to inform the Special Committee, and the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, of the outcome of the negotiations.
2. In pursuance of the above-mentioned resolution, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Michael Stewart, and the Foreign Minister of Spain, Mr. Fernando M. Castiella, met on 18 May 1966 in the British Foreign Office.
3. The Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom was accompanied by Mr. H. A. F. Hohler of the Foreign Office; Mr. C. G. Eastwood, Assistant Under-Secretary for the Colonies; Mr. D. S. L. Dodson, Head of the Central Department of the Foreign Office; Mr. Allan Williams, Ambassador to Spain, and other advisers. The Spanish Foreign Minister was accompanied by the Marquis of Santa Cruz, Ambassador to London; Mr. Ramon Sedó, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs; Mr. F. Olivie, Director-General, Foreign Affairs; Mr. Jaime de Pinies, Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and other advisers.
4. At the talks, the Spanish Minister stated the Spanish Government's position and proposed to the British Government the signature of a convention

"... the First Article of which should contain the cancellation of Article 10 of the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 and the restoration of the national unity and territorial integrity of Spain through the reversion of Gibraltar, thus complying with the mandate of the United Nations.

"In the Second Article [Spain] would accept the presence at Gibraltar of a British Military Base whose structure, legal situation, and coordination with the defense organization of Spain or the Free World would be the subject of a negotiation for a especial Agreement to be attached to the Convention we are proposing.

"Spain proposes a Third Article stipulating that a legal regime to protect the interests of the present citizens of Gibraltar should be the subject of an additional Anglo-Spanish agreement registered in the United Nations, as has been stated. In this agreement, in addition to the appropriate economic and administrative formulae, a Personal Statute would be established, by which among other fundamental rights - such as freedom of religion and the press - the British nationality of the present inhabitants of Gibraltar would be respected, and their right of residence would be guaranteed, as also the free exercise of their lawful activities, and a guarantee of permanence in their place of work.

"Finally in a Fourth Article, it would be specified that this Convention will be effective after the two additional agreements to which reference has been made in the Second and Third Articles, shall have been signed and registered in the United Nations."

5. The Foreign Secretary replied with a statement of the position of Her Majesty's Government.
6. It was agreed that the talks should be continued between officials of the two Governments. An initial meeting took place in London on 20 May in which the representatives of the United Kingdom asked and received clarification of Articles 2 and 3 of the proposals. The United Kingdom was represented by Mr. Hohler of the Foreign Office, and Mr. Eastwood of the Colonial Office; Spain was represented by Señor Sedó and Señor Olivie of the Spanish Foreign Ministry, both of whom are guided by the Spanish Ambassador in London. It was agreed that the conversations would continue, and the next meeting will probably take place in two or three weeks.
7. On 23 May 1966, in reply to a parliamentary question, Mr. Stewart said,

"... I am hopeful - I ought not to say more at present - that one result of these talks will be the establishment of a civilized relationship between Gibraltar and Spain."

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: The Secretary-General
A:

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YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	X	POUR INFORMATION

Thoms
2/19

Date:
20 Sept. 1966

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:
DE:

A.E. Nesterenko,
Under-Secretary, PSQA.

AA 6

CONFIDENTIAL

19 September 1966
PhP/flr

NOTE ON ALL-EUROPEAN RELATIONS
(including the German question)

(July-August 1966)

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. The meetings of foreign minister Couve de Murville with Czechoslovak and Hungarian leaders, the last in a series of high-level French visits to Warsaw Pact members, "accelerated the East-West thaw", in the words of a French journalist ^{1/}; and the UN Secretary-General in his statement of 1 September took note of "signs of improvement" in the situation in Europe.
2. At the end of July meeting of Nato defence ministers, the trend was towards a more optimistic appraisal of the strategic situation in Europe ^{2/} - a striking development in the face of an escalating war in Viet-Nam and ensuing tension in US relations with the Soviet Union and the CPR.
3. Comparatively uneventful summer months in Europe afforded an opportunity to assess two-year developments there which no longer fitted into the traditional East-West framework. In the July issue of "Foreign Affairs" Mr. Brzezinski indeed noted that the East-West division was no longer in keeping with the present, real international issues ^{3/}. Whether or not justified elsewhere ^{4/}, this point was well taken as regards Europe. In no part of the world had the process of normalizing relations between East and West gone so far - at the same time as internal conflicts within each camp became sharper or more conspicuous ^{5/}.
4. In addition to the policy of France, Nato differences between the FRG and her allies on her nuclear role, long since emphasized in the European surveys as regards Britain, now affected FRG-US relations ^{6/}.

^{1/} Le Monde, 2 August, p. 2.

^{2/} Note on East-West relations, July 1966, para. 11, p. 3.

^{3/} "... the East-West conflict no longer touches on the 'real' issues of the second half of the twentieth century" Zbigniew Brzezinski in "Foreign Affairs", July, p. 663'.

^{4/} See East-West Notes.

^{5/} A significant instance of new situations, unthinkable only a few years ago, was a report that Romania may seek to ameliorate relations between two Nato countries, Greece and Turkey (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11 August, sheet 1).

^{6/} See East-West Note for July 1966, para. 11, p. 3. Further there may now be more emphasis on territorial issues in Eastern Europe.

5. On the other hand, the old confrontation, commonly referred to as "East-West", was neither so sharp, nor so clear or meaningful. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski neither the East was likely to make major progress in Western developed countries, nor did the West any longer expect a roll-back of communism:

"The West does not expect to dismantle the existing social-political organization of the Communist states... Communism clearly will not take over any advanced Western society". 7/

6. Shorn of ideological overtones - which, perhaps, never were basic - the cold war was now reduced to the super-power conflicts. Hence a contrast between deteriorating US relations with the USSR and the CPR and, on the other side, a détente in other "East-West" relationships - such as all-European.

7. Germany has traditionally been regarded as an East-West problem. Yet during the French-Czechoslovak meetings, it became clear that France - the major Western Continental enemy of Germany in World War II - and Czechoslovakia entertained very close views on the question.

8. A European settlement now appeared less remote to some political analysts in the West, whether or not a decisive advance towards German reunification could be made at this stage. Contributors to Foreign Affairs 8/ took note inter alia of "the attrition of passions and threat in Europe" 9/ and US and Soviet "new and pressing concerns in Asia"; 10/ and they stated: 11/

"Conditions now exist for a European settlement which did not exist a decade ago when the various schemes of disengagement were put forward in the West and in Poland".

9. US commentators, in expectation of such a European arrangement, were increasingly concerned that it should come about in circumstances safeguarding American interests: 12/

"As a nation which twice has been drawn into great European wars we have earned the right to concern ourselves with the stability of Europe itself and with the stability of arrangements by which Soviet power is withdrawn".

7/ Foreign Affairs, July, pp. 663-664.

8/ Herman Kahn and William Pfaff.

9/ Foreign Affairs, July, p. 599.

10/ Ibid., p. 597.

11/ Ibid.

12/ Foreign Affairs, July, p. 600.

10. The improved political climate in Europe which may later facilitate a political settlement has already had military repercussions ^{13/}. As noted in Neue Zürcher Zeitung ^{14/},

"the reduction of the compact, massive Nato presence in Western Europe is already taking place". ^{15/}

11. Even as a war "was waged with greater intensity" in Viet-Nam, there were suggestions in the West "for an East-West agreement on disengagement in Europe" ^{16/}

12. In the summer of 1966 far from Viet-Nam embittering East-West European relations - as Berlin crises had done - it was not unlikely that, in perspective, the war there may later appear to have furthered a pan-European rapprochement. A steady normalization of all-European relations went on in July and August with the French visits to Czechoslovakia and Hungary; a further improvement of the Balkan political climate through visits to Turkey of the Romanian and Bulgarian leaders; and contacts between Denmark and the Hungarian and Romanian Governments. Not only was there no sign that this process, which must be very slow ^{17/}, would already have gone further were it not for Viet-Nam, but, on the contrary, as the war escalated there, Europeans may be brought closer by a clearer mutual interest that their long-suffering continent should not become engulfed into a super-power conflict.

13. Whether or not this feeling contributed to the improvement in French relations with Eastern Europe, it was noted ^{18/} in Le Monde that France, in her relations with the countries of the East, "seeks to proceed from the détente to the entente and co-operation". Thus, in this particular connexion, East-West relations in Europe were in the process of going further than the stage of the "détente" - the very notion which had, as yet, not been accepted by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany ^{19/}:

^{13/} Although the needs of the war in Viet-Nam accounted for a US desire to withdraw military personnel from Europe, actual measures could only be taken in a normalized European situation.

^{14/} 31 July, sheet 1.

^{15/} Even though such talk of reduction in armed forces and disengagement was primarily due to specific European developments, the regional European détente could not have had such effects - indeed there would have been a stepping up of the military confrontation in Europe as well - if Viet-Nam had been an "East-West" issue in the same sense as Berlin.

^{16/} Note on East-West relations, para. 1, p. 1 and para. 12, p. 3.

^{17/} In the very admission of the most optimistic promoters of European "reconciliation".

^{18/} 29 July, p. 1 (leader).

^{19/} At the July Nato meeting, "only the West German Defence Minister stressed what he

I. THE GERMAN QUESTION

East-West Relations in Europe and the German Question

14. Following the visits in July of M. Couve de Murville to Czechoslovakia and Hungary it was reported in Paris that the East-European countries approved the French policy of small steps towards a normalization of European relationships, which, in the French view, was "a success for Gaullist diplomacy".

15. The French-Czechoslovak meetings made it clear that in the opinion of France, as of the Socialist Camp as a whole, "Germany must not re-open the question of her frontiers, nor have nuclear weapons at her disposal". ^{20/} Further, France, more openly than ever before, criticized the West German stand on the Munich agreement ^{21/}.

M. Couve de Murville was quoted as saying that the West German argument was "unfortunate" and that:

"Quite frankly, I do not understand well the position of the West Germans on this matter".

16. It was further reported that such statements "of course caused much satisfaction among [M. Couve de Murville's] Czechoslovak partners". Moreover French-Czechoslovak differences of opinion on the status of East Germany reportedly "did not worry the Czechoslovaks very much", since France could hardly adopt another attitude without antagonizing West Germany. The Czechoslovak approach was apparently that France was mainly trying to gain time until in the long run, realities, unpleasant as they may appear to-day in West Germany, are recognized - as they must and shall be. ^{22/}

17. There were still, of course, differences between the French and Communist approaches. M. Couve de Murville, in Prague and Budapest, reportedly pointed out that the French called "German problem" what the East Europeans referred to as "European security". In the French view a political problem of Germany's reunification was also involved - and must eventually be solved. To this end the French foreign minister reportedly advocated a normalization of East-West relations and a more peaceful European atmosphere.

^{19/} Cont'd: considered the continued Soviet 'threat' to Western Europe", East-West Note, July 1966, para. 11, p. 3.

^{20/} Le Monde, 28 July, p. 3.

^{21/} Although acknowledging that the agreement had no territorial significance at present, the FRG Government refuses to regard it as null and void, avowedly due to legal difficulties concerning the status of the Sudeten Germans.

^{22/} Hungary's wish that France should recognize the GDR was reportedly expressed by Foreign Minister Janos Peter on 28 July but the question was apparently not taken up on the following day.

18. In this connexion, the FRG official Bulletin on 19 August published ^{23/} an interview in which foreign Minister Schröder reiterated West German policy towards East European States. While a normalization of relations, which included the establishment of diplomatic relations, remained the target, progress in this direction could not be achieved at the cost of basic positions of the FRG "German-policy":

"We must be careful that our entering into diplomatic relations with East European States should not be used by the States of the Third World as a presumed abandonment of the claim to unique representation or by others as a green light for the assumption of diplomatic relations between them and the Soviet zone of occupation. Such a step as the assumption of diplomatic relations with the East European states must therefore be carefully prepared and protected against any unfavourable consequences".

19. The re-assertion at this stage of the West German policy of normalization of relations with the Communist part of Europe was in keeping with recent trends in West German public opinion ^{24/}. Indeed there was increasing recognition, in West Germany as elsewhere in Europe, that European reconciliation may be the only path towards German reunification. Such, in the words of C.L. Sulzberger was the "Irish plan for Germany":

"Perhaps unconsciously they [the Germans] are assuming a position similar to that of Eire, another partitioned land. Dublin's perspicacious Government hopes some day to link up in a larger community with Northern Ireland when both, with Britain, are admitted to the Common Market and some kind of eventually federated Western Europe. Many Germans have started to think that an even greater 'Europe' may be their own road to unity".

20. The unofficial visit of Social-Democratic (SPD) Vice Chairman Helmut Schmidt to Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Soviet Union actually confirmed that there were possibilities of improving West German relations with the Socialist Camp, notably with Czechoslovakia and Romania. On the other hand Poland reportedly ^{25/} regarded the GDR as a "bastion" against the FRG and placed three conditions on normalization of her relations with West Germany, namely that the latter should recognize the Oder-Neisse line and the GDR and enter into an international law commitment to renounce nuclear weapons.

^{23/} Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 August, sheet 1.

^{24/} When first enunciated two years ago, Herr Schröder's policy towards the East was ahead of public opinion.

^{25/} Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 August, sheet 1.

FRG and GDR.

21. Following the abandonment ^{26/}, at least for the time being, of the plans for joint Social-Democratic (SPD) and Socialist Unity Party (SED, Communists) meetings, the West German SPD leaders, on the date - 15 July - tentatively set for such a meeting in Karl-Marx-Stadt (Chemnitz) made statements on the West German TV and radio. They said that they would continue their efforts, since in the words of Willy Brandt "any progress on the path of a détente would be a German contribution to peace". Herbert Wehner invited the Germans themselves to find the framework and the form of their coexistence and, through public discussion, to set up "a kind of higher Court that would be the German people as a whole". While the West Germans, Herr Wehner said, did not want to become Communists, they did not demand that the others should cease being Communists.

22. In the East German view, the FRG Government now had no other alternative but to deal with the GDR. On 13 August Walter Ulbricht, the First Secretary of the East German SED (Socialist Unity of Germany) Party, in his speech extolling the results of the building of the "anti-fascist protective wall" ^{27/}, said ^{28/} that West Germany had lost its fight to speak for all Germany and that its "policy of revenge" had reached a "dead end". As a result, a German peace settlement would be reached only through negotiations between the two Germanies on a basis of equality.

23. The FRG Government was reportedly ^{29/} ready to take a conciliatory step towards the GDR, namely to make it clear that its readiness to give undertakings not to use force against the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia could be extended to cover the "Soviet Zone" territory.

24. The above report could not be construed as a change in basic FRG attitudes towards the "Soviet zone". On 12 August, Chancellor Erhard, on the eve of the East German celebrations, stated ^{30/}:

^{26/} While it was generally assumed in West Germany that this failure was due to the attitude of the East German Communists, Le Monde again took note of "the obstacles placed in the path /of the West German Social Democrats/ by the Christian Democratic Party" (Le Monde, 16 July, p. 3).

^{27/} In the West it was stated that, in the words of The Times, "economically the country has been consolidated. Politically it is still a rather flimsy structure". (15 August).

^{28/} New York Times, 14 August.

^{29/} Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 20 August, sheet 1.

^{30/} The Times, 13 August.

"They are without realism who believe that two utterly opposed structures of society can come together in functioning unity in a confederation".

25. Pessimism on the immediate prospects for reunification was one point on which the Bavarian Christian Social (CSU) wing of the ruling party was in harmony with the Chancellor. Franz-Josef Strauss, the Bavarian leader, reportedly believed that the Soviet Union would not "accept a unified Germany under any terms".

26. Outside West Germany also, some Western observers believed that, in the words of C.L. Sulzberger, ^{31/} "reunification becomes an increasing obsession, but there is decreasing hope that it can soon be achieved".

27. At the same time there were those, even in the West, who believed that the FRG Government was not keeping up with public opinion in West Germany, - as affected both by the improvement in East-West European relations and recent contacts between the two Germanies. On 15 August, the Times of London wrote:

"There is an element... of disappointment in West Germany that West German policy is not adjusting more quickly to the present climate in East-West relations, and is not pressing hard enough for more contacts (below the diplomatic level) with East Germany".

II. EUROPE-EAST AND WEST

28. While all contacts between Warsaw Pact and Nato countries were useful in improving bilateral relations, special significance attached from the all-European viewpoint to the diplomatic activities of such Western countries as France which has adopted an independent attitude on a broad range of issues or as Denmark, which has taken specific initiatives concerning relations between Communist and Western countries.

29. On 26 - 30 July, M. Couve de Murville, the French foreign minister visited Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and on 10 August, in the French Council of Ministers, he reported on his journey. French relations there were in two fields, cultural and commercial, the Minister said; while a lot had as yet to be done about cultural relations, an effort must be made by French industrialists who should acquire the frame of mind of exporters.

^{31/} New York Times, 17 August.

30. Although the above remarks were, perhaps, disappointing, M. Couve de Murville pointed out that the warmth of the reception was, in his opinion, a tribute to French policy and a sign of sympathy for France. Further the main discussions in Prague related to the German question concerning which France and Czechoslovakia could no longer be regarded as standing on opposite sides of an "East-West" issue ^{32/}.

31. During an interview on 27 July, Mr. Novotny, the President of the Republic apparently informed ^{33/} M. Couve de Murville that he attached great importance to economic relations with France - were it only to avoid an undue increase in Czechoslovak-West German trade exchanges.

32. Similarly a feature of Hungary's commercial relations with the West was West German preponderance and Premier Kallai reportedly told M. Couve de Murville, during their meeting on 29 July that his government was anxious to promote Hungarian-French exchanges, so that a new balance could be achieved in this Western sector of his country's trade. ^{34/}

33. Shortly before the Secretary-General's remarks of 1 September on the "signs of improvement" of the situation in Europe, further steps were indeed taken towards better relations in the Balkans. Romanian and Bulgarian leaders visited Turkey respectively for the reported purposes of "smoothing political relations and increasing commerce" ^{35/} and of "going over from the normalization of relations to the establishment of good neighbourly relations" ^{36/}.

34. In the final communiqué ^{37/} on the Romanian-Turkish meetings, the two delegations "noted that the visit to Turkey of the Romanian Government delegation had made an important contribution to an increase in mutual understanding and good neighbourly relations between Turkey and Romania". The President of the Republic and the Prime Minister of Turkey accepted an invitation to visit Romania in 1967.

^{32/} See the German Question, above.

^{33/} Le Monde, 29 July, p. 1.

^{34/} While Hungary's trade with the Soviet Union was scheduled to increase from 36 % in 1965 to 40 % in 1970 (Le Monde, 31 July - 1 August, p. 3), her trade with the West amounted to 30 %, of which 60 % with West Germany and only 7 % with France (Le Monde, 30 July, p. 2).

^{35/} The Times, 2 August.

^{36/} Le Monde, 18 August.

^{37/} Le Monde, 2 August, p. 14.

35. The Balkan situation, in the wake of recent developments and the expectation of further improvements, was reviewed by Romanian Party Secretary Ceausescu in statements ^{38/} made during a visit to Bulgaria:

"The experience of history has taught the Balkan peoples, which in the past have been used by the Imperialistic powers as pawns for their policy of domination and conquest, that their interests were linked with the establishment of relations of understanding and good neighbourliness in this part of the world".

36. Denmark continued to entertain active relations with East European countries. On 9 - 15 August foreign minister Haekkerup was in Hungary. At a press conference on 13 August, he declared ^{39/} that the Danish and Hungarian leaders had decided to make closer the cultural, commercial and political relations between the two countries.

37. The main interest of the Romanian visit to Denmark was that, in June 1966, foreign Minister Haekkerup, in the Atlantic Council, proposed to set up a European Conference on security; and that such a proposal, similar to various Communist initiatives ^{40/} was warmly received in Romania.

38. On 16 August Messrs. Maurer and Manescu arrived ^{41/} in Copenhagen. On 20 August, the communiqué announced that the two countries had agreed to establish closer contacts in the fields of technical, commercial, scientific and cultural cooperation. Further Premier Krag accepted an invitation to visit Romania.

39. Although there is a long history of bilateral contacts between Italy and Poland, and high level visits were exchanged in the recent past, the closeness of Italy's relations with the United States, at a time of escalation in Viet-Nam, "renders impossible a true dialogue" in the opinion of Le Monde ^{42/}. Yet the visit of foreign minister Fanfani to Poland on 25 - 27 July served to improve technical and industrial co-operation and commercial relations in the wake of the trade protocol of 9 February 1966.

^{38/} Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 11 August, sheet 1.

X ^{39/} Le Monde, 16 August, p. 2.

^{40/} Yet, Per Haekkerup, at the Nato meetings on 7 - 8 June, called US participation in such a security conference "necessary". (European Note for June 1966, para. 5, p. 2 and para. 35, p. 9). In an article in the Conservative newspaper BT, Mr. Haekkerup wrote that an increase in economic, cultural and scientific relations between East and West should be a "prelude" to a pan-European Conference on Security. He again made it clear that the United States and Canada should participate (Le Monde, 27 July, p. 2).

40. Although the United States - and perhaps also its closest allies - may be "paralyzed until the end of the war in Vietnam", there is nothing, in the opinion of the Senior Editor of Newsweek, ^{43/} "to prevent West Europeans from negotiating with the East in full consultation with the US". In order to do so, the West Europeans would, in Newsweek's opinion, have to reject the "obsolete thinking" of the FRG Government which "is preventing, rather than accelerating, détente and the reunification process". ^{44/} Also, note was taken in Newsweek of the growing pressure for the FRG to accept the present frontiers and renounce nuclear weapons. ^{45/}

^{41/} Le Monde, 17 August, p. 4.

^{42/} 27 July, p. 2. In the final communiqué of 27 July the two governments "affirm the necessity to pursue their efforts with a view to strengthening the international détente and security and to reinforce the bases for a fruitful peaceful co-operation between the peoples".

^{43/} 15 August, pp. 38-39 "A 'New Deal' for Europe - exploring possibilities".

^{44/} This thinking consists essentially in giving priority to West European integration "which, in effect, means the irrevocable hardening of the division between East and West Europe".

^{45/} A former Presidential Assistant Mc George Bundy and M. Spaak recently made statements to this effect.

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:
A: The Secretary-General

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Thanks -
10/13/66

Date:
11 Oct. 1966
CR.13 (11-64)

FROM:
DE A.E. Nesterenko,
Under-Secretary, PSCA.
A. Nesterenko

AA-7

CONFIDENTIAL

7 October 1966

Ph.P/flr

NOTE ON ALL-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

(including the German Question)

(September 1966)

GENERAL COMMENTS

1. "Positive trends" ^{1/} in relations between countries having different social and political systems, in keeping with resolution 2129(XX), were widely acknowledged in the general debate. Dissenting European views by those who either denied or resented such developments included, in the East, Albania and, in the West, the "Atlanticists".
2. As noted by President Marcos of the Philippines ^{2/}, East-West "rivalries have abated in Europe". In contrast with the deterioration of the US relations with Socialist countries, peaceful coexistence continued to make progress in Europe. In the words of the Romanian-Italian communiqué of 7 September, "all States, regardless of their political and social orders" should "establish among themselves relations of collaboration". ^{3/}
3. In addition to the development of economic and cultural relations there were political developments as well. The procedure of joint periodic Ministerial meetings, originally a feature in West European organization ^{4/} and subsequently applied to Soviet-French relations, has now been adopted by Poland and Belgium. As announced in their joint communiqué of 8 September the two Governments had agreed to conduct regular bilateral consultations at various levels, including meetings of the two foreign ministers.
4. While reference to such developments in Europe was made in the general debate, Albania denied that there could be a "situation conducive to a pan-European meeting" since "the main post-war problems had not been solved". ^{5/} The isolated Albanian position in the General Assembly was partly reminiscent of the FRG stand ^{6/} that there could not and should not be a détente in Europe as long as the main political problems had not been solved. ^{7/}

^{1/} In the words of Czechoslovakia, 26 September (A/PV.1416).

^{2/} 21 September, A/PV.1411.

^{3/} A similar statement was made in the Greek-Romanian communiqué of 3 September.

^{4/} As envisaged in the Fouchet plan for the six Common Market countries and carried out in the Treaty of co-operation between France and the FRG of 22 January 1963.

^{5/} 29 September, A/PV.1422.

^{6/} An important difference was that Albania recommended the signing of a Peace Treaty - on a status quo basis - while the FRG regards the division of Germany as the main issue.

^{7/} In its notes of 25 March 1966, the FRG Government said that its own proposals

5. Although France has taken the position that the Germans could not hope to achieve reunification except through a détente^{8/}, the West Germans were reluctant, to say the least, to leave the solution of this problem "for a long range... process", ^{9/} such as de Gaulle's European "reconciliation".

6. In the light of the general debate, there now was a broad consensus in Europe that favourable, meaningful political developments were taking place on that Continent - whether the beginning of a détente or "positive trends" - and that, in the words of France, ^{10/} the General Assembly should be "pleased" with the evolution that was starting.

7. Desirable as German reunification was said to be in official statements, this political problem was actually not allowed, any more than the war in Viet-Nam, to stand in the path of a pan-European rapprochement, all the more important as, in the words of Bulgaria ^{11/}, "the political situation in Europe exerts a considerable influence on the world situation". In apparent reply to Albania's pessimistic appraisal of the situation in Europe, Bulgaria pointedly stated that "all those who have respect for the principles of the UN Charter should not only welcome these [positive European] trends, but also contribute to strengthening them".

8. In the West, and in addition to the misgivings in the FRG lest a détente might crystallize partition, the "Atlanticists" were dismayed by the initiatives which a number of Nato countries were currently taking, independently of the United States. On 19 September, Lord Gladwyn declared that it was "regrettably possible" that Nato governments were "tempted to follow the French example" inter alia by carrying out "independent" ^{12/} policies.

^{7/} Cont'd: for a relaxation of European tension such as a reduction of the number of nuclear weapons in Europe should be linked inter alia with "essential progress in the solution of political problems in Europe".

^{8/} For instance, in Premier Pompidou's speech of 28 March 1966.

^{9/} Statement by Foreign Minister Schröder in October 1965.

^{10/} 28 September, A/PV.1420.

^{11/} 29 September, A/PV.1423.

^{12/} Quotation marks are Lord Gladwyn's.

I. EUROPE-EAST AND WEST

9. On 3 September a joint Greek-Romanian communiqué on the visit to Greece of Prime Minister Gheorghe Maurer announced ^{13/} the signing of six agreements on economic, financial and cultural questions, Mr. Maurer stated that efforts for cooperative relations in the Balkans were a positive contribution to peace and that Greece's and Romania's different social systems, as well as their participation in different political and military pacts, did not constitute an obstacle to cooperation.

10. On 8 September, Poland and Belgium, following the visit to Poland of Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel on 5 - 8 September - agreed to conduct regular Polish - Belgian consultations at various levels, including meetings between the Ministers for Foreign Affairs ^{14/}.

11. The joint Romanian-Italian communiqué of 7 September, on the visit to Italy of Foreign Minister Manescu, stated ^{15/}:

[In view of the anxiety aroused by the present international situation, it was regarded as important that] "all states, regardless of their political and social orders, establish among themselves relations of collaboration based on the principles of independence and national sovereignty, equality in rights, non-interference in internal affairs, and respect for the interests of each other. Reaffirming the importance of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security, both sides favoured the latter's activity being strengthened with the above-mentioned goals in view, on the basis of the principles of the Charter. It was opportune to work toward developing collaboration among European peoples, particularly in the economic and cultural fields. With this aim in view the two sides will continue to carefully examine all initiatives intended to strengthen peace and security in Europe, and to solve the political problems still unsolved on the European continent".

12. Concerning Italian-Romanian bilateral relations it was noted with satisfaction that the exchanges governed by the long-range trade agreement of 6 September 1965 were developing steadily; and that the exchanges in the field of culture, science, art, and technology had developed well. A new cultural agreement was

^{13/} FBIS, Daily Reports, Blue, 6 September, No. 172-1966, J1.

^{14/} "Particular consideration being given to problems of European security"; Joint communiqué issued on 8 September, FBIS, Daily Reports, Orange, 9 September 1966, No. 175-1966, ff 1-2.

^{15/} FBIS, Daily Reports, Blue, 8 September, No. 174-1966, z 1-2.

regarded as necessary. Foreign Minister Fanfani accepted an invitation to pay an official visit to Romania.

13. At the present stage in the normalization of European relations on a Continental basis, it appeared that the examples of pioneering Western governments in the European détente, such as Austria and France, were being followed by other Western statesmen, notably from Denmark, Belgium, Turkey and Greece ^{16/}.

14. While Greece and Turkey have considerably improved their relations with their Communist neighbours, the issues on which Western differences with the Warsaw Pact countries are apparently being narrowed down included the holding of a pan-European security conference, in the case of Denmark and Belgium, and, in the latter instance, also disengagement.

15. On 8 September Foreign Minister Harmel held a press conference in Warsaw in which he dealt with the attitude of his country towards "initiatives aimed at relaxing tension between East and West", particularly from Poland, and he declared:

"We can state with satisfaction that, even during the meetings between Minister Rapacki and Minister Spaak, progress was made regarding a rapprochement of positions. The initiatives which have become known as the Gomulka plan and the Rapacki plan aimed at a limited denuclearization are valuable and constitute the basis of common views, while certain practical problems connected with them are matters for further discussions".

16. M. Harmel also pointed out that meetings of Foreign Ministers of Poland and Belgium - which, in his opinion, should be held regularly and should be preceded by meetings of experts - "would contribute to the proper preparation of a European conference on security and cooperation". In answer to a question, M. Harmel said that, if such a conference materialized, it should first of all deal with problems of European security and with steps aimed at consolidating economic cooperation among states, and on this basis should pass on^{to} the examination of European political problems.

17. It seems that the full effect of increasing co-operation across ideological frontiers cannot be achieved or, at any rate, cannot be seen during the Viet-Nam crisis. The Warsaw Pact countries, in spite of their desire to further this trend,

^{16/} The avowed intention of Britain was to conduct a policy of more active relations with Eastern Europe. Yet she was and is hampered by economic and financial difficulties.

are open to criticism from the PRC and Albania; while some Nato allies are being restrained by the fact that the United States is being bitterly attacked by the whole Communist group.

18. In these circumstances the conclusions which may be drawn from developments recorded in European surveys may be two-fold. Useful spadework is being done against the day of actual settlements which would have to await an end of the Viet-Nam war. Secondly the South-East Asian crisis is not involving European countries. Neither is it slowing down the European détente. On the contrary, US and Soviet preoccupations there are apparently making it easier for the smaller powers to work for an East-West rapprochement through bilateral relations across ideological borders. A coincidence of tension between the United States and Socialist countries and greater friendship between Europe neighbours - some of whom were on very bad terms only recently - shows that Europe is beginning to acquire a separate destiny of her own, much less influenced by ups and downs in the two super-powers' mutual relations.

19. While, in Eastern Europe, Albania was taking a dim view of the "détente" in Europe, and of the proposals for a pan-European conference on security, some circles in the West, even outside West Germany, resented the lesser West European political reliance on the United States. On 19 September at a meeting of the Atlantic Treaty Association ^{17/}, Lord Gladwyn declared ^{18/} :

"I do not think we should be unduly pessimistic, unless - which is greatly possible - any of our Nato governments is tempted to follow the French example by such actions as substantially reducing their forces in Germany, trying to carry out 'independent' policies of their own, or drastically cutting their defence budgets. For this really would disrupt the alliance and then we should certainly see not a reduction of but an increase in so-called 'tension'. The world balance of power, in other words, could be upset and a third world war become a distinct possibility".

^{17/} Which links non-governmental organizations in the Nato countries.

^{18/} The Times, 20 September, p. 14.

20. The close link which, in the French view, existed between a détente and the reunification of Germany was reaffirmed on 16 September in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National Assembly.. M. Couve de Murville declared ^{19/}:

The creating of an atmosphere of confidence between the countries of the East and of the West, which should make possible a settlement of the German problem "is a matter of a long process. The main thing is to undertake such a process and to go in the right direction. This is what we have done. In the field of economic and cultural relations we have already secured numerous results. But there still is a big job to do if we want to place our economic and cultural relations at the level of our political relations".

II. THE GERMAN QUESTION

21. As other European powers seemed mainly concerned with normalizing relations on the basis of the status quo, the Germans themselves failed to follow up the impetus generated in the spring by the beginning of inter-German contacts. Yet, the plan for reciprocal visits has not been abandoned as yet by either the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) or the East German Communists of the Socialist Unity of Germany (SED) Party.

22. First Secretary Ulbricht reportedly ^{20/} demanded official talks with the SPD as a prerequisite for new discussions on a speakers' exchange. This report came from Herr Gefeller, the head of a FRG Trade Union who, acting as a self-appointed "mediator", appealed to the SED to continue the dialogue with the SPD.

23. In a telegram to the Congress of the West German Union of Chemical Industry, Walter Ulbricht, the President of the Council of State and First Secretary of the SED Party, stated ^{21/} that his party was ready to resume the dialogue with the SPD:

"Such a dialogue should lead to a rapprochement and to a reconciliation between the two parties and would further the détente and the normalization of the relations between the two Germanys".

^{19/} Le Monde, 18 - 19 September, p. 2.

^{20/} FBIS, Daily Reports, Blue, No. 175 - 1966, 9 September 1966, q 3.

^{21/} Le Monde, 9 September 1966.

24. In possible recognition of the view that an East-West European détente would be conducive to a solution of the German question, ^{22/} the FRG Government displayed some activity in Eastern Europe. On 7 September Herr Schmücker, the FRG Minister for Economy, returned ^{23/} to Bonn from a four-day visit to Romania which was regarded as bringing their mutual relations a step closer to normalization. Herr Schmücker, who was received by Party Secretary Ceausescu, said that diplomatic relations between the two countries may be entered into later this year; that there was understanding in Bucharest for the FRG desire to insert a "Berlin clause" in agreements with East European countries, and that the Romanians, on their part, had asked for understanding of the fact that they must have regard for their friends in the Eastern bloc.

25. Herr Schmücker made it known that he wished to rectify a statement allegedly made by him during his conversation with Mr. Ceausescu, and in which he was quoted as saying that reunification was a matter for the Germans themselves. The West German Minister said that Mr. Ceausescu actually made a statement to that effect, and he, Schmücker replied that there would only be reunification through self-determination in free elections; if this was what the Romanian leader had in mind, Herr Schmücker could agree.

26. A visit of Foreign Minister Manescu to Bonn was due to take place later in 1966. In the meantime economic and cultural relations were to be further developed. Herr Strätling had already assumed his functions as the new Head of the German Trade Mission in Bucharest.

27. On 24 September, in Plovdiv, Rolf Lahr, the State Secretary in the FRG Foreign Office, said ^{24/} that his conversations with Bulgarian leaders were "a good basis for further contacts" and that "we Germans approach the question of a deepening and widening of our collaboration with good will". Ognyan Tichomiroff,

^{22/} The FRG is also concerned with "isolating" the GDR.

^{23/} Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 9 September.

^{24/} Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 26 September, sheet 1.

Bulgaria's first Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, replied that the visit of Herr Lahr was "an important step towards a wider development of economic and trade relations and of the relations in other fields".

28. Obstacles in the way of a West German opening to the East were made clear in a statement of 2 September by the Prime Minister of Poland, Josef Cyrankiewicz re-asserted the three conditions placed by his Government for a normalization of relations with the FRG, namely: 25/

- (i) recognition of the present frontiers of Poland;
- (ii) rejection of the FRG's claim for representation of the whole of Germany;
- (iii) rejection of Germany's "nuclear calling". 26/

29. The question of Socialist States' relations with Capitalistic countries, particularly the FRG, was dealt with in a statement 27/ of 15 September to the Central Committee of the SED Party by its First Secretary. Walter Ulbricht said in part:

"The laws of class struggle are being under-estimated by those who believe that it is possible to reach the most modern scientific and technical level by intensifying the relations with the Capitalistic countries" - whereas "our center of gravity to-day lies in international co-operation with the Socialist countries".

The declaration of the countries of the Warsaw Pact at their Bucharest meeting in July 1966 left no loophole, Herr Ulbricht said, "through which an 'elastic policy' of Bonn could infiltrate in order to play the Socialist countries against each other, to separate the people's democracies from the USSR and to isolate the GDR from the Socialist Camp".

25/ Le Monde, 3 September, p. 6.

26/ This did not appear to be acceptable to the FRG. For an account of Chancellor Erhard's visit to Washington, see East-West Note.

27/ Le Monde, 18 - 19 September, p. 4.

30. As regards the question of the UN status of the two Germanies, Warsaw Pact countries which spoke in the UN general debate favoured the admission of the GDR since its government respected the principles of the Charter; the FRG could also be admitted, they stated, although they made reservations as to its policies. Finland referred ^{28/} to the Secretary-General's Introduction to the Annual Report and agreed with U Thant that all countries, even those which, for one reason or another, were not yet Members, should be able to follow more closely UN activities. Finland pointed out that there were such countries in Europe as well as in Asia and that it would be useful if they could, in case they were interested, maintain observers at UN Headquarters and regional offices.

31. A Note Verbale dated 24 September 1966 addressed by Bulgaria to the Secretary-General transmitted a Memorandum from the GDR on its application for membership (A/6443 and S/7508). The GDR Government inter alia referred to the declarations by the UN Secretary-General, as well as by the non-aligned States, on the universality of membership; pointed out that the Eastern neighbours of Germany were particularly qualified "to judge the peaceful character of the GDR on the basis of their own experience"; quoted a paragraph in the Warsaw Pact members' Bucharest Declaration of July 1966 condemning discrimination and pressure on the question of "normal relations with the two German states"; stated that it would welcome the admission of both German states, in spite of reservations on FRG policies; reaffirmed the Socialist position that reunification could "be achieved only through a process of relaxation and peaceful rapprochement between the two German States"; said that UN membership of both German States would be in keeping with "the principles of peaceful coexistence as laid down in the UN Charter" and would not mean "a perpetuation of the division of Germany" since states which had been separate members had subsequently united; asserted that "the support given to the aggressive claim of the West German Government to sole representation... renders reunification impossible" and declared:

^{28/} 29 September, A/FV.1423.

"The German Democratic Republic cannot make the German people's right guaranteed by international law to equality in international peaceful cooperation dependent upon the refusal of the West German Federal Republic to agree to the admission of both German states to the United Nations Organization or upon the refusal of the Western powers to conclude a peace treaty with both German states. The interest of peace in Europe and in the world calls for cooperation in the world organisation of the German people with its great potential on a basis of equality. A continued non-membership is bound to have a great detrimental effect on the cause of relaxation and peace. The German Democratic Republic asserts the claim guaranteed by international law of the German people in both German states by applying for admission as a member of the United Nations Organisation".

32. The GDR finally referred to its earlier proposals on disarmament and European security, to its position against colonialism and to its "many contributions to the work of other UN organs".

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CONFIDENTIAL

JJ:111

27 September 1966

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

GENERAL DEBATE

1413th Meeting, 23 September 1966

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

GENERAL DEBATE

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The address of Mr. Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, to the General Assembly could be analysed in two major parts. In the first part, Mr. Gromyko drew the attention of the General Assembly to the practice of some Member States in neglecting to implement certain important resolutions of the General Assembly. In this context, he mentioned the Assembly resolutions adopted at the 20th session of the General Assembly regarding non-intervention in internal affairs, the question of military bases and the resolution on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The second part of the speech dealt with general issues affecting the United Nations, such as the Secretary-General, the universality of the United Nations, the role of the Security Council, disarmament, colonial questions, economic and social questions and outer space.

Secretary-General

Mr. Gromyko asserted that the Soviet Union would be willing to endorse another term for U Thant if he wishes to make himself available for a second term.

Universality

Finally, Mr. Gromyko appealed for universal representation in the United Nations. In this regard he reaffirmed the Soviet position that the People's Republic of China should receive its rightful place within the United Nations. He also suggested that the German Democratic Republic become a Member of the United Nations and also left open the possibility of membership for the Federal Republic of Germany.

Security Council

Mr. Gromyko also dealt with the role of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security. He again affirmed the Soviet position that the Security Council has the main responsibility in this field and that nothing should be done to violate the Charter principles.

Non-Intervention

(a) Vietnam

On the question of non-intervention, Mr. Gromyko asserted that since the Assembly adopted the resolution at the 20th session, the United States has

continued to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries. He said, "the intervention of more than 300 thousand American soldiers and officers in South Vietnam, the barbaric bombing of the territory of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the military interference in the affairs of Cambodia and Laos - all this is aggression". Mr. Gromyko went on to assert that, although the United States Government has been expressing interest in peace negotiations, its "aggressive actions" belie this claim. In this context, he stated that the so-called new proposals enunciated by Mr. Goldberg on 22 September meant that the United States was defending its aggressive course in Vietnam and there was still no sign testifying to the seriousness of the intention of the United States to seek for a settlement of this problem and to stop the aggression against the Vietnamese people.

The Soviet Foreign Minister strongly supported the four points of the DRV, emphasizing that the United States must cease the bombing of the DRV, withdraw its troops from Vietnam and then allow the Vietnamese people to settle their own affairs. He summarized this position by saying "the aggressor has come to Vietnam, the aggressor should leave". Mr. Gromyko also affirmed that the USSR is continuing to offer all necessary help to the Vietnamese people.

Still on the question of interference in internal affairs, he criticized the United States "aggressive designs against Cuba". He warned that the friends of Cuba would come to its aid if attacked by the United States.

In order to reaffirm United Nations commitment of non-intervention, he suggested that the USSR would propose before the Assembly a resolution on the question of the progress of implementation of the declaration of non-intervention. Mr. Gromyko also supported the Czech proposal "On the Strict Compliance with the Prohibition of Threat or Use of Force in International Relations and the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination".

(b) Military Bases

The next item in the first part dealt with the question of military bases in foreign countries. Mr. Gromyko criticized the foreign bases of NATO countries, primarily the United States, which are established in many parts of the world. He warned that these bases threatened the independence of the various countries. While realizing that it would be difficult for the Assembly to secure the removal of all foreign military bases, Mr. Gromyko suggested that a start should be made in eliminating foreign military bases in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It was the view of Mr. Gromyko that the peoples of Asia, Africa and

Latin America could not by themselves remove the foreign military bases, even though they would like to do so. It is to help them remove foreign military bases that he suggested a draft resolution "On the Elimination of Foreign Military Bases in Countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America".

Armaments

(a) Nuclear Weapons

The third item in the first part dealt with nuclear weapons. Here the important question was the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Mr. Gromyko asserted that no sooner had the Assembly adopted a resolution at the 20th session against loopholes in the non-proliferation agreement than the United States sought in Geneva to provide loopholes in the treaty which would make possible the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Federal Republic of Germany. Mr. Gromyko went on to criticize the German leaders who, he felt, were already making preparations for the production of nuclear weapons. In order to reassert the Assembly's interest in non-proliferation, he proposed an Assembly resolution "On the Renunciation by States of Actions Hampering the Attainment of Agreement on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

(b) Disarmament

In the second part of the speech, Mr. Gromyko dealt with a wide range of issues. He reaffirmed the Soviet commitment to general and complete disarmament and he deplored the lack of progress on disarmament in the ENDC which, he said, was due to the Western Powers. He called upon all Members to continue to strive for complete disarmament. He also reiterated the USSR support for the convening of a world conference on disarmament in which all States will participate.

Others

On the colonial question, he drew attention to the Assembly that most of the remaining colonial territories were still in Africa. In this context, he criticized the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Rhodesia, asserting that the Soviet Union would support a resolution on South West Africa.

On economic and social questions, he spoke of the work of the United Nations in this area but criticized the Western Powers for using economic aid for imperialist ends, and looting economically less developed countries.

In outer space, he reaffirmed USSR commitment to a treaty on the peaceful uses of outer space.

On Korea, he supported the proposal for the United Nations to adopt a decision on the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops from South Korea and the dissolution of the United Nations Commission on the Rehabilitation and Unification of Korea.

Mr. Gromyko drew the attention of the Assembly to the Declaration of the Warsaw Pact countries meeting in Bucharest regarding the question of European security. He reiterated the commitment of the Soviet Government and the Warsaw Pact Members to the convening of a European conference on security since the security of European peoples could only be ensured on a pan-European basis. He did not rule out the possibility of the Federal Republic participating in this all-European conference.

TO: The Secretary-General

A:

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I am sending you herewith a short résumé of Mr. Brezhnev's speech made on 15 January 1966 in Ulan Bator.

I hope that it may be of some help to you as it represents the Soviet approach to a number of international issues that could be subjects of interest during your press conference.

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20/1

Date: 20/1

FROM: A.E. Nesterenko
DE: *Handwritten signature*

MR. BREZHNEV'S SPEECH IN ULAN BATOR AT A MEETING OF THE
SIGNING OF A TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COOPERATION AND MUTUAL
ASSISTANCE BETWEEN THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AND THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC ON 15 JANUARY 1966

Resumé

In the first part of his speech, Mr. Brezhnev spoke of the achievements of the Mongolian People's Republic to which he gave a high appraisal. Then Mr. Brezhnev said about the Treaty in question:

"The Treaty we have signed today consolidates the results of development of Soviet-Mongolian relations for the years past. It opens a new stage in the history of our relations and is a firm foundation for a further flowering of friendship between our peoples."

Having devoted then the next portion of his speech to the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Brezhnev said:

"The struggle for consolidation of the Socialist community and the international Communist movement is in the focus of activities of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet State in the field of foreign policy. We can record with satisfaction a further strengthening of the military union of the countries, participants of the Warsaw Treaty, development of economic cooperation between the Socialist countries both within the framework of the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and on a bi-lateral basis, a considerable extension of bi-lateral and multi-lateral contacts between the Socialist countries, between Communist and Workers' Parties of the world."

Then Mr. Brezhnev spoke about the contacts with Communist and Workers' Parties, stressing that the meetings with their representatives during the last year "revealed an identity of views on all the major questions of the present day".

Then Mr. Brezhnev said: "The Communist Party and the Peoples of the Soviet Union consider it their internationalist duty to support the liberation struggle of other peoples. This struggle assumes in our day, depending on concrete conditions and tasks, various forms. Some peoples have to resort to armed struggle for their

freedom while others face today another problem as their major task -- a struggle for strengthening their economic independence and securing social progress. We take this into account in our policy. Hence the diversity of assistance we are giving to these peoples, which ranges from political support and delivery of arms to economic agreements, granting of credits and participation in the construction of industrial enterprises.

During the last decades the peoples struggling for their freedom and independence have more than once requested Moscow and the Party of Lenin to render them help and support. And we can say with a clear conscience: there has never been a single case of Moscow declining their request.

The Soviet Union as well as other Socialist States consider the young States of Asia and Africa pursuing an anti-imperialist policy as their natural friends and comrades-in-arms. We are gratified by the fact that the peoples of many countries of Africa and Asia such as, for example, Ghana, Guinea, the United Arab Republic, Algeria, Mali, Burma and others have put themselves the task of struggling for Socialism. The fact that an ever greater number of young States are attracted to Socialism creates especially favourable conditions for our friendship and cooperation. It is not only the cause of constructing new life in the countries of Asia and Africa proper that stands to gain by it, but also the entire cause of peace and progress because our cooperation broadens the general front of struggle against imperialism and steadily weakens the positions of the imperialists.

The Soviet people show complete solidarity with the struggle of peoples against the colonial yoke, for freedom and independence. We are again declaring our support for the heroic fighters of Mozambique, Angola and other enslaved peoples struggling for their liberation from the yoke of colonialism. We are declaring again our ~~ardent~~ ^{ardent} support for the people of Southern Rhodesia, courageously opposing the plot of the racist Smith. We are convinced that the peoples of Africa who have risen to wage their struggle will destroy the walls of colonial prisons, will gain their liberation from the alien oppression and emerge onto the road of an independent life.

In the struggle against imperialism the unity of the Socialist countries with the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, gains new strength. This has been once again demonstrated by the Havana Conference of Solidarity of Peoples of the Three Continents. The decisions it has adopted will undoubtedly help in gaining new successes of the struggle for liberation and also in consolidating all anti-imperialist forces.

The Soviet State since the time it was led by Lenin has been consistently advocating the principles of peaceful co-existence of States with different social systems. Today the struggle for the triumph of the principles of peaceful co-existence has assumed a special significance. To advocate peaceful co-existence in our day means to struggle against interference by the imperialists into the internal affairs of other countries and peoples. It means to struggle for the deliverance of peoples from the threat of a world thermo-nuclear war. It means to work for the creation of more favourable conditions for the triumph of our great cause. The Soviet Union, other countries of Socialism, pursue an active, peace-loving foreign policy, undertake measures aimed at exposing the imperialist aggressors, ^{at} mobilizing all progressive forces against the danger of war, working for a relaxation of tension and liquidation of the hotbeds of war and solving outstanding international problems by negotiation.

We consistently advocate the development of economic and other ties between all States irrespective of the differences in their social set-up."

Then Mr. Brezhnev said the following concerning the Viet-Nam war:

"There will be no peaceful co-existence if no struggle is waged against those who are trying to undermine it, against any attempts of imperialist aggression and interference in the affairs of other countries and peoples. This determines the position of all peace-loving forces in relation to the American aggression in Viet-Nam. The Vietnamese people are waging a just and heroic struggle for its truly national interests and that is why all the Socialist countries and the entire progressive humanity give them firm support.

Despite the absence of a common frontier between the Soviet Union and Viet-Nam and the remoteness of Viet-Nam from the Soviet Union, our country renders the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam an increasing assistance in repelling the American aggression. This assistance extends to all aspects of our cooperation, military as well as political and economic. We are constantly keeping in touch and maintaining contacts with the leaders of the working people's party of Viet-Nam and the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Recently we discussed the situation again and have agreed on further practical steps for rendering assistance to the struggling Vietnamese people in strengthening the defence capacity and the development of the economy of this fraternal country."

Then Mr. Brezhnev continued: "Feeling that their venture has no prospects, the American imperialists are trying to maneuver. Widening their aggression, they are at the same time harping upon their desire for peace negotiations. But the sincerity of such statements ^{be} can/ easily tested. The programme of peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese question enunciated by the National Liberation Front of South and the National Assembly of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam Viet-Nam/is well known. If the American leaders really desire to end the war in Viet-Nam, who then prevents them from recognizing the justness of demands of the Vietnamese people and opening thereby the way to peace?

The attempts by the United States to break the will of the Vietnamese people for freedom by force is a hopeless thing. Whatever the persistence the imperialists may have been showing, whatever the zeal they may have been displaying in their criminal activities, they will not succeed in subjugating the people who have risen to wage a struggle for their independence.

It should be stressed that the aggression of the USA in Viet-Nam is not the only cause for alarm. That is caused by some other events in Asia. The imperialist reaction is stubbornly trying to turn this continent into a bridgehead for an open struggle against Socialism and the national liberation movement."

Then Mr. Brezhnev spoke of the Declaration of Tashkent: "The other day, as you know, the meeting in Tashkent which had been held there in response to the proposal of the Soviet Union, concluded its work. The negotiations which took place there between the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan have resulted in signing a Declaration in which these two countries pledged to accomplish a number of important measures aimed at improving good neighbourly relations between them.

The Soviet Union, which has invariably wished that peace and accord would prevail between our two friends, the Asiatic Powers, India and Pakistan, has reason to express its great satisfaction regarding this Agreement.

The Declaration of Tashkent is, in our view, a major international act, a good contribution into the cause of strengthening peace in Asia and the whole world. This is also a serious success of the peace-loving foreign policy of our country which actively helped in achieving positive results in the course of the Tashkent negotiations."

Then Mr. Brezhnev touched on the events in Indonesia. He said: "The continued persecution of progressive forces in this country and above all the Communists, who have always been in the forefront of the struggle of the Indonesian people against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, causes us serious concern."

Mr. Brezhnev also said that there is a real danger ^{that} the imperialist interventionists may extend the hostilities to the territory of Laos and Cambodia.

"It stands to reason" said Mr. Brezhnev -- "that behind the events which have been taking place of late in Asia lie various reasons, but one can easily discern behind them the hand of reactionary forces, of American imperialism in the first place. Imperialism counts on splitting the unity of the liberation movement, on strengthening internal reaction in every country. These are insidious tactics. If they are not given a fitting rebuff the liberation struggle of peoples, the entire revolutionary movement, may sustain serious losses."

Then Mr. Brezhnev stressed that "life demands vigilance on our part in relation to another hotbed of international tension, that existing in Europe", and called for preventing the West German militarists from gaining access to nuclear weapons.

In conclusion, Mr. Brezhnev expressed satisfaction with the growing prestige of the Mongolian People's Republic in the international arena and shared his impressions of the visit.

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: The Secretary-General
As:

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Date:

27.9.1966

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE:

A. H. Nesterenko

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ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: The Secretary-General
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Handwritten: 9 Nov / 5710

Date:

3 Oct. 1966

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FROM
DE:

A.E. Nesterenko,
 Under-Secretary, PSCA.
Handwritten signature: A.E. Nesterenko

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DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1422nd Meeting, 29 September 1966

TURKEY

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1422
29 September 1966
AHO:pmm

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

TURKEY

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, addressed the General Assembly on 29 September 1966 (A/PV.1422).

Questions bearing directly on the Organization

Mr. Caglayangil referred to the Secretary-General, universality and the maintenance of peace.

(a) He expressed profound gratitude to the Secretary-General for his services to the United Nations and to the cause of peace. He urged U Thant to review his decision not to seek another term in office.

(b) On universality of United Nations membership, he asserted, without reference to the PRC and the Divided Countries, that the Organization must strive to obtain universality "so that the authority and influence of the United Nations may be exercised in all corners of the globe".

(c) On the maintenance of peace, Mr. Caglayangil pointed out that the Charter had imposed certain limitations on the United Nations by placing special responsibility on the Security Council and subordinating the action of the Organization to the agreement of the permanent members of the Council. Nevertheless, the true power of the Organization rested "in its moral influence, in its ability to mobilize world public opinion, and the principles of its Charter". Resolutions adopted by the Assembly should, as far as possible, express general consensus so that its recommendations will contribute to the solution of outstanding problems.

References to items on the agenda

Mr. Caglayangil referred to colonialism, Palestine, peace-keeping operations, disarmament and the economic field.

(a) Colonialism

He referred to Southern Rhodesia, Apartheid, and to South West Africa which he has discussed earlier (A/PV.1419). It was incumbent on the United Nations to eliminate colonialism and policies of racial oppression, such as Apartheid and the situation in Southern Rhodesia, in order to "make its full contribution to world peace and to the progress of mankind". Means to secure compliance with the resolutions of the United Nations in this regard was essential. Turkey is a co-sponsor of the draft resolution on South West Africa (A/L.483).

(b) Palestine

In the Middle East, the Palestine question prevented the establishment of a durable peace and was the cause of a dangerous arms race. The refugees, more than a million, hindered the economic and social development of the area. The problem continued to await a settlement in conformity with law and justice.

(c) Peace-keeping operations

The United Nations had rendered immense service to the cause of peace whenever it was able to organize peace-keeping operations. The Organization must not abandon such efforts. No Member State had the right to condemn the United Nations to impotence and paralysis. Difficulties in this regard must be overcome and a solution to the problem found urgently.

(d) Disarmament, prevention of proliferation in nuclear weapons and of the armament race

There was the danger of the re-armament race, in its nuclear form, of spreading to an ever-growing number of countries instead of being channelled to constructive uses such as economic development and social progress. Proliferation of nuclear armaments must be precluded through the elimination of different viewpoints on certain provisions of existing draft treaties. Then the question of providing an effective safeguard for the non-nuclear countries and halting the race among nuclear Powers could be attained. It was necessary, moreover, to ban all nuclear testing. Recent scientific progress could hopefully eliminate the question of verification of underground testing. General and complete disarmament under effective international control was dependent on putting an end to the nuclear armament race. However, efforts to reduce conventional armaments must be pursued at any rate.

The economic field

Mr. Caglayangil devoted extensive attention to the topic, including references to Turkey's interests to and support of UNCTAD, the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development, the Programme for Technical Assistance and the Special Fund, the FAO and the World Food Programme, etc. The disappointing problems related to economic growth of developing countries and the growing disparity between rich and poor countries were stressed. The Minister emphasized the need to undertake constructive efforts to surmount difficulties involved in this regard.

Viet-Nam

Mr. Caglayangil emphasized the dangers of the war in Viet-Nam as well as the human suffering caused by "this bloody war". He said, however, that no one could contest the right of the people in Viet-Nam to decide on their political future free from all foreign interventions. The United Nations did not possess any means to act directly but it must redouble its efforts to help preserve the peace. Negotiations were imperative to arriving at an honourable solution, and all parties concerned should be appealed to. Concerning Ambassador Goldberg's statement, the determination of the United States to seek a de-escalation of the war and to engage in negotiations in any forum, should be noted with satisfaction.

Other matters

Under other matters, Mr. Caglayangil dwelt on the questions of Indonesia, Malaysia, India-Pakistan, Cyprus, and Europe - German reunification - in that order.

(a) Indonesia-Malaysia

He expressed satisfaction at the settlement of the conflict between the two countries concerned. This was an example to be followed in settling the question of Viet-Nam.

(b) India-Pakistan

Peace in Asia also depended on relations between India and Pakistan. The Tashkent Agreement was commendable. However, lasting peace could not come about so long as disputes, above all the Kashmir question, remained unsettled - a matter which should be settled equitably in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council.

(c) Cyprus

Mr. Caglayangil said that an "uneasy peace" was maintained through the presence of UNFICYP. He expressed gratitude to countries contributing forces and funds to UNFICYP, and to the efforts of the Secretary-General.

There had been no improvement during the past year. The Turkish community had been deprived of its most elementary rights and subjected to vexing and arbitrary restrictions and danger. However, it would not "accept subjugation and the loss of their historic and constitutional rights".

Turkey, from the beginning had "sincerely sought an agreed and peaceful solution to the crisis". At present Turkey and Greece, as co-signatories of the treaties determining the status of Cyprus, are engaged in confidential discussions with the aim of bringing about a peaceful solution among all the parties". He hoped these would attain "harmony and concord between the two communities and between Turkey and Greece". However, "if we fail to reach an agreement, the present situation cannot go on". It "was necessary to maintain the UNFICYP on the island for an indefinite period" and "bring about conditions in which UNFICYP can, without hinderance, discharge its duties".

Following the above statement, exchanges took place between Foreign Minister Kyprianou of Cyprus and Mr. Caglayangil. The former objected that reference was made to the internal situation on the island. The Turkish Foreign Minister regretted that the Foreign Minister of Cyprus had thought fit to intervene.

(d) Europe, German reunification

Mr. Caglayangil stressed that "Europe at present is free of grave crises that carry with them the threat of war". Despite Viet-Nam, "relations between countries of the East and the West are in a constant state of development in the economic, technical and cultural spheres". Turkey was happy to make its contribution in this regard. Such development was "likely gradually to eliminate mutual distrust and pave the way to general understanding that would end the division of Europe". However, the problem of the reunification of Germany posed the main problem. Germany "should be freely reunited in conformity with the people's right to self-determination and within the framework of a general arrangement which would effectively safeguard the security of all the countries of the region".

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:

The Secretary-General

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FOR SIGNATURE	POUR SIGNATURE
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FOR COMMENTS	POUR OBSERVATIONS
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YOUR ATTENTION	VOTRE ATTENTION
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AS REQUESTED	SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
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NOTE AND RETURN	NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	POUR INFORMATION

Thanks.
Hans
20/9

Date:

28.9.66

CR.13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE:

A. E. Nesterenko

A. E. Nesterenko

CONFIDENTIAL

Ph.P:111

28 September 1966

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

GENERAL DEBATE

1416th meeting, 26 September 1966

Czechoslovakia

GENERAL DEBATE

Czechoslovakia

The Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, Mr. Vaclav David, addressed the General Assembly on 26 September.

Secretary-General

Czechoslovakia expressed her appreciation of the tireless activities of U Thant who had so greatly contributed to UN work, and would welcome an expression of his willingness to serve another term.

Peace-Keeping

Since the Charter was the basis on which every United Nations activity must be built, Czechoslovakia would not permit any by-passing of the provisions on the exclusive competence of the Security Council concerning the use of armed forces.

Vietnam

Fundamental principles of the Charter were being flouted, notably through the continued and escalated undeclared war of the USA against the Vietnamese people on the territory of that people. United States imperialism acted as if it had a right to force the peoples to live in accordance with the ideas and interests of the United States.

As regards alleged United States willingness to enter into so-called negotiations, its insincerity was attested by the ruthless escalation of the war.

Certain allies of the United States were directly participating in its intervention which had the blessings of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Warsaw Treaty countries would continue to assist the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as stressed in their recent Bucharest Declaration.

The proposals of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam showed that it in no way refused to negotiate. Czechoslovakia unconditionally supported the proposals of the DRV and of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

Other US aggressive actions and need for UN action

The United States continued its intrigues against Cuba and had hundreds of military bases on foreign territories serving the purposes of

aggression against newly emerging States. Czechoslovakia fully supported consideration of the Soviet item 98.

Czechoslovakia had submitted item 92 "Strict observance of the prohibition of the threat or use of force in international relations, and of the right of peoples to self-determination". The General Assembly should address an urgent appeal to all Members to observe relevant Charter principles, in order to ensure peaceful relations among States, strengthen their security and support the struggle of nations for freedom and independence.

The General Assembly should also consider urgently item 96 on the implementation of resolution 2131 (XX) on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, since certain States continued to carry out policies which were at variance with this Declaration.

Korea

The name of the United Nations should not continue to be abused by the US for its military occupation of South Korea.

The Korean question had to be resolved by the Korean people themselves. The memorandum of 21 July 1966 from the People's Democratic Republic of Korea contained a reasonable basis for a just solution. US and other foreign military units should be withdrawn and UNCHRK should be dissolved (item 93).

UN Membership

(a) China

The time had come to put an end to an abnormal situation by immediately restoring the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations. Czechoslovakia rejected the "two-Chinas" theory and favoured the ousting of the Chiang kai-Shek representatives.

(b) Germany

The German Democratic Republic not only subscribed to the principles and purposes of the Charter but implemented them. Its request for admission should therefore be granted. Czechoslovakia also favoured the admission of the other German State, the FRG.

Disarmament

In this field also the aggressive trend of US foreign policy, particularly in Vietnam, had a most unfavourable effect. Further the United States, out of consideration for the rewarichist forces in the FRG and in opposition to the resolution adopted at the 20th session, was proceeding with plans that

would make it possible for the FRG to gain access to nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO. In this connexion Czechoslovakia supported the Soviet draft resolution contained in Document A/6398. Czechoslovakia also favoured the convening of a world Disarmament Conference.

Outer Space

Czechoslovakia expected that the General Assembly would contribute to the solution of the question under item 91.

Peaceful coexistence

Czechoslovakia continued to support the adoption of a declaration with the objective of attaining strict observance of the principles of international law concerning peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems.

Colonialism

Six years after the adoption of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, there were still tens of millions of people under direct colonial domination.

Czechoslovakia would support every effective measure against colonialism and racist policies. The question of South West Africa was particularly urgent and Czechoslovakia did not accept the decision of the International Court of Justice.

The present session should adopt measures so that 1967 may see the final liquidation of colonialism. Also the General Assembly should watch over all attempts at neo-colonialism.

Developing Countries

Their economic situation would remain alarming until the advanced capitalist countries that bore the responsibility for their plight took adequate steps.

Czechoslovakia, within the framework of her new system of management of the national economy, would provide for increased economic cooperation with developing countries.

Europe

Although an exacerbation of international tension was also taking place on that continent, there was a growing conviction in Europe that concrete steps should be taken towards the solution of pending questions. Such positive trends were to be encouraged.

However, aggressive circles in the United States were leaning on reactionary elements in Western Europe; and the FRG, in support of its policy

of revision was building a strong army drilled in nuclear weapons and rocket techniques. The FRG had usurped the right to speak on behalf of the whole German people and was blocking any progress in European security by insisting on prior unification of Germany according to its own ideas, that is, by swallowing up the German Democratic Republic. While Czechoslovakia offered to normalize relations with the FRG, the latter refused to recognize that the Munich Diktat was null and void.

There was a need for developing peaceful relations and cooperation among European States in order to contribute to the solution of outstanding European problems. Socialist countries such as the German Democratic Republic and Poland had made numerous proposals for the relaxation of tension in Europe. The Bucharest Declaration presented a programme for peaceful cooperation in Europe. Czechoslovakia supported the convening of an all-European Conference on security.

Joint meetings of West European and Socialist States had recently shown that progress in solving European problems could be achieved.

ROUTING SLIP

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The Secretary-General

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Ther.
2/10

Date:

30 Sept. 1966

CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE:

A.E. Nesterenko,
 Under-Secretary, PSQA.

30 September 1966

Ph.P/flr

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

GENERAL DEBATE

1422nd Meeting, 29 September 1966

Albania

21st SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

ALBANIA

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Albania, Mr. Nesti Nase addressed the General Assembly on 29 September 1966 (A/PV.1422).

General

Mr. Nase asserted that the United States had become the fiercest strong-hold of reaction in world history. In Asia, Africa, Latin America, everywhere in the world the United States imperialists were leading a Neo-Colonialist policy in the pursuit of its historical mission, allegedly "assigned to them by Providence". The situation was made graver by the support given directly or indirectly by another great power which every day was strengthening its rapprochement and collaboration with American imperialism in spite of declarations in favour of the liberation of peoples.

Viet-Nam

The United States had now extended their aggression to North Vietnam in order to secure a bridgehead for a war against the People's Republic of China.

Through escalation of the war against North Vietnam the United States was endeavouring to thrust upon the Vietnamese people the swindle of "peace negotiations".

All peace-loving States should support the four points of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and the five points of the National Liberation Front of South Viet-Nam.

As to the United Nations, it had no right to intervene in the question of Viet-Nam, which would be contrary to the interests and rights of the Vietnamese people.

War Preparation in Asia and the alleged détente in Europe

The United States, in cooperation with Japan, was making South Korea into a base for an aggression against the People's Democratic Republic of Korea. At the same time, other Governments were creating favourable conditions for the Japanese militarists against the Korean people.

In the face of the revolutionary movement of liberation of the peoples of Asia, the US Government was transferring its war strategy from Europe to Asia, while Socialist China was the main obstacle to the implementation of the plans of Washington for the domination of Asia and the world. After the Japanese-South Korean Treaty the United States was seeking to create new military alliances, with the ultimate purpose of creating an anti-Chinese "holy alliance".

The implementation of the American war plans was also connected with the changes in the political and ideological line of the leaders of a great European power and their positions of co-operation with the most aggressive imperialistic Power. Part of the American troops sent to Asia were accordingly withdrawn from Europe, as those leaders were alleging that there existed a détente in Europe conducive to the holding of a pan-European meeting.

In fact, the main European problems had not been solved and the United States had not given up their hostile designs against the Socialist countries. On the contrary, they still had their military bases in Europe and were trying to give nuclear weapons to the revenge-seeking regime of West Germany.

In the circumstances there was no possibility of an agreement with Nato, led by the United States. Peace could not be divided and the American aggression in Viet-Nam as well as the preparation of war against the People's Republic of China were linked with the destinies of world peace. The solidarity of peace-loving countries and peoples was in conformity with the objective laws of human society.

The imperialist and colonialist powers were weakening, and divided amongst themselves, and the international situation was developing favourably. At the same time, there were ups and downs and the vigilance of peace-loving countries assumed a particular importance. Albania, for her part, while in favour of the strengthening of peace in Europe, would not separate it from a true peace in the world at large.

Disarmament

In the course of twenty years no real progress has been achieved in the United Nations for the settlement of this problem. While the Committee of seventeen was proceeding with academic debates, the United States now had a yearly military budget of some 60,000 million dollars. The United States was not in favour of disarmament, inasmuch as imperialism was always based on the force of arms. Only the common struggle of all the peoples could make them disarm.

The present negotiations on non-proliferation were actually proceeding between the great Powers, even though a show of negotiations was made within the Committee. Non-proliferation was a trap against the sovereignty and the sovereign equality of States. The fate of peace and international security must not be left in the hands of two great powers.

Albania reaffirmed her complete support of the People's Republic of China's proposal for a summit Conference of all the countries of the world to study the question of complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons.

Under the direct influence of two great powers, the question of the studying of the creation of permanent United Nations forces had again been placed on the Agenda. As designed by the Two, those forces would serve to suppress movement of national liberation and revolution of the peoples, thus supplementing the US role of an international gendarme. It should not be forgotten that the financial aspect of peace-keeping was used to sabotage, through a blackmail under Article 19 of the Charter, the whole nineteenth session.

Albania would actively oppose the setting up of a UN International gendarmerie against the sovereign states and the freedom loving people.

National liberation of peoples

Albania rejected the claims of those who, under the slogan of peaceful co-existence, advocated a capitulation of oppressed peoples.

The question arose whether the United Nations had contributed to the national liberation of peoples or given them vain hopes which were detrimental in their struggle.

What happened with the numerous resolutions concerning the Portuguese colonies, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Oman, etc...? They were trampled upon by the colonial powers, without effective measures being taken against them. It would be so, as long as the Organization was under direct US control.

The neo-colonialists had invented a new system to strengthen their domination. The imperialists headed by the United States and the pseudo-Socialist countries, through credits and other forms of economic penetration, were interfering in the domestic affairs of other countries.

The peaceful States should strengthen their co-operation.

China

Through US handling of the United Nations an abnormal situation had been created. A founding Member had been denied its legitimate seat. This flagrant violation of the Charter had prevented the Organization from fulfilling its duties. Without the participation of the People's Republic of China, a strong Socialist country inhabited by seven hundred millions men, no international problem could be solved and the United Nations could not enjoy the confidence of the world popular masses.

The People's Republic of China was playing an important part in safeguarding peace in Asia and the world. The PRC accordingly enjoyed the respect of all progressive mankind.

German Democratic Republic

The United Nations, in conformity with the Charter, must be a universal Organization. In this connection, Albania supported the just application of the German Democratic Republic.

Peaceful coexistence, non-intervention and other principles

Albania had always been in favour of the development of relations between countries with different social systems on the basis of the principles of peaceful co-existence, equality, non-intervention in internal affairs, respect and mutual benefits; and she had always sought to help the United Nations on the path of the principles and purposes of the Charter.

Albania therefore stressed the need for rejecting US influence which prevented the Organization from taking the necessary measures for her reorganization, thereby, preventing the Organization from discharging its essential duties.

Through the efforts of all peace-loving countries and peoples it would be possible to frustrate all plans against freedom and peace.

30 September 1966

PhP/flr

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

GENERAL DEBATE

1423rd Meeting, 29 September 1966

Finland

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1423
29 September 1966
PhP/flr

21st SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

FINLAND

The Minister of External Affairs of Finland, Mr. Ahti Karjalainen, addressed the General Assembly on 29 September 1966 (A/PV.1423).

He said that the United Nations was a corner-stone of Finnish foreign policy. Finland would continue to support the United Nations with all the means at her disposal for peace and international cooperation.

Secretary-General

Finland completely supported U Thant. If he agreed to continue to serve, as Finland hoped, he could be sure of her continued full confidence.

UN Membership and observers

An important reason for the United Nations to have been shunted off to a side-track on Viet-Nam was that it had not yet achieved universality. Finland had consistently held the view that the seat of China belonged to the PRC representatives. Continued isolation of the PRC in the long run contained greater dangers than would cooperation.

The Secretary-General in the Introduction to his Annual Report expressed the hope that all countries, even those which for one reason or another were not yet Members, should be able to follow more closely UN activities. There were such countries in Europe as well as Asia; and it would be useful if they could, in case they were interested, maintain observers at United Nations Headquarters and regional offices.

Africa and enforcement action

Race conflicts were a universal problem. Condemnation of discrimination by the General Assembly had no effect in South Africa, South West Africa or Rhodesia. The time had come to consider new international measures to combat racial discrimination. Africans and others impatiently demanded effective action.

Responsibility for carrying out the will of the General Assembly lay with the Security Council under the Charter; and indeed enforcement action against a State could be practical only if the permanent members, along with all other Members, unanimously took part in carrying it out.

Peace-Keeping

The primary responsibility of the Security Council had also been generally recognized in the debate on peace-keeping. As pointed out by Finland at the 20th session, differences over principles had not prevented the continuation of important peace-keeping operations. Finland was participating to the full. For instance, a Finnish general commanded the UN Force in Cyprus. The presence of the Force had been necessary but could not be permanent. Hence the parties must be urged to make a fresh effort to settle their differences through negotiations.

UN Finance

Finland was one of the relatively few Members which had responded to the Secretary-General's appeal and, in accordance with the consensus at the end of the 19th session, made substantial voluntary contributions. It was gratifying that, as recently stated by the Secretary-General, there were good hopes that other Members would soon make their voluntary contribution now that the Committee of Fourteen had completed its task.

Development and Trade

Self-interest commanded the Members to increase their efforts; and Finland intended to increase her contribution to the UN Development Fund by a substantial proportion.

Even more important for economic growth was the promotion of trade and economic cooperation between industrialized and developing countries. Finland was prepared to negotiate in GATT the removal of customs duties on about thirty tropical products, and hoped that the Kennedy round would stimulate trade with developing countries.

Also in order to promote cooperation with developing countries, Finland had joined the Asian Development Bank.

Disarmament

Improved cooperation between East and West in Europe created a basis for negotiations, in particular for preventing further proliferation. Finland had participated in the scientific cooperation on identification of seismic phenomena, and regarded it as possible to agree on the banning of underground tests, as well as on the prevention of further proliferation on the basis of the principles adopted almost unanimously at the 20th session. While primary responsibility for disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, lay with the great nuclear Powers, no country would remain indifferent, as its existence was at stake.

Viet-Nam

Military activities and violence had intensified. US raids had increased and targets widened. Vietnamese suffering was more severe in both parts of Viet-Nam.

Neutral Finland refrained from taking sides in political issues between the great Powers, yet she voiced strong opposition to military means and violence. Only a negotiated settlement based on the Geneva Agreements could enable the people of Viet-Nam to settle their future without interference or pressure from outside. But, before conditions favourable for negotiations could be expected to emerge, the trend of events in Viet-Nam must be reversed; for, no solution could be reached militarily.

With the war in Viet-Nam severe tension would prevail everywhere, hampering UN efforts for cooperation in other fields. Yet, it was not possible in the UN framework to attempt to solve the conflict.

Europe

Only through cooperation across ideological frontiers could the conditions for a stable peace be created. On the basis of her experiences, Finland had sponsored a draft resolution at the 20th session on cooperation between European countries representing different political and social systems [resolution 2129 (XX)]. Since then, continued progress had been made. Relations between European States had further improved. Largely thanks to this, the situation in Europe, generally speaking, had remained peaceful and stable.

AA-13

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

30 September 1966
PhP:pmm

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1422nd Meeting, 29 September 1966.

DENMARK

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

DENMARK

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Mr. Per Haekkerup, addressed the General Assembly on 29 September 1966 (A/PV.1422).

UN Future and Secretary-General

While those who had been originally skeptical were becoming alive to UN significance, those who had overestimated its possibilities were now realizing that it was imperfect. On the whole there was a more realistic evaluation of UN potentialities and limitations.

In connexion with these good prospects for the UN future, Denmark earnestly hoped that the United Nations would not be deprived of U Thant's inestimable services.

Peace Keeping and UN Finance

Denmark shared the Secretary-General's regret that the deficit had not been liquidated and that the Committee of Thirty-three had failed to agree.

Some nations including Denmark had made substantial voluntary contributions and Denmark trusted that those who had not yet fulfilled their promises in that respect would do so now, following the work of the Committee of Fourteen and the large measure of agreement as to the present deficit.

As to the basic principles for financing and initiating peace-keeping operations, Denmark warned against pressing for a solution that could not be approved by a large majority including the permanent members of the Security Council.

Since it was often easier to agree on practical measures, Denmark was confident that the existing discord would not prevent any operation considered necessary by a large majority of the membership.

In addition to troubled areas, the United Nations could not and should not overlook the possibility of a much wider field of peace-keeping relations

between states and peaceful settlement of disputes. Mr. Haekkerup referred in this connexion to resolution 2129 (XX), to the Czechoslovak proposal under item 87 and to the British proposal on peaceful settlement of disputes. In spite of a regrettable halt in relaxation of tension, there were in Europe in particular good prospects for wider cooperation.

South Africa

Notwithstanding Denmark's vote last year in the Security Council, Denmark in no way departed from the Charter principle that action under Chapter VII could only be taken by the Security Council. While the General Assembly had made its opinion known, it was for the Security Council to decide whether it would take steps in accordance with these recommendations.

Secondly, the proper means were economic sanctions as explicitly provided for by the Charter. Yet there would be no sense in applying sanctions so long as the major trading partners did not cooperate. One could go no further by just adopting resolutions. The technical aspects of such measures had to be looked into. Although the expert committee of the Security Council had made little headway because it was much too dependent on political views, the report should be considered by the Council in the near future.

Since a major political obstacle was the heavy economic losses which the implementation of sanctions would inflict on certain countries, a solution may be found in the principle of an equitable distribution of burdens, with particular reference to the breaking off of important and long-established trade relations. Those countries which called persistently for sanctions must be prepared to bear their share.

Disarmament

At Geneva differences were brought out clearly and a wealth of constructive proposals for overcoming them were presented as a basis for political decisions. The technical expertise of a standing conference was therefore demonstrated to be most useful. In particular the ENDC should follow up the June 1966 proposal of the unofficial Scarborough conference on a time limited moratorium on underground tests, combined with the experimental implementation of the verification by challenge procedure suggested by Sweden.

Denmark appealed to the major Powers urgently to agree in a spirit of compromise on non-proliferation and the banning of underground tests. Denmark would naturally support the USSR draft resolution on non-proliferation (A/6398).

Viet-Nam

This conflict could not be solved by military means. This was a political problem. Self-determination for South Viet-Nam could only be secured by bringing all foreign intervention to an end. This implied a general cease-fire and the withdrawal of all foreign forces, followed by general elections and eventually a free decision on the question of reunification. These elections must be internationally controlled and organized by an Administration in which all parties could have reasonable confidence.

The withdrawal must be phased, balanced and internationally controlled. At some stage the general agreement machinery may have to be substantially reinforced and, perhaps, placed under a wider authority such as the United Nations. Denmark, for her part, would be prepared to contribute personnel, equipment and money.

Denmark agreed to the three steps listed by the UN Secretary-General. The United States statement was a considerable approximation thereto, although Denmark would have liked to have a more detailed definition on some points. The next step ought to be taken by Hanoi, and Denmark joined in the appeal to that Government for a positive response. Denmark also appealed to Governments having friendly contacts with Hanoi to use their good offices.

China

Non-representation of the world's largest nation, the People's Republic of China, was one of the factors responsible for UN inability to act on Viet-Nam. China's isolation, whether a result of external pressure or self-chosen or both, had revived memories of former humiliations. In order to solve the critical problems, it was up to the United Nations to take the first step in breaking the isolation of China by recognizing her right to be represented. It was also essential that China should recognize the importance of world cooperation.

Political Consensus in the world

While the United Nations had given hope for a better world, political consensus could not be found - it could only be created through equal amounts of realism and idealism.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1424th Meeting, 30 September 1966

THE NETHERLANDS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1424
30 September 1966
PhP:mm

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

THE NETHERLANDS

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, Mr. J.M.A.H. Luns, addressed the General Assembly on 30 September 1966 (A/PV.1424).

The Secretary-General

The Netherlands expressed confidence in U Thant and would be happy if he were prepared to stay on.

Annual Report

This plain, forthright document revealed that the prospects of world-wide co-operation were less encouraging than in Europe and its component parts. The Netherlands would take a constructive part in the discussions on disarmament.

Peace-keeping

There had been basic differences on the initiation and financing of UN operations, and the Committee of 33 had not so far achieved any tangible results. Indeed, rigid rules might be harmful since the absence of rules did not prevent a positive decision as shown by the recent peace operation between India and Pakistan.

UN Finance

During twenty-one years the Organization and its Specialized Agencies had been allowed to grow unchecked without co-ordination of the component organs. The Netherlands had therefore supported the French suggestion at the 20th Session and the Reports of the Committee of 14 had been extremely valuable.

The Netherlands hoped that on the basis of these reports the entire UN family could be integrated into a more coherent structure, perhaps in the face of some resistance by vested interests.

Some years ago the establishment of five-year appraisals had been a step forward and now, instead of tactical steps, a whole strategy should be devised through a complete survey of UN Agencies.

Development

Peace-keeping, a function of international co-operation, could be effective only if it contributed to international prosperity. In this context the recent speech from the throne of Queen Juliana expressed a decision to increase further Netherlands spending on development aid, which for 1967 exceeded by 10 percent the 1966 figure.

Nevertheless, there should be a world-wide effort for the furthering of the prosperity of the developing countries. Up to now, the development decade had been disappointing, but perhaps the remaining three years should be used to conceive a new infrastructure of co-operation between all participating Agencies and to draw up a master plan for the next ten years.

The prospect of world-wide co-operation was more promising now that Indonesia had once again joined the co-operating countries.

Decolonization

The process was almost complete, yet its few remainders still provoked deep-seated emotion.

The Netherlands had always expressed its rejection of every form of racial discrimination, ever since apartheid was placed on the Agenda.

As regards South-West Africa, the course of law had hitherto provided no solution, yet there was a fundamental belief in the necessity of international law as shown by the work of the Committees of the General Assembly in this very session.

The present process started hardly a hundred years ago and the United Nations should realize that great international issues were ripe for judicial decision only insofar as the political conditions were fulfilled. The United Nations should therefore never abandon the path of law, but institutions should be improved. Perhaps the Charter should be amended in such a way that the United Nations, in the same way as States, should acquire locus standi before the Court.^{1/}

In Rhodesia the Netherlands continued to support the principle that a lawful and democratic regime representative of the population as a whole should be established. While no road to this end was in sight yet, it was

^{1/} The Netherlands announced that it was prepared to make a significant contribution towards new premises for the Court at The Hague.

hoped that the United Kingdom, which still carried the responsibility for that territory, with the assistance of the United Nations, would yet arrive at an acceptable solution.

The Netherlands had loyally carried out the economic sanctions recommended by the United Nations and would continue to do so.

Vietnam

The Netherlands Government and Parliament had repeatedly voiced their concern and their desire for a peaceful solution by negotiation. Most of the specific proposals fell short in two respects. One was that these exhortations were usually, openly or implicitly, addressed to the United States only and ignored that for more than a year now the United States had made several serious peace proposals which had been turned down with contempt. Secondly, these proposals asked primarily or even exclusively for de-escalation on the American side and not, or only in a second phase, from North Vietnam. Totalitarian regimes always declared themselves prepared for negotiations provided the other side conceded in advance the main point.

The Netherlands hoped that the new US proposals would be seriously studied. While public opinion paid most attention to unsolved conflicts, it should be remembered that the Security Council had brought about an end to warfare between India and Pakistan, and a withdrawal of their troops.

Europe

Viewed from the Netherlands, the best results had been achieved in the smaller circle - Benelux. For instance, at ECOSOC the Luxembourg Delegation included Belgians and Dutchmen.

Within the European Common Market, there had also been significant results. In spite of difficult crises, the groundwork had been completed for full agricultural integration, as a pre-requisite for the success of the Kennedy Round.

Active Community participation provided proof that it was anxious to remove the concern of third States such as Mexico. Indeed, the Kennedy Round was an implementation of a vital article of the EEC Treaty relating to "the harmonious development of world trade". This article was by no means limited to the industrialized countries, as proved by the agreements of association concluded by the Community with Greece, Turkey, 18 African countries and Madagascar, and recently Nigeria. In addition, there had been preliminary

talks with the East African Federation and with Tunisia and Morocco. Further, the EEC had concluded trade agreements with some Middle Eastern countries.

In Europe as a whole, although the differences in ideological and economic systems persisted, there was a definite tendency towards closer and more cordial contact. The Netherlands welcomed this development and would actively further it.

AA15

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

1 October 1966
PhP:ms

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

GENERAL DEBATE

1423rd meeting, 29 September 1966

BULGARIA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1423
29 September 1966
PhP:ms

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

BULGARIA

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, Mr. Ivan Bashev, addressed the General Assembly on 29 September 1966 (A/PV.1423).

Secretary-General

Bulgaria was deeply appreciative and grateful for U Thant's efforts and devotion in his difficult and responsible tasks, and would greet with satisfaction a decision by him to continue for another term. He could count, as in the past, on Bulgaria's support and co-operation.

UN membership

(a) China

U Thant had noted that the United Nations had not "yet achieved universality of membership". Due to US pressure a grave error was committed at the time. For 17 years non-recognition of the PRC's legitimate rights has been an obstacle to UN efficiency. Nothing could justify the delay due to pressure and procedural wiles. China should have resumed its seat in the United Nations as the sole legitimate representative of the whole Chinese people, with all the consequences as to the PRC status in the United Nations as well as to the Chiang Kai-shek clique being deprived of its seat. A majority in the Assembly was conscious of the urgent need for correcting this mistake.

(b) Germanies

Bulgaria fully supported the GDR application. A sovereign, peaceful country, working for European security and international co-operation, the GDR fulfilled all Charter conditions.

Irrespective of some reservations as to the FRG's international policy, Bulgaria also had a positive attitude as to the admission of the FRG. Simultaneous admission of the two German States would be a contribution to an improvement in the European political climate.

United Nations - General

The reasons which obstructed UN activity should not be sought mainly in UN organizational weaknesses or financial difficulties. The real difficulties and limitations were to be found in the policy of violation of Charter principles, and of standards of international law, and of non-implementation of UN decisions, particularly the policy of interference and aggression. All forces should unite against this policy. In this connexion, Bulgaria welcomed the inscription on the agenda of item 96 on the inadmissibility of intervention and of item 92 on the prohibition of the threat or use of force respectively submitted by the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

As often said by the Secretary-General, the United Nations was only what the Members wished it to be; and its role would be all the more positive as Members respected the Charter principles, particularly concerning equality and self-determination of peoples, threat or use of force, and non-intervention in domestic affairs, and conformed to UN decisions.

Intervention in the domestic affairs of States

Viet-Nam

The United States acts of aggression on both sides of the 17th parallel were a flagrant violation of the Charter, the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and resolution 2131 (XX) on the inadmissibility of intervention. The United States was using armed aggression to impose its will on the people of Viet-Nam and prevent them from solving their own domestic problems. The US statement at the present session contained no element likely to lead to a just, peaceful solution.

Firstly, the United States proposed to begin negotiations without preliminary conditions, but it intensified the escalation and created faits accomplis, the maintenance of which amounted to imposing new preliminary conditions and hindrances in the way to any negotiated solution. This was a policy of diktat and ultimatum which the valiant, patriotic Vietnamese people could not accept.

Further, the United States stated that it was ready to negotiate on the basis of the Geneva Agreements. Yet since 1954, the United States had not ceased to violate them by setting up military bases and sending troops and arms to South Viet-Nam for the needs of its aggression. Respect for the Agreements meant an end to bombings and other aggressive acts against the DRV; the withdrawal from South Viet-Nam of the forces of the United States and its allies; and recognition

of the right of the Vietnamese people to solve its own problems in conditions of full freedom. Such were the proposals of the DRV and the NFL of South Viet-Nam - the only legitimate representative of South Viet-Nam - which Bulgaria fully supported as the only basis for a solution.

Other interventions

Intervention in the domestic affairs of States also created tension elsewhere in Indo-China, as shown by the violations of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cambodia and Laos. This same policy was also seen in the Dominican Republic and Cuba.

In certain respects the situation in South Korea was similar to Viet-Nam. The presence of US forces, which was the cause of a worsening of the situation in that part of Asia, must end. The Memorandum of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of July 1966 contained a programme for peaceful unification of the Korean people. Bulgaria hoped that, through the consideration of item 93, the General Assembly would put an end to a situation which in no way contributed to UN prestige.

Foreign military bases

Numerous resolutions, including resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2105 (XX) had shown that the bases were incompatible with basic international principles. Their liquidation was therefore imperative. While the liquidation of all bases throughout the world would be preferable, Bulgaria, taking into account inter alia the US position, would welcome as a first step a partial solution. The adoption of the Soviet draft resolution, and its implementation, would greatly influence the final solution.

Disarmament

Justified concern arose from the report of ENDC that no result had been achieved. The analysis of the facts led to the conclusion that the United States Government had no intention of taking disarmament measures and contributing to the solution of the problems of general and complete disarmament, but, on the contrary, extended its military actions and kept up the armaments race. With US goodwill and even in the present international context, a measure of agreement could be achieved.

A treaty on non-proliferation would be a first step. In conformity with resolution 2028 (XX), there should be no loop-hole. The US draft which did not

formally preclude the nuclear powers from giving such weapons to non-nuclear States, as was the case with the FRG, could not serve as a basis for the treaty.

Bulgaria would welcome any initiatives to get out of the impasse, and supported the Soviet proposal which was of a constructive nature.

By tackling the most urgent problem the United Nations would move more easily towards general and complete disarmament.

Economic development

Bulgaria shared the general view on the alarming nature of some present economic phenomena, notably, as pointed out by the Foreign Minister of Senegal, the international division of labour, established by colonial regimes, and the deterioration in the trade position of various developing countries.

The decisions and recommendations of the first UN Conference on Trade and Development could not be carried out, especially because of the positions of some Western countries, which continued a policy of discrimination - between "friendly" and "unfriendly" governments - and used trade to intervene in other peoples' internal affairs.

The Second Conference would have to take additional measures to carry out the recommendations of the First. Bulgaria, considering that the speedy elimination of all obstacles was essential, was taking measures in conformity with the decisions and principles of the Conference. As a result, during recent years, Bulgaria's economic relations especially with developing countries, had constantly expanded.

Positive measures had been taken by some countries in Western Europe with a view to broadening their trade relations with Socialist countries. Bulgaria for her part had done and would do everything to develop her economic relations with those countries on the basis of mutual advantage and respect.

Europe

Another positive fact was that in Europe there was a strengthening of certain trends not only in economic co-operation but in cultural, scientific, political and other relations between certain countries on a basis of equality and non-intervention in domestic affairs. This contributed to an improvement in East-West relations.

The political situation in Europe clearly had a considerable influence on the world situation. This was why all those who had the UN principles at heart should contribute to the strengthening of such trends.

In the Bucharest Declaration of July 1966, the Warsaw Powers presented a constructive programme for peace and security in Europe. Bulgaria was ready to participate in all initiatives, in the belief that Europe should become a true factor of peace and understanding in the world.

Decolonization

Since 1960, the United Nations took important decisions towards implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). Nevertheless, the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea, South West Africa and South Arabia were still under the colonial yoke. The racist regime in South Africa and the white minority usurpers in Southern Rhodesia continued to oppress the indigenous people. The General Assembly must ask the Security Council to adopt effective decisions, including sanctions under Chapter VII.

South West Africa was one of the most serious colonial problems, and Bulgaria would support all proposals that would make it possible to ensure the freedom and independence of that people.

In order to liquidate colonialism, the Organization and its Members must increase their moral and material assistance to the movements of national liberation. This was also the duty of the international agencies and organizations connected with the United Nations. Yet some of those Organizations not only did not help the peoples fighting for their freedom but continued to grant loans and economic assistance to Portugal and South Africa. The General Assembly should express itself on this activity directed against the policy and decisions of the UN Organization.

Note

This Paper is not on original list
and not marked .

See additional list - appendix 1

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

5 October 1966
CdeH/DK:ms

TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

GENERAL DEBATE

1428th meeting, 4 October 1966

CHAD

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1428
4 October 1966
CdeH/DK:ms

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

CHAD

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Chad, Dr. Jacques Baroum, addressed the General Assembly on 4 October 1966 (A/PV.1428).

Dr. Baroum made a short speech touching upon world problems and the situation in Africa. His speech on all points represented the moderate African viewpoint.

Organizational Questions

(a) The Secretary-General

The delegation of Chad hoped that "U Thant will accept a new term of office because a situation as complicated as the present one requires the presence of a man of faith, justice and courage".

(b) China

Although Chad believed that the absence of "a great community such as that of Peking China constituted a serious obstacle for this Organization in its search for peace, it believed that it would be dangerous and abnormal to establish special conditions for the admission of any State which might one day wish to become a Member". Chad had also a "prior commitment" with the Republic of China.

(c) Languages

The speaker referred to the question of the use of the French language at the United Nations and "regretted the treatment that has been given to it".

Items on the Agenda

(a) Disarmament

Complete disarmament is of immediate urgency for mankind. Nonetheless, the impression is gained "that no one believes any longer in disarmament ... it is no longer a question of the 'balance of terror' but rather one of a race towards the imbalance of the world by terror".

(b) Colonialism in Africa

Although the United Nations has often given assistance in fighting colonialism, "in the last analysis the efforts must be made by the Africans themselves".

South Africa, with its policy of apartheid, is a "symbol of the return of man to the Dark Ages of history" and was engendered by "narrow selfish interests". The findings of the International Court of Justice on the question of South West Africa "do it dishonour". The situation in Southern Rhodesia can only be explained in terms of a "sudden amnesia of the United Kingdom ... which has always had a clear sense of its own best interests but this time has played the wrong card".

(c) Declaration on the Inadmissability of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States

Despite the resolution, subversion in all its forms continued. Chad reaffirmed its devotion to principles set forth in the Declaration.

Other items

(a) The problem of divided nations

The delegation of Chad believed that the great Powers in whose purview the final answer lay should abide by "commitments that were undertaken in the past. The final solution should be left to the peoples themselves".

(b) Viet-Nam

The United Nations is standing by powerless to act in spite of the "cries of alarm that had been raised by men who refused to stifle their consciences" such as the Secretary-General who, in his letter of 1 September 1966 to members of the Security Council, expressed his deep concern for the situation in South East Asia.

AA-76

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1430

5 October 1966

PhP:ms

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

NORWAY

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

NORWAY

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. John Lyng, addressed the General Assembly on 5 October 1966 (A/PV.1430).

UN Organization

(a) Secretary-General

Norway repeated her urgent request to U Thant to continue in his office and appealed to Members to give him the necessary tools and, through their policies, to assist him in reaching the high objectives which he had set forth for the Organization.

(b) Peace-keeping

The United Nations should utilize all Charter means to prevent friction and settle disputes, thereby neutralizing latent conflicts. The peace-keeping functions should be improved in accordance with the Secretary-General's 1964 proposal for a study of preparatory measures. Although misgivings had been expressed, the United Nations should not continue to rely on improvisations, notwithstanding political objections. Norway associated herself with Canada's points of view.

Other Agenda Items

Disarmament and related items

Long-term UN tasks aimed at creating a basis for peaceful co-existence could only be fulfilled through patient efforts.

Parallel with efforts at peace-keeping, armaments should increasingly be controlled and reduced. Top priority should be given to non-proliferation. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia had dealt particularly with one of the defence alliances. Norway believed that the principle of non-proliferation should apply to existing and future alliances. Consultations between Members on basic strategic questions could take place without any transfer of the

control of nuclear weapons within the alliance. Norway agreed with Canada that a definition of proliferation must prevent nuclear weapons from passing into the control of additional States or groups of countries, and that this would not be inconsistent with legitimate measures of collective defence. Draft resolution A/C.1/L.368 was accordingly sponsored by Norway (Addendum 3).

An ideal solution would consist in concurrent agreements on non-proliferation and a comprehensive test ban. Yet, the most realistic procedure was to accept partial solutions.

Norway had previously proposed that States which did not possess atomic weapons might voluntarily place all their peaceful nuclear activities under the IAEA safeguards system, as Norway was prepared to do. This very limited measure should not compete with, but might lead to, more comprehensive arrangements.

Norway warmly supported the Secretary General's idea in the Introduction to the Annual Report, that an appropriate UN body should study all the implications of nuclear weaponry.

Political Problems not on the General Assembly Agenda

Viet-Nam

It was not a matter of passing judgment on the parties' policies but finding a solution to the conflict. There had been a consensus in the General Debate that a military solution was not possible, and that, in any case, it could never be satisfactory or lasting.

How, then, could a way be found to start negotiations? The two questions were as follows. First, which were the parties' requirements to meet at the conference table? Secondly, what long-term aims had the parties set forth as their final objectives?

Mr. Goldberg contributed to a clarification of the US position on these two points. Although some of the speakers had regarded his presentation as a camouflage, why not, at his invitation, subject US conditions and objectives to analysis and constructive criticism?

With respect to the conditions for initiating negotiations, the United States had declared its readiness to come to the conference table without any preconditions or requirements as to the course of the negotiations and their final outcome.

Further, Mr. Goldberg implied a readiness to accept the participation of representatives of the NFL and their right to express their points of view.

He also stated that an end to the bombing would be tied to an assurance of a corresponding and appropriate de-escalation by the other side.

The various US statements, however, indicated a certain general flexibility. Mr. Goldberg's statement gave the impression that a cessation of the bombing might follow any indications of a possible approachment from the other side. If this were correct, the US position would now be approaching the three points of the Secretary-General. Were these two views still so far apart that they could not be bridged?

As to the long-term US objectives in Viet-Nam, there was reason to emphasize the declaration that the United States sought no permanent military bases, establishment of troops, alliances or US presence of any kind in South Viet-Nam. While the main objectives were of necessity of a rather general character, they should not discourage negotiations.

There were difficulties in obtaining precise clarification from Hanoi and the NFL on the two questions, and UN Members who were in a position to assist in the communication of viewpoints between the parties had the task to assist in seeking a further clarification of the position of North Viet-Nam and the NFL.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1430th Meeting, 5 October 1966

AUSTRIA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1430

5 October 1966

PHP:mm

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

AUSTRIA

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Austria, Mr. Lujo Toncic-Sorinj, addressed the Assembly on 5 October 1966 (A/PV.1430).

UN Organization

The Secretary-General

Anxiety was caused by U Thant's decision. Austria expressed appreciation and admiration for his outstanding services, his devotion, objectivity and patience. Austria joined the appeals of all those who have requested U Thant to reconsider his decision not to stand for a second term.

Membership

In welcoming Guyana, Austria noted that the admission of new Members was a significant step towards universality - a principle which she supported - as well as an act of faith by the new States. The United Nations needed the co-operation of all States, regardless of their political or social systems. The idea of universality would, however, become reality only if accomplished in accordance with the basic Charter principles.

Peace-keeping and UN Finance

The UN role in this field should be strengthened. Yet the Committee of 33, which in 1965 had made an effective contribution, was unable to achieve further progress.

Austria had in the past given continuous support, financially and through her participation. She had a medical and police contingent in Cyprus. Her Parliament had passed a law to the effect that military units could be put at the disposal of international organizations or the IRC.

Taking into account the respective competence of the Security Council and the General Assembly, and the principle of collective responsibility of

all Members, only a pragmatic approach would bring about the settlement of the question of peace-keeping. Austria stressed the primary responsibility of the Security Council for international peace and security under Article 24. The basic consideration was that peace-keeping operations could only be undertaken if the permanent Members agreed to such undertakings, or at least did not object.

Austria fully supported the residual functions of the General Assembly under Articles 10-17.

Attempts to force the issue could only deepen the division. In trying to find a workable solution, one should be guided by what was desirable and yet at the same time feasible.

Concerning the question of UN solvency, Austria welcomed the French initiative, trusting that the work of the Committee of 14 would provide a basis for a final settlement.

Peace-keeping did not go to the roots of the problems. In order to bring about lasting and just solutions, it was desirable to study the possibilities for a peaceful settlement of disputes by a more practical implementation of the means provided for in the Charter.

Other Agenda Items

Colonialism and related items

The situation in Southern Africa raised issues which were not only of importance to the Africans, but appealed to the conscience of all nations.

Austria had signed the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights, and had in advance recognized the competence and jurisdiction of the European Court on Human Rights. The United Nations should without further delay undertake all efforts for the full realization of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, in particular in the area of Southern Africa.

Austria had refused to recognize the unilateral declaration of independence by the minority regime in Rhodesia.

Austria continued to regard South-West Africa as a non-self-governing territory to which the principle of self-determination fully applied. Austria trusted that it would be possible to find a solution corresponding to the international obligations regarding this territory, and in particular to the wishes of its people.

Disarmament and related items

Disarmament was the most urgent question of our time. The ENDC in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the 20th Session concentrated on non-proliferation and underground tests. The issues had been clarified to the point that agreement could be quickly achieved on either non-proliferation or a comprehensive test ban or both, if the nuclear powers took the necessary political decisions.

Time was running short, particularly on non-proliferation. Although a non-proliferation treaty would be operationally and politically weak without an agreement on the cut-off of fissionable material and a ban of all or part of the underground tests, one should not insist on too many conditions, lest one should be faced with a new round in the armaments race.

Austria appreciated the efforts of the eight non-aligned ENDC members which opened possibilities for immediate or successive banning of all underground tests. Sweden had made an interesting approach. Austria hoped that a satisfactory compromise would be reached in the near future.

Outer Space

Legal and political solutions should not lag behind technology for fear the armaments race might gain a new dimension.

The US-USSR proposals were a significant and constructive step, aiming at a special regime in outer space which would reserve a vast and theoretically unlimited zone of activity for the benefit of all mankind. Inasmuch as key provisions had been agreed upon, Austria hoped that the remaining difficulties would be overcome during the 21st Session.

Austria extended an invitation to hold the 1967 Outer Space Conference in Vienna, in the belief that outer space research offered encouraging prospects for space and non-space powers alike, and that outer space demanded extensive international collaboration.

Economic Development and Trade

The rich nations should help the poor to overcome an increasing imbalance in the world's economic situation. Austria was ready to pledge a substantial increase of her UN Development Programme contribution, and had already contributed to the Asian Development Bank.

The Development Decade, which unfortunately was falling short of its objectives, had stimulated further UN efforts to equip itself with more effective machinery.

Austria had in the past two years laid the foundation for the implementation of UNCTAD's aims and goals. In a democratic government, understanding in the country at large was essential in order to take the necessary measures. The debate in UNCTAD had given the necessary stimulus and discussions were now taking place in all circles. On 20 April 1966, Chancellor Klaus made special reference to development problems in alluding to Austria's willingness to make contributions proportionate to her economic strength.

Austria had in recent years undertaken measures designed to facilitate trade and increase her financial aid to developing countries. While the task was immense, there was now with UNCTAD a firm institutional framework and an effective secretariat. This was the beginning of the last stage of "synchronized action" by industrialized and developing countries; and the Second Conference would provide the necessary guidelines.

Austria supported resolution 2089(XX) and had decided to offer Vienna as a possible site for the UN Organization for Industrial Development, if a majority of Members wanted to establish the permanent Secretariat outside the UN Headquarters. Neutral states were welcome partners for developing countries, not only for the provision of experts or technical assistance but by acting as a centre for conferences and seminars.

Political problems not on the GA Agenda

South Tyrol

Austria referred to resolutions 1497(XV) and 1661(XVI) and to the Austrian statement at the 20th Session. The negotiations of this year were focused on a settlement of remaining open points with a view to establishing an effective and internationally guaranteed autonomy for the minority. Considerable progress had been achieved: nevertheless, some substantial issues needed clarification.

Under no circumstances could this problem be solved by violence, which Austria continued to condemn resolutely.

A settlement would prevent the dispute from impairing the friendly relations between the two countries. Italy had repeatedly expressed her goodwill. Austria was therefore confident that all efforts would be undertaken also on Italy's part in order to overcome the last difficulties.

Questions of a détente in Europe
and the Council of Europe

Austria was determined to work incessantly for the further improvement of good-neighbourly relations, irrespective of political or social systems. She belonged to the family of West European democracies, but had hundreds of miles of frontiers with neighbours adhering to different systems. It was therefore with satisfaction that Austria registered an encouraging trend towards greater political stability in Europe. Nevertheless complete stability could only be achieved when the German problem had found a peaceful solution.

As President of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Mr. Toncic-Sorinj recalled that U Thant had delivered a most impressive speech in Strasbourg in May 1966, and found the right words to make the Consultative Assembly conscious of the new responsibility of Europe. His visit was a resounding success and would help the Council of Europe contribute to UN goals.

Regional Organizations

In Strasbourg U Thant stated that regional organizations had come to be regarded as complementary to the UNO, and that they could be the pillars of a larger world structure. The Introduction to the Annual Report suggested a study of the functioning of regional organizations in terms of their charters. Such a study might lead to a more rational relationship between the regional organizations, the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies, and the Council of Europe would certainly welcome it. In this connexion, Austria welcomed the activity of the regional organizations in Africa, Latin America and Asia, which "undoubtedly helps to achieve the purposes" of the UN Charter.

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO:
As: The Secretary-General

FOR ACTION		POUR SUITE A DONNER
FOR APPROVAL		POUR APPROBATION
FOR SIGNATURE		POUR SIGNATURE
PREPARE DRAFT		PROJET A REDIGER
FOR COMMENTS		POUR OBSERVATIONS
MAY WE CONFER?		POURRIONS-NOUS EN PARLER?
YOUR ATTENTION		VOTRE ATTENTION
AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
NOTE AND FILE		NOTER ET CLASSER
NOTE AND RETURN		NOTER ET RETOURNER
FOR INFORMATION	x	POUR INFORMATION

Thoms
19/10

Date:

6 Oct. 1966

CR.13 (11-64)

FROM:

DE:

A. E. Nesterenko
Under Secretary
PSCA.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1430th Meeting, 5 October 1966

MONGOLIA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1430

5 October 1966

PSM:mm

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

MONGOLIA

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic, Mr. Mangalyn Dugersuren, addressed the General Assembly on 5 October 1966 (A/PV.1430).

Questions bearing on the Organization

The Secretary-General

The desire was expressed that U Thant "should accede to the request of many Governments and agree to serve another term".

Reference to Items on the Agenda

The Soviet proposal on the "Status of the Implementation of the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States" (Item 96), and the Czechoslovak proposal on "Strict Observance of the Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations, and of the right of Peoples to Self-Determination" (Item 92), were endorsed for guiding the way towards eliminating the dangers that beset the world.

Korea

Mongolia as a co-sponsor of the item "Withdrawal of all United States and other foreign forces occupying South Korea under the flag of the United Nations" (Item 93), urged that the Assembly take action and bring to an end a situation which is "inconsistent with the aims and principles of the Charter".

Decolonization

While colonialism was coming to an end through the national liberation movement of the subjugated peoples, "the colonizers were still trying to hold on to what is left", as exemplified in the situation prevailing in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese territories. The United States was condemned for pursuing "neo-colonialist designs" with its "support of anti-national and reactionary forces" in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Foreign Minister stated that, in his opinion, the Security Council "should

frequently deal with the problems of the colonial territories" since they are the source of threatening situations affecting neighbouring countries.

Military Bases

The continued existence of military bases in foreign territories was severely denounced for they constituted a threat to the newly independent nations and were "a bridgehead ... for ... nuclear and other weapons" that posed a direct threat to the peace and security of the world. The United States was denounced for its presence in Guantanamo, Thailand, the Philippines, Oceania and the Pacific. The Assembly was urged to adopt a positive decision on the Soviet proposal for the elimination of foreign military bases (Item 98).

Disarmament

Mongolia proposed that

"general and complete disarmament should start with nuclear disarmament at the very outset".

An agreement should be reached to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with Resolution 2028(XX) and stopping "all loop holes" that would permit proliferation. To this effect Mongolia supported the Soviet proposal (Item 97).

Support was voiced for the creation of nuclear-free zones. This was "of particular importance for Europe".

Universality

Referring to the need for improving relations in Europe, it was urged that the German Democratic Republic be admitted to the United Nations as it

"fully complies with all the requirements set forth in the United Nations Charter for its membership".

Regarding the People's Republic of China, "its legitimate rights should be restored immediately" and Taiwan should be expelled. In line with the principle of universality, the United Nations should admit "observers" without permitting any party to be excluded.

Other Questions

Vietnam

The US action in Vietnam was severely condemned and the proposals of the DRV and the National Liberation Front were strongly endorsed. The US "peace initiatives" were declared to be "irresponsible" since they were "always

followed by new escalation". Furthermore, US proposals for negotiation were being rejected by the Saigon regime which showed that the proposal was "only meant for public opinion".

The proposal to convene a conference of Asian countries on Vietnam was flatly rejected, as was the US effort to set up "a new military bloc - the so-called Asian and Pacific Council" whose true aim was to

"strengthen the military and political positions of the United States ... and the reactionary regimes in the Far East and South East Asia under the slogan of outspoken anti-communism".

In this connexion the "military circles of Japan" also came under criticism for being "at variance with the national interests of the Japanese people".

Europe

The Foreign Minister called attention to a "new constructive programme" resulting from the recent Bucharest Declaration which will help in normalizing the situation in Europe, particularly with respect to the German question, though criticizing the "revanchist" attitude of the military circles in the Federal Republic of Germany.

ROUTING SLIP

FICHE DE TRANSMISSION

TO: The Secretary-General
A:

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AS DISCUSSED		COMME CONVENU
AS REQUESTED		SUITE A VOTRE DEMANDE
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Thanks
10/10

Date:
6 Oct. 1966
CR. 13 (11-64)

FROM:
DE: A. E. Nestoranko
Under-Secretary, PSCA.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

1430th Meeting, 5 October 1966

ICELAND

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1430

5 October 1966

PhP:mmm

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

ICELAND

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Mr. Emil Jonsson, addressed the General Assembly on 5 October 1966 (A/PV.1430).

UN Organization

The Secretary-General

The outstanding services of U Thant had been recognized by all Members, and Iceland associated herself with the unanimous appeal to him to serve another term.

General

Primary consideration should be given to UN successes since one of them may suffice to justify the existence of the Organization. The most important task was to forestall or halt conflicts; the United Nations had faced both kinds of problems, sometimes with success.

Peace-keeping

Iceland maintained no armed forces but had shown her support of these activities by financial contributions, which during the last year amounted to half a US dollar per inhabitant.

Since peace-keeping was the principal UN activity, it must be regretted that some Members had not made appropriate financial contributions. Financing a UN mobile military force should not be an insurmountable obstacle to 119 nations, since individual States maintained millions of men with modern equipment. Such a force should be able to forestall limited wars, which were always dangerous.

The allocation of the cost of peace-keeping activities ought not to be an impossible task.

UN Attention drawn to
Fishery Conservation

Mr. Jonsson placed much emphasis on the need for international efforts to conserve fish, which can benefit those who suffer from lack of protein. He

noted that the introduction of new and advanced technology in fishing, such as the big fisheries in the North Atlantic, has increased the danger that the fish stocks could no longer withstand such exploitation.

He drew attention to the UN work on the Law of the Sea which, inter alia, recognized the twelve mile fishing limit as a general principle. However, since the conference did not then deal with the question of fishing conservation, he suggested that the United Nations pay attention to the problem of conserving the resources of the sea -- fisheries may be important elements in the war against hunger.

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
General Debate

1428th Meeting, 4 October 1966

ISRAEL

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND
SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

Political Affairs Division

Meeting No. 1428

4 October 1966

ZK:mmm

21ST SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

General Debate

ISRAEL

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban, addressed the General Assembly on 4 October 1966 (A/PV.1428).

UN Organizational Questions

The Secretary-General

Mr. Eban hoped that the Secretary-General would give due weight to the unanimity of confidence expressed in him by big and small powers and would agree to serve the United Nations again.

Human Rights

Israel hopes that the General Assembly at the present Session will make further progress towards the formulation and proclamation of human rights. It also hopes that Member States will do more to bring their legislation into conformity with the progress made by the United Nations in this field. Israel will give favourable consideration to the appointment of a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Disarmament

Israel felt that there was reason for the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament to persevere in its efforts -- it had valuable contributions to make in achieving international accords.

Non-intervention - Peaceful Co-existence

The Israeli Foreign Minister endorsed the principle of peaceful co-existence which he said has been expressed in the Soviet proposals on non-intervention as well as in the Czech proposals on peaceful co-existence. He went on to suggest that the principle of peaceful co-existence should be equally applied in all regions of the world.

Political Questions

The Middle East

Israel holds that each Middle Eastern State has an absolute right to maintain its sovereignty and integrity immune from the threat or use of force. While peace is not an indispensable condition of Israel's existence, it holds peace to be a high aim which will give equal benefit to neighbours. Only by

establishing peaceful and stable conditions amongst themselves can the Middle Eastern States keep the area free from external intervention.

Africa

The General Assembly must press for the independence of Angola and Mozambique, Mr. Eban said, and its condemnation of apartheid must be governed by a stern consciousness of what ensues when men are classified in different levels of privilege, rights and disability. The tensions of African life are not the fruit of independence, but the heritage of colonialism.

In the case of South-West Africa, the General Assembly should insist that a mandatory power forfeit its mandate when it flagrantly and constantly violates the central aims for which the trust was conferred.

Other Questions

Vietnam

The Foreign Minister said that the Vietnam conflict is approaching the stage at which all that can be publicly said will have been uttered. The time has come to seek concrete solutions in private negotiations. The Secretary-General might be of assistance in bringing the parties involved into contact so as to submit existing and future proposals to detailed discussion.

Development Decade

In the appropriate Committee the Israeli delegation will propose that the comparative failure of the Development Decade so far be frankly acknowledged and analyzed, and that development problems be given a far higher priority in the work of the United Nations. Mr. Eban also suggested the eventual formulation of a United Nations "peace corps" of technicians and experts for service in developing countries.